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This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in The Economic Journal following peer review. The version of record [Laurent Bouton, Jorge Gallego, Aniol Llorente-Saguer, Rebecca ...

Designing Contests between Heterogeneous Contestants: An Experimental Study of Tie-Breaks and Bid-Caps in All-Pay Auctions

Llorente-Saguer, A; Sheremeta, RM; Szech, N

Designing contests between heterogeneous contestants: An experimental study of tie-breaks and bid-caps in all-pay auctions

Llorente-Saguer, A; Sheremeta, RM; Szech, N (2023)

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Designing Contests between Heterogeneous Contestants: An Experimental Study of Tie-Breaks and Bid-Caps in All-Pay Auctions

Designing contests between heterogeneous contestants: An experimental study of tie-breaks and bid-caps in all-pay auctions