• Login
    JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.
    Stochastic game dynamics under demographic fluctuations. 
    •   QMRO Home
    • School of Mathematical Sciences
    • Mathematics
    • Stochastic game dynamics under demographic fluctuations.
    •   QMRO Home
    • School of Mathematical Sciences
    • Mathematics
    • Stochastic game dynamics under demographic fluctuations.
    ‌
    ‌

    Browse

    All of QMROCommunities & CollectionsBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesSubjectsThis CollectionBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesSubjects
    ‌
    ‌

    Administrators only

    Login
    ‌
    ‌

    Statistics

    Most Popular ItemsStatistics by CountryMost Popular Authors

    Stochastic game dynamics under demographic fluctuations.

    View/Open
    Published version (1.553Mb)
    Volume
    112
    Pagination
    9064 - 9069
    DOI
    10.1073/pnas.1418745112
    Journal
    Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A
    Issue
    29
    Metadata
    Show full item record
    Abstract
    Frequency-dependent selection and demographic fluctuations play important roles in evolutionary and ecological processes. Under frequency-dependent selection, the average fitness of the population may increase or decrease based on interactions between individuals within the population. This should be reflected in fluctuations of the population size even in constant environments. Here, we propose a stochastic model that naturally combines these two evolutionary ingredients by assuming frequency-dependent competition between different types in an individual-based model. In contrast to previous game theoretic models, the carrying capacity of the population, and thus the population size, is determined by pairwise competition of individuals mediated by evolutionary games and demographic stochasticity. In the limit of infinite population size, the averaged stochastic dynamics is captured by deterministic competitive Lotka-Volterra equations. In small populations, demographic stochasticity may instead lead to the extinction of the entire population. Because the population size is driven by fitness in evolutionary games, a population of cooperators is less prone to go extinct than a population of defectors, whereas in the usual systems of fixed size the population would thrive regardless of its average payoff.
    Authors
    Huang, W; Hauert, C; Traulsen, A
    URI
    http://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/xmlui/handle/123456789/31832
    Collections
    • Mathematics [754]
    Language
    eng
    Licence information
    Freely available online through the PNAS open access option.
    Copyright statements
    © The Author(s) 2014
    Twitter iconFollow QMUL on Twitter
    Twitter iconFollow QM Research
    Online on twitter
    Facebook iconLike us on Facebook
    • Site Map
    • Privacy and cookies
    • Disclaimer
    • Accessibility
    • Contacts
    • Intranet
    • Current students

    Modern Slavery Statement

    Queen Mary University of London
    Mile End Road
    London E1 4NS
    Tel: +44 (0)20 7882 5555

    © Queen Mary University of London.