dc.contributor.author | Nikolowa, R | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Ferreira, D | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-02-16T12:00:01Z | |
dc.date.available | 2023-02-15 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | https://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/xmlui/handle/123456789/84474 | |
dc.description.abstract | We develop a theory in which financial (and other professional services) firms design career structures to “sell” prestigious jobs to qualified candidates. Firms create less prestigious entry-level jobs, which serve as currency for employees to pay for the right to compete for the more prestigious jobs. In optimal career structures, entry-level employees (“associates”) compete for better-paid and more prestigious positions (“managing directors” or “partners”). The model provides new implications relating job prestige to compensation, employment, competition, and the size of the financial sector. | |
dc.relation.ispartof | Journal of Finance | en_US |
dc.rights | This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version accepted for publication The Journal of Finance following peer review. The version of record is available at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/jofi.13301 | |
dc.title | Prestige, Promotion and Pay | en_US |
dc.type | Article | |
dc.rights.holder | © 2023 the American Finance Association. | |
pubs.notes | Not known | en_US |
pubs.publication-status | Accepted | en_US |
dcterms.dateAccepted | 2023-02-15 | en_US |