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dc.contributor.authorPiquet, Aen_US
dc.description.abstractThis article aims at analysing Europol's supranational activism through a reworked Principal-Agent framework. This theoretical approach offers insights regarding the preferences of the Member States, the European Commission, and the European Parliament as Europol's Principals, and discusses how they interact with each other, with a focus on potential conflicts. Furthermore, this paper studies how Europol has evolved within this context, with the aim to determine if it is getting closer to one actor or the other, and how it manages to follow its own preferences and aims of expansion. Consequently, Europol's principals' heterogeneous preferences and its capability of defining problems, notably through its Directors, have enabled Europol to act as a policy entrepreneur to project its preferences and its representations for its strengthening. Hence, Europol appears as a supranationalist opportunist, as it punctually aspires for its own supranationalisation, taking care not to antagonise Member States which remain its main clients.en_US
dc.format.extent1186 - 1207en_US
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Contemporary European Researchen_US
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 United States*
dc.titleSupranational activism and intergovernmental dynamics: The European police office as a supranationalist opportunist?en_US
pubs.notesNot knownen_US
dc.rights.licenseCC BY NC ND
rioxxterms.funderDefault funderen_US
rioxxterms.identifier.projectDefault projecten_US

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Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 United States
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 United States