Facts, Artifacts, and Law-Given Reasons
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Editors
Burazin, L
Kenneth, H
Roversi, C
Banaś, P
Pagination
199 - 222 (24)
Publisher
Publisher URL
ISBN-13
9781800885912
DOI
10.4337/9781800885929
Location
Journal
The Artifactual Nature of Law
IVR Studies in the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy
Metadata
Show full item recordAbstract
This chapter centers around law's capacity to constitute practical reasons. In discussing this theme, consideration is given to law's artifactual character. The discussion falls into two main parts. In Section 1, I critically examine a skeptical line of thought about law's capacity to constitute reasons for action, which draws, in part, on law's artifactuality. I argue for a somewhat less skeptical (but still qualified) stance, according to which the fact that a legal directive has been issued can (notwithstanding the artifactuality involved) be a reason for action, yet one that is underpinned by bedrock values which (under certain conditions and constraints) law is apt to serve. In Section 2, I consider whether, and in what sense, law can acquire an even more 'robust' status as a source of practical reasons. I focus particularly on Joseph Raz's position about the normative force of (legitimate) legal authority and on an alternative position I have proposed and advocated elsewhere.
Authors
Gur, NCollections
- Department of Law [873]