The Joint Intelligence Committee and the German Question, 1947-61

Abstract

This thesis analyses the contribution that the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIQ made to British policy concerning Germany (both West and East) during the early Cold War. The question of control over war-ravaged, but strategically significant Germany was critical to the security of Europe. As such, Germany and Berlin in particular, became the most important Cold War battleground in Europe. By combining recently released JIC archives with both existing research on intelligence, foreign and defence policy and records from the other government departments, this research adds to the understanding of one of the central themes of the Cold War. It reveals how ministers, senior officials and military officers made use of the assessmentps roduced by the JIC in formulating their policies towards Germany and the developing threat from the Soviet Union and its allies. This research takes a chronological approach, in order to trace both the development of policy and of the role of the JIC within central government. It explores the major crises of the period: the Soviet blockade of Berlin in 1948, the riots in East Berlin of June 1953 and the 1958-61 Berlin Crisis. Away from these crises, the thesis examines the picture that the JIC painted of Soviet intentions and capabilities in Eastern Germany and of the development of the two German nations. It also looks at the JIC's contribution to British attitudes towards German rearmament. The developing role of the intelligence apparatus, both within central government and in Germany is a major theme running through the thesis. By improving its sources, its product and its administration,, the JIC ensured that it became an essential tool for successive governments, and within Whitehall, became the interface between intelligence and policy.