Supranational activism and intergovernmental dynamics: The European police office as a supranationalist opportunist?
1186 - 1207
Journal of Contemporary European Research
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This article aims at analysing Europol's supranational activism through a reworked Principal-Agent framework. This theoretical approach offers insights regarding the preferences of the Member States, the European Commission, and the European Parliament as Europol's Principals, and discusses how they interact with each other, with a focus on potential conflicts. Furthermore, this paper studies how Europol has evolved within this context, with the aim to determine if it is getting closer to one actor or the other, and how it manages to follow its own preferences and aims of expansion. Consequently, Europol's principals' heterogeneous preferences and its capability of defining problems, notably through its Directors, have enabled Europol to act as a policy entrepreneur to project its preferences and its representations for its strengthening. Hence, Europol appears as a supranationalist opportunist, as it punctually aspires for its own supranationalisation, taking care not to antagonise Member States which remain its main clients.
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