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dc.contributor.authorMazor, M
dc.contributor.authorMoran, R
dc.contributor.authorFleming, SM
dc.date.accessioned2023-12-20T09:43:08Z
dc.date.available2021-01-06
dc.date.available2023-12-20T09:43:08Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.identifier.urihttps://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/xmlui/handle/123456789/93131
dc.description.abstractPeople have better metacognitive sensitivity for decisions about the presence compared to the absence of objects. However, it is not only objects themselves that can be present or absent, but also parts of objects and other visual features. Asymmetries in visual search indicate that a disadvantage for representing absence may operate at these levels as well. Furthermore, a processing advantage for surprising signals suggests that a presence/absence asymmetry may be explained by absence being passively represented as a default state, and presence as a default-violating surprise. It is unknown whether the metacognitive asymmetry for judgments about presence and absence extends to these different levels of representation (object, feature, and default violation). To address this question and test for a link between the representation of absence and default reasoning more generally, here we measure metacognitive sensitivity for discrimination judgments between stimuli that are identical except for the presence or absence of a distinguishing feature, and for stimuli that differ in their compliance with an expected default state.en_US
dc.format.extentniab005 - ?
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherOxford University Pressen_US
dc.relation.ispartofNeurosci Conscious
dc.rightsThis is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
dc.rightsAttribution 3.0 United States*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/us/*
dc.subjectabsenceen_US
dc.subjectmetacognitionen_US
dc.subjectpresenceen_US
dc.titleMetacognitive asymmetries in visual perception.en_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.rights.holder© The Author(s) 2021. Published by Oxford University Press.
dc.identifier.doi10.1093/nc/niab005
pubs.author-urlhttps://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/34164152en_US
pubs.issue1en_US
pubs.notesNot knownen_US
pubs.publication-statusPublished onlineen_US
pubs.volume2021en_US
dcterms.dateAccepted2021-01-06
rioxxterms.funderDefault funderen_US
rioxxterms.identifier.projectDefault projecten_US


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This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.