The Use of Foreign Jurisprudence in Human Rights Cases before the UK Supreme Court

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Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Queen Mary, University of London
Department of Law
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31 January 2014
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Abstract

This thesis is the first major study of the UK Supreme Court’s use of jurisprudence from foreign domestic courts in human rights cases. It contributes to the debate on judicial comparitivism by asking when, how and why the Supreme Court uses foreign jurisprudence, as well as whether the Court should be making greater use of it.

The research findings are drawn from quantitative and qualitative analysis of judgments handed down by the Supreme Court during its first four years (2009-2013). These are supported by evidence obtained through interviews with ten Justices of the Supreme Court, one Lord Justice of Appeal and the eight Supreme Court Judicial Assistants.

In the absence of legislative guidance, the use of foreign jurisprudence is neither consistent nor systematic. Different Justices use foreign jurisprudence to different degrees and for different reasons. The main use of foreign jurisprudence is as a heuristic device: it provides the Justices with a different analytical lens through which to reflect on their own reasoning about a problem. Some Justices also use foreign jurisprudence when interpreting a common legislative scheme and to support their conclusions. As a result, the Justices use foreign jurisprudence differently according to the audience to whom their reasons are addressed. Thus foreign jurisprudence can assist the Supreme Court to enter into dialogue with the Strasbourg Court. However, this thesis does not support theories of transjudicial dialogue with other domestic courts; the evidence does not indicate that the Supreme Court considers itself to be part of global conversation. Further, the use of foreign jurisprudence is limited by practical barriers including, but not restricted to, time pressures, the availability of comparative resources and the greater use of plurality style judgments. These barriers are worth addressing if the Supreme Court is to fully utilise the heuristic value of foreign jurisprudence.
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Abbreviations

CJEU: Court of Justice of the European Union
ECA: European Communities Act 1972
ECHR: European Convention on Human Rights 1950
ECtHR: European Court of Human Rights
IAT: Immigration Appeal Tribunal
JA: United Kingdom Supreme Court Judicial Assistant
JSC: Justice of the United Kingdom Supreme Court
Refugee Convention: 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
UKSC: United Kingdom Supreme Court
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1 Introduction

The aim of this thesis is to examine the use of jurisprudence from foreign domestic courts (‘foreign jurisprudence’) in human rights cases before the UK Supreme Court (UKSC). This study contributes a fresh perspective to the vast literature in the field and is associated with research that describes the use of foreign jurisprudence by domestic courts as a phenomenon that has given rise to a ‘migration of constitutional ideas’,¹ or similar characterisations on the theme, such as: ‘judicial internationalisation’,² ‘judicial cosmopolitanism’,³ and ‘trans-judicialism’.⁴ This non-exhaustive list broadly describes the simple practice of judges from one jurisdiction citing jurisprudence from another jurisdiction.⁵ There is also significant and important research concerning the propensity for courts to use the jurisprudence of foreign domestic courts as part of a ‘global dialogue’ or ‘transjudicial dialogue’.⁶ The claim made by many of these works is that judges from different jurisdictions are in conversation with each other as to

the interpretation and development of certain legal norms. As Bell has recently written, the use of foreign jurisprudence:

is taken to be one of the indicators that legal systems are not self-contained but develop as a result of ideas coming from outside as well as from inside the system. In addition, it is seen as evidence of the increasing globalisation of the law. Such potentially expansive claims from the importance of comparative law as a judicial method of decision-making need to be put in context.  

Generally, researchers agree that judges have shown an increasing willingness to draw from a wealth of jurisprudence in the course of domestic adjudication. Slaughter has claimed that ‘[c]ourts are talking to one another all over the world’. In a valuable comparative volume titled Judicial Recourse to Foreign Law, Markesinis and Fedtke wrote of foreign law’s ‘overt’ influence in Canada, Germany and South Africa and its ‘covert’ influence in France and Italy. Much has been written about the comparative approach of the Israeli Supreme Court, which is now well known for its reliance on foreign jurisprudence. Foreign jurisprudence has even found its way into a handful of judgments from the United States Supreme Court, which is usually given as the paradigmatic example of insularity.

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The use of foreign jurisprudence in UK domestic courts, however, has been given relatively little attention by researchers in the past. It is simply not clear that use of foreign jurisprudence matters. The aim of this research is therefore to provide evidence on the extent to which the UKSC makes references to foreign jurisprudence, as well as the reasons or purposes for which foreign jurisprudence is used. The following research questions are answered: Does the Supreme Court consider foreign jurisprudence in human rights cases? How is the jurisprudence used? For what purpose does the Supreme Court use foreign jurisprudence? What effect has the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) had on the use of foreign jurisprudence? And should the Court be making greater use of these sources? Questions of this kind have been considered in the context of other jurisdictions, but few researchers have focused on the United Kingdom. This thesis therefore provides insights to questions that have not previously been given significant attention in the UK context.

A detailed account of the existing literature and an explanation as to how this thesis is to be distinguished among the most relevant works is provided in much of the literature by exposing sharply divided opinion on the use of foreign jurisprudence in matters involving the interpretation of the Constitution. See e.g. Sujit Choudhry (ed), The Migration of Constitutional Ideas (Cambridge University Press 2006) 2: ‘Advocates of the migration of constitutional ideas, however, appear to have gained the upper hand’. Cf Gordon A Christenson, ‘Using Human Rights Law to Inform Due Process and Equal Protection analyses’, (1983) 52 Cincinnati Law Review 3, 5: ‘most united states courts … show less inclination now than at the beginning of the Republic to use sources of foreign and international customary law to aid interpretation, especially in constitutional cases’; Bruce Ackerman, ‘The Rise of World Constitutionalise’ (1997) 83 Virginia Law Review 771, 772: ‘The typical American judge would not think of learning from an opinion by the German or French constitutional court’.

chapter two. There it is explained that empirical research on the use of foreign jurisprudence in the UK is rare and that no one study has provided a detailed account of the practice. It follows that one of the most significant contributions made by this thesis to the existing literature in this field is the empirical data, gathered from analyses of the Supreme Court's judgments as well as through interviews with ten Justices of the Supreme Court, one Lord Justice of Appeal and the eight Supreme Court Judicial Assistants (JAs). A detailed account of the research methodology is provided in chapter three.

One of the main arguments in this thesis is that foreign jurisprudence can provide a useful perspective in human rights cases. It was therefore necessary to establish that the Supreme Court may legitimately use these sources. To that end, it is explained in chapter four that there are no rules governing the judicial use of foreign jurisprudence, whether in human rights cases specifically or other cases more generally. While the HRA 1998 provides that courts must ‘take into account’ the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Strasbourg, the Act is silent on the use of jurisprudence from the domestic courts of other jurisdictions. UK Courts are under no duty or obligation to follow the decisions of a foreign domestic court, but neither are these sources prohibited. Instead, foreign jurisprudence is merely ‘persuasive’ precedent and judges are free to use foreign jurisprudence in any manner that is thought to be helpful.

The non-binding status of these sources can give rise to criticisms—often raised in the United States debates—that the use of foreign jurisprudence is
instrumental and opportunistic.\textsuperscript{13} One of the main conclusions is that the UKSC does appear to use foreign jurisprudence in this way, but that this itself is not problematic. Chapter four closes with an explanation that the use of foreign jurisprudence \textit{per se} is not the problem. Rather, concern about the legitimacy of the practice usually stems from a perception that courts are liable to use foreign jurisprudence in an unprincipled and unsystematic way. If that is the case, the risk is that foreign jurisprudence may mask judicial creativity or obscure political judgments that a court might be minded to make. In other words, it is uncertainty about the reasons for using foreign jurisprudence that is likely to attract criticism.\textsuperscript{14} The aim in chapters five, six, seven and eight is therefore to identify the way in which foreign jurisprudence is used at the Supreme Court and the purposes that these sources serve.

Chapter five sets out the reality of citations of foreign jurisprudence at the Supreme Court, by reference to empirical research. The data is important: as one recent publication in the field notes, ‘studies have focused extensively on the theoretical aspects of this practice … while empirical analysis of the frequency and meaning of citations remain generally still rare’.\textsuperscript{15} The data demonstrates that judges are using the jurisprudence of foreign domestic courts and that there are some clear patterns to the use. The main finding is

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{14} Elaine Mak recently concluded that there was a lack of a systematic approach in the use of foreign legal materials at the UK Supreme Court: ‘Why do Dutch and UK judges cite foreign law?’ (2011) CLJ 420, 449.
  \item \textsuperscript{15} Tania Groppi and Marie-Claire Ponthoreau (eds), \textit{The Use of Foreign Precedents by Constitutional Judges}, above n 12.
\end{itemize}
that—because there are no formal rules governing the use of foreign jurisprudence—the Justices have developed their own practices. Whether or not foreign jurisprudence is used is dependent on the approach of each individual Justice. For example, Lord Collins is known to be a more enthusiastic user of foreign jurisprudence, particularly from the United States of America. It is not surprising, therefore, that a larger proportion of cases contained explicit citations of foreign jurisprudence prior to Lord Collins’ retirement in 2011, with a steady decline in citation numbers between 2011 and 2013. The decline in the use of foreign jurisprudence in human rights cases may otherwise be explained by developments in judgment styles. In particular, it is clear that the rise of plurality style judgments at the Supreme Court is likely to have had an effect: the proportion of plurality style judgments including citations of foreign jurisprudence is much smaller than in cases which comprise a full set of separate judgments.

Other practical considerations also affect the way that foreign jurisprudence is used at the Supreme Court. The interview evidence confirms that the Court is still highly dependent on counsel’s submissions, although some Justices also introduce foreign jurisprudence through their own research. Nevertheless, the most obvious variant is that some Justices simply have a greater interest in foreign jurisprudence than others, which is often a product of personal connections with a particular jurisdiction. However, this thesis does not support theories of ‘transjudicial dialogue’ as expressed in much of

16 Briefly, in this work a plurality style judgment includes a single ‘judgment of the court’, a leading judgment with which all have agreed or a single judgment with which others in the majority agree. See further n 190 below.
the literature. While citations of foreign jurisprudence are mostly drawn from a small family of courts, it is not found that the UKSC considers itself to be part of a global conversation. A more realistic conclusion is that foreign jurisprudence is used as a heuristic device; the Justices use foreign jurisprudence instrumentally and only when helpful.

The use of foreign jurisprudence as a heuristic device is the subject of chapter six. Some of the classical explanations for the use of foreign jurisprudence fall into this category. A clear example of this is the popular theory that judges would be most likely to use foreign jurisprudence in order to fill ‘gaps’ in the indigenous case law. However, it is not accepted that the ‘gap-filling’ accurately explains the use of foreign jurisprudence at the UKSC. Although the Justices might be likely to consider foreign jurisprudence in those situations, filling the ‘gap’ is not the aim of the exercise. Rather, it is argued that the some Justices use foreign jurisprudence as an analytical lens, to help elucidate the issues or to seek reassurance about a conclusion reached independently of foreign jurisprudence. The purpose served by foreign jurisprudence in these circumstances is either to provide an opportunity for reflection or to form ‘part of the process of reaching a more fully theorised … agreement’.


The only evidence for the ‘gap-filling’ theory might be the tendency to review foreign jurisprudence in human rights cases where the Strasbourg jurisprudence was unhelpful or non-existent. Foreign jurisprudence may nevertheless be used to confirm the Strasbourg position and the Court has shown willingness to use those sources to that end. This is also affected by the well-reported tendency to elevate clear and constant Strasbourg jurisprudence to a status of binding, rather than persuasive, authority.\textsuperscript{19} Chapter seven explains that this is to do with a drive towards uniformity among the states signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The most obvious purpose for using foreign jurisprudence is as a tool to identify a consensus in cases where it is necessary to maintain a uniform interpretation of a common instrument. Thus where there is clear and constant Strasbourg jurisprudence, the Supreme Court is likely to follow it.

One effect of the HRA duty to ‘take into account’ the relevant Strasbourg case law has therefore been to reduce the number of references to the jurisprudence of other foreign courts. The logic is intelligible: the conclusions of foreign courts interpreting similar but distinct instruments would not necessarily ensure compatibility with the ECHR, as the UK courts are bound to do. Thus even where it would be of interest to the Supreme Court to review the position of the other states signatory to the Convention, it is argued that

the Court prefers to accept the results of the supranational (Strasbourg) court’s research on the point.

The effect of the existence of a supranational court on the use of foreign jurisprudence is made clearer still by a review of the cases where no such court exists. The second half of chapter seven provides examples of the Supreme Court’s greater willingness to use foreign jurisprudence in such cases. It is explained that the emphasis on maintaining uniformity among contracting states is particularly prevalent when the court is interpreting an international instrument with no supervisory body. Nevertheless, anxieties remain about the legitimacy of references to foreign jurisprudence, especially if the use of those sources lead to an interpretation that unduly enlarges the scope of rights or the obligations under the common instrument in question. In part, this risk also explains the Supreme Court’s reluctance to make advances on the Strasbourg jurisprudence.

There is, however, some evidence that deference to Strasbourg may be on the decline. The Supreme Court is showing greater willingness to reject the Strasbourg jurisprudence where it is unhelpful or at odds with the constitutional arrangements in the United Kingdom. This is most obvious in cases where the Strasbourg jurisprudence has been thought to be out-dated; implicit in the construction of the ECHR as a ‘living instrument’ is the presumption that domestic courts may properly conclude that Convention
jurisprudence has lost its relevance with age.\textsuperscript{20} Other opportunities for divergence are created by the ‘margin of appreciation’ doctrine or the accuracy, clarity and reasoning of the Strasbourg jurisprudence itself. In such cases foreign jurisprudence may provide a valuable and underused perspective on the Strasbourg jurisprudence, especially where the relevant case law of that court is unclear, unhelpful or has misunderstood some aspect of domestic law. It is argued in chapter eight that foreign jurisprudence can lend confidence to the Supreme Court’s reasoning in these cases, ensuring that the Court is not simply a ‘Strasbourg surrogate’.\textsuperscript{21} Viewed in this way, the jurisprudence of foreign domestic courts is more valuable than has so far been considered. By taking those sources into account, the Justices may begin to take a more theorised approach to human rights cases, working with the Strasbourg Court in human rights cases, rather than under it.

It is concluded that the Supreme Court’s use of foreign jurisprudence is both legitimate and appropriate. The perspective offered by these sources is a valuable tool and could assist the Supreme Court to realise its full potential: to develop the domestic law of human rights which many hoped the HRA 1998 would foster.

\textsuperscript{20} Tyrer v United Kingdom (1978) 2 EHRR 1 [31].
1.1 A note about style

The lack of any single gender neutral pronoun in the English language has led many writers to forge a sense of equality by using ‘they’ or ‘their’, rather than ‘him’, ‘her’, ‘his’ or ‘her’. This approach is not adopted in this thesis. Instead, the masculine should generally be taken to include the feminine wherever there may be ambiguity about the gender of the subject. The choice of masculine over feminine has been made only on the basis that there is, at the time of writing, just one female Justice of the Supreme Court. Using the feminine pronoun when talking about judicial practices may therefore give the unintended impression that Baroness Hale is always the subject of the sentence in point. It was felt that a better balance would be achieved by dividing this attention among the male Justices, especially where anonymity was to be preserved.

An inconsistency also lies with the treatment of numbers. In this thesis, numbers are written both as numerals and words depending on the nature of the passage and analysis. The widely adopted rule about spelling out single-digit whole numbers is therefore occasionally ignored when discussing quantitative data, as in chapter five.
Two centuries ago Friedrich Karl von Savigny wrote of his despair that England, which ‘in all other branches of knowledge actively communicating with the rest of the world, should, in jurisprudence alone, have remained divided from the rest of the world, as if by a Chinese wall’. In tune with the relative reluctance to compare there was, as one great comparative scholar has put it, ‘a remarkable dearth of comparative law teachers, books and articles’. In the late twentieth century, the citation of foreign case law in domestic courts grew immeasurably and in the early 1990s, the late Lord Bingham wrote his hopeful prognosis that the decade would ‘be remembered as the time when England … ceased to be a legal island, bounded to the north by the Tweed…’. There now exists a vast literature on comparative law. As one of the current Justices of the Supreme Court, Lord Mance, has recently recognised, ‘[i]ncreasing attention has been paid over recent years to the basis on which judges use foreign authority’.

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24 Tom Bingham, ‘There is a World Elsewhere’, above n 22, 514.


26 Lord Mance, ‘Foreign Laws and Languages’ in Burrows, Johnston and Zimmermann (eds), Judge and Jurist: Essays in Memory of Lord Rodger of Earlsferry (Oxford University Press 2013), 87.
Markesinis, in particular, has been responsible for notable contributions on both foreign and comparative law. He has published valuable work on the convergence in certain legal subjects across a number of jurisdictions, on the opportunities offered by comparative law in a ‘shrinking world’ and, most recently, with Fedtke on judicial recourse to foreign jurisprudence. The literature on comparative methodology is rarely framed in a way that directly addresses the judicial use of foreign jurisprudence in domestic courts, making Markesinis’ latest publication of particular interest. However, like most of the literature, the scope is largely restricted to private law.

In public law—and in human rights cases specifically—Groppi and Ponthoreau have made one of the most relevant contributions in a volume titled *The Use of Foreign Precedents by Constitutional Judges*. As the editors of that volume point out, studies cataloguing the different approaches adopted by constitutional or supreme courts in their use of foreign jurisprudence are relatively rare. The volume therefore reports on the citation practices of different constitutional or supreme courts in both common and

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28 Basil Markesinis, *Comparative Law in the Courtroom and in the Classroom* (Hart Publishing 2003).
31 Tania Groppi and Marie-Claire Ponthoreau (eds), *The Use of Foreign Precedents by Constitutional Judges* (Hart Publishing 2013).
civil law traditions.\textsuperscript{32} Sixteen chapters report on the use of foreign precedents by a particular court. All chapters follow a quantitative approach and provide results on: the number of decisions citing foreign case law; the number of citations (generally and from each jurisdiction cited); the number of citations to foreign precedents in cases dealing with human rights and institutional issues; and the number of citations in majority or minority opinions. The research illustrates that citations of foreign case law are most common in human rights decisions.\textsuperscript{33} The volume also includes visual representations of the empirical research to demonstrate the different courts’ citation practice and behavioural patterns. The clarity afforded by these visual representations in part inspired the inclusion of similar representations in this thesis, explained further in the research methodology below.

However, unlike the approach taken in this thesis, the editors of \textit{The Use of Foreign Precedents by Constitutional Judges} chose to direct attention only at explicit citations. The editors of that volume explain the omission of results on implicit citations on the basis that it would require significant extra-judicial research, conducted by way of interviews and questionnaires.\textsuperscript{34} Research of this kind has been carried out for this thesis. A lack of express citations does not necessarily indicate of a lack of knowledge of foreign case law by the judges. Focusing only on explicit citations would inevitably ignore analysis of non-explicit uses of foreign precedents. As the author of the chapter on

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{32} Ibid 3.
\item \textsuperscript{33} Ibid 416.
\item \textsuperscript{34} Tania Groppi and Marie-Claire Ponthoreau (eds), \textit{The Use of Foreign Precedents by Constitutional Judges}, above n 31, 7.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Hungary points out, ‘the frequency of citations in itself does not tell us much about the reasons and effects of the references, so it is extremely difficult to evaluate the character of the use of foreign judicial practices and cases’.35 The chapters of the collection that do engage with these questions provide interesting insights, hinting at greater uses of foreign jurisprudence than is otherwise detectable on the face of the judgments. Lastly, the volume does not include a report on the United Kingdom Supreme Court. The absence is not explained. The potential usefulness of such a report is however noted by the author of the chapter on the South African Constitutional Court, pointing out that such a report would have assisted with her own conclusions: ‘empirical research into the propensity of the UK court to cite South African courts would be needed in order to determine whether the … relationship between these two countries has led to cross pollination or not’.36

2.1 Does the UK Supreme Court use foreign jurisprudence?

An increasing number of works are published on the work of the UK Supreme Court generally and a smaller number of works have been published with specific reference to the use of foreign jurisprudence in that court.37 Mak has made the most relevant contributions in two articles and one recently

37 The burgeoning literature on the UK House of Lords and now the UK Supreme Court was recognised by Penny Darbyshire, Sitting in Judgment: The Working Lives of the Judges (Hart Publishing 2011), 362. A helpful review of the most important works is given at 363-368.

In common with the approach taken in this thesis, the first of Mak’s articles is aimed at identifying ‘different judicial views and approaches to the use of foreign law’. \(^{40}\) To that end, Mak conducted interviews with judges from the UK and Netherlands supreme courts. Mak’s interviews were conducted prior to the interviews in this study but the article published some time after. \(^{41}\) For that reason it was, unfortunately, not possible to reflect and develop upon Mak’s interview results ahead of the interviews conducted for this thesis. The result is that some of the research findings inevitably duplicate and corroborate Mak’s published work. This thesis does nevertheless add to the interview evidence gathered by Mak, not least because a further four judges were interviewed, as well as the JAs. \(^{42}\) Further, Mak’s comparison with the Supreme Court of the Netherlands leads to a division of attention between


\(^{40}\) Ibid 423.

\(^{41}\) Mak explains that the UK Supreme Court Justices were interviewed in November 2009, the first round of interviews conducted for the purposes of this research was October-November 2010.

\(^{42}\) Mak interviewed seven Justices of the UK Supreme Court and one retired Law Lord. Ten Justices of the UK Supreme Court and one Lord Justice of Appeal were interviewed for the purposes of this thesis.
the two courts. As a result, Mak’s article is helpful insofar as it provides a broad overview of this practice, ‘mak[ing] visible the variety of views within specific highest courts’,\textsuperscript{43} but does not provide the in-depth analysis of the UK Supreme Court undertaken in this thesis.

The aim of Mak’s 2012 article was to ‘explain the development of the highest courts' decision-making practices in light of the trend of the internationalisation of the law’.\textsuperscript{44} Mak draws from the interview evidence presented in the 2011 article in order to highlight more nuanced points about the working methods at the UK and Dutch Supreme Courts. Of particular relevance, is the finding that the use of foreign jurisprudence is highly dependent on ‘personal variables’:\textsuperscript{45}

The judges of the Supreme Court for the UK feel that counsel should bring forward all legal materials which are relevant for deciding the case, including foreign judgments and academic resources concerning foreign law. The judges sometimes do conduct additional research themselves or ask a judicial assistant to look for useful sources. Some judges put more time and effort into this kind of research than others. With regard to a comparison with non-common law jurisdictions, the judges in general conduct research by themselves, i.e. without the help of judicial assistants. Therefore, the selection of this kind of foreign sources seems to be very much dependent on the personal background of the judges,

\textsuperscript{43} Elaine Mak, ‘Why do Dutch and UK judges cite foreign law?’, above n 38, 449.

\textsuperscript{44} Elaine Mak, ‘Reference to Foreign Law in the Supreme Courts of Britain and the Netherlands…’, above n 38, 20.

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid, 27.
in particular concerning the languages they master and the data they have access to.\textsuperscript{46}

These findings corroborate one of the main claims made in this thesis, that the method of foreign jurisprudence citation is not always obvious and that the Justices continue to take individualised approaches to the research and use of those sources. Mak concludes that ‘[f]urther research regarding the aims, methods and legitimacy of the use of foreign law can help to clarify what the highest national courts can and may do, and thus guide the further development of these courts’ judicial decision-making practices’.\textsuperscript{47}

Much of this ‘further research’ is developed in her book Judicial Decision-Making in a Globalised World: A Comparative Analysis of the Changing Practices of Western Highest Courts.\textsuperscript{48} The stated aim of that work was to ‘offer a new perspective on a much-debated question in current legal scholarship: why do judges study legal sources which originated outside of their national legal system and how do they use arguments from these sources in the deciding of cases?’\textsuperscript{49} Mak’s research for the volume was undertaken during a similar time period as the research for this study and publication fell very close to the submission of this thesis. As with the two articles discussed above, Mak’s evidence on the UK Supreme Court is drawn from an analysis of decided cases as well as interviews with a number of the Justices. Again, some of the findings that are most closely connected to

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid 30.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid 34.
\textsuperscript{48} Elaine Mak, Judicial Decision-Making in a Globalised World, above n 39.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid 1.
those given in this thesis are about the individual approaches of the judges.

Mak writes:

… the interviews conducted for the research make clear that individual judges have an important influence on the way in which foreign law is used in their court. The individual use of foreign law by judges in deliberations and in judgments, beyond the mandatory use of sources, depends on three main factors: legal tradition, language and the prestige of foreign courts. Interestingly, the voluntary recourse to foreign law currently does not seem to follow a specific logic.\(^{50}\)

However, the book can be distinguished from this study in at least one obvious sense: Mak’s work does not include a quantitative analysis of the use of foreign jurisprudence by the examined highest courts.\(^{51}\) Further, the research parameters are broader than in this thesis, drawing from comparative study of the highest courts in five legal systems: United Kingdom, Canada, United States, France and the Netherlands.\(^{52}\) Finally, Mak’s findings about the use of foreign jurisprudence in the UK Supreme Court contribute to a wider analysis of trends in globalisation and the interaction between the studied courts. Nevertheless, Mak’s work is a valuable contribution to the literature in this field and the similarity of the research findings and main claims provide strong support for the conclusions drawn in this thesis.

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\(^{50}\) Ibid.  
\(^{51}\) Ibid 8.  
\(^{52}\) Ibid 2.
Another closely related publication, ‘Comparative law in the Supreme Court 2010-11’, was published by Bell in 2012. In that article, Bell builds on Mak’s 2011 research and considers the use of foreign jurisprudence during the second year of the Supreme Court’s activity. He identifies a number of cases handed down by the Supreme Court during 2010-11, in which references were made to foreign jurisprudence. Interestingly, Bell finds that there was a paucity of decisions in that year directly discussing foreign jurisprudence but that this actually ‘reflects the recent analyses of the widening horizons of UK judges’.\(^{53}\) Bell’s conclusions are that ‘the Supreme Court is very open to looking at a variety of sources when value can be added to the justifications for their decisions by doing so’.\(^{54}\) However, the scope for analysis is limited, confined to just four pages. It is the aim in this thesis to develop this analysis further and consider the full first four years of the Supreme Court’s activity.

Additional insight has been given by the recently published *Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts*, authored by Michael Bobek. The volume was also published towards this end of the time period for this study. In that work, Bobek considers both ‘mandatory’ and ‘voluntary’ or ‘non-mandatory’ uses of foreign legal rules. The former, it is explained, includes ‘instances in which the national courts are obliged, by virtue of domestic law, to use foreign legal rules in deciding cases’.\(^{55}\) The latter two would include ‘references to foreign sources’ which represent ‘the choice of the national


\(^{54}\) Ibid 24.

\(^{55}\) Michael Bobek, *Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts* (Oxford University Press 2013), 21.
judge to use the foreign as a source of inspiration for devising a solution and/or justifying a solution'. 56 Bobek explains that the focus is on the use of ‘non-mandatory comparative arguments’ by supreme courts in five jurisdictions: England and Wales, France, Germany, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. 57 The purpose of the chapter titled ‘England and Wales’ is to examine the theory and the practice of comparative reasoning in the English courts. 58 In that chapter, Bobek also presents some empirical evidence from the UKSC’s activity although the evidence is limited to an analysis of one judicial year, 2010-11. 59 Bobek’s feeling was that the ‘mainstream opinion’ among the English judiciary could be said to be ‘one of “reserved optimism” vis-à-vis the foreign: yes, helpful and most illuminating, but…’. 60

Some interesting research was also carried out on the use of foreign jurisprudence in the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords (prior to the establishment of the Supreme Court). 61 ‘Resort to foreign constitutional norms in domestic human rights jurisprudence with reference to terrorism cases’ was published by Cram in 2009 with the aim of gaining ‘a clearer sense of the nature of the role played by foreign human rights jurisprudence

56 Ibid 33.
57 Ibid 67.
58 Ibid 75.
59 An analysis based on just one year runs the risk of being skewed by atypical results. Indeed, as is noted in chapter five below, the findings from this research are that foreign jurisprudence was used in an unusually high proportion of cases during the 2010-11.
60 Michael Bobek, *Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts*, above n 55, 80 (original emphasis).
61 The Supreme Court was established by part 3 Constitutional Reform Act 2005, assuming the judicial functions of the House of Lords as the highest appellate court in the United Kingdom (other than for Scottish Criminal cases). It started work on 1 October 2009.
in domestic judicial reasoning’.\textsuperscript{62} Cram identified and found five rulings which contained at least one reference to foreign jurisprudence, or, according to Cram’s terminology, ‘foreign constitutional norms’.\textsuperscript{63} The results of that study appeared to support one of the main criticisms for judicial comparativism: that citation of foreign jurisprudence is mainly opportunistic and results-driven. However Cram did not seek to interview the judges and, by his own admission, the conclusions are based on rather ‘limited evidence’,\textsuperscript{64} drawn from cases engaging the rights to liberty (Article 5 ECHR) and the right to a fair trial (Article 6 ECHR).\textsuperscript{65}

These works are valuable contributions to the literature in this field but none provide a systematic account of the use of foreign jurisprudence at the UK Supreme Court. For example, Bell found there to be a paucity of decisions citing foreign jurisprudence but cited just seven cases in his analysis of the cases decided in 2010-11.\textsuperscript{66} It is not clear whether Bell found only seven cases or whether he considered seven cases as an example. A similar picture emerges from Cram’s 2009 published study of the Article 5 and Article 6 claims before the Court of Appeal and House of Lords, which found

\textsuperscript{62} Ian Cram, ‘Resort to foreign constitutional norms in domestic human rights jurisprudence with reference to terrorism cases’ [2009] CLJ 118.
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid 132.
\textsuperscript{64} Ibid 141.
\textsuperscript{65} Ibid. At 127 Cram explained his methodology was ‘based upon searches of the Westlaw database of House of Lords and Court of Appeal decisions using each of the following search terms (i) “terrorism” and “Article 5”; (ii) “terrorism” and “right to liberty”; (iii) “terrorism” and “Article 6” and (iv) “terrorism” and “fair trial”. Within these search categories I have sought to locate all instances of judicial reference to a foreign court’s ruling in the period from October 2000 when the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force’.
\textsuperscript{66} John Bell, ‘Comparative Law in the Supreme Court 2010-11’, above n 53, 20. Bobek relied on Bell’s figures for 2010-11 in his analysis: Michael Bobek, \textit{Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts}, above n 55, 90 (n 76).
only five judgments citing foreign jurisprudence in the years since the coming into force of the Human Rights Act in October 2000.\textsuperscript{67} The feeling from the existing studies of the use of foreign jurisprudence in UK courts is therefore that it is not a big factor and contributes to only a small proportion of cases. However these studies draw mainly from explicit citations to foreign jurisprudence, which cannot capture uses that didn’t convert into a full attribution in the published judgment. Mak’s study comes the closest to addressing this through her interviews with some Justices of the Supreme Court but also refrained from quantitative analysis of judgments, preferring to avoid ‘any drawbacks related to the quantitative analysis of a small research sample’.\textsuperscript{68}

2.2 Is foreign jurisprudence used in human rights cases?

In human rights cases, the general consensus is that the frequency of judicial references to foreign jurisprudence is not unusual. Indeed, some commentators have said that judicial comparativism is seen most often in human rights cases,\textsuperscript{69} although it is also said that the extent to which judges draw from foreign jurisprudence in human rights cases varies greatly between jurisdictions. In this field, Örücü has made a significant contribution. Her edited collection, \textit{Judicial Comparativism in Human Rights Cases}, brings together chapters on the experiences of England, France, Germany, Russia,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{67} Ian Cram, ‘Resort to foreign constitutional norms…’, above n 62.
\item \textsuperscript{68} Elaine Mak, ‘Why do Dutch and UK judges cite foreign law?’, above n 38, 422.
\item \textsuperscript{69} See e.g. See Christopher McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of Human Rights? Transnational Judicial Conversations on Constitutional Rights’ (2000) 20(4) OJLS 499, 527, asking ‘is there something specific to human rights that explains the apparently greater use of foreign case law in human rights cases?’
\end{itemize}
Scotland, Turkey, the Commonwealth and South Africa as well as the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) (previously ‘European Court of Justice’) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). According to Örücü, the reader can conclude from these studies that, in human rights cases at least, English and Scottish judges utilise comparativism on a much wider scale than judges from most other jurisdictions.70 Indeed, the coming into force of the HRA 1998 provided an obvious opportunity for judicial comparativism through section 2, which explicitly obliges domestic courts to ‘take into account’ relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence. As Fenwick has written, ‘… it was always clear that the courts could also consider jurisprudence from other jurisdictions’.71 As Örücü had suggested earlier, foreign jurisprudence may provide the ‘analytical lenses’ through which domestic judges ‘converse’ with the international judges of the ECtHR and the CJEU.72

Along these lines, and around the time that the HRA 1998 was coming into force, Sedley suggested that the HRA’s status as a domestic statute ‘opens the door to a wealth of jurisprudence and experience from other

70 Esin Örücü, ‘Comparative law in British Courts’ in Ulrich Drobnig and Sjef van Erp. (eds), The Use of Comparative Law by Courts, 14th International Congress of Comparative Law (Kluwer 1999).
71 Helen Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights (Cavendish 2007) 192.
72 Esin Örücü (ed), Judicial Comparativism in Human Rights Cases (United Kingdom National Committee of Comparative Law 2003). The most relevant chapter for the purposes of this study is Paul Kearns’ contribution, ‘United Kingdom Judges and Human Rights Cases’. Unfortunately, however, Kearns centres his discussion on the impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 on domestic judicial reasoning generally therefore precludes detailed analysis of judicial comparativism with jurisprudence beyond the ‘new European human rights landscape’.
Commonwealth, common law and European jurisdictions, as well as from the Strasbourg Court itself, in its interpretation and application’.\textsuperscript{73} He continued:

It is through this rich prism that the Convention, in its turn will be read and applied in our courts: not as a monochrome exercise in textual interpretation and the application of received authority, but as a kaleidoscopic pattern combining the symmetry of law with the variety of experience.\textsuperscript{74}

In the context of the Scottish courts, Murdoch has commented that ‘reliance upon domestic solutions to domestic questions [has been] particularly acute … [with] little awareness of legal systems other than those closely-related common law systems (in particular, English law)’ because ‘Scotland … was (at least until recently) a small and relatively homogenised country’.\textsuperscript{75} In human rights cases, however, Murdoch has argued that judicial comparativism has greatly increased since the Scotland Act 1998 and the Human Rights Act 1998. These have ‘provide[d] a vessel for the use of comparative law analysis since domestic courts in giving effect to Convention rights … have to consider comparative practices in other European (and post Christine Goodwin, in other non-European) states’.\textsuperscript{76} It is as a result of the


\textsuperscript{74} Ibid foreword vii.

\textsuperscript{75} Jim Murdoch, ‘Comparative Law and the Scottish judges’ in Esin Örücü (ed), \textit{Judicial Comparativism in Human Rights Cases} (United Kingdom National Committee of Comparative Law, 2003), 88.

\textsuperscript{76} Jim Murdoch, ‘Comparative Law and the Scottish judges’ above n 75, 105. In Goodwin it is reported that ‘[t]he Court … attaches less importance to the lack of evidence of a common European approach to the resolution of the legal and practical problems posed [by the legal recognition of gender re-assignment], than to the clear and uncontested evidence of a continuing international trend in favour not only of the increased social acceptance of transsexuals but of legal recognition of the new sexual identity of post-operative transsexuals’. \textit{Christine Goodwin v United Kingdom} (28957/95) [2002] ECHR 583, [85].
HRA 1998, Murdoch submits, that ‘the use of comparative law … in the
domestic courts is now obvious’.\footnote{Jim Murdoch, ‘Comparative Law and the Scottish judges’. Above n 75, 96.}

Unfortunately, empirical evidence about the correlation between the citation of foreign jurisprudence and the type of issue is rare. As Bobek writes:

There are no conclusive empirical studies which have, for instance, qualitatively studied and compared the amount of comparative references made by the same jurisdiction in the various areas of law, thus confirming or rebutting the assumption that the greatest amount of comparative reasoning is indeed carried out in the area of human rights adjudication.\footnote{Michael Bobek, \textit{Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts}, above n 55, 64.}

Groppi and Ponthoreau’s edited volume made a significant contribution to this particular question, by reference to data gathered from a number of courts from jurisdictions working in the common law and civil law traditions. As has already been mentioned, one of the main conclusions of that volume was that citations of foreign case law are most common in human rights decisions.\footnote{Ibid 416.} However, this is a finding which has yet to be substantiated in the UK context. One of the research aims for this study is therefore to consider the reality of any such correlation in the UKSC’s decided cases.
2.3 Where does foreign jurisprudence come from?

On comparative law generally, methodological issues usually form the crux of academic debate. That is, which jurisdictions are compared and how one is to go about the exercise of comparing. Back in 1974 Otto Kahn-Freund took stock of the increasing comparativism and warned that ‘… in the process of becoming fashionable a thing gets distorted, and it is liable to be misused’.  

Kahn-Freund was not seeking to condemn the use of comparative law. On the contrary, he encouraged it, seeking only to caution that it must be undertaken with specific regard to a number of factors beyond the legal systems of the countries compared. Thus scepticism about borrowing from other jurisdictions often stems from the perceived contextual differences, which are thought to preclude the possibility for useful analysis; in reality, local conditions produce difficulties ‘which are often subtle and require … sophisticated analytical tools’ to separate them from their ‘culturally-determined realities’.  

Lest one forget Montesquieu's denial that useful comparisons could be made between jurisdictions at all. His well-rehearsed feeling was that the law of any nation would (or should) vary according to a range of factors including (but not restricted to) that nation’s history and politics as well as the customs, religions and inclinations of its people. By its very nature, law was unsuited to a comparative exercise.

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82 In The Spirit of the Laws Montesquieu argued that the law of any jurisdiction ‘should be so appropriate to the people for whom they are made that it is very unlikely that the laws of one nation can suit another’, Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller and Harold Samuel Stone (trans. and eds.), The Spirit of the Laws (Cambridge University Press 1989), 8-9.
This line of thought has links with concerns propounded by participants in the legal transplants debate, who have been emphasising the importance of contextual analysis for some time.83 As one commentator elegantly put it:

[m]uch as winemakers claim that a grape variety transplanted outside its native terroir produces a different wine notwithstanding that it remains the same plant, a transplanted law often functions in a different way in its new home.84

On the subject of legislative interpretation too, the emphasis is usually upon reading the statute as a whole and ‘drilling down into the substratum of meaning’.85 Comparative methodologists take the same view and usually argue that if comparativism is to be meaningful, it would necessarily engage with even the subtlest of contextual differences since these may—even if indirectly—feed into the respective legislative regimes.86

Given the importance attributed to the methodology of comparative law, it is curious that little has been said in relation to way that judges approach the matter, on either an empirical or on a normative level. Where it has been addressed, one of the common threads is a feeling that jurisdictions from which judges draw their sources must, above all else, be ‘fit for

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86 E.g. Mark Van Hoecke, Mark Warrington, ‘Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal Doctrine: Towards a New Model for Comparative Law’ (1998) 47(3) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 495, 496: ‘… law cannot be understood unless it is placed in a broad historical, socio-economic, psychological and ideological context’.
comparison’. Whether true or not, there is a perception that different ideological positions on human rights are taken by different jurisdictions and (if that is true) that drawing from one particular jurisdiction’s approach to human rights may be regarded as a sign of a particular orientation towards human rights generally. Thus the ‘fit for comparison’ perception has also been said to feed a reluctance to use foreign jurisprudence, especially where the domestic court suffers from a particular insularity whereby it sees its own jurisdiction as one which enjoys pre-eminence among civilised countries.

The reluctance to draw from foreign jurisprudence in the United States is a good example. There it is generally agreed that the nation sees itself as a leader rather than a follower in the world order and this means resorting to the approach of other courts is unlikely: the US is known for a limited adherence to international law and ‘[a]n attitude lingers’ that it has ‘little to learn from countries whose constitutions have not reached the two-century mark’.

Unsurprisingly, McCrudden found that ‘it is [in the main] the judiciaries of liberal democratic regimes that cite each other … [t]he citation of, for example, Chinese cases by the [UK] House of Lords, does not seem likely’. More recently, Groppi and Ponthoreau found that the practice of citing foreign

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89 Ian Cram, ‘Resort to foreign constitutional norm…’, above n 62, 124.
jurisprudence is usually confined to a particular group or ‘family’ of courts. In the UK context, Mak has written:

For the UK Supreme Court judges, the first criterion for the selection of foreign judgments concerns legal tradition, in the sense of the shared background with other common law systems. Sources most often referred to come from Commonwealth legal systems and from the US legal system.

Jurisprudence under Bills of Rights from jurisdictions in similar legal traditions and that are of recent origin are likely to be especially relevant in this respect. Such instances are not difficult to identify: many countries with legal systems rooted in the common law have adopted Bills of Rights not dissimilar to the UK Human Rights Act. Indeed the framers of the HRA are often thought to have taken inspiration from some of those jurisdictions. For example, it is often pointed out that the Labour Party was strongly influenced by the Canadian position when it decided to campaign for human rights legislation. Hence Feldman’s suggestion that the decisions of the Supreme Court of India under that country’s 1947 Constitution, those of the Court of Appeal of New Zealand on the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, and those of the South African Constitutional Court on the rights under South Africa’s 1993 and 1996 African Constitutions, may all contain ‘useful insights’.

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92 Tania Groppi and Marie-Claire Ponthoreau (eds), *The Use of Foreign Precedents by Constitutional Judges*, above n 31, 430.


was frequently repeated in the early literature on the HRA. Before the coming into force of the Act, Starmer considered jurisprudence of this kind to be ‘invaluable’ in assisting the interpretation of Convention rights.\(^\text{96}\) A few years later, Lester and Clapinska wrote that ‘[t]he developing principles contained in the constitutional case law of courts in other common law countries…are likely to be at least as persuasive as the Strasbourg case law’.\(^\text{97}\) Indeed some of the more recent literature confirms that these jurisdictions frequently refer to UK jurisprudence,\(^\text{98}\) but there is little empirical research to confirm that the UK courts follow the same pattern.

Quantitative analysis in these terms is uncommon. The most recent and direct attempt at empirical research on the citation of foreign jurisprudence—*The Use of Foreign Precedents by Constitutional Courts* (discussed above)—does not include a chapter on the United Kingdom experience. Mak’s work on the Dutch and UK Supreme Courts specifically excludes quantitative analysis and Bell’s 2012 piece takes a view of just one judicial year. Indeed, as Mak has pointed out in her most recent publication, ‘the views and practices of judges themselves have not been studied extensively’.\(^\text{99}\)

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\(^\text{98}\) See e.g. Tania Groppi and Marie-Claire Ponthoreau (eds), *The Use of Foreign Precedents by Constitutional Judges*, above n 31.

One study that does give data on the use of foreign jurisprudence is Flanagan and Ahern’s 2011 article, ‘Judicial Decision-Making and Transnational Law: A Survey of Common Law Supreme Court Judges’. Flanagan and Ahern find that judges in foreign jurisdictions are likely to ‘form a reference group’ to domestic judges adjudicating on constitutional rights. However, the authors are cynical about judges citing foreign jurisprudence ‘as a source of persuasive authority’, concluding that this is likely to ‘apply to only a minority of judicial comparativists’. Their data results also include some findings on the selection of foreign jurisprudence and supports the finding in this thesis that judges are likely to refer to a small family of courts, in particular those from Commonwealth jurisdictions. However, the research methods are quite different to those adopted in this study. Firstly, the data is drawn from a number of apex courts, including but not restricted to the United Kingdom judges. Secondly, Flanagan and Ahern did not conduct interviews, explained on the practical basis that the ‘international dispersion of our intended subjects’ meant that interviews were not feasible.

Another notable quantitative study of UK judicial comparativism was undertaken by Örücü in a chapter headed 'Comparative law in British Courts',

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101 Ibid 28.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid 9. A system of questionnaires and electronic submission were chosen as an alternative means of primary data collection. As explained in the methodology chapter below, interviews were feasible for this study and provided a distinct advantage: the possibility to follow up on interesting leads or to develop discussion in a way that is not possible in an electronic questionnaire. The point is also recognised by Elaine Mak, Judicial Decision-Making in a Globalised World, above n 39, 66.
published in Drobnig and van Erp’s edited collection, *The Use of Comparative Law by Courts, 14th International Congress of Comparative Law.* In that chapter, Örücü aimed not only to account for the number and frequency of judicial comparativism but also to detect existing patterns. She considered decisions published in the All ER rendered in 1972, 1982, 1992 and between 1990-1995, finding that the proportion of references to foreign in law in domestic cases had increased significantly by the end of 1995. Her study also revealed that the main judicial comparisons were between members of the common law family with frequent references to the United States of America and other Commonwealth jurisdictions. Further, since 1993, references to common law jurisdictions had ‘increased four-fold’ while references to civil law jurisdictions had doubled.

Similar findings were given by Siems, who undertook a quantitative study of the Court of Appeal’s citation of foreign jurisprudence. Siems drew his data from the years between 1984 and 2006, concluding that the Court of Appeal referred to the jurisprudence of common law jurisdictions much more than non-common law jurisdictions. Among the common law courts that were most frequently referred to were (in order of the frequency of citation)

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105 From references to foreign law in 26 out of 602 cases in 1972, to 119 out of a total 285 cases in 1995. It is worth explaining that the years 1972, 1982 and 1992 were chosen to test whether entry to the European Community in 1972 altered the pattern of references. Örücü recognised that these intervals allowed for a large chance element and included the period between 1990-1995 in part to correct this (but also since it was the most recent period and one that she felt to be long enough to attempt meaningful analysis and reliable hypotheses).
107 Mathias Siems, ‘Citation Patterns of the German Federal Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal of England and Wales’ (2010) 21 KLJ 152.
108 Siems found the Court of Appeal cited foreign common law courts in 16% of its cases while citations to non-common law courts were around 0.5%.
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United States, Ireland and South Africa. 109 Bobek also found that citations of foreign jurisprudence continue to be drawn from mainly common law jurisdictions. 110 It was for that reason that the focus of Bobek’s chapter on England and Wales was on how to classify such ‘intra-common law referencing’. 111

Notwithstanding these suggestions, a contrasting theme from the existing literature has actually been that reference to non-European jurisprudence in human rights cases has taken a back seat where the human rights issue is one that falls under the scope of the ECHR. In part, this has been attributed to the duty under section 2 HRA 1998, which requires domestic courts to ‘take into account’ relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence. The section has been read as prioritising jurisprudence that the European Court would itself be likely to consider. The logic is intelligible: the ECHR and its jurisprudence are built into the structure of the HRA and therefore expressly tie domestic rights to those existing in the ECHR (in contrast to, say, the Canadian, Victorian and New Zealand experiences which do not draw from another treaty). As Masterman has suggested: 112

Comparative jurisprudence from those countries outside the Council of Europe is likely to offer little in terms of the strict question of judging the compatibility of a statutory provision with

110 Michael Bobek, Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts, above n 55, 75.
111 Ibid.
the Convention rights themselves; similarly it is unlikely to point to the direction in which the common law should be developed to ensure compatibility with the Convention rights.

Nevertheless, whether judges consider these as factors that influence they way they use foreign jurisprudence to form their domestic judgments is unclear. Certainly, judges do not explain their choices in these terms through their judgments. As Cram found:

English judges, it seems, do little to explain why the insights of a particular jurisdiction might be relevant to the interpretation of domestic law and why those derived from other jurisdictions were not. The reader of these law reports searches in vain for an account of the criteria by which the included jurisdictions were deemed includable and why the excluded were considered excludable.\textsuperscript{113}

Like many comparative scholars, Cram’s conclusion is that ‘[u]ntil the methodology for selection of foreign norms is made much more explicit, the suspicion will linger that the court's selection of foreign judgments is purely results-driven’:\textsuperscript{114}

...some greater level of justification is needed from the courts as to why Case A from the Ruritanian Supreme Court is relevant and possibly even dispositive of the dispute in hand whilst Case B from the Freedonian Constitutional Court can be dismissed as irrelevant and further why the domestic court does not even bother to look at Case C from the High Court of Syldavia.\textsuperscript{115}

\textsuperscript{113} Ian Cram, ‘Resort to foreign constitutional norms…’, above n 62, 140.
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid 141.
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid.
Finally, judges are themselves also likely to approach arguments with a number of preconceived perspectives, which may include a willingness to look abroad. As Cardozo famously said, it is hard for judges to remove themselves from ‘the empire of [their] subconscious loyalties’. ¹¹⁶ For example, some of the existing literature suggests that judges from scholarly backgrounds—particularly those that have studied abroad—are much more likely to cite foreign jurisprudence than career judges.¹¹⁷

Dickson opens his 2013 publication, *Human Rights and the United Kingdom Supreme Court*, with the suggestion that ‘judges who are appointed tend to share certain characteristics, which inevitably make for a court that is cautious and reserved in its law-making’.¹¹⁸ The book is focused ‘on the attitudes struck by the United Kingdom’s most senior judges in relation to the rights set out in the Human Rights Act 1998’.¹¹⁹ For the purposes of this study, the chief interest in Dickson’s book turns on the stated aim of paying ‘close attention to the views of individual judges in the domestic court and flag[ging] up the sharp differences of opinion which have often been expressed’.¹²⁰ To that end, Dickson has identified trends and characterised

¹¹⁷ Wen-Chen Chang and Jiunn-Rong Yeh, ‘Judges as Discursive Agent: The Use of Foreign Precedents by the Constitutional Court of Taiwan’ in Tania Groppi and Marie-Claire Ponthoreau (eds), *The Use of Foreign Precedents by Constitutional Judges*, above n 31, 376.
¹¹⁹ Ibid 2.
¹²⁰ Ibid.
the attitudes of Supreme Court Justices, through analysis of their judicial and extra-judicial pronouncements.¹²¹

Life experience is particularly likely to influence Justices when they are confronted with human rights arguments, because those arguments will relate to what it is that every human being is entitled to expect from the state. The fact that all of the Justices will be of a certain age when appointed (the average age at appointment of those currently in post was 63) means that their approach to such arguments will be affected by long personal experience. Today’s Justices will have begun attending primary school in the 1950s and will not have experienced military service, as many of their predecessors would have done, nor the pre-welfare state era. As adolescents, they will have lived through the sexual revolution of the 1960s and 1970s and will have benefited from free university education (even if prior to university they attended private schools). As lawyers they will have built up considerable financial security and numerous esteem indicators. They will have acquired significant legal experience, including perhaps as a lower level judge, before the Human Rights Act was enacted in 1998.¹²²

In addition, it has been suggested that law and legal practice may simply be in harmony with a pattern of globally inter-dependent exchanges and that ‘just as those parties appearing before the courts interact increasingly with

¹²¹ Ibid.
¹²² Ibid 13. Dickson notes a connected point made by Lord Neuberger in a 2011 lecture: ‘yesterday’s judges were children of the conventional and respectful 40s and 50s, whereas today’s judges are children of the questioning and sceptical 60s and 70s’. See further Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury, ‘Who are the Masters Now?’ Second Lord Alexander of Weedon lecture, 6 April 2011 <http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Speeches/mr-speech-weedon-lecture-110406.pdf> accessed 24 November 2011, 15; Mak’s work also confirms that the selection of foreign sources ‘seems to be very much dependent on the personal background of the judges’, Elaine Mak, ‘Why do Dutch and UK judges cite foreign law?’, above n 38, 429.
others beyond national boundaries, so inevitably are courts confronted with
the existence and practices of other legal systems'.

Comparative materials are increasingly accessible, and communication with practitioners and judges of other legal systems is increasingly easy. It is often said that greater convergence between legal orders is linked to the forces of globalisation.

Ease of travel coupled with technological developments (particularly the dissemination of information via the world wide web) and the growth of an international legal ‘community’ facilitating conversation between judges and practitioners from all over the world contributes to the use of foreign jurisprudence in domestic courtrooms. As Cram has suggested, electronic databases are likely to have had a profound effect on the citation of foreign legal materials and ‘it would be surprising if the results of database searches had not begun to filter through from counsels’ submissions to court judgments’.

Thus the jurisdictions from which judges may draw from may often be limited to the sources selected and put before them by counsel. Analogy might be made with judicial reasoning on a more general level. Some time ago, for instance, Rudden identified ‘four dialogues’ that take place in the process of

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123 Ian Cram, ‘Resort to foreign constitutional norms…’, above, above n 62, 121.
124 Although some commentators have been sceptical about this. William Twining was tempted to ban the use of the word ‘globalisation’: William Twining, ‘Globalisations and Comparative Law’ in Esin Örücü and David Nelken (eds), Comparative Law: A Handbook (Hart Publishing 2007) 69, 70. Nelken’s introductory chapter also reminds us that ‘globalisation can bring about difference as well as similarity’, 31.
125 Ian Cram, ‘Resort to foreign constitutional norms…’, above n 62, 121.
126 Ibid.
arriving at a decision: the dialogue between the Bar and Bench; the dialogue amongst the Bench; the dialogue with the past (or with precedent); and the dialogue with the future (whereby judges may consider the consequences of a decisions such as any opening of ‘floodgates’).\textsuperscript{128} Alan Paterson’s valuable contribution in \textit{The Law Lords} also provided some early insight by exposing the way that the judges themselves see their role and what they understand their processes to be.\textsuperscript{129}

Further observations on that theme are given in Paterson’s most recent publication: \textit{Final Judgment: The Last Law Lords and the Supreme Court}.\textsuperscript{130} In that book, Paterson concludes that decision-making in the UK’s top court is a social and collective process.\textsuperscript{131} That process, it is argued, is a product of several ‘dialogues’ that the Justices engage in when making their decisions. Aside from the main dialogue between the Justices themselves (to which Paterson devotes three chapters), Paterson also considers dialogues with counsel, with other branches of government, with lower courts, with academics and with the judicial assistants. A few pages are given on ‘dialogues with courts overseas’ although these do not enter into the detail intended in this study and the focus is mainly on the dialogue with the Strasbourg Court rather than with foreign domestic courts.\textsuperscript{132} However,

\textsuperscript{129} Alan Paterson, \textit{The Law Lords}, above n 127.
\textsuperscript{130} Alan Paterson, \textit{Final Judgment}, above n 127.
\textsuperscript{131} Ibid 312.
\textsuperscript{132} Ibid 222-233.
Paterson’s observations about the working methods at the Supreme Court are of clear interest and are referred to numerous times in this thesis.

### 2.4 Why do judges use foreign jurisprudence?

A method of study does not lend itself to definition otherwise than by an indication of the purposes for which it may be employed, and the essential problem is not—what is comparative law? The question of real importance is—what is its purpose?  

Almost without exception, commentators addressing the ‘why’ in judicial comparativism have engaged with the concepts of comparative methodology. Grappling with the conceptual basis for comparativism is evidently felt to be an important pre-cursor to meaningful contribution. There are trends here too: the well rehearsed debate between ‘universalism’ and ‘pluralism’ (which echo the debates in human rights between universalism and cultural relativism) has become out-dated, although conversations continue to frame the possibility of a new ‘common law’ or ‘common enterprise’ which appears to operate in similar terms. More recently the debate amongst comparative law scholars has explained the issue as a tension between ‘functionalism’ and a ‘dialogic method’, of which functionalism was arguably the dominant

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134 Often, these have led academics to consider the emergence of a regional (as opposed to universal) concept of human rights. See e.g. Christopher McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of Human Rights?’, above n 69; Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘A Typology of Transjudicial Communication’ above n 8, 127: there is likely to be an ‘awareness of a common enterprise, even if only in the sense of confrontation of common issues of problems’.

135 The ‘dialogic method’, is a response to the functionalist approach which has gained currency with comparative scholarship by—it is argued—better responding to the ’present context of globalizing politics’ and providing a ‘decentred view of constitutional practices deriving from pluralist sources, with the possibility of 'cross fertilization'. Space precludes extensive analysis of these debates here.
approach, proceeding on the basis of ‘usefulness and need’: ‘…only a fool would refuse quinine just because it didn’t grown in his back garden’.

Thus it is usually argued that foreign material can contribute solutions to similar legal problems. Along these lines, one of the best known comparative lawyers wrote in 1949 that ‘at some future date more extensive use will, no doubt, be made of foreign law for the purpose of assisting our judges to fill the gaps that are still to be found in our law’. Lord Bingham touched on this explanation in his 2009 Hamlyn Lectures:

If...it is true, as I think it is, that modern British judges are on the whole more inclined than their forebears to consider the effect of foreign authority in appropriate cases, the case should not be put too high. It is not easy, if indeed it is possible, to identify cases in which resort to foreign authority (I am excluding cases relating to the law of the EU, international law and human rights law) can be confidently said to have had a decisive effect on the outcome in the sense that the judge would have decided differently but for the foreign authority. We should not, I think, regard foreign authority as a match-winner, a magical ace of trumps. But there are perhaps two situations in which foreign authority may exert a significant if not a decisive influence. One is where domestic authority points towards an answer that seems in appropriate or unjust. The other is where domestic authority appears to yield no clear answer. In such situations...the courts have proved willing to

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137 Harold Cooke Gutteridge, *Comparative Law*, above n 133, 40.
take notice of, and give weight to, solutions developed elsewhere.¹³⁸

Bell was evidently persuaded by the possibility in his study of the Supreme Court’s 2010-11 decisions, considering that *R v Chaytor* provided an example of foreign case law being used in this way (although Bell’s definition of foreign jurisprudence evidently encompassed Privy Council decisions, unlike this thesis which considers only the case law of foreign domestic courts).¹³⁹ The gap-filling thesis also formed one of Feeley’s five purposes for using comparative law, alongside being educated about other legal systems, assisting domestic law reform, assisting in the transnational spread of norms and to bring about greater harmony and unity across legal systems.¹⁴⁰

Alternatively, judges may use foreign jurisprudence as a vehicle for adopting a more theorised approach to human rights. As one commentator has hypothesised, ‘[e]ven where the *result* of the foreign judicial approach has not been adopted, it has often been influential in sharpening the understanding of the court’s view of domestic law’.¹⁴¹ Another has suggested that ‘where the difference between comparative jurisdictions is so great as to render the use of comparative jurisprudence irrelevant, it may nevertheless perform a cognitive function … the confrontation of both legal systems may force some

₁³⁹ John Bell, ‘Comparative law in the Supreme Court 2010-11’ above n 53, 23; *R v Chaytor and others* [2010] UKSC 52.
consideration and better understanding of the nature of domestic law'. 142 In this vein, both Mak and Bell have concluded that foreign judgments provide ‘more of a benchmark of the rightness’ for the Justices. 143

If a foreign court has decided a similar point, it is sensible to consider whether that solution reveals anything useful about whether it would be an appropriate decision in an English, Welsh, Scots, or Irish context. 144

Thus foreign jurisprudence is used ‘when judges want to obtain better knowledge or a yardstick for the judgment of the case at hand’. 145 A connected possibility is that judicial comparativism can perform mainly a ‘legitimation function’. 146 In other words, judges draw from foreign jurisprudence in order to re-assure themselves (and their audience) about the merits of their judgment. Slaughter has argued that ‘[r]efences to the activity of fellow courts in other states can act as … a security blanket …’ 147 and Justice Barak (of the Israeli Supreme Court) has talked of comparative law ‘grant[ing] comfort to the judge and giv[ing] him the feeling that he is treading on safe ground’. 148

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143 John Bell ‘Comparative Law in the Supreme Court 2010-11’, above n 53, 23.

144 Ibid.

145 Elaine Mak, ‘Why do Dutch and UK judges cite foreign law’, above n 38, 444; Elaine Mak, ‘Reference to Foreign Law in the Supreme Courts of Britain and the Netherlands…’, above n 38, 33-34.

146 See e.g. Luc Heuschling ‘Comparative Law and the European Convention on Human Rights Cases’ in Esin Örücü (ed), Judicial Comparativism in Human Rights Cases, above n 141, 47.


Similarly, it has been suggested that courts have recourse to foreign material for pedagogical reasons. As Slaughter has said, ‘the court of a fledgling democracy … might look to the opinions of courts in older and more established democracies as a way of binding its country to this existing community of states’. The use of foreign jurisprudence may be ‘premised on the need to instil habits of Western democratic participation in a body politic that on the whole is inexperienced in the ways of democracy.

Alternatively, foreign judgments may be used ‘as a warning’, where ‘the foreign law is “the other”, which must be avoided’.

More cynically, it has been argued that judicial comparativism is mainly results-driven. That is to say, that judges use that jurisprudence which is likely to support their own predetermined conclusions, or a means of ‘judicial fig-leafing’, designed to obscure the reality of judicial choice.

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149 Anne-Marie Slaughter ‘A Typology of Transjudicial Communication’, above n 8, 134.
Similar anxieties are prevalent about the ‘substantial “cherry picking” of which jurisdiction to cite’ which McCrudden has explained as a concern that ‘those jurisdictions chosen will be those which are likely to support the conclusion sought, leading to arbitrary decision-making, not legitimate judging’. Cram, Mak and Bell all appear to agree that in the House of Lords and now the Supreme Court, foreign jurisprudence is ‘results-driven’ and often used opportunistically.

Nevertheless, perhaps the most compelling explanation for the use of foreign jurisprudence in human rights cases is that a particular regime requires it or that there exists a common alliance. In the UK, judges have drawn from foreign jurisprudence for some time, typically through comparison with the judgments of Commonwealth courts (similarly rooted in the common law) and, more recently, with the European legal orders. The latter has been of greater relevance since the accession to the European Community and, in human rights cases, the ECHR. Under the HRA 1998 domestic courts are under a duty to ‘take into account’ relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence, but the

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155 Ian Cram, ‘Resort to foreign constitutional norms…’, above n 62, 139-141; Elaine Mak, ‘Why do Dutch and UK judges cite foreign law’, above n 62; John Bell ‘Comparative Law in the Supreme Court 2010-11’, above n 53.


Act does not specify the approach that domestic courts should take to that foreign jurisprudence otherwise. Regard to the decisions of European domestic courts, for instance, is unregulated, as is regard to non-European jurisprudence. However, as mentioned above, the HRA may have steered domestic courts in the direction of jurisprudence the ECtHR would be likely to consider.158

In keeping with these findings, Örüçü’s 1990s study of Comparative Law in British Courts (discussed earlier) linked the tendency to cite certain jurisdictions to the purposes served by those sources. Thus Örüçü concluded that comparison with common law jurisdictions led to a ‘functional use’ of comparative law whereas comparison with civilian systems lead to an arguably ‘ornamental use’ of comparative law.159 Further, she linked the use of common law material with cases that ‘deal mostly with domestic law and domestic problems’ whereas the second group of cases, comparison with civilian law, ‘fall mostly within a wider ambit, usually of European law or an international convention’.160 On a classical ‘like for like’ breed of reasoning, these findings are not surprising. What is interesting then, is the extent to which these patterns have altered since her study, a time lag which has seen the coming into force of the HRA 1998, thus augmenting the status of the ECHR in domestic law and giving rise to the possibility that—in human rights cases at lease—the relevance of foreign jurisprudence may have significantly altered.

158 E.g. Elaine Mak, Judicial Decision-Making in a Globalised World, above n 39, 143.
159 Esin Örüçü, ‘Comparative law in British Courts’, above n 70, 294.
160 Ibid.
Örücü’s 2003 publication, Judicial Comparativism in Human Rights Cases, is a less directly relevant but nevertheless significant publication on the same theme. Through a number of collaborative chapters, it is discussed how far judges are employing the comparative approach, the legitimacy of this approach and whether Comparativism is an interpretative aid, ‘functional’, or ‘ornamental’. However, the account of comparative legal models in national legal systems is discussed insofar as it relates to the development of a common law or ‘ius commune’ of human rights. To that end, the book has a different focus to the one in this thesis. By seeking to address definitions of ‘globalism’ and ‘localism’ and whether there is a place for ‘cultural exceptionalism’ in the context of human rights, there is limited space for analysis of the reasons for the use of foreign jurisprudence or the way that judges use it.

To those questions, McCrudden has made one of the most relevant contributions. McCrudden has focused on ‘the use by national judges in one jurisdiction of judicial interpretations of human rights norms in another jurisdiction’.161 He has sought (in series of articles and book chapters) to illuminate the principles underlying judicial comparativism in human rights cases.162 In doing so, McCrudden has addressed three central questions:

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162 Christopher McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of Human Rights?’, above n 69; Christopher McCrudden, ‘Human Rights and Judicial Use of Comparative Law’, above n 141; Christopher
‘How far does comparativism happen?’, ‘Why does it happen?’ and ‘Is it legitimate?’ McCrudden has thus examined the relationship between human rights interpretation and comparative legal methods as well as identifying a number of factors that are said to affect or explain the use of foreign judgments in domestic human rights cases.

This study takes inspiration from McCrudden’s work but can be distinguished in the following ways: McCrudden has chiefly been concerned with exposing patterns in the way domestic courts use foreign case law and has therefore drawn from a number of jurisdictions. By contrast, this thesis is concerned with the use of foreign jurisprudence by United Kingdom judges specifically. While McCrudden’s work provides a valuable insight into why and how judges use foreign jurisprudence domestically, his analysis does not address the purposes for which judges see themselves as applying foreign jurisprudence. Moreover, McCrudden is himself conscious that his conclusions are, by his own admission, based on ‘somewhat anecdotal evidence’ and that he has ‘done little more than identify some of the issues that a more complete study of the complex phenomenon … should examine more systematically’. As Whitman has put it, ‘some kind of borrowing is surely taking place and we need some account of what is going on’.


3 Research Methodology

One of the most significant contributions to the existing literature in this field is the empirical data, gathered from analysis of the Supreme Court’s judgments as well as the information obtained through interviews with the Justices of the Supreme Court and the Judicial Assistants. Since this evidence is the foundation for the arguments presented in this thesis, this chapter is devoted to a detailed account of the research methodology. In the first part, the parameters of the study are set out and the key terms defined. The methodology followed during the data collection and an account of sources from which data is taken is detailed in the second part.

3.1 Research Parameters

The focus of this thesis is on the use of jurisprudence from foreign domestic courts (foreign jurisprudence) in human rights cases before the UK Supreme Court. In drawing these parameters, other persuasive sources commonly used in UK courts were excluded from the study. These might include, for example, the judgments of lower courts, Obiter Dicta, academic literature and the decisions of the Privy Council. Incorporating the UK Supreme Court’s use of all persuasive authorities was considered in the early stages of the research design but could not be pursued for reasons of time and space; such a study would be of great interest but would be better undertaken as part of a larger project. Some of the findings about the use of foreign jurisprudence in this thesis may nevertheless contribute to understanding about the use of other persuasive sources more generally. In particular, it is
plausible that many of the findings reported in chapters five and six (how foreign jurisprudence is used and the use of foreign jurisprudence as a heuristic device) would be likely to reflect the approach to persuasive sources more generally. However, other findings are felt to be peculiar to the use of foreign jurisprudence. These most obviously include situations where the Court is looking to maintain consistency (chapter seven), in which the object of the exercise is to identify a common understanding or consensus among other jurisdictions. On those matters, it is not obvious that the findings in this thesis could apply to the use of other persuasive sources. For these reasons, this thesis therefore contributes strictly to the specific literature on judicial use of foreign jurisprudence and comparative law as a freestanding topic.

A number of the terms used for this project are common among other academic works or in other broader contexts. What follows is therefore an account of the meaning ascribed to each of these terms for the purposes of this study.

3.1.1 Foreign jurisprudence

In the context of this study, ‘jurisprudence’ refers to a body of law in the doctrinal sense. That is to say, it encompasses case law, legal instruments and relevant *travaux préparatoires*.\(^\text{166}\) ‘Foreign’ takes its natural meaning and refers to non-domestic matters. ‘Foreign jurisprudence’ therefore relates to case law, legal instruments and relevant *travaux préparatoires* outside the

\(^{166}\) Literally: ‘preparatory works’, referring to material produced during the drafting of legislation or related instruments.
domestic legal system. This definition important since different sources of law may be useful for different purposes. As Saunders has hypothesised,

One possible variation, which should be noted at the outset, is the nature of the foreign source on which a court draws. It may be a conclusion of law or a constitutional or legal norm, whether articulated by a court or otherwise. Equally, however, it may be an argument, a value, a perception, an interpretative approach, or merely a happy turn of phrase. The list is intended to be illustrative, rather than exhaustive.¹⁶⁷

Crucially, however, ‘foreign jurisprudence’ only encompasses foreign domestic law and does not refer to international law. It thereby excludes, for example, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR in Strasbourg,¹⁶⁸ although these materials are referred to by way of comparison or to better illustrate the approach taken to foreign jurisprudence in human rights cases where those sources are otherwise relevant. It also excludes the decisions of supranational courts which UK courts are bound to follow, including decisions of the CJEU under section 3 of the European Communities Act 1972 (ECA).¹⁶⁹ ‘Foreign jurisprudence’ thus limits the source pool to material from


¹⁶⁹ The ‘Practice Direction on the Citation of Authorities’ also excludes these sources from its guidance on foreign jurisprudence: ‘For the avoidance of doubt, paragraphs 9.1 and 9.2 do
foreign domestic legal orders—which have no more than a ‘persuasive’ authority in UK domestic courts.\textsuperscript{170} To avoid confusion, the term ‘foreign jurisprudence’ has been preferred over ‘foreign law’ or ‘foreign precedents’, even where inelegant. The only exception to this is where other scholars have used the alternative terms in quoted material, in which case the original sense has been retained.

\section*{3.1.2 Use of foreign jurisprudence}

The ‘use’ of foreign jurisprudence is the central thread of the enquiry. Identifying the use of foreign jurisprudence is the necessary first step in teasing out any method or motivation governing the practice. Discovering exactly how judges are utilising, employing, exercising, applying, exploiting, handling, managing, consuming or drawing from foreign jurisprudence are questions upon which all other research questions are parasitic. The ‘use’ of foreign jurisprudence must therefore be understood in the broadest sense.\textsuperscript{171}

\textsuperscript{170} This is in contrast with the approach taken by some other studies. For example, in her 1990s study of Comparative Law in British Courts, Örücü counted any citation of any non-English jurisprudence, including the jurisprudence on international treaties or conventions: Esin Örücü, ‘Comparative law in British Courts’ in Ulrich Drobnig and Sjef van Erp. (eds), The Use of Comparative Law by Courts, 14th International Congress of Comparative Law (Kluwer 1999); Mathias M Siems, ‘Citation Patterns of the German Federal Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal of England and Wales’ (2010) 21 KLJ 152.

\textsuperscript{171} The term ‘use’ was also applied by Groppi and Ponthoreau in The Use of Foreign Precedents by Constitutional Courts (Hart Publishing 2013); Another recent study has preferred the term ‘inspiration’, Michael Bobek, Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts, above n 169.
It captures any contribution made by foreign jurisprudence to judicial reasoning, from explicit citation to a passing reference or even a very casual consideration—including references that do not form a part of the published judgment.\textsuperscript{172} The last of these is crucial, since the existing literature has largely ignored non-explicit uses of foreign jurisprudence.\textsuperscript{173} Although practical difficulties make analysis of these non-explicit uses more challenging, it is necessary to engage with this question if the aim is to provide a comprehensive overview of the ‘use’ of foreign jurisprudence.

\subsection*{3.1.3 Courts and Judges}

At the outset, this research project purported to analyse the use of foreign jurisprudence in UK human rights cases. As originally designed, this project would have incorporated human rights cases decided in any of the UK appellate courts. However, it became clear that the volume of judgments falling within those broadly drawn parameters would allow for little depth of analysis. The parameters were therefore revised to the UK Supreme Court specifically. The empirical research draws from judgments handed down by the UKSC since the start of its work in October 2009 and up to the end of the fourth judicial year in July 2013.\textsuperscript{174} Interviews were held with the Justices of that court, their judicial assistants and one Lord Justice of Appeal. The choice

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item In the latter case, the obvious methodological issue is that such ‘use’ will not be discernable from the published decision. These are considered further in chapter five below, in the context of the methods through which the judges arrive at foreign jurisprudence.
\item See e.g. Tania Groppi and Marie-Claire Ponthoreau (eds), \textit{The Use of Foreign Precedents by Constitutional Judges} (Hart Publishing 2013), 7. The decision to ignore implicit influences in that volume was considered earlier in chapter two, see text around n 34.
\item The Supreme Court was established by part 3 Constitutional Reform Act 2005, assuming the judicial functions of the House of Lords as the highest appellate court in the United Kingdom (other than for Scottish Criminal cases).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
to focus on the Supreme Court was made on the basis that the Justices of the Supreme Court were the most likely to face the complex legal problems that would trigger the use of persuasive authorities such as foreign jurisprudence.¹⁷⁵ Time and resources preclude an extensive analysis of the way foreign jurisprudence is used in courts at all levels, although such a study would no doubt be very useful.¹⁷⁶

3.1.4 Human Rights Cases

‘Human rights cases’ takes a broad meaning, generally referring to claims under the Human Rights Act 1998. Human rights, as a field of enquiry, was chosen for two reasons: first, human rights claims raise some of the most interesting and divisive issues and are often sensitive and subject to cultural interpretation. Second, there was also a strong sense in the literature that judicial comparativism is more prevalent in human rights cases than in other fields.¹⁷⁷ Third, the diet of the highest court has been increasingly balanced

¹⁷⁵ Bobek considers there to be two reasons for this. First, on an institutional basis, ‘[s]upreme jurisdictions have a larger mandate: to look beyond the individual judicial file and case and see the broader picture’. Secondly, ‘[c]omparative analysis is, in terms of time, expertise, and resources, a demanding exercise’ and ‘it is at the level of supreme jurisdictions where human resources (analytical backup) and also procedural tools (lesser docket, selection of cases) may be available. These allow judges to concentrate on contentious legal issues in greater detail’: Michael Bobek, Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts, above n 169, 44-45; Konrad Schiemann, ‘The Judge as Comparatist’ in Basil Markesinis and Jorg Fedtke, Judicial Recourse to Foreign Law: A New Source of Inspiration? (University College London Press 2006) 369: ‘The lower down the judicial ladder a judge finds himself the greater that pressure is in general’.

¹⁷⁶ In correspondence received towards the end of the study period, Lady Justice Arden noted that the subject of this thesis is also relevant to courts below the Supreme Court, including, in particular, the Court of Appeal where the vast majority of these cases are heard and not appealed: letter from Lady Justice Arden to author (17 January 2014).

¹⁷⁷ See e.g. E.g. Tania Groppi and Marie-Claire Ponthoreau (eds), The Use of Foreign Precedents by Constitutional Judges, above n 173, 416 ‘The research clearly shows that citations of foreign case law prevail in … human rights decisions’; Christopher McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of Human Rights?: Transnational Judicial Conversations on Constitutional
towards public law and human rights cases,\textsuperscript{178} and judges adjudicating on human rights claims often have to consider the jurisprudence of supranational courts. For example, where Convention rights are at issue, section 2 HRA 1998 provides that UK courts must ‘take into account’ any relevant jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or ‘the Strasbourg Court’). The influence of the Strasbourg jurisprudence also raises a question as to the approach that would be taken to foreign jurisprudence should a claim fall outside the scope of the HRA 1998. In that case, judicial reasoning may reflect a different balance between foreign (domestic) and supranational jurisprudence. Where no supranational jurisprudence exists, the degree to which foreign jurisprudence is used by (or is useful to) domestic courts may also differ. Thus human rights cases provide a variety of perspectives on the uses of foreign jurisprudence by domestic courts, which is not possible in other fields. Therefore, while some of the research findings do reflect on the use of foreign jurisprudence in other fields, these are incidental to the analysis of human rights cases. It was not practical to consider fully the use of foreign jurisprudence in all fields within the given time period and ‘human rights cases’ were numerous enough to provide a suitable subject for the purposes of rigour and reliability.

\textsuperscript{178} This was mentioned by a number of the Justices interviewed for this study and is confirmed by another report of similar interviews conducted by Mak in 2009: Elaine Mak, ‘Why do Dutch and UK judges cite foreign law?’ [2011] CLJ 420, 432. Paterson also found that ‘...the type of case which now predominates is radically different … tax, shipping and criminal law cases have declined, whilst public law and human rights cases have dramatically increased.’ See further Alan Paterson in his most recently published work, \textit{Final Judgment: The Last Law Lords and the Supreme Court} (Hart Publishing 2013), 17, Table 2.1.
3.2 Research Methodology

Such is the volume of literature covering theoretical approaches to the use of foreign jurisprudence that empirical research was felt to be the most useful analytical lens. As Bradney observed:

... quantitative and qualitative empirical research ... provides information of a different character from that which can be obtained through other methods of research. It answers questions about law that cannot be answered in any other way.  

In order to test these research questions, it was necessary to undertake a detailed analysis of each case decided by the Supreme Court since its establishment in October 2009. This research involved quantitative analysis of each case by category (e.g. ‘human rights’) and citations of foreign jurisprudence. The findings were triangulated with qualitative data from the text of the judgments and through interviews with the Justices of the Supreme Court and one Lord Justice of Appeal. The evidence from those interviews also raised new points of interest. The final analysis therefore results from this evolution of ideas and reflects a ‘spiralling’ rather than ‘linear’ progression through the research.


3.2.1 Empirical research

A total 246 cases were handed down by the Supreme Court in its first four years. When recording cases decided by the Supreme Court, appeals reported together with the same neutral citation were counted as one case. Cases with different neutral citations but which dealt with procedural matters (such as costs or preliminary referrals to the CJEU) were also counted as one. As the outcome of conjoined appeals inevitably drew from the same reasoning, it would have skewed the data to record the use of foreign jurisprudence in such instances more than once. No issue arose as to the data concerning foreign jurisprudence in cases dealing with procedural matters, since, predictably, the Supreme Court did not refer to any such material in those instances. The 246 figure was therefore arrived at by calculating the number of cases (number of reported cases with individual neutral citations) minus the number of cases dealing with procedural matters.  

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182 If one counts each reported case decided by the UK Supreme Court during the first four judicial years, 2009-13, the total is 257 cases. However, eleven of these cases can be considered to deal with procedural matters or are in essence a duplicate by reason of a conjoined appeal. Indeed the UK Supreme Court website itself records (at the time of writing) these cases together and combines the neutral citations in these instances. Thus the following reported cases were counted as one rather than two case(s), the citation underlined was disregarded for the purposes of the data analysis in each instance: R (E) v Governing Body of JFS and others [2009] UKSC 15 & [2009] UKSC 1; Her Majesty's Treasury v Mohammed Jabar Ahmed and others (FC), R (on the application of Hani El Sayed Sabhaai Youssef) v Her Majesty's Treasury, Her Majesty's Treasury v Mohammed al-Ghabra (FC) [2010] UKSC 2 & [2010] UKSC 5; RTS Flexible Systems Limited v Molkerei Alois Müller GmbH & Company KG (UK Production) [2010] UKSC 14 & [2010] UKSC 38; British Airways plc Williams and others [2010] UKSC 16 & [2012] UKSC 43; Secretary of State for the Home Department v AP [2010] UKSC 24 &[2010] UKSC 26; Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45 & [2011] UKSC 6; Duncombe and others v Secretary of State for Children, Schools and Families [2011] UKSC 14 & [2011] UKSC 36; O'Brien v Ministry of Justice (Formerly the Department for Constitutional Affairs) [2013] UKSC 6 & [2010] UKSC 34; Daejan Investments Limited v Benson and others [2013] UKSC 14 & [2013] UKSC 36.
Information about each case was obtained from the official transcripts and law reports. Spreadsheets were generated to record basic information such as the full case name, neutral citation, date of hearing, and a list of the Justices sitting on the case. The spreadsheet also records the subject matter of each case. Since the research parameters set by this project were ‘human rights’ cases, it was necessary to ensure that all such cases were categorised. For the purposes of this research, a case was categorised as a ‘human rights’ case where it had one of more of the following attributes: where the words ‘human rights’ are found in the judgment and are used to substantive effect (that is, as more than a passing reference, comparison or analogy);\textsuperscript{183} where human rights legislation or instruments (including but not limited to the HRA 1998 and the ECHR) are cited, again, with substantive effect; where the word ‘rights’ is discernably associated with human rights even if not explicitly stated (for example, in the case of common law rights).\textsuperscript{184}

\textsuperscript{183} For example, the judgment in \textit{AB and others v Ministry of Defence} [2012] UKSC 9 makes one reference to ‘human rights’ and was therefore captured by the database search. This reference, however, serves merely to note the history of the case and the claimant’s knowledge of another case before the ECtHR. It has no direct bearing on the instant case and it would therefore distort the data to categorise the judgment as one concerning ‘human rights’.

\textsuperscript{184} This broad definition of a ‘human rights case’ risks an amount of overlap with cases that might readily be classified under alternative categories, most obviously including ‘criminal law’ or ‘public law’ cases. This overlap is not felt to have a significant bearing on the findings in this study since the primary aim is to consider the effect of using foreign jurisprudence where there are human rights issues at stake. As such, breaking down the categories further was not felt to be a useful exercise. Nevertheless, the implications of the overlap are that the research findings must be considered to apply strictly to the parameters of this enquiry. If the cases were reorganised into these further categories so as to avoid the overlap, it is entirely possible that the overall data patterns would be slightly different.
A total of 102 cases were found to meet these criteria and were thus classified as concerning ‘human rights’ matters.\textsuperscript{185} For these cases, the spreadsheets record information about the instruments engaged, e.g. significant human rights legislation cited, articles of the ECHR at issue etc. For a case to have been recorded has having ‘used’ foreign jurisprudence in the broad sense intended here, it was enough that foreign jurisprudence was cited in the judgment (even if not discussed).\textsuperscript{186} To repeat the definition of ‘foreign jurisprudence’ given earlier, a case was considered ‘foreign’ if it was decided by the court of another country which does not also fall under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court for the purposes of Part 3 Constitutional Reform Act 2005. Cases from Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland were therefore excluded from the definition. While Scots criminal cases fall within the broad definition of ‘foreign jurisprudence’ (the High Court of Justiciary in Scotland sitting as an appeal court is the final court of appeal for criminal cases), the UK Supreme Court remains the final court of appeal in civil cases. As such, the Scots jurisprudence is slightly different in character to the

\textsuperscript{185} There is a big disparity between this figure and the one given by Alan Paterson in his most recently published work, \textit{Final Judgment: The Last Law Lords and the Supreme Court} (Hart Publishing 2013). In that volume, Paterson works from the same figure for the total number of cases decided in the first four years (246) but divides these into six categories: ‘Criminal’; ‘Human Rights’; ‘Public’; ‘Private/Commercial’; ‘Family’; and ‘Tax’. The result is that just 35 cases are categorised as ‘human rights’ cases. Interestingly, if one combines Paterson’s figures for ‘Criminal’, ‘Human Rights’ and ‘Public’ cases the total is also 102. This does not, however, guarantee that the same cases would make up that sample. As Paterson explains in a footnote: ‘Any case classification contains room for quibbles. Many cases no contain human rights points, but where they are obiter, I have not classified them as human rights cases. Here I can do no better than quote from Louis Blom-Cooper and G Drewry, \textit{Final Appeal} (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1972) at 244. “Any subject-classification we construct is essentially arbitrary, and the assignment of marginal cases to particular categories is extremely difficult”. See further Alan Paterson, \textit{Final Judgment: The Last Law Lords and the Supreme Court} (Hart Publishing 2013), 17, table 2.1 and note 17.

\textsuperscript{186} As previously mentioned, this method cannot account for implicit citations, which are not obvious from the published judgments. Some insight on the potential for implicit citations was obtained through the interviews with the individuals Justices, discussed further in chapter five.
case law of other foreign courts and is likely to be more familiar to the UK
Supreme Court where, by convention, care is taken to ensure that at least
two of the Justices have experience of the Scottish legal system.\textsuperscript{187}

The following analytical details were recorded about each case:

A. If foreign jurisprudence was used in the judgments, by counsel, or both;
B. If a foreign case was specifically referred to (and if so, by whom);
C. Where the jurisprudence (if used) was drawn from;
D. How many foreign cases were cited (for each jurisdiction);
E. If foreign jurisprudence was distinguished;
F. If foreign jurisprudence appeared to contribute to, or was determinative of, the
outcome of the case.\textsuperscript{188}
G. If the outcome was in line with the foreign jurisprudence cited;
H. Whether references to foreign jurisprudence were made in leading, plurality, majority,
minority, concurring or dissenting judgments.

For each case, the spreadsheets also record contributions made by the
individual justices. This included whether a written judgment was given (in
many cases a Justice may simply ‘agree’ with one of his colleagues), as well

\textsuperscript{187} See e.g. Constitutional Affairs Select Committee, \textit{Judicial appointments and a Supreme
Court (court of final appeal) First Report of Session 2003-04}, HC 48-I, [43]; Joshua
Rozenberg, ‘Who will be the two new supreme court judges?’ \textit{The Guardian} (London, 27 July
accessed 22 May 2014.

\textsuperscript{188} This test is stronger than the ‘used to substantive effect’ test applied to the identification of
human rights cases. ‘Substantive effect’ in the latter means more than a passing reference to
‘human rights’ which is not related to the issues in the case. In other words, that test would
exclude from the data capture a contract law case which referred to the words ‘human rights’
for the purposes of some analogy. The ‘contributed to or was determinative of the outcome of
the case’ test for the effect of foreign jurisprudence goes much further and records cases in
which the outcome appears to rely in any way on the discussion of foreign jurisprudence. It
should be noted that this test, along with others in this list, was applied only to assist with the
analytical enquiry and that the much lower test was applied to capture cases using foreign
jurisprudence generally; to have been ‘used’, it was enough that foreign jurisprudence was
cited once, even if not discussed.
as whether a written judgment could be described as a leading judgment, a
concurring judgment or a dissenting judgment. Identifying a lead judgment is
significantly easier at the Supreme Court than it was at the House of Lords.
As Baroness Hale has explained:

One obvious change in the Supreme Court is that we can print the
judgments in whatever order we choose, so the lead (what I call
the 'donkey-work') judgment can come first regardless of seniority
(although that may not always happen).  

It was also recorded whether the Supreme Court gave a full set of separate
judgments from each of the Justices, whether some Justices had associated
themselves with the judgment of a colleague or whether the judgments
constituted a plurality of effectively plurality judgment. The rise of the plurality
type judgment is described in greater detail in Chapter five. Briefly, in this
work a plurality style judgment includes a single ‘judgment of the court’, a
leading judgment with which all have agreed or a single judgment with which
others in the majority agree. An ‘agreement’ is counted where the main
aim of the Justice’s passage is to associate himself with the fuller judgment
of a colleague. In most cases, this is clearly established with one or two
sentences. In other cases, it includes passages of slightly greater length but

189 Brenda Hale, ‘Judgment Writing in the Supreme Court’ (First Anniversary Seminar, 30
August 2013, 2.
190 Cf Alan Paterson, Final Judgment: The Last Law Lords and the Supreme Court (Hart
Publishing 2013), 14: Paterson defines a ‘plurality judgment’ as referring to ‘the situation in
which there is no majority judgment in the Court. In that situation the judgment which receives
the most support is sometimes referred to as a plurality judgment’. Baroness Hale’s
explanation of plurality type judgments has been adopted in this thesis, see e.g. Dan Tranch
and Laura Coogan Baroness Brenda Hale: "I often ask myself 'why am I here?'" The
Guardian (London, 16 September 2010) <http://www.theguardian.com/law/2010/sep/16/uk-
which serve only to add an observation or footnote to the judgment with which the Justice has otherwise associated themselves.

Finally, for each Justice, it was recorded if foreign jurisprudence had been explicitly cited. For the general purposes of the thesis, foreign jurisprudence was considered to have been ‘used’ even where a Justice had merely made reference to the position or attitudes of a foreign court or jurisdiction, without an explicit citation to a decision of that court. The situation arises in a number of cases where non-explicit references are made as part of a more general narrative. For example, in *R (F)*,¹⁹¹ Lord Phillips made references to the systems of several foreign jurisdictions and had evidently considered an argument made by counsel on the point:

Those acting for the first claimant have drawn attention to registration requirements for sexual offenders in France, Ireland, the seven Australian states, Canada, South Africa and the United States. Almost all of these have provisions for review...¹⁹²

A passage of this kind falls within the general meaning of ‘using’ foreign jurisprudence since it is evident that some aspect of the legal systems in those jurisdictions has been considered. In a number of cases it was possible to find references to the practice in a particular jurisdiction without any explicit reference to a reported judgment.

However, for reasons of consistency, non-explicit citations of this kind are not captured by the quantitative data analysis offered in chapter five. This

¹⁹¹ *R (F) and another v Secretary of State for the Home Department* [2010] UKSC 17.
¹⁹² Ibid [57] (Lord Phillips).
approach differs to that taken by some other academics. For example, Bobek explains that ‘unspecified references to a “foreign solution”, invoking for instance the situation in country X, but not making any further substantiated reference to legislation, case law, or scholarly works, were included’ for the purposes of his study.  

...even allusions to ‘foreign democratic legal systems’; ‘a number of foreign democratic countries’; values shared by ‘the Member States of the EU and other developed countries of the Western Europe’; or ‘the founding principles of the contemporary Euro-Atlantic civilization’ were eventually counted as further unspecified instances of invoking some foreign inspiration, in spite of the fact that the displayed referencing culture and the quality of ‘comparative argument’ leaves much to be desired.

The exclusion of such cases from the quantitative data analysis in this study is based simply on the reality that non-explicit references are almost impossible to capture systematically. The consequence, as recognised by Cram when undertaking his own study of resort to foreign jurisprudence in terrorism cases, is that the extent to which foreign jurisprudence is used is likely to be understated.

...the overriding problem is one of a failure to make an explicit attribution. This may occur for reasons to do with national pride ...

193 Michael Bobek, Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts, above n 169, 68.
194 Ibid 69.
195 Ian Cram, ‘Resort to foreign constitutional norms in domestic human rights jurisprudence with reference to terrorism cases’ [2009] CLJ 118, 129. Bobek adds that the use of foreign jurisprudence may ‘hidden behind the veil of domestic scholarship’: Michael Bobek, above n 169, 72-73.
or simply because there is no formal requirement to acknowledge help from foreign sources.\textsuperscript{196}

Non-explicit citations are, however, considered as part of the qualitative analysis in later chapters.

To test hypotheses and facilitate pattern spotting in the qualitative analysis, cases were also coded using a number of ‘tags’ according to the research questions. As the literature review makes clear, there have been previous studies on the use of foreign jurisprudence, albeit with differing purposes or focus. The analysis and conclusions of those studies provide a number of classifications or ‘codes’ for the use(s) of persuasive authorities and/or foreign jurisprudence. A number of commentators have, for instance, suggested that judges use persuasive authority as a means of judicial fig-leafing or to support their own predetermined conclusions.\textsuperscript{197} Other possibilities are that it is used as a legitimation function,\textsuperscript{198} or as a vehicle for adopting a more theorised approach to human rights.\textsuperscript{199} Alternatively, a court may look for foreign case law pedagogical reasons,\textsuperscript{200} as a warning,\textsuperscript{201} or to

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\textsuperscript{196} Ian Cram, Ibid.
\textsuperscript{197} E.g. Ian Cram, ‘Resort to foreign constitutional norms…’, above n 195, 139-141; Elizabeth Wicks, ‘Taking Account of Strasbourg?’ above n 168, 410.
\textsuperscript{198} See e.g. Luc Heuschling ‘Comparative Law and the European Convention on Human Rights Cases’ in Esin Oruç' (ed), \textit{Judicial Comparativism in Human Rights Cases} (United Kingdom National Committee of Comparative Law 2003) 47.
\end{flushright}
as part of a gap-filling exercise. To preserve a sense of continuity in the legal scholarship, those classifications have been used in this study. To these I have added respect for the judge or court in questions, responding to cited authority and references made for no discernible reason at all.

As explained in the literature review, one of the most valuable contributions to scholarship in this field has been empirical data. In particular, it is rare that researchers present their data in a digestible format, using charts, graphs or tables. This is not an approach that all academics agree upon. Some commentators have expressed doubt that this sort of analysis can provide any meaningful results at all. Bobek explained his own methodological choices from that viewpoint:

This study is not a study in statistics or the increasingly popular ‘quotation metrics’, the purpose of which were to generate a set of colourful, but for a real understanding of a phenomenon often quite useless, graphs or tables.

This is not easy to agree with. Compiling charts, tables or figures is a time consuming task but the value of doing so is felt to be greater value than for mere aesthetics. It is through these that it is possible to illustrate data patterns or trends, especially interesting if one is seeking to set out changes in judicial reasoning or consistencies in practice. Indeed, some recent works

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202 Harold Cooke Gutteridge, Comparative Law: An Introduction to the Comparative Method of Legal Study and Research (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 1949), 40
203 The full database of cases is too large to print in a sensible format and is not included.
204 Michael Bobek, Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts, above n 169, 74.
have made use of such techniques to good effect, enabling the representation of findings which might not otherwise have been possible to outline fully.\textsuperscript{205}

### 3.2.2 Interviews

The most significant contribution to legal scholarship made by this research project has been the information derived from interviews. Interview subjects were selected by a nonprobability method, sometimes called ‘purposive’ or ‘judgmental’ sampling: it was always clear that questions about judicial reasoning at the UKSC would be best answered by the Justices of that court.\textsuperscript{206}

Difficulty with access to interviewees would have required a significant revision to the central research question but the problem did not materialise; almost all interview requests were granted. This result was surprising, given the problems reported by many researchers seeking to interview elites, including the most senior judges.\textsuperscript{207} For example, the author of one of the most recent studies has written:

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\textsuperscript{205} E.g. Tania Groppi and Marie-Claire Ponthoreau (eds), \textit{The Use of Foreign Precedents by Constitutional Judges}, above n 173; Alan Paterson, \textit{Final Judgment: The Last Law Lords and the Supreme Court} (Hart Publishing 2013), above n 190.

\textsuperscript{206} See e.g. Bruce L Berg, \textit{Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences}, above n 181, 44. As Berg explains, ‘When developing a purposive sample, researchers use their special knowledge or expertise about some group to select subjects who represent this population’; Frank E Hagan, \textit{Research Methods in Criminal Justice and Criminology} (Allyn and Bacon 2006).

\textsuperscript{207} See e.g. Mandy Burton, ‘Doing Empirical Research’ in Dawn Wilkins and Mandy Burton (eds), \textit{Research Methods in Law}, above n 179, 59: ‘Organisations, such as the police and courts, are often deluged with research requests and those in authority may be reluctant to grant permission for their staff to devote time to what they see as unproductive academic research activities’.
\end{flushright}
Problems start already at the level of identifying judges to interview: it was largely only those judges who themselves tend to be in favour of ‘the foreign’ and ‘the international’ that would typically consent to an interview on the subject. Those who do not care or are even mentally hostile to anything foreign are not inclined to share their views with a foreign researcher coming to talk to them about precisely that subject. Moreover, as Continental supreme jurisdictions are larger institutions, only several judges can in fact be interviewed, typically precisely those interested. Both of these factors generate a rather non-representative sample.\footnote{208}

Problems of this kind did not arise during this research. There was never any expression of hostility towards the subject and the smaller number of Justices at the UKSC (compared to other continental courts) made it possible to ensure a representative sample. In the UK Context at least, it is possible that the general willingness to be interviewed may reflect an increasing willingness on the part of judges to consider engagement with academics as a part of their judicial role.\footnote{209} Darbyshire reached similar conclusions from her experience of studying judges: ‘[b]aby boomer judges seem to understand social research and academic freedom and most trust academics not to behave like journalists’.\footnote{210} Greater interaction with academics is also obvious from the judgments. It is no longer uncommon for judges to refer to academic

\footnote{208}Michael Bobek, Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts, above n 169, 71; Mak reported a similar experience: Elaine Mak, Judicial Decision-Making in a Globalised World: A Comparative Analysis of the Changing Practices of Western Highest Courts (Hart Publishing 2013), 63.\footnote{209} See e.g. Alan Paterson, Final Judgment: The Last Law Lords and the Supreme Court (2013), above, n 190, 5: ‘My experience of elite ‘off the record’ interviews both 40 years ago and now attests to the levels of trust that many interviewees are prepared to repose in an academic researcher that they may hardly know’.\footnote{210} Penny Darbyshire, Sitting in Judgment: The Working Lives of Judges (Hart Publishing 2011), 7.
work in judgments—a significant contrast to a time when academics were cited only once deceased.\textsuperscript{211}

\section*{3.2.3 Primary Subjects}

The primary subjects were appellate court judges, active between 2011 and 2012. Interviews with the judges were sought by letter and conducted in two rounds. The first round letters were sent in August 2011 and the corresponding interviews took place between October and December of the same year. In total, ten Justices of the Supreme Court and one Lord Justice of Appeal were interviewed. The decision to interview a single Court of Appeal judge was made early in the research period, when it was thought that more Court of Appeal judges may be interviewed as part of a broader study.\textsuperscript{212} Although the parameters were later revised to include only the use of foreign jurisprudence at the UK Supreme Court, it was felt that the evidence obtained through the interview with Lady Justice Arden was nevertheless helpful to retain on the basis that it provided a useful perspective from outside the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, care has been taken to ensure that this interview evidence is used strictly anecdotally in this thesis, rather than contributing directly to the evidence from the UK Supreme Court interviews.

\textsuperscript{211} The point was also recognised by Michael Bobek, \textit{Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts}, above n 169, 87-88.
\textsuperscript{212} Explained further above at 3.1.3 ‘Courts and Judges’.
The interviewees in round one were Baroness Hale of Richmond, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers (then President of the Supreme Court), Lord Mance and Lady Justice Arden. The second round letters were sent in March 2012, with the corresponding interviews taking place between April and July of the same year. The interviewees in the second round were Lord Dyson, Lord Reed, Lord Kerr, Lord Clarke, Lord Walker, Lord Collins and Lord Sumption. Requests were made for just 30 minutes but the majority of the interviewees extended this time and provided useful information or thoughtful suggestions on developing the study. All interviews took place in the judicial offices of the relevant court. The interview communication and design is detailed in annexe one.

Perhaps the most interesting findings related to the working practices of the judges—a subject that the judges generally considered to be obvious or uninteresting. Surprise was expressed, for example, when a question was posed about the use of the judicial assistants or about their own methods for finding sources of law. In fact, the answers to these questions provide the most obvious contributions to legal scholarship. The way that judges do their work and the resources that they use may seem routine and mundane to the judges but were not at all obvious to a researcher.

213 Lord Phillips and Lord Walker have since retired from the Supreme Court. Lord Dyson was appointed as Master of The Rolls with effect from 1 October 2012.
3.2.4 Questions

While necessary to retain structure and continuity in the questions for purposes of data analysis, the exploratory nature of the research required a broad scope for answers and it was important that the interviewees could fully explore these with minimal interruption or guidance. For these reasons, some questions were common to all interviews while other questions varied according to the interview and the relevant experience or interest that the interviewee was able to offer. For example, judges that were already known to make liberal use foreign jurisprudence were asked more probing questions about the reasons for those uses and their guiding motivations.

In all cases, a ‘semi-standardised’ or ‘guided-semistructured’ method of interviewing was applied.\textsuperscript{214} In other words, the questions posed to each interviewee were the same mixture of open questions but the interviewees were able to develop certain points above others where it was felt more relevant. It was crucial to the research aims that the judges were given the opportunity to expand on an answer or volunteer further information. In those circumstances, time was given to following any interesting leads insofar that this did not detract from the consistency of the interviews in general or detract from an otherwise important point of discussion. This flexibility was necessary in order to ensure that the interviews were not self-fulfilling and to allow for the consideration of matters that may not otherwise have been

\textsuperscript{214} The alternatives are given as either a ‘standardised’ or ‘unstandardised’ (or in words to similar effect). In contrast to the semi-standardised, these require a rigid schedule of predetermined questions or an open schedule, with questions located on the imaginary continuum: Bruce L Berg, Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences (Pearson 2007), 92-95. Mak chose took the same approach in her interviews: Elaine Mak, Judicial Decision-Making in a Globalised, above n 208, 64.
raised. As one methodologist has described, the essence of the qualitative interview is the elicitation of stories:

> When people are least interrupted, when they can tell their stories in their own way ... they can react naturally and freely and express themselves fully ... [Interruptions and leading questions are likely to have the effect that] ... the adventures into the unknown, into unchartered and hitherto undisclosed spheres, has been destroyed.²¹⁵

Where less was known about the particular area concerned, it was interesting to enable the judges to talk for longer, give their views more fully and to hear the variety of ideas and feelings.²¹⁶

It is also worth noting that these situations were, however, not always intentional. As is common with elite interviews, there was a general tendency among the Justices to steer the focus of the interview towards topics that they felt comfortable discussing. Such answers, however, are difficult to quantify and require strict attention to the precise language and comments given. The obvious limitation is that this kind of material restricts analysis to reporting the answers in their diversity, leading to anecdotal evidence or the ‘cherry picking’ of particular comments to fit a purpose. For that reason, careful consideration was given to whether insight was valued above comparable data and open questions were preferred to closed questions only where the balance fell with the former. Some attempt to focus the interview


²¹⁶ The interview design is given in Annexe 1.
discussion was made by defining the topics (as given within the ‘research parameters’ above) at the start of each interview. While these were primarily set out to ensure a common understanding of the terms and enhance the comparability of answers, this technique also provided a useful way to communicate the research aims and develop a rapport with the interviewee, reducing the need for ‘throwaway questions’ or other such devices often suggested for those purposes.217

Despite the potential for disparity between interviews, the interviewees covered a number of common themes. These themes were usually a product of question design (drawing from questions common to all interviews) and where this was the case, it is interesting to compare and contrast the responses given by each of the judge. However, there are some surprising variations and some common themes were raised independently or as a corollary to the standard questions. For example, almost all of judges interviewed raised the ‘linguistic barrier’ as part of their explanation about the limited use of jurisprudence outside the traditional common law countries.218 Judges that didn’t raise the matter of their own accord were asked about this factor. Interestingly, those that raised the matter independently of any leading question raised the linguistic barrier issue partly in response to a question regarding the overt reliance on the jurisprudence of Commonwealth jurisdictions. Of the judges that were prompted to consider the possible effect

217 See eg Bruce L Berg, Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Science, above n 181, 101.
218 The ‘linguistic barrier’ refers simply to the use of foreign jurisprudence precluded by unfamiliarity in the published language.
of a linguistic barrier on the use of foreign jurisprudence, most were
disseminate about its relevance. A number of Justices expressed the feeling
that language would not be a problem and usually gave examples of
competency in other languages.

Finally, an ethical issue arose as to the use of the interview evidence. It was
not at first clear whether it would be appropriate to refer to each Justice by
name when using interview evidence in the analysis. It was concluded that
the value to be drawn from comparing the interview findings with the case
analysis would make it impossible to retain full anonymity. Each
interviewee was therefore offered a right of refusal over the recorded material
and, to preserve that discretion, the full interview transcripts are not included.
As Paterson found, the confidential atmosphere of each interview
‘undoubtedly led to very candid discussions’. Nevertheless, in common
with Paterson’s experience, it was rare that discussions were indicated to be
‘off limits’. Any revisions to the recorded discussion made by the judges were
very minor and had little to no bearing on the substance of the discussion in
point.

3.2.5 Secondary Subjects
An important research aim was to expose the practical side of using foreign
jurisprudence, as well as the theoretical. Questions about the research

219 This is in contrast to the approach taken by Mak. Mak does not name her interview
subjects and offered this as a guarantee in her initial communication with the judges: Judicial
Decision-Making in a Globalised World, above n 208, 8.
220 Alan Paterson, Final Judgment, above n 190, 6.
behind the citations led to questions about those persons, other than the Justices, who contribute to the research process. At the time, little information was available on those who support judicial work and it became clear that speaking with the judicial assistants (JAs) might provide the desired insight.\textsuperscript{221} They are therefore the secondary subjects.

JAs support the work of judges by sourcing material, preparing briefs or undertaking specific items of research. JAs are usually appointed for one year but some are in post for just one or two terms and, although very rarely, a JA may be in post permanently. Only one of the JA posts in the UKSC is filled permanently.\textsuperscript{222} The positions are usually filled by early career solicitors or barristers, having completed—or being near the completion of—their training contracts or pupillages. Aside from some common duties, such as summarising the applications for permission to appeal into petition memos and the writing of press summaries, the work of a JA can vary significantly according to the judge by whom they are instructed.\textsuperscript{223}

The individuals in post at any one time are not publicly listed. Contact was made with the assistance of the Justices and their personal assistants. The meeting was agreed with the permission of Lord Kerr (as the Justice with

\textsuperscript{221} Recent publications have since shed light on the work of the Supreme Court judicial assistants: Tetyana Nesterchuk, ‘The View from Behind the Bench’ in Burrows, Johnston and Zimmermann (eds), \textit{Judge and Jurist: Essays in Memory of Lord Rodger of Earlsferry} (Oxford University Press 2013); Alan Paterson, \textit{Final Judgment}, above n 190.

\textsuperscript{222} The judicial assistant to Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, Penelope Gorman, had progressed with Lord Phillips up from the Court of Appeal. See further Tetyana Nesterchuk, ‘The View from Behind the Bench’, ibid 101.

\textsuperscript{223} Ibid 104.
overall responsibility for the JAs at the time) and arranged by e-mail. Seven JAs were present at the meeting, which was conducted as a focus group. The focus group dynamic was not a conscious research choice but was simply a product of the terms under which it was agreed that I could speak to the JAs.\textsuperscript{224} Thus the focus group took place in the JAs’ open plan offices at the UKSC in July 2012. All seven JAs were in post at the time of the focus group, although six were coming to the end of their annual contracts.

### 3.2.6 Reliability of Interview Evidence

The duration of each interview varied from 28 minutes to 64 minutes. It is evidently harder to cover any subject comprehensively in 28 minutes than is possible 64 minutes. This must be coupled with the general tendency of judges to maintain focus on what most interests them. When combined, these factors explain the different level of depth and consideration given to some of the subjects raised. It also explains the lack of any interview evidence on certain points, from particular judges.

In all but two cases, the reliability of interview data was greatly increased by the use of a digital recording device.\textsuperscript{225} The best efforts were made when transcribing the interviews; it is generally considered good practice to capture

\textsuperscript{224} The consequences of this dynamic are explored further under the heading of ‘reliability’ below.

\textsuperscript{225} This is another contrast with Mak’s experience. Mak explains that she did not use a recording device but relied on writing up notes the day of the interview: Judicial Decision-Making in a Globalised World, above n 208, 64-65.
interviewees’ comments as completely and accurately as possible. In the majority of the interviews, recording devices made redundant the debate about memory aids and transcriptions before the interview has ‘gone cold’, although there remain important considerations about preserving accuracy of mood and tone apart from the language itself. Mischler notes that an interview is a speech event as well as a special type of social interaction, requiring the contextual entirety of the dialog to be recorded. Thus research methodologists generally agree that the interviewer’s own questions, prompts and probes should be included and, accordingly, the transcripts reflect these fully. Transcriptions were not outsourced, and no more than one week was allowed to pass before each interview was fully transcribed. In the two cases in which a recording device was not permitted, the interview was written up immediately after the event.

The nature of the focus group interview with the JAs posed some difficulties, which were not encountered during the transcription of the judicial interviews. The number of responses and the effect of differing distances from the recording unit, led to the loss of some material. To some extent it was possible to resolve these problems by reference to notes taken during the

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226 Carol A B Warren and Tracy X Karner, Discovering Qualitative Methods, above n 215, 12; See also Jennifer Platt, ‘The History of the Interview’ in Jaber D Gubrium and James A Holstein (eds), Handbook of Interview Research, above n 215, 37.
228 Methodologists warn that transcriptions through ‘hired hands’, whom may not have the benefit of memories of the interview, can lead to unsatisfactory results. See eg Carol A B Warren and Tracy X Karner, Discovering Qualitative Methods, above n 215, 152.
229 In the vast majority of cases, the transcriptions were completed within a day or two of the interview.
230 Up to five metres in one case.
interview but it is nevertheless acknowledged that human error undoubtedly resulted in minor errors or omissions. These practical complications are additional to those fed by the nature of the focus group, as opposed to the one-to-one interviews conducted with the Justices. While the focus group dynamic has the potential to stimulate new thinking about a subject, an obvious drawback is that participants may be less willing to give a view on sensitive topics. \textsuperscript{231}

It is worth noting that other researchers have been sceptical about the reliability of interview evidence as a foundation for data analysis generally. For example, Flanagan and Ahern point out that some commentators have questioned the validity of what is termed ‘judicial self-reporting’. \textsuperscript{232} They cite Epstein and King’s cynicism:

… asking someone to identify his or her motive is one of the worst methods of measuring motive. People often do not know, or cannot articulate, why they act as they do. In other situations, they refuse to tell, and in still others, they are strategic both in acting and in answering the scholar's question. This is obvious from the example of asking justices about how they reach decisions… \textsuperscript{233}

The related risk is that self selection bias might play a role in determining the subjects of any interview study. Flanagan and Ahern explain:


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there may be a self selection bias at work due to a judge's personal attitudes toward comparison. In principle, such an effect might cancel itself out, with those anxious to present favourable and unfavourable points of view experiencing an equal marginal inclination to respond. As it was voiced to the authors, however, the concern is that the effect would predominately work to attract responses from those favourable to comparison.234

Yet, as Flanagan and Ahern point out, ‘as a method of investigating judicial decision-making, asking those with actual experience thereof offers unique advantages’.235 Since it was possible to interview most of the Supreme Court Justices active during the time period for this study, it is hoped that the danger of ‘self selection bias’ has been avoided.236

A final but important point is related to the extent to which it is possible to rely on responses that are subject to human fallibility. As Paterson found, ‘very few Law Lords or Justices have a very accurate picture of decision-making data’.237 Paterson’s examples include:

- the frequency with which they are on the winning or losing side where the court is sharply divided, their agreement rates with other judges, the proportion of judgments that are single, majority judgments, or whether their share of the lead judgment allocations is above or below the average for the Court.

Paterson continues that ‘even more intuitive statistics’, including ‘dissent rates, the average time taken between the hearing and judgment being

235 Ibid.
236 Ibid 12.
237 Alan Paterson, Final Judgment: the Last Law Lords and the Supreme Court, above n 190, 8.
handed down, and the average success rate for permission to appeal petitions or for full appeals, are matters where the Law Lords and Justices’ “guestimates” may be considerably off the mark. Similar findings were made during the interviews conducted for this study: a number of the Justices interviewed were unable to make accurate guesses about the frequency with which foreign jurisprudence was cited at the Supreme Court. A connected problem is that, at the time of interview, two of the Justices—Lord Sumption and Lord Reed—had been in post for only a short time. This relative lack of experience would be likely to prevent the Justices from obtaining an accurate picture of the Supreme Court’s working methods. The evidence from the interviews with Lord Sumption and Lord Reed must therefore be qualified by the relative lack of experience that the Justices would at that stage have had as a Justice of the Supreme Court.

It is for these reasons that the quantitative data collection is important. The thesis therefore balances the interview evidence against the evidence obtained through the empirical analysis of decided cases, using the former to flesh out some of the findings from the latter rather than to represent a reliable factual account.

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238 Ibid.
239 Lord Sumption was sworn in on 1 January 2012 and interviewed on 22 May 2012. Lord Reed was sworn in on 6 February 2012 and interviewed on 8 May 2012.
3.2.7 Secondary Sources

An important supplement to the primary materials was given by a substantial volume of literature on the subject of judicial reasoning and, to a more limited extent, on the use of foreign sources and comparative methodology. Previous works were primarily identified and sourced through online databases. One text on research methodology cautioned against reliance on computer searches alone, noting the reality that online indexes, as with print, often suffer from terminological classification bias.\textsuperscript{240} For that reason, physical searches through library collections were also conducted and did yield some additional material. An early review of the literature was an essential part of the project design and fed adjustments to the initial research questions where appropriate. The research period for this study ended in August 2013 but a small number of very relevant works were published later that year.\textsuperscript{241} Final revisions to the literature review were made in January 2014.\textsuperscript{242}

\textsuperscript{240} Bruce L Berg, \textit{Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences}, above n 181, 21.

\textsuperscript{241} Three important volumes were published in November 2013 which have made valuable contributions to legal scholarship in general and to this study in particular. The first of these is Burrows, Johnston and Zimmermann (eds), \textit{Judge and Jurist: Essays in Memory of Lord Rodger of Earlsferry} (Oxford University Press 2013), which contained an insightful chapter on ‘Foreign Laws and Languages’, authored by Lord Mance. The second, Alan Paterson, \textit{Final Judgment: the Last Law Lords and the Supreme Court}, above n 190, which draws evidence from a number of interviews, including a significant number conducted with the Law Lords and Justices of the Supreme Court. The third publication is the most closely related: Elaine Mak, \textit{Judicial Decision-Making in a Globalised World}, above n 208.

\textsuperscript{242} Mak’s most recent publication was not discovered until January 2014. It was not at the time available in any of the London libraries and was not possible to acquire in hardcopy prior to the submission of this thesis. The inclusion of that work was facilitated by reference to the proofed manuscript, which Mak kindly shared electronically.
4 The basis for using foreign jurisprudence

There are no rules governing the use of foreign jurisprudence in UK domestic courts. Decisions of foreign courts are not authoritative in the precedential sense; UK Courts are under no duty or obligation to follow the decisions of a foreign court. In fact, there is no guidance on using foreign jurisprudence at all. The UK has no provision similar to section 39(1) of the South African constitution, which provides that the Constitutional Court must consider international law and may consider foreign law. Indeed as Cram has pointed out, the South African provision for consideration of foreign jurisprudence is ‘the exception rather than the rule’. Cram continued:

More commonly, the citing of foreign norms is largely unregulated by constitutions, leaving the judges to exercise their discretion as to whether, and in which circumstances, the practice is appropriate.

Some limited guidance is given to advocates by the ‘Practice Direction on the Citation of Authorities’, which both welcomes the use of foreign jurisprudence and also cautions against the overuse of those sources. Section 9.1 reads as follows:

Cases decided in other jurisdictions can, if properly used, be a valuable source of law in this jurisdiction. At the same time,

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243 Recall that ‘foreign jurisprudence’ in this thesis refers to the domestic jurisprudence of foreign courts. It does not include in its scope the decisions of supranational courts such as the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg (the jurisprudence of which, for example, UK domestic courts are obliged to ‘take into account’ where relevant under the Human Rights Act 1998).

244 Ian Cram, 'Resort to foreign constitutional norms in domestic human rights jurisprudence with reference to terrorism cases' [2009] CLJ 118, 119.

245 Ibid.
however, such authority should not be cited without proper consideration of whether it does indeed add to the existing body of law.\textsuperscript{246}

Advocates are therefore directed to resist citation to foreign jurisprudence if unnecessary. Section 9.2 provides that any advocate who seeks to cite an authority from another jurisdiction must:

ii. indicate in respect of each authority what that authority adds that is not to be found in authority in this jurisdiction; or, if there is said to be justification for adding to domestic authority, what that justification is;

iii. certify that there is no authority in this jurisdiction that precludes the acceptance by the court of the proposition that the foreign authority is said to establish.\textsuperscript{247}

This guidance does not extend to the judiciary. There are no rules specifying the way that judges must use foreign jurisprudence. In the absence of any guiding principles, the authority of foreign jurisprudence is merely persuasive. Indeed, as Cram also recognised, the most that could be claimed is that the lack of any limitation or prohibition on references to foreign jurisprudence might indicate a possible acquiescence on the part of the legislature.\textsuperscript{248} The judges have not suggested a greater role for foreign jurisprudence. Thus Lord Mance recently made clear his view that domestic courts could derive assistance from foreign jurisprudence, in much the same way that they could derive assistance from any other non-binding authority.

\textsuperscript{246} s. 9.1 \textit{Practice Direction (Citation of Authorities)} [2001] 1 WLR 1001; [2001] 2 All ER 510.
\textsuperscript{247} Ibid s. 9.2.
\textsuperscript{248} Ibid 125.
When judges look to comparative and international material, they may do so for information, inspiration, or confirmation, just as they use domestic decisions that are not binding on them. ... What Ronald Dworkin calls a ‘relaxed doctrine of precedent’ may embrace the past decisions not only of courts above him or at the same level in his jurisdiction but of courts in other states or countries.\textsuperscript{249}

However, to say that foreign jurisprudence is merely ‘persuasive’, is to ignore the possibility that some sources may (legitimately or not) be more persuasive than others. For many, persuasive authority is a nebulous concept, ‘...well-known but imprecise’,\textsuperscript{250} about which we are ‘still in the dark’.\textsuperscript{251}

4.1 Persuasive authority

As a starting point, it is usually agreed that persuasive authority sits in direct contrast to binding or precedential authority. Whereas a court must follow or give reasons for departing from otherwise binding authority,\textsuperscript{252} a court is neither obliged to follow nor to give reasons for departing from persuasive

\textsuperscript{249} ‘Foreign Laws and Languages’ in Burrows, Johnston and Zimmermann (eds), \textit{Judge and Jurist: Essays in Memory of Lord Rodger of Earlsferry} (Oxford University Press 2013), 87-88 citing Ronald Dworkin, \textit{Law's Empire} (Hart Publishing 1986), 25.


authority. Indeed, for Schwartz it is the ‘touchstone’ of persuasive authority that a court is not ‘required to follow [its] result or reasoning’.  

Schauer agrees: ‘…the distinction between [persuasive and binding authority] hinges on whether the decision maker has a choice to use the authority’. If persuasive authority is not mandatory, it must essentially be optional. But it is difficult to reconcile ‘optional’ with ‘authoritative’, since the ‘authoritative’ is frequently defined as ‘proceeding from an official source and requiring compliance or obedience’. As Schauer has asked, ‘is there anything at all authoritative about an optional authority whose use is solely at the discretion of the judge’? Along similar lines, Flanders has proposed that it may be ‘puzzling to speak of persuasive authority? Why not simply persuasive sources?’ The answer must be that it is ‘authority’ if a judge uses it as such. In the most straightforward sense, drawing from another argument in support of one’s own is an appeal to authority. Law is a practice based on authority, the appeal to which is signalled by citation. As Schauer has explained:

a legal argument is often understood to be a better legal argument just because someone has made it before, and a legal conclusion is typically taken to be a better one if another court either reached it or credited it on an earlier occasion.\textsuperscript{261}

A source therefore manifests itself as authority if it is followed or distinguished and—crucially—cited. The intuitive hypothesis about persuasive authority is therefore that it is ‘authority’ insofar as a court is persuaded to use it as such; it is authority which attracts adherence.\textsuperscript{262} Schauer’s conclusion, however, was that ‘persuasion is rarely part of the equation when persuasive authorities are being used…’.\textsuperscript{263} The problem is one of semantics:

\begin{quote}
\ldots being persuaded is fundamentally different from doing, believing, or deciding something because of the prescriptions or conclusions of an authority. But if this is so, then the very idea of a persuasive authority is self-contradictory, for persuasion and authority are inherently opposed notions. \ldots The use of a source can be one or the other—it can be persuasive or it can be authoritative—but it cannot be both at the same time.\textsuperscript{264}
\end{quote}

It is the ‘persuasive’ element that is misleading. The problem for Schauer is that, on his analysis, a judge who draws from persuasive authority is learning...
from that source rather than taking it as authoritative. In that sense, he says, it is treated no differently in the decision making process to the treatment of a persuasive argument from any source at all. But it is surely not the same thing for a judge to be persuaded by an argument ‘heard from her brother-in-law or in the hardware store’,²⁶⁵ as for a judge to be persuaded by, say, the argument of a subject expert or the reasoning of learned judge in a similar case before another court. Even if a judge is merely ‘learning’ from persuasive authority, it is clear that some sources are better suited to the job than others; if a man is to learn about fishing, he would be advised to learn from a fisherman. The reasoning of a learned judge in a similar case, considering similar problems in a similar court, will be more persuasive and carry more authority than the arbitrary reasoning of friends, family or strangers.²⁶⁶

A further manifestation of the importance attached to the nature of the source is the distinction between ratio dicendendi and obiter dicta. While it is only the ratio of binding precedent that must be followed, obiter dicta (statements that do not go to the principle upon which a case is decided) have frequently been treated as more than merely persuasive authority by courts. Indeed in some well-known cases, obiter dicta were so persuasive as to effectively bind future courts. A good example is the development of the doctrine of promissory estoppel in Central London Property Trust v High Trees House. As is well-known, the facts of the case centred on the lease of a block of flats

²⁶⁵ Ibid 1943.
²⁶⁶ Ibid 1943.
in London. In 1940, given the reduced occupancy rates at the outbreak of war, the landlord agreed to reduce the rental rate by half, but did not specify the period for which this would apply. By 1945 the flats were at full occupancy and the landlord sued for the full rental rate. Denning J upheld the claim that the full rate was payable from the moment of full occupancy. However, Denning elaborated that a claim for the full rate from 1940 onwards would have been unsuccessful, since it would be inequitable for the landlord to resile from a representation on which the tenants had relied. This elaboration was made in an obiter statement but was subsequently followed in a number of cases which continued to develop the doctrine of promissory estoppel in English contract law. A further example along these lines might be the obiter statement in Hedley Byrne v Heller that a duty of care could arise with respect to a negligent misstatement giving rise to pure economic loss. The statement was relied upon in a number of later cases despite not being strictly binding.

In part, reliance on obiter dicta may be explained by the fact that the task of distinguishing the ratio of a case can be difficult. This might be especially so where a case is comprised of multiple judgments as opposed to single or

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268 Hedley Byrne v Heller [1963] UKHL 4
270 As one introductory text points out, ‘judges do not actually separate their judgments into these two clearly defined categories.’ Gary Slapper, How the Law Works (Routledge 2011), 87-88.
plurality judgments. Alternatively, the willingness to follow *obiter dicta* could be indicative of the greater persuasiveness of judicial pronouncements, over other sources such as academic literature. This would also explain greater persuasiveness of some Privy Council decisions.

The conclusion that the source of a given statement could have bearing on its authority sits in tension with the inclination amongst scholars to define persuasive authority as ‘content-dependent’. Since persuasive authority does not bind intrinsically, it is argued that ‘the authority it holds flows from the persuasive content of the authority … [It] ‘compels by what it says, not by what it is’.’ Clearly, however, courts do consider the source of persuasive authority to be relevant to their analysis about the value of that authority. The well-known example about the reluctance of English courts to cite academic work of living authors bears this out well. It was evidently not the content of

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271 E.g. *Doherty v Birmingham City Council* [2006] EWCA Civ 1739 in which the Court of Appeal struggled to find a clear account of the majority *ratio* in the House of Lords decision in *Kay v Lambeth Borough Council* [2006] UKHL 10. Similar difficulties arose for the Court of Appeal when deciding *Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF and others* [2008] EWCA Civ 1148. See further Alan Paterson, *Final Judgment: The Last Law Lords and the Supreme Court* (Hart Publishing 2013), 210-211.

272 E.g. In *Doughty Turner Manufacturing* [1964] 1 QB 518 the Court of Appeal felt that one of it’s own earlier decisions (*Re Polemis* [1921] 3 KB 560) could no longer be good law in light of the Privy Council decision in *Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock and Engineering Co Ltd* (*The Wagon Mound*) [1961] UKPC 1. A rarer example of the weight attached to certain decisions of the Privy Council can be found in *R v James (Leslie)* [2006] EWCA Crim 14, in which the Court of Appeal declines to follow a House of Lords decision in preference to the more recent Privy Council case. See further Richard Ward et al, *Walker & Walker’s English Legal System* (OUP 2011) 79.


those sources that altered with death; it was the source itself and, presumably, the perceived authority of that source. Even when judges do cite the work of living academics it is not always clear what the source of authority is. As Paterson wrote in his 1982 study of the Law Lords, it is unclear ‘whether these academics influence the Law Lords by the authority of their reasoning or by reason of their authority’…’

For many, the importance attached to the source of the ‘authority’ is at the heart of the legitimacy debate. This is particularly clear from the United States context. Posner explains:

Problems arise only when the foreign decision is believed to have some (even if quite attenuated) persuasive force in an American court merely by virtue of being the decision of a recognized legal tribunal. This occurs, in short, when it is treated as an authority, albeit not a controlling one …

In the UK, it is very clear that some sources are thought to be of greater relevance or than others. The point has been recognised in another recent publication:

Within the category of persuasiveness, the scale is a sliding one, depending on the case in question, its context, and its factual setting. Highly persuasive would typically be the judicial decisions from other common law jurisdictions, especially their highest courts. However, within the same category of persuasive precedent (albeit not with the same weight) also fall the decisions

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of any other courts in other jurisdictions, which might provide some inspiration or analogy in the case at hand, including decisions of Continental or other jurisdictions.\(^{278}\)

The Court of Appeal, for example, has described decisions of the Privy Council as being of both ‘strong’ and ‘high’ persuasive authority,\(^{279}\) while the Supreme Court has referred to decisions of the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR as ‘at least of the very highest persuasive authority’.\(^{280}\) In *Cadder v HM Advocate*,\(^{281}\) Lord Hope explained that ‘the court is faced with a unanimous decision of the Grand Chamber’ and that ‘this, in itself, is a formidable reason for thinking that we should follow it’.\(^{282}\) Clearly therefore, some persuasive authority is made more important by virtue of its ‘pedigree’.\(^{283}\) This is not surprising. In cases engaging provisions of international treaties, the decisions of associated supranational courts are of obvious relevance to a court attempting to reconcile international with domestic law. Similar cases would be those involving international conventions with no supranational court, where it surely makes sense to look

\(^{278}\) Michael Bobek, *Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts* (Oxford University Press 2013), 77.

\(^{279}\) ‘...the decision of the Privy Council in *Perera v Perera* [1901] AC 354 is strong persuasive authority for upholding the decision in *Parker v Felgate* (1883) 8 PD 171’, *Perrins v Holland and others* [2010] EWCA Civ 840, [23]; ‘I doubt whether technically it is binding on this court, being contained in a decision of the Privy Council. None the less, it is of high persuasive authority’, [49]. See also *R (HRH Sultan of Pahang) v Secretary of State for the Home Department* [2011] EWCA Civ 616, [35] in which the Court of Appeal sought to formally distinguish the Privy Council decision in *Liquidators of the Maritime Bank of Canada v Receiver-General of New Brunswick* [1892] AC 437 that was said to have been of ‘high persuasive authority’ and followed by the Court of Appeal in *Mellenger v New Brunswick Development Corporation* [1971] 1 WLR 604.


\(^{281}\) *Cadder v Her Majesty’s Advocate (Scotland)* [2010] UKSC 43.

\(^{282}\) Ibid [45]-[46] (Lord Hope).

\(^{283}\) Cf Chris Flanders, ‘Towards a theory of persuasive authority’, above n251, 62 arguing that persuasive authority does not bind by virtue of its pedigree.
for jurisprudence from other jurisdictions interpreting the same instrument. In these cases, a court may rely on the foreign jurisprudence in much the same way as domestic case law, seeking to identify the interpretation given to a particular clause in similar vein to the identification of the core principle (or ratio) of a previous decision. However, a distinction between ratio and obiter is likely to be of less importance when referring to foreign jurisprudence in general, since the domestic court has no obligation to follow the foreign case in any event. The court therefore simply refers to foreign jurisprudence because it is useful to do so. This is most evident in cases of interpretation since (to repeat an earlier conclusion) the reasoning of a learned judge in a similar case, considering similar problems in a similar court, will be of greater use than the jurisprudence of some other court dealing in different instruments. In fact, in such cases, the source (rather than content) of the material is probably the very feature that renders it legitimate to use.

4.1.1 Cherry picking

A related but rather different concern, is the tendency for courts to favour the jurisprudence of a court or a family of courts for reasons that are not strictly connected to the subject of the instant case. Anxieties about the ‘substantial “cherry picking” of which jurisdiction to cite’ are prevalent. McCrudden has explained this as a concern that ‘those jurisdictions chosen will be those which are likely to support the conclusion sought, leading to arbitrary

decision-making, not legitimate judging'. The asymmetry in the use of comparative case law in some domestic decisions does little to rebut this suggestion. For instance, Lord Walker found a judgment of the Constitutional Court of South Africa ‘very helpful’ when giving judgment in Williamson and borrowed heavily from Justice Sachs’ reasoning in that decision in order to conclude that the ban on corporal punishment did not violate Article 9 of the ECHR. In that case Lord Nicholls preferred to distinguish the decision of the Strasbourg Court in Campbell and Cosans in order to reach the same conclusion.

Using foreign jurisprudence in an inconsistent or arbitrary fashion leads to the most prevalent of criticisms, that is that it invites manipulation. Such an approach can be encapsulated in Judge Harold Leventhal’s well known remark, that ‘[u]sing legislative history is like looking out over the crowd at a cocktail party to try to identify your friends’. Part of the problem, of course, is that the burgeoning pool of foreign jurisprudence means that ‘identifying friends’ is almost always possible; a judgment might easily be manipulated by the ‘unprincipled selection of foreign experience’. As John Roberts, Chief Justice of the United States, said in his confirmation hearings before the United States Senate, ‘you can find anything you want [in foreign law]. If

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285 Ibid 507.
286 R (Williamson) v Secretary of State for Education and Employment [2005] UKHL 15; [2005] 2 WLR 590, [67].
287 Campbell and Cosans v United Kingdom (1982) 4 EHRR 293.
you don’t find it in the decisions of France of Italy, it’s in the decisions of Somalia or Japan or Indonesia or wherever. This, it is argued, is where the method and reasons involved in using foreign jurisprudence become obscured. The consequence is that judicial reasoning is left open to criticism on the basis that it appears opportunistic or random. The Supreme Court might expose itself to this risk by, for example, citing foreign jurisprudence with not real explanation as to how and why the relevant decision was chosen. Sometimes, of course, the problem is that the reasons are felt to be too obvious to explain. The clearest example might be the tendency to cite jurisprudence from a small family of common law courts, as illustrated in chapter five. Thus in *SerVaas Inc v Rafidian Bank*, Lord Clarke referred to decisions from the US Court of Appeals 9th Circuit as ‘strong persuasive authority’, while Lord Rodger felt a decision of the High Court to be ‘powerful authority’ in *HJ (Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department*. In keeping with these findings, several of the Justices interviewed suggested that the courts of long established democracies were likely to be the most useful. Lord Phillips, for example, explained that ‘some of the Canadian judgments are most impressive and can be very powerful

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290 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G Roberts Jr to be Chief Justice of the United States, above n 288.
292 *HJ (Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department; HT (Cameroon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department* [2010] UKSC 31
support indeed for a judgment,293 while Lord Sumption added that ‘the quality and compelling character of the judgments can be very persuasive’.294

The simplest summation is that the legitimacy of foreign jurisprudence citation is clouded by an absence of reasons for using jurisprudence from one jurisdiction or another. It is because of this that the main purposes for using foreign jurisprudence are considered in chapter six, seven and eight, where the aim is to elucidate some of the guiding principles applied by the Supreme Court when using those sources. Clarity must also be sought on the status of foreign jurisprudence and the use of the word ‘authority’. In fact, one of the main conclusions of later chapters is that foreign jurisprudence is not considered to be ‘authoritative’ in human rights cases before the UKSC. For better or for worse, that is a status better associated with the jurisprudence of the European Court as the supranational courts providing an authoritative interpretation of an international instrument.

4.1.2 Supranational jurisprudence

In contrast to the lack of guidance about foreign jurisprudence, Parliament has legislated on the use of jurisprudence from some supranational courts. UK courts are obliged to follow supranational jurisprudence in some cases, or

293 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, former President of the United Kingdom Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 23 November 2011).
take them ‘into account’ in others.\textsuperscript{295} The existence of such guidance has arguably increased the weight of those authorities such they are at least more persuasive than the decisions of foreign domestic courts. Indeed, many have recognised that the attention paid to the Strasbourg jurisprudence has often come close to the attention paid to binding authorities.\textsuperscript{296} So close, in fact, that counsel have placed greater focus on the decisions of the Strasbourg Court in their arguments. As Baroness Hale recently put it:

If you come and listen to a human rights case being argued in the Supreme Court, you will be struck by the amount of time counsel spend referring to and discussing the Strasbourg case law. They treat it as if it were the case law of our domestic courts.\textsuperscript{297}

As Baroness Hale has recognised, this is strange because the ‘Strasbourg case law is not like ours. It is not binding upon anyone, even upon them’.\textsuperscript{298} The Strasbourg cases are therefore ‘at best, an indication of the broad approach which Strasbourg will take to a particular problem’.\textsuperscript{299}

It is worth remembering that the Strasbourg authority was never intended to be anything more than strictly persuasive authority. The words ‘must take into

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\textsuperscript{295} E.g. Section 3 ECA 1972 has the effect of binding UK courts to case-law of the CJEU. Section 2 Human Rights Act 1998 does not bind domestic courts to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, but at least obliges them to ‘take into account’ its decisions.


\textsuperscript{298} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{299} Ibid.
account’ were heavily debated during the legislative stages of the HRA 1998 and replacements like ‘must follow’ or ‘shall be bound by’ were rejected for precisely the reason that

... the word ‘binding’ is the language of precedent ... [Strasbourg decisions] are a source of jurisprudence indeed, but not binding precedents which we necessarily should follow or even necessarily desire to follow.\(^{300}\)

In the House of Lords debates, Lord Browne-Wilkinson concluded that ‘the doctrine of stare decisis ... does not find much favour north of the Border, finds no favour across the Channel and is an indigenous growth of dubious merit’.\(^{301}\) Similarly, Lord Lester took the view that any stronger obligation than to ‘take into account’ would be inappropriate ‘since such cases deal with laws and practices which are not those of the United Kingdom’,\(^{302}\) while Lord Irvine thought it would give way to becoming ‘more European than the Europeans’.\(^{303}\) It was instead important to avoid ‘putting the courts in some kind of straitjacket where flexibility is what is required’.\(^{304}\) Accordingly the White Paper prior to the enactment of the HRA clarified that the scheme of section 2 would require domestic courts to ‘take account of relevant decisions ... (although these will not be binding)’.\(^{305}\) More recently, the then President of the Supreme Court, Lord Phillips, said that ‘if the wording “take into account” gives a message at all, it is that we are not bound by decisions of

\(^{300}\) Hansard HL vol 583 col 515 (18 November 1997) (The Lord Chancellor Lord Irvine of Lairg).
\(^{301}\) Ibid col 513 (18 November 1997).
\(^{303}\) Hansard HL vol 583 col 514 (18 November 1997).
\(^{304}\) Ibid col 515 (18 November 1997).
\(^{305}\) Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill, Cm 3782 (October 1997) [2.4].
the Strasbourg court as binding precedent. In fact, in his view, had those words not been included, ‘we might actually be treating them as stronger precedent than we do.’

Nevertheless, the dominant approach in the early years of the Human Rights Act was to treat the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg court as more than merely persuasive authority. This has been a point of criticism in much of the academic commentary, where it has been said that the judicial interpretation of section 2(1) HRA as requiring domestic courts to ‘follow’ or ‘keep pace’ with the ‘clear and constant’ Strasbourg jurisprudence, has lead domestic courts to ‘mirror’ the Strasbourg conclusions. Some went so far as to suggest that the UK courts risk becoming little more than ‘Strasbourg surrogates.’

This loyalty to the Strasbourg jurisprudence prevailed for most of the Human Rights Act’s first decade but some reluctance to adhere so strictly to the Strasbourg court’s conclusions did begin to manifest itself even during the final years of the House of Lords. This is most evident from a series of possession proceedings cases, starting with Qazi, and culminating in the

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306 Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, Oral Submission to the Joint Committee on Human Rights, HC 873-ii, 15 November 2011, Question 64.
307 Ibid.
Supreme Court decision in Powell. As Paterson has written, in this series of ‘fraught exchanges’, the House of Lords were split between a group opposed to the Convention destabilising a key part of the common law relating to property and an opposing group who were more content to follow Strasbourg. In Qazi, although the House of Lords unanimously held that Article 8 was engaged: the majority (Lord Hope, Lord Scott and Lord Millet) held—contrary to the relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence—that Article 8 was not infringed. By the time the matter came back to the House of Lords in Kay, Strasbourg had decided Connors v UK the other way. The majority (Lord Hope, Lord Scott and Lady Hale) in the House of Lords repeated their objections to the Strasbourg position. The saga went for another round with the Strasbourg decision in McCann, which took the minority view in Kay. When the matter came back in Doherty, the majority (again Lord Hope and Lord Scott, along with Lord Rodger and Lord Walker) explained the reluctance to follow the Strasbourg line on the basis that the Strasbourg Court had not ‘fully appreciated the very real problems that are likely to be caused if [the court] were to depart from the majority view in Kay’.

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311 Qazi v Harrow London Borough Council [2003] UKHL 43; Hounslow London Borough Council v Powell [2011] UKSC 8. For an account of the cases and the state of the law relating to possession proceedings leading up to Powell see e.g. Ian Loveland, ‘The shifting sands of article 8 jurisprudence in English housing law’ (2011) 2 EHRLR 151.
312 Alan Paterson, Final Judgment: the Last Law Lords and the Supreme Court (Hart 2013), 228.
316 Doherty v Birmingham City Council [2008] UKHL 57.
317 Although Paterson notes that Lord Walker expressed ‘grave disquiet while concurring only because he felt bound by the principles of stare decisis to do so’: Alan Paterson, Final Judgment, above n 312.
Once Kay was decided in Strasbourg (predictably endorsing the minority from the House of Lords),\(^{319}\) this internal conflict took a sharp turn. By the time the matter returned in Pinnock,\(^{320}\) the jurisdiction of the House of Lords had transferred to the Supreme Court who, in the unanimous decision of a 9-strong court, retreated to a position of guarded loyalty to the Strasbourg jurisprudence. Lord Neuberger authored the single judgment, explaining that where there is

a clear and constant line of decisions whose effect is not inconsistent with some fundamental substantive or procedural aspect of our law, and whose reasoning does not appear to overlook or misunderstand some argument or point of principle, we consider that it would be wrong for this court not to follow that line.\(^{321}\)

A year later, a 9-strong Supreme Court endorsed the approach again, in Powell.\(^{322}\)

These fluctuations in the approach of the top court are also clear outside of the possession proceeds saga. Prior to the retreat in Pinnock and Powell, the Supreme Court had decided Horncastle, which chapter eight argues represents one of the clearest examples of a ‘departure’ from the relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence.\(^{323}\) The Court changed direction again in Cadder, considering itself compelled to follow the Strasbourg jurisprudence on the

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\(^{320}\) Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45.

\(^{321}\) Ibid, [48] (Lord Neuberger).


\(^{323}\) Chapter eight from n 791.
right to a fair trial. The current mood turns back the other way; a number of Supreme Court Justices have recently set out the view that the time has come to reconsider the *Ullah* type loyalty to the Strasbourg jurisprudence. The once well-ingrained temptation to ‘mirror’ the Strasbourg line appears to have been diluted. It appears that the weight of Strasbourg authority is tending back towards persuasive, in the optional sense discussed above.\footnote{E.g. Lord Wilson proposed reconsidering the *Ullah* principle in *Sugar v British Broadcasting Corporation* [2012] UKSC 4, [59] (discussed further in chapter eight). Extra judicially, see e.g. Lord Sumption, ‘The Limits of Law’, 27\textsuperscript{th} Sultan Azlan Shah Lecture (Kuala Lumpur, 20 November 2013); Lord Judge, ‘Constitutional Change: Unfinished Business’ (University College London, 4 December 2013) Brenda Hale, ‘Argentoratum Locutum: Is Strasbourg or the Supreme Court Supreme? (2012) 12 (1) Human Rights Law Review 65; Lord Phillips, ‘Strasbourg Has Spoken’ in Burrows, Johnston and Zimmermann (eds), *Judge and Jurist: Essays in Memory of Lord Rodger of Earlsferry* (Oxford University Press 2013), 118.}

But even if not considered to be more than persuasive, it at least appears that the Strasbourg jurisprudence ranks higher than the jurisprudence of foreign domestic courts. Mak has argued that this is part and parcel of an ‘acknowledgement by British judge of a certain ideological affinity with the Strasbourg Court’:\footnote{Paterson was tempted to conclude that the fluctuations in the approach of the top court in part reflect the political dynamics surrounding the 2010 general election, the threats to the Human Rights Act from the political right, the Brighton Declaration and the more recent prisoner voting saga. See further Alan Paterson, *Final Judgment*, above n 312, 232; Chapter eight from n 791.}

In comparison with other courts the Strasbourg case law is considered to fit the ideological framework of the British highest court regarding human rights protection relatively well. A judge mentioned [in Mak’s interviews] that the UK Supreme Court used to refer more often to the Supreme Court of Canada, which developed important human rights case law after the introduction

of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982. However, this judge observed that the UK Supreme Court is now shifting its attention to Strasbourg, as it considers the Canadian Supreme Court’s jurisprudence to be too liberal.\textsuperscript{327}

An unofficial ‘hierarchy’ of persuasive authorities seemed to be well established among some of the Justices interviewed for this study. Lord Dyson, for example, explained that the approach in Convention cases would be to start with House of Lords or Supreme Court cases, if there were any. After those would come the Strasbourg jurisprudence, and after those the domestic courts but that the latter were ‘considerably down the list’.\textsuperscript{328} The logic is intelligible: it ‘reflects the fact that the Convention is an international instrument, the correct interpretation of which can be authoritatively expounded only by the Strasbourg court’.\textsuperscript{329} Courts are able to use the jurisprudence of the supranational court as a barometer. Moreover, as Masterman has suggested, the case law of jurisdictions not signatory to the European Convention is ‘unlikely to point to the direction in which the common law should be developed to ensure compatibility with the Convention rights’.\textsuperscript{330}

\textsuperscript{327} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{328} Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Dyson MR, former Justice of the United Kingdom Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 1 May 2012).
\textsuperscript{329} Ullah, above n 308, [20] (Bingham LJ).
4.2 Legitimacy of using foreign jurisprudence

Part of the difficulty with using the jurisprudence of foreign domestic courts is that Parliament has offered no instruction, making the guiding principles behind the use of these sources more obscure. Obscurity in judicial reasoning does not sit comfortably with the principles of transparency and predictability, which are integral to the usual understanding of the rule of law.\(^{331}\) Predictably, the lack of clear guiding principles has given rise to some debate about the legitimacy of using foreign jurisprudence in the first place. As Cram has suggested, resort to foreign jurisprudence has the potential to pose ‘awkward questions concerning judicial forays into the policy-making realm of the constitution and the erosion of parliamentary sovereignty’.\(^{332}\)

In the United States, where the debate is most polarised, an argument has been developing about the use of foreign jurisprudence in cases of constitutional interpretation for some time. Following several controversial decisions of the United States Supreme Court, commentators have questioned the motivation and mandate for using foreign jurisprudence in cases of constitutional interpretation. Although this debate revolves around questions that are arguably specific to the United States, there are some transferrable themes since the debate engages with broader questions about

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\(^{332}\) Ian Cram, ‘Resort to foreign constitutional norms in domestic human rights jurisprudence with reference to terrorism cases’ [2009] CLJ 118, 125.
sources of law, the nature of ‘authority’, the role of the judge, judicial reasoning and the globalisation of the courts.333

On a very basic level, to draw from foreign jurisprudence supports the simple premise that collective deliberation will produce a better solution:334 Many minds may weed out bad judgements through an evolutionary process, while the multiple analyses may contribute different perspectives. In turn, these may lead to better deliberation and better conclusions. Those who support the practice of domestic courts using foreign jurisprudence in their judgments often cite the benefits of seeking guidance ‘from the accumulated legal experience of mankind’:335 ‘If I have a difficult case and a human being called a judge, though of a different country, has had to consider a similar problem, why should I not read what that judge has said? It will not bind me, but I may learn something’.336 It is illogical, the argument goes, to ignore the ‘established body of findings to which others have contributed over the

years’. The argument is usually reinforced by analogy to scientific study. As Waldron explains:

Existing science claims neither unanimity among scientists not infallibility; nevertheless, it stands as a repository of enormous value to individual researchers as they go about their work, and it is unthinkable that any of them would try to proceed without drawing on that repository to supplement their own individual research and to provide a basis for its critique and evaluation.

Foreign jurisprudence is therefore ‘available to lawmakers and judges as an established body of legal insight, reminding them that their particular problem has been confronted before and that they like scientists, should try to think it through in the company of those who have already dealt with it’. The South African Constitutional Court’s approach to foreign jurisprudence proceeds on these grounds. It has explained that ‘[c]omparative research is generally valuable, and is all the more so when dealing with problems new to our jurisprudence but well developed in mature constitutional democracies.’ Indeed, Rautenbach’s recent empirical study of the South African Constitutional Court’s use of foreign jurisprudence shows the court to be among the heaviest users of comparative law in the world.

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338 Ibid 132-133.
339 Ibid 132-133.
340 Sanderson v Attorney-General, Eastern Cape 1998 (2) SA 38 (CC) (emphasis added); Rabinder Singh, ‘Interpreting Bills of Rights’ [2008] Stat LR 82. The South African Constitution expressly says that ‘when interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum may consider foreign law’ (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 s.39(1)(c)) but that it ‘must consider international law’ (s.39(1)(b)).
341 Christa Rautebach, ‘South Africa: Teaching an ‘Old Dog’ New Tricks? An Empirical Study of the Use of Foreign Precedents by the South African Constitutional Court (1995-2010), in
The ‘many minds’ theory, however, has lost momentum and is often criticised for being stylised or pitched at a high level of abstraction.\textsuperscript{342} It has also been viewed with scepticism by those who see foreign jurisprudence as irrelevant to the interpretative task of the judge. The arguments in the US debate on foreign authority exemplify this well. The primary objection to the judicial use of foreign jurisprudence in US constitutional cases is usually derived from a so-called ‘originalist’ view, whereby the task of interpreting the constitution ‘is to try to understand what it meant’ and ‘what it was understood by the society to mean when it was adopted’.\textsuperscript{343} The other viewpoint is that it is the task of judges to interpret the Constitution in light of the present day and that it is appropriate to do so in the context and culture in which the issues arise. Justice Breyer, for instance, sees himself as interpreting the Constitution of the United States ‘…in today’s world’ and that ‘where similar relevant experience becomes more and more common we are more likely to learn from other countries’.\textsuperscript{344}

The objection to this approach is sometimes connected to concerns about the quality and standing of foreign jurisprudence. Not too long ago the late Lord Bingham wrote about the earlier reluctance of English courts to draw


\textsuperscript{343} Norman Dorsen, ‘A conversation between U.S. Supreme Court justices’, above n 336, 525 (Justice Scalia).

\textsuperscript{344} Ibid 537 (Justice Breyer).
from foreign jurisprudence, feeling the ‘unquestioning belief in the superiority of the common law and its institutions’ to be at the root of the matter: 345

When I started in practice, it was an almost universal article of faith that English law and legal institutions were without peer in the world, with very little to be usefully learned from others…346

This attitude lingers in the United States. Several of the participants in the foreign authorities debate there have expressed scepticism about the value in borrowing from certain jurisdictions not previously famous for the quality of their human rights decisions.347

Moreover, using foreign jurisprudence as an aid to constitutional interpretation is said to undermine the authority of the original text and risk importing a meaning that was not intended when the constitution was drafted. Since judges in UK human rights cases are not reasoning by reference to an original text, the emphasis on retaining the original meaning and sovereignty of the constitutional text is itself irrelevant. In fact the absence of such an instrument may itself provide the opportunity for comparativism. As Lord Mance has recently put it, ‘without the constraints of a constitution or code,

346 Ibid.
347 Norman Dorsen, ‘A conversation between U.S. Supreme Court justices’ (2005) 3(3) International Journal of Constitutional Law 519, 528 (Justice Breyer): ‘I may have made what one might call a tactical error in referring to a case from Zimbabwe—not the human rights capital of the world’.
the legal systems of England and Scotland have a particular freedom to look to other systems’.\textsuperscript{348}

The underlying tension between judicial interpretation and judicial law making, however, remains important. This is a tension that is usually marched alongside accusations of the ‘cherry picking’ of jurisdictions from which citation occurs. These charges are discussed in further detail in later chapters, where the purposes for using foreign jurisprudence are given a more lengthy analysis. For now it is sufficient to note that a piecemeal or arbitrary approach to foreign jurisprudence is not one normally aligned with an interpretative exercise and tends to detract from the legitimacy of citing such sources.

It is not hard to see why. Used in this way, foreign jurisprudence may simply be ornamental, cited when it suits the court to do so. Waldron notes that ‘reference to official judgments, whether local or foreign, helps rescue judges from a feeling of intellectual nakedness’,\textsuperscript{349} whereas Posner describes the judicial search for quotations and citations of foreign jurisprudence (as well as previous decisions) as an effort ‘to further mystify the adjudicative process and disguise the political decisions that are at the core of the Supreme Court’s output’.\textsuperscript{350} Slaughter has added that ‘citation of [foreign decisions]...
seems most likely to reflect a calculation by the listening court that evidence of foreign support or parallel reasoning will strengthen its own decision.\(^{351}\)

Indeed, it is not universally accepted that legal citations are necessarily connected to the outcome in any given case:

Legal sophisticates these days worry little about the ins and outs of citation, tending instead to cast their lot with the legal realists in believing that the citation of legal authorities in briefs, arguments, and opinions is scarcely more than a decoration. Citation may be professionally obligatory, the sophisticates grudgingly acknowledge, but it persists largely as an ornament fastened to reasons whose acceptance rarely depends on the assistance or weight of the cited authorities … it is a mistake to think that the cited authorities have very much to do with the substance of legal argument or the determination of legal outcomes.\(^{352}\)

It must be true that the potential for ornamental citation is greater than ever before. Technological developments, in particular, have had a profound effect and the World Wide Web has made available a burgeoning pool of materials. As Wilson and Horne have commented:

…from about the mid-1990s judgments started to become available on the internet. Previously, most unreported judgments effectively vanished. With the internet—coupled with the growing


\(^{352}\) Frederick Schauer, ‘Authority and Authorities’, above n 254, 1932.
number of specialist series—almost every judgment is now freely available to counsel.\textsuperscript{353}

The effect is recognised in the first paragraph of the ‘Practice Direction on the Citation of Authorities’:

In recent years, there has been a substantial growth in the number of readily available reports of judgments in this and other jurisdictions, such reports being available either in published reports or in transcript form. Widespread knowledge of the work and decisions of the courts is to be welcomed. At the same time, however, the current weight of available material causes problems both for advocates and for courts in properly limiting the nature and amount of material that is used in the preparation and argument of subsequent cases.\textsuperscript{354}

However, the research findings do not indicate a strong inclination on the part of the Supreme Court Justices towards ornamental citations for the purpose of strengthening decisions in the manner described by Schauer above. In fact, not all of the Justices felt that the vast numbers of cited authorities would always be an advantage. Lord Reed considered that very numerous citations could often be ‘a sign of the weakness of an argument’.\textsuperscript{355} There is also a limit to the number of authorities that can realistically be used, as Lord Kerr explained:

... if you attend an appeal hearing that’s going to last two or three days in the Supreme Court and which involves a number of human


\textsuperscript{354} Practice Direction (Citation of Authorities) [2001] 1 WLR 1001; [2001] 2 All ER 510, [1].

\textsuperscript{355} Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Reed, Justice of the United Kingdom Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 8 May 2012).
rights issues, you will see vast bundles of authorities, most of which are never referred to.\textsuperscript{356}

The mere presence of foreign jurisprudence in the bundles would not therefore prompt the use of those sources by the Supreme Court.

The case law also hints at reluctance to use comparative sources in this way. Consider, for example, Lord Carnwath’s comments in \textit{ANS v ML} [2012] UKSC 30:

\begin{quote}
We were referred to numerous cases dating back over more than 20 years, dealing with the rights of children and parents in similar contexts. … In general little help is likely to be gained by detailed comparative or historical analysis. In the present case, as Lord Reed has shown, the relevant Strasbourg principles are readily apparent from the most recent cases, and the leading UK authorities, as cited in his judgment.\textsuperscript{357}
\end{quote}

When interviewed, Lord Clarke noted that the cases referred to in the judgments are ‘very often the tip of the iceberg in terms of what is actually considered … one simply can’t refer to every case that was referred to …’ and pointed to some thick bundles of authorities to show the size of the practical problem. It is not surprising, therefore, that the comparative authorities which Lord Carnwath had implied were referred to by counsel in \textit{ANS} are not found in the published judgment.

\textsuperscript{356} Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore, Justice of the United Kingdom Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 9 May 2012).

\textsuperscript{357} \textit{ANS and another v ML (AP) (Scotland)} [2012] UKSC 30, [67] (Lord Carnwath).
If it were the case that citations represent little more than decoration, they could surely be left out altogether, as Lord Carnwath apparently felt able to do here. Indeed during the data collection stages of research, it was clear even from the smaller number of references given in the law reports (as opposed to the full lists that would be found in the printed cases) that counsel frequently cited foreign jurisprudence which did not subsequently appear in the judgments. Some of the interviewed judges explained the discrepancy. Reflecting on the length of judgments in some jurisdictions, Lord Walker pointed out the size of the ‘bundle’ of authorities given to them by counsel (prior to the oral hearing), some of which included over 300 cited cases. The numbers of citations was, he felt, ‘terrifying, and one of the reasons that litigation is so expensive’. Moreover, ‘a judgment shouldn’t be a textbook. It shouldn’t try and refer to all the relevant cases’.

Since judges decide cases on the basis of reasoned arguments, it is expected that there would be a strong correlation between materials referred to by counsel and those cited in the judgments. However, without access to the printed cases, it is impossible to quantify the full extent of counsel’s submissions so as to prove this correlation. The most that can be claimed

358 Lord Walker also gave a rare insight into these bundles of authorities in HJ (Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department; HT (Cameroon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 31, [87]: ‘After all the carefully-researched debate that the Court has heard and participated in (we have had 23 bundles of authorities containing 250 different items)...


360 Ibid.

361 Law reports may provide a summary of the arguments but these are not extensive. The reports also tend to list cases cited by counsel as additional to those cited in judgment, making the correlation between the two unclear.
is that there is a general perception that counsel at the Supreme Court would be likely to refer to foreign jurisprudence. Lord Clarke felt this to be obvious from the quality of counsel at the Supreme Court:

The great thing about being in the Supreme Court is that we have, on the whole, very high quality counsel, who spend a great deal of time preparing every conceivable argument on every conceivable point and quite a few inconceivable points. And so they’d think nothing of filling the books with endless references to jurisprudence from all around the world.362

Baroness Hale also explained that this was always going to be more likely at the highest appellate court:

… you will find big variations as between this court and the Court of Appeal and the High Court, because obviously, any advocate preparing a case has got to think, ‘how interested will the Court be in this comparative material?’ … it costs money to cast your net wider and it’s pretty tricky for them … to predict the level of interest that there will be in a very busy court, whereas they can be pretty certain that, by the time it gets to us, we will want to know whether there is anything helpful in the rest of the world.363

If the citation of foreign jurisprudence does follow from references made by counsel especially those made during the oral arguments, courtesy may be a factor. As Wilson and Horne explain: ‘counsel feel able, and often obliged, to cite multiple authorities and judges, in turn, feel compelled to deal with all of

363 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Baroness Hale of Richmond, Justice of the United Kingdom Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 19 October 2011).
them’. Although they considered the practice likely to be more acute in the lower courts (where a judge may prefer to deal with as many of the authorities as possible by way or a pre-emptive strike ‘lest failure to do so results in an appeal’), it is evident that similar considerations apply at the most senior level. For example, Lord Reed described during interview that foreign jurisprudence might come to his attention while reading into the academic literature on a problem. That jurisprudence, he explained, may not necessarily find its way into the judgment unless it were directly on point and important—in which case it would just be ‘good manners, apart from anything else, to acknowledge the idea you’ve found somewhere else’. Citations made out of courtesy was also a theme picked up by Mak in her interviews:

The attitude of the British judges in particular has consequences for the use that is made of judgments from foreign courts. … If an argument is found in a foreign judgment and used in the reasoning of the case at hand, it is only courteous to mention the author, as one Supreme Court judge stated.

Bell later agreed and argued that evidence of courteous citations could be found in the Supreme Court’s recent case law:

*Knowsley* very much reflects courtesy to counsel, who had presented the material at length and so merited a response, even if it was not very positive. Certainly Lord Mance’s comments reflect a concern to show that he had considered the material, even if he

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365 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Reed, above n 355.
felt he could come to a decision without having to make a final
decision on the value of that material.\textsuperscript{367}

There are numerous other examples in the Supreme Court’s case history to
demonstrate this sort of approach. For example, in \textit{HJ Iran v Secretary of
State of the Home Department} Lord Hope made a point of noting that ‘the
court was referred to a number of decisions in Australia, New Zealand, South
Africa, the United States and Canada’ and went on to spend five paragraphs
reviewing those authorities, presumably to explain his conclusion that they
did not ‘reveal a consistent line of authority’ on the point.\textsuperscript{368}

Nevertheless, citations of this kind are not necessarily ornamental in the
‘decorative’ sense described by Schauer above. At the very least, it is a
fundamental feature of judgment writing that reasons are given for the
conclusions reached. As many academics point out, the giving of principled
reasons for judgments is a core aspect of the rule of law and judicial
accountability.\textsuperscript{369} It is no surprise, then, that a judge would address
arguments put to him by counsel and seek to explain why he did or did not
take the same view (especially, perhaps, in the case of the latter).

\textsuperscript{367} John Bell, ‘Comparative Law in the Supreme Court [2012] 1.2 CJICL 20, 22, citing

\textsuperscript{368} \textit{HJ (Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department; HT (Cameroon) v Secretary of
State for the Home Department} [2010] UKSC 31, [30]-[34].

\textsuperscript{369} See e.g. Andrew Le Sueur, ‘Developing mechanisms for judicial accountability in the UK’
\textit{2004 Legal Studies} 73, 76. Le Sueur lists ‘the common practice of giving reasons, well written
judgments’ as one of a number of practices that form accountability arrangements. Others
would include the fact that most courts sit in public and the possibility that judgments are
appealable to a higher judicial body.
A slightly different version of the courtesy point is that judges may cite foreign jurisprudence (or any jurisprudence) out of respect for a particular court or jurist. In other words, a judge might cite foreign jurisprudence in their judgment if it has been thought to provide a particularly well-reasoned account of the relevant issue, even where the conclusion in the domestic case is not in line with that authority. In these circumstances it might look like foreign jurisprudence is being formally distinguished, in the manner of binding precedent. When raised in the interviews with some of the Justices, two possible explanations were given. The first was a speculation that it might be a means of showing respect to the jurist who had authored the judgment in question. The second was that judges may do this simply as part and parcel of the duty to give reasons—in this case explaining why a source has not been very persuasive especially if counsel have placed emphasis on it in the arguments. This explanation ties in with the earlier discussions of showing respect to counsel and was best articulated by Lady Justice Arden, in the Court of Appeal:

Most likely [foreign jurisprudence is distinguished] because it has been cited and ... if you’re turning away a party and holding that their case must be rejected, if they’ve relied on some foreign authority and made a big point of it then you have to deal with it.370

Nevertheless the prevailing feeling in the UK is that judgments are already too long and that citations of this kind would be increasingly unlikely. The Justices of the Supreme Court are visibly taking steps to reduce the length of

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their reasoning. Ornamental citations of foreign jurisprudence are therefore less and less likely to be a feature of judicial reasoning. Indeed none of the interviewed Justices expressed the view that superfluous citations of this kind would be a useful addition to a judgment. Lord Kerr’s assessment was that:

… to add to the authorities that we consider by casting around in domestic courts is probably not going to be a profitable exercise. Ultimately … the outcome of these cases depends critically on your own powers of analysis. Reference to authority, be it domestic, supranational, international or whatever, is always going to be by way of supplement to your own reasoning in the case. Hopefully to confirm the views that you have formed and, occasionally, to shape those views. But I see that very much in a secondary—an extremely important but nevertheless secondary—role.

The dismissive view adopted by Schauer’s legal realists therefore cannot provide a satisfactory explanation for citations of foreign jurisprudence at the UK Supreme Court. The Justices are not interested in padding out judgments by referencing foreign jurisprudence. Moreover, if the explanations given by Lord Walker, Lord Kerr and Lord Reed above explain anything about the use of foreign jurisprudence it is that citations would probably only be relevant if directly on point and important.

371 The most obvious example is the common use of single and plurality style judgment (As discussed in chapter five, text from n 514) even if the reality isn’t quite as envisaged. Paterson’s empirical research revealed that ‘on average, sole leading judgments are longer than multiple leading judgments in the Supreme Court’. Alan Paterson, Final Judgment: the Last Law Lords and the Supreme Court (Hart 2013), 106-107 and n161.

372 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore, above n 356.
The attitude is more severe in the United States. Justice Scalia of the US Supreme Court has repeatedly denounced any reference to foreign jurisprudence as a practice that ‘invites manipulation’. Dissenting in *Roper v Simmons*, Scalia said that ‘to invoke alien law when it agrees with one’s own thinking, and ignore it otherwise, is not reasoned decision-making, but sophistry’. For Justice Scalia then, citation of foreign jurisprudence is entirely opportunistic: ‘[w]hen it agrees with what the justices would like the case to say, we use the foreign law, and when it doesn’t agree, we don’t use it’. The criticism usually derives from a lack of transparency about the use of foreign jurisprudence or a feeling that judges are not applying a methodical approach to the selection of those sources. As Cram has written:

...frequently no clear methodology is adopted to explain why certain sources were considered and others ignored, leaving its practitioners open to accusations of methodological sloppiness and a tendency to judicial activism. The latter charge arises because, critics argue, only those foreign norms that sit comfortably with the judge's moral preferences are ever likely to be invoked.

An obvious opportunity to level this sort of criticism can be drawn from the propensity of judges use foreign jurisprudence which has not been raised by

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373 Norman Dorsen, ‘A conversation between U.S. Supreme Court justices’, above n 336, 531 (Justice Scalia).
375 Ibid.
376 Norman Dorsen, ‘A conversation between U.S. Supreme Court justices’, above n 336, 521 (Justice Scalia).
counsel. For example, it is possible that relevant foreign jurisprudence may come to light after the oral hearing or that judges would be willing to engage in extra research into comparative material. Evidence that the late Lord Rodger engaged in research of this kind can be drawn from Tetyana Nesterchuk’s—one of his previous judicial assistants—recent account of her role. Nesterchuk explained that written pieces of research to assist with the writing of the judgment would usually be commissioned at the post-deliberation meetings with Lord Rodger (after the oral hearing in any given case) but that Lord Rodger would often carry out his own research in parallel.\(^{378}\) She continued:

I soon discovered that I was linguistically ill-equipped to assist Lord Rodger who could read a number of languages, including French, German and Italian, and would often look up decisions from foreign jurisdictions to inform or supplement his judgments.\(^{379}\)

When interviewed, Lord Phillips implied that this was a relatively frequent occurrence at the Supreme Court:

We do a bit of our own research on areas of foreign law … that was particularly the case with Lord Collins. He would almost always go off and do some research and come up with a chunk of his judgment which didn’t owe very much to counsel.\(^{380}\)

Lord Collins explained in the interview that there were a number of factors that led him to conduct independent research of this kind. The first was to do with expense: while in big commercial cases few expenses are spared, in

\(^{378}\) Tetyana Nesterchuk, ‘The View from Behind the Bench’ in Burrows, Johnston and Zimmermann (eds), Judge and Jurist: Essays in Memory of Lord Rodger of Earlsferry (Oxford University Press 2013), 109.

\(^{379}\) Ibid.

\(^{380}\) Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, above n 293.
others such as human rights cases, looking into foreign jurisprudence may not be included in the advocate’s fee but may nevertheless be helpful for the court to hear about it. The second factor was a question of practicality: it was ‘not for counsel to start looking at American law when they are not familiar’ with the exercise—‘these things take time’. Lord Collins felt himself well placed to look into these matters and fill voids left by counsel.

Some of the justices felt this to be a bigger problem than others. Lord Kerr, for example, considered that if that jurisprudence was in any way controversial it was important that counsel should be given the opportunity to make submissions on it:

If counsel had not made submissions on this particular theme, and we subsequently discovered that there was a rich vein of jurisprudence to be mined from other jurisdictions, there would be two alternatives: … if it was in any way controversial, if there were arguments to be made on either side of the particular theme, I think it’s likely that we would invite submissions from counsel on it. More usually submissions in writing, but occasionally—very occasionally—we have found ourselves in a situation (and I’m not now talking about foreign jurisprudence) where after deliberations between the Justices, issues have arisen which we feel where not sufficiently canvassed in the appeal hearing and we have reconvened to allow counsel to address those.

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381 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Collins of Mapesbury, retired Justice of the United Kingdom Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 22 May 2012).
382 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore, above n 356. The issue of judges referring to material that was not raised by counsel is given further discussion in chapter 5, from n 428.
It is therefore considered to be sufficient that counsel have been given the opportunity to consider an argument that the Justices plan to use in the determination of the case. However, it the position was felt to be ‘sufficiently clear so as not to require further submissions’, the Court might ‘conduct the research ourselves and take whatever course that jurisprudence led us to’. 383

This latter suggestion risks controversy. In such circumstances it is easy to sympathise with Justice Scalia’s feeling that citations of foreign jurisprudence are largely opportunistic. It is the task of judges to decide cases on the basis of reasoned arguments and the idea that a judge might conduct their own research, independently of the arguments given by counsel, runs the risk of obscuring the reasons for their conclusions and compromising the transparency upon which the legitimacy of the judicial process is founded. At the extreme, such techniques may be considered to render a trial unfair for the purposes of Article 6 of the ECHR since the essence of a fair trial is that the parties are entitled to hear and reply to the case against them.

Perhaps for these sorts of reasons, Lord Clarke explained that ‘one is generally reluctant … to decide cases on arguments that were never run’ and that the preference would be ‘not to cite important authorities that were never mentioned’. 384 Lord Sumption explained that even reliance on written submissions ‘would be very unsatisfactory on a brand new area’. 385 It would risk ‘counsel passing like ships’ and one would ‘not [be] able to ask them

383 Ibid.
384 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony, above n 362.
385 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Sumption, above n 294.
about points which you need to clarify’.\textsuperscript{386} Thus even where relevant material
has been found independently of counsel’s arguments, the Supreme Court
will try to give counsel the opportunity to address them on it. If a Justice were
to be influenced by foreign jurisprudence that was considered independently
of counsel’s arguments, it would always be referenced in the judgment. As
Lord Kerr put it:

If I, in writing a judgment, have been influenced by a foreign
judgment, I will say so. I will not … keep it in the background and
allow it to inform my thinking but not refer to it in the judgment. I
think that would be … a very curious way of writing a judgment:
allowing yourself to be influenced by a factor which you don’t refer
to.\textsuperscript{387}

In any case, foreign jurisprudence is not generally used as a ‘magical ace of
trumps’.\textsuperscript{388} Lord Collins felt ‘sure that [he had] never been turned by foreign
law’.\textsuperscript{389} At best he ‘might have been confirmed in [his] feelings’.\textsuperscript{390} Such
research would be ‘very much icing on the cake’ (and preferably prior to the
arguments ‘so that you can put any tricky matters to them’).\textsuperscript{391} Lord Justice
Sedley was of a similar mind when contributing to a ‘roundtable’ on
comparative constitutionalism:

Comparative constitutional law is of infinite interest but of little or
no practical value in constitutional adjudication (…) My sympathies

\textsuperscript{386} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{387} Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore, above n 356.
\textsuperscript{388} Tom Bingham, \textit{Widening Horizons} (Cambridge University Press 2010), 7-8.
\textsuperscript{389} Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Collins of Mapesbury, above n 381.
\textsuperscript{390} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{391} Ibid.
are with the British academic who has described the practice—not the theory—of comparative law as judicial tourism. Tourism is enjoyable and informative, but the artifacts which you bring back cannot be more than decorative. The real value of what you learn is to enhance your appreciation of your own culture. Like other British judges I refer to comparative sources in some of my judgments, a number of them on constitutional issues. But no judge I know anywhere in the world has ever decided a case differently because of persuasive decisions in other jurisdictions. Comparative sources will either amplify the decision which the judge has already decided is the correct one or, at worst, will be sidelined as unhelpful. This is not the isolationism of a Scalia. It is the cosmopolitanism of a Kennedy, a Breyer, a Ginsburg—tempered by judicial realism.\(^{392}\)

A distinction ought to be made, however, between piecemeal citations of foreign cases and citations of multiple foreign cases together presenting a common consensus. To conflate the two would commit the fallacy of composition. Identifying a consensus on a particular issue is one of the most obvious reasons for which judges draw from foreign jurisprudence.\(^{393}\) For some, referring to a consensus position is the most legitimate way to use foreign jurisprudence. Returning to the science analogy, a consensus represents ‘a dense network of checking and rechecking results’.\(^{394}\) It is more


than a simple accumulation of authorities and may therefore be more than the sum of its parts.\textsuperscript{395}

For those that see foreign jurisprudence as an opportunity to draw assistance from other judges facing similar problems, a consensus may represent a viewpoint that a judge would be remiss to ignore. As Justice Breyer of the United States Supreme Court has put it, ‘... the fact that everyone in the world thinks one thing is at least worth finding out’.\textsuperscript{396} For others, this approach is problematic. Identifying and relying upon a consensus in the foreign jurisprudence is to legitimate that authority on the basis of a nose-count; it is the mere fact of that conclusion being reached by a number of foreign jurisdictions that is the justification. Used in this way, the authority of foreign jurisprudence is content-independent and tends towards more than merely persuasive authority. A court draws value not from the reasoning towards the consensus position but from the consensus itself.\textsuperscript{397} In this situation, the difference between precedential decisions and decisions with merely persuasive authority turns out to be, as Flanders as put it, ‘more a difference in degree than a difference in kind’;\textsuperscript{398} a kind of ‘super persuasive’ authority.\textsuperscript{399}

\textsuperscript{395} Jeremy Waldron, ‘Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium’, above n 335, 145.
\textsuperscript{396} Norman Dorsen, ‘A conversation between U.S. Supreme Court justices’, above n 336, 519, (Justice Breyer)
\textsuperscript{398} Chris Flanders, ‘Towards a theory of persuasive authority’, above n 251, 59.
\textsuperscript{399} Ibid 82.
The ‘nose-counting’ exercise is also problematic on the basis that it presumably relies on the consensus theory of truth. Among the most obvious of criticisms is the simple possibility that a consensus can be engineered. Young has related the point well, arguing that a consensus amongst foreign jurisprudence ‘carries no guarantee of moral authority’ because the consensus itself ‘could be the result of international arm-twisting, legitimacy-seeking, or simply a tendency to fall into patterns by imitating the behaviour of other states (“acculturation”).’

An altogether different situation is the one in which the aim of the exercise is to identify the consensus itself. Such an exercise may be relevant, for example, to a court whose aim is to adjudicate in line with a particular agreement or regime. This point is pertinent to UK human rights cases since UK courts are duty bound by the HRA 1998 to decide cases compatibly the ECHR. Unlike the US Constitution, which places emphasis on interpreting an original meaning, it is well known that the Convention is said to be a ‘living instrument’, to be interpreted ‘in the light of present-day conditions’. A by-product of this is that the ECtHR has frequently altered its decisions on the basis of an ‘emerging consensus’. Keeping track of any evolving consensus is an exercise that has, on occasion, been passed down to the domestic


401 Section 6(1) and 6(3) Human Rights Act 1998.

402 Tyrer v United Kingdom (1978) 2 EHRR 1 [31].
When seeking to ‘keep pace’ with the Strasbourg jurisprudence in such cases, UK courts may find the domestic jurisprudence of other signatory states instructive. As the late Lord Bingham wrote:

... the judge's task is not, as in an ordinary domestic case, to ascertain the meaning to be given to an expression in English law: it is to ascertain the autonomous meaning which an expression bears under the Convention.

Courts discharging such a task would be likely to refer to the jurisprudence that the Strasbourg Court would itself be likely to consider. Similar considerations prevail when the Court is interpreting an international Convention with no supranational court. In those cases the case law of foreign domestic courts is of even greater importance; the very purpose of these instruments is to harmonise standards on a particular issue. Consider, for example, the preamble to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (‘Refugee Convention’), which recognises that ‘a satisfactory solution of a problem of which the United Nations has recognised the international scope and nature cannot therefore be achieved without

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403 The duty of a domestic court to keep track of the development in Convention attitudes is most clearly exemplified by a series of judgments on the rights of transsexuals: Rees v UK (1987) 9 EHRR 56; Cossey v United Kingdom (1991) 13 EHRR 622; Sheffield and Horsham v United Kingdom (1999) 27 EHRR 163; Bellinger v Bellinger [2001] EWCV Civ 1140. In the earlier cases, the Court held that the refusal of the United Kingdom Government to alter the register of births or to issue birth certificates concerning the recorded gender of the individual could not be considered as an interference with the applicant’s Article 8 right, instead affording the UK a wider margin of appreciation but stressed the importance of keeping appropriate legal measures in this area under review. In Goodwin v United Kingdom [2002] EHRR 583 The Strasbourg Court was satisfied that European (and international) consensus had progressed so that the ‘fair balance’ now tilted in favour of the applicants and The House of Lords in Bellinger accordingly say the case as an appropriate one for a declaration of incompatibility.

international co-operation’ (emphasis added).\footnote{Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Geneva, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. (entered into force 4 October 1967), preamble.} Similarly, the preamble to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child includes ‘Recognizing the importance of international cooperation for improving the living conditions of children in every country’.\footnote{United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 1989, preamble.} Where several jurisdictions are adjudicating with reference to a particular legislative instrument or agreement, the decisions of other jurisdictions may deserve recognition for exactly the same reasons that courts are minded to follow their own past decisions. That is, to uphold the same principles of predictability and stability which are embedded by the rule of law domestically.\footnote{Chris Flanders, ‘Towards a theory of persuasive authority’, above n 251, 84.}

Critics point out that this exercise is at odds with the cultural sensitivity of law. Returning to the science analogy, the problem is that it ignores the possibility that law—or interpretations of the law—can alter from one jurisdiction to another. Inescapably, law is a social science and subject to a number of external influences that flow from historic and cultural differences. In reality, local conditions produce difficulties ‘which are often subtle and require … sophisticated analytical tools’ to separate them from their ‘culturally-determined realities’.\footnote{Nicholas HD Foster, ‘The Journal of Comparative Law: A New Comparative Resource’ <http://www.wildy.co.uk/jcl/pdfs/foster.pdf> accessed 01 December 2010. Cf Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘A Typology of Transjudicial Communication’, (1994) 29 University of Richmond Law Review 99, 127: Recognition of this commonality does not obviate cultural differences, but it assumes the possibility that generic legal problems such as the balancing of rights and duties, individual and community interests, and the protection of individual expectations, may transcend those differences.}
Thus the problem is not the reference to foreign jurisprudence per se. It is the elevation of foreign jurisprudence, often different in character to domestic law, to a position where it is treated as authoritative in domestic courts: '[t]he problem is not learning from abroad; it is treating foreign judicial decisions as authorities ... as if the world were a single legal community'. The risk is not lost on the Justices of the Supreme Court. The late Lord Rodger, who is usually said to have been one of the most enthusiastic users of foreign jurisprudence at the Supreme Court, was aware of the issue and apparently voiced it among his colleagues. Lord Mance has recently written that Lord Rodger was 'insistent that the proper use of comparative law cannot permit the loose or selective citation of random foreign material; a full, informed, and up-to-date understanding is necessary.'

4.3 Conclusions

The use of foreign jurisprudence is nowhere prohibited and there are no rules governing the practice. First and foremost, therefore, judges use foreign jurisprudence because those sources are available to them in the same way as other persuasive authorities. Nevertheless, foreign jurisprudence represents an unusual kind of persuasive authority. It is unclear, for example,

410 Lord Mance, 'Foreign Laws and Languages', above n 348, 88, citing 'The Use of Civil Law in Scottish Courts' in David L Carey Miller and Reinhard Zimmerman (eds), The Civilian Tradition and Scots Law (1997) 225, 228-9; ‘Roman Law in Practice in Britain’ (1992) Rechtshistorisches Journal 261, 269-70; ‘Savigny in the Strand’ (1993-95) 28-30 Irish Jurist 1, 19, where Lord Rodger commended the work of ‘scholars like Professor Treitel [in] providing the kind of detailed comparative treatment of particular topics without which, certainly, such a development’—ie the use of codified civil law sources—‘can never begin'.
that the usual distinction between persuasive and binding authority—that these carry authority by virtue of content and source respectively—works in the context of foreign jurisprudence. Further obscurity is created by the variety of purposes for which it is used and, in turn, by the anomaly of the consensus theory through which foreign jurisprudence tends towards binding rather than merely persuasive authority.

The problem is to do with methodology. Pointing to examples of arbitrary decision-making ultimately represents a complaint that the working methods behind the use of foreign jurisprudence are unclear. A lack of transparency leaves the door open to charges of judicial activism and illegitimate law making and, as Perju has highlighted, ‘methodological challenges may be fatal to ... the authority of foreign law in such situations’.\footnote{Vlad F. Perju, ‘The Puzzling Parameters of the Foreign Law Debate’, above n 273.} 411

The intuition is that methodological questions—such as which jurisdictions judges should consult, how to check sources and references, how they can escape the dangers of nominalism, and how to assess the relevance of a particular provision or line of reasoning outside of its broader legal, cultural, and historical context—are more difficult to answer in situations of piecemeal comparisons, with serious implications about the integrity of constitutional discourse.\footnote{Ibid.} 412

If it is not to be taxed as arbitrary or opportunistic, a system that uses foreign jurisprudence must have some methodical basis. It is the lack of clear guiding principles that is confusing. To extricate these principles it will be necessary to draw together the ways in which judges use foreign jurisprudence, the

\footnote{411 Vlad F. Perju, ‘The Puzzling Parameters of the Foreign Law Debate’, above n 273.}

\footnote{412 Ibid.}

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effect of that practice on domestic human rights cases and the processes or influences involved. The answers to these may go a long way towards dispelling some of the increasingly tired complaints about judicial law making. Or, if they must be rehearsed, they may at least refresh the debate. As Waldron has explained, ‘we should not reject the idea of a theory of citation of foreign law simply because we see foreign law being cited opportunistically; we should reject it only if we think inconsistent and unprincipled citations is inevitable…’ 413

5 How is foreign jurisprudence used?

It was explained in the literature review that most of the published work in the field of judicial comparativism focuses on the legitimacy of using foreign jurisprudence or on the possibility that uses of foreign jurisprudence have provided for a dialogue between courts around the world. All such studies usually make an implicit assumption: that the courts are, in fact, using such sources. Very few, however, seek to set out the reality of the practice, making it difficult to get a real sense of the extent to which courts are actually using foreign jurisprudence. As one recent publication in the field notes, ‘studies have focused extensively on the theoretical aspects of this practice … while empirical analysis of the frequency and meaning of citations remain generally still rare’. \(^{414}\) This chapter sets out some of the results from the quantitative and qualitative analysis of the judgments handed down by the Supreme Court during the first four years of its activity (2009-2013). Although this research focuses on human rights cases, quantitative data is given on citations of foreign jurisprudence in both human rights cases and non-human rights cases. A holistic view is important in order to understand the general trends in the use of foreign jurisprudence, so as to enable any context specific conclusions to be drawn about human rights cases. The data corroborates some of the accounts given by the existing literature and adds some new contributions. Crucially, the data shows that the Supreme Court is using foreign jurisprudence in human rights cases.

\(^{414}\) Tania Groppi and Marie-Claire Ponthoreau (eds), The Use of Foreign Precedents by Constitutional Judges (Hart Publishing 2013), 3; See also Elaine Mak, Judicial Decision-Making in a Globalised World: A Comparative Analysis of the Changing Practices of Western Highest Courts (Hart Publishing 2013), 2.
5.1 Extent to which foreign jurisprudence is used

The first claim in this thesis is that the Justices of the Supreme Court are using the jurisprudence of foreign domestic courts. Judgments frequently make references to the decisions of foreign domestic courts. Of the 246 cases handed down by the Supreme Court in the first four years, explicit citations of foreign jurisprudence are found in 77, just over 30% of the total.

Table 1: Proportion of judgments in which at least one decision of a foreign domestic court is explicitly cited, by case type.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total judgments handed down between 2009-2013</th>
<th>Total cases with citations of foreign jurisprudence</th>
<th>Cases citing foreign jurisprudence as a percentage of total cases.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All cases</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>31.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-human rights cases</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights cases</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>34.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some of the literature suggests that a greater use is made of foreign jurisprudence in human rights cases but the empirical research did not find this to be true of the UK Supreme Court. As table 1 shows, the balance is broadly the same whether a case considered a human rights issue or not: of the total 246 cases decided by the Supreme Court in the time period, 144 do not engage human rights issues and explicit citations of foreign jurisprudence can be found in 42 of those, or 29.2%. The remaining 102 can be described

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as human rights cases and explicit citations of foreign jurisprudence can be found in 35 of those, or 34.3%. In other words, the Supreme Court is likely to cite a decision of a foreign court in around one in three cases, no matter what the subject. However it is important to note that the figures differentiate only between ‘human rights cases’ and ‘non-human rights cases’. They do not consider human rights cases compared to, say, commercial law cases, corporate law cases, and property or tort law cases. Further, as explained in the methodology, these numbers do not account for non-explicit citations of foreign jurisprudence or capture citations of Privy Council decisions.

The data on explicit citations does, however, provide interesting insights. It is clear from table 1 that the overall figure for the proportion of cases citing foreign jurisprudence is fairly constant when human rights cases and non-human rights cases are compared. If the same proportions are considered by year, however, a more erratic picture emerges. Figure 1 (overleaf) plots the proportion of human rights and non-human rights cases containing explicit citations of foreign jurisprudence on a line graph, by year. The graph shows a spike in the 2010-11 year when explicit citations of at least one foreign decision were found in around 47.6% of human rights cases, and this is followed by a steady decline between 2011 and 2013. The numbers were surprising given the findings outlined by the existing literature: Bell’s conclusion was that there had been a paucity of cases citing foreign

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416 Some insight on these can be gained from Elaine Mak, *Judicial Decision-Making*, above n 414, 180: ‘British judges considered that citations of foreign law mostly occur in human rights cases and in private law cases ... In contract and tort cases, the shared background with other common legal systems is thought to make legal comparison often useful. ... The use of foreign law is less frequent in criminal law cases.’
jurisprudence in 2010-11 and noted just seven where such sources were to be found (not specifically human rights cases). However, as mentioned in the literature review, it is not clear whether Bell found only seven cases or chose only to consider seven of the found cases for the purposes of that article.⁴¹⁷

The data supporting this thesis shows that 23 of the 58 judgments handed down in 2010-11 cited at least one decision of foreign court, and that this included 10 (of a total 21) human rights judgments. Meanwhile, the trend for citations of foreign jurisprudence in non-human rights cases suffers a significant dip in 2011-12, falling to just 13.8%.⁴¹⁸

Figure 1: Percentage of human rights and non-human rights cases making explicit citation to foreign jurisprudence, by year.

The spikes in the use of foreign jurisprudence may be caused by any number of factors. It may be, for example, that the use of foreign jurisprudence in human rights cases prompted the use of foreign jurisprudence in other types

⁴¹⁷ John Bell, ‘Comparative Law in the Supreme Court’ [2012] 1.2 CJICL 20
⁴¹⁸ The data is given in greater detail in Annexe two.
of case. Another possibility is that counsel before the Supreme Court in 2010-11 were more inclined to make reference to foreign jurisprudence in their arguments than in 2011-12. The influence of counsel’s submissions on the use of foreign jurisprudence citation in a judgment is not always obvious from the law reports as the ‘bundles’ of authorities given to the Justices prior to the hearing are generally not included. Some speculative analysis of counsel’s influence is drawn from the interview evidence below. At the very least, it is clear that the use of foreign jurisprudence relies upon it being introduced to the Court in the first place. As Lord Kerr explained:

First of all we need to have been referred to the jurisprudence of foreign courts, or to have some means of entry to it which arises extraneously from the litigation of the appeal. …

Alternatively, the Justices active at the Supreme Court in that year may have been more inclined to look abroad than their successors in 2011-12.

5.2 The individual approaches of the Justices

It is clear from the case analysis and the interviews that the tendency to use foreign jurisprudence is very likely to be connected with the background and inclination of the individual Justices. Along these lines, Lady Justice Arden

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419 Although the ICLR’s Appeal Cases report series do often provide a summary of counsel’s arguments, the full list of authorities provided to the Court prior to the oral hearing in the ‘bundle’ is not included. The reports also resist repetition and only list ‘additional cases cited in argument’ further to those cited in the judgment(s) of the court. Thus it is not always possible to tell whether judges are citing authorities because counsel have presented them, or whether they have come to the court through some other route.


considered that many judges would be ‘self-starters’ in comparative law: if judges had done a lot of work internationally or studied abroad, they would be ‘natural self-starters on this because they have no problem with different legal cultures’. At the Supreme Court, Lord Mance explained that the extent to which a judge would be likely to use foreign jurisprudence was dependent on:

...how interested you got, how relevant you thought it might be and how difficult it was. Lord Collins, for example, ... used to ... focus quite heavily on American authority. He had access to databases and so on which I don’t have access to and he mined that. He’s obviously ... from his academic work ... very much interested in comparative law.

Lord Mance was himself frequently referred to as a more likely user of foreign jurisprudence, by the other interviewed Justices. Talking about the possibility of an increase in the use made of foreign jurisprudence, Lord Dyson felt Lord Mance to be ‘a shining example’, being ‘more adventurous’. Baroness Hale, one of the lightest users of foreign jurisprudence at the Supreme Court, felt it obvious that the Justices may have different interests and ‘go off on frolics on their own’, giving the example of occasions on which the Court may get ‘Mance on the German law of something’. Lord Clarke implied that he was less likely to use foreign jurisprudence than some of his colleagues:

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423 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Mance, Justice of the United Kingdom Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 6 December 2011).
424 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Dyson MR, former Justice of the United Kingdom Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 1 May 2012).
425 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Baroness Hale of Richmond, Justice of the United Kingdom Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 8 May 2012).
I think we would be unlikely to go on a frolic of our own. I mean I would be unlikely myself to send my JA to go and look into the French text. But I might, I mean one might … some people are keener on it than others. … Lord Mance is very interested in German Law for example.426

Table 2 shows a breakdown of the citation practices according to each member of the Supreme Court that heard at least one case between 2009 and 2013. For each judge, the table gives: the total number of cases heard; the total number in which the judge contributed a written judgment (which includes concurring and dissenting judgments, insofar as these amounted to more than the simple expression of agreement with another of the judgments in any one case); the number of those written judgments in which explicit citations of foreign jurisprudence are found; and the latter figure expressed as a percentage. Thus, for example, Lord Hope heard 172 cases between 2009 and 2013, contributing a written judgment in 128 of those cases. Foreign jurisprudence was explicitly cited in 25 of those judgments, amounting to 19.5%. In other words, between 2009 and 2013, Lord Hope made explicit citation of at least one foreign decision in approximately one fifth of his judgments. This proportion is consistent with the practice of several of the Justices. Of the Justices that have given more than 20 written judgments, the majority fall close to the 20% figure. Lord Clarke, Lord Mance, Lord Walker, Lord Phillips, Lord Dyson, Lord Wilson, Lord Rodger, and Lord Neuberger fall into this camp. Baroness Hale, Lord Brown and Lord

426 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Clarke, Justice of the United Kingdom Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 9 May 2012).
Carnwath, however, appear less inclined to cite foreign jurisprudence, with Lord Brown doing so in just 4.2% of his judgments. Heavier users of foreign jurisprudence are Lord Neuberger and Lord Collins. In fact, the fluctuation between 2010-11 and 2011-12 shown by figure 1 may be explained on the basis of Lord Collins’ contributions. Lord Collins cited foreign jurisprudence in 42.9% of his written judgments between 2009 and 2013. In 2010 that figure peaked at 63.6%. In 2011, Lord Collins gave just two written judgments before retiring, neither of which made explicit citations of foreign jurisprudence and the figure therefore fell to zero.

The fact that certain judges are more willing to use foreign jurisprudence than others is further supported by the different approaches taken to resourcing those materials. For example, if counsel had not referred to foreign jurisprudence, a number of the Justices interviewed said that they might ask for it if they felt it was useful to do so. Lord Kerr explained:

… If we knew that there was a line of authority which bore on the questions that we had to answer and that we considered it was likely to be helpful in analysis, and we were alerted to it in sufficient time, then certainly we would ask counsel to address us on it. There have been occasions—very rare occasions—where we have pointed out to counsel that there was possibly some assistance to be derived from jurisprudence in other countries and invited them to research it themselves and to make submissions on it.428

427 In 2010 Lord Collins heard 23 cases, gave written judgments in 11 and cited foreign jurisprudence in 7.
428 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore, above n 420.
### Table 2: Citations of foreign jurisprudence in judgments written by each member of the UK Supreme Court 2009-13.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UK Supreme Court Justice (JSC)</th>
<th>Total Cases</th>
<th>... total number of cases in which JSC contributed a written judgment</th>
<th>...of these, number of cases in which at least one foreign case is explicitly cited</th>
<th>Percentage of cases in which written judgment was given and FJ explicitly cited</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lord Hope (2009 – 2013)</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>19.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baroness Hale (2009 – 2013)</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord Kerr (2009 – 2013)</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord Clarke (2009 – 2013)</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord Mance (2009 – 2013)</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord Walker (2009 – 2013)</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord Brown (2009 – 2012)</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord Phillips (2009 – 2012)</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21.43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord Dyson (2010 – 2012)</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord Wilson (2011 – 2013)</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord Reed (2010 – 2013)</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord Rodger (2009 – 2011)</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord Collins (2009 – 2011)</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>42.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord Carnwath (2011 – 2013)</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord Neuberger (2012 – 2013)</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>26.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord Sumption (2012 – 2013)</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord Judge*</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord Saville (2009 – 2010)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord Toulson (2013)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord Hughes (2013)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord Hamilton*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord Carloway*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Neither Lord Judge, Lord Carloway nor Lord Hamilton were permanent members of the UK Supreme Court
The issue was picked up by Paterson during his interviews for *The Law Lords*, and revisited in his more recent publication. Paterson notes that:

Among the counsel whom I have interviewed in the last 40 years, there has been a high degree of consensus on [this] point. Even at the level of the House of Lords or Supreme Court [counsel] do not consider it appropriate for the judges to decide appeals on points of law which have not been argued by counsel or at least put to them for comment.

As Paterson points out, the differences between the Justices in relation to the expectation has surfaced in a number of the Supreme Court’s cases:

Thus, Lord Dyson … observed that Lord Phillips had breached the convention [in *Lumba*], ‘In my view it is not appropriate to depart from a decision which has been followed repeatedly for almost 30 years unless it is obviously wrong (which I do not believe to be the case), still less to do so without the benefit of adversarial argument.’

Others among the Justices, however, were less convinced that these steps would always be necessary. Paterson notes that ‘Lord Phillips and Lady Hale were sceptical as to the strength of the convention when interviewed’, while Lord Reed felt it would be ‘a question of judgement what you decide to do’.

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432 Ibid 21.
433 Ibid 22.
Some indication of the willingness to conduct or commission research on foreign jurisprudence can be seen in some of the Supreme Court’s case law. In *HM Treasury v Ahmed*,\(^ {434} \) Lord Rodger wrote in his judgment that he had found it ‘instructive in this regard to see how certain other Commonwealth countries’ had approached the instrument in question.\(^ {435} \) Mak reported another example:\(^ {436} \) the *Jewish Free School* case.\(^ {437} \) The case is well known and concerned a policy to impose a criterion for admission to the Jewish free School that a child applicant be recognised as being Jewish by the Office of the Chief Rabbi of the United Congregation of the Commonwealth. The issue was whether the policy constituted discrimination under section 1(1)(a) of the Race Relations Act 1976. The Supreme Court judgments cite *inter alia* jurisprudence from Israel, New Zealand and the United States of America.\(^ {438} \) The source of the jurisprudence is not obvious from the reported judgment but Mak’s evidence from her own interviews is that ‘[s]everal members of the panel indicated that extra comparative legal research had been carried out at the request of the judges themselves’.\(^ {439} \)

\(^{434}\) Her Majesty’s Treasury v Mohammed Jabar Ahmed and others (No.2) (FC) [2010] UKSC 2. The case is discussed further below, from n 873.

\(^{435}\) Ibid [199].


5.3 Practical matters: accessing foreign jurisprudence

Since the Justices do sometimes consider foreign jurisprudence as a product of their own research in this way, it is interesting to consider how this unfolds. These questions are part and parcel of any understanding about the way that foreign jurisprudence is used at the Supreme Court. Baroness Hale confirmed that there were several avenues to the use of foreign jurisprudence:

We might ask Counsel, we might know about it anyway, we might look it up, or we might get one of our legal assistants to look it up and see if there is anything.\textsuperscript{440}

Practical considerations play an important part. Lord Collins explained that the main barrier to using foreign jurisprudence was likely to be a question of resources:

By contrast with the United States, we don’t have banks of law clerks here, and so those Justices who are interested in the way things are done abroad will get their law clerks to research it and those who are not, won’t. Here, by contrast, we are … largely dependent on counsel for our legal materials. We have some judicial assistants but on the whole I don’t think that they are used much for research…\textsuperscript{441}

The judicial assistants (JAs) are qualified barristers or solicitors in the UK. All but one JA (at the time of writing) are appointed for one-year posts and are generally available to assist their assigned Justice(s) in their work. The JAs

\textsuperscript{440} Interview with The Rt. Hon. Baroness Hale of Richmond, above n 425.
\textsuperscript{441} Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Collins of Mapesbury, retired Justice of the United Kingdom Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 22 May 2012).
do not write judgments but have had a growing input in other ways.\textsuperscript{442} For example, it is no longer uncommon for JAs to see and comment on draft judgments of their own Justice or sometimes even those of other Justices.\textsuperscript{443} Their role may also include conducting research on the cases and a Justice could certainly ask his JA to look into foreign jurisprudence if it appeared relevant. This might be of particular relevance if a Justice relies on his assistant to carry out online searches. Although not specifically discussing foreign jurisprudence, one of Lord Brown’s JAs has written that she was frequently asked to conduct research of this kind:

Either in the morning before the oral hearing or in the lunchtime break, Lord Brown would often think of a case that contained useful guidance on the matter that was before the Court. If the parties had not relied on this particular authority, it would be my job to find it and print enough copies for the Justices and the parties if Lord Brown decided to bring it up in oral argument. I would also give my view on the relevance of this new authority and highlight any important passages.\textsuperscript{444}

Lord Reed explained that his JA might make notes through her own initiative and that she may choose to give references to foreign jurisprudence but that he hadn’t so far specifically asked her to research foreign jurisprudence.\textsuperscript{445} However the amount of foreign jurisprudence that would be likely to come


\textsuperscript{443} Alan Paterson, \textit{Final Judgment: The Last Law Lords and the Supreme Court}, Ibid, 254-257.

\textsuperscript{444} Tetyana Nesterchuk, ‘The View from Behind the Bench’ in Burrows, Johnston and Zimmermann (eds), \textit{Judge and Jurist: Essays in Memory of Lord Rodger of Earlsferry} (Oxford University Press 2013), 107.

\textsuperscript{445} Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Reed, Justice of the United Kingdom Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 8 May 2012).
from the JAs is limited. For the most part, the JAs are often too busy to undertake extensive research of this kind without having been prompted for it. It is also not the case that the UKSC Justices each have their own JA as do, for example, the Justices of the United States Supreme Court or the courts of other countries. The JAs explained that it was normal for some of their work to be shared between two Justices, and, at the time of the interviews, Lord Reed and Lord Kerr shared a JA. Lord Kerr confirmed that there were limited opportunities for the JAs to undertake this kind of extraneous research:

… partly because I share [a judicial assistant] with Lord Reed, but mainly because we are so busy, the opportunity to cast a wide net over potentially relevant foreign jurisprudence just doesn’t exist.

Others among the Justices interviewed expressed similar sentiments about time pressures in reference to their own research. For example, Lord Mance felt that digesting the precise meaning of foreign jurisprudence would necessarily take time:

If I get say six decisions of the German Supreme Court or Constitutional Court, it takes some time to read them – they are not short! … You could easily spend, you know, three or four hours reading those decisions once you’ve got them, and you’ve got to find them first.

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447 Focus group interview with the judicial assistants of the United Kingdom Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 22 May 2012).
448 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore, above n 420.
449 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Mance, Justice of the United Kingdom Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 6 December 2011).
Nevertheless several of the justices admitted that they would be likely to conduct their own research into areas of foreign jurisprudence that were felt to be of interest. Technological developments, in particular, have had a profound effect on this; the ability to conduct research and communicate online has made available a burgeoning pool of materials. This compliments a growing tradition of international conferences and symposiums, which facilitate a direct exchange of ideas between judges and practitioners from all over the world. As Cram has said, ‘just as those parties appearing before the courts interact increasingly with others beyond national boundaries …so are courts confronted with the existence and practices of other legal systems’; and it is not surprising that these have filtered into their judgments. Baroness Hale commented, ‘you only have to push a few buttons’ to find any material that may be of interest.

In most cases this involved using the various legal databases such as Westlaw International or LexisLibrary (previously LexisNexis) which was itself indicative of one of the main differences between judicial reasoning at the Supreme Court and in lower courts. In the Court of Appeal, for example, Lady Justice Arden explained that the time pressures would often be too great to allow for much research of this kind on the part of the judges:

You have to have something which gets you started with the foreign law, because you simply do not have time to go and, as it were, sit down with Lexis Australia or Lexis South Africa, and work

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450 Ian Cram, ‘Resort to foreign constitutional norms in domestic human rights jurisprudence with reference to terrorism cases’ [2009] CLJ 118, 121.
451 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Baroness Hale of Richmond, above n 425.
out what relevant cases there might be. There has to be somebody who has done some work first.\footnote{452 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lady Justice Arden, above n 422.}

The Supreme Court also has its own library which may be asked, by the Justices, to source relevant materials for consideration. The library is well stocked with law reports from various foreign jurisdictions and, in addition to this, produces a monthly broadsheet which includes some comparative law material. In a lighter way, the UKSC blog site evidences its attention to developments in other foreign courts by posting notes on key cases from ‘Supreme Courts around the World.’\footnote{453 E.g. <http://ukscblog.com/supreme-courts-around-the-world-the-us-supreme-court> accessed 18 August 2013.}

Academic work is also an important vessel for comparative jurisprudence, again partly as a result of time pressures on the Court. Lord Phillips explained that ‘academics have the advantage of being able to spend much [more] time on looking at particular area of the law than [the Supreme Court]’ and the Justices would all be likely to read ‘the leading academics on a particular topic to see what they have to say.’\footnote{454 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, former President of the United Kingdom Supreme Court Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 23 November 2011).} It is evident that where foreign jurisprudence has been identified by academics in leading works, the Supreme Court would be alerted to it.\footnote{455 Ibid.} A good example of academic work being used in this way can be drawn from the \textit{HJ (Iran)} case considered in chapter seven.\footnote{456 Chapter seven, text from n 736.} In that case Lord Dyson did not ‘find it necessary to examine the Australian authorities to which [the Supreme Court] were
referred’. Instead, it was ‘sufficient’ to refer to an academic paper exploring the impact of the troublesome S395/2002 case on the refugee jurisprudence of Australia and the United Kingdom five years on. Lord Dyson was satisfied that the paper showed ‘the reasoning of the majority judgments is being generally applied in Australia...’.

Lord Walker also noted comparative academic work on this point and reproduced a lengthy paragraph from the paper to which Lord Dyson referred in the judgment.

The suggestion implicit here is that cases which have not been digested by academic work are not as likely to be used as those that have. Lord Reed took this view to explain the reasons why some jurisdictions were cited more than others:

There is a practical problem about finding foreign jurisprudence. … I’ve got … a French textbook on human rights law, which obviously cites French case law. But not many people have got foreign textbooks on their shelves.

This reliance on academic research may therefore further inform the consideration as to why certain jurisdictions are cited above others, as discussed below. According to Lord Mance, one wouldn’t look up jurisprudence from smaller foreign courts, for example. If foreign sources are used, ‘it would be because it was in some particular international field and

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458 HJ (Iran), Ibid [92].
459 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Reed, above n 445.
had received a degree of notoriety’. That sort of case’, he explained, ‘would be a case that had achieved international note and had therefore appeared in human rights textbooks and you would be referred to it because it was there in a footnote’. Otherwise, ‘unless one had been to a conference in Africa (for example) with the Commonwealth Magistrates and Judges Association or something like that, and it had been mentioned then, you wouldn’t come across it probably’.

The last suggestion that a judge might learn about foreign jurisprudence through conferences or judicial exchanges has perhaps been the most popular idea in the modern literature on judicial comparativism. The most fashionable explanation for the increase in judicial comparativism in recent years has been that judges refer to foreign jurisprudence simply because their eyes have been opened to it. The more widely known theory is the notion of a ‘transjudicial dialogue’. This usually encompasses ‘dialogue’ both in the sense that judges may communicate through their judgments, and in the more obvious sense of judges communicating through a direct—face to face—exchange of ideas with other judges and practitioners from all over the world. Broadly speaking, dialogue of this kind can be summarised simply as meetings which being about an awareness of each other’s decisions.

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460 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Mance, Justice of the United Kingdom Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 6 December 2011).
461 Ibid.
462 Ibid.
Such meetings are of obvious relevance between national and supranational courts, especially where national judges may wish to seek guidance as to the supranational court’s jurisprudence. Thus it is not surprising that, as Paterson has noted, these meetings are common between the Justices of Supreme Court and the judges at the ECtHR. Interestingly, Paterson also notes that the Supreme Court interacts with the Strasbourg Court much more frequently than with the CJEU in Luxembourg:

...there is far more interaction—oral and written—between the two courts than there is with Luxembourg. Members of each court visit the other and discussions ensue of actual cases and points of debate. Written exchanges are also frequent, and not just in judgments but also through lectures, and even occasional emails.\(^\text{464}\)

Paterson explains that the difference may be due to the style of the judgments in either court: ‘the outputs from the Luxembourg court are short, stilted and enigmatic, adhering to a civilian style which appears as though drafted by a committee with no spark of individualism’.\(^\text{465}\) Similar explanations were given by several of the Justices of the Supreme Court interviewed for this study.

As regards interaction with judges of top domestic courts in other jurisdictions, the Supreme Court regularly participates in international conferences and judicial exchanges and there are a few international visits a year, usually lasting three to four days. Some of the Justices interviewed did

\(^{464}\) Alan Paterson, *Final Judgment*, above n 430, 224.

\(^{465}\) Ibid 223. Paterson notes (at n 72) that no dissents or concurrences are permitted at the Luxembourg court.
consider that international conferences and symposiums of this kind would be likely to contribute to an awareness of foreign jurisprudence which might later be used in the process of reasoning. Lord Walker, for example, felt that personal relationships between judges would affect the attention paid to the jurisprudence from a particular court:

In my case that certainly is a factor. When I was at the bar and as a first instance judge, I did virtually no networking, I simply just got on with my work and it’s really only since I got to the top appeal court that I have started travelling and I have done quite a bit in the last... I first went to Australia in 2005 I think to give a lecture and I’m going for the 5th time this summer. So that’s five times in seven years. I’ve been to New Zealand a couple of times. And you do get to know people and it does make a big difference that you read a judgment and you know who it is that is writing it. I think that, right or wrongly, that is a very important factor in how much interest you take.\footnote{466 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, former Justice of the United Kingdom Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 15 May 2012).}

However none of the Justices appeared to consider that these sorts of meetings would usually be a primary source of foreign jurisprudence. It was felt to be only in very exceptional cases that dialogues of this kind would substantially affect judicial reasoning. Rarely was an example given during the interviews in which a Justice could recall an instance of discussion with judges from other jurisdictions which was visibly linked to reasoning in a later judgment. Only one such example could be recalled, regarding the well-
known *Daly* case from the early years of the HRA. Lord Dyson recounted a story about a visit to the Israeli Court during which a round-table discussion took place on the concept of proportionality. Lord Dyson felt that Lord Steyn’s judgment in *Daly* drew heavily from that meeting. Lord Dyson recalled Lord Steyn to have said something along the lines of: ‘this has been a very useful discussion, especially as I have now to write a judgment concerning this issue’.  

No more recent examples could be recalled and, aside from the *Daly* example, the general feeling was that international meetings would usually be very interesting but would not always be likely to contribute substantively to the work of a judge in their home court. In part this may be explained by a convention that discussion of topics that are known to be coming up in the Supreme Court are avoided, but there are a number of other reasons as well. Firstly, the meetings are pitched at varying levels. For example, the Israeli and Canadian conferences are regarded, by some Justices, to be more serious affairs than some of the other events. Some of the Justices that had not participated in those more serious conferences felt more sceptical about the value of international judicial exchanges, expressing the feeling that such meetings were often likely to descend to ‘chitter chatter’. One Justice went so far as to joke that international visits could often be described as ‘Judicial

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467 *R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department* [2001] UKHL 26; [2001] 2 WLR 1622.
468 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Dyson MR, above n 424.
469 Similar findings are reported by Mak in her most recent publication: Elaine Mak, *Judicial Decision-Making in a Globalised*, above n 414, 85.
470 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony, above n 426.
Tourism’. Secondly, some of the Justices were more enthusiastic about these meetings than others. While some of the Justices recounted that they had led delegations to other courts and found these meetings useful, others explained that they were not as keen on participating in this way, preferring instead ‘to get on with the business of judging’. Thirdly, these meetings repeat. Visits tend to be to those courts that are already familiar to the Justices of the Supreme Court, such as Canada and South Africa, where there is already an established relationship. The established relationships and familiarity with certain courts also perpetuates the tendency to refer to the jurisprudence of those jurisdictions. It is also likely that there are reasons connected to the perceived quality of the jurisprudence from certain jurisdictions or that there are other practical concerns, such as language barriers. These are questions that are best considered in context. The next section of this chapter therefore addresses the more literal ‘where does it come from’ question.

5.4 The preference towards common law jurisdictions

It is indisputable that the Supreme Court generally cites foreign jurisprudence from a small family of courts. As a proportion of all explicit citations of foreign jurisprudence at the Supreme Court, figure 2 shows that the jurisprudence of common law courts is the clear favourite. Of the total 316 foreign decisions cited by the Supreme Court between 2009 and 2013, 277

471 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Sumption, above n 294.
472 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony, above n 426.
473 This much has been recognised by other recent publications, e.g. Elaine Mak, Judicial Decision-Making in a Globalised World, above n 414, 206.
were from common law jurisdictions. Figures 3 and 4 show that the pattern is fairly consistent between human rights cases and non-human rights cases, although the proportion of citations of common law courts appears to be greater in human rights cases.
Figure 2: Proportion of citations from common law jurisdictions in all cases decided by the UK Supreme Court 2009-13.

- Citations from common-law jurisdictions: 87.7%
- Citations from civil law jurisdictions: 12.3%

Figure 3: Proportion of citations from common law jurisdictions in non-human rights cases by the UK Supreme Court 2009-13

- Citations from common-law jurisdictions: 85.0%
- Citations from civil law jurisdictions: 15.0%

Figure 4: Proportion of citations from common law jurisdictions in human rights cases by the UK Supreme Court 2009-13.

- Citations from common-law jurisdictions: 90.4%
- Citations from civil law jurisdictions: 9.6%
Figure 5 shows the number of cases of the total 246 handed down in the time period in which explicit citation were made to each jurisdiction. Of the 13 jurisdictions cited by the Supreme Court, only 5 jurisdictions are cited in more than 10 judgments, all from established common law or mixed systems. In human rights cases the numbers are less polarised on account of fewer judgments, but they follow the same pattern. Most citations are drawn from Australia, the United States, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa. Table 3 (overleaf) gives the break down of citations for each jurisdiction and case type.

Figure 5: Number of cases in which at least one case from the given country is cited, between 2009 and 2013.
Table 3: Total citations of foreign jurisprudence by country and case type, between 2009 and 2013.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jurisdiction</th>
<th>Total citations in all cases</th>
<th>Percentage of total citations</th>
<th>Total citations in non-HR cases</th>
<th>Percentage of total citations</th>
<th>Total citations in HR cases</th>
<th>Percentage of total citations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>113</td>
<td>35.8%</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>45.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>20.9%</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>18%</td>
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<td>18.8%</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
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<td>8.8%</td>
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<td>6.3%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>9</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>1.3%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
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<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>316</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>160</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>144</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The balance is even more extreme in human rights cases, where citations of common law courts make up over 90% of the total references to foreign jurisprudence—141 of the total 156 foreign case citations. These trends are best illustrated by figure 5, which shows the number of cases cited from each jurisdiction. Viewed this way, it is not only clear that the Supreme Court is likely to cite common law authorities the most often, but also that it is likely to cite more of those decisions per case.

Figure 5: Total explicit citations of foreign jurisprudence between 2009-13, arranged by country and case type.

The reasons for citing any particular jurisdiction are not made obvious in the judgments. As Cram found:

English judges, it seems, do little to explain why the insights of a particular jurisdiction might be relevant to the interpretation of domestic law and why those derived from other jurisdictions were
not. The reader of these law reports searches in vain for an account of the criteria by which the included jurisdictions were deemed includable and why the excluded were considered excludable.\footnote{474}{Ian Cram, ‘Resort to foreign constitutional norms in domestic human rights jurisprudence with reference to terrorism cases’ [2009] CLJ 118, 140.}

Whether true or not, there is a perception that different ideological positions on human rights are taken by different jurisdictions and that comparative standards drawn from a particular jurisdiction’s approach to human rights may be regarded, therefore, as a sign of a particular orientation towards human rights generally.\footnote{475}{See Christopher McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of Human Rights?’, above n 415, 501; Richard Clayton, ‘Judicial Deference and ‘Democratic Dialogue’: the legitimacy of judicial intervention under the Human Rights Act 1998’ [2004] PL 33, 47; Leighton McDonald, ‘New Directions in the Australian Bill of Rights Debate’ [2004] PL 22.}
The treatment of comparative authority by the South African Constitutional Court is illustrative of this point.\footnote{476}{s.39(1)(b) South African Constitution the Constitution expressly declares that ‘[w]hen interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum may consider foreign law’\footnote{477}{Sanderson v Attorney-General, Eastern Cape 1998 (2) SA 38 (CC) (emphasis added); Rabinder Singh, ‘Interpreting Bills of Rights’ [2008] Statute Law Review 82.} but that it ‘must consider international law’ (emphasis added).}
The Court has explained that ‘[c]omparative research is generally valuable, and is all the more so when dealing with problems new to our jurisprudence but well developed in mature constitutional democracies’.\footnote{477}{Christopher McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of Human Rights?’, above n 415, 517.}

On that basis, it is hardly surprising that ‘it is [in the main] the judiciaries of liberal democratic regimes that cite each other’.\footnote{478}{Cram was tempted to conclude his own study by suggesting that ‘the judges in the House of Lords and Court of Appeal conceive, in the main, of the Canadian and United States Supreme Courts as similarly placed institutions...'}
functioning under similar circumstances within a framework of broadly similar rules and underlying values'.\footnote{Ibid.} This is a conclusion that is supported by the interview evidence from this research. As Baroness Hale explained:

> The common law world is preferred to elsewhere and that is partly because it is all in English and partly because we are dealing in similar instruments, similar modes of thought and similar modes of judgment.\footnote{Interview with The Rt. Hon. Baroness Hale of Richmond, above n 425.}

Others among the interviewed Justices agreed. The then President of the Supreme Court, Lord Phillips, felt that there would be:

> … more use when we are a looking at courts in the long established democracies than some of the countries which have not had the benefit of developing over years with democratic and independent judiciaries.\footnote{Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, former President of the United Kingdom Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 23 November 2011).}

In large part, this is related to a perception that the quality of the reasoning is greater in the established common law courts. Lord Phillips added that whether or not foreign jurisprudence would be used depended very much on ‘the nature of the authority’ and that some decisions of foreign courts have been really ‘carefully thought out’—giving the example of some Canadian judgments.\footnote{Ibid.} Explaining what it takes to be ‘carefully thought out’, Lord Phillips said that ‘you have to be an outstandingly good jurist’.\footnote{Ibid.} Asked if that was something perceived from reading the cases or if that is known before, Lord Phillips answered: ‘We have a very good idea of who the really
outstanding jurists in the Commonwealth are’.\footnote{Ibid.} Lord Collins gave similar answers to these questions, expressing a requirement for confidence in the jurisdiction that one is drawing from:

[Foreign jurisprudence] won’t necessarily be … of direct assistance, unless it is a court of great authority and it’s something that hasn’t come up here, like the Supreme Court of Canada …\footnote{Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Collins of Mapesbury, above n 441.}

In fact, this apparently provides one of the barriers to the use of foreign jurisprudence from other countries:

It is very difficult to judge the quality of foreign decisions if you don’t know the people and their reputation … I suppose in itself you can say well the Supreme Court—American Supreme Court or Canadian Supreme Court or Australian High Court—they wouldn’t have got there unless they were pretty good. … You get a feel for it. When precedents are cited here, even of English judges, there are some who have got much greater reputation than others – for example. One might pay more attention to what Lord Bingham or Lord Hoffman has said than to another judge whose reputation is not so high.\footnote{Ibid.}

Nevertheless, the tendency to cite common law jurisprudence is surprising given the fact that the dominant force in human rights cases is likely to be the ECHR. That the United Kingdom has moved steadily towards convergence with the rest of Europe is hardly contentious. Indeed, the UK was among the first members of the Council of Europe to ratify the Convention and English lawyers made a substantial contribution to the drafting of the document.
Moreover, a major factor said to be involved in the reluctance of the French judges to rely on Strasbourg decisions is their national pride in front of a new instrument, which is supposed to be dominated by English legal conceptions. More significantly, and as Masterman suggested, cases from jurisdictions outside the Convention borders are ‘unlikely to point to the direction in which the common law should be developed to ensure compatibility with the Convention rights’. Unlike the Canadian, Victorian and New Zealand experiences, the Convention and its jurisprudence are built into the structure of the HRA.

The use of common law jurisprudence is especially surprising given the cautionary statements made in the early days of the HRA. For example in Sheldrake, Lord Bingham set out that, even though courts had on a number of occasions ‘gained valuable insights from the reasoning of Commonwealth judges’, the UK ‘must [now] take its lead from Strasbourg’. In Gillan Lord Bingham thought it was ‘perilous ... to seek to transpose the outcome of Canadian cases’, by reason of their being ‘decided under a significantly different legislative regime’. In Marper, Lord Steyn rejected the idea that domestic traditions bear any relevance to the scope of Convention rights at


489 Sheldrake v DPP [2004] UKHL 43; [2004] 3 WLR 876 [33].

490 Ibid.

491 R (Gillan) v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2006] UKHL 12; [2006] 2 AC 307, [23].

492 Ibid.
all. The court in *British American Tobacco* recognised that ‘it is instructive … to see how another respected jurisdiction has dealt with a related but confined problem’ but also considered that comparison (with the jurisprudence of the US First Amendment) should be undertaken with care:

…the balance between State legislation and federal legislation in the United States is a subject of renowned complexity. Decisions on such matters can have limited effect on our consideration of the balance to be struck in considering a restriction of a limited Convention rights and the measure of a discretion to be afforded to Parliament and ministers under our own rather different constitutional system.

Implicit in the idea that common law jurisprudence is likely to provide less assistance in human rights cases for the reason that they were ‘decided under a significantly different legislative regime’, is that jurisprudence from courts interpreting the same legislative regime would be of greater relevance. Thus one might reasonably consider the jurisprudence of European domestic courts interpreting the same instrument to be of interest to the Supreme Court. As Bobek has written:

After the UK joined the European Communities, some people might have hoped (and others feared) that the UK would now join Continental Europe. This should be evidenced by a change in the (comparative) attention of the English courts: less comparative

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494 *R (British American Tobacco UK Ltd) v The Secretary of State for Health* [2004] EWHC (Admin) 2493s.
495 Ibid [36].
496 *R (Gillan)*, above n 491, [23] (Lord Bingham).
consideration would be given to the common law world and more considerations to Continental Europe.\textsuperscript{497}

If the courts have followed this sort of approach, the use of foreign jurisprudence from common law jurisdictions should be on the decline. If that were true, the trend evidenced by figure 5 represents a rather more discouraging outlook: rather than representing a greater use of jurisprudence from common law jurisdictions in human rights cases, it may represent an overall decline in the use of foreign jurisprudence altogether. This is difficult to substantiate without comparable data on explicit citations of foreign jurisprudence in the early years of the Human Rights Act. The closest of the existing studies is that conducted by Cram, encompassing judicial references to a foreign court's jurisprudence in cases concerning rights to liberty and fair trial since October 2000. Cram found just five cases referencing other nations' constitutional courts but does not give a figure for the overall number of cases captured by his research.\textsuperscript{498} From those five cases, Cram also found that citations were most likely to be drawn from common law jurisdictions.\textsuperscript{499} Another study reviewed the decisions of the House of Lords in its final year, 2009. In that year, Bobek counted that ‘legal materials from outside of the UK’ were referred to in 24% of cases. These were ‘almost

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\textsuperscript{497} Michael Bobek, \textit{Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts} (Oxford University Press 2013), 93.
\textsuperscript{498} Ian Cram, ‘Resort to foreign constitutional norms in domestic human rights jurisprudence with reference to terrorism cases’ [2009] CLJ 118, 132.
\textsuperscript{499} Ibid 140: ‘The United States and Canada supplied by far the most frequent sources to which our judges refer, although the jurisprudence of five other jurisdictions is also represented in this survey’. See also Mathias M Siems, ‘Citation Patterns of the German Federal Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal of England and Wales’ (2010) 21 KLJ 152.
\end{flushright}
exclusively of common law provenience’, with just one referenced to materials from outside the common law world.500

An obvious explanation is that the analysis of explicit citations distorts the picture. In fact the Supreme Court does consider the jurisprudence of European domestic legal orders but the Justices can usually rely on the ECtHR to outline the position of national legal systems. Sir Nicholas Bratza, the then President-elect of the European Court of Human Rights, has explained that it is ‘the wider role of the Court’ to ‘[examine] the law and practice in other Member States in resolving issues of general importance for the development of the Convention’.501 Bell has pointed out that this applies to the jurisprudence of supranational courts generally:

[i]t is through [the decisions of the supranational courts] that the state of the law in other European countries comes to the notice of the UK justices. Strasbourg and Luxembourg consider the different ways a common problem is handled by national courts and select a permitted range of acceptable solutions (often by deferring to national decisions, rather than imposing a single right answer). As a result, it is not necessary for lawyers or justices to look directly at national law.502

The reliance on comparative research from supranational courts is also a reflection of the fact that the Supreme Court is a very busy court and does

not always have time to conduct research into the approach of other jurisdictions. Lord Phillips explained this when interviewed:

We basically don’t have time to go to the other European countries and look at the way they’ve addressed [an issue] with some exceptions. There is quite enough case law in Strasbourg itself … we’re looking at how Strasbourg deals with the decisions of courts in other member states and when you do that you are also looking to see how that particular court dealt with a problem and then how Strasbourg has viewed the approach of that court. And so, in some cases, we’re looking quite closely at the domestic decision in the field of human rights.\textsuperscript{503}

An alternative explanation for the tendency to draw from common law courts is that linguistic barriers preclude meaningful comparison with non-English speaking jurisdictions. Thus some comparative law scholars have been persuaded that different languages and styles are likely to be a significant barrier to judicial comparativism.\textsuperscript{504} Discussion of this suggestion was one of the common themes from the interviews. As mentioned in the methodology chapter, it is interesting that the Justices held different views about the significance of linguistic barriers and that these views broadly correlated with whether or not the Justice had raised the matter of their own accord or if they were directly questioned on it. Thus when asked about the propensity to use jurisprudence from the main common law courts, Lord Mance replied that

\textsuperscript{503} Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, above n 454.

… for language reasons, obviously, it is easier to use common law courts. Unless you speak the language pretty fluently it’s not so easy to use most other European courts. Although if you do speak the language, it is interesting to be able to do so.\footnote{Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Mance, Justice of the United Kingdom Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 6 December 2011).}

Lord Mance went on to explain that he is comfortable reading German and that he often found the German jurisprudence to be useful.\footnote{In one judgment, published in the days before submission of this thesis, another Supreme Court Justice made reference to jurisprudence from the German Constitutional Court: \textit{R (HS2 Action Alliance Limited) v The Secretary of State for Transport and another} [2014] UKSC 3. Two references to judgments of the German Constitutional Court are made by Lord Reed at [106] and [111], approving a principle applied by the German court (that the rulings of the CJEU should not be read as undermining national constitutions).} Lord Collins raised similar issues:

There is a language issue in all of this, and … there is also unfamiliarity with the legal system. On the whole we don’t get presented with anything from France or Germany or Italy, … I suppose, if there is a really important issue and that the French Conseil d’Etat has heard or the German Constitutional Court, maybe we would be told about it … but then we would just be told what they did …\footnote{Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Collins of Mapesbury, above n 441.}

Baroness Hale explained the problem to be one of confidence: confidence in any translation that one may use and confidence in one’s own standard in the relevant language:

The linguistic barrier is, I think, a very strong one because good translation is difficult to come by and very expensive. We may think that we understand French and one of my colleagues has good German but nevertheless you’ve got to be very confident that you have good legal French and good legal German.\footnote{Interview with The Rt. Hon. Baroness Hale of Richmond, above n 425. Other Justices expressed similar sentiments.}
The point was put most simply by Lord Clarke:

> With the best will in the world you have to speak very good French to understand legal French. ... I once spent six months on a farm in France and spoke quite good French at the end, but that doesn’t really qualify you to read dense texts at the Conseil d’Etat.  

Others among the Justices attributed much less influence to language as a barrier to the use of jurisprudence from non-English speaking jurisdictions. Lord Sumption, for example, felt that ‘the linguistic barrier is not terribly important’; ‘Most judges speak French’. In fact, Lord Sumption considered that it was ‘the duty of every civilised man to read another language if not more than one’. Lord Kerr was also dismissive of the idea that judges were prevented from using such materials by a lack of language proficiency and gave an altogether different explanation:

> It is certainly not a linguistic barrier [that prevents use of case law from European domestic courts], because it is always possible to get a translation of the particular judgment. It’s just that we have, generally, a wealth of material to get through and ... if you attend an appeal hearing that’s going to last 2 or 3 days in the Supreme Court and which involves a number of human rights issues, you will see vast bundles of authorities—most of which are never referred to.

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509 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony, above n 426.
510 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Sumption, above n 294. In another context, Lord Sumption is reported to have lamented the loss of a ‘general culture’ among the newest generation of barristers and solicitors: ‘It is very unfortunate, for example, that many of them cannot speak or read a single language other than their own’. Lord Sumption in conversation with Stephen Turvey and Matthew Lawson for Counsel Magazine (July 2012), published by LPA legal <http://lpalegal.com/news/conversation-with-lord-sumption> accessed 21 December 2013.
511 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore, above n 420.
Although acknowledging language as a factor, Lord Walker’s explanation for the lack of citations of jurisprudence from European domestic courts proceeded along slightly different lines:

I think it is much more [to do with] habits of judgment writing. English judgments … are far too long and most continental judgments are—to our taste—a good deal too short. I remember being shown a judgment of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands and it was so short and so devoid of reasoning. I mean no doubt all the reasoning was there, but it was concealed in their discussions and not really set out in their judgment.  

Finally, there is a more general problem surrounding the research framework involved in finding relevant foreign jurisprudence. As Lord Sumption concluded, ‘the main barrier is not knowing where to start on the research’.  

5.5 The effect of changing judgment styles

There is also a close connection to be made between the use of foreign jurisprudence and judgment types. As Dickson wrote, one feeling about the shift from the House of Lords to the new Supreme Court was that there might be new opportunities to develop the methods adopted by the House of Lords, ‘so as to operate in a more modern and accessible way’:  

The Justices do now compile and deliver their judgments slightly differently from the way their predecessors did, with the first

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512 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, above n 466.
513 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Sumption, above n 294.
514 Brice Dickson, Human Rights and the United Kingdom Supreme Court (Oxford University Press 2013), 3.
judgment no longer always being that of the most senior judge but rather that of the judge who has written the most detailed judgment explaining why the decision has gone a certain way; any dissenting judgments are usually placed after the judgments of all the judges in the majority. Moreover, Justices are increasingly issuing joint judgments.\(^{515}\)

Dickson’s last point touches on one of the most interesting findings from this research, that the Supreme Court now commonly hands down plurality style judgments. The idea of a plurality judgment was explained by Baroness Hale in an interview for the UK Supreme Court Blog, published in *The Guardian* Newspaper in 2010:

> The idea of plurality judgments as the norm is very radical. It would mean that the majority who agreed on the result would have one judgment which reflected their common views (with possible post-scripts from adherents) rather than numerous judgments reasoning in almost identical ways towards the same result.\(^{516}\)

In a speech shortly after that interview, Baroness Hale explained that the Parliamentary procedure in the House of Lords made these kinds of judgments difficult:\(^{517}\)

> In the House of Lords, we could have a considered opinion of the whole appellate committee, individual opinions with which the

\(^{515}\) Ibid. At page 4 Dickson also notes changes surrounding the decisions as to whether more than five judges should hear the appeal. The criteria, he notes, has been made more explicit. Dickson takes this to be an indication ‘that the Court wishes to be more transparent about the way it operates and that it envisages a larger bench being convened reasonably frequently’. Moreover, ‘[d]ecisions by larger benches have the potential to allow the Court to present a more powerful and united front to the outside world’.


\(^{517}\) See also Alan Paterson, *Lawyers and the Public Good* (Cambridge University Press 2012) 159, 164 et seq.
others simply agreed, or a series of individual opinions; but jointly authored or plurality opinions were difficult and rarely tried.\textsuperscript{518}

The trend from the early years of the Supreme Court’s activity is towards a significant change in that pattern. In her speech, Baroness Hale gave figures collected by one of the JAs from that year. It is worth reproducing this information in full, since it also provides the explanation of how a ‘plurality’ or ‘effectively plurality’ judgment has been defined here:

Richard Reynolds, one of this year’s judicial assistants (to whom I am greatly indebted for his researches on this subject), has surveyed our first 57 decided cases. He found that in 20, there was a ‘judgment of the court’; and in a further 11, there was either a single judgment (with which all the other Justices agreed), or a single majority judgment (with which all the Justices in the majority agreed), or an ‘effectively’ single or single majority judgment (because separate judgments were simply footnotes or observations). So 31, or more than half, came out as plurality or effectively plurality judgments.\textsuperscript{519}

This is consistent with the results of the data collection conducted for the purposes of this study. Following the same criteria, if all decided cases are included (i.e. including cases concerning procedural matters that are otherwise ignored for the purposes of this particular study), 31 cases from the first year were also found to be plurality or effectively plurality judgments. The figure is revised to 26 when the procedural cases or conjoined appeals are discounted. The proportion remains constant as the years go on. Of the total

\textsuperscript{519} Ibid 2.
246 cases handed down by the Supreme Court between 2009 and 2013, there were 130 with plurality or effectively plurality judgments. Interestingly, only 33 of the remainder actually comprised a full set of separate judgments; although the other 83 could not be classified as being a plurality or effectively plurality judgment, in each case at least one member of the court chose to associated himself (by the expression of agreement) with the judgment of another. Dickson has added useful figures on the numbers of Justices contributing judgments as well as the number of Justices hearing cases:

In its first three ‘legal’ years, 2009–12, out of 164 separate sets of judgments issued by the Justices, no fewer than 35 involved seven Justices and a further 12 involved nine Justices. Of the 35 cases, 14 concerned human rights issues, and of the 12 cases seven involved human rights issues. Altogether, 29 per cent of all the cases dealt with involved more than five Justices, and 45 per cent of the cases involving more than five Justices concerned human rights issues. In the last three years of the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords, by way of contrast, only two of the 180 cases involved more than five Law Lords (just over 1 per cent), each of which raised human rights issues.

This is not altogether surprising, since it is often said that the move to the new Supreme Court has promoted a greater sense of collegiality. For example, Paterson has described the establishment of ‘team-working’

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520 An explanation of the calculation of the 246 figure is given in chapter three, text to n 182.
521 The data for each year and the total figures given are set out in Annexe two.
522 Brice Dickson, Human Rights and the United Kingdom Supreme Court (Oxford University Press 2013), 3.
practices under Lord Phillips and Lord Neuberger as far greater than had been the case at the House of Lords.\textsuperscript{523} Mak explains:

Since October 2009, the judges have been experimenting with a system in which one judge writes the lead opinion and the other judges on the panel may choose to concur with this judge, to write a separate opinion, or to write a dissenting opinion.\textsuperscript{524}

By changing its working methods in this way, ‘the Court aims to create more transparency’.\textsuperscript{525} The reasoning is that ‘working with majority opinions leads to more consistency and gives clearer guidance to the lower courts on how to operate in the future’.\textsuperscript{526} Darbyshire has a more practical take on this development in judgment writing. ‘Jurisprudentially, judges claim they are sparing us the pain of extracting the ratio decidendi from multiple judgments’ but ‘[p]ractically, single judgments have become a labour saving device’.\textsuperscript{527}

Not all commentators agree that plurality style judgments are a positive move. Writing in 1998, Robertson was cautions:

… the Lords have moved to the expectation that there will only usually be one major speech … Whatever value this may have for legal certainty … it has reduced the extent of genuine argument

\textsuperscript{523} Alan Paterson: \textit{Final Judgment}, above n 430, 141.
\textsuperscript{524} Elaine Mak, ‘Why do Dutch and UK judges cite foreign law?’ [2011] CLJ 420, 430.
\textsuperscript{525} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{526} Ibid. Indeed, this is itself an area where the Supreme Court may have learned from courts of other jurisdictions. When Baroness Hale made the case for developing towards plurality judgments in \textit{OBG Ltd v Allan} it was clear that some support was derived from the practices applied abroad: [T]here would be much to be said for our adopting the practice of other supreme courts in having a single majority opinion to which all have contributed and all can subscribe without further qualification or explanation. \textit{OBG Ltd v Allan, Douglas v Hello! Ltd} (No.3), \textit{Mainstream Properties Ltd v Young} [2007] UKHL 21; [2008] 1 AC 1 at [303], cited in James Lee, ‘A defence of concurring speeches’ [2009] PL 305.
\textsuperscript{527} Penny Darbyshire, \textit{Sitting in Judgment}, above n 442, 344-345.
and discussion of issues in a way that not only academic lawyers but many leading counsel find distinctly unhelpful.\textsuperscript{528}

A further drawback has been pointed out by Paterson, relating to a ‘loss of individualism in our Justices’.\textsuperscript{529}

Single judgments representing the outcome of the internal debates within the Supreme Court which are not publicly rehearsed, remove the humanity of individual difference and potentially undermine transparency. … Fewer dissents and concurrences in return for more single judgments mean more judgments devised by a committee and consequently more compromise.

Paterson cites Lord Rodger of Earlsferry as a supporter of this view, setting out evidence obtained through interview:

If the powers that be have their way, and the new Supreme Court of the United Kingdom adopts more single judgments, then there will be less scope in future for humour or indeed for any other expressions of the judges’ individuality. By definition the author of a composite judgments is not writing just as himself and will alter his voice accordingly. ….The much touted efficiency savings of a single judgment will be clearly bought if, as a result, we lose individual hallmark contributions of [the] quality [of Lords Macnaghten, Wilberforce and Bingham].\textsuperscript{530}

The effect of plurality style judgments on the use of foreign jurisprudence appears to be significant. Interestingly, one of the judges interviewed by Mak ‘indicated that the use of foreign jurisprudence need not be hampered by the

\textsuperscript{528} David Robertson, Judicial Discretion in the House of Lords (Oxford University Press 1998), 77-78; More recently, see e.g. Alan Paterson: Final Judgment, above n 430, 91-95; Penny Darbyshire, Sitting in Judgment, above n 442, 387-390.

\textsuperscript{529} Alan Paterson, Final Judgment, above n 430, 315.

\textsuperscript{530} Ibid, 315-216.
increased use of majority opinions’ because ‘an individual judge might still choose to write a separate opinion about foreign law if … not satisfied with the majority opinion’.\(^{531}\) However, the findings from this study indicate otherwise. As figures 6, 7 and 8 show, the proportion of citations of foreign jurisprudence is smallest in plurality type judgments, greater in cases with more than one written judgment and greatest in cases where a full set of separate judgments were given.\(^{532}\) The proportions are similar in both human rights and non-human rights cases. The spike in 2010-11 also correlates to the year in which the highest proportion of plurality judgments cited foreign jurisprudence (30.4%, compared to just 11.5% in 2009-10, 10.7% in 2011-12, 17.0% in 2012-13).

If not to do with the loss of individualism as discussed above, the lesser frequency of foreign jurisprudence citations in plurality judgments may be explained on the basis of the nature of the cases themselves. As explained in later chapters, some of the Justices indicated in the interviews that foreign jurisprudence would be helpful for ‘insight’,\(^{533}\) especially where the law is

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\(^{532}\) The percentages in these figures add up to greater than 100%. This is because the charts do not represent the proportion of judgment types where foreign law is cited out of all judgments citing foreign law. Instead, the charts show the proportion of cases that cite foreign jurisprudence out of each judgment type. I.e. in figure 2, out of 130 cases that can be categorised as plurality style judgments, 22 contain citations of foreign jurisprudence; foreign jurisprudence is cited in 16.9% of plurality style judgments. The figures are supported by data in Annex two.

\(^{533}\) Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Mance, Justice of the United Kingdom Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 6 December 2011).
‘uncertain’.\textsuperscript{534} A number of the Justices also acknowledged a tendency to seek reassurance from foreign jurisprudence, seeking to learn from the experience of other course ‘about the impact of particular laws’,\textsuperscript{535} which might in turn lead a Justice to be ‘encouraged or emboldened’ by what other jurisdictions have done.\textsuperscript{536} It wouldn’t be surprising, therefore, if foreign jurisprudence would be most likely to find its way into the more difficult or morally contested cases, which, in turn, would be more likely to produce multiple judgments. This would fit with the citation of foreign jurisprudence in the controversial assisted suicide cases: Pretty,\textsuperscript{537} Purdy and,\textsuperscript{538} most recently, Nicklinson.\textsuperscript{539} In these circumstances, where the Justices may find it harder to reach a consensus, separate judgments are more likely. These in turn increase the chance of foreign jurisprudence citation, which may otherwise have been cut out of the final product after a degree a compromise. Alternatively, since foreign jurisprudence citation is optional, the citation of these sources is dependent on the inclination of the Justice that is writing the judgment. If a single judgment were to be handed down which has been authored by a Justice that is less keen on comparative law, one could speculate that the explicit citation of foreign jurisprudence would be less likely overall.

\textsuperscript{534} Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, former President of the United Kingdom Supreme Court Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 23 November 2011).
\textsuperscript{535} Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore, Justice of the United Kingdom Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 9 May 2012).
\textsuperscript{536} Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Collins of Mapesbury, retired Justice of the United Kingdom Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 22 May 2012).
\textsuperscript{537} R (Pretty) v Director of Public Prosecutions and Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHL 61.
\textsuperscript{538} R (Purdy) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2009] UKHL 45.
\textsuperscript{539} R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice [2014] UKSC 38.
**Figure 6**: Citations of foreign jurisprudence by judgment type 2009-13, in all cases.

- Cases with plurality or effectively plurality judgment and foreign jurisprudence is cited: 16.9%
- Cases with at least one 'agreement' where foreign jurisprudence is cited: 41.0%
- Cases with separate judgments and foreign jurisprudence is cited: 63.6%

**Figure 7**: Citations of foreign jurisprudence by judgment type 2009-13, in non-human rights cases.

- Cases with plurality or effectively plurality judgment and foreign jurisprudence is cited: 15.7%
- Cases with at least one 'agreement' where foreign jurisprudence is cited: 40.4%
- Cases with separate judgments and foreign jurisprudence is cited: 71.4%

**Figure 8**: Citations of foreign jurisprudence by judgment type 2009-13, in human rights cases.

- Cases with plurality or effectively plurality judgment and foreign jurisprudence is cited: 19.1%
- Cases with at least one 'agreement' where foreign jurisprudence is cited: 41.7%
- Cases with separate judgments and foreign jurisprudence is cited: 57.9%
Alternative explanations for the rise and fall in the use of foreign jurisprudence can, of course, be offered on a qualitative analysis of the cases themselves. For example, it is not necessarily the case that citations of foreign jurisprudence indicate heavy use of those materials. Indeed, drawing from Mak’s earlier research on the reasons for citing foreign jurisprudence, Bell concluded that in the 2010-11 cases, foreign jurisprudence does not discernibly contribute to the outcome of those cases. These are conclusions that are discussed at greater length in a later chapter. For now, it is sufficient to note that the simple citation of foreign jurisprudence does not necessarily indicate the importance attached to those decisions or the attention and depth of analysis that they have been afforded.

5.6 The decline of comparativism in human rights cases

The emerging picture from human rights cases appears to be that of a decline in the number of explicit citations of foreign jurisprudence. Figure 9 illustrates this by plotting the number of foreign cases cited each year on a line graph. The fluctuation in numbers is largely due to citations in non-human rights cases. In human rights cases, the trend is more constant.

540 Elaine Mak, ‘Why do Dutch and UK judges cite foreign law?’, above n 524.
This pattern of citations of foreign jurisprudence may simply be explained on the basis of a variation in the number of human rights cases and non-human rights cases decided by the Supreme Court in those years. Although the number of human rights cases themselves remain fairly constant, the number of human rights cases as a proportion of the total number of cases each year fluctuates: 28 human rights cases were decided in 2009-10 (representing 55% of the total 51); 22 human rights cases were decided in 2010-11 (representing 37% of the total 60); 29 human rights cases were decided in 2011-12 (representing 50% of the total 58); and 24 human rights cases were decided in 2012-13 (representing 30% of the total 79). Therefore, in 2010-11 and 2012-13—the years that show spikes in the use of foreign jurisprudence in non-human rights cases—there was generally a greater number of non-human rights judgments handed down. However, these figures do not explain the general decline in the number of citations in human rights cases, since the number of human rights cases
remained between 22-29, with the lower number (22) in 2010-11, the year in which the most human rights cases were found to have citations of foreign jurisprudence. As suggested earlier, it is likely that the influence of certain Justices could have had an impact on these trends: one of the heaviest users of foreign jurisprudence, Lord Collins, cited those sources in 63.6% of his written judgments in the 2010,\textsuperscript{541} before retiring in 2011.

Another explanation for the decline in the number of citations is to do with an increase in the body of UK human rights jurisprudence since the coming into force of the HRA in October 2000.\textsuperscript{542} Indeed, with citations in about 30% of its case law, the United Kingdom sits among the lesser users of foreign jurisprudence when compared to other common law courts. For example, a recent study found that the South African Constitutional Court had cited foreign jurisprudence in 52% of its decisions since its establishment.\textsuperscript{543} The High Court of Australia’s citation practices were similar, with foreign jurisprudence in 52.3% of its constitutional cases.\textsuperscript{544} The Supreme Court of Canada and the Supreme Court of Israel come closer to the UK Supreme Court’s proportions, citing foreign jurisprudence in 37.9% and 28% of constitutional cases respectively. Indeed the only exception is the United States, where the practice of citing

\textsuperscript{541} In 2010 Lord Collins heard 23 cases, gave written judgments in 11 and cited foreign jurisprudence in 7.
\textsuperscript{542} This would support the idea that judges largely refer to comparative sources where the indigenous jurisprudence is lacking. The ‘gap-filling’ thesis is discussed further in chapter six.
\textsuperscript{543} Tania Groppi and Marie-Claire Ponthoreau (eds), \textit{The Use of Foreign Precedents by Constitutional Judges}, above n 414, 412.
\textsuperscript{544} Ibid.
foreign jurisprudence is highly controversial. The UK jurisprudence also ranks highly for foreign jurisprudence citations in other countries. In Australia and Ireland, the UK jurisprudence is cited more often than the decisions of other foreign courts and is frequently cited by the Canadian, Indian and New Zealand courts.

The connected possibility is that the decline in the number of citations of foreign jurisprudence in human rights cases is a product of the attention paid to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. As other commentators have suggested, a combination of resource strain and an obligation to take into account certain sources of law may simply mean that there is little time for judges to look beyond those parameters. As Bodek has explained:

...there appears to be a correlation between the amount of the mandatory foreign sources and the likeliness of any further, non-

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546 Tania Groppi and Marie-Claire Ponthoreau (eds), The Use of Foreign Precedents by Constitutional Judges, above n 414, 412. Ibid. Although the use of UK jurisprudence by other Commonwealth courts is not surprising, given the common constitutional and legal origins and shared historical influences. I am grateful to Michael Walker for this reflection. See further e.g. Tania Groppi and Marie-Claire Ponthoreau (eds), The Use of Foreign Precedents by Constitutional Judges, above n 414; Christopher McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of Human Rights?’, above n 415; Michael Bobek, Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts, above n Error! Bookmark not defined., 91-93. Bobek has gone so far as to ask whether references to the law of selected few common law nations, especially the British dominions like Australia, Canada, or New Zealand, are references to foreign law at all.

547 Section 2 Human Rights Act 1998 obliges domestic courts to ‘take into account’ the relevant jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court.
mandatory foreign inspiration. The relationship is one of inverse proportion: the more mandatory foreign, the less likelihood of any non-mandatory foreign. The impression that one obtains … is that … any available judicial energy will be spent on researching and navigating within the mandatory foreign. … the exponential growth of the European and international must sources takes away much of the free space and energy for the may ones.\footnote{Michael Bobek, \textit{Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts} (Oxford University Press 2013), 195.}

The close attention paid to the Strasbourg jurisprudence is well documented in the case law and commentary on the Human Rights Act and it would not be surprising if foreign jurisprudence citations gave way to the Strasbourg Court’s case law, where relevant. It may simply be that in the later years, the Strasbourg had recently spoken,\footnote{Baroness Hale, ‘Who Defines Convention Rights?’ (2010) 5(2) JUSTICE Journal 10, 13: [T]here is nothing in the [Human Rights] Act … to support the reluctance … to seek such guidance as we can from the jurisprudence of foreign courts … especially on subjects where Strasbourg has not recently spoken.} and had provided clearer guidance. Since the Supreme Court is under a duty to ‘take into account’ the Strasbourg jurisprudence and it is that jurisprudence which provides the authoritative interpretation on Convention rights, there is little incentive to use foreign jurisprudence if an authoritative judgment is to be found in the Strasbourg case law.\footnote{The influence of the Strasbourg jurisprudence is given further discussion from n 654, below.}

Indeed, the influence of the Strasbourg jurisprudence is so clear as to be evident in some jurisdictions not signatory to that instrument. For all the common law jurisdictions mentioned above, the decisions of the ECtHR are considered ‘foreign law’ (on the basis that the states are not signatory to the
Conventions and therefore do not fall within the jurisdiction of the Strasbourg Court). But as Groppi and Ponthoreau found, the decisions of the ECtHR ‘are experiencing an increasing influence’.\footnote{Ibid 420.}

The many reasons explaining this phenomenon … include the accessibility for English-speaking countries of the [European Court of Human Rights] decisions and the fact that human rights are a more fertile ground for foreign citations.\footnote{Ibid.}

A final possibility for the decline in the number of foreign jurisprudence citations shown in figure 9 represents one of the drawbacks of using a relatively small data sample for statistical representation. The four-year data collection period may represent an unusual period of Supreme Court activity (not least because these are the first four years of its activity) and may not therefore provide an accurate picture of this trend. It would be interesting to revisit this trend after a few more years of Supreme Court activity.

\section*{5.7 Conclusions}

The quantitative analysis illustrates the central patterns in the use of foreign jurisprudence at the Supreme Court. It is clear, for example, that the Supreme Court does make reference to foreign jurisprudence. It is also clear that the proportion of cases in which foreign jurisprudence is cited has remained fairly constant across the first four years of the Court’s activity, although there are some yearly fluctuations to note—especially in 2010-11. The number of
individual citations, however, appears to be declining in human rights cases in particular.\textsuperscript{553}

The data set also reveals some surprising results and made clear the importance of direct qualitative evidence derived from interviews with the protagonists, exposing the likelihood of implicit use of foreign jurisprudence. For example, one surprising finding from the data analysis was that there were very few citations of German jurisprudence: just five cases—including three human rights cases—cited German jurisprudence out of the possible 246 handed down between 2009 and 2013. Given the reputation that Lord Mance, in particular, has regarding enthusiasm for German law, it was expected that the number would be much greater. Having said this, figure 5 shows German cases were the next most cited after the common law jurisdictions.

For the same reason, it was surprising to see that Lord Rodger did not come out as one of the more frequent users of foreign jurisprudence. Lord Rodger’s enthusiasm for using comparative law is well documented, including in recent contributions by Lord Mance and Tetyana Nesterchuk (a former JA) in a volume of essays published in Lord Rodger’s memory.\textsuperscript{554} One possible implication of these results is that that foreign jurisprudence is used more extensively than is possible to tell on the face of the judgments. It is perhaps for this reason that

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{553} Although it is acknowledged that an obvious drawback of the relatively small four-year data collection period may not provide an accurate picture of this trend.
\item \textsuperscript{554} Lord Mance, ‘Foreign Laws and Languages’ and Tetyana Nesterchuk, ‘The View from Behind the Bench’, in Burrows, Johnston and Zimmermann (eds), Judge and Jurist: Essays in Memory of Lord Rodger of Earlsferry (Oxford University Press 2013).
\end{itemize}
Lady Justice Arden commented during interview that there is ‘far more use of comparative law than appears on the face of the judgments … it’s informing the judges behind the scenes’. 555 There is an obvious explanation for the surprisingly low number of explicit citations from these Justices, otherwise known to be enthusiastic about comparative law: foreign jurisprudence may not always be being used as ‘authority’ or cited out of courtesy to counsel, as mooted in chapter four. Instead, it is possible that foreign jurisprudence is being used more determinatively, as an analytical lens, to help with a process of reflection on a problem but which does not necessarily contribute to the outcome of a case. As Lord Mance recently put it:

when judges look to comparative and international material, they may do so for information, inspiration, or confirmation, just as they use domestic decisions that are not binding on them. 556

The potential for using foreign jurisprudence simply as a heuristic device is explored further in chapter six. For now, it is sufficient to be reminded that foreign jurisprudence may legitimately be treated like any other persuasive source, which need not be cited.

Whether used implicitly or explicitly, it was clear from the interviews that practical considerations are some of the main forces driving the manner and frequency with which foreign jurisprudence is used at the Supreme Court. The Court continues to rely on counsel for references to legal materials that are to be used in the process of judicial reasoning, although it would not be unusual

555 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lady Justice Arden, above n 422.
for judges to ask counsel to address comparative material if it was felt to be useful. Beyond this, the Justices might be willing to undertake their own research, but this is likely to be closely connected to the individual approach of each judge. It is worth noting that those Justices who did express greater willingness to embark upon research of this kind also tended to be heavier users of foreign jurisprudence.\textsuperscript{557}

When foreign jurisprudence is sourced independently of counsel’s submissions, online databases and collections in libraries provided the most obvious avenue. To a lesser extent, the JAs might also have raised comparative material but this would be less usual. Accessibility and time pressures are additional factors. The Supreme Court does have a little more time for research on complex points of law than the lower courts but, as several of the justices explained during the interviews, there are limits to what can be done.\textsuperscript{558} As a result, the feeling prevails that citations of foreign jurisprudence remain unsystematic. Baroness Hale seemed to agree:

\begin{center}
We do all sorts of things for all sorts of reasons, just as things come to us in all sorts of ways. … There is a large random element to all of this…\textsuperscript{559}
\end{center}

\textsuperscript{557} Further analysis of the correlation between personal attributes and the frequency of foreign jurisprudence citations is given by Michael Bobek in his study of the supreme courts in Europe: Michael Bobek, \textit{Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts}, above n Error! Bookmark not defined., 57.

\textsuperscript{558} Cf. Michael Bobek, \textit{Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts}, ibid 44-45: \textquote{\textquote{[c]omparative analysis is, in terms of time, expertise, and resources, a demanding exercise’ and ‘it is at the level of supreme jurisdictions where human resources (analytical backup) and also procedural tools (lesser docket, selection of cases) may be available. These allow judges to concentrate on contentious legal issues in greater detail’}.}

\textsuperscript{559} Interview with The Rt. Hon. Baroness Hale of Richmond, above n 425.
An effective time saving measure is to refer to the works of leading academics in the relevant field. This, in turn, is likely to influence the jurisdictions that are used since the discretion is with the author rather than the judge. Other related influences, despite having less practical significance, are the various judicial exchanges and international meetings or conferences. These meetings may perpetuate the tendency to resort to jurisprudence from a small family of courts, but there is little evidence to suggest that new material is introduced as a result of such meetings. Even where this appears to be more likely, it is arguably better to explain uses of foreign jurisprudence as part of a prior willingness to draw from selected foreign jurisprudence in the first place, rather than as a product of judicial exchanges per se. Indeed Lord Steyn’s use of the Israeli perspective in Daly comes as no particular surprise given the general openness to foreign jurisprudence exhibited by some of his earlier judgments. For example, in McFarlane v Tayside Health Board, 560 Lord Steyn explained that he would have used foreign jurisprudence mainly to assist in his own reflections about the case. Lord Steyn also argued that comparative law has the ‘inestimable value of sharpening our focus on the weight of competing considerations’. 561

For that purpose, it is most likely that the Justices simply refer to jurisprudence from the jurisdictions that they feel most confident with, either because there is an impression about the quality of the jurists from a particular court or because it is simply easier to consider decisions from English speaking jurisdictions. As

561 Ibis [81] (Lord Steyn).
Markesinis and Fedtke have written, ‘one must not ignore the very pragmatic limitation that language limitations may restrict the extent of these “fishing expeditions”’.\textsuperscript{562} Despite the fact that not all the Justices agreed that language would be a barrier to foreign jurisprudence, it is not surprising that, where there are citations of foreign jurisprudence, there is an enduring allegiance to the courts of established common law jurisdictions.\textsuperscript{563} Flanagan and Ahern reported similar results from their electronic questionnaires:

A large majority of judges, 81 per cent, indicated that a democratic form of government was a prerequisite for the citation of the law of another jurisdiction in a judgment about domestic rights. Conversely, 17 per cent of judges indicated they set no jurisdictional prerequisites. Only a single judge indicated a set of traits that did not include democracy, namely, that it be a common law jurisdiction. Other than democracy, the most cited prerequisite was that it be a common law jurisdiction (26 per cent), followed by commonality of language (14 per cent). There were seven comments to the effect that, were a jurisdiction to possess the ‘same language’ and ‘common law’ traits, it would be more readily comparable, but that, democracy aside, such traits were not a sine qua non.\textsuperscript{564}

The effect of the HRA 1998 might have been thought to promote greater interest in the position of European domestic courts but, as in other areas, practical considerations usually drive the Supreme Court to rely on the Strasbourg

\textsuperscript{562} Sir Basil Markesinis and Jörg Fedtke (eds), Judicial Recourse to Foreign Law: A new source of inspiration? (University College London Press 2006), 71.
jurisprudence to inform them on such matters. Undoubtedly, the changes in
judgment styles since the last years of the House of Lords have also had an
obvious effect. For example, it is clear that the Justices are inclined to work
towards plurality style judgments,\textsuperscript{565} which in turn appear to yield significantly
fewer citations of foreign jurisprudence.

These are changes that must be balanced against the value of foreign
jurisprudence. The potential to derive assistance from foreign jurisprudence is
not in doubt and many of the Justices interviewed confirmed the usefulness of
these sources. For example, writing in memory of Lord Rodger, Lord Mance
expressed the feeling that it was his ability and willingness to take a
comparative view of matters which formed an important part of Lord Rodger’s
legacy as a judge. It is worth reproducing the passage at length:

Part of Lord Rodger’s legacy as a judge will lie in the weight he
attached to looking at matters from all angles and from the viewpoint
of others. That is the essential role of the comparativist, for whom
languages are correspondingly important. Too often in the highest
court, issues arise which one feels must have been considered in
other major legal systems. Too often, difficulties of obtaining
appropriate information or an appropriate interlocutor to explore or
explain a foreign system stand in the way of cross-fertilization of this
sort. Lord Rodger’s knowledge and experience straddled different
legal systems and was, in that respect, unique. His departure invites
the thought that the Supreme Court should itself aim to acquire a
comparative legal and linguistic expertise that its present admirable

\textsuperscript{565} Paterson has found that the proportion of single judgments has increased greatly since the
House of Lords and that along with there there has been ‘a parallel growth in judgments by one
Justice with which one of more colleagues will join or agree. See further Alan Paterson: Final
Judgment, above n 430, 102-107.
judicial assistants do not generally bring. Other European courts, supranational and national, have within their organization young lawyers, often with the highest academic qualifications. ... Their role is to research issues where comparative legal input could be relevant and to liaise with their homologues in similar positions.566

Lord Mance continued:

There have been numerous cases at the highest level where this might have proved of interest. ... [and] [i]n all these cases, it could have been valuable to have a direct in-house facility for comparative law research. It is an idea worth pursuing after Alan Rodger’s much-mourned departure from the court.567

567 Ibid 97.
6 Foreign jurisprudence as a heuristic device

‘The question of real importance is —what is its purpose?’

It was concluded in chapter four that the legitimacy of using foreign jurisprudence must be contingent—at least in part—upon the reason for which it is used. That conclusion is not controversial: Saunders has recently suggested that legitimacy is intimately connected to the purposes for using foreign jurisprudence. In fact, for Saunders, the latter was said to assume the former. Thus Saunders’ thesis was that the legitimacy of using any foreign jurisprudence would necessarily vary according to the purpose for which a court employs it. The result is that foreign jurisprudence can be a legitimate judicial recourse in some conditions and not in others.

The conditions in which the use of foreign jurisprudence might give rise to problems can be summarised as ones in which the result is the adoption of foreign norms or the development of domestic jurisprudence in reliance on those norms. The crux of the problem is the enduring debate about sovereignty. If a court uses foreign jurisprudence to develop domestic law in a direction not

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570 Ibid.
envisaged by the legislature, it effectively assumes legislative sovereignty.\textsuperscript{571}

This is particularly clear in the US debate about the legitimacy of recourse to foreign jurisprudence. Cram explains:

[One] strand of US exceptionalism objects to foreign norm citation on sovereignty grounds. The suggestion here is that where the Constitution does not authorize or formally give a status to foreign norms, resort to such norms by the court is improper, occurring as it does without a proper mandate from the people or their representatives. … These difficulties are further compounded where the judiciary enjoy a power of review over primary legislation and when the foreign source is being used by the domestic court to strike down a measure that has been passed by the democratically elected legislature. It is unsurprising therefore when resort to comparative legal resources is labeled as foreign interference and something to be resisted.\textsuperscript{572}

Criticisms of this kind are perpetuated by the relative lack of transparency about the methods or purposes involved in the use of foreign jurisprudence. In a limited number of cases, explanations for the citation of foreign materials can be derived from the context of a judgment. However, in by far the greatest proportion of cases, little to no explanation is given why the foreign jurisprudence has been cited.

Further uncertainty is created by the disparity between the data collected from the judgments and the evidence obtained through interviews, which suggested


\textsuperscript{572} Ian Cram, ‘Resort to foreign constitutional norms in domestic human rights jurisprudence with reference to terrorism cases’ [2009] CLJ 118, 123-124.
that judges use foreign jurisprudence to a greater extent than is detectable from the judgments themselves. If that is so, it is worth clarifying the reasons for these additional recourses to foreign jurisprudence. Certainly, the evidence from the interviews described in chapter four was that the citations of foreign materials are not usually made for purely decorative or ornamental purposes. Moreover, if this were to be the case, foreign jurisprudence would always be detectable on the face of the judgment.

The thesis in the following three chapters is that there are three main purposes for using foreign jurisprudence in Supreme Court human rights cases (and, often, in Supreme Court cases generally). The first is the purpose considered by this chapter: that foreign jurisprudence is used as a heuristic device. Foreign jurisprudence represents an opportunity for reflection on a given issue. Although this may be prompted by a lack of relevant or helpful domestic jurisprudence, the ‘gap-filling’ thesis propounded in much of the literature is not supported. The Supreme Court is not concerned with filling gaps *per se*. Rather, the Justices are using foreign jurisprudence as an analytical lens, through which to theorise on the domestic issue. These recourses to foreign jurisprudence are most likely to be conducted as an ‘extra’ but will not usually make a substantive contribution to the reasoning in any one case. As such, foreign jurisprudence used for this purpose would not necessarily convert into explicit citations in a published judgment. Chapters seven and eight detail the other two main purposes for which it is argued that the Supreme Court uses foreign

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573 The term ‘analytical lens’ is used in Esin Örücü (ed), *Judicial Comparativism in Human Rights Cases* (United Kingdom National Committee of Comparative Law 2003).
jurisprudence in human rights cases: to identify and maintain consensus or uniformity; and instrumentally, to support conclusions at odds with the relevant domestic (or Strasbourg) jurisprudence.

6.1 Gap filling

Gutteridge wrote in 1949 that ‘at some future date more extensive use will, no doubt, be made of foreign law for the purpose of assisting our judges to fill the gaps that are still to be found in our law’.\textsuperscript{574} Some years later, a strong theme remains that foreign jurisprudence may offer a useful perspective where the indigenous jurisprudence is lacking or unsettled. In such circumstances, it is usually argued that foreign jurisprudence can contribute solutions to similar legal problems. It is a functionalist approach, which proceeds on the basis of ‘usefulness and need’ and the logic is intelligible: ‘…only a fool would refuse quinine just because it didn't grown in his back garden’.\textsuperscript{575} Lord Bingham referred to such circumstances in his 2009 Hamlyn lecture:

There are perhaps two situations in which foreign authority may exert a significant if not a decisive influence. One is where domestic authority points towards an answer that seems inappropriate or unjust. The other is where domestic authority appears to yield no clear answer.\textsuperscript{576}

\textsuperscript{574} Harold Cooke Gutteridge, \textit{Comparative Law}, above n 568, 40; More recently see eg Cheryl Saunders, ‘Comparative Constitutional Law in the Courts: Is There a Problem?’, above n 569, 114.
\textsuperscript{575} Rudolph von Jhering, quoted in Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, \textit{An Introduction to Comparative Law} (Tony Weir tr, 3rd edn, Oxford University Press 1998), 17.
\textsuperscript{576} Tom Bingham, \textit{Widening Horizons} (Cambridge University Press 2010), 7-8.
It is fairly clear that counsel would tend to approach foreign jurisprudence in this way, making use of it as evidence for a movement in the domestic position or to persuade a court about the way domestic jurisprudence ought to be construed and developed. Legal practitioners are trained to give evidence for their arguments and the accessibility of foreign jurisprudence through the Internet has enlarged the pool of potential authorities. As McCrudden has written:

For the human rights advocate the role of comparison is that of persuasion to an essentially moral position. Lawyers in the human rights context often use comparison to legitimate their argument that a particular interpretation of an existing human rights norm should be adopted, or as part of the process of generating further norms.577

It is clear that some Justices of the Supreme Court expect counsel to behave in this way. Lord Kerr explained:

I suppose there must be a tendency on the part of counsel to have resort to foreign jurisprudence that deals with the point if there isn’t any unambiguous answer to be found in domestic jurisprudence.578

Whether or not judges articulate ‘gap-filling’ as a purpose, there are examples of cases in which foreign jurisprudence appears to have been used in this way. For instance, the development of the common law breach of confidence action, so as to protect the privacy right enshrined under Article 8 of the ECHR, owes much to a decision of the Australian High Court.579 The approach has been

578 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore, above n 535
579 Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats [2001] HCA 63; Roger Masterman, ‘Section 2(1) of the Human Rights Act: Binding domestic courts to Strasbourg?’
similar where the jurisprudence of the ECtHR (which the HRA 1998 obliges domestic courts to ‘take into account’) is silent or unhelpful. As Baroness Hale has confirmed (extra judicially):

[T]here is nothing in the [Human Rights] Act … to support the reluctance … to seek such guidance as we can from the jurisprudence of foreign courts … especially on subjects where Strasbourg has not recently spoken.

One of the best examples is given by two cases handed down prior to the move to the Supreme Court, by the House of Lords. In Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB, the issue turned on the minimum requirements for a fair hearing in control order cases, for the purposes of Article 6 of the ECHR. In brief, the question was whether disclosure of closed material to a special advocate would enable a controlled person to have a fair trial. When MB was before the House of Lords, the Strasbourg Court’s approach to the level of disclosure required to render a hearing fair was unclear. As Baroness Hale wrote, ‘Strasbourg [had] not yet had to deal with a case exactly on all fours with the present’. The Grand Chamber had not yet decided A and others v United Kingdom, which considered breaches of procedural guarantees in Article 5(4) of the Convention (providing similar requirements about the lawfulness of a
decision, as determined by a court). In the absence of clear and constant Strasbourg authority, the House were forced to attempt to identity some of the guiding principles from the existing Strasbourg case law. In doing so, Lord Bingham made heavy reference to the approach of the Canadian and United States courts on the issue. The references to those jurisdictions did not themselves provide the ‘magical ace of trumps’, but it is clear that the House found them to be a useful resource and used them to confirm that the Strasbourg case law had developed along the same lines. It was after quoting passages from the Canadian and United States Supreme Courts, that Lord Bingham noted that ‘[s]tatements to similar effect, less emphatically expressed, [were] to be found in the Strasbourg case law’.

By the time Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF (No 3) reached the House of Lords, the Grand Chamber judgment in A v United Kingdom had been handed down. As Baroness Hale later explained (extra judicially):

Although A v United Kingdom was concerned with detention, and the control order cases were not, the House of Lords in AF (No

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584 Article 5(4) reads: Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.

585 Tom Bingham, Widening Horizons, above n576, 7-8.


589 A v the United Kingdom [2009] EHRR 301.
considered it inevitable that Strasbourg would take the same view of the procedural requirements for confirming control orders. While the Canadian and United States authorities were again cited (when referring to MB), the effect of the decision in A v United Kingdom prompted Lord Rodger's well-known conclusion: 'Argentoratum locutum, iudicium finitum - Strasbourg has spoken, the case is closed'.

The MB and AF (No 3) cases demonstrate that a wider net might be thrown where the Strasbourg position is unclear, but it is difficult to link such examples to an attitude of using foreign jurisprudence as 'gap fillers' generally. If the gap-filling explanation were accurate, the assumption would be that the use of foreign jurisprudence would significantly decline—or be non-existent—where domestic law is settled, unless its suitability is questioned in some way. While it is said that only a fool 'would refuse quinine just because it didn't grown in his back garden', it is also said that '[n]o one bothers to fetch a thing from afar when he has one as good or better at home'. The first problem with this reasoning is that it is not easy to find examples of cases where foreign jurisprudence would have been cited but for the existence of relevant domestic law. The Justices are hardly likely to highlight such possibilities in their

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591 Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF and another, above n 588, [98] (Lord Rodger).
judgments, which the Justices are in any case aiming to reduce in complexity and length. The second problem is that, even in cases where the attitude is possible to discern, the matter is not necessarily put so clearly. Lord Rodger's short statement in AF (No 3) is unusual. As Lord Mance has written, the ‘brevity and wit were here a misleading guide to the approach which Lord Rodger might have taken in other contexts.’ Further obscurity is created by the fact that the House of Lords in the later cases did repeat the citations to the foreign jurisprudence used in AF, which is not unexpected given the House was considering the identical issue and was reviewing the reasoning of the House in the earlier case. Indeed, when reviewing the cases handed down by the Supreme Court between 2009 and 2013, it was noted that many references to foreign jurisprudence were prompted by discussion of previous cases that had considered those sources, rather than as a result of a fresh contribution.

The gap-filling thesis is therefore very hard to confirm. In fact, if there were to be cases where judges were inclined to look abroad notwithstanding a relevant body of domestic jurisprudence, the risk would be that citations would begin to

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594 Lord Mance, ‘Foreign Laws and Languages’ in Burrows, Johnston and Zimmermann (eds), Judge and Jurist: Essays in Memory of Lord Rodger of Earlsferry (Oxford University Press 2013), 95.

595 Other examples include: Smith and Others (FC) v Ministry of Defence [2013] UKSC 41, [87] where Lord Hope considered a decision of the Australian High Court by reference to an earlier domestic case: ‘In Mulcahy v Ministry of Defence [1996] QB 732, 746 Neill LJ said that it seemed to have been recognised in the Australian cases that warlike activities fell into a special category. He concluded … that an English court should approach a claim of negligence … in the same way as in the High Court of Australia did in the Shaw Savill case…’; In The Catholic Child Welfare Society and others v Various Claimants (FC) and The Institute of the Brothers of the Christian Schools and others [2012] UKSC 56, [67]-[68] Lord Phillips made reference to Canadian decisions when considering the domestic jurisprudence: ‘In Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2002] 1 AC 215 … Lord Steyn … referred to Bazley v Curry 174 DLR (4th) 45 and Jacobi v Griffiths 174 DLR (4th) 71 as “luminous and illuminating” judgments which would henceforth be the starting point for consideration of similar cases.’
look opportunistic. The point is a regular feature of the debate about the use of foreign jurisprudence in United States constitutional cases. For example, arguing against references to foreign material in *Knight v Florida*, Justice Thomas suggested:

the only reason why this material was resorted to was there was no support in the American constitutional tradition or in this Court’s precedent .... [for the conclusion reached] ... [Had there been] any such support in our own jurisprudence, it would be unnecessary for proponents of the claim to rely on European Court of Human Rights, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, the Supreme Court of India, or the Privy Council.

Perhaps the most vocal critic has been Justice Scalia of the US Supreme Court. For Justice Scalia, if domestic jurisprudence is lacking ‘…[t]hat's the end of the question … [w]hat good would reading Canadian opinions do, unless it was my job to be the moral arbiter, which I don't accept?’

The ferocity of the US debate is not mirrored in the UK where recourse to foreign jurisprudence has not been the subject of great concern. Besides, the argument that recourse to foreign norms would imply greater creativity on the part of a judge is not itself logically sound. It is entirely possible that the use of foreign jurisprudence in such cases is motivated by a desire to elucidate an issue or provide an analytical lens, rather than signalling the opportunity to

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596 *Knight v Florida* (1999) 120 S Ct 459.
597 Ibid 460 (Thomas, J).
support an otherwise illegitimate conclusion. It is not difficult to read Lord Bingham’s judgment in *MB* as taking this sort of approach.

In any case, the idea that foreign jurisprudence has some substantive influence on the outcome of the case where there is dearth of domestic law is a little extreme. The Justices provided some insight during the interviews. While Lord Dyson seemed to agree with Lord Bingham’s Hamlyn lecture formulation—that foreign jurisprudence was useful especially where there was ‘not a great deal of domestic [material]’ or if a case raised a ‘relatively new point’, Lord Kerr was evidently less convinced about the impact of foreign jurisprudence on gap-filling situations:

> Just because there is a dearth of authority, doesn’t mean to say that we have to close the gap by recourse to foreign jurisprudence. … Very often, cases come here because there is no clear—or unambiguous—answer, and that is entirely as it should be. We have to try to come up with the proper principled response to whatever problem is presented to us. Now, we would be unwise to neglect to have recourse to whatever assistance we can derive in order to help us in that process. But I think it would be wrong to overestimate the influence that foreign jurisprudence has in circumstances where there isn’t any clear national or domestic authority.

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599 It is presumed that Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas would consider a conclusion that was not supported by domestic jurisprudence to be illegitimate.

600 *Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB*, above n 587.


602 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore, above n 578.
It has in any case not been possible to find any clear empirical examples of foreign jurisprudence being transplanted to fill a gap in domestic law in the way that the gap-filling thesis often suggests.

6.2 Analytical lens

A more realistic version of the gap-filling thesis is that an absence of relevant domestic (or Strasbourg) authority might prompt judges to use foreign jurisprudence as an analytical lens, through which to test ideas and reflect on their own analysis of the law. Judges themselves often claim a role for foreign jurisprudence far removed from the notion of persuasive authority. Thus Emeritus Justice Laurie Ackermann, formerly a Justice of the Constitutional Court of South Africa, has described the purpose of recourse to foreign jurisprudence as ‘seeking information, guidance, stimulation, clarification, or even enlightenment … [o]ne is doing no more than keeping the judicial mind open to new ideas’. 603 Justice Breyer, of the US Supreme Court is well-know to support such an approach:

…I would say that I understand that a judge cannot read everything. But if the lawyers find an interesting and useful foreign case, and if they refer to that case, the judges will likely read it, using it as food for thought, not as binding precedent. I think that is fine. 604

604 Norman Dorsen, ‘A conversation between U.S. Supreme Court justices’, above n 598, 524 (Justice Breyer).
Aharon Barak, former President of the Supreme Court of Israel, similarly described the possibility that comparative law ‘awakens judges to the potential latent in their own system’ and ‘allows for greater self knowledge’. As Saunders has explained:

…foreign law has potential to contain, rather than expand, the discretion of a judge, identifying directions that others have taken and enabling evaluation of their consequences, while leaving the judge free to craft a domestic solution … A ‘comparative legal approach’ can give judges insight into their own prejudices and assist in eliminating personal preferences.

Similar explanations were given by the UK judges. The only Court of Appeal judge to have been interviewed, Lady Justice Arden, explained that she had ‘most often’ used foreign jurisprudence:

…as part of my own thinking about the case [looking] at what other courts have done and … at the examples they have come up with. Or fact situations they have had to deal with and then test it and look at the difficulties there might be if the rule was X rather than Y.

When asked whether there was something particular about the nature of foreign jurisprudence that makes it more useful than other persuasive sources for this purpose, Lady Justice Arden replied:

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... there’s a big difference between a judgment and an article, which is not related to any specific case, because the point about a decision is that it has been used to alter people’s rights and therefore it has had a considerable effect. It has been tested in the fire of actual practical use.\textsuperscript{608}

The feeling continues in the Supreme Court. Lord Mance explained that foreign jurisprudence ‘gives you insights and helps ensure that you’ve thought about all possible aspects of a problem’.\textsuperscript{609} Lord Collins—perhaps the most enthusiastic user of foreign jurisprudence at the Supreme Court—justified his use of foreign jurisprudence in similar terms:

[It is] useful just to see, in formulating my conclusions, how other people have done it and whether there is anything to be learned from other people. Not only where there are gaps ... because in theory there are never gaps. Something that is done abroad won’t be persuasive authority in the sense that you’ll follow it, you’ll just see what conclusion they have come to.\textsuperscript{610}

This sort of motive was clearly the driving force in \textit{Jones v Kaney},\textsuperscript{611} the case in which Lord Collins all but reprimanded counsel for their failure to cite what he considered to be relevant foreign authorities. So unusual were his comments, it is worth quoting the passage at some length:

\begin{quote}
It is highly desirable that at this appellate level, in cases where issues of legal policy are concerned, the court should be informed about the position in other common law countries. This court is often
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[608] Ibid.
\item[609] Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Mance, Justice of the United Kingdom Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 6 December 2011).
\item[610] Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Collins of Mapesbury, above n 536.
\end{footnotes}
helped by being referred to authorities from other common law systems, including the United States. ... On this appeal the claimant did not rely on the United States material, although it is helpful to his case. The defendant's counsel drew attention to some of the United States cases on the basis of research which (it was said) was ‘slightly hampered by the renovation of the Middle Temple’s American room’. But there is an outstanding collection of United States material in the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies in London University, and (provided the barristers or solicitors concerned are prepared to make the expenditure) all of the material is readily available online. Lord Wilberforce said in Buttes Gas & Oil Co v Hammer (No 3) ... ‘When the judicial approach to an identical problem between the same parties has been spelt out with such articulation in a country, one not only so closely akin to ours in legal approach, the fabric of whose legal doctrine in this area is so closely interwoven with ours, but that to which all the parties before us belong, spelt out moreover in convincing language and reasoning, we should be unwise not to take the benefit of it’.612

The vast American jurisprudence on ‘precisely the same arguments of policy which [had] been argued before [the UKSC]’ were, to Lord Collins, of obvious assistance. This was despite the fact that the culture relating to expert evidence was different in the United States, because ‘the underlying principle is the same’.613 Thus, as Bell concluded, the Commonwealth and United States jurisprudence in Jones v Kaney was effectively cited as a way of ‘checking that no relevant argument had been ignored’.614

612 Ibid [74].
613 Ibid [77].
However, examples like *Jones v Kaney* are relatively rare; the same methodological difficulties of identifying cases that have used foreign jurisprudence in this way arise here as with gap-filling above. Where foreign jurisprudence has been used as an analytical lens, it will not necessarily be obvious from the text of the judgment. Lady Justice Arden explained that ‘comparative law in that sense is very useful but it is not obvious on the face of the judgment, because it wouldn’t be relevant to cite it’.\(^{615}\) This kind of use is therefore a good example of reasons why this thesis attempts to look beyond explicit citations. If foreign jurisprudence is referred to but frequently omitted from the list of citations in a judgment, it represents an implicit rather than explicit use of foreign jurisprudence. It is therefore not a use that will be captured by a quantitative analysis of the cases. It is also a use that, if ignored, would significantly distort any conclusions about the way that foreign jurisprudence is used in UK courts.

Yet this sort of purpose is important. In the human rights context it is worth remembering that UK judges have been, until recently, relatively unfamiliar with human rights adjudication and with the duties imposed upon them by the HRA 1998. For example, prior to the HRA, the balancing act required by the qualified rights had almost exclusively been the jurisdiction of the supranational court. A positive duty to ‘take into account’ one particular pool of otherwise persuasive jurisprudence, to read domestic law compatibly with an international convention

\(^{615}\) Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lady Justice Arden, above n 607.
and to declare any incompatibilities that could not be so remedied, have all led domestic courts to grapple with greater depth and detail on questions hitherto unfamiliar to the role of the judge. It would not be surprising if judges were to consider the jurisprudence of other similar systems, particularly those with similar human rights instruments, in order to draw any assistance that they may provide when theorising about a particular problem at home. It is one of the major justifications for comparativism is therefore that it can aid not only in applying the under-theorised jurisprudence, but can also encourage the domestic court to adopt a more theorised approach to human rights.

6.3 Reassurance

Closely connected to the gap-filling and analytical lens theories is the idea that foreign jurisprudence can provide reassurance. Slaughter has argued that ‘[r]eferences to the activity of fellow courts in other states can act as ... a security blanket ...’ and Justice Barak talked of comparative law ‘grant[ing] comfort to the judge and giv[ing] him the feeling that he is treading on safe ground’. This purpose is distinct from the gap-filling and analytical lens theories because it constructs judicial comparativism as a sort of yardstick: by seeing that courts in other jurisdictions have come to the same or similar

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616 Sections 3 and 4 HRA 1998, respectively.
618 Aharon Barak, ‘Constitutional Human Rights and Private Law’, (1996) 3 Review of Constitutional Studies 218, 242; Michael Bobek, Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts (Oxford University Press 2013), 91: ‘English judges consider the use of the decisions from other common law jurisdictions to be ‘useful’, to give them reassurance, illumination, inspiration, or comfort’.
conclusions about a particular problem, a judge can feel more confident in his own conclusions, which are reached independently of the jurisprudence from those jurisdictions. In other words, the gap-filling and analytical lens theories capture uses of foreign jurisprudence in the very early stages of a judgment, while uses of foreign jurisprudence for the purpose of reassurance is likely to come a little later, once the judge has come to at least some tentative conclusion. Despite this difference, it is a purpose that is considered in this section because the circumstances that give rise to using foreign jurisprudence in this way are likely to be similar to those suggested to give rise to uses for gap-filling or to provide an analytical lens. If a judge requires reassurance it is likely to be because the domestic law is unsettled or underdeveloped. The then President of the Supreme Court, Lord Phillips, explained the relevance of foreign jurisprudence in this way:

I think we like to look elsewhere: if we’ve got an area where we are uncertain; an area where we are developing the law; an area where, particularly, where we would like to develop the law in a particular direction, then you are particularly keen to see if you can get any support for what your thinking is from foreign jurisdictions.

This sort of explanation also tends towards a view of foreign jurisprudence as an instrumental tool, used to legitimate ones own decision. It lends support to those who feel that the legitimacy of judicial comparativism is often

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620 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, former President of the United Kingdom Supreme Court Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 23 November 2011).
compromised by the tendency on the part of judges to ‘cherry pick’ decisions of foreign jurisdictions according to those that best support their own conclusions. The most cynical view of this is that in using foreign jurisprudence in this way, judges neglect to take a balanced view of the position in foreign jurisdictions. For the reasons given elsewhere, that argument is not accepted as an explanation for the Supreme Court’s approach to foreign jurisprudence. For the instant purpose, it is important to note just that the Supreme Court might use foreign jurisprudence in areas of uncertainty or where the law is under development. In those situations, Lord Phillips continued, ‘to see how similar jurisdictions, dealing with similar problems have developed their jurisprudence is a valuable thing to do’. 621

Using foreign jurisprudence as a type of checking mechanism was common among the explanations of the other Justices interviewed. Although Lord Kerr felt it ‘… difficult to be prescriptive about the use to which [foreign jurisprudence] is put’, it was possible to ‘envisage two main strands’. 622 The first strand, was that ‘even if it does not necessarily provide a template that one would wish to follow’, analysis conducted by a foreign court, or the court’s line of reasoning ‘does provide a yardstick against which you can measure your own process of reasoning’. Lord Kerr’s second strand echoed Lady Justice Arden’s explanation that it was helpful to get an empirical view of the effect of certain developments, 623 ‘in relating to the experience of the courts about the impact of

621 Ibid.
622 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore, above n 578.
623 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lady Justice Arden, above n 607.
particular laws’. Lord Collins agreed: ‘You might be, I suppose, encouraged or emboldened by what someone else has done...’

For most of the Justices, it seemed that the extent to which foreign jurisprudence is used in this way would likely be connected to the arguments made by counsel. For example, Lord Reed explained that counsel using foreign jurisprudence essentially present the Court with

... material from analogous legal systems. The argument is that the point has been considered by a superior court in that jurisdiction, and what they had to say about it is at least interesting and may give [the court] an idea about how the common law should be developed in this country.

Therefore, foreign authorities are cited ‘in order to persuade us to develop the common law in a particular way. ... to show us that another leading common law court ... has taken [a] step without the heavens falling in’. In human rights cases specifically, the justification is that the Court is concerned with considering the underlying values. As Baroness Hale put it:

It is obviously of interest to us in this court if a foreign court has been interpreting a human rights instrument, which is not unlike the European Convention, to look at its approach. That is because human rights are all about values—underlying values—and it’s good to see how similar societies, similar legal systems, see those underlying values. ... If ... you find that the same result has been

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624 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore, above n 578.
625 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Collins of Mapesbury, above n 610.
626 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Reed, Justice of the United Kingdom Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 8 May 2012).
627 Ibid.
reached on the same set of facts, by a completely different route, it
gives you some view of the underlying values.628

6.4 Conclusions

In the early or formative stages of a judgment, particularly where the domestic
law is unsettled or under-developed, the stock argument about judicial
discretion is an obvious problem. If the domestic jurisprudence is unsettled, or
there is an absence of clear guiding principles, the discretion of the judge is in
any event approaching its outer limits,629 and reference to foreign jurisprudence
for the purpose of ‘gap-filling’ is likely to attract attention. As the United States
debate shows, using foreign jurisprudence for this purpose is likely to invite the
accusation that a judge has made opportunistic citations of foreign
jurisprudence in order to support a point that is otherwise not supportable in
domestic law. However, it has been argued in this chapter that the ‘gap-filling’
thesis does not explain the UK Supreme Court’s use of foreign jurisprudence.
Certainly, none of the Justices interviewed fully accepted the theory.
Rather, it is more realistic to consider that foreign jurisprudence provides the
Supreme Court with a fresh perspective—an analytical lens—through which to
reflect on its own reasoning about a problem. In this way, foreign jurisprudence
is used mainly as a heuristic device. This is what appeared to be happening in
the House of Lords control order cases, MB and AF (No3) and this is what

628 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Baroness Hale of Richmond, Justice of the United Kingdom
Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 8 May 2012).
629 Cheryl Saunders, ‘Comparative Constitutional Law in the Courts: Is There a Problem?’,
above n 569, 114.
seemed to drive Lord Collins’ insistence on the consideration of American
decisions in *Jones v Kaney*. The evidence from the interviews supports this
construction. None of the Justices interviewed felt this use of foreign
jurisprudence to be problematic, largely because no particular reliance is placed
on these materials in any event. Lord Collins, who was the heaviest user of
foreign jurisprudence at the Supreme Court prior to his retirement, was ‘sure
that [he had] never been turned by foreign law’. At best he ‘might have been
confirmed in [his] feelings’.

As Saunders has suggested, the reality is simply that ‘such cases must be
determined … with or without the insights offered by comparative law’ and ‘in at
least some such cases, foreign experience can help to elucidate the issues and
options for their resolution’. In some circumstances this may translate into
using foreign jurisprudence as a heuristic device: a yardstick, against which to
measure a Justices’ own thinking about a problem. The purpose served by
foreign jurisprudence in these circumstances is simply to provide an opportunity
for reflection or ‘part of the process of reaching a more fully theorised …
agreement’. In fact Lord Kerr gave reasons along these lines for dismissing
the significance that might be attributed to the use of foreign jurisprudence:

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630 *Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB*, above n 587; *Secretary of State for the
Home Department v AF and another*, above n 588; *Jones v Kaney*, above n 611.
631 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Collins of Mapesbury, above n 610.
632 Ibid.
633 Cheryl Saunders, ‘Comparative Constitutional Law in the Courts: Is There a Problem?’,
above n 569, 114.
(This follows discussion drawn from Cass R Sunstein, *Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict*
(Oxford University Press 1996) in which Sunstein described the process of deciding cases on
… to add to the authorities that we consider by casting around in domestic courts is probably not going to be a profitable exercise. Ultimately … the outcome of these cases depends critically on your own powers of analysis. Reference to authority, be it domestic, supranational, international or whatever, is always going to be by way of supplement to your own reasoning in the case. Hopefully to confirm the views that you have formed and, occasionally, to shape those views. But I see that very much in a secondary—an extremely important but nevertheless secondary—role.635

These uses of foreign jurisprudence are also likely to be the more obscure in the judgment, since it would not usually be relevant to cite them explicitly, unless they had contributed something of substance to the instant case. This finding goes some way towards explaining the anomalies in the data set discussed in chapter five, where it was explained that the data collected on explicit citation did not show some Supreme Court Justices—known for their enthusiasm for comparative law—as heavy users of foreign jurisprudence. Where judges use foreign jurisprudence as a heuristic device, as an analytical lens, yardstick or benchmark against which to measure thinking, or when seeking for reassurance, it is easy to understand the lack of explicit citations.636 It was perhaps purposes of this kind that prompted Lady Justice Arden’s comment (although not speaking for the Supreme Court) that there is ‘far more

their facts without necessarily agreeing on any particular theory supporting the decision as giving rise to ‘incompletely theorised’ agreements’.  
635 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore, above n 578.  
636 The point has also been recognised by Michael Bobek, Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts, above n 618, 72: ‘The reasons for the absence of an express reference may be multiple … [including] the [possibility that] comparative argument was from the very beginning intended for internal use only, ie as a tool of internal persuasion within the court, but never even intended to be displayed in the reasoning of the court’.
use of comparative law than appears on the face of the judgments ... it’s informing the judges behind the scenes'. 637 Just as there is no obligation to use persuasive authorities, neither is there an obligation to cite them.

Foreign jurisprudence may provide the Supreme Court with a valuable perspective—an analytical lens—through which Justices may reflect on their own reasoning about a problem. This is in keeping with one of the major justifications for comparativism: that it can also encourage the domestic court to adopt a more theorised approach to human rights. As McCrudden recognised, ‘[e]ven where the result of the foreign judicial approach has not been adopted, it has often been influential in sharpening the understanding of the court’s view of domestic law’. 638 Foreign jurisprudence may ‘perform a cognitive function ... the confrontation of both legal systems may force some consideration and better understanding of the nature of domestic law’. 639

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637 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lady Justice Arden, above n 607.
7 Foreign Jurisprudence used for consistency

In chapter six it was argued that the Supreme Court Justices use foreign jurisprudence as a heuristic device. Foreign jurisprudence might therefore elucidate issues or provide a useful yardstick against which judges can reassure themselves about their own conclusions, especially where domestic jurisprudence is unsettled or underdeveloped. That purpose represents a receptive use of foreign jurisprudence, where the Supreme Court uses the decisions of domestic courts as part of a wider pool of resources. It is a one-way transaction, based on the functionalist theory of ‘usefulness and need’.\textsuperscript{640}

In this chapter, it is argued that there is also a second category of purposes for which judges have recourse to foreign jurisprudence: that foreign jurisprudence is used as a tool to ensure consistency or uniformity when grappling with a common problem and to communicate the Supreme Court’s interpretation of it.

The use of foreign jurisprudence for consistency as explained here is similar to but distinct from the use of foreign jurisprudence for reassurance described in chapter six. In that chapter it was explained that where a judge uses foreign jurisprudence for reassurance, those sources represent a sort of yardstick against which their own feelings about the case can be measured. By seeing that courts in other jurisdictions have come to the same or similar conclusions about a particular problem, a judge can feel more confident in his own conclusions, which are reached independently of the jurisprudence from those

\textsuperscript{640} E.g. Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, \textit{An Introduction to Comparative Law} (Tony Weir tr, 3rd edn, Oxford University Press 1998), 17.
jurisdictions at first. By contrast, where a judge uses foreign jurisprudence for consistency, the primary aim of the exercise to identify the position in those other jurisdictions, in order to then aim for an interpretation or conclusion that is in line with it.

7.1 Using foreign jurisprudence to promote uniformity

It has often been mooted that courts may use foreign jurisprudence as a tool to promote greater harmonisation or integration within a group of countries. This may be in response, for instance, to a common agreement or a shared heritage. One of Slaughter’s conclusions was that the use of foreign jurisprudence would be likely where there was an ‘awareness of a common enterprise’.641 That awareness ‘could flow either from a particular self-conception or a common substantive focus’.642 For example:

… the courts of some subset of countries may see their primary function as the protection of individual rights against the government. From this perspective, it is not surprising that one of the most active areas of transjudicial communication outside the European Community is among courts specifically charged with the interpretation and application of international instruments concerning human rights.643

642 Anne-Marie Slaughter ‘A Typology of Transjudicial Communication’, above n 641, 128.
643 Ibid.
In these situations, foreign jurisprudence is used as part of an information gathering exercise, with the aim of seeking to maintain uniformity with other jurisdictions.

In the context of human rights this discussion tends to draw from the on-going debate about universalism. For some, this is problematic. It is said that the citation of foreign jurisprudence assumes reliance on a fictional shared understanding. Posner, for example, has remarked that ‘to cite foreign law as authority, is to flirt with the discredited (I had thought) idea of a universal natural law; or to suppose fantastically that the world’s judges constitute a single, elite community of wisdom and conscience’.

If the citation of foreign jurisprudence does suppose that there is some common understanding about human rights, the unyielding debate between universalism and cultural relativism will continue to pose questions and carry implications for those judges that tend towards comparativism. A connected issue is that judicial comparativism may pose greater risks in such circumstances since the inclusion of common principles in these texts may act to disguise divergent views about their application as well as any theory supporting them.

The debate is further complicated by the shift in focus away from universal instruments and towards regional systems of more selective integration. For

example, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights greatly influenced the
drafters of the ECHR, which is arguably the primary text for human rights
regulation in the European Legal Order. As McCrudden has pointed out, one of
the attractive aspects of regional instruments ‘is that states that appear to share
more common cultural and ethical roots can come together to establish human
rights regimes that go beyond the state, but stop short of the global’.647 For
McCrudden, this ‘gives rise to the question as to whether regionally shared
conceptions of human rights are emerging, for example, a European ius
commune’.648 This understanding would presumably lead UK domestic judges
to consider relevant European jurisprudence in cases which engage a
Convention point ahead of, say, Commonwealth jurisprudence. Yet the
evidence suggests that the reality is quite the reverse, largely a product of the
existence of jurisprudence from the ECtHR. As Lord Mance has written:

When interpreting legislation to give effect to international treaties,
the need for international consistency provides a strong justification
[for the use of foreign jurisprudence]. In areas such as fundamental
rights, international instruments invite international discourse, though
sometimes raising the question how far different social backgrounds
and standards justify differences in application. Within Europe, the
frameworks of the European Union and the European Convention on
Human Rights encourage uniformity. Indeed, the role of the Court of
Justice and the European Court of Human Rights in establishing the
‘true’ effect of the European Treaties and European Convention

647 Ibid.
648 Ibid 373 (original emphasis).
means that such uniformity may be achieved even without consensus among national courts. 649

The hint in the last sentence is that aspirations towards adopting uniform positions also play a role in limiting the use of foreign jurisprudence.

### 7.2 Uniformity under the Human Rights Act

It is a common feature of judicial reasoning under the HRA that the Convention must be understood and applied uniformly amongst all contracting states. The better known formulation is found in the *Ullah* case where Lord Bingham stressed that while member States could legislate so as to provide for:

… rights more generous than those guaranteed by the Convention, national courts should not interpret the Convention to achieve this: the Convention must bear the same meaning for all states party to it. 650

Accordingly his Lordship felt that the task of domestic courts was ‘no more, [and] no less’ than keeping pace with Strasbourg. This restrained approach has been adopted in a line of cases since *Ullah*. In *R (Clift)* Lord Hope added that [a] measure of self-restraint is needed, lest we stretch our own jurisprudence beyond that which is shared by all the States Parties to the Convention’. 651 Lord Brown gave endorsement to this cautious approach in *Al-Skeini*, further

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650 *R (Ullah) v Special Adjudicator; Do v Immigration Appeal Tribunal* [2004] UKHL 26, [20]; *Kay and others v London Borough of Lambeth* [2006] UKHL 10.

651 *R (Clift) (FC) v Secretary of State for the Home Department* [2006] UKHL 54, [49] (Lord Hope).
suggesting that ‘no more, but certainly no less’ could be read as ‘no less, but certainly no more’.  

A major justification for this approach is based on ‘the general desirability of a uniform interpretation of the Convention in all member states’, designed to avoid confusion and relativism. The net result of this interpretation is that UK courts have taken a deferential approach to the case law of the ECtHR in Strasbourg. Masterman argued that the loyalty domestic courts were showing to the Strasbourg line would have the result of binding domestic courts to Strasbourg. In similar terms, Lewis described the approach as ‘the mirror principle’ and felt the result to be that domestic human rights law would effectively be ‘nothing more than Strasbourg’s shadow’. 

This is not difficult to understand. It reflects ‘the fact that the Convention is an international instrument, the correct interpretation of which can be authoritatively expounded only by the Strasbourg Court’. There is little incentive to use foreign jurisprudence if the Strasbourg court has handed down an authoritative judgment. As Masterman suggested, the jurisprudence of jurisdictions not signatory to the ECHR is ‘unlikely to point to the direction in

653 In Re P and Others [2008] UKHL 38, [36].  
656 Ullah, above n 650, [20] (Lord Bingham).
which the common law should be developed to ensure compatibility with the Convention rights.  

Even where it would be of interest to the Supreme Court to review the position of the other states signatory to the Convention, it is clear that the Court prefers to accept the results of the Strasbourg Court’s research on the point. The practical reasons were considered in chapter five: the Supreme Court simply doesn’t have time ‘to go to the other European countries and look at the way they’ve addressed [an issue]’. Baroness Hale also explained the lack of citations from the domestic courts of other European states along these lines, suggesting that it was simply ‘easier’ to look at the Strasbourg Court’s findings about the state of the national law in the various contracting states than for the Supreme Court to undertake its own analysis:

It is not easy for us to find out what Europe is doing on a particular point; it is much easier for Strasbourg. … We may know about it [but] I don’t think that we, as a matter of policy, would ask ourselves what is going on in France or Germany or whatever. … We might decide to do it in a particular case, but mainly we rely on what Strasbourg tells us about the way in which things are developing elsewhere.

The approach is surprising, given the well-recognised problems with the quality and consistency of the Strasbourg Court’s decisions. As Amos has written, the

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658 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, former President of the United Kingdom Supreme Court Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 23 November 2011). The full quote was given in chapter five.
659 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Baroness Hale of Richmond, Justice of the United Kingdom Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 19 October 2011).
Strasbourg case law ‘can be unclear, confusing, and admitting of many possible interpretations’. The best examples are those where the Strasbourg Court has simply got it wrong, such as in the well-known Osman v United Kingdom case. In other cases, the judges have commented on the lack of clarity or the mixed messages given by the complexity of several judgments. Another possibility is that Strasbourg’s review of the European jurisprudence is itself out-dated. It is implicit in the construction of the ECHR as a ‘living instrument’ that interpretations and the consensus among member states may evolve. The Strasbourg Court has thus explained that the Convention ‘is first and foremost a system for the protection of human rights’ and that ‘the Court must [therefore] have regard to the changing conditions in Contracting States and respond, for example, to any emerging consensus as to the standards to be achieved…’ Nevertheless, it is the language of ‘uniformity’ and ‘consensus’ that has so far led domestic courts to defer to the Strasbourg Court. The risk was clearly put by Sedley: ‘in trying to stay level, we shall fall behind’. If consistency and uniformity are the aim, the Supreme Court should be willing to engage in

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664 Stafford v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 32, [68].
research to that end, including the use of foreign jurisprudence as necessary. This would at least be relevant where the Strasbourg jurisprudence is unhelpful or unclear. As Warbrick has written: ‘...to collaborate fully with the Court, national tribunals have to keep on top of the developments in the Court’s practice, and even anticipate how it might resolve an issue.’

There has been some evidence of the willingness to engage with foreign jurisprudence in this way in Convention cases, especially when seeking to confirm the conclusions of the Strasbourg jurisprudence. A good example of this is the Supreme Court’s decision in Cadder. Cadder was, in effect, an appeal against the High Court of Justiciary in HM Advocate v McLean. Both cases involved persons detained under section 14 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 and admissions made by the detainee during police interviews without prior access to legal advice. In McLean, the High Court of Justiciary had concluded that reliance on admissions made by a detainee in such circumstances was not incompatible the detainee’s right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the ECHR. The appellant in Cadder contended that McLean had been wrongly decided. The question for the Supreme Court was therefore whether the use of material obtained in a police interview without legal representation did in fact render a subsequent trial unfair.

667 Cadder v HM Advocate [2010] UKSC 43
Pursuant to their duty under section 2(1) HRA 1998, the Justices of the Supreme Court took into account the relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence as a starting point: *Salduz v Turkey*. In common with the detainees in both *McLean* and *Cadder*, Salduz had not had the benefit of legal advice when in police custody. The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR in that case held (unanimously) that there had been a violation of Articles 6(1) and 6(3)(c) ECHR.

Turning to the question of whether the Supreme Court must follow *Salduz v Turkey*, the Supreme Court applied the ‘clear and constant’ test derived from *Alconbury*. The court felt the test to be satisfied by evidence that *Salduz v Turkey* had been followed in a subsequent line of cases. To illustrate this point, Lord Hope referred to a list of authorities provided by JUSTICE (intervening).

Although the five cases cited from that list were decisions of the ECtHR, it appears from a later section of the judgment (quoted below) that the full list provided by JUSTICE had also included foreign jurisprudence from the domestic courts of other member states. It was by reference to a selection of this material that Lord Hope drew further support:

As JUSTICE has shown by the materials referred to in its written intervention, the majority of those member states which prior to

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669 *Salduz v Turkey* 36391/02 [2008] ECHR 1542.
670 *R (Alconbury) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions* [2003] 2 AC 295 [26] (Slynn LJ), ‘...Although the Human Rights Act 1998 does not provide that a national court is bound by [Strasbourg] decisions it is obliged to take account of them so far as they are relevant. In the absence of some special circumstances it seems to me that the court should follow any clear and constant jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’.
671 *Cadder v HM Advocate (Scotland)* [2010] UKSC 43, [2010] 1 WLR 2601, [47] (Lord Hope). The cases referred to are as follows: *Sükran Yildiz v Turkey* (Application No 4661/02) (unreported) given 3 February 2009; *Amutgan v Turkey* (Application No 5138/04) (unreported) given 3 February 2009, [17]-[18]; *Plonka v Poland* (Application No 20310/02) (unreported) given 31 March 2009, [35]; *Pishchalnikov v Russia* (Application No 7025/04) (unreported) given 24 September 2009, [70]; *Dayanan v Turkey* (Application No 7377/03) (unreported) given 13 October 2009, [32]-[33]; *Fatma Tun_ v Turkey* (Application No 18532/05) (unreported) given 3 October 2009, [14]-[15].

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Salduz v Turkey did not afford a right to legal representation at interview (Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Ireland) are now recognising that their legal systems are, in this respect, inadequate.\textsuperscript{672}

Lord Hope went on to review the approach of a selection of foreign domestic courts more closely:

In the Netherlands the Supreme Court has held that a suspect arrested by the police must be offered the opportunity to consult a lawyer before being interviewed and that an arrested minor was entitled to have the assistance of a lawyer while being interviewed … . In France the Conseil Constitutionnel has held that articles 62 and 63 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which authorise the questioning of a person remanded in police custody … but do not allow the person held against his will to have the benefit of legal assistance while undergoing questioning, are unconstitutional because they could not be reconciled with articles 9 and 16 of the Declaration of 1789 des droits de l’homme et du citoyen. … The Conseil d’Etat in its turn has drawn the government’s attention to the fragility, in the light of article 6 of the Convention, of article 706-88 of the Code de procédure pénale, which prevents access to legal assistance at this stage.\textsuperscript{673}

Lord Hope concluded that ‘if Scotland were not to follow the example of the others it would be almost alone among all the member states in not doing so’.\textsuperscript{674}

Moreover, the system of detention under sections 14 and 15 of the 1995 Act was devised in view of a balance to be struck between the public interest and

\textsuperscript{672} Cadder v HM Advocate (Scotland) [2010] UKSC 43, [49] (Lord Hope).
\textsuperscript{673} Ibid. The decisions referred of the Netherlands Supreme Court, French Conseil Constitutional and Conseil d’Etat are, respectively: LJN BH3079 NJ (Netherlands Law Reports) 30 June 2009; Decision No 2010-14/22 QPC (unreported) 30 July 2010; Section de L’intérieur, Projet de loi relatif à la garde à vue, 7 October 2010 (No 384.505).
\textsuperscript{674} Cadder v HM Advocate, above n 672, [49] (Lord Hope).
the rights of the accused that was irreconcilable with the Convention rights.  

This view had been reached ‘without any attempt at comparative jurisprudence on [the] issue’ and as a result of ‘shutting their eyes to the way thinking elsewhere was developing’.  

The Supreme Court was by many considered to have taken too slavish an approach to the Strasbourg case law in Cadder, with enormous repercussions for the Scottish legal system and the many victims whose cases were overturned. Lord Hope explicitly recognised the unpopularity of the decision in a lecture given to the Scottish Young Lawyer’s Association in April 2011: 

As Lord Bingham has said, our task is to apply the law, not to decide cases according to our personal preferences. Of course, the decision was not popular, especially among those who must answer to the electorate. But, as Justice Stephen Breyer of the US Supreme Court has said, do not imagine that our decisions are popular. It is not our job to be popular.  

Nevertheless, Lord Hope did alter his approach to the issue in another Article 6 case later in the same judicial year: Ambrose v Harris. In Ambrose the issue

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675 Ibid [51] (Lord Hope).  
676 Ibid. Lord Rodger’s judgment in Cadder did not replicate this review of foreign jurisprudence although it is clear that Lord Roger’s reasons are given as supplementary to those outlined by Lord Hope. Indeed, on the separate but important issue as to the consequences of allowing the appeal, both Lord Hope and Lord Rodger drew heavily from a judgment of Chief Justice Murray of the Irish Supreme Court - the relevant section is reproduced in each of their judgments, see e.g. [99]-[103] (Lord Roger).  
677 E.g. Alan Paterson, Final Judgment: The Last Law Lords and the Supreme Court (Hart Publishing 2013), 244.  
679 Ambrose v Harris (Procurator Fiscal, Oban) [2011] UKSC 53.
was whether the questioning of a suspect by police prior to being taken into custody constituted a violation of the suspect’s right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention. Lord Hope felt that the consequences of the Supreme Court establishing such a rule would be ‘profound’ and relied on the absence of clear Strasbourg jurisprudence to avoid that result: ‘if Strasbourg has not yet spoken clearly enough on this issue, the wiser course must surely be to wait until it has done so’. The others in the majority took the same approach. Lord Clarke also noted the implications for the investigation of crime, and agreed that ‘Strasbourg jurisprudence, to date, does not support the ... contention ... that the European court has gone as far as to say that the right [to a fair trial] emerges as soon as a suspect is to be questioned by the police in whatever circumstances’.

The interesting feature of the majority reasoning in Ambrose is that the absence of Strasbourg guidance was supplemented by an analysis of relevant jurisprudence from Canada and America. When expressing his reasons for rejecting Lord Kerr’s dissenting view, Lord Hope denied that there was ‘any support in the Strasbourg cases, or in such international authorities as we have been shown’, and explained his own analysis of the Canadian and American jurisprudence in those terms. In particular, Lord Hope relied on the well-known

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680 Ibid [15].
681 Ibid [116]: ‘such a requirement could hamper proper and effective investigations in situations which are often dynamic, fast moving and confused’.
682 Ibid [115].
684 Ambrose v Harris, above n 679, [59].
American case—*Miranda v Arizona*.\(^{685}\) Lord Hope devoted five paragraphs to the *Miranda* judgment,\(^ {686}\) finding that the basis for the ruling in that case was that police custody creates particular pressures which mean that the person’s will is more likely to be overcome when he is being questioned under conditions of that kind. The observation from the relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence, *Salduz v Turkey*, was that ‘the rationale of the generally recognised international human rights standards relates in particular to the protection of the accused against abusive coercion on the part of the authorities’ which Lord Hope felt ‘fit[ted] in with this line of reasoning’.\(^ {687}\) Thus Lord Hope’s view was that ‘this feature is likely to be absent when questions are being put at the locus or in the person’s home…’.\(^ {688}\)

Further, Lord Hope appeared to imply support for the *Miranda* judgment into the Strasbourg Court’s jurisprudence; although recognising that the Strasbourg court had not referred to *Miranda* in any of its judgments, Lord Hope felt it could be ‘assumed that the court will not have overlooked it in its search for generally accepted international human rights standards’.\(^ {689}\) Lord Hope continued:

> It is not unreasonable to think that *Miranda’s case* and subsequent cases that the ruling in that case have given rise to in the United States will influence the thinking of the Strasbourg court.\(^ {690}\)

Lord Kerr, in his dissent, analysed the foreign jurisprudence rather differently:

\(^{685}\) *Miranda v Arizona*, above n 683.

\(^{686}\) *Ambrose v Harris*, above n 679, [50]-[54].

\(^{687}\) Ibid [54].

\(^{688}\) Ibid.

\(^{689}\) Ibid [52].

\(^{690}\) Ibid [53].
... one must be careful about making assumptions about the Miranda experience or believing that it can be readily transplanted into European jurisprudence in any wholesale way. The implications of that decision must be considered in the context of police practice in the United States of America. Nothing that has been put before this court establishes that it is common practice in America to ask incriminating questions of persons suspected of a crime other than in custody. Indeed, it is my understanding that as soon as a person is identified as a suspect, police are trained that they should not ask that person any questions until he or she has been given the Miranda warnings.  

A cynical observation is that the use of foreign jurisprudence in Ambrose was a vehicle for the Supreme Court’s reluctance to decide the case in a way that was perceived to be advancing on the Strasbourg jurisprudence. Some support for that suspicion is given by Lord Kerr’s later explanation about the majority reasoning Ambrose case, extra judicially:

I have no objection to a mode of analysis which takes account of the fact that Strasbourg has not spoken, provided that this is by way of incidental observation or subsidiary reasoning, rather than being the sole basis for the decision to refuse to recognise the right. And, while this is not quite how the majority expressed themselves, their approach can perhaps be said to be consistent with that way of dealing with the question. I make that tentative claim because there can be detected in the judgments of my colleagues, particularly from their consideration of jurisprudence from America and Canada, clear indications that, irrespective of Strasbourg’s silence, they did not

691 Ibid [167].
consider that article 6 could have the breadth of application that was claimed for it.\(^{692}\)

As Lord Kerr points out, it is that continued reference to the absence of clear Strasbourg case law that made the use of comparative jurisprudence unconvincing. Indeed, as explained above, the majority reasoning (and Lord Hope in particular) tended towards reading the conclusion in *Miranda* into the Strasbourg jurisprudence. Thus Lord Kerr concluded that he would be ‘much more comfortable with the decision’ if the ‘absence of Strasbourg jurisprudence on the point [could] be relegated to a subsidiary status’.\(^{693}\)

The example indicates that, although the scope for using foreign jurisprudence is likely to be more limited in Convention cases, the Supreme Court is at least willing to make use of those sources where they can provide assistance in confirming the conclusions of the Strasbourg Court and confirming the consensus on a position. The feeling lingers, however, that the focus remains on the status of the Strasbourg jurisprudence as a primary concern. Thus where there is relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence, the Supreme Court is likely to pay less attention to foreign jurisprudence. Where the Supreme Court is content to follow Strasbourg jurisprudence, as in *Cadder*, it may draw support from foreign jurisprudence in its reasoning. *Ambrose* demonstrates that the Court is most likely to review foreign jurisprudence where there is no clear Strasbourg

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\(^{693}\) Ibid 18.
jurisprudence, although this may be driven by the inclination to keep pace with the Strasbourg position.

7.3 Absence of a supranational court

Identifying a consensus among foreign jurisdictions on a particular issue will be especially important where there is no relevant supranational court jurisprudence. The hypothesis is relatively straightforward. Where an instrument is given an authoritative interpretation by a supranational court, domestic courts faced with questions of interpretation will usually have a tendency to look to that jurisprudence in the first instance. The approach taken by UK courts to the ECtHR’s case law provides a good example. By contrast, where there is no supranational court to give an authoritative interpretation of a convention, domestic courts do not have an obvious body of jurisprudence to consult. Courts are nevertheless still concerned to maintain consistency in the interpretation of an international convention, since the very purpose of these instruments is to harmonise standards on a particular issue. As Dickson has explained:

The courts take account of Strasbourg’s thinking on human rights because they have been directed by Parliament to do so. Parliament has likewise transposed other international human rights standards into UK law and the courts are obliged to apply them too. The only difference is that for these other standards there is no international court the decisions of which the UK Parliament can direct UK courts to take into account. At best these other standards are overseen by treaty-monitoring bodies which are not courts, or by national courts in other countries which have transposed the standards into their
domestic law. Parliament has chosen not to direct UK courts to take account of what those treaty-monitoring bodies or national courts may have said about the standards, although Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 does say that in the interpretation of treaties ‘recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation’ when, after applying the approach to interpretation set out in Article 31, the meaning is still ‘ambiguous or obscure or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable’. The House of Lords often looked at these other sources of its own motion, especially when interpreting treaties the effectiveness of which depended on the same interpretation being adopted by all States Parties to the treaty (eg treaties on international transport). 694

Consider, for example, the preamble to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (‘Refugee Convention’), which recognises that ‘a satisfactory solution of a problem of which the United Nations has recognized the international scope and nature cannot therefore be achieved without international co-operation’ (emphasis added). 695 Similarly, the preamble to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child includes ‘Recognizing the importance of international cooperation for improving the living conditions of children in every country’ (emphasis added). 696 The limitations associated with using foreign jurisprudence where there is relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence are presumably non-existent in these circumstances.

694 Brice Dickson, Human Rights and the United Kingdom Supreme Court (Oxford University Press 2013), 34-35. See also Shaheed Fatima, Using International Law in Domestic Courts (Hart Publishing 2005) 141.
It is worth clarifying that this use is connected to, but distinct from, the ‘gap-filling’ theories discussed in chapter six. It was explained that one of the most obvious reasons for using foreign jurisprudence is to draw assistance where domestic jurisprudence is unhelpful or non-existent. Thus one of the reasons that comparativists give for the use of foreign jurisprudence is based on ‘gap-filling’—offering a useful perspective where the indigenous jurisprudence is lacking or unsettled. The argument in this section is different; far from resorting to foreign jurisprudence where there is a dearth of domestic jurisprudence, it is suggested that in some cases foreign jurisprudence may appropriately be of equal or greater importance than the domestic case-law, irrespective of the nature or absence of domestic jurisprudence.

7.3.1 Background from non-human rights cases

As most human rights issues before the Supreme Court are likely to fall within the framework of the ECHR (and consequently, the HRA 1998), the use of foreign jurisprudence under conventions with no supranational court is likely to be most relevant in non-human rights cases. As Baroness Hale explained in the interview:

If we are interpreting an international treaty, which has got nothing to do with human rights, and which may not have a supranational body

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which is the final arbiter, that’s the situation in which what other countries are doing with that treaty is particularly important. … in a way, it’s the non-human rights cases that may be more important. 698

Baroness Hale considered that in such cases it was ‘quite important to know what the other countries who are signatories to that Convention are doing’. 699 Others among the Supreme Court Justices agreed. Lord Reed considered that in these cases ‘a bit of knowledge of a foreign system can be helpful in not looking at international convention in too parochial a way’. 700 Both Lord Mance and the then President of the Supreme Court, Lord Phillips, felt that greater weight is ‘undoubtedly’ attached to comparative material in these cases. 701 Lord Phillips added:

if you are looking at any law under an international convention, you’ll look very closely at decisions in other countries. There are not all that many cases and so you’ll be looking around the world to see where there had been similar jurisprudence. 702

A number of examples can be found to corroborate this in the case law of the Supreme Court. One of the most recent is the judgment in Schutz (UK) Ltd v Werit UK Ltd. 703 Schutz involved an issue of statutory interpretation where the statutory language had been designed to conform with an international convention. The basic issue was whether the actions of one party constituted

698 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Baroness Hale of Richmond, above n 659.
699 Ibid.
700 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Reed, Justice of the United Kingdom Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 8 May 2012)
701 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Mance, Justice of the United Kingdom Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 06 December 2011); Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, above n 658.
702 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, above n 658.
the ‘making’ of a patented item according to section 60(1) of the Patents Act 1977 (which would infringe the patent at issue) or simply ‘repairing’ the item (which would not infringe the patent). Lord Neuberger considered various factors which ought to be taken into account in ascertaining the proper interpretation word ‘makes’ in the 1977 Act, one of the significant ones being the conformity with an international convention. Lord Neuberger (with whom Lord Walker, Baroness Hale, Lord Mance and Lord Kerr agreed) explained that:

…the fact that the word ‘makes’ is in a section of the 1977 Act which is intended to conform with the provisions of an international convention is particularly significant where … the convention contains a set of principles which are intended to apply consistently across signatory states.704

Lord Neuberger went on to cite a number of German authorities, on the basis that they were ‘not only decisions of a highly expert, experienced and respected court on the very point which is raised in this case’,705 but also because they were decisions of a court of another signatory state to the Convention being interpreted. For those reasons, Lord Neuberger explained that the Supreme Court ‘should therefore accord them considerable respect, and sympathetically consider the extent to which we should adopt any points of principle or practice which they raise’.706 And although this did not amount to an obligation to ‘follow the approach of the German courts’, Lord Neuberger concluded that it was ‘sensible for national courts at least to learn from each other’ and that they

704 Ibid [37] (Lord Neuberger).
706 Ibid.
should ‘seek to move towards, rather than away from, each other's approaches’.  

This practice of citing foreign jurisprudence in international convention has been consistent in the jurisprudence of the United Kingdom’s highest court for some years. There are numerous examples of this prior to the transfer of jurisdiction to the new Supreme Court. One such example was recalled by Baroness Hale during the interview of October 2011: In *Deep Vein Thrombosis v Air Travel Group Litigation* the House of Lords were interpreting the Warsaw Convention (regulating the ‘international carriage of persons, baggage, or cargo performed by aircraft for reward’),  

in order to determine whether Deep Vein Thrombosis fell within the scope of that instrument. The case is not a human rights case but does provide useful insights into the use of foreign jurisprudence under international conventions where there is no supervisory body.

In that case the House of Lords referred to case law from Canada, Australia and the United States of America.  

In fact, the UK jurisprudence played a relatively minor part and accounted for just nine of the twenty-six cases cited in the judgments. By contrast, the House of Lords referred to thirteen cases from the United States, two from Canada and two from Australia. There is some

707 Ibid.

708 Convention relating to Unification of Certain Rules in International Carriage by Air, signed in Warsaw on 12 October 1929, effective on 13 February 1933.

709 *In re Deep Vein Thrombosis and Air Travel Group Litigation* [2005] UKHL 72; [2006] 1 AC 495.
evidence that German jurisprudence was considered, although not cited.\footnote{Lord Scott of Foscote recognised that claims under the article of the Warsaw Convention in question (Article 17) based on the airline's failure to warn passengers about DVT had been ‘rejected in Australia, Canada, Germany and the United States’: \textit{In re Deep Vein Thrombosis and Air Travel Group Litigation}, ibid [19].}

Indeed, Lord Scott of Foscote (with whom the other members of the House of Lords agreed) expressly acknowledged the importance of adopting an interpretation of the Convention that was consistent with the interpretation adopted by other signatory countries. Heavy reliance was placed on a decision of the Australian High Court and the House of Lords’ conclusions were consistent with the outcome of that case.\footnote{Povey \textit{v} Qantas Airways Ltd [2003] VSCA 227; [2005] HCA 33}

This approach is not without its dangers. One significant possibility is that courts reasoning by reference to foreign jurisprudence on the interpretation of an international convention run the risk of distorting the language of the convention itself. Lord Scott of Foscote gave a clear explanation of this risk in the \textit{DVT} case, which is worth reproducing:

\begin{quote}
The language of the Convention itself must always be the starting point. The function of the court is to apply that language to the facts of the case in issue. In order to do so and to explain its decision, and to provide a guide to other courts that may subsequently be faced with similar facts, the court may well need to try to express in its own language the idea inherent in the language used in the Convention. So a judge … will often describe in his or her own language the characteristics that an event or happening must have in order to qualify [under an international convention provision]. But a judicial formulation … should not, in my opinion, ever be treated as a substitute for the language used in the Convention. It should be
\end{quote}
treated for what it is, namely, an exposition of the reasons for the decision reached and a guide to the application of the Convention language to facts of a type similar to those of the case in question.\footnote{712 In re Deep Vein Thrombosis and Air Travel Group Litigation, above n 709, [12] (Lord Scott of Foscote).}

Baroness Hale agreed with Lord Scott’s judgment and added a few words only to associate herself with those cautionary remarks about ‘the dangers of interpreting words of the decision of a court, which is interpreting the words of the Convention, as if the court's words were those of the Convention’.\footnote{713 Ibid [49] (Baroness Hale).} The sentiment was repeated by Lord Hope in the more recent Supreme Court judgment, \textit{JS (Sri Lanka)}, discussed in further detail below. In that case, Lord Hope noted:

\begin{quote}
There is always a risk, as one court after another seeks to formulate the principles that are to be applied in the interpretation of an international instrument of making things worse, not better. A misplaced word here or there can make all the difference between an interpretation that will be respected internationally because it accords with the true purpose of the instrument and one that will not.\footnote{714 \textit{R (JS (Sri Lanka)) v Secretary of State for the Home Department} [2010] UKSC 15, [41].}
\end{quote}

The observations made in this chapter are therefore subject to these important qualifications. The argument made here is not that courts are applying the foreign jurisprudence in international convention cases with less scrutiny than in other areas. The point is simply that in these cases, domestic courts have a tendency to consider the foreign jurisprudence more readily. Indeed, it is perhaps in recognition of that tendency that the Justices have expressed awareness of the risks described above.
7.3.2 Refugee Convention Cases

One of the international conventions that the Supreme Court considers most often is the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (‘Refugee Convention’),\(^\text{715}\) which provides a useful example. Because there is no supranational body acting as the final arbiter on the interpretation of the Refugee Convention, it is not surprising to see citations of foreign cases in these judgments. Baroness Hale explained the usefulness of foreign jurisprudence in such cases:

… there’s no supranational body which is the final arbiter of what [the Refugee Convention] means, so again it is of very great interest to know what other countries are doing in relation to certain problems. … I think we take some trouble to look at those…\(^\text{716}\)

Lord Bingham’s judgment in \textit{Fornah} (decided by the House of Lords) put the matter in similar terms:

Since the Convention is an international instrument which no supranational court has the ultimate authority to interpret, the construction put upon it by other states, while not determinative … is of importance.\(^\text{717}\)

Of the 246 judgments handed down by the Supreme Court between the start of its work in October 2009 and the end of the judicial year in July 2013, the

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\(^\text{716}\) Interview with The Rt. Hon. Baroness Hale of Richmond, above n 659.

\(^\text{717}\) \textit{Fornah v Secretary of State for the Home Department} [2006] UKHL 46]; [2007] 1 AC 412, [10]; See also \textit{R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex p Adan} [2001] 2 AC 477.
Refugee Convention has been cited in 13 (5% of all the Supreme Court’s judgments). Of the 13 cases in which the words ‘Refugee Convention’ are found, 5 concern the interpretation of the Convention’s provisions. It is interesting but not surprising (given the approach to the interpretation of international conventions described above) to note that foreign jurisprudence is cited each of these 5 cases. The first of these cases was JS (Sri Lanka) in which the main issue was the interpretation and application of article 1F(a) of the Refugee Convention. Article 1F(a) provides that a person would not be recognised as a refugee under the Convention where there are serious reasons for considering that he ‘has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments’. It was the first in series of cases at the Supreme Court concerning Article 1F.

The respondent in JS (Sri Lanka) was a Sri Lankan Tamil who, for a number of years, was a member of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. The Secretary of State had refused his claim for asylum on the basis of the membership with an organisation responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity. The Secretary of State appealed against the decision of the Court of Appeal, which had quashed the decision that Article 1F(a) applied in this case. The questions for the Supreme Court were whether the respondent could be regarded as


719 R (JS (Sri Lanka)), above n 714.

having committed a crime within the meaning of article 1F(a) and, more specifically, if an individual is a member of an organisation who are committing war crimes, what—beyond membership of such an organisation—must be established before an individual is himself personally to be regarded as a war criminal.\footnote{721} The leading domestic authority was the decision of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal (IAT) in \textit{Gurung v Secretary of State for the Home Department},\footnote{722} which had been endorsed (obiter) by the Court of Appeal in another case.\footnote{723} The effect of the IAT’s decision in \textit{Gurung} was that a person was a war criminal (i.e. could be excluded from refugee status under Article 1F) if the individual was a member of an ‘extremist terrorist organisation’, despite not having personally participated in the criminal activities of the group.\footnote{724} Thus counsel for the Home Secretary sought to persuade the Supreme Court that the respondent’s membership of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam was a factor justifying exclusion from refugee status according to Article 1F(a).

In the course of the arguments, counsel in both the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court made extensive references to the case law of foreign jurisdictions. Counsel for Home Secretary argued that there had been a significant degree of international consensus as to the correct approach to article 1F(a) of the Refugee Convention prior to the Court of Appeal’s decision

\footnote{721} \textit{R (JS (Sri Lanka))}, above n 714, [1].
\footnote{722} \textit{Gurung v Secretary of State for the Home Department} [2003] Imm AR 115.
\footnote{723} \textit{MH (Syria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department} [2009] EWCA Civ 226; [2009] 3 All ER 564.
\footnote{724} Although the IAT in \textit{Gurung} recognised that mere membership of a terrorist organisation was not sufficient to bring an individual within Article 1F, it added that if an organisation had become predominantly terrorist in character ‘very little more will be necessary’, \textit{Gurung v Secretary of State for the Home Department} [2003] Imm AR 115, [102]-[105].
and that the Court of Appeal had not paid enough attention to that material. The Canadian courts were said to have ‘the most developed jurisprudence in relation to article 1F(a) in the common law world’ and Court of Appeal had ‘failed to explain why it was departing from the approach in those cases’ (emphasis added) as applied in Gurung.\(^{725}\) In reply, counsel for the respondent sought to rule out the Canadian jurisprudence (on the basis of age) and drew the Supreme Court’s attention to (more recent) Commonwealth cases, which had endorsed the Court of Appeal’s approach.\(^{726}\)

The Supreme Court ultimately distanced itself from the approach of one of the Canadian cases, Ramirez,\(^{727}\) in which it had been suggested that mere membership may be sufficient for an organisation whose aims, methods, and activities are predominantly terrorist in character. It was instead concluded that each case should be considered according to its specific facts. In this respect, the JS (Sri Lanka) case is a good example of the risk awareness described above; the tendency to consult the approach of other jurisdictions does not extend to a tendency to follow it as well. As Lord Hope pointed out, ‘[t]here is always a risk, as one court after another seeks to formulate the principles that are to be applied in the interpretation of an international instrument, of making things worse, not better’.\(^{728}\)

\(^{725}\) R (JS (Sri Lanka)), above n 714, 33 A-B.

\(^{726}\) R (JS (Sri Lanka)), above n 714, 35 D-E.

\(^{727}\) Ramirez v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1992) 89 DLR (4th) 173.

\(^{728}\) R (JS (Sri Lanka)), above n 714, [41].
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the Supreme Court drew some support for ‘departure’ from the Ramirez approach by reference to other Canadian cases as well as jurisprudence from other jurisdictions. As Lord Kerr explained:

The Canadian cases … seem for the most part to at least imply that the participative element involves either a capacity to control or at least to influence events. They appear to contemplate a minimum requirement that the mind of the individual be given to the enterprise so that some element of personal culpability is involved. A notable exception to this theme is to be found in the obiter statements … in Ramirez v Canada … where it is suggested that voluntary knowing participation can be assumed from membership of a brutal organisation. These statements have not been relied on by the Secretary of State in this case and, in my judgment, wisely so. The broad thrust of authority in this area is to contrary effect.729

Lord Brown also drew from a decision of the German Federal Administrative Court when considering the issue as one of ‘complicity’ from an international criminal law perspective (the clear outcome of this case is that the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court is now the starting point for considering whether an applicant was disqualified from asylum by virtue of article 1F(a) of the Refugee Convention). Lord Hope endorsed this point, again referencing the German Administrative Court.730

729 R (JS (Sri Lanka)), above n 714, [57].
730 Ibid [49] (Lord Hope): ‘Lord Brown JSC puts the test for complicity very simply … I would respectfully endorse that approach. The words “serious reasons for considering” are, of course, taken from article 1F itself. The words “in a significant way” and “will in fact further that purpose” provide the key to the exercise. Those are the essential elements that must be satisfied to fix the applicant with personal responsibility. The words “made a substantial contribution” were used by the German Administrative Court, and they are to the same effect.’
Lord Brown also cited a United States case to support his conclusions that ‘article 1F disqualifies those who make “a substantial contribution to” the crime, knowing that their acts or omissions will facilitate it’, agreeing that ‘article 1F responsibility will attach to anyone “in control of the funds” of an organisation known to be “dedicated to achieving its aims through such violent crimes”, and anyone contributing to the commission of such crimes “by substantially assisting the organisation to continue to function effectively in pursuance of its aims”’.731

Lord Brown continued:

This approach chimes precisely with that taken by the Ninth Circuit in *McMullen v Immigration and Naturalization Service* (1986) 788 F 2d 591: “[Article 1F] encompasses those who provide [the gunmen etc] with the physical, logistical support that enable modern, terrorist groups to operate”.732

Despite the conclusion that each case ought to be considered on its specific facts, the Supreme Court judgment in *JS (Sri Lanka)* provides a useful illustration of the use of foreign jurisprudence in cases concerning the interpretation of international conventions with no supranational court. Several others follow in this theme. For example, although the Supreme Court judgment in *ST (Eritrea)* made less use of foreign jurisprudence than in *JS (Sri Lanka)*, the foreign cases cited were again used to address questions of interpretation.733 Considering the balance that the framers of the Convention

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731 *R (JS (Sri Lanka)),* above n 714, [35]. Note *McMullen v Immigration and Naturalization Service* (1986) 788 F 2d 591 had also been cited in the *Gurung* case.

732 Ibid.

733 *R (ST (Eritrea)) v Secretary of State for the Home Department* [2012] UKSC 12. In *ST (Eritrea)* the question was whether the appellant was entitled to the protection of article 32 of the
intended to strike between the protection of victims of oppression and the wish of sovereign states to maintain control over their territory, Lord Hope cited jurisprudence from Australia and the United States.\textsuperscript{734} In doing so, Lord Hope was mindful that ‘however generous and purposive its approach to interpretation may be, the Court's task remains one of interpreting the document to which the contracting parties have committed themselves by their agreement’. Moreover,

… parties to an international agreement are not to be treated as having agreed something that they did not agree, unless it is clear by necessary implication from the text or from uniform acceptance by states that they would have agreed or have subsequently done so’ (emphasis added).\textsuperscript{735}

These cases provide clear examples of the Supreme Court using foreign jurisprudence as a means of limiting their discretion: it is by reference to those sources that the Court ensures that it does not inflate the agreements reached between the various contracting parties. This awareness and tendency to exercise restraint in these sorts of cases is demonstrative of the judges’ role as interpreters rather than lawmakers.

However there are circumstances in which it may be appropriate to interpret such instruments purposively, such that it reflects a change in attitudes or

\textsuperscript{734} The cited cases are: Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225; Rodriguez v United States (1987) 480 US 522.

\textsuperscript{735} R (ST (Eritrea)), above n 733, [41] (Lord Hope).
traditions among the contracting parties. It is in these cases that identifying uniformity and consensus is most important and the Supreme Court has shown willingness to use foreign jurisprudence in this way: the HJ (Iran) case provides the clearest example. The issue in HJ (Iran) was the test to be applied when considering whether a gay person (claiming asylum under the Convention) has a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ in his or her home state, based on membership of that particular social group, so as to come within the meaning of the term ‘refugee’ for the purposes of the Refugee Convention. The two appellants were gay men from Iran and Cameroon, claiming to have a well-founded fear that they would be persecuted if they were to be returned to their home countries. The respondent Secretary of State had refused asylum in both cases and appeals against that decision had been dismissed by the IAT. In the Court of Appeal, the Secretary of State accepted that practising homosexuals are a particular ‘social group’ for the purposes of article 1A of the Convention. The issue was then how those with a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ could be identified. The Secretary of State considered that the issue was whether the applicant could reasonably be expected to tolerate the need for discretion in their home country. In other words, the two appellants could reasonably be expected to conceal their identities as gay man and so avoid the persecution feared. Counsel for the appellants argued that a requirement to conceal sexual identity in order to avoid harm was incompatible with the Convention.

737 Article 1A(2) Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Geneva, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. (entered into force 4 October 1967) provides that the term ‘refugee’ shall apply to a person that “… owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country".
As Lord Hope recognised, the difficulty was that the High Contracting Parties did not perceive persecution for reasons of homosexuality as a problem when the Convention was being drafted. Nevertheless the reality before the Supreme Court was that there is now a ‘huge gulf in attitudes to and understanding of gay persons between societies on either side of the divide’ and that ‘more and more gays and lesbians are likely to have to seek protection here, as protection is being denied to them by the state in their home countries’. Yet it was ‘crucially important that they are provided with the protection that they are entitled to under the Convention—no more … but certainly no less’ (emphasis added). The issue, therefore, was identifying the protection that this social group were entitled to.

In the arguments on this point, counsel had cited cases from Australia, Canada, the United States, South Africa and New Zealand. The Court of Appeal had, in particular, been referred a decision of the High Court of Australia. Lord Justice Buxton had accepted that the judgments in that case contained a number of statements to the effect that, if an applicant's way of life would be subjected to persecution in his home country, he cannot be denied asylum on the basis of a conclusion that he could avoid that persecution by modifying that...

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738 HJ (Iran) (FC), above n 736, [2] (Lord Hope): ‘It was the practice for leaders in these countries simply to insist that homosexuality did not exist’. See further S Chevlan, ‘Put your hands up (if you feel love)’ [2011] JIANL 56, 57.
739 Ibid [3] (Lord Hope).
741 Z v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 1578, [2005] Imm AR 75
way of life. In the Supreme Court, therefore, counsel for the appellant sought to persuade the Justices that the comparative jurisprudence illustrated the ‘proper approach’. By contrast, counsel for the Secretary of State acknowledged that the comparative case law was ‘informative’ but argued that it was not ‘dispositive’. Examples of inconsistent case law from Australia were given to show that the approach in other jurisdictions was neither unanimous not uniform. Indeed Lord Walker noted that the Supreme Court had been given ‘23 bundles of authorities containing 250 different items’. Lord Hope devoted a section of his judgment to explaining this; five paragraphs under the heading ‘Comparative Jurisprudence’ deal with the approach in Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, Canada and the United States. His Lordship ultimately agreed that the comparative jurisprudence did not ‘reveal a consistent line of authority’ and that it did not indicate ‘an approach which is universally accepted internationally’. Nevertheless, the respect paid to these sources is evident. By way of example, a judgment of the New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals Authority was said to have contained ‘impressive analysis of the relevant principles’.

After lengthy analysis, all members of the Supreme Court agreed that the Court of Appeal had misunderstood a particular Australian case that had provided the thrust of support for adopting the ‘reasonable tolerability’ test. As Lord Collins

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743 HJ (Iran), above n 736, 603 [A].
744 Ibid 617 [H].
745 Ibid [87] (Lord Walker).
746 Ibid [30]-[34] (Lord Hope).
748 Ibid [30] (Lord Hope); Refugee Appeal No 74665/03 [2005] INLR 68
put it, the test ‘was based on a misunderstanding of the passage in the
judgment of McHugh and Kirby JJ in *Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for
concluded that

the idea of reasonable toleration was plainly being mentioned in the
context of what amounts to persecution and not in the context of
what they described as ‘taking avoiding action’ or where members of
the group ‘hide their membership or modify some attribute or
characteristic of the group’ to avoid persecution.\(^\text{749}\)

Moreover, drawing on a number of other comparative cases, Lord Collins
clarified that a person concealing sexual identity because of a well-founded fear
of persecution does not cease to have that well-founded fear even if the
concealment is successful.\(^\text{750}\) Lastly, Lord Collins pointed out that ‘a similar,
though not identical, approach has been adopted in Canada and the United
States’.\(^\text{751}\)

Lord Rodger, in particular, paid significant attention to the comparative
jurisprudence, also recognising the Court of Appeal’s misunderstanding of the
judgment in *S395/2002*. Like the other members of the Court, Lord Rodger
considered the requirement to actively avoid persecution from the perspective of
the Australian case. It was of assistance that the point made by the English

\(^{749}\) Ibid [102]-[103] (Lord Collins).

\(^{750}\) Ibid [103] (Lord Collins). The cases referenced on this point were: *Applicant NABD of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs* (2005) 216 ALR 1; *SZATV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship* (2007) 233 CLR 18; *Refugee Appeal No 74665/03* [2005] INLR 68 (NZ Refugee Status Appeals Authority, Mr Haines QC).

\(^{751}\) Ibid [104] (Lord Collins).
authority had been made ‘with considerably more elaboration’ in the Australian judgment:

[McHugh and Kirby JJ] begin by pointing out … that ‘persecution does not cease to be persecution for the purpose of the Convention because those persecuted can eliminate the harm by taking avoiding action within the country of nationality’. In the remainder of para 40 they point out that, if the position were otherwise, the Convention would not protect those who chose to exercise their right, say, to express their political opinion openly.\(^{752}\)

In fact Lord Rodger’s reasoning appears to rely heavily on the Australian jurisprudence—his Lordship reproduces large sections of the judgments in the course of his analysis,\(^ {753}\) before expressly confirming the weight of that authority:

The decision of the High Court is accordingly powerful authority, which I would respectfully follow, for the proposition that, if a person has a well-founded fear that he would suffer persecution on being returned to his country of nationality if he were to live openly as a gay man, then he is to be regarded as a refugee for purposes of the Convention, even though, because of the fear of persecution, he would in fact live discreetly and so avoid suffering any actual harm. The High Court has followed the same line of reasoning in subsequent cases (emphasis added).\(^ {754}\)

Further, Lord Rodger acknowledged that the ‘same approach has been followed in New Zealand’.\(^ {755}\) His Lordship concluded the point on this evidence:


\(^{753}\) Ibid [55], [66]-[72] (Lord Rodger)

\(^{754}\) Ibid.

\(^{755}\) Ibid [72] (Lord Rodger).
For present purposes I take the decision of the [New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals] authority ... as clear support for the High Court of Australia's approach that an applicant cannot be denied asylum on the basis that he would, in fact, take effective steps, by suppressing his sexual identity, to avoid the harm which would otherwise threaten him.\textsuperscript{756}

Similar support was drawn from the comparative case law when dismissing the approach taken by the Court of Appeal. Lord Rodger’s view was that it was not possible to proceed ‘on the basis that a man or woman could find it reasonably tolerable to conceal his or her race indefinitely to avoid suffering persecution. Such an assumption about gay men and lesbian women is equally unacceptable’.\textsuperscript{757} Lord Rodger felt that most significantly, ‘it is unacceptable as being inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the Convention’, citing Canadian jurisprudence as authority for that point.\textsuperscript{758} A similar analysis was conducted by Lord Dyson, agreeing that ‘[l]ike Lord Rodger JSC, I would follow this approach which has been substantially followed in Australia’. His Lordship’s final reason for rejecting the reasonable tolerability test is instructive:

… there is no support for the Court of Appeal approach in any other jurisprudence. This is important in view of the implicit rejection of it in a number of other jurisdictions, including at least Australia and New Zealand, and the fact that it is desirable that, so far as possible, there

\textsuperscript{756} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{757} Ibid [76] (Lord Rodger).
\textsuperscript{758} Ibid [76] (Lord Rodger); Atta Fosu v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2008 FC 1135.
should be international consensus on the meaning of the Convention. 759

7.4 Conclusions

It has been argued in this chapter that the Supreme Court may use foreign jurisprudence as part of an information gathering exercise, particularly where there is a desire to interpret a common legislative scheme consistently among contracting states. As a starting point it is clear that the Supreme Court approaches the Strasbourg jurisprudence in this way. Notions of consistency and uniformity are prevalent in the HRA jurisprudence and are in fact a significant barrier to explicit citations of foreign jurisprudence where relevant Strasbourg decisions exist. As chapter five suggested, this is in part because the Supreme Court relies on the Strasbourg court to inform them about developments in contracting states, through its jurisprudence. The risk in this approach is that the Supreme Court is placing heavy reliance on the Strasbourg Court’s own review of the position in the various contracting states to the Convention. If the goal is to identify a common consensus or maintain the uniformity of interpretation, it will be important to remember that reliance on the Strasbourg jurisprudence may not always provide the most valuable or up to date analysis.

759 Ibid, [127] (Lord Dyson).
The influence of the Strasbourg jurisprudence is all the more evident when the approach in Convention cases is compared with cases turning on the interpretation of instruments that have no associated supranational court. In such cases the Supreme Court considers that one of the primary aims is to establish a common understanding or position among contracting states. Dickson has made a similar point. After an analysis of the Convention cases in which the Supreme Court (and House of Lords before it) adopted the ‘mirror principle’ approach to the Strasbourg jurisprudence, Dickson points out that it is in non-HRA cases that the Supreme Court is more willing to assert itself:

A good example of judicial creativity in non-Convention human rights law is the decision of the Supreme Court in *HJ (Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department*, where the Justices held that gay men who would risk persecution if they were returned to their home country and did not conceal their sexuality were entitled to be considered for asylum in the United Kingdom.\(^{760}\)

In such cases it is clear that the Court is willing to pay significant attention to the foreign jurisprudence. In doing so, the Court keeps similar concerns in mind to those usually offered as a reason for restraint or deference in Convention claims. Indeed, the importance of ensuring that the Court does not interpret the relevant provision so as to provide for rights over and above the common understanding of other member states is arguably of even greater importance than in the Convention context. In these cases there is no supranational court to correct over-generous interpretations and prevent courts from imposing obligations on contracting states that they did not mean to undertake.

\(^{760}\) Brice Dickson, *Human Rights and the United Kingdom Supreme Court* (Oxford University Press 2013), 43 (emphasis added).
The use of foreign jurisprudence in cases concerning international conventions with no supranational court therefore proceeds on the basis of identifying a consensus as to interpretation. It is clear that identifying a consensus on a particular issue is one of the most obvious reasons for which judges might draw from foreign jurisprudence. A consensus is more than a simple accumulation of authorities, it represents ‘a dense network of checking and rechecking results’. Where there is no supervisory body for a particular instrument, identifying and maintaining a consensus position serves to ensure that the instrument will continue to be interpreted in the same way in different jurisdictions. Many of the Supreme Court Justices interviewed spoke on the subject in these terms, highlighting the importance of consensus in such cases. Lord Mance explained:

    It is a very traditional and well recognised fact that courts try to achieve a purposive uniform international construction if they can, … in that context, there is an imperative to arrive at a uniform interpretation that will mean that there is no particular advantage of suing in one country rather than another…

In fact, Lord Mance explained that the ‘imperative’ extends so far that judges will be ‘prepared to suppress certain hesitations about the actual intention in order to achieve uniformity’.

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763 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Mance, above n 701.

764 Ibid.
It is against that background that the risks outlined in several judgments (discussed above) are best understood. To repeat Lord Scott of Foscote’s clear statement of this, ‘a judicial formulation … should not … ever be treated as a substitute for the language used in [a] Convention’. Lord Mance felt this to be obvious during the interview: ‘if you disagree, of course, then you disagree’.  

The Refugee Convention cases discussed in this chapter bear this attitude out well. While foreign jurisprudence was cited in each of those cases and were of evident assistance to the Supreme Court, it is clear that the tendency to have recourse to those materials in the first instance did not necessarily give rise to a tendency to apply them as well.

It is worth pointing out that ‘foreign jurisprudence’ in these cases also extends beyond foreign cases. When interviewed, Lord Collins felt this to be an important clarification, explaining that it was ‘not so much foreign law but foreign practice’ which would be of greater weight in an international convention case: ‘if it is an international convention you ought to have uniformity of practice if possible’. However, it is clear that further complications may arise where there are many signatories to a Convention—since it is likely to be more difficult to establish an interpretation based on state practice in those circumstances. This is in addition to the fact that, despite a shared agreement or a common membership of a legal system, a legal order does not necessarily require homogeneity. Moreover, it is important to distinguish between what countries

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765 Ibid.
are doing under the Convention and what they are doing as a matter of discretion over and above Convention obligations, in order to avoid the well-articulated risks of re-writing the instrument.\footnote{767} As Lord Brown put it in a Refugee Convention case before the House of Lords:

It is one thing to invite this House to construe the Convention as a living instrument generously and in the light of its underlying humanitarian purposes; quite another to urge your Lordships effectively to rewrite it.\footnote{768}

Given the Court’s ability to maintain this awareness and balance in these cases, it is not obvious (other than for purely practical reasons) why there is such reluctance to engage in research of this kind into the jurisprudence of the European member states. Moreover, taking a more proactive approach to the interpretation of the Convention could provide the Court with an opportunity to conduct its own review, providing the findings as support for its reasoning where required. After all, the use of foreign jurisprudence as reasons for a decision was among the clearest explanations given by the Justices interviewed. As Baroness Hale explained:

In a sense, you are trying to give the best possible explanation that you can for the conclusions that you have arrived at. … obviously if that is a set of reasons that satisfy you, you hope that it will satisfy your colleagues and you hope, if it is a Strasbourg case—or a case that could go to Strasbourg—that it satisfies Strasbourg. …\footnote{769}

\footnote{767} \textit{R (Hoxha) v Special Adjudicator} [2005] 1 WLR 1063.  
\footnote{768} Ibid 1088.  
\footnote{769} Interview with The Rt. Hon. Baroness Hale of Richmond, above n 659.
8 Foreign Jurisprudence Used Instrumentally

One of the most frequent criticisms made of the judicial use of foreign jurisprudence is that it performs mainly a legitimation function, supporting a judge’s conclusions where the relevant authority could not have done so. Such criticisms are usually linked to the fear that judges are liable to ‘cherry pick’ the jurisprudence most helpful for that instrumental purpose. The US debate on that theme and Justice Scalia’s well-known denunciation of the use of foreign decisions for those reasons were considered in chapter four. In the UK, the problem is much less pronounced and comparatively little attention has been paid to the judicial use of foreign jurisprudence in the English courts. Nevertheless, as Cram has written, ‘resort to comparative legal materials nonetheless poses similarly awkward questions concerning judicial forays into the policy-making realm of the constitution and the erosion of parliamentary sovereignty….’

The risks are obvious: if a judge is not able to support a conclusion with domestic statute or common law, the conclusion has the potential to provide for an outcome that was not intended by Parliament. Thus reliance on foreign jurisprudence might be thought to provide a smoke screen for a judge’s own discretion or law making. However, the interviewed Justices largely dismissed the idea that they might engage in the ‘cherry picking’ of sources to suit preconceived conclusions. Lord Kerr answered the charge as follows:

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770 Ian Cram, ‘Resort to foreign constitutional norms in domestic human rights jurisprudence with reference to terrorism cases’ [2009] CLJ 118, 125.
I wouldn’t accept that criticism at all. … We don’t really look for validation or endorsement from foreign jurisprudence. That would be a most curious way of adjudication, quite honestly: to reach a view and then to cast about to try to find some other court that has reached the same view. … I just find that completely alien to my own personal experience.\footnote{Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore, Justice of the United Kingdom Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 9 May 2012).}

Lord Mance was also dismissive of the idea, maintaining that the use of foreign jurisprudence was not ‘selective’ and that, if it were used, it would be necessary to also ensure that one had accounted for foreign jurisprudence that worked against one’s conclusions:

… I think the criticism which is often made, ‘you look abroad only to find what suits what you already think’ in other words, very selectively, is unfair actually. … I don’t think one would think, if one was conscious of two streams of authority, of simply selecting the one which you liked. That wouldn’t be respectable. If you’re going to address foreign law, you have to address it warts and all, and if you disagree with some aspects of it, you have to face up to that. I think the criticism of selectivity is a little unfair … even if you were simply faced with authorities that were all against the position you wanted to… you wouldn’t suppress them, you’d face up to them. You’d say, ‘the following were cited (normally they would have been cited but I think even if they came to your notice without being cited, and any were directly in point, you’d still feel the need to address it.) And this is part of one’s desire to produce something which is intellectually sustainable and which you yourself respect. So I think selectivity, well it’s a cynical view of judging and I don’t think it really corresponds to the way we think or operate.\footnote{Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Mance, Justice of the United Kingdom Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 06 December 2011).}
Others among the interviewed Justices were less determined to dismiss the idea of selective citation. Lord Phillips, for example, felt this approach would be ‘fairly natural’ and commented on this as part of his explanation of the reasons for using foreign jurisprudence:

... if we've got an area where we are uncertain, an area where we are developing the law, an area where ... we would like to develop the law in a particular direction, then you are particularly keen to see if you can get any support for what your thinking is from foreign jurisdictions. ... [O]ne is always glad to find some foreign jurisprudence that actually supports one’s own decision.\textsuperscript{773}

The use of foreign jurisprudence is not necessarily 'selective' but it nevertheless may be used instrumentally, for some particular purpose. The purpose is most frequently articulated as the giving of reasons: recall Baroness Hale’s interview comments, cited earlier:

In a sense, you are trying to give the best possible explanation that you can for the conclusions that you have arrived at. ... obviously if that is a set of reasons that satisfy you, you hope that it will satisfy your colleagues and you hope, if it is a Strasbourg case – or a case that could go to Strasbourg – that it satisfies Strasbourg.\textsuperscript{774}

\textsuperscript{773} Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, former President of the United Kingdom Supreme Court Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 23 November 2011).

\textsuperscript{774} Interview with The Rt. Hon. Baroness Hale of Richmond, Justice of the United Kingdom Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 19 October 2011). Lady Hale made similar suggestions in the context of the Horncastle case discussed further below from n 841. Baroness Hale, ‘Argentoratum Locutum: Is the Supreme Court supreme?’, Nottingham Human Rights Lecture 2011 (Nottingham, 1 December 2011) <http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/docs/speech_111201.pdf> accessed 18 October 2013: ‘the Court went to a great deal of trouble to explain to Strasbourg why we thought they were wrong, and that a fair trial could still be had in those circumstances’.
8.1 Confirmatory function / bolstering conclusions

The use of foreign jurisprudence for the purpose of giving reasons can nevertheless give the impression that the sources are used for legitimation, bolstering a predetermined conclusion. That is to say that foreign jurisprudence is used as a supporting tool, for a conclusion that a judge or court is inclined to reach notwithstanding the existence of the foreign jurisprudence. In particular, this may occur where the court is supporting a conclusion that is likely to be controversial, either because the issue in the case is morally charged or because the outcome would be surprising on the basis of other relevant jurisprudence. In this way, foreign jurisprudence may be used as evidence to justify a particular conclusion.

In this way the use of foreign jurisprudence for confirmation or bolstering is to be distinguished from the categories of ‘reassurance’ and ‘consistency’ discussed in chapters six and seven respectively. Using foreign jurisprudence for reassurance would be an internal exercise, designed to lend comfort or confidence to the judge (and as such may not attract explicit citation). Using foreign jurisprudence for consistency entails gathering evidence from elsewhere as a starting point (usually on a point of interpretation) and ensuring that the approach in the instant case is in line with the approach taken in those other jurisdictions. Using foreign jurisprudence for confirmation or to bolster conclusions is quite different in the sense that it performs a defensive or justificatory function. Here foreign jurisprudence represents evidence that the
conclusions in the instant case are reasonable, especially where they are likely to be surprising or unpopular.

The use of foreign jurisprudence for this purpose might also extend to the Strasbourg Court. During the interview, Baroness Hale cited a House of Lords judgment as an example. A good example, I suppose, is the Pretty case, in which the House of Lords quoted a case that they had had in Canada. I think that that was bolstering the conclusion that they had already wanted to reach. I suspect that was what it was, and in fact it was also quoted in Strasbourg.

The facts of the case are well known. Dianne Pretty suffered from the degenerative and incurable motor-neurone disease and sought assurances from the Director of Public Prosecution that her husband would not be prosecuted under section 2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961 for aiding and abetting her suicide. Mrs Pretty claimed a right to her husband's assistance in committing suicide and, if the 1961 Act effectively prohibited that assistance, that the Act would be incompatible with the ECHR. The House of Lords made extensive use of a judgment from the Supreme Court of Canada: Rodriguez v Attorney General of Canada. Rodriguez involved a woman with a similar disease who had also sought to end her life with medical assistance. The Canadian Supreme Court had upheld the equivalent provision of the Canadian Criminal Code, although several of the Justices of that court had concluded that

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775 R (Pretty) v Director of Public Prosecutions and Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHL 61.
776 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Baroness Hale of Richmond, above n 774.
the relevant section of the Canadian Charter of Fundamental Rights Canadian
did confer a right to personal autonomy, extending even to decisions on life and
death. Counsel for Mrs Pretty naturally sought to rely upon those statements by
analogy with Article 8 of the ECHR. The House of Lords, however, found that
the case better supported the alternative conclusion: that the Suicide Act was
not incompatible with the Convention.

The curious feature of the case is that Rodriguez was cited extensively at all.
The issue had been clearly determined by relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence,
which the House of Lords were bound to ‘take into account’ under the HRA
1998. Lord Bingham reviewed the relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence and
concluded that it did not support the Mrs Pretty’s contention.778 Yet Lord
Bingham also felt it necessary to review the Canadian case closely, copying
several passages into his own judgment.779 Lord Bingham explained the
relevance of the Canadian case on the basis that it was the ‘most detailed and
erudite discussion known to me of the issues in the present appeal’.780 Lord
Steyn made the contribution of the foreign jurisprudence more obvious:

Given the fact that Mrs Pretty’s case is based on the European
Convention I have concentrated on European developments. It is,
however, noteworthy that in the United States and Canada
arguments similar to that of Mrs Pretty ultimately failed...781

778 Pretty v DPP, above n 775, [24].
779 Ibid [19]-[23].
781 Ibid [55] (Lord Steyn); citing Vacco v Quill (1997) 521 US 793; Washington v Glucksberg
The language of Lord Steyn clearly implies that the foreign jurisprudence is considered as an additional point, which supported the decision reached primarily on the European jurisprudence. It serves to bolster the conclusion that had already been determined.

Lord Hope offered a subtle variation, explaining that the Canadian case may have been of greater importance if it provided evidence of an international consensus, which could make a ‘strained’ reading of Article 8 appropriate.

… Mrs Pretty has a right of self-determination. In that sense, her private life [according to Article 8 ECHR] is engaged even where in the face of a terminal illness she seeks to choose death rather than life. But it is an entirely different thing to imply into these words a positive obligation to give effect to her wish to end her own life by means of an assisted suicide. I think that to do so would be to stretch the meaning of the words too far. … A strained reading might have been appropriate if there was evidence of a consensus of international opinion in favour of assisted suicide. But there is none. As Sopinka J said in Rodriguez v Attorney General of Canada [1994] 2 LRC 136, 176A, no new consensus has emerged in society opposing the right of the state to regulate the involvement of others in exercising power over individuals ending their lives.\footnote{Ibid [100]-[101] (Lord Hope).}

The implication is that Lord Hope might have been tempted to ‘stretch’ the meaning of Article 8, but for the lack of evidence of international consensus. Put another way, it was the lack of that evidence in the foreign jurisprudence which bolstered the conclusion to dismiss Mrs Pretty’s appeal.
The *Pretty* case provides a useful example of foreign jurisprudence being used instrumentally to support a conclusion that is in keeping with the relevant Strasbourg authority (the Strasbourg Court unanimously found no violation with the Convention when Mrs Pretty’s case was appealed). However, a more interesting issue arises where the Supreme Court uses foreign jurisprudence in a claim where the Strasbourg case law is clear and constant but where it nevertheless wishes to reach a different conclusion. In these cases, the purpose is to support a conclusion at odds with the otherwise relevant Strasbourg authority. These uses are surprising given the relatively deferential attitude towards the Strasbourg Court, caused in part by the HRA 1998.

8.2 The ‘clear and constant’ Strasbourg jurisprudence.

As discussed briefly in chapter four, section 2(1) HRA 1998 provides that domestic courts ‘must take into account’ the relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence when addressing ‘a question which has arisen in connection with a Convention right’. In the absence of any normative guidance about the precise meaning of the words ‘take into account’, domestic courts have guided themselves to ‘follow any clear and constant’ Strasbourg jurisprudence ‘in the absence of special circumstances’. In fact, as a result of that provision, the courts have often been criticised for taking too slavish an approach to the Strasbourg case

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783 Pretty v United Kingdom (2346/02) [2002] ECHR 423.
784 Section 2(1) Human Rights Act 1998.
law. It is said that the judicial interpretation of section 2(1) as requiring domestic courts to ‘follow’ or ‘keep pace’ with the ‘clear and constant’ Strasbourg jurisprudence, has led to a treatment of the Strasbourg case-law as something more than persuasive authority. Fenwick’s conclusion was that ‘the obligation under s.2 as interpreted … comes close to affording binding force to the jurisprudence’, and Amos added that ‘[i]n the majority of cases, the obligation to take into account Strasbourg jurisprudence is construed as an obligation to follow it as well’. Kearns has suggested that loyalty to the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court is ‘a practice that is becoming gradually habitual for our judiciary … the effects of which would be difficult to reverse’. Krisch agreed, writing that ‘the dominant position among the judges is … one of close attention and loyalty to Strasbourg judgments’. Perhaps the most well-known example of this attitude in the case law comes from the AF case where Lord Rodger’s short concurring paragraph adds just this:

Even though we are dealing with rights under a United Kingdom statute, in reality, we have no choice: Argentoratum locutum, iudicium finitum - Strasbourg has spoken, the case is closed.

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787 Helen Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights (Cavendish 2007) 193.
But there are signs of change. The fluctuations in the top court’s approach to the section 2 duty and the Strasbourg jurisprudence were noted in chapter four, drawing from the possession proceedings cases. The willingness to reject the Strasbourg jurisprudence has also filtered down to the Court of Appeal. In R (on the application of the Children’s Rights Alliance for England), as a postscript to his decision, Laws LJ added the following:

…I hope the Ullah principle may be revisited. There is a great deal to be gained from the development of a municipal jurisprudence of the Convention rights, which the Strasbourg court should respect out of its own doctrine of the margin of appreciation, and which would be perfectly consistent with our duty to take account of (not to follow) the Strasbourg cases.

This appears to be in tune with a more recent example from the Supreme Court in Sugar v BBC. In that case Lord Wilson outlined his view of the manner in which the Ullah interpretation of the duty under section 2 HRA 1998 had developed:

It was in Ullah that, in para 20, Lord Bingham suggested that it was the duty of the House to keep pace with the evolving jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (‘the ECtHR’) ‘no more, but certainly no less’. It was in Al Skeini that, in para 106, Lord Brown suggested that its duty was to keep pace with it “no less, but certainly no more”. I would welcome an appeal … in which it was appropriate for this court to consider whether, of course without acting extravagantly, it might now usefully do more than to shadow the

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792 Chapter four from n 310.
793 R (Children’s Rights Alliance for England) v Secretary of State for Justice, [2013] EWCA Civ 34.
794 Ibid [62]-[64].
ECtHR in the manner hitherto suggested—no doubt sometimes in aid of the further development of human rights and sometimes in aid of their containment within proper bounds.\textsuperscript{796}

In part, these fluctuations in the approach to the Strasbourg jurisprudence since \textit{Ullah} may simply reflect the political context. The Supreme Court does not operate in a political vacuum. As Paterson has pointed out, the political dynamics surrounding the 2010 general election, the threats to the Human Rights Act from the political right, the Brighton Declaration and the more recent prisoner voting saga may all have had an impact on the Supreme Court’s relationship with the Strasbourg jurisprudence.\textsuperscript{797} Indeed some commentators have suggested that the Strasbourg Court has itself altered its approach in light of the UK proposals for reform of the European Court of Human Rights and the political outcry over some of it’s most unpopular decisions.\textsuperscript{798}

The future of the relationship between Strasbourg and the top court and the prevalence of the \textit{Ullah} principle is likely to depend to some extent on the further development of human rights reform, both at the domestic and supranational level. As Masterman has written on a well-known blogsite:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{796} Ibid [59] (Lord Wilson).
\item \textsuperscript{797} Alan Paterson, \textit{Final Judgment: The Last Law Lords and the Supreme Court} (Hart Publishing 2013), 232.
\item \textsuperscript{798} Helen Fenwick, ‘An appeasement approach in the European Court of Human Rights?’ UK Const. L. Blog (5 April 2012) <http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2012/04/05/helen-fenwick-an-appeasement-approach-in-the-european-court-of-human-rights/> accessed 22 July 2014; Alan Paterson, \textit{Final Judgment}, ibid. ‘Certainly Strasbourg has shown signs of being aware of the Tories’ distaste for Strasbourg (e.g. over prisoners’ coting rights, and the deportation of alleged terrorists).’
\end{itemize}
… the Bill of Rights debate … has arguably had a damaging effect on political perceptions of the HRA and the link the Act creates between domestic law and the Convention jurisprudence. The relationship between domestic courts and the European Court of Human Rights that *Ullah* embodies is out of touch with the widely-held view that the content of our domestic human rights law should not be ‘dictated’ to us by the European Court. 799

For now, Masternman has posited a series of circumstances that the case law has establish might underpin a departure from the apparent application of the *Ullah* principle. Some of these include: where applying the Strasbourg jurisprudence would compel a conclusion which would be ‘fundamentally at odds’ with the United Kingdom’s separation of powers; 800 where there are ‘special circumstances’; 801 and where the court can think of a ‘good reason’ that the Strasbourg jurisprudence not be applied. 802 Other more interesting opportunities are where the area is governed by common law and the court is minded to exercise its discretion to depart from the Strasbourg line; 803 where the court wishes enter into a ‘dialogue’ with the ECtHR (on the basis that the applicable case law may be wrong or badly-informed or both); 804 and the

800 *R (Alconbury Developments Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions* [2001] UKHL 23, [76].
801 Ibid [26].
802 *R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Amin* [2004] 1 AC 653, [44].
803 *Rabone and another v Pennine Care NHS Trust (Inquest and others intervening)* [2012] UKSC 2, [113]-[114].
domestic court prefers to follow non-Strasbourg authority. In all such situations, the Supreme Court must be prepared to decide the case without the benefit of clear Strasbourg jurisprudence.

8.3 Supporting conclusions where the relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence is unclear or unhelpful.

Several factors may encourage domestic courts to decide matters independently of Strasbourg. The most obvious, perhaps is that Strasbourg jurisprudence may be out-dated; implicit in the construction of the ECHR as a ‘living instrument’, is the presumption that domestic courts may properly conclude that Convention jurisprudence has lost its relevance with age. The Convention itself does not require reliance on its own jurisprudence. As Klug pointed out, this is virtually a mirror image of the classical common law approach: instead of a doctrine of precedent, the Strasbourg Court has operated a doctrine of evolutionary law in which the most recent case law is usually the most persuasive.

According to Feldman, ‘should there be reason to believe that the European Court would not follow one of its own previous decisions, that would be a good

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806 Tyrer v United Kingdom (1978) 2 EHRR 1 [31].
reason for domestic courts and tribunals to interpret a provision differently.\textsuperscript{808}

Other commentators too have noted the need to keep ‘constantly up to date’.\textsuperscript{809}

... [I]t would appear to be insufficient simply to identify a previous decision of the ECtHR on the matter in issue and to follow it; some consideration would also be required, if that decision were not a recent one, of whether it held good in the face of changes in society that had occurred in the meantime.\textsuperscript{810}

The possibility that the HRA and the Convention might have this effect was not at first popular with the judiciary. In \textit{Anderson}, for example, Lord Brown opined that ‘it would seem somewhat presumptuous for us, in effect, to pre-empt [the] decision [of the Strasbourg Court]’.\textsuperscript{811} Similarly in \textit{N} Lord Hope explained that ‘It is for the Strasbourg Court, not for us, to decide whether its case law is out of touch with modern conditions’.\textsuperscript{812}

However the courts have shown willingness to undertake these sorts of exercises. The decision in \textit{Re P} is a good example of the willingness to construct conclusions on the basis of the way the Strasbourg jurisprudence was thought to be developing.\textsuperscript{813}


\textsuperscript{809} Merris Amos, \textit{Human Rights Law}, above n 788, 18.


\textsuperscript{811} \textit{R (Anderson) v Secretary of State for the Home Department} [2002] UKHL 46, [66].

\textsuperscript{812} \textit{N v Secretary of State for the Home Department} [2005] UKHL 31; [2005] 2 WLR 1124, [25] (Lord Hope).

\textsuperscript{813} \textit{In Re P and Others} [2008] UKHL 38; [2009] 1 AC 173.
ban on unmarried adoptions in Northern Ireland.\footnote{Article 14 of the Adoption (Northern Ireland) Order 1987 provided that an adoption order could only be made on the application of more than one person if the applicants were a married couple.} It was argued that the discrimination against unmarried couples violated Article 14 of the Convention (read in conjunction with Article 8). No case had yet reached Strasbourg on the precise issue of discrimination that was raised in \textit{Re P}. Two cases raising similar issues had been handed down, which the House considered in turn: In \textit{Fretté v France} the Strasbourg court had decided by a majority of four to three that it was within the margin of appreciation allowed to member states of the Council of Europe to discriminate against homosexuals as applicants to be adoptive parents.\footnote{\textit{Fretté v France} (2002) 38 EHRR 438} A few years later, however, ‘the court appear[ed] to have changed course’.\footnote{\textit{In Re P and Others}, above n 813, [25] (Lord Hoffman)} In \textit{EB v France} the Grand Chamber decided the rejection of an application by a single homosexual woman did constitute discrimination according to Article 14.\footnote{\textit{EB v France} (2008) 47 EHRR 509.} On the back of this analysis, Lord Hoffman concluded that it was now not at all unlikely that if the issue in this case were to go to Strasbourg, the court would hold that discrimination against a couple who wish to adopt a child on the grounds that they are not married would violate Article 14. Indeed in reaching his conclusions, Lord Hope noted that the more recent case in \textit{EB} was consistent with the point made by the South African Constitutional Court.\footnote{\textit{In Re P and Others}, above n 813, [54] (Lord Hope).}
Another obvious excuse for divergence is created by the operation of the ‘margin of appreciation’ doctrine. The judges of the Strasbourg Court are ‘acutely conscious that on several key issues, the European-wide consensus which generally provides the mainspring of their decision-making does not exist … precisely because of the prevalence of divergent moral standards and religious traditions in the affiliated states’. \(^{819}\) The approach of the European Court has therefore been that the lesser the consensus among Contracting States, \(^{820}\) the better placed national authorities are to decide on the matter and the more deferential the European Court has to be in its review. \(^{821}\) The doctrine arguably signifies that there are issues on which there is no relevant Strasbourg authority at all. \(^{822}\)

It is relatively clear that judges are willing to view the matter in this way, for example by reaching a conclusion that arguably goes further than the Strasbourg court had previously done. This appeared to justify the House of Lords’ conclusion in *Re P*, \(^{823}\) concerning the joint adoption of a child by an unmarried couple discussed above. In Lord Hoffman’s view, it would make ‘no difference’ if the Strasbourg Court were to revert to its earlier position and say that these are delicate questions which should therefore be left to the national margin of appreciation. Accordingly, his Lordship did not feel that the House


\(^{820}\) *Fretté v France* (2004) 38 EHRR 438, [41]: Where the law ‘appears to be in a transitional stage, a wide margin of appreciation must be left to the authorities of each State’.


\(^{822}\) Eg Francesca Klug ‘A Bill of Rights: Do we need one or do we already have one?’ [2007] PL 701, 708.

\(^{823}\) *In Re P and Others*, above n 813.
should be inhibited from declaring the 1987 Order incompatible ‘by the thought that [they] might be going further than the Strasbourg Court’.\(^{824}\) Repeating the tenets delivered by Lord Bingham in *Ullah* (that the duty of domestic courts is to ‘keep pace’ with Strasbourg jurisprudence ‘no more, no less’) Lord Hoffman emphasised that ‘[t]hese remarks were not … made in the context of a case in which the Strasbourg Court has declared a question to be within the national margin of appreciation’.\(^{825}\) His Lordship explained that ‘none of these considerations can apply in a case in which Strasbourg has deliberately declined to lay down an interpretation for all member states, as it does when it says that the question is within the margin of appreciation’.\(^{826}\) For that reason, his Lordship concluded that ‘the question is one for the national authorities to decide for themselves and it follows that different member states may well give different answers’\(^{827}\) and ‘it is for the court in the United Kingdom to interpret articles 8 and 14 and to apply the division between the decision-making powers of courts and Parliament in the way which appears appropriate for the United Kingdom.’\(^{828}\) Lord Mance evidently agreed, adding that:

> It would be contrary to the Strasbourg court’s purpose, and circular, if national authorities were to take the view that they should not consider any question other than whether a particular solution was within the United Kingdom’s margin of appreciation. Under the 1998 Act, United Kingdom authorities (legislators and courts) have

\(^{824}\) Ibid [37].  
\(^{825}\) Ibid [31].  
\(^{826}\) Ibid [36].  
\(^{827}\) Ibid.  
\(^{828}\) Ibid [37].
domestically to address the impact of the domestically enacted Convention rights in the particular context of the United Kingdom.829

A third opportunity for divergence is given by the nature of the Strasbourg authority itself. Although some commentators have argued that Strasbourg’s decisions are so important as to be considered as authority even in instances in which they did not ‘argue the point through in a coherent and thorough manner’,830 the prevailing attitude among the judiciary has been that there is ‘room for dialogue’ where an English court ‘considers that the ECtHR has misunderstood or been misinformed about some aspect of English law’ and ‘it may wish to give a judgment which invites the ECtHR to reconsider the question’.831 As Warbrick argued, there is ‘space for national courts to reconsider Strasbourg cases which appear ‘wrong’, either because they are founded on a misunderstanding of national law or because they are poorly reasoned’.832

There are some recent examples of this approach at the Supreme Court. In R (Smith) v Secretary of State for Defence, for example, Lord Collins referred to twelve decisions of foreign domestic courts: one decision from Canada, one from Australia and ten from the United States. The references to foreign

829 Ibid [129].
830 Ian Loveland ‘Making it up as they go along? The Court of Appeal on same sex spouses and succession rights to tenancies’ [2003] PL 222, 233.
831 R v Lyons (No 3) [2002] UKHL 44; [2003] 1 AC 976, [46].
832 Although Warbrick was also careful to suggest that ‘a strong case would need to be made that this were the case’, Colin Warbrick, ‘The View from the Outside’ in Helen Fenwick, Roger Masterman and & Gavin Phillipson (eds.) Judicial Reasoning under the UK Human Rights Act (Cambridge University Press 2007) 37.
833 R (Smith) v Secretary of State for Defence & another [2010] UKSC 29.
jurisprudence are surprising at first glance, since the case concerned the meaning of 'jurisdiction' in the ECHR and it is not obvious that the jurisprudence of those countries not signatory to the Convention are likely to provide assistance on the interpretation of a term in that instrument. Lord Collins explained in the interview, however, that the jurisprudence was helpful to confirm his feelings about the result since the matter had been ‘treated in a very superficial way by Strasbourg’. 834

Some commentators have suggested that departing from Strasbourg jurisprudence on these grounds usually indicates a desire to avoid the conflicting Strasbourg jurisprudence _per se_. For instance Amos has argued that the means by which conflicting Strasbourg jurisprudence is usually avoided is by a finding that the reasoning of the Court (or Commission) was inadequate, 835 while Elizabeth Wicks identified one of the prevalent judicial approaches under section 2 HRA to be ‘assessing relevance by reference to own perception of merits’. 836 In other words, ‘the Strasbourg jurisprudence is being used merely to substantiate domestic reasoning: it is not taken into account as a factor in reaching the decision; merely as a factor in justifying the decision’. 837 This kind

834 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Collins of Mapesbury, retired Justice of the United Kingdom Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 22 May 2012). The Supreme Court has since departed from _Smith (No 1)_ in _Smith (No 2): Smith and others (FC) v The Ministry of Defence_ [2013] UKSC 41. In that case, the Supreme Court made little to no discernible reference to foreign jurisprudence, taking their lead from the more recent Strasbourg jurisprudence handed down by the Grand Chamber: _Al–Skeini v United Kingdom_ (2011) 53 EHRR 589.


837 Ibid 423.
of explanation is difficult to deny, considering cases like Re P where the court appeared to construct the matter so as to reach the desired conclusion. Lord Hoffman, for example, evidently felt that the blanket rule in Re P was ‘quite irrational’.\textsuperscript{838} Lord Hoffman could see no basis for it and referred to a recent decision of the South African Constitutional Court, which had made similar points.\textsuperscript{839} Crucially, this reference to the South African Court came prior to Lord Hoffman’s analysis of the relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence and therefore represents an example of the willingness to reject the Strasbourg jurisprudence, leaning on foreign jurisprudence when doing so.

### 8.4 ‘Departing’ from Strasbourg

This evaluative approach to Strasbourg jurisprudence has developed a step further. UK Courts are willing not only to reject that jurisprudence as determinative of a particular issue but also to reject its conclusions outright. This represents a departure from the deferential start to the relationship with the Strasbourg Court, and the sense that the UK courts appeared to be acting as ‘merely agents or delegates of the ECHR and Council of Europe’.\textsuperscript{840} These cases are illuminating on both the relationship between the Strasbourg and UK courts, as well as on a more general point about the use of foreign jurisprudence in domestic human rights cases.

\textsuperscript{838} In Re P and Others, above n 813, [16] (Lord Hoffman).
8.4.1 *R v Horncastle*: departure and dialogue

Since Strasbourg jurisprudence is not binding (section 2 HRA 1998 only obliges domestic courts to take it into account), it is not technically appropriate to talk of ‘departing’ from the Strasbourg Court’s case law. In this context therefore, ‘departure’ serves only to represent cases in which the decision of the UK court is not in line with the relevant or ‘clear and constant’ Strasbourg jurisprudence. It in these cases the Supreme Court has tended towards giving reasons for declining to follow the Strasbourg case law. This may simply be an attempt to enter into a ‘dialogue’ with the Strasbourg Court, or it may be illustrative of the hesitancy to ‘depart’ from its jurisprudence without clear reasoning. Many would describe the first case considered here, *Horncastle*, as an example of the former. Indeed, Lord Phillips appeared to have this in mind when explaining that the detailed reasons would be ‘likely to give the Strasbourg court the opportunity to reconsider…’.\(^{841}\) What follows is an alternative perspective; *Horncastle* is considered as a case that is illustrative of both the strength attached to the (clear and constant) Strasbourg jurisprudence, and of the willingness to depart from it. The use of foreign jurisprudence in the reasoning is illuminating on both points.

*Horncastle* was the first Convention rights case in which the Supreme Court ‘departed’ from seemingly clear and constant Strasbourg jurisprudence.\(^{842}\) The

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\(^{842}\) Ibid. *Horncastle* was the seventh case to raise Convention rights issues in the Supreme Courts first term after *R (E) v Governing Body of JFS & Anor (Rev 3)* [2009] UKSC 1; *R (L) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis* [2009] UKSC 3; *R (BA (Nigeria)) v Secretary of State for the Home Department* [2009] UKSC 7; *R (A) (FC) v London Borough of Croydon and one other action* [2009] UKSC 8; *R (Barclay and Others) v Secretary of State for Justice and others*
case concerned two defendants convicted of serious offences on the basis of evidence from an absent witness (‘hearsay’ evidence). In the first, the witness had died after making a full written statement; in the second, the witness feared for her life if she were to attend the hearing. In each case the evidence had been admitted pursuant to the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. In both cases, it was argued that the appellant’s conviction was based to a ‘sole or decisive’ extent on the statements of the absent witnesses. On this basis, it was submitted that the lack of an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses violated the appellants’ rights under Article 6 of the ECHR, rendering their convictions unsafe.

The relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence was a decision of the Chamber in Al-Khawaja and Tahery v United Kingdom. Al-Khawaja and Tahery concerned similar facts to the first two cases in Horncastle. Mr Al-Khawaja claimed that the admission of a statement given by a complainant who had later died was in violation of his rights under article 6(3)(d) of the ECHR. Mr Tahery claimed the same in relation to the admission of a statement given by a witness that later refused to give the evidence because of fear. In each case the UK Court of Appeal had held that the statements were admissible and that the convictions

[2009] UKSC 9; R (A) v B [2009] UKSC 12. While the Supreme Court also appeared to avoid applying the Strasbourg jurisprudence (Tsfayo v United Kingdom [2009] 48 EHRR 18) in R (A) (FC) v London Borough of Croydon [2009] UKSC 8, it was clear that the Court did not have to decide the related point in order to dispose of the appeal (Lord Walker [67]). Thus it was not necessary to fully reason that point and a number of the Justices preferred to ‘leave the point open’, not least because the Strasbourg jurisprudence was not ‘clear and constant’ but was ‘still developing’ (Lord Walker [67]; also Lord Hope [62]).

843 Section 116(1)(2)(a) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003; section 116(1)(2)(e) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, respectively.

were safe. The ECtHR sitting as a Chamber disagreed and held that there would always be a breach of Article 6 if a conviction is based ‘solely or decisively’ on hearsay evidence. Counsel for the defendants placed heavy reliance on Al-Khawaja and Tahery but also provided extensive lists of Strasbourg jurisprudence supporting the argument that the ECtHR had ‘established a clear and constantly applied principle to the effect that the admission of a statement from an absent witness whose testimony provides sole or decisive evidence at a criminal trial will breach article 6(1)(3)(d)’. 

There is nothing in the judgment given by Lord Phillips (giving the judgment of the Court) to suggest that the Supreme Court felt that the Strasbourg jurisprudence was not clear and constant. Instead, Lord Phillips acknowledged the argument that the Supreme Court ‘should treat the judgment of the Chamber in Al-Khawaja as determinative of the success of these appeals’ and responded by providing reasons for declining to do so. It is worth setting out the paragraph in full:

The requirement to ‘take into account’ the Strasbourg jurisprudence will normally result in the domestic court applying principles that are clearly established by the Strasbourg court. There will, however, be rare occasions where the domestic court has concerns as to whether a decision of the Strasbourg court sufficiently appreciates or

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846 Al-Khawaja and Tahery, above n 844. The United Kingdom subsequently requested that the decision be referred to the Grand Chamber. On 5 June 2009 the panel of the Grand Chamber adjourned consideration of that request pending the judgment of the Supreme Court in the present case.
847 R v Horncastle, above n 841, 421-422.
848 Ibid [10].
accommodates particular aspects of our domestic process. In such circumstances it is open to the domestic court to decline to follow the Strasbourg decision, giving reasons for adopting this course. This is likely to give the Strasbourg court the opportunity to reconsider the particular aspect of the decision that is in issue, so that there takes place what may prove to be a valuable dialogue between the domestic court and the Strasbourg court. This is such a case.\textsuperscript{849}

It is clear, then, that Lord Phillips was not suggesting that the Strasbourg case law was anything other than clear and constant. Rather, the Supreme Court would ‘decline to follow’ (emphasis added) it on the basis that the Strasbourg court had not ‘sufficiently appreciate[d] or accommodate[d] particular aspects of our domestic process’.\textsuperscript{850}

To speak of ‘following’ implies that to do otherwise would amount to a departure. This much is reinforced by the addition of a condition that the court ‘gives reasons’ for doing so.\textsuperscript{851} And Lord Phillips did indeed give detailed reasons for declining to follow the Strasbourg jurisprudence. After outlining the common law approach to fair trial in some detail, Lord Phillips set out examples of hearsay exceptions in other Commonwealth jurisdictions:

Other established common law jurisdictions, namely Canada, Australia and New Zealand have, by both common law and statutory development, recognised hearsay evidence as potentially admissible, under defined conditions, in circumstances where it is not possible to call the witness to give evidence, even where the evidence is critical to the prosecution case. ... \textit{This demonstrates that}, under the

\textsuperscript{849} Ibid [11].
\textsuperscript{850} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{851} Ibid.
common law and statutory exceptions to the hearsay rule recognised in those jurisdictions *there is no rigid rule excluding evidence if it is or would be either the ‘sole’ or ‘decisive’ evidence*, however those words may be understood or applied.\textsuperscript{852}

The strength of these examples were further supported by a detailed analysis of the position in those jurisdictions, prepared by Lord Mance and annexed to the judgment.\textsuperscript{853}

Not all the comparative jurisprudence supported the admission of hearsay evidence. It was explained that in the United States, the ‘right under the Sixth Amendment “to be confronted with the witnesses against him” has recently been interpreted in an absolute sense’;\textsuperscript{854} the effect was ‘to exclude any “testimonial” evidence whatever in respect of which there has been or can be no cross-examination’.\textsuperscript{855} But rather than take this as a balance against the position taken by the Commonwealth jurisdictions set out in Lord Mance’s annex, Lord Phillips used the extremity of the United States to show that the Strasbourg Court had not itself gone that far:

Article 6(3)(d) has not been interpreted by the Strasbourg Court in the same way that the US Supreme Court has now interpreted the Sixth Amendment. The Strasbourg Court has accepted that there are circumstances that justify the admission of statements of witnesses who have not been subject to ‘confrontation’ with the defendant.\textsuperscript{856}

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\textsuperscript{852} Ibid [41] (emphasis added).
\textsuperscript{853} Ibid Annexe 1.
\textsuperscript{854} Ibid [44] (Lord Phillips).
\textsuperscript{855} Ibid [45] (Lord Phillips).
\textsuperscript{856} Ibid [46] (Lord Phillips).
From that basis, Lord Phillips called once more upon the Commonwealth jurisprudence to make the argument clear:

The possibility remains, however, that by propounding the ‘sole or decisive test’ the Strasbourg Court has condemned as rendering a trial unfair the admission of hearsay evidence in circumstances where the legislature and courts of this jurisdiction and of other important Commonwealth jurisdictions (Canada, Australia and New Zealand) have determined that the evidence can fairly be received. This is a startling proposition…\footnote{857}{Ibid (emphasis added).}

It was on this basis that Lord Phillips felt it necessary to embark upon a ‘careful analysis of the Strasbourg jurisprudence’.\footnote{858}{Ibid.} The detailed analysis of the Strasbourg case law incorporated judgments before \textit{Al-Khawaja} and made important distinctions between the approach of civil law and common law jurisdictions. Lord Phillips used the example of the French Criminal Procedure, referred to by Lord Rodger in an earlier House of Lords decision,\footnote{859}{\textit{R (D) v Camberwell Green Youth Court} [2005] UKHL 4; [2005] 1 WLR 393, [10] – [11].} and spent four paragraphs illustrating the differences.\footnote{860}{\textit{R v Horncastle}, above n 841, [59]-[62].} The conclusion was that the Strasbourg jurisprudence in relation to article 6(3)(d) had ‘developed largely in cases relating to civil law rather than common law jurisdictions and this [was] particularly true of the sole or decisive rule.’\footnote{861}{Ibid [107].} Further, ‘that case law appears to have developed without full consideration of the safeguards against an unfair trial that exist under the common law procedure.’\footnote{862}{Ibid.} Thus the Supreme Court held that ‘it would not be right for this court to hold that the sole or decisive test
should have been applied rather than the provisions of the 2003 Act, interpreted in accordance with their natural meaning’.863 Lord Phillips continued:

In so concluding I have taken careful account of the Strasbourg jurisprudence. I hope that in due course the Strasbourg court may also take account of the reasons that have led me not to apply the sole or decisive test in this case.864

On this analysis, the Supreme Court appears to have used the Commonwealth jurisprudence as a springboard for (a) taking a robust approach to the Strasbourg jurisprudence, and (b) declining to follow the Strasbourg Court. There are, however, a couple of qualifications to note. As Lord Brown stated, the Supreme Court was not faced with a decision of the Grand Chamber in this case. It was for that reason that Lord Brown felt able to reject the appellant's argument that the Court should follow the ‘clear and constant’ Strasbourg jurisprudence,865 (as the House of Lords had done in Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF (No 3) when faced with a judgment of the Grand Chamber (in A v United Kingdom)).866 Moreover, Lord Brown not only felt that ‘the court's ruling in Al-Khawaja [was] not as authoritative as a Grand Chamber decision' but that it was also ‘altogether less clear than was the decision in A’.867 Indeed, the Grand Chamber went on to reconsider Al-Khawaja and accepted that the admission of hearsay evidence would not inevitably lead to a breach of

863 Ibid [108].
864 Ibid.
865 Ibid [120].
866 Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF (No 3) [2010] 2 AC 269, A v United Kingdom (2009) 49 EHRR 625, Regina v Horncastle, above n 841, [118].
867 R v Horncastle, above n 841, [120].
Article 6 where statements of this kind were used. These features make it difficult to conclude definitely that the Supreme Court in *Horncastle* is using foreign jurisprudence to support departures from clear and constant Strasbourg jurisprudence, but it at least provides certain clues. As Dickson has written, it now appears possible to predict the situations in which the Supreme Court will feel itself bound to follow Strasbourg and where it will be more comfortable adopting conclusions at odds with the Strasbourg jurisprudence:

The case law … appears to suggest that there are two situations in which the Supreme Court will feel itself bound to follow Strasbourg jurisprudence. The first is where there has been a recent decision of the Grand Chamber expressly addressing the very point at issue, as in *AF* … The second is where there has been a series of recent Chamber decisions, not yet fully endorsed by the Grand Chamber, in which the attitude of the European Court to the very point at issue has been made clear, as in *Pinnock*. If the relevant Strasbourg decisions are in cases taken against the United Kingdom, they will inevitably carry even greater weight. In a case such as *Horncastle*, which falls into neither of the two categories, the Supreme Court can persist in adopting a national approach to the point at issue, arguing the validity of that approach as authoritatively as it can in the hope that if and when the matter later comes before the Grand Chamber the national position will be endorsed. This is precisely what occurred in the aftermath of *Horncastle*: when the Grand Chamber re-examined *Al-Khawaja and Tahery* it effectively accepted the Supreme Court’s criticism of the Chamber’s judgment. … This episode is an excellent example … of the much-vaunted ‘judicial dialogue’ which is meant to characterize the relationship between the

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868 *Al-Khawaja and Tahery v the United Kingdom* [2011] ECHR 2127. The Grand Chamber found no violation of Article 6 in Mr Al-Khawaja’s case, although the safeguards remained insufficient to prevent a violation in Mr Tahery’s case.
highest courts in domestic legal systems and the European Court in Strasbourg.\textsuperscript{869}

It has been argued here that foreign jurisprudence played an important role in the Supreme Court’s mission when ‘arguing the validity of that approach as authoritatively as it can’.\textsuperscript{870} Moreover, the Grand Chamber responded in kind when it returned to the issue in \textit{Al-Khawaja and Tahery v United Kingdom}.\textsuperscript{871}

Under the heading ‘Relevant comparative law’, 25 paragraphs of the Grand Chamber’s judgment are devoted to a review of the position in Scotland, Ireland, Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, New Zealand, South Africa, and the United States.\textsuperscript{872}

\section*{8.4.2 Supporting dissenting judgments}

A slightly different but even more obvious example of using foreign jurisprudence to support conclusions is to be found in dissenting judgments. For


\textsuperscript{870} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{871} \textit{Al-Khawaja and Tahery v United Kingdom} (Applications Nos. 26766/05 and 22228/06) (2012) 54 EHRR 23.

\textsuperscript{872} Ibid [63]-[87]; See also Brice Dickson, \textit{Human Rights and the United Kingdom Supreme Court} (Oxford University Press 2013), 215 although Dickson erroneously records the number of paragraphs devoted to this comparative jurisprudence as 125.
example, in *HM Treasury v Ahmed* foreign jurisprudence appears to have been so persuasive that Lord Brown dissented from the majority view. In *Ahmed*, the Supreme Court was required to consider the lawfulness of the Terrorism Order 2006 and the Al-Qaida and Taliban (United Nations Measures) Order 2006 article 3(1)(b). The Orders had been made by the Treasury under the United Nations Act 1946 to give effect to resolutions of the United Nations Security Council designed to prevent the financing of acts of terrorism. The effect of the Orders was to deprive designated persons of all resources, save for basic expenses. The Terrorism Order empowered the Treasury to give a direction that an individual was so designated if it had reasonable grounds for suspecting that the individual ‘is or may be’ a person who committed, attempted to commit, participated in or facilitated the commission of acts of terrorism. The Al-Qaida Order provided that persons on a list compiled by the sanctions committee of the Security Council (the ‘1267 Committee’) were designated persons. The questions common to both Orders were: whether the Orders were *ultra vires* the 1946 Act; and whether the Orders were incompatible with the Convention rights under the HRA 1998.

While the Supreme Court held, unanimously, that the Terrorism Order should be quashed as *ultra vires* the 1946 Act, Lord Brown dissented on the conclusion that article 3(1)(b) of the Al-Qaida Order must also be quashed as *ultra vires*. A crucial difference between the dissenting and majority judgments on this point

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873 *HM Treasury v Mohammed Jabar Ahmed and others (No.2) (FC)* [2010] UKSC 2; [2010] 2 AC 534
874 Ibid [41].
was to do with the principle of legality. Unlike the majority, Lord Brown found it difficult to accept that the Al-Qaeda Order achieves any more than was mandated by the relevant Security Council Regulation. Concluding on this, Lord Brown states that it was

… instructive in this regard to see how certain other Commonwealth countries have given effect to these same UNSCRs. Australia, New Zealand and Canada all have legislation akin to our 1946 Act.\textsuperscript{875}

Lord Brown added that

The way Australia, New Zealand and Canada have dealt with these UNSCRs to my mind tends to support the conclusions I have reached about the impugned Orders.\textsuperscript{876}

It is interesting to note that where a judge has been inclined to use foreign jurisprudence in this way, it is more likely that other members of the court will also engage with those sources. Thus when considering the way decisions under the listing system administered by the 1267 Committee are dealt with, Lord Hope appeared to derive assistance from a number of cases from Canada and the United States,\textsuperscript{877} and the approach adopted by Australia and New Zealand was also considered in relation to the principle of legality.\textsuperscript{878} However Lord Hope emphasised the limitations of these sources:

\textsuperscript{875} Ibid [199] (Lord Brown).
\textsuperscript{876} Ibid [200] (Lord Brown).
\textsuperscript{877} Ibid [69]-[71]: Lord Hope cites: Abdelrazik v Canada (Foreign Affairs) 2009 FC 580; KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Development Inc v Geithner (unreported) 18 August 2009, US District Ct, Northern Ohio; Diggs v Shultz (1972) 470 F 2d 461 (DC Cir).
\textsuperscript{878} Under the principle of legality ‘the court must, where possible, interpret a statute in such a way as to avoid encroachment on fundamental rights, sometimes described as constitutional rights’. HM Treasury v Ahmed, above n 873, [111]; See also R v Secretary of State for the Home
Caution must … be exercised in drawing any firm conclusions from these cases. The decision of the courts in Canada and the United States were not made under reference to an international human rights instrument such as the European Convention.\textsuperscript{879}

Lord Phillips was equally reluctant to follow their conclusions:

These decisions fall short of supporting the proposition that the principle of legality raises a general presumption against Parliament delegating to the executive the power to make regulations that call for legislative design.\textsuperscript{880}

In these cases, the impulse to give reasons to an audience is arguably at its greatest. \textit{Horncastle} is a clear example. Because the Supreme Court had reached a conclusion at odds with the Strasbourg jurisprudence, there was a greater impulse towards extending the reasons given by way of explanation for such a time as when the case was to come under review in Strasbourg. In other words, the Court was using foreign jurisprudence in part to defend its conclusions to Strasbourg. This theory draws parallels with those that explain citations of foreign jurisprudence as part of a pedagogical impulse. Slaughter has given the example of ‘the court of a fledgling democracy’ which ‘might look to the opinions of courts in older and more established democracies as a way of binding its country to this existing community of states’.\textsuperscript{881} Along these lines, Justice Breyer of the US Supreme Court has suggested that said, ‘[f]oreign courts refer to our decisions … and if we sometimes refer to their decisions, the

\textsuperscript{879} \textit{HM Treasury v Ahmed}, above n 873, [71] (Lord Hope).
\textsuperscript{880} Ibid [122] (Lord Phillips).
references may help those struggling institutions’. 882 When interviewed, Baroness Hale thought it unlikely that this was in the forefront of the minds of Justices. However, she continued that ‘it may be unconscious’. 883

The thesis here is that the Supreme Court does use foreign jurisprudence in part to communicate with an audience, but that this is usually a defensive mechanism. It continues to be used as part of the general practice of giving reasons for a conclusion, which is clearest where the conclusion is likely to be controversial or unpopular:

If you are finding against the Government and a thing about which the Government feels strongly, you obviously hope that your reasoning will be sufficient to convince them ... that is particularly because the Government can’t go to Strasbourg. If you are finding against the claimant in a human rights case, well you are partly trying to convince the claimant but you are also trying to convince Strasbourg. 884

8.5 Conclusions

One of the main criticisms made by those who object to the use of foreign jurisprudence in domestic courts (and particularly in the United States) is that the practice is essentially opportunistic. That is to say, that comparativism is

883 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Baroness Hale of Richmond, above n 774.
884 Ibid.
mainly results-driven.\textsuperscript{885} judges use that jurisprudence which is likely to support their own predetermined conclusions,\textsuperscript{886} or a means of ‘judicial fig-leafing’, designed to obscure the reality of judicial choice.\textsuperscript{887} Thus some have seen the use of foreign jurisprudence as ‘giving yet another way that judges will be able to support the political choices that judges anyway wish to make’.\textsuperscript{888}

Along these lines, Posner has argued that:

Judges are likely to cite foreign decisions for the same reason that they prefer quoting from a previous decision to stating a position anew: They are timid about speaking in their own voices lest they make legal justice seem too personal and discontinuous ... Citing foreign decisions is probably best understood as an effort, whether or not conscious, to further mystify the adjudicative process and disguise the political decisions that are the core, though not the entirety, of the Supreme Court’s output.\textsuperscript{889}

Justice Scalia of the US Supreme Court has described the thought process as:

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\textsuperscript{886} See text from 8.1, p 271 above.


\textsuperscript{889} Richard Posner, ‘No thanks, we already have our own laws’, above n 887.
I want to do this thing; I have to think of some reason for it. I have to write something that—you know, that sounds like a lawyer. I have to cite something.\textsuperscript{890}

In other words, that judges draw from foreign jurisprudence in order to re-assure themselves (and their audience) about the merits of their judgment.

In the UK human rights context it is difficult to disagree that foreign jurisprudence is used in this instrumental way. However the crucial difference is that the practice is not illegitimate. In human rights cases especially, it is important that the Supreme Court is able to determine cases according to their assessment of the legal settlement in the UK. As Feldman has put it: ‘comparative study should not lead to attempted mimicry of others, but should inform the journey towards a national system \textit{which meets our distinctive needs}'.\textsuperscript{891} This reflects the optimism shared by many around the passage of the HRA, that it would foster a domestic law of human rights, rather than lead domestic courts to copy the corpus of Strasbourg jurisprudence into domestic law. This much is clear from the disappointment voiced by the architect of the HRA. Lord Irvine, the Lord Chancellor at the time of the passing of the HRA 1998, recently argued that the courts had misinterpreted section 2 of the Act and had been taken too deferential an approach to the ECtHR’ case law.\textsuperscript{892} He continued that the Supreme Court ‘should not abstain from deciding the case for themselves simply because it may cause difficulties for the UK on the

\textsuperscript{890} Norman Dorsen, ‘A conversation between U.S. Supreme Court justices’, above n 882, 531 (Justice Scalia)
\textsuperscript{892} Lord Irvine of Lairg, ‘A British Interpretation of Convention Rights’ (Lecture at University College of London’s Judicial Institute, 14 December 2011).
international law plane’. In fact, Lord Irvine suggested in that speech that it was the ‘constitutional duty’ of the Supreme Court’s judges to reject Strasbourg decisions that are flawed.

The well recorded judicial mantra to ‘follow’ or ‘keep pace’ with the ‘clear and constant’ Strasbourg jurisprudence is under development. Loyalty to Strasbourg case law is no longer a given and there is some evidence that courts are approaching the Strasbourg jurisprudence with increasing confidence, willing to take a more critical view of those decisions. The interesting and novel development is the use of foreign jurisprudence to support departure from the otherwise ‘clear and constant’ Strasbourg case law. The two cases discussed in the last section, Horncastle and Ahmed provide two such examples. It is also worth noting that in both instances the Court was determining issues arising under Article 6 of the ECHR. This is partly because Article 6 remains the most frequently invoked Convention right. It is also, as Dickson has pointed out, because Article 6 is ‘one of the Convention’s provisions in respect of which the European Court still permits Member States a fairly wide margin of appreciation in many contexts’. As a result, Dickson agrees that ‘the UK Supreme Court appears to be conscious of this and is therefore prepared to be more assertive in this field than in others’.

893 Ibid.
894 Ibid.
895 Brice Dickson, Human Rights and the United Kingdom Supreme Court (Oxford University Press 2013), 226.
896 Ibid.
897 Ibid.
… [T]here are signs that the Supreme Court Justices may be more prepared than their predecessors to ‘stand up’ to the European Court on points of domestic law which they feel the judges in Strasbourg do not fully understand. Having largely won over the Grand Chamber of the European Court during the ‘dialogue’ surrounding the use of hearsay evidence in criminal cases (the Horncastle and Al-Khawaja affair), the Supreme Court may have gained some confidence in its ability to trim the sails of the Strasbourg Court.898

The more general conclusion is that the relationship with the Strasbourg jurisprudence is changing. Not only are UK courts increasingly willing to reject Strasbourg jurisprudence as determinative of a particular issue, they are willing to reject the position adopted by the Strasbourg Court altogether—even where it is established by ‘clear and constant’ case law. While English courts may have a tendency to follow decisions of the ECtHR, it is crucial that they do so as a matter of choice, not obligation.899 This review of the deferential Ullah approach finds support in Strasbourg. Although Sir Nicolas Bratza, the then President of the ECtHR, felt that clear principles from the Grand Chamber (as in the AF case) should generally be followed, he also considered ‘dialogue through judgments’ to be ‘of equal importance’:900

Even if it is not bound to accept the view of the national courts in their interpretation of Convention rights, it is of untold benefit for the Strasbourg Court that we should have those views. … [I]t is right and healthy that national courts should continue to feel free to criticise

898 Ibid 374.
Strasbourg judgments where those judgments have applied principles which are unclear or inconsistent or where they have misunderstood national law or practices. ... But I also believe that it is important that the superior national courts should, as Lord Phillips put it in the *Horncastle* judgment, on the rare occasions when they have concerns as to whether a decision of the Strasbourg Court sufficiently appreciates or accommodates particular aspects of the domestic process, ‘decline to follow the Strasbourg decision, giving reasons for adopting this course.’ If, as has happened in the case of *Al-Khawaja*, Strasbourg is given the opportunity to reconsider the decision in issue, what takes place may indeed as Lord Phillips put it, ‘prove to be a valuable dialogue between this court and the Strasbourg Court.’ I firmly believe that such dialogue can only serve to cement a relationship between the two courts...\(^{901}\)

The main issue—often obscured by the section 2 HRA debate—is that the *prima facie* duty of UK domestic courts under the HRA 1998 is to act compatibly with the Convention. A duty to ‘take into account’ the Strasbourg jurisprudence can assist with that but is not itself the main objective. For example, it is obvious that a lack of relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence would not prevent the courts from resolving a case according to the rights set out in the Convention. As Lord Kerr has pointed out (extra judicially):

> Where a court of the UK is faced with a claim to a Convention right, it seems to me clear that it cannot refuse to examine its viability, simply because there is no relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence.\(^{902}\)

\(^{901}\) Ibid.

Lord Kerr supported this assertion with three reasons, which are worth setting out in full:

There are three reasons for this: the first practical, the second a matter of principle and the third the requirement of statute. The practical reason is that many claims to Convention rights will have to be determined by courts at every level in the United Kingdom without the benefit of unequivocal jurisprudence from ECtHR. It is simply not a practical option to adopt an attitude of agnosticism just because Strasbourg has not yet spoken. The second reason, the reason of principle, is elementary. The Human Rights Act gives citizens of this country direct access to the rights which the Convention enshrines through their enforcement by our courts. It is therefore the duty of every court not only to ascertain ‘where the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg court clearly shows that it currently stands’ (which is how Lord Hope characterised it in *Ambrose*); it is also, in my view, the court’s duty to resolve the question whether a claim to a Convention right is viable where there is no clear current view from Strasbourg to be seen. The duty to adjudicate on a claim to a Convention right cannot be extinguished or avoided by the fact that the jurisprudence of the ECtHR has so far failed to supply the answer. The final reason, the statutory imperative, is also elementary. Section 6 of the Human Rights Act leaves no alternative to courts when called upon to adjudicate on claims to a Convention right. This section makes it unlawful for a public authority, including a court, to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right. That statutory obligation, to be effective, must carry with it the requirement that the court determine if the Convention right has the effect claimed for, whether or not Strasbourg has pronounced upon it.903

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903 Ibid 7-8.
It is encouraging that the Supreme Court has been increasingly willing to move away from the deferential *Ullah* type stance and stand up to the Strasbourg Court where there are misgivings about the helpfulness of its jurisprudence. The jurisprudence of foreign domestic courts may provide an important alternative perspective. Certainly, cases like *Horncastle* demonstrate that the adoption of a conclusion at odds with the Strasbourg jurisprudence can be supported in this way, providing a layer of reasoning to the Court's judgment which may assist the Strasbourg court in its own review. Viewed in this way, the jurisprudence of foreign domestic courts is more valuable than has so far been considered. By taking those sources into account, the Justices may begin to take a more theorised approach to human rights cases, working with the Strasbourg Court in human rights cases, rather than under it.
9 Conclusions

The relative lack of attention given to the use of foreign jurisprudence at the UK Supreme Court (or in UK domestic courts generally) might give the impression that the use of these sources is limited or of little substantive relevance to judicial reasoning. The research findings, both from the quantitative data analysis of judgments and the qualitative interviews, create a rather different picture.

Of the 246 cases handed down by the Supreme Court in the first four years, explicit citations of foreign jurisprudence are found in 77, just over 30% of the total. The balance is broadly the same whether a case considered a human rights issue or not: of the total 246 cases decided by the Supreme Court in the time period, 144 do not engage human rights issues and explicit citations of foreign jurisprudence can be found in 42 of those, or 29%. The remaining 102 can be described as human rights cases and explicit citations of foreign jurisprudence can be found in 35 of those, or 34%. In other words, the Supreme Court is likely to cite a decision of a foreign court in around one in three cases, no matter what the subject. The proportion is not insignificant. Yet a close analysis of the cases does not reveal clear explanations as to why these sources are used: the Justices rarely articulate the reasons for citing foreign jurisprudence in their judgments.\footnote{Also noted in Ian Cram, 'Resort to foreign constitutional norms in domestic human rights jurisprudence with reference to terrorism cases' [2009] CLJ 118, 140.}
Since foreign jurisprudence is being used by the Supreme Court in such a significant proportion of cases, it is worth considering the contribution that these sources make. To that end, this thesis presents findings on when, how and why the UK Supreme Court uses foreign jurisprudence, as well as whether the Court should be making greater use of it.

9.1 Absence of guiding principles

The simplest reason for the use of foreign jurisprudence is that the practice is nowhere prohibited: the Justices of the Supreme Court (and other judges generally) use foreign jurisprudence because they can. It is worth repeating Lord Mance’s words, quoted in chapter four:

When judges look to comparative and international material, they may do so for information, inspiration, or confirmation, just as they use domestic decisions that are not binding on them...905

The Supreme Court is therefore free to derive such assistance as it may find from foreign jurisprudence, in much the same way that they could derive assistance from any other non-binding authority. In fact, there is no guidance on using foreign jurisprudence at all. The UK has no provision similar to section 39(1) of the South African constitution, which provides that the Constitutional Court must consider international law and may consider foreign law. While the HRA provides that domestic courts ‘must take into account’ the Strasbourg jurisprudence, the Act is silent on the use of jurisprudence from other

905 Lord Mance, ‘Foreign Laws and Languages’ in Burrows, Johnston and Zimmermann (eds), Judge and Jurist: Essays in Memory of Lord Rodger of Earlsferry (Oxford University Press 2013), 87-88.
jurisdictions. Indeed it was the absence of any guidance that legitimised the use of these sources in most cases. As Lord Mance has written, ‘without the constraints of a constitution or code, the legal systems of England and Scotland have a particular freedom to look to other systems’.  

The lack of clear guiding principles has given rise to some debate about the legitimacy of using foreign jurisprudence in the first place. As Cram has suggested, resort to foreign jurisprudence has the potential to pose ‘awkward questions concerning judicial forays into the policy-making realm of the constitution and the erosion of parliamentary sovereignty’. However, the risk has not so far manifested itself before the UK Supreme Court and it was clear from the interviews that the Justices did not themselves consider there to be any serious threat on that level. Moreover, it was not found that the Supreme Court’s use of foreign jurisprudence supported the most prevalent criticisms about the practice. Decorative or ornamental citations, for example, are unlikely. In fact, the impression from the interviews was that such uses (of any source) were liable to obscure the reasoning of a judgment. Moreover, as explained in chapter five, the impression given by some of the Justices interviewed was that the Supreme Courts’ judgments should be as concise as possible.

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906 Ibid 87.
907 Ian Cram, ‘Resort to foreign constitutional norms…’, above n 904, 125.
908 E.g. Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, former Justice of the United Kingdom Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 15 May 2012); ‘English judgments … are far too long’; Brice Dickson, Human Rights and the United Kingdom Supreme Court (Oxford University Press 2013), 3-4, commenting on the development of working methods at the Supreme Court, in order to ‘operate in a more modern and accessible way’. 
9.2 The individual approaches of the Justices

The early hypothesis was that the tendency to use of foreign jurisprudence would very likely be related to the background and inclination of individual Justices. However, the hypotheses about the individual approaches of the different Justices were not consistently supported by the quantitative data analysis. While some results showed either a greater or lesser likelihood that a certain Justice would cite foreign jurisprudence, some Justices that had a reputation for their enthusiasm about foreign jurisprudence did not actually come out as heavy users of foreign jurisprudence. For example, one surprising finding from the data analysis was that there were very few citations of German jurisprudence: just five cases—including three human rights cases—cited German jurisprudence out of the possible 246 handed down between 2009 and 2013. Given the reputation that Lord Mance (in particular) has for enthusiasm for German law, it was expected that the number would be much greater. In fact Lord Mance did not cite foreign jurisprudence any more than the average at the Supreme Court; explicit citations of foreign jurisprudence were found in around 17% of the cases in which Lord Mance had contributed a written judgment, while most of the Justices hovered around the 20% mark. For the same reason, it was surprising to see that Lord Rodger did not come out as one of more frequent users of foreign jurisprudence, with citations of foreign jurisprudence from the German Constitutional Court in R (on the application of HS2 Action Alliance Limited) v The Secretary of State for Transport and another [2014] UKSC 3. The judgment was handed down in the days prior to the submission of this thesis.

910 It is noted that reference was made jurisprudence from the German Constitutional Court in R (on the application of HS2 Action Alliance Limited) v The Secretary of State for Transport and another [2014] UKSC 3. The judgment was handed down in the days prior to the submission of this thesis.
jurisprudence in just 15% of his written judgments. Lord Rodger’s enthusiasm for using comparative law is well documented, including through recent contributions by Lord Mance and Tetyana Nesterchuk (a former judicial assistant) in a volume of essays published in Lord Rodger’s memory.\textsuperscript{911} The implication of these results was that that foreign jurisprudence must be used more extensively than is possible to tell on the face of the judgments. It was for this reason that the interviews were important; if not all uses of foreign jurisprudence are attributed in the judgments, research based only on explicit citations is not likely to reflect an accurate account of the extent to which foreign jurisprudence is used at the Supreme Court, or the reasons for which these sources are used.

The interview evidence confirmed the hypothesis that the Justices take individualised approaches to the use of foreign jurisprudence.\textsuperscript{912} As a starting point, some Justices were known to have a greater interest in comparative law than others. More specifically, some Justices were known to have an interest in certain jurisdictions. Aside from Lord Mance’s reputation for interest in German law, reference was frequently made to Lord Collins, who was well known for using American authority and had access to those databases. Other Justices expressed confidence in other languages or frequently engaged with the judges from top courts in other countries. The prevalence of citations of foreign

\textsuperscript{911} Lord Mance, ‘Foreign Laws and Languages’ and Tetyana Nesterchuk, ‘The View from Behind the Bench’, in Burrows, Johnston and Zimmermann (eds), \textit{Judge and Jurist: Essays in Memory of Lord Rodger of Earlsferry} (Oxford University Press 2013).

\textsuperscript{912} Similar findings were reported by Mak in 2012 (after the interview period for this study): Elaine Mak, ‘Reference to Foreign Law in the Supreme Courts of Britain and the Netherlands: Explaining the Development of Judicial Practices’ (2012) 8(2) Utrecht Law Review 20, 30.
jurisprudence from other common law countries was often explained on this basis.

Although many of the Justices agreed that linguistic ability would be a factor in the selection of foreign jurisprudence, ability in a foreign language does not necessarily correlate with the likelihood that a particular Justice would use foreign jurisprudence in the first place. Some of the Justices feel that a more significant barrier to using foreign jurisprudence is a practical one. Thus Lord Kerr expressed the view that the ‘wealth of material’ that was typically put forward to the Court would be more likely to prevent references to foreign jurisprudence than a lack of confidence in any given language.913 Lord Walker, however, felt that the issue was more likely to be to do with different judgment styles in different jurisdictions,914 in that shorter judgments from civil law jurisdictions would not always clearly set out the reasoning.915 Finally, there is a more general problem surrounding the research framework involved in finding relevant foreign jurisprudence: ‘the main barrier is not knowing where to start on the research’.916

An effective time saving measure is to refer to the works of leading academics in the relevant field. A good example of academic work being used in this way

913 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore, Justice of the United Kingdom Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 9 May 2012). Indeed, Lord Kerr pointed out that it was always possible to get a translation of a particular judgment.
914 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, above n 908.
915 On different legal styles of common and civil law systems, see e.g. Basil Markesinis ‘A Matter of Style’ (1994) 110 LQR 607.
can be drawn from the *HJ (Iran)* case,\textsuperscript{917} considered in chapter seven. In that case, Lord Dyson did not ‘find it necessary to examine the Australian authorities to which [the Supreme Court] were referred’. Instead, it was ‘sufficient’ to refer to an academic paper exploring the impact of the troublesome Australian and UK jurisprudence. Lord Dyson was satisfied that the paper showed ‘the reasoning of the majority judgments is being generally applied in Australia…’ \textsuperscript{918} Lord Walker also noted comparative academic work on this point and reproduced a lengthy paragraph from the paper to which Lord Dyson referred in the judgment.\textsuperscript{919} The implicit suggestion is that cases which have not been digested by academic work are not as likely to be used as those that have. Again, this is heavily reliant on the enthusiasm that an individual Justice has for reading about the law in foreign jurisdictions or how well stocked their bookcases might be.\textsuperscript{920} The feeling is that some Justices are simply more inclined to use foreign jurisprudence than others and take a view as to the potential obstacles accordingly. This relationship between the individual approach of a Justice and the use of foreign jurisprudence also contributes an explanation for decline in the use of foreign jurisprudence between 2011 and

\textsuperscript{917} *HJ (Iran) (FC) v Secretary of State for the Home Department* [2010] UKSC 31.  
\textsuperscript{919} *HJ (Iran)*, ibid [92].  
\textsuperscript{920} Lord Reed explained: ‘There is a practical problem about finding foreign jurisprudence. … I’ve got … a French textbook on human rights law, which obviously cites French case law. But not many people have got foreign textbooks on their shelves’, Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Reed, Justice of the United Kingdom Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 8 May 2012).
Lord Collins, the heaviest user of foreign jurisprudence at the Supreme Court, gave just two written judgements in 2011 before retiring.

### 9.2.1 Foreign jurisprudence as a heuristic device

Another clear finding is that different Justices use foreign jurisprudence for different reasons. In the main, foreign jurisprudence was explained as a heuristic device. That is to say, foreign jurisprudence provides the Justices of the Supreme Court with a fresh perspective—an analytical lens—through which to reflect on their own reasoning about a problem. This is what appeared to be happening in the House of Lords control order cases, *MB and AF (No3)*, and this is what seemed to drive Lord Collins’ insistence on the consideration of American decisions in *Jones v Kaney*. In the latter case, the vast American jurisprudence on ‘precisely the same arguments of policy which [had] been argued before [the UKSC]’ were, to Lord Collins, of obvious assistance. This was despite the fact that the culture relating to expert evidence was different in the United States, because ‘the underlying principle is the same’. Thus, as Bell concluded, the Commonwealth and United States jurisprudence in *Jones v Kaney*...

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921 Explicit citation of at least one foreign decision was found in around 47.6% of human rights cases in the 2010-11 judicial year. In 2011-12 the figure was at 34.5% and fell further to 25% in 2012-13.

922 Lord Collins cited foreign jurisprudence in 42.9% of his written judgments between 2009-13. In 2010, that figure was at its peak, at 63.6%.

923 *Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB* [2007] UKHL 46; *Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF and another* [2009] UKHL 28.


925 Ibid [77].
Kaney was cited ‘as a way of checking that no relevant argument had been ignored’.926

None of the Justices interviewed felt this use of foreign jurisprudence to be problematic, largely because no particular reliance is placed on these materials. As Saunders has suggested, the reality is simply that ‘such cases must be determined … with or without the insights offered by comparative law’ and ‘in at least some such cases, foreign experience can help to elucidate the issues and options for their resolution’.927 The purpose served by foreign jurisprudence in these circumstances is simply to provide an opportunity for reflection or forms ‘part of the process of reaching a more fully theorised … agreement’.928

This sort of purpose is important. In the human rights context it is worth remembering historically the relative unfamiliarity of UK judges with human rights adjudication and with the duties imposed upon them by the HRA 1998. For example, prior to the HRA, the balancing exercise required by the qualified rights had been the jurisdiction of the supranational court. A positive duty to ‘take into account’ one particular pool of otherwise persuasive jurisprudence, to read domestic law compatibly with an international convention and to declare any incompatibilities that could not be so remedied, have all led domestic courts to grapple with greater depth and detail on questions previously unfamiliar to

926 John Bell, ‘Comparative law in the Supreme Court 2010-11’, above n 926, 21.
the role of the judge. One of the major justifications for comparativism is therefore that it can also encourage the domestic court to adopt a more theorised approach to human rights. As McCrudden recognised, ‘[e]ven where the result of the foreign judicial approach has not been adopted, it has often been influential in sharpening the understanding of the court’s view of domestic law’. 929 ‘Foreign law may perform a cognitive function … the confrontation of both legal systems may force some consideration and better understanding of the nature of domestic law’. 930

However, heuristic uses of foreign jurisprudence are also likely to be the more obscure in the judgment. Where foreign jurisprudence is used as part of an information gathering exercise, as an analytical lens, yardstick or benchmark against which to measure thinking, it is easy to understand the lack of explicit citations. This finding also goes some way towards explaining the anomalies in the data set discussed above, 931 where it was explained that the data collected on explicit citation did not show some Supreme Court Justices—known for their enthusiasm for comparative law—as heavy users of foreign jurisprudence. This finding also addresses one of the main criticisms about the use of foreign jurisprudence: that these sources perform mainly a legitimation function. If the Justices are not always citing the foreign jurisprudence used, it is difficult to


931 Above, text from n 909.
conclude that these sources are simply used opportunistically, in order to bolster predetermined conclusions. If that were always the case, all references to foreign jurisprudence would be explicit and detectable on the face of the judgments.

9.2.2 Foreign jurisprudence used for consistency

The heuristic uses described above are distinct from the ‘gap-filling’ thesis offered by much of the literature. That is, that foreign jurisprudence may offer a useful perspective where the indigenous jurisprudence is lacking or unsettled. While it is fairly clear that counsel tend to approach foreign jurisprudence in this way, it was not possible to find clear evidence that the Justices do so. The only evidence might be the tendency to review foreign jurisprudence in human rights cases where the Strasbourg jurisprudence was unhelpful or non-existent. However, even in those instances, other explanations were more realistic. Thus the use of American and Canadian jurisprudence in *Ambrose v Harris* was more likely used to bolster the majority’s reluctance to decide the case in a way that was perceived to be advancing on the Strasbourg jurisprudence.932 Indeed, it is a common feature of judicial reasoning under the HRA that the ECHR must be understood and applied uniformly amongst all contracting states. In human rights cases engaging Convention issues, considerations of this kind have therefore led the court to keep pace with the Strasbourg jurisprudence. Since the court also relies on the Strasbourg jurisprudence to set out the position of

the various contracting states, it is not surprising that foreign jurisprudence is used less often in cases of this kind. Even where it would be of interest to the Supreme Court to review the position of the other states signatory to the Convention, it is clear that the Court prefers to accept the results of the Strasbourg Court’s research on the point.

The approach is surprising, given the well-recognised problems with the quality and consistency of the Strasbourg Court’s decisions. As Amos has written, the Strasbourg case law ‘can be unclear, confusing, and admitting of many possible interpretations’.933 If consistency and uniformity are the aim, the Court may find it necessary to draw assistance from the jurisprudence of foreign domestic states as a means to establishing the common position where the Strasbourg jurisprudence is lacking or unclear. There is some evidence that the Supreme Court has approached foreign jurisprudence in this way—the Cadder case discussed in chapter seven provides a good example.934 The example indicates that although the scope for using foreign jurisprudence is likely to be more limited in Convention cases where the case law of the supranational court is prioritised, the Supreme Court is willing to make use of those sources where they can provide assistance in confirming the conclusions of the Strasbourg Court and confirming the consensus on a position. The feeling lingers, however, that the very existence of the Strasbourg jurisprudence prevents research into

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934 Cadder v Her Majesty’s Advocate (Scotland) [2010] UKSC 43.
foreign jurisprudence in the terms that the Court might otherwise have sought to undertake.

The influence of the Strasbourg Court’s jurisprudence is evident when one contrasts the approach in those cases with the approach where there is no supranational court jurisprudence to refer to. In these cases, foreign jurisprudence is important precisely because there is no supranational court to provide authoritative guidance on the interpretation of the relevant instrument. It is therefore up to the contracting states to work in harmony, balancing the interpretation of the instrument according to common developments with a measure of self-regulation, so that the courts do not attach a meaning to the instrument that was not envisaged by all contracting parties. Far from resorting to foreign jurisprudence where there is a dearth of domestic jurisprudence, in these cases foreign jurisprudence may appropriately be of equal or greater importance than the domestic case-law, irrespective of the nature or absence of domestic jurisprudence. The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (‘Refugee Convention’) provides a useful example.\footnote{Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Geneva, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. (entered into force 4 October 1967)} As there is no supranational body acting as the final arbiter on the interpretation of the Refugee Convention, it is not surprising to see citations to foreign cases in these judgments. Various examples of this approach were readily discoverable in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court as well as the earlier case law from the House of Lords. The quantitative analyses of the Supreme Court judgments further support the claim. Of the 246 judgments handed down by the Supreme
November 2009 and the end of the judicial year in July 2013, the Refugee Convention was cited in 13 (5% of all the Supreme Court’s judgments). Of the 13 cases in which the words ‘Refugee Convention’ are found, five concern the interpretation of the Convention’s provisions. Foreign jurisprudence is cited in each of these five cases. Many of the Supreme Court Justices interviewed spoke on the subject in these terms, highlighting the importance of consensus in such cases. At times, it was suggested that the ‘imperative’ extends so far that judges will be prepared to suppress certain hesitations in order to achieve uniformity.

However, it is clear that further complications may arise where there are many signatories to a Convention—since it is likely to be more difficult to establish an interpretation based on state practice in those circumstances. This is in addition to the fact that, despite a shared agreement or a common membership of a legal system, a legal order does not necessarily require homogeneity. Moreover it is important to distinguish between what countries are doing under the Convention and what they are doing as a matter of discretion over and above Convention obligations, in order to avoid the well-articulated risks of re-writing the instrument. As Lord Brown put it in a Refugee Convention case before the House of Lords:

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937 R (Hoxha) v Special Adjudicator [2005] 1 WLR 1063.
It is one thing to invite this House to construe the Convention as a living instrument generously and in the light of its underlying humanitarian purposes; quite another to urge your Lordships effectively to rewrite it.\footnote{Ibid 1088.}

Given the Court’s ability to maintain this awareness and balance in these cases, it is not obvious (other than for purely practical reasons) why there is such reluctance to engage in research of this kind into the jurisprudence of the European member states. Moreover, taking a more proactive approach to the ECHR could provide the Court with an opportunity to conduct its own review, providing the findings as support for its reasoning where required. After all, the use of foreign jurisprudence as reasons for a decision was among the clearest explanations given by the Justices interviewed.

\textbf{9.2.3 Instrumental uses, standing up to Strasbourg}

In keeping with the finding that foreign jurisprudence is most significantly used to support reasons for a decision, there is evidence that some Justices of the Supreme Court are inclined to use foreign jurisprudence to support conclusions that are at odds with the relevant jurisprudence. In other words, the Justices use foreign jurisprudence instrumentally, as a tool to legitimate a particular result. It is these types of uses that have attracted the most criticism.\footnote{Eg Ian Cram, ‘Resort to foreign constitutional norms…’, above n 904, 139-141; Elizabeth Wicks, ‘Taking Account of Strasbourg? The British Judiciary’s Approach to Interpreting Convention Rights’ [2005] EPL 405, 410. See also Justice Antonin Scalia, ‘The Bill of Rights: Confirmation of Extent Freedoms or Invitation to Judicial Creation?’ in Grant Huscroft and Paul Rishworth (eds) \textit{Litigating Rights: Perspectives from Domestic and International Law} (Hart Publishing 2002); James Allan, ‘A Defence of the Status Quo’ in Tom Campbell et al (eds), \textit{Protecting Human Rights: Instruments and Institutions} (Oxford University Press 2003). Cf. Christopher McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of Human Rights?’, above n 929, 527.} For example, it
is often suggested that judges use that jurisprudence which is likely to support their own predetermined conclusions or, worst, as a means of ‘fig-leafing’, designed to obscure the reality of judicial choice.\(^{940}\)

The claims in this thesis are not as expansive. While it is argued that the UK Supreme Court does use foreign jurisprudence instrumentally, it is not suggested that this instrumentalism is driven by political concerns. Rather, the Supreme Court’s instrumentalism is driven by a general desire to give reasons for conclusions, especially those that may be unpopular or controversial. This is especially important in human rights cases where, for example, the Supreme Court has reached a conclusion at odds with the relevant jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court. In this way, foreign jurisprudence may provide a useful tool in increasing the confidence of the Supreme Court and encourage it to develop the domestic law of human rights, which meets the distinctive needs of the United Kingdom.

There is evidence that the Supreme Court is showing greater willingness to reject the Strasbourg jurisprudence where it is unhelpful or at odds with the constitutional arrangements in the United Kingdom. This is most obvious in cases where the Strasbourg jurisprudence has been thought to be out-dated; implicit in the construction of the ECHR as a ‘living instrument’,\(^{941}\) is the


\(^{941}\) *Tyrer v United Kingdom* (1978) 2 EHRR 1 [31].
presumption that domestic courts may properly conclude that Convention jurisprudence has lost its relevance with age. The decision in Re P is a good example of the willingness to construct conclusions on the basis of the way the Strasbourg jurisprudence was thought to be developing.\footnote{In Re P (A Child) (Adoption: Unmarried Couples) [2008] UKHL 38; [2009] 1 AC 173} Another obvious excuse for divergence (also relevant in Re P) is created by the operation of the ‘margin of appreciation’ doctrine, which signifies that there are issues on which there is no relevant Strasbourg authority at all.\footnote{E.g. Francesca Klug ‘A Bill of Rights: Do we need one or do we already have one?’ [2007] PL 701, 708.} It is relatively clear that judges are willing to view the matter in this way. A connected possibility is related to the nature of the Strasbourg authority itself. Although some commentators have argued that Strasbourg’s decisions are so important as to be considered as authority even in instances in which they did not ‘argue the point through in a coherent and thorough manner’,\footnote{Ian Loveland ‘Making it up as they go along? The Court of Appeal on same sex spouses and succession rights to tenancies’. [2003] PL 222, 233.} the prevailing attitude among the judiciary has been that there is ‘room for dialogue’ where an English court ‘considers that the Strasbourg Court has misunderstood or been misinformed about some aspect of English law’ and ‘it may wish to give a judgment which invites the [Court] to reconsider the question’.\footnote{R v Lyons (No 3) [2003] 1 AC 976 [46]. A number of judges have recently given lectures that have been critical of the Strasbourg Court and its approach to its jurisprudence: Lord Sumption, ‘The Limits of Law’, 27th Sultan Azlan Shah Lecture (Kuala Lumpur, 20 November 2013); Lord Judge, ‘Constitutional Change: Unfinished Business’ (University College London, 4 December 2013); Lord Justice Laws, ‘The Common Law Constitution’ Hamlyn Lectures 2013, (Lecture 3: ‘The Common Law and Europe’ (London, 27 November 2013); Jack Straw, ‘Aspects of Law Reform: an Insider’s Perspective’, Hamlyn Lectures 2012 (Lecture 2: The Human Rights Act and Europe); Baroness Hale ‘Argentoratum Locutum: Is the Supreme Court Supreme?’ Nottingham Human Rights Lecture 2011 (Nottingham, 1 December 2011); Lord Irvine of Lairg, ‘A British
It was argued in chapter eight that this evaluative approach to Strasbourg jurisprudence has developed a step further. The Supreme Court has shown willingness to reject Strasbourg jurisprudence as determinative of a particular issue even in cases where that jurisprudence is clear and constant. This represents a departure from the deferential start to the relationship with the Strasbourg Court, and the sense that the UK Courts appeared to be acting as ‘merely agents or delegates of the ECHR and Council of Europe’ of Strasbourg.\textsuperscript{946} \textit{Horncastle} is the best example of this approach.\textsuperscript{947} The case is illustrative of both the strength attached to the (clear and constant) Strasbourg jurisprudence, and of the willingness to depart from it. There is nothing in the judgment given by Lord Phillips (giving the judgment of the Court) to suggest that the Supreme Court felt that the Strasbourg jurisprudence was not ‘clear and constant’. Instead, Lord Phillips acknowledged the argument that the Supreme Court ‘should treat the judgment of the Chamber in \textit{Al-Khawaja} as determinative of the success of these appeals’ and responded by providing reasons for declining to do so.\textsuperscript{948} The Supreme Court would ‘decline to follow’ the relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence on the basis that the Strasbourg court had not ‘sufficiently appreciate[d] or accommodate[d] particular aspects of our domestic process’.\textsuperscript{949} The reasons for that conclusion relied heavily on foreign jurisprudence from the established common law courts. \textit{HM Treasury v Ahmed Interpretation of Convention Rights'}, Lecture at University College of London’s Judicial Institute (London, 14 December 2011).

\textsuperscript{946} Lord Irvine of Lairg, ‘A British Interpretation of Convention Rights’, ibid.

\textsuperscript{947} \textit{R v Horncastle and another} [2009] UKSC 14.

\textsuperscript{948} Ibid [10].

\textsuperscript{949} Ibid [11].
provided another alternative example, from the perspective of dissenting judgments.950

It is important that the Supreme Court is able to determine cases according to their assessment of the legal settlement in the UK. As Feldman has put it: ‘comparative study should not lead to attempted mimicry of others, but should inform the journey towards a national system which meets our distinctive needs’.951 This reflects the optimism shared by many, that the HRA 1998 would foster a domestic law of human rights, rather than copy the corpus of Strasbourg jurisprudence into domestic law. Indeed Lord Irvine has recently confirmed this to have been the intention at the time of the HRA’s passage through Parliament. Lord Irvine made it clear that the Supreme Court ‘should not abstain from deciding the case for themselves simply because it may cause difficulties for the UK on the international law plane’.952 In fact, Lord Irvine suggested in that speech that it was the Supreme Court’s ‘constitutional duty’ of judges to reject Strasbourg decisions that are flawed.953 Lord Kerr lent support to this sentiment in a 2011 lecture:

… if we have been the modest underworker [of Strasbourg], we should stop it at once. We should kick the habit. We should stiffen our sinews and stride forward confidently. … [E]ven if a case can be

950 HM Treasury v Mohammed Jabar Ahmed and others (No.2) (FC) [2010] UKSC 2.
952 Lord Irvine of Lairg, ‘A British Interpretation of Convention Rights’ (Lecture at University College of London’s Judicial Institute, 14 December 2011).
953 Ibid.
made that in the past we were excessively deferential to Strasbourg, there are recently clear and vigorous signals that we are no longer.\textsuperscript{954}

9.3 Providing a given audience with reasons

The underlying theme running through the different approaches to foreign jurisprudence is that the Justices are, in part, using those sources to communicate with an audience. For the most part, this manifests itself as the giving of reasons. For example, Justices that appear to cite foreign jurisprudence out of courtesy to counsel are also extending reasons for their conclusions; if heavy reliance has been place on foreign jurisprudence by counsel, it is natural that a Justice might address it when explaining their own conclusions in judgment. An extension of that possibility is that Justices are simply addressing the cited material as part of their explanation to the parties in the decided case.

Similar theories can be applied to the use of foreign jurisprudence in Convention cases, where the audience is the Strasbourg Court. This is especially clear where the Supreme Court had reached a conclusion at odds with the Strasbourg jurisprudence. In such cases there is a greater impulse towards the giving of reasons in anticipation of such a time as when the case may come before the Strasbourg Court for review. In other words, the Court is using

foreign jurisprudence in part to defend its conclusions to Strasbourg. This communication forms part of what is commonly considered to be a growing ‘dialogue’ with the Strasbourg Court.\footnote{E.g. Nicolas Bratza, ‘The relationship between the UK courts and Strasbourg’ [2011] European Human Rights Law Review 505; Merris Amos, ‘The dialogue between United Kingdom courts and the European Court of Human Rights’ [2012] 61(3) ICLQ 557; John Spencer, ‘Squaring up to Strasbourg- \textit{Horncastle} in the Supreme Court’ [2010] Archbold Review 6; Lady Justice Arden, ‘Peaceful or Problematic? The relationship between national Supreme Courts and Supranational courts in Europe’ (2010) 29 (1) Yearbook of European Law 3; Alan Paterson, \textit{Final Judgment: The Last Law Lords and the Supreme Court} (Hart Publishing 2013), 222-233.} the jurisprudence of foreign domestic courts may provide a useful perspective to the Strasbourg Court in its own review. Cases like \textit{Horncastle} demonstrate that the adoption of a conclusion at odds with the Strasbourg jurisprudence can be supported in this way,\footnote{\textit{R v Horncastle}, above n 947.} providing a layer of reasoning to the Court’s judgment, which may assist the Strasbourg court in its own review. The then President of the Strasbourg Court recognised the value of such dialogue, considering that it could ‘only serve to cement a relationship between the two courts’.\footnote{Nicolas Bratza, ‘The relationship between the UK courts and Strasbourg’, ibid 512.} Viewed in this way, the jurisprudence of foreign domestic courts is more valuable than has so far been considered. By taking those sources into account, the Justices may begin to take a more theorised approach to human rights cases, working with the Strasbourg Court in human rights cases, rather than under it.

However, this communication is strictly between the Supreme Court and supranational courts, such as the European Court of Human Rights. The Justices were dismissive in interview about the idea that they would be affected in the way they write judgments by the thought of an international audience.

When citing foreign jurisprudence, the Justices of the Supreme Court do not
consider themselves to be in conversation with the Justices of other domestic courts. Foreign jurisprudence is cited only when helpful for the purposes of the instant case. The only obvious exception is where the Court is tasked with the interpretation of an international convention or instrument, for which there is no supervisory court. In those circumstances the Supreme Court is likely to review the foreign jurisprudence not only to learn of any common consensus as to the interpretation of the instrument, but also to ensure that it does not leap ahead of any international consensus. In doing so, it necessarily contributes to the body of jurisprudence that the courts of another contracting state will review in a similar case from that jurisdiction.

The popular theories of transjudicial dialogue (a growing tradition of international conferences and symposiums, which facilitate a direct exchange of ideas between judges and practitioners from all over the world) are not supported by this thesis. Any jurisprudence prompted by international meetings or conferences is likely to be drawn from a small family of courts, since the Justices tend to engage with a small number of jurisdictions, usually in the common law tradition. Moreover the significance of these events is limited. It is only in very rare cases that such dialogue substantially affects judicial reasoning. When it does, it is probably better explained as part of a prior willingness to draw from foreign jurisprudence than as a product of judicial exchanges per se. Indeed, during the interviews with the Justices of the Supreme Court, only two of the Justices attributed any real weight to these
meetings. Rarely was an example given where they could recall an instance of discussion with other judges having a significant effect on judgments.\textsuperscript{958}

9.4 The effect of changing working methods

Finally, the research findings have also made obvious certain developments in the working methods of the UK’s top court. Most obviously, the decline in the use of foreign jurisprudence between 2011 and 2013, mentioned above,\textsuperscript{959} could be explained as a product of the change in judgment styles at the Supreme Court. One of the most interesting research findings was that the Supreme Court is increasingly handing down single or plurality style judgments, which in turn appear to yield significantly fewer citations to foreign jurisprudence. Of the total 246 cases handed down by the Supreme Court between 2009 and 2013, there were 130 with plurality or effectively plurality judgments. Interestingly, only 33 of the remainder actually comprised of a full set of separate judgments; although the other 83 could not be classified as being a plurality or effectively plurality judgment, in each case at least one member of the court chose to associate himself (by the expression of agreement) with the judgment of another.

This is not altogether surprising, given the greater sense of collegiality at the new Supreme Court. For example, Paterson has described the establishment of

\textsuperscript{958} Cf. Penny Darbyshire, \textit{Sitting in Judgment: The Working Lives of the Judges} (Hart Publishing 2013), 400: ‘There is a far more intense international interchange of senior judges, in ideas, visits, exchanges, conferences and publications than outsiders appreciate’.

\textsuperscript{959} Above, text around n 921.
‘team-working’ practices under Lord Phillips and Lord Neuberger, as far greater than there had been at the House of Lords.  

This sense of collaborative work has most obviously manifested itself through changes to the Supreme Court’s working methods. As Mak has explained:

Since October 2009, the judges have been experimenting with a system in which one judge writes the lead opinion and the other judges on the panel may choose to concur with this judge, to write a separate opinion, or to write a dissenting opinion.  

By changing its working methods in this way, ‘the Court aims to create more transparency’. The reasoning is that ‘working with majority opinions leads to more consistency and gives clearer guidance to the lower courts on how to operate in the future’.  

Mak’s own interview evidence ‘indicated that the use of foreign legal materials need not be hampered by the increased use of majority opinions’ because ‘an individual judge might still choose to write a separate opinion about foreign law if this judge is not satisfied with the majority opinion’. However, the analysis of the data for this research indicates otherwise: the effect of plurality style judgments on the use of foreign jurisprudence appears to be fairly significant. The proportion of citations to foreign jurisprudence is smallest in plurality type

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960 Alan Paterson: Final Judgment, above n 955, 141.
962 Ibid.
963 Ibid.
964 Ibid.
judgments; greater in cases with more than one written judgment; and greatest in cases where a full set of separate judgments were given.

However, despite the general trend towards collective judgments and (it might be thought) more collective approaches to judgment writing, the different Justices continue to take individualised approaches to judicial reasoning. This is because, as Paterson points out, the Supreme Court ‘team’ is a rather unusual one.965 Lord Reed explained:

> It is a curious team because the value of the team depends on everybody using their own individual intelligence and their own experience and so forth and bringing all that to the party…966

### 9.5 Reflections on Judicial Reasoning at the Supreme Court

When writing in memory of Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, Lord Mance opened his chapter titled ‘foreign laws and foreign languages’ with the following caption from Thomas Mann, Josef und seine Brüder:

> Denn nur durch Vergleichung unterscheidet man sich und erfährt, was man ist, un ganz zu weden, der man sein soll (‘For only by comparing yourself with others do you learn what you are, in order to realise your full potential’).967

The quote captures some of the most important research findings presented in this thesis. The first of these is the most obvious: since there are no rules

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965 Alan Paterson: *Final Judgment*, above n 955, 141.
966 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Reed, conducted by Alan Paterson, Ibid.
967 Lord Mance, ‘Foreign Laws and Languages’, above n 911, 85.
governing the use of foreign jurisprudence in the UK, the Supreme Court has been willing to use comparative sources where it is thought to shed light on an issue or provide a useful benchmark (or ‘yardstick’) against which to measure domestic law. The discretionary nature of these sources means that individual judicial attitudes and approaches play a large part in their use.

These findings also shed light on judicial reasoning in human rights cases more broadly and judicial reasoning at the UK Supreme Court more generally. The willingness to use foreign jurisprudence heuristically, as an analytical lens or yardstick against which to measure a judge’s own reasoning, hints at the attempt to ensure that the Court is not looking at matters in ‘too parochial a way’.968 In this regard, the Supreme Court is not very different from other top courts around the world, increasingly ready to accept the protection of human rights and the balance of constitutional powers as part of their role. Similar themes of cooperation with other top courts permeate the explanations about using foreign jurisprudence to identify and maintain consistency with the evolving international consensus. Finally, the support to be derived from foreign jurisprudence where the Supreme Court is seeking to adopt a conclusion at odds with the otherwise relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence demonstrates a greater confidence on the part of the UK’s top court than was previously evident at the House of Lords.

968 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Reed, above n 920. This approach to foreign jurisprudence is likely to reflect the Court’s use of other persuasive sources more generally, although a fuller study would be required for confirmation.
This is not a claim that the Supreme Court is evolving into a quasi-constitutional court; the Court continues to lack any power to find statutes incompatible with the constitution.\textsuperscript{969} Early in the life of the Supreme Court, Malleson accepted that it may never be a full constitutional court but argued that the Supreme Court did nevertheless have an ‘expanding role’ which was ‘rooted in continuity rather than radical change’.\textsuperscript{970} Moreover it was the continuity that would ‘facilitate rather than inhibit its development into a more powerful judicial body’.\textsuperscript{971} The research findings set out in this thesis support that conclusion.

The use of foreign jurisprudence is not a new phenomenon. When referring to these non-binding sources, the Justices of the UK Supreme Court are simply continuing a long established tradition from the development of the common law. For example, it is not difficult to understand the tendency to make reference to foreign jurisprudence for the purpose of identifying international consensus as being closely connected to the impulse to compare with past precedents, rationalised on a ‘like for like’ type of reasoning. Neither did the Human Rights Act effect any change to the legitimacy of references to foreign jurisprudence. The initial tendency to defer to the Strasbourg jurisprudence was in part derived from the duty in section 2 of the Act, to ‘take into account’ those decisions, but the use of foreign jurisprudence is nowhere prohibited.\textsuperscript{972} Indeed, it is the

\begin{table}[h]
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Andrew Harding and Peter Leyland (eds), \textit{Constitutional Courts: A Comparative Study} (Simmonds and Hill 2009) 3; Kate Malleson, ‘The Evolving Role of the Supreme Court’ [2011] Public Law 754, 757. & \\
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Kate Malleson, ‘The Evolving Role of the Supreme Court’, ibid 764. & \\
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Ibid. & \\
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\caption{Research references.}
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\textsuperscript{969} Andrew Harding and Peter Leyland (eds), \textit{Constitutional Courts: A Comparative Study} (Simmonds and Hill 2009) 3; Kate Malleson, ‘The Evolving Role of the Supreme Court’ [2011] Public Law 754, 757.
\textsuperscript{970} Kate Malleson, ‘The Evolving Role of the Supreme Court’, ibid 764.
\textsuperscript{971} Ibid.
continued use of foreign jurisprudence that has provided the opportunity for the Supreme Court to reconsider the scope of the section 2 duty. It is not insignificant that the willingness on the part of the Supreme Court to depart from the clear and constant Strasbourg jurisprudence as in Horncastle was heavily supported by references to relevant foreign jurisprudence.973

These findings also speak to the characteristics of the new Supreme Court. While the Court might be described as more collegiate than the House of Lords, and plurality style judgments are common, it does not follow that the Justices are becoming homogenous. One of the clearest conclusions to be drawn from the varied explanations about the value of foreign jurisprudence and the methods through which they are used, is that the Justices continue to take individualised approaches to judicial reasoning.974 The result is that the value to be drawn from foreign jurisprudence is heavily reliant on the individual skills and interests of the Justices. This much is clear from the practical barriers to these sources, leading the Court to rely on the introduction of foreign jurisprudence by counsel or academic texts.975 As Bobek explains:

On the whole … the judicial as well as extra-judicial pronouncements of the senior English judiciary on the use and the utility of comparative law for the decision-making of an English judge are

973 Horncastle, above n 947.
975 Similarly, Bobek has recently concluded that the limits on (persuasive) authority and citation in English courts are of ‘functional, not political origin’. ‘An open system, such as the English one, might gradually become overburdened … with the amount of available materials, internal as well as external. Anything might be cited—too much becomes cited, if the technology permits. Michael Bobek, Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts (Oxford University Press 2013), 79.
rather positive. The occasional moderate sceptical voices are concerned with ‘how can we do it’ in terms of (linguistic) competence, time, costs, and resources, pointing out the difficulty an English judge faces when trying to understand the particularities of a foreign system of law. There are, however, no rejections, certainly not outright, of comparative inspiration qua persuasive authority in courts.976

If, as has been argued here, foreign jurisprudence can provide useful and significant contributions to judicial reasoning at the UKSC, it will be important that consideration is given to improving access to these sources. Recognising the value that Lord Rodger had added in this respect, Lord Mance recently wrote:

Too often in the highest court, issues arise which one feels must have been considered in other major legal systems. Too often, difficulties of obtaining appropriate information or an appropriate interlocutor to explore or explain a foreign system stand in the way of cross-fertilization of this sort. Lord Rodger’s knowledge and experience straddled different legal systems and was, in that respect, unique. His departure invites the thought that the Supreme Court should itself aim to acquire a comparative legal and linguistic expertise …977

Foreign jurisprudence remains a persuasive rather than binding source, but the opportunity to be persuaded is a valuable one. Unlike the US Supreme Court, where the debates about the legitimacy of citations to foreign jurisprudence are

976 Michael Bobek, ibid 83.
most polarised, the UK court is not a constitutional court. Rather than searching for compatibility with a domestic constitutional text, the UKSC’s primary task in human rights cases is to ensure compatibility with international instruments—the ECHR in particular. It is this novel task that led UK courts to adopt a deferential stance towards the Strasbourg jurisprudence in the early years of the HRA. It is also for this reason that the jurisprudence of other foreign domestic courts remains important. It is worth remembering that the prevailing fear about judicial comparitivism in other jurisdictions has been that it provides an opportunity for judges to obscure the reality of judicial choice. The chief risk is that comparitivism might import foreign standards that were not intended or anticipated by the domestic legislature. In the UK the situation is reversed. The prevailing fear is that the provisions of a domestic statute—the HRA—are responsible for an overly deferential attitude to the European standards. The Supreme Court thus has the peculiar task of achieving compatibility with an international instrument, without compromising the United Kingdom’s sovereignty. In this context, the jurisprudence of foreign domestic courts provides the Supreme Court with the opportunity to measure the Strasbourg case law and support departures from it where necessary. Paradoxically, it is the jurisprudence of foreign domestic courts that may enable the Supreme Court to realise its full potential: to develop the domestic law of human rights that many hoped the Human Rights Act would foster.
Annexe 1: Interview communication and design

Interview requests

Dear [judge title and name]

I am a PhD candidate at Queen Mary, University of London, working under the supervision of Professor Kate Malleson. My research focuses on the use of foreign jurisprudence in UK human rights cases.

I am writing to request a short interview with you to ask your views about the use of foreign jurisprudence in the Supreme Court, the status of such jurisprudence and the factors and/or methods involved in its use. A central aim of my research is to understand how members of the appellate courts approach the use of foreign jurisprudence and it would therefore be invaluable to my work to hear your perspective on this topic. The interview would last a maximum of 30 minutes.

If you could spare any time between [interview period], I would be extremely grateful. I append a list of my profile and research abstract so that you may have a better idea about my personal credentials and research area.

Yours sincerely

Hélène Tyrrell

Requests for permission to use quoted material

Dear [judge title and name]

I am writing to follow up on an interview that you kindly allowed me to conduct with you on [date of interview]. You may remember me: I am a PhD candidate at Queen Mary, University of London, working under the supervision of Professor Kate Malleson. My research is on the use of foreign jurisprudence in UK human rights cases.

At the time of the interview it was agreed that I would write to confirm approval for any quotes that I wished to use in my thesis. I re-confirmed this in my thank you letter, after the interview. I am now writing to make good on this promise and to ask for your permission to use the attached quotes in my PhD thesis and
future work. I have numbered the quotes and highlighted the words attributed to you (transcribed from my recording of the interview) for ease of reference. I have also included the paragraphs around the quotes where necessary to give an idea of the context in which they are used or the point that I have used them to illustrate. Any interview evidence from other judges present in these sections has been anonymised, pending permission of those quoted.

Your contributions are an invaluable addition to my thesis but it is not my aim to misrepresent or misinterpret any of the interview evidence. Therefore, if there are retractions or corrections to be made, please do not hesitate to let me know. I also append my (revised) research abstract, to provide context. It has recently been confirmed that the examiners for this thesis will be Professor Alan Paterson and Professor Ian Cram. I have not included the full draft of the thesis but I would be happy to send it (or this document) electronically if it would be helpful.

Yours sincerely

Hélène Tyrrell

Interview questions

The interviews followed a ‘semi-standardised’ or ‘guided-semistructured’ method. What follows is an outline of interview questions commonly put to the interviewees but does not account for deviation or elaboration.

Attitude to the use of foreign jurisprudence

1. How relevant do you think that foreign domestic case law is to your work as a judge in the Supreme Court and do you perceive that these have been of growing relevance?

2. What, for you, is useful about comparative material?

3. How has the Human Rights Act altered the relevancy or use of foreign jurisprudence?

4. From your impression, would you say that foreign jurisprudence is more or less useful in human rights cases?
5. Could you approximate a proportion of cases in which foreign jurisprudence is used (cited vs not cited)?

**Purpose of foreign jurisprudence**

6. Why is foreign jurisprudence used?

7. The literature discusses the possibility that judges use comparative material to fill ‘gaps’ in the domestic law. Would you agree?

8. There has also been an suggestion that a pedagogical factor is at play. Is it ever in your mind that other (foreign) courts will be using your judgments and does that alter your judgment at all?

9. Other suggestions might include using foreign jurisprudence as part of a legitimation exercise; to bolster a conclusion that the court seeks to reach; to reassure the judge; to engage in a ‘transjudicial dialogue’ *per se*. How do these explanations relate to your experience?

10. Is there a preference for citations from some jurisdictions above others?

11. What is the influence of the Judicial Community (regular meetings with judges from foreign courts, exchanges)? There has been much discussion about a ‘transnational dialogue’ evolving between judges from various jurisdictions. Do you feel that this is an accurate analysis?

12. What are the content and consequences of this dialogue, if it exists? Does it furnish judges with knowledge that they would otherwise not have?

13. Whatever its content, does direct interaction between judges pique curiosity about foreign jurisprudence, or encourage greater use of foreign jurisprudence, as some scholars have suggested? Or to put it another way, if unable to meet, would citation of foreign jurisprudence diminish?

14. If this dialogue does increase citation of foreign jurisprudence – what is the importance of it relative to institutional variables, such as judge’s own legal training and backgrounds or the support personnel (JAs) who have interest / experience of foreign jurisprudence?
15. Is it appropriate to consider decisions of other European (domestic) courts in human rights cases?

16. How much of a problem is the linguistic barrier? Is this a significant hurdle to comparison with countries that do not operate or publish their judgments in English? If this did occur with greater frequency, would you be tempted to draw from foreign jurisprudence more often?

17. Is greater weight attached to comparative material where the court is considering a question that does not fall within the jurisdiction of a supranational court? For example, in human rights cases some direction is inevitably given from the Strasbourg Court, whereas the Refugee Convention (now widely regarded as a human rights instrument although it wasn’t necessarily designed as such) has no supranational body. Similar instruments would be the Hague Convention, the Warsaw Convention an so on.

18. In some cases, comparative material is distinguished even though it is not binding. Why do you suppose that it?

Working Methods

19. How does comparative law come to your attention? Is it always the case that counsel will raise it, or do you actively seek it out?

20. Do you expect Counsel to consider relevant comparative material?

21. How much of your own research do you conduct beyond the material given to you by Counsel? What sources would you use to do that?

22. A related question is about the judicial assistants. Do you ask for assistance with research for cases? If so, would your judicial assistants bring comparative law to your attention, or would you ask them to do a search for any relevant foreign jurisprudence?

23. How often would you say that foreign jurisprudence is considered without explicit citation in the judgment? Or, to put it another way, do the law reports accurately reflect the extent to which foreign jurisprudence is used?
### JUDICIAL REASONING AT THE UKSC 2009-2010

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<td>3</td>
<td>42.9%</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>4</td>
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## 2009-2013 TOTALS

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<th>%</th>
<th>Human Rights Judgments handed down</th>
<th>Human Rights Judgments citing foreign jurisprudence</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Non-Human Rights Judgments handed down</th>
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<td><strong>ALL</strong></td>
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<td>144</td>
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<td>47</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19.1%</td>
<td>83</td>
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<td><strong>JUDGMENTS WHERE AT LEAST ONE MEMBER OF THE COURT AGREES</strong></td>
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<td>57.9%</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
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