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    Globalized Labour Markets? International Rent Sharing Across 47 Countries 
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    Globalized Labour Markets? International Rent Sharing Across 47 Countries

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    Accepted version (370.7Kb)
    Volume
    53
    Pagination
    664 - 691
    Publisher
    Wiley
    Publisher URL
    http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/bjir.12050/abstract
    DOI
    10.1111/bjir.12050
    Journal
    British Journal of Industrial Relations: an international journal of employment relations
    Issue
    4
    ISSN
    1467-8543
    Metadata
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    Abstract
    We present evidence about the role of rent sharing in fostering the interdependence of labour markets around the world. Our results draw on a firm-level panel of more than 2,000 multinationals and over 5,000 of their affiliates, covering 47 home and host countries. We find considerable evidence that multinationals share profits internationally by paying higher wages to their workers in foreign affiliates in periods of higher headquarter profits. This occurs even across continents, and not only within Europe, as shown in earlier research. The results are robust to different tests, including a falsification exercise based on ‘matched’ parents. Finally, we show that rent sharing is higher when the affiliate is located in countries with specific relative characteristics, such as lower economic development or taxation, while it falls with the number of affiliates. We argue that these results are consistent with transfer pricing and bargaining views
    Authors
    MARTINS, PMRDS; Yang, Y
    URI
    http://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/xmlui/handle/123456789/17630
    Collections
    • School of Politics and International Relations [663]
    Language
    English
    Licence information
    © 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd/London School of Economics
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