| dc.description.abstract | This thesis is an explication of Glas, a text which reflects Derrida's profound respect for the
Hegelian dialectic, a structure in which each part has and knows its place. But Glas also works
to expose a fundamental contamination between Hegelian conceptuality and those elements of
textuality which the dialectic seeks to subordinate to, or expel from, itself. One such area of
contamination is that of representation. For while Hegel determines representation as (the)
outside of truth, Derrida demonstrates that this very determination is in fact structured and
instituted by those `outsides. '
One such `outside' is that of family relations, which Hegel utilises as a metaphor for the
relations of the dialectic in general. The question Derrida raises is whether this recourse to the
family metaphor is a matter of pedagogy and exemplarity, or whether it conforms to a more
fundamental necessity? This question forms the focus of Chapters One and Two of this thesis,
which explore Derrida's reading of the Hegelian family as both a moment on the path to
absolute knowledge and as a metaphor whose capacities disrupt and re-write the concept of
metaphoricity.
However Derrida's question also points to a more fundamental problematic which Chapter
Three will address. For what is it that determines and sanctions this opposition of inside and
outside, that underpins these relations of production, of metaphoricity and representation?
The answer to this is, I believe, mimesis. By transporting Derrida's understanding of mimesis
into the context of the Hegelian family and Glas, it becomes possible to see the crucial role
that this concept plays in the Hegelian dialectic, a role which also points the way to a
philosophy that is not bound always to repeat the same, but which is open to chance and
necessity, and to the possibility of writing philosophy differently. | en_US |
