| dc.contributor.author | Ivanov, A | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2020-11-25T13:42:21Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2020-11-09 | |
| dc.date.available | 2020-11-25T13:42:21Z | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1097-3923 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/xmlui/handle/123456789/68681 | |
| dc.description.abstract | What is the optimal default contribution rate or default asset allocation in pension plans? Could active decision (i.e., not setting a default and forcing employees to make a decision) be optimal? These questions are studied in a model in which each employee is biased regarding her optimal contribution rate or asset allocation. In this model, active decision is never optimal and the optimal default is, depending on parameter values, one of three defaults. The paper explores how the parameters affect the average loss in the population at the optimal default. | |
| dc.publisher | Wiley | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartof | Journal of Public Economic Theory | |
| dc.rights | This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made. | |
| dc.title | Optimal Pension Plan Default Policies when Employees are Biased | en_US |
| dc.type | Article | en_US |
| dc.rights.holder | © 2020 The Authors. Journal of Public Economic Theory Published by Wiley Periodicals LLC | |
| pubs.notes | Not known | en_US |
| pubs.publication-status | Accepted | en_US |
| dcterms.dateAccepted | 2020-11-09 | |
