| dc.description.abstract | The chapters of this work lie at the intersection between classical choice theory and
experimental data on decision making.
In chapter 21 study necessary and sufficient conditions for a choice function to
be rationalized in the following sense: there exists a complete asymmetric relation T
(a tournament) such that, for each feasible (finite) set, the choice set coincides with the
uncovered set of T restricted to that feasible set. This notion of 'maximization' may offer
testable restrictions on observable choice behavior. In chapter 3 Mariotti and I give a
group revealed preference interpretation to the concept of uncovered set, and we provide
a characterization of uncovered bargaining solutions of a Pareto-consistent tournament.
In chapter 41 study the rationalizability of reason-based choice correspondences
axiomatically. A reason-based choice correspondence rationalizes choice behaviour in
terms of a two stage choice procedure. Given a feasible set S, the individual eliminates
in the first step all of the dominated alternatives according to her fixed (not necessarily
complete) strict preference relation. In the second step, she first constructs for each maximal
alternative identified in the first step its lower contour set, and then she eliminates
from the maximal set all of those alternatives so that the following justification holds:
there exists another maximal alternative whose lower contour set strictly contains that
of another maximal alternative. This procedural model captures the basic idea behind
the experimental finding known as "attraction effect".
Finally, in chapter 51 build a connection between the behavioral property expressed
by the weak axiom of revealed non-inferiority and a new weak notion of rationality.
This notion is weaker than that characterized by the weak axiom of revealed preference
(WARP). | |
