• Login
    JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.
    Bilateral investment treaties treatment of international capital movement: time for reform? 
    •   QMRO Home
    • Queen Mary University of London Theses
    • Theses
    • Bilateral investment treaties treatment of international capital movement: time for reform?
    •   QMRO Home
    • Queen Mary University of London Theses
    • Theses
    • Bilateral investment treaties treatment of international capital movement: time for reform?
    ‌
    ‌

    Browse

    All of QMROCommunities & CollectionsBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesSubjectsThis CollectionBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesSubjects
    ‌
    ‌

    Administrators only

    Login
    ‌
    ‌

    Statistics

    Most Popular ItemsStatistics by CountryMost Popular Authors

    Bilateral investment treaties treatment of international capital movement: time for reform?

    View/Open
    HUSSEINBilateralInvestment2012.pdf (6.142Mb)
    Publisher
    Queen Mary University of London
    Metadata
    Show full item record
    Abstract
    While the freedom to move capital is necessary for foreign investors, the power of the state to regulate capital transfers is necessary to prevent volatile capital from causing financial crises as well as to mitigate such crises when they occur. Thus, in regulating international capital movement, a balance should be made between the right to transfer funds and the state’s right to protect the stability of its economy. It is in relation to achieving this balance that this thesis argues that bilateral investment treaties’ (BITs) regulation of capital transfers is deficient, both substantively and procedurally. On substance, this thesis identifies three substantive defects that affect obligations under BITs: absoluteness, immediacy, and breadth. First, many BITs adopt an absolute approach in liberalizing capital that does not permit any restrictions or exceptions, nor does it distinguish between different kinds of capital, or between the right to import capital and the right to repatriate capital. Second, the obligation to permit transfers is immediate and does not allow for a gradual liberalization of capital. Third, many BITs’ terms and obligations are broad and therefore vague, such as the broad definition of investment, or the obligation to grant fair and equitable treatment, which is also broad and interpreted in a manner that restricts the regulatory powers of the host state. Such results could have been partly mitigated if there were a dispute settlement mechanism with the power to create precedent and with it a clearer and more coherent body of rules. But BITs’ investor-state arbitration is also deficient since it consists of ad hoc tribunals, which are not bound by precedent; and their decisions are not generally subject to substantive review. This leads to an inconsistent and incoherent body of law that protects neither the state’s regulatory powers nor the legitimate expectation of investors
    Authors
    Hussein, Amr Abbas Mohamed Adel Abbas Aly
    URI
    http://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/xmlui/handle/123456789/2514
    Collections
    • Theses [3303]
    Copyright statements
    The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it may be published without the prior written consent of the author
    Twitter iconFollow QMUL on Twitter
    Twitter iconFollow QM Research
    Online on twitter
    Facebook iconLike us on Facebook
    • Site Map
    • Privacy and cookies
    • Disclaimer
    • Accessibility
    • Contacts
    • Intranet
    • Current students

    Modern Slavery Statement

    Queen Mary University of London
    Mile End Road
    London E1 4NS
    Tel: +44 (0)20 7882 5555

    © Queen Mary University of London.