| dc.description.abstract | This doctoral thesis demonstrates how a principle derived from EU competition law can serve as a normative benchmark for examination of Member State tax ruling practices. Using the prism of equal treatment and the Arm’s Length principle, the the- sis examines the interaction of EU State aid law and Member State taxation practices. A key objective of the research is to reconcile the understanding of relevant case law against the ongoing struggle to define the limits of the notion of selective advantage, which is a key element in establishing fiscal State aid. The research was undertaken against the backdrop of a decision by the Court of Justice of the European Union significantly limiting effective review of national tax practices. The threshold established in the Fiat judgment will be difficult to meet in practice, such as when examining a previously existing tax planning structure. These developments are consequential for the role of the European Commission as guardian of treaties; they also are critical for tax advisers and civil servants who must have a clarity on the compliance obligations of transfer- pricing structures with EU law. The thesis asserts that general principles of EU law, such as the equal treat- ment principle, can address the conundrum. As such the thesis contributes to the body of legal scholarship on fiscal State aid by elucidating the main ar- guments regarding the principle of equal treatment, by exploring the origins, scope, and impact. | en_US |
