| dc.description.abstract | Technological innovation is inescapable if civilisation is to continue
in the face of population growth, rising expectations and resource exhaustion.
Unfortunately, major innovations, confidently thought to be
safe, occasionally fail catastrophically. The fears so engendered are
impeding technical progress generally and that of nuclear power in particular.
Attempts to allay disquiet about these disastrous Low Probability
Events (LPEs) by exhaustive studies of nuclear power plant designs
have, so far, been less than successful. The New Treatment adopts
instead an approach that, after examination of the LPE in its historical
and societal settings, combines theoretical design analysis with construction
site and operational realities in pragmatic engineering, the
quality of which can be assured by accountable inspection.
The LPE is envisaged as a singularity in a stream of largely mundane,
but untoward incidents, described as 'Event-noise'. Predictions of the
likelihood of plant LPEs by frequency-theory probability are illusory
because the LPE is unique and not part of a stable distribution. Again,
noise analysis seems to lead to intractable mathematical expressions.
While theoretical LPE prognostications depend on the identification of
fault sequences in design that can either be designed-out or reduced to
plausibly negligible probabilities, the reality of LPE prevention lies
with the plant in operation. As absolute safety is unattainable, the
approach aims at ensuring that the perceived residual nuclear risk is
societally tolerable. An adaption of elementary Catastrophe theory to
model the prospective Event-noise field to be experienced by the plant
is proposed whereby potential, credible LPEs could be more readily
discerned and avoided.
In this milieu of increasing sophistication in technology when management
in the traditional administrative mold is proving inadequate, the
engineer emerges as the proper central decision-maker. The special
intellectual capability needed is acquired during his training and experience,
a claim that can draw support from new studies in neuropsychology.
The Nuclear Installation Inspectorate is cited as an exemplar of a body
practising the kind of engineering inspection needed to apprehend those
human fallibilities to which most catastrophic failures of technology
are due. Nevertheless, such regulatory systems lack accountability and,
as Goedel's theorem suggests, cannot assess their own efficiency. Independent
appraisal by Signal Detection Theory is suggested as a remedy. | en_US |
