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    Explaining Myanmar's Regime Transition: The Periphery is Central 
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    Explaining Myanmar's Regime Transition: The Periphery is Central

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    Accepted version (537.7Kb)
    Volume
    21
    Pagination
    780 - 802
    Publisher
    Taylor & Francis (Routledge)
    Publisher URL
    http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/fdem20/current#.VZaFxmPlfHo
    DOI
    10.1080/13510347.2013.863878
    Journal
    Democratization
    Issue
    5
    ISSN
    1743-890X
    Metadata
    Show full item record
    Abstract
    In 2010, Myanmar (Burma) held its first elections after 22 years of direct military rule. Few compelling explanations for this regime transition have emerged. This article critiques popular accounts and potential explanations generated by theories of authoritarian ‘regime breakdown’ and ‘regime maintenance’. It returns instead to the classical literature on military intervention and withdrawal. Military regimes, when not terminated by internal factionalism or external unrest, typically liberalise once they feel they have sufficiently addressed the crises that prompted their seizure of power. This was the case in Myanmar. The military intervened for fear that political unrest and ethnic-minority separatist insurgencies would destroy Myanmar’s always-fragile territorial integrity and sovereignty. Far from suddenly liberalising in 2010, the regime sought to create a ‘disciplined democracy’ to safeguard its preferred social and political order twice before, but was thwarted by societal opposition. Its success in 2010 stemmed from a strategy of coercive state-building and economic incorporation via ‘ceasefire capitalism’, which weakened and co-opted much of the opposition. Having altered the balance of forces in its favour, the regime felt sufficiently confident to impose its preferred settlement. However, the transition neither reflected total ‘victory’ for the military nor secured a genuine or lasting peace.
    Authors
    JONES, L
    URI
    http://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/xmlui/handle/123456789/9442
    Collections
    • School of Politics and International Relations [732]
    Licence information
    This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. The moral rights of the named author(s) have been asserted.
    Copyright statements
    (c) 2014 The Author.
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