Moral rights in The Conflict-of-Laws: Alternatives to the Copyright Qualifications

Abstract

This thesis examines the intersection between authors' moral rights and conflict-of- laws. The research question has been triggered by two important, interlinked factors. The first is that the currently applicable choice-of-law rules to moral rights are the same as those applicable to copyright. The second concerns the fact that moral rights are different from copyright - both in their nature and in the interest they aim to protect. Since these two factors coincide, it is questionable whether it ought to be the case that moral rights are subjected to the same choice-of-law rules as are applicable to copyright. The thesis therefore aims to discover whether the currently applicable choice-oflaw rules available in the context of moral rights are suitable for achieving the goals and objectives of conflict-of-laws. In the course of this thesis, I evaluate the potential validity of detaching moral rights from copyright in conflict-oflaws and instead attaching it to the characterization model of general personality rights. The research question is mainly addressed from the perspective of Rome I and Rome II Regulations. However, as there is no EU harmonization concerning general personality rights in conflict-of-laws, the examination will be directed towards France and England as examples of civil and common law traditions. Moreover, reference will also be made to CLIP and ALI principles by reason of comparison.