Modernism and the Making of Masud Khan

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Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
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Masud Khan was one of the most controversial psychoanalysts of the post-war period. This thesis argues that modernist literature and culture are central to Khan’s conception and realisation of his psychoanalytic work in Britain from the late nineteen forties onwards. His lifelong engagement with modernist art and writing also shapes Khan’s vision of himself as a ‘self-exile’, and provides the framework for his own imagining of contemporary political life in Europe, Pakistan, and Britain. His psychoanalytic work, thoroughly shaped by the writing of T.S. Eliot, James Joyce, and the painting of the cubists, is a complex response to his own sense of his postcolonial modernity, and the rapid social and political changes of the period. By taking Khan as a case study this project explores the intersection of modernist writing and the end of Empire, especially concerning questions of cosmopolitanism, exile, race, and the politics of modernism. It aims to enrich our sense of the history modernism by exploration of this highly idiosyncratic figure. The explicitly modernist bent of Khan’s writing also opens up new readings of his psychoanalytic contemporaries Donald Winnicott, Michael Balint, and Marion Milner that highlight the continuity of their writings with many aspects of modernist culture.

More specifically, the study examines the shaping effect of specific ideas and themes in modernist writing on Khan’s conception of subjectivity, whilst also reflecting on the meaning of these translations of cultural life into psychoanalytic theory. Explored are: Joyce’s articulations of ‘epiphany’ and exile, as well as his writing on race and Jewishness; T.S. Eliot’s concept of ‘tradition’ and his writing on culture and community, especially as it allows Khan to imagine his own ‘feudal’ past and ethnic distinctiveness in postwar London; and the painting of Georges Braque and Joan Miró in Khan’s figuration of new and radical forms of self-experience in psychic life.
Contents

List of Illustrations

Acknowledgements

Introduction

Chapter one

Epiphanic Psychoanalysis: Joyce in Khan’s Consulting Room

Chapter two

Feudal Psychoanalysis: T.S. Eliot and the uses of Tradition

Chapter three

“Exiled in upon his ego”: The politics of privacy

Chapter four

“Somnambulant doodles”: Masud Khan and European Modernist Art

Chapter five

“Swarthy of taint”: Masud Khan, Race and Modernism

Afterword

Something to Tell You

Bibliography
List of Illustrations

**Fig.1** Library of Masud Khan. Front endpaper and flyleaf, James Joyce, *Ulysses* (1932)

**Fig.2** Library of Masud Khan. Front Endpaper and flyleaf, James Joyce, *Ulysses* (1932)

**Fig.3** ‘Old Master, Modern and Contemporary Prints’, catalogue entry, Georges Braque, *La Liberté des Mers*, 1959, lot 87


**Fig.5** Henri Matisse, *Blue Nude* (1952). The Geoffrey Gorer Archive, postcard from Masud Khan to Geoffrey Gorer, 13/03/1965.

**Fig.6** ‘Old Master, Modern and Contemporary Prints’, catalogue entry, Joan Miró/Tristan Tzara. *Parler Seul*. 1948-1950, lot 254

**Fig.7** ‘Old Master, Modern and Contemporary Prints’, Joan Miró/René Char. *Nous Avons*. 1959, lot 251

**Fig.8** Masud Khan and Svetlana Beriosova, photographed by Henri-Cartier Bresson. Getty Images.

**Fig.9** Library of Masud Khan, bookmark: business card from Radio Knörzer, Stuttgart, *Ulysses* (1946)

**Fig.10** Library of Masud Khan, bookmark: Complimentary Ticket, Oversea Language Centre, James Joyce, *Ulysses* (1946)

**Fig.11** Library of Masud Khan, rear endpaper, *Ulysses: The Corrected Text* (1986)
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Introduction

At the end of the interview, he drove me slowly part of the way home in his Armstrong Siddeley. In the car he produced a book of poems by James Joyce from the pouch in the door and told me that he read them when he was stuck in traffic jams.1

Wynne Godley, ‘Saving Masud Khan’

Economist Wynne Godley’s 2001 account of his treatment with the controversial émigré psychoanalyst Masud Khan stimulated heated discussion in the aftermath of its publication.2 This study is inaugurated by one detail from the vignette excerpted here: Khan’s book of Joyce’s poems. Masud Khan’s biographers all argue that Khan was captivated by European literature: for Linda Hopkins it is William Shakespeare who taught Khan “to be psychologically reflective…to put feeling into words”.3 He was also captivated, Hopkins suggests, by Dostoyevsky, and she notes furthermore his interest in identifiably modernist writers: Woolf, Joyce, T.S. Eliot, Kafka, Thomas Mann, and D.H. Lawrence, amongst others.4 This thesis, however, argues for the centrality of modernist culture - especially the writing of James Joyce and T.S. Eliot, and the


4 Hopkins, p.455.
painting of cubism and surrealism - in the formation of Khan’s psychoanalytic writing and identity as a “self-exile” in postwar London. The work of these modernists gives clear shape to Khan’s conception of human subjectivity, to the ideals of his psychoanalytic theory, and provide a conceptual and cultural framework for him to imagine his own attitudes and responses to his complex ethnic, political and historical backgrounds, and his experiences as a migrant from 1946-1989 in London. Khan is a reader of high European modernist literature in the decades following its peak: the collision of these works with his particular political and historical circumstances also reveals the ambivalent relationship certain canonical modernist texts have with the end of Empire.

This thesis puts at the centre Khan’s life and work his thoroughgoing, but often problematic, commitment to particular ideals and texts of modernist culture. This interest is mobilised by Khan as a response to quite particular political and historical circumstances in his background. The two major studies of Khan that have thus far been published were written by psychoanalysts from a strictly biographical point of view and, most crucially, their discussions of the genealogy of his writing remains necessarily focused on his psychoanalytic, rather than literary, influences. As psychoanalysts, too, his biographers are drawn to produce quasi-clinical descriptions - even diagnoses - of Khan’s clinical transgressions, abuse, and late anti-Semitism, and it is these that dominate discussions of his life and writing.5 Yet Khan is of interest to literary studies, as well as historians of psychoanalysis, because his work and circumstances take key modernist writers on an unusual historical, political and institutional journey - as a consequence, such figures and their work appear transformed. Modernist culture, especially exemplified for Khan by Hugh Kenner’s and F.R. Leavis’ respective visions of it, becomes the frame through which Khan attempts to

understand and push against his circumstances as a postcolonial subject of history.

Masud Khan’s modernism is characterisable as embodying the ideals of Kenner’s ‘International Modernism’, emphasising a Euro-centric inter-city cosmopolitanism, composed of exiles and expatriates. Like Kenner, Khan reads modernism as a collection of “certain masterpieces”: Eliot’s *Four Quartets*, Joyce’s *Ulysses* and Beckett’s *Godot* are all works admired by Khan and Kenner; and indeed Eliot and Joyce take special prominence in the argument of this study. The centrality of exile to Kenner’s modernism placed Eliot, Joyce and Pound in cities unfamiliar to them and valorised the transient and contingent experience of the migrant, a discursive condition of modernism identified by Raymond Williams and George Steiner. For Khan, this modernism offered a model of self-fashioning adaptable, albeit not without complications, to his situation as a highly literate and privileged émigré travelling to Europe in the late 1940s.

In writing the first biography of Masud Khan, Judy Cooper considered herself to be facilitating Khan’s wishes stated in his diaries, the *Work Books*: “materials which I hope someone will put together and that will constitute the


8 Ibid.

VERITY of Masud Khan”. Psychoanalyst Eric Rayner’s foreword to her book indicates what is at stake in locating this “VERITY”: “Every reader of this very useful book, or of anything by Masud Khan himself, is faced by a very serious problem: should his work be deeply valued or dismissed?” My thesis approaches Khan’s work from a literary and historical perspective: as a consequence, there is no question here of rehabilitating Khan’s work as regards either its clinical application, or to exonerate, or condemn, the psychoanalytic establishment for playing whatever role in fostering his ethical transgressions. Rather, this study suggests that the “VERITY” of Masud Khan lies in his intellectual and literary affiliations, and the manner in which those are conjoined with his personal and historical circumstances. In other words, what are the special implications of his own project of self-fashioning and his theory of subjectivity and modernity as these manifest in his work?

The Life and times of Masud Khan

Khan was born in Jhemel in the Northern Punjab in 1924, to an aristocratic, military family. His father and grandfather both served in the Indian Army: the latter supported the administration during the Rebellion of 1857 and afterwards became involved in breeding horses for the Indian Army. His political loyalty was rewarded in the post-1857 administrative reorganisation of British power in the Punjab, which entailed the creation of what historian David


10 Judy Cooper, *Speak of me as I am: The Life and Work of Masud Khan* (London: Karnac, 1993), p.122. The *Work Books* exist in three copies: a partial edition in the possession of Judy Cooper, Khan’s biographer; a copy held by Sybil Stoller, widow of Khan’s colleague Robert Stoller; and one in the files of the International Psychoanalytic Association. The IPA are unwilling to allow researchers, with the exception of Linda Hopkins, who quotes them extensively in her book, to access the *Work Books*, and this material, as with other documents pertaining to Khan, is sealed in IPA archives for the foreseeable future. Thus, in my thesis, quotations from the *Work Books* are all derived from either Linda Hopkins’ or Judy Cooper’s biographies.

11 Cooper, p.xi.
Gilmartin calls “mediator families”. The British gave local administrative and legal powers to Indian families considered politically reliable whilst at the same time exploiting pre-colonial tribal traditions and structures, thus creating a class of loyal indigenes trusted by the community and backed by the authority of the British. Khan was brought up on this kind of estate, which relied on a form of authoritarian patronage inscribed into British jurisprudence. When Khan, in his 1974 book *The Privacy of the Self*, refers to the “traditions of my culture” and in his diaries to his “tradition of nurture”, this is the political structure his “feudal home” implies.

Khan was educated at home until the end of his teenage years by a personal tutor, a former civil servant, P.I. Painter. In 1940 he began to study for his first degree, at Government College in Lyallapur, in Political Science (with minors in English literature, Urdu, History) which he followed with an MA in English Literature in 1944-45 at the University of the Punjab in Lahore. It was in this period that Khan first encountered the modernist writing that is so central to his life and work. For him this was a crucial period of personal, political and intellectual fructification. “If anyone wishes to know the true matrix of my sensibility”, he writes in his diaries, “he shall have to look to…the climate of these books that created that tension in me in the years 1940-1946 which actualized itself in my becoming an analyst and living the life I do in London.” This moment is where I locate the burgeoning of his interest in modernist literature: Khan wrote his MA thesis, at the University of the Punjab in Lahore, on James

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15 Hopkins, p.13
Joyce. It was titled: ‘From Excitement to Epiphany: A Study of Joyce’s Development’. He discusses the two copies he made of it – one he alleges to have sent to T.S. Eliot - in an entry in his Work Books from 1971.

In the latter months of 1946 Khan, having completed his MA degree, travelled to the United Kingdom. Khan’s own account of this trip suggests a twofold purpose: he was to do further study at Balliol College Oxford (in Law) and then return to the Punjab to take up a political career, but whilst undertaking graduate study he also hoped to get “a good analysis” under his belt. For Khan, this trip to Europe was the beginning of his “self-exile”. The analyst Sylvia Payne, with whom Khan met early on, suggested that he apply for psychoanalytic training, which he duly did, and Khan began his training analysis with Ella Sharpe on 17th October 1946. After Sharpe’s untimely death, Khan was analysed by John Rickman (who himself died suddenly in 1951) and then Donald Winnicott, who analysed Khan for some fifteen years. Khan had achieved associate membership of the British Psychoanalytical Society and began analysis of his own patients (under supervision) by 1950.

That Khan’s first analysis in London was with Ella Sharpe is not incidental to the argument advanced in this piece of work: he specifically requested someone interested in literature and culture, and Sharpe was personally connected to Karen and Adrian Stephen, Virginia Woolf and other members of the Bloomsbury set. Indeed, Roger Willoughby also notes that Sharpe reportedly

16 Hopkins, p.404 n.20.
17 Hopkins, p.13.
18 Ibid.
introduced to Khan to Karen and Adrian Stephen, bringing Khan into very real
contact with the modernism previously admired from afar.\textsuperscript{20}

Khan lived and practised psychoanalysis in London for the next forty years, in-
volving himself in literary and artistic circles. Indeed, he was well known for
his extensive collection of modernist paintings and lithographs, and cultivated
friendships with artists and writers in Paris as well as London. This period of
cosmopolitan self-exile, which made up most of Khan’s life, takes place against
the backdrop of rapid and consequential political changes in his homeland: the
Partition of India and, in the 1970s, emergent socialist governments in Pakistan.

Professionally, Khan played an extensive role in the British Psychoanalytical So-
ciety. In addition to editing and indexing many of Donald Winnicott’s key
works, he was a commissioning editor for the psychoanalytic books published
by Hogarth, the head librarian for the society, and, in addition to other more
minor roles, the foreign editor of the French psychoanalytic journal \textit{Nouvelle Re-
vue Psychanalyse}. In the 1970s Khan published two collections of clinical and
theoretical writings: \textit{The Privacy of the Self} (1974) and \textit{Alienation in Perversions}
(1979).\textsuperscript{21}

Khan’s final years in the 1980s - he died in 1989 - saw the publication of
his third and fourth books: \textit{Hidden Selves} (1983) and \textit{When Spring Comes} (1988).\textsuperscript{22}
Both are characterised by increasingly eccentric clinical practices, formal experi-
mentation with his mode of expression, and an outlandish writerly voice. His

\textsuperscript{20} Willoughby, p.28.


last book is the most controversial, as Khan makes explicit personal attacks on colleagues and seemingly takes pride in describing outrageous boundary violations with patients. But what led to his expulsion from the British Psychoanalytical Society was the anti-Semitic tract directed at a stereotyped Jewish patient, ‘Mr. Luis.’ Khan’s colleagues identified the work as the product of Khan’s madness, the “work of a demented and dying man”, as Adam Limentani put it.23 Janet Malcolm struggled in her contemporaneous review of the book to see how the “sane and civilized writer of The Privacy of the Self” can produce “this outrageous and repellent book”, “a kind of recurrent dream of grandiosity and omnipotence”.24 Malcolm can only conclude that, in the intervening years, “something bad has happened to Mr. Khan”.25

Khan’s clinical transgressions have been described repeatedly, sometimes luridly, in literary journalism, with special reference to his anti-Semitism and his sexual relationships with patients. The first and most prominent of these accounts was Wynne Godley’s ‘Saving Masud Khan’, from which my epigraph is taken. Also noteworthy is Amy Bloom’s review of Linda Hopkins’ biography, ‘Psycho Analyst’, published in the New York Times in January 2007.26 Bloom describes Khan as “a snob, a liar, a drunk, a philanderer, an anti-Semite, a violent bully, a poseur and a menace to the vulnerable”.27 Godley’s account in The London Review of Books has offered thus far the most influential, and lurid, contemporary vision of Khan. Yet there is a more complex picture of Khan to be drawn,

23 Hopkins, p.488.
25 Ibid.
one that emerges from the historical and biographical details sketched above, especially when his life and writing are read with respect to his special literary and artistic passions. It is those that this study understand to be vital to understanding his work.

Masud Khan’s *Ulysses* and the postcolonial world

Khan’s fascination with European modernism is exemplified in one of the central objects of this thesis: his student copy of Joyce’s *Ulysses*. Fig. 1 shows the front endpapers of the book, which are heavily annotated and amended with stationery, drawings, stamps, dates and places. This striking image, with its evidence of Khan’s sustained engagement with these pages - the earliest date marked is ‘London, 1946’ - is at the core of this project. These variegated dates and places, continually updated throughout Khan’s life, not only index his own travels but countersign Joyce’s own creative and spiritual exile signaled at the end of the novel: “*Trieste-Zurich-Paris, 1914-1921*”. Khan gestures directly to that typically modernist form of self-fashioning, exile, in these front pages too: we can discern in the lower third of the endpaper (in red ink) the Urdu words *hum safar*, which can be translated alternately “fellow traveler” or “we exiled”.28 The book itself, as an object, becomes Khan’s traveling companion, as does the figure of Joyce, the modernist abroad.

28 Khan misspells the Urdu written on these pages, a gesture that is of great significance and plugs into more general concerns in his work about belonging, language and culture, which I discuss in chapter five. Thanks should be given to Dr. Santanu Das (Kings College London) and Dr. Ziad Elmarsafy (University of York) for help with the translation.
The multiple date stamps of Khan’s *Ulysses* transform it into something resembling an ad-hoc passport, a symbolic substitute for the Pakistani citizenship that he refused in 1947 with Partition, domiciling himself in the United Kingdom instead. This “self-exile” - an aesthetic self-making derived from Stephen Daedalus’ project of “silence, exile and cunning” - is frequently alluded to in Khan’s published psychoanalytical writings, especially his later work, and conjoins his interest in Joyce with both his specific political attitudes and his theorisation of human subjectivity. In Khan’s evident, almost fetishistic,  

fascination with Joyce’s novel, the historical fallout of decolonisation and Partition is inseparable from his literary passions.

The object of this thesis is to explore this conjunction, with the intention of indicating that Khan’s psychoanalytic work is one component in a larger cultural and historical circuit. If the years 1940-1946 are for Khan “the matrix of his sensibility”, then this matrix must acknowledge the radical political changes taking place in the Punjab in this period. In these crucial years at university Lahore was at the culmination of social and political transformations that had lasted three decades. The systems of patronage and local mediation used by British authorities in the countryside – the creation of administered estates that were essentially based on much more ancient tribal allegiances, and relied on local community leaders – were much less grounded and stable in the Punjabi urban populations, particularly in light of their rapid expansion in the twentieth century, as well as the blend of religious identities in the city.\(^{30}\)

The population of Lahore tripled between the years 1860-1930.\(^{31}\) Increasing numbers of migrants from across India were attracted to Lahore because of its reputation as an educational and administrative centre that circumvented systems of local patronage and intermediaries. The men trained in administration and law “communicated in the language and the cultural idiom of the British” writes David Gilmartin in *Empire and Islam*, and began “to assert claims to political influence…on their mastery of new structures of organization associated directly with the culture of the alien, colonial state…Such organizations began to assert distinctive religious identities”.\(^{32}\) The rapid modernisation of

\(^{30}\) See Gilmartin, chapters 1. ‘The British Imperial State’ and 3. ‘Urban Politics and the Communal Ideal’.

\(^{31}\) Gilmartin, p.76.

\(^{32}\) Ibid.
late colonial India, and the role urbanisation played in the constitution of new political communities, mitigated against Khan’s family’s interest as landowners, and these developments sowed the seed of Khan’s antagonism toward progressive forces in the twentieth century that would encourage him to turn to exile in London. In this respect, Khan’s interest in modernism is bound up with these political transformations.

Later political developments in Pakistan also played an important role in his writing and continued to fuel his sustained engagement with a number of modernist texts. The political backdrop to the work Khan collected and published in the 1970s and early 1980s is complex. In the 1970s Pakistan saw the election of a new, left-wing government, led by Zulfikar Bhutto, committed in its election manifesto to the redistribution of land ownership, following fifteen years of dictatorship under Ayub Khan. The feudal landlords of the Imperialist era managed to maintain their power and control for some decades after Partition, but the 1971 election and waning of Ayub Khan’s power energised socialist struggles in the region. Khan writes in his diaries at the time that

Pakistan is seething with anarchic socialist unrest and the whole population is just waiting with impatient zeal to grab hold of all varieties of properties. There are no civic values or intellectual perspectives. It is all an almost hysterical ferment in which anything could happen to anyone.33

Indeed, in 1971, Khan was forced to sell over half of the land surrounding his estates to peasants staking a claim in a deal negotiated by the local Inspector General of the police. Khan refers to this loss of land as “the voluntary end to a tradition that my ancestors have nurtured over centuries.”34 The feudal gives way to the demands of a newly emancipated class. Whilst Khan’s giving up of

33 Hopkins, p.223.

34 Ibid.
his land in early 1971 was voluntary and not demanded by state legislation (law that did not come into force until 1972), it is difficult to dissociate this incident from Bhutto’s pre-election plans to transfer ownership of property from large landowners to smaller middle-class farmers.

Khan’s distaste for these political changes is something he himself comments on in his letters and postcards to his friend the anthropologist Geoffrey Gorer, although his attitudes towards both Ayub Khan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto - key political leaders of Pakistan in the decades following Partition - are marked by a great deal of ambivalence. This finds troubling expression in the way that Khan draws on Eliot’s concepts of tradition and community in his writing: in one respect, Khan’s exile is about sustaining a political tradition that is in abeyance. But these reactionary sentiments also find expression on the imaginative continuum that links Khan’s political and historical experiences to the construction of subjectivity in his theoretical work, where, as I argue, they find more creative potential. Here the backdrop is, as much as Khan’s ‘feudalism’ and grandiose performances of his ancestral traditions, European political and social crises that characterised twentieth century history.

For instance, Khan’s conception of the “hidden”, “private”, unintegrated and dreaming self, who must be allowed to lie “fallow”, is a powerful trope in his writing and appears as a form of resistance to instrumentalized, totalitarian, and exploitative social relations that are indissolubly associated with modernity in Khan’s work. This withdrawn self, or the description of a self whose most precious elements are secret and “beyond interpretation”, 35 is an elaboration of his personal, literary interest in exile: his literary and psychoanalytic passions here form a complex, interdisciplinary, imaginative response to postcolonial

modernity. Throughout this thesis I draw attention to this collision of historical forces with private reading and theoretical speculation.

In just this way, we must note that Khan’s career in the United Kingdom saw the appearance of significant numbers of Caribbean and south Asian migrants (most iconically in the arrival of the Empire Windrush in 1948), and oscillating policies around race and citizenship in the first decades of the postwar period. We should add to this the rise of Powellism, after 1968, and the concomitant emergence of Thatcherism’s racialised law-and-order Toryism in the seventies and eighties. Considered from this angle, Khan’s construction of race and identity are an expression of the political valencies of blackness in postwar Britain, with that chapter of his last book condensing into one text anxieties about the visibility of his own ethnicity in Britain. This is a Britain, as Bill Schwarz would have it in The White Man’s World, where race operates as the organizing principle for civic and political belonging. The problems created by these various fictions of community, and the anxieties attached by Khan and others to notions of blackness, migration, and deracination, can only be addressed by Khan through that which he knows intimately: the modernist writing of Joyce and Eliot, who serve, I argue, as sources for Khan’s attempts to explore these questions.

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37 The politics of race and immigration in Britain in this period have been tackled by a number of prominent intellectuals. See, for instance, Paul Gilroy, There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack: The Cultural Politics of Race and Nation (London: Routledge Classics, 2002). See also, recently reissued by Palgrave Macmillan on the 35-year anniversary of its publication, Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and Order ed. by Stuart Hall, Chas Chrichter, et al. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). For debates on immigration and race in the postwar period, see Kathleen Paul, Whitewashing Britain: Race and Citizenship in the Postwar Era (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).
Thesis Outline

Chapter one describes the importance of Joyce’s epiphanies in Khan’s conception of psychoanalytic efficacy and object-relations. For Khan, ‘epiphanic’ psychoanalysis is one that he explicitly derives through reference to Joyce, and it is one that repudiates reliance on interpretation and metapsychological language in favour of pre-cognitive, affective experiences that crystallise new forms of subjective organisation. This chapter describes Khan’s novel reading of epiphany in Joyce - an area of Joyce’s writing that has attracted renewed critical and theoretical interest - by exploring its connections to the work of Michael Balint, whose Arglos state opens out questions of waiting, anticipation and the event that fascinate Khan more generally in modernism. Khan’s version of epiphany transforms Joyce into a proto-theorist of object relations, in which the epiphanic exists on the limits of language and whose proper realm is the pre-cognitive and affective exchanges between subjects that is described by the psychoanalysis of Donald Winnicott. Khan shows us too that the object-relations Joyce is interested in are epiphanies that belong properly to the realm of two-person psychology, and are not simply, as has been so often suggested, the solipsistic self-regarding expression of Stephen Daedalus’ grand artistic ambition.

Chapter two describes Khan’s fascination with Eliot’s concept of tradition. For Khan, the model of literary invention Eliot describes in his myriad reflections on the topic is the ideal model for psychoanalytic innovation, providing a means for the contemporary analyst to relate to the writings of Freud, simultaneously expanding and protecting the psychoanalytic edifice. This chap-
ter will examine the ways in which Khan, in his work with the institution and with Winnicott, positioned himself as a gatekeeper for this tradition. But tradition in this chapter has other valences for Khan: his description of his background in the Northern Punjab also turns to the language of tradition. His ‘feudal tradition’, and ‘tradition of nurture’, start to blur the boundaries between the consulting room and his aristocratic estate: a feudal tradition that is in historical and political decline is re-vivified and sustained by its importation into Khan’s activities as a psychoanalytic professional. Tradition, as I will argue, is in Eliot’s thought uniquely carried and protected by the figure of the exile, and Khan’s rationalisation of his own exile entails defending, as precisely that kind of outsider, the psychoanalytic and feudal traditions together. In this respect, the openness and expansiveness of the model of literary innovation Khan sees protecting psychoanalysis against scientific and instrumental forms of knowing is uncomfortably yoked to a more rebarbative and reactionary political reality. What we thus see is a highly ambivalent treatment of tradition in Eliot that attempts to hold its expansive and conservative tendencies in tension.

Chapter three returns to Khan’s reading of Joyce, and especially the image presented at the outset of this introduction, which is treated as the example par excellence of Khan’s modernist self-making. In this chapter I argue that Khan’s fashioning of himself as an exile is more than merely a superficial performance of the role: it emerges from his reading of Joyce - especially Stephen Hero and Finnegans Wake - in such a way as to be intellectually and textually tied to his most fundamental ideas about the self, which become, in this chapter, the expression of political ideas too. The essentially ‘private’ or ‘hidden’ self is exemplified by the figure of the dreaming subject, who is beyond the reach of psychoanalytic interpretation and must be protected from its persecutory excesses. The figure for this private subject, I argue, is derived from Joyce as an extension of Khan’s interest in Joyce’s epiphanies - for Khan, both the exile and the epiphanist are united in the figure of Shem in Finnegans Wake, and both exile
and epiphany raise profound questions about the ethical and political treatment of the subject. Indeed, the defence of the private subject is conducted as a defence against totalitarianism and nationalism in the twentieth century, which consistently shadow Khan’s descriptions of this ‘private self’. In this respect, I argue that modernist exile, although exemplifying in some respects a highly Eurocentric and grandiose project of self-fashioning, is nevertheless in Khan’s treatment of it mobilised as a space for mutuality and intimacy, protecting against instrumentalised forms of life Khan connects to totalitarian projects. His interest in the most secret aspects of human subjectivity is evidence not as Linda Hopkins claims of his apparent disinterest in political life but rather the opposite: it is the site of his political commitments.

Chapter four extends the topic of chapters one and three in turning to Khan’s fascination with modernist painting - especially cubism and Joan Miró - and his activities as a collector. Khan’s large art collection - over four hundred pieces - was sold following his death in 1989, and biographers of Khan often gesture to his great fondness for art, art books, and painting. This chapter argues two things: first, that Khan’s activities as a collector, consistently buying works from specific dealers in Paris, are part of his project of modernist self-fashioning and his attempt to insert himself into the networks of exchange and patronage that manifested the cultural and intellectual legacy of high artistic modernism. Second, that Khan’s explicit interest in modernist painting is a key aspect of his intellectual development and that this interest draws out a fascination with specifically modernist aspects of visual culture in the writing of Michael Balint, Donald Winnicott, and Marion Milner. Modernist paintings - making them and seeing them - present the subject with the possibility of entering into a generative pre-verbal realm that Khan describes similarly to the benign regression associated with epiphanic transformation, and the ‘private’ self of chapter three.
What emerges from Khan’s and Milner’s ideas on painting is a theory of modernist aesthetic experience and transformation that belongs specifically to British object relations psychoanalysis. Khan’s fascination with Miro’s painting in particular in an essay from 1983 also has a political dimension: the transformational experience of aesthetic immersion is presented by him explicitly as a resistance to forms of capitalist modernity. By way of a coda I read Khan’s thought on art as the expression of the radical conjunction of politics and aesthetics described in the work of Jacques Rancière. This chapter again expresses the ambivalence of Khan’s engagement with modernism: his love of painting articulates his elitist grandiosity and extends his desire to become a European modernist; but his description of the creative and aesthetic scene also holds out the hope that modernist art contains the seeds of a total transformation of the self despite the impress made by modern consumer capitalism.

The fifth and final chapter of this thesis turns to the controversy around Khan’s anti-Semitic writings and the broader figuration of race in his work, as well as the ways in which Khan’s cosmopolitanism complicates his picture of community, his ethnic background, and Jewishness. This chapter will return again to Eliot and Joyce, through whom Khan attempts to think the violence of racial difference. Eliot’s influence - particularly After Strange Gods and ‘Burbank with a Baedeker’ - is directly traceable, I suggest, in Khan’s construction of Jewishness and his anti-Semitic outbursts; and this manifests the other, more rebarbative, visions of racial and religious conformity in Khan’s understanding of community, directly continuous with Eliot’s. This finds its most powerful articulation in Khan’s construction of himself as a ‘Rajput Indian’ - a militaristic definition that provides a key clue to the fact that Khan is in thrall to historical forms of Imperialist race-thinking, which themselves dovetail with aspects of Eliot’s thought. However, following Bryan Cheyette, I argue that, just as for Eliot, writing Jewishness entails a projection of Khan’s own anxieties about his status as a migrant in the UK, with attendant debates about citizenship, belong-
ing and community. This chapter argues that Khan’s anti-Semitism emerges, in other words, out of the confluence of forms of Imperialist race-thinking into which Khan is deeply socialised. It also derives from Eliot’s own vision of the deracinated subject of modernity, and as such becomes the projection of his own blackness - the black body looms just as large in Khan’s anti-Semitic outbursts as the Jewish one - in the context of racial politics in postwar Britain, and the fears and alienation he himself attached to it.

**Masud Khan and Literary Criticism**

This study is positioned as much more than straightforward biography. Critically, it aims to contribute to the already existing critical and biographical literature on Khan that makes claims about his intellectual influences, political attitudes, and the gestation of his psychoanalytic writing in relationship to wider cultural movements. Specifically, I place European modernism as it was canonised, institutionalised and discussed from the 1950s onwards, in Britain and France, at the centre of Khan’s life and work. This thesis also claims that Khan’s work can be profitably assessed and explicated from the point of view of literary studies, bringing as it does historical and theoretical analytical frameworks broader than those offered by the strictly psychoanalytical approaches taken in the literature thus far. The centrality of modernist culture to the writing of Khan’s psychoanalytic theory, and his reading of a number of modernist works and ideas through British object-relations, reveals highly original ways of imagining familiar literary works. The modernist works I explore and the psychoanalytic thought to which Khan relates them are mutually illuminating and transforming.

As a psychoanalyst whose writing is saturated with literary and philosophical reflection, Khan is of keen interest to the exploration of the complex and ambivalent interactions of psychoanalysis and modernist literature. In this
respect, the explicitly modernist engagements in his theoretical writing make the study of his work continuous with the many areas of expansion modernist studies is exploring. British object-relations psychoanalysis after the war - especially the writing of Michael Balint, Donald Winnicott, and Marion Milner, who are all key actors in this thesis - has never been imagined in relationship to modernist culture in a sustained way. Khan’s work presents a novel opportunity in this respect.

This investigation is not without some precedent: Lyndsey Stonebridge’s *The Destructive Element* examined aspects of Winnicott’s and Milner’s thought alongside British late modernism of the 1940s. Her illuminating study provides a model for examining the interaction of psychoanalysis and modernism in the postwar period, an era that saw the flourishing of British object-relations, and I aim to pick up, historically, where Stonebridge’s inquiry stops. Khan’s work makes clear the explicit connections between key ideas in this movement - unintegrated states, transitional objects, various reflections on creativity - and modernist culture more generally. Susan Stanford Friedman suggests that modernist studies expand temporally in order to apprehend fully modernism’s continuing emergence. One contention of this study is that the postwar object-relations school of Khan, Winnicott, and their colleagues, and its varied intersections with literary and artistic culture (manifested most explicitly by Khan himself) is very much a part of that continued emergence.

Khan’s psychoanalysis is concerned first and foremost with writing, and it is for this reason that, like Stonebridge on the British psychoanalysts of the interwar period, I approach his work from the perspective of literary history.

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(not simply because, like many other analysts, he was fond of reading literature). A trenchant example of this might be taken from The Privacy of the Self of 1974. In 1970 Khan published a paper titled ‘The catalytic role of crucial friendship in the epistemology of self-experience in Montaigne, Rousseau and Freud’, in which he considers the importance of a relationship with an internalized other in actualising creative capacities. This paper reappears in revised form four years later in The Privacy of the Self, under a new title, ‘Montaigne, Rousseau and Freud’. This change is not arbitrary. Khan reflects on “the certain ponderous awkwardness of in the title: ‘The catalytic role of crucial friendship in the epistemology of self-experience in Montaigne, Rousseau and Freud’.” Instead, Khan wonders, “Why not simply say: ‘Role of object-relations in self-knowledge’?”

Evidently the latter suggestion would not do either - the final version of the title shifts the register of the piece from the apparently enclosed discourse of psychoanalytic clinical writing to something more open, meditative and essayistic. Khan is interested in the elegance and appeal of his writing as much as he is in whatever value it might have for, or contribution it might make to, metapsychological clinical discourse. This preoccupation implies an awareness of the literary and aesthetic implications of the modes of expression available to psychoanalytic thinkers.

Khan’s writing is amenable to literary critical analysis because he addresses the technical problems of psychoanalytic discourse through explicitly literary modes of thought. This is also true, I argue, of his psychoanalytic work with respect to modernism: he approaches questions of subjectivity and culture via a number of key writers, who do more than merely frame his arguments -

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41 ‘Montaigne, Rousseau and Freud’ from The Privacy of the Self, p.109.
the very logic of particular modernist texts and ideas is incorporated into his work. An approach emphasising the literary tendencies of Khan’s writing has not as yet been attempted in a sustained manner, despite the fact that Linda Hopkins herself notes that had Khan not been an analyst he would have certainly embarked on a career as a writer.42

For example, in ‘The Becoming of a Psychoanalyst’ there is an extended reflection on Khan’s part on the writing of case histories. For Khan, it is Roland Barthes who provides a key corrective to the “comforting intimacy and collusive urgency of the shared spoken language”.43 Khan argues “the bias of contemporary analytic research is very much towards exploring the experiential realities of the analytic situation, process and relationship, in addition to the meaning of symptoms and psychic data recorded”.44 This demands “more rigorous attention be paid in our instruction of students…towards facilitating them in their mental and linguistic habits towards l’écriture.” “I am deliberately using”, Khan goes on,

the current, though undoubtedly modish, French concept of l’écriture instead of the simple English noun “writing”, because the concept of l’écriture really does signify something more: it indicates a decision and a stand vis-a-vis oneself and others.45

What follows is an extended and untranslated quotation from Barthes’ Le Dégre zéro de L’écriture (Writing Degree Zero) of 1953 (translated into English in 1967).46

42 Hopkins, p.25.

43 Privacy of the Self, p.124.

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid., pp.124-125.
Without entering into a thoroughgoing excursus of Barthes’ argument, it is
worth reflecting on Khan’s choice of quotation. *L’écriture* is “not an open route
through which there passes only the intention to speak”, it is “an anti-commu-
nication”, containing “the ambiguity of an object which is both language and coercion”.\(^{47}\) *L’écriture* cannot be turned to the whims of the psychoanalyst hoping to report back faithfully the reality of the consulting room, as it “develops like a seed, not like a line”, “conveying” always “an intention which is no longer linguistic”.\(^ {48}\) Khan is concerned to draw out the confrontation with language’s unruliness entailed in expressing the charged dynamics of the consulting room. “We analysts”, he writes, “have to learn to tolerate the hostile intent in *l’écriture* and train ourselves to discipline it so that it speaks what we mean it to speak”.\(^ {49}\)

In this respect Khan’s psychoanalysis shares with modernism more an explicit and pronounced concern over representation and representability, and he demands that analysts reflect how such issues impact on the foundation and maintenance of the psychoanalytic institution. He is in this instance especially alive to the rhetoricity of psychoanalytic writing manifested when tackling transference and counter-transference relationships. Adam Phillips, in a tribute to Khan’s work written after his death, notes especially the anti-hermeneutics Khan (and Winnicott) cultivate and his express interest in how psychoanalysis confronts the limits of representation pertaining to any discussion of psychic life.\(^{50}\)


\(^{48}\) Ibid.

\(^{49}\) *The Privacy of the Self*, p.125.

In Khan’s work, Joyce’s epiphanies, exile and dreaming, and the encounter with modernist painting - discussed in chapters one, three and five - are all tied to aspects of psychic experience described by the passage of Barthes invoked here. *L’écriture* is “rooted in something beyond language”, a “‘circumstance’ foreign to language”. Khan is concerned to note that it “holds the threat of a secret”. It is this “secret”, the “extra-linguistic” (which is to say, non-instrumental and non-communicative dimensions of writing), the beyond-ness of affects, dreams and other elements of psychic life that fascinate Khan, and also make it modernist in tenor, given that the three things mentioned above - epiphany, dreaming, anti-mimetic painting - hover at the limits of representability.

**Masud Khan and Modernist Studies**

Khan claimed that he “coexist[ed] parallelly in multiple realities, external as well as internal”. The tension this entails is exemplified by his performance of a number of characters often in some contradiction. He tries to become, this thesis argues, a European modernist *par excellence* (smoking exquisite French cigarettes and collecting Braque lithographs from exclusive Parisian dealers). He also cultivates the image of ‘Prince Khan’, the carrier of his ‘feudal tradition’ in exile; and he was also, one commentator notes, impossibly other: “black, and rich, and having sex with white women”. We read that Khan was “never Europeanized”, but at the same time another commentator insists that he typifies “Savile Row with a dash of the Raj”, offering a somewhat different picture. This cross-cultural, contrapuntal, invocation of multiple characters and places

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51 *The Privacy of the Self*, p.125.

52 Khan, quoted in Hopkins, p.36.


in Khan’s staging of his own life expresses an attempt at cosmopolitan self-fash-
ing - an uneasy attempt to be, as Timothy Brennan might say, *At Home in the World* - that is strongly associated with the history of modernism, and it is this history to which Khan’s life offers some further illumination.

Khan’s writing offers an opportunity to explore a critical and political turn toward recuperating terms like cosmopolitanism and transnationalism. In one respect, careful consideration of the particularity of Khan’s historical positioning - the special reference points he has for his presentation of ethnicity, the ‘feudal’, and imperialism - is meant to address an anxiety about the rise of ‘transnationalism’ in the new modernist studies, a term that, as Urmila Seshagiri puts it, “has become modernism’s new racial byword, evoking an egalitarian boundary crossing that diffuses the particulars of race into broader discussion about nation and culture”.

I introduce Khan into this discussion because of the ramifications of his ambivalent approach to cosmopolitan style and its roots in the modernist writers he valorises. In a 1997 essay in the *Oxford Literary Review*, Julia Borossa takes Khan as demonstrative of the cultural, ethnic and geographical limits of psychoanalysis. For Borossa, Khan compounds clinical with textual transgressions, amounting to, in its eschewal of conventional modes of analytic writing, a wholesale rejection of the universalising aspects of the psychoanalytic project. I would like to add to Borossa’s discussion that it is modernist culture for Khan in particular that allows him to think through and act out this impossible tension. For this thesis, Khan also lives, and attempts to deploy, the boundary-making and breaking versions of ethnicity and community that reside within

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modernist literature. For Borossa, Khan expresses the limits of psychoanalytic hospitality - in my argument, his literary passions require us to reflect no less on the limits, or blind spots, of modernism too, especially with respect to T.S. Eliot’s and Joyce’s writings on race. The unpleasant political and racial sentiments Khan’s writing muster in its darkest moments are seen by this study as an opportunity to reflect on modernism’s complex legacy in the decades following decolonisation and World War Two.

Khan’s modernist version of cosmopolitanism and transnationalism, and the historical epoch in which his career sits (1946-1989), engages this piece of work with the emergent intellectual paradigm for modernist literary studies today - the ‘New Modernist Studies’. Douglas Mao and Rebecca Walkowitz’s 2008 PMLA article points towards its expansion: bringing literary texts into contact with parallel areas of intellectual and cultural activity (scientific discourse, popular culture, technological developments, pedagogy, psychoanalysis, medicine and psychiatry); expanding the geographical range of the modernist canon (experimental writing responding to colonial and anti-colonial intellectual movements across the globe, including non-anglophone vernacular modernisms); and broadening the temporal range of modernist studies both forward beyond the ‘end’ of modernism in the 1950s and backwards into the latter half of the nineteenth century. The fiercely modernist outlook of Khan’s work also enables us to see the work of the postwar Independent school of British psychoanalysis as being in dialogue with modernist culture; such an argument enriches existing accounts of Winnicott’s work which stress the centrality of Romanticism in his work (Glover (2009); Phillips (1988); and, most recently, Ffytche (2011)).


This study builds on such critical attempts to examine the political and historical junctures and disjunctures of the modernist project, which apprehend ‘alternative’ geopolitical and temporal articulations of modernism as they relate to decolonisation and race specifically. Khan’s modernism is, in one sense, utterly conventional: it focuses on the ‘traditional’ metropolitan centres of Euro-modernism (Paris, London) and orbits around its canonical figures (Joyce, Eliot, Woolf, Baudelaire, Picasso, Freud), whom it takes as uniquely descriptive of and responsive to modern experience as such. This modernism is compiled out of Kenner and the Leavisites, whose critical influence was entrenched in this period, and whose account of modernism has been more recently the subject of major critical revision. But this modernism is deployed by Khan in such unusual contexts and in relation to events and places so utterly foreign to it, that the result is a modernism made unfamiliar, politically and conceptually. Khan’s modernism is an uncanny ‘alternative’ one that appears out of a conventional articulation and location of the term. In sum, Masud Khan is a striking case study for the collision of European modernism and the legacy of decolonisation and migration in the postwar period.

Khan’s life, as I suggest in my examination of his library and art collection (chapter four), is organised around quite specific cultural and economic transactions, to which I apply psychoanalytic pressure by introduction of the languages of identification and possession. Especially relevant to this argument is Mao and Walkowitz’s claim that the new approaches in modernist studies
“engages with postcolonial theory and concerns itself with the interrelation of cultural, political and economic transactions”.

The New Modernist Studies emphasises “a variety of affiliations within and across national spaces”, which in Khan’s case call for the examination of his own ‘Joycean’ cosmopolitanism and complex ethnic and cultural self-identification as a ‘feudal’ “Rajput Indian”. The image of Masud Khan reading James Joyce in Lahore in 1945 is loaded with political and literary translations that address the critical framework described by Mao and Walkowitz. Indeed, the “cultural parataxis” that Susan Stanford Friedman argues is central to a geographically expanded version of modernist studies finds in that latter image of Khan an apt example of this work of juxtaposition and literary-political contiguity.

Indeed, the New Modernist Studies emphasises the expansiveness and range of modernist culture, geopolitically and temporally. My work on Khan expresses this reach.

Similarly, Nicholas Brown’s 2005 *Utopian Generations: The Political Horizon of Twentieth Century Literature* circumvents comparative frameworks in literary study by way of a re-constellation of African and Euro-modernist literatures.


60 Ibid.

“within a single framework in which neither of them will look the same”.62 Brown’s study is fascinated particularly by the ways in which both a “modernist tradition” and an “African tradition” are “violently opened up into world history”.63 My study of Khan wishes to examine the way his theory of the subject is split apart by world historical events in much the same way - anti-colonial struggle in Pakistan, immigration in the UK, the Holocaust - but with a crucial difference: Brown’s study seeks to coordinate African and British modernist writing into a totality such that neither can be thought without the presence of the other, entailing a degree of complementarity, however awkward. Khan’s modernism is partly an antagonistic response to the political realities of his time and expresses his desire to eschew it - reading Joyce in Lahore in 1945 and his European exile were part of a flight from that historical moment. Nevertheless, Khan’s modernism - the one that he appropriates in this incomplete project of becoming European - is a part of that history from which he attempts to take flight, and, in a way analogous to Brown’s study, the works that constitute this modernism will not appear totally familiar as a result of this encounter.

In bringing Khan under the purview of contemporary modernist and postcolonial studies I emphasise his non-paradigmatic characteristics and complicate our picture of these respective critical fields. By taking as its focus Khan himself, this study connects decolonisation in South Asia with the canonisation of modernism in Anglophone literary studies across the globe and contemporaneous debates about race and migration in the United Kingdom. A number of South Asian writers from the high modernist period have increasingly come to critical attention in modernist and postcolonial studies, and Khan’s work is understood here as adding another layer to a number of decades of interaction between literary and intellectual cultures in South Asia and the United Kingdom,


63 Ibid.
which often resulted in highly idiosyncratic and politically complex cultural
transactions.\textsuperscript{64}

Khan has an uneasy relationship with many of the established critical
categories and political virtues central to postcolonial studies since the 1980s: he
is not simply a ‘marginal’ figure (cultivating a position of huge cultural and
economic prestige as a genuine member of the \textit{rentier} class), despite the fact that
his ethnicity and religious background singled him out; nor does his superficial
hybridity prove politically resistant or redemptive. Indeed, as I argue in chapter
five, Khan’s cultivation of his exilic cosmopolitanism ties it to some especially
reactionary attitudes towards ethnicity and culture. This study argues for the
fundamental ambivalence of the work that emerges from Khan’s relationship
with modernist culture: it provides frameworks for his thinking that are radical
and creative, and yet also allows some of the most reactive political impulses in
his life and times to crystallise as well.

\textsuperscript{64} See, for example, Jessica Berman, ‘Comparative Colonialisms: Joyce, Anand, and the
question of Engagement’ in \textit{Modernism/Modernity} Vol.13, No.3 (2006), pp.465-485. Also,
Jessica Berman, ‘Neither Mirror nor Mimic’, \textit{The Oxford Handbook of Global Modernisms}
also, most recently, Rosemary George, \textit{Indian English and the Fiction of National Literature}
Chapter One

Epiphanic Psychoanalysis: Joyce in Khan’s Consulting Room

“Winnicott was very well aware”, Masud Khan writes in 1975, “that his concept of the transitional object had many close correspondences to some of the concepts in literature and art…the aesthetics of Mallarmé and Joyce’s concept of epiphany are trying to discuss the same type of human activity and experience.”¹ Khan is drawing on Donald Winnicott’s most famous psychoanalytic concept - that of transitional objects and transitional phenomena, which allow the infant to bridge the gap between their internal, imaginative world and the demands of a more durable external reality, and thus emerge as a person. Khan likens this to one of the more obscure aspects of James Joyce’s writing. But Khan’s suggestion is strange: despite evidently being a highly literate psychoanalytic writer, Winnicott does not once cite James Joyce in any of his collected writings or clinical papers. Masud Khan, however, does. In The Privacy of the Self from 1974 Khan frequently alludes to Joyce’s writing, and, more specifically, invokes his epiphanies as a model of the ‘Finding and Becoming of Self’ entailed in psychoanalytic clinical transformation. “The actualization of self-experience in the patient through the analytic situation”, Khan writes, “is very similar to what James Joyce in Stephen Hero christened as his epiphanies.”² It appears to be Khan, and not Winnicott, who is “very well aware” of the correspondence between modernist aesthetic theories and the ideas of British Object relations.

This chapter investigates the role Joyce’s epiphanies have in shaping Khan’s conception of psychoanalysis, especially the transformation such a con-


cept undergoes when it is brought into contact with the writing of Michael Balint, and Donald Winnicott, as well as Khan’s explicitly modernist reflections on anticipation, waiting and revelation in his work. By way of introduction, this chapter will also sketch Khan’s investment in Joyce as one whose writing and work embodies a special creative relationship to modernity, and accordingly occupies an important position in Khan’s conception of psychoanalysis. My focus on Khan’s epiphanies here begins to explicate the way in which Joyce functions in his writing. The production of psychoanalytic theory through Khan’s elaboration of his specific literary interests is a key aspect of this entire study.

**Masud Khan Reading James Joyce**

When did Masud Khan read James Joyce? His student copy of *Ulysses* aside, a key instance of his encountering Joyce is his MA thesis of 1945: ‘From Excitement to Epiphany: A Study of Joyce’s Development’. Whilst the document is seemingly lost, we have retained the title and Roger Willoughby, through careful archival work, has discovered the mark received by Khan for his work. According to Willoughby, Khan received a third-class degree for his MA, and a lower second-class for his BA, scoring 259 out of 400. Khan was academically mediocre at university - he passed but certainly did not excel, which somewhat undermines his own inflated claims for the reputed excellence of his academic work. His undergraduate degree, of which one year was spent at Government College in Lyallpur, was in Political Science, which he followed with an MA in English Literature in 1944-45 at the University of the Punjab, in Lahore itself. Khan claims that there were two copies – one that he kept himself and subsequently lost, and the other that he claimed to have sent to T.S. Eliot in

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4 Willoughby, n.24, p.259.
London.\textsuperscript{5} It does not help that Khan’s thesis is for the most part shrouded in contradiction and mystery. Judy Cooper, in her 1993 short book on Khan, claims that it was sent to Oxford because of its brilliance and was part of Khan’s application to Balliol College where he would study Modern Greats\textsuperscript{6} – a claim that is disputed by the records at Balliol and both Willoughby and Hopkins.\textsuperscript{7} Khan’s cousin, however, did attend Oxford, so there are reasonable grounds to assume some link between Khan and the College.\textsuperscript{8}

Khan’s time at university was the period in which he was introduced to European modernist literature. Indeed, in chapter two, I point to Khan’s copy of Eliot’s Harvard lecture sequence \textit{The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism} to identify this period in the 1940s (defining what Khan calls “the matrix of my sensibility”) as the one in which he first encounters, and builds an interest in, Eliot’s notion of tradition. But there are other tangible examples of his burgeoning interest in modernism in this decade. For instance, we might look to Khan’s library for his copy of a 1941 collection of modernist poetry (\textit{Modern Poets}), published by Chatto.\textsuperscript{9} The book ranges through the poetry of Eliot, Yeats, H.D., Dylan Thomas and D.H. Lawrence, amongst others. The flyleaf is marked with a

\textsuperscript{5} Linda Hopkins, \textit{False Self: The Life of Masud Khan} (London: Karnac, 2007), n.20, p.404. See also, Willoughby, p.25.


\textsuperscript{7} Hopkins, n.2, p.405.

\textsuperscript{8} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{9} Archived by his pupil Andreas Giannakoulos at the Hellenic Society of Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy (an organization whose foundation Giannakoulos was responsible for), Khan’s 3500 volumes have not yet been fully catalogued and organized. Of the 3,416 books that have been catalogued, 1,225 of them are literary works, criticism and theory. This should be compared to 655 books on psychoanalysis and psychology, and 255 books on philosophy, and makes a compelling case for the importance of the literary dimension of Khan’s psychoanalytic thought. Athens, Hellenic Society of Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy, Library of Masud Khan, \textit{Modern Poets} (London: Chatto & Windus, 1941).
quotation from Yeats’ poem *Byzantium*, found on page 11 of this book – “an agony of flame that cannot singe a sleeve” (32)\(^{10}\) – which was initially written in pencil then copied over with blue ink later, to preserve the original. The flyleaf also bears the ink-stamp of a Lahore bookseller: ‘THE MINVERVA BOOK SHOP. ANARKALI LAHORE’, and, on the front endpaper, a letter from ‘P.I.P.’ - Khan’s tutor P.I. Painter - to Khan has been pasted in:

My dear Masood,

Thank you so much for your letter + for so kindly sending the cigarettes, which I much appreciate.
My first free day now is 28\(^{th}\) – could I come in to [illegible] then – about 4.30? I was very sorry to miss you on Wednesday.
I managed to get hold of the enclosed for you. It contains some rather nice little poems.
All the best

Yours P I P

24.12.42\(^{11}\)

The dating of the letter shows it to be contemporaneous with Khan’s university career. The date in late December suggests, however, that it was not university term-time and that he may not therefore be in Lahore, but might presumably be on his family estate instead, hence Painter acquiring the book for him. Whilst the content of the letter is fairly banal, Khan’s preservation of it is telling and it suggests that Modernist writing here was an important point of connection for the young Khan and Painter. The letter that has been pasted in to the front of the book was a note attached to a parcel or envelope in which the book of poems arrived. It is revealing in and of itself that Khan kept this book of poems and letter until the end of his life, even when much of the same material would have been readily available and published elsewhere. This book of mod-


ernist poetry had some talismanic quality for Khan, and it is his encounters with modernist writing in these university years that lay the foundations of a ongoing fascination with that cultural movement. Joyce, for Khan, is especially prominent in Khan’s immersion in European modernism.

Khan’s engagement with Joyce’s work is multifaceted, sustained, and tied to the articulation of key concerns in his writing. In this first chapter I examine Khan’s translation of Joyce’s notion of epiphany into psychoanalytic theory and practice. First, I want to describe Khan’s positioning of Joyce in his historical and intellectual world, and that writer’s perceived relationship for Khan to modernist culture and modernity more generally: how he addresses, and embodies, what Khan in Hidden Selves terms “the crisis of consciousness that was to become the fate of modernism in our time”, that which produces the ‘Crisis of Psychotherapeutic Responsibility’. I examine this paper to demonstrate Khan’s installation of Joyce as the spokesman for, and diagnostician of, modern culture, as well as to show Khan’s stylistic, formal commitment to Joyce in his writing of ‘Joycean’ psychoanalysis. Following from this, then, will be a discussion of the Joycean epiphany as a theoretical model of psychoanalytic theory and practice.

What is modernism’s “crisis of consciousness”? This crisis, for Khan, is an ethical question of how the subject relates to her unconscious:

...As Freud’s thought permeates the sensibility of European cultures, a new situation actualizes with artists and painters. In Joyce’s pun, from Finnegans Wake, their preoccupation becomes: ‘Let us pry.’ And what they pried into was the unconscious. Gradually the awake and rational ego began to envy the dreaming ego with its access to the unconscious... The aim of the artists and writers became a frenzied pursuit of the unconscious. Joyce’s Finnegans Wake is the extreme, absurd and unique attempt to make language speak with the grammar of dreams: condensations, displacements, puns, inversions, disregard of temporal and spatial relations, etcetera. Freud’s therapeutic responsibility helped the patient
recall his repressed past into a significant self-narrative. With the Cubists, Dadaists and Surrealists, the narrative becomes utterly suspect. The artists strive to make of the image...an absolute space and reality from which they do not awaken themselves. Joyce was to claim: ‘Since 1922 my book has been a greater reality to me than reality.’ Molly Bloom’s nocturnal soliloquy, as it ends Ulysses, is a critical point in that crisis of consciousness which was to become the fate of Modernism in our times. Most creative effort was to become autotherapeutic and explore the dream-space.¹²

For Khan, this “crisis of consciousness” is a fetishization of the unconscious as a greater reality than everyday reality: the triumph of the inwardness of the dreaming experience over the intersubjective exchanges of everyday life. Such a critique of modernist art might be seen to bear superficial similarities to that advanced by Györg Lukács in The Meaning of Contemporary Realism. Conversely, what I suggest in my discussion of the epiphanic is that a re-reading of this discourse of inwardness through British Object Relations psychoanalysis brings such a phenomenon properly into the field of two-person psychology and thus resists such a critique.¹³ Whilst Khan raises the question of the relationship between aesthetics and ethics in a moment apparently seduced by the idea of the Freudian unconscious, it is to the figure of James Joyce that he ascribes the responsibility of articulating the problems, solutions and formal properties of this historical development. Joyce is quoted throughout the above in response to the problem or situation Khan describes. The preoccupation of the “writers and painters”, for instance, is explained by “Joyce’s pun, from Finnegans Wake...‘Let us Pry’”.¹⁴ The solipsistic non-awakening of the Cubists et al. is matched, predictably, by Joyce: “Joyce was to claim: ‘Since 1922 my book [Ulysses] has been a


¹³ The same is true, I argue, of Khan’s treatment of ‘privacy’, exile and the ‘hidden self’ in chapter three.

¹⁴ Hidden Selves, p.40.
greater reality to me than reality”. The hyperbolic climax follows in the next sentence: “Molly Bloom’s nocturnal soliloquy, as it ends *Ulysses*, is a critical point in that crisis of consciousness which was to become the fate of Modernism in our times”.

Khan sees Joyce’s exceptional status in *Finnegans Wake* too: the novel “is the extreme, absurd and unique attempt to make language speak with the grammar of dreams”. Joyce becomes, for Khan, both exception and rule for modernism and its crises – he personally exemplifies the challenges faced by the modern subject whilst, at the same time standing outside, offering the “diagnosis” and conveying the new “therapeutic responsibility” with an “epiphanic conundrum” from *Finnegans Wake*. Joyce, in this instance, figures the crisis in modernist subjectivity - victim to an idea of the unconscious that causes writers and artists to turn away from the world - and its cure, as a Freudian who articulates this new language of self-experience in writing. In Khan’s presentation of him, Joyce is exemplary of, and faithful to, in philosopher Alain Badiou’s terms, the ‘event’ of modernism, which is examined in the concluding paragraphs of this chapter.

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15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid., p.41.

But Joyce’s presence in this chapter is manifested by Khan in an unusual way. He writes, ostensibly, a chapter about Freud and psychoanalysis - the psychoanalyst features in the title - but written into it is a tension between Joyce and Freud where the latter is gradually supplanted by the former as the prime intellectual motivator in Khan’s argument. Indeed, Joyce “gives”, for Khan, the “diagnosis” of this crisis and the “new therapeutic responsibility” – his writing is medicalized, and such a gesture condenses and conflates the respective positions of the psychoanalyst and the writer. In the previous section of the paper, concerning Freud’s self-analysis and correspondence with Fliess, we are told that Freud “launched the twentieth century with a new humanistic vision”, but it is a vision haunted by Joyce’s language, supplementing Freud’s authority. The paper opens and closes with quotes from *Finnegans Wake* rather than Freud– the epigraph is “self-exiled in upon his ego”. When Khan describes Freud’s “heroic subjective experience” of his self-analyses in ‘Dreams and their Analytic Setting’ from *The Privacy of the Self* (also called an “heroic undertaking” in *Hidden Selves*), we are reminded of *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* or *Stephen Hero*. Indeed, Freud is called “heroic” three times in *The Privacy of the Self*, and 1897-1902 is described as an “heroic period in Freud’s life” in which he was “to expand his own consciousness in a way that would lead to a dramatic change henceforth in the consciousness of the human individual”. Freud’s self-analysis is viewed through Joyce’s modernist project of exilic self-invention,

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20 *Hidden Selves*, p.38.

21 Ibid., p.3,

22 *The Privacy of the Self*, p.29.

23 Ibid., p.107.
evocative of Stephen Daedalus drawing on “the only arms I allow myself to use - silence, exile and cunning”.24

Khan’s knowledge of and immersion in Joyce’s writing quickly becomes apparent – in ‘Montaigne, Rousseau and Freud’ from The Privacy of the Self, in which Khan rehearses much of the argument presented again in Hidden Selves, Khan describes Rousseau’s self-experience by way of “James Joyce’s phrase... ‘auto-mystic’.”25 This remark is demonstrative of careful researches into Joyce’s writing on Khan’s part – the ‘auto-mystic’ of whom Khan speaks is Richard Rowan, the protagonist of Joyce’s little-regarded 1917 play Exiles. Khan was evidently a careful and committed reader: it is only in the endnotes to the play that Rowan is described as such.

Khan invokes Joyce’s fictional metalanguage as a diagnostic tool. But more than this, Khan’s voice starts to emulate Joyce’s in Hidden Selves when he describes the “creative effort” of Modernism as “autotherapeutic”,26 inventing his own Joycean neologism in the process. Indeed, specific figures from Joyce’s writing are carried over into Khan’s case histories. In the following example, we can see how Joyce’s writing is invoked as a diagnostic tool; the specific therapeutic situation is construed in literary terms. Writing about the problems of the

24 James Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (London: Wordsworth Classics, 1992), p.181. Didier Anzieu notes, in his introduction to the English edition of Freud’s Self-Analysis, that it was Khan who instigated the translation of the volume, and to which he contributed an introduction. The study is remarkable in Anzieu’s insistence on the creative powers and possibilities inherent in Freud’s various “exiles”, and Joyce is explicitly mentioned and compared to Freud vis-a-vis creativity and experimentation in later life. Khan, in his introduction, notes that Freud “would flaunt his isolation” in another “heroic period”. See Didier Anzieu, Freud’s Self-Analysis, trans. by Peter Graham (London: Hogarth, 1986), pp.xii, p.3, p.86.

25 Privacy of the Self, p.111.

26 Hidden Selves, p.41.
false-self in a case history concerning a man who “operated as four distinct characters who were only tenuously held together”, the patient is

…very much like the hero in Joyce’s *Finnegans Wake*: ‘Here Comes Everybody’. It is one of the failures of personalization that the human being can be everybody and is a nobody.\(^{27}\)

**Epiphanic Psychoanalysis**

The “epiphanic conundrum” that Khan speaks of, though, is the most prominent aspect of Khan’s readings of James Joyce – his theory of the epiphany from *Stephen Hero* is crucial in Khan’s conception of psychoanalytic practice, and also provides the most concrete link to his reading of Joyce in Lahore from 1945. In his 1974 collection *The Privacy of the Self*, Khan writes:

The actualization of self-experience in the patient through the analytic situation is very similar to what James Joyce in *Stephen Hero* christened as his epiphanies.

Khan goes on to quote Joyce’s novel:

By an epiphany he meant a sudden spiritual manifestation, whether in the vulgarity of speech or of gesture or in a memorable phrase of the mind itself. He believed that it was for the man of letters to record these epiphanies with extreme care, seeing that they themselves are the most delicate and evanescent of moments.\(^{28}\)

In Khan’s version of psychoanalysis, the Joycean epiphany is that which is crucial to the ‘Finding and Becoming of Self’ – the title of this chapter in *The Privacy of the Self* – and is an alternative to the “logic of structural conflicts and data”

\(^{27}\) *Privacy of the Self*, p.185.

\(^{28}\) *Privacy of the Self*, p.296.
Khan feels characterizes the “patently classical situation” that relies on interpreting the vicissitudes of the drives.29 There are, according to Khan, two ways in which psychoanalysts interact with their patients:

1) Listening to what the patient verbally communicates, in the patently classical situation as it has evolved, and deciphering its meaning in terms of structural conflicts (ego, id and superego).

2) Through a psychic, affective, and environmental holding of the person of the patient in the clinical situation, I facilitate experiences that I cannot anticipate or program, any more than the patient can. When these actualize, these are surprising, both for the patient and for me, and release quite unexpected new processes in the patient.30

There is no ‘I’ or other personal pronoun in the first definition. Khan grounds his own voice in the second “style of relating”. This psychoanalytic epiphany is further likened by Khan to Michael Balint’s notion of ‘the new beginning’, alongside its Joycean heritage. Khan’s critique of what he terms “the patently classical situation” is conducted through a complex blending of Joyce’s epiphanies and a reading of Balint’s classic work The Basic Fault: Therapeutic Aspects of Regression.

Balint’s 1968 book offers a summation of thirty years of clinical theory and practice. The book ostensibly addresses what Balint considers to be a lack of understanding of regression within the analytic setting due to the lack of a proper differential diagnosis and a standard labeling of everything in both transference and regression as ‘primitive’. The ‘new beginning’, as Balint sees it, is a regressed state in which early styles of productive relating to the mother crystallize, and “lead to a changed relationship to the patient’s objects of love and hate”. It also means:

29 Ibid., p.295.

30 Ibid.
(a) Going back to something ‘primitive’, to a point before the faulty development started, which could be described as a regression, and (b), at the same time, discovering a new, better-suited, way which amounts to a progression.\(^{31}\)

The new beginning period, for Balint, entails a change in libido structure\(^{32}\) and should be differentiated from regression in the classical sense – “a process entirely within the individual’s mind” – because it belongs “to the field of two-person psychology”.\(^{33}\) The new beginning proper requires a mutuality and reciprocity that is not a part of the normal idea of regression: “an individual feels that nothing harmful in the environment is directed towards him, and, at the same time, nothing harmful in him is directed towards the environment”.\(^{34}\) The “real new discovery” of the new beginning for Balint is the instigation of a two-way process (“he was able to shed all sorts of character and defensive armours”\(^{35}\)) and the discovery of the analyst as a real object rather than the purveyor of interpretations. This relationship of subject-world-object means that this special form of regression is better characterised as sharing the attributes of Winnicott’s “transitional space”, to which Khan explicitly likens Joyce’s epiphanies in his introduction to *Through Paediatrics to Psychoanalysis*.

The analyst, in Balint’s account, is instead “a safe object in whose presence a patient could and might indulge in childish pleasures”. Indeed, Balint notes, “interpretation is…experienced as interference, cruelty, unwarranted


\(^{32}\) Ibid., p.131.

\(^{33}\) Ibid., p.135.

\(^{34}\) Ibid.

\(^{35}\) Ibid.
demand or unfair impingement, as a hostile act” \(^{36}\) when dealing with the regressed patient. When Joyce writes in *Finnegans Wake* of the “grisly old Syko” who “did our unsmiling bit on ‘alices when they were yung and easily freudened”, \(^{37}\) we can see how a concern with the cruelty and mastery of the aggressively interpreting psychoanalyst emerges in both Joyce and Balint’s writing. According to this view analysts who “freudened” their patients destroy a primitive pre-Oedipal environment in which mutuality and exchange is possible. For Khan too, interpretation also contains a persecutory dimension, hence his insistence on respecting the ‘private’ or ‘hidden’ dimension of the self. \(^{38}\)

Crucially, in this particular instance of the case history Balint offers, these regressed moments that are shared with the analyst are not acting-out but rather the crystallization of an impossible desire and joy. In the clinical vignette offered here, the young woman patient literally performs a somersault in the presence of the analyst, symbolically and physically overcoming psychic obstacles. This ‘unobtrusive analyst’ that Balint theorizes towards the end of the book offers an “essential” “participation in the external world, of the object” to the patient that they can use to “get on with his internal problems”. \(^{39}\) For Balint, it is through the intervention of the external world that internal problems can be addressed; a process that in turn generates a new relation to the external world itself. The new beginning state is also marked, for Balint, by a period of mourning for the narcissistic image of oneself which “develops as an over-compensation for the

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\(^{36}\) *The Basic Fault*, p.175.


\(^{38}\) Khan speaks in *The Privacy of the Self* of a patient who “felt every interpretation as an attack or cruel injunction compelling them to do and be what they felt utterly unable to do and be.” *Privacy of the Self*, p.84. In *Hidden Selves* he notes accordingly: “No patient is totally knowable as a person, to himself or the analyst. And this final privacy is, perhaps, what we should never transgress clinically.” *Hidden Selves*, p.180.

\(^{39}\) *The Basic Fault*, p.142.
basic fault” – for Khan’s epiphanic psychoanalysis this is a key point as it sug-
gests a real epiphany must entail a renunciation of solipsistic narcissism - in his
assessment of modernism, a greedy pursuit of the internal world - and a re-
drawing of the boundaries of the self.⁴⁰

The new beginning actualises a new kind of object relating (in which the
object affects the subject as much as the subject uses the object) because of a
frustration with the limits of what interpretation itself can achieve clinically. He
writes,

…on many occasions I have found to my annoyance and despair that
that words cease to be reliable means of communication when the analyt-
ic work reaches the areas beyond the Oedipal level. The analyst may try,
as hard as he can, to make his interpretations clear and unequivocal; the
patient, somehow, always manages to experience them as something ut-
terly different from that which the analyst intended them to be.⁴¹

When dealing with the pre-oedipal, which for Balint is the psychic space from
which any kind of libido reorganization must emerge, the traditional psychoan-
alytic interventions becomes ineffective. In the realm of the pre-oedipal, and in-
deed the pre-verbal,

Words – at these periods – cease to be vehicles for free association; they
have become lifeless, repetitious and stereotyped; they strike one as an
old worn-out gramophone record, with the needle running endlessly in
the same groove. By the way, this is equally as often true about the ana-
lysts’s interpretations.⁴²

Both the analyst and patient are faced with “a confusion of tongues”, an empty
speech evocative of the moment in Analysis Terminable and Interminable when

⁴⁰ Ibid., p.183, n.1.
⁴¹ Ibid., pp.174-175.
⁴² Ibid., p.175.
Freud writes of “the sense of repeated wasted effort, the feeling that you are preaching to ‘thin air’”.43

“Words become”, Balint writes, “unreliable and unpredictable”: the traditional interpretive power of the analyst of what Balint calls “the classical ‘massive’ centre” is compromised.44 The “standard technical advice” is for the analyst to understand what lies behind the patient’s words – Balint here suggests the material can be “tolerated so that it may remain incoherent, nonsensical, unorganized”.45 The regressed patient suffers because of the psychoanalytic theoretical orthodoxy as regards regression – “the general impression is that of bleakness and stagnation” – where theorists such as Greenacre, De Groot and Arlow “go on faithfully and monotonously repeating the eternal connections between fixation and regression, already described by Freud”.46 The psychoanalysts in question sound as if their words, like those of the regressed patient of whom meaningful free association is demanded, are also worn-out gramophone records.

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43 ‘Analysis Terminable and Interminable’ from Sigmund Freud, *Wild Analysis* trans. Alan Bance (London: Penguin, 2002), p.206. Here Balint also alludes to Sandor Ferenczi’s influential paper ‘Confusion of the Tongues between the Adults and the Children’, in which Ferenczi argues that regressive trances in traumatised patients will be unresponsive to the analyst’s intellectual explanations, in a situation that stems ultimately from the mis-reading of children’s play by pathological adults as inviting a sexual advance. The repercussions of such an incident is severe, as the misuse of the relationship leads the child to introject the guilty feelings of the adult and mis-characterise play as a punishable activity, which they ultimately deserved, as well as developing psychoses and mechanical, automatistic behaviours later in life. The confusion of tongues arises from this misuse of children’s play by the adult, and the child’s alienation from this experience, in which the figure of the unpunished aggressor shatters the child’s “confidence in the testimony of his senses”. Sandor Ferenczi, ‘The Confusion of Tongues Between the Adults and the Child’, *International Journal of Psychoanalysis* (1949), 30, p.228.

44 *The Basic Fault*, p.175.


46 Ibid.
The Joycean Epiphany

With this in mind, Khan’s engagement with Joyce’s writing occupies then a unique position in the history of encounters between James Joyce and psychoanalysis. Khan’s object-relations legacy, when combined with the Joycean epiphany, demands a rethinking of both Joycean aesthetics and psychoanalytic practice. Luke Thurston, in ‘Scotographia: James Joyce and Psychoanalysis’, offers a useful overview of the meeting of Joyce and psychoanalysis, and it is into this history of encounters that we should insert Khan. Khan’s conflation and confusion of the figures of Freud and Joyce in Hidden Selves is fittingly mirrored, as Thurston reports, by Joyce’s own humorous acknowledgement that “Joyce meant the same thing in English as Freud in German”. For Thurston, the critical desire to link Freud and Joyce, who appear as each other’s uncanny doubles, leads to a “suggestive contention: that both psychoanalysis and Joycean writing are uncanny, self-conflicted participants in a “clearobscure” coincidence of modernity and traditional morality, of enlightenment and obscurity”. This “clearobscure” coincidence is a good way of approaching this discussion of the psychoanalytic epiphany: epiphany exists at the limits of symbolic articulation, and the clinical transformations it describes cannot be easily figured by the psychoanalytic writer; yet at the same time, this unprogrammable event has a definite presence and is turned by Khan into a principle of psychoanalytic activity. Additionally, this “clearobscure” coincidence of Freud and Joyce also describes the blurred and complex relationship those two writers have in the formulation of Khan’s theoretical ideas: such a confluence of modernist culture and psychoanalytic investigation is characteristic of all Khan’s ideas examined in this thesis.


48 Ibid.
Thurston’s chapter discusses Jung’s correspondence with Joyce (and Joyce’s subsequent resistance to going into psychoanalysis with him) as well as Lacan’s writing on Joyce from his Seminar of 1976 titled Le Sinthome. We can see the originality of Khan’s vision of ‘epiphanic psychoanalysis’, and the implications of thinking epiphany as a phenomenon belonging to the realm of two-person psychology by turning briefly to Jung’s critique of Joyce. Writing in ‘Ulysses: A Monologue’, Jung suggests that Joyce’s novel is “a drama without eyewitnesses”, a “solipsistic isolation”, a book that is empty of anything except itself – “I suspect that Joyce does not wish to ‘represent’ anything”.49 Thurston rightly identifies Jung’s puzzling reading of the novel, which disregards the realist style opening the Telemachiad and tendency towards mimesis, even within Bloom’s early fragmentary monologues. Joyce’s aim, as Thurston suggests, was not to “defeat” readerly intelligence, as Jung claims, but rather to stimulate different kinds.50 This way of seeing the epiphanic makes it a pretext for the transitional or ‘transformational’ experience. Jung’s critique of Ulysses as a book that does not “want to tell me something, to be understood” is disputed by Khan’s reading of Joyce’s epiphanies, as he puts it in his introduction to Through Paediatrics to Psychoanalysis, as having “distinctly the quality of the transitional object”, assimilating “the imagined to the concretely found”.51 In other words: bringing into dialogue, and disputing the opposition of, internal and external worlds.

Joyce’s epiphanies, as they appear in his shorter writings and longer prose projects, have been widely discussed, both as narrative devices within the particular works and as an aesthetic theory (as they are presented in Stephen

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid.

51 Through Paediatrics to Psychoanalysis, p.xx.
Hero, Joyce’s autobiographical draft for *A Portrait of the Artist*). Robert Scholes’ classic paper on the subject from 1964 chronicles the sustained interest in Joyce’s epiphanies from the appearance of the manuscript of *Stephen Hero* in 1941. scholes’ subsequent collaboration with Florence Walzl in *PMLA* provided the critical framework for further discussion of this particular aesthetic phenomenon in Joyce’s work, influencing studies such as Morris Beja’s *Epiphany in the Modern Novel*, published three years before *The Privacy of the Self*. although Joyce criticism in the last two decades has, broadly speaking, disputed the centrality of epiphany in Joyce’s project in favour of poststructuralist, postcolonial, and feminist readings of the author, epiphany has seen renewed interest in recent years. contemporary with this thesis is Michael Sayeau’s striking account of the Joycean epiphany in his 2013 *Against the Event*, arguing epiphanies represent “performative theorisations of modern narrative form and its limits” posing an ironic “conjunction of concealment and self-revelation”.

Amongst these recent critical accounts Vicki Mahaffey offers an excellent summary of the different manifestations of the epiphany in an article on Joyce’s shorter writings. Mahaffey identifies two types of epiphanies in Joyce’s writing: ‘dramatic’, which “reduce the stature of those around [the narrator]”, and narrative, which “celebrate the power of the author’s mind”. Both, for Mahaffey, serve to “present the nascent artist as inevitable Hero”.


54 *Against the Event*, p.192.


56 Ibid.
nies as a key part of the process of aesthetic creation for Joyce is generally agreed by critics to have been abandoned by the time he writes *Ulysses* and certainly by *Finnegans Wake* – even in the drafts of *A Portrait of the Artist* Joyce expunges the term ‘epiphany’ and refers the these heightened moments of aesthetic apprehension as moments of ‘stasis’.57 Khan swims against this critical current somewhat by positing the appearance of an epiphany in *Finnegans Wake*, leading us to the conclusion that Khan has a radically different notion of the narrative epiphany, tied to the earlier Joyce who composed *Stephen Hero*. Mahaffey identifies the post-*Portrait* epiphany as “a rare balance of spirit and matter, imagination and observation, an evenness of apprehension” as opposed to “a semi-religious celebration of the spirit’s ability to manifest itself through matter”.58 The emphasis shifts away from the object in the epiphany and towards what Liesl Olson believes to be an escape from the everyday experience and matter evinced by Stephen Dedalus’ solipsism. Olson offers, in her 2009 work *Modernism and the Ordinary*, the ‘lists’ of Leopold Bloom as democratic, inclusive and celebratory of everyday experience as an alternative to the self-aggrandizing epiphanies of Stephen Dedalus.59

Khan, though, is interested in the Joyce of *Stephen Hero* and the theory of epiphany contained therein. The nature of the object in the theory of epiphany we see in *Stephen Hero* is well worth examining, particularly in this passage:

First we recognize that the object is one integral thing, then we recognize that it is an organized composite structure, a **thing** in fact…we recognize that it is **that** thing which it is. Its soul, its whatness, leaps to us from the vestment of its appearance. The soul of the commonest object, the struc-

57 Ibid., p.178.

58 Ibid., p.179.

ture of which is so adjusted, seems to us radiant. The object achieves its
epiphany.60

The recognition of the object that Joyce is interested in here runs counter to the
epiphanies later in his work that Olson suggests he is “deflating” or ironizing as
an escape from the everyday. On the contrary, it is the whatness or realness of
the object that impinges on the viewing subject or author. The object is given a
“soul” that has the agency to “leap” to “us” from the vestment of its appear-
ance. The object has depth that goes beyond mere “vestment” and surface func-
tion. The object, rather than the solipsistic viewing subject, “achieves” the
epiphany, a moment at which the object articulates and addresses itself to the
subject in a reciprocal process.

The early epiphanies, too, would have been of interest to Khan because
of their more explicitly psychoanalytic character — indeed, the release of un-
conscious tensions and thoughts we read about in Balint’s new beginning and
Khan’s vision of the therapeutic epiphany seem remarkably similar to Stanis-
laus Joyce’s description of his brother’s early work:

Jim always had a contempt for secrecy, and these notes were in the be-
going ironical observations of slips, and little errors and gestures –
mere straws in the wind – by which people betrayed the very things they
were most careful to conceal…The revelation and importance of the sub-
conscious had caught his interest.61

The object that has its epiphany is both ‘discovered’ by the subject and leaps out
to him, and it is this transitional dimension that is crucial to Khan’s reading of
Joyce. It is productive to compare this moment in Joyce’s thought with Winni-
cott’s writing on transitional phenomena and Christopher Bollas’ own re-read-
ing of Winnicott in The Shadow of the Object. For Winnicott, the transitional object


61 Mahaffey, p.178.
is that which the infant ‘discovers’ in the external world, but also invents in a legitimate experience of omnipotence: “It comes from without from our point of the baby, but not so from the point of view of the baby. Neither does it come from within; it is not a hallucination”. The object is very much one from the external world, but the infant’s dynamic relationship with it means that it is invested or cathected in such a way that the infant treats it as fundamentally personal. Winnicott notes paradoxically – given the title of his paper from Playing and Reality, ‘Transitional Objects and Transitional Phenomena’ – “it is not the object, of course, that is transitional. The object represents the infant’s transition from a state of being merged with the mother to a state of being in relation to the mother as something outside and separate”. This transitional space relies on the unpredictability and contingency of the mother’s behaviour as a real, subjective being in order to communicate her *whatness*. The gradual process of disillusionment that mothering entails for Winnicott involves a coming to terms with the reality of an object and a gradual lessening of a certain amount of omnipotence, though this is psychically damaging if the capacity to “imaginatively elaborate” objects in the external world is lost with it. For Winnicott, this phantasmatic elaboration of the object is the “true meaning of the word ‘cathect’.”

**Epiphany and the Transitional Space**

We can see such a description of the object world more distinctly by turning to the contemporary analyst Christopher Bollas’ concept of the transformational object. Bollas was analysed and trained by Khan - Bollas wrote Khan’s obituary for the Guardian on the occasion of his death - and his work belongs

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63 Ibid., pp.19-20.

64 Ibid.
properly to the Winnicottian Independent tradition in British psychoanalysis. The concept of the transformational object is an extension of Winnicott’s theorisation of the transitional object, and helps to indicate the latent connections in Khan’s thought between aesthetic experience and the transitional character of the mother/child relationship: epiphany in Khan, in other words, bridges these two areas of intellectual inquiry. One of Bollas’ keenest examples of the transformational object is indeed an aesthetic object, Melville’s *Moby Dick*, on which Bollas wrote his PhD and which retains for him an evocative psychic power throughout his life.\(^{65}\)

In *The Shadow of the Object*, Bollas’ first book, the mother is the figure that facilitates bodily- and psychic development and exploration in the child; she becomes a “signifier of transformation”, an object whose function is “to transform the self”.\(^{66}\) For adults, “the object is pursued in order to surrender to it as a medium that alters the self”,\(^{67}\) and the psychoanalytic process is exemplified by the “anticipation of being transformed by an object”.\(^{68}\) In such powerful aesthetic experiences – Bollas sees the function of mothering and the function of aesthetic experience as coterminous – the object becomes a “process”, engendering a new experience of lived reality (in chapter three, I argue that Khan’s copy of *Ulysses* functions in this way, and that this is evident across his work). Bollas writes in a clinical example,

> My interpretations were appreciated less for their content, and more for their function as structuring experiences. He rarely recalled the content

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\(^{66}\) Ibid., p.13.

\(^{67}\) Ibid., p.15.

\(^{68}\) Ibid.
of an interpretation. What he appreciated was the sense of relief brought to him by my voice.\textsuperscript{69}

What I am suggesting in this comparison between Winnicott, Balint, Bollas and Joyce’s theory of the epiphany, is that Khan sees in Joyce’s modernist aesthetic a latent theory of object-relations. The epiphany, as Khan sees it theorized in \textit{Stephen Hero}, has the character of a transitional and transformational phenomenon. Khan’s combination of British object-relations theory and Joycean aesthetics is striking because it makes the analyst responsible for an experience that is spontaneous and unpredictable. Khan writes, “I facilitate experiences that I cannot anticipate or program, any more than the patient can. When these actualize, these are surprising, both for the patient and for me, and release quite unexpected new processes”.\textsuperscript{70} Similarly, he notes in a discussion of Winnicott’s Squiggle games that the therapeutic process is geared towards “a critical moment which is unanticipatable and has an element of surprise in it”.\textsuperscript{71} Such moments are crucial because “only from there is it possible for Winnicott to know whether the interview will work towards a positive or negative end”.\textsuperscript{72} Khan’s interpretation of Winnicott’s practice puts an epiphanic revelation at the heart of his therapeutic method. Indeed, this imagination of the object-world acknowledges in objects and patients a degree of autonomy and freedom, with the capacity to operate in ways that exceed the bonds of a strict theoretical framework, or rigid clinical programme.

\textsuperscript{69} Ibid., p.21.

\textsuperscript{70} \textit{Privacy of the Self}, p.291.

\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., p.265.

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid.
Khan asks the reader, as Winnicott would, to “tolerate the paradox”\textsuperscript{73}: the role of the psychoanalyst is to create a state of waiting or anticipation that has a foreknowledge of its own eventual dissolution by an unpredictable, spontaneous event. Khan highlights the experience of surprise and contingency that marks out the epiphany – Joyce’s “sudden spiritual manifestation” – as well as Balint’s new beginning, or the character of Winnicott’s transitional space, as unique and potentially transformative. Khan’s clinical duty is to respond in an appropriate manner to what Joyce calls these “most delicate and evanescent of moments”, making the psychoanalyst also subject to Joyce’s injunction to the “man of letters”, who should “record these epiphanies with extreme care”, implicating both the writing of case histories, and the responses to individual patients in the consulting room, in problems of representation.

**Epiphany, Waiting and Modernism**

Introducing Joyce’s work into this discussion, however, raises the question of the link between narrative anticipation, form and unpredictability. In other words, Khan’s introduction of the Joycean epiphany into his theory of clinical practice moves this discussion of psychoanalytic therapy into the realms of temporality and narratology. In Khan’s modernism, the aesthetics of surprise and anticipation are representations of the essential experiences of modernity, particularly with respect to Joyce. Eliot, in *Ulysses, Order and Myth* describes Joyce’s 1922 novel as having given him “all the surprise, delight, and terror I could require”, admiring its spontaneous character here, just as Eliot’s essay is also remarkable for its insistence on Joyce’s discipline, organization and “mythic method” (in this respect, it is striking that Eliot wishes to somehow find a frame that can contain, and render meaningful, such powerful and spontaneous

\textsuperscript{73} Playing and Reality, p.xvi.
feelings).\textsuperscript{74} This experience is detailed further in Eliot’s essay on Dante from 1929, where he praises the “quality of surprise which Poe declared to be essential to poetry.”\textsuperscript{75} Eliot, going on, describes this exemplary experience of poetry on the next pages:

The experience of a poem is the experience both of a moment and of a lifetime. It is very much like our intenser experiences of other human beings. There is a first, or an early moment which is unique, of shock and surprise, even of terror…a moment which can never be forgotten, but is never repeated integrally; and yet which would become destitute if it did not survive in a larger whole of experience; which survives inside a deeper and calmer feeling.\textsuperscript{76}

The overlap, then, between modernist literature and Khan’s version of psychoanalysis hinges here on the play of narrative waiting and surprising, contingent interventions like the epiphany. Nevertheless, as Eliot shows here, also crucial to this experience of surprise is the formation of a language that can allow the epiphanic experience to survive or be articulated.

Khan devotes plenty of attention in his writing to the theorization of the states of waiting and anticipation in psychoanalysis and culture. Indeed, we must see such writings as crucial given the importance Khan ascribes to the facilitating of the epiphany, the creation of what Michael Balint calls the “unsuspecting arglos state”.\textsuperscript{77} However, the waiting in which epiphany could crystallize is a particular and only very carefully contrived state. Writing in his last book, \textit{When Spring Comes: Awakenings in Clinical Psychoanalysis}, Khan explores Eliot’s \textit{Murder in the Cathedral} to articulate two different forms of waiting – one


\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., p.216.

\textsuperscript{77} \textit{The Basic Fault}, p.138.
positive—“suspense”—and one negative—“absence”: “waiting and suspense are positive spaces and absence is the negative vitiating agent”.

Indeed, the final chapter of *When Spring Comes*, titled ‘The Long Wait’ (also the title of the book in the United States) is a case history that details a long-term analysis with a patient and the clinical ‘waiting’ for her realization of her own independence and capacity for self-experience (“hers”, Khan writes, “had been a long wait”). The ‘clinical awakenings’ in the subtitle of his last book are contingent on an experience of waiting whose provision is the therapeutic responsibility of the psychoanalyst. The epiphanic revelation that offers a climax to this state is, however, not momentary or fleeting – the “task” which “cannot be escaped or shirked”, is “to bear witness”. It should be noted that this operation that is comparable to that of Joyce’s “man of letters” whose duty it is to record “delicate and evanescent” epiphanies.

By way of example, Khan turns to Eliot’s *Murder in the Cathedral* in order to identify what he considers the transformation of the ‘intent’ waiting into “a taut confrontation of demand and counter-demand.” This verse-drama from 1936 describes the events leading up to the murder of Thomas Becket, with a chorus of women arguing with a cast of priests. It is described by Khan as “the ever-proliferating and harassed anguish of the last thirty-six years of European man and cultures”. The static nature of the arbitrary exchanges of demands between the priests and the all-female chorus is in Khan’s account the death of


79 Ibid., p.195.

80 Ibid., p.194.

81 Ibid., p.192.

82 Ibid., p.193.
any possibility for change – “We do not wish for anything for to happen”,
cries Eliot’s chorus.

For Khan, the transformation of the ‘intent’ waiting – a situation in which the capacity “to bear witness” can crystallize into a meaningful symbolic expression – into habit is a feature characteristic of modernity that impoverishes the experience of the self:

The words have become ritualized in their thoughts; they have merely a sedative soporific effect now. Habit has evened out the sharp edges of intent waiting.

Such a treatment of language, and the form of waiting it engenders, kills the possibility for unexpected and unprogrammable experiences of creativity that Khan’s version of psychoanalysis emphasizes. Whilst Khan’s writing only twice touches on the work of Samuel Beckett, it is crucial that it is earlier on in When Spring Comes that he references Beckett’s work on Proust, writing in a case history, “I have to guard against what Samuel Beckett so neatly phrases as perceptions ‘distorted into intelligibility’”. The book on Proust contains the famous disquisition on ‘habit’ to which we can be certain Khan alludes:

The laws of memory are subject to the more general laws of habit. Habit is a compromise effected between the individual and his environment, or between the individual and his own organic eccentricities, the guarantee of a dull inviolability, the lightning-conductor of his existence. Habit is the ballast that chains the dog to his vomit. Breathing is habit. Life is habit... Habit then is the generic term for the countless treaties conclud-

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83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
85 See Hidden Selves, p.108. See also When Spring Comes, p.57.
86 When Spring Comes, p.57.
ed between the countless subjects that constitute the individual and their countless correlative objects.\textsuperscript{87}

In Beckett’s writing on Proust his interest in habit as the repeated “projection of the individual’s consciousness” on the everyday is taken from Schopenhauer rather than psychoanalytic thought, even though the paper was written four years before Beckett entered analysis in London with Wilfred Bion. Whilst not having the space to allow Beckett a full exposition here, or to read the passage in a Winnicottian manner - though his talk of “periods of transition” that “represent the perilous zones in the life of the individual” is extremely suggestive – we should note the clear connections between Khan’s analysis of Eliot and Beckett’s reading of Proust. In Beckett’s account, ‘habit’ is contrasted with the “suffering of being: that is, the free play of every faculty”. We can see the germ of what Khan would rephrase as “the actualization of self-experience” and Balint would term “a change in libido structure”, where their version of psychoanalysis aims to capitalize on these “perilous zones” that Beckett calls “dangerous, precarious, painful, mysterious and fertile”.

Returning to Khan’s writing, Eliot’s account of waiting prompts him to suggest, “the individual, in these spaces of waiting and suspense, has to programme himself”.\textsuperscript{88} This self-programming, in psychoanalytic terms, is only possible through a collective act of bearing witness by both analyst and patient. This is the productive alternative to a more stultified experience, for Khan, an agonized waiting that collapses into a stalemate of demands “in which no autonomy is possible”.\textsuperscript{89} In the face of this crisis, “there are no remedies”, according to Khan. The only “relief possible” is to “see the dire predicament with a


\textsuperscript{88} \textit{When Spring Comes}, p.194.

\textsuperscript{89} Ibid., p.193.
clarity of words”, an injunction to aesthetic invention that reflects Joyce’s injunction to the “man of letters” from earlier.

In a short paper from *Hidden Selves*, Khan similarly explores the creative and therapeutic possibilities for waiting in ‘On Lying Fallow’. This area of self-experience is one that is not “one of inertia, listless vacancy or idle quietism of soul; nor is it a flight from harassed purposiveness or pragmatic action”, but rather what Khan calls “a transitional state…a mode of being that is alerted quietude and receptive wakeful lambent consciousness”. It is worth reflecting on the open-endedness of the state Khan is describing here – on the one hand it bears extremely strong comparison with the *arglos* state of receptivity that Balint sees as ideal for the crystallization of a ‘new beginning’, a state of suspense that the “man of letters” could optimize in order to record epiphanies, or be receptive to them. Having the requisite “strength and vigour of sensibility needed to sustain that state of free-floating animation” is for Khan one of the main challenges of creative production that this “fallow mood” can facilitate – Khan also refers to it as a “preparatory state”. Even though Khan insists that the fallow mood is more conducive to painting rather than “verbal articulation” – he claims that Miro, Braque, Leger, and Picasso expressed “states of transitional experience” derived from “lying fallow rather than from dream states” – the open, transitional character of the state would logically make it receptive to seeing the *whatness* of the object in epiphanic experience. The fallow mood, though, for Khan, is also equally as valuable when nothing should crystallize from it, making the subject paradoxically both open to transitional relating and closed

90 Ibid., p.194.

91 *Hidden Selves*, p.183.

92 Ibid., p.184.

93 Ibid.

94 Ibid.
off too – it is also “a reduced relatedness” and requires a “tolerance of non-communication”. The ‘potential space’ of this state (to borrow another phrase from *Hidden Selves*) is remarkably similar to the open-ended possibilities of the relationship between mother and child in Winnicott’s classic paper ‘The Capacity to be Alone’.

The literary element of this line of thought can be elucidated if we turn to one of Khan’s close friends and associates, Frank Kermode. Writing in his seminal study *The Sense of an Ending*, Kermode articulates this relationship between narrative surprise (‘peripeteia’) and the feelings of realness or whatness that we encounter in Khan’s clinical narrative. “Peripeteia”, Kermode writes, “is present in every story of the least structural sophistication. Now peripeteia depends on our confidence of the end; it is a disconfirmation followed by a consonance”. It is not difficult to envisage this in psychoanalytic terms as regards the expectations of the patient – the analyst intervenes in an unexpected way in the self-narrative of their therapy, but both must maintain a “confidence of the end” (in Freud’s *Wolfman*, for instance, Freud sets a definite point in time for the termination of the treatment). The nature of the peripeteia is crucial for Kermode in terms of its realness:

The more daring the peripeteia, the more we may feel that the work respects our sense of reality; and the more certainly we shall feel that the fiction under consideration is one of those which, by upsetting the ordi-

95 Ibid.


nary balance of our expectations, is finding something out for us, something *real*.\(^9^9\)

The nature of the surprise, and the more serious the shock on offer, is convincingly in tune with “our sense of reality”. The bigger the surprise, the more likely it is that the novel (or the psychoanalyst) is “finding something out for us, something *real*”.\(^9^9\)

In ‘Some Motifs in Baudelaire’, Benjamin identifies that “Shock is among those experiences that have assumed decisive importance for Baudelaire’s personality”,\(^1^0^0\) and draws a line from this to Proust’s *memoire involuntaire* and the over-stimulated, assaulted ego of Freud’s *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*. The function of consciousness, rather than being the preservation of memory traces, is “protection against shocks”.\(^1^0^1\) Freud describes the “excessive energies at work in the external world” – the *whatness* of different things acquires here a realness that is deadly and uncomfortable, from which we must be shielded – “which tend towards an equalization of potential and hence toward destruction”.\(^1^0^2\) The threat from these energies, for Benjamin, is “one of shocks”.\(^1^0^3\)

For both Kermode and Benjamin, the severity of the shock is proof of contact with reality, or at least parts of reality that are too severe or traumatic to be defended against by consciousness. Khan, fittingly, also writes on Baudelaire in ‘Freud and the Crisis of Psychotherapeutic Responsibility’, and chooses to

\(^9^9\) Ibid.


\(^1^0^1\) Freud, cited by Benjamin, *Illuminations*, p.161.

\(^1^0^2\) Ibid.

\(^1^0^3\) Ibid.
describe *Les Fleurs du Mal* as having “shocked” and “scandalized” Paris.\textsuperscript{104} The “new direction” in aesthetics that Khan attributes to Baudelaire’s work in his essay relies on a “new epistemology [of self-experience]” where “narrative is replaced by intense and instant lucidities”\textsuperscript{105} – the similarities with Joyce’s early experimentation with the short form of the epiphany are readily apparent here, certainly connecting to the “moment of fullness or passion” that Richard Ellmann feels typifies the epiphanic experience.\textsuperscript{106} For Balint and Khan, however, such “fullness” belongs not to the isolated richness of an individual psyche but rather has a transitional character necessarily including an intersubjective interaction: its “fullness” is derived from its belonging properly to the field of two-person psychology.

Because of this insistence on the centrality of the subject-object dialectic in these accounts, neither Joyce’s version of the epiphany from *Stephen Hero* nor Khan’s ‘epiphanic’ psychoanalysis can be reduced to a solipsistic heroism – the arrival of the epiphany is for Khan an “…experience I cannot anticipate or program”. Because of its mutuality and reciprocity, the ‘shock’ of epiphany cannot be, for example, reduced to a solipsistic experience of catalepsis, negotiating a way between Martha Nussbaum’s critique of Proust’s vision of love and the counter-example of shared experience she sees in Ann Beattie’s short story *Learning to Fall*.\textsuperscript{107} For Khan, the creation of the therapeutic environment in

\textsuperscript{104} *Hidden Selves*, p.27.

\textsuperscript{105} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{107} Martha Nussbaum, in *Love’s Knowledge*, critiques the narrator of Proust’s *A La Recherche du Temps Perdu* for his solipsistic, loss- and suffering-based love of Albertine. Such cataleptic impressions as ‘proof’ of love are “a form of flight – from openness to the other, from all those things in love for which there is no certain criterion” (p.267.) The narrator’s relationship with Albertine “has no element of mutuality or exchange”, and “does not require Albertine’s knowledge or participation.” Martha Nussbaum, *Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p.270.
which such epiphanies may or may not happen is the responsibility of the analyst (the “psychotherapeutic responsibility” of “our time”), but both the analyst and patient will have a shared experience of spontaneity. Between Khan’s writing on waiting and its different modalities, and the notion of an epiphany that goes on between subjects, as a process, we can see him attempting to imagine an experience of catalepsis that could involve the participation of an other, through the re-figuring of the cataleptic as a transitional phenomena.

**Epiphany, Language and Representation**

The quote from Joyce that Khan uses to set up his conception of ‘epiphanic’ psychoanalysis, and his subsequent discussion of his own psychoanalytic writing, binds Khan’s ideas here to questions of language and representability. Joyce’s injunction to the “man of letters” – “he should record these experiences with extreme care, given that they are the most delicate and evanescent of moments” – is for Khan a crucial, if problematic, injunction for the psychoanalyst-writer too. Joyce, as the exemplary man of letters, whose writing weaves its way in and out of the vicissitudes of Modernism for Khan, seemingly has little problem in recording epiphanic moments as compared to Khan. For Khan, describing in clinical narratives this second type of relating to a patient - the epiphanic mode - is often an unsatisfactory experience: “one reports [these experiences] to one’s colleagues, the narrative strikes them, and oneself as well, as singularly banal and unsurprising”. Similarly, he states “one is often left lacking in rapport and credulity vis-à-vis this second type of clinical experience”, in comparison with “clinical narratives of structural conflicts” (referring to the first type of psychoanalytic technique), such narratives proving “rich and complex in the nature and content”.

108 *Privacy of the Self*, p.295.

109 Ibid., pp.295-296.
these compelling narratives of the vicissitudes of the drives, Khan fears that the ‘epiphanic’ experiences are easily misrecognized as “acting out in the analytic situation with the analyst as both witness and accomplice”, and, worst of all, “as quite a fatuous happening, and not analysis at all”.

There is something in the nature of the epiphanies he hopes to record that makes them less compelling than the traditional psychoanalytic meta-language. Indeed, for Freud, writing in *Analysis Terminable and Interminable*, the spontaneous and unpredictable drive conflicts that manifest themselves in the transference are beyond the control of both the patient and the analyst: “You can make him jealous, or experience unrequited love, but no technical purpose need be involved in this. This kind of thing happens spontaneously in most analyses”. In this instance Freud identifies the transference relationship that emerges in “most analyses” as completely contingent and subject to the uncontainable movements of unconscious life. The spontaneity at the heart of the psychoanalytic encounter is utterly mysterious and beyond the control of the physician, and, paradoxically, the psychoanalytic epiphany has the same character as that which Sayeau ascribes to the epiphany, which I quote earlier: the “conjunction of concealment and self-revelation”.

These “delicate and evanescent” moments of epiphany are almost too delicate to communicate or record properly. By contrast, narratives of the drives are much more attractive and convincing for the psychoanalytic community. But, as well have already seen, the persuasive force of these narratives elsewhere collapse into repetitious sterility – Michael Balint criticizes the stagnation and repetition in the analytic setting, and clinical language, when it attempts to approach regressed patients and the topic of fixation. Khan writes that “one can

110 Ibid., p.296.

all too readily empathize with the logic of structural conflicts and data, even when one disagrees with the theories deduced from them by one analyst”,¹¹² a description that makes apparent a sense of solidarity in the theoretical meta-language. This group identification is, for Khan, too hasty – “one can empathize too readily” – and in this commitment to maintaining a shared clinical language the resistant “privacy” of the self is disregarded. When discussing the ‘actual-ization of self-experience’ Khan notes that there is no “rapport” with his col- leagues when attempting to articulate the epiphanic experience of analysis.

It becomes apparent, then, that the experience of the epiphanic in both psychoanalysis and Stephen Hero are related to experiences on the limits of language. On closer examination, the section of Stephen Hero from which Khan’s quotation is drawn is immediately presaged by a conversation between a man and a woman that for the narrator is nearly incomprehensible. The Young Lady is “(drawling discreetly)” and “(softly)”; the Young Gentleman is speaking “(almost inaudibly)” in the “fragment of colloquy” Stephen hears in passing.¹¹³ The ellipses that separate the Young Lady’s speech seem to suggest a struggle to make coherent speech – Stephen and the reader must struggle along the line that is nearly reduced to a series of arbitrary syllables. The Young Gentleman, by the same token, manages nothing more comprehensible than an ‘I’:

The Young Lady – (drawling discreetly)...O, yes...I was...at the...chapel...
The Young Gentleman – (inaudibly)...I...again inaudibly)...I...
The Young Lady – (softly)...O...but you’re...ver...wick...ed...¹¹⁴

¹¹² Privacy of the Self, pp.295-296.

¹¹³ Stephen Hero, p.188.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.
This moment, a “triviality” that inspires Stephen to “collect such moments together in a book of epiphanies” is marked by incomprehensibility, fragmented speech, and banal “trivial” meaninglessness. The construction of such a book of epiphanies asserts the literary importance of the authorial signature and the production of a literary object, but also undermines the entire project by the contingent and arbitrary nature of the inclusion of this “trivial” material. Khan’s description of the epiphanic as a “conundrum” in *Finnegans Wake* certainly seems appropriate when the legacy of an epiphany means coming up against the limits of representations when trying to record it.

When writing on the new beginning in *The Basic Fault*, Balint, in a similar vein, not only notes the inadequacy of the analysts’s empty interpretations – the words that become “lifeless” – but the difficulty in finding the appropriate language for the *arglos* state crucial to the new beginning. For Balint, misleading meanings mar at every turn attempts to find the correct term for the atmosphere of the new beginning:

To characterize the special atmosphere of the new beginning period, I used the German adjective *arglos*, which, like *Lust* or *Besetzung*, has no English equivalent. The dictionary translates it by the cluster: ‘guileless, innocent, simple, harmless, inoffensive, unsophisticated, unsuspecting’, none of which expresses its proper meaning…We might get some help from our analytical terminology…The trouble with these latter is that they are too sophisticated.  

The challenge here, we learn on the next page, is that “I am trying to render into words experiences that belong to a period well before – or beyond – the discovery of words”, an indeterminate space that creeps into Balint’s style (“before – or beyond”) that renders even the use of prepositions problematic. The impossibility of the translation of this state into language should certainly

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115 *The Basic Fault*, p.135.

116 Ibid. p.136.
be compared with Khan’s emphasis on the pre-verbal and silence in his clinical writing, particularly his suggestion that the anticipatory ‘fallow’ state is more easily actualized in painting than writing. The paradox of Khan’s epiphanic experiences is that whilst they demand the involvement of an other in order to be seen as legitimate (even if the relationship evoked is pre-Oedipal), their communicability to others, particularly psychoanalysts, seems to be foreclosed by their very nature. This is doubtless related to Khan’s claim that a fundamental non-relation to others typifies the self – “No one can communicate directly from his self or can be related to directly in his self…Its domain is privacy”. The self and ‘the actualization of self-experience’ are marked as sites of non-communication, a paradoxical turn in considering the supposedly revelatory dimension of the “sudden spiritual manifestation”. If there is a communication that goes on, it is pre-verbal, articulated in the body and highly resistant to re-description and re-transmission in psychoanalytic discourse.

For Khan, it is the revelation of somatic expression that lends the psychoanalytic epiphany its liberating and transformative potential – “Self-experience is intimately related to body ego”. Indeed, two of Balint’s key examples in his writing on the new beginning from The Basic Fault involve the expression of what Khan would call “ego-motility” through a somersault and through the holding of an analyst’s thumb. Balint writes of the somersaulting girl “since her earliest childhood she had never been able to do a somersault, although at various periods has desperately tried to do one”. She then rises from the couch and “to my amazement, executed a perfect somersault without any difficulty”. The moment of breakthrough for Balint is this physical manifestation that

117 Privacy of the Self, p.294.

118 Ibid., p.297.

119 Privacy of the Self, p.296.

120 Ibid.
constitutes a breaking away from her previous symbolic constraints: “[prior to the somersault discussion] apparently the most important thing for her was to keep her head safely up, with both her feet firmly on the ground”.\textsuperscript{121} For Khan, the psychoanalytic epiphany actualises pre-cognitive, bodily and affective experiences which resist the classical constraints of insisting the patient remains flat on the couch at all times, and the traditional hermeneutic categories employed by analysts: “I have learned to accept that often self-experience in the analytic situation can have no means of symbolic and/or concrete actualization if motility is rigidly tabooed”.\textsuperscript{122}

In Michael Sayeau’s *Against the Event* epiphanies in Joyce stand for the very shattering of narrative logic and linear temporal movement modernism stages, “press[ing] against the limits of narrative”.\textsuperscript{123} Joyce’s epiphanies “go through the motions of fiction only to find that ‘fictionality’ itself has slipped out between the cracks…they enact a stalling of narrative logic, a static dialectic.”\textsuperscript{124} Khan’s frustration with the unconvincing character of his psychoanalytic epiphanies points to their teetering on the brink of the unrepresentable. Khan’s attention to this aspect of his clinical experience touches on something stated more explicitly in Sayeau’s account: epiphanies “suggest a variety of signifying turns” - they gesture towards meaningfulness - but these turns are “characterised, time and again, by circularity and issuelessness.”\textsuperscript{125}

They stage for Sayeau an important crisis of representation that is not incidental to Khan’s psychoanalytic project, calling “into question the relationship

\textsuperscript{121} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{123} *Against the Event*, p.204.
\textsuperscript{124} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{125} Ibid.
between the temporality of experience and our ability to narrate it cogently”.

The reality that is accessed by the patients who undergo psychic transformations in Khan’s and Balint’s writings is primarily affective and non-symbolic, a reality of the body that is the backdrop to the rational ego and normally excluded from self-experience. The inability of Khan, or Balint, to narrate cogently the epiphanic experiences of their patients indicates the disjuncture between the normal psychoanalytic procedures for narrating clinical experience and the unconscious, affective forms of experience that are actualised in their consulting rooms. Khan’s epiphanies stage the stalling of psychoanalytic narration and the cracks in its discourse they open up can be read as the equivalent of what Sayeau sees in the relationship of Joyce’s epiphanies (and modernist narrative technique more generally) to normal narrative progression in the realist novel. Although surely Sayeau would disagree with the rhetoric of selfhood and the psychoanalytic bent of my argument about epiphany, his remark that epiphanies “only work to destabilise the notion of the autonomous self” rather than offering piercing insights “into the interiority of individual subjects” is nevertheless relevant. Khan’s psychoanalytic epiphanies actualise in an environment in which the rational ego of the Symbolic realm becomes dissolved and language loses its communicative function.

Epiphany shatters normal communicative powers of language and the capacity to symbolise. In Sayeau’s analogous reading, this means it resists the forward movement of narrative logic to a revelatory conclusion, instead stretching it out into a ‘spinning stasis’ or ‘static dialectic’. Epiphanies call into question the relationship of the temporality of experience with our capacity to narrate it cogently. For Sayeau such epiphanies are anti-transformative - they stage a symbolic and communicative emptiness. The sterility of the symbolic order

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126 Ibid.

127 Ibid.
under such conditions is expressed in Khan and Balint’s account too, but in my reading this suspension of the symbolic world is transformative insofar as it actualizes new forms of pre-cognitive, affective experience.

The theoretical and literary constellation around epiphany in Khan’s writing I have detailed here is intended to add another layer to contemporary discussions of modernist culture that, over recent years, have become increasingly interested in ‘evental’ or messianic paradigms of change and transformation in political, cultural, and psychic life. Indeed, modernism itself is increasingly construed by the critical industry solidifying it as an ‘event’ in aesthetic-political history in Alain Badiou’s sense of the term, which cannot be strictly periodised. As a consequence, aesthetic modernism is, to paraphrase Stephen Ross, a moment that resonates beyond its immediate context. Fidelity to such an event, for Badiou, would entail as Ross puts it “seeing the world from the new perspective it opens up”, maintaining a relationship with, even as it recedes into the past, the “singular happening that ruptures the given order and necessitates a new way of being.”

Khan’s placing Joyce at the centre of modernist culture appears on the surface indicative of an utterly conventional reading of the history of modernism, even if a concept like epiphany is given a novel treatment in an unusual intellectual context. But we might instead read Khan’s description of Joyce as he who diagnoses the “crisis” of “psychotherapeutic responsibility” and stages his own aesthetic experiments in relationship to it as his display of a certain fidelity

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128 We might note, in this regard, the title of the Modernist Studies Association 2013 conference, *The Everyday and the Event*, and, more recently, the title of the British Association of Modernist Studies 2014 conference, *Modernism Now!*, the blurb for which explicitly referenced to Neil Levi’s contention that modernism is an ongoing, emergent phenomenon with the character of Badiou’s event.

to the event. What does it mean to be faithful to the event of modernism? Without engaging in a thoroughgoing excursus of Badiou’s complex theory it is worth reflecting on Badiou’s event for a moment. Khan’s attempt to inscribe the epiphany, and Joyce more broadly, into clinical psychoanalytic practice might be read as an attempt to sustain through institutionalisation the epochal break of modernism, despite Khan’s wariness of the official language of psychoanalysis. For Badiou, “to be faithful to an event is to move within the situation that this event has supplemented by thinking (although all thought is practice, a putting to the test) the situation ‘according to’ the event”. In Khan’s writing on Joyce and epiphany here an attempt is made to first describe the repercussions of the event of modernism and second to quite literally put that event into “practice” by thinking through its implications for the consulting room. In Neil Levi’s reading, institutionalisation for Badiou is “unavoidable, even desirable, if the event is to remain consequential, is to persist”. Khan’s attempts to hold in an institutional form - no matter how resistant it is to the more abstract and instrumental languages of psychoanalysis - Joycean epiphany speaks to Levi’s suggestion that modernist works are “events whose implications demand continued investigation.”

In a parallel way, the experiential structure of Khan’s psychoanalytic epiphanies bears comparison to the dialectical relationship of the everyday (themselves key tropes in contemporary modernist studies) to the rupture in-

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131 Levi, p.120.

132 Ibid.
augurated by the event. The charged anticipation of Balint’s arglos state and Khan’s ‘fallow mood’ is the vital preparation for the emergence of the epiphany, which is paradoxical insofar as it cannot be anticipated yet contains the expectation of the future-anterior, that something will have happened. For Michael Sayeau, the everyday cannot simply be understood as referring to that which is boring, or static, or banal, or trivial. Instead, the everyday is a mode of temporal experience “that occurs only in the shadow of the event - whether past, future, or never to arrive”. With reference to Henri Lefebvre, Sayeau suggests that the everyday is a “concept that is coherent only when rendered in relation to what is not everyday - that is to say, as a moment in a process”. The everyday “is when something might happen tomorrow or even today, but has not happened yet”. Khan’s epiphanic psychoanalysis, which has an eye on the experiences of waiting, anticipation, and preparation as much as the epiphany itself, instantiates in a model of clinical transformation a modernist temporal structure that entails the overlapping of, and oscillation between, the everyday and the event.

Exploring the position of Joyce’s epiphanies in Khan’s psychoanalytic writing inaugurates a larger argument of this thesis. The presentation of psychoanalytic epiphanies as existing at the limits of intelligible language and narrative is a critical step in Khan’s construction of the self as fundamentally hidden, concealed, or, indeed, exiled. It is from this point that chapter three will

133 The everyday, for Sayeau amongst others, is highly characteristic of our experience of modernity, holding together “seemingly incompatible modes forms of time”: in Walter Benjamin’s words, the “homogenous, empty time” of progress whose endpoint is deferred, and the “striated heterogenous time punctuated by events, turning points, and meaning” (p.10.) It is related, in his argument, to commercial and imperial expansion, as well as the automation of industrial society, and such social structures produce the everyday as a “side effect…It is a rogue temporality…It oscillates between the utopian and dystopian registers.” Against the Event, p. 10.

134 Against the Event, p.10.

135 Ibid.

136 Ibid.
explore how the figure of the exile further contributes to this vision of selfhood. Indeed, if we follow closely Khan’s selections from *Finnegans Wake*, with special attention paid to the characterisation of Shem ‘the penman’ in the passages he quotes, then it transpires that the discoverer of epiphanies - the psychoanalyst, Stephen Daedalus, and Shem the “serendipitist” - is also an exile, of indeterminate ethnic and national background.\(^{137}\) This finds expression, I will argue in chapter three, in Khan’s theoretical elaboration of the ‘hidden’ and ‘private’ self, and the dreaming subject, who is to be shielded from the persecutory dimensions of interpretation which violate this subject’s same privacy: in an analogous way, the victim of totalitarianism for Khan has this same privacy violated. The psychoanalytic epiphanies I discuss in this chapter, when read in the latter way and in light of Khan’s arguments about dreaming and privacy, turn out to have a political as well as clinical dimension.

First though we must turn to what is, in many ways, Khan’s contradictory treatment of another prominent articulation of literary modernism: T.S. Eliot’s concept of tradition. Khan explores tradition in relation to a number of key tropes of this thesis: exile, his political background, and a concomitant desire to make himself in the image of the modernist writers he admires. But his engagement with tradition in Eliot also continues one of the intellectual gestures his thought stages in this chapter: combining an idea derived from modernist writing with conceptions of subjectivity experience, like that of the transitional space, derived from British object-relations.

Indeed, the spontaneity of the epiphanic characterises one aspect of modernist aesthetic thinking which we can contrast, in Khan’s thought, with tradition, as Eliot elaborates it. Khan’s writing is not the first to consider them together. In the final sections of *Stephen Hero* we read Daedalus’ exposition of his theory of

\(^{137}\) *Finnegans Wake*, 191.2-4.
epiphany for Cranly. Stephen notes “No esthetic [sic] theory…is of any value which investigates with the aid of the lantern of tradition.” In order to apprehend properly the mechanism by which we experience epiphanic moments of aesthetic immersion, we must, Stephen notes, jettison tradition, as the particular characteristics of different traditions serve to obscure the actual process on which aesthetic experiences depend. Joyce writes,

What we symbolise in black the Chinaman may symbolise in yellow: each has his own tradition. Greek beauty laughs at Coptic beauty and the American Indian derides them both. It is almost impossible to reconcile all tradition…

Myopic obsessiveness about the norms and habits of particular cultural forms deadens our understanding of aesthetic experience as something broader. Stephen appears to set understanding tradition against the more phenomenologically inclined aesthetic investigation he outlines here. We might then identify some contradiction in Khan’s own adoption of different aesthetic theories in modernism for his psychoanalytic work. The situation is more complex than this, however. In a scene much earlier in the novel, Stephen talks - admittedly finding the same indifference he does with Cranly - of the vital need in understanding tradition to Father Butt.

Stephen laid down his doctrine very positively and insisted on the importance of what he called the literary tradition. Words, he said, have a certain value in the literary tradition and a certain value in the marketplace -- a debased value. Words are simply receptacles for human thought: in the literary tradition they receive more valuable thoughts

138 Stephen Hero, p.189.

139 Ibid.
than they receive in the market-place. Father Butt listened to all this, rubbing his chalky hand often over his chin and nodding his head and said that Stephen evidently understood the importance of tradition.140

Tradition is opposed to a number of things here, and it has a certain function. It is an alternative to the “market-place”, as it saves the richness and openness of language from its destruction by means of modern instrumental use. The “literary tradition” is, as I argue the psychoanalytic one is analogously for Khan, part of an attempt to resist the crudest aspects of modern experience and create a place of continuity and rumination. But Stephen and Butt have quite different ideas of tradition: one is vivifying, and possessed of a capacity to invent new and richer thoughts.

The other literary tradition, which Butt seems wearily glad that Stephen can appreciate, is dusty, scholastic - “chalky” - and pious. It has a deathly character that shows little interest in the life-giving and enriching qualities of the work of art. Butt’s teaching is damningly haphazard - he skips two songs from Twelfth Night and, when questioned about this by Stephen, remarks that it is “improbable such a question would be on the [exam] paper.”141 Even though Butt does a more serious job of discussing Othello, we nevertheless learn of the college’s hidebound attitude toward culture, as Stephen hears with some amusement that “the president had refused to allow two of the boarders to go to a performance of Othello at the Gaiety Theatre on the ground that there were many coarse expressions in the play.”142

140 Ibid., pp.30-31.
141 Ibid., p.32.
142 Ibid.
It is, in part, the former - radical - version of tradition that I want to suggest Khan explores when encountering Eliot in his work. It is that version of tradition which is the vital framework for the explosive spontaneity of a psycho-analysis orbiting around the possibility of epiphanic invention and transformation, clinically and theoretically.
Chapter Two

Feudal Psychoanalysis: T.S. Eliot and the uses of Tradition

Masud Khan’s claim that his MA thesis had been posted to Balliol College Oxford and to the poet and critic T.S. Eliot, which appears to be completely unsubstantiated on both counts, is nevertheless an important clue to Khan’s vision of himself as a serious consumer of European modernism. Eliot’s writing is a pervasive presence in his theoretical output, drawing as it does on his poetry, verse drama, and critical prose. I contend in this chapter that Eliot’s thought in his prose – especially ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’ – underpins and organizes some of the crucial areas of Khan’s life and work. It is Khan’s exploration of the word ‘tradition’ that is key in understanding the convergence of the feudal, the psychoanalytic and the literary in his thought.

Writing in ‘The Becoming of a Psychoanalyst’, from his 1974 book The Privacy of the Self, Khan notes “nurtured in a feudal home in the then Northern India, those who facilitated and nourished my growth as a person were different from those who instructed me to read, write and acquire knowledge”. He adds “I mention these facts because I am sure the traditions of my culture and the way I have been trained are responsible for my point of view”. It is the word ‘tradition’ that dominates this first page of the chapter – the “traditions of my culture”; the “tradition of that skill [psychoanalysis]”; the “tradition” of

4 Ibid.
“analytic education”. Khan’s use of the word tradition here brings different forms of continuity in his personal history into conflict: feudal India, European humanism, psychoanalytic training and his colonial education.

Indeed, we are told of the value of ‘tradition’ throughout The Privacy of the Self. In ‘On Freud and the Provision of the Therapeutic Frame’, analysis depends “essentially on the discovery by the patient and the analyst together of a symbolic language which is larger and richer than the individual effort and tradition of each alone”. This dimension of psychoanalysis is itself one of two “distinct traditions within the analytic profession”, distinct from the use of dream- and symptom interpretation. Freud’s invention of the ‘therapeutic frame’, as Khan articulates it in this chapter, makes psychoanalysts the recipients of a tradition with which it is their duty to engage:

The primary task of... psychoanalytic pedagogy is to ensure that the tradition we have inherited from Freud is not adulterated and diminished by teaching impatient and coercive therapeutic pragmatism on the one hand, and is not rendered rigid and sterile through over-institutionalization on the other.

The psychoanalyst reading Eliot

The pervasiveness of Eliot’s writing in Khan’s books, as well as Khan’s range and variety in his readings of Eliot, should be outlined before the focus here narrows to consider ‘tradition’ in particular. Amongst this range of refer-

5 Ibid.
6 Ibid., p.135.
7 Ibid., p.117.
8 Ibid., p.128.
ences, which includes the well known papers ‘The Metaphysical Poets’ and ‘Hamlet’ (from which Khan extracts the ‘objective correlative’ to serve as a model for the relation between a patient’s physical and psychic injuries), there are more obscure points of contact – the verse dramas The Cocktail Party and Murder in the Cathedral, and the prose piece After Strange Gods. Indeed, in chapter one we saw how Khan employed Murder in the Cathedral to argue that the experience of ‘waiting’ is the crucial subjective experience in modernity. Khan even praises Eliot’s play as containing “some of the most heroic lines since Milton’s Paradise Lost”. Khan’s praise for Eliot here is worth considering in light of Eliot’s own attitude towards Milton. Khan opens ‘Freud and the Crisis of Psychotherapeutic Responsibility’ with a reference to a passage in Eliot’s ‘The Metaphysical Poets’, positioning Eliot’s writing as a key description of modernity:

Modernism is a historical process that took more than three centuries to crystallize its identity towards the end of the nineteenth century. TS Eliot, in his famous essay, ‘The Metaphysical Poets’ (1921), has argued: “In the seventeenth century a dissociation of sensibility set in, from which we have never recovered”.

If we look up Khan’s quote from Eliot’s piece, he omits a further sentence by Eliot: “This dissociation, as is natural, was aggravated by the two most power-

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11 See Hidden Selves, p.78. For Murder in the Cathedral, see When Spring Comes, p.192. For After Strange Gods, see Alienation in Perversions, p.211.

12 When Spring Comes, p.193.

13 Hidden Selves, p.11.
ful poets of the century, Milton and Dryden”. Whilst Eliot’s attitude towards Milton in his two pieces exclusively on the author (from 1936 and 1947 respectively) is fairly ambivalent – he claims Milton’s theology is “repellant”, and that he has “done damage to the English language from which it has not wholly recovered” – he nevertheless admires the “remoteness of Milton’s verse from ordinary speech, his invention of his own poetic language” as “one of the marks of his greatness”. This capacity for linguistic invention, along with Milton’s blindness, causes Eliot to compare *Paradise Lost* to *Finnegans Wake*, just as he compares Milton’s poetry with Joyce’s *Ulysses* in his 1936 essay.

Khan’s analysis and praise of *Murder in the Cathedral*, then, situates it at a moment of historical rupture (modernity) in much the same way Dryden and Milton do for Eliot in ‘The Metaphysical Poets’. *Murder in the Cathedral* typifies for Khan “the ever-proliferating and harassed anguish of the last thirty-six years of European man and cultures”. Eliot’s writing of modernity embodies the “dissociation of sensibility” that he himself identifies in Milton and Dryden in the seventeenth century – the criticism and historical analysis Khan is practicing at that point in his text is therefore modelled on Eliot’s own version of literary and social history.

In Khan’s *Work Books* there is a further suggestion that he read Eliot’s writing on culture. Writing to Robert Stoller in 1970, and reflecting on the contrasts between his life in the Punjab and in London, Khan claims, “Our culture could no more produce a Kafka than it could a Freud”. His comment bears

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16 Ibid., p.262.

17 *When Spring Comes*, p.194.

18 Hopkins, p.13.
comparison with an extremely similar one in Eliot’s ‘Notes Towards the Definition of Culture’ (1948), which argues for the intractable importance of Christianity as the foundation of European culture: “Only a Christian culture could have produced a Voltaire or a Nietzsche”. Eliot’s writing appears to again be framing Khan’s idea of cultural activity.

If, as Eliot puts it, criticism is “a distinctive activity of the civilized mind”, then Khan can certainly be read as doing it on Eliot’s terms in his psychoanalytic writing. Indeed, although his discussion of Murder in the Cathedral appears in Khan’s last book, examining his personal library tells us that he was acquainted with Eliot’s critical writing whilst still an undergraduate in India. In his library there is a copy of Eliot’s 1933 lecture series The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism, bearing Khan’s initials on the front endpaper and the ink-stamp of a Lahore bookshop. The edition, published by Faber, contains a number of annotations throughout the body of the text and on the contents page, where Khan has marked two chapters out as of special interest (‘Introduction’ and ‘Matthew Arnold’). The rear endpaper has a date marked in pencil – “5/4 Lahore 1 Jan. ‘43” – and the final page of the body text, immediately underneath the concluding paragraph, has another date marking – “2.5.44”. These are presumably the dates of the purchase of the book and the completion of Khan’s reading of it respectively. The annotations and marginalia run throughout the book, suggesting Khan became acquainted with the text in the course of his

\[19\text{ The Selected Prose of T.S. Eliot, p.304.}\]
\[20\text{ Ibid., p.7.}\]
\[21\text{ See Masud Khan’s personal copy of T.S. Eliot, The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism: Studies in the relation of Poetry to Criticism in England (London: Faber & Faber, 1933). Khan’s library is kept at the Hellenic Institute of Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy in Athens, Greece, although it is not yet fully catalogued. For an account of the journey of Khan’s library to Athens after his death, see Hopkins, p. 383. Latif is also discussed briefly in Christiane Hartnack, Psychoanalysis in Colonial India (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp.153-157.}\]
studies. The second chapter of the book, ‘The Age of Dryden’, is also intermit-
tently marked by Khan’s pencil, and is a restatement of the salient points of
‘The Metaphysical Poets’. When Khan was an undergraduate, we can be sure
that Khan encountered Eliot’s concept of the “dissociation of sensibility” – Eliot
reflects on the popularity of both his terms ‘objective correlative’ and ‘dissocia-
tion of sensibility’ in the Introduction, marked out by Khan for reading. There
is, in addition, a key reference by Eliot to his ideas about literary tradition in the
book in chapter IV, ‘Wordsworth and Coleridge:

Surely the great poet is, among other things, one who not merely restores
a tradition which has been in abeyance, but one who in his poetry re-
twines as many straying strands of tradition as possible.22

There are other suggestive annotations. A mark in the margin of page 19
indicates that Khan singled out Eliot’s remarks about the encounter with tradi-
tion (the “third stage of reading…reorganization”) in particular:

The element of enjoyment is enlarged into appreciation, which
brings a more intellectual addition to the original intensity of feeling. It is
a second stage in our understanding of poetry, when we no longer mere-
ly select and reject, but organize. We may even speak of a third stage, one
of reorganization; a stage at which a person already educated in poetry
meets with something new in his own time, and finds a new pattern of
poetry arranging itself in consequence.23

Khan, on page fifteen of Eliot’s lectures, also highlights a related passage in
pencil, in which the value of tradition is stated in the starkest possible terms by
Eliot: “The people which ceases to care for its literary inheritance becomes bar-
baric; the people which ceases to produce literature ceases to move in thought
and sensibility.” ‘The Becoming of a Psychoanalyst’ is a paper ostensibly con-


23 Masud Khan’s personal copy, The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism: Studies in the
cerned with the responsibilities of psychoanalytic pedagogy within which “there are two types of experiences involved: apprenticeship and instruction”.\textsuperscript{24} Khan defines Apprenticeship as “the process of experientially facilitating the talent and capacities in a person for a certain skill in terms of the tradition of that skill”.\textsuperscript{25} This component of the training is the five-year training analysis and the supervision by a more senior analyst of the trainee’s first cases. This is more precisely subdivided by Khan into two things: the candidate learning to experience and understand the “data of transference” and manufacturing what Khan calls “a very special capacity for dissociation within the analytic situation” – i.e. the surrendering of “ego-vigilance” to the analytic process whilst simultaneously remembering and recalling the nature of this process, so that it can be called upon when the trainee becomes the analyst.\textsuperscript{26} This experience bears some striking similarities with Eliot’s historically situated conception of the “dissociation of sensibility”, whereby intellectual and analytical capacities are split-off in the subject from a more affectively engaged experience of feeling. In this way, the psychoanalytic apprenticeship implicitly rests on an especially modern form of self-experience.

The second part of this apprenticeship actually overlaps into ‘Instruction’, and is concerned with the relationship to theory and accepting or resisting the influence of a particular supervisor or indeed the ‘canon’ of psychoanalytic theory as it stands. For Khan, this relationship between trainee and supervisor is concerned with reciprocity, and reciprocity with tradition. He writes:

Learning here is a mutual and reciprocal activity. Every candidate has his own ‘theory’ but is not intellectually fully aware of it. The task of the supervisor is to help the student become aware of his crude and tentative

\textsuperscript{24} The Privacy of the Self, p.112.

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., p.116.
theory and explore it and examine it in the light of what others have done before and made available to us. Tradition helps us to economize in learning-effort and error. It is not a substitute for either, because that engenders only arid imitation and stereotyped practice. Tradition is also our only corrective against the cravings for novelty and magical curative adventures.27

The “crude and tentative” thoughts of the trainee are framed by the authoritative knowledge of the supervisor, and placed in the context of the established literature. The “craving for novelty” of which Khan is somewhat suspicious, and against which tradition serves as a bulwark, is exacerbated by an abdication of responsibility on the part of those who are supposed to protect it:

I have evaded so far one very tricky issue: ‘the demand of the elders’. We live in a climate of thought where the elders have abnegated from their rights of expectancy and demand. We are a generation of guilty elders who have sponsored grievances and anarchy in the students because authority is a degraded and suspect word today. I put it to you that there can be no rights of the students without matching the reciprocal demands of the elders. To sustain this paradox… is the primary task of the apprenticeship.28

This “climate of thought” has clear parallels with Eliot’s various pronouncements on the “dissociation of sensibility” that characterises modernity. Eliot’s vision of modern life, in ‘Ulysses, Order and Myth’, is of an “immense panorama of futility and anarchy”,29 where “unlimited industrialism” in Britain has created an anarchic nightmare:

The tendency of unlimited industrialism is to create bodies of men and women – of all classes – detached from tradition, alien-

27 Ibid., p.118.

28 Ibid., pp.116-117.

29 The Selected Prose of T.S. Eliot, p.177.
ated from religion, and susceptible to mass suggestion: in other words, a mob.\textsuperscript{30}

This situation, for Eliot, can only be redeemed by the reinstitution of a ‘Christian Society’, a prospect that involves “discipline, inconvenience and discomfort”, but is at least the “purgatory” which stands as “the alternative to hell”, a “chaos of ideals and confusion of thought in our large scale mass education”.\textsuperscript{31}

For Khan, tradition is that which facilitates a meaningful exchange between the students and their psychoanalytic elders, offering some antidote to the collapse of traditional authority that characterises Khan’s version of modernity. This situation of reciprocity, where the rights of the students are only guaranteed by a respect for the Elders, is one way of limiting what Eliot, in his second piece on Milton, sees as the unsustainable nature of revolution:

We cannot, in literature, any more than in the rest of life, live in a permanent state of revolution...For poetry should help, not only to refine the language of the time, but to prevent it from changing too rapidly.\textsuperscript{32}

Similarly, acknowledging the importance of the work of previous writers and theorists in psychoanalysis is a principle Khan is keen to enact in his paper: “I need hardly stress how much we all owe to James Strachey and specially the English-speaking analysts, who know our Freud only through Strachey”.\textsuperscript{33} Indeed, Khan would pay tribute to Alix and James Strachey in his unpublished preface to volume 24 of the \textit{Standard Edition} and an obituary address for Alix Strachey delivered to the British Psychoanalytical Society in May 1973, calling

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., p.287.

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., pp.288-289.

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., p.273.

\textsuperscript{33} \textit{The Privacy of the Self}, p.115.
in the former for contemporary analysts to “pay homage” to the efforts of the Stracheys in the “fruition” of this “great venture”.  

The trainee can only make sense of training as an analyst by placing themselves within the established framework of the discipline – the alternative is “anarchy”. But this is not simply an imperative to obey more senior supervisory figures in the discipline. Khan identifies in the founders of psychoanalysis, and its current institutional guarantors, a betrayal of founding principles, which itself has resulted in reckless experimentation. Khan’s language opposes a mythic society of rigid tribal hierarchies (the ‘elders’) to revolutionary fervour, although the “climate of thought” of degraded authority that he evokes is a psychoanalytic one. By way of example, Khan concludes his argument by quoting Anna Freud’s ‘Child Analysis as a Sub-Speciality of Psycho-Analysis’, where she remarks in 1970 that “there is revolution and almost anarchy in the field of theory and technique”. Anna Freud’s criticisms of the international psychoanalytic community are that attempts to increasingly regulate and organize psychoanalytic practice is a poor substitute for genuine bonds of “shared convictions and mutual understanding” between members and societies. She


35 Identifying the ‘elders’ Khan mentions here has proven difficult. Geoffrey Gorer, Khan’s friend, remarked in a letter that he could not understand what Khan was referring to when reading an early draft of the paper in 1970. He writes: “I don’t understand the third paragraph about the demand of the elders. Do you mean the authority of senior people? What do “the elders” demand except pensions? I think this wants explicating.” Given his obvious reluctance to explicate or revise this passage, Khan seems to mobilise this phrase merely to evoke a tribal or mythic image of established authority in the essay. See Brighton, The Keep, University of Sussex Special Collections, The Geoffrey Gorer Archive, SxMs52/4/2/1/11/3, letter from Masud Khan to Geoffrey Gorer 7/11/1970, p.6.

36 The Privacy of the Self, p.128.
describes how this “atmosphere runs counter to the original psychoanalytic one”.37 Indeed, Anna Freud’s position on child analysis and its relationship to the patently classical version of analytic treatment was the source of what one commentator terms a “creative tension” in her work, requiring her to reconcile new areas of psychoanalytic practice and experience with the theoretical foundations of Freud’s own work.38 Engendering new forms of analytic thought and practice whilst ensuring, as Khan puts it, that the tradition “is not adulterated and diminished” is the challenge Khan’s work confronts in ‘The Becoming of a Psychoanalyst’.

Both Khan and, in his example, Anna Freud, are engaged in a critique of institutional orthodoxy in psychoanalysis in order to resuscitate and reinvent the tradition they see truly stemming from Sigmund Freud’s thought and that has been neglected; in this respect, the defence of the tradition entails taking a stand against the prevailing authorities. The version of tradition in psychoanalysis Khan offers here - illustrated by way of Anna Freud’s remarks - exemplifies the ways in which his engagement with Eliot’s ideas can take on a subversive character, even if it is so often couched in language that on the surface intimates a slightly authoritarian sensibility.

Indexing Winnicott

Khan’s work as Winnicott’s principal editor exemplifies this treatment of tradition as reconciling innovative and idiosyncratic approaches to psychoanalysis with the shared language offered in its established frameworks. Khan’s influence on Winnicott’s writing and the promotion of his work is well documented by Linda Hopkins in her biography, noting that Vladimir Granoff in-

37 Ibid.

formed her that “Masud made Winnicott. He edited, indexed and published
him. Winnicott is the product of Masud’s industry and he is a colossal figure
now due to Masud.”\textsuperscript{39} Hopkins also elaborates the allegations that Khan’s “as-
sistance went beyond editorial help. Charles Rycroft told me...that Khan literal-
ly wrote many of Winnicott’s major papers”.\textsuperscript{40} Along these lines, analyst Sadie
Gillespie remarks in Hopkins’ book that “Masud was the midwife to Donald’s
books”.\textsuperscript{41}

We can learn more about the nature of Khan’s editorial work on Winni-
cott’s books by examining the Acknowledgments that appear in the front of
them. In the Acknowledgements to \textit{The Maturational Processes and the Facilitat-
ing Environment}, Winnicott writes:

> Lastly I thank Masud Khan, who has provided the drive that resulted in
> the publication of this book. Mr Khan has also given a great deal of his
time to the work of editing. He also made innumerable valuable minor
>suggestions, most of which I have accepted. He is responsible for my
> gradually coming to see the relationship of my work to that of other an-
> alysts, past and present. In particular I am grateful to him for the prepa-
> ration of the index.\textsuperscript{42}

Khan’s editorial function is to index, literally, the meaning of Winnicott’s
writing amongst the body of psychoanalytic writing, in a version of the rela-
tionship Khan describes as existing between trainee and supervisor: the super-
visor offers a context and heritage to the trainee’s ‘crude’ theory. Indeed, Khan
elaborates the meaning of this role in his Editorial Note to \textit{The Maturational Pro-
cesses}:

\textsuperscript{39} Hopkins, p.142.

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{42} Donald Winnicott, \textit{The Maturational Processes and the Facilitating Environment} (Lon-
The basic concepts of Freud are indexed in relation to Dr Winnicott’s discussions or elaborations of them. Quite often Dr Winnicott has taken a Freudian concept as his given frame of reference but has not discussed it as such, and it is intended that the index should in part remedy this by pointing out the links between Dr Winnicott’s ideas and those of Freud.43

These two paratexts to The Maturational Processes make it apparent that Khan’s role in the production of the book was to emphasize the continuity between Winnicott’s thinking and the writing of Freud. Winnicott’s biographer Robert Rodman claims in his preface to the Routledge edition of Playing and Reality that “Winnicott’s affirmation of Freud’s work placed him in a continuous line of development in psychoanalysis, rather than play the role of a dissident”.44 Rodman’s language ties one of the concepts most associated with Winnicott’s writing – playing – with dissent. There is a tension manifested in Winnicott’s work between his own quite novel conceptions of psychic life and those that are inherited from Freud. For instance, in ‘Playing: A Theoretical Statement’, Winnicott asserts the primacy of playing for psychoanalytic thought (“Psychotherapy is to do with two people playing together”) over and above Freud’s insights:

The natural thing is playing, and the highly sophisticated twentieth century phenomenon is psychoanalysis. It must be of value to the analyst to be constantly reminded not only of what is owed to Freud, but also of what we owe to the natural and universal thing called playing.45

Winnicott challenges the primacy of Freud’s writing within the psychoanalytic project. ‘Playing’ seems to Winnicott to be the most important feature of psychoanalysis, that which historically and culturally outstrips and supersedes the

43 Ibid., p.9.


45 Playing and Reality, p.56.
much more immanent, “highly sophisticated”, and recent “twentieth century phenomenon” of psychoanalysis. If there is an affirmation of Freud going on in Winnicott’s writing, the evidence suggests that Masud Khan was the one who engineers the relationship between Winnicott’s work and Freud. Indeed Winnicott presents his own ideas as distinct from Freud’s project, stressing the naturalness and universality of play as that which underpins psychoanalysis, a position that Khan must work to reconcile with his insistence on the importance of maintaining the “tradition we have inherited from Freud”. Khan here, in his work on Winnicott, is performing the “great labor” by which Eliot insists tradition is sustained. Part of this labor requires Khan to undertake the impossible: to make Winnicott’s dissent appear as the true Freudian legacy, and accommodate Freud to Winnicott’s work, even if it is at cross-purposes.

Khan’s relationship with Winnicott concerns the manufacturing and articulation of continuity in Winnicott’s writing, whether with Freud or with his own ideas. In a letter to Winnicott from 13th February 1968, Khan advises Winnicott on an early paper (from 1935) he is aiming to publish (in translation) in a Spanish-American journal of psychoanalysis:

I have given it further thought and still think that you should offer your paper of [sic] Manic Defence (1935)...and my recommendation is that you should add to it a paragraph in the beginning and a paragraph at the end to relate it to your concept of the transitional objects...I also feel that when you are being translated into a new language and culture people really should have some idea of how your concepts have developed, rather than ‘Winnicott fresh-1968-style’.48

46 Ibid.
47 The Selected Prose of T.S. Eliot, p.38.
48 New York, Weill-Cornell Medical Centre, Oskar Diethelm Library and Archive, Winnicott Papers, letter from Masud Khan to Donald Winnicott, 13 February 1968.
Khan places great value here on communicating the continuity and development in Winnicott’s thought, organizing it into a series of coherent relations which could give rise to a tradition of thought in Winnicott’s own work. Indeed, in a letter written in 1962, in which Khan offers feedback to Winnicott on a paper written on female homosexuality, Khan also organizes Winnicott’s own writing into four key groups:

- A. Infancy Development in terms of parental-social environment
- B. Intra-psychic personality integration of the infant
- C. Problems of diagnosis, prognosis and choice of treatment
- D. Problems of Technique

Khan’s list here integrates Winnicott’s work into the technical language of Psychoanalytic psychotherapy and psychiatry. The effect of this is to bring his style – what Adam Phillips calls “a wry version of pastoral…unprecedented in the psychoanalytic tradition” – into a dialogue with the rest of the psychoanalytic world, which could be recast in Winnicottian terms as the outside world. For Khan, this is doubtless a necessary activity – Phillips notes that Winnicott “uses certain key terms as though they had no history in psychoanalytic thought”. For Phillips, Winnicott’s style was at times adaptive and municipal, “juggling professional languages and allegiances in front of learned audiences”, when giving lectures to diverse groups like the Progressive

49 Winnicott Papers, Masud Khan to Donald Winnicott, 27th July 1962.


52 Winnicott, p.24.
League or the Association of Teachers of Mathematics. However, Winnicott’s idiomatic simplicity was also reflective of a psychoanalytic practice that privileged “the privacy of the self in making personal sense, and by the same token, personal non-sense.” Phillips is thus suggesting, by reference to Khan’s language of personal idiom, the singular character of Winnicott’s voice.

Khan’s attempts to integrate Winnicott’s private language into the psychoanalytic establishment can be read in terms of the mother in Winnicott’s thought who manages the baby’s relationship with the outside world. In the Acknowledgements section of Playing and Reality, Winnicott makes Khan sound like a good-enough mother: “I am much indebted to Masud Khan…for his always being (as it seems to me) available when a practical suggestion is needed.” Mothering, in Playing and Reality, can lead to the creation of the ‘potential space’ between the baby and the mother, “the hypothetical area that exists (but cannot exist) between the baby and the object (mother or part of the mother) during the phase of the repudiation of the object as not-me, that is, at the end of being merged with the object.” The separating out of the mother from the baby’s self facilitates the baby’s introduction to the external world (a world of objects and frustrations of which Winnicott is at pains to stress the objective existence) through the gradual withdrawal of “her adaptation to the baby’s needs”. This withdrawal also serves the mother by way of allowing her to recover from “a high degree of identification with her baby” and continue to


54 Winnicott, p.14.

55 Playing and Reality, p.ix.

56 Playing and Reality, pp.144-145.

57 Ibid.
exist in her own right as well, asserting her “need...to be a separate phe-
nomenon”. According to this logic, we can already discern how, for Khan, the
work of editing of Winnicott’s writing described above allows him to separate
himself out from this influential analyst and theorist and eventually articulate
his own separateness as an authorial voice. Khan’s reliability and availability as
Winnicott’s editor resonates with Winnicott’s description of mothering and the
potential space. For Winnicott, access to this space between the self and the out-
side world, in which play happens and which is crucial to “the whole cultural
life of man”, must be mediated by the Mother:

The Mother’s love, displayed or made manifest as human reliability,
does in fact give the baby a sense of trust or of confidence in the envi-
ronmental factor.

Mothering becomes a way of bringing the child into contact with the de-
mands and frustrations of the external environment in a way that is disillusion-
ing but not alienating. The potential space is a space for negotiation, that which
“initially both conjoins and separates the baby and the mother”. In terms of
Khan’s editorial work, we can see how Winnicott relies on Khan to negotiate the
conflict between his idiomatic and private style and the external battery of
Freudian concepts that demand recognition. Khan’s introduction of Freud’s
writing into Winnicott’s work allows Winnicott to emphasize the differences
between his thought from Freud, but at the same time forces Winnicott’s ideas
into a dialogue with Freud, and in doing so Khan insists that Winnicott’s work
must speak to the psychoanalytic community at large, in a language compre-
hensible to as many clinicians as possible. For Roger Willoughby, Khan’s “edito-
rial lieutenancy” as regards the writing of Winnicott was a substitute for his

58 Ibid.

59 Ibid.

60 Ibid, p.144.
dissatisfying analysis with him.\textsuperscript{61} Winnicott’s prefatory remarks about Khan is interpreted by him as “similar to Hegel’s master-slave dialectic, the dogsbody may be seen as coming to exercise a paternal function, allowing Winnicott to begin to acknowledge his filial and fraternal position in psychoanalysis.”\textsuperscript{62} Willoughby opts for an explicitly paternalistic model of influence, which seems unusual given the primacy in Winnicott’s own thought to mothering as the process by which individuals are socialised into reality, whilst also retain their inner psychic distinctiveness. This Winnicottian theoretical model, in Khan’s thinking, is merged with Eliot’s language of literary tradition, which also especially apt when we consider that Khan is undertaking a project centred on writing with his indexing editorial work. As I discuss now, the combination of these two areas of intellectual and cultural activity is exemplary of the manner in which Khan’s work connects up ideas specific to the British Independent tradition of psychoanalysis and modernist culture.

Modernism and Tradition

The term ‘tradition’ was most famously expanded and explored critically by F.R. Leavis in the United Kingdom and Cleanth Brooks (author of \textit{Modern Poetry and the Tradition}) in the United States. Leavis’ critical practice rested on a number of key works that concern themselves with ‘tradition’: \textit{The Great Tradition} (1948) and \textit{Revaluation: Tradition and Development in English Poetry} (1933) being the key examples. Tradition, as a key term in modernist literary criticism, is grounded on T.S. Eliot’s crucial essay of 1919 ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’, published in \textit{The Egoist}, which became within Eliot’s lifetime the most heavily anthologized of his prose writings. Indeed, it is a fitting coincidence

\textsuperscript{61} Willoughby, pp.57-58.

\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., p.56.
that Leavis switched from History to the new school of English Literature at Cambridge in the same year as Eliot’s first collection of critical writing, *The Sacred Wood*, was published, including as it did a re-print of ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’. 63

Eliot’s vision of the creative process is one that entails “a continual extinction of personality”, drawing on the image of a platinum catalyst for the mind of the poet. For Eliot, “Emotions and feelings” and “phrases and images” are catalyzed into a “concentration, of a very great number of experiences” or “a new compound”. 64 This extinction of the personality – where poetry “is not a turning loose of emotion, but an escape from emotion” 65 – is part of a doctrine of impersonality which Jewel Spears Brooker describes as “a dialectical process that allows the poet to refine ordinary human emotions into ‘art emotions’”. 66 In this version of creative activity, the poet’s “autonomous romantic self” is disciplined by formal concerns into a genuine articulation of personal emotion. 67

Frank Kermode, in his introduction to Eliot’s collected prose, describes this transformation of the personal as “surrender to the tradition”, 68 an exercise that transmutes the personal through a familiarity with the historical and formal features of poetry. The tradition as embodied by the “mind of Europe”,


64 *The Selected Prose of T.S. Eliot*, p.40.

65 Ibid.


67 Ibid.

“comes to be more important than the [poet’s] own private mind”.\textsuperscript{69} For Eliot, though, this newness is born of a dialectical relationship with the past – he rejects “this search for novelty in the wrong place” that “discovers the perverse”.\textsuperscript{70} The literature of the past, Eliot writes, “makes a writer most acutely conscious of his place in time, of his own contemporaneity”, though is itself “altered by the present as much as the present is altered by the past”.\textsuperscript{71} F.R. Leavis, in his introduction to \textit{The Great Tradition}, his study of the novels of George Eliot, Henry James, and Joseph Conrad, notes that Jane Austen “in her indebtedness to others, provides an exceptionally illuminating study of the nature of originality, and she exemplifies beautifully the relation of ‘the individual talent’ to ‘tradition’.”\textsuperscript{72} Leavis goes on to describe the relation of the past to the present in Austen’s work:

…her relation to tradition is a creative one. She not only makes tradition for those coming after, but her achievement has a retroactive effect: as we look back beyond her we see what goes in before, and see because of her, potentialities and significances brought out in such a way that, for us, she creates the tradition we see leading down to her. Her work, like the work of all great creative writers, gives a meaning to the past.\textsuperscript{73}

As Leavis describes it, literature is perfectly capable here of embodying and rationalizing its past into a coherent movement forward. It is worth reading with respect to Khan’s claim in ‘The Becoming of a Psychoanalyst’ that Freud “provided humanism with its first laboratory: the analytic situation”.\textsuperscript{74}

\textsuperscript{69} \textit{The Selected Prose of T.S. Eliot}, p.43.

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid., p.38.

\textsuperscript{71} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{72} F.R. Leavis, \textit{The Great Tradition} (London: Chatto & Windus, 1948), p.5.

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{74} \textit{The Privacy of the Self}, p.127.
invention of psychoanalysis changes the meaning and historical direction of
writers like Montaigne and Rousseau, whose work Khan explores in the adja-
cent chapter in The Privacy of the Self, arguing that they present a series of ques-
tions about the interior life of the self that culminates with Freud: “It is only
with Freud that self-experience finds its true instrumentality through the other
for self-reflection and discovery” (as opposed to Montaigne and Rousseau,
where Khan sees their self-experience as “restricted”).

In these versions of tradition, time’s arrow is not unidirectional – accord-
ing to Eliot the present drives into and transforms the past just as the past refig-
ures the present. Eliot’s “historical sense” brings the “timeless and the temporal
together”, in which his allegiances are variegated and connected to “the whole
of the literature of Europe from Homer…the whole of the literature of his own
country” in a “simultaneous order”. The poet, though, also has a profound ef-
fect on the writing of the past:

…what happens when a new work of art is created is something that
happens simultaneously to all the works of art which preceded it. The
existing monuments form an ideal order amongst themselves, which is
modified by the introduction of the new work of art among them. The
existing order is complete before the new work arrives; for order to per-
sist after the supervention of novelty, the whole existing order must be,
if ever so slightly, altered; and so the relations, proportions, values of
each work of art are readjusted; and this is conformity between the old
and the new.

In New World Modernisms: T.S. Eliot, Derek Walcott and Kamau Braithwaite,
Charles Pollard’s study examining the impact of the modernist notion of tradi-
tion on Caribbean writing, Pollard suggests that Eliot offers as an “alternative

75 Ibid., p.111.
76 The Selected Prose of T.S. Eliot, p.38.
77 Ibid., pp.38-39.
heuristic to a positivistic narrative of historical progress”.

It confronts, Pollard notes, the paradoxical task “of creating a poetry of a fragmented order” that responds itself to a “shared anxiety” of both modernist and postcolonial scenes about their own belatedness.

For Eliot, cultivating a sense of tradition produces what Leavis calls a “current classic” (vivifying the past in the present), and also offers a way of making sense of modern life. In ‘Ulysses, Order and Myth’ he values Joyce’s “mythic method” because the “continuous parallel between contemporaneity and antiquity” gives “shape and significance to the immense panorama of futility and anarchy which is contemporary history”.

There are clear echoes of Eliot’s language in Khan’s writing in *The Privacy of the Self*. For instance, the confrontation with tradition is alluded to in ‘Montaigne, Rousseau and Freud’. When discussing Montaigne and his *Essais* Khan glosses it in a way that intermingles Eliot’s concept of tradition and a psychoanalytically inflected idea of environment: “Montaigne’s inner reality becomes totally inclusive of the human environment and its tradition outside”.

For Khan, Freud’s writing is precisely one of the works of the past that is transformed by the framework of contemporary research – with the insights gleaned from Winnicott’s work, for instance – but is also an example of writing to which a great debt is owed. For Khan, seeing how the “monuments form an ideal order amongst themselves” in the psychoanalytic canon is the key operation for the trainee. Indeed, Khan was the principle Librarian at the Institute of


79 Ibid.

80 *The Great Tradition*, p.4.

81 *The Selected Prose of T.S. Eliot*, p.177.

82 *The Privacy of the Self*, p.103.
Psychoanalysis from 1954 until 1974, symbolically affirming his position for Winnicott (and others) as “well-read Khan”\textsuperscript{83} and guardian of the Freudian legacy.\textsuperscript{84} This is further bolstered by the importance of his role on the Publications Committee of the BPAS, where, with John Sutherland, he approved and edited over thirty texts for the Hogarth Press and “breathed new life into the series”.\textsuperscript{85}

**Instruction**

Negotiating between Winnicott’s idiomatic style and the weight of the psychoanalytic intellectual tradition was the main concern of Khan’s editorial relationship with Winnicott. This negotiation is more abstractly explored in Khan’s discussion of the other branch of psychoanalytic pedagogy identified in ‘The Becoming of a Psychoanalyst’ – ‘Instruction’. It is in Khan’s vision of this relationship between contemporary psychoanalysts and Freud’s writing that this is more explicitly articulated, and also the place where his language is most evocative of Eliot’s work. “The writings of Freud”, Khan writes, “sets us the hardest task in both reading and writing”:

> No matter how much progress is made…in psychoanalysis…since Freud, there will never be a substitute for reading Freud himself. Here, Freud is more in the tradition of Tolstoy and Shakespeare. And yet one has to immediately add the rider that all the research since Freud does in fact change the reading of Freud.\textsuperscript{86}

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\textsuperscript{83} Khan reports Winnicott referring to him as such in *When Spring Comes*, p.48.

\textsuperscript{84} Hopkins, pp.136-137.

\textsuperscript{85} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{86} *The Privacy of the Self*, p.118.
In the subsequent paragraph we learn that Freud must be “read creatively”, and that “this is also true of any analyst, be it a Hartmann, a Melanie Klein or a Winnicott”.\textsuperscript{87} For Khan, the “moral of all this” is that “Freud must be read in a bifocal way: historically, in terms of his own text; and contemporaneously, in terms of all that has evolved since”.\textsuperscript{88} Reading Freud himself is crucial, as there is something about the Freudian literary legacy that must not be “adulterated and diminished”. Before a lengthy quote from Freud’s letters in \textit{Hidden Selves}, Khan notes “I quote the relevant passage in full because these days more is read about Freud than by Freud”.\textsuperscript{89} Similarly, in ‘The Becoming of a Psychoanalyst’, Khan prefaces a quotation by saying, dramatically, “First, let us hear Freud on this count”, and indeed, one of the frequent injunctions in Khan’s writing is to make the reader attentive to Freud’s authorial voice.\textsuperscript{90} In the former remark we may discern an echo of Eliot’s famous opening to the ‘Metaphysical Poets’, whom he calls “a generation more often named than read, and more often read than profitably studied”.\textsuperscript{91}

Khan’s model for this “task in reading and writing” in ‘The Becoming of a Psychoanalyst’ is taken from the debate that raged between physicist and novelist C.P. Snow and F.R. Leavis in the late 1950s and early 60s. The ‘Two Cultures’ debate, prompted by Snow’s 1956 Rede lecture given in Cambridge, concerned what Snow saw as a collapse in Scientific literacy amongst scholars of the humanities, and a more general institutional divide between the humanities and the sciences. For Snow, this fragmentation is detrimental to the development of civilization – the scientific illiteracy he identifies with the Arnoldian

\[87\text{ Ibid., p.121.}\]

\[88\text{ Ibid.}\]

\[89\text{ Hidden Selves, p.158.}\]

\[90\text{ The Privacy of the Self, p.113.}\]

\[91\text{ The Selected Prose of T.S. Eliot, p.59.}\]
“traditional culture” of enquiry in the humanities is anti-progressive and anti-technology.\textsuperscript{92} Snow’s vision of an education that was even-handed in its approach to the arts and sciences was designed to ensure the political and social leaders of the future were equipped to make decisions about powerful new technologies that had the capacity to radically transform human life. Indeed, in her 2009 C.P. Snow Memorial lecture Lisa Jardine contextualizes Snow’s argument for the connection of scientific understanding with policy-making and public life with the political decision-making processes regarding the RAF strategic bombing campaign in Germany and the use of nuclear weapons in Japan in the Second World War.\textsuperscript{93}

Leavis’ and Snow’s dispute continued in the \textit{Times Literary Supplement} and the \textit{Spectator} in the years following the lecture. Leavis’ position, evident in his notion of literary tradition, was ostensibly to defend the study of the humanities (and of the writing of ‘Great’ authors in particular). For Leavis, such writing did not exist solely in the past, as a relic to be treated indifferently or as a curiosity, but rather must be made to live in the present as a moral corrective through the act of reading and criticism.

For Khan, the Two Cultures debate pertained particularly crucially to Freud because of his ambiguous position between literary and scientific disciplines. Khan quotes at length from Snow in order to identify the “tension” between “these two processes”.\textsuperscript{94} For Snow, scientific discourse “cannot help but show the direction of Time’s Arrow. It has an organic and indissoluble relation

\textsuperscript{92} For more on this, see Stefan Collini’s introduction to the 1993 re-issue of the lecture. Collini contextualizes the debate with the Matthew Arnold and T.H. Huxley’s nineteenth century dispute over the limits of a literary education. C.P. Snow, \textit{The Two Cultures}, with an Introduction by Stefan Collini (Cambridge: CUP, 1998).

\textsuperscript{93} Lisa Jardine, ‘Don’t we need trained minds to handle all this?’, \textit{The Sunday Times}, October 15\textsuperscript{th}, 2009.

\textsuperscript{94} \textit{The Privacy of the Self}, p.120.
with its own past.” The scientist, here, has no need to “ever read an original work of the past…Their substance has all been infused into the common agreement, the textbooks, the contemporary papers, the living present”. This culture, which Snow calls a “successful search for agreement” and a “mental consensus”, is to be contrasted with the peculiar temporality of “‘humanist’ culture”, a label that for Snow is much more evasive and much less concrete than his scientific culture: “there should be a more acceptable term, but it has not yet emerged”. This culture, exemplified as it is here by Shakespeare and Tolstoy, is made up of works that “cannot pass into general agreement or collective mind…they cannot be incorporated into the present”. Such works, Snow writes,

…endure as independent entities. Partly outside of time. Partly but not entirely: for we have to see them with a kind of double exposure, perceiving as well as we can, what they meant in their own time, and (what is much easier) what they mean in ours. But, though the relation of time to Humanist art is not simple, there is no direction of time’s arrow…There is no built-in progress in the humanist culture. There are changes, but not progress, no increase of agreement.

Snow’s claim as to the pastness of literature is crucial when considering the version of tradition, and temporality of literature, offered up by Eliot and Leavis. Edward Said’s description of Eliot’s tradition puts this position succinctly:

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95 Ibid.

96 Ibid., p.119.

97 Ibid.

98 Ibid., p.120.

99 Ibid.
“Neither past nor present, any more than any poet or artist, has a complete meaning alone”.100

When Khan is reading Snow it is clear that he is using the Two Cultures debate to raise the question of the scientific status of psychoanalysis, a question on which his mind is decisively made up: “Here, Freud is more in the tradition of Tolstoy and Shakespeare.”101 There is no call from Khan here to expand the definition of science to include psychoanalysis, as would be possible with the German intellectual concept of Wissenschaft.102 Indeed, later in the paper, when Khan addresses Freud’s question about whether psychoanalysis belongs in the domain of the scientific Weltanschauung, Khan states: “Freud’s discoveries and genius derive more from the humanistic disciplines than its scientific ones...his true precursors are Sophocles, Montaigne, Cervantes, Nietzsche”.103 For Khan, the importance and weight of that tradition for Freud’s writing is such that he insists on it “in spite of Freud’s protestations [that psychoanalysis must belong to the scientific Weltanschauung]”.104 Freud is written, by Khan, back into a humanistic tradition that explicitly rejects the claims of Snow and of scientific modernity. Psychoanalytic texts are like those of the Eliotian tradition, rearranging the furniture of the intellectual canon as they emerge: “all the research since Freud does in fact change the reading of Freud”.105


101 Ibid., p.120.

102 See Collini’s introduction to The Two Cultures, pp.xiv-xv.

103 The Privacy of the Self, p.127.

104 Ibid.

105 Ibid., p.120.
The psychoanalytic tradition of Freud is a humanistic one and acts as counter-modernity to Snow’s highly instrumental model of scientific progress and technological utopianism. Whilst for Snow literary heritage is fixed and unchanging, assigned to a particular historical and cultural moment (they are taken in terms of the “words on the page as they stand”), in Eliot and Leavis the tradition is a living one: it is mobile; it animates contemporary cultural and moral life. Whilst Leavis’ famously acerbic response to Snow, with its insistence on the total non-equivalence of scientific and humanistic areas of inquiry, is certainly an attempt to shore up the special status accorded to literary studies as a profession, it also defends on ideological grounds what Leavis sees as a necessary corrective to Snow’s technocratic modernity. Literary studies, for Leavis, must

Inaugurate another, a different, sustained effort of collaborative human creativity which is concerned with perpetuating, strengthening and asserting, in response to change, a full human creativity—the continuous, collaborative creativity that ensures significance, ends and values, and manifests itself as consciousness and profoundly human purpose.¹⁰⁷

Khan’s invocation of Leavis’ debate with Snow, and his Eliotian language of tradition, indicates the intention of his project in ‘The Becoming of a Psychoanalyst’ and elsewhere: to model the psychoanalytic institution on that of professionalised, modernist-inflected, literary studies, and to imagine its internal intellectual dynamics along similar lines. I want to explore next in more detail the particularities of tradition in modernist literature, and the appeal this has for Khan as south Asian migrant psychoanalyst in Britain, as well as the impact such a notion of tradition has on other elements of Khan’s writing and thought.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ F.R. Leavis, Nor Shall My Sword: Discourses on Pluralism, Compassion and Social Hope (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1972), p.156.
Masud Khan’s Feudal Tradition

Eliot’s notion of tradition, and its unusual temporality, shapes Khan’s attitude towards psychoanalytic knowledge and practice, and inheritance. For Khan, the emergence of new work in psychoanalysis interacts with its predecessors in the character Eliot describes. Psychoanalysis in Khan’s hands concerns itself with the use of tradition as a corrective and a coercive (the writing of Freud existing as a principle in the past but also subject to some reshaping from the present) - but what is it about the temporality of tradition, with its “simultaneous order”, that so fascinates Khan?

The weight Khan places on tradition can be understood when we recognise the connection that word has to his imagining of his ethnic and cultural background in the northern Punjab, his “tradition of nurture”. The family estate, gifted to his grandfather by the British administration in the 1870s because of his support during the rebellion of 1871, was essentially feudal in character. Khan’s upbringing was quintessentially aristocratic and connected to the highest echelons of the colonial administration. After his departure from India in 1946 for Britain, he never applied for Pakistani citizenship, so his half-brother ran his vast estates near Lahore by proxy.\(^{108}\)

The political and legal existence of this feudal tradition would come under special threat in the 1970s, when Khan was at his most productive as a writer. The publication of The Privacy of the Self in 1974 was shadowed by key events three years earlier: the death of Winnicott (and Khan’s subsequent exclusion from managing his literary estate in Winnicott’s will); the death of Khan’s mother; and the civil war in Pakistan, which lead to the foundation of

\(^{108}\) Hopkins, p.178.
Bangladesh. Khan experiences in these few short years three different forms of disinheritance, shattering his sense of continuity professionally, politically, and personally. As I noted in the introduction to this thesis, during the course of the civil war, seven of Khan’s ‘peasants’ claimed ownership of much of the family estate and Khan was forced to sell the plots in question. Khan described the period as one of “anarchic socialist unrest”, suggesting the mood is that of “an almost hysterical ferment in which anything could happen to anyone”. What Khan sees as a greedy anticipation “to grab hold of all varieties of properties” can be more concretely contextualized with the election campaign of Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party and the program of Land Reforms on which it was based. Khan referred to the aforementioned sale of his family’s land as “the voluntary end to a tradition that my ancestors have nurtured over centuries”.

The feudal is forced to give way to the very real demands of a recently emancipated political class. The first democratic elections in Pakistan’s history took place in 1970 and saw the end of the fifteen-year military dictatorship of Ayub Khan. Zulfikar Bhutto was elected to office as the leader of the Pakistan People’s Party on an Islamic-Socialist platform, winning a significant majority in West Pakistan: in East Pakistan, the pro-independence and socialist Awami league won a similar landslide. The PPP’s election manifesto (authored by Bengali communist J.A. Rahim) uncompromisingly opens with “DEMOCRACY

109 See Hopkins, p.223.

110 Ibid.

111 Ibid.

112 Ibid.

113 For more on the results of the 1970 election, see Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), pp.195-205.
IS OUR POLITY / SOCIALISM IS OUR ECONOMY”,¹¹⁴ and anticipates the “abolition of privileges and the transfer of power to the people”.¹¹⁵ Indeed, the popular slogan of Bhutto’s election campaign was “Roti Kapra Makaan” [“Food, Clothing, Shelter”].¹¹⁶ The PPP’s brand of ‘Islamic Socialism’ was suggested by Bhutto to be equivalent to “musawat” [“egalitarianism”] and insisted that the “equality and brotherhood enjoined by Islam could not be attained in an exploitive capitalist system”.¹¹⁷

This Islamic socialism offered to lower and middle class voters another version of the ‘horizontal’ emancipation into a political community promised by the Islamic Communalism movement of the early 20th century in Lahore, as opposed to the ‘vertical’ political community based on local rites, traditions and custom. The ‘vertical’ community by contrast, as I have discussed earlier, was instituted by the Imperial administration in an attempt to use local aristocratic ‘mediators’ to ease the establishment of British administrative control. The feudal landlord, therefore, is one of the main targets of attack in the PPP manifesto, with the “feudal lords” constituting “a formidable obstacle to success”:¹¹⁸ “The party stands for elimination of Feudalism.”¹¹⁹

How did Khan himself imagine this politically compromised ‘tradition’? His language, through its allusions to Eliot, blends psychoanalytic and biographical modes. Writing in his Work Books, Khan’s vision of this past was, he


¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Talbot, p.197.

¹¹⁷ Election Manifesto, p.3.

¹¹⁸ Election Manifesto, p.28.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.
puts it, of a “dark inheritance…impersonal, militaristic and political”, calling it, “the taint of my ancestry” that engenders in him an “inner craving for heroic social battle”. Whilst Khan’s life was certainly not dedicated to “social battle” – he was neither militaristic like his brothers, nor, as Linda Hopkins has noted, particularly interested in writing about politics in depth in his diaries – we can see how his language here spills over into his psychoanalytic writing. The “heroic subjective experience” that he ascribes to Freud’s self-analysis echoes this craving for “heroic social battle”, but takes this imagined militaristic past from the social historical ‘outside’ and applies it to the inner life, in this case Freud’s. Khan, notably, reproduces Eliot’s language of literary tradition in describing his ancestry. Eliot envisages the work of art that stands as part of tradition as being “universal, strange and impersonal”; Khan refers to his background as an “impersonal” “dark inheritance”. In a self-authored obituary written two years before he died, Khan writes similarly that

Raja Mohammad Masud Raza Khan was the last of his ancestors, who had travelled…with the Persian conquerors in the fourteenth century… Six centuries ended with him, but he had lived nobly and in the tradition of his ancestors.

This tradition of his ancestors, “impersonal” and strange, is suspended and continued by Khan. “The models of one’s parental idiom”, he writes in his diaries, “stick deep to one’s soul”, and it is a “logic of impersonal devotion to service” that he derives “from [his] father’s example.” Communicating the virtues of his tradition by means of a familial bond is echoed in Eliot’s ‘Notes

\[\text{(footnotes) Hopkins, pp.3-4.}\]
\[\text{(footnotes) Hopkins, n.22, p.489.}\]
\[\text{(footnotes) Hopkins, p.3.}\]
\[\text{(footnotes) Willoughby, pp.246-247.}\]
\[\text{(footnotes) Hopkins, p.136.}\]
Towards the Definition of Culture’ where he celebrates a continuing relationship with one’s ancestors, a “bond which embraces a longer period of time…a piety towards the dead, however obscure”. Writing about his father, who died in the nineteen forties whilst he was at university, Khan suggests:

I have internalized my father as tradition and not merely as parent. Tradition has a larger holding capacity than any individual relationship.\(^{126}\)

Here Khan suggests a difference between parenting as a basic, functional and personal relationship and parenting as a pretext for the transmission of a sense of continuity that extends beyond the lifespan of any individual person. Indeed, in another comment in Khan’s Work Books, his father is described in terms that make him sound as if he is one of Eliot’s texts of tradition: “a gaunt, bleak, monumental presence”.\(^{127}\) The relationship between the parent and child here – in Khan’s feudal environment – becomes the mechanism by which the child acquires a sense of deep historical order. Indeed, we can understand this remark as re-casting the developmental holding environment of Winnicott’s work in the land politics of colonial India, and substituting the maternal for patriarchal militarism.

There is, then, a key conflation going on in Khan’s remarks above on the “holding capacity” of tradition: of psychoanalytic terminology concerning the work of mothering, and the transmission from father to son of a socio-economic structure in colonial India. The opposition Khan posits at one point in his diaries between his ‘Western’ colonial educated self and his feudal upbringing –

\(^{125}\) *The Selected Prose of T.S. Eliot*, p.301.


\(^{127}\) Hopkins, p.9.
“I am always being pulled apart between the insights of my mind & the feudal prejudices of my temperament”\(^{128}\) – is nonexistent here. The psychoanalytic and feudal both rely on the same vocabulary of tradition. A pointed example of this can be detected in his diaries. Khan praises his training analyst John Rickman, a Quaker whose writing was concerned with the role of silence in psychoanalysis, for his “traditions of hospitality, generosity and respect”.\(^{129}\) These traditions are precisely those that Khan associates with his feudal upbringing - in his final book, *When Spring Comes*, Khan describes his heritage as a “family background with a tradition of care at all costs”.\(^{130}\)

The blending of feudal and psychoanalytic environments is typified in an excerpt from Linda Hopkins’ biography. When Khan moved his consulting room from Hans Crescent (in Knightsbridge) to 7 Palace Court, near Kensington Gardens in Bayswater, he cultivated what Hopkins calls “an intellectual and social group with three young people whom he referred to as his ‘villagers’”.\(^{131}\) These “villagers”, Hopkins tells us, were:

…analytic candidates who were also his analysands, and then met regularly to discuss clinical material. They were two male medical doctors… and a female Ph.D., Margarita [pseudonym], united in a ‘brotherhood’ in which they vowed to be totally supportive of each other.\(^{132}\)

Everything in Khan’s new home in Bayswater was carefully contrived – he wanted a “Masudic white monastic library…stark, spacious and daunting”\(^{133}\) –

\(^{128}\) Hopkins, p.67.

\(^{129}\) Hopkins, p.31.

\(^{130}\) *When Spring Comes*, p.199.

\(^{131}\) Hopkins, p.254.

\(^{132}\) Ibid.

\(^{133}\) Ibid., p.253.
with Khan choosing soft furnishings, a new wardrobe of clothes and furniture that expressed, according to Hopkins, “a more idiosyncratic blend of English and Indian”. The style of Khan’s new home and the cultivation of his “villagers” was all part of his designs: “I am nurturing Flat 7 into a Masudic Village”. Hopkins refers to this vision of his new home as hoping that “Palace Court could be the Western equivalent of Kot Fazaldad Khan [the name of Khan’s house and estate in Pakistan].” Khan is quite deliberately reinventing his feudal tradition in Bayswater, by means of interior design.

The feudal impinges on his psychoanalysis too. The psychoanalytic relationship as conceptualized by Khan is remarkably similar to the tradition Khan describes as collapsing when selling his lands in 1971. Then, Khan sees the feudal tradition as “an alliance that was always larger than each and all and was handed over from generation to generation”. Almost verbatim, Khan refers to the psychoanalytic relationship of the analyst and analysand as “a shared symbolic language larger and richer” than any individual alone in The Privacy of the Self. We can see another instance of exchange between the psychoanalytic and the feudal here. The feudal alliance Khan speaks of earlier has its technical mirror in Khan’s theoretical writing - the “therapeutic alliance”. Khan borrows this term from American psychoanalyst Elizabeth Zetzel, who developed this notion of the therapeutic relationship in a 1956 paper (“Current concepts of

\[\text{\textsuperscript{134}}\text{Ibid.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{135}}\text{Ibid.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{136}}\text{Ibid.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{137}}\text{Ibid.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{138}}\text{The Privacy of the Self, p.135.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{139}}\text{Ibid., p.136.}\]
transference’) reprinted in 1970’s The Capacity for Emotional Growth, and whom Khan cites explicitly here.140

Zetzel conceptualizes a view of the psychoanalytic relationship derived from Richard Sterba’s idea of a rational component dissociated from the ego in dialogue with the analyst as a prerequisite for a successful treatment.141 Zetzel’s alliance is the meeting of an autonomous component of the analysand’s ego that must be addressed directly in treatment by the analyst. Zetzel offers up this notion, which theoretically regards patients as having some measure of autonomy, as an alternative to interpreting all of the behavior and demands of the analysand as expressions of a regressed transference neurosis.142 Zetzel’s ego psychology here, which insists on the clinical primacy of a strong and rational ego, can be seen as an attempt to turn the analytic relationship into a more formal agreement entered into by two more-or-less autonomous persons. At the very least, therapy emerges from a partnership where the establishment of the “human attitude” of the analyst must precede any transference-based interpretation.143 For Zetzel, the analysis can only proceed if the analyst recognizes that they are also entering into a dialogue with a rational, autonomous part of the ego as well as with the unconscious of the analysand. Crucially for the version of ego-psychology that Zetzel expounds (and which Lacan amongst others


143 Echtegoyen, pp.240-241.
would so malign), this ego-autonomy at the outset of analysis meant that analytic regression would inevitably be in the service of the ego.144

The autonomy that Zetzel attempts to restore to the analysand, for better or worse, has implications for Khan’s use of the term “feudal alliance”. Khan’s adaptation of the term alliance from Zetzel suggests perhaps that his serfs have a lot more autonomy than might be the case. Indeed, describing the feudal relationship by means of Zetzel’s pre-transference mode of analytic treatment - tacitly invoking its autonomy and reciprocity - conceals the real power relations of this situation. A psychoanalytic lexicon here is deployed to misrepresent the rights and conditions of Khan’s feudal world.

It is also worth considering the meaning of this exchange of terms between psychoanalytic and feudal discourses in terms of the critical description, repeatedly suggested, of Khan as a subject cleanly divisible into ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ selves, as Linda Hopkins argues in her study.145 Other writing and commentary on Khan’s life employs such clichés. Judy Cooper’s short biography ‘Speak of me as I am’ associates him with Othello and takes as its epigraph Kipling’s The Ballad of East and West. The photographer Zoe Dominic, a friend of Khan’s, also suggested Khan “was never Europeanized. You’re either Europeanized or you’re not”.146 It is to Roger Willoughby’s credit that he identifies in the opening chapter of his book (on Khan’s early life in India) the complex series of cross-identifications that must have assailed Khan as an educated colonial subject.147

144 Ibid.

145 For her theory of Khan’s East-West split in his personality, see Hopkins, pp.387-388.

146 Hopkins, p.387.

Khan’s use of Zetzel’s term ‘alliance’ for his feudal background enables us to critique such an oppositional understanding of Khan’s experience of colonisation. Khan is not mechanically mapping his ‘Eastern’ heritage onto a modern ‘Western’ discourse like psychoanalysis: rather terms are adapted, invoked and transformed in the variety of cultural and professional scenes that make up Khan’s life. The same could certainly be said of Khan’s use of ‘tradition’ as espoused by Eliot – it, along with Zetzel in this example, is instrumental in re-imagining and reshaping Khan’s idea of the nature of social relations in the Punjab. Indeed, if this is the case, any discussion of Khan’s thought and life as typifying a clash between the archaic East and modern West must be dismissed outright. Instead of a crude orientalism, it is instead Eliot’s concept of tradition that frames his imagining of both of these intellectually and political institutions.

The way in which Khan turns to Eliot’s modernist conception of tradition to reinvent and rethink the socio-economic background of his youth makes it clear that any kind of opposition between East and Western selves in Khan’s psyche cannot hold, especially given that Linda Hopkins maps this division onto the Winnicottian True- and False-self paradigm. Indeed, his explorations of modernist literature and culture seem to contradict the suggestion that “Khan lived in two cultures for most of his life and he had Eastern and Western selves that were coexistent and noninteracting”. Indeed, Khan employs the vocabulary of tradition in order to comprehend enormous changes in both his ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ realities:

Within six months I have lost two beloved persons who alone anchored me in two cultures: Mother in Pakistan, DWW in London. And now

\[148\] Hopkins, p.388.
\[149\] Ibid.
that both are gone, all my tradition is within me, and I can drift anywhere. Freedom and alienation are at root the same.\textsuperscript{150}

The tradition that has collapsed in Pakistan was one that was “nurtured over centuries”, and it is nurture that leads us back to Eliot’s remarks on tradition in his eponymous essay: “Tradition is a matter of much wider significance. It cannot be inherited, and if you want it you must obtain it by great labor”.\textsuperscript{151} The enormous work involved in the formation and continuation of tradition (Khan’s remark about “nurture” also evokes ideas of care and mothering found in Winnicott’s version of psychoanalysis) suggests that there is a great deal at stake in establishing and reiterating it for both Khan and Eliot. Eliot’s notion of tradition provides Khan with an idea of temporality, continuity and mobility that allows him to bring his feudal heritage – under serious threat, as we have seen – into contact with the world of British psychoanalysis. Indeed, we can see this curious co-existence of past and present in Khan’s peculiar phrasing when describing the place of his upbringing: in ‘The Becoming of a Psychoanalyst’, the new state of Pakistan, with all the attendant upheavals and violence, shadows Khan’s seemingly innocuous remark about his “feudal home in the then Northern India”.\textsuperscript{152}

\textbf{Tradition and exile}

It is the crisis of this particular tradition in Khan’s world that raises the question of his “self-exile”,\textsuperscript{153} and the attendant questions of cultural difference, heritage and modernity that accompany it. Khan’s notion of tradition – Feudal,

\textsuperscript{150} Ibid., p.228.

\textsuperscript{151} The Selected Prose of T.S. Eliot, p.38.

\textsuperscript{152} The Privacy of the Self, p.112.

\textsuperscript{153} When Spring Comes, p.200.
literary and psychoanalytic – are inextricable from such questions. Indeed, we can see in the following examples that the idea of tradition cannot be dissociated in Khan’s writing from key personal and social crises from his life. Tradition appeals especially to the migrant Khan as for Eliot and some of his critics it is inextricable from a state of deracination: indeed, a state of uprootedness is the ideal one for cultivating and nurturing the tradition that is in abeyance. For this reason it appeals especially to the exile or migrant, and I take Khan’s interest in Eliot’s concept of tradition as expressive of his wider commitment to modernist models of exilic self-fashioning.

Contemporary criticism describes how Eliot’s concept could pertain to Masud Khan’s predicament as the feudal Prince living in exile. In a 2007 collection of essays on Eliot’s concept of tradition, Aleida Assmann concentrates on the origins of the notion of tradition in Roman law, the “enemy of time, change and death”. Frank Kermode, in a short introduction to the volume, notes that this notion of tradition “resembles the scholastic invention of the aevum, a duration distinct from both time and eternity, the time of the angels”. Such a phenomenon is crucial to creating an order that Kermode describes as able to “accumulate novelties” and “does not invalidate that intemporal wholeness”. In the editors’ introduction to the volume, Cianci and Harding note that Assmann identifies how Eliot’s conception of the ‘historical sense’ functions to “sever tradition from history in an ordered yet dynamically evolving system”. In Khan’s thought, tradition has the temporal potential to suspend


157 Ibid., p.5.
and sustain, through its interaction with a living present, the cracked historical and political structures that formed his background and shaped his identity.

In *Utopian Generations*, Nicholas Brown identifies the significant “prestige accorded modernist literary texts by colonial-style education at mid-century”, but Khan’s interest in Eliot is more than this.\(^{158}\) Charles Pollard, in *New World Modernisms*, elaborates the postcolonial dimensions of such a “dynamically evolving system” in Eliot’s writing. In this work, he notes that if tradition is not simply a matter of inheritance, but rather a form of work in which tradition is mutable, mobile and contingent, then it obviously pertains to anxieties about belonging, migration and displacement that are shared by both Anglophone high modernism and the writers of burgeoning postcolonial nations.\(^{159}\) For Pollard, the idea of a malleable tradition, entailing an order accommodating of contemporary experience, is key to the creative careers of Caribbean poets like Brathwaite and Walcott.\(^{160}\) They turn to Eliot because, as Peter Howarth suggests, himself drawing on Pollard, “Poets who need a model of how an oppressive past can yet be a resource for a freer present…find Eliot’s idea of ‘tradition’…a liberating one.”\(^{161}\) Although Khan’s politics is of a different character to Brathwaite or Walcott, it is nevertheless the case that Khan turns to the notion of tradition to make a space for himself as both a psychoanalyst and as a deracinated migrant. And as with Brathwaite’s or Walcott’s engagements with Eliot, Khan turns to that writer in order to explore his predicament as a subject of colonial history and to frame his responses to it.

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\(^{159}\) *New World Modernisms*, p.43.

\(^{160}\) Ibid., p.51.

Eliot’s anxieties about his non-European background in the years leading up to the 1920s are, for Pollard, key to understanding his conception of tradition. In a 1919 letter we sense the experience of deracination driving Eliot’s interest in tradition: “remember that I am a metic – a foreigner, I want to understand you, and all the background and tradition of you”. Nevertheless, at the same time the word and concept tie Eliot’s voice to the civilization he sees as founding the principles of European culture. The metic in ancient Athens, Pollard notes, “was an alien allowed to reside in the city because of a special skill but never granted full rights as a citizen”.

In the final chapter of this thesis, I elaborate the compromised nature of Khan’s citizenship status as it pertains to race and the end of Empire, but here I would note that debates about ‘Britishness’ in the post-war decades, and the structuring of citizenship policy, orbited in an exclusionary way around questions of race. Such legislation served to bring Khan’s relatively privileged existence closer to the experience of south Asian migrants who were otherwise less fortunate than him. It is this context that means that Khan’s interest in tradition cannot be disaggregated from two contradictory wishes: the attempt to ameliorate his difference as a migrant (becoming a European modernist and the bearer of the authentic psychoanalytic tradition), and his cultivation of his exilic, outsider status: something that is intrinsic, I argue, to Eliot’s concept of tradition.

162 Ibid., p.41.
163 Ibid.
When Spring Comes contains Khan’s most explicit statements (in his professional writing) about his self-exile, as well as his feudal background:

Having lived and worked in London for forty years, I have learned that self-exile is quite different from being an émigré. I did not have to fabricate a new identity as a British citizen and, while I am open to learn from the culture in which I have been living, the tenacious hold that my own roots and culture have on me has strongly influenced my way of working.\(^\text{165}\)

Khan may envisage himself as an exile, just as Eliot imagines himself as a metic, but neither was systematically deprived of their political or legal rights in their homelands. Whilst the politics of Khan’s upbringing and his writing are examined in the next chapter, it is worth noting in the meantime that his exile must be considered as self-fashioning, in the manner of James Joyce, and an attempt to delve deeper into the pleasures of metropolitan, urban existence he encountered at University.\(^\text{166}\) The ideas of tradition that we see here also suggest paradoxically that Khan’s retreat into exile allowed him to sustain and suspend an idealized vision of the feudal world haunting his writing. F.R. Leavis, writing on Conrad in his introduction to The Great Tradition, makes an apt observation along such lines:

Conrad, of course, was a déraciné, which no doubt counts for a good deal of the intensity with which he renders his favourite theme of isolation. But then a state of something like deracination is common today among those to whom the question of who the great novelists are is likely to matter.\(^\text{167}\)

\(^{165}\) When Spring Comes, p.200.

\(^{166}\) For some discussion of Khan’s university experience in Lahore, including details of how his half-brother Salah introduced him to the exciting pace of urban life, see Hopkins, p.16.

\(^{167}\) The Great Tradition, p.22.
Khan’s self-exile and the decline of his feudal tradition increase the need for him to work at the “great labor” of establishing and reiterating this tradition when in England. Accordingly, in every chapter of When Spring Comes there are clear references to Khan’s “ancestral home” in Pakistan; his serfs; his “non-literate, oral culture”. The climactic chapter of the book, ‘The Long Wait’, is less of a case history and more of an account of the dialogue between Khan and ‘Aisha’, a young woman from a similarly aristocratic family from the Punjab. The account is loaded with references to different Punjabi dialects, their respective Islamic backgrounds, Aisha’s experience of a rootless, “vagrant” life travelling in the West, and Persian poetry. Khan ascribes a particular significance to Aisha’s behavior in alternating between different languages when positioning her body differently in the consulting room:

Note she spoke English and French when sitting up and facing me; only when lying down did she speak in Urdu and Chanauti Punjabi.

In addition to the vernacular Urdu and Chanauti Punjabi, Khan also notes the presence of his dialect, Chakwali Punjabi, in their conversations. Aisha’s and Khan’s speech is presented as a contrapuntal intermingling of different registers of speech: “colloquial” French and English, vernacular Urdu, “refined” Punjabi dialects spoken with “impish accent and the choicest diction”.

In this respect, Khan’s psychoanalytic writing becomes a space for him to stage his own cultural difference and to indicate publicly the extent to which he embod-

168 When Spring Comes, p.147.

169 Ibid., p.181.

170 Ibid., p.177.

171 Ibid.

172 Ibid., p.180.
ies a living ‘feudal’ tradition, “living nobly in the tradition of his ancestors”. But his nostalgic celebration of his own cultural idiom is always conducted with reference to the sense of this tradition being lost to him - he laments his vocabulary is lacking when listening to Aisha speak - and to his own status as an exile.

‘The mind of Europe’ and cultural belonging

As well as allowing Khan to revive his own ethnic and cultural background, the terms of cultural belonging that are framed in Eliot’s writing on tradition also create a cosmopolitan, pan-European space accessible to Khan as a south Asian migrant. Eliot, writing as a migrant, find solutions to the problems of his own not belonging - his sense of being a “metic” - by re-figuring the terms of such a cultural belonging with his ideal of the communal “mind of Europe”, constructed further in ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’, his writing on Dante, and ‘What is a Classic?’ amongst others. Eliot’s vision of culture in 1919 talks of both “the mind of Europe” and “the mind of his own country”, which does not “superannuate either Shakespeare, or Homer, or the Magdelanian draughtsmen”. Frank Kermode articulates Eliot’s demand for dual loyalty in his introduction to the collected prose: “there is a need for modern men to be members of a larger polity than that of their own province – to accept their nationality yet aspire to membership of a more abstract empire”. Kermode makes one thing clear here that we can see elsewhere in Eliot’s aspirational cultural writing: national belonging is an inevitable accident of birth and is nevertheless the object of some piety; but it is a poor second to the richness and universality of a transnational European mind. This form of post-national identity has obvious appeal as an alternative for an exile like Khan, who refused to take

173 Willoughby, pp.246-247.
up Pakistani citizenship in 1947, and as I argue in the next chapter, this exilic existence is principally imagined through an engagement with Joyce.

In his writing on Dante’s Inferno from 1929, Eliot argues that Dante “is the most universal of poets in the modern languages”, and his culture is not “of one European country but of Europe”. The breadth of Dante’s poetic and linguistic identity is contrasted with Shakespeare’s and Racine’s: “there is something much more local about the languages in which they had to express themselves”. It is the same situation with French and German poetry: “To enjoy any French or German poetry, I think one needs to have some sympathy with the French or German mind”. Dante, by contrast, was “nonetheless an Italian and a patriot” but is “first a European”. The critique of the “local” nature of the languages of Shakespeare or Racine is elaborated in Eliot’s critique of the “new kind of provincialism” he describes in ‘What is a Classic?’:

I mean a distortion of values, the exclusion of some, the exaggeration others, which springs...from applying standards acquired within a limited area, to the whole of human experience; which confounds the contingent with the essential, the ephemeral with the permanent.

By contrast, Eliot insists here on the universality (or “comprehensive-ness”) of Virgil’s writing in The Aeneid, generating as it does the “classic of all Europe”. The corrective to this provincialism, for Eliot, is to insist on reminding ourselves that “Europe is a whole...European literature is a whole”, sup-

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177 Ibid.
178 Ibid.
179 Ibid.
180 ‘What is a Classic?’, in The Selected Prose of T.S. Eliot, p.129.
181 Ibid., p.128.
ported by a Roman “standard…established once and for all”.\textsuperscript{182} The “obligation” for the modern writer and critic, which ensures “mutual intelligibility” and “our freedom”, is the “maintenance of the standard”.\textsuperscript{183} Eliot conceives of the wholeness of European literature and culture as related to the wholeness of a body or “organism”, sustained by the “blood-stream” of Latin and Greek literature.\textsuperscript{184} This blood-stream “circulates” through the “several members” of Europe and cements the link between those members and “our parentage in Greece”.\textsuperscript{185} This body politic model of cultural community and transmission is under threat from “mutilation and disfigurement”,\textsuperscript{186} something that can only be forestalled, paradoxically, by “our annual observance of piety towards the great ghost who guided Dante’s pilgrimage”\textsuperscript{187} – the corporeal solidity of cultural life can only be strengthened by ongoing communion with our spectral antecedents.

Eliot’s discussion here of the “mind of Europe” suggests a level of commonality which does not only rely on membership to a particular geographical locality or nation state – the idea of European culture supersedes other types of belonging. The kind of universality that Eliot associates with Dante is somewhat convoluted, with the “localization” of Dante’s “Florentine speech” actually emphasizing the universality of the writing, “because it cuts across the modern division of nationality”.\textsuperscript{188} Dante’s universality is owed to the proximity of

\textsuperscript{182} Ibid., p.130.

\textsuperscript{183} Ibid., p.131.

\textsuperscript{184} Ibid., p.130.

\textsuperscript{185} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{186} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{187} Ibid., p.131.

\textsuperscript{188} Ibid., pp.206-207.
his language to Medieval Latin, functioning as it does as the lingua franca of Europe. Eliot imagines a truly transnational production of the medieval philosophy that influenced Dante’s writing (and therefore accounts for his “universal-ity”):

…there were, for instance, St. Thomas who was an Italian, St Thomas’ predecessor Albertus, who was a German, Abelard who was French, and Hugh and Richard of St. Victor who were Scots.189

Eliot’s articulation of the nationalities of these writers is a move that helps to define the opposition he sets up between the transnational “mind of Europe” and the limitations of an imagination that is loyal to a single state. In fact describing these writers along such lines is somewhat spurious: Germany, France and Italy did not exist as political states, let alone as imagined communities, until several hundred years later.190

Against this historical backdrop of competing languages and cultures, Eliot makes it extremely clear that whatever European culture is, he belongs to it; culture is “our” parentage; “our common heritage of thought”. The pronoun “We” is most frequently used, in the final paragraphs of ‘What is a Classic?’, with imperatives and obligations: “We may remind ourselves of this obligation”; “We need to remind ourselves”; “matters where we ought to maintain a standard”.191 Eliot insists ferociously on his own belonging, despite his migrant status and earlier descriptions of himself as a “metic”. Nevertheless, because his idea of culture does not hinge on membership of a particular nation state, and because his idea of tradition has a temporality that allows it to par-

189 Ibid., p.208.

190 For the classic account of modern nationhood and the ‘imagined community’ see Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1983).

tially step outside the vicissitudes of history, Eliot creates a point of access to European culture for those not born or bred in Europe. Even if “the family is the primary channel for the transmission of culture”, for Eliot the ancient European universities are institutions that transcend national boundaries and create a virtual network of shared ideals:

The universities of Europe should have their common ideals, they should have their obligations towards each other. They should be independent of the governments of the countries in which they are situated. They should not be institutions for the training of an efficient bureaucracy.

If the European universities can exist independently of nationalistic concerns, embodying a “variety of loyalties”, then the implications is that being a part of such an organization brings one into the closest proximity possible with the ideals of European culture. The implications that Eliot’s ideas here have for Masud Khan are clear: if Eliot, as a non-European migrant, can talk of belonging to and embodying tradition and culture, then Khan too could perhaps be privy to the “humanistic culture” that he sees culminating with Freud and psychoanalysis. It is worth noting, as an aside, that Khan’s stationery boasted that he was in possession of a D.Litt from Oxford, an institution with whom he would link himself, fraudulently, with some frequency in his autobiographical reflections. Tradition, in other words, offers Khan access to a form of cosmopolitanism that is an alternative to simple national belonging (and indeed belonging to a socialist nation state - Pakistan - whose existence is antagonistic

192 ‘Notes towards the definition of Culture’, in The Selected Prose of T.S. Eliot, p.300.
193 Ibid., p.305.
194 Ibid.
195 See the introduction to this thesis, Fig. 1., for Khan’s stationary with his title and address, claiming the award of a D.Litt. Khan’s attempts to associate himself with Oxford are described by Hopkins, n.2, p.405 and p.24. See also, Willoughby, p.209, p.246.
towards his interests). Traversing the boundary of past and present - the 
movement constitutive of tradition in these accounts - works for Khan because 
it allows for the suspension and sustaining of his feudal ideals, with the muta-
bility and mobility of tradition allowing the feudal to be reshaped, through 
“great labor” according to the geographical and institutional circumstances 
Khan finds himself in. The idea of European culture, or a collective European 
‘mind’, that forms the backdrop to this notion of tradition, is construed in such 
a way that makes it open to non-Europeans. Indeed, Eliot’s favourite figure- 
heads for transformative, redemptive European culture – Dante and Aeneas – 
are both, crucially, exiles. Eliot’s description of Aeneas’ exile sounds almost 
prophetic when considering Khan’s obsession with continuing the tradition of 
his ancestors:

He would have preferred to stop in Troy, but he becomes an exile, and 
something far greater and more significant than any exile; he is exiled 
for a purpose greater than he can know, but which he recognizes; and 
he is not, in a human sense a happy or successful man. But he is the 
symbol of Rome.\textsuperscript{196}

Aeneas’ exile is part of what Eliot calls “surrendering his will to a higher pow-
er”.\textsuperscript{197} Exile, in this instance, can be seen as part of the extinction of personality 
that is crucial to the encounter with tradition. Khan’s self-exile, when read in 
this light, is perhaps a similar mission to make the feudal tradition of his ances-
tors live in the present, through a version of psychoanalysis that enacts his 
“tradition of nurture”.

\textsuperscript{196} The Selected Prose of T.S. Eliot, p.128.

\textsuperscript{197} Ibid.
The uses of Tradition

We can see that Eliot’s vocabulary of tradition and notions of culture shape Khan’s vision of his feudal environment; his ideas about the legacy of Freud’s writing; and the nature of psychoanalytic training. Indeed, tradition is such an intoxicating concept for Khan it starts to blur the boundaries between his feudal world and his clinical one. Nevertheless, Khan’s insistence that he lived in the tradition of his ancestors, and his insistence on the likenesses between psychoanalysis and the feudal environment, raises several important questions. What does it mean, for instance, to describe psychoanalysis using a vocabulary taken from Eliot’s prose, which is, as Frank Kermode has noted, dominated by a “conservative-Imperialist politics”? In such moments any democratizing impulses in the psychoanalytic notion of the transitional space, which is concerned with mutuality, reciprocity and ambivalence, are completely flattened out in Khan’s account by his casting such a space in terms of feudal lord and serf. Eliot’s vision of impersonality allows Khan to venerate the absorption of both these figures into “something larger and richer”.

This “something”, as I shall argue in the next chapter, is more fraught with the Imperialist concerns and political negotiations of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century than Khan’s enthralled description of his militaristic medieval past might suggest. In the introduction to Culture and Imperialism, Edward Said notes that Eliot’s veneration of a “supposedly unbroken tradition” obscures “the combativeness with which individuals and institutions decide on what is tradition and what is not”. For Said, Eliot’s idealized temporality, where the past and present exist in a dynamic synthesis, masks a series of


199 Culture and Imperialism, p.2.

200 Ibid.
power plays and disputes whose existence does not necessarily register in the overall picture of the literary canon.

In Khan’s writing there are signs of the “combativeness” and conflicts that arise from the making and perpetuation of tradition in his upbringing. In the opening of paragraph of ‘The Becoming of a Psychoanalyst’, different traditions only exist insofar as they are in battle with another: “those who facilitated and nourished my growth as a person were different from the ones who instructed me to read, write, and acquire knowledge”. 201 This claim must be queried: Khan’s sense of self and heritage relies profoundly on an understanding of a modernist aesthetic trope, introduced to him by his personal tutor and in his experiences at university. Khan notes further conflict: “I have received all my education in what are called the humanistic disciplines and none in the scientific ones”. 202 Even his “analytic education” was a “similar dissociated yet reciprocal experience” in relation to his colonial education. 203

The manifest difficulties in Khan’s interactions with conflicting traditions (Imperial and feudal; scientific and humanistic) offer an unsettling riposte to Eliot’s slightly neater version of cultural and literary continuity – unlike a subject living with Imperialism, Eliot is not assailed by multiple identifications and authorities in the same way that Khan is. But this discernible “combative ness” invites us to examine particular conflicts and circumstances that underwrite Khan’s veneration of his feudal tradition, and, indeed, his veneration of modernist writers like Eliot and Joyce.

201 The Privacy of the Self, p.112.

202 Ibid.

203 Ibid.
Khan’s encounter with Eliot in this chapter demonstrates the range of uses it was put to in Khan’s thought. It is, to an extent, mobilised - just as it is for Leavis and Eliot - as a conservative counter-modernity, giving shape to chaos and promising the restoration of forms of cultural authority. On the one hand, it serves to defend the humanistic and literary dimension of psycho-analysis, and to create an expansive, organic sense of the dynamic between new and established ideas in psychoanalytic institutions. In particular, tradition in Khan’s hands was deployed to reveal the radical theoretical insights of Winnicott’s work and the impact this has on an appreciation of Freud’s legacy. His work indexing Winnicott nevertheless showed the constant work of translation required to bring variegated psychoanalytic thinkers into a dialogue with one another.

But on the other hand, Khan turns to tradition to continue celebrating his own highly reactionary roots - a celebratory performance that was carried over, as I discuss in chapter five, and indeed made to live on, in a highly dubious way, in his psychoanalytic activities. Tradition has this more malign aspect in Eliot and Khan’s literary outputs, manifested in the explicit and implicit racial codings of both their versions of cosmopolitanism and community. Khan’s anti-Semitism in his last book bears the trace of this disturbing version of tradition, as well as more obvious literary analogues in Eliot’s output. In this respect, Khan’s mobilisation of tradition becomes toxic in its effect on his late writing.

It is his celebration of Joyce, and his fascination with exile, that is the topic of the next chapter, which explores the specifically Joycean character of Khan’s other reflections on exile, and the manner in which it is insinuated, just as Eliot’s writing on tradition is, into his theoretical imagination.
Chapter Three

‘Exiled in upon his ego’: The politics of privacy

The final chapter of Khan’s 1979 study *Alienation in Perversions* is titled ‘Pornography and the politics of rage and subversion’. Khan’s strident argument about the dehumanizing nature of pornography concludes, on the penultimate page, “the politics of pornography are inherently fascistic”: it exploits “extreme stances of submission and humiliation”.¹ What is peculiar about this chapter is Khan’s placing the word politics so prominently in its title, yet only employing it twice in the course of the piece (in the title, and in the quote above). Indeed, the word ‘politics’ cannot be found at all across Khan’s three major books. Linda Hopkins notes in her biography that Khan seemingly writes very little about contemporary political life in his *Work Books*:

Khan had little interest in large-scale social or political issues. In thousands of pages of Work Book entries and correspondence, there are only a few comments about such topics and these either express a lack of concern or give a psychoanalytic interpretation of the matter.²

Hopkins argues for Khan’s disinterest in, and refusal of, the political realities of his time. In his theoretical writing too there are scant references to major historical events and little reflection on the political landscape of his day. But there is evidence in a number of Khan’s letters which somewhat complicates this position, and provides the context for his imagination of that most arch-modernist of figures: the exile (more specifically, the Joycean exile). Indeed, I argue in this chapter that Khan’s imagination of the individual in his psychoanalytic work,

especially with reference to the most cherished aspects of psychic life, is deeply political in its formation and implications.

Somewhat contrary to Hopkins’ position, I want to suggest that Khan’s life and writing are consistently shadowed by the political realities of his time, both in India and the United Kingdom, and that ultimately this finds expression in his psychoanalytic work. His general BA degree, from Government College in Lyallpur, required him to take English literature, Urdu, History and Political Science. Roger Willoughby has noted that across Khan’s account of his own life, his description of his BA degree frequently changes: in 1955 it is History, Political Science and English; in 1964 it is merely Political Science; and in the 1980s it is English, Political Science and Persian Sufi literature. The thing that remains constant is the political component of his early studies. Indeed, Khan’s never-studied degree at Balliol College, Oxford was supposedly to be ‘Modern Greats’ – now better-known as Politics, Philosophy and Economics – and was supposed to prepare Khan, he alleges, for returning to India and taking up a political position.

The fact that Khan never took up a political career might suggest he indeed became disinterested in political life. However, I argue that it is by examining Khan’s readings of literary texts that we can access the latent political thoughts and reflections of his writing. Rather than understanding Khan’s interest in literature as being what Roger Willoughby calls “a psychic sanctuary into which he could retreat, comforting himself in an escapist fantasy…a mechanism for retrenching within the self”, we could instead see Khan’s reading of Joyce as a highly engaged, though not unproblematic, response to the political


4 See Willoughby, p.20. See also Hopkins, p.24.
realities of Partition (and after) in south Asia, as well as European fascism, with its legacy of displacement and migration.\(^5\)

Contemporary history is not totally absent from Khan’s work. Roger Willoughby has identified a number of Khan’s letters in which he denounces the British administration for the infamous massacre at Amritsar in 1919 (despite, as Willoughby notes, his own father and brother’s complicity in such suppressive activities as part of the Indian Army, which he ignores).\(^6\) Willoughby also identifies a review of *Freud: His Life in Words and Pictures* for the *International Journal of Psychoanalysis* in which Freud is presented as a revolutionary force “shaking Western colonial civilization out its smug narcissistic complacency”.\(^7\) Freud’s modernism, in Khan’s review, “rattled the smug composure of the established nineteenth century values: values that had the sovereignty of Empires.”\(^8\) Later in the passage, Khan’s review also mobilizes Darwin and Marx as harbingers of a modernity that compromised the integrity of “the puritan arrogance of...Imperial England’s self-satisfaction”. The work of this triptych of proto-modernist writers is specifically deployed by Khan to trouble the domination of colonial and imperial power, the end of whose epoch is signalled by “advances in technology and the mass media”.\(^9\) Implicitly, modernism and modernity in Khan’s thought are inextricable from the history of colonization.

Khan recognises, in a letter to his friend Geoffrey Gorer, that his exile was a complex response to a self-proclaimed “failure to adapt to rapid social and political changes that have taken place in all the Far Eastern countries (from

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\(^5\) Willoughby, pp.13-14.

\(^6\) Willoughby, p.127.

\(^7\) Ibid., p.260.

\(^8\) Ibid.

\(^9\) Ibid.
Afghanistan to Japan) in the post-war years. Khan claims he left British India because he found living there “stifling and murderous, to my own sensibility and character”, but nevertheless in other letters he alludes to his participation in nationalist anti-colonial agitation as a student in the forties. He also indicates his distaste for American and European neo-imperialism in the post-war period and cultivates a degree of hostility towards a wide range of European and south Asian political institutions, including the welfare state, the Bhutto government and Ayub Khan’s dictatorship. Khan is well aware of his oppositional stance, noting to Gorer: “As you know, I am not one of those Easterners who nostalgically over-compensate their sense of guilt at having left their countries by progressively over-idealising their culture.”

For instance, writing to Gorer from Pakistan on the eve of the 1965 election, Khan reflects on the uneven and chaotic urbanisation of postcolonial Pakistan: it “sprawls in opulent chaos and messy congested poverty”, populated by “nouveaux riches, pseudo-democratic politicians, corrupt officials and careless overfertile [sic] masses.” He is ambivalent about the prospect of the election of a new government. Although he initially backs the incumbent Ayub Khan - “Field Marshal Ayub we hope will win” - and stridently rejects Fatima Jinnah, the candidate of the Combined Opposition Parties - “should Miss Jinnah win there will be total anarchy and chaos” - a more general dissatisfaction with the


11 Ibid.


14 The Geoffrey Gorer Archive, postcard from Masud Khan to Geoffrey Gorer, 01/01/1965.
political climate creeps in to his short missive.\(^\text{15}\) “It is not that Ayub + this govt.” Khan writes “have not been corrupt by Western standards. But they have some sort of policy + plan - and they at least have five or so years of experience.”\(^\text{16}\) “Miss Jinnah”, Khan suggests, conversely, is “without party or program.”\(^\text{17}\) Khan obviously favours the autocratic incumbent military leader over the “irresponsible factions” and “frantic emotionalism” of the opposition parties.\(^\text{18}\)

Without entering into an extended discussion of the political climate of the 1965 elections, and reflecting on the extent to which Khan’s description is accurate or otherwise - it is worth noting his sense of unease with the political landscape as a whole, and pessimism about Pakistan’s political future. Even though he notes the estate - descriptions of which bookend the short letter - is “quiet, tranquil and peaceful”, and its “rhythm of life” is “persistent, languid”, the outside world of “emergent industrialised Pakistan” nevertheless intrudes.\(^\text{19}\)

Khan is not averse to commenting on other political issues. In an exchange of letters with Gorer, from December 1968, Khan signals his disquiet at the foreign policies of the Western powers as they are manifested in the “horri-\(^\text{20}\)fying” “American interventions in Korea and Vietnam”. He suggests “European civilisation” is attempting to solve its own political crises “through the instrumentality of the Americans” “by pushing warfare into Eastern countries and cultures.”\(^\text{21}\) This is a “way of keeping war safely restricted to the areas

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\(^{15}\) Ibid.

\(^{16}\) Ibid.

\(^{17}\) Ibid.

\(^{18}\) Ibid.

\(^{19}\) Ibid.

\(^{20}\) The Geoffrey Gorer Archive, letter from Masud Khan to Geoffrey Gorer, 02/12/1968.

\(^{21}\) Ibid.
where it will not flare into international dimensions” without any regard for “the cost of this is to the indigenous populations, as in Vietnam”: these wars are conducted, Khan suggests, to make “Europeans feel safe and good.” For Khan, this is the expression of a form of imperialism that has a “totally nihilistic and destructive shape, much worse than the economic imperialism of Europe in the last three centuries”, transforming “Eastern countries [which] are going to be exploited as a human hunting ground and slaughterhouse”.23

What is striking about this exchange is partly that it foregrounds Khan’s critical attitude towards Anglo-American post-war imperialism, and that by way of conclusion Khan cannot help but refer to his exilic status. His conversation with Gorer at dinner the previous weekend - which these letters were written to extend, with Khan hoping to express how “horrified” he was to hear Gorer’s admiration for Lyndon Johnson - activates “something which has only been larval in my mind [that] suddenly finds its articulation and shape through sponsoring by you”: Khan “did not realise that all these things mattered so much to me”.24 But it is not just Gorer’s discussions with Khan that reveal to Khan his own “staunchly nationalistic attitude” that he finds himself “sur-

22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
prised” to hold.\textsuperscript{25} He suggests “another aspect of living abroad” is “that one gradually becomes much more authentically oneself in terms of one’s cultural inheritance, because one no longer has to fight with one’s culture for day to day maintenance of personal identity”.\textsuperscript{26} The process of exiling oneself from one’s own culture is the means to fashion oneself into something new, and to allow something authentic to emerge. His remarks connect two of the key tropes in Khan’s writing - the hidden, larval aspects of self-experience, and his sense of himself as an exilic outsider to both European and his native culture - to explicitly political concerns.

In Hidden Selves Khan also takes issue with the proudest achievement of his adopted home: the welfare state. For Khan, various manifestations of the modern welfare state, whether they are “idealistically socialist, traditionally conservative or militantly Marxist”, have “evolved an intrusive concern for the individual’s well being which, instead of promoting his personal growth, is turning him into a depersonalised parasite, as well as a victim”.\textsuperscript{27} Though the rhetoric of Khan’s critique evokes typical conservative and liberal critiques of the functioning of the modern state, he goes on to suggest that nevertheless

\textsuperscript{25} The Geoffrey Gorer Archive, letter from Masud Khan to Geoffrey Gorer, 02/12/1968. There is other evidence in their letters of a pronounced interest in politics. Khan also copies a letter to Gorer in which he refuses the opportunity to review a book on Gandhi, citing his personal bias as one who “grew up in the Islamic feudal Northern India when the continent was British India”. The letter also alludes to his political activities as a young man. “In my college years” he writes, “[I] played a very active role politically, like the rest of my generation, in combating Gandhi and struggling for a division of India in Pakistan and India.” He goes on to note that his “view of Gandhi’s “truth” is very different and historically prejudiced”, and disdains the “rather innocent, and for that matter perhaps unbiased approach to Gandhi’s programme and ruses” he scribes to Europeans. Khan makes clear his position: “the muslims of India feel very differently about the sainthood of Gandhi’s stand than the native Hindus did.” The Geoffrey Gorer Archive, letter from Masud Khan to Prof. Robert Rothberg, copied to Geoffrey Gorer, 06/01/1970.

\textsuperscript{26} The Geoffrey Gorer Archive, letter from Masud Khan to Geoffrey Gorer, 02/12/1968.

“civilization is not worth a bean if it does not look after the ordinary welfare of its citizens”, and Khan is keen to underline that he “is not jeering at the true virtues of modern civilisations and that civic concern for the well-being of the individual”. Rather, what Khan objects to is precisely the form of such “programmed endeavours”, which are conducted by a society that is “excessively pragmatic” and acts through “the instrumentality of the state and politicians”: subjects are “flooded…with ready-made switchable distractions” in these “technical cultures”. His critique of the twentieth century welfare state, though heavy-handed and without nuance, is not simply reducible to a straightforward anti-statist liberal position resting on a fundamental assumption of the autonomy of the subject. Such attacks, from this period, might well be associated with the digestion of Friedrich von Hayek’s writings by the neoliberal consensus of Thatcher’s and Reagan’s governments. Khan’s psychoanalysis, and his theory of the subject, stands explicitly against the instrumental and the functional when it comes to the evaluation of human experience, and it is this attitude that his interest in exile and the ‘private’ self expresses.

Both the welfare state and the forms of leisure exemplifying modern capitalist culture (“imposed” on the individual “in massive doses”) entail a decline in “comprehension of the necessity of the responsibility for an inner relation to its own self”: a relationship only established via immersion in the fallow state, the manifestation of epiphany, or, indeed, taking up exile. Khan’s language of necessity and responsibility here makes it clear that having a capacity for the subdued and withdrawn character of the fallow state – and the benign regressed state of the ‘new beginning’ – is the basis for relating to oneself and others. These various exilic states that Khan describes and defends in his theo-

28 Ibid., p.185.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.
retical accounts of the subject are suggested as the only response to modernity that can save some capacity for self-experience:

It is precisely because Western cultures and civilizations have firmly established the civic dignity, freedom and well-being of the individual that we should try to look at the more subtle aspects of the private and psychic experiences and their value for human existence.\(^{31}\)

These political and personal vignettes are clear evidence that Khan had strong feelings about many of the political realities of his time, was involved in them, and was very much aware of his own position as a subject of a particular history. But his attitude towards these variegated contexts and events provides him with the opportunity to cultivate an oppositional stance exemplary of his performance of the role of modernist exile. Indeed, his maintaining of some distance from these varied political projects, ideals and communities is one of the foundations of a psychoanalytic writing that privileges aspects of psychic life that are unintegrated, or resist inclusion in psychoanalytic language or indeed the shared spaces of human activity. Khan writes boastingly in *Work Books*, though not without a hint of ironic self-critique, of cultivating an exilic self-consciousness early on in London:

> I was a complete stranger in London, strange in my way of life, wayward and insufferably arrogant in my style of living...I was isolated and flaunted my aloneness as a superior way of being...It was hellishly annoying for everyone, but - this being England - individuals are never extinguished; they are merely bullied through a persistent and cussed politeness and negation.\(^{32}\)

Khan takes aim at what he sees as the absurdity and cruelty of English manners, whilst also being well aware that what he does is a performance (“a great deal of it was bluff and exhausting for me”). That aspect of Khan’s per-

\(^{31}\) Ibid., p.185.

\(^{32}\) Hopkins, p.34.
sona is most readily identifiable with the figure of the modernist exile. Khan claims that he is not invested in the fortunes of mass political movements

I have reached a point in my own spiritual vision where the fate of even one person is more important than the mass-destiny of a multitude. Today we are at a point of crisis in the development of human ethos where unless the individual is established, the absolute measure of the destiny of the species, we will be lost forever.33

Yet political life and the fashioning of the individual are not, I would argue, mutually exclusive concerns in Khan’s work. Indeed, the exile is coterminous in his thinking with the individual whose privacy, and whose capacities to be unintegrated, in psychoanalytic terms, are cultivated. The development of the individual, in Khan’s thought, is contingent on establishing the privacy of the self and cherishing the unintegrated and secret parts of the psyche. Such versions of selfhood are direct responses to political life, and derived, in Khan’s highly literary imagination, from a substantive engagement with the trope of exile in modernist literature, especially Joyce.

Accordingly, this chapter stitches together a number of theoretical, literary and historical motifs in Khan’s writing: modernist exile; twentieth century political life in Europe and south Asian; the ‘private’ self of the “dreaming experience”; and Khan’s psychoanalytic anti-hermeneutics that protects this ‘hidden’ self. It will thus extend my reading of Khan’s fascination with Joyce’s work by foregrounding explicit and implicit gestures to exile in the attention he pays that writer. Such gestures serve to connect up a very particular idea of exile in Joyce - creative and anti-nationalist - to epiphany and, by implication in Khan’s work, to the ‘private’ or hidden self. This version of subjectivity is built on, and inextricable from, Joyce’s versions of exile and their various political and cultural valences, and for Khan it becomes a form of self-making that expresses the

33 Hopkins, p.34.
most grandiose tropes of the emergent modernist canon in the period. Indeed, this exilic ‘hidden’ self finds one of its most virtuosic and poetic articulations in Khan’s writing on dreaming: the “dreaming experience” is “beyond interpretation” and represents a privileged space of human experience that must be protected from instrumentalised forms of human activity, in which fascism and totalitarianism are included. Khan’s theory of the dreaming subject, which I equate with the exilic subject, is a calculated and complex response to modernity that draws on not only psychoanalysis but also modernist aesthetics.

The goal of this discussion is to make clear the political and theoretical contradiction at the centre of Khan’s thinking: his theory of the exiled subject reflects many of his reactionary ‘feudal’ impulses, but also pulls in the direction of the democratic values of Winnicott’s psychoanalysis: mutuality, openness, and the capacity to tolerate conflict and uncertainty. Khan’s basic manoeuvre is to give Winnicott’s nearly-isolated subject in ‘The Capacity to be Alone’ a Joycean twist, turning the ‘privacy’ of such a subject into an exile. The unintegrated subject - in my argument, the psychoanalytic transmutation of the Joycean exile - is one whose fundamental privacy must be protected from, and is the alternative to, fascism and totalitarianism. Such a quiescent form of experience is also, importantly, the alternative to the instrumental character of capitalist modernity, which Khan also rejects. Joycean exile is elaborated by Khan into a form of the Winnicottian ‘facilitating environment’, and exile becomes a (modernist) maturational process in its own right. Edward Said, in Reflections on Exile, notes “Joyce’s fiction concerns what in a letter he once described as the state of being ‘alone and friendless’.” Khan’s creation of a dialogue between Joyce’s writing, Winnicott’s psychoanalysis and his own political context allows a more complex picture of isolation, aloneness and exile to emerge: in which exile is construed by Khan as reparative.

The inward-facing character of Khan’s version of psychic life might well be vulnerable to the political critiques of discourses of interiority levelled at modernism by, most notably, György Lukács, amongst others. Indeed, Lukács’ critique of the politics of the modernism of Joyce and Kafka in *The Meaning of Contemporary Realism* can help to highlight what I see as the subtlety of Khan’s conception of exile.

For Lukács, although Franz Kafka, Robert Musil and Joyce held a variety of political attitudes towards which Lukács was more or less sympathetic, it is the “ideology underlying these artists presentation of reality” that he rejects. Lukács’ critiques of Joyce and Kafka have been challenged extensively elsewhere for a number of reasons, but I invoke him here because Khan’s psychoanalysis is especially concerned to explore the “potential space” of human experience, that area of shuttling between internal and external realities, and his psychoanalysis is one that pushes beyond the terms set out by Lukács’ political aesthetics. Khan’s own conception of modernism, as argued in chapter one, rests on his construction of a “crisis of psychotherapeutic responsibility” in

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36 For instance, much recent critical work on Irishness and Ireland’s colonial status has identified a sensitive and complex political thought in much of Joyce’s writing. See *Semicolonial Joyce*, ed. by Derek Attridge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). See also Joyce, *Imperialism and Postcolonialism* ed. by Leonard Orr (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press).

37 Theodor Adorno famously disputed Lukacs’ reading of modernist writing and its (apparently) fatalistic adoption of interior modes of narration that describe reality as merely a mass of unconnected individuals, offering instead a quite different vision of the relationship of literature to late capitalist modernity. See, for instance, Adorno’s reading of Samuel Beckett’s *Endgame*, in Theodor Adorno, ‘Trying to Understand *Endgame*,’ *New German Critique*, 26 (Spring-Summer 1982), pp.119-150. For a more contemporary version of the case for Beckett’s modernist work as fundamentally rooted in, and not turning away from, the experiences of matter that constitutes everyday life see Steven Connor, *Samuel Beckett: Repetition, Theory, and Text* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998).
which the modern psyche is in danger of fetishistically pursuing the creation of an inward reality from which it cannot awaken itself: in his version, modernism is an ambivalent articulation of this state of affairs.

Lukács’ concern with what he terms the ideology of modernism is that discourses of interiority lead to “the negation of outward reality”. There is a misapprehension of reality as regards “the image of man” in modernism: “the ‘human condition’ – man as solitary being, incapable of meaningful relationships – is identified with reality itself”. Human subjectivity “itself is impoverished” by “exalting…subjectivity, at the expense of the objective reality of his environment”. The confinement of the hero “within the limits of his own experience” is compounded by a “negation of history” in which only “the narrator, the examining subject is in motion; the examined reality is static”. For Lukács, modernist interiority forgets the dialectical relation between individual, group and the historical forces that shape them which he sees so perfectly dramatized in the writing of Walter Scott, whose fiction is concerned with the construction of social groups and classes who dispute each other rather than merely the experience of the individual. The intense focus of a disinterested and isolated narrator – who has an animated interior – does not do justice to Lukács’ conception of human beings as the zoon politikon. The “human significance” and “specific individuality” of characters like Tom Jones and Anna Karenina “cannot be separated from the context in which they are created”. The relative position of the voice in the novel to the action depicted and the wider social world that the novel describes is more explicitly articulated in Lukács’ comparison of the horse-races in both Anna Karenina and Zola’s Nana, in the essay ‘Narrate or

38 Contemporary Realism, p.21.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid., p.21.
Describe?" The merit of Tolstoy’s and Walter Scott’s work over that of modernism is that their dramatization of the whole social order addresses the “distortion” of capitalism with a clearer account of the problem. Modernism’s insistence on what Lukács terms pathological states – the “schizophrenia” of Beckett and Kafka’s novels – as the product of this system is ultimately self-cancelling:

Literature must have a concept of the normal if it is to ‘place’ distortion correctly; that is to say, to see it as distortion... But to present psychopathology as a way of escape from this distortion is itself a distortion. There is no principle to set against the general pattern.

Lukács claims that thus “distortion becomes the normal condition of human existence”, and Khan too is concerned about this elevation of “distortion” to the status of a fetish. His concern is with modernism as a movement that could “envy the dreaming ego” and thus enter into a pure subjectivism “from which [writers and artists] do not awaken themselves”. This solipsism is equivalent in Khan’s thinking to a veneration of isolated states that are pure defensive organizations, and cause him to draw a distinction being alone and being isolated, where the latter state is typified by an attitude that “idealized the solitary isolate state of the noble human individual and glorified the suffering that it entails”. Khan’s concern with modernism is that it faces a crisis over whether artists can turn towards the wider social world or not.

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43 Contemporary Realism p.33.

44 Ibid.

45 Hidden Selves p.40.

46 Through Paediatrics to Psychoanalysis p.xliii.
As with epiphany, Khan’s re-translation of Joycean exile through Winnicottian aloneness (and vice-versa) challenges critical perceptions of modernist exile as inward looking and unconcerned with shared, exterior reality, exemplifying the hostility borne toward the apparent political quietus of modernist literature. Instead, in Khan’s vision of the exiled/solitary subject, there is a dialectical relationship of aloneness and mutuality, where the former can only emerge from the latter, and the security of the latter becomes a prerequisite for the manifestation of the former.

**Masud Khan and the Modernist Canon**

Before elaborating this alternative vision of exile in Khan’s thought, and in turn the debt owed to Joyce in its construction, it is worth noting that despite this there is no doubt that Khan’s fascination with exile becomes a vehicle - as do his activities as a collector of modern art, the topic of chapter four - for his grandiose and elitist project of fashioning himself as an exemplary cosmopolitan modernist. It installs at the heart of his psychoanalytic work an intensely canonical and narrow vision of Euro-modernism, which itself bears a highly problematic relationship to postcolonial political reality, as Neil Lazarus has recently argued in the *The Postcolonial Unconscious*. Khan’s substantive engagement with this aspect of Euro-modernist discourse embodies both the most innovative and reactionary tendencies in his writing.

Khan’s privileging of the institutional and critical formation Hugh Kenner described as “International Modernism” provides a crucial framework for

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Khan’s preference for the modernism of the colonial centre instead of the anti-colonial Urdu writing of his immediate political context in the 1940s – the Progressive Writers’ movement – is indicative of a broader split between the canonized Euro-modernism and the emergent fictions of postcolonial struggles in South Asia and Africa. Khan’s thought is catalysed by the dichotomy between the legitimated and canonized Euro-modernism of Kenner et al. and radical nationalist Progressive movement in pre-Partition Urdu writing.

Khan’s work, or his diaries, makes almost no reference to the rich literary context in India that was contemporaneous with his burgeoning interest in European literature and university study, although some accounts of his university studies allude to some past interest in “Persian” and “Urdu” literature. Khan was not alone in turning to European modernism for inspiration in tackling questions of politics, aesthetics and interiority in India in the 1940s; although his work is disconnected from the moment of Urdu modernism in a number of significant ways.

The foundation of the Indian Progressive Writers Association in London in 1935, and their subsequent consolidation one year later in Lucknow, drew on a number of literary innovations in European modernism and saw political and aesthetic innovation as coterminous. The IPWA was a multi-lingual organisation producing literature in a number of South Asian vernaculars and English. The IPWA’s political position, whilst not uncritically accepting of Marxist thought, was nevertheless critical of middle class attitudes towards sexuality,

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class and caste. Ahmed Ali, one of the founding members of the IPWA, states the aims of the group:

…the progressive writers movement was essentially an intellectual revolt against an outmoded past, vitiated tendencies in contemporary thought and literature, the indifference of people to their human condition, against acquiescence to foreign rule, enslavements to practices and beliefs…

The IPWA issued a manifesto that was concerned with, as Bodh Prakash suggests, “affirming the faith of the writer in the specific material reality of the times”. The IPWA manifesto followed in the wake of one of the most notorious and influential works of the new Urdu modernism, the short story collection Angare, published in 1932 by Ahmed Ali, Sajjad Zaheer, Rashid Jehan and Mahmuduz Zafar. Angare was remarkable for not only its social and political critiques of Imperialism and the caste-based social structure of Indian society but also for its range of literary styles. Prakash’s analysis of the IPWA stresses the profound connection between the writing of the IPWA, which, even when not explicitly political was “deeply involved in debating and articulating the contours of the new society that was emerging”.

This required the cultivation of new literary forms, and the adoption of techniques that permitted the experimental writers of the IPWA to explore forms of interiority and subjectivity mobilised to critique aspects of everyday experience. Premchand, for instance, referred to his style as Adarshonmukhi Yatharvad (‘idealistic realism’), which Jagdish Lal Dawar describes as having “an important social function: to contribute to the transformation of society by creating an awareness about existing conditions and by

49 Prakash notes that whilst the group was principally left-leaning, Marxism was only one of a range of political possibilities being explored at the time. As the nineteen forties wore on, in fact, there was some dissent within the Progressive movement about the problematic attempts to translate Marxism “from the Kremlin…to Lahore’s Mcleod road.” Writing Partition, p.138.


51 Ibid., p.8.
projecting a vision of the future”. 52 Although, as Ulka Anjaria argues, Premchand’s work draws comparatively less from the formal innovations of modernism than other writers of that context, his realism, Anjaria suggests, gestures “like Eliot” to a “representational universe that is less confined by an a priori understanding of the relationship between characterisation and the human.” 53 In his writing, “the integrity of characters cannot be assumed in advance, but must be made in and by the text itself…in that making there might lie the possibility of new or multiple selves.” 54 In this respect, Premchand’s writing articulates intensely modernist questions about the relationship of inner and outer lives, the divided character of the self, and the representational problem writers face in describing these issues. 55

Khan then was not the only South Asian writer to take a special interest in the European modernism, and especially in Joyce, Woolf and Eliot. He is not unique in recognising himself, like Mulk Raj Anand in Conversations in Bloomsbury and key founder of the IPWA, in Stephen Daedalus, the hero of A Portrait. 56 Jessica Berman has recently examined the striking relationship of Anand’s work to that of James Joyce. 57 Anand’s best known novel, Untouchable, was published in 1935 and staged a searing attack on the caste system, religious and racial seg-


54 Ibid.

55 The writers of the IPWA also produced novels in a more explicitly experimental mode. Sajjad Zaheer’s A Night in London from 1938 is inspired by Joyce’s Ulysses and employed the stream-of-consciousness technique. The novel is set over one day in London and dramatizes particularly the humiliating experiences of Indians living under colonial domination. Likewise, a Marathi novel, Ratrica Divas, was published in 1942 and bears strong similarities to Ulysses and Mrs Dalloway, set on one day and narrated thorough the consciousness of the protagonist.


regation, and the economics of British imperialism. Indeed, Anand had close links to many of the key figures of British high modernism, including Woolf, Eliot and Forster, partly through his work on the Criterion. Anand’s experiences of modernist London, where he wrote his PhD, are chronicled in a late memoir, 1981’s Conversations in Bloomsbury.

Although Khan’s own work and career reach their respective peaks some decades after the Progressive Writers movement is at its creative zenith, Khan can be understood as emerging from a legacy of literary dialogue between India and European metropolitan modernism. Khan’s version of modernism, however, treads quite a different political and cultural path to that of the IPWA. Khan’s version of modernism can certainly be seen as emphatically recapitulating the vision of European modernism articulated by Kenner in the postwar period, as I suggested in the introduction to this thesis. This is indicative of a choice Khan has made - it is not clear whether it was a conscious one or otherwise - that functions to distance him from the radical politics of the vernacular progressive writing of 1930s and 1940s India, which agitated for and welcomed the dissolution of the old order, in anticipation of a socialist future.

Khan’s library, as I have stressed throughout this thesis, describes the contours of this choice. For instance, we find in his book collection a copy of Kenner’s study of T.S. Eliot, The Invisible Poet. The Invisible Poet in particular resonates with the over-arching themes of Khan’s psychoanalytic writing, with Kenner stressing Marianne Moore’s sense of Eliot as a “master of the anonymous”. Kenner’s Eliot is evasive, “Invisible”, “the archetype of poetic impenetrability”, and the difficulty of his writing is missed by critics who “tour the Eliot territory in chartered buses”, looking up explicit and implicit allusions and fastidiously constructing line-by-line commentaries that nevertheless miss, in

Kenner’s words, the “restless symbolic echoes” of his greatest poems. Some equivalence may be drawn here between the inscrutability of Eliot’s writing in an “age of systematised literary scrutiny” and Khan’s own elaboration of the essential privacy of the self, which entails in his work a cultivated skepticism towards the value of interpretation and the self-evident authority of psychoanalytic knowledge and categories. Kenner also highlights on the fourth page of his preface Eliot’s status as an émigré who is never fully naturalised or integrated: he was, Kenner suggests, even after ten years in Britain “always The Stranger, impeccably camouflaged, a role congenial to his temperament, to which expatriation afforded scope.”

Khan’s characterization of modernism, like Kenner’s, emphasizes a Euro-centric inter-city cosmopolitanism, composed by exiles and expatriates. This finds symbolic expression, I want to suggest, in aspects of Khan’s theory of the subject, and this aspect of his work is the fruit of a substantive engagement with modernist culture, especially in this instance Joyce. The centrality of exile to Kenner’s modernism placed Eliot, Joyce and Pound in cities unfamiliar to them and valorized the transient and contingent experience of the migrant. Kenner’s decisions about the inclusion and exclusion of certain from the modernist canon – Woolf, Faulkner, and Wallace Stevens to name the most renowned – was itself connected to a disdain for the apparent provincial or local qualities of their work. Bloomsbury, in Kenner’s vision, was characterized as a “village”, with Woolf as its “novelist of manners, writing village gossip…for her English readers”. Indeed, Bonnie Kime Scott has remarked upon the par-

59 Ibid., p.xi.

60 Ibid., p.ix.

61 Ibid., p.xiii.

particularly brutal attacks on Bloomsbury and Woolf in particular that Kenner launches in *The Sinking Island* and elsewhere, noting that “Kenner suggests that Bloomsbury was a collection of shallow simpletons”. For Kenner, Woolf’s work invites disdain because of its apparent parochialism, similar to Wallace Stevens, a writer “absent from capitals” who “seems a voice from a province, quirkily enabled by the International Modernism of which he was never a part”. Kime Scott notes that Kenner’s internationalism is one that does not feature “rural cultures, multiculturalism, critiques of empire and international fascism”.

Khan’s own valorisation of his feudal past makes clear the importance of the provincial and regional particularity in his imagination, and also breaking with Kenner, has a sustained fascination in his work with the culture of Bloomsbury - the Stracheys and Virginia Woolf in particular. Indeed, Khan outlined, and began drafting, a study of Woolf towards the end of his life. Such aspects of his literary taste, and the shadowy presence of his particular political context, indicate the limits of his integration into this authorized version of canonical modernism. Nevertheless, Kenner’s modernism does provides a clear framework for much of his thinking, even if Khan’s treatment of those key texts and ideas can be highly idiosyncratic and responsive to the particularities of his situation.

63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 In the previous chapter I discuss Khan’s obituary address for Alix Strachey, which alludes to their relationship with the Bloomsbury scene.
67 See the Robert Stoller archive, Letter from Khan to R. Stoller, 07/08/81, where Khan encloses his draft outline of his study of Woolf, provisionally titled *No Walls*. 
Khan’s is not a conventional treatment of Kenner’s Euro-modernist canon. The possibilities for psychoanalysis to open up the relationship between the personal and the political – things that “have little place in Kenner’s thinking”\(^{68}\) – are explored through Khan’s intermingling of Winnicott’s transitional space, and concepts of psychic life, with classic modernist texts. This treatment of modernism in Khan’s intellectual world indicates the ways in which he draws from Kenner’s canonised modernism - regarded by one critic following Fredric Jameson as “sheared of its resistances and its criticality”\(^{69}\) - novel ideas and propositions. Though Khan’s thinking is rooted in a discourse that may limit what it is possible for him to think politically, his readings of these texts take his thought in a highly idiosyncratic direction and produce an unusual version of what might appear on the surface a highly conventional account of modernism. Though Khan has no interest in the politically progressive Urdu writing of the period, this does not preclude him from serious political meditations of his own even if working within the approved modernist canon. If the condition of membership of Kenner’s International Modernism is exile, Khan’s work, I would like to suggest, nevertheless processes that trope in a way that leads it in an unexpected direction.

Joyce and Khan’s Exiles

\(^{68}\) Refiguring Modernism, p.83.

\(^{69}\) For a good summary of Jameson’s critique of modernism as dispensing with its political potential by obsessing more and more over purely formal concerns see Douglas Crimp, On the Museum’s Ruins with photographs by Louise Lawler (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2000), pp.305-306.
As I demonstrated in the background of the first chapter, Khan’s reading of Joyce was detailed and extensive. Khan owned four copies of *Ulysses*: the Odyssey Press edition of 1932, ostensibly his student copy; an Everyman edition from 1945, purchased in London after his arrival there; the corrected text from 1986, edited by Richard Ellmann; and the 1935 Limited Editions Club version illustrated by Henri Matisse. The copies of the books indicate that Khan returned to them frequently throughout his life. The 1945 edition, for instance, contained a folded slip of paper as bookmark that suggests it was used for Khan to conduct a conversation with his wife Svetlana Beriozsova when he was unable to speak: from this we can infer that Khan was reading *Ulysses* whilst being treated in hospital for lung cancer and was unable to speak for some months. Of all the books in his library that he could have had brought to him whilst in hospital, Khan chose *Ulysses*, a text which subsequently crops up in the book completed following his illness, *Hidden Selves*.

Joyce typifies for Khan a mode of exilic life that Khan himself takes as a model after he leaves the then northern India. Like James Joyce, the idea of exile is central to not only Khan’s style of living, but also his writing and thinking. “I need an experience of voluntary, sustained and progressive loss”, he writes “to find and establish my private discipline of retreat, reserve and silence”. This experience of “voluntary” loss is very similar to Joycean self-exile, entailing the renunciation of the community to which the exile formerly belonged, much like Stephen Daedalus’ *non serviam* (“I will not serve that in which I no longer believe”). Khan draws, like Joyce, on the language of discipline and withdrawal

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71 *Hidden Selves*, p.34.

72 Hopkins, p.167.

73 *Portrait*, p.191.
the “arms” and “defence” of Portrait – to describe this “mode of life or art”, a self-exile that is ultimately self-fashioning: the establishment of Khan’s “private discipline”.

One version of exile in Joyce is explicitly laid out in his somewhat critically neglected play of 1918, Exiles. Exiles explores the return of Richard Rowan to Dublin after his own self-exile in Europe because of political disagreements with his love rival in the play, the pro-nationalist journalist Robert Hand. Rousseau’s “inconsolable isolation”74 is diagnosed by Khan via Joyce as the case of an “auto-mystic” – but this isolation, when read with Joyce’s play in sight, can also be construed as a form of exile, and points to Joyce’s particular interest in exile as one that underwrites Khan’s thinking.

Whilst the play is often considered to be something of a dramatic failure, it nevertheless presents Joyce’s early thoughts about exile and Irish politics. In a key passage in the final act, Richard Rowan reads an article about him composed the night before by his rival Robert Hand:

Not the least vital problems which confront our country is the problem of her attitude towards those of her children who, having left her in her hour of need, have been called back to her now on the even of her long-awaited victory, to her whom in loneliness and exile they have at last learned to love. In exile, we have said, but here we must distinguish. There is economic and there is spiritual exile. There are those who left her to seek the bread by which men live and there are others, nay, her most favoured children, who left her to seek in other lands that food of the spirit by which a nation of human beings is sustained in life.75

There is already an intimation here of one of the possible models in Joyce’s writing for Khan’s exile. Robert Hand’s article on Richard Rowan here (read, in the

74 Privacy of the Self, p.111.

play, out loud by Rowan himself) makes a distinction crucial to discussing Khan’s exile: between “economic” and “spiritual exile”. The latter is concerned with exile as a creative self-fashioning, a deliberate estrangement of oneself from one’s home to seek alternative models of community and, in Edward Said’s words, “to give force to…artistic vocation”. This self-elected exile is in contrast to “economic exile”, where leaving home is not a matter of choice but more a question of survival as such. Indeed, it is the freely chosen (Joycean) exile that Said says we must “set aside…and think instead of the uncountable masses for whom UN agencies have been created”. The difference between these forms of exile is also the difference between the many millions of refugees displaced after Partition of India and Pakistan and Khan’s own abandonment of the new Pakistan, where he refused to apply for citizenship.

In the above passage, the journalist Robert Hand suggests self-exile is a process by which a more profound love for one’s nation can be cultivated – “her whom in loneliness and exile they have at last learned to love” – though even when Rowan returns from exile the question of his re-integration is left unresolved by the ambiguous ending of the play. It is not clear, even though Bertha renounces her interest in Robert Hand, that she and Rowan will be reconciled – a reconciliation that can be read as Rowan’s giving up of his exile and re-integration into Irish society. When Rowan addresses his lover Bertha in the final lines of the play, the stage directions mark that he is “[speaking as if to an absent person]” – in other words, Rowan is still fundamentally estranged. Rowan’s

76 ‘Reflections on Exile’, p.182.
77 Ibid., p.176.
78 Hopkins, p.178.
79 Exiles, p.147.
exile is figured as a “wound” that “tires me”, the source of an ineradicable difference even at the end of the play.\textsuperscript{80}

Khan likewise conceives of his self-exile as self-fashioning. This exile is one that allows him to cultivate not a love for the nation, but rather for his feudal tradition through an “experience of voluntary…loss”. Khan’s exile in the previous chapter was mediated by Eliot’s concept of tradition: the individual in exile became the symbol, for Eliot, of the profound mission to perpetuate the ideals of European culture. For Khan, exile in this respect had the potential to continue the feudal tradition that was disappearing in India. For Edward Said, “All nationalisms in their early stages develop from a condition of estrangement”, and whilst the collapsing feudal tradition in Khan’s thinking is not a nationalism (indeed, nationalism in India was directly opposed to his feudal heritage), exile allows Khan to entrench his own belief in the feudal tradition in a similar manner to the nationalist in exile. The passage from \textit{Exiles} quoted above makes clear the uses of exile from the nationalist journalist Robert Hand’s point of view: exile is ultimately about strengthening the connection to one’s homeland, with which Khan has a highly ambivalent relationship.

This pertains to Khan’s treatment of exile when we consider it in terms of Eliot’s notion of tradition. But the cultivation of this “spiritual exile” has other implications for Khan’s theory of the subject and suggests an alternative way of thinking about exile within Khan’s own thought. Spiritual exile entails both a change in geography – physically leaving one’s home for somewhere else – but also a more fundamental state of existential estrangement. When writing about his occasional journeys back to Pakistan in 1971, the year of the death of Winnicott and his mother, Khan notes

\textsuperscript{80} Ibid.
...somewhere my life has been sighted towards monastic aloneness from the start. I have also got the reassurance of my estate in Pakistan where I can always be in exile until I recover my confidence in life.  

Exile here is conceived of paradoxically as nourishment through loss. Rather than merely being put into the service of nationalism (or, indeed, the veneration of a feudal tradition), exile here could be conceived of as a fallow state. This is, I shall argue, interlocked with Donald Winnicott’s narrative of ego maturity as contingent on the recognition of the subject’s aloneness. The ambiguity over Richard Rowan’s reconciliation with his lover at the end of Exiles is symptomatic of this uneasy form of self-exile: neither Khan nor Rowan are never fully reconciled with their homes. For Khan, it is even more extreme: home becomes the site of exile, though a generative exile that holds some possibility of the recovery “of confidence in life”.

From Epiphany to Exile

Whilst the exilic dimension of Khan’s engagement with Joyce is fairly clear, I would also like to suggest that Khan’s writing draws out latent connections between Joyce’s epiphany, his political attitude towards nationalism, and the exilic life. In ‘Freud and the Crisis of Psychotherapeutic Responsibility’, Khan notes that Joyce provides the “diagnosis” with an “epiphanic conundrum” from Finnegans Wake:

Shem Macadamson, you know me and I know you and all your shermeries. Where have you been in the uterim, enjoying yourself all the morning since your last wetbed confession? I advise you to conceal yourself, my little friend, as I have said a moment ago and put your hands in my hands and have a nightslong homely little confiteor about things. Let me see. It is looking pretty black against you, we suggest,

81 Hopkins, p.168.
Sheem avick. You will need all the elements in the river to clean you over it all and a fortifine popespriestspower bull of attender to booth.\textsuperscript{82}

Khan’s reading of \textit{Finnegans Wake} concentrates for the most part on Book 1 of the novel, from which this passage is taken. Nevertheless, examination of the context in which this passage appears in \textit{Finnegans Wake} points out a direct link between the epiphanic and the exilic. In this dialogue from Book 1 between Justius/Brawn/Shaun and Mercius/Shem the penman, the more authoritarian Justius explicates and interprets Shem’s “birthwrong” as “shirking both your bullet and your billet” to “sing a song of alibi”.\textsuperscript{83} Justius criticizes Shem for his failure to “do your little thruppenny bit and earn from the nation true thanks”, an abdication of his responsibility to “do as all nationists must, and do a certain office”.\textsuperscript{84} Shem, by contrast, is an “Irish emigrant the wrong way out” and a “semi-semitic serendipitist”: one who is prone to the accidental or fortuitous discovery.\textsuperscript{85} This serendipitist echoes the analyst and analysand of Khan’s epiphanic psychoanalysis. In my argument, it is Shem, rather than Justius, who is the model for Khan’s vision of his self-experience, and like Khan is marked as transnational “nomad”\textsuperscript{86} with multiple cultural identities: “(I think that describes you) Europasianized Afferyank!”\textsuperscript{87} Indeed, earlier in book one, Shem is figured as an “eastasian import”\textsuperscript{88} – the parallels with Khan’s life in London are

\textsuperscript{82} Hidden Selves, p.78.


\textsuperscript{84} Ibid., p.190.12-13.

\textsuperscript{85} \textit{Finnegans Wake}, p.191.3.

\textsuperscript{86} \textit{Finnegans Wake}, p.190.32.

\textsuperscript{87} \textit{Finnegans Wake}, p.191.4.

\textsuperscript{88} Ibid., p.166.32.
clear – and even antagonistic Shaun reflects that “we cannot escape our likes and mislikes, exiles or ambusheers”.

Shaun/Justius’ accusations of political failure or denial of political responsibility are also what Khan construes as an invasion of the privacy of the self. The discussion of modernist subjectivity with which this chapter opened - what Khan calls the “situation that actualizes with artists and writers”, where the “awake and rational ego began to envy the dreaming ego and its access to the unconscious” - is explained by means of a quotation from *Finnegans Wake*. Khan calls this an “epiphanic conundrum”, and the quoted passage concludes with Justius/Shaun’s remark: “Let us Pry”. The “preoccupation” of modernism that Joyce dramatizes in the dialogue between Justius and Mercius is an obsession with prying that bears the hallmark, as Joyce’s pun makes clear, of a confessional discourse that punishes and pursues the subject (“you will need… a fortifine popespriestspower bull of attender to booth.”)

In the context’s of Khan’s psychoanalytic thinking, Justius’ attitude constitutes a failure to create a therapeutic environment in which self-experience can be actualized because of an over-reliance on an invasive hermeneutic framework. The alternative to this, in psychoanalytic terms, is a respect for what Khan variously describes as the unknowable, “private” or “hidden” nature of the self. The final chapters of his 1983 book *Hidden Selves* are each concluded with a reflection on the nature of this privacy. In ‘The Evil Hand’, Khan finishes the case history by noting:

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89 Ibid., p.163.12-13.

90 *Hidden Selves*, p.40.

91 *Finnegans Wake*, p.188.8.
I want to say that I cannot account exactly for the *why* of this change in his self-relating... No patient is totally knowable as a person, to himself or the analyst. And this final privacy is, perhaps, what we should never transgress clinically.\textsuperscript{92}

The defense of this privacy and the capacity the unknowability of the subject are at the heart of Khan’s ethical thinking, and his ‘epiphanic’ psychoanalysis. If “each adult is mad in a very private way, and also alone”, as Khan suggests in *The Privacy of the Self*, then they are entitled to a psychoanalytic treatment that respects this fundamental state of affairs:

We also try to make sense of the *non*-sense of the analysand’s spoken vocabulary in terms of our conceptual vocabulary, through which we are addicted to listening to the analysand’s normal or pathological material, and interpreting it. Misguidedly, but from concern, we try to make sense of this *non*-sense... the creative potential of the madness lapses back into oblivion and the analysand is no longer mad or alone, but merely alone and lost.\textsuperscript{93}

Returning to *Finnegans Wake*, in Shem the epiphanic and the nomadic are coterminous. His transnational identity – the “Europianized Afferyank” – is, like Khan’s private subject, extremely difficult to pin down. Justius’ attempts to describe Shem and his “birthwrong” start out confidently (in the passage that Khan quotes: “I know you and all your shemeries”. Indeed, Shem’s person and purpose is apparently clear: “You let me tell you,” remarks Justius’, “…were very ordinarily designed… to fall in with Plan, as our nationals should”. But by the climax of Justius’ tirade against Shem’s abandonment of the nationalist cause, he proves less knowable – as Khan would put it – than Justius initially suggested. Justius’ confrontational manner is undone by moments of uncertainty as to how to place or diagnose Shem as a subject, imploring him at one moment for assistance: “(will you for the laugh of Shekspair just help mine with

\textsuperscript{92} *Hidden Selves*, p.180.

\textsuperscript{93} Ibid., p.182.
the epithet?). Even though Shem is named finally by Justius as a “Europaisianized Afferyank”, the parentheses that precede this description give away the latent uncertainty: “(I think that describes you)”. Shem’s transcontinental identity is composite, partial and can only exist at the limits of Justius’ knowledge, much like Khan’s description of the private subject. “Europasianized” would certainly be a fitting epithet for Khan’s multiple presentations of himself to his friends and colleagues – Feudal prince; English gentleman; European cosmopolitan intellectual – and his own self-image as one who “coexist[s] parallelly in multiple realities, external as well as internal”.

\[\textit{Stephen Hero: Epiphany and the Nation}\]

An earlier version of Shem’s refusal to take part in a Nationalist agenda in Ireland is explored in \textit{Stephen Hero}. \textit{Stephen Hero} is a text that explicitly shaped Khan’s interest in epiphany in \textit{The Privacy of the Self} but can also be seen as offering a possible response to the anti-colonial nationalism in Khan’s Lahore. Shem, the “eastasian import” and “serendipitist”, has an early antecedent in Stephen Dedalus. The writer of epiphanies, in Joyce’s early semi-autobiographical novel, is also an outsider to the nationalist sentiments of his fellow students at university, and this rejection of the prevailing political position in Joyce’s novel is co-extensive with Stephen’s striving towards a new theory of aesthetic practice. His theory of art is as contrary as his political position.

Early in the novel, the character Madden, Stephen’s colleague at University College Dublin, argues with Stephen about Irish politics, his friend who “previously tried in vain to infect him Stephen with nationalist fever”.\[\textsuperscript{96}\] Joyce

\[\textsuperscript{94}\] Ibid.

\[\textsuperscript{95}\] Khan, quoted in Hopkins, p.36.

makes Stephen’s differences with Madden clear: “The so-desired community for the realizing of which Madden sought to engage his personal force seemed [to Stephen] anything but ideal and the liberation which would have satisfied Madden would by no means have satisfied him.” Stephen’s interests are much more cosmopolitan. In an argument about the role of the church in the anti-colonial struggle – Stephen suggests the priesthood would have the Irish people “withdraw... into a past of literal, implicit faith” – Madden remarks that “really our peasant has nothing to gain from English literature”, preferring instead “an Irish Ireland”. Stephen’s response is that “English is the medium for the Continent”, indicating an interest in the place that Stephen shares with Khan.

These tendencies cause Stephen some difficulties. In chapter twenty, Stephen presents a paper on his aesthetic theories at the University. Mr Hughes, amongst the respondents who comment on his paper with such vitriol, criticizes Stephen for failing to contribute towards establishing a moralistic national literature, and relying too much on “obscure” foreign authors:

They wanted no foreign filth. Mr Daedalus might read what authors he liked, of course, but the Irish people had their own glorious literature where they could always find fresh ideals to spur them to new patriotic endeavours. Mr Daedalus was himself a renegade from the Nationalist ranks: he professed cosmopolitanism. But a man that was of all countries was of no country – you must first have a nation before you have art...If they [the Irish] were to have art let it be moral art, art that elevated, above all, national art.

97 Ibid.
98 Ibid., p.53.
99 Ibid., p.54.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid., p.104.
Stephen rejects the didacticism and provincialism of the literature being described by Hughes here. When Stephen is criticized later in the novel we are told that “He himself was the greatest sceptic concerning the perfervid enthusiasms of the patriots”. His alternative manifesto is to be found in the theory of epiphany towards the end of the manuscript, where the artist is “the mediator between the world of his experience and the world of his dreams”, preferring the examination of the inner life instead of a didactic national art.

The significance of the novel to Khan is clear. Stephen Daedalus is, of course, key in the articulation of Khan’s theory of epiphanic psychoanalysis. Further to this, the mythological Daedalus was not only the architect of the labyrinth but also (like Khan) an exile himself: banished to Crete after attempting to murder his nephew and rival Perdix. Though Stephen Hero was only published posthumously in 1945 it seems extremely likely that Khan managed to read a copy as his MA thesis takes Joycean epiphany as its subject. Though there is no hard evidence as to the real content of Khan’s thesis – we can only rely on his own account of his education – it is clear that epiphany was extremely important to Khan’s later thinking, and Stephen Hero offers Khan the possibility of reimagining his own self-experience and autobiography through Joyce. Khan shared with Stephen a university environment that was committed to a radical anti-colonial nationalist project, but, more crucially, draws from Joyce’s characters the idea of exile as a creative response to political anti-colonial modernity, and a standoffish relationship with nationalism. Both Joyce, and many of his key characters, reject any straightforward notion of national belonging. Khan’s interest in epiphany is one aspect of his expression of this political and artistic trope in Joyce.

102 Ibid., p.208.
103 Ibid., p.77.
Khan’s *Ulysses*

![Image of front endpaper and flyleaf, James Joyce, *Ulysses* (1932). The Library of Masud Khan.](image)

The enthusiasm for cosmopolitanism, travel and exile that Khan borrows from Joyce is exemplified by the annotations in the front of his student copy of *Ulysses*, to which I have gestured earlier in this thesis. The Odyssey Press edition of *Ulysses* was printed four times between 1932 and 1939. The edition here is from the first printing, which was itself divided into three limitations: one printed on thin India paper; one in a two-volume edition; and a special two
volume limited edition of which only thirty five copies were printed.\textsuperscript{104} Khan’s copy is from the first limitation, and though hardly as exclusive as the latter two, was still an exclusive, expensive and elite product.

Indeed, this particular copy is from the first printing of the 1932 edition, printed in Germany and priced at either 5.60 Reichsmarks; 36.00 Francs; and 28.00 Lire.\textsuperscript{105} Translating this cautiously into contemporary value,\textit{Ulysses} in this limitation would cost ca. 70GBP. Though this 1932 edition was sold at a quarter of the cost of the Shakespear & Co. edition, Lawrence Rainey has noted that the limited availability of that first edition was cause to push the price of even the cheapest limitation up by 350\% (equivalent, Rainey suggests, to the cost of one month’s rent in a good apartment in Paris):\textsuperscript{106} one can reasonably speculate that the difficulties in getting hold of a book which was hardly mass-produced in 1932 in India could also have similarly inflated the cost for buyers like Khan. This would also be supplemented by the cost of importing the book into India. Khan’s copy features a note on the back flyleaf prohibiting the entry of the book into the USA or the British Empire, and although the British ban on\textit{Ulysses} was lifted in 1937, the fact that Joyce was not the dominant influence in Urdu modernism until after Partition (as Aijaz Ahmad has argued in relation to Indian writing) suggests that even in the 1940s access to his work was limited.\textsuperscript{107} Indeed, given the evidence that Khan’s tutor Painter would purchase and procure


\textsuperscript{107} Aijaz Ahmad, \textit{Lineages of the Present: Ideology and Politics in Contemporary South Asia} (London: Verso, 2000), p.338 n.2.}
books for Khan, it seems most likely that his access to a work like *Ulysses* would have been mediated through Painter, who Khan alleges was connected to R.G. Collingwood and thus to Bloomsbury.\(^{108}\)

Khan’s attachment to the book is clear, however (fig.2). The variegated dates and places, continually updated throughout Khan’s life index his own travels, and this composite of various geographical locations does give it some resemblance to the “Europasianized Afferyank” of *Finnegans Wake*. It is also, as I argued in the introduction, Khan’s countersign to Joyce’s own exilic self-making. The bilingualism of these pages further references the composite polyglot language of *Finnegans Wake* and Joyce’s interest in what Laurent Milesi terms a “pluridialectal idioglossary”.\(^{109}\) This mixing of media and temporalities in the front endpaper and flyleaf – postage stamps from various countries, stationery from his office, handwritten script – constitute a collage of the sort of interest to Khan. For instance, on the back cover of *Hidden Selves*, the blurb suggests “the person is not just a single self but a collage of hidden selves; and one of the goals of psychoanalysis is to find out how this collage functions for the individual concerned”.\(^{110}\) Inside the book itself, Khan’s patient Judy “was most vulnerable, and so she would for a long time arrive as a collage, and not just herself”.\(^{111}\) Similarly, when describing Montaigne’s *Essais* in *The Privacy of the Self*, he writes:

> Montaigne lived, in fact, a fairly active life, both politically and socially, and travelled vastly, particularly in 1580-1581 to Germany and Italy. All of these

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\(^{108}\) See the example of the letter pasted into the front of Khan’s copy of the slim volume ‘Modern Poetry’, which I discuss in chapter one.


\(^{110}\) *Hidden Selves*, back cover.

\(^{111}\) Ibid. p.63.
experiences reflect themselves in the superimpositions that we discover in the three editions of Les Essais, because the definitive edition of Les Essais in 1580 is built like a collage, where different stages of Montaigne’s evolution are transparently superimposed upon each other.\textsuperscript{112}

We can see in Khan’s annotated Ulysses the presentation of himself as a collage, where, like Montaigne, “different stages” of his own “evolution” are “transparently superimposed upon each other”. Khan has made a modernist passport from his date-stamped Ulysses. Joyce’s exile becomes the model for Khan’s alternative citizenship that repudiates both the post-Partition socialist state in Pakistan and what Khan sees as the full integration of the émigré:

Having lived and worked in London for forty years, I have learned that self-exile is quite different from being an émigré. I did not have to fabricate a new identity as a British citizen and, while I am open to learn from the culture in which I have been living, the tenacious hold that my own roots and culture have on me has strongly influenced my way of working.\textsuperscript{113}

As I noted at the outset of this thesis, the allusion to exile is explicit: hum safar, written in the front endpaper of the book, can be translated alternately “fellow traveler” or “we exiles”.\textsuperscript{114} The book itself, as an object, becomes Khan’s travelling companion, as does the figure of Joyce abroad.

Khan’s copy of Ulysses, then, can be understood as a Winnicottian transitional object: the formative object that mediates the subject’s relation between the private self and the wider life of the culture. The transitional object must have, for Winnicott, the capacity to be changed and to survive the (sometimes destructive) creativity of the infant. Khan’s Ulysses is both an object that is “af-

\textsuperscript{112} Privacy of the Self, p.101.

\textsuperscript{113} When Spring Comes, p.200.

\textsuperscript{114} I am grateful to both Dr. Santanu Das (Queen Mary, University of London) and Dr. Ziad Elmarsafy (University of York) for help with the translation here.
fectionately cuddled” (in the sense of Khan’s fondness for Joyce) but also “excitedly loved and mutilated”, with Khan’s front page collage representing a certain appropriation and transformation of the object. The necessary survivability of the object – Khan kept it for over forty years – is attested by the dates that range from 1946 to 1983, with the book enduring the passage of time that Khan inscribes in it. Although the book is not a blanket, toy or comforter, as a novel it nevertheless embodies that transitional space between the individual and what Winnicott comes to call “the cultural field”. It embodies the values of the wider cultural sphere (modernism) but is only activated by the private engagement of the reader:

It comes from without from our point of view, but not so from the point of view of the baby. Neither does it come from within; it is not an hallucination.

Adam Phillips paraphrases Winnicott’s statement as “it is observable by others…but cannot have a comparable significance for them.” Khan’s copy of Ulysses – and his wider engagement with Joyce – function to help Khan make sense of his political reality and to give Khan a basis for his own project of self-fashioning; but at the same time, Joyce’s Ulysses becomes overlaid with Khan’s own geographical movements and experiences.

Christopher Bollas’ elaboration of Winnicott’s thinking – Bollas’ transformational object, to which I allude in chapter one – is instructive here in understanding Khan’s copy of Ulysses. In Being a Character, Bollas speaks of retracing

\[\text{115} ‘\text{Transitional Objects and Transitional Phenomena’ from Donald Winnicott, Playing and Reality (London: Routledge, 2010), p.7.}\]

\[\text{116 Ibid., p.5.}\]

\[\text{117 Ibid., p.7.}\]

“some of my psychic footsteps” through investigating his own relationship with Melville’s *Moby Dick*, and found in the object something “I could use to engage in deep unconscious work, an effort that enabled me to experience and articulate something of myself.”\(^{119}\) The mutuality and reciprocity that Khan stresses in his account of the psychoanalytic epiphany (the patient and analyst altering each other in the analytic setting) is, fittingly, carried over into Bollas’ evocative description of his encounter with *Moby Dick*: “…as we encounter the object world we are substantially metamorphosed by the structure of objects… In play the subject releases the idiom of himself to the field of objects”.\(^{120}\) Khan and Bollas, who both show the imprints of youthful readings of two great literary masterpieces (*Ulysses* and *Moby Dick*), demonstrate the ways in which “memory becomes a kind of gathering of internal objects”.\(^{121}\) To engage in this gathering is “to be a character”, to “gain a history of internal objects, inner presences that are the trace of our encounters.”\(^{122}\) The so-called *internal object* that marks this encounter is less for Bollas a “picture, or clear inner drama” – that which could be simply incorporated or archived within the self – but rather a “*highly condensed psychic texture*”.\(^{123}\) Relationships with external art objects allow complex internal terrains and “inner structures” to be established by which, Bollas insists, “I am inhabited”.\(^{124}\) Indeed, I think it is clear from many of the earlier discussions of Khan and Joyce in this chapter that his writing is populated by many of Joyce’s own figures. The copy of *Ulysses* here ties Joyce’s writing - and this particular book with its particular history for Khan – to concrete


\(^{120}\) Ibid., p.59.

\(^{121}\) Ibid., p.58.

\(^{122}\) Ibid., p.59.

\(^{123}\) Ibid., p.59.

\(^{124}\) Ibid.
places and situations in Khan’s own life. “To be a character”, Bollas writes, “is to enjoy the risk of being processed by the object – indeed, to seek objects, in part, in order to be metamorphosed”.125

Khan’s annotated *Ulysses* is a crucial object in this study not just because of the weight his own psychoanalytic writing places on the value and use of an object but because, as Bollas insists, “our encounter, engagement with, and sometimes our employment of, actual things is a way of thinking.”126 Khan’s physical interactions with the book make clear his commitment to the idea of a cosmopolitan, Joycean exile, laying bare the frame or lens that Joyce provides him with to envisage his own life away from Pakistan. The particular frame Khan finds for his experience could only be brought into existence by the book *Ulysses*, and his study of Joyce, in particular: as Bollas notes, “the employment of any particular thing brings about a psychic experience specific to its character”.127

The Capacity to be an Exile

The intermingling of Winnicott’s thought and modernist aesthetic principles is in this thesis taken to be the essence of Khan’s intellectual project. Khan’s interest in Joyce, and the relation of Joyce’s own thinking on exile to Khan’s theory of the private subject, produces a clear picture of his intellectual genealogy: that his theory of the subject is formulated in response to the material and political reality of modernity, both in Khan’s India and in Europe. Furthermore, Khan’s theory of subjectivity politicises the aloneness central to Win-

125 Ibid.


127 *Being a Character*, p.33.
nicott’s conception of subjectivity foregrounded in the ‘The Capacity to be Alone’, his seminal paper from 1958.

In ‘The Capacity to be Alone’, reprinted in The Maturational Processes and the Facilitating Environment, Winnicott presents a narrative that predicates the emergence of the ego proper on the subject’s articulation of the phrase ‘I am alone’. In Winnicott’s paper, what he terms the capacity to be alone is “nearly synonymous with emotional maturity”. Winnicott explains this in terms of a semantic shift from “I am” to “I am alone”. In the former state, the infant occupies a protective environment of intense mutuality, in which the mother is “preoccupied with her own infant and oriented to the infant’s ego requirements.” In such a state, the needs of the infant are the basis for their intense engagement. The emergence of the latter state – “I am alone” – is contingent on the mother in the former state being attentive enough to the infant’s needs. In this latter state, the infant develops the capacity for “ego-relatedness”, in which it becomes possible for the infant to “enjoy being alone”. Winnicott makes this enjoyment contingent on “the continued existence of a reliable mother whose presence makes it possible for the infant to be alone” – the mother’s reliability is crucial for the establishment of this state because the infant can only experience aloneness if the mother is there to address any potential demands. Aloneness in the presence of another is crucial to Winnicott because it holds in play the uncertainty about the infant’s own desire – which may or may


129 Ibid., p.33.

130 Ibid.

131 Ibid.

132 Ibid.
not emerge – and sustains a belief in the mother as an agent that can address it should the need arise.

Winnicott’s version of maturity is grounded on an experience of the subject’s own separateness from others but also the simultaneous implicit recognition that this creative aloneness is contingent on the presence of the other. In his preface to Through Paediatrics to Psychoanalysis Khan deliberately emphasizes the centrality of aloneness to Winnicott’s conception of the subject. For Khan, Winnicott suggested “the human person in the ambience of culture alone was a viable and a creative being”. Winnicott, like Khan, is characterized as an exile, “a true solitary”, and compared to Montaigne in this passage, who is in turn offered in ‘Montaigne, Rousseau and Freud’ as exemplary of this productive aloneness. Khan’s theoretical sophistication here, as in his discussion on Montaigne, is to attempt to describe such a state of aloneness as nevertheless inclusive of the outside world at even the most minimal level: “he was a solitary who included others to increment his experience of himself”.

Imagining Khan’s conception of exile in relation to Winnicott’s idiosyncratic picture of being alone means that exile, like epiphany, belongs paradoxically to the sphere of two-person psychology. This introduction of some dimension of inclusivity and reciprocity (“he enriched their lives through their encounter with him”) into states of aloneness is what differentiates, for Khan, Winnicott and his thinking from the “auto-mystic” Rousseau. Rousseau exem-


134 Ibid.

135 Privacy of the Self, pp.100-103.

136 Paediatrics, p.xliii.

137 Ibid.
plifies for Khan an attitude that “idealized the solitary isolate state of the noble human individual and glorified the suffering that it entails”,\textsuperscript{138} with Rousseau being one whose aloneness signified the withdrawn state as “a defensive organization implying an expectation of persecution”. In Khan’s thought it is vital that the privacy of the self - which, as I argued earlier in this chapter, can be nourishing and generative - does not harden into a pathological formation. It is for this reason that Winnicott’s paradoxical formulation of the capacity to be alone is crucial in Khan’s construction of the hidden self.

Khan develops his notion of the private subject in ‘Beyond the Dreaming Experience’, a paper that has been discussed illuminatingly by both Roger Willoughby in his biography of Khan, and Adam Phillips in \textit{On Kissing, Tickling and Being Bored}.\textsuperscript{139} The paper is Khan’s own “attempt to define significantly the space-potential of the dream towards self-experience”,\textsuperscript{140} and depends on a re-formulation of Pontalis’ dictum that “the speaking subject is the entire subject (‘Le sujet parlant est tout le sujet’)” as “The dreaming subject is the entire subject”.\textsuperscript{141} Khan shifts the focus in psychoanalytic thinking from interpretation of the dream-text produced in the analytic session to the meaning and importance of the experience of dreaming as such – “an entirety that actualizes the self in an unknowable way”.\textsuperscript{142} This experience “never becomes fully available for ordinary mental articulation”, and its enriching potential can only be experienced in the analytic situation through the “mutuality of playing dialogue between the

\textsuperscript{138} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{140} \textit{Hidden Selves}, p.45.

\textsuperscript{141} Ibid., p.46.

\textsuperscript{142} Ibid., p.47.
analyst and the patient in an atmosphere of trust in unknowing”,\(^\text{143}\) similar to the fallow state discussed previously in this thesis. The dreaming experience is both a space and state that exist, for Khan, beyond the reach of traditional analytic hermeneutics (“dreaming itself is beyond interpretation”\(^\text{144}\)) and even the analysand’s own capacity for self-description (“dreaming and the remembered dream-text are not sufficiently differentiated from each other”). This dichotomy of the private dreaming experience and the dream-text produced in the world of language can also be seen to have its antecedent in Joyce’s *Stephen Hero*, where Joyce notes that Stephen imagined the artist “standing in the position of mediator between the world of his experience and the world of his dreams”.\(^\text{145}\) This mediation occupies the position given in Winnicott’s theory to the transitional space.

Winnicott’s own argument for “the positive aspects of the capacity to be alone” is furthermore re-translated by Khan into an argument for exile as similarly generative.\(^\text{146}\) Khan’s account of dreaming here is part of what Adam Phillips understands to be a “continual and passionate critique of the overinterpretive analyst as maternal saboteur, as the one who appropriates or colonizes the patient”.\(^\text{147}\) Phillips’ metaphor of choice here, “colonizes”, suggests the possibility that Khan’s theory of the subject is also complaint about a “bad-enough Imperialism”.\(^\text{148}\) Roger Willoughby similarly argues, following Phillips, that the untranslatability of the dreaming self into analytic discourse – its status

\(^{143}\) Ibid.

\(^{144}\) Ibid.

\(^{145}\) *Stephen Hero*, p.77.

\(^{146}\) *The Maturational Processes*, p.7.

\(^{147}\) *On Kissing*, p.61.

\(^{148}\) Ibid.
beyond interpretation – signals Khan’s ineradicable feeling of his racial and cultural difference, a feeling that cannot be addressed by European psychoanalysis and culture.\footnote{Willoughby, p.187.} These compelling arguments, which are suggestive of Khan’s uneasy position within European culture, can be extended if the links between epiphany, the private subject, exile, and the writing of James Joyce, are brought to the forefront. Khan places his experience of self-exile – and thus his political experiences – at the centre of his description of subjectivity in psychoanalytic terms.

**The Politics of Privacy**

The symbolic presence of exile in Khan’s work in this respect foreshadows Christopher Bollas’ remarks on psychoanalysis and exile in his introduction to *Freud and the Non-European*, an understandable connection when we note that Bollas was one of Khan’s analysands and best student.\footnote{Hopkins, p.357.} Bollas notes, bringing Edward Said’s notion of the contrapuntal experience of exile into dialogue with psychoanalytic thinking, that:

Moving from the maternal order to the paternal order, from the image-sense world of the infantile place to the symbolic order of language, maybe our first taste of exile, one that seems to haunt and yet energize much of Proust’s writing. In this respect, we may all be exiles of a sort\footnote{Christopher Bollas, ‘Introduction’ in Edward Said, *Freud and the Non-European* (London: Verso, 2004), p.8.} Khan’s insistence on the impossibility of translating the dreaming experience into a shareable dream text could be construed, following Bollas, along the lines of a shift from the Real to the Symbolic. I would like to argue for the political dimension of this theory, and that the privacy of the self in Khan’s thinking,
rather than constituting a withdrawal or retreat from the political is offered by Khan as a response to it. What Winnicott identifies as the “incommunicado element” at the heart of every human being is haunted by Joycean exile in Khan’s writing.

When it comes to the preservation of this exilic, unintegrated subject, the stakes are high in Winnicott and Khan’s thought, and here I want to indicate the explicit and implicit political aspects of Khan’s defence of the private self against the “depersonalization” entailed in his picture of modernity. In 1979’s *Alienation in Perversions* Khan sets out what he sees as the most pernicious form of object relations. In this argument, the essence of perversion is the transformation of intimacy into a “technique” which engenders an experience of another person emptied of mutuality, with a predetermined outcome. In *Alienation in Perversions* Khan sets out what he sees as the most pernicious form of object relations. In this argument, the essence of perversion is the transformation of intimacy into a “technique” which engenders an experience of another person emptied of mutuality, with a predetermined outcome.\footnote{Masud Khan, *Alienation in Perversions* (London: Hogarth, 1979), p.20.} A pervert, for Khan, is one “fucks from intent” and refuses to “surrender to the experience”.\footnote{Ibid., p.197.} His discussion of intimacy early on in the book plays on the definitions presented in the *OED*: *intimate* as both adjective and verb. In the first instance, intimate is concerned with “the inmost nature and character of a thing”.\footnote{Ibid., p.22.} Khan’s selection of this definition recapitulates his epiphanic psychoanalysis, and the form of object-relation it entails. In *Stephen Hero*, Joyce instructs the artist to record the particularity of each object, which Khan takes as exemplary for psychoanalytic practice:

> “Its soul, its whatness, leaps to us from the vestment of its appearance. The soul of the commonest object, the structure of which is so adjusted, seems to us radiant. The object achieves its epiphany.”

\footnote{Stephen Hero, p.218.}
The verb *intimate* is “to put into, drive or press into, to make known, announce, etc”.\(^{156}\) Perversion for Khan consists of the unavoidable injunction to communicate something unconscious – “of the inmost nature and character” – to another person. This strategy to communicate something in the pervert’s “inmost nature” – in psychoanalytic terms the return of a deprivation or frustration from the early environment – is thwarted however by the pervert’s reluctance to “surrender to the situation”: “he remains outside the experiential climax”.\(^{157}\) This is owing to the inherent artificiality of the “make-believe situation” that the pervert constructs so that traumatic frustrations and deprivations can only return in a situation where “two individuals temporarily renounce their separate identities and boundaries”.\(^{158}\) In other words, the pervert manufactures a situation of quasi-liberation that is ultimately fraudulent because it only stages, rather than enters properly, an intimate sphere of intersubjective exchange and mutuality.

Accordingly, Khan situates a paradox at the heart of perversion: that it consists of both an “achievement and failure in the *intimate* situation”, and it is this failure “that supplies the compulsion to repeat the process again and again”\(^{159}\) despite the initial hope in the pervert’s desire to establish some communication. But the attempt to establish a genuine dialogue is troubled by the pervert’s need to “retain a split off, dissociated manipulative ego control of the situation”,\(^{160}\) and it is this dissociative character that leads to the alienation the pervert experiences, from both their own desire and from their partner. Pornography for Khan is a fake intimacy: it “masquerades as mutual; and ecstatic…

\(^{156}\) *Alienation in Perversions*, p.20.

\(^{157}\) Ibid., p.23.

\(^{158}\) Ibid., p.22.

\(^{159}\) Ibid., p.23.

\(^{160}\) Ibid.
through somatic events” and “is in fact a sterile and alienated mental concoc-
tion…in it, there is neither scope nor reverie for object-relations”.

Pornography, in Khan’s argument, is an example of an “impersonal ob-
ject” employed by the pervert in order to maintain his or her distance from their
desire. As he puts it succinctly in the preface, “the pervert puts an impersonal
object between his desire and his accomplice: this object can be a stereotype fan-
tasy, a gadget or a pornographic image. All three alienate the pervert from him-
self, as, alas, from the object of his desire.” In the final climactic chapter of
Alienation in Perversions, also published separately as an article in the Times Lit-
ery Supplement, it is the employment of these impersonal objects that raise pro-
found political and ethical questions, and cause Khan to close the book with an
indictment of what he sees as the nihilism and cynicism in descriptions of the
human subject in modernity. The chapter is titled ‘Pornography and the Politics
of Rage and Subversion’, and argues that pornography (Khan draws on de Sade
for much of the piece) has “replaced sexual freedom and sharing by a mental
act of coercion on the body-self and object into extremes stances of submission
and humiliation”. There are profound implications for social life: “In this con-
text, one can say that the politics of pornography are inherently fascistic”.

Indeed, the spectre of fascism haunts Khan’s writing. The dream that
opens Khan’s crucial discussion of the ‘private’ subject in ‘Beyond the Dream-
ing Experience’ is that of an exile whose entire family “had perished in the Nazi
gas chambers”. Khan writes that “the patient had come to London from cen-

161 Ibid.
162 Ibid., p.9.
163 Ibid., p.225.
164 Ibid.
165 Hidden Selves, p.43.
tral Europe and money was to be delivered to her here with which she was to help bring the rest of her family to London”.\footnote{166} The patient is betrayed as regards the money and it becomes impossible for her family to escape. The dream that is reported is considered by Khan to be crucial in the treatment because the patient “used the dream space” – as distinct from the “dream text” – “to extend and establish her freedom from guilt”.\footnote{167} In her dream, the patient wanders around a hospital dispensary collecting sleeping pills, then transitioning to an “occupational therapy room” where she begins to paint:

As I am about to finish I become aware that someone is watching me. I become terrified and nearly tear up the drawing… I turn around and the man strikes me as odd: he is short, grey-haired and looks like a Gestapo officer.\footnote{168}

It is crucial that Khan chooses an exile and victim of twentieth-century totalitarianism to foreground his theory of the private dreaming subject. The dream indicates for Khan a key change in the patient’s sense of self-experience: “The transference reference to me…showed an intrapsychic shift from regressive dependence on an idealized me to use of me as a discriminating but noncensur- ious internal figure”.\footnote{169} In the context of the dream, Khan’s presence with the patient as “watching her benignly” should be contrasted with the figure of the Gestapo officer in terms of these different forms of authority. The “regressive dependence” of the patient is substituted for a different kind of relating that is mutual but non-invasive.

\footnote{166} Ibid.
\footnote{167} Ibid., p.44.
\footnote{168} Ibid., p.43.
\footnote{169} Ibid., p.44.
It is possible to understand the shift described in that case history – simply, from fascism to democracy – with reference to Khan’s thinking on pornography. The position of “regressed dependence” as regards the analyst turns psychoanalysis into what Khan calls in Alienation in Perversions an “extreme stance of submission and humiliation”. For Khan, pornography facilitates a mode of object-relating that is the culmination of a certain attitude towards man in secular modernity, the final end point of which is the extermination-camp. One of the tasks that faces psychoanalysts is not to adopt a perverse mode of inquiry along the lines of Justius in Finnegans Wake. Khan is unequivocal about rejecting the prying of both Justius and the “overinterpretive analyst”: “We do not pursue the dream as hermeneutic fetish”.170

The unintegrated self must be protected from such zeal. It is again Winnicott’s writing that crystallises the political dimension of the relationship between the ‘exiled’ self - beyond the reach of communication - and the persecutory threat of psychoanalytic interpretation. The language of ‘Communicating and Not Communicating Leading to a study of certain opposites’, reprinted in The Maturational Processes, is striking:

Starting from no fixed place I soon came, while preparing this paper for a foreign society, to staking a claim, to my surprise, to the right not to communicate. This was a protest from the core of my being to the frightening fantasy of being infinitely exploited. In another language this would be the fantasy of being eaten or swallowed up. In the language of this paper it is the fantasy of being found.

The political implications of this passage can hardly be concealed: Winnicott alludes to rights, “protest”, exploitation. The passage emphasises non-belonging, beginning from “no fixed place” and presenting itself to “a foreign society”. Extending this theme, translation too is embedded in Winnicott’s writing: he nego-

170 Hidden Selves, p.50.
tiates between “another language” - of being eaten, that of Kleinian psychoanalysis - and “the language of this paper”. Arriving at the “right not to communicate” is continually deferred by the troubled syntax of the first line, continually derailed by the interjection of sub-clauses: it is as if Winnicott’s thought struggles to settle itself in one place. It is also worth noting the unanchored, suspended approach Winnicott takes to the subject: “I shall allow myself considerable latitude in following my theme wherever it takes me”. Winnicott remarks upon his “surprise” at the claim staked in his argument; he becomes what Julia Kristeva might term a stranger to himself. What this passage demonstrates nevertheless is a connection, further elaborated in Khan’s work, between the critique of the overinterpretive analyst who troubles the privacy of the self; the language of exile, foreignness and displacement; and the realm of political life.

The political stakes of the privacy of the self are explored in psychoanalyst and critic Josh Cohen’s pellucid study of 2013, The Private Life, which reads Winnicott alongside Hannah Arendt. For Cohen, “Private life is the first enemy of totalitarianism because it harbours an otherness no amount of social control or surveillance can abate or control.” Private life means “the outer reaches of the inner life” - for Khan, this is exemplified by the dreaming experience - but it also entails “all that’s too contemptibly ordinary to warrant notice, and which for that very reason escapes...the totalitarian mind can’t abide what escapes.” For Khan this everyday privacy might be best spotted in the fallow state, that quiet and ruminative state of withdrawal and anticipation.


173 Ibid.
Strangely, however, Masud Khan does not appear once in Cohen’s study, despite the centrality of metaphors of privacy and hiddenness to his conception of subjectivity, and their shared interest in Winnicott, pornography, and political life. In Khan’s writings, the “prying” analyst is identifiable with myriad forms of political coercion, characterised by zealotry. In his comment on the Pakistani political environment of 1971, he remarks on the “impatient zeal” of those wishing to deprive him of his family’s property. In *The Privacy of the Self*, published four years later, Khan describes in one case history how he managed to refrain from acting “with…defensive interpretive zeal” when faced with a patients’ regression. Later in the book, Khan quotes the analyst Ralph Greenson when discussing what he terms Freud’s “adamant refusal to be caught up with any therapeutic evangelism”. What we have inherited from Freud, Khan suggests, quoting Greenson in his remark, is “a dread of ‘pathological therapeutic zeal’” - Freud’s project is a moderate one that should dissuade us from extreme and exploitative positions. The zealous psychoanalyst in the consulting room, for Khan, is equivalent to the violent political radical and the religious fundamentalist.

Although Khan’s conflation of those two positions reflects his rebarbative attitude toward the political changes of his time in Pakistan - it is a convenient smear of those calling for economic justice after years of dictatorship - his remark does nevertheless speak to more fundamental questions about the relationship of psychoanalysis and democracy. The alternative to the zealous analyst is another psychoanalysis, allowing for the emergence of the most larval aspects of self-experience, without trying to order them. The non-invasive char-

174 Khan, in Hopkins, p.223.

175 *Privacy of the Self*, p.57.

176 Ibid., p.93.

177 Ibid.
acter of Khan’s anti-hermeneutic psychoanalysis evokes the democratic impulses Adam Phillips identifies: democracy, like analysis, “extends the repertoire of possible conflict…[and] fosters an unpredictability of feeling and desire.” In Khan’s psychoanalysis the cultivation of the hidden and private aspects of psychic life run the risk of being closed off, or interpreted out of existence, by the over-zealous analyst; if these aspects of the self are not closed down, however, they can produce the kinds of new experiences and beginnings Phillips describes here, and as Khan does in his version of epiphany.

Respecting and defending the privacy of the self is the basis, for Khan, for a properly mutual and democratic exchange: psychoanalysis and politics can too easily suffer, in his view, from a proclivity towards authoritarianism. This authoritarianism is characterised by Khan as embodying a highly instrumental treatment of human life: the “infinite” exploitation of human potential that Winnicott fears in *The Maturational Processes*. Pornography is conceived in totalitarian terms earlier in ‘Pornography and the Politics of Rage and Subversion’ when Khan notes, “everything is imprisoned through words in a violent and tyrannical game with the own-body self and the other”. The state apparatuses here corrupt the playful and creative possibilities for language: tyranny and imprisonment. Khan’s defense of the dreaming experience in *Hidden Selves* takes on a deeply political overtone when read in light of Khan’s remark from *Alienation in Perversions* that “pornography is the stealer of dreams”.

For Khan this exemplifies a view of human subjectivity as “based on the model of a machine”, which he situates historically in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries: “…with the Industrial Revolution and the advent of

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179 *Alienation in Perversions*, p.222.

180 Ibid.
scientific technology in European cultures man began to consider neither in the image of God nor of man, but in that of a machine which was of his own invention”. Pornography in his argument thus facilitates an idea of “the human body” as “an ideal machine, which can be manipulated to yield maximum sensation”. This leads to “a distinct dehumanization of man’s relation to himself” through the pure instrumentalization of bodies and thought. The subjectivity of the fallow mood - which I equate with the quiescent exiled subject in the psychoanalytic consulting room - is Khan’s response to instrumentalised modernity.

For Theodor Adorno in *Minima Moralia* this transformation of human behaviour, embedded in the seeds of Enlightenment rationality, is tied to the rise of fascism. Roger Willoughby has convincingly argued for the importance of a little known paper by Wilfred Bion in Khan’s taking up of the ‘man-as-machine’ metaphor in modernity. At the same time, Adorno’s thinking here advances a more explicitly political reading of technology in modernity that resonates with Khan’s pronouncements on the topic. “Technology”, Adorno writes, “is making gestures precise and brutal, and with them men. It expels from movements all hesitation, deliberation, civility.” Adorno sees in the slamming of refrigerator and car doors the demand for “movements...from their users [that] already have the violent, hard-hitting, unresting jerkiness of Fascist maltreatment”. The new types of doors that have “the tendency to

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181 Ibid., p.223.

182 Ibid.


185 Ibid.
snap shut by themselves“ leads to a form of social decay, inducing in users “the bad manners of not looking behind them, not shielding the interior of the house that receives them”. This “withering of experience” is connected to the instrumentality of things by Enlightenment thought:

…things, under the law of pure functionality, assume a form that limits contact with them to mere operation, and tolerates no surplus, either in freedom of conduct or in autonomy of things, which would survive as the core of experience, because it is not consumed by the moment of action.

This “mere operation” and “pure functionality” denies the “autonomy of things”. It is precisely this possible autonomy in things that Khan’s thinking on epiphany wishes to explore. Khan’s notion of an exiled or “unintegrated” state is one that refuses precisely the instrumentality Adorno identifies here, and it is only through such a refusal that the intimate and the mutual can crystallize in Khan’s thinking.

Indeed, the passage of Finnegans Wake on which Hidden Selves settles speaks to the rise of twentieth century fascism. The paragraph that following Shaun’s explosive attack on Shem contains a parody of the rhetoric on Nazism, and alludes directly to Hitler himself:

Shall we follow each others a steplonger, drowner of daggers, whiles our liege, tilyet a stranger in the frontyard of his happiness, is taking, (heal helper! one gob, one gap, one gulp and gorger of all!) his refreshment?

186 Ibid.

187 Ibid.

188 Finnegans Wake, p.191.5-8.
We can read in “(heal helper! one gob, one gap, one gulp and gorger)” the ‘Heil Hitler! Ein Volk, Ein Reich, Ein Fuhrer’ of Nazism. Shaun describes Hitler as “our liege”. This particular culmination of the passage Khan that quotes in *Finnegans Wake* adds totalitarianism to the intellectual exploration of dreaming, exile and privacy. Khan’s writing elaborates: the violence of Shem’s “privacy” is implicitly connected with Hitlerism.

Privacy, at another moment in Khan’s work, has a different political valence. It hardly seems possible that the same psychoanalyst composed this inward and intimate account of the fragility of psychic life when reading Khan’s racist bile and callous invocation of the Holocaust in his most controversial and shocking writing in *When Spring Comes*. Mr. Luis, his maligned Jewish patient, is attacked for his obscene outbursts, but also for his lack of privacy. “Why won’t you treat me yourself”, asks Mr. Luis. “Why do you want to be humiliated by me, by insisting on an answer?”, Khan replies. “It is that you have very little sense of privacy in any sense, or in any context...And without some capacity, or need, for privacy in a person, I cannot relate to him.” Khan connects Mr. Luis’ “gaudy” clothes, and the obscene stories of sexual exploits he tells, to both his lack of privacy and his Jewishness. In *When Spring Comes* the disappearance of the privacy of the self shifts in Khan’s thought from being a malaise specific to our experience of modernity to a racial characteristic, part of Khan’s psychic profiling of Jews. How is such an erratic turn possible? It is the supervention of myriad forms of race thinking into Khan’s imaginative world - derived from nineteenth century British imperialism, T.S. Eliot, and contemporary Powellite politics - that facilitates this particular distortion of his thought, and it is the politics of race in Khan’s writing that form the basis on the final chapter of this thesis, extending this discussion of his responses to migration and modernity.

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189 Ibid., p.274.
I have argued in this chapter that the exilic, uncommunicative character of Khan’s vision of psychic life has its genesis in his fascination with Joyce’s writing. But the unintegrated self, who is often beyond the reach of psychoanalytic interpretation and sits at the limits of representation, finds further expression and elaboration in another key aspect of Khan’s engagement with modernism: in the painting of cubism and surrealism. The subsequent chapter aims to explore Khan’s interest in painting as the expression of his desire to become a European modernist, with his collecting practices exemplifying a material commitment to a particular articulation of the modernist project in postwar Europe. But at the same time his love of the painting of Miro and Braque is also a pretext for a further exploration in his thought of alternative forms of subjective (dis)organisation and the liberating potential of such experiences. In this exploration he enlists the contemporaneous reflections of Winnicott, Michael Balint and Marion Milner on painting. His own explicit alliance with modernism also expresses the ways in which the rise of modern painting framed their own discussions of aesthetics and subjectivity.
Chapter Four

“Somnambulant doodles”: Masud Khan and European Modernist Art

Pour Madame Svetlana, Pour Monsieur Masud R. Khan, Hommage de l’Éditeur, un collectionneur, un bibliophile de qualité, avec tout sa sympathié G. Mourlot St Paul le 12 Aout 1965

This is the handwritten inscription in the front of Masud Khan’s copy of Georges Braques’ La Liberté des Mers, a 1959 book in which the poetry of Pierre Reverdy is illustrated by seven colour lithographs and additional lithographic decorations of the poems themselves (fig. 3). Khan’s edition, signed by the artist and author, was numbered 79 from an edition of 250 and printed on luxurious Arches paper. The auction catalogue for the posthumous sale of Khan’s art collection has the list price of lot 87 at £1200 - the price realized at auction was £3200. The book was published by Maeght Éditeur, of the Galerie Maeght on the Rue de Bac, and printed by the Atelier Mourlot, run by brothers Fernand and Georges Mourlot, the latter of whom inscribed Khan’s book at the shop on the Rue St. Paul in the 3rd Arrondissement.

Such a book is typical of Masud Khan’s extensive art collection. The inscription shows Khan establishing key relationships in the networks of exchange, patronage and taste that constituted the postwar modernist art scene in Paris. Georges Mourlot recognizes Khan as “un bibliophile de qualité” and “un collectionneur” worthy of Mourlot’s respects and sharing with him a certain cultural sympathy. This note from 1964 indicates how far Khan inducted himself into a cultural formation now celebrating the institutional (and economic) tri-

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umphs of French modernist painting in the postwar years, since his first being introduced to dealer and patron Aimé Maeght via poet and critic Jean Cassou in the mid-1950s. Indeed, the auction catalogue makes note of many other personal dedications and inscriptions to Khan, including Albert Ayme’s lithographic illustrations of the poetry of Francis Ponge (lot 68, L’Araignée de Francis Ponge), as well as indicating where he himself signed books to mark his ownership of them (Le Coffret de Fleurette by Antoni Clavé, lot 166).²

2 NAL, Old Master, Modern and Contemporary, pp.16, 40.
Fig. 3. ‘Old Master, Modern and Contemporary Prints’, catalogue entry, Georges Braque, *La Liberté des Mers*, 1959, lot 87, p.22.

Khan continued to visit Paris and buy art for the rest of his life, even after many of the major figures he came to know in that scene (Matisse, Braque, D.H. Kahnweiler, the Maeght family) had died: the front of Khan’s copy of *Ulysses* tells us that in 1983 he stayed at the Hotel Lutetia, a luxury art deco hotel popu-
lar with André Gide, Henri Matisse and Pablo Picasso (all Maeght collaborators), and only a ten-minute walk from the Galerie Maeght down the Boulevard Raspail. Braque’s studio on the Rue de Douanier was also within walking distance of the Hotel. The Galerie Maeght was also a similar distance walk from Victor Smirnoff’s apartment on the Rue Duguay Trouin, at which Khan was a regular guest from 1965-1980.

Hopkins and Willoughby have sketched some of Khan’s encounters with this world. Hopkins suggests that Khan saw Jean Cassou and Georges Braque as amongst his crucial friendships, equivalent to those he sustained with John Rickman and tutor P.I. Painter. Indeed, Khan’s student Andreas Giannakoulos reports in his own historical account of British psychoanalysis that Khan was well acquainted with not only Jean-Paul Sartre, Claude Levi-Strauss and Henri Matisse, but developed an especially deep and lasting friendship with Braque, who apparently dedicated several paintings to the psychoanalyst. Indeed, Giannakoulos goes on to state that Khan and Beriosova were often invited to holiday in Monte-Carlo with Braque, towards whom Khan was especially deferential. Khan would sit, Giannakoulos notes, beside Braque for hours without moving as he painted.

These relationships would become crucial to Khan’s self-mythologizing, with Christopher Bollas reporting as fact after Khan’s death his claims about the exact nature of his involvement with the art world in Paris: “As a young man,

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4 For Giannakoulas’ reminiscences of Khan and an account of his work, see ‘Paradidomena: L’estesienza umana, psicoanalitica ed artistica di Masud Khan’, in Andreas Giannakoulos, La tradizione psicoanalitica britannica indipendente (Rome: Libri Borla, 2010), pp. 123-124. Thanks to Thomas Langley, Newcastle University, for help with the translation of select passages in Giannakoulos’ book.
[Khan] swept Paris and met Matisse and Braque, charming them out of several of their paintings which were signed to him. Giacometti sculpted him.”5 (An analysts in Hopkins’ biography also reports Khan’s boast that Giacometti sculpted him, as does Andreas Giannakoulos, who adds that Khan would compose verses to accompany Giacometti’s sculptures and drawings).6

Modernist art is alluded to in the accounts of Khan’s life we receive through his former patients. One analysand, with whom Khan socialized, describes in Linda Hopkins’ biography how Khan “gave [he and his wife] a wedding gift that was a print of a still life of pumpkins with a plate and a knife signed by Braque”.7 Similarly, Peter Elder, an analysts who saw Khan for four years in the early 1960s, recounts buying “a book of Chagall reproductions that I felt I had to have.” He goes on,

I was embarrassed to tell him about spending the money since I was paying him so little, but I did tell him, and his response was to stop the session. He took me into his grand living room and showed me his large collection of books, paintings, and sculpture. There was one enormous sculpture – a tall long abstract figure, seven feet tall. It may have been a Giacometti…I do know that there was more than one Braque on the wall.8

Though the patient claims this moment was a key breakthrough in their transference relationship, there can also be no denying the grandiosity of Khan’s display of his capacity to collect the most exclusive and expensive art (Elder remarks that the book of Chagall reproductions he purchased cost five Guineas). Khan perhaps exploits here the intimate setting of the analytic en-

5 Bollas, cited in Hopkins, p.379.

6 Hopkins, p.77. See also, Giannakoulos, p.124.

7 Hopkins, p.52.

8 Ibid., p.77.
counter to communicate his belonging to another special, private club of art collectors. The scene is strangely private - his collection is seemingly hidden away, for his private consumption - yet also flaunted. The auction catalogue reveals that Khan was an avid collector of Marc Chagall, owning 46 of his works. Indeed, Khan’s presentation of himself as a collector and patron of modernist art is a key part of his self-fashioning in the image of European modernists like Jean Cassou and Daniel Kahnweiler (Picasso’s dealer and one of cubism’s most ferocious ideologues and promoters). Collecting and patronage have been identified in classic studies (such as Rainey’s *Institutions of Modernism*), and more recent work, as key modes in the articulation of modernist culture. One of Khan’s and Svetlana Beriozsova’s close friends was anthropologist Geoffrey Gorer, who owned a large collection of modernist artworks and occasionally made gifts of paintings to the couple, suggesting the extent to which Khan was enmeshed in such modernist networks of collection, gift-giving and patronage.

This point is underlined by Khan’s relationship with Jean Cassou, who was the principal curator at the Musee d’Art Moderne from 1945 to 1965, ideally placed to connect Khan intellectually and personally with the artists, dealers and critics of cubism. Indeed, in his correspondence with Gorer modernist art becomes an epistolary leitmotif, as he would send the anthropologist numerous postcards and greetings cards with reproductions of well known paintings by

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10 Hopkins, p.59, p.382.
Jean Arp, Georges Braque, Piet Mondrian and Henri Matisse, and Paul Gauguin, amongst others. (See fig. 4 and fig. 5).¹¹

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Khan was at pains to indicate his various degrees of connection to the modernist art scene. This contention is borne out by Khan’s large art book collection. In the main, it comprised books of lithographs illustrating French modernist and surrealist poetry (Braque, Miró, Apollinaire, Picasso, Gide, Char, Giacometti, to name only the most prominent). His collection of books was deeply significant. “Nothing roots me in London”, he wrote in his diaries, “but my work, my books and my lithographs and the space they need.”

Modernist painting also had an important place in the early stages of Khan’s career. A footnote to the opening page of Michael Balint’s own investigations into modern painting, published in 1952 in *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, notes that the essay takes its title from a paper by Khan delivered one year before. Indeed, this first psychoanalytic paper of his was delivered to the British Psychoanalytical Society’s Scientific meeting on June 6th 1951, and titled ‘Notes on the Dissolution of Object Representation in Modern Art’. Roger Willoughby reports that the paper was followed by an “active discussion” featuring psychoanalysts Hanna Segal, Michael Balint, Donald Winnicott as well as the art critics Herbert Read and Anton Ehrenzweig. This paper “stimulated” a response from Michael Balint published one year later in 1952, which I discuss in due course. Though Khan’s paper is now lost, its concerns are carried and varied - much like his early interest in Joyce - across his writing career. Indeed, Khan’s first psychoanalytic publication was intended to be a review of Adrian

12 Hopkins, p.176.


14 Willoughby, p.34.
Stokes’ Kleinian study of aesthetics *Smooth and Rough*, though Anton Ehrenzweig finally superseded the original review written by Khan.\(^{15}\) 1953 also saw Khan publish two reviews in the *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* of books on psychoanalysis and art, writing that I shall address directly later in this chapter.

These anecdotal and autobiographical accounts of Khan’s art collection can be supplemented by a revealing examination of documentary evidence connected directly to it, principally, the illustrated sales catalogue for the auction of the paintings, lithographs and art books in Khan’s possession after his death. The auction, held at Phillips, Son and Neale in London’s Bond Street on November 28\(^{th}\) 1989, showcased Khan’s large collection of modernist paintings and lithographs alongside illustrated and signed versions of modernist texts (Matisse’s illustrated edition of *Ulysses*; David Hockney’s illustrated *Poems of Cavafy*), the auction running to some 429 lots.\(^{16}\)

This chapter examines Khan’s particular investment in collecting European modernist painting during his life in London. First, what was at stake, for Khan, in the exchanges and friendships he made with Maeght, Braque, Mouri lot, and others? How does his involvement in the postwar Parisian art scene relate to other efforts of his, examined in this thesis, to become a modernist and insert himself into modernist culture? What does Khan’s involvement with these groups further indicate about the cultural and institutional status of French modernist painting in the postwar period? The answer I offer to these questions is that an emerging consensus around the historical and aesthetic value of cubist painting in particular, and modernism more generally, creates the conditions for Khan’s project of modernist self-fashioning through his in-

\(^{15}\) Ibid., p.40.

\(^{16}\) See the sales catalogue, lots 239 (Matisse) and 374 (Hockney) respectively. NAL, *Old Master, Modern and Contemporary*, p.65, p.99.
volvement in intimate networks of patronage and friendship. Khan’s immersion in modernism is analogous to his other attempts to effect a ‘Europeanization’ of himself through his engagements with T.S. Eliot and James Joyce.

In this respect, the visibility of Khan’s collection in the anecdotes outlined above is of special importance, as it highlights his motivations as a collector. Khan himself places great importance on observing and reading people’s clothing, manners and the objects with which they associate themselves. In the opening pages of When Spring Comes, Khan notes that in his clinical writing he strives to communicate, “often in some detail, how a patient conducts himself and dresses...Sartorial self-presentation tells a lot”. This remark suggests his commitment to what Leo Bersani, in chapter four of The Freudian Body, identifies in Henry James’ writing as “the readability of human behaviour”. Turning to the “highly-Europeanized” Madame Merle from The Portrait of a Lady Bersani argue that this “readability” is “complicit in Madame Merle’s view of the relation between appearances and being”, taking the following quotation as his epigraph:

When you’ve lived as long as I you’ll see that every human being has his shell and that you must take that shell into account. By the shell I mean the whole envelope of circumstances. There’s no such thing as an isolated man or woman; we’re each of us made up of some cluster of appurtenances. What shall we call our ‘self’? Where does it begin? Where does it end? It overflows into everything that belongs to us - and then it flows back again. I know a large part of myself is in the clothes I choose to wear. I’ve a great respect for things! One’s self - for other people - is one’s expression of one’s self; and one’s house, one’s furniture, one’s garments,


the books one reads, the company one keeps - these things are all expressive.  

Khan himself reports that he was introduced to the writing of Henry James by his Jewish patient Mr. Luis, who appears in the most notorious chapter of *When Spring Comes*. Bersani’s choice of epigraph is apposite here because Khan, like Madame Merle in Bersani’s example, is committed to the readability of his own self - his art collection is the “cluster of appurtenances” he uses to express his Europeanness. Such a substantial collection is clear evidence that Khan has “a great respect for things”, and buying all the artworks he does must be read as “one’s expression of oneself” for “other people”; in this instance, it forcefully articulates his putative Europeanisation. The photographer and friend of Masud Khan, Zoe Dominic, who I cite earlier in chapter two, suggested that Khan’s main problem in London was that “he was never Europeanized. You’re either Europeanized or you’re not.” This remark has a bearing on questions of race and migration that I unpack in the next chapter. But Khan’s fascination with European modernist art expresses a desire to remake himself as a European through the solidification of crucial friendships and intimate commercial relationships with major figures in the postwar Paris art scene.

One of Khan’s analysands notes that he strove to communicate “that he was learned and cultured and from the upper echelons.” Khan

19 Ibid., p.81.

20 *When Spring Comes*, p.109.

21 Bersani, p.98.

22 Ibid.

23 Hopkins, p.387.
...quoted Auden and Eliot and he would make reference to modern French painting....And the truth was, I did care about those things, because I had been brought up in an English public school.24

Khan forges a connection with his patient by his invocation of canonical modernist writers and painters. Their shared knowledge of those cultural scenes are a crucial currency in their relationship. But this connection is also articulated in relation to race: the patient remarks that before being referred to Khan he was asked if he “was racially prejudiced.” “I WAS”, he notes, “but I replied: ‘I can’t afford to be, because I’m of mixed race myself’”.25 This mutual display of their knowledge of cultural value allows two ethnically sensitive figures to legitimate each other as participants in European culture, both acclimatising themselves to the tastes of a certain type of cultivated English public schoolboy.

Khan’s highly visible staging of his behaviour as “un collectioneur...un bibliophile de qualité” is striking because it is, in one fundamental respect, at odds with Khan’s thought, and indicates the existence of a striking contradiction at the heart of his interests in modernist art: his notion of the subject always stresses the capacity for the most private elements of psychic life to resist hermeneutic interventions, and to refuse to be fully known or completely revealed (indeed, attempts to do so are in Khan’s thinking profoundly persecutory). Khan’s interests in the modernist painters that he so avidly collected and patronized have another life that pulls away from questions of Europeanness, and Khan’s snobbery, back towards the fundamental ethical and political aspects of his psychoanalysis. Making and seeing modernist paintings offers possibilities, in Khan’s work, for cultivating what Marion Milner would describe as “some kind of relation to objects in which one was much more mixed up with

24 Hopkins, p.268.

25 Ibid.
them than that”: exploring radically new forms of subjective (dis)organisation. Indeed, these ideas about seeing and subjective disintegration directly address those most privileged, secret and private areas of psychic life that Khan’s work describes.

It is my argument that the explicit references to modernist art and painting in Khan’s psychoanalytic writing, when read as continuous with the reflections on painting offered by Khan’s colleagues Marion Milner, Donald Winnicott, and Michael Balint, crystallises connections between modernist aesthetics and the development of British psychoanalytic thought, with special importance for dialectics of subject and object, artwork and spectator. The painting of Braque and Miró, though stylistically divergent in striking ways, is for Khan the expression of transitional states of experience that take further the capacity of the solitary subject into realms of subjective disintegration and the dissolution of a normally coherent ego.

More explicitly, Khan’s ideas about modernist art – particularly the cubism of Braque and Picasso and the work of Joan Miró – demonstrate that his interest in non-verbal or pre-verbal states is developed and imagined through the aesthetic procedures and possibilities that inhere in the work of those artists. If it is not possible fully to articulate the absolute of the dream space through psychoanalytic discourse, then it is in painting, for Khan, that these solitary-yet-transitional subjectivities can at least be partially apprehended or approached. In Khan’s work, cubism offers a striking picture of the constant negotiation between private unconscious, object, and outside world - what Marion Milner will call an “undifferentiated ego-Id state”. The study of Khan’s art writing shows that parts of British object-relations psychoanalysis are much more intimately connected to modernist experimentation in visual art than anticipated.

The emphasis placed on the importance of Khan, Winnicott and Milner’s psychoanalytic aesthetics and anxieties over the treatment of the object is part of my overall critical rationale. There has so far been only limited engagement with the relationship of their writing to modernist aesthetics. Lindsay Stonebridge notes that in *The Destructive Element* it is beyond the historical parameters of her study to begin to explore Winnicott’s relationship with modernism. She also goes on to note that an extension of her project would have to explore “the impact of psychoanalysis on later modernist theories of the visual arts, such as Anton Ehrenzweig”. In any case, the historical period she examines is concluded before the major theoretical explorations of British object relations were underway, and Winnicott’s major texts were published.

Khan and the aforementioned cohort of analysts aggregate psychoanalytic concepts with aspects of modernist visual culture. Although Stonebridge’s study begins to engage with ideas of transitional and potential spaces in her discussion of Marion Milner, the historical and cultural moment the book describes necessitates her intense focus on Kleinian psychoanalysis. There is accordingly a concomitant interest in aggression, destructiveness and fragmentation, aspects of psychic life that are, for Stonebridge, played down by Winnicott and Milner in their thought. In my investigation I explore the manner in which Milner, Winnicott, and Masud Khan turn to a quite different psychoanalytic register to Klein in order to imagine the productive possibilities for subjective disintegration and disorganisation. Consequently, this discussion expands Stonebridge’s study so as to include the high points of Khan and Winnicott’s thinking in postwar Britain, and describe a different notion of subject-object relations to discussions of modernist art.

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28 Ibid., p.147.
Khan’s relationship with European twentieth-century painting also serves to bring modernism back into otherwise thorough accounts of Winnicottian potential and transitional spaces. Nicky Glover’s comprehensive 2009 study *Psychoanalytic Aesthetics* offers careful elucidations of Winnicott’s thinking as regards these areas in relation to aesthetics (and crucially differentiates his work from Klein’s in a number of ways) but misses out Masud Khan, a crucial omission when bearing in mind the influence Khan is now recognized to have had on the development of Winnicott’s work - an influence, from the point of view of this study, that is uniquely modernist in character. The paucity of references to modernist culture in Glover’s study is also surprising given the emphasis she places on psychoanalytic writers deeply embedded in Anglophone artistic modernism - Ella Sharpe and Adrian Stokes are just two - and the result is an account of aesthetics that neglects the tangled relationships its psychoanalytic thinkers had with the various institutions and networks of modernism that in turn influenced them.

By contrast, exploring Khan’s interest in modernist art will help to embed his and Winnicott’s work in the cultural context that produced it. Khan’s activities as a collector should make clear that any psychoanalytic criticism coming out of it is connected to the cultural networks of exchange and patronage that constitute modernism itself. In other words, there is no sense in which Khan and Winnicott’s psychoanalytic aesthetics could stand outside or merely reflect upon the cultural artefacts of cubism, surrealism, etc.

The richest and most comprehensive documentary evidence about Khan’s activities as a collector is the auction catalogue from the posthumous sale of his collection in 1989. A cursory examination of the catalogue indicates it is highly characteristic of Khan’s interests, thematically and intellectually. 385 of 429 lots appear under the headings ‘Modern Prints and Illustrated Books’ (lots 43-349); ‘Contemporary Prints’ (350-395a); and ‘Reference Books’ (396-429), and the vast majority of the collection is by European artists, with Marc Chagall, Georges Braque, Pablo Picasso, Costia Terechkovitch, Bernard Buffet and Joan Miró featuring most frequently. Eight artists in the catalogue, with at least ten works to their names, represent nearly half (48.8%) of the 385 twentieth century lots, which is 44% of the entire collection as it stood at sale in 1989. The numbers of paintings Khan owned by these top eight artists breaks down as follows: Marc Chagall (46); Bernard Buffet (30); Costia Terechkovitch (28); Georges Braque (25); Pablo Picasso (21); Joan Miró (18); Henri Matisse (10); Antoni Clavé (10).

Tzara/Miró’s *Parler Seul* (fig. 6) can be considered exemplary of Khan’s interests as a collector. The majority of the works are small, intimate books of lithographs, often produced in collaboration with a French language poet. Sometimes they are signed, and almost always printed on high-quality paper: japan nacrée, montval, and Velin d’Arches feature prominently. Such books were produced in limited editions running to between 200-500. The catalogue makes clear that the processes dominating Khan’s collection are highly specialised and artisanal, including especially lithography, etching, woodcuts and screen-printing.

165 lots (43% of the ‘Modern’ and ‘Contemporary’ sections of the catalogue) in the catalogue are individual lithographs, etchings or aquatints. Of these individual pieces, 113 are lithographs, whilst 49 are etchings, along with 3
woodcuts and ten silk-screened items. 162 lots (42%) (including the reference books at the end of the catalogue) are books (often illustrating poetry), catalogues and albums containing multiple lithographs, and luxury art journals featuring the same, such as *Derriere le Miróir* and *Verve.*
Fig. 6. ‘Old Master, Modern and Contemporary Prints’, catalogue entry, Joan Miró/Tristan Tzara. *Parler Seul*. 1948-1950, lot 254, p.73.
The majority of the works in his collection, then, were not large and expensive single purchases, though there were certainly pieces that became extremely valuable. Eight of the twenty most valuable works in Khan’s collection, going by the prices realised at auction, were published or printed by the Paris companies most frequently patronized by Khan: Maeght, Mourlot, Tériade and Fequet and Baudier. When the twenty most expensive sales in the collection are discarded as outliers (their range is £42,000 - £6200), then the mean price of an individual work in the catalogue is £495.10. By contrast, at a sale of ‘Impressionist & Modern Paintings, Drawings, Watercolours and Sculptures’ that took place at 2pm the day prior to the auction of Khan’s collection, the predominance of large oil paintings and individual sculptures pushes the average list price per piece into the tens of thousands.30

Khan’s habit of buying many more smaller works offered repeat business to individual dealers and publishers, and he developed long-standing commercial relationships with them. Mourlot and Maeght dominate the 215 publishers in lots in the sales catalogue, occurring 38 and 42 times respectively. Individual lithographs and paintings, along with the few Old Master sketches at the beginning of the catalogue, did not require and thus had no named publisher, but 37% of the 215 works with publishers listed are represented by just Mourlot and Maeght. Overall, these two publishers produced just over 1-in-5 (20.7%) twentieth-century works in the collection.

Indeed, if the eight most popular artists in Khan’s collection are taken as exemplary of his interests and habits as a collector, then it is striking that the mean dimensions of the works ascribed to these artists in the catalogue is 552.5mm x 454.2mm. Indeed, the largest pieces have a maximum height and

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width of between 1-1.5 meters (1052mm and 1592mm respectively)\textsuperscript{31} whilst the smallest work, by Antoni Clavé, measures just 65mm x 60mm. Lot 178 is particularly remarkable for its intimacy and rarity: a pack of silkscreened playing cards by the Boutique Simultané of Sonia Delauney.\textsuperscript{32} What this indicates is that Khan’s collection is consistently characterized by relatively small works, often not much larger than an illustrated book like *Parler Seul* (380mm x 283mm), not suited to exhibition display. Instead, they suggest a closed, private, and intimate circle of like-minded admirers gathering together to share something small and exquisite.

Hopkins’ biography is also suggestive of Khan’s fascination with the exquisite papers used to manufacture the many books of lithographs and poetry in his collection when describing new notebooks gifted to him by Victor Smirnoff, in which he would subsequently come to write his *Work Books*. “I want to thank you”, Khan writes, “for finding the ideal format and quality of paper for my Work Book. Please get me 50 of them.”\textsuperscript{33} Strangely, Khan goes on to attack his former friend Vladimir Granoff over the luxurious notebooks, published by Tisne, a Parisian printing shop that produced books on Paul Gaugain and Georges Braque, which he had previously given to Khan, complaining that they were “snobbish, expensive products...they cramped my freedom & style.”\textsuperscript{34} He prefers the apparent simplicity of the sample notebook Granoff sends, feeling greater “comfort” with them and suggesting they call forth “a

\textsuperscript{31} *Old Master, Modern and Contemporary Prints*. For the greatest height, see lot 259: *Le Grand Ordinateur*, Joan Miró, p.75. For greatest width, see lot 353: *Composition*, Eduardo Chillida, p.93.

\textsuperscript{32} Lot 178, *Old Master, Modern and Contemporary Prints*, p.42.

\textsuperscript{33} Hopkins, p.216.

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid. See also p.176. “The first Work Book volumes were written in twenty-three blank copybooks bound by Tisne of Paris, a previously unused gift from Wladimir [sic] Granoff”. Khan was evidently fond enough of the notebooks at the time to use them as diaries.
certain cowardly reverence that I entertain towards the thingness of things. It is not a question of economics.”35 This feeling for the “thingness of things” is key, I will argue, to understanding the relevance of modernist painting to Khan’s psychoanalytic writing on the subject.

Khan shared the enjoyment Verve publisher Tériade described in “writing on beautiful, satiny paper” - something he considers as “pleasurable and satisfying” as “writing about Georges Braque”.36 Indeed, the fact that Khan chose to begin his Work Books in Granoff’s gifted volumes - an attempt at the “notation of self-experience” that satisfied Khan “the most”37 - indicates how important they, and the experience of writing in them, must have been to him. But Khan’s comments about the notebooks he is given by Smirnoff show how alert he must have been to the highly tactile and personalized nature of the albums and books of lithographs he came to possess.

Modernism and Collecting

Khan’s large collection is testament to quite particular psychoanalytic interests. It also points to the sustained project of becoming modernist he cultivated throughout his career in postwar London. Indeed, collecting, as Jean Baudrillard suggests, is “a discourse addressed to oneself”, and creates what Jeremy Braddock calls “a self-referential world of private consumption”.38 The act of collecting is implicated in processes of subject formation and is thus of obvious interest to psychoanalytic discourse. Indeed, accumulation, collection

35 Ibid., p.216.
37 Hopkins, p.176.
38 Braddock, pp.2-3.
and collage all prove to be powerful forces in Khan’s articulation of subjectivity. Collecting, exchanging, and patronizing art and artists has always been an integral part of the modernist project in both Europe and the United States.

Lawrence Rainey’s classic study *Institutions of Modernism* identifies the modernist response to a transformed public sphere as “a tactical retreat into a divided world of patronage, collecting, speculation, and investment...the construction of an institutional counterspace”.39 This regressive institution is opposed to an increasingly degraded public and commercial sphere, though Rainey is consistently at pains to point out the ways in which modernist collecting cultures were always in a “fatal compromise” with the very same degradation.40

Rainey’s study points to a number of key collectors and patrons of modernist painting who were themselves key in establishing the literary foundations of the movement. John Quinn, for instance, was an American collector and patron who edited the *Little Review* and purchased large canvasses by Matisse, Cezanne, Picasso and Braque, amongst many others.41 The editor of the *Dial* Scofield Thayer and editor of *Vanity Fair* Frank Crowninshield were likewise “major buyers of contemporary art”.42 These three men of letters were all intimately involved with the journals crucial in marketing and disseminating *The Waste Land*, a modernist work whose critical and institutional force gave shape to the cocktail of Kennerite and Leavisite modernism that in turn frames Masud Khan’s life and thought. Likewise, Rainey’s striking reading of *Ulysses*, a work deeply embedded in Khan’s consciousness, is highly suggestive in this context too. Daedalus and Bloom do not “wander aimlessly” around Dublin but are,

39 Rainey, p.5.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid., pp.47-48.

42 Ibid, p.97.
instead, on “a tireless search for patrons and patronage”. Buck Mulligan styles himself as “a prelate, patron of the arts in the middle ages” and, though not mentioned in Rainey’s introduction, the English student Haines is an anthropologist keenly engaged in collecting Irish cultural artifacts.

Khan’s fondness for patronage might also be tied to the Leavisite conservatism typifying much of his social thought, valorizing his medieval ‘feudal’ background as against the modern machine age. Patronage, Rainey argues, is “an essentially premodern form of social exchange” and “lacked the ideological and social sanctions widely accorded to the impersonal mechanisms of the market”. Patronage as an alternative to more vulgar commercial ventures was crucial to the creation of modernism’s avant-garde ethos: Ezra Pound and the Dial preferred to envisage their commercial activities that way. Khan’s disdain for technocratic capitalist modernity and mass culture (exemplified by his outbursts in ‘On Lying Fallow’, which I discuss in chapter three) can be interpreted here using the sense of patronage Rainey provides, and might represent a highly idiosyncratic confluence of Khan’s feudalism and an elite, cosmopolitan, artistic culture.

Rainey’s modernism has been imagined by more contemporary critics as entailing both collecting practices and a “collecting aesthetic”, alluding to mod-


44 Ibid.


46 Rainey, p.74.

47 Ibid.
ernist habits of quotation, citation, intertextuality, and anthology-making.\textsuperscript{48} These themes resonate with Masud Khan’s theoretical ideas about “collage” and notions of accumulation in his psychoanalytical writing, as well as more obvious appearances of works employing collage in his collection itself (\textit{Parler Seul} is a pertinent example). As we saw, Khan’s own copy of the 1932 Odyssey Press edition of \textit{Ulysses} bears a superficial similarity to such collages, mixing a range media in the front endpaper and flyleaf – postage stamps from various countries, stationary from his office, his own ornate handwriting – and the book accumulates and collects crucial everyday places and experiences from Khan’s life. Hopkins also tells us, further to this, that in 1967 after a period of depression that Khan started painting again and “returned to making paper collages”.\textsuperscript{49} These are the same paper collages Khan’s analysand ‘Eva’ mentions in an interview with Hopkins: “His letters were wonderful, often illustrated with abstract collages made of tissue paper”.\textsuperscript{50}

Likewise, collage is an important concept in \textit{Hidden Selves}, the blurb suggesting that “the person is not just a single self but a collage of hidden selves; and one of the goals of psychoanalysis is to find out how this collage functions for the individual concerned”.\textsuperscript{51} Inside the book itself, Khan’s reflects that his patient Judy “was most vulnerable, and so she would for a long time arrive as a

\textsuperscript{48} Braddock, p.25. Jeremy Braddock opposes Rainey’s fatalistic assessment of the modernist marketplace’s attempts to critique twentieth century capitalism - a critique Rainey suggests is only evanescent and ultimately heads towards the “precommodified” art of Warhol and postmodernism - by suggesting that publicly minded collectors created outward facing exhibitions and galleries that, in certain respects, democratized modernist culture. Khan’s private collection, never exhibited or displayed, is emphatically not of this character and would rightly be more closely associated with forms of modernist collecting practice - highly elitist ones - outlined by Rainey.

\textsuperscript{49} Hopkins, p.177.

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid, p.204.

collage, and not just herself” (Khan’s emphasis).\textsuperscript{52} Khan too alludes to collage in The Privacy of the Self when describing Montaigne’s Essais as a series of “superimpositions.” The “definitive edition” of the Essais of 1580, he writes, “is built like a collage, where different stages of Montaigne’s evolution are transparently superimposed upon each other.”\textsuperscript{53}

‘My Galleries and Painters’: Collecting modernist art in postwar Paris

Khan’s habitual collecting of artworks took place in the context of institutions and publications seeking to shore up the reputation of French modernism, especially cubism, in the immediate aftermath of the war. Khan was one of many active participants in this process, which rested on the cultivation of commercial friendships that helped to solidify the financial and cultural status of individuals with a special interest in cubism. As Lawrence Rainey suggests, “Modernism required not a mass of readers but just a corp of patron-collectors or patron investors”,\textsuperscript{54} and it is unsurprising to see in the writings of the major Paris art dealers of the time an enormous emphasis placed on friendship and intimate relationships in sustaining what was, by the fifties and sixties, a critically and commercially established art movement. Khan fitted well into this model of commercial culture: Linda Hopkins identifies intense and sustained friendships as being a subject of special intellectual and personal interest to Ma-

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{52} Hidden Selves, p.63.
\bibitem{54} Rainey, p.76.
\bibitem{55} Hopkins, pp.84-85.
\end{thebibliography}
sud Khan. Furthermore, she suggests his relationships with Braque and Cassou were especially significant for Khan.

Daniel Kahnweiler, Picasso’s friend, main dealer, and critical interlocutor, noted in a late book of interviews that substituted for his autobiography that it was friendship “that accounts for the special quality of our business: the fact of its being really trusting, friendly, even familial, if you will. I can’t conceive of its being otherwise.” The introduction to Kahnweiler’s interviews with Francis Crémieux, My Galleries and Painters, contrasts Kahnweiler’s business practices with more traditional dealers like Joseph Duveen. Indeed, John Russell suggests the dealer “substituted” for the “reassurance” peddled by Duveen an informal, unpretentious relationship in which a profound emotional commitment was the thing that mattered the most.” He represents “a new kind of art dealing”, and his relationships with artists went beyond merely “inviting them to luncheon”, instead “living with Picasso, Braque, Gris...on a day-to-day, hour-to-hour basis.” Kahnweiler, Crémieux suggests, had no interest in “money for the sake of money”, with Kahnweiler claiming in response that “the idea of harnessing myself to a business and becoming an enormously rich man never occurred to me”. Kahnweiler’s “triumph”, Russell notes, was just as much “owed to a sense of human quality” as to “an inherited sense for business.” Such descriptions resound with the personalized character of commercial activity that typify

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56 Hopkins, p.45, p.313.


58 My Galleries and Painters, pp.7-8.

59 Ibid., p.9.

60 Ibid., p.28.

61 Ibid.
modernist networks of exchange and patronage in Rainey’s analysis - a rhetoric that attempts to play down the fact that this is, nevertheless, business (Kahnweiler’s interviews make it clear that he was an extremely shrewd businessman).

This is also the period that sees the critical and institutional solidification of cubism’s claims to historical and cultural importance, exemplified and recorded by many of the journals and magazines in Khan’s collection. Just as Khan’s time in exile ran parallel to the making of the reputation of literary modernism in Anglophone criticism, his interests in cubism and surrealism coincide with a wholesale reappraisal and re-affirmation of their respective legacies in France (an affirmation contesting, as Kahnweiler notes in My Galleries and Painters, the emergence of new movements in painting such as abstraction and tachisme). Kahnweiler’s short 1920 book Der Weg zum Kubismus (The Rise of Cubism) was translated from the German into English in 1949 by American painter Robert Motherwell (a lithograph of whose Khan owned), and outlines the genealogy of cubism with a ‘Preliminary Notice’ by the painter. Kahnweiler’s history of the movement starts with ‘The Conflict between Representation and Structure’, going on to identify Paul Cézanne and André Derain as forerunners, then reflecting on Braque and Picasso’s collaboration on questions of form and colour from 1910 onwards. Braque and Picasso are considered the heroes of the short book, with Léger also included as a “pathfinder” for the movement, characterised as leading cubism in a new direction (“Leger departs


63 Old Master, Modern and Contemporary Prints. Lot 43 in the catalogue is “four lithographs by Johnny Friedlander, Robert Motherwell, Marino Marini, Jasper Johns, slightly scuffed cover”, p.10.


65 Ibid., p.17.
entirely from [the tendencies of Braque and Picasso] in terms of colour"). His work shows a “wealth of unspent, boundlessly seething strength”, and is cubism’s future.

Similarly, in the 1969 Afterword to Kahnweiler’s *My Galleries and Painters*, written ten years after the interviews in the book were conducted, Kahnweiler reflects on his sense that “History has assigned a pre-eminent position to the artists of my generation whom I defended”. When not absorbed in denouncing the art world of 1969, Kahnweiler uncompromisingly reiterates the “triumph” of cubism: “I have succeeded in communicating the unconquerable joy, the passionate fervour that inspired us in the period between 1907 and 1914, our unshakeable faith in victory. Today this victory is complete.”

Khan’s collection indicates that he was a committed patron of the Galerie Maeght, an institution heavily implicated in the financial and critical canonisation of French modernism, staging key cubist and surrealist exhibitions in the late 1940s. Aimé Maeght’s daughters, Yoyo and Isabella, describe the period from 1946-1953 as one of “Vision and Creation”, in a large, glossy, retrospective of the Maeght family and the art world published in 2007. 1947 saw six major exhibitions, with the third - “Sur 4 Murs” (‘On Four Walls’) - showcasing works by Picasso, Braque, Léger and Gris who had all recently joined the “Maeght ‘stable’”. In the same year the Galerie Maeght also used the exhibition “Ten-

66 Ibid., p.19.
67 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
71 Ibid., p.38.
dence” (‘Tendency’) to showcase new work by Marc Chagall and Joan Miró, long-term Maeght collaborators who feature especially heavily in Khan’s own art collection. The Galerie also organized one of the exhibitions crucial to the postwar re-appraisal and renaissance of surrealism: “Surrealism in 1947”. Each exhibition, starting with the Matisse-Bonnard focussed “Le Noir est une Couleur” (‘Black is a Colour’), was accompanied by the publication of a new edition of *Derriere le Mirroir (Behind the Mirror)*, an influential journal publishing lithographs accompanied by text from contemporary writers. Lot 45 of the auction catalogue indicates Khan owned eleven issues of *Derriere le Mirroir* from 1959-1966, and Lot 44 a 1956 special edition of the journal featuring original double page lithographs by Chagall, Miró and two original etchings by Giacometti and Miró respectively. Khan also owned two copies of the Marc Chagall 1969 edition of *Derriere*.75

The auction catalogue also shows that Khan was in possession of six separate issues of modernist art journal *Verve*. Khan owned several consecutive issues of *Verve*, numbers 25-36 (with the exception of 34-35), which featured: No. 24, Marc Chagall, *Contes de Boccace* (1950); Nos.25-26, Pablo Picasso, *Picasso at Valluris* (1951); Nos.27-28 Georges Braque et al. (1952); Nos. 29-30, Pablo Picasso, *Suite de Quatre-Vingt Dessins de Picasso* (1954); Nos.31-32, Georges Braque, *The Intimate Sketchbooks of Georges Braque* (1955); Nos.35-36, Henri Matisse, *The Last Works of Henri Matisse* (1958).

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72 Ibid., p.38, p.40.


74 See lots 44 and 45, *Old Master, Modern and Contemporary Prints*, p.10.

75 See lots 143-144. Ibid., p.36.
Verve was founded by Tériade (the nom de plume of Greek emigre Stratis Eleftheriades) in 1937, after he undertook lengthy apprenticeships working for Christian Zervos on Cahiers D’Art, subsequently founding the surrealist journal Minotaure. Verve, like Derriere le Miroir, was in many ways exemplary of Khan’s interests as a collector, especially in its medium and presentation. From its outset, Verve was a product that emphasized its “luxuriousness” from the first issue, using printing processes (photogravure in both colour and black and white) that “give the pages...the velvety softness and sharp definition usually reserved for deluxe art books”.76 Verve unusually employed a “wide range of expensive processes” in the production of each issue, particularly the high-end lithography of Fernand Mourlot.77 The opening page of the English-language Verve No.1 highlighted Tériade’s fondness for what he considered “the forgotten process of lithography”, a mode of production that dominating Khan’s postwar collection.78 Verve’s commercial character also meant that it could be “rapidly assimilated”, as Lawrence Rainey suggests with reference to The Waste Land and Ulysses, to “the rare and antiquarian book markets that had matured in the nineteenth century”, and would sit easily with the other valuable items in Khan’s library.79

Khan’s interest in Verve is significant for two reasons. His attempt to acquire this number of issues indicates his wish to be recognised as part of an aesthetic and intellectual movement that was coming to attest its own historical and cultural importance. Verve consistently strove to communicate, from its appearance in December 1937, an atmosphere of urgency and contemporaneity, presenting, as the opening of Verve No.1 suggests, “art as intimately mingled

76 Ibid., p.27.

77 Ibid.


79 Rainey, p.100.
with the life of each period and to furnish testimony of the participation of the artists in the essential events of their time.”\textsuperscript{80} The magazine cultivated a sense of it being a “momentous phenomenon”, bringing together “traditionally segregated fields of artistic and literary endeavour at a special moment in history”. Michel Anthonioz suggests it archived “an unusually rich period of artistic creativity” for the major painters of cubism and after, who all feature heavily in Khan’s collection: “Matisse, Picasso, Braque, Chagall”.\textsuperscript{81} The luxurious presentation encouraged buyers to see it as a collectible, archiving a special moment in contemporary cultural life, which itself endowed it with the potential for resale by collectors, patrons and investors. In this respect, \textit{Verve} is an excellent example of what Rainey describes as the “precommodified” aspect of the modernist artwork.\textsuperscript{82}

\textit{Verve} also articulated a number of the key intellectual and aesthetic questions Khan’s psychoanalysis would take up. In 1951’s \textit{Picasso at Valluris}, for instance, Daniel Kahnweiler writes a lengthy introduction titled “Le Sujet Chez Picasso”, which, most pertinently for Khan, states that “cubist painters had to come to grips with two problems at the same time...the dichotomy between what the painter experiences and the forms those experiences assume, and...the problem of finding something ‘truer’ than ‘illusionist figuration’.”\textsuperscript{83} In a similar manner in the same issue, Odysseus Elytis, one of Tériade’s closest friends, contributed a piece titled ‘Equivalences Chez Picasso’ exploring the same issues: Elytis praises Picasso’s “quest for truth” and his art’s capacity to capture “many

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{80} Ibid., p.26.
\item \textsuperscript{81} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{82} Ibid., p.41.
\item \textsuperscript{83} Ibid., p.220.
\end{itemize}
undreamt-of aspects of reality...Picasso manages to disconcert, as it were, the nature of things.”

Khan’s own sense of cubism - that it assimilates “the given to the created, the imagined to the concretely found in one space...and there give it a new unity and reality” - reproduces, in more psychoanalytical language, many of the arguments Kahnweiler advances in this essay. Khan’s remark is of a piece with Kahnweiler’s definition of Synthetic Cubism, that it “concentrates everything the artist knows about [the object] into an intellectual totality”. The psychoanalytic implications of these discussions are partly what Khan himself attempts to explore in his writing on art. *Verve* articulates with special intensity a key theoretical question for Khan, Winnicott and Milner: what is the relationship of pictorial expression and psychic life, and what aspects of self experience are actualised by the pictorial in a way that is not possible through verbalisation alone?

Khan’s passion for collecting is thus Janus-faced. In analysand Peter Elder’s reference to Khan’s art collection, where he remarks on his grand living room and enormous Giacometti figure, we are given the impression of Khan as a grandiose, self-mythologizing, and cosmopolitan. Such ostentatious displays of his refined sensibility and insider status, involved in an artistic coterie, are part of the larger project described in this thesis of modernist self-making Khan undertakes in his self-exile. But at the same time, these works evoke private and meditative encounters that suggest a quite different intellectual and personal interest in these rarefied and beautifully crafted art objects that goes beyond simply showing off to friends, and it is the ramifications of these particular forms of aesthetic experience also foregrounded in Khan’s writing on art.

84 Ibid.

“Assimilating the given to the created”

How can I coincide with everything that is”, asks Henri Lefebvre in the *Introduction to Modernity*, “without letting myself be swallowed up?” It is significant that Khan’s first psychoanalytic paper, to which Michael Balint responded in 1952, would concern the frightening and liberating dissolution of subject-object boundaries of cubist painting, and the ethical quandary perhaps entailed in these novel forms of representation. These discussions of painting extend Khan’s thinking on pre-verbal and non-verbal aspects of subjectivity that I formerly outline in relation to epiphanies and the dreaming experience.

Joan Miró, we learn in *Hidden Selves*, is the artist of the “fallow state” *par excellence*. The reflective stillness that ushers creativity in the British psychoanalytic thinking of this moment - Winnicott’s potential space, Khan’s epiphanies, Balint’s *arglos* state - belongs to Joan Miró, whose “wayward somnambulant doodles and blotches of colour...are so playful in their stillness.” The cubism of Georges Braque, whom Khan collected avidly (Hopkins claims that Braque was Khan’s favourite artist), likewise illuminates Winnicott’s ideas about transitional states of experience. In the introduction to Winnicott’s collection *Through Paediatrics to Psychoanalysis*, Khan suggests

…the Cubist collages of Braque and Picasso have distinctly the quality of the transitional object in so far as they assimilate the given to the created, the imagined to the concretely found in one space – that of the canvas – and there give it a new unity and reality.

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87 *Hidden Selves* p.186.

88 Hopkins, p.45. Hopkins here somewhat strangely describes Braque as a “Fauvist”.

89 *Through Paediatrics to Psycho-Analysis*, p.xx.
In ‘Beyond the Dreaming Experience’ Braque’s pictorial practices are invoked in a clinical example to explicate the elusiveness of the dream as psychological object. The “gifted and successful young pop musician” in analysis describes the experience of listening to music after having “smoked a lot of pot the night before”:

There are four of us: the tune, me listening to the tune, and the tune and me as one. And yet again we are also all one. That is the joy of it.\textsuperscript{90}

In an attempt “to link up with his trend of thought”, Khan quotes to him “George Braque’s statement about his cubist collages where shapes are superimposed upon each other:”

‘Il ne s’agit pas de reconstituer une anecdote, mais de constituer un fait pictorial.’ (It is not a case of reconstructing an anecdote, but of stating a pictorial fact.)\textsuperscript{91}

The above quotation is axiom twenty two from the Cahiers of Georges Braque 1916-1947, published by Maeght and printed by Mourlot in 1948. This volume’s appearance in the argument of Hidden Selves is a clear example of the intimate correlation of Khan’s status as “un collectioneur...un bibliophile de qualité” and the production of his psychoanalytic work (signed by the artist, it is Lot 76 in the auction catalogue, and numbered relatively low in the limited edition - thirty-six of ninety five).\textsuperscript{92}

Braque’s statement reveals to the patient “we were speaking of the distinction between the dreaming experience and the dream text; that in the dreaming experience the anecdote is absent, whereas the dream re-establishes

\textsuperscript{90} Hidden Selves, p.48.

\textsuperscript{91} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{92} Old Master, Modern and Contemporary Prints, p.17.
the text." Braque’s paintings delineate the problems associated with the representation of the dream as dream-text on the one hand, and the immersive, restorative aspects of the dreaming experience - which cannot be straightforwardly symbolized - on the other. The value of the dreaming experience is that it allows the subject to retreat to an area of experience in which the coherent speaking ego partially disintegrates, opening up a pre-verbal universe of intense affectivity. It is from this state that the subject emerges refreshed and in possession of a new sense of the outside world and new ways of relating to, and experiencing, other people - going through the dreaming experience, in other words, allows the subject space and time to bring new capacities and thoughts into the world. It is in this regard that painting in Khan’s thought is intimately connected with the creation of new ways of being and experiencing.

The place of Khan’s interest in painting in his psychoanalytic thought is encapsulated in the passage from Braque he cites: “it is not a case of reconstructing an anecdote”. In this sense, painting is not a vehicle for the re-presentation of unconscious symbols or pictorial representations of scenes found in dreams for perusal by the analyst and patient. Rather, it is the stage for more or less abstract formal realisations of different states of ego-organization, particularly the transitional state or the fallow mood. Khan is indeed relatively hostile to the notion that painting could, for instance, transmit or reproduce unconscious messages or symptoms in an easily readable, communicable form - in much the same way that he privileges exploration of the dreaming experience over explicating the dream text.

In the International Journal of Psycho-Analysis in 1953 Khan reviews Schizophrenic Art: Its Meaning in Psychotherapy by Margaret Naumberg, one of the early pioneers (like Marion Milner) of art therapy. Khan critiques Naumberg’s

93 Hidden Selves, p.49.
book, which symbolically interprets the works produced by the author’s schizophrenic patients as embodying their internal conflicts, on the grounds that Naumberg “neglects the dynamics of the chaotic experience and emotions achieving the solid state of symbols.” Khan is skeptical of the “happy facility these patient exhibit in getting all their experiences so easily embodied in dramatic symbolic paintings”, viewing it himself as a “defensive mechanism”, feeding the analyst “with fat dreams full of meat.” Indeed, Naumberg’s insistence on “the importance of symbolism” in her patients’ paintings, and her “over-valuation” of these same paintings, demonstrates for Khan not only a powerful counter-transference where Naumberg heavily idealizes her own clinical technique but a general neglect in her work of the transference relationship in general.

For Khan, a symbol-oriented analysis of painting and subjectivity does not address the ways in which artistic and pictorial practices describe both the orientation (or not) of the subject towards the outside world and the expression of very private forms of self-relating. The “various techniques” depicted in the book do nothing to describe, Khan suggests, “the slow and complex working of mental mechanisms, early processes and emotional tensions”. Khan identifies these aspects of inner experience elsewhere in his writing, conversely, with the artistic projects of Miró, the cubists, and Marion Milner’s work. Symbolism is thus less important in a psychoanalytic understanding of painting for Khan than the way pictorial representation addresses specific forms of object-relations and accompanying moods.


95 Ibid.

96 Ibid.
Khan’s remarks on painting in his writing may seem merely illustrative of wider psychoanalytical concepts such as the transitional space. But we can track the impact and importance of modernist visual art in particular on the thought of British psychoanalysis in the period, which I shall explicate briefly here. Modernist painting, in other words, provides Khan and his colleagues with an especially compelling way of imagining the crucial ethical and phenomenological problems that grew from their psychoanalytic thinking.

Balint’s own response to Khan’s 1951 paper offers some striking insights into Khan’s thought at this moment, and the problems of narcissism and mastery tied to modernist pictorial practices. Balint identifies in modernist art an emergent fascination with the disintegration of the secure outline dividing subject from object and objects from each other:

The sovereign, sharply defined, and delineated object disappeared. It was no longer possible to project ourselves into the objects, to see in them our cherished phantasy about our independent, uninfluenceable, imperishable selves; we had to learn to represent the objects as we saw them (not as we wanted to see ourselves): merged into and inseparable from their environment.97

For Balint, such an experience of reality calls forth “an immense pleasure, a kind of enraptured liberation from the oppressive shackles of contour” and “an intense fear that not only the objects but also the artist might merge and perhaps even disappear”98. These conflicting affects indicate the principal problems of the intense interest in subjectivity Balint discerns in the art following Impressionism. Such art, Balint argues, entails “a frightened withdrawal into narcissistic preoccupation”, with dire consequences for the object: “The object has more and more been losing its importance as an object; it has become a


98 Ibid., p.325.
mere stimulus, unimportant in itself.”\(^{99}\)

Accordingly, Balint is particularly concerned with what happens to the object undergoing cubist transformation, whether or not, in an example of Picasso’s lithograph drawings of a bull, “the bull survived this process of elimination…whether the lithograph finally accepted by Picasso…conveys anything to us about the bull or only how Picasso saw (I have deliberately left this verb intransitive).”\(^{100}\) Balint drops the object that could be attached to the verb to suggest its ultimate obliteration at the hands of cubism as an artistic process. When these questions about an ethical relationship with the object are seen in relation to Khan’s work, then such processes of artistic representation have a political significance, echoing his thinking about fascism, pornography, and persecution in other aspects of his work. Indeed, it is no coincidence in this respect that Balint’s essay speaks of the dissolution of the sovereignty of the object of modernist artistic attention, a remark that, in 1952, addresses a more general malaise about traditional ideas of political subjectivity, autonomy and freedom in the wake of the Second World War. The fragility and contingency of human life in modernity is what Balint dwells on in his reflections on modernist art - a loss of faith in the human being as unquestionably “independent, uninfluenceable, imperishable”.\(^{101}\)

Such questions are of critical importance to Khan and Winnicott. Balint likewise calls for a new ethical responsibility when concluding his discussion: the “great strain” of the dissolution of object boundaries places on the artist and audience will require “the objects to be loved for what they are”, and not for “projecting onto them our phantasy of ourselves as independent and

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\(^{99}\) Ibid., p.326.

\(^{100}\) Ibid. p.327.

\(^{101}\) Ibid.
Khan raises Balint’s concerns about the fate of the object in modernist art in the paper that opens *Hidden Selves*. Khan argues that the “narrative” presented by the “cubists, dadaists and surrealists” “becomes utterly suspect”, because they fervently pursue the creation of “an absolute space and reality from which they do not awaken themselves”. At first glance it appears Khan’s attitude towards modernist experimentation in the visual arts is a relatively conservative one, reminiscent of that skepticism in aspects of modernist thought towards what György Lukács identifies as the “exaltation of subjectivity”, which I discuss at the outset of chapter three. Khan’s statement in *Hidden Selves* is also extraordinary given his demonstrable enthusiasm for the work of these same artists, expressed directly in his sustained practices as a collector.

Khan’s scathing attack on this modernist “crisis of consciousness” in artistic modernism might also however be somewhat overstating the case in order to make a point: that the radical innovations of modernism (in art and literature) are highly ambivalent, and that he himself maintains an uneasy stance with respect to it, cultivating both intense affection and a degree of skepticism. The innovations of modernism entail risks: of subjective disintegration, and of the disintegration of the outer reality such artworks are involved in representing. Elsewhere in his writing, I argue, modernist art is treated with significantly greater nuance than in the polemical gestures of *Hidden Selves*.

Lukács’ concern with what he calls “the ideology of modernism” is that discourses of interiority lead to “the negation of outward reality”. Such a concern resonates with those that Balint and Khan identify in the papers under

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102 Ibid.

discussion here: for Balint, the channelling of unconscious forces into a non-
imetic painting destroy the outer reality of the object being depicted. But for
Khan and some of his colleagues, this process of representation might not nec-
essarily be reducible to simply looking inwards; instead, it might offer possibili-
ties for appreciating and describing the self’s fluctuating relationship with the
outside world.

Thus I want to suggest that the dialogue between Khan, Winnicott and
Milner’s writing on art might suggest this other possibility. In that account, the
experience of disintegration, the sundering of the ego, is rich with possibility
too, and it is this generative capacity of modernist visual aesthetics that Khan’s
work on art also draws out, and is where the most ambitious aspects of his in-
tellectual project are to be found. Khan’s ideas about modernist painting go be-
yond Lukács’ argument and the rebarbative treatment he himself offers in the
opening chapter of Hidden Selves. Instead, there is a larger, more ambitious,
conversation going on between Winnicott, Khan and Milner that tries to find a
novel way of negotiating the opposition between the apparently disastrous sub-
jectivism critiqued by Lukács’ and the desire to respectfully reproduce the ob-
jects of the material world without the interference of the artist’s subjectivity.

Painting and disintegration

Disintegration is more than simply a threat to psychic cogency in other
psychoanalytic accounts of the periods. It also appears, for Winnicott and Mil-
ner, as a productive capacity. Indeed, it is these two aspects of disintegration in
modernist art that Khan’s work attempts to balance out. Balint’s response to
Khan is noted in a paper by Winnicott on the value of disintegrated states, lat-
terly re-printed in his posthumous collection Home is Where We Start From. In
‘The Concept of a Healthy Individual’ Winnicott notes “organized defence
against disintegration robs the individual of the precondition for the creative
impulse”, an impulse which depends on the individual exploring an “unintegrated state”. This paper connects this state - a lack of separation between mother and child - with health and creativity. “In the space-time area between the child and the mother”, Winnicott writes, “the child, and (and so the adult) lives creatively, making use of the materials available - a piece of wood or a late Beethoven quartet.” The productive aspect of the unintegrated state is described more fully in a footnote, and his argument is conducted with reference to Khan and Balint’s exchange on the nature of modern painting:

It is thought by some, as in Balint’s paper...discussing Khan, that much of the pleasure of the experience of art in one form or another arises from the nearness to unintegration to which the artist’s creation may safely lead the audience or viewer. So where the artist’s achievement is potentially great, failure near the point of achievement may cause great pain to the audience by bringing them close to disintegration or the memory of disintegration, and leaving them there. The appreciation of art thus keeps people on a knife-edge, because achievement is so close to painful failure. This experience must be reckoned part of health.

Winnicott’s reference to Khan’s and Balint’s papers in this theoretical discussion highlights an intriguing connection between the visual arts in modernism - the topic of the papers, even though Winnicott makes no explicit reference to the movement - and the conceptual foundations of the version of object relations pioneered by these psychoanalysts. Similarly, in the much cited ‘The Location of Cultural Experience’ from Playing and Reality, Winnicott deliberately digresses from his discussion of the separation of the baby from the mother to describe the importance of Marion Milner’s revelatory experience of seeing the play of the edges of two jugs upon a table:

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105 Ibid., p.27.

106 Ibid.
It was an important point in the phase of development of these ideas in me in the early forties that Marion Milner (in conversation) was able to convey to me the tremendous significance that there can be in the interplay of the edges of two curtains, or of the surface of a jug that is placed in front of another jug.\textsuperscript{107}

Winnicott’s encounter with Milner’s work is epiphanic because it concerns the revelation of a more ambiguous and contingent sense-world - one in which the disintegration of solid outlines and boundaries is heightened in painting. This disintegration involves entering into, as Milner suggests in ‘Being Separate and Being Together’, “a kind of relation to objects in which one was much more mixed up them than that.”\textsuperscript{108} Such a way of seeing is freed from being “concerned with those facts of detachment and separation that are introduced when an observing eye is perched upon a sketching stool.”\textsuperscript{109}

Milner’s work is cited frequently in Khan’s psychoanalytic writing, and he himself was directly involved in her intellectual career. Again, one of Khan’s earliest pieces of published psychoanalytic writing is a substantial review of Milner’s \textit{On Not Being Able to Paint} from the 1953 issue of the \textit{International Journal of Psychoanalysis}, in which Khan “can only exhort all, especially psychoanalysts, to read and re-read the book”, himself directing toward it “a passionate attitude of surrendered attention”. This form of attention is of special interest to Khan and should be connected to his idea of the fallow mood. Janet Sayers’ introduction to a recent edition of \textit{On Not Being Able to Paint} reports that in December 1987, Khan, though wracked by his terminal cancer, nevertheless at-

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{107} Donald Winnicott, \textit{Playing and Reality} (London: Routledge, 2005), p.132.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{108} \textit{On Not Being Able to Paint}, p.12.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{109} Ibid.}
tended a talk given by Milner at the Squiggle Foundation.\textsuperscript{110} His response to Milner’s paper, Sayers suggests, was “effusive”.\textsuperscript{111} Early in his career Khan also attended a weekend painting class with Milner - who was supervising Khan’s training at this point in the late 1940s - and Sylvia Payne, run by the Polish emigre artist Marian Bohusz-Szyszko.\textsuperscript{112} Khan also encouraged Milner to write up her analysis of patient Susan into the magisterial 1967 study of psychosis, \textit{In the Hands of the Living God}, which, not insignificantly, explores the patient’s doodles and drawings as a way of explaining her own tangled relationship with reality.\textsuperscript{113} Emma Letley’s 2013 biography of Milner further notes that it was Khan who urged the re-printing of \textit{On Not Being Able to Paint} in 1957 and persuaded Anna Freud to write the preface.\textsuperscript{114}

Khan’s explicit interest in modernism, and the overlapping aspects of his and Milner’s work, helps to draw out modernist aspects of Milner’s writing that do not otherwise register. Maud Ellmann’s introduction to a reissue of \textit{An Experiment in Leisure}, for instance, argues, following Lyndsey Stonebridge, that Milner “pays little attention to contemporary works of modernism”, sharing instead the “anthropological enthusiasms” of T.S. Eliot and D.H. Lawrence, an English modernism sheared of the avant-garde confrontation Khan evidently preferred.\textsuperscript{115} Nevertheless, in \textit{On Not Being Able to Paint} Milner remembers going to a “much-discussed Picasso exhibition” and identifies the painter as

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{111}] Ibid.
\item[\textsuperscript{112}] Sayers’ introduction elaborates many interesting additional connections between Milner and postwar British painting and sculpture, p.xlvii. See also Hopkins, p.177.
\item[\textsuperscript{114}] Letley, p.80,p.44.
\end{itemize}
“someone with the courage to recognise and admit such inner chaos”.\textsuperscript{116} Picasso’s painting “showed how deceptive the external wholeness of bodies can be...full of conflicting wishes and chaotic standards”\textsuperscript{117} His paintings make this case “with kindness and humour”, making the ideas his work dramatizes - “one’s self” is a “shell of bits and pieces, picked up anywhere and stuck on anyhow” - a “much less intolerable fact to face”.\textsuperscript{118} Indeed, this description is remarkable as it is one of the few explicit references to particular painters and artists that Milner makes in her book.

Milner’s \textit{On Not Being Able to Paint} specifically appears in a case history from \textit{The Privacy of the Self}. The patient is “a frightened, shy, harassed” woman whose life is dominated, as Khan sees it, by maintaining a constant manic state (which he likens to Winnicott’s concept of the ‘manic defence’).\textsuperscript{119} This state in the analysis totally alienates the patient from herself - the manic defence is itself an “object” maintained as a “satellite state”.\textsuperscript{120} It is distanced from “her own social environment”, “her relation to [Khan]”, “her own body” and “inner psychic experiences”.\textsuperscript{121} The deep sense of unreality the woman experiences is only tentatively broken down by her reading of Milner’s book:

Reading...\textit{On Not Being Able to Paint} had started her straight off on painting. The first picture that she brought me was very revealing as to the current state of affairs. It was of my consultation room, in bright colours. There was a chair and a couch; no patient, no analyst. I felt it to be an en-

\textsuperscript{116} \textit{On Not Being Able to Paint}, p.88.

\textsuperscript{117} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{118} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{119} \textit{The Privacy of the Self}, p.156.

\textsuperscript{120} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{121} Ibid., p.157.
couraging sign that at least there was a chair and a couch. Some things retained their reality.\textsuperscript{122}

Painting in this instance has two functions - it is revealing of the psychic difficulties the patient is facing as regards relating to herself and her analyst; it also offers a space in which some parts of the outside world still yet survive the patient’s psychotic alienation from reality. The “negation of reality” the manic defence entails is only redressed by a process of aesthetic immersion that brings the subject back out of “terror and loneliness”.\textsuperscript{123}

In fact, painting provided some continuity in Khan’s own troubled psychic life. In 1967, Hopkins tells us, Khan was “lying fallow” and “thriving”.\textsuperscript{124} Painting, for Khan, was one of the “four sanities of my psyche”, and Hopkins suggests that it was the act of painting that “helped him to ground himself”.\textsuperscript{125} For Hopkins, these remarks are exemplary of Khan’s idea of ‘lying fallow’, which Khan himself identifies with Miró. We learn from Hopkins that Khan would paint in the early hours of the morning when unable to sleep, noting himself in his \textit{Work Books}

I paint as I can, but utterly true to my physicality of Being. Painting is the only activity that absorbs the whole of me in a non-reactive and truly expressive way.\textsuperscript{126}

I suggest it is in Milner’s writing that we find a compelling description of the psychic and somatic experience Khan alludes to in his diaries. Painting is asso-

\textsuperscript{122} Ibid., p.156.

\textsuperscript{123} Ibid., p.157.

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid., p.177.

\textsuperscript{125} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{126} Ibid.
associated with a change in the forms of relating to the subject’s own body and to objects outside the body, as well the dissolution of the autonomy of the ego. This transformation entails the creation of a dialogue between a more primitive form of ego identification and the outside world: the sense of “two-ness” Milner unfolds in *On Not Being Able to Paint*. In an interview with John Richardson in a December 1957 edition of the *Observer* Braque describes his “great discovery” about the world of objects in a manner that illustrates these new forms of object-relating described psychoanalytically by Khan and his colleagues. “Objects don’t exist for me”, Braque says, “in so far as a rapport exists between them and myself.”

When one attains this harmony one reaches a sort of intellectual non-existence - what I can only describe as a sense of peace, which makes everything possible and right. Life then becomes a perpetual revelation.¹²⁷

Khan tries to draw the psychoanalytic equivalent of this “perpetual revelation” in his description of the fallow state as an area of experience through which the subject moves to emerge with a transformed relationship to the outside world. Painting in Khan and Milner takes the subject into a pre-Cartesian universe fusing subjectivity and the body. In chapter 27 of *The Hands of the Living God*, Milner reflects on a paper by Adrian Stokes discussing a diary entry from John Ruskin about drawing an Aspen tree. Paralysed by despair and exhaustion on his journey to Italy, Ruskin’s experience of drawing the tree is revivifying: his “intense imaginative emotional experience” allows him to banish his fears of death and continue travelling.¹²⁸ In Stokes’ reading, Ruskin recovers because his drawing of the tree facilitated his gaining, in Kleinian terms, “the

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measure of a good incorporated object”. Milner, however, wishes to “add the words ‘good subject’” as “these two [subject and object]...are deeply fused”. The external tree is “paradoxically, also the symbol for this direct non-symbolic internal psycho-physical awareness of the body...a symbol for the matrix of being”. This awareness of the body - what Milner calls on the next page the “primary body-ego” - is an “on-going background which can yet become foreground if one learns the skill of directing attention inwards”.

For Milner, contrary to Balint’s concern about the destruction of the object, it would be a mistake to define such inwardly-directed attention by invoking the “primitive manifestations” of narcissism and auto-eroticism, in which an unbounded sense of self is projected onto, and consumes, the outside world. Thus Milner’s discussion allays these sorts of fears, described by Balint earlier in this argument, in suggesting that behind “the states that are talked about...as auto-erotic and narcissistic there can be an attempt to reach a beneficent kind of narcissism.” Drawing on Freud’s remarks about the whole body as an erotogenic zone, Milner identifies this “primary self-enjoyment” as cathecting “the whole body, as distinct from concentrating on the specifically sexual organs”. This beneficent narcissism, which reconnects the subject with the minimally present background noise of their own bodily existence, is thus

129 Ibid.
130 Ibid.
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid., p.383, n.1.
133 Ibid., p.383.
134 Ibid.
“not a rejection of the outer world but a step towards and renewed and revitalized investment in it.”\textsuperscript{135}

A great deal hinges on the cultivation of this form of attention, and can shed light on Khan’s sense of ‘lying fallow’ as preparation for its emergence. Susan’s drawing of the ‘inner eye’, in chapter 27, are indicative, Milner argues, of her making “a direct kind of inner face-to-face contact with the ‘other’ in themselves which is yet also themselves.”\textsuperscript{136} Such contact takes place through a psychic apparatus Milner struggles to define, suggesting that it could be “a primal undifferentiated ego-Id force”; an “organizing pattern-making aspect of instinct”; or, indeed, an “unconscious integrating aspect of the ego”.\textsuperscript{137} But it rests on the cultivation of “an attention to those subtle inner changes of bodily sensation which become different and grow as soon as they are attended to dispassionately”. This is something “I thought Cezanne called the ‘little sensations’ that he concentrated on in his painting.”\textsuperscript{138}

This reparative aspect of painting is key to both Milner’s and Khan’s thoughts on the subject. In ‘The Concentration of the Body’ from \textit{On Not Being Able to Paint} Milner speaks of looking at a picture “and getting a glimpse of what it would be like to be a truly whole person”.\textsuperscript{139} This wholeness is not a version of an hermetically-sealed autonomous subject whose consistency is defined in their separation from the world of objects (what Bruno Latour identifies as the “quasi-subject” of post-Hobbesian philosophy in \textit{We Have Never Been}).

\textsuperscript{135} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{136} Ibid., p.384.

\textsuperscript{137} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{138} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{139} \textit{On Not Being Able to Paint}, p.129.
Instead, the wholeness Milner describes comes from the viewer’s experience of the “rhythm” of painting. “Since rhythm itself”, Milner writes, consists of a two-ness, a continuing relation between two differences, either in space or time, does it perhaps not represent the most important fact about the way the pattern making force inside works, in active relation to the environment, to achieve a wholeness of the organism? At least it can work towards such a wholeness; but it all depends on whether the arrogant Will gives up its omnipotence and devotes itself to providing the conditions under which the natural rhythms can grow; rather than trying to impose artificial ones.

This “pattern making force” is an energised exchange between subjects, objects and things in the world - the “wholeness” of the organism is achieved when these various subjects and objects exist in a “continuing relation” to each other. Painting, therefore, can help to reconstruct this energised relation - for Milner it is encountered in the composition of pictures, whereas for Khan it is enacted in the form of modernist painting itself. Painting represents the possibility of this relation.

We can then begin to understand Khan’s abstruse remarks on cubism in his introduction to Through Paediatrics to Psychoanalysis. If the space of the canvas “assimilates the given to the created... the imagined to the concretely found” then the “new unity and reality” produced by the painting is the product of a dialectical relationship of subject and object in which neither is simply active nor passive. Rather, the experience of seeing, and making, paintings being a process whereby the normal conscious ego is decomposed and fused


\[\text{141 On Not Being Able to Paint, p.129-130.}\]

\[\text{142 Through Paediatrics to Psychoanalysis, p.xx.}\]
with a more primal physicality, and then emerges from that “undifferentiated ego-Id state” with a renewed sense of, and connection to, the outside world.

Khan and Milner’s psychoanalytic description here compliment other recent accounts of the relationship of the artist and the external in cubist painting. Indeed, for Milner, that artistic “awareness of the external world is itself a creative process”. The theoretical underpinnings of their account allow it to move beyond such simplistic dualisms in a way that echoes T.J. Clark’s critique of the early attempts to read cubism. It is neither a “(pseudo-)Kantianism” - “the idea that reality is fixed and painting should be likewise” - where cubism offers a new painterly language that offers a neutral material accounting of the real life of forms as they appear in the mind. Nor can the cubist process be understood as “some kind of daft inverted Hegelianism”, where the artist’s “Idea of an object world” is subsumed in the object-world, and thus “mind is completely made over into matter”.

Rather, the philosophical basis of Milner’s and Khan’s journeys into painting is better described in the idiosyncratic phenomenology of Henri Lefebvre. ‘A Vision’, in Lefebvre’s Introduction to Modernity, poses questions about subjective consistency, disintegration, and repetition: “How can I coincide with everything that is, without letting myself be swallowed up?” The speaker in Lefebvre’s strange prose-poem interlude on swimming paradoxically claims “I am permanence, I am fragility”. The plunge into the water entails a “sense of reality...no longer segmented in a fixed and reliable way, like a series


144 Ibid.

145 Lefebvre, Introduction to Modernity, p.128.

146 Ibid.
of blocks.” Rather, this “vision of simultaneity” calls up a reality that “becomes restructured, a shifting totality, roaring, buffeting, overwhelming: the sea”. This account passes through Lefebvre’s attempts to acknowledge his sense of separation of himself from the movement of the waves (“my shifting, active identity is incredibly different from the shifting, active identity of these waves as they repeat each other”), which are then described with a precision that momentarily removes Lefebvre from the scene, to an expansion and dissolution of this consciousness into a “totality”.

There are three of us. Not two...The fearful turbulence of the waves happens in only in the space shared by the air, the wind, the light, the sea, the marches of sky and ocean, their common limits. There are three. Not two. And myself, I was about to forget myself, but I am the third one too, caught up in the imperturbable motion, fighting to defend myself, a thing of pathetically precarious stability.

What Lefebvre calls “The third term” permeates everything around him, “inside the limits, in the relation between what is limiting and what is limited...in the limitless depths of harmonics and the amplitude of space.”

The limits of Lefebvre’s consciousness are broken accordingly and “my consciousness...stretches away to the horizon and beyond the horizon as far as the sun as it fades away, and beyond that sun. Through me and my consciousness a totality is achieved - a supersession - but not of my own making...” The final clause is crucial. Lefebvre’s experience is not a narcissistic spilling over of the

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147 Ibid.
148 Ibid.
149 Ibid., p.129.
150 Ibid., p.130.
151 Ibid.
152 Ibid.
self onto the entire world, but instead the emergence of a new sense of exchange and mutuality between the subject and the material world, in which the limits separating them are burst open and remade. These are the characteristic experiences of Milner’s and Khan’s ideas about painting and psychoanalysis.

Shattering the bounds of the normal self makes indistinguishable any opposition between the irreducible realness of the material world and the overflowing of his dreamlike imaginary onto it: “Disturbing, spellbinding: the sea. Am I dreaming, is this imaginary? Is this reality at its harshest? I can no longer say.” Lefebvre leaves this encounter with a refreshed sense of self: “Never before have I experienced my own strength and willpower so clearly”, he claims, though this re-emergence of a formerly shattered ego is only possible through its momentary collapse, and the suspension of his normal faculties: “Within me”, he writes, “reason and insanity have come together”.

“The Plunge into Colour”: Painting and Dreaming

The exchange between Milner and Khan on this subject goes further. Thus, this version of the creative process, reiterated in Milner’s late work *The Suppressed Madness of Sane Men*, draws specifically on Khan’s account of an undifferentiated ego-Id state, which oscillates between a boundless experience of the body in the world and an integrated, whole ego - the psychoanalytic equivalent for Lefebvre’s account of his swimming experience. Milner cites Khan’s 1960 paper ‘Some Aspects of the Schizoid Personality’, taking note of “a pre-stage of infancy development where ego and Id themselves emerge from an

\[\text{\textsuperscript{153}} \text{Ibid., p.129.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{154}} \text{Ibid., p.131.}\]
undifferentiated matrix of energic potential structure.” This developmental state seems to best embody the experience of fusion that Milner and Winnicott identify with aesthetic immersion and ego disintegration. Milner also draws on Khan’s work on dreaming in the same text to confront directly the ambiguous and troubling dimensions of what happens to the self in these undifferentiated ego-Id experiences:

What Masud Khan calls the dreaming experience...is to do with knowing who, what, one is. What one is. What any self is. Do we know the answer to that?

Milner’s ordinarily lucid prose falters here. It is fitting: entering the undifferentiated and ambiguous realm of cubist painting entails depriving the subject of the normally available representative regime of language, just as in dreaming. Milner herself connects her writing on art to Khan’s writing on the dreaming experience in *The Suppressed Madness of Sane Men* when she suggests that when attempting to understand Khan’s concept she “was taken back to something I was trying to formulate in 1956 for my Freud Centenary Lecture on ‘Psycho-Analysis and Art’.”

Khan’s writing on painting is of a piece with his account of dreaming. More explicit connections can be drawn: Miró’s work is, of course, characterized by “wayward somnambulant doodles”. In chapter four of *On Not Being Able to Paint*, ‘The Plunge into Colour’, Milner offers an insightful description of what Khan imagines when describing Miró’s “blotches of colour” in *Hidden Selves*. This reading also goes against the grain of Khan’s thought: he suggests


156 *The Suppressed Madness of Sane Men*, p.227.

157 Ibid., p.225.
that the “claim” “Picasso, Braque, Leger, Gris” make for expressing “transition-
al states of experience” in their art derives from “lying fallow rather than dream
states” [my emphasis]. But this distinction cannot hold - why does Khan gesture
to the “somnambulant” character of Miró’s work if it is distinct from the world
of dreams? There is a disjunction between the theoretical logic that offers the
background to the fallow state - its relationship to unintegrated, private, dream-
ing states - and another way in which Khan characterizes it in his short essay
which is worth examining.

Khan’s remarks on the fallow mood draw out the tension between
Khan’s reactionary appropriation of modernism as the work of a dedicated mi-
ority of exiles and exceptional individuals (thus providing the framework for
his cultivation of his own special outsider identity as cosmopolitan émigré), and
the aspect of his work that emphasizes the revolutionary potential of mod-
erism for describing radical new forms of self-experience, which are inscribed
into his theory of the subject. For instance, Khan stresses that the fallow mood
has “discipline” and a “relation to will” - it is not, he claims, “an idle moronic
state of being”. Not everyone, Khan suggests, can “doodle like Miró”, contrast-
ing his work with that of “the nostalgic escapist efforts of the Sunday Painters”.If artists like Miró can martial the productive forces of the fallow state - “no
small achievement of the ego”, Khan notes - then such artists are implicitly in a
very capable and select minority. Khan’s insistence that the creative capacities
attached to the fallow state are available to modernist painters in particular is a
telling sign of his commitment to modernism as a minority movement within
the culture with which, as we have seen, Khan is especially keen to identify
himself, especially through the presentation of himself as an exile and as “un
collectioneur”.

‘On Lying Fallow’ then occupies an uncomfortable and indistinct middle
ground that inadequately expresses the movement between waking and dream-
ing selves. Perhaps Khan’s keenness to stress the strength of artists like Miró in their use of the fallow mood is also an attempt to contain, or keep the lid on, the frightening and liberating aspects of the disintegration of the conscious ego that the emergence of the fallow state necessarily entails. Khan’s writing here seems to pull back from the most radical and alarming aspect of this idea of self-experience just as he is advancing it. The dangers of an unbounded sense of self are palpable in Milner’s writing too. For Milner, mixing colours is only a short step from mixing up people and things. It is thus comparable to the experience of the young pop musician mentioned earlier, who, in his stoned listening sessions, feels of a piece with “the tune, me listening to the tune, and the tune and me as one”. She describes the feeling of colour as that “of something moving and alive in its own right”, quite apart from “a common sense world of objects separated by outline, keeping themselves to themselves.” Instead, colour “had to to do with a world of change, of continual development and process, one in which there was no sharp line between one state and the next.” This sense of the breakdown of outlines and boundaries between states “also introduced the idea of no boundary between one self and another self, it brought in the idea of one personality merging with another.” Milner’s analogy is indicative of the links between this aesthetic experience and the world of the dream. There is, she suggests, “no fixed boundary between twilight and darkness but only a gradual merging of one into the other.”

Milner perceives a certain dynamism in the spontaneous and vibrant interplay of different colours on palette and canvas – she notes that “smear of

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158 Hidden Selves, p.48.

159 On Not Being Able to Paint, p.29.

160 Ibid.

161 Ibid.

162 Ibid., p.30.
paint left on the palette after painting, where white merged into red, blue, brown” is “interesting, and alive.”¹⁶³ This is analogous to the “playful” “blotch-es of colour” Khan sees in Miró. It is towards this same intermingling of colours that Freud directs our attention in a suggestive remark in New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis. Freud turns specifically to modern tendencies in painting as illustrative of the functioning of the psychic apparatus, and it is crucial that the remark also touches on the oscillating separation and coalescing of psychic material:

We cannot do justice to the characteristics of the mind by linear outlines like those in a drawing or in primitive painting, but rather by areas of colour melting into one another as they are presented by modern artists. After making the separation we must allow what we have separated to merge together once more. You must not judge too harshly a first attempt at giving a pictorial representation of something so intangible as psychic processes.¹⁶⁴

Though Freud does not offer any specific examples, Milner’s ideas connecting blurred fields of colour with the intensities of psychic life come from an interview between Paul Cézanne and his biographer Joachim Gasquet. The quotation extends the remarks cited above about the breakdown of boundaries ambitiously and dangerously in the direction of there being no boundary, not merely between one ego and another, but between the ego and the world of things:

The part, the whole, the volumes, the values, everything is there...Shut your eyes, wait, think of nothing. Now, open them...One sees nothing but a great coloured undulation. That is what the picture should give us...an abyss in which the eye is lost...One is revivified, born into the real world, one finds oneself, one becomes the painting. To love a painting, one must have drunk deeply of it in long draughts. Lose consciousness. Descend

¹⁶³ Ibid., p.28.

with the painter into the dim tangled roots of things...be steeped in the light of them.\textsuperscript{165}

There is a contradictory emphasis on both the strengthening of the self - “one is revivified...one finds oneself” - and also on its dissolution - “one becomes the painting”; it is “an abyss in which the eye is lost”. It seems pertinent to gesture to the pun of eye/I the translation manifests.\textsuperscript{166} Cézanne’s language, like Milner’s, comments on the dissolution of boundaries and outlines, is of fluidity: one must have “drunk deeply” of a painting; tones “circulate in the blood”; one is “steeped” in the light of colours. But Cézanne’s version of the encounter with a modern painting also sounds a lot like going to sleep. His instruction is to “Lose consciousness”, to “shut your eyes, wait, think of nothing.”\textsuperscript{167} The plunge into the “great coloured undulation” and, by extension, the blotches in Miró’s paintings, is connected to the “somnambulant” experiences of the dreaming subject.

Indeed, dreaming, Freud, and the painting of Cézanne are connected in this context. In chapter 7 of Interpreting Dreams, ‘The Psychology of the Dream Processes’, Freud’s language is of a piece with Cézanne’s. In passage explicated by a number of critics, Freud describes the point at which the meaning of all dream texts becomes elusive, the so-called navel of the dream:

In the best-interpreted dreams, one often needs to leave a particular passage obscure, having become aware, during the work of interpretation, that a knot of dream thoughts rises there that refuses to unravel but in fact made no further contribution to the dream content. This then is the

\textsuperscript{165} On Not Being Able to Paint, p.29.

\textsuperscript{166} The translation here is most likely Milner’s own, as it was only in 1991 that the first English translation of Gasquet’s conversations with Cezanne were published. See Joachim Gasquet, Cézanne: A Memoir with Conversations, trans. by Chris Pemberton (London: Thames & Hudson, 1991).

\textsuperscript{167} On Not Being Able to Paint, p.29.
hub [Ger. nagel - navel] of the dream, the place where it squats on the unacknowledged. The vast majority of dream thoughts that one comes across must of course remain unresolved and seep away in all directions into the web-like entanglement of the world of our thoughts. From a spot on this intricate web which is denser than the rest, the dream wish then arises like a mushroom from its mycelium.168

Like Cézanne, Freud takes us down into the tangled roots of things - this time, the “knot” of dream thoughts that rises from the “mycelium” of the mushroom. The “world of our thoughts” is likened to an entanglement (or, as Samuel Weber suggests, a trap) where the analytical tools of dream interpretation no longer function.169 For the Cézanne cited by Milner, and for the dreamer in Khan’s writing, the descent into the “tangled roots of things” in modernist painting and the web-like entanglement of the dream catalyse a loss of self and a dissolution of the outlines between subject and object.

The disjunction between speaking ego and withdrawn dreaming subject is typified by one of the most striking works in Khan’s collection. Nous Avons, a 1959 collaboration between Joan Miró and René Char, puts this tension at the centre of its aesthetic. The album contains four etchings printed in colours, as well as the lithographic cover picture in fig.7, presented in dialogue with poetry by René Char. Khan’s edition was number nine of forty produced through the combined efforts of printers Fequet and Baudier; publisher Louis Broder; and designers Crommelynck and Dutrou. Nous Avons is one of five texts published by Char and Miró in collaboration in which, as critic Thomas Jensen Hines puts it, “both poet and painter present separate parts to function in combination”.170


The result, Hines suggests, “is a collaborative form, a work that is the sum of its interactions.”

This properly collaborative form is quite different from other examples of Khan’s collection - his copy of *Ulysses*, illustrated by Henri Matisse, is a notorious example of a lack of connection or collaboration between image and text: Matisse had not read Joyce’s novel when completing his drawings, though he had read the parallel episodes in Homer’s *Odyssey*.

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**Fig. 7.** ‘Old Master, Modern and Contemporary Prints’, Joan Miró/René Char. *Nous Avons*. 1959, lot 251, p.71.

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171 Ibid.

Conversely, Char and Miró’s collaborative approach speaks to the forms of psychoanalytic thought and practice developed by Khan, Winnicott and Milner. The combination of text and image in Winnicott’s famous squiggle games with patients typified a psychoanalysis, developed in conjunction with Khan and Milner, that stressed the equal importance of (and productive tension between) verbal and non-verbal dimensions of experience. In this account, art, especially modernist art, offers a specific example for Khan as to how this mutual ‘shaping’ of the self and the other can take place in the negotiation between verbal and pictorial forms.

The incommensurability of text and image in Char and Miró’s book also reflects a range of tensions embedded in Khan and Winnicott’s psychoanalysis: between non-verbal and verbal states; between the dreaming experience and dream text; and between ego-organization and disintegration. Rather than attempting to resolve such oppositions by privileging one over the other, Winnicott and Khan stress the importance of being able to oscillate between the two (this oscillation might in fact be the essence of the fallow mood Khan describes). *Nous Avons*, then, is a crucial work in Khan’s collection as the process of its production stages explicitly the same dilemmas of translatability and communication faced in Winnicott and Khan’s psychoanalytic theories of language, infancy and dreaming. The fallow mood of Miró’s painting thus exemplifies the difficult and necessarily incomplete transition from ‘Secretiveness to Shared Living’ (*Hidden Selves*), shifting from the privacy of self-experience to a minimal intersubjective exchange, or producing a renewed sense of the object-world, itself recalling the discussion of epiphany in chapter one.

The originality of Khan’s thinking on Miró enriches similar criticism of the artist that take a psychoanalytical approach. Christopher Green’s analysis, in two different critical essays, of Miró’s painterly procedures draws on an influential article by writer and poet Michel Leiris in an edition of the French
modernist art magazine *Documents*. Green psychoanalytically imagines Miró’s work as entering into, and passing through, “the void”:

> For Leiris, the void fixed a new starting point: once the details of the world had been thought away, they were, one by one, to be brought back into being. Miró, too, it seems, never saw the void as an ending: it was a state from which to depart as well as towards which to move. In every case, however, the void remains...The void is a force.173

As well as being a force, the void is an alternative, ruminative zone, in which we experience a double movement towards emptiness and disintegration as well as fullness and richness, into which is plunged the painter, the objects dissolved and remade in the picture, and the spectator. The void is “an oscillation between the desire to fill and the desire to empty the picture space”.174 Green suggests that “the epithet of the infantile” in Miró’s work invites “the total integration of Miró as subject with the image”,175 remarks that are hardly a step removed from Milner’s fascination with Cezanne’s “plunge into colour”, and the entrance of the subject into a more ambiguous sense world of blurred outlines and indistinct ego-Id states. Green highlights Miró’s fascination with the work of child psychologist Jean Piaget, and the infantile must accordingly be thought from a “Freudian as well as a Piagetian viewpoint”.176 In Green’s account of Miró’s interest in Jean Piaget, the primitive and the infantile are of a piece, with Miró’s project resting on “an idealized notion of the child state as one of unrepressed desire”.177


174 Ibid., p.62.


176 Ibid.

177 Ibid.
Indeed, Green considers the production of Miró’s painting to be mediated by the new anthropologies and psychologies of French intellectual life in the 1920s and 30s, exemplified by the ethnography of Marcel Mauss (one of Michel Leiris’ explicit influences) and the educational theory of Piaget, working at the fittingly named Institut J.J. Rousseau. The infantile and the primitive were idealized and conflated, celebrating what the contemporaneous German critic Carl Einstein termed a “defeat of virtuosity [in painting]”, the “rise of intuition” and “prehistoric simplicity”.

In Green’s readings, Miró’s painting describes a regression in which the painter becomes inseparable from the world remade in the space of the canvas. But there is an additional “complication”, Green suggests, as “the image was offered to the spectator, another subject”. The image becomes “open” and “leaves a space for that other subject (us) to occupy”. The process by which the painting is created by the artist is thus reproduced for the spectator, a move coordinating the psychic experiences of the artist and spectator related to the painting: “Miró not only holds up to himself the chance of regression”, Green suggests, “he holds it up to us as well”. In this account the artwork, as in Milner and Khan, is the pretext for an encounter with the strata of psychic life; Leiris’ “void” is where we encounter the experience, through a picture plane that is simultaneously both saturated and empty, of undifferentiated ego and Id.

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179 Ibid., p.212.

180 Ibid., p.231.

181 Ibid.

182 Ibid.
Miró’s infantilism, when read through Jean Piaget as Green does, expresses a wish to return to childhood omnipotence, as “everything in the world becomes an extension of the self”. Of course, this entails the concomitant risk, described by Balint at the outset of this chapter, that intermingling the self totally with the world might also function to annihilate or destroy its autonomous existence. Khan’s writing entertains a more skeptical attitude toward the idealisation of the child and the liberating possibilities that such a regression, into childhood omnipotence might entail: entering into the void can be terrifying, and the subject must be able to return from it in order to make it into something psychically useful.¹⁸³

My reconstruction of Khan’s sense of modernist art, via Milner and Winnicott, asserts that their psychoanalysis might prove even more pertinent to understanding Miró’s voids and large blotches of colour. The regression Green reads in Miró’s work, in other words, can be understood as something other than a primitivist idealization of the infantile and the regressive. In my alternative psychoanalytic reading, the regression that becomes “an attractive and possible aspiration” in Miró’s painting and Leiris’s writing eschews omnipotence. Instead it is the basis of anticipatory states crucial to the epiphanic emergence of creativity in Khan’s thought: Balint’s arglos state described in chapter one, and Khan’s concept of “lying fallow”.¹⁸⁴ To identify this regression with creativity would mean, for Khan and Milner, that it cannot be simply infantile omnipotence or the return to a primary narcissism, as this excludes the experience of the outside world permeating (or indeed invading) the subject, preferring instead to focus on an infantile fantasy in which the outside world submits totally

¹⁸³ See, for instance, ‘The Finding and Becoming of Self’ in The Privacy of the Self: “There is a distinct danger of a romanticization of a pure self-system...We have all seen to what nihilistic, as well as idealistic, extremes Laing (1967) and Cooper (1971) have pushed the mythic pursuit of a true and unique selfhood. I only want to say I do not share these Utopian notions of selfhood”, p.304.

¹⁸⁴ Green, ‘The Infant in the Adult’, p.221.
to the artistic process. Khan’s writing on Miró instead suggests that the relationship of painter-image-spectator might be understood as having a transitional rather than magical character.

**Khan’s Radical Aesthetics**

The modernist painters whose work summons into existence the fallow state - Miró and the cubists - offer, in Khan’s thought, a decomposition of the conscious ego that creates the conditions for an encounter with the subject’s primary body-ego that is for Milner the background thrum of somatic existence. Such an encounter leads to a revitalized relationship with the outer world, along with a fresh sense of the self’s own otherness and strangeness. This experience, in which the subject is neither active nor passive, neither looking simply inwards nor outwards, gives rise to new forms of being and the creation of new capacities.

It is important that the forms of inattention praised in ‘On Lying Fallow’ are presented as an alternative to mass culture and a leisure industry that is somewhat crudely characterized by Khan. The fallow state, and the attention that accompanies it, is presented in opposition to the instrumental functionality of modern culture and society, an instrumentality that I argue in chapter three Khan rejects wholesale. In Khan’s thinking the politics of aesthetics, particularly in painting, might then be understood in relation to the contemporary arguments of Jacques Rancière, particularly as aesthetic experience in both versions pertains to transforming what Rancière terms the “distribution of the sensible” (*partage du sensible*).185 The “Aesthetic Regime” is distinct because it forms, as his interlocutor Steve Corcoran suggests, “an exception to the normal

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The normal regime is concerned with the distribution and organization of specific groups and individuals in society, deciding who is destined to hold power or their relative importance and function in public or private life - what Rancière lambasts in *The Emancipated Spectator* as the idealized “harmonious fabric of community”, in which bodies are adapted to their stations and purposes. The emergence of the aesthetic regime, conversely, “invents new ways of being, seeing and saying” and “engenders new subjects”. It is this transformational dimension of aesthetic experience that most powerfully resonates with Khan’s psychoanalytical writing on painting in this instance - the fallow state is a description of a form of experience that functions to distance the subject from the normal experiential regimen of mid-twentieth century capitalist culture.

For Rancière, aesthetic experience is always political because it “effects a break with the sensory self-evidence of the natural order”. The promise of the aesthetic regime is “of a new world of Art and a new life for individuals and the community”, realized by the way that the artwork shuttles between the two poles of *poiesis* (for Rancière, a way of doing) and *aisthesis* (a way of being affected by poiesis). Thus, for Rancière, the aesthetic “opens up a gap between poiesis and aisthesis, between a way of doing and a horizon of affect”, and it is in this new space created between the two poles that the distinction between art and non-art collapses. Reading Schiller, Rancière argues that the artwork

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189 *Dissensus*, p.139.

190 Corcoran, Ibid, p.16.

191 Ibid.
“will bear the edifice of the art of the beautiful and of the art of living.” He continues

The entire question of the ‘politics of aesthetics’ - in other words, of the aesthetic regime of art - turns on this short conjunction. The aesthetic experience is effective inasmuch as it is the experience of that and. It grounds the autonomy of art, to the extent that it connects it to the hope of ‘changing life.’

The artwork is presented then as an alternative to the forms of experience to which subjects are entitled by the normal regime of the sensible - but it is this very alternative aspect of aesthetic experience that offers the possibility for the emergence of new forms of life. Art, for Rancière, always pertains to something other than art, and is neither fully autonomous nor applicable as a model of ethical life (Rancière identifies the latter position with what he terms the “ethical regime”, exemplified in Plato and Hegel). Rather, Art and life are continuously exchanging their roles, and aesthetic experience gives rise to “a reconfiguration in the here and now of the distribution of space and time, work and leisure.” ‘Lying Fallow’, for Khan, is thus an alternative experience of attention and absorption to capitalist consumer culture. In Rancière’s terms such an alternative mode of experience necessarily transforms the relationship of the subject experiencing the fallow state to the normal distribution of the sensible.

Like Khan’s vision of the fallow mood, Rancière’s study of the history of aesthetic self-education amongst workers in nineteenth century France puts at its centre, leisure, inactivity and contemplation - though for Khan such experiences are sharply differentiated from the empty, ersatz leisure activities offered in twentieth century European culture. Rancière’s workers, who walk in the

193 Corcoran, Ibid, p.15.
194 *The Emancipated Spectator*, p.19.
countryside on Sundays and evangelize philosophically to their colleagues at the inn, are “strollers and contemplators” who indulge in an “idleness” that gives rise to a “reformulation of the established relations between seeing, doing and speaking.” This, for Rancière, is the original definition of the word ‘emancipation’: “the construction of new capacities”. Emancipation entails a “breaking” the “fit between an ‘occupation’ and a ‘capacity’”, “dismantling the labouring body adapted to the occupation of an artisan”. Thus, I would argue, Khan’s critique of mass culture in ‘On Lying Fallow’ turns to the suspended inattention he associates with modernist painting because it describes for him an alternative mode of life to the prescribed pleasures and pains of everyday working life and leisure: it is “the proof that a person can be with himself un-purposefully”. Lying fallow, Khan writes, is “the obverse of leisure”, which is itself “an “industry”, “an imperative social need” that is ultimately met by the “emergence of a colossal trade in organizing people’s leisure.” Citizens are “flooded with ready-made switchable distractions” which destroys the capacity for a personality with “an inner relation to its own self.” Lying fallow, by contrast, is a “capacity of the ego” that gives rise to the subject’s “innate aliveness” and allows the creation of new pictorial forms shaped by this aliveness.

In a striking statement, given how much modern art he owned, Khan claims in ‘On Lying Fallow’ that “one of the few genuine achievements of mod-


196 The Emancipated Spectator, pp.42-43. See also, Dissensus, pp.140-141.

197 Hidden Selves, p.186.

198 Ibid.

199 Ibid., p.187.

200 Ibid., p.186.
ern art between 1900 and 1940 was that it divested the pictorial activity of painting of its too close alliance with thematic representation.” Thus, for Khan, this shift signals that the aesthetics of European modernist painting are not about symbolically representing or recoding unconscious thoughts, wishes, or reconstructing the dream, but rather is directed towards the expression of particular moods pertaining to the way the subject experiences their own self, inner life, or creativity. Thus Miró’s painting offers a certain kind of mood to viewers, who, if they can successfully suspend their attention (Khan describes it as a “state of free-floating animation”) in this way, can actualize new creative experiences and capacities in themselves.

These states can be described through Rancière’s complex construction of the spectator in his philosophy. The misadventure of critical thought, from Brecht, through Artaud, to Althusser and Guy Debord, is to envisage the spectator as either active or passive. Thus, in The Emancipated Spectator, Rancière strives to offer an account of spectatorship, and of aesthetic experience, stripped of paternalistic encouragements to spectators to engage and dissolve the spectacle presented to the audience: rather, Rancière challenges “the opposition between viewing and acting”. It is incoherent, Rancière suggests, to view the actor on stage as active and the audience member as passive. The same logic cannot be applied to the opposition of the “property owners who lived off their private income” - who are in appearance idle but politically and intellectually efficacious - and the workers whose bodies are highly active but are considered “passive citizens”, “unworthy of these duties [governing and philosophizing].” The spectator, we read, “also acts”, as “viewing is also an

201 Ibid.

202 Ibid.

203 The Emancipated Spectator, p.13.

action that confirms or transforms this distribution of positions” (and also, necessarily, the “distribution of the sensible”). This account of aesthetic experience is highly associative, where the spectator “composes her own poem with the elements of the poem before her”. Performances and artworks entail a process of “refashioning” in which the spectator “associates this image with a story which she has read or dreamt, experienced or invented.” In the aesthetic encounter, Rancière argues, viewers are “both distant spectators and active interpreters of the spectacle offered to them.”

Rancière’s deconstruction of the opposition between activity and passivity articulates an indistinct zone in which the relationship of the spectator to the object (and the spectator’s relationship to herself) is remade - exemplified in Rancière’s essays on Mallarmé (‘Aesthetic Separation’) and photography (‘The Pensive Image’) in The Emancipated Spectator. This account systematizes, I would argue, many of the implicit thoughts detectable in Khan’s and Milner’s accounts of painting and modernist art. Khan’s 1953 review of Milner’s On Not Being Able to Paint helps to clarify this idea, and it is striking to note that in part 2 of the 1953 issue we see the first publication of Winnicott’s seminal ‘Transitional Objects and Transitional Phenomena’. In Khan’s review, the “imaginative body” is an alternative to her “concentrated mind”, and likewise the intense focus the fallow mood directs towards this body results in something quite new: “the quiet outflow of a sensibility that batters down its own confines of established thought and perception, to unfold an emergent richer texture of feelings.” The sleep-walking doodles and fields of colour in Miró’s paintings

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205 Ibid, p.17.


207 Ibid.

create the conditions for realizing, as Khan suggests in his review of Milner’s text, that “the false contradiction between outer reality and subjective reality resolves itself into a rich and vivid interplay.” The “imaginative body” allows for the creation of new capacities - what Rancière in *The Emancipated Spectator* identifies as the original meaning of the term ‘emancipation’ - and disrupts the prescribed sensorium through the very act of engaging in the forms of aesthetic experience Khan describes in ‘On Lying Fallow’. The authentic experience of leisure, or radical inaction, Khan describes in Miró’s painting is, in Rancière’s terms, inevitably political.

Khan’s ideas could be said to prefigure Rancière’s description of the spectator as neither simply active nor passive, but engaged in a reciprocal and modulating relationship with the outside world. Accordingly, Milner “presents us with...a world of change, of continual development and process; an awareness of the developing relation between oneself and what one is looking at”. The artist, in Khan’s review, is presented as the maker and provider of “‘new bottles for the continually distilled new wine of developing experience’”, and such a description keenly stresses how Milner’s project dramatizes the emergence of new types of psychic and somatic experience. Such new experiences of life are made available to us by painting, but only if we can, as Khan puts it, “spread the imaginative body in wide awareness”.

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209 Ibid., p.333.

210 “We need to return to the original meaning of the word ‘Emancipation...social emancipation signified breaking this fit between an ‘occupation’ and a ‘capacity’...Emancipated workers fashioned in the here and now a different body and a different ‘soul’ for this body - the body and soul of those who are not adapted to any specific occupation; who employ capacities for feeling and speaking, thinking and acting”. *The Emancipated Spectator*, pp.43-44.

211 Khan, ‘On Not Being Able to Paint’, p.332.

212 Ibid.

213 Ibid.
the body leads to the resolution “of the false contradiction between outer reality and subjective reality”, opening up the prospect of “a rich a vivid interplay” where “subject and object achieve a new reciprocity and dialectic relation.”

Milner’s achievement for Khan rests on her disrupting what she calls (Khan specifically cites this in his review) “the tyrannical victory of the common-sense view that always sees objects as objects”.

Milner’s alternative form of aesthetic contemplation, like Rancière’s, precisely undermines the straightforward or given sense of the way the outside world is organized for subjects. Khan’s fallow state, exemplified by Miró’s painting, is the experiential route to the re-ordering and re-experiencing of the outside world.

One of Rancière’s concerns in 2013’s *Aisthesis* is to identify incidents in artistic modernity where there are “occurrences of certain displacements of what art signifies”: I argue that Khan’s encounter with Miró’s painting pertains to this project.

Artistic modernity, for Rancière, “follows a few adventures of the relations between” its new subject, “the people” and its “new place, history”.

Thus it goes to develop “a number of overlapping points and elaborations” between these areas: the overlapping of the autonomous and non-autonomous dimensions of the artwork. The confusion in Khan’s description of the fallow state between its somnambulant, unintegrated quality and its relation to “discipline and will” is indicative of its radical aspect, as it describes a new zone of indistinction between activity and passivity. Citing Schiller once more, Rancière argues that “the free people” is “the people embodied in this ac-

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214 Ibid.

215 Ibid., p.333.


217 Ibid.

218 Ibid.
tivity that suspends the very opposition between active and passive”, and Khan’s model of inattention here repudiates instrumental and predictable outcomes and effects.\(^{219}\) Likewise Rancière suggests that “Emancipated movement does not succeed in reintegrating the strategic patterns of causes and effects, ends and means”.\(^{220}\)

But whilst Khan’s contemplation of modernist painting dovetails with many aspects of Rancière’s empowering vision of modernism, the so-called ‘aesthetic regime’, his own veneration of modernism as a cultural movement returns to complicate this picture. Miró, as a modernist artist, has capacities and abilities to inscribe the character of the fallow state pictorial which are not, Khan suggests, available to everyone. Khan’s stake in modernism as a minority culture offers him a model of European émigré identity that undermines the emancipatory vision he has of its aesthetic possibilities. The “discipline and will” of his selected artists translates the Scrutineers’ “armed and conscious minority”\(^{221}\) to the European artistic avant-garde, and his work elaborates, in a contradictory manner, the revolutionary possibilities of their aesthetic experimentation whilst nevertheless circumscribing it within his own special status as a migrant, which, for him, is a specific form of privilege. The following chapter further describes the extent to which Khan’s interest in modernism has similarly reactionary and troubling aspects when it encounters migration, race and cultural difference.

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\(^{219}\) Ibid., p.xiv.

\(^{220}\) Ibid., p.xv.

Chapter Five

“Swarthy of taint”: Masud Khan, Race and Modernism

...the paths of allo-identification are likely to be strange and recalcitrant. So are the paths of auto-identification.¹

Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet

This chapter begins with a quotation from the last: “Masud had a problem in London”, the photographer Zoe Dominic said in an interview, “he was never Europeanized. You’re either Europeanized or you’re not.”² For Linda Hopkins, Dominic’s diagnosis illuminates Khan’s other ‘problems’ in London. Surveying Khan’s many (alleged) personal and professional transgressions, Amy Bloom’s review of Khan’s biography in the The New York Times describes the psychoanalyst as “a snob, a liar, a drunk, a philanderer, an anti-Semite, a violent bully, a poseur and a menace to the vulnerable”.³ Hopkins suggests, accordingly, that Khan’s resistance to becoming European offers one rationale for the extreme character of these personal and professional transgressions as a psychoanalyst in the United Kingdom. “Thinking like this”, Hopkins writes when reflecting on Dominic’s remarks, “we can see why he felt free to break analytic rules: he had never agreed to follow them.”⁴

There is something disturbing in these remarks. Khan’s non-European-ness is aligned with his capacity for sexual and clinical transgressions, whereas

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⁴ Hopkins, p.387.
'European' psychoanalysis figures for the observance of the law, for accepted clinical standards, and, by implication, for civilization and progress. Khan, as an “oriental” - a term used by Hopkins and Khan’s friend Vladimir Granoff⁵ - is therefore opposed to this ‘civilized’ order and his transgressions are accordingly the eruption of another time, place and culture. André Green suggests to Hopkins that Khan “didn’t realize that he was in England in the 20th century. He thought it was Pakistan in the 17th.”⁶ Khan is untimely, connected to anachronistic institutions and opposed to modern Britain: “The only powers he accepted as legitimate were Islam, his father, and the British Royals.” Khan’s “life in the west becomes more understandable”, Hopkins suggests, “if Khan is viewed as a wealthy landowner from feudal Muslim Pakistan.”⁷ Whilst Khan’s imagining of his own ‘feudalism’ is doubtless crucial to any examination of his life and writing, Hopkins’ comment is peculiarly double-edged: his behaviour only becomes more understandable if we also accept that brutality and transgression fall under the same sign as “feudal Muslim Pakistan.” Hopkins does not simply relocate his often brutal behaviours to a foreign scene - she also assumes that we are all in agreement as to what the character of “feudal Muslim Pakistan” is, and that it would inevitably produce someone like Khan, whose failure to ‘Europeanize’ is synonymous with a failure to come onto the side of civilization and the law. This position excludes any consideration of the political and cultural valences of blackness in postwar Britain.

We might suggest accordingly that Hopkins’ and Dominic’s resolute insistence on the divisibility of East and West is, among other things, a way of projecting all of the intimate risks of the psychoanalytic situation onto a pre-modern, barbarous, specifically Orientalized other. By placing Khan’s bad be-

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⁵ Ibid., p.484.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid., p.387.
haviour geographically and temporally elsewhere, and ascribing its causes to apparently intractable racial and cultural differences, Hopkins and Dominic implicitly find a way to disavow the ethical and clinical ambiguities faced by all psychoanalysts, as well as the ways in which the psychoanalytic establishment may have been complicit in facilitating Khan’s misdemeanours.

Dominic’s and Hopkins’ dichotomy of the West and the rest also elides the not uncomplicated legacy of decolonization, with its concomitant displacements and uneven epistemological shifts, bequeathed to European imperial powers. Khan’s writing emerges from historical contexts imbricated in struggles of national liberation that created new political communities as well as exiles, migrants and refugees. To read Khan’s life and work is to face directly the fallout of the collapse of the old Imperial regime and the ways in which such historical events instituted new debates in Europe about foreignness, race and citizenship.

There are two things that are known about Khan’s career by a general audience of analysts and critics: the existence of vicious anti-Semitic attacks in his final book, *When Spring Comes*; and that he was, in the words of one anonymous analyst, “‘black’ and rich, and...having sex with white women”. The simple proposition of this chapter is that those two things are intimately connected. In other words, I will argue that the way that Khan’s anti-Semitism is manifested in his last book means that it inevitably bears the trace of his own anxieties about migrant experience, citizenship and racism in postwar London.

Khan’s relationship with that historical context is mediated by his commitment to modernist forms of self-fashioning: whether as a migrant bearer of ‘tradition’ on the model of T.S. Eliot; a Joycean self-exile; or as a collector and

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8 Ibid., p.472.
patron of European modernist painting. The modernist inflections in Khan’s construction of, and anxieties around, his own cosmopolitanism are also implicated, I argue, in his anti-Semitism and his other comments about race in his late work.

“Sartorial self-presentation”, Khan writes in When Spring Comes, “tells a lot”. In the photograph below (fig.8), Khan is pictured sitting with his second wife, the Principal ballerina at Covent Garden Svetlana Berioszova, herself an émigré. They are photographed by Henri Cartier-Bresson, whom he met through the Cassou family and his association with the Galerie Maeght. Khan was good friends with the Cartier-Bresson couple and thanks Henri and Martine Cartier-Bresson in the Acknowledgements to Hidden Selves. The Acknowledgements are a paratext Khan exploits to ostentatiously display (just as in his more private copy of Ulysses) his glamorous internationalism, thanking a range of friends in Paris; London; “His Excellency General Yakub-Khan” (“Ambassador of Pakistan in Washington, Moscow and Paris”); Robert Stoller in Los Angeles; and Sardar and Begum Jamil Nishtar of Pakistan. The book foregrounds the author’s cosmopolitan, transnational aspirations.

This photograph of Khan serves a similar function. It is an image in tune with journalist Robert Boynton’s description of Khan as mixing “Savile Row with a dash of the Raj”. Khan wears an exquisitely tailored jacket and cravat. On his head there is a traditional Punjabi or Kashmiri Karakuli, a lambswool hat favoured by the first President of Pakistan Muhammad al-Jinnah. Jinnah supplemented the Savile Row suits of his youth with the traditional headgear.


and offered a carefully contrived blending of old and new, emphasizing both
his sophistication and his resolute commitment to the revival of vernacular
Punjabi cultures.\textsuperscript{12} The Karakuli, though traditional, was also a marker of Jinnah’s forward-looking vision of Pakistan, connected to his project of fashioning
a new, unified Muslim consciousness with an anti-colonial bent. One comment-
tator, analysing photographs of Jinnah, remarks that his sartorial displays
“could not have been bettered by Madison Avenue experts”.\textsuperscript{13} Khan, though po-
litically at odds with Jinnah, likewise opts for what Hopkins calls “a more idio-
syncratic blend of English and Indian”.\textsuperscript{14} The karakul here appears incongru-
ously archaic alongside the modern cut of his English suit. His sartorial display
is ambiguous: moving towards and away from the ‘Europeanization’ that Zoe
Dominic suggests he never achieves.

The picture is archetypically cosmopolitan, stressing cross-cultural con-
tact, glamour (Khan holds Beriosova’s sunglasses), and haughty intellectualism
(a large book rests in Khan’s lap). An émigré psychoanalyst and his in-
ternational ballet dancer wife are photographed by an iconic photographer of
the twentieth century whilst wearing exquisite, expensive clothes. Many of the
photographs of Khan in both Hopkins’ and Willoughby’s biographies repeat
these tropes, and the Karakuli reappears on the head of Khan’s first wife, Jane
Shore, on the day of their wedding in 1952, and other pictures of the couple.\textsuperscript{15}
But it is worth juxtaposing these similarly cosmopolitan scenes with the knowl-
edge that Shore’s marriage to Khan was shadowed by deeply racist attitudes.

\textsuperscript{12} For a detailed discussion of the politics of Jinnah’s self-presentation, see ‘Clothes as a
diacritical cultural symbol’, in Akbar Ahmed, \textit{Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity: The

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., p.124.

\textsuperscript{14} Hopkins, p.253.

\textsuperscript{15} For photographs of Khan, Beriosova, and Shore see Roger Willoughby, \textit{Masud Khan:
Shore’s aunt wrote in a letter some months after the wedding that “my niece has disgraced the family by marrying a Pakistani”.\textsuperscript{16} “There was noticeable tension”, Hopkins writes, “about an interracial marriage”, and it was reported by Shore herself that one of her father’s friends made, at the reception, a racist speech about Japanese Netsuke art, whose aesthetic plays off the opposition between ivory and wood.\textsuperscript{17}

Khan was “‘black’ and rich” and “he was having sex with white women”.\textsuperscript{18} His relationship and his ethnic background were visible. Indeed, Khan’s marriage to, and relationship with, Beriosova was widely reported in the British press - she was a well-known ballerina.\textsuperscript{19} A very short article in the \textit{Daily Mirror} from December 1964 takes time to note that Beriosova is in “for a Christmas with a difference”, on account of her visiting Khan’s family in Lahore for the first time. Khan is described as “a wealthy Pakistani psycho-analyst.”\textsuperscript{20} The article concludes by saying that Svetlana’s “contribution” to “the sunny seasonal party” is “an English Christmas tree.”\textsuperscript{21} The incongruity of the image plays on a fundamental assumption that Khan is not “Europeanized”, let alone English. The difference entailed in this Christmas is only legible to a society that is implicitly attentive to the visibility of racial difference, and for whom such a difference serves a structuring function.

\textsuperscript{16} Hopkins, p.412.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{18} Hopkins, p.472.

\textsuperscript{19} See the notice of Khan and Berosova’s marriage in \textit{The Times}, ‘Marriage: Mr. M. M. R. Khan and Miss S. Beriosova’, \textit{The Times}, Sunday, January 24, 1959.


\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
This short piece of filler in a national newspaper hints at the way in which the hierarchy and composition of Englishness are, in this period, coded in racial terms. “If the colonies worked through race”, Bill Schwarz notes in *The White Man’s World*, “then, by extension, so did the metropole.” The press gestured to Khan’s religious and ethnic background in other ways: a funeral notice for his brother Tahir published in *The Times* noted that Tahir was buried “with full Islamic ceremony…May Allah rest his soul in peace”. The notice of Khan and Svetlana’s divorce, posted in *The Times* in 1974, mistakenly described Khan as the “cousin” of the “late Field Marshal Ayub Khan, former president of Pakistan.” Christopher Bollas’ obituary in *The Observer* also makes reference to Khan’s apparent use of “Islamic pronouncements” on his patients in psychoanalytic sessions. Bollas goes on to note that patients would thrive under Khan’s treatment if they were “able to stand up to him”, “almost”, he suggests “to represent another civilisation [sic] view of a democratic order and the right to speak!”

“There are certain complications”, George Lamming writes in *The Pleasures of Exile*, “when the exile is a man of colonial orientation…he has to win the approval of Headquarters…England”. It is these problematics of ‘becoming’ ‘European’, and winning the recognition of those same Europeans, that concern Khan and his modernist idols, Eliot and Joyce. Linda Hopkins’ biography often mentions Khan’s race and racist encounters Khan had, but there is little interest in the politics of race and the cultural context framing the experiences of non-

white subjects in postwar Britain. Joyce’s and Eliot’s own ambiguous and contentious accounts - particularly in *Ulysses* and *After Strange Gods* - were crucial in shaping Khan’s attitudes to race, and, in terms of Eliot’s influence, the particular form his anti-Semitism took. Accordingly, one of the things this chapter will reflect on is the possibilities modernist writing has for a non-European reader confronting complex issues of racism and belonging in exile.

This chapter will have two principal arguments. First, to show that Khan’s anti-Semitism in *When Spring Comes* is connected to Khan’s reading of Eliot and the ideas of ‘tradition’, rootedness and culture offered in texts like *After Strange Gods*. This argument will complement the earlier discussion of Khan and ‘tradition’ in this thesis - in the second chapter, tradition in Eliot offers for Khan a way of imagining his own (distanced) feudal background, as well as offering a model for Freud’s influence on contemporaneous psychoanalytic writing. The concept of tradition there is split between an expansive and enriching encounter with the prevailing cultural forms, similar to Winnicott’s concept of the transitional space, and a deeply reactionary and self-aggrandising veneration of the elite, imperialist institution of Indian feudalism. Here, I wish to explore the ways in which notions of tradition and rootedness in Eliot shape Khan’s anti-Semitism and are deployed accordingly to distance his experience as migrant from that of Jews. In addition to this, I would like to examine the way in which Khan combines racist notions of tradition in Eliot’s writing with his own presentation as one of the ‘martial races’ of nineteenth-century ethnographic writing, and in doing so show how forms of race thinking permeate *When Spring Comes*.

The second argument of the chapter will aim to draw out all of the ambivalences and contradictions in Khan’s construction of himself in relation to the Jewish character of his racist case history, Mr. Luis. Khan’s Jewish caricature conceals a powerful identification with the figure of the deracinated Jewish mi-
grant, and becomes a screen onto which Khan projects his own experiences of racial difference in the United Kingdom. In order to explore this, I will examine the slippages between Khan and Mr. Luis’ character, as well as Khan’s identification with exilic “semi-semitic” characters in Joyce’s work - hence the epigraph that heads this chapter. A fortuitously placed bookmark in one of Khan’s copies of *Ulysses* shows how questions of race, belonging and the toxic dimensions of nationalist thought were unavoidable for Khan when reading Joyce. His bookmark appears at a crucial moment in the ‘Cyclops’ episode of the novel. The second epigraph to this chapter invokes Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, and Khan’s anti-Semitism will be held alongside his interest in Joyce in order to consider questions of identification and reading that *When Spring Comes* produces. In *Epistemology of the Closet*, Sedgwick continues from the epigraph at the head of this chapter:

...the relations implicit in identifying with are, as psychoanalysis suggests, in themselves quite sufficiently fraught with intensities of incorporation, diminishment, inflation, threat, loss, reparation, and disavowal.\(^{26}\)

Identification is in Khan’s thoughts at the outset of his final book. Explaining his reasoning behind describing in great detail aspects of his patients’ self-presentation (clothing, mannerisms, the “patient’s style of communicating” in analysis), Khan suggests that “as a result the reader will be able to identify that much more closely with my patients”.\(^{27}\) Whilst Khan foregrounds the entanglement of readers in his patients’ psychic lives, what is left unsaid is the extent to which, following Sedgwick, his own psyche might be inextricable from the characters he describes. It is the embedding of Khan’s identity in Mr. Luis that I wish to unearth in this chapter.

\(^{26}\) Sedgwick, p.59.

\(^{27}\) *When Spring Comes*, pp.viii-ix.
Fig. 8. Masud Khan and Svetlana Beriosova, photographed by Henri-Cartier Bresson. Getty Images.
Khan’s invocation of the Holocaust in his anti-Semitic tirade against Mr. Luis, and the possibility that Mr. Luis’ ‘analysis’ functions as a screen for his own anxieties about race, raises another issue related to the entanglements of identification that I examine by way of conclusion. Khan’s relationship to race in his thought can be read by way of Michael Rothberg’s increasingly influential study of legacies of modern suffering, *Multidirectional Memory*. Rothberg draws out an alternative history of cultural remembering, one that is not “competitive” and subtractive. Instead, what interests Rothberg are texts that read multiple legacies of suffering within the same frame, often ranging across historical and geographical settings. This cross-cultural remembering entails an often ambiguous immersion in another cultural history of persecution that becomes inextricable from the production of one’s own narrative of oppression. Rothberg explores the complex relationship the Holocaust has with postcolonial reckonings of imperialist tyranny, both before and after decolonization, for instance in a particularly powerful account of the writings of Aimé Césaire and Frantz Fanon. The ethical ambition of Rothberg’s book, which is the first to explicitly draw together the Holocaust and the fallout of decolonization, is that recognition of ultimately shared and deeply imbricated legacies of suffering from the twentieth century describe feelings of commonality that could be the foundation of a new polity.

Masud Khan’s own anti-Semitism draws together Imperialism and European totalitarianism and cultivates a great deal of tension between these two histories. As Rothberg writes, “Black and Jewish histories do not actually intersect, but approach each other and veer away asymptotically”. At the end of this chapter, I assert that Khan’s vision of these histories is circumscribed by his historical circumstances and modernist-centric outlook and that this calls into

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question the cosmopolitan triumphalism of Rothberg’s version of cross-cultural remembering.

To begin with, though, a survey of the range of analyses of Khan’s anti-Semitism in *When Spring Comes*. Linda Hopkins, in the closing chapters of her book on Khan, offers a number of perspectives on Khan’s anti-Semitism, mainly derived from discussions and interviews with Khan’s colleagues and others close to him towards the end of his life. The range of sometimes contradictory and counter-intuitive opinions offered on Khan’s racism point to the great difficulty in comprehending his final, bitter, outbursts; I outline some of these below.

For many commentators Khan’s anti-Semitism is explained by the circumstances of the last two decades of his life, with Khan taking a significant turn for the worse after the publication of *The Privacy of the Self* in 1974. The following years were indeed a difficult time for Khan, during which his second marriage ended, he faced a life-threatening illness, descended further into alcoholism, was barred from training other analysts (owing to a range of therapeutic misdemeanours), and, some commentators suggest, suffered increasingly from bipolar disorder.\(^29\) It is the madness ascribed to Khan in these last years of his life, exacerbated by all these factors, that is offered as the first possible explanation for his final racist tirade. For Hopkins, Khan’s final years were characterized by increasingly paranoid attitudes towards Jews, the British Empire and the British Psychoanalytic Society, amongst others.\(^30\) When his friend Robert Stoller wrote to Victor Smirnoff calling the book a “kamikaze plunge”, Smirnoff responds by suggesting that Khan was out of his mind and did not

\(^{29}\) Hopkins, pp.261-262, p.466.

\(^{30}\) Hopkins, p.308, p.369.
know what he had done. Stoller, Hopkins tells us, agrees with Smirnoff. In her words, *When Spring Comes* is the work “of a demented and dying man”. Khan’s anti-Semitism is thus understood as mad and aberrant, manifesting an unrestrained personal destructiveness. It is consequently seen as unrelated to his earlier, “sane and civilized”, work.

Hopkins’ second explanation of Khan’s anti-Semitism is that Khan was the conduit for prejudices embedded in the Independent group of British analysts, who were mainly Protestant. Hopkins claims that “there is a history of Jewish-Protestant tension that can be documented”, and that one interviewee goes as far as to suggest “there is a high degree of tolerance for anti-Semitism in…the Society”. Hopkins even suggests at one point that Clare Winnicott implied, when discussing her late husband, that “‘English’ and ‘Jewish’ are mutually exclusive categories”, reportedly remarking that “[Donald Winnicott] was very, very, very, very, very non-Jewish indeed. Very English, actually”. This is complemented by an extraordinary anecdote in which Winnicott makes an anti-Semitic joke to Charles Rycroft. Rycroft reports

> At society meetings, which were always terribly crowded, I remember Winnicott coming up to me, shaking me vigorously by the hand and saying, “Dr. Livingstone, I presume?”. An anti-Semitic joke I think - It’s what Stanley said when he met Livingstone in the middle of Africa...The Society after the war was predominantly Jewish. It wasn’t exactly a

31 Ibid, p.488.

32 Ibid.


34 Hopkins, p.368.

problem not to be, but you had to be careful. I think that was what he meant. It was a relief to meet a blond Gentile in the woods.\textsuperscript{36}

Thus Hopkins suggests that British Protestants in the psychoanalytic community felt outnumbered, even persecuted, by Jewish analysts, and that Khan’s theoretical and clinical allegiances with the Independent group primed him for his later anti-Semitic sentiments. Khan, Hopkins suggests, “may have spoken in part for colleagues when he expressed anti-Semitism”.\textsuperscript{37} But whether these anecdotes may be more or less or true, then the figuration of Jews as non-white and non-European also has profound implications for understanding Khan’s own anti-Semitism, and the ways in which it can be read as a screen for other concerns about migration and race in the United Kingdom. Reading Khan’s anti-Semitism as merely the expression of his allegiance to a particular institutional network neglects this key context. Indeed, it is worth remembering that Winnicott himself was the one who asked patients if they would mind seeing a Pakistani analyst.

A third explanation of Khan’s anti-Semitism argues it was not real. Some of Hopkins’ interviewees described his anti-Semitism as “curiously unconvincing” or a “red herring”.\textsuperscript{38} One is led to wonder how the interviewees knew a convincing anti-Semitism from an unconvincing one. Nevertheless, Khan’s doctor and close friend Barrie Cooper saw his anti-Semitism as a front for a more particular institutional quarrel:

\begin{quote}
Ibid., p.368.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
Ibid.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
Ibid., p.367.
\end{quote}
You don’t find overt anti-Semitism [from Masud] before the Institute rejected him. The anti-Semitism was meant as an attack on his colleagues and the Institute. It was a ‘professional’ anti-Semitism.\(^{39}\)

For Cooper, Khan’s anti-Semitism is not something deeply felt but rather a tactic deployed after his disciplinary run-in with the institution in 1976 (the principal reason for his animus against Segal, Hopkins claims). Hopkins goes so far as to suggest that Khan’s anti-Semitism, after his falling out with the establishment, shifts from being “playful” to “offensive” - though her book is at a loss to provide any examples of this “playful” racism - coinciding with a paranoiac belief that Jews in the Society were deliberately targeting Khan.\(^{40}\)

His “playful” racism was, in Hopkins’ reading, a boisterous attempt to provoke Jews and others in order to learn more about them. An interviewee suggests: “He was actually very interested in Jews – they were a fascinating subject that he wanted to understand”.\(^{41}\) As Jonathan Karp and Adam Sutcliffe note in a 2011 collection of essays, philosemitism has an ambiguous relationship with its antonym.\(^{42}\) An analysand offers a particularly loaded insight into Khan’s occasionally sympathetic attitude towards Jews: “[Khan] often used to maintain that there was nothing more impressive than a cultured Jew”.\(^{43}\) It is hardly worth explicating the naked racism of this statement, but it is worth thinking about it in light of Khan’s construction of Mr. Luis who, unlike Khan, is gauche, crass and though aspiring to Khan’s own immersion in European cul-

\(^{39}\) Ibid., p.369.

\(^{40}\) Ibid., p.370.

\(^{41}\) Ibid., p.370.


\(^{43}\) Hopkins, p.370.
ture can never truly inhabit it. We might also wonder, if the suggestion of Khan’s identification with Jewishness is kept in the frame, whether Khan imagined that there might be nothing more impressive than a cultured - or “Europeanized” - Pakistani.

Whether these conflicting and ambiguous views of Khan’s attitude towards Jews go one way or the other, they are all underwritten by the idea that Jews, whether ‘good’ or ‘bad’, are fundamentally different. The literary historian Artus Sandauer helpfully advances the term “allosemitism” to describe this phenomenon, an idea developed by Zygmunt Bauman in Modernity, Culture and ‘The Jew’. For Bauman, allosemitism is prior to, and contains the seeds of, both anti- and philo-Semitism. This construction of Jews as fundamentally different determines, for Bauman, that the emergence of whichever attitude will be necessarily “intense and extreme”, though allosemitism itself is a “radically ambivalent attitude”. What makes this most relevant to Khan, I think, is that this radical ambivalence located in Jews by Bauman causes “a sort of resonance” between allosemitism and “the endemic ambivalence of the other, the stranger”. Khan’s outsider status should mean therefore that his relationship with the idea of Jewishness is inevitably more complex that has previously been suggested by critics.

Summarizing Bauman’s suggestion that anti-Semitism is not the manifestation of a latent hatred of difference but rather of “proteophobia” (“someone or something that does not fit the structure of the ordered world”), Karp and


46 Ibid.

47 Ibid.
Sutcliffe describe the ways in which “Jews have occupied intermediary, analytically incongruous roles, standing out as anomalous in the social order”. Tellingly, and integral to my argument, such a description equally pertains to Khan just as it much as it does to the figure of the Jew - we can read in his life and writing a parallel to the “categorical elusiveness” Bauman identifies with Jews. It is this tension between the object of his attack in When Spring Comes and the form his own postcolonial identity takes that will be elaborated in due course. We can see in Khan’s writing what Sutcliffe and Karp identify in their study as “the ways in which Jewishness can inspire contradictory associations within a given cultural context”. The remarks that follow should be crucial in any discussion of Khan’s anti-Semitism:

We can only reach an understanding of ambivalence toward Jews if we patiently pick apart its contrasting and sometimes contradictory component threads.

It does not seem sufficient to posit an anti-Semitic conspiracy in parts of the British Psychoanalytic Society; to write off Khan’s attacks as sheer madness; or to deem his outbursts somehow inauthentic. If Khan’s anti-Semitism did allow him to commit “psychological suicide” as one commentator puts it - along the lines of Stoller’s suggested “kamikaze plunge” - then might not this dimension of masochistic self-annihilation and wish for personal abjection be produced by race thinking in the cultural and political context of postwar Britain that Khan inhabits? What is sorely lacking in the study of Khan’s anti-Semitism - although Sander Gilman certainly lays the foundation for a meaningful discussion of Blackness and Jewishness by bringing his work into contact with Frantz Fanon’s writing on Jews - is an approach that situates Khan in his polit-
cal and social context (as regards citizenship and race in postwar Britain) and reads his own complex literary engagements with modernists like Eliot and Joyce.\textsuperscript{51}

For Gilman, Khan and Fanon are connected because of the fact that they are both “psychoanalysts of color” and, in his view, their attitudes towards race are not “tightly bound to the political ideology of the moment” (though such a reading neglects the social and political importance of the operant forms of race thinking in both their contexts). Gilman’s reading of Khan’s anti-Semitism notes that he constructs the body of the Jew as feminine and exotic, and notably identifies the ways, via a comparative reading of Fanon, to show that Khan’s sense of Jewishness is a “biological” one of the late-Victorian type. Khan’s Jewish body is continuous with the queer body, a mode of thinking that is continuous with Arendt’s exploration of the correspondence between attitudes towards Jews and homosexuals in Marcel Proust in her study of totalitarianism. Gilman suggests further that Khan’s construction of Jewishness, when read in light of Fanon’s work, is involved in creating a hierarchy of forms of difference (Blackness over Jewishness). What can be added to this reading is the particular literary and cultural genealogy of Khan’s anti-Semitic stereotypes and the ways in which that intellectual history might serve to complicate racialized binaries and competing conceptions of identity in Khan’s work.

It is possible instead to trace in Khan’s anti-Semitic writing a more tangible engagement with T.S. Eliot’s work. The seeds of this idea are embedded, in fact, in a reference Linda Hopkins makes to Anthony Julius’ controversial prosecution of Eliot in his 1995 study of the Anglo-American poet, quoting from the opening page of the book. For Hopkins and Julius, Eliot produced an anti-Semitism designed to “wound Jewish sensibilities” rather than “break Jewish

bones”, and Hopkins states outright that Khan’s anti-Semitism was “similar to Eliot’s”. However, there is little consideration of a more direct connection between the form and ideology of Eliot’s writing on Jews and Khan’s own racism, which themselves can be connected to Khan’s particular vision of culture, authenticity and tradition.

It is worth stating exactly how we are to understand the term ‘race’ as deployed in this chapter. Heather Streets’ 2004 study of imperialism, masculinity and race - which I would like to explore in relation to Khan’s own conception of his background later - understands the term race to operate in “two contradictory ways”. First, it is read as “part of an increasingly ‘scientific’ understanding of race as a set of objective biological characteristics”, particular to the last half of the nineteenth century. Second, race is an “artificial strategy of rule during a period of Imperial anxiety”, part of a range of linguistic and performative tools that intervened in periodic crises in Imperial power (most notably after the shock of the 1857 rebellion.) For Streets, race begins to function more specifically in the latter half of the nineteenth century, denoting (and inextricably connecting) outward physical characteristics (skin colour; head or nose size) and inborn characteristics (“honesty or servility or deceitfulness”). This marks a shift away from an earlier Orientalist sense of race as embodying very general geographically delimited populations, with distinctions between races also being articulated with reference to relative degrees of ‘civilisation’, differences in religion and governmental practices. It did not solely rest on differentiating between physical characteristics.

52 Hopkins, p.367.


54 Ibid.
For the purposes of this chapter, I suggest that Khan, too, treats race with this double vision. His peculiar investments in ethnographic stereotypes and characteristics (both in relation to himself and Jews) demonstrate the extent to which this ‘objective’ dimension of race functions as a still point in a turning world of more ambiguous and multifarious cosmopolitan identities, sharpening the divide between himself and his Jewish double in *When Spring Comes*. But his deployment of race thinking is precisely, at the same time, a “consciously manipulated and performative tool”, strategically invoked in an attempt to attenuate the anxieties of resemblance and identification described in this chapter.

Race too has a special character in Khan’s political context - a postcolonial Britain that felt the impact of Powellism on the public imagination of race and migration in the decades of Khan’s career. Camilla Schofield argues that in Powell’s discourse skin colour was the ultimate signifier of who could and could not belong to the political community of Britishness; skin colour, as he put it, “is like a uniform”. Schofield notes that for Powell “race served as a sign of political allegiance”.

In the 1970s and 80s, as Paul Gilroy has argued, blackness becomes the sign of a range of fundamental and existential threats from within to British law and society, exemplified for conservatives in the ‘race riots’ of Brixton, Toxteth and Notting Hill. The black Briton is also a disruptive reminder of the failure of Imperialism to manifest a political community bounded by loyalty, the bearer of an uncomfortable history, and living example of a conflict of allegiance that is

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55 Ibid.


57 Ibid., p.327.

the fallout of decolonisation. The Powellite watershed in postcolonial politics also impacted heavily on the development of black politics, and the politics of solidarity, in Britain, which were articulated with special intensity in Paul Gilroy’s seminal 1987 work *There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack*. Khan’s own race politics was separate from, and in many ways antithetical to, those movements, deriving instead from a blend of Powellite attitudes to blackness, imperialist ethnography and Eliot’s anti-Semitism. Yet recognising Khan’s specific place in the race politics of his time helps us to see the range of possibilities available to him and understand the discursive conditions and objects that drove his thought in the reactionary direction they did.

Schofield discusses a number of letters written to Powell. They indicate the degree to which blackness “endangered”, as Schwarz puts it, “the domestic, the intimate and the sexual…domains of life cherished as most intimate and private”. One example from Schofield’s introduction is especially germane to this discussion of Masud Khan, whose own attention to race is highly sexualised. It is this anxiety in discourses of race that is also central to Khan’s construction of Jewishness and Blackness in *When Spring Comes*, and that I explore in the opening sections of this argument:

I ONCE HEARD A NIGGER SAY TO ANOTHER NIGGER…HAVE INTERCOURSE WITH WHITE WOMEN AND KILL ALL WHITE MEN,

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60 Schwarz, p.20. See also, *Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and Order* ed. by Stuart Hall, Chas Chrichter, et al. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).
AND I REALLY BELIEVE IT SIR THE PATTERN IS HERE BUT NOT TO STAY I HOPE. 61

As the newspaper references to Khan cited above indicate, his race was highly visible; indeed, Khan cultivated this image himself. It certainly seems a provocative proposition for readers of the Daily Mirror to consider the prima ballerina at Covent Garden having a sexual relationship with a non-white migrant. Many of the cultural anxieties described in the discussion above find their expression in the race discourse of When Spring Comes; there is an especially sexualised attitude to race in his presentation of blackness and Jewishness. Such a construction itself stems from the key conjugation we find in the description of Khan from his former analysand ‘Margerita’: “He was ‘black’ and rich, and he was having sex with white women.” 62

T.S. Eliot’s Semitic Discourse and When Spring Comes

In chapter four of When Spring Comes we meet ‘Mr. Luis’, a cosmopolitan Jewish homosexual from Chicago, born to “displaced Russian immigrants” who comes to Khan for treatment following the emergence of suicidal intentions. 63 Mr. Luis is, as Linda Hopkins has noted, almost certainly fictitious. 64 The character Khan contrives is a collage of anti-Semitic stereotypes who often simply serves to flatter Khan in the eyes of his readers. “Dave told me”, Mr. Luis says fawningly,

that there was this Monsieur in London, he is a prince and well-known as an analyst. He could [treat Mr. Luis], but he doesn’t accept patients

61 Schofield, p.7.

62 Hopkins, p.472.

63 When Spring Comes, p.113.

64 Hopkins., p.372.
easily from others…I was very impressed by the number of languages you could speak.\textsuperscript{65}

Luis’ description also presents the reader with a collage of Khan’s fantasies of self-aggrandisement. Here, Khan is a multi-lingual “Monsieur” as well as being a “prince”. Mr. Luis also allows us a glimpse of Khan’s exquisite taste and gorgeous home: “Everyone and everything around you is beautiful, just beautiful…including your houseboy…And these Braques and Giacomettis on the wall. Just beautiful…”\textsuperscript{66} Khan takes the opportunity to juxtapose Luis’ gauche inauthenticity with his own masculinity, sophistication, wealth and cultural background:

I said: ‘OK, if you also relish paying to be humiliated, here goes. Let us look at each of us. I am tall, handsome, a good polo and squash player. Fit. Only forty-one. Very rich. Noble born. Delightfully married to a very famous artist. Live in a style of my own making. Am a Muslim from Pakistan. My roots are sunk deep and spread wide across three cultures, from the Punjab of Northern India, Rajput Indian and Shia Persian. So where do you, and I, Mr. Luis, meet? Can possibly meet?\textsuperscript{67}

Khan’s invocation of “Rajput Indian” and “Shia Persian” are important clues to understanding the ways in which Imperialist ethnographic categories structure Khan’s vision of himself, grounding his identity in the race discourses of the nineteenth century. It is important to note at this point that Khan’s idea of ‘rooted’ subjectivity in an increasingly rootless world - it is no coincidence that Khan mentions Mr. Luis’ refugee background - becomes contingent on, just as in Eliot’s later prose, an idea of continuity powerfully anchored in the homogeneity of race. In other words, for all of Khan’s cosmopolitanism and exilic self-fashioning, the dangers of deracination are mediated in this later writing by an

\textsuperscript{65} When Spring Comes, p.89.

\textsuperscript{66} Ibid., p.95.

\textsuperscript{67} Ibid., p.91.
insistence on a blood connection to that “tradition that [Khan] kept hooting on about”, which becomes inseparable from ideas about race.68

Khan’s construction of Mr. Luis as a character is mired in anti-Semitic clichés. This “mixed up Yiddish kid” has, Khan notes, “dark gleaming eyes, dark hair” and is “swarthy of taint, I mean tint of skin”.69 Skin colour looms large in this chapter, and the “taint” of Luis’ skin is crucial in relation to what we can read as Khan’s own attempted disavowal of any likeness between himself and his patient. Luis’ swarthy taint is a key feature working in conjunction with other aspects of his that Khan invokes in order to represent the Jew as non-European. His Russian background means that “both parents lived and worked by the Russian Calendar, so their dates were always out of step”, and accordingly, Khan feels that “Mr Luis’ experiences and measure of time were quite radically different from mine, and that of most others (Europeans included)”70

For Khan, Mr. Luis’ Jewishness is ineradicable and irreducible. “You dress almost elegantly”, Khan notes, “but the Ghetto screams through”.71 It is located ambiguously in Luis’ clothes and on his skin. Indeed, Khan’s definition of Jewishness, as Sander Gilman has pointed out, is cultural, ethnic, religious and political, but also reducible to none (Gilman describes Khan’s “trinity” of “Jewish-Yiddish-Zionist”).72 The “unmatching loud colours” of his outfit are the incongruity that betrayed Jewishness, along with his gold teeth. Luis wears “a gold tie-pin”, “gaudy tie”, “gold cuff-links” and his mouth contains a “capped


69 When Spring Comes, p.90.

70 Ibid., p.108.

71 Ibid., p.90.

72 The Jew’s Body, p.199.
upper eyetooth, left” – also in gold. This gaucheness is equivalent to Jewishness: “All right, I am a Jew and sell myself as one,” he says. “That is what you so disdain, Prince Khan, isn’t it?” Khan sardonically suggests that Mr. Luis’ boyfriend, Dave, takes him “to the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem and shake all this phoney crying out of him”. Mr. Luis’ affects are first and foremost “theatrical”. Khan attempts to contrast this inauthenticity with his own rootedness, “spread deep and wide across three cultures”.

“In a world of mass series productions”, Adorno and Horkheimer write in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, “stereotypes replace individual categories”. Eliot’s writing provides some of the prototypes for Khan’s Jewish caricature here. Khan’s vision of a Chicago Jew can be read as a particularly crass elaboration of what Eliot, in 1920’s ‘Burbank with a Badaeker: Bleistein with a Cigar’, calls “Bleistein’s way”:

A saggy bending of the knees
And elbows, with palms turned out,
Chicago Semite Viennese. (14-16)

‘Burbank’ is a poem central to Anthony Julius’ controversial critical argument about anti-Semitism in Eliot’s aesthetic. It is more than coincidence given Khan’s commitment to Eliot’s work that Mr. Luis is described as belonging to

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73 *When Spring Comes*, p.93.

74 Ibid., p.95.

75 Ibid., p.91.


what he calls “that sagging plumage” of the “Homo International Jetset”. In Eliot’s ‘Burbank’, the cosmopolitan Jew ostentatiously displays, like Khan’s Mr. Luis, “Money in furs.” Indeed, Khan suggests to Luis that he is “more of a customer, and less of a patient”.

For Anthony Julius, *Burbank* is a complex poem that in one regard appears to “unmask” (and perhaps even critique) anti-Semitism, though also finds ways of sustaining it. As Julius says, “Though the poem subjects anti-Semitism to great pressure”, it nevertheless “holds up”. Julius thus warns us not to forget the devastating anti-Semitic cliches on which the poem rests - he is unequivocal that this is not “love masquerading as hate”. “Burbank”, he writes, “does not ironize anti-Semitism”, and although the poem demands a “careful reading”, we should not be taken too far from our “first impressions”. *Burbank* articulates a range of racist anti-Jewish character types from which there is no escape. It is worth seeing Khan’s own anti-Semitism as connected to precisely this anxious tradition about the figure of the Jew in modern culture. The poem rests on

...the open-palmed gesture of Bleistein, his fat cigar and subhuman, dead eyes; there is the manipulative, corrosive sophistication of Klein; there is the destructive philistinism of them both, and their parasitic homelessness; and there are the rats that spread the plague, noiselessly and invisibly destroying what they infest.

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78 *When Spring Comes*, p.91.

79 Ibid.


81 Ibid.

82 Ibid., p.108.

83 Ibid., p.107.
Much of this speaks to Khan’s characterization of Mr. Luis. Luis’ is characterized in a plethora of ways: as “absurdly Russo-Francais”; “a real American innocent in the style of Henry James”; “a Russki/American Peter Pan”; a “vintage quality” “Yiddish/Jewish” “kid”.

There are clear echoes of Bauman’s proteophobia here. Luis is uncannily close to Bleistein’s “subhuman, dead eyes” in Khan’s account, describing himself as having “the over-famished scanning eyes of all reptiles”. He has, according to Khan, “a reptilian capacity for scanning his environment for ‘food’...a cobra who swallows everything, small or huge, and experiences nothing,” a “withering sac of a body”. His less-than-human Jewishness is precisely corrosive and destructive, with an “aggressivity [sic]” that “expressed itself through wasting others”, possessing only a “meagre Self” and an inauthentic sexuality marked by “a febrile excitedness, with little true desire or appetite to it”. Mr. Luis is “colourless”, with only a partial selfhood that is represented by the gauche philistinism of the Jew:

Mr Luis had said: ‘I wear these bizarre colours because I feel so colourless, I am so colourless. How very colourless I am, Prince Khan. You know it, I have to live with it.”

Khan’s construction of Mr. Luis shows some clear connections between the anti-Semitic tropes Julius draws out of ‘Burbank’. Khan’s prized copy of a short anthology of modernist poetry gifted to him by P.I. Painter (discussed in chap-

84 When Spring Comes, p.106.

85 Ibid., p.101.


87 Ibid., p.100.

88 Ibid., p.101.
Another crucial point of attack in Julius’ argument, as it opens with the image of the deracinated and parasitic Jew. For Julius, the Jew is again represented as less-than-human, “spawned” in a “low place public place” rather than naturally conceived.

My house is a decayed house
And the Jew squats on the window-sill, the owner,
Spawned in some estaminet of Antwerp,
Blistered in Brussels, patched and peeled in London.89 (7-10)

The blisters of the Jewish landlord are identified by Julius with venereal diseases stereotypically carried by Jews in Eliot’s period, and it might be significant in this regard that Mr. Luis’ sister is identified as having suffered from “the clap” and requiring a hysterectomy at age seventeen.90 Furthermore, Julius reads the squatting of the landlord as associating Jews with bestial defecation, something which might be paralleled in When Spring Comes by the unusual focus on Mr. Luis’ anally-fixated sexual habits, with Khan graphically discussing Luis’ “dirty Jewish arse”.91

Marjorie Perloff’s reading of ‘Gerontion’ contextualizes Eliot’s poem via a short biographical excursus that offers some possible insights into understanding Khan’s racist discourse along the same lines as Eliot. For Perloff, there is little chance of explaining away the anti-Semitic stereotype that opens the poem by suggesting that the narrating voice is a purely fictive “diseased mind” that itself figures for a corrupted “mind of Europe”, populated by “withered


90 When Spring Comes, p.88.

91 Ibid., p.94.
and repulsive remnants” projected outward by Gerontion’s own despair.\textsuperscript{92} Gerontion’s voice, Perloff suggests, is “too perceptive, too aphoristic and too definitive in his judgements to be dismissed as some sort of mental case”.\textsuperscript{93} This chapter asserts that the same might indeed be said of Khan when considering the attempts to explain his anti-Semitism.

Perloff turns to Eliot’s own anxieties about his foreignness - describing himself as a “metic” in a letter composed two days after completing the poem - and his precarious, transitory existence in 1919 in order to read the poem as a “psychic displacement”.\textsuperscript{94} “All of Eliot’s hatred and resentment”, Perloff writes, “...were displaced onto nightmare figures with labels like ‘The Jew’”.\textsuperscript{95} Stereotypes of “Jewish or Oriental or female behaviour” become for Perloff an “elaborate objective correlative”,\textsuperscript{96} containers for Eliot’s private uncertainties about belonging; his relationship with Vivien and his treatment by Bertrand Russell; and the guilt he feels towards his parents. Although the opening of the poem has an unpleasant “anti-Semitic cast”, it is “finally a meditation in which critique is pointed inward”.\textsuperscript{97} Perloff’s reading of this poem thus broadly opens up complex questions of identification and displacement in relation to anti-Semitism, but also more particularly how it is that cosmopolitan Jews come to figure prominently - as in \textit{When Spring Comes} - for the rootlessness, nihilism and self-negation construed as the typical malaise of modernity.


\textsuperscript{93} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{94} Ibid., p.29.

\textsuperscript{95} Ibid., p.30.

\textsuperscript{96} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{97} Ibid., p.38.
Race and After Strange Gods

The debate about Eliot’s characterizations of Jews revived by Anthony Julius’ controversial study (most notably explored in a special issue of Modernism/modernity edited by Ronald Schuhard) is pertinent to my discussion of Khan’s anti-Semitism. A Manichean attitude toward the debate means that both sides wish for Eliot either to be a philo-Semite in disguise (for Schuhard), who (like Khan) merely finds Jews to be interesting objects of study; or a racist, albeit a subtle and intriguing one. Bryan Cheyette perceptively notes that both Schuhard and Julius treat Eliot as “peculiarly unambivalent”, their arguments turning into “mirror images of each other”. The limits of both critics’ vision is a reliance on a “conventional historiography of anti-Semitism”, and Cheyette suggests jettisoning terms like philo- and anti-Semitism in favour of the more expansive “Semitic discourse”. Like Cheyette, I share this interest in the cultural signifier of “the Jew” as one way of figuring “protean instability or ambivalence”, and in discussing Khan seek neither to recuperate nor condemn his writing but rather see his own semitic discourse, as Cheyette puts it, “through the lens of certain dominant discourses—whether they be empire, nation, religion or race”. We can therefore perceive the representation of Jews in Khan’s work “in Trilling’s terms, as a microcosm of broader concerns”.


100 Ibid.

101 Ibid.

102 Ibid.

103 Ibid.
way, Cheyette’s own reading of Eliot’s ‘anti-Semitism’ prepares the ground for my discussion of Khan, and will crop up intermittently in the course of my argument.

Eliot’s influence on Khan’s attitude towards Jews is in evidence in Khan’s 1979 study *Alienation in Perversions*. Particularly pertinent is reference to Eliot’s *After Strange Gods*, a lecture series from 1933, in chapter ten (‘From Masochism to Psychic Pain’), a case history that explores the problems of the disappearance of God from twentieth-century cultural life. Conversely, the supposedly inescapable hold which religion has on psychic life is the main thrust, according to Khan, of his final book as well. There are a number of important parallels between Khan and Eliot’s thinking as regards the role of religion in structuring the experience of the self. These parallels represent the explicitly conservative dimension of Khan’s interest in Eliot’s concept of tradition. This interest can be read as a response to Khan’s own anxieties about migration and displacement, and Khan’s commitment to Eliot’s version of community - and the position of Jews in his arguments - is key in Khan’s own efforts to, superficially, differentiate himself from Jews.

The most notorious passage in *After Strange Gods* is not the one quoted by Khan. The passage he references in *Alienation in Perversions* some pages after the moment in the text I cite here. Eliot writes,

> The population should be homogeneous; where two or more cultures exist in the same place they are likely either to be fiercely self-conscious or both to become adulterate. What is still more important is unity of religious background; and reasons of race and religion combine to make any large number of free-thinking Jews undesirable.\(^{104}\)

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Indeed, as in Eliot’s lectures, it is the deracinated Jew that comes under attack in *When Spring Comes*. The “free-thinking Jew” is cosmopolitan but inauthentic, and accordingly, Khan’s Mr. Luis is a “phony, murky character”. Khan does not hesitate to indicate his disdain for “self-made Jews who pretend to be artists, atheists, writers or dancers”.\(^{105}\) The assimilated Jew, for Khan, is also ubiquitous. “I have seen all types everywhere”, he notes, “even in Moscow”.\(^ {106}\) For Khan, as in much anti-Semitic discourse, the Jew is insidious, finding his or her way inside institutions, including psychoanalysis: “The yids certainly know how to climb up. My profession is no exception”.\(^ {107}\)

There is a great deal more in the passage quoted above that would be of great interest to Khan. Eliot’s concern about religious sectarianism on the one hand, and the adulteration of language and ethnic identity on the other, has obvious parallels with Khan’s own political context in 1940s Lahore, a city riven by religious and racial violence in the years leading up to Partition. Linda Hopkins reports that as a teenager Khan had a forbidden and short-lived love affair with a Hindu girl whilst attending Gout College in Lyallpur; he was vigorously discouraged from pursuing the relationship owing to the dominance of the local Muslim League faction in parochial politics.\(^ {108}\) Though it is unclear from the account whether the divide between Khan and the unnamed Hindu girl was ethnic as well as religious, their relationship was nonetheless considered scandalous and even potentially dangerous for Khan to persist in. Whatever degree of difference there was in their backgrounds, it is worth noting that Eliot’s ambiguous account of race and religion is often prone to conflating the two, with

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\(^ {105}\) *When Spring Comes*, p.90.

\(^ {106}\) Ibid.

\(^ {107}\) Ibid.

the exact criteria for a “homogenous” society remaining somewhat indistinct - it is this ambiguity that Khan rehearses for his own ends in his writing on Jews.

This anecdote nevertheless reveals the centrality of racial and cultural transgressions to Khan’s imaginary, and in When Spring Comes Mr. Luis is where such transgressions are projected. This is conveniently in line with Eliot’s own construction of Jews as licentious. For Julius, the free-thinking Jew in Eliot’s writing “represents extremes of intellectual and physical license, a fantasy of liberation that is rendered through the language of disgust and contempt”.109 Luis claims that “abject poverty and its insatiable terrors...made me take to stuffing myself with sex...both orifices wise”.110 Although Luis is boastfully and deliberately outrageous - “I go to bed full in the mouth and the arse” these licentious extremes are the outward expression of his vapid, unfulfilled existence: “I wake up famished, empty and dry”.111 Khan’s reports of Mr. Luis’ dreams are similarly explicit:

I see a gleaming dagger in his hand. He is going to thrust it in my arse, I think. Wake up screaming. Always find I am holding my wee-wee, and it is erect and I have come. I can never get an erection anywise, waking or sleeping, except in this dream. I am a passive homo. Totally so. Never even wanted anyone to suck me. Touch me, yes!112

It is striking that Mr. Luis’ obscene outbursts link sexual behaviour and racial characteristics. “Them goys,” he reports, “talk more dirt, but do less. They also fall asleep after.” “Blacks”, Luis offers comparatively, “all do it different ways...The Blacks do it differently with the same woman...The Blacks want to

109 Julius., p.146.
110 When Spring Comes, p.107.
111 Ibid., p.99.
112 Ibid., p.89.
be up and dance and eat till next time”. Luis figures the black body as sexually voracious and physically robust, and notes when recounting his childhood “delivering newspapers in the Black Ghetto”,

We were much of the same kind. Only they had longer cocks. The women bulged in their sweaters. It is not a myth about Blacks in the USA. They do have longer cocks and fuck merrily. Anyone they can lay their cock into. Boy, man, girl or an ageing spinster.

Black sexuality is figured as polymorphous and perverse. Julia Borossa’s exploration of the polymorphous perversity ascribed to Khan in a number of accounts should immediately alert us to the ways in which this extreme figuration of black bodies is the expression of both the ways in which Khan himself was exoticized in Britain (likened, by one former lover, to Omar Sharif, which telling conflates Arab and South Asian into an indiscriminate, Orientalist exoticism) and his colourful sexual practices. Mr. Luis functions partly to express this perverse fascination - as well as disgust - with sexualized and racialized bodies in Khan’s narrative. Here Luis’ boasts of his promiscuity:

Blacks in Washington arse-financed me. I mean I gave the arse; they gave the money. A goy politician took a fancy to me after I had finished college...He couldn’t stand the Blacks taking turns on me, with him...(I am incurably promiscuous).

The appearance of the “goy politician” perhaps articulates in Khan’s narrative the expressions of disgust and outrage that accompanied Khan’s sexual transgressions with white patients. If this is the case, then we can see how other as-

113 Ibid., p.92.
114 Ibid., p.88.
115 Hopkins, p.33.
116 When Spring Comes, p.88.
pects of Khan’s outrageous narrative are a screen for his own anxieties. But Khan himself does not conceal his disgust in addressing Mr. Luis’ sexual proclivities: “Poofs, especially the gilded ageing ones, do fill me with instant disgust and disdain”.

“You have”, he accuses Mr. Luis, “too much moss on your arse”.

Khan’s projection of racially transgressive sexual relationships on Mr. Luis is key to the issues of disavowal and identification that pervade Khan’s hateful construction of this figure for Jewishness. But this interest in such transgressions articulates anxieties about adulteration and purity present in Eliot’s own discourse. Eliot’s later writing on culture also privileges, like Khan when at his most rebarbative, an idealized pre-modern agrarian society that, although homogenous in terms of race and religion, sees a great deal of richness in regional particularity and above all stresses the importance of “loyalty” to these intimate local relationships. Eliot calls for “a proper balance between urban and rural, industrial and agricultural development”, resisting a conception of nation that is “no more than a centralised machinery” (this bears similarities with Khan’s critique of the mechanization of human subjectivity from the conclusion of Hidden Selves).

The “local community” for Eliot “must always be the most permanent”, and it is a community that is opposed to “a more abstract national patriotism”. Neglecting the richness of the “distinct tradition” and its equivalent “local patriotism” gives rise to a concept of the nation as too “fixed and invariable”. It is a “law of nature” to give “precedence” to a local sense of belonging over a more generalized allegiance to the idea of a nation or people.

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117 Ibid., p.91.

118 Ibid., p.93.


120 Ibid.

121 Ibid.
Craig Raine’s *In Defence of T.S. Eliot* sees the sentiments expressed in Eliot’s later prose as calling for a “unified, rooted culture, settled on the land and opposed to deracinated cosmopolitanism”.\(^{122}\) Khan’s attacks on Mr. Luis imply that Khan exemplifies a form of cosmopolitanism which is not deracinated because of Khan’s continuing racial and cultural connection to the “Rajput Indian”, “Shia Persian” and Punjabi feudal tradition from which he sees himself as coming. He is, as he puts it in his unpublished obituary, “the last of his ancestors”,\(^{123}\) and we are perhaps invited to believe that his exile in fact strengthens his deep connection to this distant past. In other words, Khan’s highly cosmopolitan and heterogenous identity, which blends the feudal Prince with Euro-modernist exile, is founded on his disavowal of and differentiation of himself from a fully deracinated Jewish cosmopolitanism - any danger of his being “adulterated” by the protean existence of the cosmopolitan exile is mediated by putting ethnographic categories (“Rajput Indian”, “Shia Persian”) first. This manifests an anxiety about authenticity and belonging which has as its shadow - just as Cheyette suggests of Eliot - the Jewish migrant. Indeed, Maud Ellmann suggests that for Eliot Jews “represent the adulteration of traditions severed from their living speech and native soil”, and the exclusion of Jews from Eliot’s ideal vision of culture Eliot is “attempting to banish from himself the forces of displacement”.\(^{124}\)

Khan as migrant and vigorous advocate of his own Eliotian racialized ‘tradition’ is similarly trying to displace his own geographical, political and linguistic alienation from his homeland onto the Jew. His insistence on his differ-


\(^{123}\) Willoughby, pp.246-247.

ence must be read through Eliot’s attempts to define the term *definition* in *Notes Towards the Definition of Culture*: as Ellmann puts it, “to confine, to delimit, to put things in their place and keep them there”. Khan’s self-definition *against* Mr. Luis tries to displace his own displacement: “Displacement”, Ellmann writes, “erodes the bounds of definition, creating social and semantic turmoil”.

I argue that Khan’s antagonistic relationship with Jewishness resonates with Eliot’s in a number of key ways. Khan’s resolute insistence on the distinction between himself and Luis (“I am all things you are not, and you are many things I could never be”) betray similar concerns in Eliot’s writing that are lucidly explicated by Bryan Cheyette. For Cheyette, the “very real hostility Eliot encountered in attempting to promote the modernist avant-garde” only served to reinforce a form of “Jewish self-identification”. Eliot himself was even construed as a hidden quasi-Semitic manipulator by reactionaries like C.S. Lewis, from whose letters Cheyette quotes, who remarked that Eliot was “sometimes disguised as a friend”, dangerously close to “Pounds and Steins...the Parisian riff-raff of denationalised Irishmen and Americans who have perhaps given Western Europe her death wound”. Eliot is thus caught in a web of projections of foreignness (Lewis himself being a denationalised Irishman) to which he himself adds by passing on his own “alien cosmopolitanism” onto “what he calls ‘free-thinking Jews’”. Cheyette thus notes that “Eliot’s disciplined search for a fixed sense of tradition and a transcendent ‘order’ took many forms...all of

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125 Ibid., p.90.
126 Ibid.
128 Ibid.
129 Ibid.
which were constructed to oppose his own dark Semitic double”. It is my contention that Luis, in much the same way, figures as Khan’s own Semitic double, and indeed produces the same authoritarian inflections we see in the Khan of When Spring Comes.

Blackness and Jewishness in When Spring Comes

How do the ethnographic and cultural boundaries of Eliot’s vision of community then come to structure Khan’s presentation of his own ethnicity in When Spring Comes? We can read the most notorious racist outburst in Khan’s last book as setting out the respective positions and differences between himself and Mr. Luis. After Luis has been goading Khan with euphemistic remarks about his relationship with his wife, Khan finally explodes:

Find your own people then. Shoals of them drift around, just like you. Yes, I am anti-Semitic. You know why, Mr Luis? Because I am an Aryan and had thought all of you Jews had perished when Jesus, from sheer dismay – and he was one of you – had flown up to Heaven, leaving you in the scorching care of Hitler, Himmler and the crematoriums. Don’t fret, Mr Luis; like the rest of your species you will survive and continue to harass others, and lament, and bewail yourselves. Remarkable how Yiddish/Jewish you are. Vintage quality too…Face you can mask with paints. Do you hear me, Mr Luis? It is not that difficult to splurge obscenities and outrageousness.

Khan’s identification of himself as Aryan here is a gesture that distances him from blackness and Jewishness. This claim for his Aryan heritage can be understood in relation to his claim that his “roots” that “are sunk deep and spread wide”: “Shia Persian” and “Rajput Indian”. In imperialist ethnography Rajputs are descended, in the words of an early twentieth century treatise on martial races, from “the ancient Aryan races, who invaded India in prehistoric

130 Ibid., p.436.

131 When Spring Comes, pp.92-93.
times, viz. Rajput (lit. sons of princes) and Brahman, who for practical purposes may be divided into two distinct classes, those of Hindustan and those of the Punjab”. Khan envisages himself as falling into the latter category, and identifies his own family with these “prehistoric” (which he reads instead as “medieval”) conquerors:

Raja Mohammad Masud Raza Khan was the last of his ancestors, who had travelled…with the Persian conquerors in the fourteenth century… Across the centuries the Persian Empire dwindled and so did his ancestors…six centuries ended with him, but he had lived nobly and in the tradition of his ancestors.

Thus Khan’s positioning as Aryan places him closest to European races (“the martial races”, MacMunn explains, “are largely the product of the original white races”) and furthest from both Mr. Luis and the unnamed, voiceless “Blacks” who pepper his narrative. But it is blackness Khan most aggressively represses here because such blackness is also unequivocally his own. It is worth noting again Hopkins’ report that Khan “was ‘black’ and rich, and he was having sex with white women.” The racism directed towards Khan punctuating this discussion is what Khan attempts to displace here with his Aryanism: his attempt at ‘Europeanization’.

The black characters and bodies that penetrate and exploit Mr. Luis are thus utterly voiceless and exist for Luis merely as body parts that “fuck merri- ly”; have “longer cocks”; and are “skin-dressed black by nature”. For Khan, this proves (in response to Luis’ suggestion that “one is the clothes one wears”)
that clothes exist “not merely as decoration and fineries...but as skin”\textsuperscript{136} But Khan and Luis’ elision of clothing with skin itself on the black body suggests a racial identity that is inescapable and irreducible - the alternative being, for ‘Aryan’ Khan and Jewish Luis, the manipulation of clothing-as-artifice which allows identities to be manufactured, concealed or elaborated. The irony was that no matter how many Savile Row suits he wore it was still his own skin colour that often determined the way in which he was treated and perceived.

This indicates the extent to which Khan was utterly mired in the race thinking that structures colonial and postcolonial experience in the colonial and the metropole: as Enoch Powell noted, “skin colour is like a uniform.” Indeed, Hopkins’ interviewee’s description of Khan as ‘black’ highlights the importance of Khan’s racial difference in the eyes of his colleagues and in relation to his conduct. Mr. Luis, it seems, is not the only one to attract attention for culturally- and racially-transgressive sex acts, and Khan’s positioning of himself as Aryan can thus be read as an attempt to distance himself from the non-European characteristics of both blacks and Luis’ Jewishness. His assumption of his own whiteness is thus designed to ameliorate the fact that, as Kathleen Paul notes, UK government policy in the postwar period “assigned all colonial migrants the stereotypical characteristics of blackness”\textsuperscript{137} Within the British Empire, Paul adds, “racialization divided the population into white and colored”\textsuperscript{138}

The traumatic supervention of racial difference in the everyday life of postwar London returns elsewhere in \textit{When Spring Comes}. The cause of young patient Benjamin’s “breakdown” eight months earlier is related to “suddenly” seeing

\textsuperscript{136} Ibid., p.108.


\textsuperscript{138} Ibid.
…a young Negress feeding her baby, with her bosom totally bared...if he could have stopped the train, he would have done so, and got out. But he had to suffer it all, and no matter how hard he tried not to look, he found himself staring at the Negress’s bosom and the baby sucking it.139

The ‘Thoughts’ (the title of the case history) that haunt Benjamin are “lewd, cruel, vicious and hurtful”,140 and in this instance provoked by an encounter with a black body. Though Khan reads the case in light of his own work on perversion and Benjamin’s thwarted relationship with his own mother, this climactic moment in the case might instead be read as rehearsing and replaying the traumatic encounter with the racial other and the ambiguous projection of aggression and desire that accompany it. Khan’s text here both represses and announces the encounter with blackness.

It is at the point where Khan most radically opposes himself to Luis (“I am an anti-Semite”) that the racial distinction Khan draws so starkly begin to crumble. Mr. Luis is a “vintage quality” Jew, but Khan himself too is recognised by his “vintage style” - both Khan and Luis appearing as exemplary caricatures of their respective races. Mr. Luis’ “swarthy...taint” and “tint of skin” mark him as non-white and non-European in a way that exactly mirrors Khan’s blackness. Indeed, Mr. Luis - just like Khan in his late paranoiac mode - feels himself to be an outsider in Europe and consequently “repeatedly protested against, lamented, and cursed how the Europeans, all brands and breeds, had exploited and abused his innocence”.141 Moments like this problematize comparisons of Khan

139 *When Spring Comes*, p.174.

140 Ibid.

141 Ibid., p.109.
and Frantz Fanon as regards their attitude towards Jews: whilst for Fanon the Jew can pass as white, and the Holocaust is accordingly considered a “little family quarrel” amongst Europeans, in Khan’s writing Jews are constructed as non-white. They are, in Fanon’s words, “overdetermined from without” by being marked by Khan with the same ethnic “taint”, and it is this gesture that points up the major difference between Fanon’s and Khan’s Semitic discourses. Whilst Julia Borossa has in a recent essay pointed to the process of racialization to which Khan is subject and which Fanon’s work aptly theorizes, no one has yet advanced the idea that Khan’s anti-Semitic writing might itself rehearse and displace forms of race thinking in postwar Britain onto the Jewish body. I would also supplement her argument about Khan by suggesting that the problems of hospitality, integration and difference are, for him as a writer, approached through concerns articulated in the writing of Joyce and Eliot.

However, whilst here I emphasise this difference between Khan and Fanon in their understandings of Jews, I would nevertheless like to stress that despite this Fanon states explicitly what Khan knows implicitly: that, after all, the “Jew is my brother in misery”. We should take seriously Fanon’s anecdote from ‘The Fact of Blackness’ when he reports his philosophy professor saying

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142 See, for instance, Julia Borossa’s reading of Khan as “polymorphous” and “perverse” outsider in ‘The Extensions of Psychoanalysis: Colonialism, Post-Colonialism and Hospitality’, in *Psychoanalysis and Politics: Exclusion and the Politics of Representation*, ed. by Lene Auestadt (London: Karnac, 2012). Borossa explores the co-extensive nature of desire and the racialized body in Khan’s presentation of himself through a reading of Fanon’s work. As the title suggests, her argument focuses slightly differently on how Khan’s and Fanon’s writings approach the limits of the cross-cultural applicability of psychoanalysis.


144 Ibid.

145 Fanon, p.122.
“Whenever you hear anyone abuse the Jews, pay attention, because he is talking about you.” And I found that he was universally right—by which I meant that I was answerable in my body in my heart for what was done to my brother. Later I realized that he meant, quite simply, an anti-Semite is inevitably anti-Negro.\(^{146}\)

For Fanon, speaking against Jews is continuous with the racism that underwrites imperialist power. Khan’s writing in *When Spring Comes* is both anti-Semitic and anti-Negro: but his identification with the ‘Aryan’ racial identity mobilized to carry out these sorts of racist attacks also contains at the same time Khan’s own consciousness of the racism he suffers as a black migrant. In the *Identification Papers* Diana Fuss offers a psychoanalytic perspective that is crucial in shaping my argument about Khan’s racial self-presentation:

> How might it change our understanding of identity if we were finally to take seriously the poststructuralist notion that...our most fervent disidentifications may already harbor the very identity they seek to deny?\(^{147}\)

There are traces of this identification throughout Khan’s writing. In his *Work Books* Khan feels the “taint” of his “ancestry” that echoes the “swarthy taint” marking Luis’ exotic difference as a Jew. This taint is felt by Khan as an inner compulsion towards “war and soldiery”, “action” and “heroic social battle”.\(^{148}\) His “dark inheritance” moves him towards “dark recesses of my soul” where he is “still hankering after an ideal of heroism which is essentially militaristic, impersonal and political”.\(^{149}\) The hint of ironic self-critique here, which partly suggests the artificiality of Khan’s warlike, masculinized presentation of himself, also indicates the uneasy relationship he has with his own background

\(^{146}\) Ibid.


\(^{148}\) Hopkins, pp.3-4.

\(^{149}\) Ibid, p.4.
as a somewhat deracinated émigré in London, an uneasiness that mirrors what I read as his own disavowed filial connection with Jews.

Khan’s displacement of this “dark inheritance” into some similarly dark recesses of his soul also mirrors the ways in which Eliot himself identifies Oriental “alien languages” with a “relapse into unconsciousness” and Greek refinement with exactitude and coherence. Similarly for Khan, his civilized education at the hands of P.I. Painter cannot eradicate the apparently barbaric traits of his “ancestry”, which are figured as larval, embodied and pre-linguistic, irrupting to challenge the possibility of his full ‘Europeanization’. For Cheyette, this opposition in Eliot is his attempt to shore up the difference between Aryan and Jew.

This opposition, which Khan himself hopes to maintain by insisting on his Aryan pedigree, is complicated by his interest in James Joyce, further troubling the racial and cultural positioning in Khan’s imaginary. Joyce, Cheyette suggests, “embraces the confusion [of Aryan and Semite] in the figure of the ‘greekjewish’ Leopold Bloom”, whom Khan will himself encounter facing myriad forms of racist essentialism in his own copies of *Ulysses*. Likewise, Joyce scholar Len Platt explores the pleasure Joyce takes in the transgressive racial confusions of *Finnegans Wake*. Khan’s writing, I suggest in the final sections of this chapter, also carries elements of these confusions, transgressions, and ambiguities. Joyce’s own treatment of Jews is woven into Khan’s understanding of

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151 Ibid.

152 Ibid.

his own migrant experience, and built into his image of himself even as it is disavowed and rejected at other moments in his writing. In the interim, however, it is vital to explore further the implications of another image Khan takes great pains to cultivate: the warlike ‘Rajput Indian’.

Khan and the martial races

Khan’s image of himself is suffused with the characteristics of the warlike ‘Rajput Indian’ and in this regard mirrors exactly the sort of racial stereotyping that is used to produce Mr. Luis in When Spring Comes. Consequently, we can read into Mr. Luis Khan’s own anxieties about blackness and race thinking. It becomes uncannily fitting that a number of analysts and journalists - even in The New York Times - have accidentally misspelled K-H-A-N as K-A-H-N, the Ashkenazi form of the name.154

Heather Streets’ 2004 Martial Races is the most recent and comprehensive study of the titular ideology of late imperialism. The time of Khan’s family’s own ascendency to a position of relative power in the imperial administration was marked by an increasingly racialized emphasis on those considered reliable enough to help reinforce the existing power structure of British India, following the 1857 rebellion. This was principally marked by privileging within the military those who had “largely fought to defend the Raj”:

Within the next quarter century, Gurkhas, Sikhs, and other Punjabi and border groups had taken the place of the disgraced high-caste Hindus as the Indian Army’s most preferred soldiers. This dramatic shift in the army’s recruiting base, for the political and strategic goal of securing India from internal revolt, was increasingly justified in racial terms.155

154 Hopkins, p.33, p.403.

155 Streets, p.9.
The production of the particular categories of martial race were connected to an anxiety, Streets argues, about embedding effective masculinities in military service: they were “constructions, forged in a moment of crisis”. Streets identifies the vicissitudes of global imperial politics as the crisis calling forth these rigorous forms of race thinking:

British officers increasingly felt themselves challenged on all sides by the simultaneous spectres of Russian expansion into the northwest frontier region, German militarism, British recruiting difficulties, and Indian and Irish nationalism.

The Punjabi and border groups are the ones with whom Khan explicitly identifies, particularly the “rajput Indian” and the “Pathan chieftains” who appear in an extraordinary vignette in The Privacy of the Self. The martial races were admired for their gallantry, loyalty, horsemanship skills (Khan’s own family bred horses for the administration, and he continued to ride in Britain) and “courageous masculinity”. Bengalis, the ethnic and cultural group most heavily implicated in the rebellion of 1857, were conversely feminized and described as quick to passion, treacherous and “faithless”.

The Armies of India is a key source for understanding the rhetoric and ideology of martial race theory. As its author MacMunn puts it, “only certain races were permitted to bear arms, and in the course of time only certain races remained fit to bear arms”. Khan deliberately identifies himself with one of

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156 Ibid., p.11.
157 Ibid.
159 Streets, p.11. See also, Streets, p.291.
160 Ibid., p.291.
161 The Armies of India, p.130.
these races, the Rajputs. MacMunn suggests the Rajputs and their variegated clans produce a “valued soldier” who is remarkable for “their good behaviour, courtly manners, high courage, and physical endurance”.\textsuperscript{162} The Rajput are especially skilled horsemen “and hence provide a mounted soldier second to none”, exhibiting “pride of race and pride of weapons”.\textsuperscript{163} Khan’s own “feudal tradition”, which at times he is desperate to claim he exemplifies (he suggested to Anna Freud that he managed, on his father’s estate, “25,000 peasants”), is likewise closely associated with what MacMunn calls “Rajputana”.\textsuperscript{164} The Rajputs, he writes, “maintained their feudal system and held aloof from actual agriculture”: there are clear connections with Khan’s military horse-breeding background. “Those of the Rajputana”, MacMunn notes, “being famous as horse soldiers”.\textsuperscript{165}

The supposed characteristics of the Rajput Indian and the Punjabi warrior races can be spotted relatively easily in Khan’s writing, which, as he grows older, becomes increasingly concerned to present his physical prowess and presence in often eccentric case histories. Indeed, one of the major differences Khan posits between himself and Luis is that he is “physically fit”, “tall, handsome, a good polo and squash player” (Mr. Luis is “ageing” and “sagging”).\textsuperscript{166} Khan himself took polo lessons in London, and boasts elsewhere in \textit{When Spring Comes} that he was a “champion international rider and squash player”.\textsuperscript{167} Other accounts of Khan also emphasize his physicality and aggressivity in and out of

\textsuperscript{162} Ibid., p.144.
\textsuperscript{163} Ibid 205-206
\textsuperscript{164} Hopkins, p.47.
\textsuperscript{165} MacMunn, pp.157-158.
\textsuperscript{166} \textit{When Spring Comes}, p.91.
\textsuperscript{167} Ibid., p.136.
the consulting room. One patient describes Khan as “an enormous giant, wearing black robes and silver jewellery. I think I must have fallen in love instantly.” A particularly bizarre report from the now-renowned analyst and writer Susie Orbach (supervised by Khan for a number of years in the late 1970s) describes Khan telling a lurid tale of his dealing with a patient’s large and aggressive dog. Khan, tiring of the patient’s attempts to intimidate by bringing the dog to each session, explains to Orbach that he drew a large dagger “and slit the throat of the dog from ear to ear - he demonstrated that for us! He said he had to do this to show the man that he would not be able to destroy the analyst with his aggression”.168 “After we heard that story”, Orbach goes on, “we really thought he was mad”.169 Whilst Hopkins understandably questions the veracity of the story - it seems patently absurd - we can see how Khan’s identification of himself as a “martial” subject demonstrates precisely the ways in which, as Streets puts it, race is a “consciously manipulated and performative tool” that Khan invokes to structure expectations of his behaviour.170

An equally bizarre vignette from Hidden Selves lays bare the extent to which Khan models himself on Imperialist paradigms of martial races. Khan introduces us to a young female patient prone to aggressive outbursts, having formerly been hospitalized and restrained. After she threatens to “wreck” the consulting room, Khan the therapist decides to match her physicality with his:

She looked menacing and I felt she meant what she said. So I said to her: ‘Before you try any of your antics, please come and let us shake hands. She hesitated, did not move, but put out her right hand. I stood up, went over, and took hold of her hand firmly. ‘Please try and squeeze my hand’, I demanded. ‘I won’t!’

168 Hopkins, p.348.
169 Ibid.
170 Streets, p.7.
‘In that case, I will squeeze yours!’ She looked undecided for a moment, and then taunted me: ‘You won’t!’ I started to squeeze her hand, harder and harder. Within a minute, she was crumpled on the floor, shouting: ‘Let go! Let go! You are hurting me!’ ‘I mean to,’ I responded…I sat back in my chair and said firmly but gently to her: ‘You see, you cannot wreck my Consultation Room; not only am I physically stronger and more agile than you, but I have staff to provide me with coverage [Khan’s “houseboy” appears owing to the com-motion]. I don’t need hospitals.\textsuperscript{171}

The emphasis Khan places upon his physical capacities and aggression is, I suggest, intimately connected to Khan’s understanding of his own cultural identity and the discourses imbricated in its constitution. Indeed, the quasi-objective and anthropological discourses of ethnic and racial ‘characteristics’ and cultural practices also find their way into Khan’s writing. In \textit{The Privacy of the Self}, a nineteen year old woman Khan is treating returns from a break of four months in which she has been traveling.

Before lying down, she asked me: ‘Are you a Pathan from Northern India?’ I replied: ‘Almost, but not quite.’ She produced an article from some magazine about the Pathans of Northern India and their customs. She had come across it during her vacations and had cut it out for me. I said I would read it later, but perhaps she could tell me what had interested her specifically about them. She lay down, and for the first time was rather awkward in manner. Then she told me that this reporter had said that the elderly Pathan chieftains...adopted a young boy and he was their protege and accompanied them everywhere, and they would show him off as almost an angelic little being. That this did not necessarily involve buggery or sexual practices between the elder chieftain and his boy. She asked me whether it was true. I said it was, though not everyone could indulge this very specialized and responsible luxury. She laughed.\textsuperscript{172}


\textsuperscript{172} \textit{The Privacy of the Self}, pp.238-239.
Khan’s exchange with his patient here is striking for a number of reasons. The anecdote rehearses the situation of epistemological domination embedded in Khan’s colonial background. Khan himself is viewed by the patient in terms of a quasi-anthropological Orientalist discourse interpellating him into a legacy of ethnographic representations. Khan’s situation here is not dissimilar to the operation of the “racial epidermal schema” Fanon identifies in Black Skin, White Masks. “My body was given back to me”, Fanon writes, “sprawled out, distorted, re-colored”, and Khan’s own body here finds itself figured as ‘Pathan’, inscribing onto it customs and traditions from which Khan himself (as a collector of modernist art and venerator of Ulysses) is in reality somewhat distant. Fanon goes on, “I was responsible at the same time for my body, for my race, for my ancestors”, discovering in the moment of his racialization “my blackness, my ethnic characteristics; and I was battered down by tom-toms, cannibalism, intellectual deficiency, fetishism, racial defects”. Khan, whilst not finding cannibalism, certainly discovers an apparent sexual perversity (the suggestion of “buggery or sexual practices” between an old man and young boy) that constitute his, as Fanon puts it, “ethnic characteristics”.

But we might also note the equivocal nature of Khan’s response - “almost, but not quite” - and the “awkward manner” of the young woman when raising the question of Khan’s ethnic background. This scene also hints at Khan’s ambivalent attitude towards self-definition along racial lines and even suggests a muted discomfort with the forms of racial categorization that Khan, at other points, capitalizes on in When Spring Comes to articulate his rooted ethnic identity.

173 Fanon, p.113.
174 Ibid., p.112.
175 Ibid.
The invocation of ‘Pathans’ is doubly interesting when one examines their genealogy through *The Armies of India*. Like the ‘Rajput’ with whom Khan identifies himself in *When Spring Comes*, Pathans are considered resolutely loyal, martial and physically well-built. But they are also descendants, according to MacMunn, of the Jewish people:

It has been the fashion for all Afghans and Pathans for the last five hundred years to claim for themselves a common descent, and that descent a Jewish one. The Afghan proper, that is to say, the Durani clans, call themselves the Ben-i- Israel, the Children of Israel, and the legendary ancestor is one Kais, the chief of the descendants of a Jewish settlement in the Mountains of Ghor which lie north-west of Kandahar…all Afghan and Pathan tribes trace their origin, and cling to the Jewish legend.176

Khan’s foregrounding of his ‘tradition’ and ethnic background in his psychoanalytic writing is no less an attempt to displace the Jewishness he identifies with psychoanalysis, and which he identifies covertly with himself. Khan’s recourse to ethnographic tropes is in one regard a way of marking his version of psychoanalysis with his own ethnic and cultural particularity. The way in which Khan uses Eliot’s concept of tradition to elide psychoanalytic therapy with his exilic continuation of a “feudal tradition” and “tradition of nurture” is discussed at length in chapter two. Khan, like Eliot, disparages psychoanalysis in *When Spring Comes* as a Jewish or “parvenu” (as Eliot puts it) science.177 Its practitioners, he suggests in the final pages of the book, develop “elaborate circumcision rituals” and are “collectors of prepuces”.178 His own project is “freeing myself of the Yiddish shackles of the so-called psychoanalysis”.179 Indeed, Sander Gilman

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176 *The Armies of India*, p.146.

177 For examples of Eliot’s attacks on psychoanalysis as a “parvenu” science, see Julius, p.145.

178 *When Spring Comes*, p.192.

179 Ibid., p.62.
has already noted in considering Khan and C.G. Jung’s anti-Semitism that “the superficiality of the Jewish parvenu in the realm of culture is a set theme in anti-Semitic discourse within psychoanalysis”.\(^{180}\) Khan’s treatment of Luis accordingly follows the logic of representing Jews as Hannah Arendt’s pariahs and parvenus.\(^{181}\) Eliot himself, Julius suggests, sees Freud as “an object of scorn” and psychoanalysis as “quackery” - a “fashionable science” that he ridicules because it is (as Julius says) “new”.\(^{182}\)

Khan’s attempts to articulate a fully ‘feudal’ ‘Rajput’ psychoanalysis are contingent on a disavowal of the Jewishness associated with psychoanalysis and the denial of his own blackness. What I would like to examine is how Khan and the Jewishness he purports to despise are inextricably connected. It becomes increasingly apparent that the work of repression enacted in ‘A Dismaying Homosexual’ is inevitably incomplete - I identify a number of curious parallels between Khan and his Semitic double in both textual and biographical terms. Furthermore, there are major points of identification between his position as a non-white non-European migrant, who can neither be assimilated completely nor identified as simply ‘Indian’, and the protean figure of the Jewish migrant or exile whom Khan encounters in modernism. Khan’s response to the question “Are you a Pathan from Northern India?” marks him out as resistant and heterogenous (“Almost, but not quite”), and brings him into proximity with similar understandings of Jews in modernity signifying multiplicity and non-integration.

\(^{180}\) *The Jew’s Body*, p.197.

\(^{181}\) For Arendt’s discussion of antagonisms displayed towards Jews and homosexuals in Proust’s *À la Recherche du Temps Perdu*, and the case of Alfred Dreyfus, see ‘Between Pariah and Parvenu’ and ‘The Dreyfus Affair’, in Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (London: Harcourt, 1976). It is striking that the equivalence Arendt and Proust draw between the status of Jews and homosexuals in their respective analyses is manifested in Khan’s characterization of Luis as a gay Jew.

\(^{182}\) Julius, pp.145-146.
He recognises in himself the “amorphousness” by which Jews are characterised in *When Spring Comes*. “I coexist”, Khan suggests in his *Work Books*, “parallelly in multiple realities, external as well as internal”.\(^{183}\) Indeed, it is telling that he plays down his own status as migrant/exile in ‘A Dismaying Homosexual’ with an inflated rhetoric of rootedness and tradition but does not fail to point out Luis’ deracinated background. Maud Ellman’s perceptive discussion of Eliot’s and Pound’s figuration of Jews in their writing provides a useful model that can be adapted for thinking about Khan’s own relationship to Jewishness. “Pound and Eliot reveal”, for Ellmann, “the dangers of identification, of this consuming love in which the object has to be destroyed”.\(^{184}\) If Eliot creates in the figure of the Jew his own double, reviling “what [Pound and Eliot] both cherished and feared in themselves”, then such vitriol lays bare the political problems of identifying as altogether. “To identify oneself as male or female, white or black, Gentile or Jew,” Ellmann writes, “is always to produce a hated double: it is to repeat the error of Eliot and Pound, who projected their own darkness upon the Jews”.\(^{185}\) If Khan’s anti-Semitism can be read likewise as the culmination of “a lifelong struggle to exorcise his unknown self”,\(^{186}\) then it is a struggle whose outcome is also circumscribed by the modernist writers - Joyce and Eliot - Khan most cherishes. And, if Eliot’s work enacts the oppositions of Aryan and Semite that Khan rehearses in *When Spring Comes*, then why does Joyce’s writing, a writing that Bryan Cheyette (amongst many others) argues ironizes and debunks such oppositions, fail to temper his anti-Semitism or call out a more explicit realisation on Khan’s part of his complex relationship with Jews?

\(^{183}\) Khan, cited in Hopkins, p.36.


\(^{185}\) Ibid.

\(^{186}\) Ibid., p.100.
Masud Khan meets Joyce’s Citizen

When Khan refers to Jewish analysts as “collectors of prepuces”, he adopts a turn of phrase so bizarre that it could only come from James Joyce. This phrase is used at two points in Ulysses: in ‘Telemachus’ and ‘Scylla and Charybdis’. Khan’s allusion is evocative and revealing in both instances. In ‘Telemachus’, Buck Mulligan remarks in a blasphemous mock anthropological and imperialist aside to Haines, the Englishman, that “the islanders speak frequently of the collector of prepuces”, after the old woman delivering the milk to Martello tower says “Glory be to God.” Mulligan addresses Haines in a wry treatment of the ethnographic imperialism to which that particular Englishman is intellectually and culturally committed. His remark invokes the stock images of British imperialism - the primitive “islanders” with pre-modern and non-European religions. Khan might be invoking Mulligan’s words - it is not clear whether it is intentional or otherwise - to describe Jews, yet his words also carry the weight of the history of colonisation, and the racialized logic of that particular historical formation. Khan’s Semitic discourse contains, in other words, the historical scene of colonisation. We also know that Khan read this section of the novel around the time of his composing When Spring Comes, owing to a bookmark found between pages 12-13, and other information in his copy of the 1986 text, discussed below.

In ‘Scylla and Charybdis’ it is Mulligan who mentions “Jehovah, the collector of prepuces” during his conversation with Stephen in the National Li-

187 When Spring Comes, p.192.


Mulligan thinks of Bloom two lines before, mentioning in a derogatory way his Jewish background: “Who is he? Ikey Moses? Bloom.” But a mere one hundred lines later it is the sexual and marital habits of Jews that come under scrutiny, when Stephen reflects on the work of Thomas Aquinas, noting that “Jews...are of all races most given to intermarriage”. Again, the allusion touches on thematic aspects of Khan’s writing on race in *When Spring Comes*, which is explicitly concerned with Luis’ racially transgressive sexual relationships, and, I argue, implicitly, with Khan’s relationships with white women.

What these scenes indicate is the manner in which Khan’s writing of race and Jewishness is conducted with Joyce, as well as T.S. Eliot, in the background, in a number of senses. We can connect Khan’s reading of the ‘Cyclops’ episode to the writing of *When Spring Comes* quite precisely. Khan’s 1986 copy of *Ulysses*, the corrected text edited by Hans Walter Gabler, features a bookmark - a small scrap of paper - in the middle of ‘The Cyclops’ episode of the novel, a chapter that has implications for understanding Khan’s attitudes towards race and migration. The 1986 publication date makes it clear that Khan must have been reading *Ulysses* in the course of the composition of *When Spring Comes*, the manuscript of which first went to Chatto’s freelance editor in July 1986.

The front endpaper of the book offers additional evidence of Khan’s reading *Ulysses* at the same time as his composing *When Spring Comes*. Although Khan has, for one reason or another, pasted the endpaper directly onto the facing page, we can still make out some of what was originally written there: a scrawled signature; some illegible writing at the top of the page accompanied by

190 *Ulysses*, p.257.
191 Ibid.
192 Ibid., p.264.
193 Hopkins, p.364.
by another date or cipher; and a date running along the bottom of the page.\textsuperscript{194} Although the date is difficult to read and only faintly visible, when reversed it becomes apparent that Khan is using Urdu numerals rather than Arabic ones to write the date. Translating these figures puts the date at 25th of June 1986, which again places his reading of Ulysses alongside the writing of When Spring Comes.\textsuperscript{195} The editing of the book, Hopkins reports, “went on for months”, and it took a great deal of time to turn the manuscript into a series of publishable chapters. The completion of the ‘Foreword’ and ‘A Dismaying Homosexual’ - along with the latter chapters and afterword - is dated 1987, which easily makes them contemporaneous with Khan’s revisiting of Joyce’s novel.

Revisiting Khan’s engagements with Joyce provides some opportunities to explore his treatment of race, and his vision of himself, in When Spring Comes. The parallels between Khan and HCE’s nomadic son Shem in Finnegans Wake have been discussed in chapter three as regards the relationship between epiphany, exile and the tentative ethics of the object Khan advances through his notion of the ‘private’ self. But it is also worth noting that Shem is not only a “serendipitist” and an “Irish emigrant the wrong way out” but also “semi-semitic”, much like Leopold Bloom, who is also vilified because of his Jewish background.

Indeed, Shem himself is denigrated because of his apparent Jewishness and non-white ethnic origin (seemingly both Asian and African). The “semi-semitic” character, as Maren Linett points out in her reading of the novel as ‘The Jew’s Text’, is described by his brother Shaun - the white Irish “nationist” - as an “Esuan Menschavik” (185.35). His writing - composed on his own body using ink made from his own shit - is described as “harrobrew bad” (419.27), which

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[194]{Library of Masud Khan, Ulysses: The Corrected Text (1986), front endpaper.}
\footnotetext[195]{With thanks to Dr. Ziad Elmarsafy, University of York, for help with this translation.}
\end{footnotes}
Linett suggests mingles “‘Hebrew with ‘horribly’ and ‘harrowing’”. The “nomadic” or perhaps even stateless “Europasianized Afferyank” is a deracinated wanderer, a “national apostate” who travels everywhere but settles nowhere.

It is worth reflecting on some examples of particular relevance to Khan’s reading of *Finnegans Wake* as they highlight questions connected with race and racism in the text. Shem is constructed as non-white in a move that mirrors the anti-Semitic trope of figuring Jews as non-European or Oriental: he is, according to Shaun, “negertop, negertoe, negertoby, negrunter!” Shem has a “tanbark complexion” that is the reason for his “being warmed of the ricecourse of marrimoney, under the Helpless Corpse Enactment”. This appearance of the HCE sigla evokes the Nuremburg race laws forbidding intermarriage leaving Shem in the universe of *Finnegans Wake* “forbidden tomate” - it is in this scene that the text records, for Linett, “the history of European Jews in the years between the wars”. Presciently for Khan, it is Shem who is identified with racial-sexual transgressions. Khan’s own distaste for Luis’ sexual-racial transgressions - which can be also be read as projections of his own encounters with European

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women - are complicated much further by their association with this figure who is heavily implicated in Khan’s exilic and epiphanic psychoanalysis.

Alluded to here is the same fascism Khan attacks in The Privacy of the Self and Alienation in Perversions, and we should accordingly emphasize Khan’s ambivalence. Rather than speculating whose ‘side’ Khan may have ‘taken’ in this quasi-argument between Shem and Shaun - he obviously both espouses a fascist anti-Semitism and an exilic plurality resisting the monologic of those forms of nationalism - we could instead suggest that Finnegans Wake, along with parallel moments in the ‘Cyclops’ episode of Ulysses, show how Khan sits on the political fault lines of Euro-modernism. Indeed, the dichotomy of Shem and
Shaun, in whom Finn Fordham sees the exteriorization of Joyce’s own critics, “the part of him that criticizes himself”, show in relation to Khan the range of positions on offer in his beloved modernist canon between which he veers throughout his life and writing.201 Khan’s political and racial consciousness is, like Joyce’s, scattered across not just Finnegans Wake but all of the modernist authors of whom he is enamoured. Diana Fuss describes identifications as necessarily carrying with them the “capacity to reverse and disguise themselves, to multiply and contravene one another, to disappear and reappear years later”.202 It is this “astonishing mobility and plasticity of hysterical identification”,203 and identifying with and as that allows different versions of Khan’s exilic identity to proliferate across a range of modernist texts.

It is in two of Khan’s copies of Ulysses that we find the most compelling evidence for the connection of Khan’s anti-Semitism with other aspects of racism and the problems of identity Khan’s faced as a migrant. A bookmark in Khan’s 1946 Everyman edition of Joyce’s novel provides a vital clue. In the so-called ‘Cyclops’ episode, Leopold Bloom faces the anti-Semitic abuse of a heterogenous group of Irish nationalists in Barney Kiernan’s pub, principally headed up by the boorish ‘Citizen’, a character Joyce bases on Michael Cusack, the founder of Gaelic Athletic Association. The Citizen is an avowed Fenian and spends much of the chapter advocating violent insurrection against the British and extolling the virtues of Irish language and culture. The unnamed narrator of the chapter, from whose point of view the scene unfolds, moves between the conversation taking place in the pub to more expansive and fantastical episodes concerning famous Irishmen and the execution of Nationalist rebel Robert Em-


202 Identification Papers, p.2.

203 Ibid., p.115.
The chapter climaxes with the citizen attacking Bloom by hurling a biscuit tin at him after an impassioned argument about Bloom’s nationality and loyalty.

The episode is a powerful and funny reflection on political nationalism, the relationship of race and culture and the attitude towards migrants like Jews. I will here concentrate on moments in the text particularly pertinent to Khan as a non-European migrant in postwar and postcolonial Britain. Vincent Cheng suggests that the chapter is Joyce’s attack on forms of anti-colonial nationalism and “a wonderfully concise illustration of the cycloptic myopia of polarized binaries”.204 In Khan’s 1946 edition of the novel, a bookmark - Khan uses a business card for a television and Hi-Fi shop in Stuttgart (fig.9) falls between pages 332-333.205 This bookmark itself suggests a link between Khan’s reading of Joyce and the anti-Semitic sections of When Spring Comes. Khan refers to Mr. Luis as a “Hausfrau”. Khan writes: “I had deliberately used that word; I had heard it used in Stuttgart to describe ageing poofs.” Linda Hopkins writes that Khan frequently visit Stuttgart with Beriosova, whose father was the Ballet master at the Opera house, especially in the early stages of their relationship, whilst Khan was nevertheless still married to Jane Shore. But what this particular textual artefact shows is not simply that Stuttgart was a key location for Khan’s sexual relationships, and this is somehow refracted back into his anti-Semitic writing; it also crystallises a connection between Khan’s reading of Ulysses and the tropes he marshals to describe Mr. Luis.

In this passage of Cyclops, we read some of the citizen’s most vicious anti-Semitic attacks on Bloom: “A wolf in sheep’s clothing, says the citizen. That’s what he is. Virag from Hungary! Ahasuerus I call him. Cursed by

204 Cheng, Joyce, Race and Empire, p.214.

205 Library of Masud Khan, Ulysses (1946), pp.332-333.
Bloom, despite being born in Ireland, is from an immigrant family, and is seen as a foreigner, “Ahasuerus” identifying Bloom with ‘Ahasver’, the wandering Jew. The citizen reflects on the subhuman character of Jews, wondering aloud to J.J. Molloy, “Do you call that a man?” Khan’s own anti-Semitic portrait of Luis imagines him similarly as a “venomous creature” and “could-become-a-person creature”. These pages of *Ulysses* contains some of the most violent expressions of xenophobia in the episode: “Saint Patrick would want us to land again at Ballykinlar and convert us, says the citizen, after allowing things like that to contaminate our shores”. The unnamed narrator joins in, “It’d be an act of God to take hold of a fellow the like of that and throw him in the bloody sea. Justifiable homicide, so it would”.

The bookmark in his 1986 edition, a scrap of paper, falls approximately twenty pages earlier than in Khan’s 1946 copy, where we find the discussion of hanging and Bloom’s attempts to medically explain the *post-mortem* erection. Bloom’s Jewishness is hardly ignored by the narrator here. Remarking on the attention Bloom gets from the citizen’s mongrel dog, Garryowen, the narrator speculates “I’m told those Jewies does have a queer odour coming off them for dogs”. After Bloom’s explanation begins, the narrator xenophobically describes him again as “Herr Professor Luitpold Blumenduft”, emphasising...

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206 Ibid., p.332.

207 Ibid.


210 Ibid.


212 Ibid.
Bloom’s background as a European Jew. Bloom’s argument with the citizen is cut short, on the facing page, by the citizen’s Fenian outburst:

-You don’t grasp my point, says Bloom, what I mean is...
-Sinn Fein! says the citizen. Sinn Fein Amhain!213

The citizen’s silencing of Bloom here with nationalist rhetoric is striking, as it is apparent that the nation the citizen has in mind is not one that will include Jews or other foreigners. Khan, writing in the late 1980s, is reading passages in the Cyclops episode that throws into sharp relief the consequences of xenophobic and racist nationalism - the denial of racial heterogeneity and the silencing of diverse voices. But the moment cuts both ways: the citizen’s ‘ourselves alone’ also resonates with Khan’s rebarbative distancing of himself from the psychoanalytic community and normal clinical procedures in an hysterical and self-regarding protest at his apparent victimisation. The citizen’s exclusionary rhetoric could also be, more troublingly, a darker mirror image of the isolated, exilic dreaming subject of Khan’s psychoanalysis: this time self-aggrandizing and deliberately antagonistic.

We may be led to wonder, then, whether Khan’s invocation of the Holocaust in When Spring Comes does not just indict him as a crypto-fascist but also articulates deep anxieties about the consequences of race thinking. The chapter concludes with the citizen’s hurling a biscuit box at Bloom, but such threats of violence against contaminating foreigners - “we want no more strangers in our house”,214 the citizen remarks - must have a peculiar resonance in a society that was, as suggested in one the letters posted to Powell, terrified of black men having sexual relationships with white women; such transgressions were only one

213 Ibid., p.251.

214 Ulysses 310
step away from racialized violence. Shaun, in *Finnegans Wake*, suggests of Shem that he will “dumb well show him what the Shaun way is like how we’ll go a long way towards breaking his outsider’s face”.

The problems of national belonging are also thrown into relief in this section of *Ulysses*. One the page proceeding Khan’s bookmark in his Everyman edition, John Wyse and Molloy argue the rootless existence of the Jewish migrant is the outward expression of dubious personal and political integrity.

-And after all, says John Wyse, why can’t a jew love his country like the next fellow?
-Why not? says J.J., when he’s quite sure which country it is.

This uncertainty about Bloom’s national affiliation is also anticipated by the citizen a few pages earlier:

-What is your nation if I may ask, says the citizen.
-Ireland, says Bloom. I was born here. Ireland.
The citizen said nothing only cleared the spit out of his gullet and, gob, he spat a Red bank oyster out of him right in the corner.

The citizen’s incredulity at Bloom’s claim is obvious. Bloom’s own repetition of “Ireland” in his response is double edged - the epanalepsis reveals his own anxieties about whether Ireland is indeed his own country whilst also expressing the hope that it might. The multiplicity of Bloom’s affiliations - Jewish, Irish, central European migrant - mirrors the ambiguities surrounding Khan’s own citizenship. Linda Hopkins suggests that Khan is a “man without a coun-

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215 For an account of the ‘white riots’ that were connected to perceived racial-sexual transgressions, see Paul, *Whitewashing Britain*, pp.155-156.

216 *Finnegans Wake*, p.442.22-23.


218 Ibid., p.327.
try”,219 as he declined to take up Pakistani citizenship, but the situation for Khan as a non-white colonial migrant travelling before Partition and residing in Britain during the foundation of India and Pakistan is just as ambiguous, though distinct from, more cut-and-dried forms of statelessness. Khan’s irreducible cultivation of a range of identities marks him with Bauman’s proteophobia just as Bloom is marked: “Is he a jew or a gentile or a holy Roman or a swaddler or what the hell is he? says Ned. Or who is he?” Bloom, we read earlier, is “one of those mixed middlings”.220 Likewise, Luis himself is, as Khan puts it, “a polymorph, unintegrated”, and his “psychosexual pathologies were as polymorph and viscous as the rest of him”.221

In the face of the citizen’s xenophobia and racism, Bloom makes a double appeal in terms of his identity: for Joyce’s citizen, this is exactly the problem, as this appeal rejects the racist conflation of nationality and ethnicity. The first is to the fact of his birth in Ireland, a nationality based on natality that takes the accident of birth and coincidence of geography as the foundation of citizenship, a position consistent with the Ius Soli of much twentieth century European nationality law. Additionally, Bloom appeals to his Jewishness, belonging to “a race too” “that is hated and persecuted”.222 Bloom’s double belonging, for Vincent Cheng, resists the “monologic” of racist nationalism.

Bloom’s appeal to the fact of his Irish birth as qualification for Irish citizenship is considered insufficient for nationalists like the citizen because it does not necessarily mean that Bloom has the required immersion in the Irish language or culture that he sees as integral to Irishness per se. “What’s the latest

219 Hopkins, p.178.


221 When Spring Comes, p.99.

from the scene of action?”, the citizen asks, “What did those tinkers in the city-hall at their caucus meeting decide about the Irish language?”223 Earlier in the chapter we read that the citizen “begins talking about the Irish language and the corporation and meeting and all to that and the shoneens that can’t speak their own language”.224 Joyce references the Gaelic League’s attempts to teach “shoneens” - effete gentlemen aspiring to Bourgeois colonial values225 - the Irish language and to reinvigorate interest in Irish culture. But what is crucial here is the association of ‘native’ language with authenticity and political identity, something which is further buttressed by reviving, for instance, traditional sports: the citizen’s historical counterpart, Michael Cusack, was the founder of the Gaelic Athletic Association, and we read accordingly that “off they started about Irish sport and shoneen games the like of the lawn tennis and about hurley and putting the stone...and building up a nation once again and all of that”.226

To restate, then, the earlier argument about Finnegans Wake in relation to Ulysses: rather than simply identifying Khan with Bloom (or the citizen) we might instead note the way in which this episode of Ulysses embodies the split in Khan’s writing between the idealized cosmopolitan selfhood of European modernism (Shem and Bloom) and his own reactionary ethnocentric and monological forms of identification (the citizen). In relation to the latter, it is worth noting that Khan’s fondness for polo and horse riding can be read as gesturing to this ‘authentic’ racialized subjectivity derived from his imperialist background.

223 Ibid., p.311.

224 Ibid., p.297.


These questions of language and culture are indeed refracted through Khan’s copies of Joyce’s novel. I have already noted, for instance, the fact that Khan misspells ‘Hum safar’ in the front of his student copy of *Ulysses*. Likewise, in a case history with the similarly privileged and cosmopolitan Muslim woman ‘Aisha’ in *When Spring Comes*, Khan remarks on his own sense of alienation from, and lack of facility with, the particular Urdu dialects through which they converse in the course of her analysis. “My Chakwali Punjabi”, Khan writes, “is no match for [her] Chanauti accent and clipped phrasing. Her vocabulary is much larger than mine”.227 Aisha, like Khan, moves between different languages and cultures as she moves around the analytic space. “She had talked in her native Punjabi mixed with English and also some French”, Khan notes.228 When “sitting up and facing me” “she spoke English and French”, but when “lying down” she speaks in Urdu and “Chanuti Punjabi”.229 It is worth noting in passing that Aisha, like Mr. Luis, has “swarthy skin” that “become[s] her”.230 Aisha’s use of Urdu appears familiar and unfamiliar to Khan, marking for readers both his cultural difference (his references to unfamiliar Urdu vernaculars must have left his Anglophone readers somewhat bewildered) and his alienation from his mother tongue.

The other bookmark in the 1946 edition is prescient (fig.10): a voucher or ticket for a complimentary “conversation class” in French, German, English or Spanish at an Oxford Street language school in London.231 It is a striking marker of Khan’s cosmopolitan aspirations. Indeed, the presence of the voucher in the

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227 *When Spring Comes*, p.176.

228 Ibid.

229 Ibid., p.181.

230 Ibid.

novel as bookmark demonstrates the ways in which Khan brings his own migrant experience into contact with the modernist versions of self-creation that Joyce’s text has come to exemplify. Khan certainly fancied himself in *When Spring Comes* as polyglot, boasting of acquiring “seven languages”\(^\text{232}\) and elsewhere peppered his work with long stretches of untranslated French critical theory (see, for instance, his reproduction long passages of Roland Barthes’ *Writing: Degree Zero* in *The Privacy of the Self* and his following insistence that

\(^{232}\text{When Spring Comes, p.136.}\)
Barthes’ term *écriture* must remain untranslated). But Khan’s trumpeting of his own multilingualism is also accompanied by a sense that he was never entirely comfortable in any of his adopted languages and, although an often skilled writer of English prose, having a number of difficulties with English prepositions meaning that “Hogarth had to do a lot of work on his typescripts”.

“At times”, his editor Mark Paterson writes, “his writing was faulty”.

When the citizen asks Bloom what he considers a nation to be, Bloom responds by suggesting that it is “the same people living in the same place” (317). The social homogeneity of Bloom’s statement is amplified by its appearance in one of Khan’s other key texts: Eliot’s *After Strange Gods*.

Tradition is not solely, or even primarily, the maintenance of certain dogmatic beliefs; these beliefs have come to take their living form in the course of the formation of a tradition. What I mean by tradition involves all those habitual actions, habits and customs, from the most significant religious rite to our conventional way of greeting a stranger, which represent the blood kinship of ‘the same people living in the same place’.

The double presence of Joyce’s critique of race thinking from *Ulysses*, and then its peculiar re-articulation in Eliot’s more reactionary vision of culture, shows the extent to which Khan’s writing rehearses the ambivalences of race and place embedded in Euro-modernist discourse. This doubling, though, shows the twin appeals Khan makes, on the one hand, to racial homogeneity as the guarantee of a stable socio-political identity, and, on the other, to a form of

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234 Hopkins, p.438.

235 Ibid.


237 *After Strange Gods*, p.18.
unbounded cosmopolitanism. But the appeal to a racialized ‘tradition’ to which Khan so powerfully commits himself is already ironized in Eliot’s invocation of Bloom’s remarks about “the same people living in the same place.” For Maud Ellmann, this is an idea that Joyce “has already consigned to the ridiculous” and she indicts Eliot’s rejection of the cosmopolitan Jew in *After Strange Gods* because it is only made possible through Bloom, “the most free-thinking” of free-thinking Jews.238 “The same people living in the same place”, for Khan the committed reader of Eliot, must inevitably mean racial and religious sameness, and it is precisely these forms of essentialism that emerge in Khan’s own Semitic discourse. In *When Spring Comes* Khan does not align himself with a race that is hated and persecuted: he goes to great pains to distance himself from blackness. Instead, he comes down on the side of racial and religious homogeneity. These manifestations of racial essentialism are the frustrated expression and reproduction of the race thinking that structures colonial and postcolonial experience in Britain.

*Cits and Citizenship in When Spring Comes*

The implicit connections between race, citizenship and nationality in the ‘Cyclops’ episode resonates with the situation of colonial migrants like Khan in British immigration policy from the late 1940s onwards, and the question of citizenship also enters the frame toward the end of Khan’s case history for Mr. Luis. Khan’s career in London is framed by the crisis of ‘Britishness’ and its concomitant anxieties about what a political community should look like that are exemplified in Powellism. Their discussion of “cits” and citizens that closes Khan’s case history may even mark the intrusion of the citizen from ‘Cyclops’ into *When Spring Comes*. Khan concludes the chapter by relaying Mr. Luis’ explanation of “the American civet, Mr. Luis’ somewhat nasty, but one has to grant

him pertinent, euphemism for the civilizations (in the plural) of the USA”.

Mr. Luis fetches the OED and Webster’s dictionary from Khan’s waiting room - but before he goes, Luis leaves Khan with “something for you to think about”:

The USA has no - or very few - citizens in the English or French sense of the word. It has cits instead. Now a cit is a clever and expert lowly trader. Always a yid or a goy. Almost never a Black or a Red Indian...I wrote an essay about it at college. This is how I know what cit means...My argument was then, as it is today, that the USA is the first nation known to Homo sapiens that has created a scatter of civilisations, spread all over America, without creating a culture of any sort.

Luis explains this cultural deficit by suggesting the United States has “very few citizens”. “We are the first...of Homo sapiens”, he goes on, “who breed a special category of cits” (Luis’ examples include Abraham Lincoln, Roosevelt, and the Kennedys) “not peasants or gentry or noblemen - known to us as “citizens” in quotes, from whom we elect our political leaders”. Luis describes a Jewish and Gentile political elite who are like “the Elders of the Athenian city states” and the “Consuls of the Italian oligarchies, and the Kings and Queens of Europe”. Luis’ ‘citizens’ are manifestly non-aristocratic but are nevertheless bred - for him the difference between American and European civilisations is that the former propagates itself “all over the globe, for profit only, without soliciting conversions or convictions”. This is done, so Luis says, by the white cits who “cultivate the civet of African cats - of course I couldn’t say the Blacks, though I meant them”. Luis identifies blackness with

239 When Spring Comes, p.113.

240 Ibid.

241 Ibid., p.114.

242 Ibid.

243 Ibid., p.115.

244 Ibid.
powerlessness (a cit is “almost never a Black”), animality and rank physicality, going on to quote the definition of civet from the OED:

a. A genus of carnivorous quadrupeds, yielding the secretion called by the same name. Specifically, the central African species, *Viverra civetta*...

b. A yellowish or brownish unctuous substance, having a strong musky smell, obtained from sacs or glands in the anal pouch of several animals of the *Civet* genus.²⁴⁵

The symbolism here is multifaceted and evocative. Khan and Luis’ critique of the materialistic United States argues that its “citizens” are mere cits: truncated; inauthentic; the spurious product of an alienated modernity that is overly secularized. The absurd and parodic version of cits and citizenship Luis advances might be understood additionally as an undermining any faith we might have in notions of rights or citizenship as promising equality or emancipation for migrants in ethnically diverse societies - Luis’ critique, Khan suggests, is particularly powerful because of his exilic perspective:

Mr Luis, who was born to displaced Russian immigrants and had never really settled in America before he had been pushed over to Europe, had quite a knack for perceiving realities, that others missed, and phrasing them with an impish, dry, often salacious wit.²⁴⁶

Khan and Luis’ confusing and highly idiosyncratic discussion of “cits”, civets and citizens does not produce a defined legalistic version of national belonging, instead connecting it variously to class and race in often inconsistent and incongruous ways. Indeed, the hooking together of race and citizenship in this vignette expresses the political and ideological debates that framed discussions of migration in Khan’s political context.

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²⁴⁵ Ibid., p.113.

²⁴⁶ Ibid.
One way this discussion can be read with reference to the confusion and ambiguity expressed about non-white former colonial migrants in UK citizenship law between 1948 and the 1980s. Fiorello Dell’Olio describes British immigration law from 1948-1981 as marking a shift from ‘Subjecthood’ to ‘Citizenship’.\(^{247}\) In 1946, before the partition of India, Khan would have been considered a British subject given his birth and residency in colonial India. Before the 1948 Nationality Act, those born in the colonies of the British Empire automatically appeared under the banner of subject of the British Empire, though particular areas of the Empire were allowed to grant “local nationalities” which carried weight only in the territory of their creation.\(^{248}\)

The partition of India and Pakistan left migrants like Khan with a choice - to apply for citizenship rights in these new states or to remain a ‘British subject’. What the 1948 Act did was to replace ‘subjecthood’ with the category of ‘Citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies’, which would apply to anyone born or naturalised within the British Isles or one of its colonies. This was, Kathleen Paul remarks, the beginning “of an adventure involving citizenship, subjecthood, national identity and migration from which [the Attlee government’s] successors have not yet extricated themselves”.\(^{249}\) The 1948 act was a last-ditch attempt to solidify the “universal citizenship” of the British empire in the face of increasing pressure from anti-colonial nationalisms across the imperial world. “Subjects of color”, Paul writes, were allowed to become “members of the imperial political community of Britishness”, but this was an attempt to forestall calls for colonial independence masquerading as equality.\(^{250}\) Khan,


\(^{248}\) Paul, *Whitewashing Britain*, p.11.

\(^{249}\) Ibid., p.10.

\(^{250}\) Ibid., p.23.
then, was not, strictly speaking, a man without a country, as Hopkins suggests, in the late 1940s. Subsequent legislation would not revoke his naturalised citizenship, but the political climate was nonetheless one in which race and citizenship were inextricably bound up.

Despite the apparent inclusivity of this legislation, there also existed “an exclusive familiar community defined by blood and culture”. In short, the difference between “British subjects” (residents of the Empire who were from African or Asian heritage) and “British stock” (white Europeans). The tension between these two ideas of the migrant would culminate in an increasingly reactionary immigration policy in an attempt to codify and solidify the idea of Britishness along racial lines. “The situation”, Dell’Olio argues, “changed...when it was considered to have been a mistake ever to have included colonial citizens in the same category of citizenship as people from the UK”.

Race and the notion of “European-ness” were instrumental in shaping attitudes towards citizenship in the following years, with legislation “sharpening the divide between separate spheres of nationality” and “competing communities of Britishness”. Indeed, a hardening of attitudes towards colonial migrants founds its corollary in an increasingly tolerant attitude towards Italian and Irish migrants, who were literally welcomed, as Paul puts it, “with tea and buns”. The valorization of white European migrants only served, of course, to further marginalise and exclude Asiatic migrants. The basis of this exclusion was, again, race: from the 1950s onwards attitudes towards immigration and

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251 Ibid.
252 Dell’Olio, The Europeanization of Citizenship, p.35.
254 Ibid., p.76.
the granting of citizenship took for granted the connection of skin colour with inherent physical traits and mental attitudes, and demonstrates the persistence of the race thinking operating in Khan’s own background in pre-Independence Pakistan. For all intents and purposes, “all colonials” were defined as black and thus divided the population into proper spheres of Britishness: “white and British, coloured and immigrant”. Immigration itself was constructed as a generalised problem through a combination of “proactive initiatives” (government spokespeople discussing immigration in terms designed to excite and goad the public) and “inactivity” (the deliberate neglect of social services and infrastructure required for new communities of migrants).

The two pieces of immigration legislation subsequent to the 1948 Act - 1962 and 1971 - codified this attitude in the law by placing increasingly strict controls on migration and then finally by insisting that citizenship proper be contingent on patriality - direct ancestral connection to the United Kingdom. The 1962 Act introduced a ‘voucher’ system for colonial migrants which was principally designed “to work against migrants”, and although it was ostensibly colourblind, its chief virtue was considered to be its practical capacity to “operate on coloured people almost exclusively”. The voucher system put immigrants in an increasingly precarious position and subjected them to “political and economic considerations”. But the act is also notable for its creation of a new legal understanding of the migrant as distinct from British citizenship proper. It is worth repeating that although Khan himself was not under threat of deportation or what we might see as ‘real’ statelessness, these legal discourses were shaped by public and political attitudes towards race in the United Kingdom.

\[\text{255 Ibid., p.168.}\]

\[\text{256 Ibid., p.166.}\]

\[\text{257 Ibid.}\]

\[\text{258 Ibid.}\]
Kingdom. The emergence of this situation vis-a-vis migrants in Britain can be understood as giving Khan’s reading of Joyce’s novel a particularly personal urgency and relevance.

The greatest irony of the 1971 Act, which emerged from increasingly conservative debates in the 1960s about immigration and was finally codified by the Heath government, should be understood in relation to the ‘Cyclops’ episode. For Paul, the emphasis on patriality meant that the Act finally gave “concrete form” to, and legally differentiated between, various communities of Britishness: “the truly British - those descended from white colonizers” and “individuals who had become British through conquest or domination”. Khan’s own UK Citizenship status was not compromised by the Act (as he had lived in Britain for more than five years) but the lack of a close familial connection to ‘Britishness’ meant that his own citizenship moves, in this context, in the direction of the “nonpatrial”. Even though Khan would retain the right to live in Britain, the discourse of citizenship and belonging had oscillated towards whiteness and a traceable connection to the land itself. Leopold Bloom’s resolute insistence on his right to belong owing to his Irish birth (despite being the son of immigrants) is thus one that would not even be possible for Khan to identify with in Britain. Khan’s veneration of his ethnicized feudal tradition can be read in this context as the tragic internalization of the kinds of racially essentialist forms of identity seen as defining belonging and authenticity in postwar Britain.

We might therefore understood the truncated citizen of Luis’ “cits” - whose inauthenticity is associated with the culture of the United States and with the sordid “musk” of an “African cat” - as figuring for the only partial inclusion which migrants like Khan faced in the postwar period. This sense of a

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259 Ibid., p.181.
partial, truncated or even corrupted citizenship might indeed be that which produces Khan’s strange front pages of his 1932 *Ulysses*, an alternative passport to supplement the sense of national belonging that he feels somewhat excluded from (in both the United Kingdom and the new Pakistan).

Khan’s anti-Semitic writing then, far from being a late aberration, contains a complex identification with Jewishness that acts as a screen for his own experiences of his blackness in postwar Britain. It also bears within it the trace of an equally complex commitment to Eliot’s work that promises versions of identity and belonging that perhaps he hopes offer a salve to a man who was alienated and troubled by the problems of racism, despite his own production of a deeply racist discourse.

“When we were all suddenly somebody else”: Khan’s multidirectional imaginary

When Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer identify the so-called ‘Elements of Anti-Semitism’ in their magisterial *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, we read that anti-Semitism is “based on a false projection”. 260 This false projection “confuses the inner and outer world and defines the most intimate experiences as hostile”. 261 They continue in a way that is deeply pertinent to Khan’s characterization of Jews:

Impulses which the subject will not admit as his own even though they are most assuredly so, are attributed to the object – the prospective victim. The actual paranoiac has no choice but to obey the laws of his sickness. 262


261 Ibid.

262 Ibid.
For Adorno and Horkheimer, totalitarianism’s antipathy to the Jewish people is borne of disavowal. The image of the Jews, they write, “has the features to which totalitarian domination must be completely hostile: happiness without power, wages without work, a home without frontiers, religion without myth”. These characteristics, Adorno tells us, are “hated by the rulers because the ruled secretly long to possess them”.

What is relevant to Khan and his anti-Semitism here is that his difference from Mr. Luis is not only precarious, but that he is also deeply attached – as his

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263 Ibid.

264 Ibid, p.199.
copy of *Ulysses* suggests – to modernism’s glamorous promise of a “home without borders”; forms of trans- or postnational life that are deeply implicated in representations of the figure of the Wandering Jew. Khan’s blindness to this process of disavowal is the tragedy the compounds his fall from grace: “the morbid aspect of anti-Semitism”, Adorno and Horkheimer note, “is not projective behaviour as such, but the absence from it of reflection”.265 It is this cosmopolitan promise of modernist writing whose historical and political implications I will finally consider in relation to Khan’s project of self-fashioning.

There is one last moment in Khan’s many textual interventions in his library that I would like to explore in order to theorize his relationship with Jewishness in *When Spring Comes* more thoroughly. The rear endpaper of Khan’s 1986 *Ulysses* has written on it a quote from the Hades episode (fig.6): “If we were all suddenly somebody else”.266 Leopold Bloom, in the middle of Paddy Dignam’s funeral, tentatively articulates the possibility of an imaginative flight into another body or set of experiences - not dissimilar to the invitation Khan offers his readers at the outset of *When Spring Comes*. Khan’s connection with this moment is the one that most explicitly suggests that his anti-Semitic writing and his racialized self-presentation in *When Spring Comes* rests on multifaceted identifications with a range of literary figures. When thinking about Khan in this regard, we should take seriously Diana Fuss’ contention that “every identity is an identification come to light”267 - and that Khan’s anti-Semitism is the expression of the contradictions and ambiguities that inhere in the literary and historical objects in which his subjectivity is entangled.

265 Ibid, p.189.


267 *Identification Papers*, p.2.
“If we were all suddenly somebody else”. Khan’s selection of this moment in *Ulysses* could be explained in a straightforward way: reading Bloom’s reflections on mortality and the disintegration of the human body at Paddy Dignam’s funeral would have inevitably spoken to his own battles with ill health in these last years. But the quote also resonates powerfully with Michael Rothberg’s sense of memory and imagination as multidirectional and expansive, endowing it with the capacity to place oneself at the interstices of other identities and histories. Rothberg’s *Multidirectional Memory* is the first study to explicitly elaborate the resonances between the experiences of those who suffered under European fascism and the violence of colonization and decolonization by psychoanalytically conceiving the ‘multidirectionality’ of memory. Rothberg accordingly makes a great deal of Hannah Arendt’s notion of the “boomerang effect” of Imperialist race society returning in Fascist Germany, and sees its parallel concept in Aimé Césaire’s *choc on retour*.269

Rothberg’s study is at its most compelling, however, when it shows the difficulties in making such connections within the work of individual writers: his reading of Arendt particularly stresses how her comparison of the holocaust and imperial race society is ultimately circumscribed by her Euro-centrism and her treatment of Africans in her reading of Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness*.270 Nevertheless, such a reading reframes Arendt’s argument by highlighting its relationship to multiple historical and political contexts. In turn this disrupts the historical and conceptual barriers that divide European and non-European histories of suffering.


269 Ibid., p.70.

This presents one way in which we can read Khan’s anti-Semitic writing, and such a reading would share the generosity and optimism of Rothberg’s readings of Arendt (amongst others) in his study, seeing Khan’s entanglement with Jewishness as articulating, very latently, the connections between his experiences as a black man in London and the murdered Jews of Europe. The introduction to Rothberg’s study offers a promising framework for the kind of consideration of When Spring Comes I offer in this chapter. Rothberg notes, for instance, that “Europe’s ambivalent memory of the Nazi genocide has left traces that inflect policies and discussion concerning race, religion, nationalism, and citizenship today”. A comparative approach to the study of the lives of postcolonial migrants and Jews would stress “shared histories of racism, spatial segregation, genocide, diasporic displacement” and would take seriously the contention that “the experience of Jewish difference within modern Europe...foreshadows many of the debates and problems faced by...postcolonial migrants in contemporary Europe”. Multidirectional comparisons and connections such as this, Rothberg notes, necessarily run against the logic of linear historical relationships and for Rothberg this is precisely the point: they show how moments of the past can, in a reading derived from Walter Benjamin’s idea of the “constellation” in his ‘Theses’ on history, be blown apart to forge new solidarities that are inherently intercultural and transhistorical.

A multidirectional reading of Khan’s anti-Semitism would also rest, however, on the tacit acknowledgement of forms of transnational cosmopolitanism that finds its prototype in modernist conceptions of such identities. Indeed, Rothberg suggests his study directs us towards “a multidirectional ethics

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271 Ibid., p.23.
272 Ibid, pp.22-23.
273 Ibid., p.43-45, p.80.
that combines the capacious open-endedness of the universal with the concrete, situational demands of the particular”, a gesture reminiscent of modernist, especially Joycean, descriptions of the relation of universal and particular, local and international. Rothberg’s multidirectional ethics produce an attendant politics that veers towards “a notion of transnational, comparative justice”. The multidirectional imaginary is one that is unquestionably cosmopolitan, and Rothberg’s connections are typified by the fact that they precisely reject the nation state as the ultimate frame of reference. For instance, Rothberg’s eschews Aimé Césaire’s Marxist internationalism in favour of his “multidirectional universalism” that “approaches contemporary notions of cosmopolitanism”.

Khan’s work presents fresh material for contemporary debates concerning the valency of the concept of cosmopolitanism, which has itself undergone significant critical resuscitation in contemporary modernist and postcolonial studies, as well as in critical and political theory. Indeed, a great deal has been staked politically on cosmopolitanism as the model for a new kind of community in the era of globalisation, by writers and thinkers as prominent as Jacques Derrida, Kwame Anthony Appiah and Bruce Robbins. Recently, Rebecca Walkowitz’s Cosmopolitan Style: modernism beyond the nation argues for the value of a “critical cosmopolitanism” indebted to the legacy of modernism, itself exemplified in her own genealogy of modernist expatriate writers: Joseph Conrad,

\[\text{Ibid., p.22.}\]

\[\text{Ibid.}\]

\[\text{Ibid., p.99.}\]

James Joyce, Salman Rushdie, Kazuo Ishiguro, and W.G. Sebald. This cosmopolitanism is directly counterposed to the frame of the nation state: it involves the “useful cosmopolitanism of belonging beyond the polis or the nation”. Whilst this critical cosmopolitanism is, for Walkowitz, only one amongst many, its global imagination of “citizenship, world war, empire, and decolonization” militates against “xenophobia and nativist conceptions of community”.

Khan’s own positioning of himself as cosmopolitan par excellence, shattering the frame of the nation state, seems to provoke anxieties of deracination that in turn give rise to his own reactionary conceptions of community. Khan’s “nativist” conceptions of identity and community cannot be ameliorated by the embrace of a more cosmopolitan outlook or posture; in my argument, the latter instead exacerbates the former. Even if the multidirectional, spiralling movement of imagination and memory opens a space for Khan to identify with Jews in When Spring Comes, identifying such an impulse as cosmopolitan cannot be seen, as it is in Rothberg’s work, as unambiguously redemptive or productive. Recognizing the multidirectionality of political identities might be (as in Rothberg’s reading of Aimé Césaire) the royal road to a politically redeemed cosmopolitanism, but in Khan’s case the articulation of a cosmopolitan borne out of a range of identifications offers as much antagonism as it does possibility.

If Khan’s anti-Semitic writing can be read as embodying the multidirectional impulse, then it might also show the ways in which such multidirectionality can be circumscribed, and it is Bloom’s “If” in Khan’s aptly chosen quota-


279 Ibid., p.5.

280 Ibid.
tion that reveals its limits. For Khan, such limits can be discerned in a number of features particular to modernism and colonialism: Eliot’s anti-Semitic discourse and stereotypes that provide the raw material for Mr. Luis; his own veneration of the special status of exile as offered by his favourite modernists; forms of imperialist race thinking in which his own subjectivity is entangled; and his disdain and distaste for the political movements of his own formative years in the Punjab. Taken together, these things conspire to produce not just Khan’s explicitly negative attitude towards Jews in *When Spring Comes*, despite its inherent contradictions and identifications, but also his isolation of himself from broader concerns about race and imperialism faced by millions of other migrants in postwar Britain as well as in Pakistan.
Afterword: *Something to Tell You*

Sixty pages in to Hanif Kureishi’s 2008 novel *Something to Tell You*, the Anglo-Pakistani protagonist Jamal - himself to become a psychoanalyst as the novel unfolds - is on the verge of psychic and emotional collapse. An academic friend recommends that he see another Pakistani doctor: Tahir Hussein. Hussein has, we read, “the exotic-doctor presence and charisma”:

Dark-skinned, with long-greying hair, he was imperious, handsome, imposing. Few would doubt he was arrogant, cruel, alcoholic, and more than a little narcissistic...For him, as for the other hip shrinks, it wasn’t the work of analysis to make people respectable conformists but to let them be as mad as they wanted, living out and enjoying their conflicts - even if it meant suffering more - without being self-destructive...Gossip had it that Tahir had had affairs with his patients; apparently he’d talked on the phone while seeing them, and even went to the opera with them...he would speak of his friendships with painters, dancers, poets, knowing that I liked to identify with him, that this was something I wanted for myself.¹

This slightly overheated description should be familiar to readers of this thesis. Susie Thomas has suggested in her review of *Something to Tell You* that Tahir is based on Masud Khan.² It is unclear where exactly Kureishi harvested the details of this portrait – according to a newspaper article, he was himself in analysis with Khan’s protege Adam Phillips³ - but his fictionalised account of Khan bears the hallmarks of the literary journalism which discussed Khan in the first decade of the twenty-first century (the detail about Tahir talking on the tele-

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Many key tropes of Khan’s life, and this thesis, are recognisable from the narrator’s description. Tahir’s place is “full of…paintings that had to be insured and sculpture that had to be plugged in.” Khan’s flamboyant dress, which knowingly invoked a range of cultural formations, is alluded to: Tahir is “something of a show-off, dressed in post-war ethnic gear…salwar kameez, a kaftan, hippy trousers, even a fez, and those slippers which curled up at the toe.” We even read that Tahir is “much talked about” by a “small literary metropolitan elite.”

Of special interest to this thesis is the explicit connection drawn between modernist culture - Jamal’s narrative is heavily larded with allusions to Proust, Beckett, and Eliot - and Jamal’s encounter with Tahir. Why, indeed, is Jamal encouraged to go to Hussein in the first place? His friend notes,

‘From our talks, I am aware that the art you like is modernism, the exploration of extreme mind states, of neurosis and psychosis. I, too, have spent my life with such books, but reading Kafka or Bruno Schulz can only take you so far. You will find in books characters who are like you. But you will never find yourself in a book unless you write it yourself. It is the wrong place to search…you can’t get out of a locked room without the right key.’
‘Where or what is the key?’ I almost shouted […]

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5 *Something To Tell You*, p.68.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid. p.64.
He said the key might be this fellow Tahir Hussein.\(^8\)

From one enthusiastic modernist to another, Tahir Hussein is “the key”. Tahir encourages Jamal to read Proust, Marx, Dostoyevsky and Whitman, and Jamal even describes one dream he presents for interpretation as “like a Surrealist painting.”\(^9\) The modernist aura around Tahir – read as a figure for Masud Khan - and the implications this might have for these two Pakistani Muslim migrants in their attempts to construct a response to a postcolonial modernity in which race and culture are powerful signifiers is what this thesis has explored over the course of five chapters.

Kureishi’s novel is about the experience of educated migrant Muslims in late twentieth century London, and Kureishi’s insinuation of Khan into his text provides the psychoanalyst’s work with an afterlife beyond his death in 1989. Jamal is an aesthete, a social climber, and a snob, but the novel effectively juxtaposes his pretensions with more troubling articulations of explicitly racist anti-Muslim politics that emerged in the decade following September 11th 2001. Kureishi’s novel propels Khan into a contemporary moment where the dilemma of the Asian citizen of Britain has dramatically intensified. As Jamal walks to Tahir’s South Kensington consulting room, “a smart flat at a smart address” - gesturing towards Khan’s Knightsbridge residence - he notes that “Even as I walked there, I felt rays of hatred emanating from passers-by.”\(^10\) The “academic friend” who recommended Hussein to Jamal “had told me that one of the virtues of psychoanalysis in England was that it had been developed...by people of all nationalities, by which he meant” Jamal wryly notes, “European”.\(^11\)

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\(^8\) *Something to Tell You*, p. 64.

\(^9\) Ibid., p.69, p.70.

\(^10\) Ibid., p.68.

\(^11\) Ibid., p.67.
one dream, Jamal is “standing alone in an empty room with my arms by my side and scores of wasps in my hair”: for both Jamal and Tahir, the insects are (“of course”) “White Anglo-Saxon Protestants.”

Jamal’s hopes of becoming a psychoanalyst are bound up with emulating the “history and achievement” of his family in Pakistan (“my uncles had been journalists, sportsmen, army generals, doctors”), but being a professional intellectual also means he can transcend, to some extent, his ethnic and religious distinctiveness in Britain: “I wasn’t only a ‘Paki’”, he suggests. Nevertheless, as the “rays of hatred” suggest, it is his skin-colour that proves seemingly inescapable. This thesis has orbited around Khan’s attempted cultivation of his European-ness via his veneration of modernist culture - becoming a collector, becoming an exile, becoming a bearer of the psychoanalytic tradition. The parallels with the situation Kureishi’s novel describes are quite clear.

Khan’s literary afterlife in Kureishi’s novel stages in a condensed way the intellectual conjunctions and questions explored in this thesis. The collocation of modernism, migrant experience, ethnicity, and psychoanalytic imaginations of the inner life are the spheres of interest that collide when considering Khan’s work. Jamal remarks that, as his desire to become an analyst intensifies towards the end of his time with Tahir, the thing that compelled him about psychoanalysis was that it “was where a person’s history met the common world.” This seems an apt way of describing the manner in which Khan’s investigations into the most mysterious reaches of psychic experience are constantly, and contrapuntally, in some struggle with world-historical and social forces: specifically, the post-war politics of Partition, European fascism, and the

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12 Ibid., p.70.

13 Ibid., p.73.

14 Ibid., p.71.
politics of race in postwar Britain. The modes of thought he turns to in order to tackle these concerns are, I argue, specifically modernist ones.

I invoke the term contrapuntal advisedly. Khan’s treatment of modernist writing, this thesis suggests, is itself contrapuntal. In his 1992 Culture and Imperialism, Edward Said shows the novels of Conrad, music of Verdi and André Gide’s L’Immoraliste to be in a disjunctive and often contradictory relationship with their imperial context. Likewise, Khan’s invocation of modernism, and the place it has in his thought, is interdependent with the historical circumstances and discourses that frame his experience of exile. For Said, contrapuntal works entail, as in the case of Verdi’s Aida, “disparities”, hybridity (they are “radically impure”), and will belong “equally to the history of the culture and the historical experience of overseas domination.”15 Said’s concept is an elaboration of musical thinking:

In the counterpoint of western classical music, various themes play off one another, with only a provisional privilege being given to any particular one; yet in the resulting polyphony there is concert and order, and organised interplay that derives from the themes, not from a rigorous melodic or formal principle.16

Identities for Said are not essentializations, but rather “contrapuntal ensembles” that function oppositionally, intertwining histories and overlapping territories, as the title of his opening chapter has it.17 Khan’s writing, I would suggest, bears the traces of such collisions and retains precisely such a contrapuntal character: although it is riven with more contradictions and dead-ends than the carefully orchestrated polyphony of Said’s nineteenth century novels

16 Ibid., p.59.
17 Ibid., p.60.
of Empire, it nevertheless manifests a whole that tries to hold together disparate and competing thematics.

For instance, Khan’s mobilisation of modernism in psychoanalytic writing, produces a counter-intuitive reading of the aesthetic and literary concept of epiphany, which in his thought is refigured as belonging to a transitional sphere of two-person psychology. Likewise, Khan’s elaboration of the tradition he reads in Eliot yokes together, in his version of the ‘psychoanalytic tradition’, his sense of his declining feudal background with a model of the transformation of European culture, itself transposed to a psychoanalytic setting, and riven with his own anxious attempts to enter European culture as an exile.

His writing on exile and the private self also conjoins a range of disparate texts, concepts, and locations. As with epiphany, my argument is that Khan rethinks exile and withdrawal through Winnicott and the transitional space, producing yet another counter-intuitive reading of modernist discourses of interiority: his version of the private self is not depoliticised and anti-politics, as for Khan it is a vital bulwark against the instrumental character of modern totalitarian politics. But this clinical elaboration of his literary interests is also intertwined with his own particular brand, or version, of politics in postcolonial Pakistan, and his highly antagonistic attitude towards forms of postwar socialism there and in Britain.

Similarly, for Khan, collecting modernist art, and inserting himself in its supporting networks of patrons and producers, was an attempt to manufacture his own sense of belonging to a high-European modernist tradition from the position of a non-European migrant; despite the conservative character of such gestures, his writing on painting and art nevertheless is turned to quite different ends in his theoretical reflections, extending many of his most radical ideas about subjectivity.
Finally, we see the intensity of the contrapuntal interplay of a range of texts, writers, histories and contexts in the vexed issue of Khan’s anti-Semitism. Khan’s anti-Semitic outburst is imbricated with Eliot’s, but Eliot’s and Joyce’s writings on race and community frame the legacy of imperialist race-thinking to which Khan is ambivalently attached, and the treatment of blackness that operates in his immediate context, which is Powell’s postcolonial Britain. Khan’s writing on race exemplifies his most reactionary attempts to disown, through the invocation of certain modes of cultural and ethnic authenticity, his own racially-marginalised position in postwar Britain. Most striking, though, is the collision in his writing of the holocaust and the racism entailed in the experience of non-white postwar migrants.

The contrapuntal character of these engagements with modernism, and the contexts in which it is put to work, expresses what I regard as the ‘late’ character of Khan’s work, following Edward Said. It is this ‘lateness’ that I see as a way of concluding the articulation of Khan’s modernism in this thesis. Khan’s own writing, especially in his final two books, grows increasingly eccentric, rhetorical, experimental and idiosyncratic, and transgresses, as Julia Borossa convincingly argues, many of the standard tropes of psychoanalytic writing. Indeed, Khan’s last case histories not only detail his explicit transgressions against psychoanalytic norms, but in doing so invoke memoir, autobiography and other highly subjective modes of expression.

Khan’s own language in his final book involves increasingly bizarre and abstruse syntactical formulations, as well as highly idiosyncratic coinages, and sudden changes of tone. We might note the fragmentary character and free indirect discourse of this section, which jars greatly with the more formal argumen-

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tative signposting with which Khan opens the paragraph, and the citational conventions that are discarded halfway through:

I shall end with some thoughts on the themes of waiting and disillusionment in Freud’s writings... The physician who used to be available to his patients, as they need him (Freud, 1985), had gradually put himself out of their reach... A rather sick programme, I regret to say. Today I see it for what it is after its outrageous inhuman demands. The patient is victimised in every respect. Lie down, do not touch me with your eyes, demanded Professor Doctor Sigmund Freud. Use only words to tell of yourself. Do not seek to know me. The game is played one-sidedly. So the spaces of waiting start to emerge, expand, and swallow up the patient... All will become clear. All what? the patients asked. The ‘what’ is the task, Freud told them. Let us sort out the hows to this unknowable what.19

Khan adopts a standoffish attitude towards his readers, and the friction with the forms this entails is somewhat characteristic of his ‘late style’. For Edward Said, late style, as derived from Adorno’s reading of Beethoven’s Spätestil, is expressive of not only a form of aesthetic exile but more precisely is “remorselessly alienated and obscure...the prototypical modern aesthetic form”.20 Said’s anchoring of this term in Adorno’s work, and the extensive exposition he conducts of that writer in On Late Style, indicates the extent to which late style is especially modernist in its conception and effects. Artistic lateness is “intransigence, difficulty and unresolved contradiction”;21 it is untimely, being “in, but oddly apart from, the present”.22 Beethoven’s late works, for instance, abandon “communication with the established social order of which he is a part and

19 When Spring Comes, p.196.


21 Ibid., p.7.

22 Ibid. p.8.
achieves a contradictory, alienated relationship with it. [These] late works constitute a form of exile.”

In this passage from *When Spring Comes* Khan turns to a high modernist mode of expression in order to engage with the fundamental aspects of his work, and to revisit a debate inside psychoanalysis. Khan is addressing Sándor Ferenczi’s dispute with the taboo Freud places on the analyst’s movement and activity in the psychoanalytic session. The “unknowable what” and the victimisation of the patient Khan alludes to here return to his own major themes, themselves following Ferenczi in their critical attitude to analytic orthodoxy, of the fundamentally hidden self and the necessity of protecting from hermeneutic persecution. Khan’s rejects the standard modes of expression we find in the psychoanalytic case study, instead producing fitful and uneven prose that switches rapidly between voices and registers. In this way, Khan deconstructs in formal terms the rigid clinical and professional boundaries - the authority and stability of orthodox psychoanalysis - that his ideas would too address. This moment in his writing indicates the way in which modernism is far more than a way for Khan to add cultural and historical colour to his psychoanalytic work; it instead allows Khan to supplement and challenge the conventions of his professional institution.

There are obvious ways, described in this thesis, in which Khan presents himself as an antagonistic outsider: the performance of his ‘self-exile’ and his obsession with his feudal tradition, to name just two. But it is in the form and eccentric mode of Khan’s later writing, as the example above indicates, that Khan most stringently takes up the oppositional, unreconciled aesthetic Said terms ‘late’, and it is this that I suggest is one of Khan’s most modernist gestures, exemplifying best what he sees in that movement. There is what Said

23 Ibid p.10.
calls an “unharmonious, non serene tension” in his work,\textsuperscript{24} which frequently discards continuity (the “episodic character” Said reads in Beethoven) and conciliation, giving it an “unfinished quality”.\textsuperscript{25} This thesis suggests that these characteristics of Khan’s writing emerge from his enthusiasm for modernist form, and the sometimes rebarbative aspects of it with which Khan identifies deeply: but the unusual shape modernism is given in his work arises even more fundamentally from the tensions between the differing political and cultural arenas that shape it. The strange contours of his writing come, to borrow a final phrase from Edward Said, from the fact that it is ‘Between Worlds.’\textsuperscript{26}

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  \item \textsuperscript{24}Ibid., p.15.
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