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dc.contributor.authorBjelde, Aen_US
dc.contributor.authorFischer, Fen_US
dc.contributor.authorKlimm, Men_US
dc.date.accessioned2017-11-21T17:28:11Z
dc.date.available2017-03-21en_US
dc.date.issued2017-12-30en_US
dc.date.submitted2017-11-16T17:40:41.675Z
dc.identifier.other21en_US
dc.identifier.other21en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/xmlui/handle/123456789/28869
dc.descriptionta no_volume: no_number: no_pages: A:X–A:Y no_year: pdf: publications/bfk_impartial.pdf no_tr: no_http: slides: publications/slides_wine15.pdf keywords: web,recent,journal cvnote: \contrib33%en_US
dc.descriptionta no_volume: no_number: no_pages: A:X–A:Y no_year: pdf: publications/bfk_impartial.pdf no_tr: no_http: slides: publications/slides_wine15.pdf keywords: web,recent,journal cvnote: \contrib33%en_US
dc.description.abstractWe study mechanisms that select members of a set of agents based on nominations by other members and that are impartial in the sense that agents cannot influence their own chance of selection. Prior work has shown that deterministic mechanisms for selecting any fixed number k of agents are severely limited and cannot extract a constant fraction of the nominations of the k most highly nominated agents. We prove here that this impossibility result can be circumvented by allowing the mechanism to sometimes but not always select fewer than k agents. This added flexibility also improves the performance of randomized mechanisms, for which we show a separation between mechanisms that make exactly two or up to two choices and give upper and lower bounds for mechanisms allowed more than two choices.en_US
dc.languageEnglishen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherACM Digitalen_US
dc.relation.ispartofACM Transactions on Economics and Computationen_US
dc.rightsThis is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation following peer review. The version of record is available https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=3174276.3107922
dc.subjectMechanism designen_US
dc.subjectimpartial selectionen_US
dc.titleImpartial Selection and the Power of Up to Two Choicesen_US
dc.typeArticle
dc.rights.holder© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015
dc.identifier.doi10.1145/3107922en_US
pubs.issue4en_US
pubs.notesNot knownen_US
pubs.publication-statusPublisheden_US
pubs.publisher-urlhttp://delivery.acm.org/10.1145/3110000/3107922/a21-bjelde.pdf?ip=161.23.96.113&id=3107922&acc=ACTIVE%20SERVICE&key=BF07A2EE685417C5.53A024A4F41048F4.4D4702B0C3E38B35.4D4702B0C3E38B35&__acm__=1518434817_6e95c925f8b653b98a485f261faad30fen_US
pubs.volume5en_US
dcterms.dateAccepted2017-03-21en_US


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