Sovereignty, failed states and US foreign aid: a detailed assessment of the
Pakistani perspective
Waheed, Ahmed Waqas

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School of Politics and International Relations

SOVEREIGNTY, FAILED STATES AND US FOREIGN AID: A DETAILED ASSESSMENT OF THE PAKISTANI PERSPECTIVE

Ahmed Waqas Waheed

Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

September 2014
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This thesis explores the international politics of Pakistan’s conditional sovereignty through a comparative analysis of Pakistan-US relations during the Cold War (1979-88) and the War on Terror (2001-08). The thesis seeks to understand whether the end of the Cold War restructured, reshaped and reconfigured US attitudes towards Pakistan when caught up in a new geo-political conflict, namely the War on Terror. The thesis is constructed around three main arguments focusing on Pakistan’s sovereignty, US foreign assistance to Pakistan and Pakistan’s state failure. Firstly, the thesis demonstrates that US conditions on Pakistan’s sovereignty fluctuate according to whether or not the US is strategically interested in Pakistan. In both cases, different sets of conditions are applied to Pakistan’s sovereignty. The thesis also details Pakistan’s response to these conditions on its sovereignty. Secondly, the thesis argues that given the importance of the normative value of state failure in the post-9/11 US policy and its absence in the War on Terror as a condition on Pakistan’s sovereignty, it is expected that Pakistan’s state failure status will come to dominate the conditions on Pakistan’s sovereignty when the US is not strategically interested. Thirdly, the conditions on Pakistan’s sovereignty are a means to secure Pakistan’s compliance to US demands, by either withholding foreign assistance or disbursing it. In that case then, given the centrality of human rights and state failure in post-9/11 international relations, the thesis demonstrates that US statebuilding efforts remain pivoted on US political interests rather than human rights and development. The qualitative research includes elite interviews, unclassified documents and builds on existing literature, while the quantitative portion involves statistical data.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This research could not have been possible without the support of many people. First and foremost, I will use this opportunity to thank my supervisors; Professor James Dunkerley and Professor Ray Kiely. Both were abundantly helpful and offered invaluable assistance, support and guidance, in their own ways. Professor James Dunkerley inspired and motivated me. It was Professor James Dunkerley’s words that kept me convinced that this project is possible, especially during tougher times. All I had to do was mail Professor Dunkerley a draft, and along with corrections and suggestions, packed in my email, I would find a burst of hope. Professor Ray Kiely was very methodical and surgical in his feedback on the thesis. This thesis immensely benefits from his feedbacks and his suggestions. His dedication in assisting me from the first paragraph I wrote for this project to now when I am submitting, is truly humbling. Under his guidance I have gone half bald because of pulling my hair; his supervision was so extensive and meticulous. I fear I may have had the same effect on him, albeit for different reasons. I have greatly benefited from my supervisory team and for that I am very grateful.

I wish to express my gratitude to my wife. It was definitely not easy for her to leave the comfort of being an Army officer’s wife and suffer years of separation and unrequited sacrifice. Yet she believed in my dream, and unflinchingly held on. Without her emotional support none of this could have come to fruition. Secondly, I wish to convey my deepest gratitude to my father, who was always there to support during tough and difficult times. Without his motivational and financial support it might not have been possible to come this far. Thirdly, my special thanks to all my friends, who have suffered my severe mood swings and hours long lectures on state sovereignty.

I also wish to thank the staff members of the School of Politics and International Relations, Queen Mary, University of London, for their prompt help and assistance whenever I required it. In the end, I wish to thank my elite interviewees, who notwithstanding time constraints, contributed wholeheartedly towards this study.
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>AICC</td>
<td>All India Congress Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSF</td>
<td>Coalition Support Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENERCON</td>
<td>Energy Conservation Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESAF</td>
<td>Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility</td>
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<td>EFF</td>
<td>Extended Fund Facility</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAA</td>
<td>Foreign Assistance Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>GoP</td>
<td>Government of Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>HEC</td>
<td>Higher Education Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICISS</td>
<td>International Commission for Intervention and State Sovereignty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>Unmanned Aerial Vehicle</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>WAPDA</td>
<td>Water and Power Development Authority</td>
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Chapter 1 - INTRODUCTION

Introduction

It is common knowledge that during the Cold War, sovereignty was usually interpreted by states to imply, in theory at least, a principle of non-interference and non-intervention, and more so by the Third World states. However, a series of humanitarian crises that ensued during the 1990s reconfigured and renewed the challenges to state sovereignty. The move to requalify sovereignty to modern realities also gained impetus after 9/11 when the US proclaimed that it was threatened more by weaker states than stronger ones. While Cold War interventions (Yoon 1997) and Foreign Assistance strategies (Lake 2010) were known to fulfil geopolitical purposes, these geopolitical purposes were now ostensibly replaced by human rights. Though the debate on the obsolescence of sovereignty as an analytical tool in international relations is not something new however, recent developments in international relations, pivoted around human rights and signified by the inclusion of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ norm in the UN charter have renewed the debate on state sovereignty (UN General Assembly 2005). Thus what we have witnessed is a transformation internationally, from sovereignty as authority (Ayoob 2002a) to sovereignty as responsibility (Pender 2002). In this context it is important to study this transition. Since this transition directly affects the Third World and legitimizes intervention in cases the global community deems necessary, it is thus important to observe how the Third World states have responded to this development. Secondly, it also needs to be seen whether the policies of powerful states are more human-centric now given the transformation of the concept of state sovereignty.

In this regard, Pakistan constitutes a near perfect case study to investigate this phenomenon. Pakistan has been consistently ranked amongst the top failed states (Foreign Policy Magazine 2013) and its projected state failure remains a pivotal concern of policymakers and intellectuals alike. In that case, the contemporary tangential discourse on state sovereignty which suggests that weaker states are a greater threat than stronger ones, to the security of greater powers, makes the study of Pakistan’s state sovereignty an important exercise. Further, the contemporary logic of foreign economic assistance justifies foreign aid as a means to alleviate weaker states from their dire conditions. This logic has three components; the nature of the threat (terrorism/humanitarian crisis), the location of the threat
(weaker/failed states), and the solution to the threat (foreign aid). Amongst others, Pakistan conspicuously falls on the intersection of these three components.

Though Pakistan has remained a vital US ally in the War on Terror, however the extremist militancy within its population and its lack of control of the region bordering Afghanistan has remained a pivotal security concern of the US. Indeed the capture of Osama bin Laden from within Pakistan and the continuing drone attacks within Pakistani territory, in the region along Pakistan-Afghanistan border, are amongst many issues that haunt relations on both sides. This is because these issues highlight US insensitivity to Pakistan’s state sovereignty. For instance, in the case of the capture and killing of Osama bin Laden, the major powers were euphoric however the mood in Pakistan was sombre. In his speech Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Yousaf R. Gillani commenting on the capture of Osama bin Laden and US drone attacks (Prime Minister of Pakistan 2011) iterated that ‘Unilateralism runs the inherent risk of serious consequences … Any attack against Pakistan’s strategic assets whether overt or covert will find a matching response. Pakistan reserves the right to retaliate with full force. No one should underestimate the resolve and capability of our nation and armed forces to defend our sacred homeland. There are of course legal and moral issues that relate to the question of sovereignty. In a generic sense this is a question that continues to vex the international community as a whole. The Security Council while exhorting UN member states to join their efforts against terrorism has repeatedly emphasized that this be done in accordance with international law, human rights and humanitarian law. The drones are given out as an instrument to fight terror. Yet, as we have repeatedly said these attacks constitute a violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty and are counter-productive. On this question which relates to operational matters, we have strong differences with the United States’.

On the other hand the US argued otherwise. As Orr (2011,732) observes [The US] argue that the American drone strikes in Pakistan are permissible, or at least that certain existing legal models are inadequate to regulate American engagement with al Qaeda in that country. First, prolonged, intense hostilities involving non-state actors that are capable of conducting large-scale strikes, merit military, rather than law-enforcement responses. American drone strikes also do not violate Pakistani sovereignty because Pakistan is unable or unwilling to prevent al Qaeda fighters from hiding and planning future attacks within its borders.

What is noteworthy in the narrative above is the logic that drone attacks are justified because of Pakistan’s inability to control its territory, a language that closely follows the ‘responsibility to protect’ argument. Thus Pakistan is a classic case of the loggerhead between ‘sovereignty as authority’ and ‘sovereignty as responsibility’. This thesis is thus a
detailed expose’ of Pakistan’s state sovereignty and will be analysed within the larger framework of Pakistan-US relations.

**Research Questions**

The thesis concerns itself with the following research questions:

1. The introduction of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ norm in the UN charter signified a departure from the traditional rigid notion of state sovereignty. Has Pakistan’s sovereignty, correspondingly, transformed from the Cold War to the post-Cold War?
2. Considering that the War on Terror established that the US was now threatened more by weaker states than by stronger ones and that Pakistan is a weaker state, did this change in US threat perception transform Pakistan-US relations?
3. US has, traditionally, kept Pakistan’s sovereignty conditional to its demands, by withholding and releasing US foreign aid as it suited its convenience. Has this circumstance changed?
4. US foreign assistance strategy was based on a realpolitik model during the Cold War and now it is supposed to be based on humanitarian reasons centred on alleviating conditions in weaker states that make these states ‘incubators of terrorism’. Since Pakistan is a weaker state at the centre of the discourse on international terrorism, does US foreign aid to Pakistan conform to this pattern?
5. Considering that internationally Pakistan is viewed as a failing/fragile state, how does the Pakistani state view this development in light of its state sovereignty?

**Significance of the Research**

This thesis seeks to provide a detailed exposé on Pakistan’s state sovereignty in the face of US political and strategic interests, Pakistan’s state failure and US foreign aid. Most of the literature on Pakistan-US relations deals specifically with strategic and security issues and the (dis)harmony of interests among the two states. These issues encompass a wide range of diverse topics such as the Pakistan-US relations in general (Ali 2008; Schaffer & Schaffer 2011; Berger 2010; Mustafa 2012; Fair 2010b), Pakistan’s nuclear activity (Kupfer 2004; Kerr & Nikitin 2013; Clary 2010; Zaborowski 2005; Ahmed 2010), Pakistan’s alliance with the US in the War on Terror (Shah 2010; Ahmed 2014; Haqqani 2002; Hussain &
Soherwordi 2011; Quinlan 2012; Hussain 2009), religious extremist and militancy in Pakistan (Kapur & Ganguly 2012; Fair 2004), and the role of Pakistan Army in democracy and Pakistan-US relations (Murphy 2008; Shah 2011; Nasr 2004; Khan 2009; Fair & Nawaz 2010). These studies are not only expansive and empirically rich but also provide a detailed analysis of how Pakistan-US relationship functions. However, within these narratives, Pakistan’s sovereignty is mentioned marginally and in a matter-of-fact manner. Even those studies which specifically seek to explore Pakistan’s sovereignty, either look at Pakistan’s internal dynamics (Fair 2011), the economics of aid to Pakistan (Rehman 2005) or Pakistan’s sovereignty within a constitutional and theological context (Ahmed 2009; Ahmed 1960). This study is hence a pioneering effort to fill the gap in the literature on the subject of Pakistan’s state sovereignty by analysing Pakistan’s state sovereignty during the Cold War era and the War on Terror. The study is also significant because it primarily investigates the Pakistani state’s perspective on its sovereignty by basing its fieldwork on the interviews of Pakistani state elites.

Another gap in the literature is with respect to Pakistan’s projected state failure. While the literature on Pakistan’s state failure is scarce, even then most of it is based on how the western world views Pakistan’s state failure (Ziring 2010; Kux 2001; Fair 2010a; Abbas 2009). This aspect of Pakistan’s state failure will be explored in greater detail in chapter 5. This study will thus be a first to study how the Pakistani state views its projected state failure. Further since the concept of state failure is intrinsically tied to international economic assistance, in that sense then the thesis seeks to analyse the flow of US assistance to Pakistan to determine whether the transforming narrative of sovereignty has equally transformed international foreign assistance strategies. While there are numerous detailed studies of US assistance to Pakistan during the Cold War and the War on Terror mostly dealing with Pakistan’s security and democratization (Murad 2009; Anwar & Michaelowa 2006; Epstein & Kronstadt 2012; Tabbasum 2013; Khan 1997), however this thesis is unique in the sense that it follows the trajectory of US assistance to Pakistan during the Cold War (1979-88) and the War on Terror (2001-08) to determine whether Pakistan’s state failure has transformed US policies towards Pakistan. This thesis then is not only an effort to analyse Pakistan’s state sovereignty but is also a significant attempt to analyse Pakistan’s state failure from the Pakistani state’s perspective. While as mentioned earlier numerous studies on Pakistan-US relations, Pakistan’s state failure and US economic and military assistance exist, however this
thesis seeks to knit these developments within an explanation of Pakistan’s sovereignty and the internationally changing norms on state sovereignty.

**Pakistan State Sovereignty**

This section seeks to answer four main questions: Firstly it enquires, how does the Pakistani state understand political sovereignty? Secondly, why is it important to study state sovereignty, given contemporary global settings and thirdly, why do we need to study Pakistan’s political sovereignty specifically? And how does the theory of cosmopolitanism figure in the discussion on Pakistan’s state sovereignty?

Sovereignty has quite an ambiguous and elusive character, compounded by various definitional and theoretical conundrums (Mishra 2008). As a concept it is ‘fuzzy’ and complex (Jackson 2003). Conceptually, at least, ‘it’s protean character has baffled intellectual pursuits since its inception’ (Mishra 2008, 65). However, despite the fact that the concept of sovereignty has retained its problematic character, it has continued to remain a central feature of international politics. As Jackson (2003, 783) argued: ‘the concept of "sovereignty" is still central to most thinking about international relations and particularly international law’. Ayoob (2002a, 81) argues that the ‘respect for state sovereignty… forms the cornerstone of … the global covenant which, in turn, acts as the foundation for international order’. It is around this centrality of sovereignty in the international order, around which this thesis seeks to conceptualize its argument. The thesis will not indulge in detail on the conceptual problematique of sovereignty but will rather seek to understand how Pakistan has viewed its sovereignty in the face of US demands.

In order to explore the contours of Pakistan’s sovereignty and the conditions that the US has applied on it, an understanding of sovereignty is required, one which encapsulates Pakistan’s political reality. Given that Pakistan gained its independence from British colonial rule in 1947 and is categorised among the states that form the Third World it is important to observe how the institution of sovereignty developed in the post-colonial Third World. Any understanding of sovereignty for this thesis will then have to be sensitive to Pakistan’s post-colonial Third World character. This aspect will be explored in detail in chapter 2 and will be discussed briefly here to contextualize the meaning of sovereignty the thesis chooses to study Pakistan’s political sovereignty.
Most of the Third World was decolonized around the middle of the twentieth century. This meant that their membership into the existing community of states allowed them the same privilege of equality among other states, independence and non-interference in their domestic matters and consequently, political sovereignty. Sovereignty, then, provided these states a strong barrier against international interference and intervention in their domestic affairs and at the same time allowed them to use force and exercise supreme political authority over their domestic affairs. However while apparently, it seemed that all member states of the international system enjoyed the same privilege of state sovereignty, in essence, the newly decolonized Third World approached state sovereignty as a principle of international relations, differently. This was because to begin with the Third World state was not only weak, vulnerable and insecure, domestically but externally as well. In that sense the continued insecurities of the Third World was a defining feature in their understanding of sovereignty. Thus as Sturman (2008, 70) argued

‘The external and internal insecurity stems from their late entry into the state system, and their precarious sovereignty based on colonial demarcations of their boundaries. A shared colonial legacy is essentially what separates Third World conceptions of sovereignty from others in the international system…Newly independent governments found themselves in the ironic position of having to defend the artificial colonial borders rigorously in order to establish their own legitimacy at home and abroad’.

Thus since the concept of state sovereignty, imbibing the idea of non-interference in their domestic matters and sovereign equality externally, provided a powerful bastion against foreign intervention, hence, Clapham observes that ‘post-colonial states have, since their independence in the decades following WWII, emerged as the most strident defenders of Westphalian sovereignty in the international order’ (Clapham 1999, 522). This particularly holds true for Pakistan, who’s domestic and external insecurities, as explored in chapter 3, have kept it strongly confined to the Westphalian understanding of sovereignty. Further since the ‘central elements of state sovereignty are the control of territory, population and the use of force’(Cronin 2002, 194), in that sense then in the Third World states such as Pakistan, sovereignty may be seen as ultimate political authority. Thus as Jackson (2003, 782) argues

‘The old "Westphalian" concept in the context of a nation-state's "right" to monopolize certain exercises of power with respect to its territory and citizens … is still prized and harbored by those who maintain certain "realist" views or who otherwise wish to prevent (sometimes with justification) foreign or international powers and authorities from interfering in a national government's decisions and activities. Furthermore, when one begins to analyze and disaggregate the concept of sovereignty, it quickly becomes apparent that it has many dimensions. Often, however, the term "sovereignty" is invoked in a context or manner designed to avoid and
prevent analysis, sometimes with an advocate's intent to fend off criticism or justifications for international "infringements" on the activities of a nation-state or its internal stakeholders and power operators'.

Since one of the purposes of the thesis is to analyse how Pakistan responded to US demands, such a study cannot move forward without understanding how Pakistan encapsulates the institution of political sovereignty. As the thesis has observed above, Third World states have clung to the idea of Westphalian ‘realist’ sovereignty since their decolonization. This is because these artificially created states had to strive for legitimacy at home and abroad against foreign interventions and domestic dissent. In this regard Westphalian sovereignty, with its emphasis on the equality of states operating in an anarchic world and supreme political authority over domestic affairs, provided them the perfect apology. Hence in the context of this research, the understanding of Pakistan’s state sovereignty will be based on the postulates of Westphalian sovereignty according to which:

‘First, a sovereign state is one that enjoys supreme political authority and monopoly over the legitimate use of force within its territory. Second, it is capable of regulating movements across its borders. Third, it can make its foreign policy choices freely. Finally, it is recognized by other governments as an independent entity entitled to freedom from external intervention’ (Haass 2003, 1).

Since the thesis analyses Pakistan’s political sovereignty, with specific regards to its relationship with the US during the Cold War and the War on Terror, hence to understand how and why Pakistan has responded to the US in the manner it has, the thesis cannot proceed without understanding how the concept of sovereignty is institutionalized in Pakistan. A detailed understanding of the development of sovereignty in the Third World will be provided in chapter 2, while the case of Pakistan’s sovereignty linked with its state formation will be analysed in chapter 3.

Why is it important to study state sovereignty?

Sovereignty has historically remained a problematic concept. Despite various conceptual and various challenges to sovereignty, the predominance of realism and specifically neo-realism, during the Cold War continued to accord state sovereignty a ‘no-contest accepted feature’ (Mishra 2008, 67). All this changed after the Cold War. As Jackson (1999, 423) argued

‘Historically speaking, sovereignty has a birth..., a life (the past three or four centuries), and arguably just like any other basic political arrangement it will – sooner or later – undergo a transformation that will be so fundamental and consequential as to spell its death for all intent and purposes. Some scholars think that transformation is underway’.
Further Teschke (2003, 1) reinforces a similar stance when he argues that

‘While Realists insist on a mere reconfiguration of the balance of power, premised on changes in the distribution of power across the system’s units, affecting only the polarity within an unaltered anarchical system of states, the near-unanimous verdict in the non-Realist camp is that traditional state sovereignty is under attack. The classical Westphalian system, rooted in the primacy of the modern, territorially bounded sovereign state, is being replaced by a post-territorial, postmodern global order. The old logic of geopolitical security is being subordinated to geo-economics, multi-level global governance, or the demands of a multi-actor international civil society’.

Two issues after the Cold War sought to renew the debate and hence challenge the idea of state sovereignty in international relations, theory and practice. The first issue was the resurgence of the idea of globalisation. The analyses of globalisation advocates, who heralded the eclipse or the near-death of state sovereignty, were largely based on ‘the emerging global economy with its interdependent systems of production and consumption, dramatic flows of currency across national borders, and increasingly sophisticated technologies of information gathering and processing’ (Cohen 2001, 76). This aspect of the challenge to state sovereignty remains out of the purview of this thesis. However it is the second issue around which this thesis builds the debate on state sovereignty.

The second challenge to the idea of state sovereignty begun with the humanitarian crises of the 1990s. While intellectuals and scholars (Hoffmann 1997; Moore 1998) were grappling with the idea of humanitarian intervention to solve the dilemma posed by the humanitarian crises in places such as Somalia, Kosovo, Rwanda, policymakers in the global community were confounded by the problem as well. Most conspicuously, the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan posed an inquiry in his Millennium Report (Annan 2000):

‘If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica, to gross and systematic violation of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?’

The Canadian government responded to this enquiry by setting up a Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty which presented its report titled ‘Responsibility to Protect’ in 2001. The report (UN 2001) ‘found that sovereignty not only gave a State the right to "control" its affairs, it also conferred on the State primary "responsibility" for protecting the people within its borders. It proposed that when a State fails to protect its people — either through lack of ability or a lack of willingness — the responsibility shifts to the broader international community’. This norm on intervention and state sovereignty became a part of
the UN Charter in 2005. It transformed the idea of sovereignty from state sovereignty as authority to state sovereignty as responsibility and thus noted a departure from the traditional notion of state sovereignty. Thus in essence then, since most humanitarian crises seemed to occur in the Third World and in weaker states, this transformation, that sought legitimacy to intervene in a state’s domestic affairs was seen as an onslaught on weaker states. As an observer noted, amongst the ‘different forms of attack on Third World sovereignty in international politics, one form of attack comes from new articulations of —human rights positioned in opposition to (Third World) sovereignty [and] expressed through the notion of —humanitarian intervention and the recent doctrine of the —Responsibility to Protect’ (Arat-koc 2010, 1). This observation was shared by most of the Third World states as evidenced in the summits of non-aligned movement states. As Chomsky (2004, 14) observes that the South Summit of non-aligned movement states, in April 2000 ‘was the most important in their history, the first ever at the level of heads of state, who…firmly rejected "the so-called 'right' of humanitarian intervention."’ That stand was reiterated in the summit of nonaligned countries in Malaysia in February 2003, in the same words. Perhaps they had learned too much history, the hard way, to be comforted by exalted rhetoric and had heard enough about "humanitarian intervention" over the centuries’.

In a parallel development the terrorist attacks on the US soil in 2001, completely reconfigured US threat perception. This was because the US now felt less threatened by conquering states than by failing ones (White House 2002). In response to this threat the US sought to ‘actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world’ (Ibid, ii). The US further argued that

‘the events of September 11, 2001, taught us that weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states. Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders’ (Ibid).

Thus, while the sovereignty of weaker states of the Third World was already under the ire and focus of the Western powers because of humanitarian crises within their political territory, the War on Terror opened another front. As Patrick (2006, 2) argued; ‘Before 9/11, US. policymakers viewed states with sovereignty deficits primarily through a humanitarian lens: they piqued our moral conscience but possessed little strategic significance’. The event of 9/11, that commenced the War on Terror, accorded the lacking strategic significance to the issue of Third World sovereignty. Thus now, Third World weaker/failing states face two
onslaughts on their state sovereignty. Domestically, their ultimate political authority has come under increased scrutiny in a situation where humanitarian crisis may ensue. Internationally, their equality amongst states and their norm of non-interference is threatened for strategic reasons. Thus now, the growing significance of state failure in weaker states has pitched the interests of the Western powers and the First World states led by the US, against the political sovereignty of the Third World states. In this regard what interests this thesis is that while a plethora of literature on state sovereignty has emerged since the Cold War pivoted around humanitarian intervention and state failure that have questioned western motives (Clapham 1999; Ayoob 2002a; Lawson & Shillam 2009; Gordon 1997), there is a substantial dearth in the empirical literature on how the Third World states themselves view their political sovereignty against this growing international trend of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’.

Hence, the objective of this thesis is twofold. Firstly, it seeks to analyse whether the recorded departure of state sovereignty, from ‘sovereignty as authority’ to ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ have changed the patterns of inter-state interactions between the First World and the Third World, and for this we employ a case study of Pakistan-US relations. Secondly, it seeks to understand how Third World states view their political sovereignty in the face of the transforming discourse on sovereignty.

Why study Pakistan’s state sovereignty?

Considering, as we have observed above, that the Third World weak states are now at the centre of the discourse on sovereignty, Pakistan’s existence as a Third World post-colonial state provides us an opportunity to check the veracity of various claims made against Third World state sovereignty. Clapham (1999, 523) observed that ‘the newly independent governments took to Westphalian sovereignty like ducklings to water, and as participants in the post-1945 international order, their concern was to protect[it]’. This was because, Ayoob (2002a, 83) argues

‘Strong states have routinely intervened, even forcibly, in the affairs of weaker ones. Nevertheless, during the past 50 years, following the emergence of post-colonial states in large numbers, the notion of sovereignty and its corollary of non-intervention had forced the strong to make at least mildly credible cases for intervention into the affairs of the weak. Sovereignty had thus acted as a restraint on the former’s interventionary instincts’.

Thus the norms of Westphalian sovereignty accorded the Third World a perfect barrier behind which to organize their affairs without foreign intervention or interference. Now,
Westphalian sovereignty is under increased scrutiny and ‘it is increasingly apparent that the greatest challenge to the notion of international society comes from the new found proclivity on the part of major powers as well as international and regional organisations to intervene in the domestic affairs of juridically sovereign states for ostensibly humanitarian purposes’ (Ibid, 98). This poses an even greater challenge to Third World states’ sovereignty. Considering the transformation of this narrative, Pakistan is most suitably placed to study how Third World states have responded to this departure in the discourse on sovereignty. Thus, a study of Pakistan’s sovereignty allows us to verify the claim that Third World states have continued to be strident defenders of Westphalian sovereignty by analysing Pakistan’s state sovereignty from the prism of Pakistan-US relations.

Pakistan is also a fragile Third World state and has remained at the centre of international activity on terrorism. The explosion of the concept of state failure and/or state fragility has fundamentally reconfigured the way international organisations and powerful states view foreign assistance. For instance, ‘The OECD Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations assert that state building is the central objective of international engagement in fragile states and set the ambitious goal of assisting in the building of “effective, legitimate and resilient states’ (OECD 2008). On the other hand, in early 2006,

‘Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced a sweeping “transformational diplomacy” initiative to promote the emergence of “democratic, well-governed states” in developing countries. Her plan included a significant reform of US. foreign assistance. Henceforth, US. foreign aid would be targeted toward five strategic objectives: promoting peace and security, investing in people, promoting economic freedom, supporting just and democratic rule, and providing humanitarian assistance’(Patrick 2008).

These foreign assistance strategies were formulated behind the logic that improving governance and humanitarian conditions in fragile states, would alleviate these states from being ‘festering incubators of terrorism’(Piazza 2008, 469). In this instance then, Pakistan’s case as a fragile state at the centre of global terrorism provides us an opportunity to validate and analyse whether Pakistan’s status as a failing state has transformed Pakistan-US relations. This the thesis will do by analysing US foreign aid to Pakistan during the Cold War and the War on Terror to check whether there is a persistent pattern of US foreign assistance to Pakistan that remains unchanged from the patterns identified during the Cold War or has the discourse on state fragility fundamentally altered the dynamics of US foreign assistance strategy.
Pakistan is also the only fragile Third World state whose alliance with the US was vital during the Cold War, especially the War in Afghanistan and the War on Terror. During the Cold War, the Pakistan-US alliance was purely for geostrategic reasons i.e. to counter Soviet expansionism in Afghanistan. In that instance given the predominance of the realpolitik model of international relations, US foreign aid to Pakistan were also for geostrategic purposes (Lake 2010). Thus during the Cold War, especially during the Reagan years, in the US policy calculus Pakistan was part of the solution. In the War on Terror, Pakistan’s record of supporting the Taliban, its ineffectiveness in containing religious extremist within its territory and its inability to halt cross border terrorism in Afghanistan, made it a part of the problem. Thus considering US problem solving approach towards fragile states, US foreign assistance strategy, it is argued, ‘seeks to build legitimacy for new states by providing security and essential public services to their populations…This model rests on social contract theory, and its core tenet that legitimacy follows from providing effectively for the basic needs of citizens’ (Ibid, 258). In essence then, what is argued is that the focus of US foreign aid has shifted away from being used for geostrategic purposes towards more human centric concerns given the nature of the threat. The case of Pakistan empirically allows us to test the validity of this model and ascertain whether this is indeed the case. Secondly, US foreign aid during the Cold War ‘emphasized building loyal and politically stable subordinate states’ (Ibid). In that sense then Pakistan’s dependence on US foreign assistance, economic and military has come to be a recorded fact. Pakistan’s dependence on the US has often been studied as a dependent client state and a rentier state. Since dependence is aimed at creating opportunities to exercise leverage on client states, Pakistan’s sovereignty has been conditional to US demands throughout from the Cold to the War on Terror. By exploring Pakistan-US relations during the Cold War and the War on Terror, this thesis is in a position to ascertain how these conditions on Pakistan’s sovereignty were exacted and how did Pakistan respond to them.

**Why use the theory of Cosmopolitanism?**

Cosmopolitanism is a political theory that closely aligns with recent developments on state sovereignty and humanitarian intervention. If humanitarian intervention, is ‘the paradigmatically liberal cosmopolitan practice in international society today’(Rao 2010), in that case then so is the ‘responsibility to protect’ norm of state sovereignty. Thus we can say that humanitarian intervention and foreign economic assistance strategies are solutions to the anathema of state failure, only that the former is harsher than the latter. For instance, ‘three
elements are shared by all cosmopolitanist positions. First, individualism; the ultimate unit of concerns are human beings…second, universality; the status of ultimate unit of concern attaches to every human being equally…third, generality; this special status has global force’ (Pogge 1992). According to cosmopolitans then once a state fails to fulfil its responsibilities towards its citizens, it becomes the collective responsibility of the states in the international system to intervene by either statebuilding, which involve a sizeable foreign assistance plan or through armed intervention depending on the gravity of state failure. As Archibugi (2008, 188) argues; ‘Cosmopolitanism undertakes to guarantee individuals a whole range of fundamental rights, even when their own state is violating them or is incapable of defending them’. In essence then what cosmopolitans argue is that when states fail to deliver public goods to its people, and fails its ‘responsibility to protect’, the onus of the responsibility lies on the community of states in the international system to intervene in order to ensure that human rights are protected. Thus, cosmopolitanism provides us a unique framework to analyse the international developments proceeding the War on Terror given that ‘the responsibility to protect’ doctrine of state sovereignty, the discourse on state failure and the solution to the problem of state failure are major paradigmatic components of cosmopolitanism. A detailed understanding of the theory of cosmopolitanism and its contemporary relevance in exploring Pakistan’s state failure will be discussed in the chapter 2.

Research Methodology

As is evident from the title of the thesis, this research is a comparative case study of two different time periods in Pakistan’s political history; the Cold War (1979-88) and the War on Terror (2001-08). The time periods identified for this case study share various similarities. During both these time intervals, Pakistan was under military dictatorial rule, the US was strategically interested in the region, and foreign aid flows to Pakistan recorded high volumes. The case study is aimed at measuring the quality of Pakistan-US relations during these time periods in order to understand whether the change in global politics after the end of the Cold War, signified by the emergence of the discourse on state failure, the increased importance of human rights attached to state sovereignty and the global war on terror, has been equally followed by a qualitative change in the nature of Pakistan-US relationship. The thesis is thus, deductive in nature and uses a historical-comparative case study method driven by both, descriptive and explanatory research to formulate a more comprehensive
understanding of the dynamics of Pakistan’s sovereignty in a changing world. In the process, it employs various methodological tools such as elite interviewing of Pakistani officials, analysing declassified US state documents and gathering data on US aid to Pakistan, besides scavenging the existing literature for secondary sources.

The case-study method is normally used when ‘a how or why question is being asked about a contemporary set of events over which the investigator has little or no control’ (Yin 1994, 9). Further, the case-study method employs tools such as ‘documents, archival analysis, surveys and interviews’ to provide a deeper and detailed exposition of ‘contemporary events when the relevant behaviour cannot be manipulated’ (Rowley 2002, 17). In such a case, given that the questions typified by this thesis follow a ‘how’ and ‘why’ pattern, the case-study method seems the most suitable method for the analysis of Pakistan-US relationship. Further Yin argues that ‘a case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident’ (Yin 1994, 13). Since the thesis, seeks to provide an explanation of Pakistan’s sovereignty during the War on Terror, the phenomenon (Pakistan’s state failure) and the context (transforming discourse on sovereignty internationally) have not been analysed in detail and thus a case-study of Pakistan’s sovereignty is the most appropriate method to analyse Pakistan’s sovereignty. Thus, while the discourse on Pakistan’s state failure is shaped elsewhere, this study seeks to question how the Pakistani state views its state sovereignty and its status as a failed/failing state.

Within the case study method, the thesis uses the historic-comparative case-study method. This is because ‘explanations of major societal processes … rely on studies that use historical and comparative research’ (Kreuger & Neuman 2006, 418). Further, since the historic-comparative case-study method ‘can reveal processes over long time periods and across societies, and it addresses many central issues in general theory’ (Ibid), it is a suitable design to analyse the research questions posed by this thesis which, only broadly, seek to enquire whether Pakistan-US relationship transformed from the post-Cold War to the War on Terror. This method thus allows the thesis to study the contemporary processes (War on Terror and the transforming discourse on sovereignty) by first establishing the practices in the past (Cold War). Thus, the comparative approach to analyse the two eras of the Cold War and the War on Terror, provides us with a comprehensive framework to study not only the change in the global processes but also how units in the international system have responded to these processes over time. The thesis thus seeks to analyse Pakistan-US relations during the Cold
War and the War on Terror through a comprehensive analysis of Pakistan’s sovereignty and US interests during these temporal intervals to check whether the nature of Pakistan-US relations has transformed in consonance with the global transformation of the discourse on sovereignty following the end of the Cold War. The thesis uses both primary and secondary sources to support its argument. Primary sources involve recently declassified documents of the Cold War era and the beginning of the War on Terror. At the same time the thesis also uses elite interviews of Pakistani state officials to shed light on the various themes of this thesis. However since the fieldwork primarily depends on the interviews of Pakistan’s state elites, it essentially assesses the view of the Pakistani state.

This use of primary sources works on two levels. On one level, it provides a lucid landscape of contemporary and past events as they happened, by analysing documentary sources such as the declassified documents and on another level, the elite interviews of Pakistani state officials offer the ideational construct of Pakistan’s response to these events. The elite interviewing conducted for this thesis is inspired by Richards (1996, 199-200) understanding who argues that

‘One of the most important functions of an elite interview is to try to assist the political scientist in understanding the theoretical position of the interviewee; his/her perceptions, beliefs and ideologies. Such information can rarely be gleaned from examining books, documents or records. By their very nature, elite interviewees provide a subjective account of an event or issue. Thus, elite interviewing should not be conducted with a view to establishing ‘the truth’, in a crude, positivist manner. Its function is to provide the political scientist with an insight into the mind-set of the actors who have played a role in shaping the society in which we live and an interviewee’s subjective analysis of a particular episode or situation.’

In this sense then, the opinions of Pakistani state officials gathered through elite interviewing, provides us an understanding of Pakistan’s state sovereignty, their perception of Pakistan’s state failure and the dynamics of Pakistan-US relations. The interview questionnaire was open-ended and semi-structured. The questionnaire thus focused on a ‘broad number of themes/areas, rather than a rigid set of formal questions’ (Ibid, 202). These themes included Pakistan-US relations, US foreign assistance to Pakistan, Pakistan’s sovereignty in response to US interests and Pakistan’s state failure.

However this tool of data collection comes with its shortcomings. Firstly, ‘inevitably, elite interview samples tend to be a lot smaller’ (Ibid, 200). The thesis was further complicated because during the time these interviews were planned and conducted, Pakistan and the US were going through one of the worst phases of their relationship in history, largely because of
US unilateral action to capture Osama bin Laden and US drone attacks within Pakistan’s territorial boundary, amongst others. Thus the sample size of these interviews, which was already small, was further reduced because some of the interviewees declined to participate in the interview. Further, most of the elites who were interviewed were bureaucrats and with the exception of three military generals, none acquiesced to an interview.

The research is both qualitative and quantitative, in style. While we have already discussed how elite interviews and declassified documents have been used as primary qualitative sources for the thesis, the quantitative bit of the thesis involves extensive data on US foreign aid to Pakistan. This is because foreign aid and its relationship with sovereignty is a pivotal concern of this thesis. One cannot study Pakistan’s sovereignty and Pakistan-US relations without a detailed understanding of US foreign assistance to Pakistan. The data on Pakistan’s foreign aid spans the decade before the end of the Cold War and the initial decade of the War on Terror respectively, and has been taken from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

**Structure of the Thesis**

After introducing the topic in the first chapter, the second chapter indulges in a comprehensive overview on state sovereignty in the Third World, the cosmopolitan understanding on state sovereignty and how this understanding manifests itself in the discourse on state failure. The chapter opens up with a discussion on sovereignty and especially Third World sovereignty. It then explores in greater detail, US involvement in the Third World during the Cold War. The chapter then moves on to identify the theoretical parameters of cosmopolitanism, especially focusing on sovereignty and also provides a critique of cosmopolitan values, based on Pakistan’s experience of multilateral institutions. Thus this chapter provides an analysis of two different eras; one that was based on realpolitik and the other that was premised on human rights and cosmopolitan value based on a network of international multilateral institutions. Within the cosmopolitan discourse, failed states then occupied a central position. The chapter also deals specifically with state failure and its projected solution in terms of foreign economic assistance before moving on to provide a critique of the discourse on state failure. While during the Cold War, the US foreign assistance strategy was premised on realpolitik, however considering that in the War on Terror the strategy was aimed at alleviate failing states, it is important to study these
developments in detail in order to analyse if there is a pattern in Pakistan-US relations from the Cold War to the War on Terror.

The third chapter provides a historical account of the formation of the Pakistani state. Once we have identified the historical pattern through which Pakistan’s state sovereignty has evolved as it has, we will be in a position to understand its behavioural responses to US policies towards it. Thus the historiographical overview of the Pakistani state will help us provide a framework through which to analyse Pakistan’s relations with the US. The chapter, initially, draws on the existing literature to understand the evolution of the Pakistani state before moving on to provide an account of Pakistan’s security problems at its inception which helped create a security centric Pakistani state. The major security issues that helped shape Pakistan’s security centric perception of sovereignty remains as potent an explanation today as they did at its inception. The chapter then analyses the broader rubric of Pakistan-US relations. It seeks to explain Pakistan-US relations in the light of Pakistan’s ever-present security paranoia of Indian hegemony and Indian territorial threat to Pakistan. The chapter also provides an overview of Pakistan’s academia’s contribution to the Pakistani state’s security doctrine. It analyses the crossover of former military officers and civilian bureaucrats into the academia and the policy-advising think tanks, and demonstrates how the state, due to the presence of a dominant bureaucracy in the think tanks, has kept research in these think tanks aligned with its own interests. Finally, the chapter concludes by demonstrating how the Pakistani state has held on to realism and its definition of state sovereignty because of its security perceptions.

The fourth chapter examines the issue of Pakistan’s state sovereignty from 1979-89 fusing the opinions of policymakers with the existing literature. The chapter will particularly engage with the opinions of elite policymakers collected through interviews, subsequently relating to policymaking understanding of consistency and change in the state sovereignty paradigm. The chapter begins by providing an introductory overview of US-Pakistan relations during the Soviet war in Afghanistan. The chapter will explore in detail the US pressures on the sovereignty of Pakistan and subsequently Pakistan’s response to these pressures. This chapter would thus be a first in a series of empirical chapters that will investigate Pakistan-US relationship through the prism of sovereignty. The primary investigation in this chapter will be of Pakistan’s sovereignty caught in a Cold War confrontation, crucially the War in Afghanistan, between the US and the USSR. At this juncture it is also important to note what this chapter will not do. The literature on the Cold War is expansive and thus cannot be
covered in its entirety here. The chapter initially chalks out the contours of the US-Pakistan relationship to provide a framework on which it will build its explanation on Pakistan’s sovereignty. Thus, while the Cold War experienced many global and regional players locked in a geostrategic power struggle, this chapter only concerns itself with the dynamics of US-Pakistan relations viewed through the prism of sovereignty.

The fifth chapter aims to contribute towards a contemporary understanding on the issue of sovereignty, specifically related to Pakistan. The chapter will examine the imperatives that dictated Pakistan’s alliance with the US on the War on Terror (2001 – 08) and will analyse the problematique that surrounded Pakistan’s state sovereignty. It will also examine how and whether US policies have changed towards Pakistan, in its second alliance with Pakistan dominated by a conflictual environment in the region. The chapter will initially provide a background to the Pakistan-US alliance on the War on Terror by analysing the political developments between the two states prior to 9/11. It will then move on to provide a detailed examination of Pakistan-US relations, post-9/11, looking at the issue of Pakistan’s sovereignty through the prism of the three most important variables; nuclear proliferations, democracy and human rights, and the War on terror itself. The primary investigation in this chapter will, be a detailed exploration of the conceptual and political landscape of Pakistan’s sovereignty in the War on Terror (2001- 08). The chapter is organized in three major sections. The first section deals with Pakistan-US interactions from 1999 to 2008 and discusses major issues such as democracy, human rights, nuclear proliferation, and Pakistan’s conduct in the War on Terror and US foreign assistance. The second section explores Pakistan’s response to US policies and how do the Pakistani elites view the role of US in Pakistan’s politics. The last section provides an in-depth analysis of how Pakistan’s state failure is perceived internationally and juxtaposes it with Pakistan elite perceptions on the issue.

The sixth chapter focuses on an analysis of Pakistan’s state sovereignty in the Cold War and the post-Cold War era. What this chapter seeks to analyse is, how independent and autonomous Pakistan was when it was strategically allied with the US, during the dictatorial regimes of General Zia-ul Haq and General Pervez Musharraf. Further the cosmopolitans argue that state sovereignty is ‘intrinsically linked to its absolutist past, and if so is frankly undesirable, or that it is no longer applicable to modern systems of government which operate according to networks of checks and balances’ (Ibid, 38) in a globalised world. Considering that the ICISS, in a way, revolutionized the way in which state sovereignty was earlier
Conceptualized, and hence required reformulation to adapt to modern political realities, a vital part of the chapter is then to study how and to what extent has the US-Pakistan relations during the War on Terror been influenced by cosmopolitan thought. The study then is between two cases of ‘conditional sovereignty’; one, during the Cold War in which conditional sovereignty was distinguished as the extent to which the decision making processes of a client/subservient/dependent state has been interfered upon by another state; two, during the War on Terror, when a state’s sovereignty became conditional to its meeting the responsibilities it owed to its citizens and the states in the international system. Two inquiries will be addressed in this chapter: Firstly, has the first case of conditional sovereignty continued into the War on Terror? Second how does the second case of conditional sovereignty figure in Pakistan-US relations?
Chapter 2: STATE SOVEREIGNTY, COSMOPOLITANISM AND STATE FAILURE

Introduction

This chapter provides a detailed overview on state sovereignty in the Third World, the cosmopolitan understanding on state sovereignty and how this understanding manifests itself in the discourse on state failure. The first section opens up with a discussion on sovereignty and especially Third World state sovereignty. It then moves on to provide a detailed landscape of US involvement in the Third World during the Cold War. This is important for two reasons. Firstly, to understand Pakistan-US relations during the Cold War, it is important to understand how Third World states such as Pakistan, viewed their state sovereignty. Secondly, understanding the environment in which the US was interacting with the Third World during the Cold War, enables the thesis to identify the conceptual parameters of US interventions and interferences in the Third World. In the second section, the chapter then moves on to explore the theoretical parameters of cosmopolitanism, especially focusing on sovereignty. This again is important for two reasons. Firstly, because the dynamics of global politics changed after the Cold War as symbolized by the introduction of the Responsibility to Protect as a norm in the UN Charter (UN General Assembly 2005), which called for a flexible understanding of sovereignty. Secondly, the US the identification of weaker states as the locus of threat to international security, created an environment of pressure on weaker states, with regards to their sovereignty. Both these developments are paradigmatically cosmopolitan in nature. Thus this chapter provides a conceptual framework for analysing two different eras; one that was based on realpolitik and the other that was premised on human rights and cosmopolitan value based on a network of international multilateral institutions. This section ends with a critique of cosmopolitan values, based on Pakistan’s experience of multilateral institutions.

Within the cosmopolitan discourse, state failure occupies a central position. The third section deals specifically with state failure and its projected solution in terms of foreign economic assistance before moving on to provide a critique of the discourse on state failure. While during the Cold War, US foreign assistance strategy was premised on realpolitik, however considering that in the War on Terror this strategy is ostensibly aimed at alleviate failing
states, it is important to study these developments in detail in order to analyse if there is a pattern in Pakistan-US relations from the Cold War to the War on Terror.

**Sovereignty and the Third World State**

Sovereignty, as an idea and an institution, is said to trace its roots back to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. As Bobbitt (2003, 501) observes: ‘Out of the anarchy that characterized the final stages of the Thirty Years' War, there arose a stronger, more coherent society of states whose legal structure was redefined by a new constitution for that society. This constitution is the set of treaties known collectively as the Peace of Westphalia’. The end of the Thirty Year War and the Treaty of Westphalia severely weakened the extraterritorial authority of the Roman Church which inadvertently resulted in the rise of the secular nation-state (O’Callaghan 2002). Thus the Thirty Year War culminating on the Treaty of Westphalia, in 1648, is said to have brought about the Westphalian state system, characterized by ‘territorially bounded sovereign states’. Domestically, in relation to its population, each individual state of this state system features a centralized administration and legitimised coercive authority, defined as a state’s possession of virtual monopoly on the legitimate use of violence within its territory (Camilleri & Falk 1992; Jackson 2003). Internationally, these states were ‘yoked together in a global system with a virtually impermeable wall separating domestic hierarchy from interstate anarchy,” (Ferguson & Mansbach 2007, 9). Thus, according to popular narrative, the evolution of the nation state and sovereignty as a concept followed a parallel trajectory. In this instance, the nation state came to ‘be defined in very loose terms as a territorially defined political society that is recognized (and recognition is a formal or legal act) as being solely responsible for the governance of that territory and, on the international stage, as independent from any political or religious superior’ (Sutch and Elias 2007, 23). Consequently, sovereignty as a political doctrine ‘captures the ideas of freedom, independence and self-determination that are the primary claims of existing states and the major aspiration of many subnational, cultural, ethnic and religious groups who are subsumed in the territory of existing states’ (Ibid, 23). The concepts of nation state and sovereignty then became a major attribute of realist thought, and through realism then, state sovereignty became conceptualized as an impenetrable wall that disallowed any external influence by other states into each other’s matter.

Within realist thought, the concept of sovereignty ‘tends to be viewed as a static, fixed concept: a set of ideas that underlies international relations but is not changed along with
them’ (Barkin & Cronin 1994, 107). Realists then believe that sovereignty possesses a permanent character in political life and that it exists ‘independently of our descriptions’, linguistic representations, and normative interpretations. Since, ‘to the realist, conceptual change is much more like a thematic variation of an underlying core meaning that remains basically the same across time and space’ (Bartelson 2006, 465), sovereignty then, for realists, occupies a fixed, static position around which all systemic changes operate and which remains the enabling concept in International Relations. While initially, the concept of sovereignty for the west meant upholding the right of full independence by rejecting imperial overlordship and the authority of the Pope, for the Third World states sovereignty initially meant securing full independence from western imperial and colonial rule. Since the evolution of the concept of sovereignty in the Third World followed a different trajectory, the concept continues to carry different meanings. This holds true, particularly, for all states who gained their independence from western imperialism at the end of World War II, such as Pakistan. Thus for these freshly independent states, sovereignty became a concept that enabled its freedom and independence and provided for a constitutional barrier against any foreign intervention from which they had only recently escaped.

After the Second World War, the United Nations became the vehicle for the decolonization of Third World states. The “‘retreat from empire” or “abandonment of the colonial project”…involved the UN system, which responded to and encouraged “retreat” in legally innovative ways’ (Grant 1999, 11). These ‘legally innovative ways’ held at their core a prime concern for international human rights and included ‘the relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration, and the two international covenants’ (Reus-smit 2001, 525). Further, in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, the discourse on human rights was being shaped by the anti-colonial activism of the Third World states (Burke 2011). This was because ‘anti-colonialism was in part conceived as a struggle for human rights, the two parts proceeding together in the campaign for freedom and independence’ (Ibid, 14). Thus, the successful adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, followed by the success of the Bandung Conference in 1955 gave considerable momentum to anticolonial struggles and as a result by the late 1970s, the initial fifty eight members who had signed the Universal Declaration of Independence were joined by another one hundred and sixteen states who had recently achieved independence from colonial rule. Thus, while the UN played a vital role in accepting the right of self-determination of the
newly formed states, at the same time ‘the process of decolonization transformed the UN and the shape of human rights discourse’ (Ibid, 1). As Barnett (1995, 84-85) argues that the

‘…principal purpose of the United Nations was to facilitate the transition from the era of empires to the era of sovereignty, to globalize and universalize sovereignty as the basis of relations between states. From the beginning, the United Nations indicated that it would be actively concerned with decolonization because of its normative imperatives and security implications…decolonization dominated the UN's agenda for its first twenty years, and the organization established numerous institutional mechanisms to ensure that it was carried out in a peaceful manner…In short, the fact that human rights became equated with self-determination and anti-colonialism was a clear signal that the timing of independence should not be unduly affected by the lack of empirical sovereignty’.

Barnett believes that in the rush towards decolonization, over time ‘the United Nations, with Third World states taking the lead, shifted attention to the importance of territorial integrity and sovereignty’ (Ibid) to the detriment of empirical sovereignty which ‘asserts that the state maintains order within its borders’ (Ibid, 82). Since most of the states that gained their independence after the Second World War were ‘colonial appendages’ (Ibid, 83), their empirical sovereignty was clearly not to the level of the already established Western states. However, two factors contributed in the marginalisation of empirical sovereignty, in favour of juridical sovereignty i.e. territorial integrity and sovereignty. Firstly, sentiments advocating that the colonial states had to demonstrate some level of empirical sovereignty before being given independence was seen as an ‘unwillingness of the colonial powers to forgo the symbolic, strategic, and economic benefits associated with colonialism’ (Ibid, 84) which ran counter to the desire of the Third World states to ‘eradicate speedily the remaining bastions of European colonialism’ (Kay 2009, 787). Secondly,

‘The United Nations was quite concerned that because these territories that were achieving self-determination were "multiple selves," their governments might attempt to create a "whole personality" through territorial adjustment. In fact, many of those newly decolonized states feared much the same possibility and used the UN to discourage such tendencies’ (Ibid, 86).

Thus, the process of decolonization in the Third World accelerated because of two insecurities: One, stemming from the reluctance of the colonizers to grant independence and two, from the newly formed states in their respective regions. These circumstances took sovereignty in the Third World states on a different trajectory to those of the Western states who not only held juridical sovereignty but also enjoyed a much higher degree of empirical
sovereignty. Bobbitt (2003) classifies the existing international system into three categories of market-states. Consequently, he argues that each category views sovereignty differently.

The three new forms of the market-state that are currently emerging are marked by radically different views of sovereignty. The entrepreneurial market-state holds that state sovereignty is transparent: other states are entitled to pierce the veil of sovereignty if the target state has forfeited its claim to legitimacy, even by its internal acts. Managerial market-states hold, by contrast, that sovereignty can be penetrated only with the endorsement of the United Nations, or at least the ratification by a regional security organization that is itself endorsed by the U.N. Mercantile market-states hold that sovereignty is opaque and cannot be breached on the basis of a state's internal behavior’ (Ibid, 779).

While the US and the western world fall predominantly in the first two categories, the Third World states, by Bobbitts measure, are essentially the mercantile market-state. Thus, sovereignty continues to conjure different meanings for Third World states. Firstly, it becomes a technical term that confers upon them, membership in the international system of states, ‘rested on a tacit recognition by the international system that they should be permitted to enjoy the formal privileges of membership’ (Clapham 1999, 524). Thus, while for the western world this membership is a given, for the Third World states it is a privilege bestowed upon them by the international system and hence evokes the powerful idea that it can be taken away, an insecurity that often surfaces on issues of humanitarian interventions. Further, ‘the concept is by its nature Janus faced: it looks both to an international system in which recognized sovereign statehood serves as an admission ticket to the ‘premier league’ of actors, accorded a status denied to non-sovereign entities; and to a domestic political order in which … state sovereignty fulfils an analogous function to that of a “No Trespassing” sign standing at the perimeter of a piece of property held under domestic law’ (Ibid, 525). Thus, for the Third World states, the concept of sovereignty is pivotally embedded in an idea that promotes an unfettered control over their internal affairs and consequently their domestic population. For the western world this might not be as quintessential, since in western states the ‘relationship between governments and citizens is at least relatively unproblematic’ (Ibid, 526) as compared to those of the Third World. Considering that domestic political disorders in Third World states, have been shown to have spill over effects, the political disorder emanating from these source has increasingly gained western attention to the detriment of the Third World states, for most of whom, humanitarian or any other form of intervention remains a constant threat. At this juncture then, sovereignty becomes the only shield behind which inept Third World governments can take refuge against any external intervention from western powers. Not only is this true of the contemporary world, but of global politics during...
the Cold War, in which states were insecure against either the Soviet Union or vulnerable to US interventions.

This is an important observation for the thesis. Since their inception, Third World states were plagued by the prospects of external interference into their sovereign matters by more powerful states. In addition, the idea that their privilege of being part of the international system could be taken away, as we have observed above, increased their sense of insecurity. Thus for them then, sovereignty became a measure of their insecurities. Thus the more insecure the state is, the stauncher its defense of its sovereignty becomes. Thus states such as Pakistan, as a consequence, indigenized the powerful realist impulses of regional balance of power, survival and self-interest. This assertion will be validated by the thesis in the subsequent chapters.

Most intellectual positions on sovereignty in the Third World, argue that these states continue to remain staunch defenders of sovereignty as understood by the realists and have remained so traditionally since their independence. For example, Bajpai (2009, 126) notes the early inclination of newly independent South Asian states, to conform to certain realist concepts such as survival, self-interest, anarchy in the international system and security. He argues that during the Cold War, the newly decolonized South Asia was, coming to terms with its new found identity and the main problem facing them was how to maintain independence in the face of a turbulent Cold War. And ‘not surprisingly, some form of political realism appealed the most…’ (Ibid). In essence then, newly independent Third World states instrumentalised realism since the idea of state sovereignty, as conceptualised by the realists, could be used as a defence against great power intervention. Similarly, (Behera 2009, 144) argued that ‘the state has proved to be complicit in privileging the realist discourses and worldview as the norms of the Westphalian state system- sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-interference in internal affairs – fitted in admirably with powerful indigenous impulses for the maintenance of national security, independence and frontiers’. This does seem to be the case with Pakistan. The decolonization of Pakistan and India in 1947 followed by an asymmetrical distribution of power and resources between the two states and the newly born Pakistani state’s perceived existential threat from India, played pivotally in Pakistan’s deep scepticism towards Indian regional influence. Thus Pakistan’s policy apparatus became increasingly centred on the norms of the Westphalian state system i.e. sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in internal matters. Further, its sovereignty became increasingly defined by its insecurity, as we will observe in the next chapter. For Pakistan, then, these values
provided a bastion against any foreign interference that sought to limit its sovereignty and threaten its national security. Thus, it may be argued that, for Pakistan, a realist impulse was linked to its survival from a very early stage and consequently Pakistan’s sovereignty became increasingly intertwined by its perception of national security. This will be discussed in length in the subsequent chapters.

From its inception Pakistan was plagued by a sense of insecurity domestically and internationally. Ayoob (1995, 1) captures this development theoretically when he argues that: ‘Third World state behaviour, whether at the individual or the collective level, is largely determined by the insecurity that is aggravated by the overwhelming feeling of vulnerability, if not impotence, among its state elites’. Providing an elaborate expose’ on Third World state behaviour and state formation, Ayoob believes that the Third World preoccupation with domestic order arose due to threats from ‘recalcitrant elements within their population or by those who aspired to replace the “successor elites” and take over the rein of state power themselves’ (Ayoob 2002b, 43). This assertion will be studied in greater length in the next chapter. Thus in Third World states, violence and oppression by the state became a necessary feature to establish effective statehood over the state’s population. Third World insecurities, then, are compounded by threats from both external and internal sources. As a consequence, the Third World states feel their sovereignty threatened from both dimensions of sovereignty; one that bestows upon them membership of the global community of states, and second which makes them unfettered masters of their political dominions. Hence unlike the western states, concerns of international or domestic legitimacy remain the cornerstone of Third World political reality.

According to Ayoob (1995) state-making, and consequently sovereignty, in Third World states are largely driven by their security predicament. This security centric understanding of Third World state behaviour might be one of the reasons why the military in most of these states take a central role in state affairs. This can explain why for example, Pakistan, while lagging far behind in social and economic indicators, boasts one of the largest armies and possesses a sizeable nuclear arsenal. Further, since both threats to a state, from the inside (domestic violence, insurgency, separatist movements) and the outside (territorial conflicts, annexations etc.) require mostly military solutions, this places the military of a Third World state in a very powerful position as arbitrators and interpreters of what violates their state sovereignty and what does not. Thus, most of the Third World states are caught in a vicious circle. Their security centric definitions of sovereignty necessitate the pre-eminence of the
military, and the military in turn, further continue to pivot the problematic of national interest strictly in terms of (in)security. Hence, the Pakistani military has come to occupy a central position as protectors of not only its national sovereignty and territorial frontiers but also its ideological boundaries which the thesis will discuss in greater length in the next chapter.

For Pakistan, its traditional enmity and territorial insecurity against neighbouring India has made it increasingly conscious of its sovereignty and independence. Thus, whether it be General Zia-ul-Haq’s dictatorial regime during the Cold War or General Musharraf’s during the War on Terror, Pakistan’s relationship with the US have largely been seen as a means to achieve some sort of military equilibrium with India. Even General Ashfaq Kiyani, the Pakistani Chief of Army Staff who took the reins on the War on Terror from General Musharraf, argued that ‘while the Pakistan Army is alert to and fighting the threat posed by militancy, it remains an “India-centric” institution and that reality will not change in any significant way until the Kashmir issue and water disputes are resolved’ (Dawn News 2010). Thus for Pakistan, the preservation of state sovereignty remains a vital element in its international interactions and responses to systemic changes, centred on countering Indian hegemony. This becomes quite evident in light of the fact that the Pakistani state used religious extremists, to further its interests in Afghanistan to provide strategic depth and to augment Kashmir liberation movements, against India. However, now the increasing lack of control, by the state, of these religious extremists have garnered much international controversy and now, more than ever, Pakistan's sovereignty is under critical international scrutiny.

Considering the discussion above, three observations become quite apparent. Firstly, Third World states are often plagued by external and internal threats and hence in the face of such threats, realist impulses of survival, self-interest, and security provide the parameters to their response to these threats. Thus the threat to Pakistan’s territorial sovereignty by India and to its political sovereignty by the US, have been responded by policies that are embedded in a security centric understanding of its sovereignty, as we will observe in the next chapter and then throughout the thesis. Secondly, threats to Pakistan’s sovereignty that emanate internally by dissident elements within its territory, are also seen to require military solutions rather than political dialogue, because they are not viewed as political problems but as dire threats to its sovereignty, as we will observe in the next chapter. Lastly, since sovereignty for the Third World, as we have observed, is a bastion against external interference, in the case of Pakistan, any concerns of the Western powers and specifically the US regarding Pakistan’s
nuclear ambitions, its human right record, and its democracy are considered as interferences in its sovereignty as we will observe in the subsequent chapters.

**US and Third World State Sovereignty**

US global policies during the Cold War, it has often been argued, were motivated by its primary concern to prevent the Soviet Union from achieving hegemony (Huntington 1987; Katz 1991). Initially, the Cold War was considered to be a conflict between competing ideologies- a view that became the mainstay of the *Orthodox* school of thought (Bailey 1950; Feis 1957; McNeill 1953) - which argued that Soviet political behaviour was irreconcilable with ‘American aims, for reasons ranging from Russian expansionism…to communist beliefs’ and as such was an ‘aggressive antithesis to American freedoms’ (Westad 2000, 3).

This view of the Cold War was later challenged by the *Revisionists* (Kolko 1972; Williams 1988) for whom the Cold War was primarily an American effort ‘to enforce its will (and its economic system) upon a reluctant world’ (Westad 2000, 4). As such then, by both arguments, the Third World became intrinsic to US policies and became the battleground for the Cold War. By 1970s and early 1980s, the ‘conditions in the Third World and the capabilities of both superpowers had reached a stage that made events in Africa, Asia, and Latin America central to international affairs’ (Westad, 2005, 4). As a consequence, Pakistan became the US ‘most allied ally’ in South Asia, since it was the only US ally in the region central to US interests in Afghanistan. This US alliance with Pakistan became of vital geopolitical importance when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan.

Since the US interventions and involvement in the Third World was, amongst other things, a derivative of ‘it’s taking on of the responsibility for a global capitalist system’ (Ibid, 111), thus consequently, its interactions with the Third World were perceptively understood as ‘defensive interventions, mainly against left wing or Communist movements’ (ibid). This was because the US was fundamentally antagonistic towards the idea of a revolution ‘and its commitment to extensive but nondoctrinaire changes in the status quo’ (Williams 1972, 4).

As Williams (1972, 9-15) argues

…Americans steadily deepened their commitment to the idea that democracy was inextricably connected with individualism, private property and capitalist marketplace economy…the Cold War – is in reality only the most recent phase of a more general conflict between the established system of western capitalism and its internal and external opponents…In expanding its own economic system throughout much of the world, America has made it very difficult for other nations to retain their economic independence… [there is] the firm conviction, even
dogmatic belief, that America’s domestic well-being depends upon such sustained, ever-increasing overseas expansion’.

Since, for the US, the capitalist economy was inextricably linked to democracy and US well-being depended on overseas expansion of its economic system, in that case then, states that deviated from democracy were viewed as a threat to US well-being. While, as Williams points out, the US because of it expansionist economic ideology, made it tougher for other states to retain their economic independence, any move by those states to wrestle themselves from US economic control, was seen as a threat to the US. In that case then, the US used various methods of interventions to halt the process of diversion in those states. For the US, then, the meaning of its sovereignty became more expansionist and translated into hegemony and preponderance over the Third World. According to Westad, by the 1970s and early 1980s, the US had begun implementing the “counterforce strategy” in the Third World, ‘meaning an emphasis on supporting whatever opposition could be mustered to Soviet allies in Africa and Asia (Westad 2005, 331). This meant that, for the Third World states then, sovereignty became increasingly conditional to US preponderance depending on the extent to which they acquiesced and conformed to US ideals and policies. Further, since the 1970s and the 1980s witnessed the “counterforce strategy”, as a consequence Pakistan became central to US policy in countering the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, despite the presence of a dictatorial regime. In this instance then, given US emphasis on democracy, it remains to be seen how it negotiated with the presence of a dictatorial regime in Pakistan during the Afghanistan War. This forms a crucial part of the thesis and will be explored in subsequent chapters.

US policies during the 1970s and 1980s were distinctly divided between the Carter and the Reagan administration. While earlier, the Carter administration had shied away from overt interventionism and had sought to influence the Third World by the spread of democratic ideals, Ronald Reagan who later took office, ‘had from the mid-1970s onwards become one of the main critics of American “inaction” in the Third World and by far the most eloquent spokesman for US interventionism’ (ibid, 333). While for the Carter administration, the spread of democratic ideals globally was a vital policy concern, the Kirkpatrick doctrine, which influenced much of the Reagan administration’s foreign policy in the Third World, drew a sharp distinction between Communist/Revolutionary totalitarian regimes and pro-western dictatorial ones. The doctrine traced its genesis to a 1979 seminal piece by Dr. Jeane Kirkpatrick, who later took on the office of the United States Ambassador to the United Nations. The essay, which President Reagan claimed was the ‘the best article he had read on
the subject’ (Guardian 2006), lamented and criticized the Carter administration’s emphasis on ‘the modernization of the Third World’ (Kirkpatrick 1979, 39). Kirkpatrick argued that ‘the Carter administration, … came to power resolved not to access international developments in the light of “Cold War” perspectives, but to accept at face value the claim of revolutionary groups to represent “popular” aspirations and “progressive” forces –regardless of the ties of these revolutionaries to the Soviet Union’ (Ibid, 43). She further argued that the Carter administration’s policy had unnecessarily stressed on viewing international problems as ‘human issues’ (Ibid, 39), ‘instead of viewing international developments in terms of the American national interest’ (Ibid). It was thus imperative, for US national interest, to draw a distinction between traditional and revolutionary autocracies. Her essay concluded on the note that ‘traditional authoritarian governments are less repressive than revolutionary autocracies, that they are more susceptible of liberalisation and they are more compatible with US national interest’ (Ibid, 44). Given the fact that ‘the rapid incorporation of this attitude into US foreign policy made her article one of the most influential since George Kennan’s 1949 advocacy of "containing" the Soviet Union’ (Guardian 2006), it comes as no surprise that the US, under Reagan, immediately moved to mend ties with a dictatorial regime in Pakistan. Though Pakistan had historically been a US ally since the advent of the Cold War in the early 1950s, however relations remained strained between Pakistan and the US, during the Carter administration’s time in office due to the administration’s emphasis on nuclear non-proliferation, democracy and human rights. However in the early Reagan era, Pakistan occupied a central position in the war as an ally of the US, despite being under the grip of a dictatorial military regime.

Indeed Reagan criticized the Carter administration of operating ‘under the assumption that the United States must prove and reprove and prove again its goodness to the world’ (Westad 2005, 358). Consequently, US interventions in the Third World took various forms depending on the circumstances confronting it. While some interventions were more overt and military in nature, others involved regime changes, constructing dependent client relationships, supporting dictatorial regimes and at other times involved supporting anti-communist groups within states to counter the Soviet threat. The only thing ‘moralistic’ about the US position in the Cold War, was its view of the Soviet Union as an ‘evil empire’, ‘diametrically opposite to what the US stood for’ (Ibid, 334). As a result, Third World interventions were considered as means to purge or counter this evil in the Third World. Indeed, the US in alliance with Pakistan, trained thousands of mujahideen to fight off the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan by
indoctrinating them with the powerful Islamic tenet of jihad (simplistically and often wrongly described as fighting against infidels). The argument was simple: The Soviet posed a threat to the Islamic state and consequently Islam, and hence were an evil force, thus it was a religious duty to fight off this evil. In pursuing this goal all other considerations of human rights, freedom, democracy became secondary to this countenance. As Westad (Ibid, 357) observes

‘To many within the Reagan Administration, in the US neoconservative movement, and on the American right in general, Third World left-wing radicalism was part of a global threat to the United States. It existed, however, mostly because previous US administrations had failed to confront it and standup for American values...It was time, the Americans argued, to strike back against Third World regimes that opposed America’s mission’.

Hence, for Third World states, failure to comply and uphold American values became a threat to their sovereignty. For the US, then, the sovereignty of Third World states became intrinsically tied to their adherence, subjection to US Cold War ideological imperatives. While Pakistan had historically remained an ally of the US in its Cold War confrontation against the Soviet Union, however strains often appeared in Pakistan-US relations on issues of nuclear non-proliferation, democracy and human right, which were values that the US upheld globally. This observation is crucial to the thesis, since one of main enquiries of the thesis is to ascertain how interventionist was the US in Pakistan’s affairs during the Reagan’s mandate or how conditional was Pakistan’s sovereignty on US interests and ideals?

Thus as Westad (Ibid, 396) notes

‘As seen from the South- the Cold War was a continuation of colonialism through slightly different means. As a process it centred on control and domination, primarily in ideological terms. The methods of the superpowers and of their local allies were remarkably similar to those honed during the last phases of European colonialism: giant social and economic projects, bringing promises of modernity to their supporters and mostly death to their opponents, or those who happened to get in the way of progress...In a period of extreme global instability, it is not surprising that highly ideologised regimes such as the United states and the Soviet Union opted for intervention in what seemed to be a zero-sum game, unless there were strong domestic reasons against it’.

In the newly formed Third World then, the US sought to influence the outcome of the Cold War, through two different kinds of intervention in the Third World. Firstly, the US sought to cultivate dependent client states in the Third World and harness the ability to alter the foreign policy behaviour of weaker states (Moon 1983). For the purpose of this thesis, the concept of dependence is taken as an idea rooted in the political aspect of power politics (Moon 1985; Kinsella 1998; Moon 1983; Carney 1989) rather than the conception of economic
dependency deriving its pedigree from the *dependencia* theory (Cardoso 1977; Caporaso 1978; Duvall 1978). Thus in this conception, dependence is weighed in terms of cost and benefit. The dependent state derives direct benefits from its relationship with a stronger state, in that its needs for arms and economic assistance are fulfilled. The stronger state ‘derives no direct benefits only costs…Dependence then is the “currency” which settles these accounts’(Kinsella 1998, 9). Moon (1983) argues that behaviours such as foreign aid play a vital role in influencing a dependent state foreign policy and is a dependency-producing transaction. He further argues, that in this context then

‘Its function becomes the support of a given elite and the maintenance of a given pattern of social and political relations within the country as well as between countries … Moreover, foreign aid becomes only one of many transactions which serve to create an asymmetrical integration of economic, social, political and cultural systems, and, consequently, produce a distortion in the foreign policy behaviour of the weaker dependent state.’

Give that foreign aid is only one of the many dependency-producing transactions; other examples include ‘trade concentration, IGO membership concentration, treaty behaviour, arms transfers [and], event interaction’. For instance, Muller( 1985, 460) demonstrates that during the Cold War ‘Brazil’s high level of dependence on US military aid … afforded the United States substantial leverage for influencing the behaviour of the Brazilian military’. In a similar manner, as we will observe, the Pakistani military’s obsession with India became a vital factor in its dependence on US arms transfer and foreign aid. Once a dependence is created, ‘the foreign policy behaviour of dependencies is viewed as partial payment in exchange for the maintenance of benefits they derive from their economic [and military] ties to the dominant country’ (Richardson 1978, 64). Moon (1983; 1985) argues that once the dependence of a weaker state on a stronger one, is established it allows the stronger states considerable leverage in conditioning the foreign policy of the weaker state by rewarding/punishing the weaker state through providing/withholding economic assistance and foreign aid. For instance he argues that ‘Aid-giving has been widely recognized by American decision-makers as a key component of American efforts to influence Third World nations’(Moon 1983, 317) This does seem to be the case with Pakistan, as we will observe, where the US interest in Pakistan during the Cold War ‘was to further US national security interests by strengthening anti-Communist forces in the Third World: aid was “seen as a Cold War tool that could be used to promote political stability, win alliances for the United States, and impede the emergence of radical or Communist regimes”’(Muller 1985, 460). As I will demonstrate in later chapters, even in Pakistan during the Cold War years, the US continued
to disburse colossal amount of aid. Developmental agencies such as the USAID were involved in giant social and economic projects. At the same time, not only did the US tolerate a dictatorial regime in Pakistan, it also protected, aided and abetted it in as many ways as it could, ranging from ignoring the build-up of a nuclear capability to turning a blind eye to human rights violations.

Dependence then is a two way traffic. While the weaker states in the international system depend on the advantages they accrued by virtue of strong military and economic relations with the stronger states, the stronger states on the other hand, depend on these weaker states to comply with their foreign policy view. As Moon (1985, 300) argues, ‘weaker states abandon their preferences on foreign-policy matters and instead seek the approval of the United States, anticipating that future American policy will reward and punish states in proportion to their compliance. In turn, American trade or aid is calibrated to the level of compliance, thereby justifying and reinforcing the compliance logic’. The compliance logic ensconces two parts; the reward and the punishment. In the former, both the weak and the strong state are engaged in a symbiotic relationship and enjoy mutual dependence. However, in the latter the weak state is unilaterally dependent on the strong state. Given the extent to which a weak state is unilaterally dependent on the strong state determines how drastically it is affected by the abeyance of privileges that it accrues by virtue of its relations with the strong state. As we will observe in the proceeding chapters, Pakistan, for the most part of its history, has remained dependent on US foreign aid and military assistance. It has gone through cycles of unilateral and mutual dependence on US economic and military assistance. Considering that foreign aid and military assistance have remained US foreign policy tools to influence decision-making in the Third World, dependency then poses an indirect threat to a state’s sovereignty.

Secondly, the US has directly intervened in Third World state sovereignty by using military force. Yoon (1997) details the extent of US intervention in the Third World internal wars. He argues that US interventions in Third World states were quite common during the Cold War. Not only were these interventions selectively considered, further, these US interventions took various forms such as verbal, economic, political, military etc. to produce desirable outcomes. He further explains that, ‘…of the 82 internal war considered…the United States intervened in 6 wars directly by using force on a large scale, 21 indirectly by sending military weapons and advisors and 10 economically or verbally. It ignored 45 wars, although some of them were much more severe, in terms of fatalities, than wars that attracted US
intervention…’ (Ibid, 580). Thus, by Yoon’s argument then, since Pakistan was already an ally of the US during the Cold War, hence using force on a large scale or sending military weapons and advisors to elements within the state was not necessary. Major power military interventions witnessed a slight increase from the Cold War to the post-Cold War, with the US and French activities accounting for most of this increase (Pickering & Kisangani 2009, 596). Amongst these interventions, only the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan were military expeditions in a sizeable country. However, the painful experience of the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan (Eikenberry 2014), makes military intervention in Pakistan quite improbable if not impossible, given the size and the proportion of the country. However the US did intervene economically and verbally by exploiting Pakistan’s dependence on its foreign aid, by disbursing and at times withholding it. This is a central feature of the Pakistan-US relations that will be explored in great length in the thesis.

Yoon argues that interferences and interventions in the Third World states’ sovereignty, were not solely by direct military intervention since he believes that considering military interventions to be the only form of intervention propagates a very narrow understanding of the phenomenon. For Yoon then, intervention ‘entails different levels of actions ranging from verbal statements, economic assistance or the withholding of economic assistance, initiation or increase or arms supply, deployment of advisers, deployment of combat personnel into a war zone, to actual military engagement in combat operations’ (Ibid, 585). While it is a historical fact that the US did not militarily intervene in Pakistan, this thesis seeks to question how deeply interventionist the US was in Pakistan’s sovereign affairs. Further as we had observed in the previous section, how sovereignty, for Third World states, became a bastion against foreign interference and intervention, it also needs to be observed how Pakistan responded to the US interference in its sovereignty. This will be explored in great detail in chapter 4, 5 and 6.

Considering the extent of US involvement in Third World states, by various means, irrespective of the rationale behind it, raises certain concerns on Third World state sovereignty. While Taylor (1999, 438) might argue that ‘during the Cold War sovereignty was usually interpreted by United Nations members in the manner of traditional hard-line realists’, the concept itself offered little protection to Third World states in the face of a US intervention as Yoon demonstrates. Further if US interventions during the Cold War were as extensive and varied as suggested, in that case, Third World state sovereignty then maybe considered dependent on US interest or disinterest rather than being a rigid normative
principle of international affairs. In that case then, the partial sovereignty that Third World states enjoyed was largely a derivative of the superpower rivalry. For instance Westad observes that ‘by remaining non-aligned and playing the superpowers against each other, many new states were able to craft out a measure of independence in an increasingly bipolar world’ (Sharma 2007, 147). The opposition between the ‘East’ and the ‘West’ bloc provided the Third World with the opportunity to further their own interests by using one superpower against the other. Thus, ‘for the leaders of the newly-independent states, the Cold War provided models—and money—for their development plans; for the superpowers, they provided opportunities to prove those models and gain strategic influence throughout the world’ (Ibid). However while submitting to one superpower’s influence against another provided to be at least partially advantageous, competing Soviet and US expansionist designs made Third World vulnerable to Soviet and US interventions, in that sense then ‘the Cold War was not simply a matter of East versus West but of East and West versus South’ (Ibid, 148).

Thus the two questions that emerge then are: Firstly, considering US deeply interventionist policies during the Cold War, how interventionist was it in the affairs of Pakistan? Secondly, since Third World states had taken up the idea of sovereignty as a concept that would allow them to defend themselves against foreign intervention, in that sense then, how did Pakistan being a Third World state defend its sovereignty against US interference? These two questions are central to the thesis and will be discussed in greater length in chapter 4, 5 and 6.

**Cosmopolitanism: Theoretical Parameters and Critique**

Following the end of the Cold War and the period spanning the 1990s, states in the international system were faced with various humanitarian challenges globally in states such as Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia. The international response to these humanitarian challenges, in the form of humanitarian interventions were controversial, whether they happened as in the case of Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo, or whether it did not happen as in Rwanda (ICISS 2001). The unprecedented role of these international humanitarian challenges that dominated much of the 1990s, provoked theorists and practitioners alike to rethink the role of states and the idea of state sovereignty. It was the ‘NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999 that brought the controversy to its most intense head’ (Ibid, VIII). Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General responded to these challenges in the UN report millennium when he
highlighted the prevalence of gross violation of human rights that had raised much concern. He argued (Annan 2000, 16-48)

‘The provision of the Charter presupposed that external aggression, an attack by one state against another, would constitute the most serious threat; but in recent decades far more people have been killed in civil wars, ethnic cleansing and acts of genocide… I accept that the principles of sovereignty and non-interference offer vital protection to small and weak states… If humanitarian intervention is indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systemic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?’

It was in response to this plea by the UN Secretary General that the Government of Canada in collaboration with various foundations formed the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty and was announced at the General Assembly in 2000 (ICISS 2001). The Report was entitled ‘Responsibility to Protect’ reflecting the major theme of the report. The report principled the response to gross human violations on ‘a) State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself b) Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect’ (Ibid XI). Thus the basic idea behind the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ was that for states in the international community, sovereignty is not a luxury of unfettered rule within their territory but rather a responsibility towards its citizens to keep them safe from gross human violations. In case the sovereign states failed to fulfil this responsibility, it then becomes the collective responsibility of the international community of states to intervene. The ICISS was later incorporated as a norm in the UN Charter in 2005.

Thus the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ became the most vociferous challenge to traditional realist understanding of sovereignty which had dominated the Cold War. Sovereignty, as a consequence of the humanitarian issues of the 1990s, became ‘doubly contested: first, in terms of its salience as a substantive area of international politics; and second, in terms of its role as a normative frame of reference’ (Lawson & Shilliam 2009, 658). Both these challenges to sovereignty form the core arguments of cosmopolitanism, as we will observe shortly. Further as we had argued in the previous section that for weaker states, sovereignty had come to represent a barrier against any foreign intervention and interference, the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ then became a much greater challenge to the sovereignty of weaker states than to the sovereignty of western ones and Kofi Annan acknowledged that in
the process ‘weak states are far more likely to be subjected to [humanitarian intervention] than strong ones’ (Annan, 2000 48). Thus for weaker states in the international system, the barrier provided by sovereignty against foreign interference became a responsibility to be upheld as a member of the global community of states, failing which its sovereignty would be breached.

The norm of non-intervention, which is intrinsically attached to state sovereignty, has come under fierce scrutiny from the champions of human rights and those who believe that a state’s failure is a global issue as its effects reverberate globally. This shift in the idea of sovereignty is one that apparently replaces the centrality of the state with the centrality of human rights. Hence, while during the Cold War states’ human rights remained secondary to a state’s sovereignty, now in the post-Cold War sovereignty has become increasingly conditional to a state’s performance in maintaining human rights within its territory and acting responsibly externally. For example, during the Cold War, the Afghan refugees exodus to Pakistan was the ‘largest refugee crisis in the world’(Schöch 2008, 1) and while General Zia ruled the country with an iron grip and his actions of public flogging and political victimizations, often caught the focus of the international human rights advocacy groups, never once during the Cold War did the US express grievance even over the matter, let alone condemnation. Secondly General Zia ruled the state for 10 years and the US was perfectly content in the abeyance of the democracy till the time Zia brought the US desired results, as we will observe in subsequent chapters. However, what needs to be seen is whether during General Musharraf’s era (1999-08), the US was equally despondent about Pakistan’s democracy and human rights. Thirdly, while during the Cold War, the US encouraged, aided and abetted an insurgency in Afghanistan which was primarily based and operated from Pakistan, in the post-Cold War, Pakistan’s inability to contain the Taliban from launching operations against the US and NATO forces became a prominent source of contention. The question then is, given the development on state sovereignty in the post-Cold War, one that makes it conditional to a state’s human rights performance, how do these developments relate to ground realities? This is one of the central questions of the thesis.

It seems that the Third World seems more bent in continuing to interpreting sovereignty in the realist sense of the word. Even though as we have observed earlier that sovereignty is increasingly being recast in a different light, pivoting on human rights, Third World states have continued to remain sceptical of this development and have not submitted to it wholesomely. One might argue that these states have not moved past their Cold War
interpretations. Hence, sovereignty in the Third World, remains defined as "the institutionalization of public authority within mutually exclusive jurisdictional domains … based less on a set of principles than on the ability of a political group to establish domestic control over its territory and defend it from external attack’ (Barkin & Cronin 1994, 108-110). This emphasis on state sovereignty in the Third World is validated by the fact that while there was a wave of euphoria and relief all over the world on the death of Osama Bin Laden at the hands of the US forces, in a secret raid on his hideout in Pakistan, however the Pakistani state felt its sovereignty challenged ‘warning that any similar action would lead to a reconsideration of the relationship with the United States’ (Perlez 2011). This poses some crucial question; why have the Third World states held unflinchingly and so resiliently to sovereignty as traditionally conceptualised by the realists while the global community imbibed in the UN and led by the major powers, moves towards a more flexible understanding of sovereignty?

While the practitioners were tackling the issue of humanitarian intervention and the ‘Responsibility to Protect’, theorists of the cosmopolitan traditions, in a parallel development, were arguing for a more flexible understanding of sovereignty, as opposed to the rigid principle of sovereignty during the Cold War, and were spearheading the cause of humanitarian intervention. Indeed, humanitarian intervention became the ‘paradigmatically liberal cosmopolitan practice in international society today’ (Rao, 2010, 72). It is only recently, in the post-Cold War period, that state sovereignty has opened up for analytical scrutiny and critical enquiry. Since then the state-centric paradigm, has been the focus of many intellectual investigations. This rigid interpretation of sovereignty ‘perpetuated by the continuing domination of the discipline by realism and neo-realism’ (Ferfuson & Mansbach, 2007, 1) had kept sovereignty confined within a ‘westphalian straitjacket’ (Wilkinson 2007), and according to cosmopolitan theorists it was time that a flexible understanding of sovereignty evolved to confront global humanitarian challenges.

Theorists of this cosmopolitan tradition, have set forth a research agenda for a global political order that is as much concentrated on a political order as it is in laying down an interdisciplinary foundation that cuts across law (Archibugi 1995; Falk 2009; Hirsch 2012), international relations (Bartelson 2008; Held 2003; Linklater 2002), political philosophy (Fine 2003; Nussbaum 2010; Pogge 1992) and sociology (Beck 2006; Delanty 2009). Thus as Fine and Boon (2007, 5-6) explain: ‘The new cosmopolitanism is an endeavour to denature and centre the nation-state – to loosen the ties that bind the nation-state to theories of
democracy in political theory, theories of society in sociology, theories of internationalism in international relations, theories of sovereignty in international law and theories of justice in political philosophy’. The cosmopolitan endeavour to denature and centre the nation state is essentially an effort to challenge the state-centricity of the Westphalian model. A crucial question for this thesis is hence, how effective has the cosmopolitan endeavour been in challenging the state-centric view of sovereignty. In addition, the thesis will also demonstrate how big powers like the US have used cosmopolitan ideas, even when cosmopolitan theorists may not agree with the way these ideas have been instrumentalised.

In international relations, cosmopolitanism challenges the idea of state sovereignty as an immutable, autonomous political doctrine that bestows ultimate moral and legal authority upon the state. It finds state sovereignty, as understood in practical and realist terms, incompatible with human wellbeing and thus moves to resolve this disparity by placing the onus of the global order on a global citizenship which transcends and limits state sovereignty by taking citizenship out of its territorial nationalistic cage. Cosmopolitanism criticizes the realist conception of an anarchic international system of states by pointing out that this realist point of departure is in fact ‘historically specific and normatively conditioned’ and that state sovereignty is itself a temporal product of history (Ibid, 3). Thus sovereignty, as understood by the realists, is contentious for the cosmopolitans for whom, as we have explained previously, rigid and inflexible interpretations of state sovereignty becomes a barrier behind which states often pursue agendas detrimental to the population within their territories. Hence, cosmopolitans call for an order that transcends and limits state sovereignty to protect human well-being. This has particularly given rise to a human-well-being centred development approach to security issues. For example, in Pakistan it is argued that the state’s inability to promote development has given rise to militancy and exacerbated political instability. Thus, ‘stability through development has emerged as a principle of US. policy in the fight against militancy in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)’ (Abbas & Qazi 2013, 23).

The theory rejects the realist argument that state power is an eternal perpetuation of power and interest devoid of any moral or ethical values. Cosmopolitanism, thus, situates the idea of sovereignty within a ‘moral’ and a ‘legal’ framework (Pogge 1992). At the basis of this idea is an underlying understanding that ‘every person has global stature as the ultimate unit of moral concern and is therefore entitled to equal respect and consideration no matter what her citizenship status or other affiliations happen to be’ (Brock 2013, 3). Accordingly, Gowan
suggests that ‘by political cosmopolitanism we mean the idea of overcoming the fragmentation of the world into an anarchy of states by constructing a global public order within which states are subsumed’. Interestingly then the cosmopolitan project seems more focused on the weaker states in the international system, since it is mostly in these states that gross human right violations have been recorded recently.

Cosmopolitan theorists argue that the idea of a global democracy has been accentuated by the rapid globalization of the world. Archibugi believes that in such a world, then, where democratic decision-making ensues within states, the citizens of other states suffer their impact, without being part of the decision-making process. For example he believes that

‘A decision on the interest rate in Germany has significant consequences for employment in Greece, Portugal and Italy. A state’s decision to use nuclear energy has environmental consequences for the citizens of neighbouring countries. Immigration policies in the European Union have a significant impact on the economic development of Mediterranean Africa. All this happens without the affected citizens having a say in the matter’ (Archibugi 1998, 204).

This also holds true for the War on Terror. While Pakistan has been the major US ally in its battle against terrorism, the state’s inability to rein in the Taliban and its international reputation as a breeding ground for terrorism has often been the subject of major debates in international politics. Further, its’ ranking as one of the top and most dangerous failed states has complicated the situation further. While Pakistan develops its nuclear arsenal, the US remains sceptical that they might fall into the hands of the terrorist and hence may result in potentially disastrous global consequences. In defense, Pakistan has always countered this argument by vociferous declarations of its sovereignty. Terrorism and its link to Pakistan remains an international anathema for reasons that the effects of Pakistan’s failure to contain terrorism may reverberate internationally. However, Pakistan continues to stay resilient to its realist interpretation of sovereignty defined in terms of national security and territorial integrity as I will demonstrate in the proceeding chapters.

Cosmopolitans see the ideals of global justice and global democracy already gaining roots in international politics. They argue that certain changes over the previous century catalysed the transformations in the world politics, from a state-centric one to a more cosmopolitan one. These changes include ‘the increase in the processes of globalization,…the end of the Cold War…(and) the extension of the democratic ideal to an increasing number of states throughout the globe’ (Kiely 2007, 106-107). If the desirable consequence of the changing
character of the global political structure is a cosmopolitan utopia of global democracy and global justice, what is the motivation behind the idea? For most proponents of the discourse, the answer is human rights. Humanitarian lapses, during the 1990s, on the part of sovereign nations in the developing and the under-developing world propelled the global community (read western states) to identify means and develop measures through which the responsibility of those persecuted could be shared. As the ICISS report argued ‘the three traditional characteristics of a state . . . (territory, authority, and population) have been supplemented by a fourth, respect for human rights’ (ICISS 2001, 136). Moreover, Pogge (2010, 116) suggests that ‘it is only because all human beings are participant in a single, global institutional order- involving such institutions as the territorial state, a system of international law and diplomacy, as well as a global economic system of property rights and market of capital goods and services –that all unfulfilled human rights have come to be, at least potentially everyone’s responsibility’. It is on this turf of human rights that the cosmopolitans argue for an idealistic notion of global citizenship through a global democracy which provides global justice, which they believe is already in process. Thus according to them

‘the violation of human rights, conditions of extreme poverty, periodic recourse to war, and environmental degradation are but a few of the many problems facing humankind today. These ancient problems have taken on a different dimension today, as they are increasingly difficult to confine to, and sometimes even to situate in, a circumscribed geographic area. The capacity for a territorial government to ensure security and promote prosperity is therefore substantially limited’ (Archibugi 2008, 2).

These conditions have, for the cosmopolitans, necessitated a reconfiguring of state sovereignty along legal and discursive lines. State sovereignty, as traditionally understood, divides its political dominion along the external and the internal, with the external defining inter-state relations in an anarchic environment and the internal as moral and legal authority over the society. This is highly contentious for the cosmopolitans as it inhibits human wellbeing and humanitarian efforts. Considering that cosmopolitans pivot their entire discourse on human wellbeing across territorial, national and cultural divides, in doing so they emerge as a formidable critic of state sovereignty as upheld by the realists. Further, since almost all weaker states in some way or another are confounded by problems of human rights, poverty, war and conflict, cosmopolitans then seek a more interventionist international system that exacts control on these political units to find solutions to such problems.
Cosmopolitan idealists believe that traditional concepts of sovereignty not only impede global endeavours aimed at promoting prosperity and ensuring security, in many cases the Westphalian idea of sovereignty is at the source of many crises that plague the world as in the case of failing states. Thus, there is a basic consensus amongst the variant trends in cosmopolitanism that the traditional rigid parameters of sovereignty need now, more than ever, to evolve to provide space for changing global dynamics pivoted around increased transnational activity (Held & McGrew 2007).

**Critique of Cosmopolitanism**

Traditionally states, especially those which have undergone spells of dictatorial regimes and humanitarian crises, have remained unable to deliver public goods to their citizens. Cosmopolitan theorists argue then, that a first step in the right direction is to strip away the ontological privilege that states enjoy as actors that deliver public goods exclusively (Ibid). Pakistan is a state that has seen decade long dictatorial regimes in power; however each dictatorial regime has witnessed immense financial, economic and military support not only from the US alone but multilateral institutions too (Murad 2009). Thus, by way of the cosmopolitan arguments then, the Pakistan state’s ontological privilege of sovereignty should be stripped away and handed to a network of institutions that helped consolidate it in the first place. Secondly the cosmopolitans argue that owing to the processes of globalization, the network of transnational organisations and the expansion of a global civil society, decision-making processes have to an extent become decentralized and the state has been caught at an intersection where it cannot be fully deemed absolute in its decision-making (Held 2003). However Pakistan remains ever sceptical of this network of transnational organisations because its scepticism of the Western powers at large and the International Financial Institutions specifically, have predominantly been shaped by its relationship with the US. Further, given that the US ‘today is primed in its internal politics and international projection for a struggle to dominate the globe’ (Gowan 2002, 65), its considerable influence in shaping decision-making in multilateral institutions comes as no surprise. While it is often true that the relationship between the two states is transactional or as some would claim, rentier in nature, the ability of the US to influence multilateral organisations to conform to its strategic interests hasn’t been lost on Pakistan. Pakistan’s outlook on multilateral organisations, especially the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the United Nations has been moulded by a recurrent historical pattern of its interaction with these organisations. As Ishrat Hussain (2002, 6), former Governor of Pakistan State Bank argued:
‘The image of IMF in developing countries and in Pakistan remains tarnished because of the burden of historical legacy, the increasing debate about the efficacy of the IMF programs during the Asian crisis and the political antecedents of a disproportionate influence of the US and Western countries on decision making’.

A study of the disproportionate influence of the US in the IMF’s decision-making process further debunks (Gowan 2003, 53) the cosmopolitan claim that powerful states in the international arena ‘have broken with power politics as their governing impulse’, As Beesma Momani (2004, 47-48) points out:

‘IMF procedures require a formal approval of the report by the executive board. The board represents the interests of the IMF’s major financial contributors, namely the United States and the G-7 powers. The United States contributes approximately 17 percent of the IMF’s liquidity. The executive board officially makes its decisions based on weighted voting that reflects members’ financial contributions. Therefore, the United States holds 17 percent of IMF votes. This vote share does not seem sizable, but it is significant considering a vote of only 15 percent is required to veto many board decisions (excluding loan approvals) and that it is nearly impossible for a natural coalition of votes to oppose the voting power of the United States. In other words, it would be difficult to find a large enough coalition of members who do not share similar interests in advancing economic liberalization to counteract the power of the United States on the executive board; the United States has de facto supremacy on the board’.

Pakistan’s alliance with the US, in the War on Terror, is demonstrative of the influence that the US wields over at the IMF. In October 1999, following a coup by General Pervez Musharraf, the IMF Managing Director, Michel Camdessus, stated an imminent improbability ‘that the Fund could offer assistance to Pakistan in the wake of the coup’ whereas IMF officials reportedly divulged that the ‘release of the next tranche of a 1997 $1.6 billion loan worth $280 million could be affected’ (NY Times 1999). As the Governor of the State Bank of Pakistan, Ishrat Hussain notes

‘…the relationship between Pakistan and IMF in the early days of Musharraf Government was quite rocky and uneasy. The dismissal of a democratically elected government and take over by a military leader was not taken lightly by the major shareholders of the IMF. On the top of this, the new government had to inform the Board about the misreporting of the fiscal deficit data in the year 1998-99. Thus there was an air of suspicion, scepticism and lack of credibility about the country. Voices were raised at higher level of management and the Board about the country’s track record in delivering on its commitments and promises to the international financial community. There was a little sympathy to the proposal made by the GOP [Government of Pakistan] that they were willing to implement all the conditionalities contained in the suspended ESAF/EFF program and that this program should be resumed. (Husain 2002, 3-4)

However, 9/11 brought significant changes in the way the IMF dealt with Pakistan. Just days after 11 September, 2001, on September 22, 2001, Pakistan had begun successful
negotiations with IMF for a $2.5 billion to $3 billion three-year IMF program. It seemed that this time around, the presence of a dictatorial regime in Pakistan, Pakistan’s poor economic performance and its lack of credibility was not an issue. A similar pattern can be observed with Pakistan’s interaction with the World Bank. Observers note that ‘following the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the ensuing military campaign in Afghanistan, World Bank ODA to Pakistan, a key ally of the US in its ‘War on Terror’, tripled from USD 226 million in 2001 to USD 860 million in 2002’ (Andersen, Hansen, & Markussen 2006, 773). Anwar demonstrates that

‘Pakistan received the lowest amount of total official flows from the World Bank (US $ 300.8 million), in the year 2000. Then, suddenly, in 2001, World Bank lending to Pakistan increased to US $ 669.17 million. Further, in the year 2002, Pakistan was second among the top ten recipients of high commitments from the IDA. Finally, with even higher disbursements than commitments (US $ 961.1 million) in 2002, Pakistan became highest recipient of World Bank lending’ (Anwar 2006, 158).

The data demonstrates that IFI lending to Pakistan increased substantially after Pakistan joined the US-led coalition in its war against terrorism (Calomiris 2000; The Economist 2001), leading Anwar (2006, 6) to argue that

‘throughout the 1970s and the late 1990s, the country was clearly in need of foreign resources. According to the objectives initially defined by multilateral financial institutions for distributing loans, IFIs’ lending should be based on the economic needs of a country. Thus, Pakistan should have received more lending from international organizations in those times when it faced particular economic hardship’.

For Pakistan, the hierarchical nature of international politics remains a stark reality and resultantly for it, cosmopolitanism becomes a theory that is invasive of its sovereignty. Cosmopolitanism seeks to challenges the system of westphalian states which granted Pakistan, a lesser and weaker state, an ‘equal standing as Western ones within the international order, despite continuing inequalities of economic and military power’ (Chandler 2000, 59). In essence then, the cosmopolitan argument for equality across the board, which suggests that international institutions treat all states equally is to misrepresent the nature of the relationship between the US and the institutions because most of the international organisations are effective only so far ‘as they correspond to the perceived priorities of the United States’ (Ibid). Amongst various issues that have plagued Pakistan’s experience with multilateral agencies and the US, a prominent example of the misrepresentation of the nature of US-multilateral institution’s relationship, is the issue of US drone attacks in Pakistan.
The Bureau of Investigative Journalism reports 368 drone strikes within Pakistan’s territorial boundary, by the US government from 2004 to 2013. However, while Pakistan’s government has cried foul at various occasions, it has been unable to halt these territorial incursions. It has been established, that Pakistan’s government under General Pervez Musharraf, was in agreement with the US on these drone strikes (Boone & Beaumont 2013; Mazetti 2013). However, recently, the U.N special rapporteur on counter terrorism and human rights, Ben Emmerson, after a three day fact finding mission, reported the US drone strikes in Pakistan a violation of international law. According to him ‘the position of the government of Pakistan is quite clear: It does not consent to the use of drones by the United States on its territory and it considers this to be a violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity’ (Hughes 2013). Pakistan's foreign affairs ministry had further confirmed to him ‘that since mid-2010 (and to date) it has regularly sent 'notes verbales' to the US embassy in Islamabad protesting the use of drones on the territory of Pakistan’ and ‘requiring the US to cease these strikes immediately’ (Bowcott 2013). While the legality of these territorial violations of sovereignty are being debated and researched, not only amongst policymakers but intellectuals as well (Shah 2010; Orr 2011), The US government remains entrenched in its position on these strikes as being necessitated by its involvement in the ‘War on Terror’ (Paust 2010).

Thus owing to Pakistan’s experience, we can argue that the international system exhibits a marked tendency towards the erosion of state sovereignty in a vast majority of states in the international system, ‘accompanied by an accumulation of exceptional prerogatives on the part of one state’; the US (Gowan 2003, 57). In essence then, the mesh of multilateral institutions, which the cosmopolitans herald as their practical foundations, is merely effective till they do not clash with US political goals (Chomsky 2007; Chomsky 2004). Thus, while cosmopolitan theorists are progressive, in that they prescribe a reordering and restructuring of the global power structure, in essence, ‘there is a real danger that the cosmopolitan impulse will legitimize a much more hierarchical set of international relationships’ (Chandler 2003c, 25). Thus, when delinquent states are central to American interests, as in Saudi Arabia, Israel and as we have observed, Pakistan, all other moral and ethical concerns, that are the proposed cornerstones of the cosmopolitan position, are held in abeyance.

Cosmopolitans argue that the idea of placing equal respect and concern of human beings at the centre of the international agenda, one which cuts through the barricades raised by state sovereignty is not a utopian ideal, but rather a development that remains central to the post-World War II legal and political evolution of the international system. Hence what these
cosmopolitan theorists advocate is that ‘rather than the rights of states being the founding principle of international society it should be the rights of individual citizens’ (Chandler 2003b, 332). This is indeed quite a moral position that is difficult to argue with, but even here the network of organisations that are projected by the cosmopolitans to uphold such humanistic concerns have demonstrated caveats. For example an instance of multilateral institutions reneging on their ‘cosmopolitan’ duties is the case of General Pervez Musharraf’s arrest. General Pervez Musharraf, the most recent dictator in Pakistan’s history, is accused in three cases in Pakistan’s courts including the conspiracy to murder Benazir Bhutto in 2007, the abrogation of the constitution by imposing emergency and the illegal detention of Supreme Court’s Chief Justice. Since General Musharraf was in exile and local arrest couldn’t be made possible, Pakistan sought an arrest warrant for Musharraf by approaching the Interpol Headquarters. The Interpol rejected these requests twice. The first time pleading those insufficient documents had been submitted by local authorities and the second time because it found the cases against the General, “engaged by Pakistan” to have a “political character”, even though his offences were offences of ordinary law and not inherently political ones (Abbasi 2013). This example demonstrates why Pakistan remains mistrustful of international institutions.

Further, Pakistan’s mistrust of multilateral institutions has a historical background as well. Two specific events, the occupation of Jammu and Kashmir in 1947, by the Indian Forces, and the Indian ‘humanitarian intervention’ into, what was East Pakistan in 1971, have reinforced common perception within the Pakistan state that it operates in an unequal, anarchic environment where multilateral institutions have failed to provide justice and equal treatment vis-à-vis its hegemonic aspirant neighbouring India. In the case of Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan finds the Western powers and the UN, ineffective in containing human rights violations in Kashmir, perpetrated by the Indian forces on the local Muslim population as the Indian forces have been known to engage in ‘massive human rights violations, including extra judicial executions, rape, torture and deliberate assault on health workers’ (Watch & Human Rights 1993, 1). The pattern continues till date. In 2012, the Association of Parents of Disappeared Persons and the International People’s Tribunal on Human Rights and Justice in Indian-administered Kashmir jointly compiled a 354 page report. The report ‘analysed 214 cases of abuse and highlighted the role of officials in the killing of nearly 70000 people over two decades’ (BBC News 2012). The report argues that ‘India’s priority in Kashmir was to control the territory, not pursue justice’ (Ibid).
It seems that the international community (read UN and US) has turned a blind eye to these atrocities. However, in Pakistan, a similar case of human rights violation in Balochistan elicited the tabling of a Resolution in the US Congress. The resolution introduced by US Congressman Dana Rohrabacher, co-sponsored by House Representatives Louie Gohmert and Steve King, called upon Pakistan to recognise the Baloch right to self-determination. It noted that, it was US policy to ‘oppose aggression and the violation of human rights inherent in the subjugation of national groups as currently being shown in Iran and Pakistan against the aspirations of the Baloch people’ (Imtiaz 2012). There are two issues with this US human rights concerns in Pakistan. Firstly, it is duplicitous, in the essence that a more prolonged human rights violation in Kashmir by neighbouring India has not moved the US in seven decades to resolve the human rights issue. Secondly, even the US human rights concerns with regards to the Baloch people, are evoked from two non-human rights centric motives. One, that Washington should ‘help the Baloch break away from the federation so that American and NATO forces can have unfettered access to landlocked Afghanistan, given how Pakistan has been holding the US to ransom’, in the War on Terror; Two, that ‘Rohrabacher wants to "stick it to the Pakistanis" for their support of terrorism, sheltering of Osama Bin Laden, and harassment of US forces’ (Rajghatta 2012). Clearly, then, US pursuit of a universal human rights, is not as moral-driven, as might apparently seem. Herein lays the paradox. The Cosmopolitan discourse that pivots on human rights has been captured in a hierarchical practice that serves to protect US political and strategic interests and seems to be used only as a pressure tactic rather than a universal aspiration of which the cosmopolitans boast.

For the Pakistani state, the Westphalian values of sovereignty and non-interference had provided the perfect bastion against external interference. Consequently then, any efforts by the multilateral institutions or powerful states which seek to capture and control Pakistan’s state sovereignty, are seen as hegemonic practices through which the West and the US seek to elicit the acquiescence of Pakistan ‘in the international system in its continued dominance’ (Rao 2010, 32), by using the vocabulary of cosmopolitanism. Such continued dominance reeks of striking similarities between historic imperialism and the current interventions in Third World, justified by cosmopolitan thought and is seen as a contemporary development that has followed a temporal continuum from classic imperialism to neo-imperialism. In face of such interventions by the powerful states in the West, and their continued dominance over the international system both in the case of weaker states and multilateral institutions, ‘the pluralist norms of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-intervention…now seem
extraordinarily valuable to the weakest members of the international society’ (Ibid, 73). For the Pakistani state then, the Westphalian values of sovereignty and non-interference had provided the perfect bastion against external interference. However the changing context of global politics, increasingly surrendering its character to an ever-evolving multilateral network, heralds to Pakistan the same interventionist fears that were characteristics of its colonial past. This does seem to be the case with Pakistan. For example, in a speech at the UN, the Pakistani Permanent Ambassador to the UN, Abdullah Haroon, commented on the paradigmatically cosmopolitan humanitarian ‘Right to Protect’ norm (Haroon 2009):

‘R2P shall be a delicately defined process and in order to prevent any misunderstanding or misuse of the concept as a tool to pressurize or interfere in the internal affairs of a sovereign state, the continuous double standards and selective approach to different conflicts in the world including situations under foreign occupation in the world would have to be systematically rectified to remove the doubts about the implementation of the R2P’.

At another meeting in the UN, which was organized to discuss the UN Secretary General’s report on “Early Warning, Assessment and Right to Protect” (Haroon 2010), Pakistan made a case that

‘The report does not mention the cost and consequences of causing selective and false alarms. If there is no accountability of the Early Warning and Assessment as the report suggests then in case of a false alarm etc. no one will be held responsible… This leads us to the issue of historical trust deficit both in the form of experience of colonialism and unresolved historical disputes. While no warning or assessment is required in the case of internationally recognized disputes, the world and the UN system has consistently failed to address the issue’.

While it is true that the westphalian sovereign state lies at the intersection of various transnational and multinational organisations, however, Held believes that there is still a long way to go before cosmopolitan ideals can be reached. Till then, the current structure still remains one where transnational decision-making processes remain hostage to great power interests. For example, as Chandler points out that the ‘UN in practice was repeatedly utilized as an instrument of American hegemony’ however, theoretically at least, a framework of international law had been put into place which constrained the exercise of state sovereignty (Chandler, 2003a, 31). What has happened then is that, while cosmopolitanism with its emphasis on human well-being and human rights projects a moral idea that as Held has argued is at the core of many human rights developments after the Second World War, however the idea, the structure and the solution that cosmopolitan tenets have offered have often remained hostage to great power interests. Thus even though cosmopolitan argue that
the post-Second World War developments and subsequently, the post-Cold War global scenario has witnessed an increased in transnational activity that has often centred around human rights, these developments have often been selective to great power interests. As this thesis makes clear, the US tolerated a dictatorial regime in Pakistan during the Cold War and supported another one after the Cold War. Further, it was not alone. The Western powers along with international institutions provided the dictatorial regime with much needed international legitimacy, a phenomenon which we have observed above and will continue to explore in the subsequent chapters.

Thus while state sovereignty during the Cold War, as we have observed, followed a rigid principle of non-interference and non-intervention, in the post-Cold War gross human rights violations triggered a rethinking and conceptualizing of the idea of sovereignty. This development, spearheaded by the cosmopolitans, as we have observed, argues for a flexible understanding of sovereignty and once which is centred on human rights rather than the state. Pakistan’s experience with multilateral institutions, which form the foundation of the cosmopolitan conceptions, has only endorsed the fact that in the post-Cold War order, these multilateral international institutions have remained hostage to US interests.

**State Failure: Theoretical Parameters and Critique**

If, as we have observed earlier, humanitarian intervention is paradigmatically a cosmopolitan idea, then by extension, so is the idea of state failure. This is because humanitarian interventions are justified by cosmopolitans only in states that have failed to fulfil their responsibility to protect their citizens. Failed/failing states, rogue states and terrorist organisations have come to dominate the international perception and caught focus of policymakers as agencies impinging global peace. Hence consequently, these states have become major concerns which require immediate attention. Earlier, state failure was understood to be the domestic concern of the respective states and thus any external attempt to remedy the situation was considered as interference and an infringement of sovereignty. Now, increasingly, state failure is being acknowledged as a pandemic that ‘not only bears upon the well-being of the citizens concerned (which often has proven to be not good enough a reason for international action), but its implications reach further, i.e. to neighbouring states, regional security, and to the ‘global society’ at large’ (Aalberts 2004, 246). In a nutshell, sovereignty for the weak states is now conditional to their performance. Internally this performance is measured by how responsibly a state acts towards the well-being of its
citizens and externally how does the state act as a responsible member among the community of states? Thus while the international community, spearheaded by the western states, endeavour to make sovereignty conditional to a state’s performance, Third World weak states demonstrate their resilience to this international effort by growing even stauncher advocates of the traditional rigid conception of state sovereignty. Consequently, while the western world, spearheaded by the US, has moved from viewing sovereignty in the Third World as a rigid idea, at least paradigmatically if not practically, to conditional sovereignty; the states in the Third World have not shared this view. This argument will be dealt in greater length in chapter 5 and 6.

State failure does not have one strict accurate definition or explanation. Each political organization depending on the country it belongs to has different sets of measurements, indicators, even explanations as to what the term ‘failed states’ imply. However there is an underlying consensus that, ‘failed states’ are incapable or unwilling to deliver public goods like security, education, health facilities etc. to their people depending on their relative ineffectiveness . The USAID paper (USAID 2005, 1) on Fragile States Strategy uses the term ‘fragile states’ to include a broader range of states including failing, failed and recovering states. Further, instead of categorizing these states into failing and failed, the paper separates fragile states into two broad categories of crisis states and vulnerable states. The category of Crisis states refers ‘to those states where the central government does not exert effective control over its own territory or is unable or unwilling to assure the provision of vital services to significant parts of its territory’. Further these are those states, ‘where legitimacy of the government is weak or non-existent, and where violent conflict is a reality or a great risk’. The category of vulnerable states on the other hand, includes states ‘unable or unwilling to adequately assure the provision of security and basic services to significant portions of their populations and where the legitimacy of the government is in question. This includes states that are failing or recovering from crisis’ (Ibid). The analytical framework of the USAID paper is based on the premise that ineffective and illegitimate governments are primarily responsible for instability within the fragile states. In the case of Pakistan then, by USAID definitions, Pakistan’s state failure is attributed to poor governance and inefficient governments which are held responsible for instability within the state. But if illegitimate or weak/non-existent legitimacy of government is a huge coefficient in determining the degree of state failure, surely then a dictatorial regime, such as General Pervez Musharraf’s in Pakistan, should be a huge cause of global concern. However, contrarily, it was during the
General Pervez Musharraf’s regime that Pakistan-US relations were closest and the regime, due to its alliance in the War on Terror, garnered international goodwill.

The DFID seeks to develop a common approach by reinforcing and incorporating the OECD and the World Banks’ understanding of definitional issues and theoretical parameters. OECD earlier recognized states as fragile when the “state structures lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the security and human rights of their populations” and later modified it to states which were “unable to meet its population’s expectations or manage changes in expectations and capacity through the political process” (OECD 2008, 17). Here OECD and DFID share a common conceptual ground that “it is important to recognise that fragility exists on a spectrum and takes different forms that may require varying policy responses” (Ibid, 16).

However, a look at UK’s National Security Strategy (UK Government 2008) seems inconsistent with the DFIDs’ understanding of fragility. While the DFID seems to measure, gauge and assess failure on a spectrum of fragility and apparently, seems to have moved away from coining the term “failed states” for states, failing or in the process of failing, the UK National Security Strategy understands failed states and fragile states differently. It still finds a use for the term failed states as those where the “government is not effective or legitimate enough to maintain the rule of law, protect itself, its citizens and its borders, or provide the most basic services”, while a fragile state “is one in which those problems are likely to arise”(Ibid, 14).

It is evident then that even in the policymaking apparatus in the developed world, there is ambiguity and theoretical confusion on the idea of what state failure is and how it should be represented. Thus, while some policymakers agree that ‘most donors now prefer the term ‘fragile’ rather than ‘failing’ states’ (Batt 2004, 2), there seems a clear demarcation between developmental agencies and the mainstream policy apparatus in developed countries in their understanding of state failure and fragility. However, despite the various definitions and expositions on state failure and fragility, the concept is moving towards a common definition of defining it as a state’s incapacity or incapability to provide public goods to its population. It is in this context largely that Pakistan’s state failure has come to attract increased international attention. A detailed expose of the confusion on Pakistan’s state failure, both internationally and domestically, will be provided in chapter 5.
Failed states, as we have observed above, are said to be characterised by a complete or partial collapse of law and order whereby the institutions of the state are rendered ineffective and inefficient to monopolize the legitimate use of force and are unable to provide for the security of their citizens, or alternatively, they become oppressive instruments and terrorize their citizens. Public institutions in these states are degenerative and largely unresponsive to their citizens’ needs and basic rights. Internationally, they suffer from a lack of credibility that makes them unrepresentative of their polity beyond their own borders (Brinkerhoff 2005; Gordon 1997; Milliken & Krause 2002; Rotberg 2002b). Pakistan has often made it to the list of such states. However, while domestically, its institutions are indeed in a degenerative state and are less responsive to its citizen’s needs and rights, internationally the state continues to successfully enjoy legitimacy in the eyes of the Western powers. This was even the case during the dictatorial regime of General Musharraf which represented Pakistan on all international forums and was considered credible enough for an alliance with NATO and the US in the War on Terror.

In the current political structure, putting individuals as ultimate units of moral concern and hence at the centre of the global political agenda then, applies pressure on states, from ‘above’ by emerging multilateral institutional frameworks and transnational arrangements designed to coordinate and regulate activities of states beyond their territorial domains and from ‘below’ by a growing network of non-state actors, both nationally and internationally, forming a global civil society (Held 2003; Kaldor 2003). Thus when states fail or appear to fail in fulfilling their statutory obligations, constitutional duties and ethical and moral responsibilities towards its citizens, it faces pressure from these multilateral institutions and the global civil society to hold itself accountable to these global entities for its misconduct towards its own citizens. In case a state(s) lacks the capacity or the capability to resuscitate itself from its decline into failure, resulting in humanitarian catastrophes, ranging from genocide to abject poverty to famine etc., the Western powers, mobilizing around multilateral institutional arrangements, either force a humanitarian intervention or agrees to provide foreign assistance through which the capacity and the capability of the recipient state(s) is developed and enhanced. According to cosmopolitans then, humanitarian interventions and foreign assistance strategies are coded in the moral justification of humanitarian emancipation and concern arising from global empathy and the target of these exercises are states that show visible signs of failure. By this measure then, Pakistan’s state failure should have attracted US foreign aid aimed at rejuvenating and rebuilding its infrastructure and
improving its governance. The question this thesis seeks to explore is, was the US foreign assistance strategy aimed at improving governance and governmental infrastructure in Pakistan, given Pakistan’s state failure status?

The detrimental effect of failed and failing states are manifold and do not only affect the states themselves but also negatively impact upon the developed world. It is quite obvious that the effects of failed states resonate across borders and permeates into the fabric of the developed world societies. However, what changed after 9/11 was that various other external impacts, generated by the failure of a state to some extent, became secondary and security concerns became pivotal to the concept of failed states. As (Rice 2005) iterated:

‘When people, goods and information traverse the globe as fast as they do today, transnational threats such as disease or terrorism can inflict damage comparable to the standing armies of nation-states. Absent responsible state authority, threats that would and should be contained within a country's borders can now melt into the world and wreak untold havoc. Weak and failing states serve as global pathways that facilitate the spread of pandemics, the movement of criminals and terrorists, and the proliferation of the world's most dangerous weapons. Our experience of this new world leads us to conclude that the fundamental character of regimes matters more today than the international distribution of power.’

Hence, now, ‘reinventing states from failing, and resuscitating those that do fail, are thus strategic and moral imperatives’ (Rotberg 2002a, 127). This argument thus advances a moral justification of state intervention, militarily or economically. It is argued that, terrorist groups have difficulty operating within a state that is fully functional, because active and strong institutions of law and order would hamper their subversive activities. These groups, thus, would find it easier to operate in a state where the institutions are weak and which are victims of bad governance. Thus in these states, strengthening institutions and improving the quality of governance would significantly reduce terrorist activities (Newman 2009, 431). While during the 1990s, literature on failed states, ‘perceived’ these states as transnational threats to international peace and security (Helman & Ratner 1993), not least to the United States (Dorff 1999), the event of 9/11 served as a fulfilling prophecy substantiating these perceptions thus rendering the transnational threat of failed states to the global community as an ‘established’ fact. Secondly, it was only after 9/11 that ‘addressing the threat of transnational terrorism’ became a ‘high priority policy objective’ within the US foreign policy, an issue that remained largely ignored and peripheral to US policy interests during the 1990s (Piazza 2008, 469). It is in this context that Pakistan’s state failure has rose to
international prominence due to its links with Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda, and its projected status as a breeding ground for terrorism.

Within the growing literature on failed and failing states, some argue that the emergence of state failure as a phenomenon is a function of the end of an imperialist culture in the post-World War II era. Hence the failure of states is largely, the failure of imperialist and colonial powers to take on their responsibility as hegemons, an argument of those (Cooper 2002; Williamson 2007) who solicit the return of imperialism. Since in a less globalised era there were few, if any, implications for global security and peace, spurning from the failure and weaknesses of states and the global system of states did not enjoy the inter-connectedness that it does today, hence the chances of a state’s fragile domestic situation had little bearing on other states (François & Sud 2006; Rotberg 2002b). The only solution, then, to resuscitate these states from their path of self-destruction, is to bring back imperialism and colonialism back in its full glory.

Robert Cooper, a senior British diplomat, writing about humanitarian intervention and state sovereignty, argued that, ‘the need of colonialism is as great as it ever was in the nineteenth century’ (Cooper 2002, 1). Cooper (Ibid) argues that there is currently a dire need to bring colonialism and western imperialism out of its past, to solve the problems in the present. He suggests that

‘The most logical way to deal with chaos, and the one most employed in the past is colonisation. But colonisation is unacceptable to postmodern states (and, as it happens, to some modern states too). It is precisely because of the death of imperialism that we are seeing the emergence of the pre-modern world. Empire and imperialism are words that have become a form of abuse in the postmodern world. Today, there are no colonial powers willing to take on the job, though the opportunities, perhaps even the need for colonisation is as great as it ever was in the nineteenth century… What is needed then is a new kind of imperialism, one acceptable to a world of human rights and cosmopolitan values’.

Thus Cooper (Ibid) argues that while the weak states need the strong states, the strong states in return desire an orderly world. Thus to bring weak states out of their pre-modern chaos, they must be opened up for international interference and interference. While shying short of advancing such an overt advocacy of colonialism and western imperialism Williamson (2007, 14) iterates that

‘American exceptionalism is grounded in the belief that American values have universal application. Human rights, religious tolerance, the rule of law, an independent judiciary, representative government, and so on are not merely for the fortunate few, but the inalienable rights of all mankind. These values are transcendent. They
are values for which American patriots have died. It is the opportunity and responsibility of Americans today to keep faith in those values at home, as well as in the animation of our foreign relations. Weak, failing, and failed states are places in which those values are denied, sometimes violently. These places are areas that offend American values. They are locations where America’s efforts to project those values, and the benefits they provide, are denied’.

Since western colonialism and imperialism, have historically tied the imperialist and its colonies in a symbiotic relationship wherein the imperialist emulated its designs of progress in the colonies to benefit themselves, a call to imperialism now, would imply a similar mechanism that would allow the imperialist states to exercise control over these failed/failing states in order to achieve a milestone wherein the failed/failing states would no longer be a threat to the security and peace of the western world. Thus the advocates of the return of the empire, primarily, solicit a western style of governance and model of economic growth in failed and failing states while maintaining substantial control over the decision-making process of these states. These assertions, in the case of Pakistan, are lent some credibility by the fact that once the War on Terror commenced, the dictatorial regime of General Pervez Musharraf received a significant amount of aid flow, not only from the US but the financial institutions as well, to enhance its economic growth, improve governance and advance development. How altruistic have these international economic assistances been, will be analysed and discussed in subsequent chapters.

The advent of the War on Terror, at the dawn of the 21st century, witnessed foreign assistance from donors becoming one of the central policy agendas of the developed world. Much of it owed to the fact that the Western powers viewed the failed and failing states as a pandemic disease that plagued prosperity, human rights and security throughout the globe. Considering the dominant discourse on failed states, it is quite understandable that they pose problems of governability that may jeopardize and subject their local populations to hazardous conditions.

‘The economy weakens. Education and health care are non-existent. Physical infrastructure breaks down. Crime and violence escalate out of control. These conditions generate opposition groups which often turn to armed uprising. More often than not, the weapons of choice are small arms, light weapons and explosives because they are cheap, plentiful, durable, easily transported and simple to use. These conflicts create huge population shifts and refugee crises, long-term food shortages, failing economies, and the death of large numbers of civilians from disease, starvation and direct conflict’ (Carment 2003, 409).
These are the domestic situations that might arise from the failure of the state and could possibly spill over, effecting stability in neighbouring states and accentuating security concerns all over the globe, resulting from terrorism, as is often suggested in the case of Pakistan. It seems logical to comment then, that the developed world gauges the strength of institutions and the quality of governance in the mirror of its assumed performance which is evaluated under a capitalist model of neo-liberal market economy. Consequently, it is assumed that ‘every state can be evaluated on the basis of a prototype of an advanced state. This advanced state is essentially that which exists in the Western core: it is the normative goal, the top end of a single and universalised spectrum of proper state functioning, and it is towards this model that all states ideally should move, as it is the only viable option to bring them out of the poverty and misery that makes them such easy prey to criminal and terrorist networks’ (Jennings & Bøas 2005, 387). Foreign assistance programmes are thus seen as a concerted global effort, required to alleviate these states from their degenerating path.

For some (Lemay-Hébert 2009), the problem of failing or failed states was a product of weak institutions and poor governance and hence improving the quality of state institutions would rescue these states from their downward spiral. It is thus argued that failed states are governmental structures overpowered by circumstances and that the difference between strong and weak states remains the level of their effective delivery of the most crucial public goods which are security, provision of basic services and the protection of essential civil freedom. The segment of authors, policy-makers and intellectuals, who understands democratic governance, free market economy and the prevalence of human rights as prerequisites of any properly functioning state, see the problem of failed states as a reverse image of their prosperity and hence tend and intend to structure their governance in the semblance of their own political values and institutional structure (Newman 2009). Since, these approaches ‘focus on the (in)effectiveness of institutions, which rests upon a Weberian-state ideal as the starting point; unsurprisingly, these approaches to define and measure weak and failed statehood take the functioning, liberal (Western) state as the ideal, and rank states in declining categories of effectiveness the further they stray from this ideal’ (Ibid, 426). Pakistan, has largely subscribed to the western state ideals and to the neoliberal ideology that drives it. The concern of this thesis is not to assess Pakistan’s performance based on these ideals, but to ascertain whether US foreign assistance strategy towards Pakistan followed this model of institutional development, given that Pakistan is considered a failing state by much
of the global community? This aspect of Pakistan’s state failure will be observed in chapter 5 and chapter 6.

It thus needs to be seen whether the US foreign assistance strategy is a disguise for furthering its national interest. ‘For Marxists, these interests are vital geostrategic or economic interests which can be safeguarded informally, through the dictate of the market, and, if necessary, through direct coercive intervention and the negation of sovereign rights. For Foucauldians, these vital interests, of maintaining neoliberal market conditions and social stability, necessitate more complex forms of intervention, aimed at the regulation of societies as well as governments’ (Chandler, 2006, 18). Thus US is seen as a ‘global hegemon, acting on behalf of international capital and instituting a new universal empire, enforcing the power of the market over elites which refuse to cooperate with international financial institutions’ (Ibid, 13). However US concerns in Pakistan, when there have been as during the dictatorial regimes of General Zia-ul Haq and General Pervez Musharraf, have largely been more geostrategic than economic. This has meant that in the case of Pakistan, the US has often used the International Financial Institutions not to enforce power but to elicit cooperation by providing monetary incentives through institutions like the World Bank and the IMF, an aspect that will be detailed upon in the coming chapters.

The question that arises, then, is whether it is possible to carry out statebuilding efforts in states without infringing upon their sovereignty. Deng et al. (1996, xviii) suggest that

‘the normative principle of sovereignty… have internal and external dimensions. The internal dimension has to do with the degree to which the government is responsive to the need of its people, is accountable to the body politic, and therefore legitimate. The international dimension has to do with the cooperation of sovereign states in helping or checking one another when a fellow state loses or refuses to use its capacity to provide protection and assistance for its citizens… On the international level, then, sovereignty becomes a pooled function, to be protected when exercised responsibly, and to be shared when help is needed’.

Voicing similar concerns Ghani and Lockhart (2009, 26) argue that while earlier it was more idealistic and less pragmatic to view state intervention or foreign assistance as an essential matter of concern, ‘in the post 9/11 world this has become a global issue. Like it or not, we are moving toward a common security-development paradigm. It is increasingly clear that one key phenomenon – the failed state, or the sovereignty gap- connects the entire complex of these problems’. Thus according to the proponents of this discourse, sovereignty is a fluid concept not rigidly bound to the sovereign but also accountable to the global body politic. Thus, it becomes morally and strategically imperative to intervene, militarily or
economically, in states where a situation may arise that might threaten global humanitarian values or may give rise to security concerns. Since Pakistan remains ideally placed for a study on a security-development nexus, and as a projected failed/failing state, in that case then, it becomes important to analyse how these variables are employed to make its sovereignty conditional.

Critique of State Failure

The Foreign Policy magazine (2014) assesses failed states by measuring them across categories such as demographic pressure, refugees/Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), human flight, uneven development, economic decline, human rights, security apparatus etc. The problem with such measurements is that they generalize the concept of failed states. States may fail for different reasons. While some states may be undergoing dire developmental issues, others may have security problems or a humanitarian crisis. There is thus an agreement that

‘beyond methodological shortcomings, the lists of failed states reveal only that there are many countries plagued by severe problems. The top ten states in the 2009 Failed States Index include two countries the United States occupies (Iraq and Afghanistan), one country without any central government to speak of (Somalia), four poor African states (Zimbabwe, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic), two resource-rich but unstable African countries (Sudan and Guinea) and a nuclear-armed Muslim country, population 176 million (Pakistan)’ (Logan & Preble 2011, 381).

The sheer diversity of the countries on the lists makes clear that ‘few policy conclusions could be drawn from a country’s designation as a failed state’ (Ibid). To measure failed states by a single yardstick of neoliberal institutional development, undermines any effort to realize a sustainable long-term solution to their problems, as these efforts would not be specifically tailored to the situation on ground. For example ‘an examination of just the ten most failed states [as per the Foreign Policy Failed States Index] reveals a divergence as to the source of their failings. While Haiti (ranked 8th) scores 5.0 for Refugees and Displaced Persons, Afghanistan (ranked 10th) scores 9.6; Sudan (ranked 1st) scores 7.5 for Economy while Zimbabwe (ranked 5th) scores 9.8. Further down the rankings the differing scores become more pronounced; for example, Nepal (ranked 20th) differs markedly from Burundi (ranked 15th) in almost all the 12 variables’ (Hehir 2007b, 314). Further, while Liberia, Sierra Leone, Colombia, Somalia or Haiti may be described as states ‘incapable of maintaining even minimal levels of public order and productivity’ (Dorff 2005, 23), thus signifying a complete absence of central authority, this is not the case with Iraq, whose state failure is largely an
attribute of its post-conflict reconstruction, prior to which it was categorized as a rogue state rather than a failed one. This is again different from the case of Pakistan, whose failure comes to fore as its incapability to deal with terrorist organisations and maintain law and order within its territorial boundaries. However, according to the Failed States Index except that the Pakistan state holds a higher degree of legitimacy amongst its people, provides comparatively better public services and scores lesser on the index of external intervention, it seems there is no significant difference between Afghanistan and Pakistan (Foreign Policy Magazine 2014). Further for a state that has undergone three failed economic take-offs, it seems quite unremarkable that Rwanda (ranked 35) figure less failed on the Index. This begs the question that if there is little or marginal policy currency of the concept why does it still remain a dominant analytical tool in policy making circles? Leading us to ask how does conceptually capturing Pakistan as a failed/fragile/failing state assist the Western world in decision-making processes, when the concept is found analytically inadequate to explain the depth of issues confronting Pakistan? In Pakistan’s case, as I will demonstrate in chapter 5, Pakistan’s state failure status has largely been under international focus due to its link with terrorism, which is further confounded by its status as a nuclear armed state.

The discourse on failed and failing states is a conceptual quagmire, one that has been taken up by policymakers all around the developed world to now form a major component of their foreign policies. Given the vagueness and lack of conceptual clarity in formulating precise international mechanisms to deal with the phenomenon of state failure, it is then understandable why resuscitating states from their persistent state of failure has frustrated the policy circles (Lemay-Hébert 2009; Yannis 2003). Another anomaly in measuring state failure is that it places the entire onus of the responsibility of failure on to the failed state itself. State failure is largely seen as a consequence of civil conflict, inept leadership and/or degenerating weak governmental institutions, while largely ignoring the role that international financial institutions, multinational corporations and foreign interests play to the detriment of these states (Wilde 2003), a recurring theme in the literature on neo-colonialism (Leonard 1980; Nkrumah 1965; Sklar 1975). Thus while Pakistan’s state failure is often attributed to its domestic conditions which include poor governance, weak security, and deprivation of basic human rights to its population, literature (Hehir 2007a; Kfir 2007; Ziring 2010) on Pakistan’s state failure largely ignores external inputs which have contributed towards its state failure for example in establishing Pakistan’s link to terrorism, Taliban and
Al-Qaeda, US contribution in creating these entities and its historical link with its interaction with Pakistan are marginally mentioned.

The entire efforts put into providing foreign aid to failed and failing states is not a divine mission of international solidarity, but an exploration into identifying means of control on the decision making process in such states, and hence making them satellites without taking any responsibility. In January 1991, ‘minutes after Yemen voted against the resolution to attack Iraq, a senior American diplomat told the Yemeni ambassador: ‘That was the most expensive no-vote you ever cast’. Within three days, a US aid program of $70 million to one of the world’s poorest countries was stopped. Yemen suddenly had problems with the World Bank and the IMF; and 800,000 Yemeni workers were expelled from Saudi Arabia… When the United States sought another resolution to blockade Iraq, two new members of the Security Council were duly coerced. Ecuador was warned by the US ambassador in Quito about the ‘devastating economic consequences’ of a No vote. Zimbabwe was threatened with new IMF conditions for its debt. After the Security Council adopted its Iraq resolution of November 8, 2002, U.N…the ambassador Jagdish Koonjul (Mauritius) was recalled by his government for failing to support the original US draft resolution on Iraq. Why? Because Mauritius receives significant US aid and the African Growth and Opportunity Act required that a recipient of US assistance ‘does not engage in activities that undermine US national security or foreign policy interests’” (Solomon 2003).

Pakistan has had similar experiences. As a consequence of US air strikes that hit two border posts at Salala on 26 November 2011, killing 24 Pakistani soldiers, Pakistan closed the main NATO supply route to Afghanistan. The reopening of this route was made conditional to an American apology of the incident and the cessation of drone attacks amongst other issues. The US Congress proposed stopping preferential trade with Pakistan and reducing aid to just 10 per cent of available funds unless Islamabad reopened NATO supply routes. The lawmakers also approved a proposal to stop all reimbursements to the country if Pakistan continued to ignore US demands. The restrictions, included in two bills passed separately by House panels, are the harshest since Pakistan joined the US-led war against terror 11 years ago. The restrictions were endorsed by an overwhelming majority as both Republicans and Democrats castigated Pakistan for closing the supply routes and for allegedly patronising various terrorist groups. “The bill places appropriate conditions on aid to Pakistan,” said Congressman Adam Smith, a ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee. “It is imperative that Pakistan support our counter-terrorism efforts’ (Iqbal 2012). The US – Pakistan political impasse lasted nine month after which the Pakistani government, under tremendous pressure, gave way to US demands and reopened the NATO supply route. In a similar incident earlier, involving Raymond Davis, a US official detained over shooting two
Pakistani men in Lahore, US congressmen had threaten Pakistan of dire consequences, unless he be released. John Kline, a Republican from Minnesota, remarked that ‘It is imperative that they release him and there is certainly the possibility that there would be repercussions if they don't’ (The News International 2011). Two months later, he was released despite huge public outrage. Since these pressures, are largely premised on the disbursement of foreign aid, it indeed puts a question mark on the US foreign assistance strategy.

The examples above debunk the altruism that has come to be attached to international economic assistances, specifically the US. Thus while foreign aid to recipient states, is required to improve their governance and institutional infrastructure, however it has come to be used as a political tool. Thus aid and its attachment with various conditionalities that base themselves on donor state’s national interest rather than the projected idea of alleviating the conditions of infrastructure and governance run contrary to the arguments on international assistance programmes. The question then is that is US foreign assistance a foreign policy tool employed to pursue its own interest when it suits the US? Is it basically designed to create dependencies amongst recipient states so that the dependence maybe exploited when required? Does the pattern of US foreign assistance during the post-Cold War, differ from those during the Cold War? In the case of Pakistan-US relations, this will be explored throughout the thesis.

Some argue that, in the context of international economic assistances, the ‘contemporary problem of statebuilding might therefore be thought of as the problem faced by an imperial power that seeks to construct a temporary rather than a permanent empire’ (Wagner 2003, 4). Thus by creating dependent states, imperial powers endeavour to construct a temporary empire, which absolves them of the responsibility of continuing their support, once the dependent has served its purpose. Could this be the context in which the global powers operate in the post 9/11 scenario? Does the War on Terror, provide them with a moral justification to further their strategic interests? Such an argument might have some validity. The western interventionist policies of the 1990s were bogged down in a quagmire of legal and moral interpretations. The grounds for intervention were often subjected to rigorous moral and legal interrogation by both academics and practitioners alike. There was a ‘need to close the gap between legality and legitimacy by clarifying the ‘grey zone’ of moral consensus. More than this there was a widespread discomfort about the potentially destabilizing consequences of eroding legal barriers to the use of force’ and economic intervention (Cunliffe 2007, 42).
This led the Permanent Representative of India to the UN to remark: ‘in recent years…the development activities of the UN have diminished while the regulatory and punitive aspects have acquired prominence. The developing countries are the target of many of these actions which has led to a sense of alienation among the majority of UN Member States[…] The Security Council’s legislative decisions and those on the use of force…appear as an arbitrary and alien power: this is an alienation not of the individual or class but of countries’ (Ibid, 43). Thus as Cunliffe continues to explain, in situations requiring urgent attention and intervention the question of who is best suited to act becomes secondary to the ‘moral imperative to act’. Hence ‘In practice this means that the powerful have the final word because, by definition, they are the best placed to act’ (Ibid, 47). It can then be deduced that such power could also be used, garbed in a moral justification, to further the geostrategic and geopolitical interests of the powerful states, defined in terms of their political positioning and concerns, resource attraction market expansion.

David Lake (2010) theorizes the pattern of US foreign assistance strategy within three models of US statebuilding efforts that have evolved over time. The first model explains the US foreign assistance strategy during the Cold War. This model is premised on the concept of realpolitik which suggests that it was a security imperative of the US to provide foreign assistance to failed and failing states, in order to secure their loyalty against the communist bloc. The second model provides the framework for US foreign assistance strategy in the developing and the underdeveloped world during the 1990s. According to this model, US foreign aid was more concentrated towards creating democratic institutions. The third model chalks out the current timeline and advances as a core tenet, that US foreign assistance now is aimed at establishing legitimacy of the failed/ failing state within their territorial boundaries by assisting them in providing effectively for the basic needs of the citizens. In this model democracy and free market economy, hence the focus on institution – centric development, became the main emphasis of US policy makers. This is central to the thesis since the thesis seeks to question exactly that: has the main emphasis of US policy makers in the post-Cold War era, in Pakistan, been on institution centric development? Is this pattern a break from the realpolitik-centred US policies of the Cold War?

**Conclusion**

This chapter, initially, begun with an exploration of sovereignty in Third World states. It argued that Third World states have become increasingly staunch in their protection of their
sovereignty. This was because sovereignty for Third World states represented a barrier against external interference in their domestic matters. However, during the Cold War, the Third World became the battlefield for the ideological confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union. During this time the US intervened in states, directly and indirectly, to keep them conformed to its ideals and goals. However the end of the Cold War, heralded a new era of unipolarity and the 1990s witnessed state failure becoming a major humanitarian concern. It was after 9/11 that the US identified weaker states, rather than the stronger as the main threat to its security. Hence state failure became a major focus of international policy makers. Pakistan’s state failure in that sense then required sustained and comprehensive foreign assistance strategy, however what needs to be seen is whether the existing US foreign assistance strategy towards Pakistan was aimed at governance, institutional infrastructure and development. Since, during the Cold War, US foreign aid was provided purely for realpolitik reasons, during the War on Terror, it should have been provided for development purposes focused on human rights. The thesis questions whether this has been the case. If the US has not provided foreign aid to Pakistan to alleviate it from its failing status, then what is the purpose of identifying and projecting Pakistan as a failed state? Is there a pattern in the US interaction with Pakistan from during the Cold War, when its foreign assistance was used for realpolitik reasons, to the War on Terror, when its foreign assistance is purportedly for humanitarian purposes? How did US interaction with Pakistan change, if it did, from the Cold War, when it was more threatened by stronger states, to the War on Terror, when it was threatened by weaker states? Has the global change after 9/11, manifested in cosmopolitan and human rights values, affected the way Pakistan-US interact when the US is strategically interested in Pakistan? All these questions will be explored throughout the thesis.
Chapter 3 – A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE PAKISTANI STATE

Introduction

This chapter provides a detailed historiographical overview of the Pakistani state. In the previous chapter we observed how during the Cold War, competing ideological narratives and ‘realpolitik’ dominated US and western global concerns and how in the post-Cold War era, cosmopolitans argued that state sovereignty should be redefined and centred around human well-being. Thus, what we observed was that globally the idea of sovereignty was departing from one pivoted around the state to one based on human well-being. This meant that Cold War inter-state interactions between the western world and states of the Third World, which were ostensibly based on realist principles of sovereignty and non-intervention, were now open to interventions and interference by the global community. Thus sovereignty now, came to be based on how responsible the state has been in protecting its citizens and acting as a responsible state in the broader community of states. Since this is the prism through which we will analyse Pakistan-US relation in the Cold War and the War on Terror, it then becomes essential to understand the Pakistani state’s evolution and consequently, the dynamics of its state sovereignty. Once we have identified the historical pattern through which Pakistan’s state sovereignty has evolved as it has, we will be in a position to understand its behavioural responses to US policies towards it. Thus the historiographical overview of the Pakistani state will help us provide a framework through which to analyse Pakistan’s relations with the US.

In the first section the thesis draws on the existing literature to understand the evolution of the Pakistani state. It traces the dominance of Pakistan’s military-bureaucratic oligarchy in its initial few years to how, subsequently, the military emerged as a dominant force amongst state elites. The second section gives an account of Pakistan’s security problems, largely attributed by the Pakistani state to India’s belligerence, at its inception which helped create a security centric Pakistani state. The major security issues, international and domestic, that helped shape Pakistan’s security-centric perception of sovereignty remains as potent an explanation today as they did at its inception. The third section looks at the broader rubric of Pakistan-US relations. It seeks to explain Pakistan-US relations in the light of Pakistan’s ever-present security paranoia of Indian hegemony and Indian territorial threat to Pakistan.
The fourth section provides an overview of Pakistan’s academia’s contribution to the Pakistani state’s security doctrine. It analyses the crossover of former military officers and civilian bureaucrats into the academia and the policy-advising think tanks, and demonstrates how the state, due to the presence of a dominant bureaucracy in the think tanks, has kept research in these think tanks aligned with its own interests. The last section then concludes the chapter and brings all these sections together to demonstrate how the Pakistani state has held on to realism and its definition of state sovereignty because of its security perceptions. This chapter will thus provide us with an understanding of Pakistan’s security-centric sovereignty and will help us understand Pakistan’s relationship with the US during the Cold War and the War on Terror.

**The Pakistani State and the Military-Bureaucracy Oligarchy**

The literature on the Pakistani state is rich and expansive, with various intellectuals seeking to analyse the Pakistani state from different prisms and hence generating varied understandings of Pakistan’s state-society relations, as we will observe. This section, instead of providing a chronological date-to-date development of Pakistan since its inceptions, looks at these different themes in the literature. The question that this section seeks to answer is that how did the Pakistan military become the most powerful institution of the state, powerful enough to channel the policies of the state into a security centric direction.

The independence of the subcontinent from British Colonial rule, created two independent separate states, hostile to each other. Consequently, Pakistan, ‘as the smaller of the successor states, was at a disadvantage in having to create an entirely new federal government and administration. Moreover, Pakistan was immediately faced with very serious problems of refugee resettlement and economic and foreign policy’ (Symonds 1950, 45). Thus, as Waseem and Mufti (2009, 23) argue, ‘questions of national identity were overshadowed by the more basic problems of Pakistan’s survival as a weak state’. The fact that there was little common between the five provinces that formed the territorial extant of the Pakistani state ‘by way of ethnic identity, linguistic aspirations, administrative traditions and political culture’ (Ibid), confounded the Pakistani state at its inception with a myriad of issues of national significance. Further, even the banner of Islam under which Pakistan gained its independence was not enough to keep the nation together. As Alavi (1987, 22) argues

‘[The movement for the creation of Pakistan] was not a millenarian movement seeking a divinely ordained political and social system. Rather, it was a movement in which diverse Muslim ethnic groups from different
regions of India, representing different social strata and interest at the centre of whom were the emerging Muslim salariat, allied in the pursuit of material objectives. The alliance, as it was did not include all Muslims of India at all times. There was no automatic and universal translation of the attribute of the Muslim by faith or Muslim by descent to Muslim ethnic identity. Practice of their faith did not bring muslims together into one unified group’.

Thus, Alavi (1989) argues that unlike European states where nations constituted states, the case of Pakistan was opposite: the state had to be transformed into a nation. Thus the failure of the Muslim League, which was the vanguard of the Pakistan movement, to serve as a ‘conduit for the articulation of diverse interests and identities into a democratic framework for politics’ (Waseem & Mufti 2009, 23) led to the emergence of a military-bureaucratic elite which increasingly came to capture the role and the meaning of the Pakistani state. This failure of the Muslim League was largely because, ‘the Muslim League was a conglomeration of elite interest groups representing varying regional, social and economic factions that following partition disintegrated into its constituting parts. Thus, the party’s lack of rootedness in the new territory as well as the insufficiency of its national vision led to the ascendency of the military in alliance with the bureaucracy’ (Bajwa 2012, 275). Two reasons contributed in the ascendency of the military. Firstly, contrary to the Muslim League, the military was rooted in the new territory. This was because fifty six percent of recruitment in the military, during the British Raj, was from Punjab, which later became the major, most populous province of Pakistan (Chaudhry 2012). The military had thus come to be an honourable and respectable profession in the newly created Pakistan. A second reason becomes apparent in Guy Wint’s (1960, 66-67) report on the 1958 military Coup d’état in Pakistan, in which he stated that

‘The Pakistan army had gained prestige and the people despised politicians. The army was conspicuously efficient and incorrupt. Thus, an imbalance developed between the respected army and the corrupt and inefficient politicians. The army might have moved earlier to intervene; however, the military desisted from intervening because its commanders had inherited the traditions from British that it should stay aloof from politics’.

Thus, the lack of rootedness of the political parties, coupled with their ineffective administration and their penchant for corruption worked detrimentally towards them and at the same time profiting the military. Since as we have observed that the army was already rooted in the newly created Pakistan, due to the British Raj’s preferential policies of recruitment in the region, the fact that the military was seen as an effective and incorruptible organisation provided it the popular base to supersede the political parties in their ascendance
to power. Thus, from the very beginning of Pakistan, the military became intrinsically relevant to Pakistan’s policies and the pattern continued till the War on Terror.

Hence, while India firmly followed the democratic path, Pakistan dwindled in and out of four dictatorial regimes and continued to remain in a constant struggle to identify what the state should look like. Waseem and Mufti identify Pakistan as a diarchy ‘comprising two constellations of interests’ (Waseem & Mufti 2009, 24); namely, the state elites and the political elites. They argue that while the state elites comprised the military and the bureaucracy which had since the British Raj days maintained control on the levers of power, the political elites on the other hand represented the wider socio-political and economic interests of the society and constituted of political groupings and parties. The state of Pakistan, then increasingly became defined by the struggle for power between these two constellations of interest and their endemic rivalry and since ‘the crisis of statebuilding following the chaos of partition put the administrative institutions in a commanding position’ (Ibid), the military-bureaucratic oligarchy came to dominate much of the political space in Pakistan. Consequently then, while the Marxists have sought to enquire whether the Pakistani state ‘is an instrument of class power or an independent separate force’ (Tepper 1977, 678), for the non-Marxists, the enquiry into the nature of the Pakistani state revolves around the ‘elite, status and influence’ (Ibid, 674). It comes as no surprise then that most of the work on the Pakistani state looks at the role of elite’s or the tussle of classes in state formation.

Some important works on the Pakistani state, pivot the centrality of their argument around the ‘socio-economic and political structure of the colonial state and the society’ (Hussain 2010, 96). For example, Alavi argues that the struggle of Pakistan was driven by Muslim ethnicity and the ‘salariat class’ and Pakistan was the result of their ambition to pursue their economic interests against the Hindus of the region. Since in the independent state of Pakistan the bureaucracy and the military were more dominant in the salariat class, in this context then, the civil-military oligarchy came to dominate the political space of the polity. By Alavi’s (1989, 1527) reckoning, the Punjabis dominated much of the salariat class in bureaucracy and the military, he thus sees the Pakistani state as a state where the ruling predominantly Punjabi military bureaucratic oligarchy, ‘having appropriated state power, identify the state and the nation narrowly with their own particular purposes and interests’. Since the military-bureaucracy oligarchy is dominated by Punjabis, attempt to unify the various ethnic groups under the banner of nationalism is then ‘official nationalism’, a national identity which ‘is
imposed from above by those at the heart of the power /structure in the country’ (Ibid). Explaining his understanding of the ‘overdeveloped state’ of Pakistan, Alavi (1972, 60) argues that

‘If a colony has a weak and underdeveloped indigenous bourgeoisie, it will be unable at the moment of independence to subordinate the relatively highly developed colonial State apparatus through which the Metropolitan power had exercised dominion over it. However, a new convergence of interests of the three competing propertied classes, under Metropolitan patronage, allows a bureaucratic-military oligarchy to mediate their competing but no longer contradictory interests and demands. By that token it acquires a relatively autonomous role and is not simply the instrument of any one of the three classes [landed-feudal class, indigenous bourgeoisie and metropolitan bourgeoisie]’.

Thus, the landed-feudal, the indigenous bourgeois and the metropolitan bourgeois treated the state as a return maximizing instrument. Since the bureaucratic-military oligarchy that governed the state was autonomous and mediational hence, Alavi argues that ‘the indigenous bourgeois and the land-feudal entered into a structural relationship with the civil-military bureaucracy, the functional face of the state, in order to access and link itself with the metropolitan bourgeois’ (Hussain 2010, 98).

Both Alavi and Waseem argue that in the formative years of Pakistan the bureaucracy had the upper hand, an equation that turned in favour of the military after the coup d’état of General Ayub in 1958. For example Waseem and Mufti (2009, 24) argues that ‘The Pakistan Army, which was initially the junior partner in the military-bureaucracy oligarchy, emerged as the dominant partner in the institutional alliance after the coup of 1958’. While many other authors (Jalal 1995; Rizvi 2000; Waseem 2007) have endeavoured to understand and identify what the Pakistani state is, invariably, a common convergence point in the literature is an overwhelming understanding of the Pakistani state as a political unit governed by a military-bureaucratic-political elite, that seeks to preserve their own interests to the detriment of the masses. Hussain (2010) identifies four different predominant views in the existing literature, on the Pakistan military’s involvement in national politics. The legitimists, he believes demonstrate an increased tendency to legitimise the military’s interventionist role in Pakistan’s politics. Proponents of this view argue that that the military is a modernizing force that works towards the socio-economic development of the state. The conspiracy theorists, on the other hand, place the predominance of the Pakistan’s military on the role that external factors play in the national politics of Pakistan. Thus by their argument, the Pakistan military has remained predominant in national politics because of its aligning with the US in the years
of the Cold War. The generalist views on Pakistan’s military are both conspiratorial and structural and their accounts are generally based on a ‘historically linear view of socioeconomic and political developments’ (Ibid, 77). The Structuralist literature on the Pakistani state look towards inherent class struggles, and class formations, before and after partition, to understand how the Pakistani state evolved. While these literatures have followed different tangential explanations of state formation in Pakistan, what remains common amongst them is the understanding of the Pakistani military’s dominance of the state structure.

These views diverge on whether the military should be intrinsically attached to politics to preserve the state of Pakistan, or whether the military-bureaucratic elite took advantage of weak political structures. However, what remains established through these writings is the preponderance of the military, followed by the bureaucracy, as an oligarchy, an elite or a class in defining the state, the nation and its national interests, increasingly so after the 1958 coup. Therefore, the dominance of Pakistan’s military is an important observation for the thesis. This is because, as we will observe later, it came to define Pakistan’s state sovereignty, in very security centric terms. Thus from its very inception, the dominance of the military kept Pakistan confined to a security centred understanding of sovereignty which became the basis of its interaction with other states, specifically, India and the US. Thus, as we will demonstrate later, the dominance of the military, coupled with internal and external threats and compounded by a weak political structure, all contributed towards Pakistan’s conceptualization of its state sovereignty.

Thus, ‘As one military leader followed another, the army’s vision of Pakistan began to define the state’ (Cohen 2002, 112). While the military went through many phases, from a colonial army drawn from the rural elites (Alavi 1989) to an army with a wider urban base (Fair & Nawaz 2010), from an economically sound one to an economically strong one (Siddiq 2007) and from a secular, liberal one to a more religious one (Fair & Nawaz 2010). However, Pakistan’s shaping up as a security state in the early years of its independence, put the Pakistani military into the position of power and influence from the beginning, a trend which continues till date and consequently, worked towards a security specific definition of sovereignty as we will observe in the next section.

As Rizvi (2011, 8) observes that Pakistan’s shaping up as a security state, helped assign the highest priority to defence and security against the perceived external threats to the detriment

‘It also suffered from the fear of internal collapse due to economic, administrative and internal security problems in the early years of independence. India was viewed as the major source of security threat with which Pakistan developed several disputes at the time of independence and in the subsequent years. The war on Kashmir (1947-48) and the belligerent statements of Indian leaders convinced Pakistani leaders that India was out to undermine the new state of Pakistan. Afghanistan also made irredentist claims on Pakistani territory in NWFP and Balochistan. The rulers of Pakistan assigned the highest priority to survival of the state rather than its democratization. Since then security considerations have continued to shape Pakistan’s political choices. The focus was on centralization of power, impatience towards dissent and strengthening of the military. All Pakistani governments assigned more national resources to defence and security than to education, health care and social development. This contributed to atrophy of civilian institutions and democracy’.

As we have observed above, whether the narrative of Pakistan’s military-bureaucracy oligarchy’s dominance spurns from Marxist understandings or they are grounded in historiographical analysis, all literature arrives to a single point, i.e. that while at the inception of Pakistan the bureaucracy had the upper hand in the military-bureaucracy oligarchy, but the continued security centricity of Pakistan’s problems sooner made Pakistan’s Army the predominant institution of power. Since the military, and its ever present security priorities vis-à-vis more developmental ones continued to frame Pakistan’s policies and each problem, whether it be of domestic political dissent or poor civilian democracy, was perceived as a threat to the state, this perception kept the military in power, sometimes directly and the rest of the times indirectly.

This constituted a vicious circle. The existential threats to Pakistan as we will observe later and the ineffectiveness of the political parties to govern brought the military into power which became more concerned with defending its territorial sovereignty and hence worked towards strengthening itself. Most of the national resources were then channeled to the military, development sectors suffered and remained fragile. Since the civil infrastructure remained weak, it further became a reason for the military to retain and maintain its strength. Thus, Pakistan remained caught in viewing its sovereignty in security terms because to the military the only threat to the sovereignty of Pakistan were existential threats, from the inside and the outside, which needed to be dealt with militarily.
Pakistan: The Security State

Three issues exacerbated Pakistan’s security perceptions at its inception. Firstly, belligerent statements by the Indian leaders that publicly acclaimed unacceptance of Pakistan as a sovereign polity, before and after the partition. For example, ‘when the All-India Congress Committee met in Delhi on June 14, 1947 to approve the June 3 plan for partition, it contained these words: The A.I.C.C. earnestly trusts that when the present passions have subsided, India’s problems will be viewed in their proper perspective and the false doctrine of two nations in India will be discredited and discarded by all’ (Mansergh 1966, 2). Vallabhbhai Patel, who was the first India Home Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, was often vocal in his argument that ‘Pakistan was “not viable” and would “collapse in a short time”’ (Ibid, 16). Nehru, who was the first Prime Minister of India, ‘also, though less categoric, did not think it could last’ (Ibid). He argued that ‘if Gandhi had asked Congressmen not to accept partition they would have gone on fighting, and in any event, they expected, that partition would be temporary, that Pakistan would come back to us’ (Ghose 1993, 161). Further as Sayeed (1964, 746) recorded: ‘After sixteen years of Pakistan's independent existence, and even after India's humiliating defeat in the border clash with China, Mr. Nehru in an interview declared that Indo-Pakistani “confederation remains our ultimate end”.’ The continued unacceptance of Pakistan as a viable polity by Indian statesmen’s and their denial to recognize that Pakistan would survive beyond a few years, only helped reinforce Pakistan’s perceptions of its insecurity.

Secondly, the distribution of the resources at independence, from the colonial India to Pakistan, was not only unequal but also quite insufficient to maintain Pakistan’s security. One of the main reasons for that was, that the British had allotted only eleven days for the distribution of resources, resources that had taken a century to build (Nawaz 2009). This proved detrimental to Pakistan and its security. Further, since the departing British had assumed the role of the arbitrator, this meant that resource distribution rested heavily on India, thus providing it with more leverage. Cohen (2004) further argues that India betrayed Pakistan’s trust on three accounts. Firstly, by unjustly distributing resources; secondly, by colluding with the British in manipulating the international boundary; and thirdly, by conniving with princes of Muslim majority states to make their territories a part of India, which would otherwise be a part of Pakistan. At the time of independence it was decided that the distribution of military resources would be based on a ratio of 66:34 for India and
Pakistan, respectively. The first problems between the two states occurred when India denied Pakistan its one third shares in the military resources. ‘Out of forty-six training establishments, only seven existed in Pakistan. Three out of seventeen ordnance factories were located in Pakistan. Pakistan’s request to dismantle the proportionate machinery was also rejected by India. Further, much-needed items like military ammunition, tanks and other munitions were also denied by India’ (Chaudhry 2012, 11). Since most of the defense stores were located in India, it clearly enjoyed a monopoly in the transfer of these stores to Pakistan. Thus, when the Pakistan India war broke out over Kashmir in 1948, Indian attempts to transfer the resources became more stringent, whereby the Pakistan military was reduced to fight a war with depleted resources. This event highlighted Pakistan’s inadequacies in the face of a stronger India, after which much of its efforts, which continue till date, remain, focused on building a sizeable strong military against India.

Thirdly, the internal threats to Pakistan required the military to take formidable action. These threats in the formative years of Pakistan were mostly secessionist. For example, in Baluchistan, the ruler of Kalat had seceded to Oman and it was only after the intervention of the state that the move could be halted and reversed. While the 1947independence plan made Balochistan a part of Pakistan, the Balochi leader and Khan of Kalat, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan refused to join Pakistan. Only after many negotiations did the Pakistan Army intervene and forced the Khan of Kalat to secede to Pakistan. Mir Ahmad Yar Khan’s younger brother, Prince Karim formed an insurgent group and rebelled against the Pakistani forces. The Balochistan insurgency has continued till this day, in various forms and as many leaders, and its history is as extensive and its dynamics complicated. However what remains a fact is that since then by one way or another, the Balochi nationalism has been a significant internal threat that the state of Pakistan has had to deal with, mostly by military means. The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, which was earlier known as North Western Frontier Province, saw the Pathans, the indigenous population of the province, looking towards Afghanistan instead of Pakistan, thus foaming another secessionist movement. This was because Afghanistan did not recognise Pakistan as an independent state, and did not recognise the validity of the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, called the Durand Line. Thus, as Rizvi noted; ‘Afghanistan also began to manifest interest in the future of the Pathans living on the east of the Durand Line when it became clear that the British were leaving India’ (2000, 54). The Afghan government realizing that the newly formed Pakistan was in a weak position to defend itself and was mired in deep administrative problems that it would not be able to
handle another political problem, instigated an insurgency in the Pakistani regions bordering Afghanistan, with the help of some locals, India, and Russia (Ibid). Thus from the very beginning, Pakistan’s internal circumstances became increasingly intertwined with its external security.

In the wake of these secessionist movements, it was not a political solution that was deemed required, but a military action. Hence, these circumstances not only compounded Pakistan’s internal security problems but their link with external actors also moved Pakistan into the direction where its policies became security centric and hence Pakistan’s territorial sovereignty became the first and foremost concern of the state managers, who found strengthening defense and the military as the only solution to the problem. As Sayeed (1964, 764) observed in 1964: ‘Pakistan alleges that India has been promoting subversive activity in East Pakistan and that in the event of a military conflict her first and relatively easy target would be East Pakistan’. Later, the events of 1971 and the independence of the East wing of Pakistan to form a sovereign state, Bangladesh, reinforced Pakistan’s security perceptions, especially in the light of Indian assistance to the separatist elements in the then, East Pakistan.

What is particularly apparent in the dynamics of the internal threats to Pakistan’s sovereignty, discussed above, is how these threats were intertwined with external threats. For example, the Pashtun secessionist movement was instigated by Afghanistan, which was further aided by India and Russia. In the later years Balochistan witnessed unrest with various states aiding the insurgents against Pakistan, and Bangladesh had been dismembered from Pakistan in 1971 with help from India. In such a scenario, considering how the military had remained dominant in Pakistan’s state affairs, the solution to these anathema were seen primarily as security problems and as threats to the state’s sovereignty. It is no wonder then, that the Pakistani military felt pressured to maintain the territorial sovereignty of Pakistan from forces acting from within and outside. Thus the solution to these insurgencies was always by use of military force rather than political efforts. Secondly, since all these secessionist movements, whether in Balochistan, the then Frontier province or Bangladesh, had always been seen as efforts by external forces to threaten Pakistan’s territorial sovereignty and thus, instead of viewing these insurgency as political problem, they were viewed as proxies of other states working within Pakistan’s territory. Thus, this further contributed in militarizing the conflict between the state and the insurgents.
No other fact shows the security-centricity of the Pakistani state more than the fact that, beginning from 1948 Pakistan has gone on to fight four wars with India. As Haqqani (2005, 11) argues: ‘It is true that Indians accepted partition only reluctantly and, for some years, spoke of their desires to undo partition. It was natural for Pakistan’s leaders to feel insecure about India’s intentions. The manner in which Pakistan dealt with that insecurity, however, made India an obsession of Pakistan’s leaders…’. Earlier, Sayeed (1964, 764) in 1964 referred to a Dawn editorial which stated: ‘If the main concern of the Christian West is the containment of Chinese communism, the main concern of Muslim Pakistan is the containment of militarist and militant Hinduism’. Almost thirty years later Hewitt (1992, 15) observed that, ‘Despite her size, Pakistan has refused to concede to India the role of regional hegemon, and has made it clear that she must be judged as India’s equal by the smaller states of South Asia and by the wider international community’. Fast forward another twenty years and The Pakistani Chief of Army Staff, General Kayani, in a speech at the Sri Lankan Military Academy positioned that, ‘our armed forces persistently seek peace within the region and beyond. We earnestly desire regional stability based on a balance of power that promotes respect for each other’s sovereignty and discourages any form of quest for dominance and hegemony’ (ISPR 2013). What remains obvious is a linearity in the security centric consciousness of the Pakistani state. This linearity has as we have shown, manifested itself in Pakistan’s ambitions to counter India’s regional hegemonic designs. So strong has the influence of countering India been in Pakistan’s foreign policy, that it has directed much of the course in Pakistan-US relations history, as will observe subsequently.

**Pakistan-US Relations**

Any exploration of Pakistan-US relations largely follows three themes: Pakistan’s dependence on the US for foreign civilian and military assistance, Pakistan’s discontentment with the US with regards to its relationship with India, and Pakistan’s grievances with the US. Each of these themes has its basis in Pakistan’s security centricity, most of which are tempered by Pakistan’s security perceptions towards India. A remarkable feature of these themes in Pakistan-US relations is their frequent recurrence over time. For example, The US first extended military aid to Pakistan in 1954, in the wake of the Cold War. This was because India had maintained a non-aligned status towards the US-USSR confrontation. Since Pakistan’s economy and its military was in already quite a depleted condition as we have mentioned previously, thus, this alliance not only suited Pakistan’s strategic interests but
provided it the requisite economic and military support that was much needed at the time. In 1954, Field Marshal Ayub took over the reins of power through a coup d'état but the US assistance continued. A similar instance, which will be elaborated further in the coming chapter, was in the case of General Zia, which saw a renewed Pakistan-US alliance and a similar trajectory of US assistance to Pakistan, to roll back the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, and then again during the General Musharraf era, in which Pakistan and the US joined hands to combat Terrorism. Evidence on foreign assistance to Pakistan, as we will demonstrate, show that Pakistan’s democratic regime received substantially less assistance than dictatorial regimes, leading some to question whether the US has unwittingly, through its short term policy goals, helped strengthen Pakistan’s military vis-à-vis its democratic structure (Murad 2009). Since most of the military and economic assistance was provided during the military regime, it is obvious that the security centric mind-set used these resources to strengthen itself against India. This dependence of Pakistan on US assistance remains the single most determining feature of Pakistan-US relationship. Pakistan’s dependence on US military and economic assistance has historically provided the US, the opportunity to apply conditions on Pakistan’s sovereignty by providing or withholding its assistance. This dependent relationship of Pakistan on the US is a central theme of the thesis and will be analysed in greater length throughout the thesis.

Secondly, since the beginning of Pakistan’s relationship with the US, its discontentment towards US policies with regards to India, have always been a key concern for the Pakistani state. Writing in 1964, after the Indo-China War of 1962 in which the US heavily supported India against China, Sayeed (1964, 755) argued that

‘The Pakistan Government maintains that they are not against the American policy to extend military aid to India in order to improve the defense capacity of the latter. Their contention is that this American military aid to India has been of such a massive character that the military balance between India and Pakistan has been altered from three to one to four to one in favour of India... All this massive military assistance will ultimately be used by India against Pakistan. The United States both as an ally of Pakistan and as a big power should try to maintain a proper military balance between India and Pakistan in the same way as the Western powers have been maintaining a military balance between Israel and the Arab States. Pakistanis also challenge the view that India can ever become a leader of Asia as long as she continues her present hostility towards Pakistan by refusing to resolve the Kashmir dispute’. 

The Pakistani state’s grievance towards the US, with respect to India was thus twofold. Firstly, the Pakistani state has remained emphatic throughout the years, as we will demonstrate in the chapters on General Zia and General Musharraf, that the US should favour
Pakistan against India since they are allied states, secondly, that if and when the US seeks to promote India as the leader of Asia, Pakistan will challenge this hegemonic stance.

Clearly then, the element of US relations with India remain a pivotal concern for the Pakistani state. A third theme in the Pakistan-US relations is the growing discontentment and the increasing unpopularity of the US in Pakistan. While anti-Americanism and the discontentment of Pakistan with the US are historically rooted in the US perceived betrayal to come to Pakistan’s aid in the 1965 and 1971 war against India, it remains a strong feature of the Pakistani state and society till the present day. Waseem (2004, 1) observed that

‘The remoteness of the American public and private life from the experiences and imaginations of Pakistanis in general lent a peculiarly reductionist character to their attitudes towards the United States. At the bottom of it lay a state-to-state relationship, which was largely understood by Pakistanis in terms of their security and development. For example, the general public in [Pakistan] looked at relations with America essentially as part of its security framework, conceived and operationalized for defense against the perceived threat from India. Not surprisingly, Pakistani perceptions about the United States often took a turn for the worse in the wake of the latter’s perceived tilt in favour of India.’

Further, Waseem (Ibid) argues that the US exit from Afghanistan in 1988 left a sense of betrayal amongst the general Pakistani population, since they thought they had invested too heavily in the war. The trend of persistent and growing anti-Americanism in Pakistan is evident from a Pew survey held in 2012 which recorded that 74 percent of Pakistanis, nearly three amongst four people, consider US the enemy and ‘moreover when asked which is the bigger threat to the country, India, the Taliban or Al Qaeda, 59 percent name India’ (Global Survey 2012). While we have already ascertained why India remains captured in Pakistan’s mind-set as a bigger threat, it is further obvious that US unfavourable policies towards the region have contributed significantly in moulding public perception towards US too. As Hoodbhoy (2013a, xxxvii) argues that ‘In the Pakistani military’s mind, the Americans pose a rising threat, one that may become as serious as India’s’. What is quite evident then is even though the Pakistani state, for economic and military reasons endeavours to draw benefits from the US, it faces immense pressures from the general population to disengage from this dependent patron-client relationship (Lieven 2011). Further, while there may be many fissures in the Pakistani state-society relationship, deducing from the Pew survey and the literature on the subject, we can assert that the Pakistani society largely shares the states security centric values and hence, concomitantly, its reductionist idea of state sovereignty.
Anatol Lieven (Ibid) argues that if matters between the US and Pakistan worsen and hypothetically speaking, they come face to face in a confrontation, one of two things would happen. Either the Pakistan state will respond to US transgression militarily, in case of which there will be an actual military battle, or the Pakistani state may refuse to fight the US in case of which there will be a civil war which might divide the Pakistan military. This he argues is because of increased anti-Americanism not only in the lower ranks of the Pakistan Army but also in the society of which they are a part of. It is not difficult to see the veracity of Lieven’s argument. Over the last decade, incidents that the Pakistan people have interpreted as infringement of its sovereignty, whether it be the killing of Osama-bin-Laden to US drone attacks in the tribal region, or US misdirected fire on Pakistani border outposts on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border to increased American presence on Pakistani soil, each has elicited severe reactions from the people, if not an equal response from the state. As mentioned earlier, the state has trudged a delicate line where it has maintained a pro-American stance to attract US assistance in order to thwart Indian hegemony in the region. However the population remains anti-Indian and anti-American. As Waseem (2004, 41) argues that since, ‘there are very few links available to the society at the bottom to influence and shape the policy at top. Thus, it has been possible to have a pro-American state elite and an anti-American society in Pakistan at the same time’. Many societal factors contribute and are consequently nurtured by the state in its bid to maintain security centricity, such as the historical paranoia of India deeply embedded in the psyche of a larger segment of the population and the growing influence of the resurging Islamic groups, which has deep roots in the society. However, another yet unexplored dimension is the role that the academia plays in feeding security centric policy suggestions to the state. This has become possible because of the huge crossover of bureaucrats, ex-military officers and journalists into the academia and policy research.

Pakistan’s dependence on the US assistance was due to its insecurities arising from an India centric security perception. However, Pakistan’s discontentment with the US always arose when the US favourably tilted towards India, considering that India was primarily the locus of Pakistan’s insecurities. This perception of the state was and has been shared by the population of the Pakistani state which has increasingly become more anti-American in its outlook. Thus while there might exist many fissure in Pakistan’s state-society relations, the security centric understanding of sovereignty remains shared between both the state and the society. In that sense then, since the academia is a vital part of the society and one which
produces and disseminates knowledge, therefore the control of this institution by ex-state officials ensures that the institution’s knowledge production conforms to the state preferences.

The Pakistani State and Academia: A Vicious Security Circle

The Higher Education Commission of Pakistan classifies journals, published by the Pakistani think tanks and universities, into four categories of W, X, Y, and Z. Of these four classifications, publication only in the categories of W, X and Y merits consideration for tenure as indicated in Appendix I. This means that these journals, according to the Higher Education Commission, possess the qualitative niche in research that any institute should aim for. Only 1 international relations journal qualifies for the ‘X’ category, while 6 international relations journals qualify for the ‘Y’ category. Out of all these international relations journals, only 1 is published from an academic institute, which is also an area study centre. The rest 6 are published by think tanks/research institutes/defence university. A category ‘Y’ journal is a journal classified as ‘not having an Impact Factor and meeting all HEC Journal Criteria except review of each paper by at least one expert from an academically advanced country in the respective discipline’ (HEC 2014). Except for the academic institute, all the think tanks are presided by a former bureaucrat (as in the case of Institute of Strategic Studies, Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, Institute of Regional Studies, and International Policy Research Institute) or military officer (National Defence University). Remarkably, there are no PhDs housed in the International Policy Research Institute which publishes an ‘X’ category journal. The maximum number of academics with a Ph.D in the institutes publishing journals in the ‘Y’ category is 3, while the rest are research scholars, housed within the institutes, with either a postgraduate degree or are undergoing a doctorate at one of the local universities. However, the top hierarchy of these institutes almost always comprises of journalists, military officers and bureaucrats. It is not surprising then that most of the research in these think tanks and institutes are focused towards area studies and more thematic dimensions, as there research is already claimed to be policy oriented.

There is nothing wrong with policy oriented research or thematic studies. The problem however is that due to the presence of ex state officials in the top hierarchy, officials who have been indoctrinated into following state preferences by the nature of their work, much of the work that comes out of these research institutes is complacent to state policy preferences. As a result of the very narrow corridor, through which the understanding of international
relations in Pakistan traverses, almost all ‘IR’ research is a positivist enterprise which takes two sets of ‘givens’ - the infallibility of the state ‘modelled after the Westphalian nation-state and a thorough internalization of the philosophy of political realism’ (Behera 2008, 19). Since the research is skewed towards producing realist narratives, it reinforces state preferences by ‘justifying government policies’ rather than presenting well-researched alternative options (Behera, 2009, 148). Thus the research community is complicit with the state in assuming rather than challenging state preference, which operates under a paradigmatic hegemony of positivism (Acharya & Buzan 2007). This complacence of the research community does not go unrewarded and is recognized by the government through allotting of funds and research grants, making information available, and according state patronage. ‘Proximity to power’, then, not only becomes the goal but also the means of research, which remains the only incentive for a resource-starved academic community. This, then, constitutes a vicious circle. Research Institutes, thus, do not compete in what quality of knowledge they produce, but rather in their pursuit to have closer ‘proximity to power’. It, then, is more important for these institutes to be recognized within the foreign policy corridors rather than the broader, more international academic community. This could be one explanation why the Pakistani state is more ‘realist’ in its outlook and hence consequently, why its sovereignty is so narrowly defined by a security centric world view.

Since research in Pakistan, is concentrated in think tanks, and policy institutes which have no bend towards challenging state narratives and are largely concerned with policy and thematic studies, not only does that hamper critical investigations, further these think tanks are headed and directed by military/civilian bureaucrats and journalists which make it even tougher to do any research that is not policy relevant. This happens because the officials who run these organizations are or have remained practitioners of or participants in Pakistan’s foreign policy, and thus, they find thematic and area centric research more relevant while theoretical researches are viewed as a waste of time and effort. That is why, since for these practitioners, the infallibility of state sovereignty is an unquestionable, strict and rigid rule, no studies have been conducted that might critically analyse how the internationally changing norms on sovereignty will or can affect Pakistan. This constitutes a vicious circle ‘of knowledge production that is designed to cater to the state’s need and demands’ (Behera 2009, 149). Since the state operates within some form or variety of political realism (Inayatullah 2005), its practitioners leave the government and form part of the think tanks which produce the same dominant thought that feeds into practice. That is why, while there is a lot of literature
within Pakistan on themes like poverty, terrorism, nuclear issue, centred around area studies like in respect to relations with China, India or USA for example, however it has no article published in any journal in the last five years around for instance, state sovereignty, failed state or humanitarian intervention. Even though state failure and humanitarian interventions, are themes as well, but these themes touch a nerve with the state as they unwittingly challenge state preferences.

Another reason why ideas such as state sovereignty, humanitarian intervention and state failure, has taken a backseat in most publications may be because, journalists and bureaucrats dominate the field of writing on international relations in Pakistan, by their dominating presence within research institutes and think tanks. Thus, in such a heavily dominated field, even academics are cornered into publishing ‘sellable’ books and writing ‘readable’ articles. As Behera (2009, 148) explains:

‘...A near-universal trademark of these institutes is their privileging of “policy-relevant” research, which further shrinks the space for basic academic research in IR. Most look down upon the latter as a “waste of time” partly because there is no “cliente” for the consumption of basic research. In other words, the “saleability” of research ideas tends to determine their research agendas’.

It comes as no wonder then that most of the scholarship on Pakistan, studied from an international relations (read foreign relation studies) perspective, is largely concerned with extremism, Pak-US relation and the War on Terror. This is because the academia in Pakistan is complicit with the state in keeping the states’ policies narrowly defined by a security centric view. While other thematic issues are discussed quite regularly and openly, more sensitive subjects such as state sovereignty and state failure are ignored. This is because of two reasons. Firstly, since the think tanks are headed by ex-state officials, state patronage is important to them. Themes like state sovereignty and state failure do not provide them with state patronage and acceptance since such subjects are sensitive to the state due to its securitized national outlook. Secondly, since these ex-state officials have spent long periods of time within state organisations, they are by default indoctrinated to follow a world view that follows closely to the states.

The complacence of these organisations enables the state to tightly control the discourse on security and sovereignty. Thus as we have observed earlier and we will do so too later, while the changing discourse on the norms of sovereignty and intervention have been incorporated in the UN charter, there has been no substantial mention or research on how this affects
Pakistan. This is because the state has remained confined to a very security centric definition of its sovereignty, a definition that runs counter to the evolving norms on sovereignty. Since the state patronizes these institutions, it ensures that the discourse conforms to its security centric view. This maybe one of the reason why while cosmopolitans herald the changing norms of sovereignty centred on human well-being, Pakistan remains resilient to its security centric idea of sovereignty.

**The Pakistani State and State Sovereignty**

Most intellectuals agree that Pakistan’s foreign policy is India centric and is heavily influenced and by that way, channelled, by the military establishment. Jefferlot (2004, 97) argues that Pakistan’s ‘antagonistic relationship with India’ forms the basis of Pakistan’s foreign policy, centred on ‘strengthening the security and preservation of the territorial integrity of Pakistan against what is perceived as an Indian threat’. Grounding his argument in realism, pivoting around statism, survival and self-help, Ahmed (2010, 322) traces the Pakistan state’s insecurities to the genesis of the country. He believes that ‘the threat perceptions of Pakistan paved the way for the military elite to formulate security and foreign policy of the country’. In a similar vein Behera (2009, 137) lends some credibility to this argument, when he shows that publications on strategic and military issues ‘tend to peak whenever Pakistan is under military rule’. Military regimes in Pakistan have stayed in power more than their civilian counterparts and the fact that ‘even during democratic rule, the military continued to be the pre-eminent player in the formulation of Pakistan’s overall security and foreign policy, particularly *vis-à-vis* the US, China, Afghanistan and India’ (Ahmed 2010, 322), may be why discourse on Pakistan continues being framed in realist terms. However, with increased violations of Pakistan’s territorial integrity and subsequently its sovereignty by the US, is there a possibility that the dialectic would replace India with the US, as an existential threat? How has Pakistan’s intellectual as well as the policy-making community responded to the challenge of sovereignty posed by the US? As a consequence, are we looking at the reconfiguration of the narrative on sovereignty within Pakistan, to suit Pakistan-US relationship, or will we see the existing narrative grow stronger and voluminous in the face of US breaches of Pakistan’s sovereignty?

As already explained, the study of sovereignty in Pakistan is predominantly entrenched in the realist paradigm. While elsewhere, discursive openings are constantly challenging and debating ‘state sovereignty’ from various sources of understanding, remarkably the study of
state sovereignty in Pakistan is unavailable in the literature spanning international relations. There are many explanations why this might be so. One of the reasons is because, ‘sovereignty, for realism and neo-realism is a no-contest accepted feature. The theory works on the premise of sovereign states and cannot afford to critically engage with it’ (Mishra 2008, 67). Thus, proponents of realism in Pakistan, see the sovereign state as a bastion against foreign intervention and interference in their domestic affairs. Since any move away from the rigid idea of sovereignty, means ceding intellectual territory to those who take a more ‘universalist’ position, on for e.g. human rights issues, they fear that they might be held complacent towards those who propose interventions in the state’s affair. Interference for South Asia, in general, and Pakistan in specific reawakens the horrors of British colonial rule, hence any intellectual position that promotes suggests or advocates a flexibility in the concept, is taken as a position of advocating colonialism, or by extension, imperialism. Secondly, in the Coxian perspective, if ‘theory follows practice’, then it can be asserted that the Pakistani state adheres to a given set of principles and policies that can be best interpreted through the realist paradigm. Hence, theoreticians and scholars find little relevance of alternate theoretical sites of investigation into state sovereignty. Pakistan has since its onset, in 1947, has been caught in an existential paranoia and hence, consequently, remained largely concerned with policy prescriptions rather than ontological theoretical debates. The military in Pakistan has remained a cornerstone in Pakistan’s politics and especially its international relations and foreign policy. It has taken over the political apparatus through non-violent coups three times and has ruled the country for more than 30 years of its 66 years since inception. It is of no surprise then, that security continues to define the prism through which the state acts amongst its global fraternity of states. But while most realist positions might qualify Pakistan’s policies towards India, can Pakistan’s relationship with the US, in the last decade, be termed ‘realist’, especially when it comes to defending its sovereignty?

While the US has never been a popular enterprise within the Pakistani state, it can be said that its unpopularity has reached new lows. The difference however between the pre 9/11 and the post 9/11 era is that while the Pakistani state’s policies were manoeuvring around strategic and political interests around India earlier, in the post 9/11 scenario, the US increasingly became a factor to reckon with, alongside India. Secondly, the introduction of state failure as a discourse that has increasingly put pressure on the Pakistani state, seemingly justifies US incursions in Pakistani territory. The argument that draws international agreement is that since the Pakistani state has lost control of the territory, which has become a haven of
terrorists, the US in pursuit of its national security, finds no other way but to intrude in Pakistan’s sovereignty. Thirdly, while earlier, relations with the US were more focused on how bilateralism between the two states worked to each other’s benefit, now, Pakistan perceptively, seems to be caught in a political environment, between an international hegemon and an aspiring regional hegemon. The denunciation of the outfits held responsible for causing ‘terrorism’ in Kashmir, the US – Indian civil nuclear deal, and the US – Indian cooperation in Afghanistan, are only a few events, that identify the strategically problematic environment, Pakistan seems caught in. While issues of sovereignty, have always remained high on the Pakistani state’s agenda, the Musharraf era, has consistently been criticized for failing to protect Pakistan’s sovereignty. In the proceeding chapters, the thesis will explore the dynamics of Pakistan’s sovereignty during the Cold and the War on Terror.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has chronicled the Pakistani state’s evolution and has aimed to explore how and why Pakistan remains caught in a security centric interpretation of its sovereignty. This is important for the thesis because we cannot study Pakistan’s conditional sovereignty in the face of US demands, unless we know how Pakistan views its sovereignty. This will help us understand how Pakistan-US relations progressed during the Cold War and the post-Cold War, with specific reference to Pakistan’s sovereignty. Thus, this chapter in essence helps us understand the dynamics of sovereign interaction between the US and Pakistan and to seek whether these dynamics have changed overtime. Secondly, studying the rise and dominance of the military to power in Pakistan’s politics not only allows us to observe how Pakistan’s security centric idea of sovereignty took shape but also enables us to understand how deeply entrenched this idea is, not only in the policies of state, but in the population imagination as a whole. Thus without understanding Pakistan’s conception of its sovereignty, the military’s role in defining it and the situations and circumstances that have worked towards embedding it in the collective imagination of the state, we cannot progress to understand how Pakistan views its sovereignty in the face of US demands. This, thus, brings us to question the issue of sovereignty in Pakistan and begs an examination of the trends and changes, in the issue on sovereignty that has fenced the political and strategic landscape over time. This shall be the substance of our enquiry in the proceeding chapters on sovereignty.
Chapter 4: THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF PAKISTAN’S SOVEREIGNTY (1979-88)

Introduction

This Chapter examines the issue of Pakistan’s state sovereignty from 1979-88 fusing the opinions of policymakers with the existing literature. The chapter will particularly engage with the opinions of elite policymakers collected through interviews, subsequently relating it to policymaking understanding of consistency and change in the state sovereignty paradigm. The chapter begins by providing an introductory overview of US-Pakistan relations during the Soviet war in Afghanistan. The chapter will explore in detail the US pressures on the sovereignty of Pakistan and subsequently Pakistan’s response to these pressures. This chapter will hence, be a first in a series of empirical chapters that will investigate Pakistan-US relationship through the prism of sovereignty.

The primary investigation in this chapter will be of Pakistan’s sovereignty caught in a Cold War confrontation, crucially the War in Afghanistan, between the US and the USSR. At this juncture it is also important to note what this chapter will not do. The literature on the Cold War is expansive and cannot be covered in its entirety here. The chapter initially chalks out the contours of the US-Pakistan relationship to provide a framework on which it will later build its explanation on Pakistan’s sovereignty. Thus, while the Cold War experienced many global and regional players locked in a geostrategic power struggle, this chapter only concerns itself with the dynamics of US-Pakistan relations viewed through the prism of state sovereignty.

The arguments in the chapter are along three different but interconnected trajectories. Firstly, the chapter argues that during the Cold War Pakistan’s sovereignty was conditional on different sets of US demands depending on whether the US was strategically interested in Pakistan or not. Secondly, the chapter argues that even though the US sought Pakistan’s compliance, by means of either withholding foreign assistance or disbursing it, Pakistan’s strict definition of its sovereignty allowed the US very limited influence over its domestic decision-making. Lastly, the chapter argues that the US foreign assistance strategy were a determinant of its Cold War policy towards the Soviet Union. Using foreign aid data, the
chapter demonstrates that even though Pakistan received huge sums of foreign aid from the Reagan administration, the US was more dependent on Pakistan’s support in its effort to counter the Soviet in Afghanistan than Pakistan was on US foreign aid. For this reason, even though the US administration had reservations on Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation and human rights, the fear of losing Pakistan’s support inhibited the US from putting substantial pressure on Pakistan. On the other hand, Pakistan used the situation to maximize its gains without ceding much sovereign grounds, which meant attracting substantial US foreign assistance. However, the purpose here is to establish them in a more concrete fashion so that it becomes possible in the future chapters to analyse the trajectory that conditional sovereignty and US foreign assistance has taken in Pakistan.

**Overview of Pakistan-US relations**

As we have observed in the previous chapter, Pakistan’s sovereignty had historically continued to remain central to its security concerns. Thus during General Zia-ul-Haq’s regime Pakistan continued to suffer from its insecurities on two different but connected levels; military insecurity and territorial insecurity. The military insecurity was related to Pakistan’s continued dependence on US military assistance. By the time of the War in Afghanistan, Pakistan suffering from a series of US sanctions on its procurement of arms and munitions, found its arsenal in a debilitating state. Firstly, the Pakistan-India war of 1965 precipitated into a suspension on arms shipments to Pakistan, which had been provided to Pakistan in return for its membership in two treaties; SEATO and CENTO. The embargo was lifted in 1975 only to be followed by nuclear-related sanctions in 1979. Unlike India, which heavily relied on Soviet arms and was equipped to the hilt, Pakistan’s reliance on US patronage had severely affected the condition of its military. In April 1979, the US administration suspended military and financial aid to Pakistan as required by the Symington Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (Congress 2010, 544). This was because the US was now convinced of Pakistan’s nuclear enrichment programme. In a secret, recently declassified, memorandum (US National Security Archives 2010) to the Under of Secretary of State for Political Affairs David Newsom, the Legal Adviser to the US State Department, Herber J. Hansell reported that:

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1 It was originally enacted as section 669 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and codified at 22 US.C. 2429, by sec. 305 of Public Law 94–329.
'There is now convincing evidence that Pakistan has received enrichment equipment since August 1977. Section 669 of the Foreign Assistance Act FAA (the Symington Amendment) prohibits us with providing Pakistan with further assistance of the kind covered by the amendment' (Appendix II).

Further, the Pakistani state had not given the US the assurance that it will not ‘proceed with the construction of an offensive nuclear capability’ (van der Kroef 1980, 20). Earlier, in January 1979, Pakistan confronted by its strategic problems and an underdeveloped military ill-suited to navigate through the contemporary strategic developments around it, had forwarded a proposal to the US, for an extensive modernization of its military. The US administration had turned this proposal down because it ‘felt the Pakistani request to be in excess of the country's security needs’ (Ibid, 19). As a result, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, when the US offered $400 million aid to Pakistan (Wirsing & Roherty 1982, 588), the Zia regime turned it down calling it ‘peanuts’. While the aid package offered might have helped Pakistan in a very minimal way, ‘it would have fallen far short of a comprehensive and coordinated defense modernization effort’ (van der Kroef 1980, 19). Considering Pakistan’s historic obsession with India and its security, as we have demonstrated in the previous chapter, the Pakistan military’s drive to modernize and suitably equip itself became more pronounced now that there was military dictatorship in the country. As we have observed in the previous chapter the military had emerged as the most dominant force in the state and its concerns regarding Pakistan’s existential insecurities made strengthening the military a most vital aspect of protecting the state sovereignty.

Pakistan’s insecurity was largely with regards to its territorial integrity. The Pakistani military’s insecurity was a consequence of its territorial insecurities and thus its appeal to the US for the modernization of its army was an appeal to defend itself against external aggression. In Pakistan’s view, this was much needed, since it considered itself under constant threat from its eastern arch-rival India, whom it held responsible for its dismemberment in 1971. While, ‘until the late 1970s, Pakistani threat perceptions accrued from the relationship with India, but the volatile situation in Afghanistan invigorated the threat from across the western borders’ (Malik 1990, 287) and now the Soviet threat was snowballing into a threat to its existence, and hence its sovereignty. Pakistan was apprehensive that the Soviet might exploit its internal political divisions and fan flames of separatism in Balochistan (Ayoob 1985) and the North Western Frontier province (now
Pakhtunkhwa), reducing the remainder of Pakistan into a ‘Soviet puppet, probably with India's connivance’ (van der Kroef 1980, 24). Thus, the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan had reinforced Pakistan’s perception of its insecurity. Pakistan’s security apprehensions were not baseless. A Memorandum of Conversation between President Carter and Premier Hua Guofeng of the Peoples’ Republic of China held on July 10th, 1980 in Tokyo divulged the Chinese Premier Hua Guofeng’s apprehension when he informed President Carter that the Soviet Union ‘had been putting pressure on Pakistan, even to the point of threatening “another dismemberment”’ (Department of State 1980). Thus for Pakistan, the ‘perilous US procrastination’ (van der Kroef 1980, 23) in recognizing the Soviet threat was not so much of a threat it posed to the US as it did for Pakistan.

What remains abundantly clear then is that Pakistan considered its sovereignty threatened by the Soviet Union and India, at the same time. While the existential threat from India had remained a variable in Pakistan’s policy equations since its inception, the War in Afghanistan made its western borders vulnerable to the Soviet Union. Understandably then, given that Pakistan felt threatened on its eastern and western border, it needed the US to firstly, counter the threat that the Soviet Union posed on its western borders, and secondly to re-equip it with modern weaponry so that it could preserve its territorial integrity against India on the eastern borders. Pakistan’s national interest had traditionally continued to remain India centric and was pivoted around its security and the defence of its sovereignty, as we have observed in the previous chapter. Given that its security was dependent on US assistance, economic and military, it came down to a list of US demands that Pakistan had to comply to in order to secure itself. In other words, to protect its sovereignty from the Soviet and the Indian threat, it had to cede some sovereignty to the US. What this meant was that while Pakistan’s territorial sovereignty was considered vulnerable to futuristic Soviet and Indian aggression, at the same time its political sovereignty was conditional to US requirements. Thus Pakistan had to choose between one of the two scenarios. One, it could either acquiesce to US demands on its nuclear activities and its dictatorial regime, consequently attracting US military assistance to equip and modernize its army and thwarting any threats to its sovereignty. Two, it could keep its sovereign decision-making tightly under its control, foregoing any US assistance, and remain vulnerable to the infringement of its sovereignty by the Soviet Union and India.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan initiated new US overtures to Pakistan. This was the beginning of a decade-long alliance between the US and Pakistan, in a war in Afghanistan,
which ended with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. The Soviet invasion opened doors for US aid and economic assistance to Pakistan and hence, notwithstanding Pakistan’s dictatorial regime and the development of its nuclear facilities, the US and Pakistan indulged in a mutually beneficial relationship to counter the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Pakistan, since its inception in 1947, had viewed US preponderance to be more attractive than its Soviet counterpart. Caught in a conflictual regional environment, where Indian hegemony was easily translated into a threat to its existence, Pakistan had always sought to rely on US assistance, military and civil, to maintain a semblance of counter threat to its regional adversary. As Ayoob (1989, 71) explains

‘The problem is further exacerbated by concrete considerations of state and regime security that force Third World decision-makers to concentrate primarily on immediate regional environments populated by other Third World states. Threats to Third World states and regimes emanate largely from within their regions, if not from within these states themselves. This is a result both of geographic proximity and of weak state-structures and narrowly-based regimes lacking unconditional legitimacy, which invite intra-state security problems that often get transformed into inter-state conflicts among neighboring political entities. Not surprisingly, these security concerns are perceived by Third World governments as more pressing than abstract considerations…’

As we have observed in earlier chapters, the US Cold War with the Soviet Union was primarily aimed at denying the Soviet Union hegemony and by the late 1970s and the early 1980s Africa and Asia had become battlegrounds for this ideological war. Given these circumstances, the War in Afghanistan created an opportunity for the US to exert pressure on Soviet Union, since Pakistan, which had historically been a dependent ally of the US, shared a border with Afghanistan. Further considering the security-centricity of the Pakistani state, the US could use its alliance with Pakistan to counter the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. What then needs to be seen is whether, or how, the US state behaviour towards Pakistan transitioned with the change in circumstance. Thus central questions to the thesis which will be explored in subsequent sections are; was there any change in US policy towards Pakistan after the War in Afghanistan? If the US policy had changed, how did it affect Pakistan’s sovereignty, since we have already mentioned how Pakistan’s dependence on US assistance coupled with its security-centricity, provided the US much space to exact leverage on Pakistan by conditioning its sovereignty to its demands.

Indeed by 1979, Pakistan had already suffered more than ten years of military dictatorship; more than half of its existence as a political unit. It was no surprise then that it viewed its
sovereignty in strict terms, circumscribed by a narrow understanding of security. The military which had always been preoccupied with countering Indian hegemony and influence, as a means to sustain the sovereignty of the state and to consolidate its security situation, was now in power. The war in Afghanistan provided an opportunity to both consolidate the security of the state and at the same time the legitimacy of the dictatorial regime. What this further meant was that the traditional US demands on Pakistan’s nuclear activities and its dictatorial regime were replaced by more immediate US concerns like countering the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, a phenomenon that is central to this thesis and will be delved in detail in the proceeding sections. Since Pakistan-US relations have often been studied under a dependent, patron-client relationship, what we will also explore in the proceeding sections is that while undoubtedly Pakistan was quite dependent and reliant on US assistance, military and economic, however to what measure could the US take advantage of this dependence? While recognizing the primacy of the security concerns in Pakistan’s policy calculus, inviting US intervention did not necessarily translate into a subservient, dependent relationship as we will observe, given that the huge volume of foreign aid dedicated to Pakistan, was a measure to create a patron-client relationship and render Pakistan’s sovereignty conditional to US interest (Paul 1992). Thus the central question in this chapter is; how conditional was Pakistan’s sovereignty to US interests during the dictatorial regime of General Zia-ul-Haq?

As we have observed earlier, the withholding of assistance military and economic, put considerable pressure on the Pakistani state with respect to its security and consequently its sovereignty, however once the War in Afghanistan commenced, the Zia regime witnessed significant rise in foreign aid inflows. As we have argued earlier, the War in Afghanistan brought new sets of pressures on Pakistan’s sovereignty. Now that Pakistan received substantial aid inflows, correlative the expectations from Pakistan became more intrinsically attached to US strategic interest in countering the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The US foreign aid to Pakistan was, ostensibly, a tool to assist Pakistan in its statebuilding and hence help Pakistan stabilize its economy and pursue its developmental goals.

David Lake (2010, 258) argues that throughout the Cold War to its very end, US statebuilding, which was essentially based on US foreign assistance strategy. ‘emphasized building loyal and politically stable subordinate states. When loyalty to the United States conflicted with local interests, Washington tolerated autocratic governments; democracy was never irrelevant, but it was always a distant and instrumental goal/and rarely realized.
Privileging American geopolitical and economic interests over those of local populations this model of statebuilding was premised on the theory of realpolitik.’ This becomes quite apparent when studying Pakistan-US relations during the Cold War and specifically the War in Afghanistan. While Pakistan’s dictatorial regime of General Zia-ul-Haq was under US pressure and international isolation due to its undemocratic status and violation of human rights, a subject we will touch in detail in the subsequent sections, however once the War in Afghanistan commenced the autocratic government in Pakistan was not only tolerated but became a pivotal ally of the US, owing to its strategic interest of checking Soviet expansionism in Afghanistan. This change in US policy towards Pakistan was quite demonstrable by the change in US foreign assistance that ensued due to US ‘realpolitik’ interest in the region.

Foreign aid received by Pakistan, during the Zia regime has shown military aid to be a significant component of overall US aid to Pakistan and the volume of US economic aid has been demonstratively, strongly correlated with the volume of US military aid (Khan 2013). For example between 1981 and 1989, the total amount of US economic assistance was $537.4 million, whereas military aid disbursed to Pakistan was $380.2 million (USAID 2014). While earlier, between 1971 and 1980 when the US was not strategically interested in Pakistan, the US economic assistance was $432.3 million and the military aid was a mere $0.9million (Ibid). As we have argued in the early chapters, the military aid was a means to allay Pakistan’s security fears in the face of its military disparity with India and consequently persuade Pakistan to give up its nuclear programme. The economic aid was largely to support and reinforce Pakistan’s own statebuilding efforts, however as we will argue in this chapter, the US foreign aid was instead a means to keep Pakistan compliant to US strategic interests in checking Soviet expansionism and as such were purely dictated by Cold War necessities and ‘realpolitik’ rather than more altruistic motives. This becomes further clear, when we observe in the subsequent sections how the US policy towards Pakistan changed after the War in Afghanistan.

While US foreign assistance to Pakistan, came in two categories, military and economic assistance, the economic assistance was further divided in two categories; economic and developmental assistance. Nabi and Hamid (1990, 52) provide a lucid account of the economic aspect of the aid relationship between Pakistan and US during the Cold War. They argue that the relationship ‘…has influenced not only the investment portfolio in Pakistan but also the overall development strategy, through [the US] active participation in institution
building and their wide ranging technical advice. These facets of the relationships have had a subtle but important influence on Pakistan’s economic performance…” These efforts towards institution building involved advising ‘Pakistan to delink the rupee from the dollar, focus on efficient import substitution, reduce government expenditures, establish tax reforms to increase domestic resource mobilization, encouraging savings, institution price reforms, and push for export-led growth and privatization’ (Ibid, 55). US efforts were not only restricted to help alleviate Pakistan’s economic concerns, but also continued into social and infrastructure development.

On the developmental aspect of the US assistance, Nabi and Hamid (Ibid) chronicle:

‘Most of the commitments were in agriculture. Commitments to infrastructure development were renewed, and social sector projects - malaria control II, population and primary health care – continued to be emphasized. Further technical assistance was provided through a number of initiatives such as project design and development support training…USAID also responded the alarming increase in drug abuse and drug smuggling out of Pakistan, A project was designed in the Gadoon-Amazai area, a centre of narcotics production, to provide alternative economic opportunities’.

Further a USAID brochure (2002) on the US-Pakistan relationship between 1982 and 1987 highlights its efforts in assisting various Pakistani developmental projects. Below are some of the figures reported from this brochure. It boasts of one fourth of US assistance to Pakistan for the energy sector which included, cooperation with the Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority to help build a new 900 megawatt power plant, providing $6 million computer system to improve the efficiency of a new power distribution wing of WAPDA by training 30,000 of its personnel, $19.3 in equipment to WAPDA to help reduce energy losses and improve efficiency, providing $7.7 million to hydro-carbon, fuel research and industrial research centres and financing a $16.5 million (Ibid) for new oil and gas development and seismic equipment. It also ‘helped initiate a national energy conservation program as well as establish an energy conservation centre (ENERCON) in Islamabad. Under the Seventh Five Year Plan, USAID helped the government create an energy wing within the Ministry of Planning to coordinate Pakistan’s national energy strategy’ (Ibid, 2). The brochure further highlights USAID contribution in agriculture that tantamounted to nearly half of the programme’s financial volume. This included strengthening agricultural research and education by involving and establishing national agricultural institutes to enhance agricultural productivity. Beyond this ‘from 1982-87, USAID assisted Pakistan in improving 4000
kilometres of canals and waterways throughout the country, upgrading irrigation workshops in the provinces and introducing computer-aided design techniques. More than $50 million in computers, vehicles, heavy machinery, and other equipment was provided’ (Ibid).

The purpose to mention these early US efforts in Pakistan is to reiterate and demonstrate that the aid relationship between Pakistan and US was not only militarily in nature, to appease Pakistan and help lift the pressures it faced on its sovereignty from India and the Soviet Union, it was also economic too. However, the US foreign assistance programme was not altruistic, but was strongly embedded in American foreign policy that was captive to the Cold War logic and was indeed based on the ‘realpolitik’ model explained by Lake (2010). ‘During the Cold War, US foreign aid enjoyed what aid reformers now call “policy coherence.” Further, until the 1990s “the underlying rationale for providing foreign aid was the same for all US foreign policy—the defeat of communism”’ (Barry 2005, 1). There seems an almost unanimous agreement of foreign aid researchers on this assertion. For example Nabi and Hamid (1990, 48) had observed earlier that Pakistan’s geopolitical positioning and US political considerations ‘have remained paramount in determining aid to Pakistan’. Khan (2011, 12-13) argues that

‘aid has fluctuated enormously with changing US perceptions about the geopolitical significance of Pakistan. While there are other donors in Pakistan, given the leadership role of the US in global geopolitical decisions, US strategies are very likely to influence the strategies of other major donors in Pakistan. While there is always some amount of coordination across donors in a country, for a country that has a strategic position for the sole superpower, the formal and informal coordination of aid conditions is likely to be stronger than is usually the case. Taken together, these characteristics of the Pakistan aid package have meant that aid flows have fluctuated significantly over time and economic flows have been significant in periods when military flows have also been high. The variability of overall aid flows and the dominance of strategic and military considerations are significant features of aid to Pakistan’.

This line of argument remains the mainstay of numerous studies that seek to analyse and research US aid to Pakistan during the Cold War and hence confirm the intellectual position taken up by David Lake (2010) on US foreign assistance during the Cold War. The subsequent chapters will demonstrate that, firstly, US efforts during the Cold War were to develop patron-client relationships and by the use of foreign aid, control sovereign decision-making in client states, such as Pakistan, thus making their sovereignty conditional to its interests. Secondly, different sets of US interest generated different sets of conditionalities on
the client state’s sovereignty, which in return determined the volume of the inflow of foreign assistance.

**Conditional Sovereignty during the Carter Years before December 1979**

The Carter administration had taken office in 1977. Thomas P. Thornton, a senior member of the staff of the National Security Council, concerned with South Asian affairs, in the Carter administration noted that Carter and his National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, ‘were mildly sympathetic towards India’ for a variety of reasons, one of them being that India ranked amongst one of the largest functional democracies (Thornton 1982, 960). The execution of Bhutto, a democratically elected leader, by the hands of the military regime of Zia-ul-Haq, further problematized the US-Pakistan relationship, since the Carter administration placed great value on democracy and human rights. Indeed, as a result of the reaction, Pakistan under Zia-ul-Haq’s dictatorial regime had achieved the status of pariah around the world; so absolute was Pakistan’s isolation. As Robert Wirsing (1991, 10) observed: ‘The ranks of its allies were diminishing at that very moment when ranks of enemies were swelling. Never before had Pakistan been quite so isolated and quite so threatened at the same time’. In an interview conducted for this thesis, Shafqat Kakakhel, Former Assistant Secretary General of UN, divulged that the only country to extend a formal invitation to Pakistan was Guinea Bissau. Pakistan under General Zia-ul-Haq was ‘increasingly disposed towards further downgrading of the US tie as the price for closer relations with Pakistan's preferred constituency in the Muslim and nonaligned worlds’ (Thornton 1982, 960).

At the same time in 1977, the US was moving away from an anti-Soviet foreign policy, something that had bound the two countries together. It was increasingly seeking to identify ‘its interests in the Third World with those of "regional influentials". In South Asian terms, that meant India’ (Ibid). Not only did these circumstances negatively influence the settings of the US-Pakistan relationship, further the Carter administration’s emphasis on global issues such as ‘as human rights, arms sales, and nuclear non-proliferation, not US.-Soviet relations’ (Ibid, 961), put a lot of pressure on the Pakistani state when these issues were addressed. For example when talking of human rights, the existence of a dictatorial regime in Islamabad, in case of nuclear non-proliferation, the state’s denial to ‘submit all of its nuclear facilities to
international safeguards largely designed and promoted by the United States’ (Ibid) and its defiance in continuing with its Nuclear programme, was quite negatively received in Washington. As Feroz Khan (2012, 208) observes:

‘President Zia-ul-Haq faced not only the threats on both borders, but also US sanctions on two accounts: nuclear proliferation and the military coup that derailed democracy in Pakistan. In September 1979, the United States formally withdrew the A-7 aircraft deal that was earlier offered to Bhutto. On a visit to Islamabad, Joseph Nye Jr., assistant secretary for the State Department, issued an unambiguous warning that economic assistance would be cut off under the Foreign Assistance Act should Pakistan continue with its nuclear program’.

At this stage, the pressure on Pakistan’s sovereignty spurned from the divergence between Pakistan and US interests on three accounts. Firstly, the presence of a dictatorial regime and secondly, Pakistan’s nuclear activities alienated Pakistan from the rest of the world, specifically the US. Thirdly, the increased identification of US interests with India meant that not only was the US moving away from Pakistan, it was also creating pressure on Pakistan by being increasingly bent towards India, which had traditionally been seen by Pakistan as the main threat to its sovereignty and against whom it had sought US assistance. Consequently the pressure on Pakistan’s sovereignty was also on three accounts. Firstly, the US demanded of Pakistan to curb its nuclear activities, secondly, it demanded that Pakistan restore democracy and value human rights and thirdly its increased predisposition towards India further put pressure on Pakistan’s sovereignty.

For the US, Cold War interests were dominated by their objective to contain the Soviet Union and China; ‘for Islamabad it was opposition to India’ (Thornton, 1987, 11). The US disinterest in Pakistan during the 1970s, which gave rise to much discontentment in Pakistan-US relationship, was because during the 1970s, Pakistan was thought not to matter much to the structure and functioning of the global balance between the US and the Soviet Union as the US perceived it (Wriggins 1984). In other words, Pakistan was not considered strategically important to US security concerns and due to its diminished status in the US security policy, it became a target of US human rights, nuclear non-proliferation and democracy concerns. This is an important observation since the thesis seeks to question whether this trajectory has continued in the post-Cold War era. Thus, Thornton (1982) notes that there were fewer countries in the world where so many global concerns intersected than they did in Pakistan and in each circumstance Pakistan found itself at loggerheads with
American priorities. The Carter administration’s fresh focus on ‘globalism’, which ‘called for
global leadership of the United States in the field of human rights’ (Hartmann 2001, 404) was
a break from traditional US foreign policy and compounded much of the relationship between
US and Pakistan.

For Pakistan, one of the main goals generally pursued through its foreign policy and more so
in its relations with the United States was to maintain its ‘territorial integrity as a sovereign
nation-state with legitimate interests and ideals’ (Malik 1990, 284). However the American
insistence on nuclear non-proliferation, democracy and human rights put undue pressure on
Pakistan’s sovereignty. At this stage Pakistan’s sovereignty was under pressure on two
accounts. If it required US assistance, it had to comply with American conditions of halting
its nuclear proliferation and improving its democracy record. Thus in this case its sovereignty
was conditional to US demands. However, if it did not comply with US demands, the lack of
foreign assistance, military and economic, would render its sovereignty vulnerable to an
Indian threat. As we have observed earlier, the continued dependence of Pakistan on US
military and economic assistance provided the US space to condition Pakistan’s sovereignty
according to its needs. Thus by withholding assistance on account of Pakistan’s nuclear
activities, the US exacerbated Pakistan’s insecurities and consequently, rendered its
sovereignty vulnerable to India, whom Pakistan had identified as its main antagonist, as we
have explained in the previous chapter.

After the Indian nuclear test of 1974, Pakistan had increasingly come to stake its security and
consequently its sovereignty, on the development of its own nuclear program, since it
believed that ‘nuclear weapons possessed by India and Pakistan would stabilize their
relationship as nuclear deterrence would create a better atmosphere of security’ (Rais 1991,
383). This assertion is supported by an account of a meeting (The National Security Archive
2010) between US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Gerard Smith who was Special
Presidential Representative for Non-proliferation Matters and Pakistan’s Foreign Minister
Agha Shahi, in which they warned Shahi

‘that a nuclear test would harm US – Pakistani relations, with Smith arguing that Pakistan was "entering the
valley of death" because India "can utterly destroy you."
Apparently Shahi responded that "he did not have to be a nuclear expert to understand that the value
of a nuclear capability lies in its possession, not in its use."’
Thus, during the latter years of the Carter administration, the main preoccupation of the US-Pakistan relationship was Pakistan’s ambivalent stance on the development of its nuclear programme. The Nuclear Non-proliferation Act of 1977 along with Symington and the Glenn amendments (Congress 2010), were invoked to put pressure on Pakistan to give up its nuclear project. These US amendments ‘forbade US aid to countries that transfer to, or receive from other nations plutonium reprocessing or uranium enrichment equipment, materials, or technology that is not under international safeguard’ (Paul 1992, 1087). Thus, Thomas P. Thornton, notes that this became ‘the most ominous cloud over US-Pakistan relations’ (Thornton 1982, 962). Any effort to deter Pakistan from the development of its nuclear program was perceived as an attempt to curb its sovereignty, and it was in this case that the US came down hardest on Pakistan.

The pressure on Pakistan’s sovereignty came from two sides. First, Congressional acts and amendments, like the ‘Non-proliferation Act of 1977 and the Glenn amendment and the Symington amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act provide powerful, if blunt, weapons to be used against nations about to go nuclear’ (Ibid). Under the Glenn amendment, consequently, foreign aid was terminated to Pakistan in 1978. Secondly, The US administration’s vocal position against non-proliferation created a ‘climate of international opinion’ and the French, who were working with Pakistan on its nuclear programme, had to effectively terminate their assistance in the same year. In a secret, recently unclassified, memorandum dated October 18, 1977, to the US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Alfred Atherton who was US Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs and George S. Vest, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, reported that:

‘...the Pakistanis have rejected the French offer of a restructured reprocessing plant, thus highlighting their desire for plutonium for which there is no economic justification. We consider this a potentially positive development, since the French now seem more persuaded of the need to get out of the contract’ (Appendix III).

Later, another recently declassified secret telegram from the US embassy in Islamabad to the Secretary of State in October 1977, observed that

‘It now appears that we have virtually achieved our objective of assuring that the existing contract for a reprocessing plant in Pakistan will not be carried out. The question of whether the contract remains outstanding, and may not be answered for many months or longer (It is apparent that the regime here finds itself paralysed on
this issue and unable to do anything but continue to insist that the present contract go forward, even though it may not be awakening to the realization that the French are not going forward’ (Appendix IV).

Despite these breakthroughs, the US continued pressurizing other western powers to keep up the pressure on Pakistan’s nuclear activities, however the response was lukewarm and not to the complete satisfaction of the US. In another secret cable dated 15 November 1979, Gerard Smith, Special Presidential Representative for Non-proliferation Matters, wrote to the Secretary of State that

‘At your direction, I discussed Pakistan with Foreign Ministers and other senior officials during my recent trip to Europe… I reported that during the Agha Shahi visit to Washington the US had foreshadowed a drastic change in relations should Pakistan test a nuclear device. I asked governments to consider making similar statements to Pakistan…There seems to be little enthusiasm on Europe to emulate our position with Pakistan. Nor is there optimism in Europe that any combination of available disincentives or incentives will influence Pakistan’s nuclear course. It is remembered that the US and Europe did not “punish” India in 1974. It was also not helpful that my visits to Bonn, Paris and London were preceded by those of Hua Guofeng, who preached the need to bolster Pakistan as a barrier to Soviet adventurism in the region’ (Appendix V).

All these US actions were in effect measures to control Pakistan’s decision to develop its nuclear programme and hence rendered Pakistan’s sovereignty conditional to US demand of nuclear non-proliferation. Since, as we have argued earlier, Pakistan’s security was focused on countering India’s hegemony in the region and achieving a parity that would allay its security concerns, thus Pakistan’s nuclear project became the mainstay of its security-defined sovereignty. Any US effort that worked against Pakistan’s nuclear programme was then seen as an infringement in Pakistan’s sovereignty that played out on two levels. Firstly, if Pakistan did not acquiesce to US demands on its nuclear activities, the withholding of foreign assistance by the US made it vulnerable to Indian aggression and further, it would not be in a position to counter Indian influence in the region. Secondly, by acquiescing to US demands, it would have to forego its nuclear activities, but would still remain vulnerable to Indian aggression, since India possessed a nuclear device, thus again, Pakistan would not be in a position to balance the power in the region. In the face of US pressures on its sovereignty, Pakistan decided to protect its sovereignty against US nuclear demands.

When this did not work, the Carter administration tried to buy out Pakistan by offering it fifty F-5E fighters with advanced air-to-ground missile. Pakistan, under Zia, remained resilient to
negotiate on its nuclear capabilities and often the US State Department noted that it had limited influence on Pakistan (Appendix VI). Another declassified note of the meeting between, Deputy Secretary of State, Warren Christopher with General Zia and Foreign Minister Shahi on the 1st and 2nd March 1979 notes that Shahi rejected the offer of these fifty F-5E fighters on the argument that they ‘are not good night receptors and we need that in view of [Indian] jaguars night strike capability’ (Appendix VII). Pakistan remained undeterred by these US actions till the aid to Pakistan was cut off in April 1979.

Even once the aid was cut off, Pakistan continued to stave off US demands on its nuclear activities. A recently declassified cable mentions a meeting between Ambassador Hummel and the Pakistani official held on April 21, 1979 in which the US proposed ‘an interim arrangement under which Pakistan would agree to limit its uranium enrichment activities to a research scale program and consistent with its trilateral agreement with France and the IAEA would accept safeguards on all reprocessing activity in return for a resumption of US economic assistance, and the possibility of gaining some reciprocal response from the Indians’ (Appendix VIII). We know that Pakistan refused the US offer. This reaffirms our previous observation that Pakistan would not acquiesce to any US demands, especially on its nuclear activities, till it did not conform to Pakistan’s security interests pivoted around India. Since the US offer was not sufficient to allay Pakistan’s fear of its nuclear neighbour, every US measure to curtail Pakistan’s nuclear programme failed and was seen as an infringement of Pakistan’s sovereignty.

As Burke and Ziring (1990, 440-41) note:

‘Zia argued that Pakistan had the sovereign right to acquire nuclear-processing technology as a means to boosting its energy production. Zia complained that the Carter administration had unfairly accused Pakistan of promoting nuclear proliferation. Scoffing at the attack he cited countries like Brazil and Israel, who he said possessed more advanced nuclear programmes. Unlike Pakistan they were neither pressured nor criticized’.

Compounded by a security specific definition of sovereignty that centred on India, Zia was aware that it was only a matter of time that the Americans would realize the magnanimity of the situation in Afghanistan. His only concern was to upgrade Pakistan’s security situation by strengthening the military through advanced military hardware and protecting its nuclear project. Thus the Nuclear Non-proliferation Act of 1977, the Symington amendment and the
Glenn amendment failed to curb Pakistan’s sovereign decision to pursue its nuclear ambitions. Hence, Pakistan’s resilience in the face of US interventions to inhibit its progress in achieving a nuclear status, demonstrates that despite these interventions, Pakistan went ahead with what it considered was in its national interest. Since this national interest of pursuing nuclear weapons was considered vital to its sovereignty as a state neighbouring an aspiring hegemon, Pakistan remained staunch in the face of US pressure.

Another issue that compounded US-Pakistan relations, during the Carter administration’s years in office, was the issue of human rights. Baluch tribesmen of the province of Baluchistan had been vociferously voicing their concerns of unequal treatment and human rights abuse against the Pakistani state. The nationalist elements within the Baluch had increasingly started looking at a separatist movement, aimed at self-determination, as a solution to their political predicament. Here again, the US increasingly started showing concerns of its own. Such was the interest of the US policy-makers in Pakistan’s internal problems that, ‘hardly a meeting could be held in Washington without reference to the Baluch’ (Thornton 1982, 964). For Pakistan, these issues, taken up by the US, were infringements into its sovereign rights and intervention into its exclusive domain.

Thus during the Carter years, US efforts to apply conditions on Pakistan’s sovereignty, by exploiting Pakistan’s historical dependence on its assistance, did not work. Any and every US effort to somehow control Pakistan’s nuclear activities or pressure its dictatorial regime on issues of democracy and human rights remained ineffective. As we have argued in the previous chapter, this was because Pakistan, which had predominantly remained under military power, operated with an existential mind-set that viewed each problem, domestic and international, of human rights, political dissent in the province or its nuclear activity, from a security specific point of view. Since security had become intrinsically linked to sovereignty, thus all US efforts were seen as an infringement of its sovereignty and since they were consequently seen in the light of Pakistan’s security centricity, they were successfully resisted.

These tenuous situations between Pakistan and the Carter administration, thus compounded much of Pakistan’s (in)security situation which had increasingly become intertwined with its idea of sovereignty. The US policies on human rights and non-proliferation weren’t specifically designed to deter Pakistan exclusively, for example the non-proliferation act was
triggered by India. However, Pakistan’s much reliance on US support vis-à-vis India, exacerbated its problems. Thus from Pakistan’s point of view, the reduction of arms sale, the non-proliferation act and the withholding of economic assistance all contributed negatively towards its security, whereas they had marginal impact on India. ‘Indeed, most of the adverse American actions took the form of not doing something for Pakistan’ (Ibid, 966), and doing something was conditioned to Pakistan fulfilling American requirements, in the absence of which it would continue being punished. Pakistan was a country whose security centric policies revolved around perceived Indian threat to its sovereignty, whether this threat was of India’s efforts to establish a regional hegemony or by direct military action. In that case then, the Carter administration’s policies and its increasing bend towards India, were both hostile in nature and were seen complicit in curbing Pakistan’s sovereignty. As Pande (2011, 104) observes:

‘Pakistan’s nuclear program is India-centric: it was started to ensure military parity with India. Any attempt by the United States or any other country to dissuade Pakistan from having nuclear weapons, without preventing India from doing so, is seen as playing into Indian hands’.

Thus the pressures on Pakistan’s sovereignty weren’t directly from US alone, but the policies that it followed created an air of Indian predominance in the region which further aggrivated these issues. Pakistan’s reliance on US assistance, to sustain its sovereignty vis-à-vis India, was a fact of the Cold War era. However, the dynamics of the relationship were quite complicated. In an interview, a former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, Tanvir A. Khan (2012) argues that

‘Pakistan and the US had a peculiarly troubled relationship. To start with, the US was never interested in South Asia as a region of any vital strategic importance. But since Pakistan’s military was trained and equipped by the US, once the investment was made, for Pakistan, it commenced a long struggle for securing its sovereignty in the face of the superpower. Americans would demand Pakistan to make policy measures and concessions as their entitlement. For example the Americans would chastise Pakistan that it started the 1965 war without its approval. However, despite various pacts and agreements, Pakistan was keen and consequentially, successful in maintaining and projecting its sovereign rights on various issues. For example, during the Vietnam War, the US demanded that Pakistan do something symbolic. However the Pakistani state found any such gesture to go against its national interests and hence refrained’.

Despite the perils of the Pakistan-US relationship and the intricate dynamics that guided their interaction, Pakistan still hinged on the US to meet its security needs. However, while
Pakistan looked towards the US for assistance, civil and military, the US had traditionally sought to nurture closer ties with India, since the partition of the sub-continent. As Kakakhel, former Assistant Secretary General of UN and Pakistan’s former Permanent Representative to the UN Environment Programme (2013) argued in his interview,

‘As far as the US is concerned, Pakistan has always been a second fiddle to India. It is only the circumstantial positioning of American interests in the Pakistani state that have allowed some degree of cooperation between the two states. Since American perceptions of Pakistan are shaped by global imperatives, an absence of any convergence of interest will play to the detriment of the relationship between the two states and the tilt towards India will become more obvious’.

Throughout its existence, Pakistan’s main incentives for an alliance with the US were to firstly, attract financial and economic assistance in the form of foreign aid and to upgrade its military, which included buying sophisticated weapon systems, equipment and arms. As we have already observed the Carter administrations increased emphasis on normative values such as non-proliferation, human rights and democracy initiated a series of sanctions under US law which prohibited the US from providing foreign aid or from alleviating Pakistan’s security concerns. Thus with a depleted economy and a poorly equipped military, Pakistan considered itself vulnerable to Indian aggression which again was an issue of its sovereignty. This issue could then only be resolved if Pakistan complied with the US demands of nuclear non-proliferation, restoration of democracy and improving human rights records. Even then, the issue of US tilt towards India would not have been resolved, considering the Carter administration’s disposition towards India. Thus the US was not only intrusive and had not only rendered Pakistan’s sovereignty conditional to its interests, it used Pakistan’s historical dependency on US foreign, military and economic assistance to pressure Pakistan to comply.

All the problems in the Pakistan-US relationship during the Carter years boiled down to one thing: the issue of foreign assistance. Indeed Pakistan had always eyed a US alliance primarily to attract foreign assistance, military and economic. As we have argued earlier, US foreign assistance strategy, during the Cold War, was a strategic tool advanced to states which were considered of strategic importance to the US. Since during the Carter years Pakistan wasn’t considered of much strategic importance hence foreign aid was conveniently withheld to condition Pakistan’s sovereignty to conform to US nuclear concerns of it.
**Foreign Aid during the Carter Years before and after 1979**

Zia took over the office of the President of Pakistan on the 16th September 1978. In 1978, the US economic aid to Pakistan amounted to $220.9 million. Out of these, $39,742 was given for narcotics control, $57.04 million was provided through USAID, $160.1 million under Title I and $3.75 million under title II (food sales) (USAID 2014). While the levels of US aid to Pakistan was already very low, in 1979, the presence of a military regime in Islamabad accompanied by the passage of the Symington Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, designed to thwart Pakistan’s continual and clandestine pursuit of nuclear capability, prompted the Carter administration to cut off all assistance in April 1979 (Smith 2011, 204). Thus in 1979, total aid received by Pakistan was $132.3 million and continued to be received in the same accounts as those of 1978 (USAID 2014). During the rest of the Carter administration years, aid amounted to $141.3 million in 1980, and $168.7 million in 1981 (Ibid). As we have observed in the previous chapter, the reduction of US foreign aid during the Carter years were principled on the basis of human rights, US tilt towards India, and in reaction to Pakistan’s nuclear efforts. Thus Pakistan’s sovereignty was tied to US interests and was conditional to its giving up its nuclear programme, accepting India’s regional leadership role and bettering its human rights and democracy record. In that case then US foreign aid became a tool to condition Pakistan’s sovereignty and to pressurize it to follow its demands. Since the US was not strategically interested in South Asia during the initial Carter years, thus the pressures on Pakistan’s sovereignty were qualitatively different from those which would be when it was strategically interested, as we will further demonstrate.

Thomas Perry Thornton (1982, 959), a senior staff member of the National Security Council under the Carter Administration argued that

‘When Carter assumed office in 1977, Pakistan loomed fairly small on the policy horizon. The importance it had enjoyed as a link in Dulles' chain of containment had long since faded. Pakistan's geographic location was of dwindling interest to the United States since Iran had become the US. listening post and, along with Saudi Arabia, the principal support of US. interests in West Asia. The United States was seeking to negotiate itself and the Soviets out of the Indian Ocean power race. Pakistan's other key asset in its relations with the United States in the Nixon years had disappeared since Washington now had direct access to China’.

Pakistan’s fairly small appearance on the US horizon, was the reason why low flow of foreign aid was observed during the Carter years. As far as the United States was concerned,
Pakistan had lost its strategic importance in the Cold War because it was moving away from an anti-Soviet posture and seeking to ally with regional influentials. As Hess (1987, 281) opines in retrospect:

‘Carter’s determination to give enhanced attention to the Third World and to democratic values led…to a more favourable approach towards India. The improvement of relations with India was paralleled by a hostile attitude towards Pakistan, at least before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Even the Afghanistan invasion only modestly improved the situation, for Pakistan and the United States looked upon Pakistan’s security from differing perspectives…General Mohammad Zial-ul-Haq contemptuously dismissed the offer of $400 million in military and economic assistance as “peanuts”, and despite Pakistan’s renewed importance in American strategic planning, Washington never provided firm assurance that Pakistan was included in the “Carter Doctrine”.

Following the thaw in the Cold War, because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, the US executed a complete policy reversal as far as Pakistan was concerned. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, a recently declassified cable, from the US Secretary of State to its ambassadors in other states dispatched in January 1980, affirmed that

‘The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has created a serious threat to the states of the South Asia region, particularly Pakistan. President Carter has announced that the United States would provide military equipment, food and other assistance to help Pakistan defend its independence and territorial integrity… I wish to emphasize that US global non-proliferation policy is unchanged… [we do not] have plans to change the Symington or Glenn amendment’ (Appendix IX).

Van Hollen (1980, 38) notes that

‘the Carter administration in late December 1979 executed a remarkable about-face in its head-long rush to embrace Zia. Non-proliferation policy, human rights considerations, and realistic assessments of the Soviet threat to Pakistan and of the India-Pakistan power equation—all were swept aside or White House's crash program ignored to do something to help meet the perceived threat from the Soviet Union’.

However even then the Carter administrations did not waive off the Symington and the Glenn amendment. US foreign assistance to Pakistan were intrinsically tied to US demands and till the time Pakistan would not acquiesce to American political vision, any form of assistance was kept in abeyance. What is noteworthy is that the restrictions on foreign aid continued, even though the Soviets had invaded Afghanistan and Carter in his State of the Union
address, on 23rd January 1980, had declared that ‘the implications of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan could pose the most serious threat to the peace since the Second World War’ (Carter 1980). The President further said that: ‘We've reconfirmed our 1959 agreement to help Pakistan preserve its independence and its integrity. The United States will take action consistent with our own laws to assist Pakistan in resisting any outside aggression. And I'm asking the Congress specifically to reaffirm this agreement. I'm also working, along with the leaders of other nations, to provide additional military and economic aid for Pakistan. That request will come to you in just a few days’ (Ibid). However the $400 million dollar aid package presented to Pakistan did not project the seriousness of the US administration in the corridors of Islamabad. While the US did make many overtures in terms of financial assistance to Pakistan however, none could achieve fruition. As Thornton (1982, 969) points out:

‘First, the newfound enthusiasm for Pakistan was not universally shared in Washington, and many saw the Soviet attack as a much less traumatic event than portrayed by the President and Brzezinski. There were many claimants besides Pakistan for scarce resources, and there were widespread doubts as to Pakistan's dependability and suitability as a major element of an American security design. Second, the overhang of disputed global issues from the past several years could not simply be wished away. These were too central to the set of priorities that Carter had brought to office and was still loath to abandon. In any event, these issues had broad public resonance and had been built into the legislative and bureaucratic systems. Regional issues, of course, also persisted’.

Consequentially (Ibid, 971) he notes that ‘Both sides had misjudged badly. The Americans overestimated the extent to which Pakistan had rethought its role following the Soviet attack; the Pakistanis erred in believing that the American offer could be bargained upward’. What is however remarkable is that even though after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Carter administration’s offer of aid wasn’t quite substantial but the about turn in its policy towards a dictatorial regime in Pakistan, under nuclear related sanctions, demonstrates how US strategic interests relegate all other concerns.

The entire idea to chronicle these developments in the Carter era is to demonstrate that American foreign assistance was subservient to its Cold War strategic interests. Secondly, when the US was not strategically interested in Pakistan, Pakistan’s sovereignty remained conditional to US demands such as halting nuclear non-proliferation and democracy. Initially, in the face of dwindling and subsequently, diminishing interests of the US in Pakistan,
foreign aid programmes were at an all-time low, however, the invasion of the Soviet in Afghanistan reconfigured the entire political dynamic of the region. President Carter’s offer of aid along with other forms of assistances, military and economic, however insufficient in Pakistan’s view, demonstrates how the US foreign assistance strategy was pivotally embedded in the US Cold War strategic objectives. In 1981, the Reagan Administration took office and sought to dramatically improve Pakistan-US relations. This was a continuation of the urgency felt by the Carter Administration to counter the Soviet threat in Afghanistan. AS William (2007, 81) argues, ‘While rhetoric concerning Pakistani fears and American commitments persisted for the remainder of the Carter administration, the US and Pakistan failed to reach an agreement on an aid package. A major US policy shift concerning Pakistan did not occur. While the Soviet invasion certainly transformed US policy makers’ perceptions of Pakistan, the substantive turning point in the relationship came with the inauguration of Ronald Reagan in January 1981’. However, the only remarkable difference, as far as Pakistan was concerned, was that the US under Reagan sought to engage Pakistan positively by acquiescing much of its demands in terms of foreign aid.

**Conditional Sovereignty during the Reagan Years**

With the Reagan administration in the White House, Pakistan’s sovereignty became conditional to a different set of issues. As Thornton (1987, 20) argued: ‘Even when US military and economic aid has been given to support broadly accepted Pakistani goals, it has contributed to the economic well-being and to the satisfaction of the military, thereby strengthening successive regimes. Withholding assistance is, of course, at least as intrusive’. We have already discussed how different sets of issues made Pakistan’s sovereignty conditional to US needs when Pakistan was not of strategic importance, on issues such as nuclear non-proliferation and democracy through sanctions. However when the Reagan administration took on Pakistan and pledged a huge aid package for Pakistan to elicit its cooperation in containing soviet expansionism, a different set of issues became the focal point of the relationship and thus, a different set of conditions were brought in place to check Pakistan’s sovereignty.

The war in Afghanistan naturally posed a threat to Pakistan’s sovereignty because it was feared that the Soviet Union in collusion with India, might attempt at fanning a separatist
movement, as we have observed in the previous section. Such a fear, which threatened Pakistan’s sovereignty, was more blatant and ostentatious. However, through a meaningful alliance with the US, Pakistan came out of the war “intact”. But if sovereignty is considered as ‘the institutionalization of public authority within mutually exclusive jurisdictional domains’ (Barkin & Cronin 1994, 108), then surely, a superpower in a relationship with a state, would want to dictate some terms of its own to the detriment of the state which might cut through the ‘exclusive jurisdictional domain’ of the state and hence violate its sovereignty. As Paul (1992, 1072) explains:

‘During the Cold War era, arms supply was perceived by both the United States and the USSR as an important tool for creating dependencies, patron-client ties, and alliance relationships. The superpowers behaved under a generally held, though not yet fully tested belief that the supply of arms served as a major instrument for international influence, often benefiting the strategic and political interests of the supplier.’

These influences were not only restricted to arms sales and supplies but were a part of a broader repertoire of aid and international assistance, including developmental assistance, civilian assistance and military assistance. Thus a broader understanding of sovereignty not only looks at foreign interventions but also the dynamics whereby the client state cedes some jurisdictional territory to its patron, as an infringement of sovereignty. While in the context of the war in Afghanistan, Russia and supposedly India, had posed some threat to Pakistan’s sovereignty, what also needs to be seen is how Pakistan defended its sovereignty (or whether it did) against indirect US involvement in its affairs. More importantly, it needs to be examined whether the US used its excessive economic and military transactions to exact outcomes from Pakistan that otherwise were not in Pakistan’s favour. Hence the question that we seek to answer is that how conditional was Pakistan’s sovereignty to US concerns, especially in an era defined by political realism?

In such a course of action where a superpower wishes to exert its influence through a client state, there is a huge probability that the sovereignty of the client state will, to an extent, be compromised in a situation where the superpower’s interests supersedes the client’s. Indeed Sanjian modelling on US arms transfer policies (1998, 98) demonstrates that the purposes of US arms transfer policies toward Pakistan ‘were not to create a more stable South Asian security environment; rather… [its] primary goal was to cultivate and then police a largely dependent and subservient client’. Sanjian believes that the US took advantage of Pakistan’s
historical security paranoia. He argues that ‘security in a tension-filled environment will compel the importers to scramble for arms; and the superpowers will endeavour to dominate their clients by policing those states’ actions’ (Ibid, 111). By creating such a dependent relationship, the US strategized to dominate Pakistan’s decision-making policies to further its own interests with much disregard to Pakistan’s own political situation. Sanjian, conclusively argues, that the US, during the war in Afghanistan, accomplished its goal of creating a dependent, disciplined and subservient state out of Pakistan which helped it in dominating the situation in South Asia. By this measure then, Pakistan’s sovereignty, according to Sanjian, was conditional to US interests in dominating the situation in South Asia which replaced the Carter year conditions of nuclear non-proliferation, democracy and human rights. However whether it was this dependent relationship or Pakistan’s sovereign concerns that played a pivotal role in the alliance between US and Pakistan will be explored in subsequent sections.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 precipitated just the convergence of interest between Pakistan and the US which Pakistan had hoped for, especially during the Reagan administration. Thus, when the Soviet invaded Afghanistan, Pakistan again took on the mantle of a ‘frontline state’ and ‘as an essential anchor of the entire south-west Asian region’ (Wirsing and Roherty 1982, 589) it became the focus of much US assistance. By 1984, Pakistan was ‘placed fourth after Israel, Egypt and Turkey among ninety-one recipients of US security assistance’. As Wirsing (1984, 12) explains:

‘For thrice-embargoed Pakistan, with whom even economic assistance had been terminated by Washington in 1979 on grounds that it was pursuing unsafe-guarded nuclear technology applicable to the development of nuclear weapons, this third instalment of a six-year $3.2 billion military and economic assistance package represented a considerable jump in status’.

The US for its own strategic interests which was largely to counter Soviet Union in Afghanistan, found it convenient to debunk its policy on democratization, human rights, amongst other concerns that were pivotal to US foreign policy. However, while the agenda of contentious issues, especially, nuclear non-proliferation remained almost unchanged, the US remained quite lenient in its approach towards Pakistan on the issue (Thornton 1982). In essence then, the conditions that the US had imposed on Pakistan’s sovereignty with regards to its nuclear programme, democracy and human rights, by withholding foreign aid, were discarded in favour for more immediate concerns.
When the US got involved in the War in Afghanistan, it did not matter to it, that the Pakistani state was in the throes of a dictatorial regime, that it had embarked on an ambitious nuclear project and that it had a poor human rights record. The US strategy with Pakistan was to keep it in line so as to confront the Soviet threat in Afghanistan, and Pakistan was already too eager to play the role of a frontline state. Secondly, since the US did not want to directly involve itself in the conflict, Pakistan became a significant option for the US, to counter the Soviet in Afghanistan. One of the major issues that compounded US-Pakistan relationship was Pakistan’s insistence on is sovereignty, especially with regards to its nuclear programme. Since Pakistan denied that it was making nuclear weapons, it could not ‘directly accuse the United States of frustrating its national interests’ (Thornton 1987, 16). However, US dependability on Pakistan was so great that when in December 1982, Pakistan’s President, General Zia-ul-Haq, visited Washington and pushed for a tacit US acceptance of its nuclear programme, ‘even though both Reagan and Shultz warned against the development of nuclear weapons, the secretary noted to the president that they ‘must also recognise that how we handle the nuclear issue can have a profound effect on our ability to continue to cooperate with Pakistan in supporting the Afghan freedom fighters’(Westad 2005, 353). Thus respecting Pakistan’s sovereignty, on the nuclear issue, was a matter of US strategic interest or, in other words, the US conditions on Pakistan’s sovereignty had changed with the change in its interests. Now the nuclear issue was not a condition on Pakistan’s sovereignty, even though it remained a concern of the Reagan administration.

The Reagan administration that took office in 1981 too, remained concerned with Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions. As Feroz Khan (2012, 214) observes:

‘In 1981, President Reagan took office with two clear objectives: roll back the Soviets from Afghanistan and slow down Pakistan’ nuclear programme…An agreement was agreed upon’ by virtue of which US sought to allay Zia’s ‘concerns over US interference in Pakistan’s domestic affairs. The Reagan administration agreed not only to remove the military sanctions but also to refrain from pressuring Islamabad on democracy and human rights issue’.

According to the Reagan administration ‘its predecessor's termination of military assistance had increased Pakistan's sense of insecurity and, thereby, its determination to pursue nuclear weapons capability’ (Ibid). They then sought to ease Pakistan’s security predicament by
improving Pakistan’s conventional military capabilities, arguing that this would initiate a reduction in Pakistan’s enthusiasm to follow the nuclear route, since ‘Pakistan would not sacrifice such significant assistance for a mini-nuclear capability’ (Ibid). However, later years proved that the American assumptions were wrongly based and had limited effect. In a meeting on 7 December 1982 between President Reagan and President Zia-ul-Haq, ‘Reagan laid out specific parameter for the Pakistani nuclear program: no assembly or test of nuclear devices, no transfer of technology for such devices, no violation of international safeguards, and no unsafeguarded reprocessing’ (National Security Archives 2010). The Reagan administration, in 1984, sought to curb Pakistan’s nuclear project by restricting it to a 5 percent non-weapon level, Pakistan overlooked the US caution here as well. Finally, in August 1987, the US Under-Secretary for Political Affairs Michael Armacost, in his visit to Pakistan, admonished that if ‘Pakistan did not make all of its nuclear facilities available for on-site inspection, the aid would be terminated. President Zia flatly rejected the US demand’ (Paul 1992, 1089).

As we had mentioned in the previous chapter, Pakistan’s sovereignty has traditionally been very security specific and Pakistan has historically seen India as the main antagonist. The Reagan administration’s understanding to allay Pakistan’s security fears did help in gaining an alliance with Pakistan, unlike the $400 million offered by the Carter administration, however Pakistan viewed its nuclear programme pivotal to its security, and consequentially its sovereignty, against the neighbouring India, and hence it continued on with its nuclear security despite US reservations.

Hence, amongst many other factors, nuclear non-proliferation had come to be seen as symptomatically intrinsic to Pakistan’s sovereignty and despite various pressures, threats and incentives; the Zia regime did not budge on the issue. In an interview to a TV channel, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan (2011), “The father of the Nuclear Bomb”, explained Pakistan’s nuclear predicament and the pressures from the United States:

‘Zia-ul-Haq was a rich advocate of Pakistan’s nuclear programme. He took all the pressures emanating from the Western powers and specifically, the US, for whom Pakistan’s nuclear agenda was highly contentious. Whenever Sahibzada Yaqub Khan or Agha Shahi (Ex. Ambassador to the United States) were scheduled to visit the US, Zia was aware that they would be enquired upon about the nuclear programme. We used to have board meetings before their departures and Zia used to emphasize to his ambassadors that if there is any talk about
Pakistan’s nuclear project, you tell them that you will not discuss anything, not a word about it. It is none of their business. The state of Pakistan had tremendous pressures with regards to its nuclear plans but it did not balk down’.

It can thus be postulated that when US does not have strategic interests in the region Pakistan’s sovereignty is conditional to its conforming to US ideals such as non-proliferation, democracy and human rights. However when both states converge on certain strategic interests such as countering Soviet expansionism in the Cold War, Pakistan’s sovereignty then becomes conditional on a different set of interests that are anchored in US strategic vision narrowly defined in terms of security. Thus both sets of conditionalities on Pakistan’s sovereignty have evoked different sets of reactions from Pakistan, however all these reactions have been in a direction that seeks to preserve rather than surrender Pakistan’s sovereignty. Hence, while during the Carter years, Pakistan’s sovereignty was conditional to its acquiescing to US interests in non-proliferation, human rights and democracy, during President Reagan’s tenure in office, it became conditional to the expanse of US strategic demands to counter Soviet expansionism. This was because Pakistan heavily relied on US assistance towards its military and economic growth.

The resumption of military and economic aid and the wavering of US sanctions that were in place due to Pakistan’s nuclear programme and its dictatorial regime, at the beginning of the Reagan years, suggest that the only reason why this happened was because Pakistan acquiesced to assist the US in checking the Soviet expansion in Afghanistan. It can then be postulated that Pakistan’s sovereignty was conditional to its harmonizing with the US security perception in Afghanistan. The thesis can argue then that had Pakistan not acquiesced to ally with the US, in this instance, the sanctions would have remained in place and the US demands on nuclear, democracy and the human rights issue would have remain unchanged. The thesis will demonstrate, that the belief that Pakistan’s acquiescence to US demand of acting as a conduit for arms supplies to the Afghan mujahedeen and its willingness to confront the Soviet Union in alliance with US, are demonstrative of the influence that US had over Pakistan, is unfounded. The decision by Pakistan was a sovereign decision, one which had been taken when it found US assistance in arms and foreign aid to directly correspond with its perceptions of security. Thus the relationship was a quid pro quo arrangement rather than a patron-client one. Hence while as we will demonstrate, for the US, Pakistan’s sovereignty was conditional to its aligning with the US against Soviet
expansionism in Afghanistan, for Pakistan it was not only a quid pro quo arrangement, it was also one which it wanted.

Two issues come to fore with respect to Pakistan’s conditional sovereignty. Firstly, given the historical dependence of Pakistan on US military and economic assistance, it can be argued that Pakistan in dire need of upgrading its military and improving its economic performance joined the US in the War in Afghanistan under pressure. Hence, it can be further argued that the US successfully exercised its conditions on Pakistan’s sovereignty by using Pakistan’s historic dependence, on its assistance, to elicit its cooperation in the War in Afghanistan. However, the observations of this thesis establish the contrary. While US did elicit Pakistan’s cooperation, but it did so on Pakistan’s terms, which becomes clearer in light of the fact that Pakistan had earlier rejected the $400 million offer from the Carter administration. Further, it was not the US who elicited Pakistan’s cooperation. Selig Harrison noted that mounting evidence supported the fact that Pakistan had been ‘quietly funnelling Chinese, US, Saudi and Egyptian aid to the [Afghan] resistance since early 1980’ (Harrison 1982, 96). Zia as early as 1979 had remarked to the Americans that ‘you take Pakistan out of the region, and you will find that you have not one inch of soil where America can have influence-right from Turkey down to Vietnam’ (Dorsey 1980). Adding credence to the claim, Tanvir Khan (2013), a former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, argued in an interview conducted for this thesis that:

‘America did not push Pakistan into an anti-Soviet posture. Zia had successfully argued that Pakistan will do the US bidding but on its own terms. Zia-ul-Haq had a firm grip on the ground situation to such an extent that even the Americans were wary of not controlling the nitty gritty or to interfere in the matters governed by the state’.

These views resonate across the board amongst Pakistani policy-makers as they agree in consonance that the jihad in Afghanistan was a Pakistani initiative, which drew the US in. Thus Zia already wanted to engage the US in Afghanistan; however he wanted to do it on his own terms. Terms, which he thought appropriately, suited the security of the Pakistani state and were in congruence with Pakistan’s sovereign independence. While under the major rubric of the alliance the US made certain strategic demands, Pakistan did not agree to them as matters of sovereign concern. In other words, Pakistan’s quid pro quo strategy was that Pakistan will ally with the US if the US respects its sovereignty. This severely limited US influence on Islamabad since the condition that the US had imposed on Pakistan, to control
the situation in South Asia, was something that Pakistan wanted more. In that case then, by Pakistan’s standards, its sovereignty was not conditional to the major US designs of checking the Soviet posture in Afghanistan.

Secondly, once the War in Afghanistan commenced, the US made more tactical demands on Pakistan including provision of air bases and deployment of US troops etc. For example, ‘Among various American objectives …[were] acquisition of military base facilities for prepositioning of RDF military equipment and material, access to air base facilities for anti-submarine surveillance aircraft, and reopening of electronic surveillance bases shut down in the mid-1960s’ (Wirsing and Roherty 1982, 596). However, once the war in Afghanistan commenced, the Pakistani state maintained a tight grip on its territorial sovereignty and internal matters. In April 1982, President Zia-ul-Haq divulged that at the time the US aid was being negotiated, he had rejected an American proposal to station troops and arms in Pakistan (NY Times 1982). Thus the fact that ‘Pakistan successfully resisted US efforts to acquire base facilities on its territory’ (Paul 1992, 1085), and the awareness amongst the US officials that ‘Islamabad’s approval of ambitious United States military projects in Pakistan would face stiff obstacles’ (Wirsing and Roherty 1982, 595), speaks emphatically of how consciously the Zia regime pursued its policy to ensure Pakistan’s sovereignty, territorial and political. Writing in 1985, Khan (1985, 96) commented that:

‘The basic objectives of the American economic aid and military sales package seem to be to build the confidence of Pakistan via its security situation and to restore the lost American leverage. America wishes to obtain leverage over Pakistan for several purposes: 1) so that it does not accept a settlement which is not in America’s global interest; 2) to dissuade Pakistan from pursuing its nuclear option; 3) to persuade Pakistan to share American perceptions of regional cooperation and India’s regional leadership role in South Asia; and possibly in the long run 4) to make Pakistani facilities available for the rapid deployment of the newly created Central Command forces in time of a crisis’.

We now know that the American idea of gaining leverage over matters that concerned Pakistan’s sovereignty and its decisions, reaped little benefit to the Americans. In the four instances mentioned by Khan (1985), none of them were realized to fruition. Pakistan did not give up its nuclear ambitions. Neither did it accept India’s regional leadership role, nor did it take any sovereign decision that clashed with its own perception of sovereignty and security, under US pressure. In retrospect, Pakistan had made its policy on cooperation with the US quite clear. As Pande (2011, 103-104) explains:
‘The Reagan administration put together a five-year $3.2 billion aid package for Pakistan. Though pleased, the Zia government put forward many conditions. Pakistan would not grant military bases to the US, it would not give up its “non-aligned status” and would not compromise on the nuclear program. The American response was that as long as Islamabad did not explode the bomb, Washington “could live” with Pakistan’s bomb. On the human rights front as well, Washington asserted it was Pakistan’s “internal matter”… On the question of US covert assistance, the Pakistanis insisted, and the Americans agreed, that the modus operandi would be that the American, the CIA, would supply arms, equipment and munitions for the mujahedeen via Pakistan’s intelligence services, the ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence’.

Pakistan’s former Foreign Secretary, Riaz Khokhar (2012), explained in an interview conducted for this thesis:

‘Pakistan-US relationship has always been unequal and a transactional one. This has been so because major powers have always had the freedom to manoeuvre in strategic situations, a luxury that lesser powers do not enjoy. However, during the War in Afghanistan, Pakistan was firmly in the driving seat and in a strong position of negotiation’.

In effect then, once the US became strategically interested in Pakistan, it sought to make Pakistan’s sovereignty conditional to Pakistan’s alliance in the War in Afghanistan and on tactical and strategic aspects of the war. In the first instance, the US failed to condition Pakistan’s sovereignty because Pakistan was more eager of US involvement in Afghanistan albeit on its own terms; terms that followed Pakistan’s security perception. In the second instance too, as we have demonstrated above, US had little influence on Pakistan’s decision-making with respect to the tactical and strategic arrangements of the war.

Indeed, as mentioned earlier, Pakistan rejected the $400 million dollar aid from US on the grounds that they were ‘peanuts’ and held all such proposals at bay until the Reagan administration took office and took due cognizance of Pakistan’s security dilemma. Even after that, Zia retained strict control of the Afghanistan situation. In an interview conducted for this thesis Tariq Fatemi, Special Assistant to the Prime Minister on Foreign Affairs and former Ambassador to the US argued that General Zia was a ‘micromanager’ (Fatemi 2012). In another interview conducted for the thesis, former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, Dr. Humayun Khan argued that ‘General Zia-ul-Haq saw to it that all matters regarding the state passed through him and American involvement in the war should be defined and their actions
restricted to that definition’ (Humayun 2012). As the ex-Director General of ISI, General Hameed Gul, reminiscing about the Cold War in his interview for this thesis, explained:

‘Indeed we were cooperating with the US in the war, but under very strictly defined rules. No American activity within Pakistan, from visits to training, went unsupervised or unchecked. We had emphasized upon the US that any and every American activity within the Pakistani state will have to be sanctioned and the permission needs to be sought from the state’.

While the US might have sought leverage over matter that were of Pakistan’s sovereign concern, for Pakistan the relationship was a ‘handshake not an embrace’ which implied ‘a readiness to cooperate on specific issues and to face together certain understood contingencies’ and which allowed the US ‘to provide some support without disturbing the recipient's own balance of interests and alternative options’ (Wriggins 1984, 296). Further as Rashid (2009, 39) reminds us: ‘Zia’s quid pro quo with the Americans was that they were not to question his domestic policies or his grip on power…As long as Zia backed the Afghan mujahedeen Reagan turned a blind eye to Pakistan’s lack of democracy, the flogging and torture, the drug trafficking by the Army and even the clandestine nuclear weapons program’. In effect then Pakistan successfully bargained to maintain its sovereignty which is evident in Thornton’s (1987, 23) observation when he argued that ‘…our ability to alter Pakistani developments, at least in any positive way, is extremely limited. The patron-client relationship belongs to a past of sad remembrances’. Thus by Thornton’s observation, Pakistan did not submit its sovereignty to the conditions that the US wished to pursue. As we have argued earlier, that the Pakistan-US alliance was based more on a quid pro quo basis rather than a patron-client relationship, hence Pakistan’s decision to join the US was a sovereign one and a transactional one. However within the transactional relationship, US attempts to have its demands met by way of leverage were also not successful as we have demonstrated above.

We can thus arrive to some deductions. Firstly, US strategic and security interests have traditionally, as we have observed, taken precedence over its more normative ideals of nuclear non-proliferation, human rights and democracy. This is remarkably evident from the change of the US posture on Pakistan once the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Secondly, Pakistan’s sovereignty during the Cold War was conditional to different sets of conditionalities. During the Carter years when the US had little to no strategic interests in
Pakistan, Pakistan’s sovereignty was conditional to its surrendering its nuclear programme, restoring democracy and improving its human rights record. However once the US strategic interests were thought to be at stake, these US normative ideals were debunked for more security specific conditions such as providing bases for US troops, accepting Indian leadership role in the region and acting as a conduit to arms to Afghan mujahedeen fighting Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

However these different sets of conditions as we have observed above have elicited different responses from the Pakistani state. In both instances, when Pakistan’s sovereignty was conditional to US norms and values and when later, it was conditional to US security interests, we have observed that Pakistan remained resilient to US pressure and pursued a course that was conducive and in harmony with its idea of sovereignty which remained embedded in a security centred definition. Thus US interference in Pakistan’s affairs, during the Carter years, did not succeed in halting Pakistan’s nuclear project neither did it work towards improving the domestic situation of Pakistan with respect to its democracy. In the Reagan years, the US ignored Pakistan’s nuclear weapons development and human rights and democracy record and initiated a huge aid programme to elicit Pakistan’s cooperation. However even in that scenario, while receiving huge sums of foreign aid, Pakistan did not deviate from upholding its sovereignty as it envisaged, and in the face of US demands kept a tight leash on its territorial and political sovereignty. Thus we can boldly assert that while the US had sought to make Pakistan’s sovereignty conditional to its needs, Pakistan nonetheless continued to move on a trajectory that sought to preserve its sovereignty successfully.

**Foreign Aid during the Reagan Years**

The war in Afghanistan thus substantially alleviated Pakistan’s concern, which was then in the grips of a dictatorial regime aggressive pursuing a nuclear goal. Moreover, it also made Pakistan one of the largest recipients of US military and civil aid, as we have observed in the previous section. Thus Pakistan became central to US Cold War strategy once again. By providing aid to Pakistan and ignoring key issues like democracy, nuclear proliferation and human rights issues, the US intended to influence Pakistan on key decision-making issues which it believed served its strategic and political interests. Such strategies of influencing decision-making processes involving assistance and patronage, during the Cold War, were
‘perceived by both the United States and the USSR as an important tool for creating dependencies, patron-client ties, and alliance relationships’ (Paul 1992, 1078). In that sense then US foreign aid was considered an effective tool by which such relationships could be constructed which would provide the US the opportunity to make sovereignty of the recipient/client/dependent states conditional to its needs. However in the case of the Pakistan-US alliance during Reagan’s era, US foreign assistance was a quid pro quo.

The Reagan Administration is known to have debunked the Carter’s administration’s policies of arm restraint, non-proliferation and human rights, by raising the issue of Afghanistan to its top most priority. While the Carter Administration had already made overtures towards Pakistan in a bid to counter the Soviet threat in Afghanistan, the Reagan Administration was more successful in enlisting Pakistan’s security apparatus by providing substantial economic and military aid, an area in which the Carter Administration remained impeded due to budgetary constraints, congressional approvals and national policies. As Paul observes:

‘To the Reagan team, countries in strategic locations needed to be supported with military and economic aid in order to deter any aggression against them by the Soviets. Rapid response to meet challenges and flexibility in policy became the key words in the administration’s arms transfer approach. Thus, in its overriding belligerent attitude toward the Soviet Union, Reagan and his team rejected Carter’s pre-December 1979 arms restraint, non-proliferation, and human rights policies. Consistent with this new permissive policy framework, Pakistan emerged as a strategically important state. The result was a manifold increase in the US. arms and economic aid to Pakistan in the 1980s and a substantial bolstering of its defense capabilities, despite the concerns expressed by some quarters on the trampling of democracy and human rights by the Zia regime and Pakistan's quest or achieving nuclear capability. By 1985, Pakistan became the fourth largest recipient of US. bilateral military assistance, behind Israel, Egypt, and Turkey. With the approval of the $4.02 billion military and economic aid package in 1987, Pakistan emerged as the second largest recipient of American aid, after Israel’ (Paul 1992, 1084).

The foreign aid to Pakistan was aimed to achieve two objectives. Firstly, it was used to elicit Pakistan’s cooperation to counter the Soviet threat in the war on Afghanistan. This purpose was achieved by using both the military and the economic aid. Secondly, it was used to bolster Pakistan’s defense capabilities to rival the Indians and hence motivate Pakistan to give up its nuclear ambition. The study of military aid does not fall in the purview of this thesis and hence will not be discussed. Economic aid which was disbursed to Pakistan had huge statebuilding ambitions and potential. As Nabi and Hamid (1990) point out in their research, between 1982 and 1987, $232.2 million were provided to Pakistan for agricultural
purposes out of which $3.2 million were provided for agricultural research, $65 million for irrigation system management, $10 million for farm water management, $120 million for agricultural commodities and equipment, and $25 million for forestry planning and development. This amount comprised 40 percent of the economic aid provided to Pakistan. For infrastructure development the US provided $185 million out of which $155 million were provided for rural electrification and $30 million for Energy planning and development. In the social sector, $86.6 million were provided under the heads of malaria control, population welfare planning and primary health care. Major increases in the aid were seen in narcotics control and PL-480 Title II (food for aid) programs. USAID assistance which remained suspended from 1980 to 1984, was initiated in 1985 in which $92 million was provided to the Pakistani state (USAID 2014). Similarly, Economic Support Fund/Security Assistance Fund was held in abeyance from 1978 to 1981 and in 1982 $205.6 million was disbursed to Pakistan under this account (Ibid).

Further a USAID paper (2002, 2) on the US-Pakistan relationship between 1982 and 1987, highlights its efforts in assisting various Pakistani developmental projects. It boasts of one fourth of US assistance to Pakistan for the energy sector which included, cooperation with the Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority to help build a new 900 megawatt power plant, providing $6 million computer system to improve the efficiency of a new power distribution wing of WAPDA by training 30,000 of its personnel, $19.3 million in equipment to WAPDA to help reduce energy losses and improve efficiency, providing $7.7 million to hydro-carbon, fuel research and industrial research centres and financing a $16.5 million for new oil and gas development and seismic equipment. It also ‘helped initiate a national energy conservation program as well as establish an energy conservation centre (ENERCON) in Islamabad. Under the Seventh Five Year Plan, USAID helped the government create an energy wing within the Ministry of Planning to coordinate Pakistan’s national energy strategy’ (USAID 2002, 2). The brochure further highlights USAID contribution in agriculture that tantamounted to nearly half of the programme’s financial volume. This included strengthening agricultural research and education by involving and establishing national agricultural institutes to enhance agricultural productivity. Beyond this ‘from 1982-87, USAID assisted Pakistan in improving 4000 kilometres of canals and waterways throughout the country, upgrading irrigation workshops in the provinces and introducing computer-aided design techniques. More than $50 million in computers, vehicles, heavy machinery, and other equipment was provided’ (Ibid).
The purpose of US foreign assistance was largely motivated by US Cold War interests and ‘realpolitik’. This becomes quite apparent once a comparative analysis is done between the Carter administration and the Reagan administration. While in the Carter administration, the US was not strategically interested in South Asia, and consequentially Pakistan, foreign aid to Pakistan was quite marginal then. However, as we have observed above, once the War in Afghanistan commenced, substantial aid flow, economic and military assistance was rendered to Pakistan. Thus it becomes evident that US fluctuating interests, in the case of Pakistan, are a determinant of its foreign assistance strategy.

Further, even Pakistan was well aware of American needs and had no illusions as to the purpose of the aid. Pakistan was well aware that the greatest impediment to receiving foreign aid was its ambition to achieve nuclear strength, whereas the US understood that securing Pakistan’s assistance in countering the Soviets in Afghanistan would not be possible until it temporarily turned a blind eye to its nuclear proliferation. As Smith argues

‘US. officials were aware of Pakistan’s incessant efforts to develop a nuclear weapon capability. As early as 1985, the US. intelligence community determined that Pakistan most likely had a “workable design for a nuclear explosive device” and was close to having the capacity to produce adequate quantities of highly enriched uranium. Normally, such discoveries would have invoked US. sanctions under Section 669 of the Foreign Assistance Act. However, Congress gave President Reagan “qualified authority to waive for a period of six years the provisions of Section 669.” Overall, the US. government determined that the imperatives of the Cold War—and of countering the Soviets in Afghanistan—outweighed US. counter-proliferation objectives’ (Smith 2011, 205).

Thus it can be argued emphatically, that US foreign aid to Pakistan was tied to a political conditionality i.e. if Pakistan supports and offers assistance to the US in countering the Soviets in Afghanistan, it will be provided with aid in the form of political and economic assistance. Had Pakistan refused, such a relationship would have been rendered quite unlikely, given the fact that when Pakistan and the US did not have a convergence of interests, there were economic and military sanctions. For example, in an interview for this thesis, Humayun Khan, a former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, (2013) argued that ‘When a state accepts aid it has to be ready to pay the price and in the case of Pakistan, the US has always given aid when its strategic interests are at heart.’ Dr. Ashfaq Hussain Khan (2013), a former economic adviser to the former Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz noted, in an interview
for this thesis, that there is ‘no such thing as benevolent foreign aid. Since aid in Pakistan has always been motivated by converging strategic interests of the US in Pakistan, by that measure alone we can infer, that aid is more transactional and political’. Riaz Khokhar (2013), another former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, in an interview for this thesis argued that, ‘aid has almost always been used as a political whip to coerce or allow some degree of leverage over political affairs that interest the US’. However on this account US foreign aid did not cut through Pakistan’s sovereignty since it was primarily Pakistan who had initiated and desired this relationship in the first place.

Foreign assistance programmes often come loaded with economic conditionalities as well. In this department as well, Pakistan seemed to be resilient to comply. There is not much data available on the economic conditionalities imposed by the US however a general reading of the literature indicates that Pakistan did not cede much of its sovereign grounds to it. For example Ayesha Khan details the travails of the population control programme during the Zia-ul-Haq regime. She argues that of the $3.2 billion US aid package, initially negotiated with Pakistan, 25.6 million had been allocated for population welfare. This allocation was made because ‘the military-security-political position of Pakistan, including the burden of a massive refugee influx, accentuates the development problem to which the proposed US economic assistance package responds’ (USAID, 1982, 7). She argues that

‘USAID was not involved during the reconceptualization of Pakistan’s population strategy, which in part explains why their own input during the 1980s did not reflect any major innovation or rethinking on their part. The $25.6 million was enhanced by another $14.4 million in 1986 to purchase additional contraceptives for the project. $45 million were further allocated during the project period, to support the Social Marketing of Contraceptives...Contraceptive supplies remained USAID’s largest input into the programme, despite USAID’s policy to add training and IEC components during the 1980s’ (Khan, 1996, 39-40).

Deriving her conclusions from the failure of the USAID programme to make any headway in the population program, she concludes that

‘The political contingencies and context of US assistance to Pakistan made this harsh verdict inevitable. Despite obvious failures in population during the 1970s, USAID was politically bound to commit large funds to Pakistan and its own mandate compelled it to prioritize population as part of development assistance. The Pakistani government knew US assistance would continue flowing in as long as the US government relied on General Zia to support their policy in Afghanistan. Those who had most control over the highest-level financial and
implementing decisions relation to Pakistan’s population programme did not believe they stood much to lose if the programme failed’ (Khan 1996, 40).

An indication of such a behaviour is also obvious in Hamid and Nabi’s observations when they argue that

‘Where sufficient resources are involved and when the government can clearly see the value of particular economic policy changes, it is willing to implement reforms. There are always, however, internal political considerations and revenue implications that the government must take into account when implementing any policy change. Reforms that adversely affect established interest groups or have broad negative political consequences are generally not undertaken despite external pressure’ (Hamid and Nabi 1990, 64).

The above data qualify certain observations. Firstly, it becomes evident that during the Cold War, US foreign assistance was dwarfed by its geostrategic consideration. The US acceptance of a dictatorial regime in Pakistan, its tolerance of Pakistan’s nuclear programme and its human rights issues, during the War in Afghanistan, lend credibility to this observation. Thus the huge inflow of aid was a US tool to condition Pakistan’s sovereignty to its own geostrategic interests. Secondly, while it might appear as if US foreign assistance had minimized in the aftermath of the 1970s, in the case of Pakistan, such a statement may not hold true, since Pakistan was recipient of one of the largest volumes of US aid packages. Thirdly, it appears that the US was more dependent on Pakistan’s support in countering the Soviet in Afghanistan than Pakistan was on US foreign aid, which allowed Pakistan to develop a more quid pro quo relationship rather than a patron-client one, and hence through that wrestle Pakistan’s sovereignty out of US diktat. Pakistan understood that till the time it was effectively countering the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, all conditionalities, political and economic, were weak and could be circumnavigated where desired. Thus Pakistan’s sovereignty stood on strong grounds and despite attracting huge amounts of foreign aid, it did not succumb to the US pressures on its sovereignty.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has provided a detailed overview of Pakistan-US relations between 1979 and 1988. The aim of the chapter was to demonstrate that the US used Pakistan’s historical
dependency on its military and economic assistance to apply conditions on Pakistan’s sovereignty, depending on the circumstances of the Pakistan-US relations. Thus when the US was not strategically interested in South Asia, and consequentially Pakistan, different sets of issues such as nuclear proliferation, democracy and human rights became conditions on Pakistan’s sovereignty and these conditions were exercised by withholding US assistance to Pakistan. However, once the US became intrinsically involved in the War in Afghanistan, more immediate strategic concerns such as troop deployment and provision of bases became conditions on Pakistan’s sovereignty since the US had provided substantial assistance. Thus the provision of foreign assistance became a tool to make Pakistan’s sovereignty conditional to US demands. Since now that the thesis has determined that US immediate strategic interests, during the Cold War, dominated other considerations such as nuclear proliferation, human rights and democracy, what needs to be seen is whether this pattern of US engagement with Pakistan continued during the Cold War. This chapter has thus provided us an empirical base to test whether the transformation of global politics after the end of the Cold War, equally transformed the nature of Pakistan-US relationship. The next chapter will thus seek to analyse Pakistan-US relationship during the War on terror.
Introduction

The War on Terror transformed the dynamics of global politics. The post-9/11 world saw debates about state failure, humanitarian intervention rise to the top of the global agenda and occupy a central position in politics-centred discursive explorations. The changing conceptual landscape of the debate on sovereignty has already started demonstrating openings into policy discourse; an example of which is the United Nation’s endorsement of the norm on the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ as devised by the ICISS (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty) (UN General Assembly 2005). It has, thus, become increasingly important to understand what role sovereignty plays in the practice of international politics under present global circumstances and whether the concept should evolve to adapt to modern political practices. This chapter aims to contribute towards a contemporary understanding on the issue of sovereignty, specifically related to Pakistan. The chapter will examine the imperatives that dictated Pakistan’s alliance with the US on the War on Terror (2001–08) and will analyse the problematique that surrounded Pakistan’s state sovereignty. It will also examine whether US policies have changed towards Pakistan, in its second alliance with Pakistan dominated by a conflictual environment in the region.

The chapter will initially provide a background to the Pakistan-US alliance on the War on Terror by analysing the political developments between the two states prior to 9/11. It will then move on to provide a detailed examination of Pakistan-US relations post-9/11, looking at the issue of Pakistan’s sovereignty through the prism of the three most important variables; nuclear proliferations, democracy and human rights, and the War on Terror itself. This chapter analyses the imperatives of American foreign policy that have forged this alliance with Pakistan on the War on Terror. Finally, within Pakistan, sovereignty has become increasingly important in the context of Pakistan-US relationship. The primary investigation in this chapter will, thus, be a detailed exploration of the conceptual and political landscape of Pakistan’s sovereignty in the War on Terror during the Bush era (2001-08). The chapter is organized under four main sections. The first section provides the background of the
Pakistan-US relations before the advent of the War on Terror. The second section deals with Pakistan-US interactions from 1999 to 2008 and discusses major issues such as democracy, human rights, nuclear proliferation, and Pakistan’s conduct in the War on Terror and US foreign aid. The third section explores Pakistan’s response to US policies and how the Pakistani elites have viewed the role of US in Pakistan’s politics. The last section provides an in-depth analysis of how Pakistan’s state failure is perceived internationally and juxtaposes it with Pakistani elites’ perceptions on the issue.

Pakistan – US Relations before the War on Terror

The Cold War in Afghanistan ended with the pull-out of Soviet troops which later culminated in the dissolution of the USSR in 1991. Since Pakistan had fulfilled its strategic role, which was to assist the US in checking the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, the US left the region leaving Afghanistan and Pakistan to their own device. Since US strategic interests in the region had diminished considerably, as a consequence Pakistan’s nuclear activities became a major issue for the US again during the 1990s. Throughout the 1990s Pakistan remained under sanctions of one type or another. These sanctions were invoked by US law on nuclear proliferation pertaining to US foreign assistance. The first of these laws was the Pressler amendment, passed in 1985 which had been added to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 which required the President of the US to certify that ‘Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device and that the proposed United States military assistance program will reduce significantly the risk that Pakistan will possess a nuclear explosive device’ (Congress 2010, 348). From 1981 to 1990 i.e. the time period spanning US involvement in Afghanistan, the US Presidents, Reagan and Bush, had issued determinations that Pakistan was not involved in building a nuclear bomb. However in 1991, President Bush did not issue the determination which was a prerequisite for making US assistance available to Pakistan. Thus, through the Pressler amendment, the US levied sanctions and withheld US foreign assistance to Pakistan.

This remained the practice throughout the 1990s and President Bush later succeeded by President Clinton continued denying Pakistan the certification. Later, in 1995, the Pressler amendment was changed by, popularly known as Brown amendment, ‘struck out “No

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assistance”, and inserted in lieu thereof “No military assistance” (Ibid, 346)\(^3\) and thus made the country eligible for other non-military assistance. Politically, during the 1990s, the pressures on Pakistan were largely of a nuclear nature. The US was adamant to curb Pakistan’s nuclear efforts. During this time, the region on a whole fell out of the US priorities, and due to its diminished strategic importance, when it came to Pakistan, the focal point of US efforts was on Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions.

A pattern thus is quite observable in the Cold War and the post-Cold War era. As we have observed in the previous chapter, during the Carter administration’s years, the US was not strategically interested in Pakistan and hence the US was less willing to compromise in areas of disagreement since strategic interest in Pakistan was quite limited. For this reason, Pakistan was subjected to sanctions resulting from its nuclear activities. Similarly after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the US priorities shifted away from the region and Pakistan. Consequently, Pakistan once again suffered sanctions for its nuclear programme. Thus Pakistan’s nuclear programme continued to remain a thorn in Pakistan-US relations even though the dissolution of the Soviet Union is said to have ushered in a new era of global order.

The situation worsened in 1998. On 11\(^{th}\) May 1998, India conducted a series of contained nuclear tests. This was the first time since India had carried out such test in 1974. Immediately, there was condemnation from Pakistan. The Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif, responded that: ‘As a sovereign and independent nation, Pakistan will make its own decision on the steps to be taken towards its sovereignty and defence’ (BBC News 1998, 1). Since Pakistan’s central sovereign concerns, with regards to its security, had always been Indian-centric, the US was well aware of the dilemma the Pakistani state was caught in. President Clinton made several urgent appeals, even till the last hours before the test, to dissuade Pakistan from a quid pro quo reaction. These appeals included incentives of resumption of economic and military aid and other financial assistances ‘that would give Pakistan the sense that it can forgo tests and still feel secure’ (Enda 1998). However at the same time, US officials were also sceptical and wary of the ambiguities in the financial assistance arrangement they had offered. This was because, any demands that Pakistan would

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\(^3\) In sub-subsection (e)(1) of Section 620 E Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87–195), Section 559(a)(1)(A) of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1996 (Public Law 104–107; 110 Stat. 743), struck out “No assistance”, and inserted in lieu thereof “No military assistance”. This is popularly referred to as the Brown amendment.
table, required congressional approval. Further, the US had immediately levied sanctions on India after its nuclear test. President Clinton impressed upon Pakistan, that were it to go the nuclear route, it would face similar sanctions which might harm Pakistan more than India due to Pakistan’s much dependence on US foreign assistance. Pakistan however argued back that India was ‘not suffering enough for its transgressions’ (Ibid). Pakistan was adamant that the major powers had failed to ‘follow Clinton's lead and endorse more widespread sanctions’ (Ibid). Eventually, Pakistan conducted its nuclear explosions on the 28th of May 1998, to the chagrin of the global community. Thus ‘By going ahead with the tests, [Pakistan] turned its back on a broad package of American military and economic assistance Mr. Clinton had offered if Pakistan held off” (Burns 1998, 1).

This incident demonstrated two things: Firstly, it demonstrated that in the face of Indian actions, Pakistan’s security centric definition of sovereignty continued to dominate its actions notwithstanding the repercussions that might ensue, due to the reservations of major Western powers. Secondly, it demonstrated that even though the appeal of military and economic assistance have largely been the reason of a Pakistan-US alliance, it turned its back to the US proposals once it found Indian actions to be threatening towards it security. This development again bears a stark resemblance of the Zia regime as the thesis had observed in the previous chapter, albeit in a different context. For example the thesis observed that when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, the Carter administration had offered $400 million to Pakistan in a bid to secure its alliance against the Soviet Union. However, Pakistan declined the offer since it was deemed inadequate in meeting its security requirements. Similarly here when the US offered assistance to Pakistan and threatened sanctions if Pakistan continued on by detonating a nuclear device, Pakistan declined the US offer because it found it more imperative to test its nuclear device. In both situations, Pakistan retained control over its sovereign decision-making process against US pressures.

As if Pakistan’s compounding problems and its already strained relationship with the US was not enough, General Pervez Musharraf orchestrated a coup on the 12th October 1999 which deposed the democratic government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and thus in doing so touched another nerve with the US i.e. on democracy and human rights. In 2000 President Bill Clinton visited India on a five day tour which was accompanied by a ‘decision to lift sanctions against 51 companies and agencies involved in weapons programs’ (Lelyveld 2000, 1) and further declaring the initiation of ‘a closer and qualitatively new relationship between
India and the United States' (Ibid). However the US relations with Pakistan remained cold, the nature of which was starkly evident in the President's five hours visit to Pakistan. Thus as Leylveld (Ibid) noted: 'the United States appears to have changed its position since the nuclear crisis. After favouring Pakistan for years, it now smiles on India'. For Pakistan this was another blow since American tilt towards India was seen immensely unfavourably due to the nature of Pakistan-India relations. US disappointment with Pakistan’s nuclear development and poor democratic record had translated into a US-India strategic partnership since the US believed that India was not only a regional power and a bigger economic market but also because it had a thriving democracy. Further, terrorism had only recently come to light after the Cold war had ended. Pakistan was seen as a hotbed of transnational terrorism because of the presence of elements of the al-Qaeda network and many other indigenous organisations that were purported to spread terrorism in Kashmir in the name of jihad. Thus, in obvious conformity to the pattern of Pakistan-US relations, when the US was not strategically interested in the region, it favoured a tilt towards India, as we had seen earlier during the Carter administration. Further, in such a scenario, US demands on Pakistan’s democracy and human rights became the focus of Pakistan-US relation. The relationship turned sour again owing to Pakistan’s poor democratic record and the presence of a dictatorial regime, another pattern of interaction that conforms to the past. In an interview Pakistan’s former Permanent Representative to the UN Environment Programme, Shafqat Kakakhel (2012) revealed that ‘Before 9/11, Musharraf was not looked upon favourably. Once on his way to the United Nations General Assembly, he wished to stopover in Paris, but the French refused. Further, the EU decided not to accept any retired generals as ambassadors. From there to after 9/11, there was a qualitative change in the Western powers’ behaviour. After 9/11, President Chirac welcomed him once he came to France’.

Here again, it is prudent to note the similarities in the US relations with the dictatorial regimes of General Zia-ul-Haq and General Musharraf. During the early years of both dictatorship, US was strategically uninterested in Pakistan, thus in both eras what is quite noticeable, is the US favourable tilt towards India and its conditions on Pakistan’s sovereignty with regards to its democratic record and human rights. In both instances, the dictatorial regimes were, in their initial years, internationally isolated and distanced by the US.
The events in the early years of General Musharraf’s regime, before 9/11, are quite similar to those of General Zia, before the US got strategically involved in the region to roll out the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, as we have demonstrated in the previous chapter. In this time period as in General Zia’s early years, the US was not strategically interested in an alliance with Pakistan. Similarly, in both time periods that noted a US disinterest in Pakistan, the US is seen to favourably tilt towards India and at the same time distance itself from Pakistan due to Pakistan’s non-compliance to US values. Thus in both eras, the US disinterest and its distancing itself from Pakistan was followed by applying conditions on Pakistan’s sovereignty, the non-compliance of which resulted in withholding of US assistance to Pakistan. Another observation that requires mentioning is Pakistan’s India centric security. The mere fact that Pakistan chose to ignore US incentives and continued on with controlled nuclear explosions in response to Indian nuclear tests, demonstrates that the state places a higher premium on its security than US assistance. As we had argued earlier in chapter 2, Pakistan had always sought a US alliance for the purpose of countering Indian hegemony in the region and to build a military parity should its existence ever be threatened by India. However with the US favourably tilted towards India, Pakistan conducted its nuclear tests to challenge the hegemony in India with or without the US.

US disinterest in Pakistan is further evident from its minimal foreign assistance to Pakistan during General Musharraf’s early years. As we have observed earlier, by the time General Pervez Musharraf came into power on the 12th October 1999, most of the sanctions on US economic assistance to Pakistan, that were in place due to Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions, had been waived off. This was owing to a one year congressional waiver authority issued to President Clinton. However when General Musharraf took over power, a new set of sanctions were placed on Pakistan owing to the presence of a dictatorial regime in Pakistan. On the 25th October 1999, through the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2000, Congress provided permanent waiver authority to the President of the United States (Congress 2010, 347). The law read that

‘(A) it is the sense of the Congress that the broad application of export controls to nearly 300 Indian and Pakistani entities is inconsistent with the specific national security interests of the United States and that this control list requires refinement; and
(B) export controls should be applied only to those Indian and Pakistani entities that make direct and material contributions to weapons of mass destruction and missile programs and only to those items that can contribute to such programs.’

The President of the US was, hence, provided the authority ‘to waive all the economic sanctions imposed against India and Pakistan in response to the nuclear tests, including for the first time those sanctions related to military assistance, USML licenses, and exports to high technology entities’ (Rennack 2003, 3). This waiver against India and Pakistan could only be provided if the President of the United States determined and certified that ‘that the application of the restriction would not be in the national security interests of the United States’ (Ibid). While the sanctions were completely removed off India, however Pakistan continued to remain ‘ineligible for most forms of US foreign assistance under a provision of the annual foreign assistance appropriations act’ that banned foreign assistance to any state whose democratically elected head of government was deposed by military coup or decree (Ibid, 4). In 1999, the total aid received by Pakistan was $106.4 million, out of which a major portion of $90.8 million was allocated for food programmes (USAID 2014). This was because, immediately after the impositions of the sanctions following the detonation of nuclear devices, the ‘Congress intervened on behalf of US wheat growers by passing the Agriculture Export Relief Act, which President Clinton signed into law on July 14, 1998. The Act amended the Arms Export Control Act to exempt various forms of US Department of Agriculture-backed financial support from sanctions applied pursuant to section 102 of that Act. This freed up US wheat farmers to participate in early summer auctions in which Pakistan was a substantial buyer’ (Rennack 2003, 3). Thus the aid provided to Pakistan was not as altruistic as it seemed. In 1999, owing to General Pervez Musharraf’s military coup the financial assistance to Pakistan dropped to $29.1 million only to rise significantly to $221.7 million in 2001 (USAID 2014). This time, the substantial portion of the assistance provided to Pakistan, was under the heads of narcotics control ($95.5 million) and other food aid programmes ($91.9 million) (Ibid).

This pattern of US foreign assistance also remains consistent with Pakistan’s previous experience in General Zia’s initial years. US assistance had been conditional, then, on Pakistan’s acquiescing to US non-proliferation policy, however this time around, it was conditional to democracy and human rights. The data above demonstrates that when the US is strategically uninterested in the region, its foreign aid to Pakistan is minimal which is evident
from the low aid flow during the initial years of Musharraf. The withholding of foreign aid was an effort by the US to pressure Pakistan on the issue of democracy and human rights. Thus we can argue that the withholding of aid, and the dependence that Pakistan has had historically on it for its economic and military growth, was a measure by the US to condition Pakistan’s sovereignty to its demands on democracy and human rights.

Some observations have come to fore. Firstly, when the US is strategically disinterested in the region and hence Pakistan, it applies conditions on Pakistan’s sovereignty on matters such as nuclear proliferation, democracy and human rights. Secondly these conditions are applied by withholding US assistance and consequentially, halting US foreign aid to Pakistan, on which as we have observed previously Pakistan has remained historically dependent. Thirdly, when the US is disinterested in Pakistan, a favourable tilt towards India is quite obvious. This puts pressures on Pakistan’s sovereignty indirectly since Pakistan’s sovereignty and security has historically been India centric as we have observed in previous chapters. Fourthly, on matters concerning Pakistan’s nuclear activities, Pakistan has defended its sovereignty as its nuclear capability has occupied a centrality in its security centric definition of sovereignty. Lastly, in the face of US interventions into its sovereign matters, Pakistan remained resilient in defending its sovereignty.

The War on Terror and US

President General Pervez Musharraf took over the government through a military coup d'état on 12th October, 1999. The US and the Western powers were swift in their condemnation of the coup. US President Bill Clinton condemned the act and argued that ‘Pakistan's interest would be served by a prompt return to civilian rule and restoration of the democratic process. I urge that Pakistan move quickly in that direction’ (BBC World 1999, 1). He urged Pakistan's military leaders to return the country to civilian democratic rule. The US State Department spokesman James Rubin posited that: ‘Clearly, we would not be in a position to carry on business as usual with Pakistani authorities consistent with our laws’ (Rubin 1999, 1). The US Ambassador to Pakistan signalled that the United States will give the new military government time to prove its Democratic intentions. He stated that: ‘We are confident General Musharraf is a moderate man who was acting out of patriotic motivation and was provoked into doing what he is doing’ (Butler, 1999, 1). While James Foley, US State
Department Spokesman, indicated that ‘the jury is still out in terms of the ultimate intentions of the military authorities in Pakistan. They've indicated, again, that they don't intend to stay in charge for longer than is necessary, and that they want to see a return to democratic government’ (Foley 1999, 1). However, the response of the other Western powers was harsh.

‘The European Union was quick to react to the takeover. It issued a statement calling for the return of civilian rule, and suspended the signing of a partnership agreement with Pakistan. Current EU president Finland said: "The EU can in no circumstances approve extra-constitutional and non-democratic means in any country and therefore urges the Pakistani military to respect democracy and the parliamentary process."

The Commonwealth - a grouping of former British territories - warned that it may suspend Pakistan if the military does not hand over power quickly. Secretary-General Emeka Anyaoku said that what had happened "flies in the face" of democracy and "isolates the Pakistani regime”’ (BBC 1999, 1).

The Foreign Secretary of United Kingdom, ‘Mr. Cook said he was ‘deeply worried’ by the situation but added that, ‘the military there must be under no illusion: we will strongly condemn any unconstitutional actions’ (BBC News 1999, 1). Thus the response of the Western powers to Pakistan’s non-compliance to global normative values of democracy and human rights was harsher than the US response which was more weighed and calculated, however despite the weighed US response, Pakistan was still subjected to sanctions on US assistance programmes.

These condemnations were subsequently followed by actions against Pakistan. Pakistan was subjected to sanctions and remained ‘ineligible for most forms of US. foreign assistance under a provision of the annual foreign assistance appropriations act that bans foreign assistance “to any country whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup or decree… foreign operations appropriations act requires that the President determines and certifies to Congress that a democratically elected government has taken office before aid can be restore”’(Rennack 2001 4). This was followed by Commonwealth’s decision to suspend Pakistan’s membership and the EU’s shelving of plans on cooperation, which cornered Pakistan into international isolation that remained in place till the event of 9/11.

Thus the international pressure by the global community and the US severely isolated Pakistan and made it a pariah state amongst states. The pressure on Pakistan by the Western powers, which not only included official statements but were subsequently followed by actions such as sanctions and suspension of memberships to international organizations,
demonstrate that the US was not alone in condemning Pakistan’s dictatorial regime. Thus Pakistan’s sovereignty became conditional to not only the US demands on the restoration of democracy but also to the demand of the Western powers. This reaction of the Western powers, to the military coup demonstrated their international commitment to global normative values of democracy and human rights. However, to what extent was this condition on Pakistan’s sovereignty followed through became evident after the commencement of the War on Terror.

The War on Terror initiated a complete about turn in the US and the Western powers’ interaction with Pakistan. The US rescheduled Pakistan’s debt, waived off its sanctions by enacting new legislation, and resumed a substantial aid package. The EU resumed its talks with Pakistan on trade and other important bilateral issues whereas the Commonwealth resumed Pakistan’s membership. Don McKinnon, Secretary General of the Commonwealth argued that the judgment on Pakistan’s renewal of Commonwealth membership was based on ‘the country’s democratic credentials and value of its democratic institutions’ (The Telegraph 2004). Until the second coup d’état of General Musharraf, when he imposed emergency on the 3rd November, 2007, the US and the Western powers had looked favourably towards Pakistan’s dictatorship. They observed that the regime was making progress towards consolidating democracy, yet not once challenging the regime in the midst. The inhibitions of the western community, especially the US, with regards to Pakistan’s dictatorial regime which clearly cut through Pakistan’s sovereignty, seemed to have the opposite effect when geostrategic stakes rose higher. Thus Musharraf’s actions within Pakistan, with regards, to the nuclear issue, democracy or human rights, were vocally opined as matters of Pakistan’s sovereign concerns. Though Musharraf’s second coup reignited the debate on democracy, but as Senator Robert Menendez noted in a Committee on Foreign Relations hearing, even then President Bush didn’t ‘think that President Musharraf crossed the line on November 3, when he instituted emergency rule and then simultaneously arrested thousands of political opposition figures, human rights activists and lawyers. President Bush even characterized Musharraf as someone who truly believes in democracy’ (Committee on Foreign Relations 2007, 2). The major concern of the US, when dealing with Pakistan during General Musharraf’s regime, was to not provoke Pakistan in a manner that might elicit a response detrimental to US efforts in the War on Terror. However the conduct of the War on Terror was a different issue.
One of the reason why the Western states also stood behind the dictatorial regime in Islamabad was because, as allies to the US, they were now directly involved in Afghanistan under the banner of the NATO-ISAF coalition. Following the events of 9/11, ‘the first ever by a NATO Secretary General to the EU Foreign Ministers Council’ took place and unanimously invoked ‘Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty – the self-defence clause: An attack on one state to be considered as an attack on all then 19 NATO countries’ (Robertson 2011). On the other hand a ‘coalition of the willing’ termed ISAF (International Security Assistance Force), mandated by the UN emerged after the Bonn Conference in December 2001 (The Henry L. Stimson Center 2002). The coalition of 19 Western states was initially led by UK and Turkey before NATO assumed command of ISAF in August 2003 (NATO 2015). The ISAF contributing countries included Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Spain, and Sweden (The Henry L. Stimson Center 2002). What remains remarkably evident then, is that a significant proportion of the force drew its pool from European countries and the US. Thus this made developments in Pakistan significant to Western concerns. Firstly, because Pakistan’s assistance in curbing terrorism, which now emerged as a significant threat to these states, was vital; and secondly, since the Western states now had their forces on the ground battling the Taliban, Pakistan’s assistance in battling these Taliban became a vital strategic concern. This development might explain why the Western states lifted the pressure on Pakistan’s sovereignty with regards to its nuclear ambitions, human rights and it dictatorial regime.

While Pakistan’s sovereignty remained preserved with respect to its nuclear status and the presence of a dictatorial regime, Pakistan’s dubious contribution to the War on Terror brought to fore serious debates on Pakistan’s sovereignty issues, to an extent that they started affecting all other issues indirectly, which had been ignored or tolerated by the US otherwise. These issues included Pakistan’s objections to UAV (drone) attacks within its territory, its inability to halt cross border movements of Taliban and Al-Qaeda members into Afghanistan and its inefficiency to apprehend them within its own territory. Issues like these prompted Senator Menendez to enquire ‘So here’s the first question. Are we getting the most bang for our buck? What happens if Pervez Musharraf is suddenly no longer the leader of Pakistan? Have we put too much emphasis on individuals at the expense of institutions?’ (Ibid, 3). All this because, he argues, that ‘the United States has provided about $10 billion in financial assistance to Pakistan since 2001. In spite of that $10 billion, al-Qaeda and the Taliban have a
safe haven in the FATA region. Osama bin Laden is still on the loose in the region. Anti-Americanism remains high and Pakistan’s President has repeatedly exercised the powers of a dictator’ (Ibid 1). Thus the frustration of the US was clearly with General Musharraf’s inability to come up to their expectation in providing them services whereas Musharraf’s dictatorial mandate was a lower priority tolerated because of his unconditional support in the War on Terror.

It is obvious then that the US pursuit of democratization in Pakistan was subservient to its strategic interest which was the War on Terror. Similarly, while the US and the Western powers equally condemned the dictatorial regime in Pakistan, as we have observed earlier, once the War on Terror commenced, all reservations with regards to Pakistan’s dictatorial regime subsided. Not only did the US nurture better ties with the regime of General Musharraf, even the other Western powers rolled back their sanctions and fostered cordial ties with the dictatorial regime. This demonstrates that in upholding global normative values such as democracy and human rights, the Western powers are led by the US. While, when the US is disinterested in the region, the response of the Western powers may be independent of US influence, as demonstrated by their harsh response to Pakistan’s dictatorial regime as compared to the US’ more measured response, however when the US strategic interests are at stake, it deeply influences their response as we have observed after the turn of events on 9/11.

Another of the main issues of contention between the US and Pakistan, to date, has been Pakistan’s insistence on the right to nuclear technology for its security purpose. While various legislations were enacted by the US administration to control the global spread of nuclear proliferation, in the case of Pakistan, the failure of sanctions to reach that objective was evidenced when Pakistan tested its nuclear capability on the 28th May, 1998. However, though the Pakistan nuclear tests brought upon it the ire of the Western powers and the US, the move towards sanctions were as hasty as they were in their withdrawal in the subsequent months. A report for Congress observed that:

‘The reaction of the President and Congress appeared to reflect several factors, including a decline in the belief of the efficacy of sanctions once the tests were a fait accompli, efforts by US. agricultural interests to prevent a loss of markets, and the rising influence of the India caucus in Congress. Legislation passed in July 1998 made Pakistan eligible for agricultural export credits to buy US. winter wheat, while legislation signed into law in October that year, “The India and Pakistan Relief Act,” gave the President the authority to waive various
economic sanctions for one year. Later in October 1998 Congress made this authority permanent and also extended it, with conditions, to include military assistance, foreign military sales credits, and exports to high technology entities, in the FY2000 Department of Defense appropriation. India was able to take advantage of many of these relaxations of sanctions but Pakistan remained ineligible for most US assistance on two other grounds: General Musharraf’s October 1999 military coup; and the fact that Pakistan had fallen into arrears in its debt repayments to the United States’ (Cronin et al. 2005, 2).

These sanctions remained much in place throughout 2000 and even later, while the US kept looking favourably towards India. ‘Throughout the first eight months of 2001, the Bush administration had hinted that the United States would like to remove the sanctions imposed against India and, to a lesser extent, Pakistan’(Rennack 2001, 3). This was detrimental to Pakistan, whose security was Indian-centric. However, before the War on Terror, it was not the nuclear issue but Pakistan’s dictatorial regime that became a source of contention between the two countries. Immediately after 9/11, the US in a continuation of its consistent pattern of interaction with Pakistan, not only waived off sanctions but also elicited Pakistan’s dictatorial regime’s cooperation in the War on Terror. Thus, for Pakistan, 9/11 brought a decade long wanted relief. Once Pakistan agreed on US demands, all issues of proliferation and those warranting sanctions were swept under the rug. But Pakistan’s nuclear ailment refused to go away.

In January 2004, evidence began to accumulate of a vast nuclear proliferation network. Allegedly, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the “father of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb” (Fair 2010b), was said to have sold nuclear secrets to countries like Libya, Iran and North Korea (Rashid & LaGuardia 2004). Earlier in January 2004, US Secretary of State Colin Powell briefed the press that ‘American officials have presented evidence to Pakistan's leaders of Pakistani involvement in the spread of nuclear weapons technology’ (Murphy 2004). This was exactly the kind of scenario that the US had wanted to avoid. However while earlier, just the mere assumption that Pakistan was developing and enhancing its nuclear arsenal, had brought legislation after legislation, and condemnation at its doorsteps, this time around the US was unvocal on the issue. Kupfer (2004, 3) observed that ‘despite the high stakes involved in the scandal, the Bush administration has been very protective of the Musharraf government’. For example, at a hearing of the House Committee on International Relations at the end of March, John Bolton, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security (US House Committee on International Relations 2004), stated that
‘based on the information we have now, we believe that the proliferation activities that Mr. Khan confessed to recently -- his activities in Libya, in Iran and North Korea, and perhaps elsewhere -- were activities that he was carrying on without the approval of the top levels of the government of Pakistan. That is the position that President Musharraf has taken, and we have no evidence to the contrary...We have not asked for access to Mr. Khan, nor do we think we should’.

A Congressional Research Service Report to Congress (Cronin, Kronstadt and Squassoni 2005, 30) chronicles in greater detail the response of the US government on Pakistan’s proliferation episode.

‘The Bush Administration has maintained that “there was no evidence that the top officials of the Pakistani government were complicit in or approved of [Khan’s] proliferation activities.” The Bush Administration has found insufficient evidence to trigger US. nonproliferation laws, even though US. officials claim neither to have asked for access to Khan nor believed that such access was necessary. Some senior US. officials have insisted that the United States is receiving the cooperation it needs from Pakistan, but in testimony to Congress on April 29, 2004, then-Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage said that the Administration was “impatient for even greater efforts from President Musharraf.” In a feature article on December 26, 2004, the New York Times reported that the Administration had received little new information from Pakistan to its questions about where Khan obtained the plans for a nuclear weapon. The article also maintained, based on unnamed sources that the Administration had not gained access to his chief assistant, Buhari Sayed Abu Tahir, who has been jailed in Malaysia as a consequence of the discovery of Khan’s network’.

Apparently, it thus seems that the US considered the issue of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan’s nuclear network an internal matter of Pakistan and thus did not put any pressures on Pakistan’s sovereignty neither did it infringe upon it in any manner. This time around, there were no legislations, no sanctions and no international condemnation of the state to conform to US ideals and its strategic interest in non-proliferation. The Pakistani state took minimalistic action on Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan by putting him under house arrest, having him confess for his crimes and the entire matter was dealt by the state alone. Condoleezza Rice, in her nomination hearing for the Secretary of State in front of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, argued that: ‘This is a matter that's being handled by the Pakistanis. It is not our place to talk about what should or should not happen with the IAEA, and we have not’ (Rice 2005a, 150). However, recent evidence suggests that this might not have been the case. The IAEA was indeed pressured by the US administration but it was not against Pakistan but rather in favour of it. For example Collin and Frantz (Frantz & Collins 2007, 13) argues that
What is less well known is that national interests similar to those that tied Pakistan’s hands in dealing forcefully with the architect of the world’s most dangerous proliferation ring hampered the ability of prosecutors in other countries to go after other participants in Khan’s network. In January 2009, a Swiss parliamentary commission made public a fifty-eight-page report that described the way in which the American government had applied pressure to the Swiss government to destroy evidence collected from three Swiss citizens who were participants in the Khan network. The report, which received limited publicity outside Switzerland, recounted numerous specific instances over a period of nearly four years in which the administration of President George W. Bush intervened at the highest levels of the Swiss government to block efforts by the Swiss police to prosecute the three Swiss men -- Friedrich Tinner and his sons, Marco and Urs Tinner -- and possibly to prosecute agents of the Central Intelligence Agency who had recruited the Tinners to spy for the United States. The parliamentary commission concluded that the Swiss government had bowed to US pressure and destroyed material that was relevant to an ongoing criminal inquiry.

Clearly, the US War on Terror had taken precedence over its non-proliferation policy. In addition it is also apparent from Frantz’s findings that US national interest can easily trump more global requirements. It had become more important to secure the Pakistani state’s assistance in the War on Terror which compelled the US to forfeit its non-proliferation interests. So much so that the US acquiesce to Pakistan’s stance on the Dr. Qadeer Khan issue tantamounted to a tacit recognition of Pakistan as a sovereign nuclear state that could hold up to its own, a luxury that had been denied earlier. The Dr. Khan issue is not only a signpost in how the US can backtrack on its global commitments when it comes to US national interests but gains much more importance when considering its commitment to strengthening global institutions to solve global problems.

The issue of Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation highlights the fact that when the US is strategically interested in an alliance with Pakistan, as was the case during the War on Terror, in that case its values such as nuclear proliferation hold minimal value. Conditions which were previously seen to be detrimental and were exacted to curb Pakistan’s sovereignty, are replaced by more strategic concerns. Even the international organisations, as in the case of IAEA, remain powerless and toothless in the face of US intentions. This pattern bears resemblance, to similar patterns observed in the previous chapter on General Zia-ul-Haq’s regime. In both instances then, when the US was disinterested in the region, Pakistan was subjected to sanctions resulting from its nuclear activity. However once the US got involved in the region, whether it be in the War in Afghanistan or the War on Terror, conditions on Pakistan’s sovereignty with respect to its nuclear programme were relaxed. Further as we had
also observed earlier, these conditions on Pakistan’s sovereignty with respect to its nuclear programme, democracy and human rights were replaced by more immediate and strategic concerns, the fulfilment of which then became the conditions on Pakistan’s sovereignty. In the case of General Musharraf, the conditions on Pakistan’s sovereignty owed to its conduct in the War on Terror.

The War on Terror brought the dictatorial regime of General Musharraf out of ignominy and raised his international profile. It was Pakistan’s conduct in the War on Terror that increasingly witnessed the US pressures on Pakistan’s sovereignty, rather than the issue of democracy, human rights or nuclear proliferation.

As Gude (2005, 69) observed:

‘Musharraf’s support for the United States after the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent US military action in Afghanistan, however, have served him favourably, wiping away more than a decade of economic and political sanctions. The administration of George W. Bush waived all economic sanctions imposed on both Pakistan and India after their nuclear tests, rushed through an aid package to Pakistan of nearly $600 million, pressed the World Bank and the IMF to grant some relief on Pakistan’s $37 billion debt, waived most military sanctions imposed because of Pakistan’s nuclear program and missile technology purchases from China and allowed remaining sanctions to expire in November 2002. A new aid package made Pakistan the third largest recipient of American assistance behind Israel and Egypt. Britain followed suit, as did the European Union, which boosted its aid package, and the European Commission, which passed trade concessions worth nearly $1.35 billion’.

What remains particularly noteworthy is how not only the US, but the Western powers and the international financial institutions reversed their policy decisions on Pakistan, once Pakistan gained geostrategic important for the US. With such high returns to Pakistan’s cooperation in the War on Terror, it was natural that it had to bear the burden of heightened expectations. Thus, the War on Terror raised issues of sovereignty on various occasion. The most important issues were firstly, Pakistan’s acquiescence to US cooperation on the War on Terror; secondly, US dissatisfaction with Pakistan’s progress in halting cross-border infiltration; thirdly, Pakistan’s reluctance to clamp down militarily on the Taliban and Al-Qaeda elements in the ungoverned tribal areas bordering Afghanistan and lastly, UAV drone attacks within Pakistan’s territory.
The first condition on Pakistan’s sovereignty came on the eve of 9/11. Given Pakistan’s engagement and relationship with the Taliban during the 1990s, it didn’t come as a surprise that it had tried hard to bring the Taliban to the negotiation tables with the US. However 9/11 changed all that. Recent declassified documents recorded a meeting between the US ambassador and General Musharraf, in which the Ambassador emphasizes upon the General that ‘the September 11 attacks had changed the fundamentals of the debate. There was no inclination in Washington to engage in a dialog with the Taliban. Pakistan needed to act with the United States –not to urge dialog but to act’ (Appendix X). On the same day the US Deputy Secretary Richard Armitage met with the ISI Chief General Mahmoud Ahmed in which he reiterated the US position that ‘Pakistan must either stand with the United States in its fight against terrorism or stand against us. There was no manoeuvring room. This was a black and white choice, with no grey’ (Appendix XI). On September 14th, 2001, Armitage put forward ‘the actions and support expected of Pakistan in fight against terrorism’ (Appendix XII). These were;

‘1) Stop al-Qaida operatives at your border, intercept arms shipments through Pakistan and end all logistical support for bin Ladin; 2) Provide the US. with blanket overflight and landing rights to conduct all necessary military and intelligence operations; 3) Provide as needed territorial access to US. and allied military intelligence, and other personnel to conduct all necessary operations against the perpetrators of terrorism or those that harbor them, including use of Pakistan's naval ports, airbases and strategic locations on borders; 4) Provide the US. immediately with intelligence, [EXCISED] information, to help prevent and respond to terrorist acts perpetrated against the US., its friends and allies; 5) Continue to publicly condemn the terrorist acts of September11 and any other terrorist acts against the US. or its friends and allies [EXCISED]; 6) Cut off all shipments of fuel to the Taliban and any other items and recruits, including volunteers en route to Afghanistan that can be used in a military offensive capacity or to abet the terrorist threat; 7) Should the evidence strongly implicate Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda network in Afghanistan and should Afghanistan and the Taliban continue to harbor him and this network, Pakistan will break diplomatic relations with the Taliban government, end support for the Taliban and assist us in the formentioned ways to destroy Usama bin Ladin’.

The same documents chronicle Pakistan’s response to the demands put forward by the US. The Pakistan ISI chief assured Undersecretary of State, Richard Armitage that the US ‘could count on Pakistan’s unqualified support’ (Ibid). On 14th September, 2001, US Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin informed the State Department that ‘in a 90-minute meeting with the ambassador and the Polcounselor late September 14, Musharraf said he had studied the points and discussed them in an all-day meeting with his Corps Commanders and other ranking military officers. He said he accepted the points without conditions and that his military
leadership concurred’ (Appendix XIII). Given Pakistan’s unconditional acceptance of US demands, and the circumstances that surrounded them, it is understandable why commentators and analysts might argue that Pakistan ceded sovereign grounds to the US by agreeing to cooperate with the US in the War on Terror. However, now ‘it is largely assumed that Islamabad over the past decade has taken the "grey" approach Armitage steadfastly denies as a potential position’ (The National Security Archive 2011). As the War on Terror progressed, the increase in the US’ frustration with Pakistan became increasingly evident.

While the first condition on Pakistan’s sovereignty came when it was forced to acquiesce to US demands on the eve of 9/11, the next phase of US conditions on Pakistan’s sovereignty was with regards to Pakistan’s conduct in the War on Terror. Despite various arrests of Taliban and Al-Qaeda operatives and successive military operations in the tribal areas of Pakistan which resulted in military casualties that numbered in hundreds, the US still found Pakistan’s efforts inadequate and insufficient in containing the Taliban and al-Qaeda. ‘In February 2007, Vice President Cheney and the Deputy Director of the CIA, Steve Kappes, made an unannounced four-hour visit to Islamabad, where they reportedly warned President Musharraf that a Democratic-controlled Congress could cut US. aid to Pakistan unless that country takes more aggressive action to hunt down Al Qaeda and Taliban operatives on its soil’(Kronstadt 2008, 38). The US, ‘expressed dismay at the slow pace of progress in capturing wanted fugitives in Pakistan and urge Islamabad to do more to secure its rugged western border area. US government officials voiced similar worries, even expressing concern that elements of Pakistan’s intelligence agency might be assisting members of the Taliban’ (Ibid, 40). What the US wanted was Pakistan’s use of its complete resources to assist the US, notwithstanding its own political compulsions. As Kennedy notes: ‘previous governments in Pakistan, including Musharraf’s prior to 2004, have been exceedingly reluctant to interfere in the affairs of the tribal agencies. However, the US. government has long been concerned about the sanctuary provided to the Taliban and foreign mercenaries in Pakistan’s tribal area, and encouraged Pakistan to close this escape route. Until 2004, Musharraf was able to stave off such pressure’ (Kennedy 2005, 110-114). It was because of the Dr. Qadeer Khan nuclear proliferation issue that Pakistan could not stave off the pressure and had to resort to a military strike in the tribal region under US pressure.

Another example of US condition on Pakistan’s sovereignty was the truce with the tribal elders in North Waziristan. In September 2006, when General Musharraf moved towards
peace talks with tribal elders in North Waziristan, the US response was lukewarm. However, ‘within weeks there was growing concern among both US government officials and independent analysts that the truce represented a Pakistani “surrender” and had in effect created a sanctuary for extremists, with the rate of Taliban activities in neighbouring Afghanistan much increased and the militants failing to uphold their commitments’ (Kronstadt 2008, 55). Such was US dissatisfaction with the truce talks, that when General Musharraf extended a similar truce to the Bajaur tribal agency, just hours before the deal, a madrassa in Bajaur was subjected to a dawn attack which killed 82 people. While the Pakistan Army claimed responsibility ‘many observers speculated that the attack had in fact been carried out by US. Predator drones’ (Ibid). The issue of drone continues to, till date, frame the debates on sovereignty in Pakistan and internationally.

What becomes quite evident then is that for the US, as far as Pakistan was concerned nothing else mattered except Pakistan’s unquestioning acquiescence to its demands on the War on Terror. Thus Pakistan’s sovereignty during the War on Terror became conditional to US demands on its conduct. The US exercised these conditions by threatening to withhold US assistance, a pattern we have observed in the previous chapter, and by brute force through the use of drone attacks, a new development. The US pressured Pakistan’s sovereignty on multiple occasions, as described above, and even infringed upon its territorial sovereignty by means of drone attacks of which the Bajaur incident was amongst the first few. These conditions on Pakistan’s sovereignty are not consistent with Pakistan’s experience of the Pakistan-US alliance in the war in Afghanistan during the 1980s. There can be various reasons why this might be so. Firstly, the US for the first time had militarily involved itself in Afghanistan. Earlier during the Zia era, Pakistan had restricted US interference in the region by acquiescing to be a conduit of US arms and support to the mujahedeen in Afghanistan. Earlier during the Zia era, Pakistan had restricted US interference in the region by acquiescing to be a conduit of US arms and support to the mujahedeen in Afghanistan. This time around not only were the US troops involved but so were the militaries of various other states. Secondly, the War on Terror had commenced after the unfortunate event of 9/11 which was an attack on American soil, thus the US took the matters in Afghanistan more seriously than before. Thirdly, since the War on Terror had established that for the US weaker states were a greater threat to their national security than the stronger ones, as Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had opined in her official statement, Pakistan was amongst one of them. However despite US increased conditions on Pakistan’s sovereignty another similar trend reminiscent of the Zia era, was the high volume of US aid flow to Pakistan.
As we had observed earlier, in the previous chapter, US foreign aid spiked when the US was strategically interested in the region. In similar conformity to historic patterns of Pakistan-US interactions, after 9/11 US aid boosted up considerably. In 2002, the aid disbursed to Pakistan, reached a huge figure of $947.9 million (USAID 2014). This was because the US added another account under which to provide Pakistan economic assistance: the Economic Support Fund/ Security Support Assistance and thus provided Pakistan a major portion of $746.8 million under this account (Ibid). Between 2002 and 2005, under the Economic Support Fund/Security Support Assistance, Pakistan continued to receive the larger amount of assistance, to the neglect of other development related assistances. However in 2006 and 2007, data demonstrated a comparatively, substantial increase in the funds allocated to development assistance (USAID 2014).

From 2001 to 2007, an approximate amount of $10.58 billion had been disbursed to Pakistan, out of which a rough figure of 60 percent was disbursed under the Coalition Support Fund (Ibid). However the CSF ‘are intended to reimburse US. partners for their assistance in the war on terrorism. They are considered by the US. government to be a repayment rather than assistance’ (Cohen 2007, viii). Cohen observes that

‘Roughly 15 percent, or close to $1.6 billion, has been dedicated to security assistance. The Pakistanis have spent most of this money on purchases of major weapons systems. Another 15 percent has gone toward budget support or direct cash transfers to the government of Pakistan. This money is intended to provide macroeconomic stability and to free up funds for social spending, but few transparent accountability mechanisms are built in. The remaining funds—roughly 10 percent—have been used specifically for development and humanitarian assistance, including the US. response to the October 2005 earthquake’ (Ibid).

Even a Congressional Research Service report verifies the division of this data when it argues that

‘For most of the post-2001 period, funds have been split roughly evenly between economic and security-related aid programs, with the great bulk of the former going to a general economic (budget) support fund and most of the latter financing “big ticket” defense articles such as airborne early warning aircraft, and anti-ship and anti-armor missiles. Only about one-tenth of the roughly $10 billion provided to Pakistan since 2001 (including coalition support) has been specifically devoted to development and humanitarian programs’ (Kronstadt 2008, 78).
It is quite ironic then, that a state whose state failure had made centre stage, received only one-tenth of aid for developmental purposes, considering as we have pointed out in Chapter 2, how foreign assistance strategies and state failure have formed a discourse that merges developmental concerns with global security apprehension. For example, the logic of the ‘Failed State’ encapsulates the ideas that since failed states are ‘incubators of terrorism’ thus it is important to ameliorate these states from the pervasively deteriorating economic, social, political and developmental situations, thus foreign assistance programmes, now more than ever, need to target conditions in these states that might consequentially present a threat globally. However, while Pakistan evokes many nightmares in US political imagination, and as we have observed earlier, its status as a failed/failing state and/or failing state, have been deemed to have hazardous global consequences, the US economic and developmental assistance to Pakistan have remained scant at best. As Fair and Chalk argued (2006, 341)

‘...the bulk of American assistance has emphasized hard security while paying scant regard for wider (and just as critical) civic outreach programs designed to ameliorate underlying drivers for militant extremism. Although USAID is moving to address certain socioeconomic externalities that are believed to contribute to popular malaise, alienation and frustration (such as poverty, unemployment, lack of adequate housing/education), modalities for establishing robust structures of transparent and accountable community-based policing – which are vital to the institution of any effective system of local law enforcement that is fully respectful of human rights – have yet to feature prominently in the scope and parameters of current US assistance to Pakistan’.

In a similar tone (Cohen 2007, 26) explains that

‘Education has been the showcase of programming by the US. Agency for International Development (USAID) in Pakistan. The 9/11 Commission Report concluded that educational assistance to Pakistan ought to be central to US. engagement because of its potential to play a moderating influence by providing alternatives to madrasahs. Yet US. educational assistance accounts for only $64 million per year, divided among 35 million to 50 million primary and secondary school children, or an average of less than $2 per Pakistani child per year’.

However, Cohen (Ibid, 4) concludes that ‘the vast majority of US. assistance to Pakistan since September 11 has been intended to strengthen Pakistan’s internal stability, but instead has been designed to achieve a specific counterterrorism and counterinsurgency objective focused on the country’s western border and on Afghanistan’. This analysis is problematic. The US assistance to Pakistan was largely designed as a quid pro quo wherein Pakistan would assist the US in the War on Terror and the US would lavish it with all sorts of aid. The intention of the US was never to ‘reconstruct’ Pakistan or to ‘support Pakistan’s long-term
stability and prosperity’ (Ibid, 9), neither was it to address the problem of Pakistan’s state failure or its failing. The US aid was intended and designed to, as Cohen puts, achieve a specific counterterrorism and counterinsurgency objective. The issue of Pakistan’s state failure and its link to the War on Terror will be touched upon in greater detail in the subsequent sections.

The pattern of US assistance to Pakistan, during the Musharraf era, was demonstrative enough of the fact, that the US was driven by its strategic designs in the region, rather than a long-term engagement that was serious about Pakistan’s potential state failure. Despite the rhetoric about US concerns of Pakistan’s stability, no concrete US foreign assistance strategy was introduced to assist Pakistan circumvent the ominous situation that it was purportedly caught in. However, while ground realities kept dictating a pattern of US engagement with Pakistan, as we have seen earlier, the discourse on Pakistan’s state failure kept gaining strength too. Even though, it was postulated that Pakistan’s state failure had deep roots in its social and economic structure, these concerns remained largely marginal to US interests in the region. Thus it can be argued that while failed states had taken centre stage in US global politics, as far as Pakistan was concerned, the label of ‘failed state’ only succeeded in providing the US leverage on which it could pressure Pakistan to do its will. Beyond that Pakistan’s state failure did not possess any currency. Thus Pakistan’s status as a failing state became another condition on Pakistan’s sovereignty, one which included all the issues that plagued Pakistan. This aspect of the thesis will be analysed in greater detail in the subsequent sections.

The War on Terror and Pakistan

Some (Sethi 2011) argue that Pakistan ‘sold’ its sovereignty to the US in the event of 9/11. Christina Fair, writing for the Washington Quarterly, believes that ‘the only time in recent history when Pakistan agreed to the most expansive of US demands was in September 2001 when Musharraf agreed to abandon the Taliban following a clear exposition by Secretary of State Colin Powell that Pakistan is “either with us or against us.”’ It is clear, from Musharraf’s own account of Pakistan’s choices, that the prospect of coercive force was real and decisive. After what he described as a ‘shockingly barefaced threat,’ he ‘war-gamed the United States as an adversary’ and concluded that Pakistan could not ‘withstand the
onslaught’ (Fair 2010b). It apparently seems that the US did indeed pressure Pakistan into allying with it on the War on Terror and thus by such pressure violated Pakistan’s sovereign right to make an independent decision.

In an interview for this thesis, Riaz Khokhar (2012), a former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, argued that ‘Musharraf was a greater pariah than General Zia was. The events of 9/11 presented to him an opportunity to legitimize internationally. Particularly, Pakistan wasn’t in a position to dodge the UNSC Chapter 7. General Musharraf’s mistake was that he didn’t define the relationship’. Tariq Fatemi, a former Federal Secretary of Pakistan (2012) argued, in his interview for this thesis, that ‘the 9/11 was an injury to the pride and arrogance of the US. The US influence in the UN was so strong that UN became part of the US intervention in Afghanistan. In that, it was used and might continue to be used as an extension of the US State Department’. Former Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar (2012) opined that ‘in 2001, we had a gun on our head’. However, Ali Naqvi rejected the opinion that Pakistan took decision against its sovereign interest. He argues, while interviewing for the thesis, that ‘Pakistan maintained its sovereignty and worked with the US towards common objectives. There was no gun held on our head’. Major General Athar Abbas (2012), a former spokesman of Pakistan Army, believes that the decision by Pakistan to join the War on Terror, was to protect its own sovereignty. He recorded in his interview that according to him, ‘the 9/11 presented General Musharraf with a situation. Had he not sided with the US, the US wouldn’t have cared. He needed time to safeguard the state’s vital interest’.

The interviews quoted above provide us information on three issues. Out of the four interviewees, three (Khokhar 2012, Fatemi 2012, Abbas 2012) argued about the international pressure on Pakistan particularly from the US. What is interesting to note is the divergence in the opinion between the bureaucracy and the military. While for the bureaucrat (Khokhar 2012) the reason of General Musharraf’s alliance with the US as a means for the dictatorial regime to legitimize itself internationally, for the army officer (Abbas 2012) the alliance was born out of the regimes’ concerns to safeguard its vital interests. This divergence clearly depicts the difference in the mind-set of the bureaucracy and the military. Secondly, while Khokhar (2012) viewed Pakistan’s acquiescing to US demands on the War on Terror resulting from US pressure, he argues that the alliance was also a bid by the regime to legitimize itself internationally. However the chronology of event remains unclear in his argument. Did Pakistan ally itself because the regime wanted to legitimize itself
internationally or did it ally because it was not in a position to confront the US and the Western powers? Notwithstanding the divergence of opinion between the interviewees on why Pakistan allied with the US, a common point amongst them is that Pakistan was subjected to US pressure on the issue. This aspect of their opinion also correlates to our observations in the previous section where we observed that Pakistan continuously sought negotiations between the US and Afghanistan on the matter surrounding 9/11 and gave up its position when it found the US unflinching in its resolve to attack Afghanistan.

Pakistani elites, who argue that Pakistan’s decision to join the War on Terror was indeed in line with Pakistan’s sovereignty, contend that firstly, it was not in Pakistan’s national interest to stay non-aligned or against the US in the aftermath of 9/11, especially since the US had the backing of the entire international system of states. Secondly, the War on Terror offered Pakistan the opportunity to break its decade long isolation that had begun from the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Thirdly, an alliance with the US held promises of relief to the already decrepit economy of Pakistan. Finally, soon after 9/11, India had voiced all out support to the US in the War on Terror. Had Pakistan not allied with the US, India would have which would have created a myriad of problems for the security establishment in Pakistan. As we have observed in chapter 2, Pakistan’s security has remained India centric throughout its history. Thus the problem as these elites identified were two fold. Firstly, had Pakistan not allied with the US in the War on Terror, it would have had broader repercussions with regards to its security and its nuclear programme. Secondly, had Pakistan not aligned with the US, the US would have asked for Indian assistance which was already too eager to provide. This would have meant a lot of aid and military assistance that would have further shifted the regional balance in India’s favour, a circumstance even more detrimental to the Pakistani security establishment. Thirdly with India allying with the US, all sorts of pressures would have confounded the Pakistani state. General Musharraf, in his televised speech on 19th September, 2001, voiced these concerns:

‘Let us now take a look at the designs of our neighboring country. They offered all their military facilities to the United States. They have offered without hesitation, all their facilities, all their bases and full logistic support. They want to enter into any alliance with the United States and get Pakistan declared a terrorist state. They want to harm our strategic assets and the Kashmir cause. Not only this, recently certain countries met in Dushanbe. India was one of them. Indian representative was there. What do the Indians want? They do not have common borders with Afghanistan anywhere. It is totally isolated from Afghanistan. In my view, it would not be
surprising, that the Indians want to ensure that if and when the government in Afghanistan changes, it shall be an anti-Pakistan government’ (Musharraf 2001).

What is observable then is that Pakistan’s sovereignty was under quite duress with regards to its decision to join the US in the War on Terror. As we have already observed that Pakistan’s sovereignty follows a very India specific security centric definition, its decision to ally with the US was primarily motivated by concerns on its nuclear programme seen as its vital interests (Abbas 2012) and to maintain the balance in the region, which would have tilted in India’s favour had it not allied with the US. Lastly, had Pakistan not allied with the US, its dictatorial regime might have been chastised, considering US emphasis on democracy and human rights. Thus the conditions on Pakistan’s sovereignty which were based on Pakistan’s nuclear programme, democracy and human rights and US’ favourable tilt towards India were used successfully by the US to acquire Pakistan’s alliance in the War on Terror.

However, observers note that Pakistan’s alliance with the US soon started showing signs of duplicitous behaviour. The Pakistan military was found to be covertly supporting the Taliban through intelligence sharing and logistics, while at the same time overtly playing fiddle with the US. ‘Thus, even as some ISI officers were helping US officers locate Taliban targets for US bombers, other ISI officers were pumping in fresh armaments for the Taliban’ (Rashid 2008, 77-78). Thus the tension in the alliance were imminent from the start. Former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, Tanvir A. Khan (2012), in his interview for this thesis, argued that these tensions were more prominent because: ‘This time the US came to the region with the intention of drastically limiting and containing Pakistan’s sovereignty. Musharraf tried to embattle the situation by playing a double game’. Further, former Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar (2012) argued, in his interview for this thesis that ‘after 9/11, the US was interested in roping Pakistan into its own strategy. The caveat in Pakistan-US relationship initially appeared when the US promoted the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan instead of the Pashtuns’. The assertions of these interviewees are validated by the chain of events that ensued after 9/11 as we will observe later.

Thus, one of the major reasons why Pakistan took a turn away from US interests in the region was because of US support of the Northern Alliance. An argument that is lent credence by Christina Fair, who argues:
‘The December 2001 Bonn conference was, in many ways, a conference of Pakistan’s defeat. With US. military assistance, the Northern Alliance, which had long enjoyed the support and assistance of India, Iran, Russia, and other countries, wrested Kabul from the Taliban. The United States had promised Pakistan that this would not happen. The US. decisions to rely on the Northern Alliance in the early years of Operation Enduring Freedom and to retain a light footprint discomfited Pakistan, which feared the emergence of a pro-India Afghanistan… these early actions, conditioned Pakistan’s decision to retain its contacts with the Taliban to thwart the emergence of a hostile Afghanistan aligned with India’ (Fair 2009).

Pakistan’s interest in Afghanistan had always been to have an Afghani government that was more sympathetic to Pakistan’s security concerns. For this reason it had nurtured the Taliban against the Northern alliance which was heavily influenced by India. As we have mentioned earlier, Pakistan’s India centric security perceptions became the main reason why Pakistan played a double game with the US. Thus Pakistan’s security concerns, that shape the idea of its sovereignty, were inimical to US interests, because Pakistan has traditionally envisaged India as an existential threat. That being the case, Pakistan was ill prepared to a role the US took in the region, especially one that involved its intrinsic support. Thus it was not the pro-Taliban approach of Pakistan, but the idea that the loss of a proxy and a pro-Pakistan government in Afghanistan, might favour India and hence prove detrimental to its sovereignty, which drove a wedge in Pakistan-US relations. While the US had, initially, successfully capitalized on the conditions it had placed on Pakistan’s sovereignty as we have seen earlier, later when the US actions seem to run counter to Pakistan’s India centric security understanding, in the face of US belligerence, Pakistan played a double game to keep its insecurities addressed adequately.

By relying on Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, the US threatened Pakistan’s sovereign concerns. As Rashid argues:

‘The ISI justified its actions as stemming from fear of an Indian controlled Northern Alliance government after the overthrow of the Taliban. It also did not want to totally abandon the Taliban, its only proxy in Afghanistan. At the same time, the [Pakistani] army wanted to keep the Americans engaged, fearing that once Kabul had fallen, they would once again desert the region. With one hand Musharraf played at helping the war against terrorism, while with the other he continued to deal with the Taliban’ (Rashid 2008, 67-68).

It was not very long before the US started becoming increasingly frustrated by the inadequacy of Pakistan’s support. This had much to do with Pakistan’s slow progress in pursuit to clamp down on extremist organisations within Pakistan’s borders. However, once
again the reason why Pakistan chose to exercise its sovereign right in the face of US demands was India. Even till late 2007, analysts were arguing of covert support of religious extremist organisations in Pakistan. Further, the peace deal with the tribals in North Waziristan, in 2004, went strictly against US interests. One of the reasons for such slow progress was that the sympathies of the population were against the US and in favour of the Taliban. However another reason was that since the US and India had now mutually colluded and shared their interest in terrorism, they coalesced against the organisations in Pakistan, which were Pakistan’s primary tools in its proxy war in Kashmir. Tellis sums this up when he argues:

‘Competition with New Delhi has also pushed Islamabad to prevent India from restoring its influence in Afghanistan. In this effort to preserve its “strategic depth,” Pakistan has consciously tolerated the presence of Taliban remnants along its northwestern frontier as a hedging strategy in case Afghan president Hamid Karzai’s government turns out to be overly friendly to Indian interests… The chief difficulty here remains the clash between US and Pakistani priorities, specifically Pakistan’s policies toward Kashmir and its relations with India. The United States would obviously prefer Pakistan to use only peaceful means in its struggle over Kashmir and for India and Pakistan to work together toward a peaceful settlement. Islamabad, however, believes that, if it does not foment terrorism in Kashmir, New Delhi will ignore Pakistan...The United States has neither the incentives nor the capability to compel India to alter its goals in Kashmir. Because Pakistan’s means of attaining its goals have come to threaten both its own security and that of the United States, however, Washington must exert influence on Islamabad’ (Tellis 2004, 109-112).

Caught between assuaging a global super power and balancing a regional power, Pakistan under General Musharraf walked a tightrope. However, much of the external dimension of its international interactions was shaped by its own views of sovereignty. The major emphasis of these interactions has been continuously defined to be on ‘security against external and internal challenges to its national identity, territorial integrity and independence’(Rizvi 2004, 9). It is no wonder then that Pakistan views its sovereignty as the right to preserve its national identity and to protect its territorial integrity and independence. Thus for Pakistan then, any action that challenges Indian hegemony in the region, by either using non-traditional forces to foment dissent for example in Kashmir or by denying India space to politically manoeuvre, as in Afghanistan, or by acquiring parity militarily, as in the case of Pakistan’s nuclear capability, are matters of sovereignty. Thus the decision of the US to rely on Northern Alliance in the heydays of Operation Enduring Freedom, to clamp down on extremist organisations that Pakistan had so carefully fostered to counter India and to surgically pursue
Taliban within Pakistani territory, became matters that cut right through Pakistan national security and were seen as actions that might consequently, threaten its sovereignty.

There seems to be a near consensus amongst Pakistani policymakers on the role of US in international politics and the nature of Pakistan-US relationship. The following are excerpts of interviews conducted for this thesis. For example, Dr. Humayun Khan, a former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan (2012), in his interview for this thesis, argued that, ‘when the US has objectives to be served they overlook and ignore all issues that might pose hindrance in their objective. Its immediate concerns override other concerns’. Consequentially, former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan Tanvir A. Khan (2012) argues that, ‘if Pakistan keeps blocking US interests in the region it should be ready to for the consequences’. Similarly, former Additional Foreign Secretary of Pakistan Ali Naqvi opines that: ‘the US overlooks at its own convenience’. Another, former Additional Secretary of Pakistan, Saeed Khalid (2012) believes that ‘there is an international order maintained by larger powers, specifically the US, a Pax Americana, which at times becomes blind in its own self-interest. In the face of US interests then, there is no sovereignty for countries like Pakistan. When General Musharraf tried to resist the US over involvement in Pakistani affairs, he was showed the door’. Javed Hafiz (2012), former Ambassador of Pakistan, maintains that, ‘a state can get away with non-humanitarian acts or other matters of prime concern, if it is a darling of the US’. Major General Athar Abbas (2012), the former Spokesman of Pakistan Army, contends that ‘the US, like great powers, rides roughshod in international politics. If Pakistan blocks its national interest, it will come after it’. Riaz Khokhar (2012), another former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, argues that the ‘major powers, have the freedom to manoeuvre politically, something which lesser states don’t’. Former Defence Secretary, (late) Lieutenant General Hamid Nawaz (2012) claims that ‘superpowers always violate sovereignty. General Musharraf stood up to the US. Had he stayed, he would have borne severe pressures on Pakistan’s sovereignty’.

What becomes apparent from these interviews is that Pakistani bureaucrats subscribe to a certain view of the United States and how Pakistan features in US policy making. Most of them are well cognizant of US power and the influence it wields in international politics. At the same time they acknowledge that Pakistan can only pursue a limited view of its sovereignty in the face of US strategic interests. According to them then, the US views Pakistan through a strategic prism and as long as the Pakistani state continues satiating their
objectives, it will continue to enjoy some sovereignty as an independent state. Thus sovereignty, for them, is a relative concept, given the vagaries of international politics. As Dr. Ashfaque H. Khan (2012) argues: ‘There is no sovereignty for countries in the developing world. The developed world, led by the US, gives only enough sovereignty to the developing states to survive’.

Pakistani elites seem to be well aware of the hierarchical nature of international politics and the US influence in the international system, after the end of the Cold War. However, as we had seen in chapter 3, Pakistan had always sought an alliance with the US to counter India’s hegemony in the region and to maintain a proportionate parity. This time, Pakistan felt betrayed because of increased US interest in welcoming India’s role in Afghanistan, something that Pakistan had tried to avoid all along. Given the Pakistani discontentment with India’s ambitions in the region, Pakistan played a double game whereby it maintained the alliance, as breaking it up was firstly not an option and secondly, because it would have implied increased US-India interaction, and at the same time supported or at least didn’t do much to help the US in Afghanistan in their War against the Taliban. Thus, Pakistan seemed to be balancing its national interests by either losing sovereignty to the US or losing its regional balance against India. Apparently, Pakistan chose the former.

The War on Terror and State Sovereignty

In this chapter and the previous one, we have discussed Pakistan’s conditional sovereignty in relation with the US, with regards to its nuclear activities, democracy and human rights, and US strategic interests, when it is strategically involved in the region as in the War in Afghanistan and the War on Terror. However since we are exploring conditions on Pakistan’s sovereignty, a more recent development which was absent during the Cold War, is Pakistan’s status as a failing state. Thus any discussion of Pakistan’s sovereignty in the post-Cold War era and specifically after the 9/11 is incomplete without discussing Pakistan’s projection as a failed state. This is because state failure, by its very definition, wrests away the centrality of sovereignty pivoted around states and places it on human well-being as we have argued in earlier chapters. Since Pakistan’s sovereignty, as we have observed, revolves around a state centric security definition, by that measure then, the conceptualization of sovereignty in the discourse on state failure is diametrically opposite to Pakistan’s view of its sovereignty and
hence, is bound to create tensions. Secondly, the commencement of the War on Terror witnessed the US acknowledging the significance of weak states to global peace. In that context then, it becomes important to understand how Pakistan’s state failure figured in Pakistan-US relations.

The events of 9/11 fundamentally altered the ways security was perceived in the west. While earlier, the main adversaries and threats to international peace emanated from great power rivalries, the events of 9/11 moved the onus of this threat from the stronger states to weaker ones. Thus, state failure and fragility started featuring increasingly in the debates on global politics. Various studies purport to examine state failure along many dimensional divides as we observed in chapter 2. These studies agree that it is the responsibility of the global community to absolve states suffering failure from their abject conditions of economic and political decline, through a mix of political and economic assistances. Consequently, these assistances are provided to contain international security threats emanating for failing states. Thus economic and development assistance programmes are intrinsically tied to the concept of state failure and through that, global politics. Pakistan has for several years maintained a position of state fragility in various indexes that measure the phenomenon. Further, Pakistan, during the War on Terror, once again emerged as one of the major recipients of US aid; an event demonstrating remarkable consistency with the past.

Nonetheless, the rhetoric of Pakistan’s state failure has remained strong in US policy circles. In 2008, Senior US Congressman Frank Pallone declared that ‘Pakistan is essentially a failed state. I do not believe the central government controls most of the territory of the country,’ (Jha 2008). David Kilcullen, special advisor for counter-insurgency to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, predicted in 2009 that ‘Pakistan may fail within six months’ (Gupta 2009). President Obama in a public speech ‘described Pakistan as “fragile”’ (Ibid). Congressman Rohrabacher, who was the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation, in a letter to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, in 2012, wrote that, ‘it has become increasingly clear to members of the US Congress that Pakistan is a failed state and no amount of US aid money will ever change that’ (Imtiaz 2012a). Just one year later in 2013, Ambassador Ryan Crocker, discussing the threats facing Pakistan iterated his stance that “Pakistan is in a state of institutional failure. It’s not a failed state, but you could argue it is a failing state” (Morrison 2013). Despite this recognition of Pakistan’s failing status, the US assistance to Pakistan continued to neglect the drivers of
Pakistan’s status as a failed state has been a matter of controversy, since before the concept of state failure became central to global politics as a result of 9/11. However even then as now, there were those such as Dennis Kux (Kux 2001) who argued that Pakistan was a flawed state and not a failed one. While at that time no quantifiable measurements had been introduced to properly gauge state failure, as we do now, still the epithet was ripe with controversy and contradictions. Even though before 9/11, there were sporadic discussions on Pakistan’s state failure, however they failed to garner international attention since the region had lost its geostrategic importance for the US, as we have observed in the previous chapter.

The War on Terror brought the region back into international focus. The US Security strategy, this time, pivoted around weaker and failing/failed states, as we observed in chapter 3. A Congressional Research Service report details the framework of the US security strategy in Pakistan:

‘The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, released by the White House on February 14, 2003, stressed the broad scope of US. policy aimed at denying terrorists sanctuaries. … the strategy document also emphasized other instruments such as diplomacy, economic assistance, and programs to strengthen governance…More broadly, the strategy sought to eliminate conditions that produce terrorist sanctuaries, especially in failed states…The 9/11 Commission Report identified six primary areas in particular that do or could serve as terrorist sanctuaries. These include Western Pakistan and the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region…’(Miko 2005, 2-10).

Thus the US increasingly started viewing Pakistan’s state failure which was a derivative of its poor governance and its associated issues such as poverty, lack of political control over its territory and weak policing institutions, as the anathema responsible to breed terrorism. The US sought to employ its foreign policy instruments to strengthen Pakistan’s military and its governance structure to increase their effectivity to combat terrorism and hence consequentially ‘choke off the lifeblood of terrorist groups’ (Ibid, 2). Hence the primary US purpose, in emancipating Pakistan from its failing status, was to confront terrorism which had come to be increasingly linked with statebuilding and resuscitating weak institutions.
Stephen P. Cohen, writing in 2002, argued that the aforementioned reasons aren’t the only ones, to halt Pakistan’s spiral into state failure. According to him then

‘the downward trend in many indicators of state failure can be temporarily halted. Because of its very size (it will soon become the world’s fifth-most-populous state); its ties to many Arab and other Islamic states, especially Iran; its nuclear capabilities; and its critical geographic location mean that many powers also believe in the importance of Pakistan not failing… that the failure of Pakistan would be a multidimensional geostrategic calamity, generating enormous uncertainties in a world that craves order and predictability’ (Cohen 2002, 118).

For these reasons, Cohen argued, the wider community of states cannot allow Pakistan to simply fail. In a similar tone, Root (2005, 74) argued that ‘Pakistan, in short, is a failing state with an arsenal of nuclear weapons and a dedicated core of Muslim fundamentalists. The consequences for all of us could be dreadful, indeed’.

While along with the qualitative literature on state failure, many quantitative studies appeared on the intellectual horizon, however amongst these the Failed States Index (Failed States Index 2014) which was developed by the Fund of Peace, remained most notable in projecting Pakistan’s state failure. The FSI evaluated state performances against twelve indicators; Demographic Pressures, Refugees and IDPs, Group Grievances, Human Flight, Uneven Development, Poverty and Economic Decline, Legitimacy of the State, Public Services, Human Rights, Security Apparatus, Factionalised Elite and External Intervention. The FSI, in its first year in 2005, ranked Pakistan 34. However in the proceeding years of the Musharraf regime, Pakistan remained consistently ranked in the top twelve. While as mentioned earlier, Pakistan’s state failure had been an intellectual debate, but its consistent mention in the FSI, brought the issue to a much wider and broader audience.

Hehir (2007a, 5) postulated that Pakistan demonstrated endemic signs of failure and that there were two trends that exhibited these signs; political and ethnic fragmentation and religious radicalisation. He argued that:

‘much evidence suggests that owing to its obvious internal divisions, coercive incapacity and high level of terrorist activity Pakistan can plausibly be deemed a failed state, as the Failed State Index attests. However, while the chief indicators of failure, as advanced by proponents of the empirical determinability of state failure, are readily evident in Pakistan the answer to the question “Is Pakistan a failed state?” [The answer is that]
Pakistan is a “persistently failing state” – one which has continued to exhibit major signs of failure but which has nonetheless not fully collapsed.

Thus with Musharraf regimes each year passing, the discourse on Pakistan grew stronger and came to occupy a central position in the state’s international image. What initially started as an effort to alleviate Pakistan in order to effectively combat terrorism quickly degenerated into Pakistan becoming a prime global concern. The most likely possible dangers that Pakistan’s state failure could pose were, ‘a complete collapse of Pakistani government rule that allows an extreme Islamist movement to fill the vacuum; a total loss of federal control over outlying provinces, which splinter along ethnic and tribal lines; or a struggle within the Pakistani military in which the minority sympathetic to the Taliban and Al Qaeda try to establish Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism’ (Kagan & O’Hanlon 2007).

In stark contrast with the initial years of General Musharraf, where Pakistan’s failing status wasn’t much of an issue, the later years of General Musharraf’s regime witnessed Pakistan’s state failure become a dominant discourse amongst policymakers and academics alike. The discovery of a nuclear black market established by Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the intense terrorist activity within Pakistan’s territory and the state’s inability to efficiently control it, all added up to the threat that Pakistan’s failure posed to the wider global community of states.

As a consequence, the inability of the state to control violence perpetrated by various terrorist organisations which included religious extremist organisations as well sectarian organisation, and its incapacity to establish writ in the region along Pakistan-Afghanistan border, figured vitally in any discussions on Pakistan’s state failure. The prospect of a military intervention, however improbable it may seem, consequently, became a stark political reality for Pakistan. Thus Pakistan’s status as a failed/failing status came to represent everything that was wrong with Pakistan including US inhibitions on Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities to international concerns on Pakistan’s inability to control violence within its territory and its degenerating institutions. Accepting Pakistan as a failed state has come to represent the singular most serious threat to Pakistan’s idea of state sovereignty, since it groups all its ills under one umbrella. Thus Pakistan moved from a staunch advocate of its state sovereignty based on the equality of states in the international circuit to a defensive apologist of its state sovereignty.
While many scholars and intellectuals have argued that Pakistan is not a failed state (Fair 2010a, Lieven 2011) they however do conclude that Pakistan state continues to remain in a perilous position. Further, since ‘the term is quite nebulous and in many respects subjective’ (Hehir 2007a, 1), those who indulge in sensationalist accounts of Pakistan’s state failure and those who argue against them, both sides have plethora of reasons to advocate their positions, often different from each other. Thus the absence of a yardstick, to measure state failure has contributed to much of the ambiguity and the debate surrounding Pakistan’s state failure. The fact however is, that the normative understanding of ‘failed state’ has attracted such widespread international currency, it is often used powerfully without invoking any quantitative logic.

The Pakistani elites remain as confused and ambiguous about Pakistan’s state failure as does the rest of the world. In a series of elite interview conducted, two different sets of opinions surfaced on the issue of Pakistan’s status of a failed state.

In interviews conducted for this thesis, there were clearly two divergent opinions. One group of bureaucrats argued that Pakistan was not a failed state but rather a different aberration and that the term ‘failed state’ was ill suited to describe the political unit in its present circumstance. Many amongst them, overtly shied from used the word ‘failed state’ to define Pakistan however, they resorted to terms such as failing state, fragile state, failed democracy and fatigued state etc. For example Abdul Sattar (2012), former Foreign Minister of Pakistan (1999 - 2002) and former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan 1986–1988, argued in an interview conducted for the thesis that

‘Failed States are defined by the decline in their political in their political coherence, poor economic sphere and loss of administrative control. By that measure Pakistan is not a failed state but is heading towards becoming one. American and international academic institutions are not politically motivated thus their research on failed state does hold meaning’.

Similarly, Saeed Khalid (2012), another former Additional Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, agrees on Pakistan’s failing situation, but demonstrates slight disagreement in the purpose of indexes that work to quantify state failure. In an interview conducted for this thesis, he opines that
‘Pakistan is not a failed state but is definitely failing. Pakistan is a soft state due to the deeply embedded societal fissures inherent in its political history. Thus the degree of Pakistan’s failing is related to its softness. The Failed State Index is an academic exercise much like the rest of the research that tries to quantify state failure as such they are warnings, but this does not exclude manipulation and putting pressure on Pakistan’s polity’.

Three bureaucrats interviewed for this thesis, similarly, shared the views of the aforementioned bureaucrats. Shafqat Kakakhel (2012) who, previously, served as Deputy Executive Director of the UN Environment Programme, argued that while there is no internationally accepted definition of failed state, normatively, ‘Pakistan is a failing state but not a failed state where part of Pakistan’s failing can be attributed to the US involvements in the region. The status of Pakistan as a failed state is a gross exaggeration. If anything, Pakistan is a failed democracy and a fatigued state’. Similarly, Riaz Khokhar (2012), an eminent bureaucrat argued that ‘we are moving towards a failing state but we are not failed yet’. However Javed Hafiz (2012), a former Pakistani Ambassador, believes that ‘Pakistan’s state institutions are not sure about their boundaries, civil-military relations remain unsettled, the economy is fragile and the centre provincial relationship is also problematic. For these reasons Pakistan’s state is fragile but not failed’. Thus these bureaucrats argued that Pakistan was not a failed state but a different variant of the phenomenon. For some Pakistan was a failing state that had not failed yet but was continuing on a path towards being a failed state, for others it was fragile and for yet another it was fatigued. These variations in their understanding demonstrate that while these bureaucrats agreed that Pakistan was not a failed state, however they all agree that Pakistan was ailing one way or another.

Even amongst these proponents, who choose to accept some degree of failure or fragility of the Pakistani state, the reasons do not always correlate with what the international discourse on Pakistan’s state failure is. For example, the first time Pakistan reached the top ten club on the FSI list was in 2006 and a major reason for that was the widespread devastation in Pakistan due to an earthquake during the same year, whereas these interviews demonstrated different other reasons but none that figure centrally in the assessment techniques of the FSI. Similarly, internationally Pakistan’s state failure is largely attributed to its ungoverned territories which are considered hotbeds of terrorism, an argument which remained absent from the discussions with the interviewees.
Another set of bureaucrats and military officials interviewed for this thesis, not only deny that Pakistan’s state failure but also argue that the term itself is malintended and used to manipulate weaker states. Humayun Khan (2012), a former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, argues that ‘state failure is a value judgment. If the ideals of a political structure are that the government is democratic and the political processes are, consequentially, democratic too, in that case any move away from democratic process is a move towards failure and a dictatorship is then, emblematic of a failing state’. Dr. Ashfaque Hassan Khan (2012), who has previously held positions of Economic Advisor, Director General Debt office, and Spokesperson on Economic Affairs for the Pakistani Government, believes that the international discourse on failed states is all international politics. He cites Goldman Sachs statistic which had predicted that by 2007 Pakistan would be an economic power alongside India, China and Vietnam and thus he argues that ‘even though Pakistan was in the throes of a dictatorial regime when the statistics came out, how could it, with such economic potential, be a failed state?’ Similarly Tanvir A. Khan (2012), a former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, demonstrates his reservations on the veracity of the discourse on failed states. He argues that ‘FSI, along with similar studies, have political motives. They are based in academic institutions but they are not entirely academic. They have been greatly hyped by the US, India and the western media and are a tactical ploy to put pressure on Pakistan with regards to its nuclear arsenal and its role in combating terrorism’.

Lieutenant General (Retired) Hamid Nawaz Khan (2012), the Defence Secretary of Pakistan from 2001-05, rejects the entire idea of Pakistan’s projected state failure, in his interview. For him, ‘Pakistan was never and will never be a failed state’. He argues that ‘The only reason Pakistan was initially projected as a state failure was because of its military rule, which was a coercive US technique to keep Pakistan doing its strategic bidding. Pakistan is indeed not a failed state because of its educated diaspora and its status of a nuclear state. However the basic problem of Pakistan is national integration. If Pakistan fails to achieve that, then it will fail as a state. Thus whether, be it DFID, USAID or World Bank who postulate Pakistan’s fragility, they are all pulled by the same strings’. Further, Major General (Retired) Athar Abbas (2012), former military spokesperson for the Pakistan Defence Forces, opines that ‘Pakistan is not a failed state. It’s a tactic to keep pressure on Pakistan. Indexes that detail state failure of Pakistan are both a ploy and are academic at the same time. In that, while they serve to keep Pakistan in a tight corner, Pakistan’s postulated state failure is also a matter of
genuine concern for the west’. Former Additional Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, Ali Sarwar Naqvi (2012), believes that

‘Pakistan is not a failed state. Those who talk about Pakistan’s state failure take cue from a common source of assessment which is not in one place. Further, who ascertains their assessment criteria and what is the source of their information? What variables do they include and how do they measure them? There is a preponderance of western opinion and it goes all over the world. Just because they think dictatorship is bad, doesn’t make dictatorial presence a failed state. I don’t think states fail or succeed. They go through cyclical periods’.

Tariq Fatemi (2012), a former Pakistani Ambassador to the US, argues that: ‘Political scientists can come up with evidence to support whether Pakistan is failed or not. The US project of Pakistan’s state failure is not an analytical judgment rather it enables them to achieve important objectives that might not be achieved at the same cost. It further, serves to keep Pakistan off balance therefore weakening their resolve to engage in nation-building. Thus, Pakistan’s state failure is very subjective and depends from what angle you see it. As far as I am concerned, if Pakistan was failed state then there was no justification for the Pakistan-US partnership’.

The in-depth analysis of state failure in Pakistan, both from the perspective of international scholars and Pakistani elites reveals the profound conceptual ambiguity that is ripe, in the use of the label. While different international perspectives on Pakistan’s failure assess Pakistan’s state failure differently, considering that the term is quite nebulous, this gives rise to various assessments and reasons of Pakistan’s state failure, depending on the perspectives that scholars follow. Though the normative content of state failure finds states which are unable to govern their territory or have lost their legitimacy to rule, as the yardstick to gauge state failure, however as we had pointed out in chapter 1, this normative understanding also comes across various challenges. Two views appeared predominantly in the interviews with the Pakistani state elites. Firstly, few believed that Pakistan was indeed a failed state, however, the manner in which they understood Pakistan’s state failure was quite different than those that are present in international scholarship. Secondly, some argued that Pakistan was not a failed but a failing or fragile state, yet these arguments too were less rigorous given that there seemed no clear understanding between the interviewees of the difference between failed, failing and fragile. Thirdly, a group of elites argued that Pakistan was not a failed state and argued that its appearance in international discourse as a failed state was only a ploy to put
pressure on the Pakistani state to follow US diktat. The confusion amongst these various groups, international scholars and local elites, as to what constitutes Pakistan’s state failure and whether it is a failed state or not, makes the concept quite unworkable. Lastly, given that the US had put failed states at the centre of its international agenda, the volume of foreign aid to Pakistan earmarked for development, which was almost marginal, demonstrates that for the US even, Pakistan’s state failure is not as big an issue as is often projected. Thus the best explanation that this thesis can come up for Pakistan’s state failure status is that it remains a formidable tool of power in the hands of the US to pressurize Pakistan on issues, that might be in US interest but be detrimental to its sovereignty. Thus Pakistan’s status as a failed state can be used to condition its sovereignty when it is desired in the future.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has explored the contours of US conditions on Pakistan’s sovereignty before and after the commencement of the War on Terror by looking at Pakistan’s nuclear activities, democracy and human rights and by analysing Pakistan’s state failure status, which is a new global development in relation to the Cold War. The chapter has demonstrated that while before the War on Terror commenced, Pakistan was subjected to conditions on its sovereignty in a stark continuity with the early years of General Zia-ul-Haq, as we had observed in the previous chapter. However once the War on Terror commenced, the US successfully used Pakistan’s historic security centric understanding of its sovereignty to apply conditions on Pakistan’s sovereignty. These conditions manifested themselves not only in Pakistan’s acquiescing to ally with the US in the War on Terror but also in more immediate strategic considerations such as violations of Pakistan’s territorial sovereignty by drone attacks and the placement of troops and acquiring bases within Pakistan. Thus while the emphasis on Pakistan’s nuclear non-proliferation, democracy and human rights subsided after the commencement of the War on terror, Pakistan could not successfully defend its sovereignty against US in the aftermath. Thus as we had observed earlier, US strategic interests dominated Pakistan-US relations and US conditions on Pakistan’s sovereignty worked in favour of the US.
Chapter 6: THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF PAKISTAN’S SOVEREIGNTY: AN ANALYSIS

Introduction

The focus of this chapter is to analyse Pakistan’s state sovereignty in the Cold War and the post-Cold War era. State sovereignty has been ‘usually understood as external sovereignty and internal sovereignty’, where external sovereignty refers to ‘a states’ place in the international order and its capacity to act as an independent and autonomous entity’ (Heyword 2000, 37). It is in the purview of this understanding of external sovereignty that the thesis seeks to question US-Pakistan interaction during the Cold War and the War on Terror. Thus what this chapter seeks to analyse is, how independent and autonomous Pakistan was when it was strategically allied with the US, during the dictatorial regimes of General Zia-ul Haq and General Pervez Musharraf. Further the cosmopolitans argue that state sovereignty is ‘intrinsically linked to its absolutist past, and if so is frankly undesirable, or that it is no longer applicable to modern systems of government which operate according to networks of checks and balances’ (Ibid, 38) in a globalised world. Considering that the ICISS, in a way, revolutionized the way in which state sovereignty was earlier conceptualized, and hence required reformulation to adapt to modern political realities, a vital part of the chapter is then to study how and to what extent has the US-Pakistan relations during the War on Terror been influenced by cosmopolitan thought. The study then is between two cases of ‘conditional sovereignty’; one, during the Cold War in which conditional sovereignty was distinguished as the extent to which the decision making processes of a client/subservient/dependent state has been interfered upon by another state; two during the War on Terror, when a state’s sovereignty became conditional to its meeting the responsibilities it owed to its citizens and the global community of states. Two inquiries need to be addressed here: Firstly, has the first case of conditional sovereignty continued into the War on Terror? Second how does the second case of conditional sovereignty figure in Pakistan-US relations?

Much of the assistance that has been provided to Pakistan or has been withheld from it has been through the US Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Section 101 of the Foreign Assistance Act provides a general policy for US assistance (Congress 2010, 15-16).
While the general policy goals of US assistance seem altruistic and provide no evidence of being intrusive in a recipient state’s sovereignty, however as we have observed in earlier chapters, the conditions that are attached to them often prove to be detrimental and intrusive to a recipient’s state’s sovereignty. State sovereignty as conceptualised by the realists provides the state ‘a special status…identified with its right to be left alone in the conduct of the community’s internal affairs and its duty of non-intervention in the internal affairs of others’ (Beitz 1991, 243). In this regard, then, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 which, has gone through a number of amendments that have been pivotal in defining US relations with Pakistan: namely, the Symington Amendment⁴, the Glenn Amendment⁵, the Pressler Amendment⁶, Brownback I⁷ and Brownback II⁸, (US Congress 2010) tantamount to US interference in Pakistan’s state sovereignty. These amendments will be explained subsequently, in the periods during which they had been brought to force on Pakistan. Two observations are noteworthy here.

Firstly, the timings of when these amendments were invoked to allow or prohibit foreign assistance to Pakistan reflect the strategic nature of Pakistan–US relations. Since Pakistan has been historically dependent on US assistance, civilian and military, as we observed in chapter 3, providing Pakistan assistance or withholding it, is equally used as tools to condition Pakistan’s sovereignty and hence consequentially, worked to diminish Pakistan’s capacity to act independently and autonomously. For example, the Pressler amendment which was added to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (Ibid, 346-348) stated that:

‘No military assistance shall be furnished to Pakistan and no military equipment or technology shall be sold or transferred to Pakistan, pursuant to the authorities contained in this Act or any other Act, unless the President shall have certified in writing to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, during the fiscal year in which military assistance is to be furnished or military equipment or technology is to be sold or transferred, that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device and that the proposed United States military assistance program will reduce significantly the risk that Pakistan will possess a nuclear explosive device’.

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⁵ Adopted 1977. Sec. 102(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, formerly Sec. 670 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended.
While the amendment was passed in 1985, it did not come into effect until 1990 when President Bush refused to certify that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive device, because by then the Cold War was over and Pakistan had lost its strategic significance. Even though in 1985, the US had strong evidence that Pakistan was pursuing a nuclear option, then President Reagan continued providing the certification to keep Pakistan co-opted in the US effort to check Soviet expansionism in Afghanistan. Thus US assistance to Pakistan has mostly been dictated by geostrategic strategic logic rather than altruistic motives as observed in the general policy of Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Since for Pakistan ‘external sovereignty has come to embody the principles of national independence and self-government’ (Heyword 2000, 39) thus any effort by the US to intervene in Pakistan’s sovereignty has largely been seen as an effort to condition its freedom.

Secondly, all these sanctions revolve around Pakistan’s nuclear project. Thus the Symington amendment, the Pressler amendment and the Glenn amendment remain biased to the provision of assistance to Pakistan owing to Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions while the brown amendment, the Brownback I and the Brownback II amendments provided relief to Pakistan from the above mentioned amendments, which will be discussed subsequently. Two other non-nuclear related sanctions were brought into place during General Pervez Musharraf’s early tenure (1999-2001) which were Military Coup Sanctions (Section 508 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961) and Missile Sanctions (Chapter 7 of the Arms Export Control Act, as required by US membership in the Missile Technology Control Regime) (Congress 2010). We will discuss the two observations in greater detail in the next two sections.

**Unilateral Dependence and Pakistan’s Sovereignty: (1979-81) and (1999-2001)**

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 was amended by the Symington Amendment in 1976. This provision, as amended, is now contained in Section 101 of the Arms Export Control Act (Ibid, 544). This amendment entailed that:

‘no funds made available to carry out the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or this Act may be used for the purpose of providing economic assistance (including assistance under chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961), providing military assistance or grant military education and training, providing assistance under chapter 6 of part II of that Act, or extending military credits or making guarantees, to any country which the President determines delivers nuclear enrichment equipment, materials, or technology to any other country on or after August 4, 1977, or receives such equipment, materials, or technology from any other
country on or after August 4, 1977, unless before such delivery— (1) the supplying country and receiving
country have reached agreement to place all such equipment, materials, or technology, upon delivery, under
multilateral auspices and management when available; and (2) the recipient country has entered into an
agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency to place all such equipment, materials, technology, and
all nuclear fuel and facilities in such country under the safeguards system of such Agency.

(b) CERTIFICATION BY PRESIDENT OF NECESSITY OF CONTINUED ASSISTANCE; DISAPPROVAL
BY CONGRESS.—(1) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, the President may furnish assistance
which would otherwise be prohibited under such subsection if he determines and certifies in writing to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that— (A) the
termination of such assistance would have a serious adverse effect on vital United States interests; and (B) he
has received reliable assurances that the country in question will not acquire or develop nuclear weapons or
assist other nations in doing so’ (US Arms Export Control Act, 473).

The Symington amendment thus purported US sanctions with regards to economic assistance,
military assistance or to grant military education and training, extending military credits or
making guarantees, to Pakistan if the US President determined that Pakistan delivered nuclear
enrichment equipment, materials, or technology or received such nuclear equipment or
materials. However, the amendment also provided that if the US President determined and
certified to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate that the termination of the assistance would adversely affect US vital
interests, he would be allowed to waive off the imposed sanctions. As noticed in chapter 4,
the Zia regime’s inhibition to submit its nuclear facilities for international safeguard and the
mounting evidences of its pursuance of a nuclear weapon brought it under the purview of the
Symington amendment. US President Carter had the authority to waive off these sanctions
if these sanctions were detrimental to US vital interests. However, as we had seen earlier in
Chapter 4, the US was not strategically interested in Pakistan because of its tilt towards India,
its move away from a Soviet centric policy toward more global values of nuclear non-
proliferation, democracy and human rights. Owing to the US disinterest in Pakistan, under the
Symington amendment, sanctions were levied on Pakistan. As Carney( 1989, 45) argues, in a
relationship where the weak state is dependent on the stronger state ‘what goods are
exchanged and it what amounts are determined by the particular needs each party brings to
the relationship…If either party becomes dissatisfied with the relationship they may attempt
to redress the problem, alter the existing arrangement or withdraw from it altogether (though
the patron will usually have more leverage in this respect than the client)’. Pakistan’s only
use to the US was as a strategic anchor in South Asia against soviet expansionism. However,
once confronting Soviet expansionism became a lesser priority during the Carter years, there was not much that Pakistan could offer then. During periods of unilateral dependence of Pakistan on the US, Pakistan’s policy choices did not conform to US policy goals. Consequently, the US grew dissatisfied with its relationship with Pakistan. Though the US did not completely withdraw from the relationship, it did however use Pakistan’s dependence on its foreign aid and military assistance as a tool to alter the existing arrangement.

While the Symington amendment was adopted in 1976, Pakistan was subjected to the sanctions in 1979 because Pakistan had not provided the US with assurances that it was not pursuing a nuclear course. At the same time, as we had observed in Chapter 4, President Carter’s priorities rendered Pakistan, strategically irrelevant to US interests. Firstly, President Carter’s increased focus on ‘human rights, arms sales, and nuclear non-proliferation, not US-Soviet relations’ (Thornton 1982, 961) became a recipe for Pakistan’s marginalization in US policy concerns. That was because, all US priorities, during President Carter’s era were counter-productive and polar opposite to the state Pakistan was in. In essence then, US demands were seen as an intrusion in Pakistan’s sovereignty. Since Pakistan had remained dependent on US assistance for much of its history, these sanctions were seen as a tool to condition Pakistan’s sovereignty and through the withholding of assistance, manage Pakistan’s internal affairs. For example, US human rights concerns contributed in US-Pakistan estrangement due to the presence of the dictatorial regime of General Zia-ul-Haq in Pakistan; the sway of US policies away from using arms sales for strategic reasons contributed negatively to the relationship due to Pakistan’s increased dependence on US military assistance; most vitally damaging to the relationship was US policy on nuclear non-proliferation and Pakistan’s persistence in acquiring nuclear technology to harness its security; and lastly, since the US-Soviet relations had taken a backseat in the face of global US priorities, Pakistan which had only been important to the US as the only significant South Asian ally, became increasingly replaced by India. Further, the US increasingly sought to better its relationship with India because the US identified ‘its interests in the Third World with those of "regional influentials"’ (Ibid, 960) which meant India in South Asia and of course because India was a functioning democracy, unlike Pakistan.

Even though the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 prompted the Carter administration to waive off the sanctions to protect “vital US interests”, however it wasn’t until the Reagan administration that foreign assistance reached its peak. But the mere fact that the Carter administration waived the sanctions demonstrates that Pakistan’s relationship with
the US has been dictated by geostrategic imperatives. Further, despite Carter administration’s insistence on democracy, human rights and nuclear non-proliferation and Pakistan’s resilience to comply shows that Pakistan kept its sovereignty under close guards. It is in this context we argue that Pakistan’s protectiveness of its national interest which revolved around security provided for a rigid view of state sovereignty.

A similar pattern of how US strategic disinterest in Pakistan has kept Pakistan’s sovereignty conditional to its ‘global’ needs, can be observed in the dictatorial tenure of General Pervez Musharraf, as we have also demonstrated earlier in Chapter 5. Similar to the situation during the Carter years, the 1990s were a period of US strategic disinterest in the region. Much like President Carter, President Bill Clinton was also increasingly disposed towards India and hence did not view Pakistan very favourably. Further, Pakistan’s nuclear test in 1998 had moved the Clinton administration to levy sanctions on Pakistan under the Glenn amendment which was also termed the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act and had been inacted in 1994 (Congress 2010, 545-549).

As is obvious from this Act, the sanctions suggested by the Glenn Amendment (Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act were fairly extensive. Thus by way of this amendment, sanctions were imposed on Pakistan: 1) on any form and kind of US military assistance, 2) on any credit, credit guarantees, or other financial assistance by any department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States Government, barring certain exceptions, 3) to prohibit any United States bank from making any loan or providing any credit to the government of that country, 4) to prohibit exports to Pakistan, of specific goods and technology, barring exceptions. While Pakistan was already suffering from the Pressler amendment, which had been imposed on Pakistan in 1990, by US discontinuing military and economic assistance to Pakistan, the Pakistani nuclear tests in May 1998, invoked the Glenn amendment and added another nuclear related sanction to the list of sanctions. However, just a month later in July 1998, an amendment in the form of Brownback I (Ibid, 346), was inacted and was later signed into law in October 1998. It stated that

\[\text{Waiver Authority.}\]

\[(a) \text{ Authority.--The President may waive for a period not to exceed one year upon enactment of this Act with respect to India or Pakistan the}\]

\[\text{It was originally enacted as sec. 670 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and codified at 22 US.C. 2429a, by sec. 12 of Public Law 95–92 (91 Stat. 620).}\]
application of any sanction or prohibition (or portion thereof) contained in section 101 or 102 of the Arms Export Control Act, section 620E(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, or section 2(b)(4) of the Export Import Bank Act of 1945.

(b) Exception.--The authority provided in subsection (a) shall not apply to any restriction in section 102(b)(2)(B), (C), or (G) of the Arms Export Control Act.

(c) Availability of Amounts.--Amounts made available by this section are designated by the Congress as an emergency requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended: Provided, That such amounts shall be available only to the extent that an official budget request that includes designation of the entire amount of the request as an emergency requirement as defined in the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended, is transmitted by the President to the Congress.

Sec. 903. Consultation. Prior to each exercise of the authority provided in section 902, the President shall consult with the appropriate congressional committees.

Sec. 904. Reporting Requirement. Not later than 30 days prior to the expiration of a one-year period described in section 902, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees on economic and national security developments in India and Pakistan.\(^\text{10}\)

Thus Brownback I or commonly known as the India-Pakistan Relief Act of 1998, provided the US president the authority to waive off sanctions on Pakistan, for the period of one year, with the exception of the sanctions imposed on military assistance, dual-use exports, and military sales. Later Brownback II which was passed in June 1999, provided the President of the United States with authority to permanently waive off these sanctions, including sanctions on military assistance and all other sanctions that had been imposed as a result of the Pressler and the Glenn amendment. However in October 1999, Pakistan had slid back into a military dictatorial regime and this time a different set of sanctions kept Pakistan from gaining any US assistance (Rennack 2001). These sanctions remained in place till 2001.

When General Pervez Musharraf took power through a coup d’état in October 1999, the Clinton administration along with the other Western powers were vocally unsupportive of this action (BBC News 1999; BBC World 1999). However Pakistan did not receive the presidential waiver till 2001 when President Bush signed the waiver in recognition of Pakistan’s role in the War on Terror. The Coup d’état of General Musharraf in 1999, prompted President Clinton to levy more sanctions on Pakistan under Section 508 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 which was adopted in 1988 and prohibited most forms of US

\(^{10}\) Adopted 1998. The India-Pakistan Relief Act of 1998, incorporated into the fiscal 1999 omnibus appropriations bill (Public Law 105-277).
economic and military assistance to any country whose elected head of government is deposed by a military Coup d’état (Rennack 2003). Thus as we had observed in Chapter 5 as well, The Clinton administration’s pressure on Pakistan’s sovereignty were on two grounds; firstly, the nuclear issue and secondly, democracy and human rights. Thus we can evidence a continuity in US approach towards Pakistan’s sovereignty and can argue that at both times during the Cold War and the post-Cold War, US interferences in Pakistan were measures to make Pakistan’s sovereignty conditional and subservient to its demands.

Thus, when the US is strategically disinterested in Pakistan, it uses its foreign assistance programme and the legislature as a tool to intrude in Pakistan’s sovereignty. By withholding foreign assistance, then, the US takes stock of Pakistan’s historical dependency on US military and economic assistance and seeks to condition Pakistan’s sovereignty by persuading it to follow US diktat. This situation works detrimentally towards Pakistan’s sovereignty in two different ways. Firstly, the US sanctions exploit Pakistan’s historical security paranoia by halting military and economic assistance, thus Pakistan then, whose idea of sovereignty revolves around a security centric definition is left militarily vulnerable and consequentially feels its sovereignty threatened. The only way for Pakistan then to reduce this vulnerability and strengthen its sovereignty is to follow the conditions that the US demands of it for example improve human rights record, promote democracy and curtail the nuclear programme. Secondly, in the periods during which the US is strategically disengaged from Pakistan, it demonstrates obvious shifts of favour towards India as we have observed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. Since Pakistan’s security centric definition of sovereignty is largely a derivative of its insecurity arising from neighbouring a hegemonic aspirant regional power, the US shift towards India is seen as further weakening its sovereignty.

Almost all sanctions on Pakistan have been due to its pursuance, possession or explosion of a nuclear device. While the sanctions in 1979 were due to the Symington amendment, those during the 1990s were due to the Pressler and the Glenn amendment which remained in place during the initial years of General Musharraf. However, since Pakistan considers its nuclear programme as a vital element of its state sovereignty, the efforts by the US to halt or contain Pakistan’s nuclear programme is considered as an infringement in its sovereignty. Thus, we can argue, that amongst other factors such as human rights and democracy, US demands on Pakistan’s nuclear issue has been the vital condition for providing military and economic assistance, and thus is an essential element in conditioning Pakistan’s sovereignty.
The fig. 1 demonstrates the pattern of US economic and military assistance to Pakistan during the Cold War years, specifically the War in Afghanistan. The tabulated figures back the assertions made earlier. The figures demonstrate that while the US professedly seeks, as a general policy of its foreign assistance strategy to promote the ‘traditional humanitarian ideals of the American people and renews its commitment to assist people in developing countries to eliminate hunger, poverty, illness, and ignorance’ (US Congress 2010, 16) by providing economic assistance, however to the contrary its foreign assistance strategy remains strategically motivated. In the case of Pakistan then, US economic and its military assistance coincided, both in the period before and after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Thus US foreign aid to Pakistan is seen to be tied to its demands of Pakistan. For example, till the time Pakistan did not comply with US demands on nuclear non-proliferation, the subjected sanctions following the imposition of the Symington amendment kept both the economic and military assistance at bay. As we have discussed earlier, since Pakistan has been historically dependent on US economic and military assistance, the withholding of US assistance has provided the US the leverage to exact politically desirable outcomes. In the case of the Carter years, this centred on US nuclear non-proliferation concerns along with US normative ideals of Democracy and human rights (Thornton 1982; Hess 1987). Thus it can be said that the US withheld foreign aid to Pakistan to exploit the dependency that it had nurtured over the years.
A similar trend is observable in the initial years of General Pervez Musharraf’s regime in Pakistan. As fig. 2 demonstrates before Pakistan had agreed to ally with the US in the War on Terror, US aid to Pakistan was quite low. Further military assistance to Pakistan was non-existent (Rennack 2001). Again this time the Clinton administration’s emphasis on normative US values such as nuclear non-proliferation, democracy and human rights were the constraining factors (Enda 1998; BBC World 1999; Burns 1998). The tilt of the US towards India, in conformity with past patterns when Pakistan was of no strategic interest to the US, was a defining feature of the early years of General Musharraf. Thus in a remarkable similarity to the Carter years, US insistence on controlling the development of nuclear weapons, restoring democracy and improving human rights were intrusions into Pakistan’s sovereignty. Again, Pakistan’s sovereignty was conditional to it acquiescing to US demands. Pakistan’s failure to do so resulted in the sanctions and since as we have shown in the earlier chapter, Pakistan’s military and economy was already in a depleting condition, these sanctions further weakened Pakistan. Also, as we have argued earlier, considering Pakistan’s security centric definition of sovereignty, the deliberate attempt by the US to weaken Pakistan through military and economic sanctions were seen as a measure to keep Pakistan’s sovereignty subservient by coercing it to conform to US conditions. At the same time the US tilt towards India was again seen as a threat to its political sovereignty. However in both the cases, as soon as the US found its strategic interest in Pakistan’s alliance, whether to check Soviet expansionism or in the War on Terror, it waived off all sanctions and sizably increased assistances, both military and economic, to Pakistan. However, once Pakistan strategically
allied with the US, the normative conditions on Pakistan’s sovereignty (nuclear non-proliferation, democracy and human rights) were replaced by more militarily strategic conditions such as provision of airbases, stationing of US troops within Pakistan’s territory, logistic support etc.

**Mutual Dependence and Pakistan’s Sovereignty: (1981-88) and (2001-08)**

As we have observed in previous chapters and argued earlier, once the US became strategically interested in the region, whether it was to check Soviet expansion in Afghanistan in 1981 or in the War on Terror in 2001, its strategic interests outweighed its normative interests. However besides this phenomenon, there are some noteworthy differences between both US involvements. Firstly, unlike the 1980s where the Pakistani state and its military were the conduits and the US had minimal troops on ground, US involvement in the region was a result of an attack on its homeland on 9/11. After 9/11 the war was not against a competing state but rather against terrorism. It was established early by Condoleezza Rice that the US was more threatened by weaker states rather than stronger ones (Rice 2005a). This threat was manifested because of the space the weaker states provided by ostensibly, being breeding grounds for terrorism. In that sense then, Pakistan not only became part of a solution in the aftermath of 9/11 but also part of the problem, which was not the case during the war in Afghanistan during the 1980s. This yielded different results against the trend of US involvement with Pakistan.

As we have observed in Chapter 4, while the US might have sought leverage over matter that were of Pakistan’s sovereign concern, for Pakistan the relationship was a ‘handshake not an embrace’ which implied ‘a readiness to cooperate on specific issues and to face together certain understood contingencies’ and which allowed the US ‘to provide some support without disturbing the recipient's own balance of interests and alternative options’ (Wriggins 1984, 296). Thus as a matter of quid pro quo Pakistan acquiesced to ally with the US to check the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, on the conditions that its sovereignty would be respected. This is clearly visible in Feroz Khan’s observation:

‘In 1981, President Reagan took office with two clear objectives: roll back the Soviets from Afghanistan and slow down Pakistan’ nuclear programme…An agreement was agreed upon' by virtue of which US sought to allay Zia’s ‘concerns over US interference in Pakistan’s domestic affairs. The Reagan administration agreed not only to remove the military sanctions but also to refrain from pressuring Islamabad on democracy and human rights issue’.
With regards to other issues such as providing base facilities, stationing troops and arms in Pakistan, or more militarily ambitious projects that Pakistan considered against its territorial sovereignty, Pakistan successfully resisted and thus successfully bargained against the conditions that the US had demanded. While some considered Pakistan’s alliance with the US during the 1980s as an uneven alliance in which Pakistan’s sovereignty was subservient to US interests, however two observations nullify these assertions. Firstly, Pakistan had initiated an overt campaign against the Soviet presence in Afghanistan long before the US became interested in the region strategically in 1981 (Harrison 1982). Thus as we have already demonstrated, Pakistan already wanted the US to get involved. It was hence a convergence of interests that brought both states into an alliance (van Hollen 1980; Wirsing & Roherty 1982). Secondly, once the US was involved Pakistan maintained a tight grip on its sovereignty. Hence, as we have observed above, Pakistan’s sovereignty was not conditional to US demands since it was not part of the quid pro quo arrangement.

Since in 2001 the US was now itself militarily involved in Afghanistan, this brought a different set of dynamics and pressures on Pakistan’s sovereignty. At the advent of the War on Terror, the US released the sanctions placed on Pakistan due to its nuclear project and its dictatorial regime. Thus as we have observed above, once the US is strategically involved in the region, its strategic goals take over its more normative demands. However notwithstanding the tranche of aid assistance that the US provided Pakistan, on a political level the US demands put conditions on Pakistan’s sovereignty. Firstly, was the US insistence that Pakistan unconditionally accept all its demands before it got militarily involved in Afghanistan (The National Security Archive 2011). Given the fact that Pakistan had been consistently requesting the US to negotiate with the Taliban in Afghanistan before it was faced by a blunt choice to either join the war or stand against the US, demonstrates that its sovereignty had been conditioned to its acquiescing to join the US in the War on Terror. Secondly, while the US had come to terms with Pakistan’s nuclear weapons development programme, its insistence that Pakistan do its strategic bidding in the War on Terror, which most often ran counter to Pakistan’s national interest, remained a thorn in the alliance. This led to much US frustration which remained evident throughout Musharraf’s tenure as we have observed in Chapter 5. Thus clearly the trend of conditional sovereignty and dependence that we witnessed in the Cold War era, as evidenced in previous chapters, continued in the post-Cold War era, however this time Pakistan’s sovereignty succumbed to severe US pressures, at times.
At the same time, a similar trend can be witnessed in the way the international community responded to the US led War on Terror. As we have observed in previous chapters, before the US commenced its war on terror, the international community by which we mean international financial institutions and major western powers, were unequivocally vocal about their displeasure on the presence of a dictatorial military regime in Islamabad (Foley 1999; BBC News 1999). This has been quite evident in Pakistan’s bid to secure funding arrangements from IMF and World Bank and, as we observed in chapter 5, and from the various statements of leaders of states and international organisations. However, once the US war on terror commenced, not only did the IMF approve a loan of $2.5 billion three year programme, but the ODA assistance from the World Bank also tripled (N.Y.Times 1999). Considering how the cosmopolitans herald the network of international institutions as a practical foundation on which they base the prospects of a cosmopolitan order, it then is evident that such a hypothesis underestimates the clout and influence that the US exercises on these institutions. Even in the case of the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Association), the suppression of evidence in the case of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, by the US, as we have demonstrated in Chapter 5, validates the argument that against US influence and its perceived national interest, international organisations remain helpless (Frantz & Collins 2007). Similarly, once the US war on terror commenced, other Western powers rallied around the US to support Pakistan and accept its dictatorial regime. As we evidenced in Chapter 5, the Commonwealth had suspended Pakistan’s membership and the EU had halted bilateral trade agreement following the coup d’état of General Musharraf, only to renew the membership and bilateral trade talks once the war on terror commenced (The Telegraph 2004).

The US proclamation that it felt more threatened by weaker states more than stronger ones, in the aftermath of 9/11, made US foreign assistance to weaker states a vital part of US global agenda. It was argued that, since weaker states are breeding ground for terrorists, hence by alleviating the conditions that contributed in terrorism, such as poverty, improving governance structures etc., terrorism can be controlled and the threat emanating from weaker states can be contained (Piazza 2008; Office of the President of the United States 2003; Wise 2004). However considering that Pakistan is one of those prominent weaker states, the foreign assistance that the US provided to Pakistan, uncover the paradox inherent in US ambitions. Again as detailed in chapter 5, from 2001 to 2007, an approximate amount of $10.58 billion had been disbursed to Pakistan, 60 percent of which were disbursed under the Coalition Support Fund (USAID 2014). However since CSF is a fund intended to reimburse
US partners for their assistance in the war on terrorism they are thus more of a repayment than assistance, and hence cannot be included as part of the US foreign assistance to Pakistan. Thus as a CRS report notes ‘only about one-tenth of the roughly $10 billion provided to Pakistan since 2001 (including coalition support) has been specifically devoted to development and humanitarian programs’ (Kronstadt 2008, 78). This dissects the myth of US assistance to Pakistan. Clearly then, US assistance is not as development and humanitarian oriented as is proclaimed to be. During the War on Terror, clearly there was a quid pro quo arrangement, in which the US would provide Pakistan military and economic assistance and Pakistan in return would strategically conform to the US vision in South Asia. The problem this time around, different from the earlier Zia-ul-Haq decade, was that the US was not only quite unilaterally intrusive in Pakistan’s sovereignty, Pakistan’s failure to appease the US resulted, on many occasions, in US threats of withdrawal of assistances. Thus considering how different aspects of US policies were interfering and intrusive, Pakistan’s vision of its own national interest created frictions in the US-Pakistan relations. But if the Pakistan-US relations were more transactional in nature, how did Pakistan’s status as a weak state figure in US foreign policy?

We have already ascertained that the trend of ‘conditional sovereignty’ that was motivated by US interest in the region during the Afghanistan War, continued in the post-Cold War era into the War on Terror. However, in the post-Cold War era, specifically after 2001, a reconfiguration of political sovereignty internationally, began featuring prominently in the discourse on state sovereignty. By this account sovereignty of a state was conditional to its fulfilling its responsibilities towards its citizens and the broader community of states. By this standard then Pakistan was in the crosshairs of the major Western powers since internally, the presence of a dictatorial regime, and externally its failure to control Taliban and terrorist movement across the border created an anathema for them. This was, as we have demonstrated, quite evident in the various indexes on state failure which featured Pakistan prominently. Thus Pakistan’s status as a failed state made it vulnerable to international intervention, at least theoretically. However, the international response to Pakistan’s state failure was anything but congruent to the discourse on it. This means that, while state failure opens up avenues to the Western powers for various kinds of interventions, military and economic, however in the case of Pakistan, the Western powers were complacent i.e. while there were many voices that advocated action against Pakistan based on its failed state status, however, the Western powers did not think so but rather respected Pakistan’s political
Thus the aspect of ‘conditional sovereignty’ that had come to dominate the reconfigured thinking of the Western powers played a marginal role in Pakistan’s interaction with them.

Thus, we can argue that till the time Pakistan’s sovereignty remains conditional to the US, and further, till the time Pakistan remains a complacent ally to the US, in that case then, US strategic interests take precedence over the interests of the international organisations and the western powers. Secondly, in case Pakistan does not measure up to US requirements, in that case then, considering US global dominance as we have demonstrated, this aspect of conditional sovereignty can be used to keep Pakistan subservient. Thus, in that way, the aspect of ‘conditional sovereignty’ that derives its essence from state failure becomes another tool for the US to ensure compliance.

While the thesis has observed and analysed the sway of US policies from the period when the US is strategically interested in Pakistan to when it is not, four observations come to fore when studying Pakistan’s sovereignty. Firstly, in situations of Pakistan’s unilateral dependence on the US, Pakistan has faced major impingements on its sovereignty through US military and economic sanctions. As Carney (1989, 46) argues: ‘The more advantage a patron a patron gains…through its association with its client, the more the patron will value the relationship’. Further, since the asymmetrical relationship between US and Pakistan was characterised by Pakistan’s dependency on the US, this gave rise to two scenarios. Periods of Pakistan’s unilateral dependence on the US, witnessed a divergence of interests between the two states. During the Cold War, US tilt away from an anti-communist following the Carter administration’s emphasis on nuclear non-proliferation and human rights, reduced the advantages of a US relationship with Pakistan. In this instance, the presence of a dictatorial regime in Pakistan and its nuclear activities put it on a collision course with the US. Similarly, the unilateral dependence that characterised Pakistan’s relationship with the US after the Cold War followed a similar pattern. In these situations, the US employed economic and military assistance and foreign aid sanctions to ‘compel compliant behaviour’ (Ibid, 47) from Pakistan.

When the relationship between the US and Pakistan was based on mutual dependence, it was a different story. During the Cold War, the US was dependent on Pakistan to check soviet expansionism in Afghanistan, whereas during the War on Terror, it relied on considerable Pakistani support in its effort to battle the growing scourge of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.
Given that during these occasions, the Pakistan-US relationship was valuable to the US because of the advantages it incurred for the US, Pakistan gained a certain degree of leverage with the US and ‘some measure of tolerance of occasional non-compliance behaviour’ (Ibid, 46). Thus the US ignored Pakistan’s nuclear activities and its dictatorial regime, for which Pakistan had been economically and militarily sanctioned when it was unilaterally dependent on the US. In situations of mutual dependence then, aid conditionalities came to bear on Pakistan, which spurred from more immediate US strategic concerns, and were largely premised on Pakistan’s support in countering Soviet expansionism in Afghanistan during the Reagan years, and checking/countering the Taliban and Al-Qaeda during the Bush years. However one stark difference emerged, between these two periods when Pakistan and the US were mutually dependent on each other.

Unlike the Cold War, during the War on Terror, Pakistan largely succumbed to the US conditions on its sovereignty. During the regime of General Zia-ul-Haq in the 1980s, Pakistan maintained a tight grip on its sovereignty, territorial and political, and mostly denied US any leverage over the matter, in the case of General Musharraf in the 2000s that was not the case. While during the Reagan years, despite various kinds of aid conditionalities, Pakistan enjoyed the ‘leverage’ to maintain its territorial sovereignty in the face of US demands, that was not the case during the War on Terror. The use of drone strikes to target Al-Qaeda and the Taliban elements within Pakistan’s territory represented a significant shift in US strategy and demonstrated the loss of leverage that Pakistan had previously enjoyed. This was because during the Cold War, the US was not militarily actively involved in Afghanistan and was pursuing it ambition of countering the Soviet Union in Afghanistan through Pakistan. Given Pakistan’s acquiesce to support the US ambition to counter Soviet expansion in Afghanistan and the enthusiasm of the Reagan administration to continue assisting Pakistan in this alliance, the US was at this stage seemingly more dependent on Pakistan’s alliance than Pakistan was on US foreign aid. Since the US was more dependent, Pakistan could protect its sovereignty against US conditions. For Pakistan, this scenario was quite opposite to what developed in the aftermath of 9/11. The 9/11 was an attack on US soil which not only saw the US invade Afghanistan but also witnessed other states allied to the US directly involved in the conflict, unlike the Cold War. Thus, the involvement of other powerful states and the NATO in Afghanistan had reduced, to quite an extent, US dependence on Pakistan and thus despite various protests, by the Pakistani state, on the use of drone strikes, the US continued unabated.
Secondly, after 9/11, unlike the Cold War, weaker state became the main threat to the US rather than the powerful states in the international system, thus the Soviet Union of the Cold War was replaced by Afghanistan and Pakistan in the War on Terror. This was because the weaker states did not have complete control over their territories and hence provided to be ‘incubators of terrorism’ (Piazza 2008). Since during the War on Terror, the main target of the US were Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, the fact that the Al-Qaeda had been sheltered by the Taliban and the Taliban, in return, enjoyed close contact with the Pakistani state, made Pakistan part of the problem, rather than the solution. Thus Pakistan’s reluctance to carry out operations, in the region along the Afghanistan border, on US behest, its inability to control the Taliban pilferage across its borders and the US frustration on Pakistan’s ineffectiveness and reluctance to ‘do more’ than it actually was (Kronstadt 2008; Kennedy 2005), led the US to directly infringe upon its sovereignty. This is because while the US was quite dependent on Pakistan’s support, the above mentioned issues drove it towards infringing upon Pakistan’s sovereignty and considering that during the War on Terror, the US was ready to take unilateral action to intervene in Pakistan’s sovereignty, there was little the Pakistani state could do to dissuade the US.

Thirdly, what is noteworthy is Pakistan’s continued India-centric security understanding. Even when Pakistan had decided to ally with the US in the War on Terror, as we have demonstrated earlier, General Musharraf’s speech to the nation involved a threat of analysis of how India will benefit and Pakistan will suffer if Pakistan did not ally with the US. This remains a common trend between both, the Cold War and the War on Terror. In the Cold War, Pakistan profited from the alliance with the US by virtue of receiving substantial military aid which it required for its regional competition with India. Further, the alliance with the US, helped Pakistan stave off the pressure off its nuclear activities, which again was India centric, and lastly allying with a superpower enabled it to maintain a semblance of regional parity with India. Thus it may not be so far from the truth to suggest that during the Cold War Pakistan’s alliance with the US was quite purely to counter India regionally. As we had observed in chapter 5, Musharraf’s decision to ally with the US, had one of its major objective to deny India the benefits of the alliance should Pakistan decide to not assist the US in the War on Terror. In complete consonance with the Cold War, the case of A.Q Khans illegal nuclear network and the handling of the issue by the US, as we have observed in chapter 5, demonstrates that Pakistan retained its sovereignty with regards its nuclear activity
and the US did not apply conditions to Pakistan’s sovereignty with regards its nuclear activities, even though the case of nuclear proliferation during the Musharraf era was much worse than the case of Pakistan pursuing a nuclear option during the Zia era. However, as we had observed in chapter 5, the caveat in Pakistan-US relationship started to appear once the US started continuing policies that were insensitive of Pakistan’s India centric security policies (Fair 2009). The most prominent amongst these US policies was the US decision to take on board the Northern Alliance faction in Afghanistan against the Taliban. The Northern Alliance had traditionally been supported by and had been supportive of India. This, as we had observed in chapter 5, initiated a reconfiguration of the strategic dynamic of Pakistan-US relations by Pakistan. Since Pakistan, being a weak state was not in a position to confront the US, it moved to play a double game in Afghanistan, by covertly supporting the Taliban in a bid to allay its India centric security fears. Thus, we can assert that the divergences in Pakistan-US relations were largely due to US insensitivity of Pakistan’s India centric sovereignty.

Fourthly, state elites in Pakistan remain confused and at times in denial to recognize Pakistan’s image of a failing and failed state as an international reality. This is a recent development compared to the Cold War, when the nomenclature let alone the phenomenon were quite marginally discussed. As we observed in chapter 2, the commissioning of the ICISS (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty) report in 2001 and its subsequent inclusion as a norm in the UN Charter coupled with the shift of the US locus of threat from stronger states to weaker one, which we examined in chapter 5, brought state failure to international prominence. Pakistan has been consistently ranked in the top tier of failed states since 2006 when the Failed State Index was newly introduced (Foreign Policy Magazine 2013). However even before that its state failure status was popularly debated as we observed in chapter 5. A series of interviews of state elites, discussed in detail in chapter 5, demonstrated that Pakistani state elites had ambivalent stances on the subject. While few argued that Pakistan was indeed a failing state if not a failed one, their reasons for Pakistan’s state failure differed substantially from international accounts. Others argued that Pakistan was neither failing nor failed and that state failure represented an international tool of applying pressure on Pakistan. Further, as we observed in chapter 3, the complete absence of any mention or research of Pakistan’s sovereignty and state failure in policy literature emanating from policy institutions, which work under state patronage, demonstrates that the
state does not consider Pakistan’s status as a failed state an important factor to consider in its international relations.

The argument of the Pakistani state elites, who view Pakistan’s international status as a failing state as an international tool to apply pressure on Pakistan’s pressure, may hold some currency in the face of US foreign assistance to Pakistan during the War on terror. As we demonstrated in Chapter 5, given the centrality of US policies on identifying the locus of threat in weak and failing state, US foreign assistance to Pakistan did not correspond to Pakistan’s status as a failing state. In chapter 2, we had observed that failed and failing states were characterised by inefficiency in providing public goods, such as education, health care, security etc. to its people. Externally because these states had weak institutional infrastructures and governance, they were unable to control the activities of terrorists within their territory and the movement of these terrorists into other territories. Thus to effectively control terrorism it is important to assist in improving governance and state institutional infrastructure in these states. This, as we observed, is the security-development nexus on state failure. However when we look at US foreign assistance strategy in Pakistan during the Musharraf regime, what is quite apparent is that the US provided substantial military assistance to Pakistan, and within the economic assistance provided only a small amount was allocated towards development activities. The US aid, as we had observed in the previous chapter, reminisced of the pattern observed during the Cold War, and the evolution of the state failure, as a central point of US concern, was nowhere apparent in this pattern. Thus US foreign assistance was largely of a transactional nature based on realpolitik rather than on the holistic bases of revitalizing and rescuing Pakistan from its state failure.

The question this thesis has sought to answer is not whether Pakistan is a failed/failing state or not, but what is its importance in US policy discourse and how do the Pakistani state elites view Pakistan’s international image of its state failure. Two observations became quite clear in analysing these sets of questions. Firstly, for the US, during the War on Terror, the mismatch between its identification of failed/failing states as a central tenet of its War on Terror policy and the US foreign assistance to Pakistan, suggest that Pakistan’s perceived state failure holds little to no currency when the US is strategically interested in its alliance with Pakistan. The aid, thus given to Pakistan, is aimed to appease the state and keep it sufficiently motivated in its alliance with the US. It can then be hypothesized that since US conditions on Pakistan’s sovereignty fluctuate with whether it is strategically interested in Pakistan or not, the fact that Pakistan’s state failure has till yet not been used as a condition
on Pakistan’s sovereignty suggest that the norm will become a condition on Pakistan’s sovereignty once the US is not strategically interested in Pakistan. Secondly, since the Pakistani elite perceptions are captured in a realist tradition, centred on defining its sovereignty strictly in terms of security, Pakistan’s state failure status to them then, at best, is merely another international ploy to keep pressure on Pakistan’s sovereignty.

The Chinese Factor in Pakistan’s Sovereignty

A Chinese diplomat once, confronted by a US delegate about Beijing’s uncompromising support for Pakistan, sarcastically responded: ‘Pakistan is our Israel’ (Aljazeera 2010). Any discussion on Pakistan’s relations with the US thus, is incomplete without discussing the role of China in the region. While, China and the United States are two major powers that have strived to ‘possess significant exogenous influence over Pakistan and its decision-maker’ (Smith 2011,199), they have approached ‘Pakistan with their own agendas and strategic interests’ (ibid). As we have noted in previous chapters, US strategic interests have varied over time, rendering Pakistan-US relationship as an ‘on-again, off-again friendship’ (Lavoy 2005, 52). However, China’s relationship with Pakistan have remained consistent since the 1960s earning it praise as a ‘reliable ally’ (Lavoy 2005, 56) while China heralds Pakistan as an ‘irreplaceable all weather friend’ (Economic Times 2015). When it comes to the divergent and convergent interests of these two powerful states with Pakistan, the locus of problem is only one: India. As we have observed in the previous chapters, the US never explicitly addressed Pakistan’s security paranoia at the expense of its relations with India. Pakistan-US interests have only converged when US strategic interests were at stake, and India never once figured in them. During the Cold War, ‘vastly differing ideological and governing philosophies’ (Burns 2007b) marginalised India in US foreign policy objectives (Burns 2007a). The focus of US policy in South Asia was to support Pakistan as an anchor against Soviet expansionism in the region, not to allay it security paranoia against India. After the Cold War three developments cemented US-India ties.

‘First, the end of the Cold War removed the US Soviet rivalry as the principal focus of US foreign relations and the rationale for India's nonalignment policy. Second, India's historic economic reforms of the early 1990S, led by Manmohan Singh, then finance minister and now prime minister, opened India to the global economy for the first time and catalysed the extraordinary boom in private-sector trade and investment between the United States and India that continues today. Finally, as the twenty-first century began, the global order started to undergo a tectonic shift, and India's emergence as a global force was obvious for all to see’ (Ibid, 134).
Adding to the list was also India’s image as ‘a potential counterweight to China’s growing wealth and power’ (Inderfurth 2008, 253). In the decades proceeding the War on Terror, the relations between the United States and India reached an apex, ‘with the two countries enjoying unprecedented levels of cooperation in the economic, strategic, and diplomatic spheres’ (Kapur & Ganguly 2007, 642). This development was threatening for both Pakistan and China. For Pakistan, US rapprochement towards India increased its security paranoia spurring from the belief that ‘the balance of power is being tipped toward India...with the help of the Western World’ (Craig 2015). For China, US efforts to reimage India as a regional and global player ran counter to Chinese regional strategic interests. It is on this juncture that Pakistan and US interests have diverged and it is here that Pakistan and Chinese interests have converged.

Pakistan-China strategic relations are more historical than the recent sojourn between US and India, and have increasingly converged on one major objective. China has always sought to ‘bottle up India in the subcontinent, forestalling the emergence of a continental-sized rival’ (Feigenbaum 2011) and, in the case of Pakistan, ‘unlike the Americans, was also interested in balancing Indian power’ (Cohen 2004, 121). The strategic landscape of Pakistan-China convergence of interests is best illustrated by Pant (2012) who argues that:

‘India has been the main factor that has influenced China’s and Pakistan’s policies vis-à-vis each other. China, viewing India as a potential challenger in the strategic landscape of Asia, has tended to use Pakistan to counter Indian power in the region, while Islamabad has gained access to civilian and military resources to balance Indian might in the sub-continent. The China—Pakistan partnership serves the interests of both by presenting India with a potential two-front theater in the event of war with either country. Each is using the other to balance India as India’s disputes with Pakistan keep India preoccupied, distracting New Delhi from the task of reaching its potential as a major regional and global player’ (Pant 2012, 83).

It is quite clear how Pakistan’s political sovereignty, given its India-centricity, has substantially benefitted from its alliance with China, but the advantages that Pakistan have accrued from this relationship, have also indirectly assisted it in maintaining its political sovereignty in the face of US demands. As we have observed in previous chapters, Pakistan’s sovereignty has remained myopically restricted to its security, and historically dependent on US assistance. During times when Pakistan was unilaterally dependent on the US, before and after the Cold War, US incursions in Pakistan’s sovereignty were more overt. For instance, US demands on Pakistan’s nuclear programme were seen as an infringement of its sovereignty and so were the military and economic sanctions on Pakistan that followed.
Broadly, China’s assistance to Pakistan on three issues helped Pakistan to sustain the pressure on its sovereignty; namely, its nuclear programme, military assistance and economic cooperation. On the issue of Pakistan’s nuclear programme, Hoodbhoy (2013, 70) argues that Pakistan ‘elicited crucial nuclear help from China. Alarmed at India’s nuclear success, China was willing to share the designs of its first weapon with Pakistan…It is quite likely that the development of nuclear weapons by Pakistan would have eventually succeeded, but without Chinese assistance this would have taken longer’.

For Pakistan, it nuclear programme symbolized a ‘talisman, able to ward off all dangers…[and] became the means for neutralizing India’s far larger conventional land, air, and sea forces’ (Hoodbhoy & Mian 2002). This meant that Pakistan’s sovereignty came to hinge on the development of its nuclear weapons. Consequently, Paul (2003) argues that ‘Chinese-Pakistan nuclear cooperation began in the 1970s during the tenure of Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. This cooperation reached its peak in the 1980s and early 1990s when Beijing assisted Pakistan in building its nuclear capabilities…US intelligence sources have contended that the Pakistani nuclear bomb project would not have come to fruition without the active support of China’ (Paul 2003, 24). Further Malik (2002, 3) observes that “Beijing has not only provided Islamabad with nuclear bombs, uranium and plants (all three Pakistani nuclear plants - Kahuta, Khushab and Chasma - have been built with Chinese assistance), but also their delivery systems: ready-to-launch M-9 (Ghaznavi/Hatf), M-11 (Shaheen), and a number of Dong Feng 21 (Ghauri) ballistic missiles’. During the late 1970s and throughout the 1990s, the US had levied sanctions on Pakistan in an effort to dissuade Pakistan from pursuing its nuclear weapons programme. Even when US Pakistan interests had converged, while the US had lifted sanctions, it remained concerned about Pakistan’s nuclear programme (The National Security Archive 2010). It can be safely assume that without China’s help Pakistan would not have been able to sustain the pressures on its sovereignty that arose from unilateral dependence of the US. The pressures on Pakistan’s sovereignty manifested themselves in the sanctions, the US levied on Pakistan in the late 1970s and throughout 1990s.

Given Pakistan’s historical dependence on US economic and military assistance, the US sanctions were aimed at coercing an agreement out of Pakistan on its nuclear programme, aligned with US interests. Here again, China’s economic cooperation and military assistance to Pakistan played a pivotal role in blunting the effect of these sanctions. The Chinese-Pakistani military cooperation gained impetus after the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965. The US
took a position of neutrality, blaming Pakistan largely. This ran counter to the US-Pakistan 1959 Agreement of Cooperation. At this point China provided significant military support to Pakistan. Thus,

‘...while the United States cut off arms sales to India and Pakistan, China gave Pakistan the political support it desired, backing its position and threatening to intervene if necessary. After the 1965 US embargo on weapons to Pakistan, China also became a strategic supplier of conventional weaponry. China’s role in building Pakistan’s defence industry grew as the United States imposed severe nuclear-related sanctions in the 1970s. The Chinese offer of military assistance and economic aid to Pakistan as the United States suspended economic assistance only served to reinforce “a new friendship that came into being on account of American neglect and a powerful shared antagonism with India”’ (Kabraji 2012, 4).

Chinese military assistance, over the years, have been in the area of missile technology and modern weapons systems including modern combat and surveillance aircrafts. As observed by the Council on Foreign Relations: ‘China's role as a major arms supplier for Pakistan began in the 1960s and included assistance in building a number of arms factories in Pakistan and supplying complete weapons systems...After the 1990 imposition of US sanctions on Pakistan, China became the country's leading arms supplier. Collaboration now includes personnel training, joint military exercises, intelligence sharing, and counterterrorism efforts’ (Afridi & Bajoria 2010). In her testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission on May 20, 2009, Lisa Curtis detailed the extent of Pakistan-China security partnership when she argued that:

‘The most significant development in China-Pakistan military cooperation occurred in 1992 when China supplied Pakistan with 34 short-range ballistic M-11 missiles. Recent sales of conventional weapons to Pakistan include JF-17 aircraft, JF-17 production facilities, F-22P frigates with helicopters, K-8 jet trainers, T-85 tanks, F-7 aircraft, small arms, and ammunition. Beijing also built a turnkey ballistic-missile manufacturing facility near the city of Rawalpindi and helped Pakistan develop the 750-km-range, solid-fuelled Shaheen-1 ballistic missile. While the US has sanctioned Pakistan in the past—in 1965 and again in 1990--China has consistently supported Pakistan's military modernization effort’ (Curtis 2009).

What needs to borne in mind here, is that the period specifically mentioned above, the 1990s, was a period when the Pakistan was unilaterally dependent on the US for the modernization of its security infrastructure. However the US sanctions, that had ensued throughout the 1990s, as a result of US reservations on Pakistan’s nuclear programme, had put undue pressure on Pakistan’s sovereignty with regards to the balance it wished to maintain in the region vis-à-vis India. At this juncture, Chinese military assistance played a vital role in
staving off the pressure on Pakistan by assisting it in modernizing its army against India and thus Pakistan did not buckle under the pressure on its nuclear programme.

On the economic front too, China as provided considerable support to Pakistan. However the economic relations have historically been limited on two accounts. Firstly, even though China has provided significant economic aid to Pakistan (Pande 2011), ‘but, given China’s capacity and compared with what Pakistan receives from other countries’, this is fairly limited (Kabraji 2012, 4). Secondly, even though trade between the two states commence in 1963, when Pakistan gave China the Most Favoured Nation status, ‘it was only in the late 1990s that the total value of Sino-Pakistani two-way commerce began to shoot upward’ (Ibid, 8). The trade between the two states expanded from less than $1 billion in 1998 to $2.4 billion in 2002. By 2007 the trade volume touched nearly $7 billion, rising to $10.6 billion in 2011 from $8.7 billion in 2010 (Ibid) following trade and investment agreements, worth $20 billion, between the two governments. The most vital development has however, been in the department of joint ventures between the two states. These ventures have largely focused on infrastructure and have almost always carried a strategic undertone. The ventures are ‘concentrated on strategic sectors where state involvement is important: defence, nuclear energy, transportation, space programmes, telecommunications, electronic products and energy’ (Ibid, 9). Examples of such ventures are; the Karakoram Highway completed in 1986, which serves as an artery connecting China to West Pakistan; the financing and construction of the Gawadar Port in Balochistan, which will introduce Chinese presence in the Arabian Sea alongwith various other economically strategic benefits; and ‘two major joint mining ventures, a copper-gold mine at Saindak and the Duddar zinc-led mine project’ (Ibid, 10). As we have argued in previous chapters, Pakistan has historically, viewed its sovereignty strictly in terms of security, and that too a military oriented security. Thus these joint ventures have substantially contributed in alleviating its strategic concerns whereas economic trade and investment does not figure vitally in the security dimension of Pakistan’s state managers.

The Pakistani state believes that ‘they have paid too high a price’ (Pande 2011, 134) for the US military and economic aid. ‘Close ties with the US notwithstanding, Pakistan has always resented any attempts by the American administrations to impose conditions’ (Ibid). In other words, the Pakistani state seems to have learnt that unilateral dependence on US has often resulted in conditions being imposed on its sovereignty. Thus, in China, they did not only find a ‘dependable ally’ (Ibid, 133) who has ‘never pressured Pakistan’ (Ibid, 134), but also
an ally with whom military-strategic cooperation has helped it diversify its dependence and sustain pressure on its sovereignty by the US and continues to do so.

The Pakistan-China relationship has been tested at some occasions. Ups and downs in the Pakistan-China relationship, such as the Kargil conflict with India in 1999 (Kabraji 2012), and the ‘issue of Chinese Uighur separatists receiving sanctuary and training on Pakistani territory’ (Curtis 2009), along with the growth of unprecedented economic relations with India (BBC News 2010) have questioned the longevity and strength of Pakistan-China relations. However, recent developments, if anything, suggest that the two states remain strategically aligned in protecting their interests against India; and that will not change soon. For instance ‘over half of China’s arms exports – namely, 55% – in the 2008–2012 period were to Pakistan’ (Siddique 2014, 36). Two nuclear power complexes are scheduled to be completed by 2015 and 2016 (Ibid) for which China granted Pakistan $6.5 billion, in January 2014 (Ersan 2015). Pakistan has also signed many multimillion dollar deals with China, ‘including deals for F-22P frigate, AWACS aircraft, JF-17 Thunder and FC-20 aircraft’ (Fazl-e-Haider 2013). These developments highlight the consistency in China-Pakistan relations. Pakistan’s increased leaning towards China for defence commodities demonstrate that its years of unilateral dependence on the US are almost over as it has to quite an extent diversified its defence capabilities and with the trade with China at a record high, Pakistan might not feel the alienation once the US is strategically disinterested in the region again and consequently it might not feel the pressures on its sovereignty that might arise as a result.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has analysed in great detail the international politics of Pakistan’s conditional sovereignty by a comparative analysis of Pakistan-US relations during the Cold War (1979-88) and the War on Terror (1999-08). The analysis demonstrated the veracity of three arguments. Firstly, it demonstrated that US conditions on Pakistan’s sovereignty fluctuate with whether the US is strategically interested in Pakistan or not. In both cases, whether it is interested and when it is not, different sets of conditions are applied to Pakistan’s sovereignty. Secondly, US global values such as nuclear non-proliferation, democracy and human rights are overridden by more immediate US strategic concerns. Hence, given the importance of the normative value of state failure in US policy and its absence in the War on Terror as a condition Pakistan’s sovereignty, it is expected that the norm will come to dominate the conditions on Pakistan’s sovereignty when the US is not strategically interested.
Lastly, Pakistan remains captured by an India-centric security which then defines the contours of its sovereignty. Thus it may be expected that, once US is strategically interested in Pakistan and applies conditions to Pakistan’s sovereignty with regards to its state failure, which may be based on a flexible understanding of state sovereignty, Pakistan’s security centric understanding of sovereignty will become more resilient to US demands. This may provide to be a greater source of tension between Pakistan and US than ever before.
Chapter 7: CONCLUSION

This study set out to explore the international politics of Pakistan’s sovereignty through a comparative analysis of Pakistan-US relations during the Cold War (1979-88) and the War on Terror (2001-08). The thesis also sought to understand whether the end of the Cold War restructured, reshaped and reconfigured US attitudes towards Pakistan when caught up in a new geo-political conflict, namely the War on Terror. In the course, this thesis makes an original contribution to the existing body of literature on three accounts. Firstly, the thesis is a pioneering effort to comparatively analyse Pakistan-US relations, during the Cold War and the War on Terror, from the prism of Pakistan’s state sovereignty. While earlier the scant literature on Pakistan’s sovereignty was limited to the economics of foreign aid (Rehman 2005), theology and the Pakistani state constitution (Ahmed 1960; Ahmed 2009), it is only recently, after 9/11, that Pakistan’s political sovereignty has come under international scrutiny. The current debates on Pakistan’s state sovereignty centre around US drone attacks in Pakistan (Paust 2010; Shah 2010), cross-border US incursions in Pakistan (Deeks 2011; Hussain & Soherwordi 2011; Murphy 2008) and Pakistan’s internal turmoil (Fair 2011). However, there is an absence of scholarship which address questions such as: 1) How do the Pakistani state elites view Pakistan’s state sovereignty? What factors motivate Pakistan’s interpretation of its state sovereignty? Given the recent introduction of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ norm in the UN charter and the change in the US locus of threat from stronger states to weaker ones, has Pakistani state’s conception of its state sovereignty transformed correspondingly? By addressing these questions, the thesis has sought to fill the gap in the literature, since the literature remains silent on whether Pakistani state’s sovereignty has transformed, given that the concept of state sovereignty has transformed internationally, from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era.

Secondly, in an effort to analyse the factors that sustain the Pakistani state’s understanding of its sovereignty, the thesis sought to investigate the role of the Pakistani academia in interpreting state sovereignty. This is an original contribution to the existing literature on state sovereignty. While the state of Pakistani academia has been explored before (Inayatullah et al. 2005), however this study is the first of its kind since it uses primary data, imported and compiled from the Higher Education Commission of Pakistan, to explore the
role of the Pakistani academia in sustaining the Pakistani state’s understanding of its state sovereignty.

Thirdly, the thesis makes an original contribution to the discourse on Pakistan’s state failure. Here again, the scholarship on Pakistan’s state failure has largely been shaped outside Pakistan. Most of the literature is grounded in western perspectives on state failure and is disconnected from the discourse on state sovereignty (Fair 2010a; Masud et al. 2013; Kux 2001; Ziring 2010; Hehir 2007a; Wise 2004; Abbas 2009). This thesis has sought to understand the Pakistani state’s perspective on its international status as a failing state and hence investigated the extent to which the western view of state failure has permeated into the state’s understanding of state failure. It further explored Pakistan’s failing status within the framework of the Pakistani state’s understanding of its state sovereignty. Thus the thesis provides a fresh perspective on Pakistan’s state failure through the lens of the Pakistani state officials who were personally interviewed for this thesis. A synthesis of the aforementioned contributions to the existing body of literature on Pakistan’s state sovereignty and its state failure thus provides us with a wholesome picture of Pakistan’s sovereignty.

This thesis begun by seeking an enquiry around four research questions. The first question enquired if Pakistan’s sovereignty, correspondingly, transformed from the Cold War to the post-Cold War in face of the recent introduction of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ norm in the UN charter. The thesis argued that this is not the case. Pakistan continues to hinge on its traditional rigid understanding of political sovereignty, which was a characteristic of the Cold War. Thus the change in the discourse on sovereignty internationally has not affected Pakistan, whose state elites’ views on sovereignty remain circumscribed by a narrow understanding of security. This security centric interpretation of its sovereignty is embedded in the nature of the Pakistani state’s evolution, as we observed in Chapter 3. The emergence and subsequently the dominance of the Pakistan Army as a powerful actor in Pakistan’s politics has helped maintain and continues to limit Pakistan’s perception of its sovereignty in interpreting it strictly in security terms.

Since its inception, Pakistan faced existential territorial threats both on the domestic and the regional front. On the domestic front, separatist movements such as those in the NWFP province (now Pakhtunkhwa) and Balochistan were amongst the prominent threats while on the regional front it was India’s regional hegemony and the perception that it posed an existential threat which contributed towards Pakistan’s security centric understanding of
sovereignty. In a parallel development, the ineffectiveness of the civilian governments and Pakistan’s political parties, to mitigate these security issues politically and their inability in enhancing good governance, provided the military space to enhance its political role in the affairs of the state. Since the military had always been more concerned with defending its territorial sovereignty and geared towards providing military solutions to political problems, hence, most of the national resources were then channelled towards the development of the military to the detriment of the development sectors. Considering then that the military in Pakistan has ruled the state for more than 30 years of its existence and further, considering that for the military, domestic and international threats were viewed as threats to the security of the state which required military solutions, the state sovereignty of Pakistan became strictly encoded in security terms.

As we observed in earlier chapters, during the Cold War, state sovereignty remained a ‘no-go’ area, however after the end of the Cold War, the humanitarian interventions of the 1990s and the attack on US soil on 9/11, reconfigured the idea of state sovereignty to incorporate the phenomenon of state failure. This reconfiguration did not happen in Pakistan. This is because the state apparatus and the academia have largely ignored this international development and continues to define state sovereignty through its understanding of security, as characteristic of the Cold War era. This thesis pioneers in exploring how the Pakistani academia remained complicit with the military in defining state sovereignty, strictly through the prism of security. This is because there is a substantial crossover of military and civilian bureaucrats into the Pakistani academia, which subsequently channels research in the direction that conforms to the Pakistani states’ security agendas. Thus, even intellectual inputs conform to the state’s understanding of its sovereignty. Considering that the military remains the dominant actor in Pakistan’s politics and alternate sites of intellectual debates on state sovereignty, such as the academia, continues to share the military’s understanding of state sovereignty, hence Pakistan’s sovereignty has not transformed from the Cold War to the post-Cold War and continues to be defined by its security perceptions.

This understanding of Pakistan’s sovereignty was important for the thesis because without understanding Pakistan’s conception of its sovereignty, the military’s role in defining it and the situations and circumstances that have worked towards embedding it in the collective imagination of the state, we cannot progress to understand how Pakistan views its sovereignty in the face of US demands, its resilience or acquiesce to these demands, and the dynamic of interaction within these two states during the Cold War and the post-Cold War world.
Secondly the thesis posed whether the change in US threat perception, from being threatened more by weaker states than by stronger ones, transformed Pakistan-US relations? Especially, considering that Pakistan is the weaker state. Thus as the locus of threat, in the US political imagination, changed from stronger states during the Cold War, to weaker ones in the War on Terror, Pakistan’s status in US policy calculus correspondingly changed, from being part of the solution to being part of the problem. The thesis analysed Pakistan-US relations during the Cold War and the War on Terror by looking through the lens of Pakistan’s nuclear activities, human rights and democracy. Judging from the empirical evidence presented in chapter 5 and 6, the thesis argues that US immediate strategic interests, during the Cold War, dominated other considerations such as nuclear proliferation, human rights and democracy, and this pattern of US engagement with Pakistan continued during the War on Terror. Thus the thesis argues that when the US is not strategically interested in an alliance with Pakistan, normative interests such as nuclear proliferation, human rights and democracy remain a pivotal concern of the US with respect to Pakistan. However once the US is strategically interested in Pakistan, its immediate strategic interests dominate its relations with Pakistan, an argument that has historic resonance (Chomsky 2007, 87). The thesis argues that given Pakistan’s status as a failing state during the War on Terror, once the US strategically disengages from the region, Pakistan’s state failure will become another normative interest alongwith Pakistan’s nuclear activity, its human rights and democracy, which will dominate Pakistan-US relations.

Another reason why the thesis argues that Pakistan-US relations did not transform, given the change in US threat perception, from being threatened more by weaker states than by stronger ones, is because the US foreign assistance strategy designed for weaker states do not correspond with the empirical realities in Pakistan; given that Pakistan is a failing state. The US foreign assistance strategy emphasize upon measures to improve governance and institutional infrastructures to alleviate conditions in weaker states which contribute towards a threat to the US. However such a strategy, in Pakistan, remains unevident. Thus, during the War on Terror, the flow of US aid to Pakistan demonstrate that the it was used as a strategic tool, rather than an instrument to address Pakistan’s weak governance. Further, patterns of military and economic aid to Pakistan during the War on Terror (2001-08) resonate strongly with the patterns of the Cold War (1981-88). This demonstrates that the US foreign assistance during the Cold War, which was based on a realpolitik model, has not evolved in the War on terror. Thus the thesis debunks the argument that US foreign assistance now is based on
humanitarian reasons centred on alleviating conditions in weaker states that make these states ‘incubators of terrorism’.

Thirdly, since US has traditionally kept Pakistan’s sovereignty conditional to its demands, by withholding and releasing US foreign aid as it suited its convenience, the thesis investigated whether this circumstance has changed? The thesis concludes that the pattern of US conditions on Pakistan’s sovereignty has not changed. Pakistan has, historically relied on US foreign aid to contribute towards the growth of both its military and its economy, in an effort to counter India in the region. Further, considering that Pakistan’s security centric understanding of state sovereignty is predominantly motivated by its fear of Indian aggression, in that case then, withholding US aid enhances Pakistan’s security fears. Given that the US has traditionally nurtured Pakistan’s dependence on its foreign aid, it continues to use foreign aid as a tool to condition Pakistan’s sovereignty and hence elicit its acquiescence in conforming to US interests. Thus, when the US is not strategically interested, it withholds foreign aid to Pakistan and applies conditions on Pakistan’s sovereignty by laying emphasis on Pakistan’s nuclear activities, its human rights and democracy record. However, once the US is strategically interested in Pakistan, there is a substantial increase in US foreign aid to Pakistan and the conditions on Pakistan’s sovereignty change from nuclear proliferation, human rights and democracy to more immediate strategic concerns.

The thesis reveals that while Pakistan defended its sovereignty rigorously during the Cold War however that was not true of the War on Terror. This was because during the Cold War, Pakistan was part of the solution to contain Soviet expansionism however during the War on Terror, Pakistan was part of the problem to contain global terrorism. Secondly, unlike the Cold War, from the beginning of the War on Terror, there was an imminent danger that if Pakistan did not ally with the US, India would offer its services. Considering that Pakistan had always sought US alliance primarily to counter Indian hegemony in the region, the prospect of a US-India alliance, bore immense pressure on its sovereignty by threatening its security. Thirdly, Pakistan had nurtured the Taliban in Afghanistan during the 1990s as an extension of its India centric security policy. The US policy in Afghanistan to counter the Taliban included favouring and supporting anti-Taliban forces. For Pakistan, this automatically played into the hands of India. As observed in chapter 6, this induced substantial strains in Pakistan-US relations. However, given the US emphasis on the war on Terror, Pakistan remained unable to defend its state sovereignty at various occasions.
Lastly, considering that internationally Pakistan is viewed as a failing/fragile state, the thesis examined how the Pakistani state viewed this development in light of its state sovereignty? The question this thesis has sought to answer is not whether Pakistan is a failed/failing state or not, but what is its importance in US policy discourse and how do the Pakistani state elites view Pakistan’s international image of its state failure. In a series of elite interviews conducted for this thesis, few elites argued that Pakistan was a failing state and not a failed one. Their arguments for Pakistan’s state failure differed substantially from international accounts as we observed in chapter 6. Others argued that Pakistan was neither failing nor failed and that state failure represented an international tool of applying pressure on the Pakistani state. These divergent views of the Pakistani elite on Pakistan’s international status as a failing state demonstrates a lack of conceptual clarity of the state elites on what constitutes state failure. In that case then, it can be asserted that the Pakistani state does not view its state failure status as a threat to its state sovereignty because if that had been the case, the interviewees would have demonstrated a coherence and an in-depth understanding of the dynamics of Pakistan’s state failure, as they do when questioned about Pakistan’s security and its link with India, which drives Pakistan’s understanding of its state sovereignty. Further, as we observed in chapter 3, the complete absence of any mention or research of Pakistan’s sovereignty and state failure in policy literature emanating from policy institutions, which work under state patronage, demonstrates that the Pakistani state does not consider Pakistan’s status as a failed state an important factor to consider in its international relations.

The confusion amongst international scholars and local elites, as to what constitutes Pakistan’s state failure and whether it is a failed state or not, makes the concept quite unworkable. Lastly, given that the US had put failed states at the centre of its international agenda, the volume of foreign aid in Pakistan earmarked for development, which was almost marginal, demonstrates that for the US even, Pakistan’s state failure is not as big an issue as is often projected. Thus the thesis argues that Pakistan’s state failure status is a formidable tool of power in the hands of the US to pressurize Pakistan on issues that might be in US interest but be detrimental to Pakistan’s state sovereignty. Thus Pakistan’s status as a failed state can be used to condition its sovereignty when it is desired in the future.

The thesis took a historical-comparative case study approach to the comparative study of Pakistan-US relations during the Cold War and the War on Terror, employing quantitative
and qualitative tools such as US foreign aid data, declassified documents and elite interviewing for its investigation and built the research around six chapters.

The second chapter, initially, begun with an exploration of sovereignty in Third World states. It argued that Third World states have become increasingly staunch in their protection of their sovereignty. This was because sovereignty for Third World states represented a barrier against external interference in their domestic matters. However, during the Cold War, the Third World became the battlefield for the ideological confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union. During this time the US intervened in states, directly and indirectly, to keep them conformed to its ideals and goals. However the end of the Cold War, heralded a new era of unipolarity and the 1990s witnessed state failure becoming a major humanitarian concern. It was after 9/11 that the US identified weaker states, rather than the stronger as the main threat to its security. Hence state failure became a major focus of international policy makers. During the Cold War, US foreign aid was provided purely for realpolitik reasons, during the War on Terror, it should have been provided for development purposes focused on human rights, as emphasized in the literature on cosmopolitanism and state failure. The first chapter thus identified the theoretical parameters of the study and provided a literature overview on state sovereignty, cosmopolitanism and state failure.

The third chapter chronicled the Pakistani state’s evolution and explored how and why Pakistan remains caught in a security centric interpretation of its sovereignty. This was important for the thesis because Pakistan’s conditional sovereignty in the face of US demands cannot be investigated unless we know how Pakistan views its sovereignty. This chapter helped us understand the dynamics of sovereign interaction between the US and Pakistan and to seek whether these dynamics have changed overtime. Secondly, studying the rise and dominance of the military to power in Pakistan’s politics not only allowed us to observe how Pakistan’s security centric idea of sovereignty took shape but also enabled us to understand how deeply entrenched this idea is, not only in the policies of state, but in the population imagination as a whole. The chapter argues that without understanding Pakistan’s conception of its sovereignty, the military’s role in defining it and the situations and circumstances that have worked towards embedding it in the collective imagination of the state, we cannot progress to understand how Pakistan views its sovereignty in the face of US demands, its resilience or acquiesce to these demands, and the dynamic of interaction within these two states during the Cold War and the post-Cold War world.
The fourth chapter provided a detailed overview of Pakistan-US relations between 1979 and 1988. The chapter demonstrated that the US used Pakistan’s historical dependency on its military and economic assistance to apply conditions on Pakistan’s sovereignty, depending on the circumstances of the Pakistan-US relations. Thus when the US was not strategically interested in South Asia, and consequentially Pakistan, different sets of issues such as nuclear proliferation, democracy and human rights became conditions on Pakistan’s sovereignty and these conditions were exercised by withholding US assistance to Pakistan. However, once the US became intrinsically involved in the War in Afghanistan, more immediate strategic concerns such as troop deployment and provision of bases became conditions on Pakistan’s sovereignty since the US had provided substantial assistance. Thus the provision of foreign assistance became tools to make Pakistan’s sovereignty conditional to US demands. This was also observed in the case of US foreign aid when US aid was more attached to US strategic interests rather than having any altruistic motives. This chapter determined that US immediate strategic interests, during the Cold War, dominated other considerations such as nuclear proliferation, human rights and democracy. The chapter thus provided an empirical base to test whether the transformation of global politics after the end of the Cold War, equally transformed the nature of Pakistan-US relationship.

The fifth chapter explored the contours of US conditions on Pakistan’s sovereignty before and after the commencement of the War on Terror by looking at Pakistan’s nuclear activities, democracy and human rights and by analysing Pakistan’s state failure status, which is a new global development in relation to the Cold War. The chapter demonstrated that while before the War on Terror commenced, Pakistan was subjected to conditions on its sovereignty in a stark continuity with the early years of General Zia-ul-Haq, as we had observed in the previous chapter. However once the War on Terror commenced, the US successfully used Pakistan’s historic security centric understanding of its sovereignty to apply conditions on Pakistan’s sovereignty. These conditions manifested themselves not only in Pakistan’s acquiescing to ally with the US in the War on Terror but also in more immediate strategic considerations such as violations of Pakistan’s territorial sovereignty by drone attacks and the placement of troops and acquiring bases within Pakistan. Thus while the emphasis on Pakistan’s nuclear non-proliferation, democracy and human rights subsided after the commencement of the War on terror, Pakistan could not successfully defend its sovereignty against US in the aftermath. Thus as we had observed earlier, US strategic interests
dominated Pakistan-US relations and US conditions on Pakistan’s sovereignty worked in favour of the US.

The sixth chapter analysed in great detail the international politics of Pakistan’s conditional sovereignty by a comparative analysis of Pakistan-US relations during the Cold War (1979-88) and the War on Terror (1999-08). The analysis demonstrated the veracity of three arguments. Firstly, it demonstrated that US conditions on Pakistan’s sovereignty fluctuate with whether the US is strategically interested in Pakistan or not. In both cases, whether it is interested and when it is not, different sets of conditions are applied to Pakistan’s sovereignty. Secondly, US global values such as nuclear non-proliferation, democracy and human rights are overridden by more immediate US strategic concerns. Hence, given the importance of the normative value of state failure in US policy and its absence in the War on Terror as a condition Pakistan’s sovereignty, it is expected that the norm will come to dominate the conditions on Pakistan’s sovereignty when the US is not strategically interested. Lastly, Pakistan remains captured by an India-centric security which then defines the contours of its sovereignty. Thus it may be expected that, once US is strategically interested in Pakistan and applies conditions to Pakistan’s sovereignty with regards to its state failure, which may be based on a flexible understanding of state sovereignty, Pakistan’s security centric understanding of sovereignty will become more resilient to US demands. This may provide to be a greater source of tension between Pakistan and US than ever before.

The thesis suffered limitations on two accounts. Firstly, the elite interviews were conducted during the time period in which Pakistan-US relations had touched new lows following a series events which included US unilateral action to capture Osama bin Laden and the blockade by Pakistan of NATO supply lines through its territory in response to US indiscriminate fire on one of the Pakistani outposts on Pakistan-Afghan border. During this time, many of the elites declined the invitation to be interviewed. While elite interviews already consist of a small sample, this further reduced the number of prospective interviews. Secondly, declassified documents from the US National Security Archives were only available upto September 2001. Thus for the rest of the period spanning 2002-08, the thesis had to utilize secondary sources which included newspaper articles, published interviews and secondary literature sources.

This thesis set out to explore Pakistan’s state sovereignty from the Pakistani state’s perspective. Considering the scarcity and the limited research that covers Pakistan’s state
sovereignty and its state failure, the thesis sought to introduce a new dimension to the existing debates i.e. the perspective of Pakistani state on its state sovereignty and state failure. However, much is yet to be explored in this dimension. This thesis thus provides a solid foundation for future research on Pakistan’s state sovereignty.
## APPENDIX I

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<td>Academic (Director)</td>
<td>Journal of European Studies</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**W Category**

Journals having an Impact Factor of ISI and included in Journal Citation Report (JCR) of ISI web of knowledge.

**X Category**

Journals not having an Impact Factor and verified by HEC, that they meet all HEC journal criteria and have paper reviewed by at least one expert from an academically advanced country in the respective discipline.

**Y Category**

Journals not having an Impact Factor and they meet all HEC journal criteria except review of each paper by at least one expert from an academically advanced country in the respective discipline.
APPENDIX II

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION MEMORANDUM

March 17, 1979

SECRET/NODIS

TO:     P - Mr. Benson

THRU:   T - Lucy Wilson Benson

FROM:   L - Herbert J. Hansel

Pakistan and the Symington Amendment

There is now convincing evidence that Pakistan has received enrichment equipment since August 1977. Section 669 of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) (the Symington amendment) prohibits us from providing Pakistan with further assistance of the kinds covered by the amendment. This memorandum describes the assistance programs covered by the Symington amendment, and proposes steps to terminate them in an orderly way.

Affected Assistance

The Symington amendment (Tab A) applies to the use of funds appropriated (i) under the FAA for economic, supporting, or military assistance, or military education and training or (ii) under the Arms Export Control Act for credits or guarantees. The affected programs in Pakistan are development assistance and military training (IMET).

We have interpreted the Symington amendment as prohibiting new obligations, but not as preventing the disbursement of funds already obligated.

Tab B shows A.I.D.'s current portfolio of development assistance projects for Pakistan. Each project has been reviewed in light of the Symington amendment.

Costs for IMET (approximately $600,000 in FY 79) are obligated on the basis of participation by individual students in courses -- i.e., usually when an armed service issues the invitational travel orders for a particular participant. IMET obligations are incurred pursuant to
APPENDIX III

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION MEMORANDUM

Oct. 18, 1977

SECRET

NODIS

TO: The Secretary

THRU: D - Mr. Christopher
       P - Mr. Habib
       T - Mrs. Benson

FROM: NEA - Alfred L. Atherton, Jr.
       EUR - George S. Vest (G/N)

SUBJECT: The Nuclear Reprocessing Issue with Pakistan and France: Whether to resume Aid to Pakistan

ISSUES FOR DECISION

(1) Whether to continue deferral of development aid to Pakistan for the time being, and (2) approval of instructions to Ambassadors Himmel and Hartman for approaches to the Governments of Pakistan and France respectively.

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

You will recall that in connection with the October 7 bilateral with Pakistan Foreign Secretary Agha Shahi, you asked us to look into the question of resuming development aid for Pakistan.

There have been a number of developments that relate to the broader reprocessing question, which also require decisions on how we proceed in both Paris and Islamabad. The Department officers and NSC staffs concerned with this issue met last week to review the situation.
France:

As you know, the Pakistanis have rejected the French offer of a restructured reprocessing plant, thus highlighting their desire for plutonium for which there is no economic justification. We consider this a potentially positive development, since the French now seem more fully persuaded of the need to get out of the contract. They have said privately that they will transfer no more sensitive equipment and will consider “non-sensitive” transfers only after the Pakistanis sign off on two other pending commercial deals.

The French continue to stress the need to hold information on their present posture very closely, presumably out of concern for possible domestic repercussions in France. We consider it important to respect the French wishes for confidentiality, but we believe it likely that there will be leaks in Pakistan fairly soon on the French proposal and the holdup of transfers.

The French are now grappling with the question of how to get out of their contract. They would almost certainly prefer to delay any decision until after their March elections. They have suggested that the next move is up to the U.S., noting that we may have means of influencing Pakistan possibly through military assistance. Ambassador Hartman, however, recalls that DeGuiringaud in his earlier conversation said that if the Pakistanis rejected the French proposal, this would be sufficient excuse for cancellation. The Ambassador recommends that we press the French on this and not allow them to put the ball back in our court. In any event, our leverage in Islamabad on this issue is very limited. Draft instructions for Ambassador Hartman which follow his recommendations are attached.

Pakistan:

The elections in Pakistan have been postponed for at least eight months and perhaps longer. Although General Zia has put a lid on political party...
November 15, 1979

TO: The Secretary

FROM: S/AS - Gerard Smith

Consultations in Europe on Pakistan

At your direction, I discussed Pakistan with Foreign Ministers and other senior officials during my recent trip to Europe for post-INFCE explorations. I reported that during the Agha Shali visit to Washington the US had foreshadowed a drastic change in relations should Pakistan test a nuclear device. I asked governments to consider making similar statements to Pakistan.

A summary of responses in capitals is attached. There seems to be little enthusiasm in Europe to emulate our position with Pakistan. Nor is there optimism in Europe that any combination of available disincentives or incentives will influence Pakistan's nuclear course. It is remembered that the US and Europe did not "punish" India in 1974. It was also not helpful that my visits to Bonn, Paris and London were preceded by those of Hua Guofeng, who preached the need to bolster Pakistan as a barrier to Soviet adventurism in the region.

Attachment:

As Stated

CC: NSC - Dr. Brzezinski
    D - Mr. Christopher
    P - Mr. Newsom
    NEA - Mr. Saunders

SECRET
GDS 11/16/85
West Germany. Genscher was non-committal, believed the Pakistani government should be supported, and stressed the importance of equal treatment with India. He mentioned that Hua Guofeng, recently in Bonn, had advised against a tough line because of Pakistan's importance in the anti-Soviet structure in the region. The Federal Republic plans to increase economic aid by 10%. Count Lambsdorff took the line that "embracing" and not "denial" was the best hope for nonproliferation.

France. Francois-Poncet was non-committal. Minister of Industry Andre Giraud said that so far France had been the only nation other than the US to take concrete action against Pakistan (halting reprocessing cooperation); others should now pitch in.

United Kingdom. Sir Michael Palliser cited the line of support for Pakistan which Hua Guofeng had also presented in London and surmised that it was a general position behind which the Chinese are cautioning the Pakistanis. Peter Blaker responded similarly and spoke of the need for mutual restraint in the region. Other foreign office officials doubted that the available "sticks" and "carrots" would have much effect, and believed that the solution to the Pakistani problem lay in India.

Netherlands. Van der Klaauw assured his support for nonproliferation, but would have to consult with his colleagues on any statement to the Pakistanis along the line of the US statement.
Chris:

Herewith Tom Pickering's ideas on where we should now go with Pakistan. This paper is being cleared around. I gather David Newsom generally agrees with it.

The paper basically proposes an audacious buy-off, premised on the "need" to maintain Pakistan's stability and security. That need is not analyzed or questioned, however, and I think it ought to be before we take the kind of plunge this memo suggests.

A.C.U.
Steve

Chris - This is wrong. David thinks this memo should be "killed."
As it is not capable of
pursing a nuclear option

We are committed to not using
nuclear weapons
APPENDIX VIII

-- AS THE PRC IS AWARE, WE HAVE IMPRESSED UPON THE INDIANS OUR VIEW THAT A SOLUTION TO THE PAKISTAN NUCLEAR PROBLEM IS UNLIKELY WITHOUT INDIAN PARTICIPATION. WE BELIEVE SOME SORT OF A REGIONAL ARRANGEMENT OFFERS THE BEST HOPE. WE HAVE FURTHER SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS AN INDO-PAK JOINT COMMITMENT NOT TO USE OR DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS COULD BE THE FIRST STEP IN THIS DIRECTION. SENIOR INDIAN LEADERS HAVE REJECTED THIS SUGGESTION AS WELL AS THE CONCEPT OF A NUCLEAR FREE ZONE.

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 158902

-- AMBASSADOR HUMBEL AND OUR CHARGE IN ISLAMABAD HAVE HAD SEVERAL MEETINGS WITH, AT WHICH THE NUCLEAR ISSUE WAS DISCUSSED IN DETAIL. ON APRIL 21 WE PROPOSED AN INTERIM ARRANGEMENT UNDER WHICH PAKISTAN WOULD AGREE TO LIMIT ITS URANIUM ENRICHMENT ACTIVITIES TO A RESEARCH SCALE PROGRAM AND CONSISTENT WITH ITS TRILATERAL AGREEMENT WITH FRANCE AND THE IAEA WOULD ACCEPT SAFEGUARDS ON ALL REPROCESSING ACTIVITY IN RETURN FOR A RESUMPTION OF OUR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF SENDING SOME RECIPROCAL RESPONSE FROM THE INDIANS.

-- AS THE PRC IS AWARE, OUR LEGISLATION AND OUR POLICIES PREVENT US FROM PROVIDING SIGNIFICANT ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN AS LONG AS IT IS CONDUCTING A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE PROGRAM. WE WOULD LIKE TO BE MORE SUPPORTIVE OF PAKISTAN PARTICULARLY GIVEN THE SOVIET INTRUSION INTO AFGHANISTAN AND THE HIGHLY UNSTABLE SITUATION IN IRAN. WE HAVE OFFERED TO MAKE A SERIOUS DEMARCHE TO THE SOVIET UNION ON BEHALF OF PAKISTAN REMINDING THE USSR OF THE 1959 US-PAK BILATERAL AGREEMENT.

-- WHILE OUR SUSPENSION OF AID AND THE PUBLICITY IT HAS BEEN GIVEN HAVE DISTRESSED THE PAKISTANS, WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO CONTINUE A DIALOGUE WITH THEM ON THE BROAD RANGE OF OUR RELATIONS, INCLUDING THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM.
UNCLASSIFIED

APPENDIX IX

O R 300123Z JAN 80
TO AMBASSADORS IMMEDIATE
AMBASSADOR BOGN IMMEDIATE
AMBASSADOR BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
AMBASSADOR CANBERRA IMMEDIATE
AMBASSADOR LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMBASSADOR MADRID IMMEDIATE
AMBASSADOR OSLO IMMEDIATE
AMBASSADOR OTTAWA IMMEDIATE
AMBASSADOR PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMBASSADOR ROME IMMEDIATE
AMBASSADOR STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE
AMBASSADOR THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE
AMBASSADOR TOKYO IMMEDIATE

Page - 1
E.O. 12055 GDS 01-28-80

TAGS: MNUC, PARM, MARR, PK

SUBJECT: U.S. NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY AND RENEWED ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN

1. [REDACTED] ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ACTION ADDRESSEES SHOULD TAKE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS AT APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF HOST GOVERNMENTS:

-- THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN HAS CREATED A SERIOUS THREAT TO THE STATES OF THERSUHANIA REGION, PARTICULARLY PAKISTAN. PRESIDENT CARTER HAS ANNOUNCED THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD PROVIDE MILITARY EQUIPMENT, FOOD AND OTHER ASSISTANCE TO HELP PAKISTAN DEFEND ITS INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY.

-- THE ADMINISTRATION PLANS TO SEEK URGENT CONGRESSIONAL

PAGE 03 STATE 025686

APPROVAL FOR A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF ECONOMIC AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN OVER THE NEXT 18 MONTHS. WE VIEW THIS ASSISTANCE AS PART OF A LARGER MULTILATERAL EFFORT TO HELP PAKISTAN AT THIS CRITICAL TIME.

-- WE ARE TAKING THIS EXTRAORDINARY ACTION IN VIEW OF THE REAL AND IMMEDIATE THREAT TO PAKISTAN'S SECURITY. I WISH TO EMPHASIZE THAT U.S. GLOBAL NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY IS UNCHANGED AND THAT THE DECISION TO RENEW ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN IN NO WAY DIMINISHES THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO PREVENTING THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES CAPABILITIES.

-- A PAKISTANI NUCLEAR TEST WOULD HAVE SERIOUS REPERCUSSIONS IN THE SOUTH ASIA REGION AND ELSEWHERE. IT WOULD FURTHER DESTABILIZE A REGION WHICH IS ALREADY HIGHLY UNSTABLE. WE HAVE INFORMED THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN THAT A NUCLEAR TEST WOULD HAVE DRASTIC CONSEQUENCES FOR OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. WE WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS THE PAKISTANIS ON THIS ISSUE AND ON OUR VIEW THAT IT IS IN PAKISTAN'S OWN BEST INTEREST TO ABANDON ITS NUCLEAR ENRICHMENT AND REPROCESSING PROGRAMS AND OTHER INFERNITIVE NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES.

-- IN THE PAST YEAR, THE U.S. HAS CONSULTED WITH YOUR GOVERNMENT REGARDING OUR CONCERNS OVER PAKISTAN'S SENSITIVE...
APPENDIX X

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

PAGE 01

ISLAMABAD 05087 01 OF 03 1310552

ACTION NODS-00

INFO LOG-00 CCO-00 SAS-00 /000W

O 131023Z SEP 01

FM AMBASSAD Y ISLAMABAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 8955

SECRET SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 005087

NOTE

REVIEW AUTHORITY: APPEALS REVIEW PANEL
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET REASON: 1.4(D), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 12 SEP 2016
APPEAL ACTION: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELEASED
REASON(S): B1, 1.4(D), 1.4(D)
DATE/CASE ID: 11 SEP 2005 2696049900

B.O. 12958: DECL: 9/13/11
TAGS: PRL, PK, US, FTR

SUBJECT: MUSHARRAF: "WE ARE WITH YOU IN YOUR
ACTION PLAN IN AFGHANISTAN"

REFS: (A) STATE 157813 (NODIS) (B) ISLAMABAD
5047 (NODIS) (C) SISON-OP CENTER TELECON 1455
9/13/01

CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR WENDY CHAMBERLIN FOR
REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

1. SUMMARY. IN A FORTY-MINUTE MEETING
FOLLOWING THE AMBASSADOR’S CREDENTIALS
PRESENTATION, PRESIDENT MUSHARRAF TOLD THE

AMBASSADOR THAT PAKISTAN WAS "WITH YOU IN AN
ACTION PLAN FOR AFGHANISTAN." HE EMPHASIZED
SEVERAL TIMES THAT PAKISTAN "HAD BEEN A FRONT
LINE STATE IN THE PAST AND WOULD BE A FRONT LINE
STATE AGAIN." THE AMBASSADOR TOLD MUSHARRAF
BLUNTLY THAT THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS HAD CHANGED
THE FUNDAMENTALS OF DEBATE. THERE WAS NO
INCLINATION IN WASHINGTON TO ENGAGE IN A DIALOG
WITH THE TALIBAN. PAKISTAN NEEDED TO "ACT WITH
THE UNITED STATES -- NOT TO URGE DIALOG BUT TO
ACT." MUSHARRAF STATED EMPHATICALLY TO THE
AMBASSADOR THAT "WE ARE TOGETHER IN THIS." ACTION
REQUEST PARA 13. END SUMMARY.

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

PAGE 02

ISLAMABAD 05087 01 OF 03 1310552

AMBASSADOR THAT PAKISTAN WAS "WITH YOU IN AN
ACTION PLAN FOR AFGHANISTAN." HE EMPHASIZED
SEVERAL TIMES THAT PAKISTAN "HAD BEEN A FRONT
LINE STATE IN THE PAST AND WOULD BE A FRONT LINE
STATE AGAIN." THE AMBASSADOR TOLD MUSHARRAF
BLUNTLY THAT THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS HAD CHANGED
THE FUNDAMENTALS OF DEBATE. THERE WAS NO
INCLINATION IN WASHINGTON TO ENGAGE IN A DIALOG
WITH THE TALIBAN. PAKISTAN NEEDED TO "ACT WITH
THE UNITED STATES -- NOT TO URGE DIALOG BUT TO
ACT." MUSHARRAF STATED EMPHATICALLY TO THE
AMBASSADOR THAT "WE ARE TOGETHER IN THIS." ACTION
REQUEST PARA 13. END SUMMARY.
FOLLOWING STATE 157813 DATED 130031Z SEP 01 SENT ACTION
ISLAMABAD BEING RELEASED FOR YOUR INFO:

QUOTE STATE 157813

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/21
TAGS: PREL, PK, US, PTER
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE'S MEETING WITH PAKISTAN
INTEL CHIEF MAHMUD: YOU'RE EITHER WITH US OR YOU'RE NOT

PAGE 02 STATE 157813 130217Z
(U) CLASSIFIED BY DEPUTY SECRETARY RICHARD ARMITAGE;
REASONS 1.5 (B AND D)

1. (U) 9/12/01, 11:00 AM, DEPUTY SECRETARY'S OFFICE

2. (U) PARTICIPANTS:

U.S.

DEPUTY SECRETARY
A/S CHRISTINA ROCCA
2/CT FRANK TAYLOR
SA DONALD CAMP
FURTHER WORD FROM THE UNITED STATES.

6. (S) DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE EXPRESSED THANKS FOR
THOSE WORDS, AND INDICATED WE MIGHT BE TESTING PRESIDENT
MUSHARRAF'S INSTRUCTIONS QUITE SOON. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY
HAD PLANNED TO GO TO CONGRESS THIS WEEK TO DISCUSS LIFTING
SANCTIONS ON BOTH INDIA AND PAKISTAN, BUT IT WAS NOW
UNCLEAR JUST WHEN WE WOULD BE ABLE TO GET BACK ON TRACK IN
VIEW OF YESTERDAY'S EVENTS.

7. (N) MR. ARMITAGE HAD A CLEAR MESSAGE TO PASS, ONE
WHICH HE WOULD ASK AMBASSADOR CHAMBERLIN TO DELIVER TO
PRESIDENT MUSHARRAF JUST AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. PAKISTAN
FACES A STARK CHOICE: EITHER IT IS WITH US OR IT IS NOT;
THIS WAS A BLACK-AND-WHITE CHOICE, WITH NO GREY. IT IS
QUITE PROBABLE THAT AL QAIDA AND USAMA BIN LADEN WOULD BE
FINGERED AS OUR INVESTIGATION CONTINUES. THE NOOSE WAS
TIGHTENING AROUND THEIR NECKS. THERE MAY BE MORE ACTS OF
TERRORISM IN THIS COUNTRY. THE CHOICE WAS CLEAR, MR.
ARMITAGE REITERATED.

8. (N) THE DEPUTY SECRETARY NOTED THAT BECAUSE OF THE
HEINOUS NATURE OF THIS CRIME, WE ARE RECEIVING VERY STRONG
SUPPORT ACROSS THE BOARD, WITH THE UN, WITHIN NATO, IN OUR
DISCUSSIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS AND OTHERS. WE ARE
CURRENTLY PLANNING WHAT WE ARE GOING TO DO. WE MAY SOON
TEST THE OFFER OF COOPERATION THAT PRESIDENT MUSHARRAF HAD
EXTENDED THROUGH GENERAL MAHMOOD THIS MORNING.

9. (N) MAHMOOD REPLIED THAT PAKISTAN HAS ALWAYS SEEN SUCH
MATTERS IN BLACK-AND-WHITE. IT HAS IN THE PAST BEEN
ACCUSED OF "BEING IN BED" WITH THOSE THREATENING U.S.

10. (N) MR. ARMITAGE INDICATED IT WAS STILL NOT CLEAR
WHAT MIGHT BE ASKED OF PAKISTAN BY THE U.S.
APPENDIX XII

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

PAGE 01

STATE 158711 140126Z

ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO LOG-00 CCOX-00 SAS-00 /000R

158711

SOURCE: KOYAKBE.014002
DRAFTED BY: S/A/FLAB:SMYOUNG:CLP -- 09/13/01 7-6711
APPROVED BY: D: THE DEPUTY SECRETARY
S/ES-0: VCRITES
O 140119Z SEP 01 ZFP4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE

SECRET

SECRETIONED

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/21
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PK, US
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE'S MEETING WITH GENERAL
MAREMUD: ACTIONS AND SUPPORT EXPECTED OF PAKISTAN IN FIGHT
AGAINST TERRORISM

REF: (A) STATE 157813, (B) ISLAMABAD 5087

CLASSIFIED BY DEPUTY SECRETARY RICHARD ARMITAGE; REASONS
1.5 (B AND D).

PAGE 02

STATE 158711 140126Z

1. (U) 09/13/01, 12:00 PM, DEPUTY SECRETARY'S OFFICE

2. (U) PARTICIPANTS:

U.S.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE
A/S CHRISTINA ROCCA
S/CT FRANK TAYLOR
SA/FLAB DIRECTOR YOUNG

PAKISTAN

UNCLASSIFIED
6. (S) BEGIN TEXT OF NONPAPER: SPECIFIC ACTIONS AND SUPPORT TO ADDRESS TERRORIST ATTACKS

-- STOP AL QAIDA OPERATIVES AT YOUR BORDER, INTERCEPT ARMS SHIPMENTS THROUGH PAKISTAN AND END ALL LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR BIN LADIN;

-- PROVIDE THE U.S. WITH BLANKET OVERFLIGHT AND LANDING RIGHTS TO CONDUCT ALL NECESSARY MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS;

-- PROVIDE AS NEEDED TERRITORIAL ACCESS TO U.S. AND ALLIED MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, AND OTHER PERSONNEL TO CONDUCT ALL NECESSARY OPERATIONS AGAINST THE PERPETRATORS OF TERRORISM OR THOSE THAT HARBOUR THEM, INCLUDING USE OF PAKISTAN'S NAVAL PORTS, AIRBASES AND STRATEGIC LOCATIONS ON BORDERS;

-- PROVIDE THE U.S. IMMEDIATELY WITH INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION, TO HELP PREVENT AND RESPOND TO TERRORIST ACTS PERPETRATED AGAINST THE U.S., ITS FRIENDS AND ALLIES;

-- CONTINUE TO PUBLICLY CONDEMN THE TERRORIST ACTS OF SEPTEMBER 11 AND ANY OTHER TERRORIST ACTS AGAINST THE U.S. OR ITS FRIENDS AND ALLIES;

-- CUT OFF ALL SHIPMENTS OF FUEL TO THE TALIBAN AND ANY SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED
7. (S) REPEATING HIS EARLIER STATEMENT THAT THE NOOSE WAS TIGHTENING AROUND BIN LADIN'S AND AL QAIDA'S NECK, MR. ARMITAGE SAID THIS INVOLVES NOT ONLY AFGHANISTAN, BUT WOULD ENCOMPASS TERRORIST GROUPS ELSEWHERE. HE NOTED PRESIDENT BUSH'S DESCRIPTION THAT AMERICANS WERE RESPONDING TO TUESDAY'S ATTACKS WITH UNYIELDING ANGER, AND ALSO NOTED WITH REGRET THAT THIS HAS SOMETIMES MANIFESTED ITSELF IN UGLY ATTACKS AGAINST MUSLIMS AND OTHERS IN THE U.S.

8. (S) MAHMUD RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT PAKISTAN'S POSITION WAS ABSOLUTELY CLEAR. IT STOOD WITH THE U.S. AGAINST THIS EVIL, WHICH HE INSISTED WAS NOT MUSLIM BEHAVIOR. ANYONE WHO BECOMES A TERRORIST HAS ABANDONED ISLAM AND MUST BE HUNTED DOWN. HE PROMISED TO PASS THE U.S. MESSAGE PROMPTLY TO HIS GOVERNMENT. HE THEN SUGGESTED THAT THE U.S. MIGHT WANT TO APPROACH THE ORGANIZATION OF ISLAMIC CONFERENCE (OIC) FOR STATEMENTS OF SECRET.

PAGE 06 STATE 158711 140126Z SUPPORT SIMILAR TO THOSE BEING COLLECTED FROM THE RU, NATO AND THE G-8. QATAR WAS CURRENTLY THE CHAIRMAN OF THIS ORGANIZATION, AND MIGHT BE APPROACHED. THE U.S. COULD ALSO TALK WITH THE OIC SECRETARIAT.

9. (S) MAHMUD THEN TOOK NOTE OF ATTACKS AGAINST PAKISTANIS AND OTHERS IN THE U.S. IN THE WAKE OF TUESDAY'S ATTACK, AND ASKED THE USG TO TAKE NECESSARY STEPS TO PREVENT SUCH INCIDENTS. MR. ARMITAGE TOOK THIS ISSUE VERY SERIOUSLY, AND NOTED THAT FORMER PRESIDENT BUSH HAD JUST BEEN ON CNN TO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF AVOIDING SUCH SENSELESS CLASHES.

10. (S) NOTING THAT HE HAD MET EARLIER THAT MORNING WITH JCS DEPUTY GENERAL ABIZAID IN THE PENTAGON, MAHMUD ASKED WHETHER THERE WOULD BE SOME SORT OF MILITARY CONSULTATIVE MECHANISM SET UP TO FACILITATE PAKISTANI COOPERATION WITH THE U.S. MR. ARMITAGE SAID HE HAD SPEAKEN WITH GENERAL ABIZAID AND UNDERSTOOD THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS STEP. HE INDICATED THAT ONCE WE HAD RECEIVED PAKISTAN'S FORMAL APPROVAL TO OUR NONPAPER, WE WOULD QUICKLY TURN TO THAT PROBLEM. HE URGED A RAPID RESPONSE FROM ISLAMABAD, NOTING

UNCLASSIFIED
APPENDIX XIII

UNCLASSIFIED

END SUMMARY.

2. (s) IN A 90-MINUTE MEETING WITH THE AMBASSADOR AND POLICOUNSELOR LATE SEPTEMBER 14, MUSHARRAF SAID HE HAD STUDIED THE POINTS AND DISCUSSED THEM IN AN ALL-DAY MEETING WITH HIS CORPS COMMANDERS AND OTHER RANKING MILITARY OFFICERS. HE SAID HE ACCEPTED THE POINTS WITHOUT CONDITIONS AND THAT HIS MILITARY LEADERSHIP CONCURRED.

3. (s) REVIEWING EACH POINT IN DETAIL, MUSHARRAF ENUMERATED A VARIETY OF SECURITY AND TECHNICAL ISSUES THAT NEED TO BE ADDRESSED.
APPENDIX XIV

List of Interviewees


2. Former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan (1988 – 1989) and former High Commissioner in London, Dr. Humayun Khan.


10. Special Assistant to the Prime Minister (Minister of State) (2013 – Till Date) 
Ambassador Syed Tariq Fatemi.

11. Economic Advisor, Special Secretary to Finance Minister, and Spokesperson on 

12. Former Ambassador of Pakistan in Tajikistan, Myanmar, Greece and Oman, Javed 
Hafiz.

13. Former Director-General of the Inter-Services Intelligence (1987 – 1989), Lieutenant 
General (Retired) Hamid Gul.

14. Former Director General of Inter Services Public Relations (2008 – 2012), Major 
General (Retired) Athar Abbas.
APPENDIX XV

Sample Questionnaire

1. How would you characterize the Pakistani state from 1980-89?

2. General Zia-ul-Haq’s regime is remembered for its totalitarian hold on the society, with images of corporal punishments and many humanitarian related issues, did the international community specifically, the US, raise the issue on any platform or move to intervene?

3. Do you think Pakistan’s failing status has its origin in US policies of the Cold War?

4. Do you think Pakistan’s acquiescing to an alliance with the US in the Afghanistan during the second Cold War (1980-88) resonates with its alliance with the US in the War on Terror (2001-08)?

5. In that case, don’t you think Pakistan shared its sovereignty with the US?

6. Do you think US statebuilding efforts during the second Cold War (1980-88) and the War on Terror (2001-08) were an American foreign policy tool to bring Pakistan’s interest in alignment with the US?

7. At any point during this time do you feel the US was more interested in the provision of public goods to people or was it only concerned with its own policy goals?

8. Do you see any difference in US attitude towards Pakistan between now and then?
9. Do you think Pakistan is a failed state? If yes, what do you think constitute the indicators?

10. Musharraf’s regime is remembered for its liberal views, however with many humanitarian related problems, did the international community specifically the US, raise the issue on any platform or intervened in any way?

11. How do you view US foreign aid to Pakistan?
Bibliography


