‘A Grand Strategic Error’: the British military elite’s role in the invasion of Iraq

Abstract

President George W. Bush required only symbolic British participation in the invasion of Iraq, so why did the Labour government deploy their maximum military effort when this was unnecessary and considerably increased the political risk to Prime Minister Tony Blair? The Chilcot Report (2016) provides considerable evidence of the military elite’s role, in pursuit of their perceived organisational interests, not only lobbying but also manipulating the Labour government into a maximum military role. Shortly after the invasion, the military elite began to pursue their next war, again pressuring and manipulating the government into Britain’s deployment to Helmand, Afghanistan, in 2006. While fighting wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the military elite were overstretched and in crisis, yet they successfully empowered themselves by deflecting responsibility onto the Labour government. Consequently, it is argued that the lack of democratic control over the military makes Britain particularly disposed to belligerence and fighting further unnecessary wars.