dc.contributor.author | YAN, M | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-02-14T12:03:28Z | |
dc.date.available | 2016-09-19 | en_US |
dc.date.submitted | 2016-12-07T15:36:27.149Z | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1533-7421 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/xmlui/handle/123456789/19382 | |
dc.description.abstract | Corporate objective, namely, for whose interests should a company be run, is the most important theoretical and practical issues confronting us today, as the core objectives animate or should animate every decision a company makes. Despite decades of debate, there is no consensus regarding what the corporate objective is or ought to be. Contrary to the widely held belief that the corporate objective should be shareholder wealth maximisation (SWM), this paper seeks to demonstrate that SWM is unsuitable by exploring its main problems. As an antithesis to SWM, stakeholder theory generally emerges and develops to be an alternative. Justifications will be offered from different aspects. In particular, its advantages in solving short-termism and externalisation compared with SWM will be focused on. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
dc.publisher | Kluwer Law International | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartof | Business Law Review | en_US |
dc.subject | Corporate Governance | en_US |
dc.subject | Corporate Objective | en_US |
dc.subject | Shareholder Wealth Maximisation | en_US |
dc.subject | Stakeholder Theory | en_US |
dc.subject | Stakeholder Model | en_US |
dc.subject | Short-term | en_US |
dc.subject | Externalisation | en_US |
dc.title | THE CORPORATE OBJECTIVE REVISTED: PART I | en_US |
dc.type | Article | |
dc.rights.holder | © 2017 Kluwer Law International | |
pubs.issue | 1 | en_US |
pubs.notes | 6 months | en_US |
pubs.notes | There is a three month embargo for the final edited version. | en_US |
pubs.publication-status | Accepted | en_US |
pubs.publisher-url | http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/toc.php?pubcode=BULA | en_US |
pubs.volume | 38 | en_US |
dcterms.dateAccepted | 2016-09-19 | en_US |