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dc.contributor.authorYAN, Men_US
dc.date.accessioned2017-02-14T12:03:28Z
dc.date.available2016-09-19en_US
dc.date.submitted2016-12-07T15:36:27.149Z
dc.identifier.issn1533-7421en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/xmlui/handle/123456789/19382
dc.description.abstractCorporate objective, namely, for whose interests should a company be run, is the most important theoretical and practical issues confronting us today, as the core objectives animate or should animate every decision a company makes. Despite decades of debate, there is no consensus regarding what the corporate objective is or ought to be. Contrary to the widely held belief that the corporate objective should be shareholder wealth maximisation (SWM), this paper seeks to demonstrate that SWM is unsuitable by exploring its main problems. As an antithesis to SWM, stakeholder theory generally emerges and develops to be an alternative. Justifications will be offered from different aspects. In particular, its advantages in solving short-termism and externalisation compared with SWM will be focused on.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherKluwer Law Internationalen_US
dc.relation.ispartofBusiness Law Reviewen_US
dc.subjectCorporate Governanceen_US
dc.subjectCorporate Objectiveen_US
dc.subjectShareholder Wealth Maximisationen_US
dc.subjectStakeholder Theoryen_US
dc.subjectStakeholder Modelen_US
dc.subjectShort-termen_US
dc.subjectExternalisationen_US
dc.titleTHE CORPORATE OBJECTIVE REVISTED: PART Ien_US
dc.typeArticle
dc.rights.holder© 2017 Kluwer Law International
pubs.issue1en_US
pubs.notes6 monthsen_US
pubs.notesThere is a three month embargo for the final edited version.en_US
pubs.publication-statusAccepteden_US
pubs.publisher-urlhttp://www.kluwerlawonline.com/toc.php?pubcode=BULAen_US
pubs.volume38en_US
dcterms.dateAccepted2016-09-19en_US


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