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dc.contributor.authorYAN, Men_US
dc.date.accessioned2017-03-14T14:00:11Z
dc.date.available2015-02-13en_US
dc.date.issued2015-04-01en_US
dc.date.submitted2016-12-07T16:20:26.448Z
dc.identifier.issn0958-5214en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/xmlui/handle/123456789/20480
dc.description.abstractAgency theory becomes the force of theoretical understanding of corporate governance and it is argued that corporate governance should primarily aim at reducing agency cost. However, both the agency relationship and residual claimant argument suffer severe problems, which implies a lopsided focus on agency theory may bring more harm than potential benefits. Therefore, this article critically re-examines the agency theory.en_US
dc.format.extent139 - 144en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherSweet & Maxwellen_US
dc.relation.ispartofInternational Company and Commercial Law Reviewen_US
dc.subjectAgencyen_US
dc.subjectCorporate governanceen_US
dc.subjectDirectors' powers and dutiesen_US
dc.subjectShareholdersen_US
dc.titleAgency Theory Re-examined: An Agency Relationship and Residual Claimant Perspectiveen_US
dc.typeArticle
pubs.author-urlhttps://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2947952en_US
pubs.issue4en_US
pubs.notesNot knownen_US
pubs.publication-statusPublisheden_US
pubs.volume26en_US
dcterms.dateAccepted2015-02-13en_US


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