Toggle navigation
Login
Toggle navigation
JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.
Convicting Corrupt Officials: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Cases
QMRO Home
School of Economics and Finance
Economics and Finance
Convicting Corrupt Officials: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Cases
QMRO Home
School of Economics and Finance
Economics and Finance
Convicting Corrupt Officials: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Cases
Browse
All of QMRO
Communities & Collections
By Issue Date
Authors
Titles
Subjects
This Collection
By Issue Date
Authors
Titles
Subjects
Administrators only
Login
Statistics
Most Popular Items
Statistics by Country
Most Popular Authors
Convicting Corrupt Officials: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Cases
View/
Open
Accepted version (1.461Mb)
Publisher
Oxford University Press
Journal
The Review of Economic Studies
ISSN
0034-6527
Metadata
Show full item record
Authors
Axbard, H
URI
https://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/xmlui/handle/123456789/97378
Collections
Economics and Finance
[394]
Licence information
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons CC BY license, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Copyright statements
Copyright © 2024, © The Author(s) 2024. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Review of Economic Studies Limited.