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dc.contributor.authorFletcher, R
dc.date.accessioned2015-02-03T11:21:52Z
dc.date.issued2014-11
dc.date.issued2014-11
dc.identifier.urihttp://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/jspui/handle/123456789/6443
dc.descriptionNOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Reproductive Health Matters. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH MATTERS, [VOL 22, ISSUE 44, (2014)] DOI: 10.1016/S0968-8080(14)44818-3
dc.description.abstractThis article draws on legal arguments made by civil society organisations to challenge the legal reasoning that apparently produced the decision in the Ms Y case in Ireland in August 2014. I show how legal standards of reasonableness and practicality ought to be interpreted in ways that are respectful of the patient's wishes and rights. The case concerned a decision by the Health Service Executive, the Irish public health authority, to refuse an abortion to a pregnant asylum seeker and rape survivor on the grounds that a caesarean section and early live delivery were practicable and reasonable alternatives justified by the need to protect fetal life. I argue that the abortion refusal may not have been a reasonable decision, as required by the terms of relevant legislation, for four different reasons. First, the alternative of a caesarean section and early live delivery was not likely to avert the risk of suicide, and in fact did not do so. Second, the consent to the caesarean section alternative may not have been a real consent in the legal sense if it was not voluntary. Third, an abortion refusal and forcible treatment fall below the norms of good medical practice as interpreted through a patient-centred perspective. Fourth, an abortion refusal that entails forms of cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment ought not to be a reasonable action under the legislation.
dc.format.extent10 - 21
dc.languageeng
dc.subjectIreland
dc.subjectabortion
dc.subjectasylum
dc.subjectcaesarean section
dc.subjectconsent
dc.subjectcruel
dc.subjecthuman rights
dc.subjectinhuman and degrading treatment
dc.subjectnegligence
dc.subjectrape
dc.subjectrefusal of treatment
dc.subjectAbortion Applicants
dc.subjectAbortion, Induced
dc.subjectCesarean Section
dc.subjectCriminal Law
dc.subjectDecision Making
dc.subjectFemale
dc.subjectHuman Rights
dc.subjectHumans
dc.subjectInformed Consent
dc.subjectIreland
dc.subjectPhysician-Patient Relations
dc.subjectPregnancy
dc.subjectRape
dc.titleContesting the cruel treatment of abortion-seeking women.
dc.typeJournal Article
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/S0968-8080(14)44818-3
dc.relation.isPartOfReproductive Health Matters
dc.relation.isPartOfReprod Health Matters
pubs.author-urlhttp://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25555759
pubs.issue44
pubs.organisational-group/Queen Mary University of London
pubs.organisational-group/Queen Mary University of London/Faculty of Humanities, Social Sciences & Law
pubs.organisational-group/Queen Mary University of London/Faculty of Humanities, Social Sciences & Law/Law - Department of Law - Staff
pubs.publication-statusPublished
pubs.volume22


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