A Linguistic Analysis of Houston Stewart Chamberlain’s German Nationalist War Essays, 1914-1917

Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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ABSTRACT

This thesis presents a critical discourse analysis of Houston Stewart Chamberlain’s German nationalist war propaganda essays written between 1914 and 1917. Focussing on Chamberlain’s discursive strategies of manipulation, the analysis explores how he uses language to suggest to his readers that they have freedom of thought while actually reducing or eradicating their critical disagreement space. As language is the sole vehicle for the manipulative dissemination of ideology in written discourse, this research makes a contribution to understanding the workings of propaganda as ideology-driven mass manipulation by exposing the linguistic mechanisms therein. The thesis also contributes to broader Chamberlain scholarship and, specifically, to as yet scant scholarship on Chamberlain as a nationalist propagandist rather than as a race theorist.

After analysing the topical content of the war essays and contextualising the results against the local and global context of Chamberlain’s Germany, an extensive text analysis is provided. The text analysis follows a targeted multi-methodological approach combining methods of critical discourse analysis with pragma-dialectics and corpus-assisted discourse studies. This incorporates a corpus-assisted analysis of keywords and concordances, and a qualitative close-reading analysis addressing discourse strategies of legitimisation and delegitimisation, coercion and dissimulation.

The major finding produced by this research is that Chamberlain’s war essays are just as much legitimisations of the author and his essays as they are of the essays’ topical ideological propositions. They are characterised by strategies of ‘othering’ on two levels: the topical ideological ‘othering’ of Germany’s war enemies in relation to the German ‘self’ and, on the meta-level, of the ‘othering’ of the readers in relation to the authorial ‘self’. Using an elaborate metaphor scenario, he delegitimises the reader by undermining the epistemic certainty of their environment, and correspondingly legitimises himself as the source of ‘enlightenment’. Using strategies of abstractive legitimisation and delegitimisation, he makes the war a human-centric matter, the resolution of war reader-dependent, and the solution to the war author-dependent, ultimately making Chamberlain’s justification of the ideological message dependent on the justification of his authorial means.
1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Houston Stewart Chamberlain

Born in 1855 in Southsea, England, Houston Stewart Chamberlain arrived in Germany in 1870 on the eve of one of the most important nationalist events in its history: the Franco-Prussian war. Up until this point, Chamberlain’s childhood had been divided between France and England. Neither a real Frenchman nor a real Englishman, Chamberlain was plagued by the feeling that he was living ‘unter Fremden’ both in England and in France (Chamberlain 1919: 11), and that he fundamentally lacked a sense of Heimat (ibid.: 29). Chamberlain came to find inspiration in German science, literature, philosophy and music, and in particular in the music of Richard Wagner. Chamberlain describes the Wagnerian Circle at Wahnfried as ‘mir Heimatlosem eine Heimat der Seele’ (ibid.: 242). He was a devoted and influential member of the Bayreuth Circle surrounding Wagner, and wrote for the Wagnerian Bayreuther Blätter until the mid-1890s, which railed against the materialism of the age and the parliamentary system, among other things, and championed an alternative empire founded on conservative, anti-modern, and anti-materialistic values and the return to an entirely monarchical system of government in the tradition of patriotic organisations such as the Alldeutscher Verein and the Vaterlandspartei. Thanks to his magnum opus Die Grundlagen des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts (1899), Chamberlain was one of the best known German anti-Semites of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and is best known as an anti-Semite today (cf. Rash 2012: 99).

Chamberlain published a total of 40 books, and a further 9 of his works were published posthumously. Moreover, Chamberlain published over 223 newspaper articles, a number of which were published posthumously. Chamberlain’s authorial and journalistic endeavours saw him assume the roles of fiction writer (Parsifal-Märchen 1900, Drei Bühnendichtungen 1902), theologian (Mensch und Gott. Betrachtungen über Religion und Christentum 1921), translator (Richard Wagner. Echte Briefe an Ferdinand Praeger 1892), personal critic (Richard Wagner 1896,

Between the years 1914 and 1917, Chamberlain published a series of essays on the First World War, which were initially published in the Strasburger Zeitung, Volkserzieher, Deutsche Tageszeitung, Tägliche Rundschau, Das Größere Deutschland, Deutschland Erneuerung, Deutsche Zeitung, and the München-Augsburger Abendzeitung. The Wagner Verein and the Neuer Wagner Verein provided Chamberlain with a publication springboard, introducing him to influential German nationalist circles in Austria and Germany such as the Alldeutscher Verband (Pan-German League), and opening doors to the print media. As Jonathan Carr observes, Chamberlain became one of the most influential propagandists for the ultra-nationalist circles surrounding the Wagner Verein (Carr 2008: 90-91). Chamberlain’s influence also extended beyond Wagnerian and Pan-German circles; Geoffrey Field notes that Chamberlain’s publications (he does not specify which ones) reached a far wider audience than the Bayreuther Blätter ever did (Field 1981: 124). Carr confirms this, stating that ‘in Germany, it was not just ultra-nationalist and anti-Semitic circles that rallied to his support. Even balanced journals like the Hamburger Nachrichten praised his energy in uncovering the “real facts” and the persuasive way he had argued his case’ (Carr 2008: 99). Among Chamberlain’s most distinguished enthusiasts were Kaiser Wilhelm II, Adolf Hitler, Julius Wiesner, and the esteemed academic Leopold von Schroeder (Schott 1927: 10/Carr 2008: 90-91). Alfred Rosenberg describes Chamberlain as ‘ein Mensch, der wie nur wenige in ganzen Jahrhunderten bis in die letzten Verzweigungen der deutschen Seele eingedrungen war’ (Rosenberg 1927: 11). In 1915, Chamberlain was awarded the Iron Cross for his wartime publications.
1.2 Research Topic

This thesis presents a critical discourse analysis of Houston Stewart Chamberlain’s war essays written between 1914 and 1917. Chamberlain’s essays are strikingly dogmatic works of nationalist propaganda that used social power and language to manipulate members of the German public with an opposing opinion or no opinion at all to accept and internalise the author’s ultra-conservative Weltanschauung. As nationalist propaganda, they constitute a consciously produced form of ideology-driven mass manipulation that strives to alter or maintain a balance of power that is advantageous to the propagandist and linked to a clear institutional ideology (Jowett & O’Donnell: 2006: 3). Manipulative discourse is morally reprehensible or illegitimate because the recipient is placed under the illusion of freedom of choice, thereby limiting their critical autonomy (Saussure 2005: 117; Handelman 2009: 23). The manipulative mechanisms of written discourse are chiefly discursive, making language use and rhetoric the most crucial objects of analysis.

1.3 Research Motivation

This thesis evolved from a combination of a critical concern with the linguistic mechanisms of manipulation in propaganda, the impressions made by a first reading of Chamberlain’s war essays, and a survey of the literature on Houston Stewart Chamberlain.

A review of the literature revealed an absence of scholarship on Chamberlain’s language use and rhetoric, in particular in the war essays, and also by recent claims that his language use can be viewed as a major influence on the discourse of Adolf Hitler. Anja Lobenstein-Reichmann identifies a ‘discursive line’ (‘eine diskursive Linie’) beginning with Immanuel Kant and ending with Hitler via Chamberlain (Lobenstein-Reichmann 2008: 444-45). She suggests that Chamberlain’s discourse was the fundamental bridge connecting race discourse of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Lobenstein-Reichmann 2008: 443), and ultimately that it paved the way to the acceptance of racism and fascism in the National Socialist era (ibid.:
8; see also Lobenstein-Reichmann 2005: 188). More recently, Felicity Rash makes a similar claim, stating ‘Houston Stewart Chamberlain […] exerted a major influence on German nationalism and anti-Semitism in the late nineteenth century onwards, and [his] views appealed to twentieth century nationalist extremists and anti-Semites, most notably Adolf Hitler (Rash 2012: 81). Although this thesis does not compare and contrast the discourses of Chamberlain and Hitler, it takes the observations by Lobenstein-Reichmann and Rash as a decisive impetus for further analysis of Chamberlain’s use of language in his ideological discourse.

Chamberlain’s most extensive and widely received work, *Die Grundlagen des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts* [hereinafter *Grundlagen*], has been the preferred subject of what little attention has been paid to his work by both his contemporaries and by modern critics (see Schott 1927; Breitenstein 1936; Meyer 1939; Lobenstein-Reichmann 2008). Although Chamberlain’s best known work is and was *Grundlagen* (cf. Clarke 1916: 6) and his most acknowledged role is that of a race theorist, the significance of his role as a propagandist should not be overlooked. In order to provide new insights into Chamberlain’s language use, the present research uses his propagandistic war essays (1914–1917) as analysis material. The exclusive focus on Chamberlain’s war essays is justified by their wide reception and popularity at the time of publication. In *Lebenswege meines Denkens* (1919), Chamberlain reports that the essay series *Politische Ideale, Demokratie und Freiheit*, and *Der demokratische Wahn* proved to be some of his most read publications, finding their way into a wide variety of circles (Chamberlain 1919: 6). In a more statistical approach to Chamberlain’s readership and reception, Field reports that somewhere between 750,000 and one million copies of Chamberlain’s essays were purchased during the war, making Chamberlain one of the best selling propagandists of the day. Field adds that official documents released by the Verein zur Abwehr des Antisemitismus, or Abwehr Verein, (Association for Defence Against Anti-Semitism) estimated that Chamberlain’s pamphlets had been read by in excess of three million people by December 1915, a figure that continued to rise during the war (Field 1981: 390). Charles Clarke reports that the war essays *England* and *Deutschland* were distributed to several thousands of German troops in the trenches (Clarke 1916: 12), and recalls
that the copy that he owned was a seventh edition, indicating mass popularity (Clarke 1916: 7). As reluctant as Clarke is to offer any positive evaluation of Chamberlain’s influence, he has no choice but to admit the vogue that Chamberlain’s war essays enjoyed in Germany, where, he writes, ‘in spite of its exaggerated assertions and absolutely idiotic statements concerning English life and institutions, it is regarded as the last word of truth’ (ibid.: 11).

Methodologically, this thesis was motivated by existing studies of political discourse that have attempted to devise a typology of the discursive mechanisms of manipulation, but that ultimately emphasise that more work must be done to provide greater detail on these (Goodin 1980: 236; Saussure and Schulz 2005: 6; Rigotti 2005: 61; van Dijk 2006: 380). Although this thesis does not claim to devise a complete typology of the discursive mechanisms of manipulation, it was undertaken with the intention of providing a substantial contribution to the body of work on understanding the workings of (nationalist) propaganda.

Initial readings of the essays were struck by a tension between dogma and abstraction, a dichotomy also noted by the Chamberlain scholar Geoffrey Field, who observes that Chamberlain’s mode of expression is ‘that of a moralist rather than a political theorist’ (Field 1981: 375). Chamberlain was a versatile academic and writer, and as a student he showed what was essentially an incompatible combination of brilliance in the natural sciences and a passion for the arts. He studied biological sciences in Geneva and Florence, received his baccalaureate a year earlier than his classmates in 1881, and moved to Vienna to do a doctorate in botany in 1882. When he was diagnosed with neurasthenia in 1884, or ‘the innate, excessive delicacy of the nerves and the great irritability of the nervous membrane’ (Field 1981: 45), he was advised by his psychiatrist to desist from his academic studies. As Chamberlain recalls, he used this break from academia to read widely, and became increasingly interested in a ‘philosophical’ approach to the natural sciences (Chamberlain 1919: 119). This movement away from the sciences and towards literature and the philosophy of Kant and Plato conflated with the intense exposure to the arts and history that Chamberlain had witnessed as a student in Florence. A conflict developed between a fascination for the arts and humanities and his brilliance in the
empirical sciences, culminating in ‘eine merkwürdige Entdeckung […] das abstrakte Denken strengte mich weniger an als jede konkrete Beschäftigung’ (Chamberlain 1919: 111). The conflicting forces in his academic career define his publications, and in particular his war essays.

1.4 Hypothesis and Research Questions

The research hypothesis addressed in this thesis was formulated on the basis of a preliminary reading of the war essays and a review of the literature on discursive strategies in political discourse analysis. The thesis investigates and corroborates the following research hypothesis:

Chamberlain’s war essays are manipulative propaganda whose persuasive force is generated by a complex network of strategies of argumentation, legitimisation and abstract epistemic metaphors and motifs. These strategies are used to gain the readers’ trust while simultaneously limiting or removing their critical disagreement space.

The specific research questions that this thesis answers are based on a combination of the literature review and the theoretical framework for analysis devised, and ask:

(1) What is the discursive role of strategies of legitimisation, delegitimisation, coercion, dissimulation and abstraction in Chamberlain’s discourse and how are these strategies linguistically constructed?

(2) What is the discursive role of epistemic metaphors and motifs in Chamberlain’s discourse?
1.5 Research Methods

A review of the literature on the critical analysis of manipulative ideological discourse suggested that a multi-methodological approach integrating aspects of persuasion theory and pragma-dialectical theory within the broader framework of critical discourse analysis (CDA) would be necessary to answer the research questions. The theoretical analysis model was thus designed to facilitate the analysis of the linguistic construction of strategies of legitimisation, delegitimisation, coercion, dissimulation and abstraction using topoi, pragma-dialectical fallacies and micro-linguistic means. On the micro scale this addresses linguistic phenomena at the supra-sentential level (e.g. intertextuality, translations), at the level of rhetoric (e.g. metaphor and metaphor scenarios, synecdoche, authorial interjection, rhetorical questions, etymology, idiomatic sayings), the level of pragmatics (e.g. speech acts of warning, questioning and admission, modality), lexical-semantics (e.g. evaluative adjectives, vocabulary pertaining to language and speech, vocabulary pertaining to cognitive confusion) and grammar (e.g. generic pronouns and adjectives of place, generic adjectives of frequency, passive verbs). The thesis incorporates a corpus-assisted discourse study (CADS), combining intuitive qualitative analysis with a corpus analysis of empirically generated keywords and concordances. The identification and analysis of topoi, metaphors and linguistic phenomena in the qualitative analysis occurred freely using the text and not using pre-determined lists of linguistic phenomena. The corpus linguistic tool WordSmith 5 was used to buttress the insights gained from the qualitative close-reading.

1.6 Research Aims

First and foremost, this thesis intends to offer the first detailed linguistic analysis of Chamberlain’s war essays in the English language. It aims to explain and characterise Chamberlain’s rhetorical and argumentative style, and to reveal the discursive mechanisms underlying the essays’ persuasive power.
Secondly, this thesis seeks to show how CDA can be used to analyse not just ideology, but manipulation. Teun van Dijk (2006) has spoken out in favour of analysing manipulation in discourse for its own sake, as well as in conjunction with the critique of social macro-structures, stating that ‘manipulation is illegitimate in a democratic society because it (re)produces, or may reproduce, inequality’, and that the study of manipulation thereby ‘belongs to the ethics of discourse’, and is hence ‘part of the foundations of CDA’ (van Dijk 2006: 363-4). Accordingly, this thesis documents CDA in the service of unmasking manipulation. It acknowledges that CDA must unmask ideologies, however unmasking ideology is secondary to unmasking mechanisms of manipulation in this thesis.

In the context of twentieth century totalitarian regimes, linguistic and psycho-social research into the mechanisms of manipulation has highlighted the necessity of understanding how these regimes were installed, consolidated and preserved in the first place in order to prevent present and future recipients from becoming the victim of manipulative ideological discourse (Rigotti 2005: 61; Saussure and Schulz 2005: 4-7). In an article entitled What Can We Do to Stop Propaganda in its Tracks? Anthony Pratkanis and Elliot Aronson list the precautionary measures that members of the public should take in order to block the manipulative path of persuasive discourse (Pratkanis and Aronson 2001: 341-345). One of the tips that the authors advance is simply to ‘know the ways of propaganda’ (2001: 341). Accordingly, this thesis aims to make a contribution to understanding the discursive mechanisms of manipulative (nationalist) propaganda. As such, this thesis adheres to the crucial task for critical political discourse analysis specified by Martin Reisigl, namely the detection and exposure of the persuasive, propagandist, manipulative nature of political discourse. Concerning the greater social influence of such critical analyses of political discourse, Reisigl suggests that ‘in keeping a watch on political speech practices related to political activities under democratic legitimation-obligation, this criticism locates itself in the action field of political control’ (Reisigl 2008: 262).

Finally, this thesis aims to demonstrate the methodological synergy between CDA and pragma-dialectics by documenting an integrated approach to the critical analysis of persuasion, rhetoric and fallacious argumentation. It demonstrates how the critical
analysis of persuasive argumentation can be systematically theorised in relation to
the notion of critical disagreement space, showing that CDA with a focus on rhetoric
and argumentation can more systematically justify a critique of institutional
ideological discourse when it is measured against the normative-pragmatic
argumentation standards proposed by the pragma-dialectical approach to
argumentation analysis in terms of ‘rules for critical discussion’ and corresponding
fallacies.

1.7 Thesis Structure

The thesis is divided into a theoretical and explanatory introduction (Chapters 1-4),
four analysis chapters (Chapters 5-8) and a synergy of the analysis results and
conclusion (Chapter 9). Two appendices provide a complete list of keywords for the
Chamberlain corpus and example concordance lines for a selection of the keywords
analysed in Chapter 7. The following Chapter 2 of this thesis reviews literature
relevant to the present research subject and research methods. It provides a summary
and assessment of the scope of existing publications on Houston Stewart
Chamberlain’s person, writings and language use, and a review of methodological
literature describes and assesses scholarly contributions to the theory and application
of critical discourse analysis (CDA), to pragma-dialectical theory, and to the
synthesis of the pragma-dialectical approach with CDA. It furthermore documents
the linguistic phenomena hitherto investigated in the framework of CDA and
argumentation analysis, and concludes with a review of scholarly contributions to the
theory and application of CADS. Chapter 3 details the theories and concepts that
inform and shape the thesis and its theoretical framework., and Chapter 4 describes
the methodology followed, setting forth the procedural guidelines, context analysis,
corpus analysis and qualitative procedures. The first analysis chapter, Chapter 5
explores the essays’ topical content and contextualises this against the historical
background of pre-war and war-time Germany. Chapters 6 to 8 detail the text
analysis: Chapter 6 outlines the main linguistic and rhetorical observations made
during preliminary manual readings. These observations shaped the remaining
analysis stages. Chapter 7 introduces the primary and reference corpora before
presenting and analysing the results of the keyword and concordance analyses. Chapter 8 presents and analyses the results of the qualitative analysis of Chamberlain’s rhetoric and argumentation, including two case studies. Chapter 9 concludes the thesis by synthesising the analysis results in relation to the research questions driving the thesis and pointing to potential directions for further research.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

The following literature review describes and evaluates publications on Houston Stewart Chamberlain's life, ideology, and writings, on critical discourse analysis, pragma-dialectical theory, key linguistic phenomena in the analysis of ideological, argumentative and persuasive discourse, and on corpus-assisted discourse studies. Particular emphasis is placed on assessing the value of previous applications of critical discourse analysis models, corpus-assisted discourse analysis, and analysis models that combine CDA with the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation analysis in order to devise the most effective analysis model possible for the present research.

2.2 Literature on Houston Stewart Chamberlain

Existing literature on Houston Stewart Chamberlain generally addresses the author's life and ideological writings. Several such works were published during the National Socialist era in Germany and are thus sources of biographical information and details of the reception of Chamberlain’s work, however they are also inevitably biased and must be treated with caution. Secondary literature on Chamberlain can furthermore be divided into two categories: publications that paraphrase and support Chamberlain’s ideology, e.g. Georg Schott (1927), Desiderus Breitenstein (1936) and Gerhard Stutzinger (1938), and publications with a more critical stance, i.e. Leo Spitzer (1918), Geoffrey Field (1981), and Anja Lobenstein-Reichmann (2008). Journal articles refer to Chamberlain merely as a point of comparison to another, primary subject of the article, and very rarely as the chief subject of discussion. The following survey of literature on Chamberlain is divided between bibliographical information and examinations of his ideological writings, looking particularly at contemporary and current descriptions and perceptions of Chamberlain, at which aspects of his ideology have received the most attention, and to what extent his distinctive linguistic style has been a topic
of interest. Of the handful of scholars who have studied the life and work of Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Geoffrey Field (1981) and Anja Lobenstein-Reichmann (2008) have contributed the most valuable research.

The majority of biographical work on Chamberlain is written in German. Lobenstein-Reichmann (2008) dedicates a significant section of her publication to Chamberlain’s life, as do Schott (1927), Stutzinger (1936), Breitenstein (1936), and Meyer (1939). Chamberlain’s own autobiographical writings additionally provide key information; primarily Lebenswege meines Denkens (1919), but also Mein Weg nach Bayreuth (1937). Geoffrey Field (1981) published a psycho-biography of Chamberlain in English, detailing his character, the influences on his intellectual development, his career and ideas, and the landmarks in the process which turned him from an Englishman into a German citizen and nationalist. He contextualises these factors against the historical and nationalist background of the period 1890 to 1914. Field’s book is divided into three sections to correspond to the three key aspects of Chamberlain’s life and ideological development: his childhood and education, Chamberlain as a writer and ‘popular synthesiser’, and the period after he had gained attention as a ‘prophet of Germanism’ (Field 1981: 6).

Chamberlain biographies generally identify three main chapters in Chamberlain’s life: childhood, early experiences in Germany and as a Wagnerite, and the period in which he wrote as a wartime propagandist in the run-up to and during the First World War. They discuss the sense of permanent transition that characterised Chamberlain’s childhood and his ill health, which forced him to seek a more beneficial climate in Germany (Field 1981: 26). They also emphasise the lack of national identity and national consciousness (Heimatbewusstsein) that haunted Chamberlain from an early age (Field 1981: 26-27, Meyer 1939: 21, Chamberlain 1919: 29), focussing on Chamberlain’s status as a product of three cultures - English, French, and German (Field 1981: 48; Meyer 1939: 36). Biographies of document Chamberlain’s career as a biologist and his career as a writer at the end of the nineteenth century, but do not go beyond the outbreak of the First World War. Field additionally provides some information on the political circles in which Chamberlain moved in the run-up to and during the war (Field 1981: 110, 168).
and substantial information on Chamberlain’s political views at this time (see below).

2.2.1 National Socialist Writers on Chamberlain

Georg Schott’s *Das Leben Houston Stewart Chamberlains in Umrissen* (1927), Desiderius Breitenstein’s *Houston Stewart Chamberlain: Ein Wegbereiter des rassischen Weltbildes* (1936) and Gerhard Stutzinger’s *Die politischen Anschauungen Houston Stewart Chamberlains* (1938) are of some informative value to the present research, however they lack the critical stance of Field and Lobenstein-Reichmann’s research. Schott’s publication essentially paraphrases Chamberlain’s ideological writings. It adopts and extends Chamberlain’s ideas, particularly concerning the equivalence of *Weltanschauung* and religion, as well as further ‘evidence’ Schott has collected from other writers to ‘confirm’ these ideas. As selective and biased as he may be, however, Schott offers valuable information about the reception of Chamberlain’s writings (Schott 1927: 10-11), although this does not include the reception of the war essays.

Stutzinger admits that his study of Chamberlain is not critical (Stutzinger 1938: 7). He reformulates and interprets Chamberlain’s opinions on the nature of freedom, religion and the state, the ‘Jewish question’, and internal and foreign affairs, referring always to Chamberlain within the context of his intellectual idols Schiller, Wager and Kant. The biographical section of his work details Chamberlain’s process of becoming a German; his first impressions of Germany, the influence of Beethoven’s music, and the influence of Richard Wagner on this process (Stutzinger 1938: 10-12). Stutzinger also documents the development of Chamberlain’s political ideologies from the time he arrived in Germany up until the end of the First World War, consistently comparing them to those of Wagner (ibid.: 13-14). Stutzinger is particularly keen to emphasise that Chamberlain cared little for foreign affairs and expansionism, claiming that the only thing that Chamberlain wished to expand was German culture (ibid.: 75). Breitenstein’s 1936 report of the contemporary popularity of Chamberlain’s ideas also offers a
substantial biographical section, interwoven with aspects of Chamberlain’s ideology that are cherry-picked from his writings to suit the interests of the author. Of interest primarily for its biographical detail and information about the reception of Chamberlain in Nazi Germany, this is largely a subjective commentary.

2.2.2 Chamberlain as One of Many

The most characteristic way of conceiving Chamberlain has been either as an anti-Semite, a Wagnerite (Fortier 1967: 344), a proto-Hitlerite, or as a bridge between Wagnerianism and National Socialism (Allen 2006: 86; Biddis 1997: 86; Szaz 1963: 930). Chamberlain is commonly perceived as an ‘ideological precursor’ of National Socialism (Szaz 1963: title), and his critics refer particularly to his influence on the chief Nazi ideologue Alfred Rosenberg (Field 1981: 1), as well as to Chamberlain’s personal correspondence and encounters with Adolf Hitler (Field 1981: 438). Lobenstein-Reichmann offers the most thorough examination of Chamberlain as a proto-Hitlerite, writing of Mein Kampf, for example, ‘Die Affinität zu Chamberlain ist stellenweise so ausgeprägt, dass man meinen könnte, einen seiner Texte vor Augen zu haben’ (Lobenstein-Reichmann 2008: 646).

Chamberlain has almost exclusively been thematised in relation to his historical and intellectual contexts. Hugo Meyer and Geoffrey Field relate the relevance and reception of Chamberlain’s work to the cultural pessimism and sense of internal division following unification under the leadership of Prussia at the end of the nineteenth century (Meyer 1939: 11-12; Field 1981: 123). Although the historical contextualisation of Chamberlain’s publications plays a secondary role in Field’s psychobiography, Meyer’s primary goal is to contribute to the overall picture of the genesis of the völkisch movement by examining each aspect of Chamberlain’s ideology in relation to the time in which it was written. Charles H. Clarke and Lobenstein-Reichmann favour the socio-cultural contextualisation of Chamberlain’s writings, and discuss the early wartime propaganda and Grundlagen in relation to Chamberlain’s membership of the educated middle classes (Clarke 1916: 9; Lobenstein-Reichmann 2008: 1).
Critics also locate Chamberlain’s ideological writings firmly within his contemporary intellectual context. Meyer and Breitenstein discuss Chamberlain in relation to his scholarly influences (Meyer 1939: 18), whereby Breitenstein focusses particularly on the influence of Immanuel Kant (Breitenstein 1936: 19). Lobenstein-Reichmann provides the most comprehensive example of this as she dedicates half of her extensive work to the analysis of Chamberlain’s intellectual sources and intertextual references, including Nietzsche, Wagner, Schiller and Kant (Lobenstein-Reichmann: 2008: 661). She concludes that Chamberlain was first and foremost an ‘intellectual synthesiser’ who interwove existing intellectual discourses into one (ibid.: 654-656). Elsewhere, Chamberlain is associated with Arthur de Gobineau (Jonassen 1951: 158; Fortier 1967: 346; Biddiss 1997: 159; Wodak & Reisigl 1999: 177; Whaley 2007), Oswald Spengler (Biddis 1997: 73), and Julius Langbehn (Weikart 2003: 279).

Chamberlain is discussed not only in terms of the ideological influences acting upon him, but also as an ideological influence himself. Etan Bloom names Grundlagen as a theoretical source for Arthur Ruppin’s Sociology of the Jews (1930) (Bloom 2007: 19), for example, although the historian and Israeli scholar Amos Morris-Reich disputes this claim (Morris-Reich 2008: 117). Most recently, Felicity Rash locates Chamberlain’s Grundlagen within the context of contemporary anti-Semitic writers, primarily summarising the thematic content and secondarily the linguistic phenomena in influential anti-Semitic works published during Chamberlain’s time in Germany, including Der Sieg des Judenthums über das Germanenthum (Wilhelm Marr 1879), Unsere Aussichten (Heinrich von Treitschke 1879), Die Judenfrage als Racen-, Sitten- und Culturfrage (Eugen Dühring 1881), Handbuch zur Judenfrage (Theodor Fritsch 1887) and Wenn ich der Kaiser wär’ (Heinrich Claß 1912). She provides a detailed analysis of the anti-Semitic ideology presented in chapters 5 and 6 of the Grundlagen: Der Eintritt der Juden in die abendländische Geschichte (The Entry of the Jews into the Western World) and Der Eintritt der Germanen in die Weltgeschichte (The Entry of the Germanic Peoples into World History) (Rash 2012: 99-116) and highlights the ways in which Chamberlain contrasts the
Germanic ‘self’ with the Jewish ‘other’ in order to emphasize the superiority of the former (Rash 2012: 101).

2.2.3 Linguistic Analyses of Chamberlain’s Writings

Until recently, references to Chamberlain’s linguistic style were fleeting and few. However, their existence confirms that this is a valuable subject for analysis. The earliest observations on Chamberlain’s use of language stem from Georg Schott. In his discussion of Chamberlain’s attitude to religion, Schott states that anybody who wishes to fully understand this attitude must pay attention to the inferences and subtleties in Chamberlain’s writing (Zeichensprache) that may well have been subconscious (Schott 1927: 19). Schott furthermore analyses Chamberlain’s use of the word Gestalt in the Grundlagen (ibid.: 100), and his statement ‘ahnendes Erschauen ist hier die Pfadfinder’ (ibid.: 75) suggests that he has identified the significance of Chamberlain’s sight and path metaphors, however he does not elaborate on this point.

Field makes several references to Chamberlain’s writings as general exercises in persuasive rhetoric (Field 1981: 149, 374; see also Ballmann 1939: 63 and Allen 2006: 91), highlighting in particular Chamberlain’s dogmatic writing style (Field 1981: 365). Alfred Rosenberg similarly discusses the artistic creativity of Chamberlain’s writing (Rosenberg 1927: 96), although Rosenberg praises its aesthetic value, whereas Field perceives it as empty rhetoric. More recently, Arvidsson and Allen have both identified particular aspects of Chamberlain’s rhetoric as noteworthy, namely his appeal to ‘lived experience’, which Arvidsson classifies as an ethical strategy in the tradition of classical rhetoric (Arvidsson 2006: 153), and his use of the organic metaphor in Grundlagen (Allen 2006: 81, 86). Any such discussions of Chamberlain’s language use are, however, rare and invariably brief.
The first definitive study of Chamberlain’s language use is Anja Lobenstein-Reichmann’s 2008 monograph. Lobenstein-Reichmann’s primary goal is to examine the linguistic construction of Chamberlain’s ideological Weltanschauung in Grundlagen; she does not include Chamberlain’s wartime propaganda in her analysis. Her linguistic approach is primarily lexical-semantic, however her analysis is interspersed with some sentence level analysis, and with some pragmatic observations. The pragmatic section of her analysis examines presupposition, speech acts, inclusion and exclusion, and collectivisation (Lobenstein-Reichmann 2008: 9), however this is afforded significantly less attention than her lexical-semantic text analysis.

The lexical-semantic section of Lobenstein-Reichmann’s analysis examines a limited number of terms primarily in Chamberlain’s Grundlagen according to their ideological perspective. The author focuses on terms from the cultural sphere, such as Künstler, Persönlichkeit, Leben, Willen, and Entartung, with the aim of explaining how Chamberlain politicises these words semantically. Lobenstein-Reichmann’s justification for this approach is, in short, that references are invariably selected and constructed from the perspective of a certain ideology (‘der Bezugsgegenstand ist immer perspektivitätsgeprägt’ (ibid.: 223)). She also discusses the pragmatic functions of metaphor and focusses particularly on Chamberlain’s use of metaphor to paint vivid pictures in order to keep the readers’ attention as well as to fog over the actual content of his writings (290-1). Her analysis of Chamberlain’s use of metaphor foregrounds three metaphorical fields (Metaphernfelder) (293): life and nature, including references to the body, to sleeping and waking, birth and death, plants and animals and procreation; light, including references to night and day, light and dark, shadows and illumination; God, race and the world, including references to purity or cleanliness (Reinheit), creation, history, knowledge, catastrophe, illness, war and battle (293). She describes each metaphor and analyses discursive instances of each in detail.
The role of rhetoric and argumentation receives little attention in this study. Lobenstein-Reichmann acknowledges that the properties one would typically expect to find in motivational campaigns are indeed present in Chamberlain’s writing, listing as examples argumentation, emotionalisation, vagueness and negation (226), however this does not constitute a focal point of her analysis. Her analysis of the persuasive mechanisms in Chamberlain’s discourse does not go beyond the level of metaphor and ‘semantisierte Lexik’, (‘semanticised’ or ‘primed’ lexis) (227). Whereas Lobenstein-Reichmann focuses on the ideological underpinnings of Chamberlain’s language use, it does not address the dogmatic rhetoric that earlier linguistic references in Chamberlain scholarship highlight and that is the substance of his wartime propaganda.

The second definitive study of Chamberlain’s language use is Felicity Rash’s (2012) Nationalist, Colonialist and Anti-Semitic Discourse 1871-1918. The two key chapters of this publication for the present purposes are Rash’s DHA of the Grundlagen and her review of Chamberlain’s language in the war essays. Rash applies discourse-historical semantics and critical metaphor analysis in a computer-assisted discourse-historical analysis of Chamberlain’s construction of racist images and ideology in the Grundlagen. She focuses particularly on the construction and justification of the German ‘self’ and the Jewish ‘other’, looking at the key stems feind-, fremd- and Freund-, and at the use metaphors of light and dark, health and sickness and upward and downward movement as well as botanic metaphors and images of poison and poisoning to present positive and negative characteristics of the ‘self’ and ‘other’, respectively (Rash 2012: 111). Chapter 6 of the same publication addresses the thematic content and language of Chamberlain’s three series of war essays, Kriegsaufsätze, Neue Kriegsaufsätze and Hammer oder Amboß. Rash makes some key observations regarding the language of Chamberlain’s entire oeuvre, namely his contrast of alleged Tatsachen with alleged Lügen, and his varied reference to and quotations from German, English and French sources (Rash 2012: 182). Although her analysis of the thematic content of Chamberlain’s essay series seems to outweigh her linguistic analysis, she also identifies some key linguistic phenomena and discourse strategies. These include
The contrast of the German ‘self’ with the ‘other’, the topos of history as example and the strategy of German self-justification in the *Kriegsaufsätze*, etymological expositions in the *Neue Kriegsaufsätze*, and intertextual references and the argumentation topos of contrast in *Hammer oder Amboß* (Rash 2012: 187). She supplements her qualitative analysis of Chamberlain’s essays with a computer-assisted concordance analysis of selected keywords in the writings of Chamberlain and Paul Rohrbach, examining occurrences of Kampf, Feind, Freund, Fried-, Pflicht, Opfer, Lüg- and Neid, and metaphors of health, sickness and poison, and animal metaphors (Rash 2012: 189-194). The present thesis follows a similar methodological procedure to that used by Rash, combining close reading with metaphor analysis and a computer-assisted analysis of keywords obtained by comparison to the keywords identified for Rohrbach’s discourse. The present analysis does not adopt Rash’s focus on the construction of the ‘self’ and the ‘other’, however, and will exceed Rash’s analysis in scope and detail.

### 2.3 Critical Approaches to Analysing Persuasive Ideological Discourse

Theoretical introductions to critical discourse analysis (CDA) by Ruth Wodak, Norman Fairclough, Michael Meyer and Teun van Dijk provide valuable summaries of this approach to discourse analysis. Fairclough and Wodak’s *Discourse as Social Interaction* (1997) offers a clear and detailed introduction to the tenets of CDA, including the CDA understanding of discourse as social action, the relationship between discourse and ideology, the practical nature of CDA in contemporary society, the origins of CDA in critical theory, and different approaches to CDA, such as social semiotics and the Duisburg School. Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart’s *The Discursive Construction of National Identity* (2009) provides a further useful introduction to the assumptions and goals of the critical approach to analysing discourse.

CDA has been applied in the analysis of a wide range of social and/or ideological issues, from mental health (Lester & Paulus 2012) and physical disability (Grue 2011), to corporate discourse (Breeze 2012). The most important
applications of CDA for this analysis are those that foreground nationalism (or national identity), argumentation and persuasion. Although proponents of CDA are reluctant to identify a fixed set of linguistic phenomena for analysis, as each study addresses a unique combination of texts that exhibit a unique combination of linguistic means (Meyer 2001: 25), the following section reviews a cross-section of these studies in order to identify which discursive and linguistic phenomena have been explored in nationalist and/or manipulative discourse.

Teun van Dijk is particularly keen to analyse manipulative discourse from the perspective of the CDA approach, and to develop a ‘systematic theory of the structures and processes involved in manipulation’ (Van Dijk 2006: 359). Van Dijk’s 2006 socio-cognitive analysis of the discursive structures of manipulation constitutes a significant step towards achieving the kind of synthesis between CDA and the study of manipulative argumentation advocated by both van Dijk and the present thesis. Van Dijk’s analysis of the exploitation of the readers’ victim status in Tony Blair’s legitimisation of the war against Iraq focuses on positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation. It identifies lexical, syntactic and rhetorical discourse structures that emphasise the position, power, authority or moral superiority of the speaker or their sources as well as the inferior position of the recipients, and specifically on new beliefs posited by the speaker as knowledge, on argumentation and proofs advanced by the speaker, on the way in which alternatives are discredited, and on appeals to the ideologies, attitudes and emotions of the recipients.

Indeed, argumentation strategies like othering, strategies of legitimisation and speaker characteristics are popular phenomena for analysis in critical analyses of persuasive ideological discourse. Martin Wengeler’s 2005 typology of eight constitutive elements of German Kriegsbotschaften (political speeches that justify war) provides a useful breakdown of the argumentative macro-features of twentieth century war discourse, some of which are compatible with the approach and discourse used in this thesis. Wengeler identifies the consistent occurrence of narratio (descriptions of how the current situation arose that depict the enemy as stubborn and malevolent and the home nation as pacifistic and as having no choice.
but to defend themselves), the speaker or writer’s presentation/construction of his role as responsible and pacifistic (Selbstdarstellung/Selbstinszenierung des Redners), appeal to danger or threat to justify/legitimise present or future actions, the construction of the common war aims as achievable by war or military measures only, appeals to history or to religion to justify the necessity or definite success of an action, appeals to values, codified norms or obligations, expressions of certain victory, and appeals to internal solidarity (Solidaritätsappell nach innen) (Wengeler 2005: 216-228).

Antonio Reyes’s (2011) makes a valuable connection between ‘othering’ and strategies of legitimisation. In his study of language as an instrument of control in speeches by George W. Bush and Barack Obama that justify American military presence during the Iraq (2007) and Afghanistan (2009) conflicts, Reyes analyses legitimisation strategies that refer to emotions and fear, a hypothetical future, rationality, voices of expertise, and altruism, and further identifies the linguistic constructions used to shape these strategies. Reyes’s observation on the tendency to construct the ‘self’ vs the ‘other’ in strategies of legitimisation may potentially also be formative for the present analysis, as initial readings of Chamberlain’s war essays suggest that they confirm this observation. Reyes finds that strategies of legitimation invariably involve the binary construction of an inclusive ‘us’ and an inclusive ‘them’ (Reyes 2011: 787). This indicates that it would be fruitful to examine the extent to which this phenomenon is evident in Chamberlain’s essays, as well as its exact discursive function here. Perhaps the most significant aspect of this study, however, is that it links legitimisation to the creation of the situation. Based on an observation by Mey (2001), Reyes states that ‘the contextual elements of the specific setting invest the political actor with authority and the power rested upon his figure by different institutions. Therefore, speech acts are effective when they are situated. Not only do they rely on the situation in which they are uttered, but they actively create it’ (Reyes 2011: 784). This notion proved formative for the present analysis.

Theo van Leeuwen (2007) sets out a different framework for analysing the language of legitimisation. He develops and demonstrates this framework in an analysis of a corpus of texts that legitimise compulsory education. By isolating all elements in the
texts that do not constitute description (e.g. of a child’s first day at school), he shows that these texts are constructed using ‘reactions’ (telling parents and pupils how to feel on the first day of school), ‘purposes’ (ascribing purposes to the actions of teachers, parents and children), and ‘legitimations’ (van Leeuwen 2007: 93). It is the third category on which the author expands in the article. He explains that legitimation answers the questions ‘Why should we do this?’ and ‘Why should we do this in this way?’ (van Leeuwen 2007: 93). In his analysis corpus he finds and examines examples of legitimation via personal authority, expert authority, role model authority, impersonal authority, the authority of tradition, the authority of conformity, and moral evaluation (op. cit.: 94-97), as well as legitimation via naturalisation, moral abstraction, analogies, rationalisation (instrumental and theoretical), and mythopoesis (op. cit. 98-105). Van Leeuwen’s work demonstrates the necessity of analysing strategies of legitimisation in persuasive ideological discourse. Although the present thesis will attempt to avoid a priori categories for analysis where possible, van Leeuwen’s typology may serve as a useful point of reference for identifying and classifying these strategies in Chamberlain’s discourse. Together with Ruth Wodak, van Leeuwen has successfully applied his approach to the analysis of legitimisation in Austrian immigration control within the scope of CDA (van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999). The authors examine authorisation legitimation, conformity legitimisation, rationalisation, moral abstraction and mythopoesis in Beschäide rejecting immigrants’ applications for residence in Austria. They find that moral abstraction is the most common form of legitimisation, followed by authorisation, and then rationalisation (van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999: 111). The successful application van Leeuwen’s strategies within the scope of CDA confirms that his approach would prove fruitful for Chamberlain’s war essays.

Wodak (2009) notes the most common topoi used when trying to convince an audience of one’s interests, visions or positions, which she notes are largely applied to legitimise positions by replacing evidence with so-called ‘common-places’ (Wodak 2009: 43). Topoi typical of this discursive context are the topos of burdening, the topos of reality, the topos of numbers, the topos of history, the topos of threat, the topos of definition, the topos of justice and the topos of urgency
(Wodak 2009: 43). As Chamberlain too was trying to convince an audience of his interests, Wodak’s typology provides an informative basic list of topoi to which to be alert in Chamberlain’s essays.

Perhaps one of the most methodologically valuable critical discourse analyses of the discourse of nationalism for the purposes of the present thesis is van der Valk’s 2003 examination of the manifestation of ethnic dominance and expression of ethnic equality in the discourse on immigration and nationality of the French mainstream parties UDF/RPRI in Assemblée General debates. The link that van der Valk conceptualises and demonstrates between the four discursive phenomena othering, legitimisation/de-legitimisation, fallacies and topoi is enlightening, and has the potential to serve as a key theoretical basis for the present analysis. Van der Valk’s analysis focuses on semantic strategies, sociopolitical strategies of legitimisation and de-legitimisation, topoi and fallacies in argumentation, and some rhetorical devices, including metaphor. She establishes that the discourse of the mainstream Right in France is highly rhetorical, making use of hyperbole, repetition, metaphor, rhetorical questions and irony in particular (van der Valk 2003: 330). She furthermore notes the prevalence of negative ‘other’ presentation, which she links closely to strategies of legitimisation, de-legitimation and fallacies (van der Valk 2003: 316/317). She shows how the macro-strategy of negative other presentation is complemented by the macrostrategy of delegitimisation, to which the straw man fallacy and the *ad hominem* fallacy are central (van der Valk 2003: 340/341). Topoi or ‘commonplaces’, so called because they imply simple common sense conclusions (op. cit. 323), are also identified to be central to the argumentation in French parliamentary discourse. Van der Valk identifies recurring instances of topoi of exceptional French legislation, immigrants are a burden, immigrants cause unemployment, immigrants come to profit from our country, immigrants abuse laws and rules, immigrants are given more advantages than the French, immigrants’ culture and values are different, stopping immigration is ‘for the immigrants’ own good’, stopping immigrant would discourage the rise of the Extreme Right, complicity (the Left favours illegal immigration), and immigration leads to the decline of French civilization (op. cit.:
324). It may thus also prove fruitful to compare and contrast the topoi identified in Chamberlain’s discourse with the topoi identified by van der Valk (2009).

Within the critical focus on argumentation and legitimisation, speaker characteristics are a major concern of the literature on persuasive discourse. Cap 2002 provides an introduction to persuasion from the perspectives of psychology and linguistics. Focussing on the pragmatics of persuasion from the perspective of speaker characteristics, his analysis looks particularly at the role of politeness, consistency and face-threatening acts (FTA) in NATO discourse. Cap highlights the human drive towards consistency in belief as ‘the strongest motivator of all persuasion strategies’ (Cap 2002: 146) and identifies that ‘the major assumption behind consistency theories […] is that once the addressee is in a committed state, he will automatically place novel information within the latitude of acceptance rather than rejection, with little concern for the essence of the information itself’ (146). Cap situates the traditional rhetorical duo ethos (persuasion through personality) and logos (persuasion through reasoning) within the context of getting to addresssee into a ‘committed state’ (146). He summarises that ethos and logos (persuasion through reasoning) interact to achieve commitment, as ‘it is the enactment of personality that provides premises for successful argument and it is the imposition of a certain pattern of reasoning that makes message acceptance possible’ (161). Although each of the theories discussed by Cap may have some bearing on the present analysis, it is Cap’s discussion of consistency theory from the perspective of speaker characteristics that may be the greatest help in shedding some light on the interactive roles of ethos and logos in Chamberlain’s rhetoric of persuasion. In particular his reflections on the fickle dynamics of ethos in consistency-based theories of persuasion may serve as an interesting point of reference for Chamberlain’s strategies of self-legitimisation. Cap points out that the speaker or author must find the correct balance between impersonal discourse, an ‘ego-trip’, and emotion, and appropriately channel personality by changing mood and tone, and identifies examples of this in speeches by Margaret Thatcher and Desmosthenes, as well as in NATO press statements regarding the Kosovo conflict and eastward expansion of the NATO military block.
Stiff and Mongeau similarly highlight that author or speaker characteristics in manipulative communication are rooted in the Aristotelian notion of ‘ethos’, and denote the source’s self-presentation and the receivers’ perception of the source (Stiff & Mongeau 2003: 104-5). A survey of the vast array of research into source characteristics in manipulation reveals that these characteristics can be grouped under the categories ‘character’ and ‘credibility’. ‘Credibility’ subsumes the characteristics of authority (Perloff 2010: 159), expertise (O’Keefe 2002: 182; Perloff 2010: 167), education, occupation and experience (O’Keefe 2002: 184), knowledge bias (Perloff 2010: 171), reporting bias (Perloff 2010: 174), and citation of evidence sources (O’Keefe 2002: 186). ‘Character’ is synonymous with Aristotelian *eunoia* or perceived ‘benevolence towards the audience’ (Kochin 2009: 33), and includes the characteristics of trustworthiness (O’Keefe 2002: 182; Perloff 2010: 167), charisma (Perloff 2010: 155), similarity (Stiff & Mongeau 2003: 119-121; Perloff 2010: 176; O’Keefe 2002:199), likeability (Perloff 2010: 175; O’Keefe 2002: 190) and perceived goodwill (Perloff 2010: 167).

The work of Chilton and Schaeffner on speaker self-presentation and the construction of relationships between the proponent and recipient provides key insights for the present research. As the authors declare, their analysis of some of the pragmatic, semantic and syntactic choices made in speeches by John Major aims to ‘bring conscious consideration of the relationships between the speaker and others that are established during the actual utterance of the text’ (Chilton and Schaeffner 1997: 216). Chilton and Schaeffner stress that speech acts never occur without participants being assigned particular roles or positions, and that the analysis of pronouns in political discourse help to map the construction of socio-political relationships. Accordingly, they analyse how John Major establishes ‘leader-led’, ‘speaker-spoken to’ and ‘teacher-taught’ relationships to position himself as truthful narrator or messenger and man of action, concluding that this is a crucial prerequisite for recipients’ acceptance of orders, requests, advising, warnings and commitments (Chilton and Schaeffner 1997: 216-219). Chilton and Schaeffner demonstrate the strategic significance of discourse
participant positioning in political texts; an objective that this thesis seeks to develop in relation to Chamberlain’s political discourse.

Research by Louis de Saussure identifies one particular aspect of authorial self-positioning that is crucial to the present analysis. In researching and formulating preliminary hypotheses on manipulation and cognitive pragmatics, Saussure advances that a central mechanism of manipulation is the so-called ‘trouble-and-resolution-device’ (de Saussure 2005: 133). He bases this concept on ‘fuzziness’, whereby the discourse proponent consciously uses obscure, vague, metaphorical or mystical language at the sentential and supra-sentential levels in order to create ‘fuzziness’ (trouble) leading the discourse recipients to believe that their inability to interpret the discourse is a result of their incompetence, and to resolve the fuzziness by abandoning some of their cognitive abilities for the sake of accepting a message originating from a seemingly higher intellect (resolution) (Saussure 2005: 134).

2.4 Linguistic Means in the Critical Analysis of Discourse

William Rogers's descriptive work *Persuasion, Message, Receivers, and Contexts* (2007) offers a comprehensive guide to potential linguistic categories in the analysis of manipulative argumentation. Rogers examines a wide range of syntactical and rhetorical devices, especially metaphor, metonymy, personification, rhetorical questions, simile, alliteration, climax, hyperbole, and irony. At times, Rogers relates his micro-linguistic analysis to discursive strategies on a macro-level, for example inoculating the audience to counter arguments by naming downside arguments yourself (Rogers 2007: 51), and using consistency, contrast, and reciprocation to gain compliance (Rogers 2007: 53). The present study similarly looks at the persuasive function of counter arguments, contrast and reciprocation in Chamberlain’s discourse.
Notable studies of the persuasive function of individual stylistic and rhetorical devices have examined the evaluative and legitimising function of proverbs and sayings (Gandara 2004), the topical-rhetorical force of concessives (Eggler 2006), and semantic-lexical bipolarity or ‘black-and-white painting’ (Danler 2005), for example. Lelia Gandara (2004) offers a particularly interesting perspective on causality in her investigation of the use of proverbs to establish a cause-and-effect relationship in press and political discourse. The present analysis adopts Gandara’s position that, particularly in societies in which authority is based on tradition, a proverb’s illocutionary force can overwhelm the addressee and thus project an argumentative mould onto a discursive situation. Instead of linking this phenomenon to causality, however, the present analysis analyses the illocutionary force of the proverb in authorial self-legitimisation. The present analysis also draws on Jinjun Wang’s 2006 analysis of the use of questions to exert power, starting from the assumption that questions are a potential means for dominant conversation participants to exert power over subordinate individuals. Wang details the way in which a questioner imposes the questioner’s will on the addressee by restricting, constraining and ratifying a topic of response, by producing the unequal allocation of turn-taking and controlling the development of the topic, by producing a new topic, or by redirecting the old topic. Although Wang’s approach is specific to conversation analysis, this article inspired a focus on the function of question and answer structures in Chamberlain’s discourse. Billig observes that concessives give the impression of advocacy or the skill of deliberation (Billig 1996: 186-187) while actually contributing to the speaker’s persuasive force and supposed legitimacy. Karl Sornig’s discussion of unmitigated and apodictic expressions informs the present analysis of the topoi of factuality and proveability (Sornig 1989: 99). Kochin’s comments on the persuasive force of fear appeals (Kochin 2009: 377-8) as well as Wengeler’s typology and theory of the argumentative potential of linguistic reflexivity (Wengeler 1996: 414) constitute further reference points for the present analysis of stylistic devices in persuasive discourse.
Many CDA-based studies of nationalism and national identity focus on a limited number of linguistic devices. Van De Mieroop and Clifton (2012) focus solely on turn-taking and length of response in the interactional negotiation of group membership and ethnicity between a white interviewer and a former slave. On the supra-sentential level, Juan Li (2009) examines the effects of intertextuality on the discursive construction of national identities in the US and Chinese press. On a micro-level, Jennifer Cramer (2010) dedicates her analysis of ‘Europeanness’ as enacted by EU leaders versus Turkish leaders in the context of Turkish entry into the EU entirely to pronouns. She analyses the use and repetition of pronouns to create and recreate national identities. These studies are limited in scope: the present research holds that the linguistic analysis of ideologies should be as varied and comprehensive as possible.

On the micro-linguistic level from the perspective of the DHA, Woda et al. 2009 focus primarily on lexical units and syntactic devices that serve to construct unity, sameness, difference, uniqueness, origin, continuity, change, autonomy, and heteronymy. These are, in particular, personal reference (anthroponymic generic terms, personal pronouns, quantifiers); spatial reference (toponyms/geonyms, adverbs of place, spatial reference through persons, by means of prepositional phrases such as ‘with us’, ‘with them’); temporal reference (temporal prepositions, adverbs of time, temporal conjunctions, temporal references by means of nouns, semi-prefixes with temporal meaning). The authors also look at vagueness, euphemisms, linguistic hesitation and disruptions, linguistic slips, allusions, rhetorical questions, and the mode of discourse representation (forms of reported speech), as well as the ways in which agents are rendered anonymous or agency more generally is obscured by use of the passive voice, the use of personification, synecdoche and metonymy, and the us of deictic ‘we’ (Wodak et al 2009: 35). The present analysis accordingly acknowledges that Wodak et al.’s linguistic means offer some helpful pointers, but that these cannot be applied as a priori linguistic devices for analysis, as the present texts and research questions are not identical to those used by Wodak et. al.
A review of the literature on metaphor shows that the most relevant theory of metaphor for the purposes of CDA is Conceptual or Cognitive Metaphor Theory (CMT). The greatest contributions to CMT originate from George Lakoff and colleagues. The earliest theoretical work on conceptual metaphor is George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s *Metaphors We Live By* (1980). Lakoff and Johnson define metaphor as a conceptual and systematic concept grounded in human experience and explain that, because so many concepts in life are abstract (e.g. emotions, ideas, time), human beings attempt to grasp them by referring to them in terms of other concepts that are more clearly delineated in their experience (e.g. spatial orientations, objects) (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 115).

Andreas Musolff has done key further work on CMT, and particularly in relation to the role of metaphor in (political) discourse. In *Metaphor and Political Discourse: Analogical Reasoning in Debates about Europe* (2004) and *The Study of Metaphor as Part of Critical Discourse Analysis* (2012), Musolff underlines the relevance of metaphor for social and political conceptualisation from the perspective of CMT. He convincingly argues that if our social experience and conceptualisations are organised in terms of metaphors then metaphors must also play a central role in the construction of social and political reality, i.e. politics must also perceived and constructed metaphorically (Musolff 2004: 1-2). Taking a corpus-based approach to critical metaphors in public discourse Musolff demonstrates that metaphor has a tripartite function in political discourse by analysing the source domain of FAMILY concepts in media discussions of the EU in the German and British press. He corroborates the CMT notion that metaphor not only constructs meaning in discourse, but that it also has an argumentative function and a rhetorical function.

Musolff (2012) focuses on the argumentative function of metaphor in political discourse. Musolff’s 2012 analysis of ‘body politic’ metaphors (A NATION STATE IS A HUMAN BODY) in racist discourse (although the author emphasises that this metaphor is not restricted to racist discourse (Musolff 2012: 303)) analyses how metaphors pertaining to ‘the great chain of being’ allow racists to denigrate their targets ‘by
“demoting” them from humankind’s central position in the chain down to “lower” ranks of animals, plants, disease-engendering organisms or inorganic material’ (Musolff 2012: 302). Musolff’s analysis centres on the so-called ‘entailments’ (implications) of metaphors; he argues that, as the metaphor A NATION STATE IS A HUMAN BODY entails that a nation state can be healthy or fall ill, and when ill can suffer from specific diseases (e.g. cancer) and need therapy, this metaphor and others like it carries social, emotional and aesthetic values that influence the readers’ or listeners’ interpretation of the utterance (Musolff 2012: 303). Musolff concludes that metaphors and their entailments such as those pertaining to the ‘great chain of being’ have an argumentative function because, by using them, the author or speaker ‘invites the reader or listener to access knowledge about the undesirability of illness and the desirability or necessity of therapy by referring to well known illnesses or agents of disease’, thereby avoiding having to ‘laboriously demonstrate their claims with facts’ (Musolff 2012: 303).

Further reading of Musolff’s work suggests that his 2006 publication Metaphor Scenarios in Public Discourse may be of particular value to the present analysis. Using the bilingual corpus EUROMETA II consisting of British and German newspapers and magazines between the years 1989 and 2001, Musolff analyses metaphors in public debates about the European Union (cf Musolff 2004) and reaches the conclusion that metaphors and their source concepts may be organised into ‘mini-narratives’ or so-called ‘scenarios’, defined as ‘conceptual clusters’ (Musolff 2006: 24). Focussing once again on FAMILY metaphors, he shows that many of the metaphors in the corpus used can be related to one broad source domain: LOVE – MARRIAGE – FAMILY (Musolff 2006: 24), and identifies conceptual specifications such as a ménage à trois between France, Germany and Britain as extensions of general mappings underlying the whole domain (Musolff 2006: 25). Perhaps his most illustrative example is that France and Germany figure both as marriage partners in the EU and as parents of the EU’s currency notion (Musolff 2006: 26). Musolff states that metaphor scenarios are an essential feature of metaphor use in public discourse as their rich conceptual structure can be easily exploited for argumentative and rhetorical purposes: normative assumptions pertaining to aspects
of love, marriage and family, for example, mean that this metaphor scenario can be used to frame attitudes and evaluation in public discourse (Musolff 2006: 28). The argumentative and rhetorical potential of metaphors in general, ‘great chain of being’ metaphors and family metaphors in particular, and ultimately ‘metaphor scenarios’ as conceptualised by Musolff indicated the necessity of analysis metaphors in Chamberlain’s war essays. Musolff’s work provides an ideal point of reference for the present analysis, which will endeavour to investigate metaphor scenarios in Chamberlain’s discourse.

2.6 CDA and Pragma-Dialectical Theory

Van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Snoeck Henkeman’s Fundamentals of Argumentation Theory (1996) provides the most informative theoretical introduction to pragma-dialectical theory. The authors contextualise the pragma-dialectical approach by outlining the main tenets of all major approaches to argumentation, such as Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s ‘new rhetoric’, and formal and informal logic as devised by Stephen Toulmin, among others. They furthermore discuss the origins of pragma-dialectics in Karl Popper’s critical rationalism, and define key concepts in pragma-dialectics, such as argumentation, analytic, dialectic, rhetoric, fallacies, controversy and discussion. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s A Systematic Theory of Argumentation (2004) and van Eemeren and Houtlosser’s article Argumentation (2010) are further valuable references for definitions of the concepts ‘argumentation’ and ‘fallacy’ as they are used in the pragma-dialectical approach to argument analysis. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992) provide a useful guide to the methodology of a pragma-dialectical analysis of argumentation, and particularly to analysing fallacies. The authors outline analysis components and provide a typology of fallacies according to each stage of critical discussion and corresponding rules for critical discussion.

A key aspect of the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation analysis for the present purposes is Daniel Cohen’s taxonomy of logical, rhetorical and dialectical fallacies (Cohen 2003: 119). Cohen’s taxonomy indicates the respective pragma-
dialectical rules for critical discussion that may be violated by each category of fallacies. Logical fallacies may potentially represent violations of the rules of inference, and include false cause, hasty generalisation, begging the question/circular reasoning, ambiguities, affirming the consequent/denying the antecedent, ‘not’ hopping, slippery slope, missing the point, appeal to ignorance, weak analogy and unfinished demonstration. Rhetorical faults are posited as potential violations of the rules of fair presentation and include suppressed evidence, unwarranted premise, false dichotomy, complex question, ad hominem, non sequitur, appeal to (illegitimate) authority, appeal to emotion, ad populum, insincerity, straw man and obscurantism. Dialectical offenses constitute potential violations of the rules of rational engagement, and include appeal to force, excessive argument, unanswered objections (by the proponent), unvoiced objections (by the opponent), unasked questions, misunderstanding, insufficient argument, insufficient counter-argument and ignoratio elenchi (ibid.: 119-120). This analysis addresses instances of van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s more general pragma-dialectical fallacies in Chamberlain’s discourse and uses Cohen’s taxonomy as a more detailed reference for the forms that pragma-dialectical rule violations can take.

Pragma-dialectics has been used as an analysis framework for a variety of discursive situations. These include general problem-solving discussions (van Rees 2003), doctor-patient interaction (Rubinelli & Schulz 2006), and pragma-dialectical reconstructions of teleological argumentation in a legal context (Feteris 2008). The application of the pragma-dialectical analysis framework in political discourse analysis is a recent development. Although not all scholars agree that CDA and pragma-dialectics are fundamentally compatible (cf. Ihnen and Richardson 2011 and Forchtner and Tominc 2012), the present research upholds that there is strong potential for a useful methodological synthesis of the two discourse-analytical approaches.

Isabela Ietcu-Fairclough in particular has demonstrated how valuable the study of argumentation along pragma-dialectical lines can be for a critical analysis of discourse, as both approaches are concerned with the way that social actors pursue and produce social change, and both are concerned with the identities set up
for the producers and receivers of texts, the interactions between them, and the way in which their choices are linked to political strategies and goals (Ieţcu-Fairclough 2007: 42-43). She combines CDA and pragma-dialectics to analyse the legitimisation strategies used by and on behalf of the two presidential candidates in the Romanian elections of 2004, in which she looks particularly at strategies that draw on populist discourse. She analyses fallacies from a functional, contextual perspective (fallacies in context) and goes into particular detail on the *argumentum ad populum* ‘as fallacy and rhetorical ploy’ (Ieţcu-Fairclough 2007: 43). As the present analysis aims to do, she analyses fallacies in relation to the pragma-dialectical rules for critical discussion, identifying that the *argumentum ad populum* is a violation of Rule 7, the Argument Scheme Rule. Ieţcu-Fairclough’s analysis also focuses on strategies of legitimisation used by the presidential candidates to ‘diagnose’ the electorate’s needs and to assert their electoral messages as the ‘fulfilment’ of these needs. Initial readings of Chamberlain’s discourse suggests that they too feature such strategies, and thus it will be interesting to examine the role of the *argumentum ad populum* here.

Dale Hample’s work on the pragma-dialectical concept of ‘disagreement space’ is testimony to the compatibility of pragma-dialectics and CDA. Hample is perhaps the only scholar who focusses on disagreement space per se, basing his publication *A Pragma-Dialectical Analysis of the Inquisition* (2001) on the concept. In this article, he shows how the Inquisition throughout the High Middle Ages and into the Renaissance systematically controlled disagreement space, by which he specifically means preventing important standpoints from being argued about and directing attention to standpoints that may not have initially seemed relevant (Hample 2001: 135). Hample points out that, in the context of the Inquisition, many beliefs, wants, and intentions that were relevant in trials could not be expressed or argued about (ibid.: 136), and examines in particular the anonymity and control of witnesses (no family, no Jews, Moors, or servants were allowed to testify), document control, intimidation (excommunication, imprisonment, threat of torture, actual torture), and reflexive arguments (to deny one’s heresy was to exhibit it). Hample’s study is motivated by his conviction that the pragma-dialectical school should not continue to avoid cognitive and macro-
sociological issues, and that it should broaden its domain of applicability in order to engage in the analysis and critique of large social institutions (ibid.: 148). Concluding that disagreement space is, in practice, not always equally available to both parties (ibid.: 146-147), this study represents an important application of pragma-dialectics in the analysis and criticism of unequal power relationships in discourse.

2.7 Corpus-Assisted Discourse Studies (CADS)

The advantages of fusing CDA and corpus linguistics have been the subject of a substantial body of literature inspired by Gerlinde Mautner (1995; 2012), Alan Partington (2003; 2004), and Paul Baker (2006). In Partington’s introduction to his edited volume *Corpora and Discourse* (2004) he describes the two linguistic phenomena as ‘a most congruous beast’, likening CADS to Ariosto’s hippogriff (Partington 2004: 11). In *The Linguistics of Political Argumentation* (2003), Partington uses an automated concordancer and frequency lists to explore the rhetoric of institutional discourse (press briefings) and the relationship between politicians and the press. Partington places particular emphasis on context, stating that questions or authorship and reception and features of interaction between discourse producers and receivers are of central interest to his analysis (Partington 2003: 1).

Michael Stubbs identifies corpus linguistics as an aid in replacing intuitive, introspective Chomskyan data with authentic language examples (Stubbs 1996: 24). Indeed, it is the applied nature of corpus linguistics that makes it compatible with CDA: both approaches view linguistics as an applied science, and both analyse authentic instances of language in use. As John Sinclair identifies, corpus linguistics furthermore allows the discourse analyst to examine a greater volume of data, broadening the empirical base that would otherwise be limited by the less sizeable scope of quantitative methods (Sinclair 2004: 16). ‘At the simplest level’, Alan Partington adds, ‘corpus technology helps find other examples of a phenomenon one has already noted. At the other extreme, it reveals patterns of use
previously unthought of. Inbetween, it can reinforce, refute or revise a researcher’s intuition and show them why and how much their suspicions were grounded’ (Partington 2003: 12).

Baker et al. (2008) devise an analysis framework comprising methods used in CDA (or, more specifically, in the DHA) and methods used by corpus linguists to examine the discursive presentation of refugees, asylum seekers, immigrants and migrants (RASIM) in the British press between 1996 and 2005. Although the authors reveal important insights into the linguistic definition and construction of RASIM, attitudes towards RASIM in the body of newspapers as a whole, and distinctions and similarities between broadsheets and tabloids in their stance towards RASIM, the article’s primary aim is to test the synergy of corpus linguistics and CDA. The authors examine the respective merits and limitations of this methodological synergy, how best to apply it, and how the two approaches to discourse analysis can be mutually beneficial (Baker et al. 2008: 273). The authors conclude that corpus linguistic methods can benefit CDA by generating frequencies of specific phenomena recognised in CDA (e.g. topoi, topics, metaphors), by examining lexical patterns, and generally by lending CDA a qualitative dimension (Baker et al. 2008: 296). In turn, methods used in CDA complement corpus linguistic methods by facilitating a more detailed analysis and taking into account larger amounts of textual context, structure and genre-specific characteristics (op. cit.: 296). CDA can furthermore identify pragmatic devices and more subtle discursive strategies that corpus linguistic means would not necessarily identify (op. cit.: 296). Most usefully of all for the present analysis, the authors devise suggested stages of CL/CDA analysis based on their approach to analyzing RASIM. These are:

- Context-based analysis of topic via history/politics/culture/etymology
- Identify existing topoi/discourses/strategies via wider reading, reference to other CDA studies
- Establish research questions/corpus building procedures
Corpus analysis of frequencies, clusters, keywords, dispersion, etc. – identify potential sites of interest in the corpus along with possible discourses/topoi/strategies, relate to those existing in the literature

Qualitative or CDA analysis of a smaller, representative set of data (e.g. concordances of certain lexical items or of a particular text or set of texts within the corpus) – identify discourses/topoi/strategies (DH approach)

Formulation of new hypotheses or research questions

Further corpus analysis based on new hypotheses, identify further discourses/topoi/strategies, etc.

Analysis of intertextuality or interdiscursivity based on findings from corpus analysis

New hypotheses

Further corpus analysis, identify additional discourses/topoi/strategies, etc.

(Baker et al. 2008: 295)

The article additionally points out that both methodological approaches can be used as entry points, making it fruitful to start either with the corpus analysis or with the qualitative analysis (op. cit.: 295). These methodological guidelines and considerations are an excellent basic point of reference for the present analysis, which may base itself wholly or partly thereon.

Gerlinde Mautner (2000) undertakes a so-called ‘critical and discourse-orientated corpus analysis’ (C-DOC) of newspaper articles on European integration in the Guardian, Daily Telegraph, Daily Mail, and Sun in selected periods between 1971 and 1994 in order to analyse the linguistic realisation of pro and anti discourse surrounding the political process of European integration (Mautner 2000: 27). She emphasises that in C-DOC, corpus linguistic methods are used to serve critical discourse analysis, and not vice versa (ibid.: 49). She combines frequency lists and keyword lists with a qualitative framework for
analysis consisting of strategies, conventionalised argumentation, and linguistic means. Her elaborate typology of linguistic means is based on initial corpus linguistic findings, and features phenomena at the level of text (text type, structure, organisation, coherence and cohesion, polyphonic text voices, author and reader identities, author-reader relationship, intextuality, reported speech); syntax (transitivity, tempus, aspect and modality, illocution, active vs. passive, nominalisation, theme vs. rheme); lexis (keywords, contrastive pairs, associative meanings, co-text, technical terms, metaphor, metonymy); phonology and graphemics (phonetic writing style); nonverbal factors (emphasis marking, suggestive typography, graphics, illustrations) (82-84). She concludes that the use of corpus linguistics can add a solid empirical fundament to CDA, and that CDA in turn can add new interpretive potential to the corpus linguistic emphasis on distribution and regularity.

In Mautner’s *Die kritische Masse: Korpuslinguistik und kritische Diskursanalyse* (2012), she addresses the questions of what exactly the advantages are to combining CL and CDA, and the limits to these advantages (Mautner 2012: 82). In a case study based on two corpora of job advertisements in *The Guardian* (one containing advertisements from the year 1978 and the other containing advertisements from the year 2008), Mautner uses corpus linguistic methods to identify and diachronically compare linguistically constructed ideologies in the job advertisements. Computed word frequency lists reveal that three personal pronouns ‘we’, ‘our’ and ‘you’ are among the 15 most frequent words in the 2008 corpus, but are negative keywords in the 1978 corpus. The corpus software additionally reveals that the number of evaluative adjectives (e.g. ‘exciting’, ‘flexible’, ‘innovative’) had risen significantly in job advertisement discourse between 1978 and 2008. Using frequency and keyword lists as a starting point to identify lexemes for further analysis, she then generates concordances for these keywords in order to analyse the use of personal pronouns and evaluative adjectives in greater detail (Mautner 2012: 100-102). She concludes that the value of using corpus linguistic methods in CDA is firstly heuristic, in that statistics like word frequency and keyness provide important insights alone, but also
indicate phenomena to analyse qualitatively in greater detail (ibid.: 104), and secondly reduces the likelihood that CDA analysts will make groundless or rash judgements (ibid.: 105).

Garzone and Santulli’s 2004 analysis of early responses to 11th September in the British press is a further enlightening study combining corpus linguistics and CDA. Garzone and Santulli alternate between corpus linguistic methods and qualitative analysis to form and test hypotheses. They use a qualitative analysis of selected text samples as a point of departure, using computer queries to verify the hypotheses formulated by means of qualitative analysis, checking whether they can be supported by objective data and their validity extended to the whole corpus (Garzone and Santulli 2004: 355). They then return to qualitative analysis to search for more complex repetition, as well as for synonyms, superordinates, and hyponyms of the computer-generated keywords (e.g. ‘world’, ‘war’, ‘enemy’). The qualitative analysis supplements the corpus analysis by identifying a series of motifs only rarely realised at the manifest level as explicitly developed arguments. It alerts the analysts to abnormally recurrent groups of semantically related lexical items, for example hyperbolic words associated with massacre and violence (‘terror’, ‘horror’, ‘evil’, ‘atrocities’, ‘slaughter’), and negative adjectives that imply that the events of September 11 can be described only in negative terms (‘incalculable’, ‘intolerable’, ‘unfathomable’) (ibid.: 358). The authors conclude that recourse to corpus linguistic instruments can help overcome some of the main objections to CDA by extending the validity of statements made on the basis of the analysis of limited text samples to larger and representative amounts of text, by providing material and verifiable evidence for the analyst’s arguments and statements concerning discourse, thus helping overcome ideological bias, and by obtaining basic indications for areas to be explored which may not be identified by means of qualitative analysis (ibid.: 366).

Of greatest interest to the present analysis are studies that combine CDA and corpus linguistics to analyse the discourses of nationalism and/or racism. Based on the hypothesis that basketball and American football are symbols of national unity, patriotism and a feeling of belonging in the USA, Karsten Senkbeil (2012)
analyses the discourse of American sports reporting, questioning in particular the allegedly ‘unpolitical’ nature of American sports, and focussing on the construction and dissemination of the socio-economic ideologies behind the American sport scene and their linguistic realisation. Senkbeil uses WordSmith and particularly the Keywords tool to analyse a corpus of written sport journalism from the New York Times, USA Today, Los Angeles Times, and Washington Post, as well as online journalism. The resulting keywords list reveals a recurring use of words pertaining to family (‘sister’, ‘husband’, ‘mother’, ‘daughter’, ‘father’, ‘children’, ‘parents’), and of the prepositions ‘in’ and ‘out’ (Senkbeil 2012: 405-406). Using concordances for these keywords to further analyse specific instances, Senkbeil concludes that family vocabulary not only emotionalises the story, but that many journalists construct a causal relationship between family ties and sporting success: American sports discourse forge a close and ‘logical’ relationship between sporting success and a conservative family image (idid: 406), an instance of ‘naturalisation’. Using CMA in the tradition of Charteris-Black and Stefanowitsch, Senkbeil also analyses the container metaphors in US sports discourse. He observes that on the one hand, the football pitch or basketball court is constructed as a container with an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’, where those on the pitch are the ‘insiders’. On the other hand, however, the key cluster ‘out there’ most commonly refers to ‘out there on the pitch’, which is a reversal of the container metaphor. Senkbeil concludes that the ‘out there’ construction is a culturally determined reinterpretation of the historical ‘frontier myth’, in which the sports pitch is presented as separate from civilisation in the tradition of new American civilisation versus the native American wilderness:

Im Falle der Phrase out there verwendet der amerikanische Sportdiskurs die Containermetaphoer „falsch herum“. Die Erklärung hierfür liegt in kulturellen Determinanten. Die out there Konstruktion ist ein Hinweis auf die kollektive Interpretation des amerikanischen Sports als von der Zivilisation teilweise abgedeckelter Raum. Die amerikanische Sportkultur re-interpretiert den uramerikanischen Frontier-Myths, also das Gegenüberstellen von amerikanischer Zivilisation und nicht-besiedelter „Wildnis“, in die das amerikanische Individuum vordringt, um dort die
Geraint O. Edwards (2012) performs a comparative discourse analysis of the construction of ‘in-groups’ in the 2005 and 2010 manifestos of the British National Party. He combines corpus analysis with CDA in order to ascertain how the language of the BNP is changing in order to appeal to a wider electoral base. Edwards focuses on racial definitions of ‘in-group’ categories in the manifestos, looking in particular at ‘natives’ versus ‘indigenous people’, and the use of the word ‘white’ in reference to race. Amir Salama (2011) combines the two approaches to analyse how antagonistic ideologies have been realised at collocation level across anti-Wahhabi and pro-Wahhabi discourses since ‘9/11’. To answer the question of how Wahhabi-Saudi Islam has been ideologically recontextualised in discourse via collocation, Salama computes the collocates for all relevant keywords. Salama’s focuses on the lexico-semantic relations between the collocates: on synonymy, and on euphemism and dysphemism. Salama’s observation that collocational relations can contribute to the ideological recontextualisation of a discourse topic is deemed particularly significant for the present analysis of the discursive realisation of ideologies.

Of central importance to this thesis is Felicity Rash’s 2012 CADS of Chamberlain’s Grundlagen. Rash uses close reading to identify which lexemes and affixes have particular significance for the analysis of images of the Self and Other in Chamberlain’s Grundlagen, and generates digital concordances for a selection of personal pronouns, noun and adjective stems, verb stems, affixes and prepositions, and adverbs and particles. Rash makes a number of observations pertaining to the Grundlagen that concur with the results of the present analysis, notably the significance of the personal pronouns ich, wir and uns in Chamberlain’s discourse, as well as verbs, affixes and prepositions of upwards and downwards movement (e.g. herab, hinauf, herunter), and adverbs of time (immer, nie) (Rash 2012: 19). She additionally identifies the centrality of tat- as in in der Tat, Tatsache and tatsächlich in discourse strategies in Chamberlain’s
Grundlagen (ibid.: 19) and Kriegsaufsätze (ibid.: 182), which constitutes a major focus of this thesis.
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1 Introduction

The present research is based on a theoretical framework within the scope of Critical Discourse Analysis developed for the specific means and purposes of the thesis. In line with the work of Ineke van der Valk, the theoretical framework is based on the notion that political discourse predominantly has a persuasive function, and the formal structure of persuasion is frequently argumentative (van der Valk 2003: 317). It is furthermore based on the assumption that argumentative persuasion is enacted using strategies, which are in turn constructed using topoi, rhetorical devices and other linguistic means. The analytical chapters of the thesis thus subscribe to the principles and intentions of CDA while developing and applying an individual theoretical framework comprising discursive strategies of persuasion (in particular strategies of legitimisation and delegitimisation and the creation of global fuzziness), topoi, pragma-dialectical fallacies, rhetoric, metaphor scenarios and the pragma-dialectical concept of the reduction of disagreement space. The critical discourse analysis is furthermore corpus-assisted, inspired by the proven synergy of corpus linguistic methods and approaches to doing CDA (Baker et al. 2008).

3.2 Critical Discourse Analysis

Critical Discourse Analysis is a critical approach to doing discourse analysis that evolved from critical linguistics, which in turn evolved from critical theory. It is characterised by a particular understanding of the nature of discourse and by socio-critical aims, rather than by a specific methodology. There are several ‘schools’ of CDA associated with varying priorities, scholarly influences and theoretical emphases, including the Dutch School practised by Teun van Dijk, the Duisburg School practised by Siegfried and Margaret Jäger, and the Vienna School practiced by Ruth Wodak and Martin Reisigl.
CDA is characterised first and foremost by a specific understanding of the term ‘discourse’, which shapes the present analytical framework. Whereas the original meaning of the term ‘discourse’ was derived from the French *discours*, meaning both direct and indirect speech and the act of ‘holding forth a subject in conversation’ (Mills 2004: 2), it now signifies a broad range of meanings across disciplines (Howarth 2000: 1). The critical understanding of the term is inherited from definitions developed by critical theorists in their analysis of the discursive construction of knowledge and of social and institutional power. The relationship between discourse and (institutional) power was questioned in the aftermath of the student protests of 1968, a discussion that was exacerbated by Althusser’s essay *Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses* (1970). Educational institutions were scrutinised as disseminators of ideology rather than of knowledge, and the conviction that so-called ‘knowledge’ was the discursive creation of those with the institutional power to create it took hold (Macdonell 1986: 14-15). At around the same time, Habermas observed the transformation of the newspaper from an institution for the publication of news into a ‘bearer and leader of public opinion’ (Held 1980: 261), leading him to question the extent to which the public sphere genuinely represented public interest. Habermas viewed this shifting media dynamic in terms of dominance and subdominance, and strived to develop a practical theory of society that would encourage the self-emancipation of the people from institutional domination (Held 1980: 250). Critical theorists therefore viewed discourse as institutional and as a force in the creation of social dominance.

Inspired by Habermas, Roger Fowler, Bob Hodge, Gunther Kress and Tony Trew, the ‘founding fathers’ of what is now known as Critical Linguistics, established critical theory as a major concern for linguists, combining critical notions of power, ideology, and discourse with detailed linguistic analysis in their pioneering publication *Language and Control* (1979). The authors explore the notion that language is a tool used in the maintenance and subversion of power. Fowler et al. thematise what they call ‘Orwellian linguistics’ (1979: chapter title): inspired by George Orwell’s satire of political language in *1984*, the authors conclude that
‘linguistic constructions have social, interpersonal and ideological functions’ resulting from the unequal distribution of power in society (Fowler, Hodge, Kress & Trew 1979: 3). The practice of CDA adheres to this critical definition of discourse, viewing it not as a structure, but as social practice; as constitutive of social action and interaction. Discourse is understood to constitute situations, objects of knowledge and the social identities of and relations between people (Wodak 2001: 359). By representing things and positioning people in certain ways, discursive practices can thus produce and reproduce unequal power relations, endowing them with the potential to have major ideological effects (op. cit.: 359). Accordingly CDA views discourse as social with the potential to be an ideological tool used in the maintenance and subversion of power. Consequently, CDA upholds that discourse can only be fully understood with reference to its context (Meyer in Wodak and Meyer 2001: 15).

Scholars who analyse discourse analysis from a critical perspective are united by a shared interest in unmasking the discursive processes of the construction and maintenance of power, and therewith conversely of exclusion and subordination. A critical approach to discourse analysis in this sense endeavours to critique social and ideological practices as they are enacted using discourse. Ruth Wodak states that this concept of social critique integrates three related aspects: ‘text or discourse immanent critique’ that uncovers propositional inconsistencies, contradictions and paradoxes, ‘socio-diagnostic critique’ that demystifies the persuasive or manipulative character of discursive practices, and ‘future-related prospective critique’ that seeks to contribute to the improvement of communication (Wodak 2009: 34). The critique in the present analysis is primarily socio-diagnostic.
3.3 CDA in the Analysis of Manipulative Political Propaganda

CDA is an ideal framework in which to analyse manipulative political discourse because, as public discourse, political discourse is first and foremost a form of social action that emphasises people acting as social agents (van der Valk 2003: 313). Political discourse can be used to reproduce stereotypes, discrimination and racism, and more generally to exert power by legitimising or delegitimising viewpoints or ideological positionings (Reyes 2011: 783). As Ineke van der Valk advocates, political discourse should be analysed at this level of social action; ‘as an instrument in the exercise of power, control and exclusion or, by contrast, as an instrument for achieving equality and democracy’ (van der Valk 2003: 313).

Chamberlain’s war essays constitute manipulative political propaganda. Drawing largely on the conclusions of Sapir Handelman, ‘manipulation’ is understood as the discursive construction of a cognitive action that consciously aims to invisibly motivate a change in thought or behaviour, creating the illusion of freedom of thought in the process (Handelman 2009: 16-17). One of the most commonly noted distinctions between ‘manipulation’ and ‘persuasion’ is that persuasion is achieved in cooperation with the message recipient’s freedom of thought, whereas manipulation is achieved by blocking this freedom of thought (O’Keefe 2002: 5). Handelman and Saussure advocate that manipulation results from the illusion of freedom of choice (Saussure 2005: 117; Handelman 2009: 23). The present analysis thus assumes that the main element of deceit that renders manipulation morally reprehensible or illegitimate is the illusion of freedom of thought, and the way in which this limits the persuadee’s autonomy. Manipulation is furthermore understood in terms of transparency: manipulation, Nathaniel Klemp suggests, is immoral because, in contrast to persuasion, it is never transparent (Klemp 2011: 73). He asserts that incidents of manipulation hide the speaker’s wishes and do not respect the other agent’s capacity to choose (Klemp 2011: 73).

The present thesis highlights the inherent connection between manipulative discourse and CDA as an approach to demystifying dominance relations because it views the propagator of manipulative discourse as in control and the receiver of manipulative discourse as dominated (cf. Chilton 2005: 17).
As propaganda, Chamberlain’s nationalist essays constitute a particular kind of manipulative discourse. The present understanding of ‘propaganda’ is based on definitions by Jowett and O’Donnell (2006) and Pratkanis and Aronson (2001). Jowett and O’Donnell differentiate between propaganda and persuasion: while persuasion denotes interpersonal influence, propaganda is a form of mass manipulation (Jowett & O’Donnell 2006: 1, 28). They also link propaganda to ideology, asserting that propaganda is ‘almost always some form of activated ideology’ (Jowett & O’Donnell 2006: 16). They argue that the conscious use of propaganda to alter or maintain a balance of power that is advantageous to the propagandist is linked to a clear institutional ideology and objective (ibid. 2006: 3). The present research similarly conceives of propaganda as a form of mass manipulation, and, moreover, a form of ideology-driven mass manipulation. This analysis also adopts an interactive or dialectical dimension from Jowett and O’Donnell. The authors state that:

The propagandist is very likely to appear as a persuader with a stated purpose that seems to satisfy mutual needs. In reality, however, the propagandist wants to promote his or her own interests or those of an organisation (Jowett & O’Donnell 2006: 44).

Propaganda can therefore be viewed as a verbal act of manipulation masquerading as persuasion; an act of manipulation which, on the surface, pretends to accommodate the needs and wishes of the message recipient.

Pratkanis and Aronson (2001) define the concept of propaganda by contrasting it to the concept of education: whereas the role of education is to teach individuals to be independent and autonomous, propaganda attempts to prevent individuals from thinking and from acting as humans with rights (Pratkanis & Aronson 2001: 266). Warren Morris agrees that propaganda ‘excludes individual freedom and the burden of considering conflicting social alternatives’. As a combination of Pratkanis and Aronson’s (2001) and Jowett and O’Donnell’s (2006) definitions, this thesis perceives propaganda to be an ideology-driven form of manipulation addressed to
the masses which works implicitly to render the readers passive while simultaneously giving the impression that the writer wishes to satisfy their dialectical standards. The dialectical obligations that Chamberlain claims to fulfil in order to create this impression are the reasonable argumentation norms identified by Jürgen Habermas as ‘validity claims’ (Geltungsanprüche): the writer’s obligation to make his utterances intelligible or comprehensible, true (wahr), sincere (wahrhaftig), and correct (richtig) (Habermas 1988: 411-413).

3.4 Particulars of the Theoretical Framework

The present critical discourse analysis is based on a hierarchical theoretical framework comprising Paul Chilton and Christine Schaeffner’s 1997 classification of discursive strategies of persuasion in political discourse, Theo van Leeuwen’s 2007 typology of strategies of legitimisation and the creation of ‘global fuzziness’ as advocated by Louis de Saussure (2005), topoi, pragma-dialectical fallacies as conceptualised by Hans van Eemeren (1992) and Daniel Cohen (2003), and the pragma-dialectical concept of the reduction of disagreement space developed by Dale Hample (2001). This framework assumes that manipulative discourse is constructed using strategies of legitimisation/delegitimisation, coercion and dissimulation, and fallacious argumentation, that these strategies and fallacious argumentation moves are enacted using topical motifs, topoi and rhetoric, and that these are constructed using language, ranging from the strategic use of punctuation and lexis to the strategic use of syntactic and suprasentential phenomena such as metaphor scenarios.

3.4.1 Critical Disagreement Space

This thesis assumes that the essays’ manipulative power lies in the author’s reduction or restriction of the readers’ critical disagreement space. When performed with sufficient manipulative will, the use of fallacious topoi, rhetoric and further linguistic means to enact discursive strategies of persuasion and manipulation not only constitutes unreasonable argumentation on a normative level, but functionally
reduces what is known in pragma-dialectics as ‘critical disagreement space’. This term was coined by van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson and Jacobs (van Eemeren et al. 1993), who define it as ‘a structured set of opportunities for argument’ (van Eemeren et al. 1993: 95); it is the freedom in discourse for the recipient to disagree with the arguments and conclusions advanced by the proponent. The present analysis specifies that the deliberate neutralisation or eradication of critical judgement using fallacious rhetoric and argumentation demobilises the reader’s ability (rather than their willingness) to critically examine the propositional content of the discourse at hand. To advocate the existence of critical disagreement space in interaction has a logical corollary: if the proponent has the ability to control the amount of critical disagreement space available to the reader, then the reader cannot be granted freedom of independent thought. The definition and application of this concept in the present analysis encompasses rule 1 of the pragma-dialectical rules for critical discussion, the ‘freedom rule’, which stipulates that parties must not prevent each other from advancing standpoints or from casting doubt on standpoints (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992: 208, c.f. Section 3.4.4).

As manipulation is understood to function on the basis of the illusion of freedom of thought (see Section 3.3), the reduction of critical disagreement space as a violation of the freedom rule bears direct significance on the workings of manipulative discourse. The use of the concept in this thesis is more specifically informed by Dale Hample’s work on the elimination of disagreement space in the Inquisition (Hample 2001: 135), and subscribes in particular to Hample’s notion that argumentative discourse can prevent important standpoints from being argued about and direct attention to others that may not really be relevant (Hample 2001: 135). As Hample has shown, disagreement space can be eliminated or reduced by the dominant party in argumentation, thus this analysis is based on the assumption that (critical) disagreement space is not always equally available to all parties (ibid.: 146-147). Based on Robert Goodin’s observation on the ability of language to constrain thought, language use is held to be the fundamental tool in the reduction of critical disagreement space (Goodin 1980: 65).
Discursive strategies are understood to be the linguistic representation of an essentially cognitive-communicative activity with an ideological or socio-psychological aim. This definition is based on Gerlinde Mautner’s understanding of the term as ‘die Auswahl, Strukturierung und Plazierung von Inhalten, um ein übergeordnetes persuasives Ziel zu erreichen’ (Mautner 2000: 83). The strategies analysed are based on the work of Paul Chilton and Christina Schaeffner (1997), who delineate strategies of dissimulation (the control of information, censorship or giving inadequate information, lying, verbal evasion, denial, euphemism), coercion (directive speech acts, speech acts backed by sanctions, and threats) legitimisation (communicating reasons for being obeyed, general ideological principles and positive self-presentation in the form of charismatic leadership projection and boasting about performance) and delegitimisation (ideas of difference and speech acts of blaming, accusing and insulting to present ‘the other’ differently) (Chilton & Schaeffner 1997: 212-213). These strategies provide an ideal basis for the present analysis as they were devised in relation to political discourse and bear direct relevance to Chamberlain’s essays.

As found by so many scholars to be key in political and/or persuasive discourse (see van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999, van der Valk 2003, van Leeuwen 2007, Reyes 2011 in Chapter 2), the analysis will focus in particular on strategies of legitimisation and delegitimisation. As Reyes aptly highlights, legitimisation in discourse goes hand-in-hand with ideology, as ‘the very act of legitimisation implies an attempt to justify action or no action or an ideological position on a specific issue’ (Reyes 2011: 782-783). Four particular substrategies of legitimisation appear to be formative in persuasive or manipulative argumentation. These are the creation of a Feindbild on the one hand and Selbstinszenierung on the other using ‘othering’ or ‘semantic strategies of self- and other presentation’ (van der Valk 2003: 318; Reyes 2011: 787), and legitimising strategies of authority, moral abstraction, and rationalisation. Van Leeuwen shows that discursive legitimisation can be enacted by way of personal authority, expert authority, role model authority, impersonal authority, the authority of tradition and
the authority of conformity, as well as by asserting commonsense moral values such as the ‘good’ and the ‘aesthetic’ (van Leeuwen 2007: 97). Furthermore, strategies of legitimisation may take the form of abstraction – ‘referring to practices in abstract ways that “moralise” them by distilling from them a quality that links them to discourses of moral values’, and rationalisation (op. cit. 2007: 98). Following van Leeuwen, there are two kinds of rational legitimisation strategies: instrumental and theoretical. Instrumental rationalisation legitimises practices by referring to their goals and purposes, and theoretical rationalisation founds a statement or action on truth, or ‘the way things are’ (op. cit. 2007: 98-103).

In relation to van Leeuwen’s theory of legitimisation by abstraction, the present analysis is additionally informed by Louis de Saussure’s concept of ‘global fuzziness’, a concept he coined in his 2005 analysis ‘Manipulation and Ideologies in the Twentieth Century’ to refer to the use of entire ‘parts of discourse’ beyond the level of linguistic expressions and sentences to create interpretative problems for the addressee (Saussure 2005: 126). This concept forms a central concern of the present thesis, which highlights the creation of psycho-social fuzziness as a central mechanism of Chamberlain’s manipulative discourse. ‘Fuzziness’ is intrinsically connected to de Saussure’s (2005) theory of ‘trouble-and-resolution’ (Saussure 2005: 133). The trouble-and-resolution device is both discursive and psychological; it refers to the use of vague or incomprehensible language to create ‘fuzziness’ in the mind of the readers, causing them to abandon their critical stance to the discourse and accept the topical content of the statements made in favour of ‘resolving’ the problem or ‘trouble’ of confusion or incomprehension. It is based on the notion that the desire to counterbalance feelings of (intellectual) inferiority to the author is stronger than the desire to critically engage with inconsistency or vagueness. The present qualitative analysis shows how the trouble-and-resolution device can have a manipulative function on a grander scale. It takes the theory beyond linguistic vagueuness and incomprehensibility and investigates Chamberlain’s use of discursive strategies of legitimisation and delegitimisation to
incite the readers’ desire to resolve the trouble or ‘fuzziness’ that the author creates at a socio-political level.

3.4.3 Topoi

Persuasive strategies of legitimisation, delegitimisation, coercion and dissimulation and the manipulative creation of ‘fuzziness’ or ‘trouble’ are constructed in part using topoi and rhetoric. The constitutive relationship between strategies and topoi is illuminated, for example, by van Leeuwen’s descriptions of strategies of legitimisation enacted using various topoi of authority (van Leeuwen 2007: 94-97). Topoi or ‘common-places’ in English are understood in the way defined by van der Valk (2003) and Wodak (2009). They are general principles or socially shared beliefs that form parts of argument by supporting it without themselves constituting the argument itself (Anscombe 1995 quoted in van der Valk 2003: 318). As Wodak and colleagues explain, topoi are ‘either explicit of inferable premises’, and ‘more or less formal or content-related warrants of “conclusion rules” which connect an argument or arguments with a conclusion, a claim. As such, they justify the transition from an argument or arguments to the conclusion’ (Wodak et al. 2009: 34). The nature of a topos as the transition from argument to conclusion necessitates explicit deconstruction of topoi in discourse; as many of them attempt to legitimise positions by providing ‘common-places’ or presuppositions instead of substantial evidence (Wodak and Reisigl 2009: 42), topoi potentially constitute controversial or fallacious aspects of argumentation. As non-evidential presuppositions, the present thesis holds topoi to be predominantly (if not exclusively) fallacious aspects of argumentation. Indeed, the fallacious nature of a topos is best illuminated in terms of fallacies in argumentation.
3.4.4 Pragma-Dialectical Fallacies

Deconstructing the topoi used in argumentation and identifying the fallacies in argumentation behind them is one major way of raising awareness of problematic discursive strategies in ideological discourse, as advocated by Martin Reisigl’s ‘politolinguistic’ approach to discourse analysis (Reisigl 2008: 116). The literature on CDA-inspired analyses of argumentation indicate that CDA is compatible with the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation analysis, and that the latter offers a highly systematic and effective way of classifying and analysing fallacies in persuasive argumentation.

The pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation analysis was developed by Frans H. van Eemeren and colleagues in the 1990s. It is based on a normative model of argumentation which indicates which argumentative ‘moves’ are admissible in argumentation (named ‘critical discussion’ in pragma-dialectics) and which are not (Ietcu-Fairclough 2007: 41). Pragma-dialecticians advance ten ‘rules’ that prescribe acceptable conduct of participants in or reasonable argumentation norms in a critical discussion (van der Valk 2003: 309):

1. The Freedom Rule: parties must not prevent each other from putting forward standpoints or casting doubt on standpoints.

2. The Burden-of-Proof Rule: a party who puts forward a standpoint is obliged to defend it if asked to do so.

3. The Standpoint Rule: a party’s attack on a standpoint must relate to the standpoint that has indeed been advanced by the other party.

4. The Relevance Rule: a party may defend his or her standpoint only by advancing argumentation relevant to that standpoint.

5. The Unexpressed Premise Rule: a party may not falsely present something as a premise that has been left unexpressed by the other party or deny a premise that he or she has left implicit.

6. The Starting-Point Rule: no party may falsely present a premise as an accepted starting point, or deny a premise representing an accepted starting point.
7. The Argument Scheme Rule: a standpoint may not be regarded as conclusively defended if the defense does not take place by means of an appropriate argument scheme that is correctly applied.

8. The Validity Rule: the reasoning in the argumentation must be logically valid or must be capable of being made valid by making explicit one or more unexpressed premises.

9. The Closure Rule: a failed defense of a standpoint must result in the protagonist retracting the standpoint, and a successful defense of a standpoint must result in the antagonist retracting his or her doubts.

10. The Useage Rule: parties must not use any formulations that are insufficiently clear or confusingly ambiguous, and they must interpret the formulations of the other party as carefully and accurately as possible.


A violation of any one of the rules for critical discussion constitutes a so-called ‘pragma-dialectical fallacy’; incorrect or unreasonable argumentation moves whose fallacious nature can be systemically explained in relation to one or more of the Rules.

A key aspect of the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation analysis for the present purposes is Daniel Cohen’s taxonomy of logical, rhetorical and dialectical fallacies (Cohen 2003: 119). Cohen’s taxonomy indicates in each category the respective pragma-dialectical rules that are violated by each category of fallacies. Logical fallacies may potentially represent violations of the rules of inference, and include false cause, hasty generalisation, begging the question/circular reasoning, ambiguities, affirming the consequent/denying the antecedent, ‘not’ hopping, slippery slope, missing the point, appeal to ignorance, weak analogy and unfinished demonstration. Rhetorical faults are posited as potential violations of the rules of fair presentation and include suppressed evidence, unwarranted premise, false dichotomy, complex question, ad hominem, non sequitur, appeal to (illegitimate) authority, appeal to emotion, ad populum, insincerity, straw man and obscurantism. Dialectical offenses constitute potential violations of the rules of rational engagement, and include appeal to force,
excessive argument, unanswered objections (by the proponent), unvoiced objections (by the opponent), unasked questions, misunderstanding, insufficient argument, insufficient counter-argument and *ignoratio elenchi* (ibid.: 119-120). Cohen’s taxonomy is ideally applicable in the present analysis as it allows not only for the analysis of the fallacious nature of the topoi underlying discursive strategies, but also of rhetorical devices that do the same.

3.4.5 Rhetorical Devices

This thesis understands ‘rhetoric’ to be the use of specific forms of language to enact a specific function. It is the verbal realisation of motivational appeal and linguistic style used to animate the inferences and propositional content of, in this case, ideological discourse (see Jacobs 2000: 261). The function of rhetoric is understood to be persuasive and aimed at the discourse recipient. This concept is based largely on the definition of rhetoric proposed by Michael Leff, who stresses that rhetoric is designed and implemented to persuade an audience (or reader) that does not participate directly in the exchange, and that it must answer (or appear to answer) to the extrinsic demands of this audience (or readership) (Leff 2000: 244-246). Rhetorical means such as metaphors, irony, hyperboles, euphemisms and rhetorical questions may steer attention, enhance interest and thus reinforce the argumentation of the speaker. Rhetorical tools emphasize meaning. ‘Rhetoric […] is essentially geared towards the persuasive communication of preferred models of social events, and thus manages how recipients will understand and especially how they will evaluate such events, for instance, as a function of the interests of the participants. It is therefore not surprising that rhetorical structures play such an important role in ideological manipulation’ (Van Dijk, 1998: 208).
3.4.6 Metaphor Scenarios and Motifs

This thesis explores the role of metaphor in Chamberlain’s linguistic construction of strategies of legitimisation, delegitimisation, coercion and dissmulation. In the tradition of Conceptual Metaphor Theory, this thesis assumes that metaphor is conceptual, meaning grounded in human experience and thought (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 115). As metaphors reflect mappings across domains of knowledge that underlie our understanding of the world in which we live (Musolff 2004: 1), metaphor is also granted a central role in the construction of social and political realities (Musolff 2004: 1), and metaphor analysis is thus central to analysing the construction of meaning in discourse. As CMT advances, the ensuing analysis upholds that metaphors can have an argumentative and rhetorical force (cf Musolff 2004: 6) enacted by the social, emotional and aesthetic values carried by their entailments (cf Musolff 2012: 303).

In particular, this thesis subscribes to the argumentative and rhetorical power of so-called ‘metaphor scenarios’ (Musolff 2006). Musolff derives the term from a combination of Charles Fillmore’s notion of a conceptual ‘scene’ as ‘an kind of coherent segment of human beliefs, actions, experiences or imaginings that can be associated with an underlying conceptual “frame”’ and Lakoff’s ‘scenario’ as ‘a subtype of “idealised cognitive models” consisting typically of people, things, properties, relations and propositions’ (Musolff 2006: 27). A ‘metaphor scenario’ pertains to the occurrence of multiple elements of a conceptual source domain within the same discourse strand which combine to create a kind of metaphorical narrative or ‘scenario’. Consisting of multiple concepts relating to the same source domain (e.g. LOVE – MARRIAGE – FAMILY – ENGAGEMENT – BIRTH - DIVORCE (cf Musolff 2006)), metaphor scenarios can carry particularly forceful evaluative and attitudinal biases as they appeal to or evoke the readers’ normative assumptions concerning multiple scenario participants and factors. Indeed, Musolff states that it is at the level of scenarios, rather than at general domain-level, that attitudinal biases and political preferences become discernible (Musolff 2006: 35).
A metaphor scenario must be differentiated from a ‘motif’. This word was taken from Gerlinde Mautner (2000), who defines a discursive motif as ‘ein wiederkehrender Inhalt, der zur Realisierung von Strategien eingesetzt wird’ (Mautner 2000: 83). ‘Motif’ is thus used in the following to denote the strategic recurrence of non-metaphor but abstract topical themes with a rhetorical and/or argumentative purpose (e.g. ignorance, truth and lies).

3.5 Synergy between methods of Corpus Linguistics and CDA

Finally, the present thesis is informed by Baker et al.’s 2008 findings regarding the mutual methodological benefit afforded by methods of CDA and corpus linguistics. ‘The combination of methodologies traditionally associated with CDA and CL in research projects, and their potential theoretical and methodological cross-pollination’, Baker et al. advocate, ‘seem to benefit both CDA and CL. Combining methods of CDA and CL strengthens the theoretical basis of both.’ (Baker et al. 2008: 297). In sum, corpus linguistics is not based entirely on computers, but also requires manual human input, and methods of CDA provide a particularly fruitful way of performing the manual aspect. Corpus linguistic methods benefit CDA by providing the analyst with tools with which to examine frequencies for and other examples of specific phenomena already noted in qualitative close-reading analysis, to examine lexical patterns, and to add a quantitative, empirical dimension using statistical measures (Baker et al. 2008: 296). Corpus linguistics thereby lends practitioners of CDA greater scholarly objectivity, and helps to guard against bias, over-interpretation and under-interpretation (O’Halloran and Coffin 2004 quoted in Baker et al. 2008: 297). On the other hand, methods of CDA can expand the depth of linguistic analysis performed using corpus linguistic methods; corpus linguistic tools for analysis are in some respect restrictive in that they allow the analyst to focus largely only on isolated lexical patterns and collocations; CDA can facilitate a more detailed analysis which also takes in account the textual context (Baker et al. 2008: 296). The crux of the synergy lies in Baker et al.’s observation that corpus-based analysis can reveal only what is explicitly written and not what is inferred, implied or omitted, including pragmatic devices and strategies (Baker et al. 2008: 296).
4. METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introduction

The multi-methodological approach used in the present analysis foregrounds historical contextualisation, corpus-assisted discourse analysis (CADS) and an approach to rhetoric and argumentation analysis informed by multiple theories, all within a critical discourse analysis (CDA) framework. As an approach to doing discourse analysis rather than a methodology as such, the documented approaches to CDA and CADS do not provide a definitive set of methodological guidelines for analysis (van Dijk in Wodak & Meyer 2001: 98). Indeed, CDA scholars share the mutual conviction that no one set of procedural guidelines should be blindly adhered to, advocating instead ‘methodological pluralism’ (Wodak 2009: 9). Teun van Dijk states that an effective piece of critical discourse analysis should consider the work of multiple researchers from multiple disciplines and not just the work of one ‘master’, adding ‘I do not want colleagues to “follow” me – a form of academic obsequiousness that I find incompatible with a critical attitude’ (van Dijk in Wodak & Meyer 2001: 95). As Paul Baker and colleagues (2008) summarise, ‘CDA adopts any method that is adequate to realize the aims of specific CDA-inspired research’ (Baker et al. 2008: 273). The methodology of the present analysis is thus guided by the CDA emphasis on the individual nature of each research project, and is tailored to suit the specific research questions driving the thesis (cf. Wodak & Meyer 2001: 14-31).

This is not to say that scholars of CDA and CADS, or indeed of a combination of the two approaches, do not document the stages and priorities in their analysis in order to demonstrate or suggest a (flexible) methodology to other scholars. The methodological guidelines informing this thesis were devised by combining the methodology documented by Meyer (2001), Baker et al. (2008) and Wodak (2009). Along the lines of Meyer 2001, the present methodology began by selecting theoretical concepts and assumptions (see Chapter 3), proceeded by operationalising procedures and instruments (corpus linguistic methodology and the theoretical
analysis framework), and ultimately concludes with an interpretation of the discourse and examination of the research hypothesis formulated at the outset (Meyer 2001: 19-20). The analysis developed from a preliminary close reading of the war essays to a corpus analysis of frequencies, keywords and concordances as a second stage of analysis. This was followed by a further qualitative analysis stage that synthesises the results of the two preliminary analysis stages while expanding them according to a systematic analytical framework. Although this throws up issues of pre-formed bias as thematised by Michael Meyer (2001), who asks ‘is it possible to gain insight from purely empirical data without using any preframed categories of experience?’ (Meyer 2001: 17-18), Baker et al. point out that both (CDA and CL) approaches can be used as entry points, creating a virtuous research cycle (Baker et al.2008: 295).

4.2 Analysis and Contextualisation of Thematic Content

The thematic content of discourse in CDA denotes the meaning and content of ideological statements in the discourse fragment (the discourse fragment here is an individual essay). The analysis of the thematic content of Chamberlain’s essays focuses on ideological statements regarding ‘Germanness’ and ‘un-Germanness’, his visions and aspirations for Germany and the German people, Germany’s innocence in the outbreak of the First World War, and England and France as war aggressors.

Functional context in CDA is of the utmost priority, as CDA views the significant unit of linguistic analysis as the text as opposed to isolated, decontextualised words and sentences (Wodak 2009: 3). This thesis contextualises the results of the text analysis in relation to their historical context, and the ideological propositions expressed in the text are compared and contrasted to the actual historical facts and events. The present context analysis is a two-part context model that foregrounds the local (national) and global (international) historical settings of the thematic content. On a local historical level, the context analysis explores the history of nationalism and anti-Semitism in Germany, the 1848 revolutions, German unification, and German domestic policy thereafter. The global historical section of the context analysis examines foreign policy in Germany between the years 1848 and 1918. This
period was chosen because the 1848 revolutions were major formative events in the course of German nationalism shortly before Chamberlain’s arrival in Germany, and 1918 signals the end of the First World War. The historical context of domestic and foreign policy in Germany during Chamberlain’s lifetime addresses German imperialism under Kaiser Wilhelm II and Bismarck, and the First World War. It is acknowledged that this context model is limited: a broader CDA context model would pay greater attention to authorship, medium, and reception, for example, along the lines of Partington’s (2003) comprehensive consideration of the wider historical, political and mediatic context of White House press briefings and the local and personal contexts of the speakers and hearers.

4.3 Preliminary Linguistic Observations

The discourse analysis began with a preliminary close-reading to obtain initial linguistic observations, using a combination of corpus analysis and further close-reading to validate or disprove these observations later. The preliminary close-reading was intuitive, and predominantly identified macro-strategies at work in the essays that justify their means vs. those that justify their message, as well as strategies of persuasion and metaphors. Some topoi, word strings and individual words were also noted that seemed significant because of the frequency with which they occur, because they appeared to be salient, or because they appeared to represent an innovative use of language. The main focus of the preliminary close-reading, however, concerned the macro-strategies at work in the war essays; ensuing quantitative and further qualitative analysis intended to confirm or dispute the presence and role of these in the war essays and to analyse their linguistic construction. The intuitive identification at this early stage of authorial self-reference, self-justification, addresses to the readers, and the undermining of epistemic certainty using motifs of intelligence, perception, truth and lies, proved formative for the ensuing stages of analysis.
4.4 Corpus Analysis:

The corpus analysis is an interim stage of the analysis that uses statistics to check the validity of initial intuitive observations and to expand on these by collating a large body of empirically derived linguistic evidence upon which to base (in part) the qualitative analysis. Featuring a corpus-assisted discourse study (CADS), the present thesis uses corpus linguistic methods to supplement the qualitative critical discourse analysis by adding a quantifiable, empirical base of frequency and keyness data, thereby limiting researcher bias. The corpus analysis is based on a primary corpus and a reference corpus. The primary corpus consists of the total collection of Chamberlain's war essays: *Kriegsaufsätze* (1914) (an essay collection containing the essays *Deutsche Friedensliebe; Deutsche Freiheit; Die deutsche Sprache; Deutschland als führender Weltstaat; England, Deutschland*), *Neue Kriegsaufsätze* (1915) (an essay collection containing the essays *Grundstimmungen in England und Frankreich, Wer hat den Krieg verschuldet?, Deutscher Friede*), *Politische Ideale* (1915), *Die Zuversicht* (1915), *Hammer oder Amboß* (1916), *Ideal und Macht* (1916), *Demokratie und Freiheit* (1917), and *Der Wille zum Sieg* (1917). This corpus contains a total of 170,593 tokens. Although, generally speaking, a larger corpus yields more reliable results than a smaller one, a significantly larger corpus would have presented an overwhelming amount of material for close reading analysis: when combining qualitative with quantitative analysis methods, an ideal corpus will be large enough to yield extensive digital results, but small enough to be manageable for a single analyst. The construction of the primary corpus was guided by advice from Pieter de Haan, who advances that ‘the suitability of the sample depends on the specific study that is undertaken, and there is no such thing as the best, or optimum, sample size as such’ (de Haan 1992: 3).

The reference corpus acts as a control corpus in order to identify keywords in the primary corpus by comparing frequently occurring words in the primary corpus with frequently occurring words in the reference corpus to ascertain which words are significantly more typical of the primary corpus. The reference corpus built for this purpose consists of five publications by Paul Rohrbach: *Der deutsche Gedanke in der Welt* (1912), *Zum Weltvolk hindurch* (1914), *Der Krieg und die deutsche Politik*
Paul Rohrbach (1869-1956) was a travel-writer, economist, political commentator and publicist, serving also as German Government Settlement Commissioner to South-West Africa between 1903 and 1906. Between 1912 and 1915 he wrote published nationalist and colonialist works such as those selected for the reference corpus. Felicity Rash notes that Rohrbach’s publications reached an exceptionally wide audience, including many future national socialists (Rash 2011: 381). These essays are used in the present reference corpus as they were written approximately in the same period as Chamberlain’s war propaganda essays, and because they address similar topics, broadly speaking. It should be pointed out at this stage that the limited and unrepresentative nature of the control corpus means that the statistical results documented in the following indicate first and foremost the differences and similarities between Chamberlain’s discourse and the discourse of Paul Rohrbach and cannot claim to reveal idiosyncracies in Chamberlain’s language use.

The essays were photocopied from their original sources and digitalised (PDF format). The original Fraktur script in the PDF documents was converted into a standard font using ABBYY FineReader, and the resulting documents were proof-read against the originals in order to identify and correct any spelling errors that had arisen during the conversion process, as spelling errors can affect the accuracy of digital word searches. The corpus analysis software WordSmith 5 was used to generate statistical data on Chamberlain’s war essays. WordSmith was chosen over similar software such as Wordcruncher and the Longman Mini Concordancer because it is the most user-friendly option. Although WordSmith is not the most advanced programme available, the present CADS requires word frequencies, keyness data, and concordance lines only, all of which can be obtained using WordSmith software. The WordList tool was used to generate a frequency list for all words in the essays, and the KeyWords tool was used to generate keyword data by comparing the frequency of each word in Chamberlain’s war essays (primary corpus) with their frequency in the writings of Paul Rohrbach during the same period (reference corpus). The Concord tool was used to generate a complete list of
concordance lines for each keyword, enabling a detailed analysis of the uses and functions of each keyword in context (KWIC).

4.5 Qualitative Text Analysis

The qualitative analysis focuses on Chamberlain’s use of discursive strategies of persuasion to construct and disseminate his ideology. Using prior observations by Nicoline Hortzitz (1988) and the Felicity Rash (2012), the qualitative analysis additionally highlights veiled but probable examples of anti-Semitic language in the essays, although this is not a priority for analysis. The analysis is deductive, beginning with the macro-strategies ‘justifying the message’ and ‘justifying the means’ identified during preliminary close readings, and identifying and analysing their discursive construction on the level of strategies, topoi, pragma-dialectical fallacies, rhetoric, and micro-linguistics. The analysis is performed by identifying and analysing discursive strategies of legitimisation and delegitimisation, dissimulation, coercion and the creation of global fuzziness, of topoi, pragma-dialectical fallacies, and the use of rhetoric and linguistic means to construct these. This approach assumes that, in discourse, manipulation is achieved using strategies of legitimisation/delegitimisation, coercion and dissimulation and fallacious argumentation, that the strategies and fallacious argumentation are enacted using topoi and rhetoric, and that at the base of all of these is the strategic use of linguistic units ranging from punctuation and lexis to syntax and suprasentential phenomena:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Macro-functions</th>
<th>Strategies</th>
<th>Pragma-dialectical fallacies</th>
<th>Topoi</th>
<th>Linguistic forms and means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Justifying the message</td>
<td>- Legitimisation/Delegitimisation</td>
<td>- Logical faults</td>
<td>Not pre-determined</td>
<td>Not pre-determined</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Justifying the means</td>
<td>- Coercion</td>
<td>- Rhetorical faults</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Dissimulation</td>
<td>- Dialectical offenses</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Global fuzziness</td>
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4.5.1 Strategies, Topoi and Fallacies

The qualitative analysis identifies and analyses discursive strategies of ‘coercion’, ‘dissimulation’ and ‘legitimisation’/‘delegitimisation’ (Chilton and Schaeffner 1997, see Chapter 3). Particular attention is paid to ‘othering’ strategies, or the construction of the ‘self’ vs. the ‘other’ in order to effectively construct a *Feindbild*, and to strategies of legitimisation by authorisation, abstraction, moralisation and rationalisation (van Leeuwen 2007: 98-105). The nature of van Leeuwen’s strategies is partly topological (e.g. the topos of authority), and thus these strategies in particular lend themselves to the analysis of topoi in Chamberlain’s discourse.

As the explicit or inferable bridge between an argument and a conclusion (see 3.4.3), there is a topos to be detected in any claim that can be reduced to the construction ‘A therefore B’ (and conversely ‘B because A’). Where such claims are identified by the Concord tool or the qualitative analysis as salient examples of discursive strategies of persuasion, the explicit or inferable premise linking A to B is deconstructed. The topos analysis does not begin from a set list of *a priori* topoi for analysis, but is informed in part by the persuasive and legitimising topoi identified by Martin Wengeler (2005) and Ruth Wodak (2009). Resulting from an analysis of German *Kriegsbotschaften*, Wengeler’s topoi are considered to have particular relevance for the present methodology. Correspondingly, particular attention is paid to the topoi of necessity and urgency (Wengeler 2005: 221; Wodak 2009: 44), of which Wengeler specifies the topos of ultimate catastrophe; the topos of history (Wengeler 2005 226; Wodak 2009: 44); the topos of principle (Wengeler 2005: 217); the topos of authority, and specifically appeals to God or a ‘higher power’ (Wengeler 2005: 217/226). The topos analysis additionally reveals the use of further topoi, and of specific forms of the topoi identified by Wodak and Wengeler. These include the topos of factuality, evidence and provability, the topos of the future, topos of uniqueness and incomparability, the topos of obviousness, doubtlessness and irrelevance, topos of sufficiency and appropriateness, the victim topos, the topos of ‘the only way’, and the topos of authorial imperfection. A considerable number of
the topoi identified can also be formulated in reference to van Leeuwen's strategies of legitimisation (e.g. the topos of factuality/provability as legitimisation by theoretical rationalisation). Topoi are also commonly found to constitute pragma-dialectical fallacies – the topos of authority may be an illegitimate appeal to authority and the topos of urgency is frequently a normatively unreasonable argumentative appeal to emotion – thus the topos analysis partially merges with the analysis of pragma-dialectical fallacies. Where applicable, therefore, topoi are named and analysed in relation to the corresponding fallacy or fallacies.

Fallacy analysis is a key constituent of the present methodology as fallacies enact what Saussure advances is the essence of manipulation, communicating the relevance of things that are not relevant by themselves, or retaining actually relevant information (Saussure 2005: 120). Pragma-dialectical fallacies are understood as violations of the pragma-dialectical rules for discussion, and are analysed here in order to show that Chamberlain reduces critical disagreement space partly by violating the rules for critical discussion. The pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation analysis identifies a specific taxonomy of fallacies in terms of violations of van Eemeren et al.’s pragma-dialectical rules for critical discussion (see Section 3.4.4), of which the present analysis examines violations of Rules 1-8 (9 and 10 are not applicable to Chamberlain's discourse). The present analysis supplements van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s 1987 taxonomy of rule-based fallacies with Daniel Cohen’s taxonomy of logical, rhetorical and dialectical fallacies (Cohen 2003: 119), addressing instances of van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s more general pragma-dialectical fallacies in Chamberlain’s discourse and using Cohen’s taxonomy as a detailed reference for the forms that pragma-dialectical rule violations can take. In particular, the analysis explores Chamberlain’s use of the logical fallacies of non causa pro causa, hasty generalisation, disjunctive logic, circular reasoning, ignoratio elenchi, affirming the consequent and denying the antecedent, the rhetorical faults of suppressed evidence (obscurantism), ad hominem, positive ad populum, appeals to the elite or what Wengeler calls Appelle zum Gruppenegoismus (Wengeler 2005: 215) as a particular form of ad populum or ad superbiam, appeal to illegitimate
authority, appeal to emotion, and dialectical offenses including unvoiced objections, unasked questions, and insufficient argument.

4.5.2 Linguistic Forms and Means

There is no consensus in CDA regarding which linguistic features should be prioritised in text analysis (Meyer 2001: 25); as Fairclough and Wodak summarise, ‘a useful working assumption is that any part of any language text, spoken or written, is simultaneously constituting representations, relations, and identities’ (Fairclough & Wodak 1997: 275). It is not uncommon for CDA scholars to provide a list of the phenomena of text grammar and language use that play a significant role in their particular research material, for example coherence, anaphora, speech acts and turn-taking (Wodak 2009:4, see also Fairclough 1995: 74; van Dijk 1997: 33; Meyer 2001: 26; Toolan 2001: 221-227); however, it would be naïve to search for a pre-formulated set of linguistic categories in any critical discourse analysis, as the analysis should be driven by the data and not by a priori categories. As a deductive analysis, the present analysis is not based on pre-selected linguistic categories; all linguistic forms and means analysed in the following were identified specifically in relation to the strategies at work in Chamberlain’s war essays.

As examples of the linguistic means analysed in the following analysis, the preliminary close-reading and quantitative analysis revealed the primary importance of examining authorial meta-commentary and metaphor. Stylistic devices revealed by preliminary readings to be central to Chamberlain’s discursive strategies include intertextuality, juxtaposition and antithesis, aphorisms, minor sentence interjections and exclamatives, hyperbole in the form of universal affirmation and universal negation, intensifiers, expressions of immeasurability and numerousness, and affective adjectives and adverbs. The analysis furthermore examines classic rhetorical devices such as apostrophe, anadiplosis and paralepsis, as well as rhetorical figures of word repetition polyptoton, tricolon and epanelepsis. Lexical priming, evidential particles, modality and agency are also addressed.
The qualitative analysis identifies and analyses an array of salient and/or recurring metaphors, including, for example, metaphors of insanity and entangled thread, journeys and playing, but also, crucially, opposing metaphors of upwards and downwards movement, concealment and revelation, sight and blindness, light and darkness, and upwards and downwards movement. It is shown that these opposing metaphors frequently constitute a ‘metaphor scenario’ in Chamberlain's war essays, namely the epistemic scenario of knowledge and ignorance on the parts of the author and readers, respectively. This scenario is constructed using recurring metaphors of sight and blindness to reinforce Chamberlain’s assertion of inaccurate or distorted perception of the truth; its argumentative function is to delegitimise the readers’ powers of thought and perception.
5. SYNTHESIS OF THE WAR ESSAYS’ TOPICAL CONTENT AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT

5.1 Introduction

Chamberlain makes extensive use of strategies of legitimisation to justify his message, suggesting that the feasibility of his ideological statements is questionable. The following chapter situates Chamberlain’s ideological propositions in their local and global historical contexts in order to compare them with the historical facts and to assess if and to what extent these propositions are valid. In accordance with the topical content of Chamberlain’s essays, the focus is placed on German nationalism, the concurrent struggle between traditional and progressive forces, the causes of the First World War, anti-Semitism and developments in German scholarship during the period 1848-1918.

5.2 Tradition vs. Progress

For Chamberlain, the monarchy and the Prussian military are essentially German, and the only German institutions not to have been ‘infested’ by un-German influences. The particular aspect of the Prussian military that Chamberlain accentuates in relation to Germanness is the army’s spirit, or Geist (Kriegsaufsätze: 79). Militarism and the values and conduct it both stands for and trains, Chamberlain asserts, are the human qualities on which the nation state is built; ‘Ohne Preußen gäbe es heute überhaupt kein Deutschland mehr, und ohne jene große Schule für die Verehrung von wahren Menschenwert, hämisch „Militarismus“ genannt, gäbe es kein Preußen’ (Kriegsaufsätze: 76, 78). Whereas the Prussian military exemplifies ideal human values and conduct, the monarchy is truly and essentially German because its represents a time-honoured tradition in the German territories. The veneration of the monarchy is largely a feature of Politische Ideale, in which Chamberlain intensifies his belief that the monarch is the representative of the German state (i.e. of ‘Germanness’), and disregard for the monarchy is equivalent to disregard for the state (Politische Ideale: 74).
For Chamberlain, the ‘un-German’ at work within Germany is represented by deficient intellect and morals, and by a tripartite network of democracy, finance and the press. He perceives the greatest antagonist of the German cause to be parliamentary democracy, attacking it as ‘das Grundübel unserer Zeit’ (*Demokratie und Freiheit*: 70). In Chamberlain’s eyes, the deplorable nature of democracy lies in the ignorance and laziness on which it is based, and in the inevitability that universal suffrage will place incompetent politicians at the head of the country. Most importantly, however, democracy is posited as ‘un-German’ and incompatible with the more laudable German war ethics and German military conduct, and must therefore be replaced. Where the (Prussian) military is decisive and operational, the *Reichstag* is irresolute and a meeting place for mere circumlocution (*Kriegsaufsätze*: 37-38). Universal suffrage thus has and will continue to put incompetent men in charge of Germany, who will lead to its downfall and destruction (*Kriegsaufsätze*: 39; *Demokratie und Freiheit*: 50-53). The historical facts offer multiple explanations for Chamberlain’s anti-democratic stance. One explanation is that, as a staunch conservative, his political views were formed and informed by the struggle between conservative particularism on the one hand and the progressive forces of liberalism and social democracy on the other that had characterised non-traditional German politics from 1848.

Although Chamberlain did not arrive in Germany until after 1848, the 1848 revolutions were the origins of the battle between traditional and progressive forces that characterised his time in Germany, and thus cannot be overlooked. In the aftermath of an increase in literacy rates, new strands of liberalism, radicalism and socialism gained momentum, and the clash between the old system of authoritarian rule and new dynamic popular engagement in political affairs gave rise to a call for change. In 1848, conflicting forces reached a climax during a series of revolutions staged by liberals who fought for a German constitution and against the authoritarian government regimes. The uprisings of 1848 led to the formation of the Frankfurt Parliament. At this early stage, the parliament was comprised chiefly of self-elected, educated members of the middle class, and voted in favour of a constitutional monarchy. Thus although the new constitution appeased the liberals, it also preserved
the particularistic monarchy. For the radicals and socialists, who developed their conception of nationhood based upon a self-governing republic, these were unacceptable compromises, and left-wing groups proceeded to revolt anew in a revolution that was, however, quickly defeated.

Chamberlain conceives of parliamentary democracy as an ‘internal enemy’. He constructs democracy as characteristic of the enemy nations, equating a pro-democracy attitude with a pro-France and pro-England attitude (*Politische Ideale*: 28). This nationalist hatred of democracy may be traced back to 1848, during which time radicals inspired by American and French ideals of freedom and equality initiated a movement to create a self-governing Volk; the antithesis to Prussian authoritarian rule. What Chamberlain does not acknowledge in his propagandistic discourse, however, is that his nation-oriented rejection of democracy as a fundamental argument for the maintenance of German national strength is self-contradictory, as the formal ideology of nationalism originates in the French Revolution. In denouncing the French democratic concepts of liberté, égalité and fraternité, Chamberlain was quick to oversee the crucial role played by the French Revolution in generating nationalist sentiment in Germany: not only did the French threat to the Rhine in 1840 significantly increase nationalist sentiment when Germans united in a wave of anti-French nationalism, but the German revolutions incited by those in France also dramatically heightened nationalist feeling.

Following German victory in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71, Germany was united as a German Empire with a constitution, a parliament, and a chancellor. The *Reich* Constitution was a mixture of conflicting forces: of a representative parliament (*Reichstag*) made largely as a concession to social democrats in order to win support for Prussia and Lesser Germany, of the middle-class liberal demand for a constitutional unitary national state, and of conservative preservation of an authoritarian monarchical state and Prussian hegemony. The balance of power in the *Reich* was in favour of Prussian authoritarianism (Berghahn 2005: 178). The *Reich* under Bismarck was characterised by his conservative attempts to keep the *Reichstag* at bay: some historians allude to superficial constitutionalism here, referring to it as
an ‘artfully constructed pseudo-constitutional structure’ (Mommsen 1995: 35), or as ‘a hybrid system that was both sham-constitutionalism and sham-absolutism’ (Blackbourn 2003: 310), for example. The decision-making powers of Bismarck’s team of executive advisors in the Bundesrat (Upper House) was untouchable by the Reichstag, and the Kaiser became president of the Confederation, retained control of the armed forces, and retained the right to dismiss parliament (Kitchen 2006: 106). Prussian executive legislative powers virtually excluded the Reichstag from government, and the Prussian right of veto of any constitutional changes meant that there was no scope for parliament to exert influence over any policy decisions. Bismarck thus dashed liberal-constitutional hopes and preserved conservative authoritarian institutions of government.

Unlike the liberals, democrats made genuine gains from the foundation of the Reich Constitution of 1871. The constitution made a significant compromise in favour of democracy in order to win support from the anti-Prussian and pro-Greater-Germany Left. As Margaret Anderson highlights, not only did the first elections in the new German Empire represent the Germans’ first experience of direct, equal, universal manhood suffrage, but the elections and constitution were the most democratic in Europe, surpassing even the democratic scope of the British Reform Bill of 1867 (Anderson 1993: 1448).

Under Wilhelm II from 1888 and Bethmann-Hollweg from 1909, progressive forces were irrevocably annihilated. Described as ‘a born autocrat with a contempt for the constitution’ (Carr 1991: 141), Wilhelm II and Bethmann-Hollweg were conservatives and opposed to parliamentary government. Wilhelm’s Reich made a firm return to the authority of the princes and the military. As Blackbourn describes, military values and style influenced virtually all sections of society after 1888; beyond the special significance assigned to the armed forces, this included a trend towards professional uniforms and the intervention of the police in everyday life: ‘almost nothing was left unregulated’, Blackbourn writes, ‘from the colour of automobiles to the length of hatpins’ (Blackbourn 2003: 289). Militarisation continued under Bülow, who supported the Tivoli Programme of 1892. This was based on the supremacy of Divine Law and pledged to defend the monarchy against
the ‘onslaught’ of parliamentarianism and democracy, and inspired a radical attack on socialism (Berghahn 1994: 217).

Chamberlain’s denunciation of the Reichstag as ‘un-German’ may be connected to its successful grapple for popularity and anti-war votes around 1912. During the periods in which the Reichstag had not been deactivated, Bismarck, Bethmann-Hollweg and Bülow had kept its influence in check or rendered it as good as powerless. It was therefore an unwelcome surprise to staunch conservatives like Chamberlain when the Social Democrats initiated a backlash against obstructions from the Right in the pre-war period 1910-1914 and achieved a Socialist majority in the 1912 elections, defeating the Conservative and Centre parties: on the eve of the war, the Reichstag was a left-wing institution and had gained firm ground over the Conservative monopoly. The outbreak of the First World War in August 1914 produced a surge of integral nationalist euphoria divided between two conflicting strains: a conservative strain and a social democratic strain, or, as Konrad Jarausch and Michael Geyer summarise, ‘the war polarised politics’ (Jarausch and Geyer 2003: 232). Under Tirpitz and Kapp, conservative ultra-nationalists founded the Fatherland Party (die Vaterlandspartei), which provided popular backing for the army and annexation, and opposed any political change. Elsewhere, democratic patriotism under the SPD strengthened; a form of nationalism that demanded constitutional reform and a compromise peace (Jarausch & Geyer 2003: 232). A certain faction of the SPD initiated an anti-war movement in which Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg incited a surge of votes against war credits. The association that developed between the SPD and objection to the war bolstered existing Bismarckian accusations that social democrats were ‘un-German’.

Ultimately, the left-wing Reichstag proved powerless in the outbreak of war in 1914. After the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the subsequent breakdown of European diplomacy, the Reichstag’s political influence was entirely subjugated by the Supreme Command of the armed forces, which acted as the chief arbiter of German politics for the entire first half of the war (Blackbourn 2003: 367). Dwarfed by the political supremacy of the ‘Hindenburg-Ludendorff dictatorship’ and lamed by the frequent application of State-of-Siege Laws, the Reichstag remained impotent.
until 1917. Uprisings in Russia in 1917 inspired the Reichstag to reactivate itself. Radicals demanded universal suffrage in all states, the Independent Socialists demanded peace without annexations, and remaining strains of the Socialist Party joined forces with the National Liberals to draft a constitutional reform. Motivated by the Russian Revolution and disillusionment with the duration and conduct of the war, the German parliament was in a state of revolt in July 1917.

5.3 War Guilt

Despite Chamberlain’s thematisation of an ‘enemy within’, he is reluctant to concede any German responsibility for the outbreak of war. He constructs the war as the product of an international conspiracy to annihilate Germany, which from the very outset was only ever an innocent victim: England, France and Russia are portrayed as the aggressors, and any subsequent German (re)action as self-defence. Germany is portrayed as a pacific nation whose sole aim was to keep the peace; so much so that the German army had existed for defence purposes only, and never to incite war. This assertion forms a leitmotif that runs through all of Chamberlain’s propaganda essays, receiving particular attention in Wer hat den Krieg verschuldet? and Grundstimmungen in England und Frankreich, as well as in Hammer oder Amboß (1916) and Der Wille zum Sieg (1917).

By 1915, England has become the ultimate enemy aggressor in Chamberlain’s eyes. He states that England traditionally eliminates anything that stands in its way on the path to world domination, and that Germany will be no exception (Ideal und Macht: 19), that England has already decided to destroy Germany and nothing can change this objective (Hammer oder Amboß: 41), and that ‘Für den Engländer handelt’s sich nicht um einen Krieg, sondern um ein Duell, bei dem einer der beiden Gegner das Leben lassen muß’ (Der Wille zum Sieg: 12). England becomes the concrete agentic force behind the war for Chamberlain, who flippantly writes, ‘Über die Tatsache der Schuld Englands hätte ich kaum nötig’ mich hier näher auszulassen: sie ist ausführlich beweisbar und bewiesen’ (Hammer oder Amboß: 39), and ‘von England geht der Krieg aus; einzig in England kann der Krieg enden’ (Hammer oder Amboß:
What drove England to inflict war on Germany, Chamberlain asserts, was jealousy and hatred. In fact, Chamberlain perceives all three enemy countries to be guilty of an intense but irrational combination of hatred towards Germany, but England in particular: ‘Was die drei zusammengeführt hat, ist nicht Liebe, ist auch nicht irgend ein positiver Plan, sondern lediglich Neid und Haß gegen das neuentstehende, kräftig wachsende Deutschland [...]’ (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 56).

Although there can be no absolute consensus regarding German responsibility for the First World War (see Blackbourn 2003: 335), the facts suggest that German diplomacy was too clumsy and inconsistent in what was a volatile situation. Following the Franco-Prussian war, the new German dominance in Europe caused resentment in Austria, France and Russia. It was crucial to maintain harmonious relations with the other major powers, however Bismarck was not willing to risk renewed competition from France for the sake of preserving the peace and the status quo. In 1875, the French Cadre Law led to the Krieg-in-Sicht crisis in Germany. The law, which aimed to comprehensively reorganise the French army, added a heightened sense of alarm to the latent fear in Germany that France could not be kept down and was preparing for a Revanchekrieg (Mommsen 1993: 23). In the spring of 1875, the German press reported on French ‘war preparations’ in the newspaper Post, possibly with the hope of convincing Great Britain that France was a threat to the balance of power in Europe. Germany’s plan backfired, however, when Britain, Russia and Italy decided not to crack down on France as a result of this, but instead to keep a closer eye on German government policy (Mommsen 1993: 24).

The 1870s in Germany were additionally characterised by tumultuous relations with Russia. Traditionally, Prussia had always been careful to foster and maintain relations with Russia. Due chiefly to the deep-seated antagonism between Austria-Hungary and Russia, however, maintaining healthy relations with both of Bismarck’s favoured conservative autocracies proved unrealistic. It thus became increasingly important for Bismarck to choose an ally and remain faithful to it, rather than trying to appease all parties. Germany began to consolidate relations with Austria-Hungary at the expense of Russo-German relations, forming a Double Alliance in October 1879. This diplomatic move signalled a break with the pro-Russian traditions of
German foreign policy. Russo-German relations appeared to improve after 1881 when the Three Emperors’ Alliance was signed between Russia, Austria-Hungary and Germany. However, although Russia was keen to use the treaty to guarantee German neutrality in the case of a war with Britain, it was still not happy to passively watch the German Empire grow from strength to strength: for Russia, it was crucial to ensure German neutrality, but also to keep Germany in check. At the same time as Russia negotiated the Three Emperors’ Alliance, therefore, it also began to consolidate relations with France (Mommsen 1993: 20).

By the 1880s, Germany’s only real allies were Austria-Hungary and Italy (Italy joined the Double Alliance to form the Triple Alliance in 1882). The Dual Alliance with Austria-Hungary was anti-Russian and pro-British, and the Three Emperors’ Alliance was pro-Russian and directed against the western powers. Martin Kitchen describes Germany’s position in the early 1880s in terms of juggling: ‘it was a singularly unstable situation, and even a master diplomatist like Bismarck was unlikely to be able to keep all five balls up in the air for much longer’ (Kitchen 2006: 68). As Kitchen concludes, Germany was trapped in an unsolvable dilemma: it could not maintain relations with Russia, Britain and Austria-Hungary, but its position was so fundamentally insecure that it could not afford to take sides (Kitchen 2006: 166).

Germany’s decision to align itself with Austria-Hungary left Russia needing an ally. Due to the antagonism that characterised Russo-British relations during the 1870s, Russia turned to France. Germany had hoped to establish an Anglo-German alliance to stave off an official Franco-Russian alliance; however, having witnessed Bismarck’s bigamous diplomatic policy in the initial decade after the Reich was founded, Great Britain refused to enter into such an alliance. France and Russia thus proceeded to sign a formal alliance in 1893, placing Germany under the threat of a potential war on two fronts. Ahrenthal’s annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the Russian sphere of influence was the decisive move in the collapse of Russo-German relations.

In April 1904, Britain and France signed the Entente Cordiale. This alliance was partly the consequence of Germany’s inability to prioritise one particular ally. Any
hopes that Germany may have had of forming an alliance with Great Britain were firmly annihilated by Bismarck’s colonial policy in the mid 1880s when he implicated Germany in the ‘Scramble for Africa’ in 1884, the China and Japan war of 1894-95, and the Boer rebellion against the British in South Africa. At the turn of the century, however, Germany was nonetheless offered a friendly handshake by Great Britain. Staunchly anti-Russian and unwilling to seek an alliance with pro-Russian France, it sought an alliance with Germany in the aftermath of wide-scale clashes with potentially dangerous consequences. However, concerned that assisting Britain in a war against Russia would implicate Germany in a war on two fronts, Germany declined, cutting itself off from the opportunity to finally form a strong alliance and driving Great Britain towards an alliance with France and, ultimately, also with Russia.

Anglo-German antagonism was exacerbated by German rearmament policy. In all probability, colonial defence was only one of the motivations behind the ambitious programme of naval expansion initiated by Admiral Tirpitz. A second motivation was to compete with the Royal Navy, which ultimately incited a naval arms race between the British Empire and the Kaiserreich. This naval rivalry was detrimental to Anglo-German relations: the British naval fleet was no longer invincible, and Britain felt threatened. Mommsen writes, ‘Bismarck tat alles, was in seiner Macht stand, um eine großangelegte diplomatische offensive gegen Großbritannien zustande zu bringen’ (Mommsen 1993: 63). Bismarckian imperialism and the Tirpitz Plan irrevocably destroyed Anglo-German relations and created intense anti-British sentiment within Germany. Germany was already highly suspicious of the Triple Entente, and when Russia joined in 1907, Germany was left feeling encircled. The reality was, however, that in failing to select one or one solid ally, Germany had not been encircled, but had rather shut itself out.

There is thus a strong case for the argument that Germany was to blame for the First World War. Firstly because Germany could not identify and remain with one ally, choosing rather to swing between between pro-Russian and pro-British policy. The contradictions and inconsistencies in German foreign policy proved to be self-defeating, achieving little but self-exclusion or Auskreisung (as opposed to
Einkreisung, see Blackbourn 2003: 337). Secondly, Germany acted provocatively, particularly in its pursuit of Weltpolitik. Blackbourn describes German imperialism as ‘a meddlesome, hyperactive policy which provoked universal distrust’ (Blackbourn 2003: 338), and blames the Tirpitz Plan in particular for Anglo-German enmity. It furthermore seems to be accepted that Germany was the most aggressive of the great powers (see Fischer 1977: 82, Carr 1991: 206; Mombauer 2001: 287 and Blackbourn 2003: 337).

5.4 Lies and Misleading in the Press

For Chamberlain, the press constituted a dangerous internal enemy in Germany, which he accuses of lying to, concealing information from, and misleading the German public. The Times is particularly attacked in the immediate aftermath of the outbreak of the war in the Kriegsaufsätze (1914). One particular journalist, who remains unnamed, is attacked for his ruthless disregard for other people as long as he gets the job done (Kriegsaufsätze: 11). More generally, he adds ‘Oscar Wilde schrieb einmal einen Aufsatz über „Die Kunst des Lügens“; seine Landsleute haben es seither in dieser Kunst weit gebracht’ (Kriegsaufsätze: 10). Chamberlain holds the foreign press particularly responsible for persuading the world that the Triple Entente are fighting for freedom whereas Germany aims to destroy it; in other words that it was only ever really Germany that wanted war (Kriegsaufsätze: 9, 11, 15). Based on the historical facts, it seems that Chamberlain conveniently confused two phenomena regarding the pre-war and war-time press in Germany: the new availability in print of a broad spectrum of differing ideological standpoints, and the real policy of press misinformation.

During the years of Weltpolitik, mass-market journalism rocketed, printing a new wealth of differing ideological positions. Newspapers were divided between conservative intellectual journalists, left-liberal journalists, and right-wing journalists. Some newspapers favoured by the government were strategically rewarded with inside information, whereas other journalists were denied information (Mommsen 1995: 198). A Press Bureaux was founded to ensure that the
government’s ideas received sympathetic coverage in the press, and to this end, the newspapers often published limited information. The selective provision of information was intended to revive latent patriotism and legitimise the German war cause. As Martin Kitchen reports, particularly the SDP and those who were ambivalent in their support for the war were misled into believing that Russia was the aggressor because anti-Russian feeling among the more radical forces in Germany was high, thus it was particularly easy to construct an effective Russian Feindbild (Kitchen 2006: 204).

In the immediate pre-war years, the German public had realised that they were subject to an official policy of misleading, and the press experienced a crisis of public confidence (Glaubwürdigkeitskrise). Public suspicion of the press led to a surge in external communication forms, which escalated to a chaotic circulation of ‘rumours’ (Altenhöner 2008). As a result of the rumours crisis, a strict policy of press censorship was introduced. Realising that the press was no longer an effective means of influencing public opinion, Bülow had resorted to a policy of repression and control, conducting foreign policy as secretly as possible and providing the public with little information about the goals and conduct of German foreign policy.

The war period 1914-1918 was characterised by an increase in initiative in all warring states to control and manipulate public and private communication (Altenhöher 2008: 88). In Germany, the necessity to forge public acceptance of official German war conduct grew, accompanied by a corresponding increase in what Altenhöher calls ‘acceptance strategies’ (ibid.). The greatest ‘acceptance strategy’ of all took the form of Die Nachrichtenabteilung des Auswärtigen Amtes (the Foreign Ministry’s News and Press Division), as well as a government-driven propaganda policy abroad. As Blackbourn reports, the German government strived to rally the nation, to mould popular attitudes, and to mould foreign opinion (Blackbourn 2003: 353). In order to achieve these aims, the public was denied information. As Mommsen summarises:
Die Kluft zwischen der tatsächlichen Lage und den nationalistischen Erwartungen in bereiten Schichten der Öffentlichkeit gewann mit der Berufung der dritten Obersten Heeresleitung unter Hindenburg und Ludendorff eine neue Qualität (Mommsen 2004: 85).

Crucially, the public was misled to believe that the war would only be short, even though German officials knew this to be a hopeless expectation: as Mommsen reports, Moltke had privately expressed the opinion as far back as 1890 that any war resulting from the international tensions exacerbated in Imperial Germany would probably last for a good seven years, if not thirty (Mommsen 2004: 79). The German public was additionally misled regarding the potential for a German victory: up until 1916, the German people continued to believe in the ‘final victory’ propagated by the press. Indeed, so confident were they that Germany would win, that the question at the forefront of the German mind was not whether Germany would win, but how to proceed after victory (Carr 1991: 214). Schramm identifies the same tendency in the British press during the war. According to Schramm’s analysis, the British press similarly exaggerated the extent of allied victories abroad, informing the public only of the positive aspects of British war conduct and never of the negative ones, and manipulating the figures in reports of German military casualties and fatalities (Schramm 2007: 359-61). As Altenhöner stresses, although it may not be entirely justified to accuse the press of consistently lying, they were certainly guilty of exaggerating the positive truths and concealing the negative ones (Altenhöner: 84).

The German press was thus used to mould and forge consent for public opinion. This was achieved by releasing only selective information, and by an extensive propaganda policy. A central concern of this propaganda policy was the depiction of the enemy, as explored by Bernhard Rosenberger (1998) and Fritz Fischer (1997). Fischer highlights comparative portrayals of England in relation to Germany in which England is represented as an old, weary, declining nation in comparison to the young and spirited Germany growing stronger by the day (Fischer 1997: 133). Rosenberger and Kestler highlight the use of Greuelpropaganda (‘horror propaganda’/‘black propaganda’) to spread rumours about the bestial enemy and to frame the enemy states as insidious conspirators who had calculatingly plotted and
incited the war. Propaganda of this kind painted the allegedly jealousy-driven enemies in an almost diabolic light, claiming that they were intent on destroying all traces of German culture and existence. As Kestler reports, the purpose of these depictions was to present their destruction by the German armed forces as legitimate, or, ‘um die Öffentlichkeit von der “Richtigkeit, Gerechtigkeit und Notwendigkeit des Krieges mit seiner unerbittlichen Konsequenz des Töten- und Sterbenmüssen” zu überzeugen’ (Kestler 1994: 136).

The selective provision of information by the press, however, pursued the same intentions as Chamberlain’s nationalist war essays: to revive latent patriotism and legitimise the German war cause. Essentially fighting for the same cause, Chamberlain was not genuinely questioning the morals and authenticity of the German press, but touching on existing public mistrust of the press in order to construct a ‘global fuzz’ of epistemic uncertainty. The key to understanding Chamberlain’s portrayal of the press is the tide of German mass-market journalism in the 1890s that was characterised by a new wealth and variety of ideological positions. Among the leading newspapers of the day, the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* promoted official government views, the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, *Berliner Tageblatt* und the *Vossische Zeitung* were liberal organs, and the Social Democrats also had their own press organs (Mommsen 1995: 194-95). Chamberlain thus exploits existing public mistrust of the press (*Glaubwürdigkeitskrise*) in order to discount newspapers representing alternative ideologies, expressing his loathing of ideological diversity in the press in the guise of disapproval of press censorship.

The likelihood that scathing references to the damaging influence of the press are, at least in part, anti-Semitic is high. The following Section 5.5 elaborates on this assumption with a discussion of contemporaneous anti-Semitism.
5.5 Veiled Anti-Semitism in Context

Although this thesis focuses on nationalism and not anti-Semitism, Chamberlain’s status as a prominent anti-Semite following the publication of *Die Grundlagen des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts* in 1899 calls for a brief examination of (veiled) anti-Semitism in his war essays. As Felicity Rash documents, Chamberlain was not only a prolific anti-Semite of his time, but was also immersed in contemporary anti-Semitic discourse such as Wilhelm Marr’s *Der Sieg des Judenthums über das Germanenthums* (1879), Heinrich von Treitschke’s *Unsere Aussichten* (1879), Eugen Dühring’s *Die Judenfrage als Racen-, Sitten- und Culturfrage* (1881), and Heinrich Claß’s monograph *Wenn ich der Kaiser wär* (1912), to name just a few (cf. Rash 2012: 84-117). Given his *opus magnum* and in the midst of this tradition of influential anti-Semitic publications, it is unlikely that Chamberlain’s war essays are devoid of anti-Semitic references. The following section examines what may be anti-Semitic references in Chamberlain’s war essays, disguised as attacks on the press, materialism and finances. It is acknowledged that anti-Semitic references in the war essays probably exceed the examples mentioned below, but are veiled due to wartime censorship which banned anti-Semitic agitation. Rash states that from 1915 onwards, Chamberlain’s readers had to look for hidden meanings in his war essays, and suggests that the author’s advocacy of ‘reading between the lines’ of his essays in the *Neue Kriegsaufsätze* intimates veiled anti-Semitic messages (Rash 2012: 120).

Chamberlain’s war essays do not feature explicitly racist or anti-Semitic diatribe. They do, however, as Rash notes, re-use some of the key terminology of anti-Semitic discourse of the time, such as *Mammon, Gold, Geld*, as well as stock insults to Jews, e.g. *Teufelsbrut* [progeny of the devil] or ‘grundböse, fluchwürdige Gesellen’ [an utterly evil, monstrous bunch] (Rash 2012: 119). In particular, they feature disparaging references to the job sectors of finances and trade, and to certain organs of the press associated at that time with the Jews. Chamberlain’s references to *Geldmänner* and *Finanzleute* are not few and far between. *Demokratie und Freiheit* is particularly rich in such references, including a description of the French government as ‘a pack of poor devils’ – a collective noun usually applied to dogs – in the hands of the *Finanzleute*: ‘Die Revolution hat Frankreich den Geldmännern
ausgeliefert, die das Land seit hundert Jahren auffressen; diese sind jetzt die Herren und Gebieter. Was man die Regierung nennt, ist ein Pack armer Teufel, die im Solde der Finanzleute stehen' (Demokratie und Freiheit: 10). He repeats this sentiment in relation to supporters of democracy in Germany, who are, for him, chiefly the Finanzleute: ‘Wer nun ein wirkliches Interesse an dieser auf zwei so morschen Grundpfählen — unfähige Wähler, unfähige Parlamentarier — aufgebauten Regierungsform hat, das sind die Finanzleute!’ (Demokratie und Freiheit: 54). Two factors make it likely that there is veiled anti-Semitism behind references to Finanzleute and Geldmänner: explicit anti-Semitic references to Jewish economic influence in the Grundlagen (specifically in the chapter Der Eintritt der Juden in die abendliche Geschichte, cf. Rash 2012: 101-102), and the frequently reported strong Jewish engagement or representation in banking and merchantry (Hortzitz 1988: 5/33/38; Pulzer 2004: 299). As Rash observes, Chamberlain forged a connection between finances and materialism in Grundlagen, positing materialism as at once dangerous to Germanic idealism and as a specific aspect of Judaism (Rash 2012: 107), thereby making Judaism dangerous to Germanic idealism.

The second sites of veiled anti-Semitism in Chamberlain's war essays are references to the press. As Rash points outs, anti-Semitic references to the press in Grundlagen were explicit, in which he states his opinion that the Jews had gained a dangerous influence in Europe, especially through the medium of the press (Rash 2012: 103). Indeed, one rare explicit reference to the Jews from the Kriegsaufsätze is enough to show that, although the majority of Chamberlain's references to the press do not explicitly mention the Jews, they are most certainty meant as veiled anti-Semitism:

Deutschland zählt aber zehnmal so viele Juden, und wo sind sie jetzt? Wie weggeputzt von der gewaltigen Erhebung; als „Juden“ nicht mehr auffindbar, denn sie tun ihre Pflicht als Deutsche vor dem Feinde oder daheim, inzwischen die englischen Juden, die doch die leibhaften Brüder und Vettern der deutschen Juden sind, dort alles Schändliche wie toll mitmachen, ihre deutschen Namen in englische schnell umwandeln und in der ihnen fast allein gehörigen Presse an der Spitze des Verleumdungs-Feldzuges gegen die Deutschen marschieren (Kriegsaufsätze: 46).
This explicit association between the Jews and the press, alleged to be ‘almost solely in the hands of Jews’, is strongly indicative of veiled anti-Semitism in further references to the press. Chamberlain scorns press organs associated with the Jews: newspapers such as the Frankfurter Zeitung and the Berliner Tageblatt, to name the most significant examples, were consistently subject to anti-Semitism (Becker 1871: 77, 125), and widely despised in right-wing circles. Criticism of the English Lord Northcliffe’s Daily Mail (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 21) and The Times in particular seems to be starkly anti-Semitic: Chamberlain asserts that The Times also controls the papers Matin and Nowoje, all three of which are more interested in financial gain than providing news (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 27) (cf. Rash 2012: 120). The latter association is heightened and solidified by further associations forged between the press and money or finances as in ‘Die Hochschätzung des Geldes, die Verspottung aller idealen Regungen, die wachsende Macht des undeutschen Teiles der Presse, die systematische Untergrabung der Verehrung des Königtums, des Heeres, der christlichen Überzeugungen’ (Die Zuversicht: 11-12, see also Demokratie und Freiheit: 59). Here, the Jews, implicitly manifested in ‘die Hochschätzung des Geldes’ and ‘die Presse’, are labelled ‘un-German’, legitimised by the argumentative triad of undermining the authority of the monarchy (as proponents of Liberalism and Social Democracy), of the army (as anti-war), and of Christian values (based on the age-old anti-Semitic argument of religious difference). The most significant figures in the so-called German Judenpresse (‘Jewish press’) were Rudolf Mosse, Leopold Ullstein, Leopold Sonnemann, Bernhard Dernburg, Jacob Riesser, and Theodor Wolff. Sonnemann, Dernburg and Riesser were bankers by profession and Riesser was the Vice President of the Berlin Chamber of Commerce.

A review of the developments in the Jewish status and social position around the time of Chamberlain's residence in Germany indicates that anti-Semitic sentiment may be behind even more of the thematic content in his essays: not just behind statements about the ‘internal’ enemy, but also behind those describing the ‘external’ enemy. This position is speculative; however, given the clear historical connection between the Jews, liberalism and parliamentary democracy on the one hand, and between conservative nationalism and anti-Semitism on the other, an outline of the
history of the Jews and anti-Semitism in nineteenth and early twentieth century Germany will highlight the potential anti-Semitic nature of topical statements in Chamberlain's essays that appear to relate first and foremost to democracy and the war guilt of the Western allies.

Nineteenth century Germany was the scene of major change for the Jews at home there. Up until the end of the eighteenth century, the Jews still had the low legal status left over from the segregational ghetto regulations of the middle ages (Hortzitz 1988:19). After the turn of the eighteenth century, the Jews in Central and Western Europe became integrated citizens with equal rights. The historical role played by the two French revolutions (1789-1799 and 1848) was paramount to this process. Revolution and Napoleonic occupation brought total equality to all men in France (1791), followed eventually by Germany in 1808 with equality of residence rights (Orts und Stadtbürgerrecht, 1808). With the Napoleonic revolutions Enlightenment took force, bringing with it the ideals of liberty and equality for all (Hortzitz 1988: 20). Although the defeat of Napoleon meant a major setback to and, in part, an annulment of the achievements for Jewish emancipation, the ensuing revolution of 1848 once again brought tempo and force into the movement towards Jewish emancipation. In the aftermath of the revolution of the eighteenth century and a failed attempt to gain equal rights at the Erster Vereinigter Preußischer Provinziallandtag in Berlin in 1847, liberally and democratically minded Jews were particularly active in the 1848 revolution (Hortzitz 1888: 27-28). The constitution of the new Preußische Nationalversammlung founded in the aftermath of the 1848 revolution introduced a fundamental right for the emancipation of the Jews: the equal status of all confessions and the independence of citizens’ rights from their religious confession. In the elections for its non-Prussian counterpart, the Frankfurter Nationalversammlung, four Jews were included. As Peter Pulzer (2004) points out, the Jews remained traditional supporters of Liberalism during the nineteenth century. Following the intensified rise of and struggle for Liberalism during the 1860s and the liberal concessions made by the new constitutional monarchy of 1871, the Jews were granted total equality.
Notable Jewish participation in the revolutions and the legal benefits that the resulting parliament brought them forged an association between the Jews, liberalism, democracy and, western values in general. To be an anti-Semite meant to reject this trio of socio-political developments, and vice versa (Pulzer 2004: 292). The introduction of Chamberlain’s detested democracy, party politics and Rechtsstaatlichkeit to German political society was the result of the liberal fight for the fundamental right of human equality, including the equal right of men to decide how the country of Germany is governed. As dependent on the right to human equality, the Jews became seen by conservatives as the embodiment of all that was despicable about democracy, and parliament of all that was despicable about the emancipation of the Jews: (Pulzer 2004: 303). It may thus very feasibly be the case that Chamberlain’s thematisations attacks on democracy are in fact veiled anti-Semitic attacks.

In addition, Chamberlain’s references to the press are probably instances of veiled anti-Semitism. He attributes part of the responsibility for the spiritual and intellectual shortcomings of the German people to the press, whereby one particular group of newspapers falls victim to Chamberlain’s denigration (die Frankfurter Presse). The evils of the German press represent a particular concern in Demokratie und Freiheit (1917), in which the Berliner Tageblatt and the Frankfurter Zeitung are accused of censoring information so that the German people have no access to the truth and cannot mature intellectually (Demokratie und Freiheit: 32-33, 59). The lack of any real distinction between Jews and democrats in the eyes of nineteenth century conservatives discussed above, however, adds a further dimension to this assumption. As a conservative monarchist, it may be that Chamberlain was railing, at least in part, against a body of newspapers that were not just Jewish, but liberal and pro-democracy. Peter Pulzer identifies three distinct groups of major newspapers in Wilhelmine Germany: those financed by the Conservative and Centre parties (e.g. Kreuzzeitung/Neue Preußische Zeitung, Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung), those financed by industrialists (e.g. Berliner Neueste Nachrichten, Die Post) and agriculturalists (e.g. Deutsche Tageszeitung, Berliner Blatt), and the so-called ‘Jewish press’ – ‘eine Reihe von Zeitungskonzernen, die Juden gehörten, von ihnen
It is important to note that the ‘Jewish press’ represented a cohesive unit not just in the number of Jewish sponsors, editors and journalists who contributed to it, but also in its political ideology: these press organs were particularly – and even radically – democratic (Pulzer 1976: 216; Lowenstein et al. 2000: 188). Dernburg, Wolff and Riesser in particular were strong advocates of liberal politics: Dernburg was a left liberal whose father had served as a National-Liberal Reichstag deputy from 1871 to 1881, Riesser was a member of the National Liberal Party, and Wolff was a Democrat. Despite associations between the Jews and the Press in the Kriegsaufsätze, given the nature of the ‘Jewish press’ as doubly animous to Chamberlain – Jewish and Liberal - it is difficult to assess to what extent Chamberlain’s attacks on the press were motivated by racial antagonism and to what extent they were motivated by ideological antagonism, and to what extents both forms of antagonism merged into one.

Not only may Chamberlain's attacks on democracy and the press be anti-Semitic, but also his attacks on England and France, and France in particular. As Hortzitz interestingly notes, the Jews came to be associated with the French during the Napoleonic occupation in eighteenth century Germany; a connection propagated by prominent German writers like Ernst Moritz Arndt and Friedrich Ludwig Jahn. Feeling threatened by the French politics of occupation, there developed in Germany during the last two decades of the eighteenth century a considerable hate of the French. In this climate, Arndt popularised the notion of the French as ‘un-German’ as a critical negation of ‘German’ (Hortzitz 1988: 255). Most interesting of all, however, is Hortzitz's observation that, in the struggle for Jewish emancipation that followed this initial revolution, the Jews – certainly in anti-Semitic circles and literature – were identified with the French ‘other’, or, as Hortzitz summarises, ‘Die Franzosen als Projektion des Feindbildes nach außen wie die Juden als ihre binnenländisches Äquivant’ (ibid.). The French occupation of Germany in the 1790s and 1840s brought with it the ideal of equality and therewith democracy, and, intensified by German nationalist anti-French feelings during the Franco-Prussian War of, the conservative-romantic reaction to liberalism as both a French and a
Jewish institution meant that one was identified with the other. As leading figures in Francophobia and anti-constitutionalism, German nationalists were thus generally also anti-Semities (cf. Pulzer 2004: 301).

German nationalist Vereine at the turn of the nineteenth century were the main agents of anti-Semitic agitation (cf. Pulzer 2004: 244). As Pulzer (2004) and Rash (2012) note, the most significant of these organisations in propagating anti-Semitism after the turn of the century were the Deutsch-Nationalen, the Verein deutscher Studenten and the Alldeutscher Verband (Pulzer 2004: 244; Rash 2012: 83). Chamberlain was a member of the latter, which Pulzer identifies as being particularly clever in its ambiguity of expression regarding the ‘Jewish question’; as the masters of the kind of ‘latenten, stillschweigenden Antisemitismus’ (Pulzer 2004: 244) characteristic of Chamberlain's war essays. A further development in German anti-Semitism that would have born direct influence on Chamberlain as a citizen of the Bavarian city of Bayreuth was the re-focus of the anti-Semitic concentration to South Germany (Pulzer 2004: 259). What is more, being written between 1914 and 1917, Chamberlain's war essays themselves were written in a heightened climate of anti-Semitism. The First World War is commonly viewed as a caesura in the history of German anti-Semitism (cf. Gräfe 2010: 213). Particularly towards the end of the war, from 1916 onwards, the fading likelihood of German military victory and an increasingly dire situation at home led to the aggravation of anti-Semitism. Furthermore, the war led to a nationalist and propagandistic merging of multiple enemies; it was a situation in which German nationalists felt that nationalist values were under attack from multiple directions. Perhaps, therefore, the ‘international’ enemy in Chamberlain's war essays stands for much more than the war enemies France and England.
For Chamberlain, there are few concrete bastions of Germanness; beyond the monarchy and the Prussian military, his concept of Germanness centres on intellectual and moral ideals. These qualities include a good education, discipline and an apt disposition (*Kriegsaufsätze*: 68), as well as reason, humanity, simplicity, loyalty and truth (‘„Vernunft, reine Humanität, Einfalt, Treue und Wahrheit,“ sagt Herder, „das ist Charakter der deutschen Nation“ (*Der Wille zum Sieg*: 13)). The superior German ideal lies partly in the (alleged) nature of Germany as the only bastion of true freedom, a conviction advanced frequently throughout the war essays, and particularly in *Demokratie und Freiheit* (1917). One of the reasons why it is so crucial that Germany triumphs in the war, Chamberlain maintains, is that it can then reinstate freedom around the world (*Kriegsaufsätze*: 13-14). What exactly the German and therefore ‘original’ (*Kriegsaufsätze*: 22) concept of freedom means for Chamberlain remains vague. He declares that the great ‘creators’ of German freedom (synonymous with freedom in its most genuine form) were Martin Luther, Friedrich (the Great), Kant, Goethe, Humboldt and Bismarck (*Kriegsaufsätze*: 21), and that the kind of genuine freedom, German freedom, at issue, is the spiritual and intellectual kind. The German concept of freedom posited by Chamberlain appears to be centre on human thought, intellect and achievement; on ‘die innere, echte Seelenfreiheit, zu sein und zu glauben und zu denken und zu reden und zu schaffen’ (*Ideal und Macht*: 29).

Chamberlain conceives the nation not as a physical or biological construct, but as a national soul, each composed of its own unique set of ideals. He thus understands the battle of the nations that was the First World War as a clash of national souls, a clash of ideals, and a clash of *Weltanschauungen* (*Neue Kriegsaufsätze*: 90). Accordingly, the essence of Chamberlain’s solution to the war is primarily spiritual, whereas any pragmatic action encouraged is at best idealistic, and invariably superficial. The only way to win the war and achieve freedom, Chamberlain advises, is to engage in an internal, spiritual process of rebirth. This spiritual solution is present in Chamberlain’s war essays from the very beginning, but gains impetus from 1916 onwards with the publication of *Hammer oder Amboß* (1916), and culminating in
Demokratie und Freiheit (1917). The war for Chamberlain is an internal process requiring self-development towards education by individuals: in order to be victorious, the Germans must strive for inner strength and intellectual power. Spiritual revolution entails improving one’s cognitive abilities, that is, learning to think and understand, or, more specifically, learning to understand ‘Germanness’ and what it stands for.

The primacy of the human mind and the battle for the truth in Chamberlain’s essays can be situated in the contemporary battle between the introspective nature of the humanities disciplines at the time. 1871 saw the emergence of two conflicting theories of knowledge: one based on facts, evidence, and numbers, and one based on subjective analysis. As the study of science and technology gained in popularity and scope, a battle between science and the humanities emerged. This conflict is explored in detail by Volker Berghahn, who tells of a battle of superiority in which humanities scholars asserted the primacy of their disciplines over the sciences: humanities scholars were convinced that the insights to be gained from their disciplines were more profound, and held scientific research to be superficial (Berghahn 1994: 176-79). The humanities thus experienced a shift towards subjectivism, focussing on theories of human cognition: scholarship realigned itself according to the progressive notion that cognition is subjective, and that the human mind is incapable of perceiving absolute truths (Berghahn 1994: 78). The concern with human cognitive faculties, subjective perception and access to absolute truths went hand-in-hand with a concern for external or ‘superficial’ versus more profound insights. Scholars began to consider the extent to which the human mind can see beyond the surface not just of the physical world, but also of the abstract world of concepts and insights. German psychology also saw a significant growth in scientific interest in human perception, such as Hermann von Helmholtz’s studies of the physiology of perception, Gustav Fechner’s optically inspired exploration of the relation between mental and material realms, and the physiologist Jakob Moleschott’s attempts to link scientific methods and philosophical materialism in pursuit of the argument that there is no knowledge other than perception (Sheenan 1989: 813-14). These new trends in the theory of knowledge and perception play a crucial role in the development of Chamberlain’s
ideology and rhetoric. He too appears to have been greatly influenced by contemporary debates on human access to absolute truths, optical metaphors, and the ability of the human mind to comprehend more than what is immediately perceptible.

Chamberlain’s concern with alleged German ignorance can also be situated in the intellectual and political context of his time. Despite a strong sense of pride in German scholarship and scientific progress in the Reich (see (Blackbourn 2003: 209), historians agree that one branch of education was critically neglected: political education. In 1917, Max Weber announced that ‘Bismarck left behind him as his political heritage a nation without any political education’ (Carr 1991: 145). The literature on political knowledge and ignorance in the German Reich contains a great variety of compatible opinions; Gordon Craig interprets the guiding motive behind Heinrich Mann’s social novels as the will to reveal the lack of comprehension in German society, ‘the potentially tragic consequences of a continuation of [their] ignorance and fecklessness in political matters’ (Craig 1981: 221).
6. PRELIMINARY LINGUISTIC OBSERVATIONS

6.1 Significance of Pre-Reading

Following the analysis of the war essays’ thematic content, the discourse analysis proceeded with close readings of the essays that concentrated on their linguistic construction (some phenomena had already presented themselves and been noted during the close reading for thematic content). The insights gained during this preliminary analysis stage were led by intuition with the intention of proceeding to corpus linguistic methods to confirm, develop or dispute the intuitive observations made here. A final qualitative analysis would then identify and more systematically analyse further examples of the discursive and linguistic phenomena identified in the two prior analysis stages, complementing existing data with further salient examples that can only be identified by human instinct and not by a computer (e.g. metaphors and topoi). In a first reading, discursive strategies and devices that appeared notably rhetorical, persuasive or otherwise noteworthy were recorded, followed by the exact words and word strings that gave rise to these assumptions in a second reading. The general impression gained at this early stage was that a considerable amount – perhaps even the majority – of the content of Chamberlain’s war essays is not a factual topical discussion, but an abstract discussion that skirts around the alleged thematic content and foregrounds the author, the readers and abstract concepts of truth and knowledge.

6.2 Dogma and Authorial Presence

The preliminary analysis revealed three striking features of Chamberlain’s war essays: a highly dogmatic writing style, dominant authorial presence, and abstraction. Indicative of a highly dogmatic writing style are first and foremost inclusive generic adverbs and pronouns (niemand, alle, nichts, alles, nirgendwo, allerort, überall, niemals), and polarised assertions of incomparability and uniqueness. Additionally, emotive and polarised adjectives of force, brutality, and monstrousness, for example, and expressions of size, amount and numerousness also contributed to the sense of
dogma in Chamberlain’s essays. Specifically, the striking sense of dogma was found to be created by the following words: allein, beispiellos, drastisch, einzig, erschreckend, erschütternd, ganz, gar, ganzlich, gewaltig, montrös, umfassend,  
unerschöpflich, unerschütterlich, ungeheuer, unvergleichlich, vollends.

Besides a dogmatic style, the presence of Chamberlain the author in his texts was felt to be dominant and strategic. Authorial presence primarily manifests itself in utterances of self-justification and self-presentation intended to establish credibility and trustworthiness. Strategies that attempt to establish authorial credibility were noted to be particularly frequent and to intimate the author’s intellectual virtuosity by way of intertextual references, etymological diversions and the integration of foreign expressions and quotations into the main (German) body of text. Similarly, regular references to the author’s objectivity, his hyper-politeness and modesty in direct addresses to the readers, and what appears to be humility and a balanced consideration of both sides of all arguments construct Chamberlain as credible and trustworthy in his authorial role.

Authorial presence additionally manifests itself in an authorial meta-commentary on both the content and formulation of his own statements, as well as on the act and medium of writing and the institution of publishing. Chamberlain often reinforces his statements with his own (positive) value judgements on their truth, correctness, exactness or sufficiency, an observation built from the repeated or salient use of the following words and word strings in conjunction with the authorial first person: andeuten, Andeutung, angedeutet, Antwort, beantworten, Beispiel(e), beschränken, Frage, fragen, genug, genügen, nötig, nur so viel, überflüssig, unnötig, zusammenfassen, Zusammenfassung, Zensur.

The initial close reading additionally discovered that the author not only foregrounds himself in the essays, but also the readers and his relationship to them. This manifests itself at the most basic level in addresses to the readers, and additionally in what were assumed to be discursive strategies to anticipate and prevent objection or critical engagement. Furthermore, an attempt to forge reader empathy with the author was noted: the author seemed to strategically emphasise himself as the human behind
the pen, introducing anecdotes from his everyday life, and employing at times a familiar and colloquial writing style, subjective personal exclamations, and aphoristic sayings.

6.3 Abstraction and Epistemics

Finally, the preliminary close reading on the level of discursive and linguistic devices in the essays intuitively detected a tendency towards abstraction. What appear to be topical statements are often not really thematic propositions, but abstract propositions that assert lies, misleading and lack of knowledge on the one hand, and assertions of truth and factuality on the other. A good deal of what appears at first glance to be topical statements are in fact not comments on the events and political situation, but a comment on human powers of perception and the truth factor of assumptions, beliefs and theories in contemporaneous German society. In as much as German diplomatic relations and the First World War are a topic, knowledge, self-knowledge and truth seem to be on a par with this. The essays are particularly full of accusations of ignorance, secrets and lies, as well as, conversely, the notable use of the adjective *wahr* (‘in Wahrheit’) to describe the author’s own theories, assumptions and opinions. Words and word strings noted to so strongly create this impression include *angeblich, Anschein, belügen, erlogen, fabriziert, falsch, fälschen, Falschspiel, Fiktion, Grundtatsache, Grundwahrheit, Heuchelei, im eigentlichsten Sinne, in der Tat, in Wahrheit, künstlich, Lüge, Lügendiplomatie, Lügenegewebe, Nebelgebild, Schein, scheinbar, Tatsache, täuschen, vertuschen, Wahrheit, Wirklichkeit, Wölfe im Schafsfell, Zerrbild.*

In relation thereto, a salient network of metaphors was noted that consistently thematise the binary opposites hiding vs. revealing, burial and excavation, depth and surface, blindness and sight, and darkness and light (e.g. *Auge(n), betrachten, beleuchten, Blick, Blindheit, Blitz, Brille, dämmern, dunkel, Einsicht, Nacht, Sonne, Strahlen, unnachtet*). These metaphors all pertain to the related source domains of SIGHT and LIGHT, indicating an underlying metaphor scenario in the discourse. As metaphor scenarios have been shown to carry considerable rhetorical and
argumentative force (cf. Sections 2.5 and 3.4.6), it would thus prove particularly interesting to investigate the frequency and discursive function of lexemes such as 

sehen, blind and Auge, for example, and to use the concordance analysis to identify as many metaphorical uses of these lexemes as possible.

6.4 Initial Insights

The preliminary close-reading was used to get a feel for potentially operative and salient discursive strategies and linguistic features of Chamberlain’s discourse suggested two central areas for analysis: an examination of Chamberlain’s self-presentation, self-justification and his construction of the author-reader relationship, and his resort to predominant moral abstraction (epistemic uncertainty which is intangible and immeasurable). This first close reading suggested that it would prove particularly interesting to investigate the proportional relation between apparent topical content and actual (moral) abstraction in the essays.
7. **CORPUS ANALYSIS**

7.1 Introduction

The corpus analysis in this thesis is an interim stage of the analysis as a whole that uses statistics to check the validity of initial intuitive observations (see Section 4.4 and Chapter 7) as well as to expand on these by collating a large body of empirically derived linguistic evidence upon which to base (in part) the qualitative analysis. The corpus analysis is based on a primary corpus composed of Chamberlain’s war essays and essay series*, and a comparison corpus composed of contemporaneous publications by Paul Rohrbach:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary Corpus</th>
<th>Reference Corpus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Kriegsaufsätze</em> (1914)</td>
<td><em>Der deutsche Gedanke in der Welt</em> (1912)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Neue Kriegsaufsätze</em> (1915)</td>
<td><em>Zum Weltvolk hindurch</em> (1914)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Politische Ideale</em> (1915)</td>
<td><em>Der Krieg und die deutsche Politik</em> (1914)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Die Zuversicht</em> (1915)</td>
<td><em>Bismarck und Wir</em> (1915)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Hammer oder Amboß</em> (1916)</td>
<td><em>Unsere koloniale Zukunftsarbeiten</em> (1915)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Ideal und Macht</em> (1916)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Demokratie und Freiheit</em> (1917)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Der Wille zum Sieg</em> (1917)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the names of the individual essays in Chamberlain’s essay series, see Chapter 4, ‘Methodology’.
The WordSmith tools ‘KeyWords’ and ‘Concord’ were used to identify the keywords in the primary corpus, generated in proportional relation to the comparison corpus. The first step was to compile a frequency list – or ‘word list’, in WordSmith terminology – for both corpora. A frequency list does not, however, differentiate between grammatical items such as prepositions and determiners, and words that carry a higher ideological value, rendering a number of lexemes in the list insignificant. A further step was therefore necessary to determine which of the items in the frequency list are salient as opposed to merely frequent. In order to determine which of the items in the frequency list are salient, the word list was converted into a keyword list using the KeyWords tool, which compares the most frequent words in the primary corpus with their statistical occurrence in the reference corpus. The KeyWords tool is used in the sense of Senkbeil’s summary of its function as a ‘rough’ tool (‘ein grobes Werkzeug’) with which to discover hidden or explicit ideological patterns within genre-specific discourse (Senkebeil 2012: 409).

The Concord tool was then used to obtain the kind of insights identified by Partington as a particular advantage to this tool: ‘concordancing can reveal patterns even within a single text that throw light on its meaning and function, and also on the conscious and unconscious strategies adopted by authors’ (Partington 2003: 9). Corpus linguistic techniques are thus used to identify patterns and abnormalities in Chamberlain’s discourse that the human eye might not have identified, or might not have identified as fast. The Concord tool proved invaluable in identifying further examples of phenomena identified in the pre-reading stage, as well as examples of related and new phenomena: as Partington aptly explains, ‘the prereading alerted me to the phenomena, but only the concordance revealed their extent and complexity’ (Partington 2003: 12).

The following section presents the results of the corpus analysis in two steps: firstly, the keyword list is presented and resulting conclusions regarding Chamberlain’s ideological and rhetorical focus points and tendencies are drawn; secondly, the results of the concordance analysis of a selection of key verbs and key nouns are presented and discussed. The collocates for each keyword were also analysed; however, as the insights provided by the collocate analysis were invariably also
shown in more detail by the concordance analysis, the results of the collocate analysis are not presented here in order to avoid repetition. The keywords analysis looks at the keywords in both corpora in relation to each other as WordSmith identifies keywords using a relative calculation involving the primary corpus and the reference corpus. The concordance analysis refers to the primary corpus only.

7.2 Keywords Analysis

The following section analyses the positive keywords in Chamberlain’s essays by word class and compares these to the positive keywords in Rohrbach’s discourse. Although the KeyWords tool does generate a list of so-called ‘negative’ keywords – tokens in the primary corpus that occur with greater relative frequency in the reference corpus – this only identifies tokens in the Rohrbach corpus that also occur in the Chamberlain’s corpus, thus the negative keywords list does not take account of all positive keywords in the reference corpus. It was thus necessary to generate a list of keywords for the Rohrbach corpus itself, using Chamberlain’s essays as a comparison corpus.

As the following screenshot illustrates, the KeyWords tool displays the frequency of occurrence and relative frequency (keyness) of occurrence for every token occurring in both corpora, as well as the position in the keyness scale for each keyword:
Of the 18305 total words in Chamberlain’s essays, 201 were identified as keywords. 125 of these were identified as positive keywords; that is, they occur with greater relative frequently in relation to the total word count of the primary corpus than the same word in the reference corpus (keyness = frequency ÷ total number of tokens). The 76 remaining keywords were identified as negative keywords, occurring statistically infrequently in Chamberlain’s discourse in comparison to the reference corpus. 11 tokens were omitted from the analysis: individual letters (R, Z), articles (ein and einem), and English and French words such as the, les and la. The final working keyword list for the primary corpus presented 114 positive keywords for analysis. 218 keywords were identified in Paul Rohrbach’s writing, of which 134 are positive. The tokens $ and # were omitted from the reference corpus keyword analysis, leaving a total of 132 positive keywords. For a complete list of keywords for both corpora, see Appendix A.
7.2.1 Results of the Keywords Analysis

The following section analyses the nature of Chamberlain’s keywords by word class and presents the frequency statistics for keywords in the primary corpus in comparison to the reference corpus. As the two corpora were used both as primary corpus and reference corpus to obtain two sets of keyword lists, they are hereinafter referred to as ‘HSC’ and ‘PR’, respectively, rather than as ‘primary corpus’ and ‘reference corpus’.

The key nouns in the Chamberlain corpus can be divided between concrete entities and abstract concepts to a notably greater extent than the key nouns in the Rohrbach corpus. A small number of concrete key nouns in the Chamberlain corpus pertain to nationality and democracy. The former include Deutschland (HSC 613, PR 529) and Franzose (HSC 29, PR 1) and indicate that one of Chamberlain’s greatest concerns is the depiction of Germany and of Germany’s war enemy France. The key nouns Freiheit (HSC 353, PR 29), Gleichheit (HSC 40, PR 1), Demokratie (HSC 38, PR 1) and Parlament (HSC 38, PR 3) are symptomatic of Chamberlain’s disdainful view of parliamentary democracy. The key nouns Staat (HSC 117, PR 51) and Vaterland (HSC 41, PR 10) are symptomatic of the author’s concern with the current state of and future development of the German nation. The proper place noun Bayreuth (HSC 32, PR 1) reflects Chamberlain’s personal background as a member of the Wagnerian Bayreuth Circle, and resident of the city of Bayreuth. The percentage of keywords in Chamberlain’s essays pertaining to concrete concepts related to nationality and political institutions is markedly low in comparison to Rohrbach’s. In the Chamberlain corpus, 11 of 47 (23%) key nouns pertain to political institutions or nations, whereas 37 of 58 (64%) of Rohrbach’s key nouns pertain to politics, nations and/or colonialism and territory. These include Rußland (HSC 86, PR 440), Türkei (HSC 2, PR 152), China (HSC 2, PR 92), Ägypten (HSC 1, PR 78), Marokko (HSC 0, PR 57), Orient (HSC 1, PR 69), Ukraine (HSC 0, PR 29), Polen (HSC 6, PR 55), Konstantinopel (HSC 0, PR 27), Kleinasien (HSC 0, PR 22), Österreich (HSC 5, PR 43), Russen (HSC 8, PR 59), Türken (HSC 1, PR 34), See (HSC 2, PR 53), Mittelmeer (HSC 0, PR, 26) and Gebiet (HSC 1, PR 67), as well as concrete terms pertaining to naval and colonial policy and world domination: (Flotte HSC 15, PR
127), Weltpolitik (HSC 2, PR 41), Weltvolk (HSC 0, PR 26), Kolonie (HSC 0, PR 23) and Weltwirtschaft (HSC 1, PR 29). These results show a marked absence of words pertaining to the more concrete aspects of what may be expected from war propaganda in the Chamberlain corpus: territory, (global) domination, politics, and economics, for example.

A further series of key nouns indicates a trend in Chamberlain’s rhetoric, namely those denoting famous cultural figures and published texts. Concrete key nouns describing cultural professions or behaviour Denker (HSC 25, PR 0) and Dichter (HSC 24, PR 1), nouns referring to written texts, Werke (HSC 48, PR 0) and Aufsatz (HSC 22, PR 1), and the names of esteemed German and British cultural figures Goethe (HSC 67, PR 3), Kant (HSC 45, PR 1 – Kants), Luther (HSC 52, PR 12) and Carlyle (HSC 23, PR 1) indicate that Chamberlain’s discourse may heavily feature intertextual references and cultural references in particular, and/or appeals to authority. Diverging occurrences of the key noun Werke in the two corpora in particular highlight the decisive difference between Chamberlain and Rohrbach’s writing: whereas Werke as an independent lexeme refers to literary works in Chamberlain’s essays (HSC 48, PR 0), it occurs only in compound nouns (-werke) denoting concrete operational systems in Rohrbach’s writings (e.g. Schleusenwerke, Bergwerke, Bewässerungswerke). Occurrences of this key noun alone highlight the rhetorical weight of Chamberlain’s essays, in this case intertextuality and appeals to authority, in comparison to Rohrbach’s greater concern with concrete thematic content. Of the keywords identified for Rohrbach’s work, only Seite (HSC 29, PR 148) implies possible intertextual references. They include the name of only one great contemporary figure, Bismarck (HSC 28, PR 121) and Bismarcks (HSC 1, PR 52), who was, however, a politician, unlike the philosophers and writers among Chamberlain’s key nouns.

The remaining key nouns in Chamberlain’s essays denote more abstract concepts that are not, at first glance, related to foreign policy or war. Sprache (HSC 109, PR 33), Wort (HSC 99, PR 55), Worte (HSC 58, PR 22), Begriff (HSC 41, PR 11) and reden (HSC 65, PR 27) reveal a distinct interest in language and words. The key nouns Wahrheit (HSC 69, PR 15) and Lüge (HSC 30, PR 2) furthermore indicate a notable
epistemic concern in comparison to Rohbach’s essays. This observation is supported by a series of key adjectives and adverbs: genau (HSC 95, PR 9), wahre (HSC 45, PR 8), wissenschaftlich (HSC 27, PR 2), aufmerksam (HSC 31, PR 5), and dumm (HSC 16, PR 0), as well as the verb versteht (HSC 42, PR 12). This group of keywords suggests a significant concern with truth, factuality, intellect and perception. Equally noteworthy are a collection of key nouns pertaining to people or humanity, and to human emotion: Mensch (HSC 151, PR 17), Menschen (HSC 228, PR 82), Männer (HSC 125, PR 22), Leben (HSC 170, PR 96), Seele (HSC 33, PR 7), Liebe (HSC 53, PR 5), Haß (HSC 42, PR 7) and Neid (HSC 15, PR 0). These nouns indicate a concern in Chamberlain’s essays with the human soul and intellect that is absent in Rohrbach’s work and therefore a crucial avenue for further analysis.

Other more abstract key nouns in the primary corpus denote ideals: Ideal (HSC 64, PR 5) and Ideale (HSC 42, PR 10) and religion, nature and fate, as in Gott (HSC 49, PR 16), Natur (HSC 121, PR 61) and Bestimmung (HSC 27, PR 1). They furthermore denote confusion or lack of order, as in Willkür (HSC 23, PR 0, but willkürlichen 2 and Willkürlichkeit 1) and Chaos (HSC 17, PR 0), and indicate a concern with sight and light, as in Augen (HSC 82, PR 21), Tag (HSC 58, PR 10) and Nacht (HSC 23, PR 2). Although it is not possible to draw more definite conclusions regarding the potential rhetorical functions of these keywords without the context of the concordance lines, the fact that Chamberlain’s essays feature such a wealth of abstract key nouns constitutes a compelling initial finding. The relative significance of this is corroborated by the analysis of the key nouns in the reference corpus. Of the 58 key nouns in the Rohrbach corpus, only a small minority (10%) can be described as abstract, namely Gedankens (HSC 1, PR 50), Zukunft (HSC 56, PR 169), Prinzip (HSC 2, PR 37), Idee (HSC 30, PR 108), Interessen (HSC 27, PR 100) and Fortschritte (HSC 28, PR 1). Although it cannot be maintained that Rohrbach’s discourse is entirely devoid of abstract concepts, the ratio of abstract concepts to concrete objects is much lower than in Chamberlain’s essays.

Two groups of key verbs can be identified in the Chamberlain corpus: verbs relating to intellectual thought and expression, as in weiß (HSC 118, PR 31), wissen (HSC 98, PR 63), verstehen (HSC 84, PR 30) and urteilen (HSC 43, PR 10), and verbs
relating to journey and discovery, as in *führen* (HSC 125, PR 98), *entdecken* (HSC 29, PR 1), and *finden* (HSC 96, PR 54). These major categories again indicate a preoccupation with intellectual processes, with truth and lies, and with journeys and discovery. The significance of these two major categories of verbs in Chamberlain’s discourse is underscored by the nature of the key verbs in Rohrbach’s discourse, which are solely modal and auxiliary verbs, as in *werden* (HSC 389, PR 788), *haben* (HSC 257, PR 521), *war* (HSC 251, PR 535), *gewesen* (HSC 47, PR 151), *können* (HSC 130, PR 278), *würden* (HSC 26, PR 97) and *müssen* (HSC 87, PR 213). Although the relatively high frequency of the modal verbs *können* and *müssen* in Rohrbach’s discourse is undoubtedly significant, the even greater absence here of the kind of main verbs rich in meaning and potentially also rich in metaphorical significance found in Chamberlain’s essays is a particularly noteworthy finding. It shows that main verbs play a greater role in the construction of Chamberlain’s ideology and/or rhetoric than they do in Rohrbach’s discourse, and point to the necessity of analysing the function of these verbs in the Chamberlain corpus.

The key adjectives *einzig-* (HSC 175, PR 38) and *wahr-* (HSC 125, PR 26) suggest a rhetorical emphasis on uniqueness and authenticity in Chamberlain’s war propaganda. The generic adjective *gesamt-* (HSC 43, PR 15) and the particular adjective *einzeln-* (which may also occur as a noun, *Einzelne*, in the essays) (HSC 178, PR 75), the adverbs *gänzlich* (HSC 15, PR 0) and *überall* (HSC 72, PR 31), and the quantifiers *alle* (HSC 328, PR 163), *alles* (HSC 244, PR 123) and *aller* (HSC 145, PR 93) indicate a hyperbolic rhetorical style tending towards universal affirmation and particular affirmation. Of the key adverbs identified, the majority are adverbs of time, *nun* (PC 202, RC 56), *nie* (HSC 103, PR 38), and *niemals* (HSC 30, PR 6). Beyond suggesting a preoccupation with time in general, these adverbs indicate a number of potential rhetorical tendencies in the essays: an emphasis on the here-and-now (*nun*), references to the past, and universal negation (*nie, niemals*).

Again, the key adjectives and adverbs identified for the Rohrbach corpus underscore the importance of analysing those in the Chamberlain corpus in detail. The key adjectives in the reference corpus almost exclusively denote nationality and nationalism, as in *national-* (HSC 15, PR 346), *russisch-* (HSC 23, RP 361),
türkisch- (HSC 1, PR 135), europäisch- (HSC 8, PR 118), chinesisch- (HSC 0, PR 61), and afrikanisch- (HSC 1, PR 51). The remaining key adjectives pertain to contemporaneous political concerns of colonialism and naval policy, as in überseeisch- (HSC 6, PR 70), weltpolitisch- (HSC 0, PR 42), kolonial- (HSC 3, PR 61) and wirtschaftlich- (HSC 18, PR 117). Two significant groups of key conjunctions can be identified in the primary corpus. Woegen (HSC 34, PR 1), sowie (HSC 30, PR 6) and vielmehr (HSC 88, PR 26) indicate a high frequency of comparative and contrastive constructions in the essays. The concessive conjunctions dennoch (HSC 17, PR 0) and nichtsdestoweniger (HSC 15, PR 0) indicate a high frequency of concessive constructions, in which the pre-conjunction clause consists of a rhetorical admission. Denn (HSC 253, PR 152) suggests frequent explanatory justifications, and sonst (HSC 74, PR 36) the use of threats.

Although key pronouns only constitute a minor word class in the total keywords list, the fact that predominantly first and second person pronouns are keywords at all gives light to an important observation. The key pronouns ich (HSC 736, PR 134), mir (HSC 158, PR 20), mich (HSC 101, PR 23), meine (HSC 41, PR 8) and du (HSC 41, PR 4) suggest strong authorial presence in the essays, and, to a lesser extent, also the presence of the reader by virtue of authorial addresses to his alleged correspondence partner, and to the reader (du). The key pronouns in Rohrbach’s discourse consist exclusively of third person pronouns, namely nominative wir (HSC 619, PR 1524), accusative or dative uns (HSC 346, PR 965), and possessive unser (HSC 36, PR 131) – also in the forms unsere (HSC 53, PR 344), unsser (HSC 51, PR 254) and unsseres (HSC 11, PR 137). This suggests that Rohrbach’s discourse is concerned with the construction of a German national ‘we’, whereas Chamberlain’s discourse separately constructs two separate roles for the authorial ich and the reader. The status of question words welche (HSC 120, PR 32), welcher (HSC 50, PR 10), wer (HSC 146, PR 72), was (HSC 412, PR 379), and wie (HSC 784, PR 756) as keywords also indicates that the author relies on the frequent use of questions, and perhaps more specifically of rhetorical questions. However, as the words classed here as question words may also occur as pronouns (welche, welcher, wer, was) or
comparative particles (*wie*) in the essays, this observation can only be tentative at this stage.

7.3 Concordance Analysis

The following section presents the results of the concordance analysis, focussing on the Chamberlain corpus only. As it was not possible to undertake a concordance analysis for all keywords within the parameters of this thesis and the most represented word classes in the Chamberlain corpus are verbs and nouns, the WordSmith Concord tool was used to search for selected key verbs and key nouns (including one pronoun). Including salient adjectives and adverbs in the concordance analysis would have enriched the analysis results, however this decision was made on the basis that adjectives and adverbs would be given due attention in the qualitative analysis.

The concordance analysis concentrates on key verbs and nouns pertaining to the three nations German, France and England, epistemic concepts of truth and understanding, language, people, and authorial *ich*. These are salient rhetorical and/or ideological themes in Chamberlain’s essays, thus the Concord tool was used to analyse discursive realisations of these themes and thereby to examine how they are constructed and for which purposes. Although no keywords were identified for the Chamberlain corpus pertaining to England, *England* was nonetheless included in the corpus analysis because England is a major constituent of Chamberlain’s *Feindbild* (see Chapter 5), thus a concordance analysis of keywords pertaining to the construction of Chamberlain’s ideological propositions would not be complete without it.
(i) **Key nouns analysed**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Noun</th>
<th>Overall keyness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ich</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freiheit</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideal</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sprache</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Augen</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wahrheit</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franzose</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deutschland</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lüge</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wort</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worte</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Begriff</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seele</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(ii) **Key verbs analysed**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Verb</th>
<th>Keyness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>wissen</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sagen</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>urteilen</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>entdecken</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>verstehen</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the following screenshots show, the Concord tool lists each occurrence of the word in a concordance line or ‘keyword in context’ (KWIC), and all co-occurring collocates and collocate clusters:
For further examples of KWIC generated by the WordSmith software, see Appendix B.
A concordance line isolates every occurrence of the search term within its immediate discursive context, enabling the analyst to identify the discursive function(s) and/or meanings of a particular word by virtue of its cotext. After testing the Concord settings to determine how long a concordance line can be before the number of tokens displayed becomes unmanageable, the settings were adjusted to display 10 tokens on either side of the search term or node word. The default concordance setting in WordSmith is Left 5 Right 5, however the often complex nature of German clause constructions necessitated longer concordance lines. 10 tokens on either side of the node word generated concordance lines of 21 tokens, which was deemed the maximum number of tokens that could be effectively analysed for one concordance line. In some cases, the concordance line did not provide an adequate amount of text from which to deduce the function or usage of the search token because this depended on a word or sentence that was not within its immediate discursive context, but further back or further forward in the text. This proved to be the case where the search term is connected to the negative particle *nicht* two sentences prior to it, or where the search term appears within a quotation but where the quotation marks are not displayed in the concordance line, or in a sarcastic remark where the sarcasm is only revealed within the context of the entire paragraph. It was thus frequently necessary to examine the source text and locate the search term in the context of its entire surrounding paragraph. Fortunately, the WordSmith Concord tool allows the analyst to view the relevant passage in the source text.

7.3.1 ‘Carrot and Stick’ Persuasion

This section presents the results of the concordance analysis for the selected key nouns and key verbs listed above. The concordance analysis gave rise to a new observation: Chamberlain’s manipulative construction of the essays’ ideological content follows a ‘carrot-and-stick’ approach; a rhetorical device that offers a combination of positive incentivisation and negative incentivisation to induce behaviour or thought modification. The typical image associated with the saying ‘carrot and stick’ is a donkey, encouraged forwards by a carrot at the head end and beaten forwards by a stick at the tail end. This metaphor was made famous by
Winston Churchill in a press conference speech in 1943 in which he announced, ‘We shall continue to operate on the Italian donkey at both ends, with a carrot and with a stick’ (Coote, Batchelor & Churchill 1947: 140). The academic use of this term in the context of international relations has been recorded by Simpon and Mendis (Simpson & Mendis 2003: 430), and features in Herbert Simon’s analysis of the relationship between persuasion and the use of threats and inducements in social conflicts, in which he calls the carrot and stick ‘handmaidens of persuasion in conflict situations’ (Simons 1974: chapter title). Reference to the ‘carrot and stick’ paradigm in this thesis further locates manipulation as movement through space (cf. ‘critical disagreement space’), equating the forwards movement of the donkey with the manipulation of the reader.

The concordance analysis reveals that the author counteracts claims of German superiority (the carrot) with accusations of German deficits (the stick), constructing ‘Germanness’ (Deutsch-) not only in relation to a multitude of talents and virtues, but also to inadequacies and failures. The tension that Chamberlain creates between reassurance and inadequacy is encapsulated by the concordance lines for Mensch-. On the one hand, Chamberlain’s references to ‘wir Menschen’ focus the readers’ attention on their own humanity, promoting human solidarity and commonality, and appealing to fundamental human essence (Demokratie und Freiheit: 23, Politische Ideale: 78). He brings the concept of Mensch into association with morals and moral improvement, for example ‘ein starkes Gefühl für die Würde des Menschen’ (Politische Ideale: 97). On the other hand, he counteracts human community and moral potential with human weakness, drawing attention to the susceptibility of humankind to intellectual submission (Demokratie und Freiheit: 15), using bodily illnesses as metaphor representations of intellectual inadequacy: ‘doch unterliegen die Menschen zeitweise, wie der Erblindung, so auch der Vertaubung’ (Demokratie und Freiheit: 77). In addition, Chamberlain’s references to Menschen as animals (Tiere) posit humans as weak and dependent, reminding the reader that ‘kein Tier auf Erden tritt so elend hilfsbedürftig ins Leben wie der Mensch’ (Politische Ideale: 30).

The following analysis uses concordance lines for key nouns and verbs to examine
the interplay of reassuring and undermining the readers as human beings and specifically as Germans.

7.3.1.1 German Superiority by Contrast (‘The Carrot’)

As the concordance lines for Mensch- show, Chamberlains’s discourse is saturated with the language of human hierarchy (‘hoch müssen diese Leute über den praktischen Menschen ihrer Zeit gestanden haben’ (Politische Ideale: 16)). Indeed, Chamberlain’s ideological Weltanschauung is governed by the general conviction that there is no such thing as equality among people:

Weder in Bezug auf Größe, noch auf Farbe, noch auf Körperkraft, noch auf Gesichtszüge, noch auf Begabung, noch auf Willensgewalt, noch auf Herzensreichtum besteht Gleichheit zwischen den Menschen, vielmehr weichen sie fast unermeßlich voneinander ab (Politische Ideale: 31).

Analysis of the concordance lines for Deutsch-, England, Franzose, Ideal, Seele, Sprache, Wort(e), Lüge, and Freiheit reveals frequent use of strategies of contrast to construct nationalist German superiority. These strategies encompass comparative declarations of German superiority (and in particular superior German intelligence), and comparative declarations of English, French, and Russian inferiority in Chamberlain’s Feindbild. The author’s construction of German superiority by contrast acts as a positive incentivisation to accept his ideological message by flattering the readers and alerting them to the proposed German potential for greatness. The concordance lines reveal how key nouns of nationality are subject to conscious lexical priming via discourse prosody. Lexical priming is a theory bridging corpus linguistics and psycholinguistics developed most notably by Michael Hoey. It holds that words are defined by how they interact with other words in patterns of use. Lexical priming is related to the corpus linguistic concept of discourse prosody in that it focusses partly on the relationship between the meaning and positive or negative evaluation of a word and the discursive context in which it is embedded.
This relationship is deemed to reveal word associations in the mind of the writer or speaker and therewith their attitudes (Hoey 2005; Chapelle 2013). Correspondingly, Chamberlain constructs German superiority by virtue of simple collocations of *Deutschland* with positively evaluated concepts such as sublimity and achievement, as in ‘Der erhabene Anblick, den Deutschland in dem Kriege 1914 bietet’ (*Kriegsaufsätze*: 22) and ‘fördersamer wäre es, man würde das von Deutschland Geleistete schätzen lernen’ (*Hammer oder Amboß*: 53).

German superiority is additionally constructed using the topos of divine endorsement or appeal to God, identified by Martin Wengeler to be typical of twentieth century German *Kriegsbotschaften* (Wengeler 2005: 226). Chamberlain portrays Germany’s role in the war as a holy mission backed by the support of God: God is on Germany’s side because Germany is fighting for all that is good and virtuous in the world, therefore Germany must and will triumph:


Here, Chamberlain underscores his image of divine Germany (*Gottes Streiter*) using the antithesis of the contrasting image *Teufelsgezücht* (‘devil’s brood’), and by reference to a Wagnerian opera (*Der Ring des Nibelungen*) and the legend of George and the Dragon. This single sentence is rich in intertextuality, and the intellectual and cultural sources reflect Chamberlain’s English roots on the one hand and passion for the work of Richard Wagner on the other.

Chamberlain’s strategies of contrast juxtapose superior ‘Germanness’ with inferior or corrupt ‘un-Germanness’ (for a discussion of what ‘un-German’ refers to in the essays, see Chapter 5). Un-German forces as one *Feindbild* are metaphori depicted as a destructive force in the form of a toxic poison or woodworm:
Schon jahrelang stand Deutschland unter dem Schatten der kommenden Katastrophe, noch mehr aber unter dem Schatten eines alles wahrhaft Deutsche durchseuchenden undeutschen, unheimlichen Wesens, das immer herrschbewußter auftrat und von Berlin aus sich wie ein fressendes Gift überallhin ergoß (**Demokratie und Freiheit**: 31).

[…]
die grundsätzliche Entwicklung echt deutscher Eigenart und die ebenso planmäßige Ausrottung des am deutschen Holze fressenden Wurmes undeutschen Wesens […] (**Hammer oder Amboß**: 8).

In the first statement, *das Undeutsche* is described using mixed metaphors; as a monstrous creature (‘unheimliches Wesen’) that emerges and moves with a threatening sense of purpose and that has steadily grown in determination and corruption so that it now casts its monstrous shadow over the entire country of Germany. At the same time, it is portrayed as a liquid poison (*Gift, ergoß*) whose acidity eats away at everything it touches. Moreover, it is construed as a greater threat than the war, the metaphorical shadow of which is less monstrous and engulfing in recent German history than the metaphorical shadow of the ‘monstrous beast’ of un-Germanness. The image of the un-German in the second statement reconciles the two mixed metaphors in the preceding extract while undermining the image of ‘un-Germanness’ as a living being: here, the ‘un-German’ is a living creature like the monstrous being in the first statement, and eats away at the metaphorical wood of Germanness as does the toxic poison in the preceding extract (*fressend*). However, the scale of the ‘monstrous being’ is reduced to a worm. A worm is an unpleasant insect which, if left to gnaw as it chooses, can be destructive. More importantly, however, a worm is a very small and simple creature that can be exterminated or ‘stamped out’ (*Ausrottung*) with ease. Whereas the metaphoricity of the first statement creates alarm by highlighting the scope of the threat, the metaphoricity of the second statement diminishes the enemy to the level of an insect: a pest, but easily eradicated.

In addition to the vague and overarching concept of the ‘un-German’, Chamberlain constructs German superiority in relation to English, French and Russian inferiority, the second major *Feindbild*. He exploits expressions of contrast and opposition such
as **zwischen**, **entgegengesetzt**, **wogegen** and **trennen** in order to create a fundamental sense of difference and opposition between Germany and the countries that made up the Triple Entente, as in ‘richtig ist aber, daß hier ein wurzeltiefer Gegensatz Deutschland von den Westmächten trennt’ (*Neue Kriegsaufsätze*: 97). This description metaphorically presents the opposition between Germany and the Western Allies in terms of a plant: **wurzeltief** constructs the differences separating the warring parties as ‘deep-rooted’, implying unavoidable predisposition and essential irreconciliation, naturalised as irrefutable by the innovative, implicit topos of nature as the original, authentic and unchangeable state of being.

[...] und nun standen sie alle drei unter dem sie fast überwältigenden Eindruck des Mannessinnes, der Organisationskunst, der ungebundenen geistigen Freiheit bei voller Selbstbeherrschung, die sie in Deutschland vorfanden, was ihnen um so mehr auffiel, als sie über Paris und London gereist waren und dort genau entgegengesetzte Eindrücke gewonnen hatten (*Demokratie und Freiheit*: 38).

This statement illustrates Chamberlain’s evaluative comparisons of Germany on the one hand, and Germany’s war enemies, here England and France represented by their capital cities, on the other. *Deutschland* is associated with a list of positive attributes underscored by the powerful adjective **überwältigend** to insinuate the scope and impressiveness of these attributes. In contrast, Paris and London are associated with ‘genau entgegengesetzte Eindrücke’ (the metonymy here is significant: Chamberlain reduces the enemy countries to their capital cities while using the name of the entire country to refer to Germany, contrasting size, unity and power). First and foremost, English and French inferiority here is moral inferiority: the phrase ‘genau entgegengesetzte Eindrücke’ implies not just contrast, but an absence of the positive attributes assigned to Germany directly above, and therefore moral inferiority. Secondly, English and French inferiority is implied syntactically: Chamberlain’s reference to Germany is expressive and descriptive, whereas he does not describe Paris and London in their own right, but briefly, and purely in relation to Germany.
The concept of difference that Chamberlain asserts between Germany and England is especially hierarchical, and is constructed by vocabulary and images of superiority and inferiority:

Was aber geschehen muß, ist die siegreiche Behauptung von Deutschlands Willen gegen Englands Willen; Englands Arroganz muß gebrochen werden, gedemütigt; England muß anerkennen, das Deutschland ihm überlegen ist (*Hammer oder Amboß*; 59).

This extract demonstrates Chamberlain’s construction of comparative superiority in terms of strength and height. Chamberlain’s triumph of German will over English will rests on the contrasting notions of military victory (*siegreich*) and assertion (*Behauptung*) on the one hand, and brokenness (*gebrochen werden*) and humiliation or debasement (*gedemütigt*) on the other. Moreover, there is a subtle metaphor of height at work here: *Behauptung* comes from the noun *Haupt* (head) in the sense of ‘raising one’s head’ which, in combination with the preposition *über* (above or on top) in *überlegen*, creates an image of hierarchy through contrasting height in relation to the physically low image of being ‘broken and debased’.

7.3.1.1.1 The Superiority and Uniqueness of the German Ideal

Chamberlain employs the topos of semantic (in)authenticity to construct a dichotomy between the French democratic ideal of *liberté, egalité, fraternité* and the superior ‘German ideal’. He reduces his rejection of democracy as a political system to a rejection of the tripartite democratic ideal of terms (*Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité*) coined by the French. In so doing, he avoids the complexities of articulating an argument against a form of government and founds his discussion on abstract concepts: it is easier to philosophise about the intangible than to deconstruct a concrete form of political government. Attacking democracy by attacking the allegedly inauthentic use in the French and English languages of the three words on which it is based rests on the innovative topos of semantic evaluation, which
presupposes that there is a correct and an incorrect understanding of an abstract concept. Concordance lines for Freiheit highlight the frequency of distinctions that Chamberlain makes between cross-cultural understandings of this term in particular. These statements commonly take the form of dubitative rhetorical questions or exclamations in which the author’s own sarcasm is perceptible, as in ‘England: Eine eigentümliche Auffassung von der Freiheit der politischen Meinung und des Wahlrechts!’ (Kriegsaufsätze: 54), and:


Concordance lines for L/lügen show that Chamberlain refers to the understanding and use of the words Freiheit, Gleichheit, and Brüderlichkeit in the enemy countries, and of Freiheit in particular, as ‘a lie’. Any form of freedom that pretends to exist in England, he elaborates, is not genuine freedom, but bogus freedom (‘in England is die Freiheit Schein’ (Politische Ideale: 36)):


Concordance lines for Lüge and Wahrheit reveal that these key nouns are used in part to delineate alleged political lies regarding English and French foreign policy in the run up to and during the war. The chief political lie with which Chamberlain is concerned is the series of alleged untruths underlying political democracy in the enemy countries:
Und zwar darum, weil alle drei Teile dieses Ideals Lügen sind, Lügen im unbeschränkten Sinne des Wortes, womit ich sagen will: Behauptungen, die der Wahrheit der Natur direkt widersprechen (*Politische Ideale*: 29).


Stating that the general ideal of political democracy is based on lies and that its implementation in England is a farce, Chamberlain aims to delegitimise democracy for his readers. The discursive function of *Lüge* and *Wahrheit* in this context is ideological. Like the democratic ideal *Freiheit, Gleichheit, Brüderlichkeit*, the first statement consists of three repetitive parts: ‘weil alle drei Teile diese Ideals Lügen sind, Lügen im unbeschränkten Sinne des Wortes’ and ‘Behauptungen, die der Wahrheit der Natur direkt widersprechen’. The repetition of *Lügen* is combined with the hyperbolic and dogmatic adverbs *unbeschränkt* and *direkt*, and the generic determiner *alle* for rhetorical impact.

Analysis of the concordance lines for *Ideal* and *Ideale* confirms that Chamberlain’s concept of the German ideal foregrounds a strictly ‘German’ concept of absolute liberty; the allegedly authentic concept that differs from the farcical democratic notion of liberty in England and France. He writes of Germany as ‘die eigentliche und einzige Heimat menschenwürdiger, menschenerhebener Freiheit’ (*Kriegsaufsätze*: 15), claiming:

Deutschland will aus lauter Angst […] den Weg in die Hölle antreten und damit aufhören, das einzige Land der Welt zu sein, wo Freiheit eine Heimat hat und einer herrlichen Blüte entgegengeng! (*Demokratie und Freiheit*: 34).
Chamberlain’s discussions of freedom as an internal German ideal often combine comparisons and contrasts to (non-existent) freedom in the enemy nations with the adjective denoting (German) uniqueness, *einzig*. The alleged uniqueness of the German ideal that Chamberlain is so keen to emphasise is key: whereas the democratic ideal is shared by multiple nations, the German ideal is unique to Germany only; it is an oppositional force and counterweight to the French revolutionary ideal discussed in terms of its ‘otherness’ (*‘ein anderes Ideal’*):

So gänzlich unfähig sind jene Leute, unser Denken zu verstehen. Für sie ist „führender Weltstaat“ so viel wie Totschlagen und in Ketten werfen; daß es ein anderes Ideal gibt, ein deutsches, blieb ihnen unbekannt (*Hammer oder Amboß*: 21).

Using mixed metaphors, Chamberlain construes the French democratic ideal as a dangerously destructive force capable of irreversibly shattering the institution of the state (*zertrümmern*), and as an insatiable creature that has devoured any intellectual capacity that the French may have held:

Dennoch haben [die drei Worte „Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité“] […] genügt, eine große Nation bis in die Grundfesten ihres staatlichen Aufbaues zu zertrümmern, so daß nichts mehr übrig blieb, woran eine neue Staatsverfassung sich hätte wieder emporrichten und dauernd befestigen können […]; aus sich heraus kann es das unmöglich vollbringen, weil seinem Ideal alles beste Blut zum Opfer gebracht wurde, und weil außerdem dieses verderbliche Ideal Denken und Empfinden des sonst so klugen Franzosen — das, was er mit einem schlechten, dem amerikanischen Englisch entnommenen Wort „la mentalité“ nennt — ganz und gar durchfressen hat, wie der Wurm das Holz, so daß kein Arzt sie heilen und kein Ingenieur sie neu instand setzen kann (*Politische Ideale*: 28).

Here, the image of a ravenous worm is used to portray the destructive effect of the French political ideal: the menace is not the nation France, but the revolutionary ideal that has ‘corrupted’ (*verderblich*) the French mentality. The French mentality is presented as a victim of the corruptive revolutionary force using a double metaphor.
for emphasis; as an incurably ill patient and as a broken machine. The French ideal is thus constructed as a force that takes health, life and functionality in terms of a metaphor from the natural world (‘wie der Wurm das Holz’) and in terms of bodily illness (‘kein Arzt kann sie heilen’). A further metaphor highlights Chamberlain’s tendency to reify the French revolutionary ideal in terms of sterility using nature metaphors based on vitality:

Dieses Ideal ist nicht aus dem Boden hervorgesprossen, als ein Erzeugnis der mit Notwendigkeit wirkenden Natur; denn dann besäße es tief hinabreichende Wurzeln und würde auf jeder Stufe — selbst mitten im Vernichtungswerk — schöpferische Kraft verraten, wogegen die unbedingte Sterilität dieses Ideals sich zu jeder Zeit und an jedem Ort in erschreckender Weise kundgetan hat (Politische Ideale: 30).

Here, the democratic ideal is constructed as a kind of anti-plant. The emphasis here is on the ideal’s figurative sterility (‘die unbedingte Sterilität dieses Ideals’), representative of its alleged inability to engender a valid or productive form of government. The accusation of sterility is an antithetical contrast to the virile verb phrase ‘aus dem Boden hervorgesprossen’ and revisits the representation of the French ideal as ‘devitalising’ discussed above.

7.3.1.1.2 Superior German Intelligence vs. English Ignorance

Concordance lines for the keywords Deutsch-, Ideal and Seele reveal that Chamberlain uses ameliorative lexical priming to associate ‘Germanness’ with intellect, culture and morals. For Chamberlain, das Deutsche relates to internal values such as intelligence, cultural brilliance, morals, ideals, and freedom. The primary facet of Chamberlain’s concept of ‘Germanness’ is intellect; he refers to Germany as ‘die Heimat des Genies’ (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 14), and many references to Deutschland and Deutsche(n) co-occur with Wissenschaft or wissenschaftlich:

Chamberlain forges a connection between the alleged inherently intellectual nature of the German people and the allegedly intellectual nature of the times. With statements such as ‘mit dem wissenschaftlichen Zeitalter tritt unstreitig das Zeitalter Deutschlands auf’ (Politische Ideale: 41), he insinuates that now is Germany’s time to flourish due to the potential symbiosis of fundamental German scholarliness and the academic or scientific nature of the ‘new era’:


The repetition of Zeitalter to refer to ‘das wissenschaftliche Zeitalter’ on the one hand, and ‘das Zeitalter Deutschlands’ on the other makes Deutschland equivalent to wissenschaftlich by virtue of the common noun and syntactic parallelism.

Perhaps the greatest point of opposition constructed between England and Germany concerns educational and scholarly standards. References to the status of Schulen and Wissenschaft in England in comparison to Germany constitute the majority of contrasts:

Die eine der tragenden Säulen des heutigen Deutschland fehlt also ganz in England: die allverbindende, das gesamte Leben der Nation in tausend Kanälen durchdringende und sie zu einer Kultureinheit erhebende Schule und Hochschule (Kriegsaufsätze: 50).
This architectural metaphor presents Germany as a classical building resting on columns: grandiose with a long historical tradition. The verbal adjective erhebend mirrors the height inherent in the image of columns, rounding off the sentence by reinforcing the notions of physical height (Säule) and cultural and intellectual elevation (‘die zu einer Kultureinheit erhebende Schule und Hochschule’).

German knowledge is frequently pitted against English or French ignorance; thus there is a vivid opposition between the wealth of statements belonging to the rubric ‘every German knows X’ on the one hand, and ‘nobody in England/France knows X’ on the other:

[…] was damit gesagt wird, wissen wir in Deutschland genau und brauche ich darum nicht zu schildern; in England weiß man nichts davon (Kriegsaufsätze: 62).

As the concordance lines for versteht indicate, statements that discuss English and French cognitive abilities also generally – if not exclusively – detail the enemy nations’ inability to understand X:

Was sollte ein Volk bewirken, das nie Gelegenheit hat, sich spontan und einstimmig als „Kraft“ zu offenbaren, sondern sich jahraus, jahrein von Winkeladvokaten und Bierbankpolitikern dumm reden lassen muß über Dinge, die es nicht versteht […]? (Kriegsaufsätze: 37).

Ich habe es an einem der ersten lebenden Staatsmänner erfahren […] von deutschem Empfinden und Denken versteht er weniger als der Mann im Mond (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 13).

Chamberlain additionally primes the meaning and connotations surrounding Deutschland and Deutsche(n) using the noun Geist. Geist is a broad term that can be interpreted as a reference to the mind and its workings. In addition to general references in which deutsch collocates with Geist such as ‘dem reinen, hohen, deutschen Geiste’ (Kriegsaufsätze: 94), Chamberlain declares that the cognitive-
spiritual nature of Germanness is a facet unique to Germany alone, unattainable by any other nation, and capable of being upheld only by Germany:

The characterisation of Germanness as fundamentally intellectual and spiritual is further developed by statements that forge semantic associations between deutsch with cultural professions such as Dichter, Gelehrter, and Künstler:

7.3.1.1.3 German War Innocence

For Chamberlain, German superiority rests partly on the nation’s status as the greatest or only advocate of peace. References to the physical and political dimensions of the war are generally disassociated from Germany and Germanness; participation in the war is presented as entirely against Germany’s will, and entirely against everything that Germanness stands for:

In declarations of German disinterest in war and consequent lack of responsibility for its outbreak, Chamberlain makes notable use of hyperolic negations, such as ‘irgend
Chamberlain’s essays are typified by a victim vs. aggressor opposition: whereas Germany has the moral upperhand because it has only ever advocated peace and never war, her enemies are inferior because they are aggressive war-mongers who have singled out Germany and bullied her into war. Concordance lines for Franzose reveal how the information structure of a sentence can be used to group the French together with the remaining German war enemies England and Russia in isolation from Germany to create a sense of the overwhelming collective enemy:

[…] jeder Franzose, jeder Belgier, jeder Engländers und Russe, der mit den deutschen Soldaten wirklich in Berührung kommt, ist erstaunt, was sie nicht allein für eisern disziplinierte, sondern für wackere, grundständige, gutherzige Menschen sind […] (Kriegsaufsätze: 69).

Der Angelsache wird durch seine Eisendrahtnerven, der Russe durch seine ungeheure Masse, der Franzose durch seinen ewig unruhigen, schlauen Geist noch viel zu schaffen machen (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 89).

In these extracts, the French together with one or more enemy country form an intimidating combined majority. Indeed, references to the Germans invariably follow a list (‘jeder Franzose, jeder Belgier, jeder Engländers und Russe’), isolating Germany within the clause on a syntactic level, and within the war on an ideological level.

The concordance lines for occurrences of D/deutsch- in particular reveal a clear division between agents and patients in Chamberlain’s conception of agency in the outbreak and progression of the war, in which Germany was allegedly passive, and her war enemies active. Some statements allude directly to a kind of conspiratorial intent on the part of Germany’s war enemies by alluding to Absicht and Pläne.
man weiß also, daß Deutschlands Feinde den Plan verfolgen, die Kraft Deutschlands endgültig zu brechen; dieser Plan umfaßt alle nur denkbaren Beziehungen und ist bereits bis ins Feinste ausgearbeitet und in einem weltumspannenden Netze organisierter Bekämpfung alles Deutschen am Werke (*Ideal und Macht*: 12).

wenn aber England die systematische Vernichtung Deutschlands mit kaltem Blut seit langen Jahren plant und nunmehr durchzuführen entschlossen ist, da hat Deutschland keine Wahl: die einzige Wehr ist hier die Gegenwehr (*Hammer oder Amboß*: 23).

Both statements emphasise the ‘significant’ length of time during which both England and France are alleged to have been plotting to wage war on Germany. The first statement is a causal construction that rhetorically overloads the ‘wenn’ clause with vocabulary of cold-bloodedness (‘mit kaltem Blut’) and with references to destruction (‘systematische Vernichtung’) and will (entschlossen) pertaining to England. The ensuing *da* clause is notably more forceful, syntactically dividing England and Germany by sentence structure and comma (‘Wenn England [X], da hat Deutschland zu [Y]’), and juxtaposing a simple and punctuated causative statement with its preceding lengthy and fast-paced counterpart to accentuate the alleged simplicity and inevitability of Chamberlain’s rather bold conclusion. A particularly striking metaphor in the construction of the victim/aggressor opposition is:

So war denn die von England und Frankreich erstrebte „Einkreisung“ nunmehr fertig; der Strick war Deutschland um den Hals geworfen, der Knoten war geschürzt, die Verschwörer brauchten nur einen günstigen Augenblick abzuwarten und dann fest zu ziehen (*Neue Kriegsaufsätze*: 62).

The policy of *Einkreisung* of which the enemy countries England and France are accused is metaphorically depicted as an act of hanging. Germany is the passive victim that has been set up to be hanged, trapped with a noose around its neck. The allies England and France are connected with the only active verb in the sentence; with the decisive and violent act of pulling at the noose around Germany’s neck (‘fest ziehen’). Elsewhere, active verbs denoting attack and destruction such as *zermalmen*
and ausrotten (Hammer oder Amboß: 27), überfallen and vernichten (Kriegsaufsätze: 76) construe England and France as active aggressors and Germany as the victim of a one-sided battle of intended destruction.

7.3.1.2 German Deficits (‘The Stick’)

Where assertions of German superiority constitute the positive incentive in the ‘carrot and stick’ dynamic, the stick is constituted by assertions of German insufficiency; negative incentivisation that coerces the readers to modify their thought and/or behaviour by making them feel uncomfortable. Unlike in the paradigm example of the donkey, negative incentivisation is achieved by making the readers feel intellectually rather than physically uncomfortable. Chamberlain constructs a general and all-encompassing tension between truth and lies centring on the key noun Wahrheit, or on the opposition between Wahrheit and its antonyms Lüge and Schein: ‘Die Lüge wirkt genau so stark wie die Wahrheit, denn sie wird geglaubt’ (Kriegsaufsätze: 10); ‘die Natur erwartet von moralischen Wesen Wahrheit, nicht Schein; dazu sind sie moralische, denkende, nicht bloß blind handelnde Wesen’ (Politische Ideale: 73-74). One of the most rhetorically effective expressions of this epistemic tension is the following extract, in which Chamberlain launches a list of oppositional pairs centring on the concept of truth to discredit the lack of truth and reality on which the German government is based:

Die ganze alte Politik und Diplomatie, die unseren Hof- und Geheimräten, unseren Kanzlern und Botschatern, unseren Landtags- und Reichstagsmitgliedern heilig ist, gehört ebenso sehr in den altväterischen Plunder, wie die Astrologie und die Alchymie: auf eine Unze Wahrheit neunundneunzig Unzen Unsinn, Wahn statt Wissenschaft […] (Politische Ideale: 25).

Indeed, concordance lines for Wahrheit reveal that Chamberlain emphasises the absence and distortion of truth within war-time Germany in particular, claiming ‘Wüßten die deutschen Arbeiter die Wahrheit, sie würden sicher anders urteilen; sie
werden aber irregeführt’ (*Demokratie und Freiheit*: 6) and deploring ‘die schamlose Verdrehung der Wahrheit in unseren Zeitungsberichten’ (*Politische Ideale*: 112). These assertions support frequent claims the the truth is ‘hidden’, as in ‘Wie ist es möglich, die offenkundige Wahrheit — die „Tatsache“ — den Blicken von Millionen zu verbergen?’ (*Kriegsaufsätze*: 9). Chamberlain’s depictions of distorted and hidden truths also extend to personifications of the truth. Inspired by the title of Goya’s artwork ‘Murió la verdad!’ or ‘Es starb die Wahrheit!’, which also constitutes the opening epigram to Chamberlain’s essay *Wer hat den Krieg verschuldet?*, Chamberlain portrays the truth as metaphorically ‘dead’, as something that is being or has already been buried in a grave:


Diese dummen Blau- und Rot- und Orange- und Weiß-Bücher, welche die Wahrheit zu Grabe tragen wollen […] (*Neue Kriegsaufsätze*: 75-76).

Further concordance lines for *Wahrheit* reveal that the key to understanding Chamberlain’s portrayal of the lamentable absence of the truth in Germany lies in the concept of the ‘die Auffindbarkeit der Wahrheit’ (the findability of truth), as in:

[…] die [These] von der Nähe und Auffindbarkeit der Wahrheit […]in Wirklichkeit steht die Wahrheit strahlend unverhüllt da, der Schleier liegt auf unseren Augen, und wir brauchen den Star nur zu entfernen, so erblicken wir die Wahrheit, und der Wahn entschwindet (*Neue Kriegsaufsätze*: 36).
The assertion that the truth, although concealed, is ‘findable’, depicts the truth as existent and available to all, but the Germans as incapable of seeing it. In both cases, the responsibility for grasping the truth is placed on the German people themselves: they are not just victims of the omission and distortion of truth, but guilty of ignoring or failing to see the truth. By making good eyesight a metaphorical condition of perception and understanding, Chamberlain blames the people and not the situation. Chamberlain’s depiction of truth in war-time Germany does thus not present the truth as totally absent, nor as fully present. Instead, the truth is latent in German society, but is still waiting to be perceived by all.

Correspondingly, the concordance lines analysed reveal that the motif of absent or hidden truth is constructed using blindness metaphors resting also on the keyword Augen, where blindness represents the inability to perceive or understand:

[… ] auch hier könnten die Deutschen viel lernen; sie bleiben aber blind und taub und lassen sich noch immer von den Phrasenmachern zum besten halten […] (Demokratie und Freiheit: 49).

Welcher Teufelsgeist den Deutschen eine Binde vor die Augen hält […] (Politische Ideale: 62).

Concordance lines for Augen reveal that Chamberlain uses this key noun to articulate the (metaphorical) weakness of the German people’s eyes, and to declare the necessity for the Germans to (metaphorically) open their eyes. Chamberlain problematises the human eye as flawed and ineffective; the only references to eyes and sight that portray the eyes positively hint only at the potential to see properly, and more specifically at the potential of a hypothetical individual to see properly:

[… ] wer aber will, wer richtig zu wollen versteht, wer die guten Augen besitzt, die Pascal verlangt, wie Gott sie uns in den Kopf setzte und jeder brave Mann sie unbewußt sein eigen nennt, wenn er sie nur nicht durch die hundert Brillen der Lüge, des Klatsches, des Vorurteils, der Ruhelosigkeit verdunkelt — der weiß schon heute, wer den Krieg verschuldet hat und wer nicht, er ist in der Lage, die
weiteren und die näheren Kreise sich mit unbeirrbarer Deutlichkeit aufzuzeichnen (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 36).

Die erste große Befreiungstat der Weltgeschichte hat ein deutscher Bauernsohn bewirkt: wer Augen zum sehen hat, kann aus dieser einen Tatsache die ganze Bedeutung des Deutschtums für die Freiheit entnehmen (Demokratie und Freiheit: 17).

In the above examples the metaphoricity surrounding Augen is manifested by the presupposition that eyesight is connected to knowledge and truth. This is achieved in the first extract by associating lies (Lüge) with glasses (Brillen) and darkness (verdunkelt), that is, with weak or reduced powers of visual perception. Strong eyes (‘gute Augen’), constrastingly, are associated with clarity of perception (‘unberirrbarer Deutlichkeit’). The construction ‘wer die guten Augen besitzt, der weiß [X]’, or ‘wer Augen zum sehen hat, kann [X]’ (cf. Demokratie und Freiheit: 17) thus implies the potential for select individuals to ‘see clearly’ in the sense of ‘comprehend’.

Chamberlain additionally uses metaphors of the human eye to allocate blame for and agency in German ‘blindness’. On the one hand, Chamberlain writes of blindfolds – an optical obstruction traditionally tied around the eyes by a second party:

Sonst aber braucht man nur um sich zu blicken, um zu sehen, wohin wir alle auf diesem Wege kommen werden, und um sich betrübt zu fragen, welcher Teufelsgeist den Deutschen eine Binde vor die Augen hält, daß sie blind ins Verderben laufen (Politische Ideale: 62).

[…:] Luther hat die Binde von den Augen gelöst, die uns Menschen seit urältesten vorgeschichtlichen Zeiten in furchtsamer Dumphheit gefangen hielt (Demokratie und Freiheit: 18).

In the first statement, the agent accused of having blindfolded the Germans is a negative but anonymous external force (Teufelsgeist), and in the second statement, the blindfold itself is the agent. In statements such as these, the German people are not to blame for their blindness. The guilty party responsible for the Germans’
inability to see is not explicitly identified, however the Germans are portrayed as the victims.

Alternative references to unfortunate events and developments that have occurred ‘before our very eyes’ imply that the blind (in most cases the Germans) are not entirely free of blame for their own ignorance. These references are based on physical proximity, clarity, and all-encompassing generic pronouns that implicate ‘everybody’ in their own ignorance, such as ‘und doch liegt die Sache klar vor jedes Menschens Augen’ (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 21) and:

[...] sobald der Deutsche nicht Träumer und Held, nicht Schöpfer und Herr ist, so sinkt er herab zum emsigen Knecht, der fremder Größe frönt. Die Beweise hat Jeder aus Geschichte und Gegenwart vor Augen (Ideal und Macht: 10).

Blindness as a German epidemic thus constructs the German people as ignorant as to the truth behind the causes of the war and the motivations and policies of both Germany and the enemy countries during the war.

In order to promote his idea of acquiring or striving to acquire new German ideals, Chamberlain constructs and exploits a climate of uncertainty and confusion using metaphors of darkness and light. This is effectively illustrated by the following extract:

[...] in einem Übergangszustand, wie das heute der Fall ist, wo die politischen Bestrebungen sich derartig kreuzen und bekämpfen, daß Keiner mehr weiß, was er will, noch was er wollen soll, da tritt das Bedürfnis ein nach neuen, klarleuchtenden Idealen, in denen eine neue Zeit sich erkennen und nach denen sie sich orientieren kann. Gerade hier nun straucheln die Meisten, weil sie nicht wissen, welcher Schritt zuerst getan werden muß, damit der Mensch aus dem Dunklen ins Helle gelange (Politische Ideale: 56).
This statement contains references to lack of knowledge, self-awareness and self-reorientation (klarleuchtend; (sich) erkennen; (sich) orientieren; ‘keiner mehr weiß, was er will’), combined with an image of chaos (‘sich kreuzen und bekämpfen’). The necessity for new ideals is legitimised by positing that they are beneficial to human identity and awareness. The final metaphor denoting transition from a state of confusion into a state of awareness (‘aus dem Dunklen ins Helle gelangen’) revisits the figurative advice ‘ohne Zögern [dieses neue Ideal] aus den Nebeln der Zukunft zu erfassen und in die Gegenwart überzuführen suchen’ (Politische Ideale: 18). ‘Der Nebeln der Zukunft’ mirrors ‘das Dunkle’, and the verb phrase ‘erfassen und in die Gegenwart überführen’mirrors the verb phrase ‘ins Helle gelangen’, where the former represents ignorance and unknowing, and the latter represents clarity and awareness.

7.3.2 Further Rhetorical Strategies

The concordance analysis suggests that the primary strategy of persuasion in Chamberlain’s ideological doctrine is the ‘carrot and stick’ strategy. The analysis of concordance lines for the key nouns and verbs also, however, reveals further rhetorical strategies not directly linked to this positive and negative incentivisation; namely a penchant for semantic and etymological expositions and salient uses of the keywords to position the reader and the author, to naturalise opinion as fact, to legitimise propositions by citing external sources.

7.3.2.1 Strategies of Author Positioning

The concordance analysis shows a high instance of what Wengeler calls authorial Selbstdarstellung or Selbstinszinierung, one of the eight constitutive elements of twentieth century German Kriegsbotschaften. Analysis of the concordance lines for the first person pronoun ich reveals that the author regularly steps into his essays in order to make the readers aware of his authorial presence on the one hand and their status as readers on the other. Sagen often co-occurs with a modal verb and the first
person singular pronoun *ich* in authorial interjections that express the author’s communicative ability or intentions, as in ‘Indem ich Verständnis für einen bitteren Scherz voraussetze, will ich sagen: England bekriegt Deutschland aus Hochachtung’ (*Hammer oder Amboß*: 56). The key verb *sagen* additionally features in authorial elaborations that emphasise the exactitude of the author’s expression or linguistic choices:


Aber, aber... wie soll ich’s sagen? ... ich fürchte, ich werde nun doch unlogisch oder gar unförmlich [...] (*Kriegsaufsätze*: 24).

Such elaborations intimate authorial consideration of how best to formulate a claim in order to justify it through linguistic precision rather than reasonable argumentation. They direct the readers’ focus away from the propositional content of the statement and towards the extent of the author’s eloquence; a fallacious rhetorical strategy that attempts to justify the message by highlighting the author’s competence of expression.

Concordance lines for the first or third person form of the verb *wissen* (to know), *weiß*, show that the author presents himself as the ultimate source of knowledge. This is construed mostly using the first person pronoun *ich* in conjunction with the verb *weiß*. Concordance lines featuring the construction ‘wer X, weiß Y’ refer to a unique or rare life experience that has already taken place in the author’s life. Chamberlain portrays these events as something that could have happened to any individual, whereas they in fact describe events that only he with his specific background has ever had the good fortune to experience. ‘Wer mit Engländern aus gebildeten Kreisen verkehrt hat, weiß [...]’ (*Die Zuversicht*: 9), for example, relates to his personal experiences as a native English speaker with roots in upper middle-class English society. Yet more illuminating is Chamberlain’s statement beginning ‘wer nur einmal
in Bismarck’s Augen zu schauen das Glück genoss, weiß, dass […]’ (Ideal und Macht: 6). This statement is not based on Chamberlain’s belief that any other reader or significant number of readers has ever been able to personally look Bismarck in the eyes, but is more an implicit expression of the author-reader hierarchy that highlights information and experience that only the author can access by virtue of his status within elevated political and cultural circles.

Concordance lines for weiß containing the first person pronoun ich reveal that the author rarely admits to lacking concrete factual knowledge. Only two counterexamples were found:

Ob ein wirklicher Bündnisvertrag damals schon bestand, weiß ich nicht, aber so hieß die Sache im Volksmund (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 57).

Jetzt wird behauptet — ob mit Recht oder Unrecht, weiß ich nicht —, diese im südlichen Deutschland allmächtige Zeitung sei überhaupt Feindesbesitz […] (Der Wille zum Sieg: 39).

The author tends instead to admit that he is unable to make future predictions: ‘Was aus den Vereinigten Staaten in Zukunft wird, weiß ich nicht’ (Ideal und Macht: 23), he confesses, and ‘Wie lange der Waffengang, der jetzt die Welt in Atem hält, noch dauern wird? Das weiß ich nicht; darüber habe ich gar keine Meinung’ (Hammer oder Amboß: 30). The author exploits the verb weiß to give the reader the false impression that he is admitting gaps in his knowledge, thereby creating sympathy and trust. The reality is, however, that he is merely admitting to his inability to make future predictions; a skill that nobody possesses, and that is thus infinitely more forgivable.

A collection of two-part authorial interjections were identified among the concordance lines for weiß that begin by admitting factual ignorance only to heighten the plausibility of a speculative claim in the subsequent clause. The following examples present statements in which the author precedes a speculative claim with a
plea of ignorance. This is a rhetorical device used to strengthen the feasibility of a subjective claim by relying on the misleading presupposition that if the author is honest enough to admit imperfect knowledge regarding X, then the unqualified statement Y must definitely be true:

Ob wir uns heute in der vorletzten oder vorvorletzten befinden, entzieht sich meinem unbelehrten Urteil; was aber die letzte Phase bezeichnen wird, weiß ich genau, wie jeder es wissen kann […] (Hammer oder Amboß: 38).

Dadurch allein kann Deutschland, und mit ihm die wahre Kultur der Menschheit, von dem ewigen Alp befreit und einer Zukunft des Friedens und der Freiheit entgegengeführt werden […] Durch welche Mittel das geschehen wird, das weiß ich nicht; daß aber Deutschland diese Mittel besitzt sowie die Macht, sie anzuwenden, dessen bin ich vollkommen überzeugt (Hammer oder Amboß: 48).

Similarly, a number of occurrences of Franzose feature in the author’s displays of his intellectual virtuosity, in which he brandishes the breadth of his knowledge through quotations and his language skills. These statements cite either the words of a famous Frenchman, or French sayings:


Daß die Menschen in keiner Beziehung unter einander gleich sind, cela crève les yeux, wie der Franzose sagt, „es drückt die Augen ein“ (Politische Ideale: 31).

In statements like these, Chamberlain advertises not only his own educational expertise, but also his familiarity with French culture and language. Indeed, the author often weaves Frenchisms into his discourse.
First person *ich* additionally co-occurs with the verb *empfehlen* with notable frequency. The indirect objects in statements of recommendation are the desirable reader (‘geeigneter Menschen’ (*Demokratie und Freiheit*: 26)), the undesirable reader, and the inclusive *jedem*, either alone or in combination with *Leser*; as in ‘jedem Leser’ (*Neue Kriegsaufsätze*: 64) or ‘jedem meiner Leser’ (*Politische Ideale*: 113). Literature recommendations given to the ‘desirable’ reader address any reader who wishes to gain a more thorough understanding of the ideological topics featured in Chamberlain’s discussions:

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Literature recommendations given to the ‘undesirable’ reader are addressed to any reader who engages in behaviour or ways of thinking of which Chamberlain does not approve; for example any readers who read the ‘wrong’ newspapers, or any readers who believe in the French revolutionary ideal of liberty, equality and fraternity:

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The literature that Chamberlain recommends is occasionally accompanied by a summary of the book’s contents, or at least a summary of those aspects of the book that corroborate the author’s ideological viewpoint:
Ich empfehle den Anhängern des französischen Revolutionsideals das Buch des englischen Juristen Stephens „Freiheit, Gleichheit, Brüderlichkeit“, in welchem dieser Gelehrte überzeugend nachweist, daß wo Freiheit wirklich besteht, Gleichheit eo ipso ausgeschlossen ist, wo aber Gleichheit besteht, dies nur auf Kosten der Freiheit ermöglicht werden kann (Demokratie und Freiheit: 69).

7.3.2.2 Strategies of Reader Positioning

In addition to emphasising his presence as omniscient author, occurrences of the first person pronoun ich show that Chamberlain also reminds the readers of their status as readers by highlighting the discursive relationship between author and reader and emphasising the readers’ roles as discourse recipients. Chamberlain explicitly justifies authorial intentions motivating a chosen statement or example, and dictates the necessity for the reader to change their way of thinking and/or behaving.

Da ich nun aus der reichen französischen Literatur, die mir zur Verfügung steht, auswählen muß und mir Leser denke, die ebenfalls darauf angewiesen sind, mit ihrer Zeit sparsam umzugehen, möchte ich die Aufmerksamkeit zunächst auf ein einziges, kleines, überaus vortreffliches Buch richten, geeignet eine ganze Bibliothek zu ersetzen (Demokratie und Freiheit: 81).

In the above example, Chamberlain interacts with the reader concerning the length and structure of his essays. The author’s explicitly formulated intention with the reader’s behaviour as a reader (‘die Aufmerksamkeit [der Leser] auf [X] richten’) locates the reader as a figure within Chamberlain’s discourse, foregrounding the position of the reader as a discourse recipient.

Concordance lines for Augen show that this noun plays a key role in reminding the reader of their status as discourse recipients. Chamberlain highlights the human eye as a receptacle for facts and for the written word. The expression ‘eine Tatsache springt in die Augen’ reifies eine Tatsache, implying that a fact is something that can be perceived and processed by the human eye:
Es genügt aber, den Zusammenhang deutlich darzulegen, wie ich es jetzt zu tun versuchte, damit eine Tatsache sofort in die Augen springe (*Politische Ideale*: 22).

There is a tension between the invisible concept of a fact or ideological proposition as the object to be processed, and the eye as the tool with which to process it. The only case in which the eye can be a non-metaphorical receptacle for facts is when the facts take the form of the written word: in the act of reading, it is indeed initially the eye that perceives a fact or proposition. The author builds on this relation between the physical representation of abstract propositions as words on a page, and the human eye as a reading tool. Using expressions such as *vor Augen führen* and *ins Auge fassen*, the written word in Chamberlain’s discourse becomes a ‘fact’ perceived by the eyes of the readers:

Und darum bleibt es uns unbenommen, uns einige Umrisse dieses Friedens vor Augen zu führen (*Neue Kriegsaufsätze*: 93).

Statements that express the author’s intention to change the readers’ thoughts or behaviour consist partly of justifications. These justifications explicitly state the intended effect that Chamberlain wishes to enact on the reader by choosing a particular statement or example:


Auch hierfür möchte ich zum Schluß — und da Ausführlichkeit ausgeschlossen ist — ein Beispiel greifbar hinstellen; der Leser wird einsehen lernen, auf welche Wege oder vielmehr Abwege England geraten ist (Kriegsaufsätze: 63).

Each of the extracts cited above is constructed around the formula ‘example + objective factual verb + subjective claim’. Chamberlain states the reason for selecting this example from his personal memory. This is particularly explicit in the first statement with the formulation ‘mit dem Hauptzweck’. The intended effect that the author expresses here is intellectual; that is, he states that his examples aim to alter the reader’s thoughts. Notably, the verbs the author chooses in relation to his intended cognitive effect on the reader are objective verbs with connotations of factuality (lernen, einsehen lernen, vergegenwärtigen) and preclude any element of subjectivity. The claims that follow the intended effect, however, are entirely subjective: the power of ideas of ‘der Mensch „als Natur“’, the French predilection for brainwashing their children, and the extent to which England has ‘lost its way’. The author thus states the intended intellectual effect of his selected example in terms of factual objectivity, when the subject of the examples at hand is subjective.

By positioning the reader as consumer of his discourse, Chamberlain can dictate the readers’ reading behaviour. He explicitly regulates the reader’s attention level before critical ideological statements, as in the following examples:

Neben solchen, welche die gegen Österreich gerichtete dauernde Agitation betreffen, Unterdrückung von Vereinen usw., gab es namentlich eine, die der Leser beachten muß: Österreich forderte, daß bei dem sofort in Belgrad anzustellenden gerichtlichen Verfahren von ihm „zu delegierende“ Beamte (also österreichische) an der Untersuchung teilnehmen (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 73).

Um das deutlich zu machen, will ich ein Beispiel herausgreifen; an diesem einen Stück wird sich uns das ganze Gewebe in seiner lügenhaften Verstricktheit offenbaren; nur muß ich allerdings den Leser um genaueste, nie nachlassende Aufmerksamkeit bitten (NeueKriegsaufsätze: 67).
The verbs *beachten* and *um Aufmerksamkeit bitten* refer to an increase in the reader’s attention demanded by the author. Although the reader’s attention is then directed to a specific ideological notion, the process of increasing attention is discursive as it signals that the reader must read the passages that follow with particular care: the attention emphasised is the readers’ attention to the author’s words. In so doing, the author directs the readers’ reading behaviour by explicitly demanding greater attention to the words on the page: in order to incite a change or modification of opinion, the author must first direct and control reading behaviour.

7.3.2.3 Naturalisation of Opinion as Fact

Concordance lines for they keywords pertaining to epistemic concepts and processes of acquiring or understanding truth *Wahrheit*, *wissen* and *verstehen*, show that these words are in fact rarely used to describe genuine facts or truths, but more commonly to describe speculative ideological opinion. Examining these concordance lines also highlighted the salience of further words in the semantic field of truth and understanding, *Tatsache*, *erfahren* and *lernen*. Occurrences of these words are thus included in the subsequent analysis section.

Only a small minority of the concordance lines for the above-named words present truth or facts deserving of the words *Tatsache*, *W/wissen* and *erfahren*. These exceptional occurrences pertain, for example, to the existence of war in Europe (‘die ungeheure Tatsache des europäischen Krieges’ (Kriegsaufsätze: 9)), the historical conclusion of a military agreement between England and Belgium in 1906 (cf. Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 62), and to patterns in the history of Franco-German and Russo-German relations:

Wer es nicht aus anderen Quellen schon weiß, wird hier von den Belgiern eine entscheidende Tatsache erfahren: französische Staatsmänner haben im Laufe dieser Zeit mehr als einmal die Gewinnung dauernd guter Beziehungen zu Deutschland erstrebt, mehr als einmal war auch Rußland hierzu geneigt […] (Hammer oder Amboß: 39).
That both France and Russia attempted to form agreements or treaties to guarantee long-term good relations with Germany is historically documented; the reader can thus genuinely ‘know’ (weiß) or ‘learn’ (erfahren) this information.

The vast majority of concordance lines for Tatsache, Wahrheit, weiß, W/wissen, verstehen, lernen and erfahmen reveal that these words are used to present speculative opinion in the guise of fact and truth. This is particularly true of expressions of Chamberlain’s two primary ideological concerns: declarations regarding war guilt and the futility and corruptive impact of parliamentary democracy. The respective concordance lines evidence numerous fallacious assertions of factuality concerning German innocence and victimhood in the outbreak of war, for example ‘die bloße Tatsache, daß Deutschland zu Kriegen gezwungen wird’ (Ideal und Macht: 32) and ‘Jeder von uns weiß, daß in ganz Deutschland nicht ein Mann lebte, der Krieg wollte’ (Der Wille zum Sieg: 50). Similarly, in the following statement centring on the verb weiß Chamberlain declares that anybody whose will to understand the political situation at the outbreak of the First World War is strong enough and anybody with (metaphorically) good eyesight will know who was responsible for the war:

Wer aber will, wer richtig zu wollen versteht, wer die guten Augen besitzt, die Pascal verlangt, wie Gott sie uns in den Kopf setzte und jeder brave Mann sie unbewußt sein eigen nennt, wenn er sie nur nicht durch die hundert Brillen der Lüge, des Klatsches, des Vorurteils, der Ruhelosigkeit verdunkelt — der weiß schon heute, wer den Krieg verschuldet hat und wer nicht […](Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 36).

By not naming a guilty party or guilty parties in this statement, Chamberlain’s intentional ambiguity leaves the reader to decide whom is meant by wer in ‘wer den Krieg verschuldet hat und wer nicht’; there is no way to determine the factual accuracy of a statement that rests on implication and speculation. The addition of ‘und wer nicht’ furthermore contributes to the statement’s speculative nature: although it is and was difficult to determine a single cause of the war in the elaborate series of events that directly and indirectly lead to the war’s outbreak, it is even more
difficult to declare that any one country involved in these events was entirely innocent. The above quotation is speculative because it does not state whom the author finds responsible for the war, but also because it thematises German innocence, which was just as difficult to gauge.

As in the above statement, the predominance of speculation and opinion in concordance lines for weiß is also evident in claims attributing knowledge to those ‘desirable readers’ who are constructed as the elite few capable of seeing and thinking properly. Chamberlain employs ‘jeder weiß [X]’ constructions featuring the generic determiner jeder, either independently or in conjunction with a collective noun e.g. ‘jeder Deutsche’, ‘jeder Mensch’, as well as the passive pronoun man, which similarly denotes general knowledge shared by everybody, and the adjective ganz where it modifies universal nouns. Statements that present certain ‘knowledge’ as accepted and internalised by everybody have two functions. Firstly, they attempt to naturalise claims through the topos of obviousness, and secondly they activate the reader’s desire to belong to the ‘knowledgeable’ or ‘desirable’ group. If certain information is held to be shared by ‘everyone’, the reader will not wish to be the odd one out, and is likely to adapt his/her thinking behaviour in order to fit in with the apparently all-encompassing majority.

Chamberlain’s assertions of the enemy countries’ premeditated and intentional provocation of war make particularly extensive use of the noun Tatsache:

Eine Tatsache, so sicher wie daß die Sonne am Himmel steht, ist es, daß die politisch maßgebenden Kreise in Frankreich, in Rußland und in England seit Jahren den Krieg gegen Deutschland planten und vorbereiteten […] (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 38).

Denn die große mittlere Tatsache, die absolut einfache Tatsache, für die es ebenso leicht ist, eine Million Belege beizubringen wie einen einzigen Beleg, die Tatsache, auf die allein es ankommt […] ist diese: schon seit Jahren ist die Vernichtung des unter Preußens Führung stehenden Deutschen Reiches der eingestandene oder uneingestandene Wunsch und die immer fester werdende Absicht aller politisierenden Engländer — und jeder gebildete Engländer politisiert von früh bis abend (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 16).
Über die Tatsache der Schuld Englands hätte ich kaum nötig, mich hier näher auszulassen: sie ist ausführlich beweisbar und bewiesen (Hammer oder Amboß: 39).

The existence of intentionality is equally as difficult to prove, thus any proclamations of factuality regarding the enemy countries’ pre-war intentions and therewith responsibility for the war can also be viewed as an abuse of the term Tatsache. These statements are furthermore illustrative of Chamberlain’s emphatic modifications of Tatsache –‘so sicher wie daß die Sonne am Himmel steht’, ‘absolut einfache’ and ‘ausführlich beweisbar und bewiesen’ – denote absolute authority and validity. The second statement in particular abounds with expressions of factual certainty and authority, partly through repetition of Tatsache and combination of this assertion of factuality with vocabulary pertaining to proof (Belege) as well as through the singular dogmatic expression ‘die Tatsache, auf die allein es ankommt’.

Fallacious assertions of truth and factuality also frequently feature in Chamberlain’s of parliamentary democracy. Using the introductory expression ‘in Wahrheit’, for example, Chamberlain asserts a subjective view of the popularity of parliamentary democracy as truth, however the high degree of subjectivity in the ensuing statement is at odds with the assertion that it constitutes truth:

In Wahrheit sind alle Nationen der Erde satt der Parlamente, satt des hochheiligen, allgemeinen Stimmrechtes, satt der unerschöpflich quillenden Redekaskaden, unter denen die gesamte zivilisierte Welt wie unter einer neuzeitlichen Sintflut dem Tode durch Ersaufen entgegengeht (Kriegsaufsätze: 39).

Here, the concise promise of factuality that opens the sentence is followed by a frenzied list of subjective descriptions (hochheilig, unerschöpflich quillend) and hyperbole (‘die gesamte zivilisierte Welt’).

Concordance lines for wissen and lernen corroborate the significance of this rhetorical tendency in Chamberlain’s discussions of democracy, as in:
Nicht wenige Männer habe ich angetroffen, die ganz genau wissen, welches Elend der Reichstag schon verschuldet hat und auch, wie aussichtslos es ist, auf Grund dieser Verfassung eine große Zukunft für Deutschland zu erhoffen (Politische Ideale: 67).

[…] [wir lernen] einsehen, daß die Grundformel einer demokratischen Regierung lautet: „Freie Bahn allen Untüchtigen!“ Von selbst ergibt sich die Ergänzung: „Herunter mit allen Tüchtigen!“ (Demokratie und Freiheit: 64).

In the first statement, the subjective notion that the German Reichstag has only caused misery and ruin and does not constitute a feasible form of German government in the long-term is presented as knowledge (‘nicht wenige Männer wissen ganz genau’). In the second statement, the author exploits the verb lernen to present his ideological conviction that democratic governments may as well be founded on the motto ‘Herunter mit allen Tüchtigen!’ as something that the human mind can acquire or accept (‘einsehen lernen’) as it would a factual truth.

It would seem that where the substance of an ideologically driven claim is particularly hard to prove or to reasonably justify, such as intentionality, innocence in or responsibility for the outbreak of war, or the doomed future of a particular form of government, Chamberlain resorts to the strategy of naturalising opinion as fact by mere use of vocabulary pertaining to truth and factuality. The same is true of ideologically driven judgements of national character and characteristics. Although national character is an unquantifiable phenomenon, Chamberlain relies on the word Tatsache to validate his personal conviction that the Germans are fundamentally apolitical (‘Es ist und bleibt halt Tatsache, daß der Deutsche für das, was man landläufig „Politik“ nennt, nicht zu haben ist’ (Der Wille zum Sieg: 14)), and the essential nature of the English:

Die Tatsache des Hasses leugnen wir also nicht: dieser Haß reicht von der mehr oder weniger verdeckten Abneigung feinerer Geister bis zu der blutigen Wut der rohen und bis hinab zu der Tücke der feigen Unterzeichner des Genfer „Protestes“ (Kriegsaufsätze: 72).
Neither the fundamental apolitical nature of the German people nor a ‘general English cynicsm and naivety’ can be measured or tangibly proven, thus the label Tatsache that Chamberlain attributes to these notions is a manipulative use of the term.

7.4 Summary

The keyword analysis of Chamberlain’s war essays reveals that the words occurring significantly more frequently in Chamberlain’s discourse than in Paul Rohrbach’s discourse pertain more to rhetorical devices than they do to ideological content. This suggests that Chamberlain’s essays are primarily an exercise in persuasive rhetoric. The keywords analysis identified an ideological focus on nationality, and on Germany and France in particular. Surprisingly, neither England nor englisch was identified as a keyword in Chamberlain’s essays. The key conjunctions wogegen, sowie and vielmehr suggest that Chamberlain presents his ideological statements partly in terms of comparison and contrast, depicting Germany in comparison and contrast to the enemy countries and vice versa. The key nouns Parlament, Demokratie, Freiheit and Gleichheit indicate an ideological concern with democracy and democratic ideals in particular. The keywords pertaining to concrete ideological content in Chamberlain’s essays are few, and hardly conclusive. Further key nouns Ideal and Ideale, Gott, Bestimmung and Natur, Willkür, Chaos, Hass, Liebe and Neid suggest that Chamberlain’s ideology is based substantially on abstract concepts.

The keyword analysis allows for a more intricate typology of Chamberlain’s rhetorical trends. Keywords from all word classes signal the dominance of several topoi. The names of esteemed German and British cultural figures, nouns describing
cultural professions, and nouns pertaining to language imply that Chamberlain makes great use of the conventional topos of expertise/authority typical of twentieth century war discourse (see Wengeler 2005: 217) by citing intertextual references. The key nouns Wahrheit and Lüge, the key adjective or adverb wissenschaftlich, and the key adverbs genau, wahre, and einzig suggest that the author’s argumentation relies on topoi of truth and factuality, proveability, exactitude, uniqueness, and authenticity. The keywords also indicate a hyperbolic rhetorical style, suggested by the adjective gesamte, the adverb gänzlich, and the similarly all-consuming numerals alle and alles. The keywords additionally indicate frequent strategies of author and reader positioning. The personal pronouns ich, mir, mich, meine and du reveal strong authorial presence in the essays, and, to a lesser extent, the presence of the reader by virtue of authorial addresses to the reader. This is supported by the high frequency of question words welche, wer, welcher, was, and wie, which indicate author-reader interaction in the form of questions. They may also indicate rhetorical questions, which constitute only rhetorical addresses to the reader, but author-reader interaction nonetheless.

It is not always possible to differentiate between keywords pertaining to ideology, and keywords with a potential rhetorical function. Key verbs relating to thought and expression (weiß/wissen, Lüge, verstehen, Glaube, urteilen) indicate motifs of intellectual processes, truth, and lies. The key adjectives wissenschaftlich- and aufmerksam similarly signal a concern with intellect and accuracy. The key nouns Sprache, Wort, Worte and Begriff reveal a distinctive interest in language and words, and adverbs of time nun, nie, and niemals suggest an emphasis on the here-and-now, references to the past, and hyperbolic universal negation. It is impossible to conclude whether these keywords and motifs have ideological or rhetorical significance in the essays. Indeed, the difficulty of categorising these keywords as either ideological or rhetorical suggests that they may fulfil both purposes, depending on the context, and that the transition between ideology and rhetoric in Chamberlain’s discourse is, to a certain extent, fluid.
The concordance analysis gives rise to further, more detailed insights into Chamberlain’s ideological focus and rhetorical tendencies, and confirms that the division between ideology and rhetoric in the essays is not always concrete. It reveals the particular salience of assertions of German superiority and potential versus German failure, as well as strategies of author and reader positioning and the naturalisation of opinion as fact. The concordance analysis reveals that these motifs and strategies function on both an ideological and a rhetorical level; that they represent persuasive rhetoric masquerading as (ideological) content. The two most significant manifestations of this are German superiority versus German inadequacy, and the essentially intellectual German ideal that is alleged to be hindered by an absence and/or lack of access to truth.

Assertions of German superiority and potential versus assertions of German intellectual inadequacy combine to create what I have called a highly effective ‘carrot and stick’ approach. The concordance analysis highlights the predominance of language pertaining to hierarchy, inequality and contrast in the essays. It identifies a wealth of comparative declarations of German superiority based on the proposed superiority of the German ideal and German intelligence, and comparative declarations of English, French, and Russian, or ‘un-German’ inferiority. The author delineates a strict dichotomy between negatively evaluated French and English ideals, and positively evaluated German ideals. Whereas Chamberlain’s concept of the French and English ideal is a dangerously destructive force, an insatiable creature that has irreversibly devoured any intellectual capacity that the two nations may have held, his conception of the (‘unique’) German ideal is multi-faceted, and consists predominantly of cultural, intellectual, and moral principles. Assertions of German superiority combine with assertions of German potential to reassure and flatter the reader, functioning as positive incentivisation (the carrot). Using plant and tree metaphors, Chamberlain constructs Germany as a young nation state with ancient roots. Descriptions that locate Germany within ancient history appeal to patriotism by representing the nation as founded on a long tradition of trials and triumphs. This is an ideological assertion that attempts to construct the image of a cohesive nation by virtue of a shared history and united triumph over historical tribulations. The crux of
the image of Germany as a young nation state with ancient roots is the notion of growth potential.

The fundamental tenets of Chamberlain’s superior German ideal are abstract and intellectual: ‘das wahrhaft Deutsche’ rests on intellectual and moral superiority, and cultural brilliance. Chamberlain’s chief focus is on superior German intelligence, and accordingly Deutschland frequently co-occurs with Wissenschaft, Genie, and Geist. These key nouns can also commonly be found to co-occur with the key noun Seele, which supports the notion that Chamberlain’s construction of ‘Germanness’ is introspective and emphasises intellectual processes. Chamberlain’s German ideals also revolve around the ability to understand: German knowledge and the ability to understand or perceive X is frequently pitted against English and French ignorance.

Using the key noun Wahrheit and antonyms such as Lüge and Schein, however, the author depicts an all-encompassing tension between truth and lies in war-time Germany, creating an alarming notion of a knowledge vacuum. Chamberlain’s preoccupation with lies, and distorted and absent truth appear to be ideological observations about the opacity of government and press communication with the public sphere. In fact, they are chiefly rhetorical, and serve the primary purpose of legitimising the necessity of accepting the ideological content of his discourse: in order to promote and justify the alleged necessity of acquiring greater knowledge and powers of perception, Chamberlain constructs and exploits a climate of epistemic uncertainty in which truth is latent and obscured, or hidden; something that the German people can potentially access, but that they must learn to ‘uncover’. This draws heavily on metaphors of sight and light, darkness and blindness, which portray the German people as blind, and light and sight as representative of knowledge and awareness. Thus what appear to be observations about Germanness are in actual fact rhetorical argumentative strategies used to chip away at the readers’ confidence in their own powers of perception and in the reliability of their discursive environment beyond Chamberlain’s essays.

In conjunction with unsettling the readers’ confidence in the epistemic validity of their environment, the concordance analysis exposes the use of strategies of reader positioning. It shows that Chamberlain uses ich, du and der Leser to remind the
readers of their roles as discourse recipients, and to interact with them on the meta-
level author-reader. Concordance lines for *Augen* show that this noun plays a key
role in reminding the reader of their status as discourse recipients, and suggest that
Chamberlain exploits his creation of absent or hidden truth in German society to
construct the printed words of his written discourse as ‘truth’ that can be perceived
by the readers’ eyes in the reading process. Furthermore, by explicitly positioning the
readers as discourse recipients, Chamberlain can dictate their reading behaviour, for
example by explicitly regulating the readers’ attention level before making a critical
ideological statement. This finding highlights the necessity of analysing the
rhetorical value of authorial meta-commentary in the qualitative analysis.

Beyond Chamberlain’s central ‘carrot and stick’ device, the concordance analysis
also reveals salient uses of the keywords in strategic authorial self-positioning.
Analysis of the concordance lines for the first person pronoun *ich* reveals that the
author regularly steps in to his essays in order to make the readers aware of his
authorial presence, and of their status as readers, communicating to them his
authorial ability, eloquence and/or intentions. This finding signalled the necessity of
paying attention to *ad hominem* argumentation in the qualitative analysis. This is
corroborated by the concordance lines for the key verb *weiß*, which reveal that the
author tends to presents himself as the ultimate source of knowledge, and draws on
his personal life experience as ‘evidence’ for the validity of his ideological
statements. A number of occurrences of *Franzose* feature in the author’s displays of
his intellectual virtuosity, in which he brandishes not only his own educational
expertise by quoting literature, but also his familiarity with French culture and
language. Recommendations for further reading revolving around first person *ich* and
the verb *empfehlen* position the author as teacher and the readers as pupils, while
simultaneously advertising his seemingly encyclopaedic knowledge of intellectual
and cultural sources.

In conjunction with Chamberlain’s self-positioning as an omniscient authority, the
concordance lines for *Wahrheit, weiß, versteh-, Tatsache* and *erfahren* revealed the
author’s tendency to naturalise opinion as fact. A thorough examination of the
propositions made in Chamberlain’s assertions of truth and factuality reveals that the
vast majority of these use these key or salient words to present speculative opinion in the guise of fact and truth. Where the substance of an ideologically motivated claim is particularly hard to prove or to reasonably justify, Chamberlain thus naturalises opinion as fact by the mere use of vocabulary pertaining to truth and factuality.
8. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF HOUSTON STEWART CHAMBERLAIN’S DISCURSIVE STRATEGIES

8.1 Introduction

The following chapter presents a qualitative analysis of Houston Stewart Chamberlain’s dualistic rhetoric of persuasion. It argues that Chamberlain’s essays are dedicated just as much to justifications of the author and the essays themselves (the means) as they are to justifications of the ideological statements they make (the message), and examines the role of discursive strategies of legitimisation, delegitimisation, coercion and dissimulation in these justifications. The analysis of Chamberlain’s justification of the ‘means’ focuses primarily on abstraction or, more specifically, the construction of the metaphor scenario of epistemic uncertainty. The analysis of authorial self-legitimisation examines self-positioning strategies (Selbstinszinierung) of personal and expert authority that present the author as teacher, architect, source of truth, source of light and sight to the blind, and guide to the lost. In the second section, the focus shifts to strategies of legitimisation used to justify the essays’ ideological message, which call on theoretical rationalisation and corresponding topoi of factuality and evidence, obviousness, history, and comparison and uniqueness. Coercive strategies to this end exploit hyperbole, stipulative constructions and topoi of urgency, immediacy and necessity. The analysis additionally examines dissimulative strategies that justify which and how much information the author provides, and which and how much information he does not. Dissimulative strategies are used to justify both the message and the means, as they provide a meta-commentary on both the nature and amount of information that the author provides, and the way in which he formulates it. The qualitative analysis furthermore makes reference to Vom Deutschen Wesen (1915), a collection of essays by Chamberlain not included in the digital corpus as it does not strictly constitute war propaganda.
8.2 Justifying the Means

8.2.1 Metaphors of das Innere

This chapter will show that Chamberlain's essays are just as much legitimisations of the author, his authorial role and his essays as they are of his ideological messages. It will also argue that strategies of legitimisation by moralisation and abstraction are the key discursive weapons that Chamberlain uses to achieve this. Chamberlain uses the metaphor of das Innere to depict the First World War as a fundamentally intellectual concern, downplaying concrete aspects of war and foreign policy in favour of the centrality of the human mind in the war. The author frames the value of his essays by asserting that the most important weapons in the war are knowledge, perception and the acquisition of information. Chamberlain’s metaphor of das Innere denotes the spirit and the mind and related intellectual processes of knowledge and understanding. This is totum pro parte synecdoche which uses the general concept of ‘the internal’ to refer to specific intellectual processes that occur internally in the human mind. As demonstrated by the following extracts, Chamberlain’s Inneres specifically refers to thoughts, feelings and will, and to intellect and morals:

[…] hinein in das innerste Gewebe unseres Denkens und Fühlens und Wollens […] (Demokratie und Freiheit: 23).

Doch, wie kommen wir zu den Tatsachen? Die materiellen, ja, die drängen sich uns auf; wie aber fangen wir es an, die intellektuellen und moralischen Tatsachen zu erfassen? (Kriegsaufsätze: 9).

The metaphor of das Innere is accentuated by the significant relative frequency or keyness of both Mensch and Menschen identified by the corpus analysis tools (cf. Sections 8.2.1 and 8.3.1.1). Using a legitimising strategy of abstraction, Chamberlain directs the readers’ attention inwards towards their own humanity, making frequent use of the phrase ‘wir Menschen’. Abstractive illusions to the readers as humans help
to direct their focus inwards, creating the necessary environment in which to accentuate matters of the human mind.

Chamberlain affords great significance to the relation between das Innere and the war. He constructs the war-time situation as an ‘internal’ concern, using juxtaposition to isolate das Innere from das Äußere (‘der innere Kernpunkt jener nach außen gerichteten Politik’ (Deutsches Wesen: 29)), and stating:

[…] was aber wirklich vorliegt, was uns trennt und auf einander hetzt, ist im Grunde genommen seelisch, und es gäbe nur eine Möglichkeit für wirkliche Heilung: die Einsicht in diese inneren Zustände des Geistes […] (Hammer oder Amboß: 31).

Here, Chamberlain claims that the fundamental differences that separate Germany from its war enemies and led to the First World War are seelisch. The assertive force of this statement is amplified by polyptoton – the repetition of words derived from the same root in different cases (Enos 1996: 542) – by which the word wirklich is repeated in two different word forms; an as adverb (‘was aber wirklich vorliegt’) and an adjective (‘wirkliche Heilung’). He describes the present state of military and political conflict in metaphorical terms of a spiritual illness, drawing on the noun Heilung derived from heilen, a verb traditionally associated with curing sickness, and, as Rash 2012 identifies Chamberlain’s anti-Semitism in Grundlagen to feature metaphors of health and sickness in reference to the ‘sickness’ of the German people penetrated by the Jews (Rash 2012: 112), is potentially a veiled anti-Semitic reference. As the present conflict is fundamentally a spiritual one originating in ‘internal’ rather than political differences, the author claims, the only possible solution to this situation is an internal one: ‘die Einsicht in die inneren Zustände des Geistes’. In marked contrast to the construction of common war aims as achieveable only by military measures identified by Wengeler to be typical of twentieth century German Kriegbotschaften, Chamberlain asserts that common war aims are achievable only by spiritual and intellectual improvement (‘Darstellung der Ziele, die nur durch einen Krieg zu erreichen sind’, Wengeler 2005: 216). The construction of
the war as a primarily intellectual phenomenon is a fallacy of oversimplified cause that asserts that the war has one characteristic only and ignores conjoint possibilities, for example that the war is military, political and intellectual. Like many of Chamberlain’s statements, the above example is also an appeal to humanity. This is a logical fallacy that violates the pragma-dialectical rules of starting-point and validity (Cohen 2003: 109).

More specifically, Chamberlain promotes the ‘internal’ phenomenon of knowledge as a weapon in the war. In ‘Deutschland besitzt Quellen der Macht, die England unbekannt sind: es sind dies geistige und moralische […]’ (Ideal und Macht: 33), for example, he aligns military conflict with the ‘internal’, altering the signification of Macht from military power to intellectual and moral power. In further examples of the juxtaposition of military weapons with intellectual ones, he aligns the importance of the ability to form clear judgements in the war-time situation with the importance of possessing a sharp sword and ‘false thoughts’ with ‘unwanted battles’:

Der Besitz eines klaren Urteils ist in diesen Zeiten kaum weniger vonnöten als der Besitz eines scharfen Schwertes (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 7).

Dort wie hier kommt es namentlich darauf an, das Heft fest in der Hand zu halten und sich ebensowenig zu falschen Gedanken wie zu ungewollten Schlachten hinreißen zu lassen […] (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 7).

The assertion that Germany can win the war because it is intellectually and morally superior to England is a non causa pro causa that misrepresents a correlative relationship between intellect and military victory with a causal relation. It also constitutes circular reasoning by referring to a second assertion to prove an assertion (‘A is true because A is true’). These are logical fallacies that violate the validity rule and the starting point rule (Cohen 2003: 109, cf. Sections 2.4 and 4.6.4) by presenting a premise (Germany is morally and intellectually superior to England) as an accepted starting point for an argument.
Chamberlain’s consistent abstractive construction of the motifs of misunderstanding, ignorance and misleading jars with his construction of the war as an intellectual phenomenon. Using an elaborate network of strategies of delegitimisation, Chamberlain delegitimises the readers and the stability of their epistemic environment by advancing that, although the war is solvable by the human mind alone, the Germans currently exist in a world in which knowledge and truth are obsolete. The war propaganda features abundant references to misleading on the one hand, and to ignorance on the other, dividing responsibility for intellectual ineptitude between the German people themselves, and the government and the press. At times, Chamberlain accuses the German people of ignorance, describing them as ‘die an politischem Scharfsinn besonders spärlich begabten Deutschen’ (*Deutsches Wesen*: 37), and lamenting:

> Am meisten aber wundert einen sowohl in diesem Falle, wie überhaupt im heutigen Deutschland, (einschließlich der Regierung,) die Unkenntnis in Bezug auf die wirklichen Weltvorgänge (*Demokratie und Freiheit*: 33).

If the war is an intellectual phenomenon in which knowledge is the key weapon, the German people, Chamberlain implies, have far to go to triumph. This constitutes an appeal to emotion by appealing to the readers’ intellectual pride and is also an *argumentum ad hominem* that discredits the readers. This is a rhetorical fault that violates the freedom rule (Cohen 2003: 109) by preventing the readers from casting doubt on the author’s standpoint on the wartime situation by undermining their knowledge of ‘the truth’ behind the war (‘die Unkenntnis in Bezug auf die wirklichen Weltvorgänge’).

Chamberlain asserts that the German people are not only ignorant, but are also victims of intentional misinformation by the government and press. He uses journey metaphors of misleading – ‘Jetzt werden völlig Arglose irregeleitet’ (*Kriegsaufsätze*: 10) – and declares ‘gerade in diesem Augenblick läßt sich das ahnungslose
Deutschland betören’ (*Demokratie und Freiheit*: 33), both of which employ the topos of immediacy, a particular form of the conventional *Kriegsbotschaften* topos of urgency (see Wengeler 2005: 221), using the adverbs of present time *jetzt* and ‘gerade in diesem Augenblick’ to create impact via alarm. The agency in the second statement (‘sich betören lassen’) is problematic: it does not present the Germans as directly responsible for their gullibility, but neither does it exonerate them entirely: ‘Deutschland läßt sich betören’ implies both the influence of a further party and submissiveness on the part of the German people: the Germans have been misled by the press and the government, however it was not inevitable that they could not defend themselves. Equivocal agency also finds expression in a series of further statements using the verbs ‘sich verleiten lassen’ and *geraten*, as in ‘sich auf dunkle Schleichwegeverleiten zu lassen […]’ (*Kriegsaufsätze*: 42), and ‘Nach Bismarck’s bedauerlich verfrühtem Abgang aber geriet Deutschland sofort wieder auf die fremden Irrwege […]’ (*Kriegsaufsätze*: 41). ‘Sich verleiten lassen’ implies that the Germans have actively been misled by a second party, but also that they played an acquiescent role in the process; that they ‘let’ themselves be led astray. The verb *geraten* is similarly ambiguous: on the one hand, this verb is active, implying that the Germans people have taken themselves down the ‘wrong’ path; on the other hand, *geraten* carries a minimal sense of agency, portraying an action completed rather subconsciously or by accident. Thus even statements that seem to imply that the German people have been led astray by others carry undercurrents of self-recrimination.

8.2.3 Motifs of Lies and Misleading Appearances

Chamberlain’s construction of epistemic uncertainty relies to a great extent on the abstract motif of pervasive lies and *Schein* identified in the corpus analysis (Section 8.3.1.2). Further close readings reveal that references to the permeation of ‘the lie’ through German society can be distinguished between those which denote the power of lies abroad in the enemy countries, and those which describe the power of the lie
at home in Germany. A collection of statements alerts the reader to general lies and hypocrisy in enemy politics, for example:

[…] aus ihnen ersieht man, dass bestialishe Grausamkeit nicht im englischen Volkscharakter liegt, vielmehr eine Folge des teuflischen Lügenfeldzugs der auf Deutschlands moralische Vernichtung hinarbeitenden leitenden Kreise ist (Hammer oder Amboß: 35).

The rhetorical effect of this statement functions on the basis of the author’s initial rhetorical admission and of subjective, strongly evaluative adjectives (bestialisch, teuflisch, ‘auf Deutschlands moralische Vernichtung hinarbeitende’). Chamberlain’s attack on England’s ‘leitende Kreise’ is introduced by the apparently neutral observation that the English as a Volk do not have a brutish barbarian nature (‘bestialishe Grausamkeit’). Following the disjunctive operator vielmehr, however, ‘governing circles’ in England are described as ‘diabolical’ and ‘hungry for destruction’. The initial admission may lend the author the guise of neutrality and prudence, however this is merely rhetorical: the discursive association between ‘das englische Volkscharakter’ and ‘Englands leitende Kreise’ is in place not only by virtue of their discursive proximity, but also by virtue of the alignment of ‘bestialishe Grausamkeit’ used to describe the English Volk, and teuflisch, used to describe the ‘governing circles’ in England. Chamberlain also highlights the skill and brilliance with which the enemies lie, continuing the satanic metaphor common to many of his delegitimising accusations (cf. ‘teuflischen Lügenfeldzugs’), ‘[sie] treiben sie bis zur höchsten Meisterschaft die satanische Kunst der Verdrehung, der Verleumdung und der Lüge’ (Hammer oder Amboß: 39). The extract cited above is rich in the vocabulary that Hortzitz identifies as typical of nineteenth century anti-Semitic discourse: grausam, teuflisch, Lüge, Vernichtung (Hortzitz 1988: 122-127).

Untruths about Germany’s war-mongering intentions in the lead-up to the First World War, Chamberlain argues, were the primary causal factor of the war’s outbreak. The author forges an association between lies and destruction (‘nur durch
systematische Lügen angefachten blinden Zerstörungsleidenschaft […]’ (Kriegsauflsätze: 20), and between lies and the war:

[…] über die ungeheure Macht der nackten Lüge hat uns der große Krieg ausreichend belehrt; die Lüge aber ist die ärgste Vernichterin der Freiheit, denn sie vergewaltigt des Menschen Selbstdenken und Selbstbestimmen und zwingt ihn zu Taten, die seinem freien Entschlusse nicht entspringen (Demokratie und Freiheit: 15).

This hyperbolic metaphor forges an association between ‘die ungeheure Macht der nackten Lüge’ and both ‘der große Krieg’ and ‘die Vernichtung der Freiheit’. Not only are the German people forced to exist in a physically dangerous and cognitively confusing situation born of lies, but these lies additionally eradicate their ability to think, to understand and to make decisions (‘sie vergewaltigt des Menschen Selbstdenken und Selbstbestimmen’).

Accusations of deception and lies within Germany are targeted primarily at the German press:

Auch unsere Zeitungsberichte über die Debatten bilden ein fressendes Übel, denn in ihrer schamlosen Verdrehung der Wahrheit sind sie nur dazu angetan, die Leidenschaften aufzupeitschen und das Urteilsvermögen herabzusetzen […] (Politische Ideale: 112).

The linguistic formulation of this statement is particularly vicious: in further proof of the frequency of metaphors of evil in Chamberlain’s strategies of delegitimisation, he accuses German newspapers of creating a ‘fressendes Übel’ (fressend here is probably anti-Semitic; an adverb used to describe the erosion of poison, a metaphor commonly used in conjunction with the Jews). By crowding the second clause with disorientatingly various dynamic expressions in immediate succession – a nominalised verb of rotation (‘Verdrehung der Wahrheit’) and a verb of downward movement (herabsetzen) – he creates a sense of relentless force and confusion.
In his discussions of the German press, Chamberlain not only accuses the German press of consciously misrepresenting the information it provides, but also of suppressing information at its disposal. The German press represents an internal German enemy not just because it twists the truth, but also because it omits the truth:

[…] daß jene obengenannte Zeitungsgruppe, die sich einen besonderen Ruf für „Wohlinformiertheit“ zu erringen gewußt hat, ihre feinste Kunst im Unterdrücken aller Nachrichten bewährt, deren Kenntnis ihr unerwünscht ist, so daß der treugläubige deutsche Michel, der sich außerordentlisch genau unterrichtet wähnt, oft von den wichtigsten Vorgängen (namentlich auf geistigem Gebiete) nicht das geringste weiß […] (Demokratie und Freiheit: 33).

Here, Chamberlain undermines the asserted Wohlinformiertheit of a specific group of German newspapers through inverted commas. The misplaced trust placed in these newspapers is juxtaposed with the patronising ‘treugläubiger deutscher Michel’, which carries both neutral connotations of ‘the plain honest German’, and condescending connotations of a ‘gullible Fritz’, appealing to the readers’ intellectual pride by confronting them with the notion that their trust in German newspaper discourse is misplaced. Once again, Chamberlain employs legitimising strategies of abstraction, accentuating the intellectual weakness of the average German citizen (‘von den wichtigsten Vorgängen […] auf geistigem Gebiete […] nicht das geringste weiß’). This is an argumentum ad hominem, a rhetorical fault and simultaneously a dialectical offense that prevents the readers from casting doubt on the author’s standpoint by undermining the allegedly disillusioned faith that they have in their own knowledge, thereby violating the freedom rule.

8.2.4 Metaphors of Entanglement, Opacity, and Sight

Using metaphors of entanglement, Chamberlain implies that the political situation is so convoluted that it is impossible for anyone to see through the embroilment of information, lies, and actions. Two words are of particular significance here: Wirrwarr and verwickelt, or die Verwickeltherit:

Das hat Ausführlichkeit erfordert, weil solche Fragen ungemein verwickelt sind und – was weit schlimmer ist – mit Absicht verwickelter gemacht werden, bis zuletzt kein Mensch aus noch ein weiß und der Teufel seinen Willen hat […] (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 83).

Wirrwarr und Verwickelheit construct a metaphorical image of the political situation as a convoluted entanglement of knots, where the knotted thread stands for information and communication. This metaphor is intensified by the co-occurrence of undurchsichtig (‘opaque’), as in:

Die Dinge lägen so ungemein verwickelt, undurchsichtig, zum großen Teil noch unbekannt, daß vielleicht in ganz Europa kein Mensch lebe, der fähig sei, den Knäuel aufzudröseln und die Wahrheit den Blicken freizulegen […] (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 30).

Chamberlain depicts the current situation as a tightly bound ball of string whose tangled thread wraps around itself in knots and must be unravelled. This metaphor rests on the verb aufdröseln: ‘den Knäuel aufdröseln’ means to unravel a ball of string; however, ‘etwas auseinanderdröseln’, which refers to the same act of unravelling on a metaphorical level, denotes making sense of something. Unravelling the entangled ball of string is thus a metaphor for disentangling the constructed political and discursive confusion of the time in order to make sense of it. A tightly bound ball of string, furthermore, displays no gaps: the thread is wound around itself so closely as to leave no spaces or holes, and is therefore opaque. This metaphor argues in favour of the German people’s blamelessness for their naivety and ignorance through the metaphor of opacity: the truth behind the present situation cannot be ‘seen’ or perceived. Hortitz (1988) identifies the metaphorical term umgarnen – a similar image to the metaphor of winding string – as characteristic of nineteenth century anti-Semitic discourse. She identifies it amongst a list of
commonly recurring vocabulary pertaining to the concept of *Hinterlistigkeit*, making the image of winding around with string tantamount to being *falsch* and *intrigant* (Hortzitz 1988: 122). It may thus be that this image is thus not only a description of the confusion and opacity that reigns in German society regarding the truth, but also a reference to the Jews. Indeed, it may be the case that all or many of Chamberlain's references to lies and confusion pertain to the Jews. However, as the primary aim of the present research is to identify and analyse Chamberlain's discursive strategies of manipulation and persuasion, to perform this second task simultaneously would extend beyond the bounds of this thesis.

Metaphors of concealment and darkness are key constituents of Chamberlain’s metaphor of opacity. Chamberlain characterises wartime Germany in terms of secrecy, as in ‘auch alle anderen Minister werden nicht etwa von der Partei, sondern von dem geheim waltenden Komitee auserkoren’ (*Kriegsaufsätze*: 16), and:

Hier reden politisch neutrale Männer, deren persönliche Sympathien, ihrer Sprache und Bildung zufolge, französisch gerichtet sein müssen; sie wissen aber, was in den Geheimgängen der Politik vor sich geht, und sind verpflichtet, darüber wahrheitsgetreu zu berichten (*Hammer oder Amboß*: 39).

As these statements demonstrate, references to secrecy primarily foreground the government, whether in Germany or abroad. This legitimising appeal to moral values fosters mistrust of the men in charge of the country and accuses them of withholding information from the public, thereby implicating them in the guilt for the German public’s ignorance and naivety.

A further series of examples achieves the same effect by referring to the state of being informed or ‘being in the know’ (*eingeweiht sein*):
Man braucht nämlich in keine diplomatischen Geheimnisse eingeweiht zu sein, um zu begreifen, daß es in Englands Hand lag, die ganze Entwicklung, die zu der jetzigen Katastrophe geführt hat, zu verhindern [...] (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 57).

[…] bis ins einzelne eingeweiht in das verwickelte Getriebe unserer Industrie, unseres Handels, unserer Landwirtschaft, unserer städtischen Bodenspekulation, unserer Finanzgebarung [...] (Ideal und Macht: 5).

References to *Eingeweihte*, or ‘insiders’, depict an elite few with access to the truth; to information that Chamberlain asserts should be available to the entire German public. This implicitly alerts the reader to their status as *uneingeweiht*, or as not privy to the kind of information that they rightly deserve.

The effect of references to secrecy is augmented by references to concealment. Statements centering on the verb *verbergen* or the adjectival noun *das Verborgene* allude once again to a small group of (government) men controlling the development and continuation of the war behind closed doors, as in ‘diese Herren wissen auch alles, was im Verborgenen geschieht [...]’ (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 31), and ‘[…] den despotischen Willen einer im Verborgenen waltenden Handvoll Männer [...]’ (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 32). Explicit declarations that the truth is being concealed from the readers predominantly rest on the verbs *verbergen* and *verschleiern* (‘to disguise’, ‘to conceal’, ‘to veil’), as in Chamberlain’s incredulous question ‘Wie ist es möglich, die offenkundige Wahrheit — die „Tatsache“ — den Blicken von Millionen zu verbergen?’ (Kriegsaufsätze: 9), and ‘man redet von der „verschleierten Wahrheit“; das ist handgreiflich’ (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 36). *Verschleiern* is generally used in the German language used to mean ‘to cover up the truth’, however it is derived from the noun *der Schleier*, meaning ‘veil’ or ‘curtain’. The figurative evolution of this verb lends a pictorial quality to the statements in which it features. Chamberlain’s descriptions of the concealment of information in metaphorical terms of fabric also draw on the verbal noun *Zudeckung* and then noun *Deckmantel*, as in:
Krieg erklärt die Regierung heute oder morgen, fragt keinen Menschen, kennt den ererbten Gehorsam und sorgt höchstens für irgend eine Parole, die dann einstimmig — wie jetzt die niederträchtige Lüge über Belgiens Neutralität — aufgenommen wird zur ein für allemaligen Zudeckung aller heimlich begangenen Sünden (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 33).

[…] nicht des elenden Wechselbalgs einer erlogenen „politischen“ Freiheit, eines Deckmantels für aristokratische oder plutokratische oder demokratische Tyrannei, sondern der inneren, echten Seelenfreiheit […] (Ideal und Macht: 29).

The second statement represents disjunctive logic by implying that (albeit ‘bogus’) political freedom and internal spiritual freedom are mutually exclusive alternatives (‘A or B, B therefore not A’). This is a logical fallacy that asserts that, as the two kinds of freedom are mutually exclusive and internal spiritual freedom is desirable, political freedom, albeit is restricted or ‘bogus’, is undesirable.

The effect of ‘cloaking’ metaphors is underscored by Chamberlain’s metaphorical references to burial and graves:

[…] die Lügenbrut, die […] bestrebt sein wird, alles zu verkehren, alles zu verwirren, um dann, nach Herstellung der gewünschten finsteren Stickluft, das Feuerwerk der Unwahrheit über dem Grabe der Wahrheit triumphierend abzubrennen (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 63).

Diese dummen Blau- und Rot- und Orange- und Weiß-Bücher, welche die Wahrheit zu Grabe tragen wollen, können auch zu ihrer Enthüllung dienen […] (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 76).

The examples cited above intensify the rhetorical effect of the image of the grave using juxtaposition: the position of the grave as closed and dark in the depths of the ground is accentuated by the accompanying image of ‘the firework of untruth’, depicted in the first example as exploding in the sky above the truth buried underneath in a grave. Here, the darkness of the grave contrasts with the bright light of the firework image, the sky with the ground, and ‘untruths’ with ‘the truth’. A
similar juxtaposition operates in the second example, in which the image of being buried in a grave (zu Grabe tragen) is contrasted with an image of revelation (Enthüllung).

A variation on Chamberlain’s burial and concealment of truth metaphors can be found in recurring metaphors of darkness and blindness. Just as the truth is presented as concealed as in a grave, the German people are presented as being ‘kept in the dark’ regarding the truth. In Chamberlain’s essays, darkness is equivalent to an absence of truth, and, existing in a state of darkness, the Germans are constructed as blind. As the corpus analysis has shown, this metaphor is constructed using references to darkness, night, and blindness (Section 8.3.1.2). The corpus analysis has also discussed the key issue of agency in the alleged ‘blindness’ of the German people, i.e. the portrayal of the German people as ‘blind’ versus their portrayal as ‘blinded’ or ‘blindfolded’. Further close reading reveals a particularly illustrative example of the association that Chamberlain forges between blindness and sight as metaphorical expressions of perception. Here, the author juxtaposes der Blindeste with einsehen, a verb that denotes the intellectual act of perceiving and accepting in terms of sight (sehen):

Der Blindeste muß doch einsehen, wenn er nur einen Augenblick aus dem engumzirkten Interessenkreise seines Heute und Morgen aufzublicken vermag, daß in dem Wettbewerb um Kolonien nicht eine Stunde mehr zu versäumen ist (Deutsches Wesen: 29).

8.2.5 Motifs and Metaphors of Chaos, Confusion, Insanity and Illusion

States of confusion and insanity are the antithesis to an ordered mind capable of proper and thorough understanding and perception. Chamberlain forges a connection between discursive confusion, general confusion and insanity, alleged to have almost the entire world in chaos:
Deutschland steht ihnen im Wege; um Deutschland wegzuräumen, haben sie von langer Hand alles vorbereitet und jetzt unter gewissenloser Ausnutzung der ungeheuren ihnen zur Verfügung stehenden Mittel heillose Begriffsverwirrung angestiftet und fast alle Völker der Erde in Wahnsinn gejagt (Die Zuversicht: 11).

References to states of illusion, intoxication and delirium reinforce Chamberlain’s depiction of the allegedly limited cognitive-intellectual faculties of the German people, as in ‘Illusionen Raum zu geben, ist immer gefährlich’ [… ] (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 92) and ‘[…] hypnotische Wirkung und in Folge dessen Übergewicht brutaler Willensnaturen auf und über die feiner organisierten, klügeren Hirne’ (Politische Ideale: 63). Descriptions of states of mind beyond conscious human control portray a climate permeated by distorted presentations of reality.

It should be pointed out here that both Wahn and Chaos have been identified as typical of anti-Semitic discourse at the time (Hortitz 1988: 127; Rash 2012: 113-115). Nineteenth and early twentieth century anti-Semitism revolved in part around what was referred to as Völkerchaos – the penetration of the German Volk by the Jews; of German blood by Jewish blood. Rash (2012) identifies many such references in her discourse-historical analysis of anti-Semitism in Grundlagen, for example ‘Doch bis heute ist es uns noch nicht gelungen, alle Gifte jenes Chaos aus unserem Blute zu entfernen’ (Rash 2012: 115).

Adding to the disorientating effect of Chamberlain’s assertion that nothing is what it seems are recurring metaphors of theatre and games. References to theatrical productions foreground classical Greek and Shakespearian tragedies in particular, as in ‘der Eindruck eines Heldendramas’ (Deutsches Wesen: 34), and ‘so war doch, wie bei Hamlet’s Wahnsinn, „viel Methode drin“’ (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 12). These general theater references form a topical backdrop for Chamberlain’s ideological theater metaphors by introducing the metaphor of play-acting. The objects that Chamberlain discusses in theatrical terms are invariably political:
The first statement posits the French parliamentary government as a theatre attended by an audience that rushes to witness the theatrical spectacle of the great speakers. The second statement presents the outbreak and progression of the First World War as a theatrical spectacle, in which Chamberlain labels the events marking the outbreak of the war as ‘das gewaltige Schauspiel’. These metaphors imply that the words issuing from the mouths and pens of the politicians are scripted, ingeniune representations of reality, intensifying the impression that Chamberlain constructs throughout his essays that the Germans presently find themselves in a critical situation in which nobody can be trusted, and particularly not politicians.

Chamberlain reinforces the effect of theatre references with metaphors of puppets and puppet shows, as in:

Wir sind Werkzeuge und Vasallen der in den Kulissen waltenden Reichen. Wir sind Hampelmännchen; jene ziehen am Faden und wir tanzen (Demokratie und Freiheit: 47).

[…] der vermeintliche oberste Leiter ein Theaterkönig mit einer Papierkrone auf dem Kopf, hinter dem sich die wahren Drahtzieher verbergen […] (Politische Ideale: 73).

The extracts cited above both refer to the act of ‘string pulling’ (‘am Faden ziehen’) or to ‘puppet masters’ (Drahtzieher). The puppets, in this case, are the wir – the German people, the readers – and the Drahtzieher are typically politicians (‘die politischen Drahtzieher’ (Demokratie und Freiheit: 65)). This rhetorical fallacy appeals to the readers’ sense of humanity by implying that they no longer have
control over their own minds or actions. It is also an argumentum ad hominem that prevents the readers from casting doubt on the author’s standpoints by discrediting their freedom of thought as puppets on a string, and as such is a violation of the freedom rule.

Chamberlain’s references to theatre and puppets are set against a general backdrop of ‘playing’ or ‘being played with’. This is constructed by references to games, as in:

[…] die französische Revolution dagegen als ein Spiel lasterhafter Buben erscheinen wird […] (Politische Ideale: 94).

[…] damit das Hin und Her eines jeden Spiels entstehe und alle Spieler die Gelegenheit bekommen, sich einmal auf dieser und einmal auf jener Seite zu betätigen, und immer wieder nach angemessener Pause die Wonne der Gewalt (power) zu kosten […] (Demokratie und Freiheit: 71).

These statements forge both a discursive and thematic association between politics and games, at once trivialising politics by reducing it to the level of child’s play (‘ein Spiel lasterhafter Buben’) and reinforcing the metaphor scenario of a false reality. A game can either be a simulation of reality or a form of amusement intended to serve as a diversion from everyday reality.

By discussing the war in abstract terms of intellect, perception and confusion, truth and lies, Chamberlain thus situates the German people in a highly unstable epistemic environment. The tenacity of artifice and deceit is portrayed to have led to the inevitable descent of Germany and the whole world into a state of intellectual confusion and disorientation so boundless that it is equivalent to insanity. As members of the German Volk, the readers are positioned as misled, confused, and lacking any solid intellectual grounding. Under these circumstances, the readers lose faith in their abilities to accurately perceive, to understand, and ultimately to be able to form their own judgments and conclusions. Chamberlain's justification of his authorial role and his essays is one large exercise in argumentum ad hominem, targeted not at an ideological opponent or enemy, but at the readers. In order to make
the readers friends of his ideology, he must first make them enemies of themselves. The topoi of intellectual war, intellect as a weapon with which to win the war, intellectual superiority, intellectual potential, intellectual sufficiency and the topos of obsolete/hidden truth are used to legitimise the assertion that the reader needs to rely on Chamberlain and his essays because of these propositions.

8.2.6 The Construction of ‘Desireable’ versus ‘Undesireable’ Readers

Chamberlain constructs parts of his essays as a discursive exchange between the author and the reader. In actual fact, the essays are not a communicative exchange as there is no scope for reader interaction; however Chamberlain creates a semblance of dialogicity in order to draw the readers’ attention to their status as the recipients of his discourse in what appears to be a discursive exchange involving two parties. The key distinction that Chamberlain strategically overlooks is that there is no dialogical interaction in the reading process, and the recipients thus cannot influence or shape the proponent’s arguments. Essays that were originally written in the form of a letter to a friend or acquaintance are particularly effective in creating this sense of dialogicity: Chamberlain claims that a small number of essays such as Die deutsche Sprache (1914) were derived from his personal correspondence (for example to the unidentifiable ‘E.E.’). These essays contain informal addresses to the reader (Du, Dich, Dein) intended for the personally acquainted recipients of these letters, as in:

Worauf ich Dich nun besonders aufmerksam machen möchte, ist folgendes [...] (Kriegsaufsätze: 29).

Wie Du siehst, es mischt sich in die Zuversicht, von der ich anfangs sprach, ein subjektives Element [...] (Kriegsaufsätze: 35).

Although these personal and singular addresses are often adopted from personal correspondence and thus perhaps not originally meant for the readers, they give the readers of the essays the impression that he is addressing them personally.
In his interaction with his readers, Chamberlain implicitly encourages them to position themselves in one of two categories: desirable (knowledgable) readers, or undesirable (ignorant) readers; legitimising strategies of authorisation that function both by role model authority and the authority of conformity. He makes great use of the conditional construction ‘only those who can X, can Y’, constructing hypothetical role models where Y represents an action or accomplishment which corresponds to the author’s ideological viewpoint.

Dieser Weg kann aber nie zurückgelegt werden, wenn er nicht einmal eingeschlagen wird; einschlagen können ihn nur Menschen, welche verstehen, worauf es ankommt […] (Demokratie und Freiheit: 17).

[…] wer Augen zum sehen hat, kann aus dieser einen Tatsache die ganze Bedeutung des Deutschtums für die Freiheit entnehmen […] (Demokratie und Freiheit: 17).

These propositions details an ideological ‘achievement’ held by the author to be desirable: to embark on a particular journey, to appreciate the significance of liberty for Germanness while distinguishing between those people who have the potential to achieve this, and those who do not. The noun phrase ‘nur Menschen, die [X]’ and the pronoun wer delineate a group of people who can [X]. This constitutes a specific form of argumentum ad populum; it is less an appeal to the majority, but an appeal to a special few. There are no descriptions of this in the literature, however this rhetorical fallacy could be described as an ‘appeal to vanity’ (argumentum ad superbiam), or ‘appeal to the elite’ (Gruppeneogismus, Wengeler 2005: 215). The appeal to a majority constitutes an inappropriate and invalid argument scheme, thereby violating the argument scheme rule and the validity rule (Cohen 2003: 109).

The implied existence of elite role models that can achieve X implies the parallel existence of a counter-group that cannot. This parallel group is delineated in the following example, in which the comparative form of the adverb hoch (höher) illustrates that Chamberlain ascribes a higher status to those who conform to his concept of ideal thought and behaviour:
The readers are confronted with two groups of Germans: those with the intellectual capacity and powers of perception to exhibit ‘desirable’ behaviour, and those without. Chamberlain intensifies this sense of intellectual division among his readers by some introductory statements to intertextual references, such as ‘Der Name Warren Hastings wird den Meisten bekannt sein […]’ (Kriegsaufsätze: 63), and ‘Schopenhauer sagt bekanntlich […]’ (Die Zuversicht: 16). These statements carry a deliberate sense of presumption regarding the breadth of the reader’s knowledge. In theory, these are modal expressions which indicate that the author deems it highly probable that these names and quotations will be familiar to the masses. In practice, the generic term den Meisten and the generalisation bekanntlich are rhetorical devices used to imply an intellectual ‘norm’. Similarly, seemingly casual remarks such as ‘Der Mensch „als Freiheit“ ist das uns allen geläufige „Zoon politicon“ des Aristoteles’ (Politische Ideale: 10) and ‘was Burke laut sagte […] das wissen mehr oder weniger genau alle’ (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 33) imply to the reader that X should belong to their general knowledge, and if it does not then it certainly belongs to the general knowledge of the majority. Ultimately, these strategies may encourage the readers to covet knowledge.

8.2.7 Strategies of Legitimisation: Authorisation by Expert and Personal Authority

The corpus analysis identified that Chamberlain’s war essays are characterised in part by strategies of author positioning (Section 8.3.2.1). Further close reading revealed that Chamberlain endorses his authorial legitimacy by highlighting his education, experience, personal contacts, knowledge bias and reporting bias, and breadth of ‘evidential’ reference. These strategies constitute a positive argumentum ad hominem, a rhetorical fault that violates the relevance rule by attempting to
warrant a claim not by reasoning, but by calling on the author’s credentials. Chamberlain makes his authorial presence explicit through egocentric references to the act of writing, making sure to thematise his publications and accomplishments as an author:

Vor einigen Monaten erhielt ich auf einen meiner Kriegsaufsätze von einem Mann, den zu verehren ich besondere Veranlassung habe, da er zugleich gelehrter Fachmann und Mann des praktischen Lebens ist, einen zustimmenden Brief, dessen Wärme mir wohltun mußte (Demokratie und Freiheit: 32).

Here, Chamberlain positions himself as a successful and popular author by referring to his earlier work Kriegsaufsätze, and the acclaim he has received for it (cf. Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 22). The effect of such statements is augmented by references to the author’s hic et nunc: in order to emphasise his authorial presence, Chamberlain provides occasional commentaries on events in his daily life that occur while he is composing a text, opening, for example, with the expression ‘Gerade während ich diese Worte schreibe’ (Hammer oder Amboß: 25) or ‘Gerade während ich diese letzten Abschnitte schreibe’ (Politische Ideale: 113). Chamberlain thereby steps into his work in order to confront the readers with the reality that he assumes the role of author and, as a natural consequence, that they assume the role of reader.

Chamberlain uses authorial interjections to exercise self-promotion. It is a particular concern of his to reassure the reader that he has an excellent memory:

So erinnere ich mich gewisser Episoden aus meinem vierten und dritten Lebensjahr, ja, Sogar an eine aus der Mitte meines zweiten Lebensjahres so deutlich, daß ich sie bis ins einzelne Schildern könnte: es steht alles haarscharf im Hirne abgebildet wie das Negativ auf einer photographischen Platte; nur aber der eine einzelne Augenblick, vor welchem und hinter welchem dunkle Nacht herrscht (Deutsches Wesen: 11).
The reliability of the author’s memory is presented as so great that he can precisely recall events from when he was two years old. In the first statement he draws on the metaphor of a photographic negative in order to help the reader to conceive exactly how precise his long-term memory is by providing them with an accessible image. The alliteration on ‘haarscharf im Hirne’ further adds to the rhetorical effect of the metaphor. The second statement reveals how important it is for the author to present his memory as infallible; he uses a performative speech act to state this intention, and calls on the testimony of Fachleuten to validate his claim to a photographic memory (cf. ‘das Negativ auf einer photographischen Platte’ above).

Using the conventional topos of authority, the author furthermore draws the readers’ attention to his intellectual qualifications for authorisation by expertise. Chamberlain quotes widely from an impressive catalogue of foreign literature, drawing not only on his breadth of intellectual reference, but also on his skills as a polyglot:


Auf Grund dieser Kenntnisse und auch anderer, aus den Ergebnissen der vergleichenden Sprachwissenschaft gewonnenen, behaupte ich […] (Kriegsaufsätze: 25).

The effect of authorial elaborations on his knowledge of foreign languages is augmented by the number of foreign words integrated into his texts, either in the form of full quotations, or of single words or phrases. The author is particularly keen to integrate Latinisms and Frenchisms into his writing:
Notably, Chamberlain translates some of his foreign expressions for the readers, and leaves others untranslated. Both translating foreign expressions and omitting translations lend the author a sense of intellectual authority. Where Chamberlain provides his own translations, he presents himself as a cultural mediator who applies his linguistic expertise for the benefit of the readers. Where he does not provide a translation, he implies that his level of understanding for foreign languages is the norm; that these do not need to be translated because the ‘desirable’ reader can keep up with him. This is particularly evident in the second statement, in which the author casually follows a lengthy French quotation with the colloquial German expression, ‘So ist es!’

Chamberlain’s exploitation of his linguistic knowledge is also manifested in etymological expositions: his knowledge of Latin in particular allows him to weave brief lessons on etymology into his claims, as in:


In statements like this, the author explores the etymological roots of a word or term where the word’s original meaning lends his ideological claim greater support, thereby committing an etymological fallacy. He diverts the readers’ attention away from the ideological arguments by focussing on a single word; he does not attempt to prove a claim through logical argumentation, but by presenting a key word from a particular ideological perspective, ultimately ‘supporting’ his argument by linguistic diversion. In these cases, the readers are willing to accept the author’s claim not
because his logic or evidence is convincing, but because he has proven himself to be intellectually viable by demonstrating etymological linguistic expertise.

Chamberlain also constructs legitimising strategies of authorisation via expert authority by drawing the readers’ attention to his prestigious political, military and intellectual contacts, as in:

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These statements name esteemed cultural figures with whom the author is personally acquainted in order to highlight the intellectual and cultural circles in which he moves and lend him legitimisation by association; legitimisation by personal authority. Just as the American political scientist Burgess is modified by bekannt, Chamberlain describes his military contact as ‘ein hoher deutsche Offizier’, accentuating the status of his personal contacts. He thereby legitimises his credibility, as a high-ranking army officer can provide Chamberlain with insights to which the average German citizen does not have access.

Legitimisation by personal authority additionally rests on the topos of life experience, a specific form of Wengeler’s Autoritätstopos (Wengeler 2005: 217). The author’s reliance on personal anecdotes to legitimise a claim represent an appeal to illegitimate authority, as authorial self-reference is invariably biased. The author reminds the reader, for example, that he witnessed the meeting between Wilhelm I and the French ambassador in Bad Ems in 1870, during which France declared war on Prussia:

Chamberlain’s first-hand experience of this momentous occasion seems to lend him authority on matters of German politics and the recent history of German nationalism. The author uses experiences from his personal life to legitimise his expertise not only on German politics and political history, but on the nature of the German people; that is, in ‘Germanness’ itself:

Wer sechs Wochen in einem fremden Lande weilte, setzt sich getrost hin und schreibt ein flottes Buch, wo klipp und klar und verblüffend einfach der National-Charakter, die Sitten, die Eigenschaften und Fehler des Volkes beschrieben werden […] Etwas andres ist es, wenn ein Mann, der dem betreffenden Volke selbst angehört und daher eine unerschöpfliche und unausschöpfliche Kenntnis desselben besitzt, sinnend das ihm ebenfalls vertraute Vergangene an sich vorüberziehen läßt: tiefe Einblicke tun sich ihm dann an gewissen Punkten auf […] (Kriegsaufsätze: 44).

This statement underscores the comprehensive extent of Chamberlain’s knowledge and experience of Germany and the German people by a hypothetical description of the insights a foreigner can gain abroad, progressing from those who spend six weeks, six months and six years abroad to those who, like himself, have been resident in a foreign country for so long that they consider themselves a national citizen (Chamberlain acquired German citizenship soon after the publication of Kriegsaufsätze in August 1916).

Chamberlain’s self-presentation as a foreigner who has fully assimilated himself into Germany society and the German Volk is a key self-positioning strategy in the establishment of source credibility. The necessity for Chamberlain to legitimise himself as an authority on ‘Germanness’ as a non-German is particularly urgent, and the rigorousness with which he pursues this objective may well have been driven by
his first experiences as a writer for the *Bayreuther Blätter*: in 1882, Hans von Wolzogen rejected Chamberlain’s first contribution to the Wagnerian publication, stating that as non-German writer, Chamberlain would never be able to fully grasp the German or Wagnerian cause. Chamberlain asserts that, as a foreigner, he is ideally placed to publish on German nationalism and Germany’s relations to England and France; not only because he is immersed in German life, but also because this ‘foreignness’ grants him a certain objective distance to German society and therewith neutrality of observation. Chamberlain as an Englishman who grew up in France and spent nearly his entire adult life in German-speaking countries, as he emphasises, can make qualified observations on Germany, England and France:

Dieser Ausländer und Neutrale macht hiermit auf die Tatsache aufmerksam, daß in Deutschland eine Verschwörung am Werke ist […] (*Demokratie und Freiheit*: 34).

Zur Vergegenwärtigung der Art, wie die Franzosen so etwas machen, wie sie die Hirne der Kinder von klein auf auf Gloire und Revanche modelln, will ich dem Leser eine Erinnerung aus meiner eigenen Kindheit erzählen (*Neue Kriegsaufsätze*: 24).

Far from being a disadvantage, Chamberlain constructs his status as a non-German national as a guarantee of the accuracy of his claims. The author asserts his own credibility through personal insight into the dominant views and opinions on Germany circulating in England and France: not only is the author an expert on English society and politics, but also on the purportedly ‘typical’ English attitude towards Germany, as in ‘Ich erinnere mich, als wie von gestern, der Schilderungen, die man mir als Kind von Deutschland gab’ (*Kriegsaufsätze*: 86).

Chamberlain also underscores his passion for and dedication to the subject matter as grounds for source credibility. The topos of authorial passion is a specific form of Wengeler’s *Autoritätstopos* (Wengeler 2005: 217). A series of assertions express personal belief and deep personal engagement in the German cause, legitimising Chamberlain’s source credibility through a sense of personal concern for the German nation. These assertions include expressions such as ‘Mir liegt im Augenblicke nur
This sense of personal concern and engagement is furthermore expressed in minor sentence interjections and exclamatives such as ‘Gottlob!’ (Ideal und Macht: 14), ‘Wohl bekomm’s!’ (Die Zuversicht: 10) and ‘Es ist zum Davonlaufen!’ (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 64). These exclamations are subjectivity markers indicative of the author’s personal engagement and passion for his subject matter. The same is true of the frequent subjective adjectives that can be identified in Chamberlain’s nationalist discourse, as in ‘in einen geradewegs Brechreiz erregenden Kultus […]’ (Hammer oder Amboß: 18), and ‘vermutlich ebenso verworren und frevelhaft willkürlich und diabolisch eigensüchtig wie die gestrige und heutige […]’ (Politische Ideale: 12). The adjective phrases ‘Brechreiz errgend’ and ‘frevelhaft willkürlich und diabolisch eigensüchtig’ are stark expressions of personal evaluation that draw on the bodily metaphor of vomiting, and on metaphors of blasphemy and evil. Such subjective accusations are common features of Chamberlain’s essays; he is particularly keen to denote views and actions that do not comply with his own ideology as ‘blasphemous’, ‘shameful’ and ‘ridiculous’, for example, as in ‘Es ist dies eine so haarsträubend und frevelhaft dumme Forderung […]’ (Demokratie und Freiheit: 53), ‘[…] dem schmählichen, zugleich lächerlichen Mißtrauensvotum’ (Kriegsaufsätze: 38).

8.2.8 Strategies of Legitimisation: Endorsement of Authorial Character

Chamberlain legitimises his character by using a series of strategies that construct authorisation by personal authority, including trust-building strategies. For the purposes of this analysis, trust-building strategies are defined as any strategy by which the author strategically lessens the intellectual or status gap between himself and the reader for rhetorical reasons. A good author of persuasive argumentation must assert personal and expert authority while remaining accessible to the reader by allowing for points of contact between himself and his readers: a solely omnipotent and untouchable authorial figure to whom the readers cannot relate may lose
credibility. The analysis of Chamberlain’s construction of authorial character subsumes his construction of trustworthiness, similarity with the reader, and perceived goodwill. All such strategies constitute a positive *argumentum ad hominem*, a rhetorical fault that violates the relevance rule by attempting to warrant a claim not by logical or rational argumentation, but by calling on the author’s personal character.

One trust-building strategy is formed of rhetorical requests to the reader for permission to make a certain statement or to make a statement in a certain way, as in ‘so erlaube man mir, Belege aus dem alltäglichen Leben zu wählen’ (*Neue Kriegsaufsätze*: 17) and ‘Nur eine Vereinfachung sei mir gestattet, der kräftigeren Auffassung zulieb’ (*Ideal und Macht*: 22). These rhetorical requests for permission appear to be a form of dialogue between the author and the reader: the reader is led to believe that the author attaches importance to their approval, whereas in fact the speech act expressed is not a request or a question, but an imperative using the subjunctive I form *erlaube*. Chamberlain seems to lessen the authority gap between himself and his readers by giving them the impression that they have some kind of input into his writing, thereby flattering them.

A further trust-building strategy involves the use of idiomatic sayings and aphoristic expressions. Chamberlain’s use of idiomatic German phrases varies from conventional applications through reformulation and/or extension to pure invention. The war essays feature a number of examples of *sententia* – the punctuation of a point with an aphorism – integrating conventional idiomatic phrases into his statements such as ‘man faßt des Pudels Kern’ (*Neue Kriegsaufsätze*: 97), ‘ein Bild sagt mehr als viele Worte’ (*Neue Kriegsaufsätze*: 36) and ‘Das geschieht — wie der Bauer sagt — in der Woche mit den vier Sonntagen’ (*Demokratie und Freiheit*: 60). Traditional idiomatic sayings help to build up the readers’ trust of the author firstly by cementing his native-like familiarity with the German language, and secondly because such expressions are gnomic, carrying connotations of timeless wisdom. Sayings are familiar to all or most readers, and help to create a sense of familiarity and trust. They are furthermore phrases used by the masses, and therefore by using them himself, the author positions himself as ‘one of them’.
Chamberlain additionally employs aphoristic sayings to demonstrate his intellectual virtuosity by virtue of his linguistic creativity. In addition to integrating traditional turns of phrase, Chamberlain also modifies and extends existing sayings:

> Um richtig verdaut zu werden, erfordert jede Depesche die Beigabe nicht eines Körnchens, vielmehr eines ganzen Salzfasses (*Neue Kriegsaufsätze*: 67).

> Es ist immer das beste, man packt den Stier bei den Hörnern; gelingt es nicht, das wild gewordene Tier zu Boden zu ringen, so schwingt man sich ihm auf den Rücken und reitet es zur Erschöpfung […] (*Politische Ideale*: 67).

Here, the author does not merely apply sayings, but adapts them and adds to them in order to achieve a rhetorical effect, or in order to explicate the significance of the saying for his ideological purposes. The ability to modify and extend idiomatic sayings in this way is testimony to the author’s linguistic and intellectual aptitude.

8.2.9 Strategies of Legitimisation: The Author as Problem Solver

Chamberlain’s central strategies of authorial legitimisation are strategies of abstraction that function by delegitimising the readers and the epistemic reliability of their environment. This is a key mechanism in Chamberlain’s creation of ‘global fuzziness’ and constitutes the ‘trouble’ of Saussure’s ‘trouble-and-resolution’ device (cf. Saussure 2005: 113). Chamberlain identifies and constructs a series of problems afflicting the German people: the German Volk is ill-placed to formulate its own thoughts regarding the current war-time situation, he asserts, as it is surrounded by media and government discourse that it cannot trust. He constructs the German people as having been led astray, and thus as in danger of stumbling onto the ‘wrong path’, or as already progressing down it. Most significantly, the author frames his ideological claims against the backdrop of reader ignorance and naivety, constructing a metaphor scenario in which the readers fundamentally lack the correct knowledge
and are metaphorically ‘in the dark’. He constructs the war as a battle of intellect and morals, and yet, he asserts, the German people are crucially lacking the kind of intellectual faculties that they need to triumph in the war; the intellect, the powers of perception, the facts, the truth (cf. Sections 9.2.1 – 9.2.5).

The following section argues that Chamberlain uses strategies of author positioning to advance ready-made resolutions to the trouble of epistemic uncertainty; the complementary device to the creation of ‘trouble’ hypothesised by Saussure (Saussure 2005: 113). Where the German people lack knowledge, Chamberlain will provide it; where they are lost, Chamberlain the guide will lead them down the right path; where the readers as Germans are ignorant and naïve pupils in need of ‘education’, Chamberlain the teacher will teach them; where the truth is buried, Chamberlain the archaeologist will uncover it; where the reader is blind or submerged in darkness, Chamberlain the bringer of light will enable them to see once more. Whereas the construction of epistemic uncertainty is a strategy of legitimisation that functions via abstraction, Chamberlain's ‘responsive solutions’ are more multifaceted, drawing on abstraction, authorisation, and theoretical rationalisation to exploit abstract moral values of enlightenment and rational concepts of fact.

8.2.9.1 Chamberlain as Teacher

Chamberlain constructs his readers as naïve and ignorant and asserts that they need to undergo a process of learning by being taught the facts and the truth. A number of statements can be identified in which the author states the ‘educational’ intentions behind writing the war essays, as in ‘[…] die andern Völker, so weit es ihnen von der Natur gegönnt sein mag, zum Verständnis der Freiheit erziehen […]’ (Kriegsaufsätze: 23), and ‘[…] das Bewußtsein dessen, was jetzt vorgegangen ist, allgemein zu machen’ (Die Zuversicht: 12). The author sees it as his job and as the job of those who represent true ‘Germanness’ to ‘educate’ others. In the first example above, Chamberlain refers to the role of ‘real’ Germans to educate other nations regarding key moral standards such as liberty. In the second example
Chamberlain refers to the more general process which must be undertaken at home in Germany, namely to raise awareness of the true course of events in the war. This statement may not feature vocabulary pertaining to teaching directly, however ‘das Bewußtsein dessen allgemein zu machen’ denotes a process of creating awareness by disseminating information equivalent to that denoted by belehren.

Chamberlain furthermore states his recommendations for current and future action in classroom terms, as in:

[...] strebsame Knaben und Mädchen tun wohl daran, sich Listen von Königen und Päpsten mit Geburts- und Todesjahren ins widerstrebende Gehirn einzuprägen [...] (Politische Ideale: 9).

This example recalls a classroom situation, in which Chamberlain advises rote learning to ‘strebsame Knaben und Mädchen’, here representative of the ideal readers.

If Chamberlain is a teacher then his readers are his pupils. Some of the clearest examples of Chamberlain’s teacher role can be identified in his instructions to the readers to consult further literature, as identified by the corpus analysis (cf. Section 8.3.2.1). These instructions address his ideal readers, that is, those who wish to put as much effort into understanding the current wartime situation as the author deems necessary:


In statements such as these, Chamberlain issues a homework exercise of further reading. These literature recommendations include precise publication data, recalling references provided by teachers or academic figures.

If Chamberlain is a teacher then his publications are also the teaching material. Reading his essays, he asserts, is tantamount to undergoing a process of enlightenment; after reading the essays, the readers will allegedly find themselves to be wiser and more knowledgeable than before:

> Damit wird nun, glaube ich, jener äußere Kreis der mit Naturnotwendigkeit zum Kriege führenden Ursachen deutlich faßlich […] (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 53).

> Nunmehr sind wir reif, einen Gedanken Fichtes zu verstehen, den ich für einen der bedeutendsten halte […] (Demokratie und Freiheit: 26).

8.2.9.2 Chamberlain as Provider of Truth

Chamberlain’s construction of himself as a teacher and his essays as teaching materials implies that the essays are factual sources of truth: it is the job of a teacher to convey factual information to his students, and not conjecture or hypothesis. Chamberlain disarms the readers, alarming them by insinuating that they have been denied access to authentic information. Using a further strategy of legitimisation that functions by theoretical rationalisation, the author attempts to resolve this problem for his readers by presenting himself as the provider of truth.

As the corpus analysis has indicated, Chamberlain’s essays abound with the adjective *wahr*. Where X is modified by *wahr-* (‘die wahre Ursache’ (Kriegsaufsätze: 52) ‘jeder wahren Freiheit’ (Demokratie und Freiheit: 16)), it is implied that something else is falsely posing as X; that there is a ‘true’ or ‘real’ version, and a ‘false’ or ‘fake’ version of X. Chamberlain, as he is keen to emphasise, construes his discourse as addressing or identifying the genuine form or understanding of a cause, concept or conception, for example. In contrast to those causes, definitions and conceptions
parading as ‘real’ in other discourse, the author implies, he thematises the genuinely real ones.

The rhetorical effect of modifying a noun with *wahr* is augmented by Chamberlain’s frequent use of the constructions *in Wahrheit*, ‘in Wirklichkeit’ and *eigentlich*:


Doch gleichviel, auf diesem Wege erfuhren wir allmählich, wer es eigentlich ist, der allerorten gegen Deutschland schürt und die Völker in den Krieg treibt […] (*Die Zuversicht*: 5).

The modifiers ‘*in Wahrheit*, ‘*in Wirklichkeit*’ and *eigentlich* insinuate that the made claims represent the truth in contrast to opposing conceptions of the same issue claimed by others. The contrast between Chamberlain’s ‘truths’ and ‘untruths’ circulated elsewhere is not always merely implied, but also explicitly formulated in juxtapositions such as

[…] eben so frei wie der einzelne Mensch sich frei dünkt und weiß, und eben so unfrei wie — vom Standpunkt des erschauten Naturganzen aus — der einzelne Mensch in *Wirklichkeit* ist (*Deutsches Wesen*: 125).

Here, the author uses antithesis and juxtaposition to alert the reader to the permeation of false conceptions in present German society and constructs his ideological claims in relation to these as ‘the truth’. 
8.2.9.3 Chamberlain as Archaeologist

Chamberlain constructs the truth as hidden, buried or covered up (see Section 9.2.4). In order to correspondingly legitimise this proposition using expert authority and theoretical rationalisation to construct the author’s status as a ‘provider of truth’, therefore, Chamberlain makes reference to the act of ‘uncovering’ or ‘unearthing’ the truth. The corresponding solution with which Chamberlain provides the readers in his construction of source legitimisation is that the author functions as an ‘archaeologist of truth’.

The war essays feature a wealth of references to discovery or Entdeckung:

 […] während sie uns weismachen wollen, was für humane Maximen solchem Verfahren zugrunde liegen, entdeckt sich jetzt, daß das wahre Motiv ein reales Objekt sei, ohne welches es die Engländer bekanntlich nie tun und welches man hätte wissen sollen (Kriegsaufsätze: 58).

[…] und doch mußte diese im Wintersemester 1807/08 als selbstverständlich ausgesprochene Wahrheit in unseren Tagen neu entdeckt werden […] (Kriegsaufsätze: 26).

The verb *entdecken* is a key constitutive element of Chamberlain’s archaeological image schema. *Entdecken* compounds the main verb *decken*, meaning ‘to cover’, and the prefix *ent-. Ent-* alone is not a semantic word, however when attached as a prefix to a main verb, it generally reverses the process denoted by the stem verb. This is equivalent to the English verb ‘discover’, where the prefix ‘dis’ turns the act of covering into an act of uncovering. *Entdecken* thus figurately denotes the process of removing the cover from something. Like an archaeologist, Chamberlain proposes that he is removing the cover that hides the truth; that he is excavating the truth.

This sense of archaeological excavation is particularly evident in constructions such as ‘geht man jedoch der Sache auf den Grund, so entdeckt man’ (Politische Ideale: 29), in which the verb *entdecken* co-occurs with the verb phrase *auf den Grund*
gehen. Figuratively, this expression refers to the act of ‘getting to the bottom of something’, or to investigating a problem. The literal roots of the expression, however, are physical, and denote descending to the depths or lower limit of something in order to fully investigate it. An archaeologist digs far into the ground in order to uncover and bring up evidence. This metaphor is perpetuated by the recurring expressions *hervorbringen* and *hervorholen*, as in:

Mann greift nicht tief genug, wenn man nur von einem Krieg der Konfessionen spricht […] (*Kriegsaufsätze*: 82).

[…] das Volk, das Friedrich, Stein und Bismarck so schnell hintereinander hervorbrachte, birgt sicher auch heute Staatsmänner von genialer Gestaltungskraft, und die Not wird sie an die Oberfläche bringen (*Neue Kriegsaufsätze*: 93).

Der Schatz der Reinheit und der idealen Anlagen, der ihm bisweilen so tief ins Innere hinabsank, daß er kaum mehr auffindbar war, muß jetzt hervorgeholt werden […] (*Die Zuversicht*: 12).

The archeological image schema is complemented by a series of verbs pertaining to investigation. In addition to the verbs *forschen* and *untersuchen* to describe his research into the subject matter at hand, Chamberlain favours compound verbs using the stem *dringen*, meaning ‘to penetrate’, such as *durchdringen* and *hineindringen*, thereby describing the processes of exploring and presenting ideological topics in terms of the penetration of a surface. Hortzitz (1988) identifies the verb phrase ‘in etwas eindringen’ as characteristic of anti-Semitic discourse of the nineteenth century, a metaphor resulting from the notion of the Jews wrongly ‘penetrating’ their way through German society as an ‘eingedrungener Volksstamm’ (Hortzitz 1988: 121). However, Chamberlain's positive use of this verb to denote the process of gaining access to the truth makes it unlikely that it carries anti-Semitic undertones in this particular context.
The metaphorical notion of penetrating the surface in order to access knowledge and information is further represented by references to *Einblick* and *Einsicht*. As with the English equivalent ‘insight’, *Einblick* and *Einsicht* denote the process of seeing into something. The *Einsicht* trope is thus a constituent element of Chamberlain’s archaeology metaphor: by uncovering or excavating the truth, the archaeologist also brings the gift of sight. Covered by a deceptive surface of falsities and lies, the German people have supposedly been hitherto incapable of seeing the truth. In physical terms of what can be seen and what cannot, the author advocates seeing beyond or below the surface to what is beneath; in other words, seeing beyond the misinformation to the truth. As an author and ‘archaeologist of truth’, Chamberlain presents himself as someone who, in the terms of his own metaphor, brings the truth back into the Germans’ field of vision by exposing it.

Chamberlain accordingly evaluates the concept of ‘the surface’ negatively. The following statements feature a dismissive combination of sight metaphors and references to surface:

> […] für den oberflächlichen Blick verwirrender zum Ausdruck kommt (*Deutsches Wesen*: 44).

Nicht wirst du das Wesen der Kunst zu erfassen vermögen, wenn du sie nur auf den Gipfeln ihres Könnens betrachtest […] (*Deutsches Wesen*: 70).

The sight noun *Blick* in the first statement cited above is modified by the adjective *oberflächlich*, denoting both the surface and superficiality. The combination of these, ‘der oberflächliche Blick’, is deemed by the author to be insufficient. In the second example, the surface is represented by *Gipfel*: a pinnacle, like a surface, is merely the top of something much greater. Whereas combined references to sight and surface are negatively evaluated, references that allude to sight and depth are invariably positively evaluated, as in:
Milton gehört unstreitig zu den größten Intelligenzen, welche die Menschheit erzeugt hat; er sah den Dingen auf den Grund […] (Demokratie und Freiheit: 12).

Hierin offenbart sich Luthers geistiger Tiefblick und seine unbedingte Wahrhaftigkeit (Demokratie und Freiheit: 19).

Der durchdringende, viel gefürchtete Blick des stolzen, bewußten, sicher urteilenden Schiller (Deutsches Wesen: 88).

John Milton’s status as one of the greatest minds in the history of the world, as Chamberlain believed, is alleged to be a condition of the way in which he saw past the surface to the bottom of or to the true nature of things (‘er sah den Dingen auf den Grund’). The celebrated German figures Luther and Schiller are similarly attributed with the gift of ‘depth of sight’, or Tiefblick. Luther’s ‘geistiger Tiefblick’ and Schiller’s ‘durchdringender Blick’ gain positive evaluation by virtue of their co-occurrence with the positive noun Wahrhaftigkeit and the positively evaluated adverbs stolz, bewußt and sicher [urteilend].

The expression ‘geistiger Tiefblick’ is of particular importance to Chamberlain’s metaphor of ‘seeing the truth’. The modifier geistig reveals that Chamberlain’s sight metaphor functions on two levels: seeing past the surface of lies, and seeing into or using the soul. As detailed in Section 9.1, Chamberlain foregrounds the notion of das Innere, which denotes intellect and the human spirit or soul. A significant number of Chamberlain’s references to Einblick or ‘in [X] blicken’ relate to das Innere:

[…] plötzlich gewinnen wir einen Einblick querdurch in ein Innerstes, das sonst die täuschende Oberfläche dem Auge entzieht (Kriegsaufsätze: 45).

Das Auge kann zunächst geradezu als „der Sinn der Oberfläche“ bezeichnet werden, und was es vermittelt — auch die Liebe — bleibt oberflächlich und vergänglich, wenn nicht zu den Eindrücken des Auges noch der Blick des Geistes hinzukommt (Deutsches Wesen: 100).
Chamberlain makes extensive use of metaphors of sight and blindness. As established in Section 9.2.4, blindness metaphors inversely represent ignorance and naivety, and metaphors of sight represent the possession of knowledge. Chamberlain often expresses ‘understanding’, both as a verb denoting knowledge acquisition and as a noun denoting the possession of knowledge, in terms of sight:

 […] wer Augen zum sehen hat, kann aus dieser einen Tatsache die ganze Bedeutung des Deutschtums für die Freiheit entnehmen (*Demokratie und Freiheit*: 17).

 […] wer Augen zum Sehen hat, bezweifelt wohl nicht, daß die Vereinigten Staaten und die englischen Kolonien über kurz oder lang den gleichen Weg gehen werden (*Politische Ideale*: 29).

Here, good eyesight is metaphorically equivalent to the ability to fully understand the significance of Germanness for the concept of liberty, for example, or to understanding and accepting that Chamberlain’s ideological predictions for the future of the USA and the British colonies are beyond doubt. By implying the existence of an elite few who do possess good enough ‘eyesight’ to perceive X and, by default, an undesirable group of readers who do not, the first and third statements additionally constitute an appeal to the elite, a more specific form of *ad populum* that violates the argument scheme rule and the validity rule.

Good eyesight is thus portrayed as a condition of understanding and realisation. The irony is, as the author asserts, that the truth is allegedly ‘in front of our very eyes’; that is, the truth is obvious and easily perceived and understood by those with the necessary intellectual faculties or adequate eyesight:

Was den Konflikt zwischen Österreich und Serbien veranlaßt hatte, weiß die ganze Welt; was Österreich wollte und warum es dies wollen mußte, liegt ebenso offen vor Augen (*Neue Kriegsaufsätze*: 71).
[...] in Wirklichkeit steht die Wahrheit strahlend unverhüllt da, der Schleier liegt auf unseren Augen, und wir brauchen den Star nur zu entfernen, so erblicken wir die Wahrheit, und der Wahn entschwindet (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 36).

Here, ‘truths’ on a general level, and ‘truths’ such as political motivations and intentions are portrayed as obvious, where obviousness is expressed in terms of proximity to the human eye (‘offen vor Augen’ and ‘Es liegt ja alles da, vor Augen’). The author’s assertion that the truth is in actual fact in plain sight to all alerts the readers to their own responsibility for ‘seeing’ or perceiving the truth. Correspondingly, it also allows Chamberlain to create a further charitable role for himself as the figure who (allegedly) opens the readers’ eyes and directs the strength and perspective of their ‘vision’. The war essays contain a number of metaphorical vision references to the act of explaining or clarifying:

Es genügt aber, den Zusammenhang deutlich darzulegen, wie ich es jetzt zu tun versuchte, damit eine Tatsache sofort in die Augen springe [...] (Politische Ideale: 22).

Diese kleine Auswahl aus verschiedenen Lebensstellungen mag für heute genügen, jene große, grundlegende Tatsache vor Augen zu führen, von der man in allen Blau- und Weiß- und Gelbbüchern der Welt kein Sterbenswörtchen erfahren wird (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 18).

The discursive acts of explaining in detail (‘deutlich darlegen’) and of providing examples or anecdotes in a discussion are presented as the means by which the human eye ‘sees’, i.e. perceives, the facts. These metaphors are examples of Chamberlain’s meta-references: these rest on a literal meaning of the process in which the eye ‘sees’ the facts, in that the eye of the reader reads the words on the page, which are the graphic constituent elements of factual information (cf. Section 8.3.2.2).
Amidst the portrayed affliction of (intellectual) blindness, Chamberlain steps in as a figure who can improve and direct the readers’ powers of (in)sight. He makes no secret of his intention to do this:

[…] kaum irgend etwas aber — macht Goethe einmal aufmerksam — ist so schwer gut ins Auge zu fassen, wie das, was unmittelbar vor Augen liegt; daß es doch gelingen möge, war der Zweck dieser Anleitung (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 83).

In order to construct himself in the role of optician whose aim is to improve the readers’ vision/perception, Chamberlain integrates a number of optical exercises and adjustments into this discourse. Firstly, a number of declarations and instructions pertaining to optical ‘accommodation’ can be identified in the essays – the act of varying the distance from which an object is viewed:

Eine andere Frage tut sich jedoch auf, sobald man den Blick weniger ausschließlich auf den allgemeinsten Zusammenhang der geschichtlichen Geschehnisse richtet und die Persönlichkeit des wunderbaren Mannes näher ins Auge faßt (Deutsches Wesen: 43-44).

Die Politik Deutschlands seit 1870 und namentlich seitdem der „neue Kurs“ eingeschlagen wurde, kann nicht vom Kirchturm des einheimischen Dorfes aus übersehen werden; der weltgeschichtliche Blick muß geübt werden (Kriegsaufsätze: 88).

Adjustments of viewing range are constructed by antithetical expressions of distance such as ‘vom Kichturm des einheimischen Dorfes’ and ‘der weltgeschichtliche Blick’, in conjunction with verbs of seeing, such as (über)sehen and blicken. Authorial adjustment of optical distances is particularly explicit in the second statement above, in which Chamberlain uses the expressions ‘den Blick auf [X] richten’ and ‘ [X] ins Auge fassen’, which denote readjusting or repositioning the eyes.
Optical metaphors in Chamberlain’s essays are additionally constructed using expressions pertaining to sharpness of vision such as ‘darum erblicken wir dieses um so deutlicher’ (*Die Zuversicht*: 18), and ultimately:


Sharp eyesight leads to clear vision, and where vision metaphorically represents insight, knowledge, and understanding, it also leads to clarity of intellectual perception through enhanced powers of understanding. Chamberlain’s essays therefore abound with references to *Klarheit* — a concept that cements the metaphorical association between seeing and understanding — found in expressions such as ‘bedeutend klarer sehen’ (*Politische Ideale*: 57), and ‘mit wunderbarer Tiefe des Blickes und in vollendeter Klarheit’ (*Demokratie und Freiheit*: 29).

Multiple references to clarity construct legitimising strategies of theoretical rationalisation and expert authority by positing the acquisition of increased intellectual clarity as facilitated by the author. Chamberlain explicitly states that his essays are motivated at least in part by the aim of achieving clarity when he writes ‘Wir werden Weite, Tiefe und Klarheit gewinnen’ (*Politische Ideale*: 11). Despite the inclusive pronoun *wir*, the author does not deem it necessary to achieve clarity for himself, but for his readers: he posits himself as the source of information that brings the kind of clarity to the readers that has previously been denied to them. The seemingly inclusive *uns* in the first statement below is similiar rhetorical; it appears to unite the readers and the author in a joint quest for clarity, whereas actually the first person pronoun refers only to the readers; the author is already in possession of this clarity and leads rather than partakes in the quest. The readers can and will gain clarity, he asserts, by reading his essays:
Das nun ist die erste Klarheit, die in wachsender „Kläre“ (wie Goethe zu sagen liebte) uns jetzt zuteil wird […] (Die Zuversicht: 5).

Wer jedoch mit mir der uneingeschränkten Verneinung beitritt, die der vorige Abschnitt brachte, der befindet sich — so glaube ich wenigstens — auf dem Wege zu größerer Klarheit (Politische Ideale: 44).

Und noch ein letztes muß zur vollkommenen Klarlegung der Lage gesagt werden […] (Deutsches Wesen: 84).

These statements are causal: they describe the process of gaining clarity from X. The kind of clarity denoted here is intellectual clarity, as it is prompted by information, anecdotes and evidential examples: ‘die erste Klarheit’ refers to an ideological claim presented as fact. The second statement describes the acquisition of clarity in terms of a path/journey metaphor (‘auf dem Wege zu größerer Klarheit’) where Klarheit constitutes the destination of the journey. The route of this journey is necessarily via ‘die uneingeschränkte Verneinung’, that is, the unmitigated negation of a view or proposition that is not compatible with the author’s ideological standpoint. The attainment of clarity is thus posited as a consequence of conforming to the author’s views. Chamberlain thus posits himself as a figure that provides his readers with metaphorical visual clarity by facilitating and directing their powers of vision and strengthening their clarity of understanding with his discourse. In the third example above, satisfactory understanding of the current wartime situation is expressed in terms of clarity (‘vollkommene Klarlegung der Lage’), allegedly achievable through discourse or through the act of ‘saying’ or ‘expressing’ (‘muss gesagt werden’), which, in the context of Chamberlain’s war propaganda, is tantamount to the act of writing.

8.2.9.5 Chamberlain as Guide

Chamberlain insinuates that the German people have been misled or led astray by the government and the press. He expresses this assertion predominantly in terms of journey/path metaphors, where the reader is located as progressing down the wrong
path; down a path that differs from the one sole path destined for the German people’s progress (see Section 9.2.2). Chamberlain’s role as guide functions on two levels: on a rhetorical level, he guides the readers as readers through his essays, and on an ideological level, he wishes to lead the readers as Germans to victory and triumph.

As Chamberlain explicitly states, he is a *Wegweiser* with a ‘destination’, or objective:


Nun endlich bin ich, wo ich sein wollte, und hoffe nur, der Leser hat nicht unterwegs die Geduld verloren (*Neue Kriegsaufsätze*: 82).

The essays are also interspersed with verbs of physical progression, as in:

Den Gang weiter Schritt für Schritt zu verfolgen, ist an diesem Orte nicht nötig (*Neue Kriegsaufsätze*: 61).

Wer jedoch mit mir der uneingeschränkten Verneinung beitritt, die der vorige Abschnitt brachte, der befindet sich — so glaube ich wenigstens — auf dem Wege zu größerer Klarheit (*Politische Ideale*: 44).

These verbs are used in reference to the readers’ discursive progression through the war essays: *der Gang* refers to Chamberlain’s discussion of events, and ‘Schritt für Schritt verfolgen’ to the act of further stages of discussion. He thus describes his ideological explication in terms of physical movement through space, in which ‘dieser Ort’ positions the current discourse fragment as physical space. Similarly, ‘der uneingeschränkten Verneinung beitreten’ describes a cognitive process in which the reader should align himself with the author’s ideological views, and the
continued path metaphor ‘auf dem Wege zu größerer Klarheit’ refers to gaining clarity of perception.

The author thus uses journey metaphors to position the readers as being on a journey through his essays. As the author, Chamberlain ‘guides’ the readers on the journey through the essays in constructions that combine the inclusive first person plural pronoun wir and verbs of movement or resting during a journey:

Kommen wir also zu neueren Zeiten und hören wir z.B. John Milton, den unsterblichen Dichter, den großen Gelehrten, den erfahrenen, unerschrockenen Politiker! (Demokratie und Freiheit: 11).

Doch, dieses Beispiel fällt mir im rechten Augenblick ein; verweilen wir hier! Wir werden Weite, Tiefe und Klarheit gewinnen (Politische Ideale: 11).

Wir gelangen zu dem „Mittleren Kreis“ […] (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 56).

The verbs of physical progression kommen and gelangen [zu] and the verb verweilen (to sojourn) position the readers and the author as being on a joint journey. The destination of these movements is a discursive one; Chamberlain uses these verbs to lead the reader to where he wants their thoughts to be ideologically, for example to ‘recent times’, to a particular example, and to his ideological concept of ‘the centre circle’.

8.3 Justifying the Message

8.3.1 Strategies of Legitimisation

Chamberlain employs legitimising strategies in order to focus the readers’ attention on the content of his ideological messages. These strategies attempt to legitimise the author’s claims through the strategies of theoretical rationalisation based on alleged factuality and evidence, through historical legitimisation, through references to the
future, through comparison and uniqueness, and through the construction of perpetrator and victim roles.

8.3.1.1 Topoi of Factuality and Evidence

The corpus analysis has pointed to naturalisations of opinion as fact in the War Essays and to *Tatsache* as one of Chamberlain’s most essential nominal modifications: this single word can legitimise the validity of an entire statement by rebutting any claims to doubt (cf. Section 8.3.2.3). As Karl Sornig summarises, unmitigated apodictic assertions without justification or proof are ‘among the most direct and brutal ways of handling [oppositional] views and attitudes’ (Sornig 1989: 99).

The following statements are further examples of uncommented factuality in which the author describes preceding or ensuing claims as ‘fact’:

Dieser Ausländer und Neutrale macht hiermit auf die Tatsache aufmerksam, daß in Deutschland eine Verschwörung am Werke ist, eine in der Hauptsache von Deutschlands Feinden angestellte Verschwörung […] (*Demokratie und Freiheit*: 34).

[…] Das folgt aus der Tatsache, daß Hauptaufgabe des Staates offenbar sein muß, das zu leisten, was der Einzelne nicht zu leisten vermag (*Politische Ideale*: 49).

The sweeping description of ideological claims as facts, such as ‘in Deutschland ist eine Verschwörung am Werk’ and ‘Hauptaufgabe des Staates ist, das zu leisten, was der Einzelne nicht zu leisten vermag’ is so seamlessly integrated into the statement that it is quickly accepted, and its questionableness overlooked. Both statements constitute circular reasoning, fallaciously attempting to prove an assertion (e.g. the author deserves merit for alerting the readers to a crucial fact) with an assertion (this ‘fact’ is that there is a conspiracy at work in Germany). This logical fallacy violates
the validity and starting-point rules by presenting a premise (‘the subjective opinion X is a fact’) as an accepted starting point (Cohen 2003: 109).

Where the author deems it inadequate to posit a statement’s factual nature simply by naming the statement a fact, he adds an intensifier to the noun Tatsache, such as ‘diese unabweisbare Tatsache’ (Hammer oder Amboß: 38), and ‘die grundlegenden Tatsachen’ (Hammer oder Amboß: 7). By drawing the readers’ attention to the alleged ‘indubitable’, ‘fundamental’ or ‘irrefutable’ nature of a fact, Chamberlain detracts from the necessity of proving the factual nature of these statements by emphasising or exaggerating their apparently unquestionable validity. He also intensifies the alleged concrete factuality of a claim using allusions to epistemic certainty and to ‘facts of nature’, as in:

Diese Tatsache steht mathematisch fest […] (Ideal und Macht: 20).

Kein Mensch auf der Welt ist fähig, die hier angeführten Tatsachen zu widerlegen; ewige Naturgesetze hören nicht auf zu wirken […] (Demokratie und Freiheit: 80).

The factual nature of the claim advanced in the first statement is augmented by the assertion that the claim is not just a fact, but a fact of mathematical certainty. Unlike ideological speculation and propaganda, mathematical formulae are black and white, correct or incorrect: a mathematical fact cannot be argued or disproved. On a more abstract level, related references to the laws of nature and human nature aim to communicate the same factual absolution. Natural law, as Chamberlain advances in the second example, is infinitely and unconditionally valid; lending the claims he makes the same kind of unconditional validity as natural law makes them untouchable by doubt or argument. This is underscored by the apodictic expression ‘kein Mensch ist fähig, [X] zu widerlegen’, which attempts to justify the validity of X by claiming disprovability.
Chamberlain’s ‘facts’ are commonly linked to evidential particles:

[...] nichtsdestoweniger bringt er eine ganze Reihe ergänzender Tatsachen zu jenen Delaisis und zwar ausführlich belegt [...] (Demokratie und Freiheit: 63).

Denn die große mittlere Tatsache, die absolut einfache Tatsache, für die es ebenso leicht ist, eine Million Belege beizubringen wie einen einzigen Beleg, die Tatsache, auf die allein es ankommt und die man sich durch kein diplomatisches Gewäsche je sollte verdunkeln oder abschwächen lassen, ist diese [...] (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 16).

These statements thematise at once Tatsachen and Belege or belegen; facts and evidence. Chamberlain’s references to ‘evidence’ for the so-called ‘facts’ that he presents, however, are deceptive. As the corpus analysis has shown (Section 8.3.2.3), only a minority of references to ‘evidence’ actually provide evidence: the remaining references are merely rhetorical fallacies which give the guise of providing ‘evidence’ simply by naming the word ‘evidence’. A number of key words for this substrategy were not identified by Wordsmith: beweisen, nachweisen and bezeugen, and a noun deriving from the latter, das Zeugnis. The most frequently occurring tendency regarding Chamberlain’s deceptive references to supporting evidence for the factuality of his claims is the use of passive constructions, as in:

Es läßt sich unwiderleglich nachweisen, daß diese Gefühle alle Schichten der ganzen Nation beseelten, so daß bis zum letzten Augenblick kein Mensch an die Möglichkeit des Krieges glauben wollte [...] (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 8).

The passive construction ‘es läßt sich unwiderleglich nachweisen, dass’ seems to express evidence or proof for the claim made. This construction, however, denotes provability rather than proof; it describes the potential for a claim to be proven, for evidence for X to be found, but they are not indicative of existing proof. There is a
significant distinction between the proven factuality of a claim that states or cites evidence, and the implication that it is possible to prove the claim.

8.3.1.2 The Topos of Obviousness

The author merges so-called ‘facts’ with a portrayed sense of obviousness:

Über die Tatsache der Schuld Englands hätte ich kaum nötig, mich hier näher auszulassen: sie ist ausführlich beweisbar und bewiesen (Hammer oder Amboß: 39).

Here, the ‘fact’ of England’s war guilt is construed as so obvious that it is unnecessary for the author to elaborate on his allegation. Chamberlain combines apodictic expressions of fact and evidence (‘ausführlich beweisbar und bewiesen’), with the topos of irrelevance and implied obviousness (‘ich hätte es kaum nötig’) to legitimise making a cursory, sweeping statement: ‘die Tatsache der Schuld Englands’. The polyptoton ‘beweisbar und bewiesen’ adds to the rhetorical impact of Chamberlain’s claim to factuality and proveability. This statement constitutes obscurantism – the practice of deliberately preventing the facts or full details of X from becoming known – and is a violation of the burden-of-proof rule. Moreover, this obscurantism is strategic; the author does not suppress evidence for fear of disproving his own claim, but rather rhetorically declares the he is suppressing ‘unnecessary’ evidence, calling at once on obscurantism and paralepsis, rhetorically emphasising a point by seeming to pass over it.

Indeed, the author periodically exploits the topoi of irrelevance in conjunction with obviousness such as ‘muß es denn erst gesagt werden?’ (Die Zuversicht: 15) and:

Daß es über eine so fesselnde und zugleich so gewaltsam zum Widerspruch reizende Persönlichkeit noch viel zu sagen gäbe, bedarf keiner Versicherung […] (Deutsches Wesen: 32).
‘Es bedarf keiner Versicherung’ and ‘muss es denn erst gesagt werden’ imply that the claim and the truth of the claim is so obvious that the author does not need to provide any further details. This at once excuses him from having to provide details to which he may or may not have access, and lends the claim in question such a great sense of obviousness that the reader is unlikely to question it. In the first instance, the author is anticipating and countering reader objection on the part of insufficient information or insufficient comment, and in the second instance he once again exploits the notion of the ideal versus the undesirable reader.

Chamberlain’s essays feature numerous implications of obviousness, such as ‘auf der Hand liegen’ (e.g. Deutsches Wesen: 184), ‘ohne Frage’ (e.g. Kriegsaufsätze: 63), and ‘mit vollkommener Gewißheit’ (e.g. Ideal und Macht: 27). These expressions attempt to legitimise a claim by insinuating that there is no need for legitimisation; that legitimisation and explanation are necessary only for those undesirable readers who are unaware or ignorant. These constructions represent the rhetorical fallacy of appeal to obviousness. Here, obviousness is used as legitimisation, whereas implied obviousness alone is only subjective and far from being legitimising grounds.

The topos of obviousness is complemented by the topos of doubtlessness. Chamberlain formulates assertions of doubtlessness in two ways: as blunt statements, and as modal directives. On occasion, doubtlessness is seamlessly integrated into a statement as a modifying adjective, as in:

\[\text{Im umgekehrten Falle ist die Folge nicht zweifelhaft: das Deutsche Reich kann sich — wegen seiner kläglichen geographischen Lage — geschwächt unmöglich halten […] (Ideal und Macht: 21).}\]

Elsewhere, Chamberlain emphatically asserts doubtlessness in the form of directives, and particularly modal directives, such as ‘Daß […] kann nicht bezweifelt werden […]’ (Politische Ideale: 52), and ‘an der Aufrichtigkeit dieser Überzeugung haben wir kein Recht zu zweifeln […]’ (Politische Ideale: 23). The force behind these commands varies: the modal verb können is indicative of a command pertaining to the possibility of occurrence – ‘it is not possible to doubt [X]’ – thereby guiding the
readers’ thought processes. The sentiment expressed in the second statement, however, is more forceful, appealing not to possibility, but to rights.

8.3.1.3 The Topos of History

Chamberlain attempts to legitimise the truth and relevance of his claims through references to history, to historical events, and to historical figures, broadly summarised as the *Geschichts-Topos* that Wengeler identifies as typical of twentieth century German *Kriegsbotschaften* (Wengeler 2005: 226), and a form ‘theoretical rationalisation’ as defined by van Leeuwen (van Leeuwen 2007: 98). Chamberlain presents history as a yardstick of epistemic validity. In actual fact, many aspects of historical study are a matter of interpretation: history consists of dates, names and events, but also of schools of thought and ideologies.

Using vocabulary denoting teaching and demonstrating such as *lehren*, *belehren* and *zeigen*, Chamberlain constructs history as an all-knowing, objective teacher, and a neutral point of comparison against which the truth of his claims can be measured: X is true, he claims, because it has happened before, as in ‘Wie genau hiermit die wahre Bedeutung des Wortes getroffen ist, zeigte die Revolution […]’ (*Politische Ideale*: 34), and ‘wie alle Geschichte es lehrt […]’ (*Politische Ideale*: 96). This is an example of the logical fallacy of affirming the consequent (‘if A then B; A, therefore B’) and as such constitutes a violation of the pragma-dialectical rules of inference.

Chamberlain furthermore utilises historical continuity as a legitimising factor, as in ‘Von Plato und Aristoteles an bis zum heutigen Tage hat jeder Denker in dieser Beziehung das gleiche Urteil gefällt […]’ (*Demokratie und Freiheit*: 68). Such statements seek to legitimise the validity of a claim not by alluding to a state or act in the past, but by foregrounding the historical continuity of which the claim at hand is alleged to be a product. Throughout Chamberlain’s essays, historical continuity is used not only to legitimise the truth factor of a claim, but also its moral merits and immoral faults. The logical fallacy constructed with expressions such as ‘wie heute, so damals’, ‘selbst heute noch’, ‘bis heute’, ‘von Anfang an’ and ‘schon seit Jahren’,
suggests not just ‘X is true because it is historically rooted’, but ‘X is good or bad because it is historically rooted’. This assertion is an example of circular reasoning that fallaciously centres on a double premise, whereby one premise is unexpressed: ‘X is positive because it is rooted in history’ implies ‘historical tradition is positive’. This logical fallacy violates the validity rule (Cohen 2003: 109) as historical tradition is not a valid measurement of positive or negative evaluation.

In reference to the enemy countries England and France, historical continuity is used to legitimise negative criticism:


[…] die politische Theorie Englands lautet seit zwei Jahrhunderten: wir Inselvolk haben nur so lange Macht, als wir Allmacht besitzen (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 19).

In the majority of cases, historical continuity as legitimisation of the negative is used to accentuate aggressive tenacity; that is, an unyielding desire for destruction, incessant and purposeful diplomatic agitation, and obstinate imperialism. These statements attempt to legitimise condemning claims regarding enemy behaviour by equating historical continuity with recalcitrant stubbornness.

Elsewhere, Chamberlain infuses references to historical continuity with positive evaluation as befits his ideological opinion, as in:

Diese Idee muß schon Jahrtausende vor den ältesten uns erhaltenen Zeugnissen menschlicher Kultur erfaßt und dann andauernd von Tausenden in aufeinanderfolgenden Generationen beharrlich gepflegt worden sein […] (Politische Ideale: 12).

[…] hätten unsere Vorfahren sich alle durch diesen Einwurf abschrecken lassen, wir besäßen noch heute kein Brot, kein Gemüse, keine Viehzucht […] (Politische Ideale: 28).
These statements present historical continuity as estimable, associating it with innovation and productivity. Here, historical continuity symbolises admirable perseverance. Chamberlain thus modifies his evaluation of historical continuity in accordance with his ideological standpoint: continuity in relation to the enemy countries is negatively evaluated, whereas continuity in relation to Germany is represented positively.

The positive value that Chamberlain assigns to historical tradition and continuity is most evident in his attempts to construct and motivate German national cohesion, or ‘nation building’. For Chamberlain, German historical tradition is synonymous with superiority, prestige and strength:

[…] die deutsche Heeresorganisation war zuerst eine Idee in den Hirnen einzelner Männer, ehe sie im Laufe eines Jahrhunderts zu dem wurde, was wir heute staunend bewundern; und weil sie eine Idee war, darum haben Tausende freudig an ihrer Verwirklichung gearbeitet (Kriegsaufsätze: 38).

Und auf diesem reichen Boden hat nun „der Geist sich offenbart“ in einer solchen seit Jahrhunderten ununterbrochenen Fülle, daß auch der Inhalt der deutschen Sprache heute einzig dasteht (Kriegsaufsätze: 30).

As illustrated by the statements cited above, Chamberlain particularly emphasises the historical tradition of nationalist institutions such as the German language and military. He additionally foregrounds the historical tradition of ‘Germanness’ (das Deutschum, das Germanentum, das Echtdeutsche), as in:

[…] ins alte echte Land, von wo das Deutschum ausgegangen war […] (Kriegsaufsätze: 82).

[…] doch leben noch große Traditionen aus dem echten alten Germanentum in dieser Versammlung fort […] (Kriegsaufsätze: 40).
Here, historical tradition is associated with the positive adjectives *echt, groß* and *unvergleichlich*. The author is keen to mark not only the ancient roots of the physical entity that is Germany or previously Germanic territory, but also of the abstract human-centric concept that is ‘Germanness’: the author incites nationalist sentiment by advocating admiration of long-standing national German institutions, but also of the ancient roots and perseverance of what he calls the German *Volksseelengeschichte* (*Neue Kriegsaufsätze*: 86).

8.3.2 Strategies of Influence and Coercion

Chamberlain’s strategies of influence and coercion aim to focus the readers’ thoughts and attention on the content of his ideological messages. Coercive acts refer to threats, intimidation, and use of pressure or force. Strategies of coercion in Chamberlain’s essays are any discursive strategies by which he attempts to apply (verbal) force; to charge his statements with particular power or compulsion in order to incite the reader’s conviction. These include the use of hyperbole, intensifiers, legitimising strategies of instrumental rationalisation – the notion of ‘the only way’, the use of path metaphors and the creation of alarm through existential appeals – the topos of necessity and modal commands.

8.3.2.1 Hyperbole

Chamberlain’s use of hyperbolic expressions in the service of coercion predominantly concerns generic pronouns and generic adverbs of place. This is symptomatic of the frequent occurrence of *argumentum ad populum* in Chamberlain’s strategies of coercion; the attempt to exert pressure on anybody who may have different views to the author by appealing to the alleged majority view compatible with the author’s standpoint. The most frequently occurring generic pronoun is *jeder*: an inclusive pronoun which denotes comprehensive applicability to everybody, everywhere. In this context, *jeder* frequently co-occurs with the verbs *wissen* and *kennen*, as in:
Heute weiß jeder Deutsche auf dem ganzen Erdrunde, wo der Anfangspunkt des furchtbaren Krieges liegt […] (Hammer oder Amboß: 38).

Was alles Deutschland seit jenem Augenblick zu erdulden gehabt hat, steht in aller Erinnerung; jeder weiß auch, wie es seine Friedensliebe immer wieder und immer wieder bewährt hat (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 62).

These statements attempt to convince the reader of the truth of a proposition through the logical fallacy *argumentum ad populum*. This fallacy insinuates that a certain proposition is held to be true by everybody, or at least by a significant majority, and that it therefore it must be true. This fallacy crucially aims to strengthen the epistemic status of a given assumption by insinuating that if many people hold a given belief, this is adequate evidence in its favour (Oswald 2011: 811).

Generic adverbs of place achieve a similar effect. The expressions *allerorts* and *allerorten* express a sense of all-encompassing geographical validity, and enjoy particular popularity in Chamberlain’s nationalist discourse:

[…] jeder verkehrt mit jedem unmittelbar an zwei verschiedenen Orten und — über das, was hier verhandelt wurde — mittelbar an drei weiteren Orten, ebenso geschieht es aber zu gleicher Zeit unmittelbar und mittelbar in jeder der anderen Hauptstädte […] (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 65).

 […] vielmehr hörte ich immer und überall davon reden […] (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 25).

Describing the topographical sites in which X is true in inclusive terms of ‘everywhere’ compels the reader to believe that X is true by constructing a pair of extreme opposites that can be easily conceptualised: generic adverbs of place such as ‘everywhere’ and ‘nowhere’ have an unequivocal frame of reference; the reader must conceptualise only simple, black and white polarised concepts, and is thus more likely to engage with and internalise the author’s proposition. This device constitutes
the rhetorical fault of false dichotomy, and violates the pragma-dialectical rules of validity and starting-point.

Universal negation in the form of ‘nirgendwo ein vereinzelter Deutscher’ and ‘in keinem Land’, for example, is also abundant in Chamberlain’s essays, as in:

Und dennoch keine Rache, keine Blutgier, nicht ein einziger Fall, nirgendwo ein vereinzelter Deutscher, der, unbeachtet, fern von aller zügelnden Disziplin, einen schlafenden oder einen verirrten Franzmann meuchelmörderisch überfallen hätte; unter Millionen Einwohnern nicht einer! (Kriegsaufsätze: 68).

[…] darum findet in keinem Land echtes Talent schneller Anerkennung und Förderung […] (Die Zuversicht: 8).

Chamberlain furthermore lends his claims emphatic weighting through the binary opposites ‘everything’/‘all’ and ‘nothing’/‘none’. Key words here are alles/alle, ganz/gänzlich, and sämtlich:

 […] der Deutsche hat Alles getan, was menschenmöglich war […] (Kriegsaufsätze: 24).

[…] alle nur denkbaren Beziehungen […] (Ideal und Macht: 12).


Chamberlain’s predilection for hyperbole additionally manifests itself in his choice of adjectives and adverbs. Not only do his essays abound with intensifiers such as ganz, ganz und gar, gänzlich and vollends, but with expressions of immeasurability and numerousness, as in:
es handelt sich um eine allgemeine Seelenstimmung der Engländer; diese Stimmung erweist sich uns als zugleich verblüffend einfach und haarsträubend zynisch; andrerseits darf man nicht ihre unermeßliche Naivität übersehen, denn das ist der rettende Zug daran (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 18).

Die Idee, Korn anzubauen, zeugt von tausendmal mehr Genie, erfordert tausendmal mehr unbegreifliche Schöpferkraft der Phantasie und birgt in sich für die Geschichte des Menschengeistes tausendmal mehr Bedeutung als irgend eine der gerühmten Erfindungen und Entdeckungen unserer Tage (Politische Ideale: 11).

Hyperbolic descriptions of immeasurability and numerosness aim to cement an ideological proposition by framing the issue at hand in terms of uppermost and lowermost parameters, Chamberlain removes the possibility of any negotiation: beyond and between the extremes there is nothing, thus there is no room for argument.

As identified in preliminary close-readings (see Chapter 7), the sense of emphatic absolutism that permeates Chamberlain’s nationalist propaganda is heightened by a series of affective adjectives and adverbs. These modifiers are used to express force, for example by alluding to brutality and monstrousness as in ‘Die ungeheure Tatsache des europäischen Krieges’ […] (Kriegsaufsätze: 9), ‘Welches ungestaltete monströse Chaos stellt Rußland dar’ (Kriegsaufsätze: 40), and ‘ohne den ungeheuer angewachsenen Einfluß der Presse war es unmöglich, diese Teufelslist überhaupt zu ersinnen […]’ (Die Zuversicht: 4) (in which the compound noun Teufelslist carries strong undertones of anti-Semitism, cf. Hortzitz 1988: 122-125). Affective modifiers are furthermore used to heighten a sense of the ‘horrific’ and of the ‘hair-raising’, for example, in descriptions such as ‘den schauererregenden Beisatz „Mann von Blut und Eisen“[…]’ (Kriegsaufsätze: 86), and ‘verblüffend einfach und haarsträubend zynisch […]’ (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 18). The emphatic force of affective adjectives is particularly effective in lists. Adjectives that fulfil this function are used by Chamberlain to increase the emphasis on both positively and negatively evaluated ideological topics:
8.3.2.2 Stipulating the Readers’ Thoughts and Reactions

The most compelling strategies by which the author focuses the readers’ thoughts and attention on the content of his ideological messages are strategies of stipulation. These strategies function on a rhetorical level as they address the readers in their role as readers, and are concerned with cognitive processes, e.g. understanding, perceiving and learning. In their most blatant form, strategies of stipulation take the form of modal directives. Chamberlain’s nationalist discourse evidences two kinds of modal directives: those which function on a rhetorical level and address the readers’ processes of thought and perception, and those which address the ideological situation and issue instructions regarding how to proceed in order to negotiate a German victory. For the purposes of the present analysis, modal directives are deemed to be coercive because they only entertain one option; there is no room for compromise or alternatives. The modal verb müssen also invariably portrays a sense of necessity. The singularity of the commands discussed in the following is viewed as a coercive force.

Chamberlain also employs imperatives to this end. He expresses these most directly in simple imperative statements rounded off by an exclamation mark, as in: ‘Weg mit französischen und englischen Vorbildern!’ (Kriegsaufsätze: 41), and ‘Der neuen Zeit die neuen Ziele und die neuen Methoden!’ (Kriegsaufsätze: 43). The modal verb müssen plays a significant role here, whereas its weaker counterpart sollen rarely occurs in coercive imperatives:

[…] der weltgeschichtliche Blick muß geübt werden (Kriegsaufsätze: 88).
Dieses Gesetz muß jetzt gemacht werden: Lügner, die den Frieden Europas gefährden, müssen gehängt werden! (Kriegsaufsätze: 11).

Modal parallelisms are particularly emphatic expressions of coercive imperatives, for example:

Will Deutschland als politische Macht ähnliche Erfolge erzielen wie als militärische Macht, so muß es hier gründlich aufräumen und für neue Bedürfnisse neue Formen, neue Methoden finden und erfinden (Kriegsaufsätze: 39).

The construction ‘will [X], so muss [Y]’ juxtaposes the desirable objective (‘als politische Macht Erfolge erzielen’) in a conditional parallel, making the former seem a non-negotiable condition of the latter.

Lists of modal verbs within commands carry a similarly effective coercive force:

Deutschland muß die erste Macht der Welt werden, Deutschland kann die erste Macht der Welt werden, und Deutschland wird — wenn es nur will — die erste Macht der Welt werden (Ideal und Macht: 35).

[…] darum kann und soll und muß und wird es neue Formen des politischen Lebens gebären (Kriegsaufsätze: 41).

Notably, the modal repetition in the first statement is a climactic tricolon; three parallel words arranged in order of increasing importance or assertive force. Although the modal repetition in the second statement has four parts, its rhetorical impact similarly lies in the increasing urgency of the elements in the scalar construction: ‘kann und soll und muß und wird’ orders the modal verbs in climactic order of least to most compelling, starting with the hypothetical verb of potential kann, and ending with the verb of inevitable reality, wird.
Modal imperatives frequently feature in conditional sentences that make X dependent on Y, where X represents the desired ideological accomplishment, and Y represents the means by which Chamberlain believes this can be achieved. The majority of these constructions rest on the subordinating conjunction *sonst*, as in:

Jetzt aber muß es anders werden, sonst unterliegt das politische Deutschland trotz aller Siege des militärischen Deutschlands (*Kriegsaufsätze*: 42).

Indem der Deutsche, ob er es will oder nicht, zu Gottes Streiter gestempelt wird, muß er das Niederträchtige aus seinem eigenen Busen verbannen; sonst schwindet alle Zuversicht (*Die Zuversicht*: 12).

Imperatives additionally take the form of *haben zu* constructions. Although these rouses to action do not contain a modal verb, their mandative force is equally as powerful:

In dieser Beziehung haben wir — und mit uns unsere Rechtssprechung — gründlich umzulernen (*Politische Ideale*: 104).

Paul de Lagarde, den wir als das ergänzende politische Genie zu Bismarck zu verehren haben [...] (*Politische Ideale*: 114).

Again, these commands address the readers’ intellect; namely the necessity of ‘relearning’ X, and whom they should admire.

The effect of these statements is augmented by the directive construction ‘es gilt, [X] zu [Y],’ as well as mandative statements which declare the reader’s duty or obligation (*Pflicht*):

Hier gilt es nun aber, deutlich zu unterscheiden [...] (*Politische Ideale*: 53).
[...] hier wird es dann Pflichtgebot, sich seines Tuns bewußt zu werden: und dazu gehört, daß man seine Ideale, seine Ideen und seine Ziele sich als Bekenntnis, als Gedanken, als Entschluß klar vor Augen hinstelle (Politische Ideale: 21).

Chamberlain therefore uses commands in order to direct the readers’ thoughts, and to stipulate their ideological perceptions. Imperative forms and the use of the modal verb müssen are perhaps the most direct and overt forms of stipulation. Elsewhere, Chamberlain stipulates the readers’ thoughts simply by integrating the inclusive third person pronoun wir and the pronoun man. Chamberlain makes a variety of statements pertaining to ‘our’ knowledge, understanding and feelings, as in:

Man begreift, welche besonders tief einschneidenden Folgen das Verbot, die deutsche Sprache zu lernen, für die Beziehungen zwischen England und Deutschland nach sich ziehen mußte (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 16).

[...] so haben wir in allererster Reihe eine Art physische, brutale, blinde Kraft zu verstehen, welche dieses ungeheuere, gestaltlose Reich treibt [...] (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 44).

Gewiß empfinden wir es hart [...] (Die Zuversicht: 21).

These statements transfer the author’s ideological perception of the subject or situation onto the reader, or at least imply that this perception is mutual. This transfer is subtle, as it rests solely on the pronoun wir or man. In actual fact, the author is dictating to the reader how they perceive (begreifen, verstehen), what they know (wissen), and what they feel (empfinden).

The same applies to statements featuring the verb phrases ‘wir sehen’ or ‘man sieht’, as in:

Wir sehen: damit eine Nation wahrhaft Großes leiste, dazu muß dreierlei zusammentreffen [...] (Kriegsaufsätze: 37).
Man sieht also: erkennen wir in dieser ganzen von Eduard VII. und seinen Kreaturen ins Werk gesetzten Bewegung einen verhängnisvollen, verbrecherischen Wahn, so war doch, wie bei Hamlet’s Wahnsinn, ‘viel Methode drin’ […] (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 12).

The verb *sehen*, in these contexts equivalent to the verbs ‘to realise’ or ‘to understand’, takes over the readers’ independent thought by dictating to them their realisations and perceptions. The second extract additionally violates the argument scheme rule by appealing to illegitimate authority twice: in his discussion of the English preference for learning to speak the French language rather than German, Chamberlain calls on two familiar names that, although figures of authority in their own right (King Eduard VII and Shakespeare, indirectly), do not contribute anything to his argumentation beyond lending it the guise of authority via (irrelevant) cultural reference.

Chamberlain furthermore stipulates the cognitive effect on the reader of the information or claims he provides, or the way in which this information is processed. In relation to anecdotes, ‘evidence’ and intertextual citations, Chamberlain infers that the readers can, should and do ‘learn’ from these:


An diesem Beispiel hat der Leser lernen können, mit welcher Vorsicht und Umsicht man solche diplomatische Dokumente lesen muß (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 83).

Again, such statements remove the readers’ powers of independent thought by dictating the effect that an anecdote, example, or source should have on the reader: they can, should and do learn X from Y.
Chamberlain stipulates to his readers not only what to think, but also what not to think. He explicitly characterises conceptions and interpretations that do not align with his own ideological standpoint as _irrig_ and _unweis_, as in ‘es wäre aber irrig, irgend eine historische Begründung dieses Hasses zu suchen […]’ (*Kriegsaufsätze*: 86), and ‘Nichts wäre unweiser, als sich dieser Einsicht zu verschließen’ (*Ideal und Macht*: 11).

The most forceful negative stipulations of all are those that accuse anybody who dares to entertain a different opinion to the author as stupid:


> […] die Wissenschaft war es, die die Schlachten für sie schlug, die die Eroberungen machte, namentlich aber, die dem Unternehmen einen moralischen Hintergrund schuf, den es sehr töricht wäre gering zu schätzen (*Ideal und Macht*: 6).

Here, Chamberlain’s accusations of stupidity are rhetorical; that is, they address the readers’ intellectual conceptions and interpretations (e*inbilden*, ‘erging schätzen’). The author equates alternative conceptions to his own as intellectually inferior, thereby coercing the readers, who learn throughout the essays to covet the intelligence that they allegedly lack, away from their own views and interpretations and towards those of the author.

8.3.2.3 Journey Metaphors

Chamberlain’s journey metaphors delineate a single route to success, blocking or undermining alternative routes. In the journey metaphors identified in Chamberlain’s nationalist discourse, the path represents a particular way of thinking or behaving, thus journey metaphors can be said to enforce assent to the author’s ideology by
denouncing any other way of thinking by insisting on the existence of one singular correct way of thinking or behaving.

Chamberlain constructs an image of a multitude of paths equivalent to a labyrinth. The labyrinth metaphor is suggested by references to *Irrgärten* and *Irrwege*, as in:

[…] wer dagegen den Blick an den größeren, gewisseren, überpersönlichen Gesamterscheinungen geübt hat, wird nicht so leicht zu verhexen sein in diesem verteuflten diplomatischen Irrgarten (*Neue Kriegsaufsätze*: 67).

Deutschland – zu hohen Dingen befähigt und berufen – ist heute auf Irrwege geraten und zu einem Sklaven des Revolutionsideals herabgesunken […] (*Demokratie und Freiheit*: 72).

For Germany and the Germans, therefore, a multitude of paths exist, but, as in a labyrinth, only one path is the correct one. Accordingly, Chamberlain construes a single correct path for the Germans. This path is portrayed as specific to Germany and different from the ‘French path’, for example, where the ‘French path’ denotes the route paved by French democracy, as in ‘Dieser Weg – das genaue Gegenstück zu dem französischen – ist der einzige, der zum Erfolg führen kann’ (*Demokratie und Freiheit*: 28).

The destination of the ‘German path’ varies according to Chamberlain’s respective ideological concern. In general, the destination or objective is an ideal or ideals advocated by the author. These ideals are, more specifically, ‘new’ socio-political ideals:

Neue Ideale sind nicht auf alten Wegen zu erreichen […] (*Kriegsaufsätze*: 38).

The journey metaphor is particularly prominent in the second statement, in which Chamberlain discusses German socio-political objectives not only in terms of *Wege*, but also in terms of ‘die Erreichung des Zieles’, which can mean both ‘to accomplish a purpose’ and ‘to reach a destination’.

Chamberlain’s journey metaphors often delineate the way to achieve one socio-political ideal in particular – *Freiheit*:

Wir dagegen erfahren, auf welchen Wegen Freiheit erworben wird (*Kriegsaußsätze*: 21).

[…] um so deutlicher erblicke ich diesen deutschen Mann als den größten Mann der Weltgeschichte, sein Wirken als den ersten Wendepunkt auf dem Wege zur Freiheit – denn Luther hat die Binde von den Augen gelöst, die uns Menschen seit urältesten vorgeschichtlichen Zeiten in furchtsamer Dumpfheit gefangen hielt (*Demokratie und Freiheit*: 18).

The coercive effect of Chamberlain’s journey metaphors is augmented by references to navigation (*steuern*), as in ‘einzig Bismarck steuerte zwischen beiden Klippen geradeaus’ (*Deutsches Wesen*: 40), and ‘Wohin diese Fahrt steuert, ist klar […]’ (*Hammer oder Amboß*: 9). Chamberlain’s journey metaphors attempt to coerce the reader into believing that there is only one ‘route’ to triumph: the route prescribed by the author. Chamberlain additionally attempts to make this route not just unique, but exclusive: there is only one correct route for the German people, and this path is only accessible to the ‘right’ kind of German people:

Dieser Weg kann aber nie zurückgelegt werden, wenn er nicht einmal eingeschlagen wird; einschlagen können ihn nur Menschen, welche verstehen, worauf es ankommt (*Demokratie und Freiheit*: 17).

This statement forges a connection between Germany’s destined ‘path’ and the division between ideal and undesirable Germans and readers, appealing to vanity and
the innate wish to belong to the ‘elite’ group (*Gruppenegoismus*), also known as *argumentum ad superbiam* (cf. 8.2.3). By appealing to the readers’ vanity via the innate wish to belong to the desirable elite, the readers learn to covet this alleged path not only because it is the best and correct route, but also because only those who possess the intellectual strength and power of perception (‘nur Menschen, welche verstehen, worauf es ankommt’) are able to journey down this path. Chamberlain thereby unites the notion of German destiny with uncompromisingly singular methods of reaching this and with the notion of the ideal German and reader.

8.3.2.4 The Topos of Necessity

The coercive strategies discussed above additionally function as a solid background against which to herald the necessity of a particular view or action. The portrayed uniqueness of the times and the looming threat and danger to the existence of Germany and Germanness enables the author to exploit the topos of necessity identified by Wengeler to be conventional in twentieth century German *Kriegsbotschaften* (Wengeler 2005: 221). The topos of necessity is coercive because it carries strong connotations of obligation, of moral duty, and the implication of being indispensable; that is, that X cannot possibly be otherwise. The topos of necessity is thus connected to Chamberlain’s unconditional construction of ‘the only way’, and to his singular path metaphors. Although the topos of necessity has a compelling motivational force in itself, the author further heightens its coercive force in two ways. Firstly, he employs the compound noun *Naturnotwendigkeit*, using the concept of *Natur* to add weighting to the existing sense of obligation:

Pairing the notion of necessity with the concept of nature or natural law augments the effect of the assertion that X is necessary as nature and natural law are unchallengeable; they typify the fundamental state of being. Notwendigkeit is additionally modified by uncompromising adjectives such as ‘die zwingende Notwendigkeit’ (Kriegsaufsätze: 32), ‘mit unentrinnbarer Notwendigkeit’ (Politische Ideale: 32), or ‘mit mathematischer Notwendigkeit’ (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 20).

The topos of necessity carries such coercive force because it implies a universal standard of urgency. This force is not man-made, but a natural, moral concept. Being subject to the laws of necessity is being subject to a fundamental moral standard that dictates human obligation or duty from above. Against a backdrop of urgency and alarm, Chamberlain’s assertion of personal obligation therefore seems entirely feasible:

\[\ldots\] berechtigt - ja, wenn die Not groß wird, verpflichtet \ldots\] (Hammer oder Amboß: 11).


8.3.2.5 Topoi of Urgency and Immediacy

Chamberlain employs a number of strategies that compel the reader to assent by instilling a sense of alarm, awe and fear; three emotions that quickly motivate action or a change in thought or behaviour. Chamberlain attempts to substantiate his arguments with the topos of threat to human existence by making existential appeals to the readers based on threat and danger, and personal appeals which foreground human existence and its fragility. This is a form of the Endpunkt-Topos identified by Wengeler to be typical of twentieth century German Kriegsbotschaften (Wengeler 2005: 223), and of instrumental rationalisation that legitimises a practice in terms of
goals and purposes (albeit here where 'not' to end up, rather than where to end up – alleged danger that the Germans will run into if they do ‘not’ to X). These appeals are made against a background of the urgency and immediacy of the present moment. Chamberlain is keen to emphasise the present as a decisive era in time:

[...] keine leichte, unterhaltende Lektüre nach Art des Wells bietet, dafür aber echt deutsche, wissenschaftlich gründliche Belehrung, wie sie in einem entscheidenden Augenblick, wie dem gegenwärtigen, jedem Deutschen not tut (Demokratie und Freiheit: 43).

The use of the adverb of time ‘in Augenblicken wie der jetzige mehr denn je’ positions the Germans in the midst of a unique epoch. The dramatic tension of this assertion is heightened by the portrayal of the current times as transitional, as in:

Man verkleinere doch nicht den Horizont, der sich plötzlich vor uns aufgetan hat! Ich höre viel von einer ‘großen Zeit’ reden; sie ist noch nicht da, sie kommt erst; wir sind in die Vorschule zu einer großen Zeit eingetreten (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 92).

Hat aber die Weltgeschichte große Umwälzungen herbeigeführt, steht der Mensch mitten inne zwischen zwei Epochen, also in einem Übergangszustand, wie das heute der Fall ist (Politische Ideale: 26).

The portrayed transitional nature of the times is critical because it is a unique and significant phenomenon in itself, but also because of what is to come: Chamberlain situates the German people in a ‘Vorschule zu einer großen Zeit’, thereby simultaneously inciting both a sense of critical distinction, and anticipatory awe of the great future that is allegedly nearing.

Indeed, the connection that Chamberlain forges between the present and the future contributes significantly to his assertion that the present moment is decisive. In what Wengeler would call a ‘Solidaritätsappell nach innen’ (Wengeler 2005: 217) Chamberlain advances that the future is dependent on action taken in the here and
now in order to attune them to the seriousness of the situation: ‘Geschieht es jetzt nicht, so ist es für alle Zeiten zu spät […].’ (*Hammer oder Amboß*: 51). This conditional sentence functions through an almost monosyllabic parallelism that expresses authority and definitiveness. *Jetzt* is mirrored by ‘für alle Zeiten’, bringing the two chronological concepts into conjunction with each other, and the threat that not acting quickly enough could have irreversible consequences creates a sense of alarm and foreboding.

Chamberlain heightens the sense of alarm created by emphasising the decisiveness of the present moment by a series of existential appeals alluding to threat and danger. The author reminds the readers that they are living in the midst of a war, and of the danger and precariousness that accompany this:

> […] von dem Augenblick ab, wo die Wendung zum Seehandel stattfand, (hub) auch eine Änderung des im Laufe von fünf Jahrhunderten deutlich herausgebildeten Gesamtwesens [an], die im letzten Ende zu der Katastrophe führen mußte, zu der Katastrophe führen mußte, deren Anfang wir heute erleben (*Kriegsaufsätze*: 47).

The rhetorical impact of this statement lies particularly in the anadiplotic repetition of the noun *Katastrophe*, which underscores the outbreak of catastrophe by repeating the verb phrase ‘zu der Katastrophe führen [mußte]’ in immediate succession at the end of one clause and the beginning of the next. Yet more effective in their attempt to compel assent though fear and alarm are those strategies that combine references to the here and now with direct references to danger, as in ‘die Lebensgefahr des gegenwärtigen Augenblicks […]’ (*Ideal und Macht*: 11), and ‘eine ebenso solche ewig drohende, brutale Gefahr […]’ (*Hammer oder Amboß*: 55). The sense of danger portrayed by *Gefahr* is augmented by the adjective phrase ‘ewig drohend’, which adds to this sense of danger the notion of eternal threat.

Chamberlain’s threats of catastrophe and the unknown are compelled by a dual force: on the one hand, the threat of impending catastrophe looms on the horizon; a vague
force or shadow. On the other hand, this catastrophe is portrayed as approaching with great speed:

 Ungleich bedrohlicher färbt sich der Horizont, sobald wir die Augen nach Russland Wenden [...] (*Hammer oder Amboß*: 55).

 [...] doch geht die hinabrollende Bewegung jetzt so rasend schnell, daß die Katastrophe schon sichtbar am Horizonte dämmert (*Politische Ideale*: 37).

The threatening force portrayed here is at once a barely visible glimmer on the horizon, and the product of ‘eine hinabrollende Bewegung’. The notion of rolling downhill creates an image of unstoppable, uncontrolled movement. The coercive force of this future threat thus lies at once in its looming presence and the uncontrollable inevitability with which it is speeding towards Germany and the German people.

The exact nature of this threat is primarily the threat of the destruction or annihilation of the German nation, as in:

 Ein einziges solches Beispiel sollte, weiß Gott, genügen, die Deutschen den unermeßlichen Wert empfinden zu lassen dessen, was sie in jahrhundertelangem Ringen sich innerlich und äußerlich als heiliges Gut erworben haben — *il y a des juges à Berlin!* — und ihnen die Augen zu öffnen über den Abgrund, in den man sie hineinstürzen will (*Demokratie und Freiheit*: 42).

 Auf der einen Seite winkt eine stolze, würdige, ja, eine erhabene Zukunft; auf der anderen droht ein Ende mit Schande (*Demokratie und Freiheit*: 83).

As illustrated by the extracts cited above, Chamberlain makes particular use of the notion of potential destruction, and of ‘the end’ of Germany, expressed by both *Ende* and *Abgrund*, the latter of which represents ‘the end’ in spatial terms by creating the image of decent into a bottomless abyss. The verb phrase ‘in den Abgrund stürzen’
has been identified by Hortzitz as characteristic of contemporary anti-Semitic discourse (Hortzitz 1988: 129), a metaphorical allusion to what was portrayed as the immanent ruin that may be inflicted on the German Volk if no action was taken to rid it of Jewish influences. The alarm created by the prospect of an end to the German nation is augmented by metaphorical references to the life and death of the nation. This is a form of Wengeler’s Endpunkt-Topos (Wengeler 2005: 223) and is particularly notable in the essay collection Hammer oder Amboß, in which Germany the physical nation is constructed as fighting for its existence in terms of life and death:

[…] auf diesem Wege würde ein siegreiches Deutschland sich eigenhändig sein Grab schaufeln. Und solche Ungedanken hält ein bedeutender und einflußreicher Teil der deutschen Öffentlichkeit für erörterungswert und vielversprechend! (Hammer oder Amboß: 10).

Da ist es nicht anders möglich, als daß jeder denkende brave Mann verwirrt wird und sich an die Stirn greift: Ja, zum Henker! Kämpfe ich um mein Leben, oder kämpfe ich nicht um mein Leben? Geht’s um Deutschlands Dasein oder geht’s nicht darum? (Hammer oder Amboß: 12).

In order to make the concept of the destruction of Germany the national entity tangible to his readers, Chamberlain reifies the German nation as an organic entity with a lifespan such as that of a human being: the personification of the German nation eases the readers’ conceptualisation of its continuation or destruction by relating it to life processes with which they are familiar.

While the First World War was in itself a life or death situation, the kind of existence and survival thematised by Chamberlain is not the life and death of soldiers on the battlefield, but of the German nation, and of humankind itself. In order to heighten the sense of urgency and alarm which function to compel a change in the readers’ attitude or behaviour, Chamberlain refocuses the metaphor of life and death, that is, the triumph or destruction of the German nation (the ‘body politic’), onto the triumph or destruction of humanity. His concern here is not with the physical survival of
human race around the world, but with the propagation of abstract values that he asserts are crucial pillars of humanity.

Chamberlain’s war propaganda essays are interspersed with general references to humanity and human existence, as in:

[…]
die Menschen sind von Geburt frei und bleiben frei: das ist doch ein Hohn auf alle Wirklichkeit. Kein Tier auf Erden tritt so elend hilfsbedürftig ins Leben wie der Mensch […] (Politische Ideale: 30).

The motif of human existence is complemented by inclusive references that address the reader’s status as a human being:

[…]
des Geistes stramm fast bis zum Reißen gespannt hält, wissend – oder halbbewußt ahnend – daß der Kampf um eine Welt geht, um alles, was es uns wert macht, ‘Mensch’ zu sein […] (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 86).

[…] das Leben Kants gilt dem erhabenen Ziele, uns Menschen endlich zu ‘Menschen’ zu machen. ‘Ich lehre, was man sein muß, um ein Mensch zu sein’: diese seine Worte bezeichnen den Mittelpunkt seines Lebens und Strebens (Demokratie und Freiheit: 23).

Statements such as those cited above modify Menschen or Menschenleben with an inclusive first personal pronoun such as wir or unser in order to draw the reader’s attention to their own humanity. Having consolidated the readers’ awareness of their own humanity, Chamberlain then alludes to the approaching decline or destruction of the human race:

Und es könnte für alle Zukunft — für die ganze Zukunft des Menschengeschlechts — verhängnisvoll werden […] (Hammer oder Amboß: 27).
In order to incite the kind of panic necessary for a change of attitude and behaviour, Chamberlain creates a penetrating sense of alarm concerning the future of the German nation and the continued existence of the readers themselves as members of the German and human race. The primary aim of Chamberlain’s topos of existential threat, however, is to alert the readers not to the questionable continuation of the human race as individuals, but of humanity in as far as it reflects the standards and values of ‘Germanness’:

[...] es geht ans Leben - auch an das Leben jenes deutschen Denkens und Dichtens, desgleichen die ganze übrige Welt nicht aufweisen kann und ohne das es für uns Deutschgeborene und Deutschkorene nicht länger Wert wäre, Mensch zu sein (Hammer oder Amboß: 19).

Here, Chamberlain’s primary concern is the ‘life’ and survival of Germanness (‘deutsches Denken und Dichten’), without which, he claims, life would not be worth living, and without which the German people could not call themselves German. The author thus combines the motif of existence and survival with the metaphorical survival of Germanness: ‘Germanness’ becomes synonymous with humanity. It is thus often the case that what appear to be allusions to a threat to humanity actually alude to the threat to humanity as it is conceptualised and represented by Germanness; to the kind of moral human values which Chamberlain proclaims are first and foremost pillars of Germanness. Beth Innocenti Manolescu has analysed the status of emotional appeals in argumentation and observes that, although emotional appeals perhaps ought to be viewed a non-argumentative fallacy of relevance as they rely on emotion and not logical argumentation to defend or promote a stand point, appeals to emotions can in actual fact create pragmatic reasons for accepting premise adequacy and may therefore be relevant (Manolescu 2006: 327-333). Chamberlain’s emotive strategies constitute both psychological manipulation and relevant argumentation: they operate on a psychologically manipulative level because they at
once allude to the exaggerated notion of the destruction or decline of humanity in general, and foreground the reader as a member of this threatened human race in the process, and yet they represent relevant argumentation by outlining logical repercussions of the annihilation of the German nation and people for German culture, thought, and world view.

8.4 Strategies of Dissimulation

‘Dissimulation’ refers to the control of information, censorship or giving inadequate information, verbal evasion, denial and euphemism (Chilton and Schaeffner 1997: 212-213). Chamberlain’s strategies of dissimulation control and justify which information the author provides and excuse providing inadequate information. They cannot be categorised in terms of van Leeuwen's typonomy, which falls short of legitimisation exercised by authorial metacommentary. Chamberlain employs dissimulative strategies in order to focus the readers’ attention on exactly what he wants them to think about, and away from what he does not wish them to think about. The dissimulative strategies identified in Chamberlain’s nationalist war propaganda are strategies of anticipating and countering reader objections, manipulating expectations of perfection, feigning a question and answer dialogue, and overt authorial censorship.

8.4.1 Anticipating and Countering Reader Objections

Chamberlain anticipates and counters reader objections in order to inoculate the readers to counter arguments by naming them himself (cf. Rogers 2007: 51). These strategies are realised in the war essays in two ways: acknowledgement or admission, and countering. Chamberlain’s acknowledgement and countering of potential objections primarily concerns anticipated or hypothetical objections, but also objections that have apparently been raised against the author in real life. Addresses to real-life critics are formulated as follows:

[…] in einer auffallend großen Anzahl wird mir der Vorwurf gemacht — oder wird wenigstens die Sorge laut: ich hätte zu günstig über Deutschland geurteilt […] Diesen verehrten unbekannten Freunden antworte ich, daß die Behandlung dieser Fragen nicht die Aufgabe von „Kriegsaufsätzen“ sein konnte, und daß außerdem, wer zwischen den Zeilen zu lesen versteht […] mich weder für einen seichten Optimisten, noch für einen Schmeichler halten wird (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 3).

Chamberlain recounts criticism he has received from members of the public in response to his writings, his personal stance, and his ideology. However, he is always quick to describe his critics condescendingly: in the first statement, he describes the Germans who do not support his views as ‘mattherzig und „räsonierend“’, whereby the inverted commas around räsonierend indicate the sarcastic use of a euphemism, and that the perjorative meaning of the adjective, ‘grumbling’, is meant. Similarly, he notes that he has received criticism from both ‘upstanding’ and ‘dishonorable’ opponents (‘redliche un redliche Gegner’ (Politische Ideale: 90)). In the second statement cited above, Chamberlain undermines the intelligence of his critics by positing that everybody clever enough to read between the lines would realise that this critic’s interpretation is superficial and inaccurate. Chamberlain thus names objections to his person and his work, and counters them by discrediting the critic. This strategy effectively quashes not only real opposition to the author’s views, but also warns the reader against pursuing any adverse opinions they may have, constituting a dialectical offense by discouraging the readers from casting their own doubt on a standpoint and thereby violating the freedom rule.

The most rhetorically significant admissions and counters are those that feature hypothetical objections. By naming and refuting hypothetical objections, Chamberlain creates and controls potential objections to his ideological claims that he can manage: admitting that his claim may be problematic, or that his perspective is not the only perspective, gives the author a guise of fairness, neutrality and
prudence, whereas such admissions are an effective form of opposition management. The essays which were originally written as letters, such as *Die deutsche Sprache (Brief an E.E.)*, present particularly effective examples of anticipation and countering, as these appear to address the reader directly:


Many hypothetical objections fulfill the same function without the use of a direct address to the reader. The majority of these statements feature an anonymous hypothetical opponent entitled *man, jemand or einer*:

Man wirft vielleicht ein, der Reichstag habe sich jetzt gut benommen? So verhält es sich aber nicht (*Kriegsaufsätze*: 38).

Man weise nicht auf die Analogie im Frankreich des ancien régime; sie führt irre (*Kriegsaufsätze*: 47).

These statements acknowledge the possibility of a difference of opinion by naming it, only to immediately follow it with a counterargument. Objections are commonly introduced in the form of questions, negated imperatives, and potential predictions. It is noticeable that the invalidating counterargument is briefer than the potential objection voiced. The conclusions of these statements are often largely monosyllabic (‘so verhält es sich aber nicht’ and ‘sie führt irre’). The relative brevity and concision of Chamberlain’s counterarguments imply that the objection is so redundant that it can be effortlessly overruled. Discrediting potential counterarguments discourages the reader from casting doubt on a standpoint or venturing an alternative standpoint, violating the freedom rule.
Chamberlain achieves an equally effective counterbalancing act by juxtaposing expressions of positive conviction such as *freilich* and *sicherlich* with rebutting conjunctions such as *aber* and *doch*:


If the statements cited above aim to prevent the readers from critically engaging with Chamberlain’s discourse to form their own opinion, a series of further statements serve to ‘guarantee’ against what the author construes as potential misunderstandings or misinterpretations of his claims, as in ‘Damit will ich nicht sagen, daß [...]’ (*Demokratie und Freiheit*: 60), and ‘ich will in keiner Weise zu verstehen geben, sie seien nicht gute Patrioten, nein, aber [...]’ (*Kriegsaufsätze*: 88). By stating what he does not wish to say or what he does not mean, the author guards against alternative interpretations of claims.

8.4.2 Manipulating Expectations of Perfection

In order to block any potential to find fault with his arguments or ideological claims, Chamberlain attempts to legitimise faults, inaccuracies and deficits in his essays by explicitly stating his personal and professional difficulties and imperfections. Strategies that manipulate the readers’ expectations of authorial perfection constitute a dialectical offense that violates the freedom rule by implying that it is not necessary for external readers to criticise the author since he criticises himself, implicitly ‘alleviating’ the readers from their need to do so.
Chamberlain offers a critique of his own intellectual faculties, admitting, for example, ‘Mir fallen Fichte’s Schriften im Allgemeinen, ich gestehe es, nicht leicht […]’ (Kriegsaufsätze: 26), and ‘Vor einigen Jahren habe ich mich fleißig damit befaßt und möchte mir doch nicht getrauen, heute eine Prüfung zu bestehen’. (Demokratie und Freiheit: 42). He additionally confesses to gaps in his knowledge, stating:

Ob ein wirklicher Bündnisvertrag damals schon bestand, weiß ich nicht, aber so hieß die Sache im Volksmund […] (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 57).

Die genauen Tagesdaten weiß ich natürlich nicht mehr; doch besitze ich Anhaltspunkte […] (Deutsches Wesen: 14).

Although acknowledging that he is not omniscient can potentially constitute a face-threatening act (Chilton & Schaeffner 1997: 216; Partington 2003: 133), the author heightens his credibility here, as absolute omniscience in any one person is unfeasible. By explicitly highlighting the few knowledge gaps that he admits to having, Chamberlain simultaneously manages and controls the probability that the reader will find fault with his arguments. Given the impression that the author had already identified his flaws for them, the reader may assume that it is unnecessary to independently find fault with Chamberlain’s discourse.

The author is particularly honest in regards to the extent of his foresight, as in:


So wenig ich es mit meinen schwachen Augen vermag, die Gestaltung des kommenden Staates zu erblicken, so deutlich erblicke ich die Verachtung, mit der unsere Enkel auf uns zurückschauen werden, als auf unbeholfene Narren (Politische Ideale: 115).
Such ‘admissions’ are deceptively humble. They appear to express admissions of authorial imperfection (‘Wie soll er das können? Ich habe es gesagt: ich bin kein Prophet’), whereas they admit merely a limitation common to every human being: the inability to predict the future. Statements such as those cited above have high rhetorical value and little substance.

On an authorial level, Chamberlain criticises his inability to express himself verbally, as in ‘Aber, aber... wie soll ich’s sagen? ... ich fürchte, ich werde nun doch unlogisch oder gar unförmlich […]’ (Kriegsaufsätze: 24), and ‘Alles, was von Gott kommt, und ich fühle mich mehr als bloß unfähig, es zu beschreiben oder auch nur zu umschreiben […]’ (Kriegsaufsätze: 24). These admissions attempt to block readers’ criticism of the author’s word choice: Chamberlain confronts his readers with the challenges of precise and effective expression in order to prevent them from picking holes not just in his argument, but in his linguistic formulations. The first statement is particularly effective as it resembles a transcript of spoken language with ellipses and hesitation indicated by the initial repetition of aber.

8.4.3 Question and Answer Constructions

One of the most effective dissimulative strategies in Chamberlain’s nationalist war propaganda is the way in which he structures his discourse according to an imaginary system of questions and answers. In order to justify selecting particular topics for discussion, Chamberlain poses questions which allegedly ‘need’ to be asked, or which he posits as concerns originating from the readers or a third party. In reality, the questions the author poses are ultimately only ever his own questions, constructed as universal concerns or the concerns of his readers in order to justify their thematisation. By posing and answering these questions, he controls what is discussed and from which perspective. Erotetic strategies constitute the dialectical offense of responding to unvoiced questions, violating the standpoint rule by implying that the author’s articulation of a standpoint was necessitated by the reader or by a third party.
A key device for the question and answer strategy is the exhortative speech act ‘fragen wir [uns] [X]’:


Um hierüber Klarheit zu gewinnen, wollen wir uns fragen […] (*Deutsches Wesen*: 77).

These imperative statements combine with the inclusive personal pronoun *wir* to posit the question as a mutual concern of the author and the reader. This is a kind of *argumentum ad populum* that falsely infers that the narrow self-interests of the speaker or writer are actually the interests of the people as a whole, (cf. Reyes 2011: 784).

The function of these exhortative speech acts is additionally enacted by statements that rely on the seamless integration of the first person possessive pronoun *unser* to modify the key noun *Frage*:

Doch genug über diese Schmäher auf Deutschlands Ehre; hinein mit ihnen Allen in ein Massengrab ewigen Vergessens, und kehren wir zu unserer Frage zurück: ‘Warum wird Deutschland so geliebt?’ (*Kriegsaufsätze*: 81).

Here, the author not only implies a hypothetical mutual question, but explicitly formulates it and places it in inverted commas, thereby placing words into the reader’s mouth. The same strategy is evident in the following:

Here, Chamberlain at once constructs an explicitly formulated question as originating from the reader, and his answer to this question, that is, his cause to embark on ideological ‘explication’, as ‘owing’ to the reader (‘die Antwort will ich dem Leser nicht schludrig bleiben’). This portrays the author as driven to write what he does by an impetus of duty and responsibility to his readers. Similarly, the hypothetical other denoted by man in constructions beginning ‘man fragt’ insinuates that Chamberlain chooses his topics and perspectives out of a duty to answer questions posed to him by others. This creates a sense of necessity, as if the author were performing a favour for the benefit of a second party, thereby mitigating authorial responsibility for omission of information, or for selective inclusion of information:

Und fragt man, welche Rolle dem Volk als Gesamtheit in der Ökonomie des neu zu gestaltenden politischen Ganzen zukäme, so antworte ich […] (Kriegsaufsätze: 39).

Fragt man mich um ein Urteil über die drei Mächte, die den Krieg verschuldet haben, so antworte ich […] (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 84).

Jinjun Wang has analysed the ‘natural joint of questions with power’ (Wang 2006: 532) and concludes that questions possess the ability to dominate and control discourse because they can control the development of a topic, produce a new topic, or control the old one (Wang 2006: 542). The present analysis has also found that questions in monological discourse can contribute to the construction or propagation of power not just by directing the topic by presenting it from a particular angle achieved by asking a specific question, but by portraying questions as mutual questions, or as the ‘right’ questions to ask in order to gain ‘sufficient’ answers. In reality, Chamberlain has the answers to his ‘mutual’, ‘universal’, or ‘necessary’ questions ready and prepared; his answers are not a response to the questions, but a rhetorical strategy used to justify presenting his pre-formulated answers.
8.4.3.1 Overt Authorial Censorship: Inclusion and Exclusion of Information

Authorial metacommentary and overt sentence structuring are common features of Chamberlain’s war essays. These interjections are diverse and fulfill a multitude of discursive functions. One function is to assess the appropriateness and necessity of including and excluding certain ‘information’. Such dissimulative strategies can be divided into those which justify the inclusion of information, and those which justify the exclusion of information, whereby Chamberlain places greater emphasis on the latter.

The inclusion of selected information is justified partly by Chamberlain’s assertions that they are important and ‘worthy of attention’, a form of Wengeler’s *Prinzipien-Topos*, or topos of codified norms and values (Wengeler 2005: 217). A number of positively evaluated adjectives expressing significance are used to modify a claim, a piece of information, or a source, as in ‘hier liegt der kritische Punkt […]’ (*Kriegsaufsätze*: 48), and ‘ich kann aus dem Ausland einen so gewichtigen Zeugen anführen, daß vor ihm alle Verleumdunge in nichts zerfallen’ (*Kriegsaufsätze*: 81).

Claims to being worthy of attention are particularly frequent in Chamberlain’s essays, as in ‘Hier ist zweierlei besonders beachtenswert […]’ (*Kriegsaufsätze*: 80), and ‘Keine Tatsache verdient nun mehr Beachtung als folgende […]’ (*Demokratie und Freiheit*: 19). Whereas claims to being kritisch or gewichtig are subjective evaluations, claims to being beachtenswert refer directly to relation of the claims to the reader: they are worthy of the readers’ attention. These statements suggest to the readers that they must to take particular care to understand and internalise a certain piece of information. The combination of Beachtung and verdienen is a particularly forceful legitimisation of the inclusion of information: the author’s assertion that a fact or claim ‘deserves’ attention affords the claim itself a merited existence.

It is often necessary for the author to justify not only the inclusion and exclusion of information, but the thoroughness or partiality of his arguments. He thus provides commentaries on the length of time and the amount of detail he attributes to certain claims and topics. With the expression ‘nebenbei gesagt’ and variants of this,
Chamberlain acknowledges the secondary status of the claim or information at hand. In so doing, he provides a pseudo-justification for brushing over a topic, or for omission of detail:

Zum Glück denkt sich der deutsche „Genosse“ bei keinem der beiden Fremdworte etwas. Doch dies nur nebenbei (Demokratie und Freiheit: 52).

Dieses Wenige sei nur im Vorübergehen angedeutet […] (Die Zuversicht: 8).

Daß sich der einzelne Deutsche — einem sehr hohen Ideale gegenüber — meistens unzulänglich erweisen wird, das ist bedauerlich, aber nebensächlich (Ideal und Macht: 36).

Expressions such as ‘nur im Vorübergehen’, ‘dies nur nebenbei’ and *nebensächlich* indicate that the topic at hand is of secondary importance in order to justify glossing over them. These are examples of paralepsis, which emphasises a point by seeming to pass over it. Expressions used to admit the brevity of discussion perform a similar function, such as ‘nur kurz sei noch ein Drittes erwähnt’ (Kriegsaufsätze: 52), ‘So viel in aller Kürze und Verkürzung’ (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 63) and ‘Auch hier wieder nur ein Beispiel, flüchtig hingeworfen’ (Politische Ideale: 15). These justifications by admission are not legitimate, but signal to the reader that the author is aware of the brevity and perhaps inadequacy of the discussion, thereby alleviating them of the necessity to voice their own criticisms. The fallacious employment of explicit authorial censorship constitutes a fallacy of insufficient argument and violates the burden-of-proof rule (Cohen 2003: 109).

Explicit commentaries on the author’s selection and inclusion of information additionally refer to anecdotal or evidential examples in order to prove or illustrate his claims. Chamberlain explicitly acknowledges that he uses a limited selection of examples, while simultaneously creating the impression that he has an extensive catalogue of examples at his disposal from which to derive his evidence:
Es ist immer die selbe Geschichte: 1200, 1600, 1700 und 1900; ich könnte mit Dutzenden von Belegen dienen (Kriegsaufsätze: 51).

Ich könnte die Beispiele vermehren, denn bekannte und unbekannte Freunde haben mir viel Material zugeschickt […] (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 52).

[…] dieses Beispiel wähle ich aus der Fülle absichtlich, weil sich in dieser geschmacklosen Art sich zu vergnügen das Gegenteil des „merry“ kundtut (Kriegsaufsätze: 61).

Here, the nouns Dutzenden and Fülle and the verb vermehren create an impression of plenty, and imply that time and space restrictions force the author to select a limited number of examples from the wealth of evidence available to him. The notion of selection fore grounded in the third statement is particularly important. As illustrated by the performative first person verb in combination with authorial intention (absichtlich), Chamberlain draws attention to the process of selecting which examples, quotations or anecdotes will serve to support his claims:

Ich suche mir mit Absicht nüchterne Ausdrücke heraus; es ist nicht der Augenblick, sich an Phrasen zu berauschen (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 91).

Da ich nun aus der reichen französischen Literatur, die mir zur Verfügung steht, auswählen muß und mir Leser denke, die ebenfalls darauf angewiesen sind, mit ihrer Zeit sparsam umzugehen, möchte ich die Aufmerksamkeit zunächst auf ein einziges, kleines, überaus vortreffliches Buch richten, geeignet eine ganze Bibliothek zu ersetzen (Demokratie und Freiheit: 51).

Such commentaries are potential face-threatening acts of communication (Partington 2003: 133) as they risk foregrounding the processes of subjective authorial selection. The primary effect of these statements, however, is to suggest that the author’s catalogue of examples is so great that he is forced to select the most appropriate or demonstrative ones.
The topos of sufficiency is complemented by the topos of appropriateness, as in:

```plaintext
In einer Flugschrift muß man fliegen; darum sage ich hier kein Wort mehr über die politischen Zustände Amerikas; vielleicht genügen diese ‘flüchtigen’ Andeutungen, einige deutsche Männer nachdenklich zu stimmen und sie zu einer Nachprüfung ihrer demokratischen Neigungen zu veranlassen (Demokratie und Freiheit: 49).
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Here, the legitimising topos of sufficiency (genügen) is paired with the statement ‘in einer Flugschrift muß man fliegen [darum sage ich hier kein Wort mehr]’, using the medium in which the essay was published to legitimise the exclusion of information. Chamberlain’s polyptotonic pun on Flugschrift, fliegen and flüchtig adds to the validating effect by softening the ensuing statement with a jovial lightness. Claims that ‘this is not the place to [X]’ (‘schlecht am Platz’, ‘hier ist nicht der Ort’) fulfill a similar function, as in ‘Weiter ins einzelne der kantischen Weltanschauung zu dringen, ist hier nicht der Platz’ (Deutsches Wesen: 69) and ‘darüber zu philosophieren ist hier nicht der Ort’ (Deutsches Wesen: 44).

In addition to explicit assessments of sufficiency and inappropriateness, Chamberlain justifies providing limited information by stating that he only wishes to make the reader think. The key word here is Andeutung or andeuten, as in:

```plaintext
Ich beschränke mich darauf, von hüben und drüben Einiges anzudeuten; nur Stoff zum Nachdenken will ich geben (Kriegsaufsätze: 16).
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```plaintext
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These statements imply that it is acceptable to provide incomplete information if it serves to incite independent thought on the part of the reader. The author absolves
himself of responsibility by constructing brevity and omission as conditions of independent thought, and thereby the information he has provided as inspiration for an intelligent mind.
Wohl niemals in der Weltgeschichte wurde die Irreführung eines ganzen Volkes so schamlos, so ruchlos und so geschickt-schlau angelegt und durchgeführt wie die Irreführung Englands in Bezug auf Deutschland. Diese Irreführung trägt die Schuld an dem jetzigen Krieg. Von Anfang an ist England die treibende Macht gewesen; England hat den Krieg gewollt und herbeigeführt; England hat die Entfremdung Rußlands von Deutschland bewirkt, England hat Frankreich unablässig aufgehetzt. Möglich wurde diese frevelhafte Politik einzig durch berechnete, systematische Irreführung des englischen Volkes...

Und nun, nach der erlogenen Tatsache des kriegwollenden Deutschland die wahre Tatsache: Deutschland als einziger Friedenshort. Hierüber mag das Zeugnis eines Ausländers einigen Wert besitzen.


Written at the onset of the First World War in 1914, this extract from Kriegsaufsätze details Chamberlain’s opinions on the causes of the war and is a prime example of the persuasive interplay between discursive strategies intended to legitimise the means and those intended to legitimise the message. The extract opens using the topos of history to legitimise an ideological message using apparent theoretical rationality. The claim that Chamberlain attempts to legitimise is that the war was caused by misleading accusations of German warmongering abroad in England. The author does this using the topos of uniqueness in the history of the world (‘Wohl niemals in der Weltgeschichte’); a reversal of the logical fallacy ‘denying the antecedent’ that perverts the (equally fallacious) topos of historical continuity. The perversion of this fallacy can best be seen in relation to the directly ensuing use of the topos of historical continuity, ‘Von Anfang an (ist England die treibende Macht gewesen)’. Here, the logical fallacy is ‘A is true because it has always been so’, whereas the previous example reverses this to become ‘A is true because it is happening for the first time’.
The opening claim is rich in authorial subjectivity and hyperbole, combining the subjectivity marker *wohl* with a dogmatic exclusive adverb of frequency, *niemals*, and a triad of subjective emotive adjective phrases that gain rhetorical weighting with the repeated equal modification *so*: ‘so schlamlos, so ruchlos und so geschickt schlau’. The legitimisation of the ideological message using the topos of uniqueness in global history thus assimilates a strong aspect of authorial passion for the subject matter; an application of the topos of personal authority that adds emotional weighting to the statement by indicating emotional authorial engagement with the topic. The authorial emotion behind the sentence is additionally expressed by its complexity; a sentence dense with words and ideas that follows a subjective emotive triad with two verbs to emphasise magnitude and extent. In ‘Wohl niemals in der Weltgeschichte wurde die Irreführung eines ganzen Volkes so schamlos, so ruchlos und so geschickt-schlau angelegt und durchgeführt’, the extended length of the sentence is a syntactic reflection of the extent of England's ‘misleading’: just when you think you have reached the end of the clause following the verb phrase, ‘so ruchlos und so geschickt-schlau angelegt’, the clause is prolonged and complicated by a further verb, ‘[...] und durchgeführt’; an expression of the allegedly never-ending and rigorous nature of England's ‘misleading’. The actual claim that Chamberlain wishes to legitimise follows this weighty opening sentence: ‘Diese Irreführung trägt die Schuld an dem jetzigen Krieg’. This key sentence is short and monosyllabic in comparison to its predecessor, lending it emphasis and weight by contrast.

A further dominating strategy to legitimise the ideological message here is othering: the presentation of the English (the other) as liars and aggressors, and the presentation of the Germans (the self) as pacifist victims in the outbreak of the war. The statement beginning ‘Von Anfang an’ is characterised by the almost rhythmic repetition of ‘England’ at the beginning of each of the four constituent clauses. ‘England’ is paired in each clause with active verbs of intent ‘gewollt und herbeigeführt’, ‘bewirkt’, ‘unablässig aufgehetzt’ in order to present it as the active cause of war. The action missing from the verb *gewesen* in the first clause is compensated by the adjective *treibend*. A further strategy of othering in the same
sentence is constructed by positioning England as an enemy and counterpoint not only to Germany, but also to Germany’s two other war enemies, France and Russia. By diminishing the role even of her two other enemies by positing them too as victims of England’s aggressive actions, Chamberlain does not so much mitigate their roles in the war, but insulates England as the sole or main aggressor by placing Russia, Germany and France together both ideologically and syntactically as the passive recipients of action.

This strategy of othering is continued in the passage centring around ‘niemals habe ich einen Kriegslustigen oder genauer gesprochen einen Kriegslüsternen angetroffen. In England dagegen […]’. This is a clear example of othering using the topos of comparison, as manifested most evidently in the use of contrastive dagegen to modify England in relation to Germany. Dagegen compares and contrasts two claims. On the one hand, a claim of unconditional German pacificity ‘niemals habe ich einen Kriegslustigen oder genauer gesprochen einen Kriegslüsternen angetroffen’, and on the other, ‘in England, dagegen, fand ich bei meinen letzten Besuchen, 1907 und 1908, allerorts einen geradezu erschreckenden blinden Haß gegen Deutschland und die ungeduldige Erwartung eines Vernichtungskrieges’. The dogmatic absolution with which the author constructs his presentation of German pacificity is constructed using the topos of numbers/magnitude and therewith the rhetorical fallacy argumentum ad populum based on a long list of different kinds of German professional roles that attempts to legitimise the validity of his claim through extent and scope (a list of professional roles that vary in essence; from scholars to artists, merchants to doctors). The construction of the German ‘self’ as anti-war continues throughout the passage, and includes the proposition ‘Außerdem weiß jeder Deutsche, dass er bei der geographischen Lage seines Landes von einem Kriege alles zu fürchten und wenig zu hoffen hat’. This statement, which argues that the Germans could not have wanted war because to actively want war in its ‘geographical position’ (presumably referring to that fact that Germany is as good as land-locked) would be foolish is a coercive stipulation that dictates to the reader as a German what they ‘do’ (i.e. ‘are to’) think (‘Außerdem weiß jeder Deutsche, daß
(…)]’) that simultaneously fallaciously attempts to legitimise the factuality of his assertion using the rhetorical fallacy *argumentum ad populum*.

This same passage illustrates how Chamberlain's legitimisations of his message are so often underscored by or at least intertwined with legitimisations of his authorial self. This passage beginning ‘Ich habe Schulleute […]’ is namely just as much an exercise in authorial self-legitimisation as it is in the accusatory othering of England. Tellingly, the passage begins with the first person pronoun *ich*; a sure sign that the author is about to give way to a deluge of self-legitimisation. Sure enough, the passage abounds with the implicit topos of life experience (‘A is true because I myself have experienced it first-hand’). Indeed, the extract in its entirety is rich in discursive strategies that attempt to legitimise the validity of a claim or claims via personal authority. In the sentence beginning ‘Mir wurde das Glück zuteil, Deutsche aus allen Gauen und aus allen Ständen gründlich genau kennen zu lernen’, Chamberlain uses the double topos of life experience and personal contacts to lend him authority on matters of German politics, political history and the nature of ‘Germanness’ itself. The repetition of the hyperbolic inclusive quantifier *alle* combines with the adjective phrase of thoroughness and exactitude ‘gründlich genau’ to add rhetorical weighting to the statement. This is an echo of the topos of numbers used earlier on in the extract to legitimise the same proposition: ‘Seit 45 Jahren verkehre ich mit Deutschen, seit 30 Jahren lebe ich ständig in deutschen Landen’, in which the consecutive repetition of two high numbers communicates length and therewith magnitude; a discursive device that gains weighting by virtue of the higher number appearing first.

A further strategy of legitimising the means in this extract is the use of the topos of objectivity or neutrality. In what is a cautious tightrope act of balancing between his status as a fully integrated member of German society and his status as a foreigner, Chamberlain asserts that his full integration in and associations within German society authorises him to write truthfully and accurately about ‘Germanness’ and the politics of war, and that this is complemented by his neutrality of perception; something that he, and he as a rare example only, is lucky enough to possess by way of his status as a ‘foreigner’. The topos of neutral authorial objectivity is primarily
constructed using metaphors of blindness and sight, where blindness represents bias and subjectivity (‘Mit Frankreich seit frühester Kindheit verwachsen, England durch Blutsbande angehörig, blieb ich vor parteieischer Verblendung bewahrt’) and clarity of visual perception represents objectivity, a key prerequisite of an accurate and trustworthy narrative (‘die Liebe zu deutscher Art, deutschem Denken, deutscher Wissenschaft, deutscher Kunst schärfte mir das Auge, ohne mich blind zu machen; mein Urteil blieb völlig objektiv’). The use of this metaphor enables Chamberlain to construct a further strategy of legitimisation shortly afterwards: authorisation resting on the topos of superior ability. With his statement ‘von einiger Entfernung erblickt man aber die Dinge klarer als aus der Nähe’, Chamberlain makes a metaphorical comment on the powers of perception to which he as one of few is privy as both a foreigner and as a foreigner integrated in German society on the scale of an optical zoom; with his double national status, he has the ability to ‘view’ the situation both from the inside and from the outside, having access to first-hand details while being able to ‘zoom out’ to the neutral positioner of the foreigner ‘looking in’; a complex strategy of legitimisation by personal authority and superiority that draws on metaphors of sight and perception.

Strategies used to legitimise the author by personal authority are again intertwined with strategies that legitimise the message: theoretical rationality via the assertion of evidence and/or provability. Here, Chamberlain's legitimising strategies of self-positioning are topoi of personal superiority used to justify the assertion that the ideological message he presents may be called a Zeugnis. In ‘mein Zeugnis lautet dahin’ and ‘Hierüber mag das Zeugnis eines Ausländers einigen Wert besitzen’, Chamberlain refers to his ideological assertions as a Zeugnis. Cleverly, the author uses a noun with two connotations, meaning both an ‘eye-witness report’, which tallies with authorial legitimisation via the topos of life experience, but also ‘proof’, with juridicial connotations of testimony before a court.

The noun Zeugnis is a semantic echo of the earlier statement ‘Und nun, nach der erlogenen Tatsache des kriegwollenden Deutschland die wahre Tatsache: Deutschland als einziger Friedensort’. This is characteristic of the way in which Chamberlain thwarts the reader’s sense of epistemic certainty. Calling on
legitimisation by theoretical rationalisation, Chamberlain emphasises the ‘true’ nature of his assertion that Germany is the one and only site of true freedom in the war by contrasting two opposing kinds of *Tatsache*: ‘erlogene Tatsache’ (German as war-hungry) and ‘wahre Tatsache’ (Germany as peace-loving). It is the opposing modifications of *Tatsache* that make this assertion to effective: ‘eine erlogene Tatsache’ is an oxymoron and therewith an impossibility, highlighting the ‘truly authentic’ nature of what Chamberlain proposes as fact: Germany as peace-loving.

The blunt proposition ‘hierüber mag das Zeugnis eines Ausländers einigen Wert besitzen’ is a strategy of dissimulation or information control embedded in the main body of the extract that uses authorial metacommentary to stipulate to the reader how to evaluate the ensuing ‘information’ (as possessing ‘quite some value’). Authorial metacommentary on the significance, value and amount of information that the author provides is characteristic of Chamberlain’s essays and is illustrated in the final paragraph of the extract:


This is a typically Chamberlainesque maneuver, leaving the ideological argument he had been so fiercely engaged with hanging on the power of a rhetorical question and resorting to a strategy of authorial metacommentary to ‘legitimise’ the exclusion of information (‘Ich übergehe darum gar vieles und beschränke mich heute auf das eine’) simply by virtue of admission and the topos of external restriction placed on him by the institution of publishing (‘Ich überschreite den mir zugemessenen Raum’), and by personal authority using the topoi of life experience and personal associations with Kaiser Wilhelm.
8.5.2 Case Study B: *Demokratie und Freiheit*, pp. 7-9


Hin und her pendelt ebenfalls die große Enzyklopädie; die gefährliche Inkonsequenz, die darin liegt, die Freiheit des menschlichen Willens zu leugnen und dennoch ein angeborenes Recht auf politische Freiheit zu lehren, empfinden die scharfsinnigen Verfasser: als Denker möchten sie sich nicht bloßstellen, als Politiker ihrem Programm nicht untreu werden; die Wolke einer zwiefachen Unaufgültigkeit lastet verdunkelnd auf dem ganzen Abschnitt. Am allerauffallendsten benimmt sich Condillac, der in seinem „Traité des Passions“ mit unerreichter Folgerichtigkeit die ausschließlich sinnliche Natur des Menschenverstandes verficht und den Menschen mit einem beweglichen Steinbilbnis vergleicht, nichtsdestoweniger aber diesem Werk eine „Dissertation sur la Liberté“ anhängt, um durch allerhand sophistische Kunststücke aus der lückenlosen Naturmechanik die Freiheit taschenspielerartig herauszwickeln. Dies bedeutet, die Herrschaft der Phrase einführen, d. h. die Herrschaft inhaltloser Worte, unter welcher die ganze Revolution gestanden hat, unter welcher Frankreich sich noch heute chaotisch weiterwälzt, und unter welcher alle Nationen der Welt aus den Fugen zu springen drohen.
So standen sich und stehen sich denn zwei Richtungen gegenüber: die englische leugnet die Freiheit, indem sie darunter nur ein angeborenes Vorrecht der angelsächsischen Völker, alle anderen Völker zu unterdrücken, versteht — im übrigen aber mit diesem Begriff lediglich zur Betörung der leichtgläubigen Massen und der fremden Nationen spielt (denn zu den erlaubten Mitteln des „Macht geht vor Recht“ gehört in erster Reihe die klugersonnene, langanhaltende, nie sich verratende Lüge, unterstützt von jener meisterlichen Kunst der Heuchelei, die englische Autoren darum so unvergleichlich zu schildern wissen); wogegen die französische Richtung sich an einem Worte berauscht, indem sie zwar edleren Beweggründen folgt, die vielgerühmte Klarheit ihrer Begriffe aber auf Kosten einer sündhaften Seichtigkeit des Denkens erkauft, die im Leben zu blutigen Welttragödien und zur Vernichtung unwiederbringlicher Güter geführt hat. Die englische Richtung bedeutet eine geistig weit tiefere und folgerichtiger Erfassung, und — da der Geist bei uns Menschen stets in irgend einer Form den Untergrund aller Taten bildet — so folgt mit Notwendigkeit, daß die den englisch redenden Ländern gemeinsame „Philosophie der Freiheit“ ungleich bedeutendere und fester gegründete politische Erfolge erzielen mußte, als die lärmende, blendende, schwatzhafte des französischen Revolutionsideales.

This extract is a further prime example of the interplay between Chamberlain's legitimisation of his message and of his means, rich in allusions to the metaphor scenario of epistemic uncertainty and the use of the motifs of truth, lies, confusion and language and metaphors of darkness and light, blindness and sight to construct this.

Before proceeding with the linguistic analysis of this extract, it is important to point out that the extract is simultaneously a paradigmatic example of veiled anti-Semitism identifiable by ‘reading between the lines’. Considering the discussion in Section 5.5 of the notion of Chaos as characteristic of contemporaneous anti-Semitic discourse, the closing statement of this extract appears to carry undercurrents of anti-Semitism. This sentence is rich in vocabulary and imagery that has since been identified as characteristic of anti-Semitic discourse of the time, and specifically of Chamberlain's Grundlagen:

[...] überall schafft es nur Chaos und in diesem Chaos schalten die Unredlichen, Unsauberen, die Verbrecherscharen, die überall vorhanden sind, sonst aber in dunklen Niederungen ihr Wesen treiben, während sie hier die Macht an sich reißen und wie Hyänen vom Blute des Volkes sich vollsaugen

Not only the lexemes Chaos, unsauber, and Verbrecher, but also the metaphor of blood-sucking hyenas, which a contains a metaphor comprised of three linguistic aspects reported to be typical of anti-Semitic discourse: the Jews as devouring animals, the metaphor of ‘blood-sucking’, and particularly the metaphor of sucking a nation dry of its blood.

The notion of Chaos fulfils a double role in Chamberlain's discourse. Not only is it symptomatic of anti-Semitism, but also a key component of the author's construction of epistemic uncertainty. This extract demonstrates the various components of Chamberlain's corresponding strategies of legitimation by abstraction on which his construction of epistemic uncertainty hinges. ‘Der Geist’, Chamberlain asserts, ‘bildet bei uns Menschen stets in irgend einer Form den Untergrund aller Taten’,
placing essential primacy on the role of the human Geist (intellect). In the preceding sentence, Chamberlain primes the evaluative connotations associated with Geist in order to cement its essential primacy, bringing it into semantic association with Tiefe and Folgerichtigkeit, two desirable moral values, and later with the superlative descriptions ‘ungleich bedeutender und fester gegründete’ and thereby intensifying the abstract moral evaluation of das Geistige. The emphasis on the importance of the abstract intellectual is repeated later with the claim ‘Freiheit ist ein Gedanke, ist ein Ideal, ein Leitstern, nicht eine Tatsache der Natur’, which emphasises the ideational nature of the subject at hand (Freiheit), adding further emphasis by contrasting it with what it is not, namely concrete (‘eine Tatsache der Natur’). Ironically, Chamberlain relies heavily on the topos of factuality to justify his ideological message, but when it comes to highlighting the abstract ideational nature of the subject matter itself, he rejects the validity of concrete facts.

Against the backdrop of the primacy of intellect, the notion of chaos contributes to Chamberlain’s construction of a metaphor scenario pertaining to intellectual insufficiency. This scenario rests on the portrayed permeation of German society with lies (Lüngengewebe, ‘die klugersonnene, langanhaltende,nie sich verratende Lüge’) and hypocrisy (‘die Kunst der Heuchelei’). The notion of chaos combines with a metaphor pertaining to a ‘web of lies and inner contradictions’, in which Gewebe calls on both the image of a web, and of woven fabric. Both images pertain to interwoven strands and create a sense of intellectual opacity; the inability to keep epistemic strands of information apart, letting strands of truth mesh with strands of lies until there is only one chaotic knot of information and claims. Notions of chaos and confusion recur throughout the extract in differing lexemes and images, including Wirrwarr and verbs or verbal nouns of unstable, uncontrolled movement such as Umwälzungen, weiterwältzen, ‘das unsichere Schwanken’ and ‘hin und her pendeln’.

Where Chamberlain constructs a sense of epistemic chaos in society resulting from lies, these lies, he asserts, are first and foremost produced by a fallacious use of language. Using the topos of definition and thereby creating an etymological fallacy, Chamberlain plays on the questionable semantics of Menschenrechte and Freiheit in
particular as ‘ein natürliches Recht’ using the adjective *angeblich* (‘so-called’) to question the nature of the terminology in allegedly fallacious use:


In the same passage, Chamberlain intensifies the alleged epistemic instability of language and terminology by alluding to the use of these to create *Betörung* (infatuation) and *Berauschung* (intoxication); mental states of unclarity. This is explicitly asserted in the description ‘die vielgerühmte Klarheit ihrer Begriffe auf Kosten einer sündhaften Seichtigkeit des Denkens erkaufen’; a construction that unites the notion of a loss of semantic clarity with a ‘sinfully shallow way of thinking’ and thereby with intellectual ineptitude.

Chamberlain constructs the causal relationship between language, lies and intellectual confusion or chaos using polar metaphors of darkness and light and of blindess and sight. He describes the French revolutionary ideals as ‘lärmend, blendend, schwatzhaft’; a triad that forges a connection between an ameliorative adjective pertaining to spoken language (*schwatzhaft*) and the ‘noise’ (*lärmend*) it makes (presumably both in literal terms of the acoustics of speech, and the metaphorical intellectual ‘noise’ of chaos), as well as the adjective *blendend* (blinding). The intellectual confusion in society allegedly created by the discourse of lies of the French revolution is thus tantamount to ‘blinding’; a metaphorical expression of the inability to perceive where ‘perception’ denotes both the act of seeing and the act of understanding. This metaphorical relationship is reinforced by the expression ‘die Wolke einer zwiefachen Unaufrichtigkeit lastet verdunkelnd (auf dem ganzen Abschnitt)’; a metaphor that lends the immoral traits of ‘dishonesty’ or ‘falseness’ the metaphorical power to ‘cast a dark shadow’. In contrast, what Chamberlain alleges to be the ‘German’ understanding of liberty – the only true understanding of the term – he identifies in Voltaire's *Brief an Friedrich*'(1738):
'sans Dieu point de liberté – ohne Gott keine Freiheit; in deutsches Denken übertragen: Freiheit ist ein Gedanke, ist ein Ideal, ein Leitstern, nicht eine Tatsache der Natur'. In relation to the process of reading Voltaire’s work, Chamberlain provides the commentary ‘dazwischen blitzt dann plötzlich […] die richtige Einsicht auf’; a commentary that describes accurate perception, or, simply, truth (‘die richtige Einsicht’), in terms of a flash of light (aufblitzen).

Meanwhile, amidst a complex construction of epistemic uncertainty, the extract also features strategies of authorial self-legitimisation. In the above-mentioned reference to the ‘true’ German understanding of liberty in Voltaire's Brief an Friedrich Chamberlain positions himself as a cultural translator, not just translating French words into German words (‘sans Dieu point de liberté — ohne Gott keine Freiheit’), but also positing himself as a translator of national thought (‘in deutsches Denken übertragen […]’). Furthermore, the extract is rich in intertextual references (e.g. to the work of Pierre Bayle and Condillac, as well as Voltaire). As the author largely disputes the validity of the ideological content of the references he cites, these references serve less to legitimise the author’s claims using a further source of authority on the subject matter, than to demonstrate the author's high intellectual standing via breadth of reference, thereby legitimising his own authority on the subject matter (positive argumentum ad hominem).
8.6 Summary

Chamberlain’s rhetoric is spanned between two rhetorical poles of tension: an elaborate negative *ad hominem* used to construct the reader, and a corresponding positive *ad hominem* used to construct the author. The war essays are also characterised by a dualistic rhetoric of persuasion that justifies the means just as tenaciously as it justifies the message. Chamberlain’s key discourse strategies are strategies of legitimisation and delegitimisation, which play a central role in both the justification of the author’s ideological message and of his means: whereas the former legitimise assertions of German superiority (the self) and delegitimise England, France and parliamentary democracy (the other), the latter legitimise the author and delegitimise the reader in what may be seen as reader ‘othering’ in relation to the authorial self. Strategies of dissimulation are used to legitimise both the message and the means, whereby their extent and manipulative function is secondary to strategies of legitimisation and delegitimisation.

Chamberlain frames his ideological message by strategically constructing ‘global fuzziness’ in order for his message to be received and accepted with minimum resistance. Using a metaphor scenario of epistemic uncertainty constructed by metaphorical references to *das Innere*, chaos, insanity, and illusion, entanglement, secrecy, concealment, darkness and blindness, and motifs of mutual misunderstanding, ignorance and misleading, lies and misleading appearances, he constructs powerful strategies of abstractive delegitimisation. In what can be seen as an extension of Saussure’s ‘trouble-and-resolution’ hypothesis, Chamberlain delegitimises the readers by positioning them as ignorant and weakening their confidence in their ability to accurately perceive, understand and judge.

The central strategies in Chamberlain’s strategies of self-legitimisation correspond directly to his creation of ‘trouble’ by delegitimising the readers’ epistemic environment. Such strategies rely on metaphors of the author as teacher, sole source of truth, archaeologist, guide, and bringer of sight and light, which combine to complete the metaphor scenario of epistemic uncertainty versus enlightenment that runs throughout the war essays. Chamberlain presents himself and his writings as the
‘resolution’ to the problem of German intellectual inadequacy: where the German people are lost, Chamberlain the guide will lead them down the right path; where the readers as Germans are ignorant and naïve pupils in need of ‘education’, Chamberlain the teacher will teach them; where the truth is buried, Chamberlain the archaeologist will uncover it; where the reader is blind or submerged in darkness, Chamberlain the bringer of light will enable them to see once more.

While using delegitimising message framing strategies to undermine the readers’ knowledge, Chamberlain uses strategies of legitimisation resting on expert and personal authority to justify his own authorial credibility and omniscience. Such strategies rest on the topoi of life experience, superior intellectual qualifications, life experience, foreigner neutrality and personal association (‘name-dropping’). The author also uses strategies of legitimisation to endorse his personal character, using the topos of personal dedication to the subject matter and trust-building strategies.

Strategies of legitimisation used to justify Chamberlain’s ideological message can be classified in terms of van Leeuwen’s ‘legitimisation via theoretical rationalisation’ and in terms of self and other presentation, or the construction of Feindbilder. They call on the topoi of factuality and evidence, the laws of nature and human nature, obviousness, irrelevance, doubtlessness, historical continuity, uniqueness, and the polarised topos perpetrator versus victim. Further strategies legitimise the German cause and delegitimise the Anglo-French cause using the topoi of comparison, uniqueness and superiority. Chamberlain additionally justifies his message using strategies of influence and coercion, which include the motif of one single correct way of thinking, journey metaphors, the topos of necessity, stipulating the readers’ thoughts and reactions, the topos of duty/obligation, and appeals to urgency, fear and humanity.

Chamberlain’s strategies of dissimulation justify both the means and the message as they provide a meta-commentary on both the amount of information the author provides, and the way in which this information is expressed. Such strategies include anticipating and countering reader objections, manipulating the readers’ expectations of perfection, question and answer constructions and overt authorial censorship.

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The following table presents the main strategies, topoi, fallacies and rule violations identified for the two macrofunctions ‘justification of the means’ and ‘justification of the message’ in a systematic tabular overview, as well as the strategies of dissimulation found to justify both the means and the message:
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9. CONCLUSION

This thesis has analysed Houston Stewart Chamberlain’s use of discursive strategies of legitimisation, delegitimisation, coercion and dissimulation to reduce the reader’s critical disagreement space in his nationalist German war propaganda. It has investigated the hypothesis that Chamberlain’s war essays are manipulative propaganda whose persuasive force is generated by a complex network of strategies of argumentation, legitimisation and abstract epistemic motifs used to gain the readers’ trust while simultaneously limiting or removing their critical disagreement space. It has analysed the linguistic construction of these strategies from the dominant use of metaphor scenarios down to rhetorical devices of repetition, answering the question:

(1) What is the discursive role of strategies of legitimisation, delegitimisation, coercion, dissimulation and abstraction in Chamberlain’s discourse and how are these strategies linguistically constructed?

(2) What is the discursive role of epistemic metaphors and motifs in Chamberlain’s discourse?

This research was pursued in the context of a gap in Chamberlain scholarship and a socio-political problem using a tailor-made theoretical framework. First and foremost, the thesis offers the first detailed linguistic analysis of Chamberlain’s war essays in the English language. This was motivated by the scholarly focus on Chamberlain as a race theorist and lack of attention to his war propaganda, particularly in light of intertextual analyses that identify the significance of Chamberlain’s linguistic influence on his National Socialist successors (Rash 2012) (Lobenstein-Reichmann 2008: 444-45). Not wanting to ignore Chamberlain’s infamy as an anti-Semite, the historical contextualisation of the war essays presented in Chapter 6 nonetheless pays due attention to contemporaneous anti-Semitism and to
the relationship between the Jews, liberalism and Social Democracy in Chamberlain’s Germany, and the text analysis highlights probable instances of veiled anti-Semitism in the essays.

The thesis has additionally responded to calls by discourse analysts and psychologists to identify the discursive mechanisms of manipulative political discourse and propaganda (Reisigl 2008: 262; van Dijk 2006: 380; Saussure and Schulz 2005: 4; Pratkanis and Aronson 2001: 341). It has pursued a critical approach to discourse analysis in order to critique manipulative ideological practices as they are enacted in and by discourse: in an age in which propaganda is still used to promote ideas, this thesis has sought to contribute to the awareness of manipulative mechanisms in nationalist propaganda by detecting and exposing some of the indices of propagandistic political discourse.

The thesis was also motivated by the conviction that CDA is an ideal toolkit for analysing not only the discursive construction of ideology, but also discursive acts of manipulation, and that more work should be undertaken to demonstrate this (cf. van Dijk 2006: 380). This aim was pursued by devising an analysis model to address the individual nature of the research project, combining pragma-dialectical theory and methods of corpus linguistics within a CDA framework. The present synthesis of CDA with pragma-dialectics has shown that critical discourse analysts who focus on manipulative rhetoric can more systematically justify critique of institutional ideological discourse using the pragma-dialectical rules for critical discussion and corresponding fallacies. This framework lends itself to the exploration of discourse strategies employed to prevent discourse recipients from assessing the truth, feasibility, acceptability and consistency factors of the discourse.
9.1 Synthesis of the Analysis Results

It has been shown that Chamberlain’s discourse has a predominantly manipulative function. The formal structure of Chamberlain’s manipulative persuasion is argumentative, enacted using strategies of legitimisation, delegitimisation, dissimulation and coercion. These strategies are largely either restrictions of the readers’ disagreement space, or violations of the pragma-dialectical rules of argumentation, or both, and are constructed in particular using topoi, rhetoric and the metaphor scenario of epistemic uncertainty versus enlightenment. The key observation elucidated by this thesis is that Chamberlain’s essays are just as much legitimisations of the author and his essays as they are of the essays’ topical ideological propositions. This implies a two-fold application of ‘othering’: on the topical ideological level of Germany (the self) versus her war enemies (the other) on the one hand, and on the self-referential meta-level of the author (the self) versus the reader (the other) on the other. Attempts to delegitimise the reader and to legitimise the author and his essays largely rest on the construction of the metaphor scenario of epistemic uncertainty versus enlightenment, a scenario that taps into an array of concepts pertaining to the same broad source domain: LIES – IGNORANCE – MISLEADING – GETTING LOST – WANDERING OFF COURSE – HIDING – BLINDNESS – DARKNESS – TRUTH – PERCEPTION —GUIDING – DISCOVERY – LEARNING – TRUTH – SIGHT – LIGHT.

Strategies of (de)legitimisation by moralisation and abstraction are targeted at the readers and act as a springboard for strategic authorial self-positioning. Reader delegitimisation strategies also act as a springboard for strategic authorial self-positioning and are the most complex and frequent strategies in the essays. They are constructed using an elaborate network of topoi, abstract motifs and the metaphor scenario of epistemic uncertainty. In order to frame his delegitimisation of the reader, Chamberlain portrays the war, wartime politics and war victory as matters of human cognition, perception and intellect. Constructing the metaphor of das Innere (the mind and soul, as opposed to ‘external’ material and political concerns), Chamberlain uses totum pro parte synecdoche, illness metaphors (THE WAR IS A SPIRITUAL ILLNESS), metaphors of destruction, polarisation, and vocabulary from the
semantic fields of the soul and intellect to present knowledge, perception and the acquisition of information as the most important weapons in the war, simultaneously asserting that Germany has the potential to win the war because it is intellectually superior to England and France. As fallacies of oversimplified cause, emotional appeals to humanity, non causa pro causa and circular reasoning, these strategies violate the validity rule, argument scheme rule, and starting-point rule.

The concordance analysis revealed that, against the backdrop of the metaphor scenario of the war as an ‘internal’ concern of the mind, Chamberlain counters assertions of German superiority with assertions of German inadequacies, employing a manipulative ‘carrot and stick’ rhetoric of positive and negative incentivisation. Using a complex network of epistemic motifs of misunderstanding, mistrust, ignorance, misleading, false realities, chaos and confusion and metaphors of insanity and illusion, Chamberlain uses delegitimising strategies of abstraction to destabilise the readers’ confidence in the ability of the German mind to triumph in the purportedly intellectual war by creating a pervasive sense of epistemic uncertainty. This is an elaborate form of the kind of ‘trouble’ that, according to Saussure (2005), proponents often create for discourse recipients. Chamberlain’s ‘trouble-and-resolution’ device, however, goes well beyond the level of discursive utterances, creating global psycho-social ‘fuzziness’ (cf. Saussure 2005: 133). Chamberlain confronts the readers with their own alleged ignorance, misinformation and metaphorical blindness, planting doubt about their own intellectual capacities and powers of perception. This strategic scenario is predominantly constructed using metaphors of concealment, darkness, night and blindness, burial and graves, cloaking with fabric, a tightly bound ball of string, intoxication and delirium, and recurring metaphors of theatre, puppet shows and games. Vocabulary from the semantic fields of lies (Lüge), false appearances (Schein), confusion (Wirrwarr, verwickelt), opacity and sight (undurchsichtig, sehen, einsehen, blind) play a correspondingly important role in the construction of this scenario.

While also drawing on the topos of immediacy, of nature as an evaluative yard stick for the moral superiority of truth, and of immorally low transparency, the key topos in the construction of reader delegitimisation strategies is the topos of intellectual
insufficiency. Concrete examples of these topoi constitute logical and rhetorical fallacies that violate a variety of the pragma-dialectical rules for critical discussion, primarily the unexpressed premise rule \textit{ignoratio elenchi} and starting-point rule \textit{non causa pro causa} and circular reasoning). The most significant and strategic fallacious rule violation committed by constructing the purported intellectual inadequacies of the readers as the primary ‘enemy within’ is \textit{argumentum ad hominem} in combination with an appeal to vanity \textit{(argumentum ad superbiam)}, or Wengeler’s appeal to \textit{Gruppenegoismus} (Wengeler 2005: 215). Moreover, Chamberlain’s use of these fallacies does not constitute a rhetorical fault, as conventional uses of \textit{ad hominem} and appeal to emotion do (cf. Cohen 2003: 109), but a dialectical offense: by discrediting the German people’s intellectual capacities and knowledge of the truth, Chamberlain weakens the readers’ confidence in their own powers of perception, decreasing the likelihood that they will cast doubt on the author’s standpoints or formulate alternative standpoints, and thereby repeatedly violating the freedom rule.

This thesis has additionally analysed the role of strategies of authorial self-positioning as Chamberlain’s ‘resolution’ to his construction of ‘trouble’ (cf. Saussure 2005: 113). In accordance with Sassure’s theory, the thesis found that Chamberlain causes ‘trouble’ (epistemic uncertainty and mistrust) in the readers’ understanding procedure in order that he may offer ready-made resolutions. In this instance, Saussure’s hypothesis is so relevant to Chamberlain’s discursive strategies that it should be quoted in full:

\begin{quote}
The addressee is led to believe the speaker’s word, since it is communication to solve the double-bind, which it thought to be due to the hearer’s incompetence but which is in fact created by the manipulator himself. The hearer abandons some of his cognitive abilities for the sake of higher values presented by a discourse originating from a seemingly higher intellect. This way, the addressee is in a position of moral, intellectual and psychological dependence towards the speaker, who in turn appears as a saviour, a genius, a ‘God-like’ being (Saussure 2005: 134).
\end{quote}
While positioning his readers as ignorant, Chamberlain offers a solution in the form of himself as knowledge provider and his essays as knowledge. In his metaphor scenario, the author is teacher, provider of truth and facts, ‘archeologist’ of truth, bringer of light, bringer of sight to the (metaphorically) blind, and guide to the lost, all of which rest of the topoi of authority and resolution. In addition to authorial meta-commentary, speech acts of recommendation, instruction and request, and extensive use of vocabulary from the semantic field of truth and factuality (wahr, Wahrheit, Wirklichkeit, Tatsachen, eigentlich), this scenario is constructed using an elaborate network of metaphors. Key metaphors employed here are teaching metaphors including the (non-inclusive) first person pronouns wir/uns, metaphors of discovery, exploration and penetrating the surface, metaphors of light and dark/night and day (DARKNESS IS EPISTEMIC OBSCURITY, LIGHT IS INTELLECTUAL ENLIGHTENMENT/EPISTEMIC CLARITY), metaphors of sight and blindness (SIGHT IS ACCURATE PERCEPTION, BLINDNESS IS IGNORANCE/NAIVETY), including optical metaphors of distance and sharpness of vision, and journey metaphors featuring verbs of physical progression (kommen, verweilen, gelangen zu). This major metaphor scenario constructs a strategy of delegitimising abstraction, an example of indirect argumentum ad hominem that attempts to justify Chamberlain’s ideological statements by presenting the author as the solution to the readers’ epistemic problems, thereby justifying the message by justifying the means. As is also true of Chamberlain’s delegitimisation of the readers, this elaborately constructed argumentum ad hominem, albeit positive in this case, functions as a dialectical offense that violates the freedom rule by presenting the author and therewith the statements he makes as the solution to the problems that he himself has strategically constructed.

The thesis has also shown that Chamberlain uses language to create the illusion of freedom of thought while reducing critical disagreement space firstly by counteracting trust-building strategies with strategies of dissimulation, and secondly using fallacious strategies of legitimisation and delegitimisation and strategies of influence and coercion to justify his message. Chamberlain’s trust-building strategies create a false sense of reassurance by convincing the readers that he fulfills their
dialectical standards (benevolence and good will, sincerity, trustworthiness, and expertise). Using strategies of legitimisation by personal and expert authority, Chamberlain endorses his authorial character and credibility. This resonates with Wengeler’s concept of authorial Selbstinszinierung, which specifies an emphasis on the author’s responsible and pacifistic nature in particular (Wengeler 2005: 216), while also far exceeding it. The results correspond to the theories advanced by Perloff (2010) and O’Keefe (2002) that proponent credibility is established by accentuating authority (Perloff 2010: 159), expertise (O’Keefe 2002: 182; Perloff 2010: 167), education, occupation and experience (O’Keefe 2002: 184), knowledge bias (Perloff 2010: 171) and reporting bias (Perloff 2010: 174). As manifestations of positive argumentum ad hominem, appeals to illegitimate authority and argumentum ad superbiam (emotional appeals to flattery or vanity), these strategies violate the pragma-dialectical rules of freedom, relevance, and argumentation scheme.

The author legitimises his expertise on Germany, England, and France using specific forms of the general topos of authority: intellectual qualifications, excellent memory, personal association with prestigious political, military and intellectual contacts, life experience and foreigner objectivity/neutrality. These strategies of legitimisation are constructed against a backdrop of egocentric references to the author’s hic et nunc in general, and to the act of writing in particular, which draw the readers’ attention to the man behind the pen. Strategies that aim to endorse author credibility are constructed using metaphors of a photographic memory, authorial interjections, personal anecdotes, and performative and assertive speech acts. They also rely on the author’s demonstration of polyglot language skills and encyclopedic knowledge, conveyed using intertextual references and etymological expositions and by integrating foreign language quotations in English, French and Latin into his writing with and without his own translations.

Chamberlain’s endorsement of authorial credibility is complemented by strategies that aim to endorse his authorial character (personal authority). As identified by Stiff and Mongeau and Perloff as key proponent characteristics, Chamberlain establishes trustworthiness of character and similarity with the readers (Stiff & Mongeau 2003: 119-121; Perloff 2010: 176; O’Keefe 2002:199). His trust-building strategies include
the topos of personal dedication to or passion for the subject matter, constructed using subjectivity markers such as minor sentence interjections and exclamatives, affective adjective phrases, lists of affective adjectives, and stark expressions of personal evaluation. He additionally attempts to win the readers’ trust using linguistic creativity and familiarity by integrating traditional idiomatic sayings and aphorisms as well as modified aphorisms into his essays that carry connotations of timeless wisdom, tradition and familiarity: gnomic sayings are familiar to most readers, creating a sense of trust. By using these, the author positions himself as ‘one of them’, lessening the status gap between himself and the readers and enhancing his personal accessibility.

Authorial meta-commentary also plays a key role in the creation of trust. By addressing (rhetorical) requests to the readers to make a statement or to use certain linguistic formulations, Chamberlain constructs a semblance of dialogicity that flatters his readers by giving them the impression that they have some kind of influence on his writing. The author furthermore gains the readers’ trust through the topos of authorial good will (see Perloff 2010: 167): using and the verb andeuten and the derived noun Andeutung, Chamberlain implies that he wishes to inspire the readers’ independent thought, rather than to present them with a fait accompli. The readers consider themselves in the hands of a trustworthy and credible author who provides them only with the basic information in order that they may use his Andeutungen to form their own thoughts and opinions.

The trust and reassurance thus created are undermined by his use of information-controlling strategies of dissimulation. Although the author gives the reader the impression that they can trust him as a benevolent expert who wishes to incite their independent thought, the meta-commentaries surrounding the author’s ideological statements tightly control the information the readers receive. Strategies of dissimulation to this end are anticipating and countering reader objections, manipulating expectations of authorial perfection, fallacious question and answer constructions, overt authorial censorship, and explicit legitimisations of the inclusion and exclusion of information.
Strategies of anticipating and countering reader objections suggest possible objections to the author’s person and his work, and counter them by discrediting the critic using the topoi of ridiculousness and careful aforethought, both of which violate the relevance rule as examples of ad hominem (in the latter case positive ad hominem). Furthermore, they represent dialectical offenses that violate the freedom rule by discouraging the readers from casting their own doubt on a standpoint. Using rhetorical admissions, rhetorical questions, sarcasm, addresses to the reader, generic pronouns (e.g. man, jemand, einer) and juxtaposing expressions of positive conviction such as freilich and sicherlich with rebutting conjunctions such as aber and doch, Chamberlain creates and controls potential objections to his ideological claims by giving voice to objections that he can manage. Admitting that his claims may be problematic or that his perspective is not the only perspective gives the author a guise of fairness, neutrality and prudence, whereas, in fact, such admissions are an effective form of opposition management. This is what Rogers calls ‘innoculating the audience’ to counter arguments by naming downside arguments yourself (Rogers 2007: 51). The device quashes any real opposition to the author’s views and warns readers against pursuing any adverse opinions they may have.

Strategies of dissimulation that manipulate the readers’ expectations of perfection attempt to legitimise the author’s faults, inaccuracies and deficits by explicitly stating his personal and professional difficulties and imperfections. This strategy is constructed using the topos of institutional restrictions (censorship) and human limitation. As a dialectical fallacy of unvoiced objections and a hybrid rhetorical fault comprising positive ad hominem and emotional appeal (appeal to the readers’ humanity), it violates the freedom rule, the standpoint rule, and relevance rule. It is constructed using admissions, humiliative acknowledgements of authorial imperfection, and linguistic reflexivity. Chamberlain particularly criticises his inability to express himself verbally, thereby blocking reader criticism of his word choice: by confronting his readers with the challenges of precise and effective expression, he prevents them from criticising not just his arguments, but his linguistic formulations. References to the hindrances and restrictions imposed by the institutions of writing and publishing furthermore allow him to attribute missing or
inadequate information to external restrictions beyond his control. By describing selected faults, the author appears honest and self-critical, thereby seeming to alleviating the readers of the necessity to criticise him themselves. Confronted with the impression that the author is honest regarding his own flaws, the readers believe it is unnecessary to find fault with his discourse as he has seemingly identified his faults for them.

Question and answer constructions are a further form of Chamberlain’s information management. Calling on the topoi of duty and responsibility to the reader and universal relevance, Chamberlain posits the questions that correspond to the ideological statements he wishes to make as universal concerns, and his ‘endeavour’ to answer these questions as ‘owing’ to the reader. As a dialectical offense, the fallacies of unasked questions and speaking on behalf of a silent antagonist violate the starting point rule and the freedom rule. The primary linguistic means used to construct this strategy are variations on the exhortative speech act ‘fragen wir uns [X]’, erotetic constructions, and the use of inverted commas to construct a question as originating from the reader, or from a third party. Ultimately, the questions the author poses are only ever his own questions, allowing him to control who is discussing what and from which perspective.

Chamberlain’s most direct strategy of dissimulation is overt authorial censorship. As fallacies of obscurantism and insufficient argument, the topological construction of this strategy violates the burden-of-proof rule. Using the topoi of appropriateness, sufficiency, (ir)relevance and worthiness (of attention), the author legitimises the inclusion or exclusion of ‘information’ and the thoroughness and/or partiality of his arguments. The strategy of overt authorial censorship furthermore calls on the topoi of modest intentions and the availability of an abundance of (hypothetical) further evidence.

Secondly, Chamberlain uses fallacious strategies of legitimisation and delegitimisation to imply that his ideological message and argumentation are true and correct. The author’s contrastive legitimisation of the self and corresponding delegitimisation of the other on the topical level is fallacious because it relies on the
topoi of the superiority and uniqueness of ‘Germanness’ and the inferiority of ‘un-Germanness’, the topoi of divine endorsement, history, and victim versus aggressor. These topoi constitute rhetorical faults of false dichotomy, unexpressed premise, appeal to God and appeal to history, and violate the validity rule, starting-point rule, relevance rule, argument scheme rule, and unexpressed premise rule. They are constructed using a variety of metaphors, including metaphors of height, good and evil, shadow and light, murder and the scaffold, poison and bodily illness, woodworm, trees/plants and sterility, architectural metaphors, the reification of un-Germanness as a monster, and personification of the German language as guardian and conquerer. They additionally rely on the use of ameliorative lexical priming, metonymy, speech acts of blaming and accusing, dubitative rhetorical questions and exclamations, hyperbolic universal negation, particular affirmation, contrastive conjunctions, and polarisation.

The strategies Chamberlain uses to justify his general ideological message above and beyond German superiority are equally as fallacious. These call on legitimising strategies of theoretical rationalisation that found a statement on truth, or ‘the way things are’. These strategies are constructed using the topoi of factuality, evidence and provability, natural law, obviousness, doubtlessness, irrelevance and history, constructed using an array of apodictic expressions (e.g. Tatsache, Tatsachen, Belege, belegen, beweisen, nachweisen, bezeugen, Zeugnis), paralepsis, adverbs of conviction such as gewiss and offenbar, modal directives, negated generic pronouns, negated adverbs of time and place, and inclusive universal affirmation. As logical faults of circular reasoning and affirming the consequent/denying the antecedent, and as rhetorical faults of appeal to obviousness, emotional appeal to alarm and humanity, ad populum and obscurantism, these strategies violate the starting-point rule, the validity rule, the relevance rule, and the burden-of-proof rule.

A number of strategies that Chamberlain uses to legitimise his ideological message were found to be coercive, and are thereby fallacious by default. Chamberlain’s ‘legitimising’ strategies of coercion call on the topoi of threat/danger (Endpunkt), urgency and immediacy, ‘the only way’, necessity, obligation, and nature. These topoi constitute the rhetorical faults of appeal to emotion, false dichotomy and appeal
to illegitimate authority, and violate the pragma-dialectical rules of relevance, argument scheme and starting-point. These strategies of coercion are partly constructed by combining reifications of the German nation as an organic entity with references to humanity and human existence (Menschen/Menschenleben), including first person pronouns such as wir and unser, and metaphors of life and death. Chamberlain appeals to the reader on a human level using the topos of existential threat. Uses of this topos constitute emotional appeals to alarm, fear and awe; three emotions that can quickly motivate action or a reorientation of thought or behaviour. Strategies of coercion also rely on the extensive use of hyperbole, including intensifiers, expressions of immeasurability and numerosness, universal affirmation using generic pronouns (jeder), generic adverbs (alles/alle, ganz/gänzlich and sämtlich) and generic adverbs of place (allerorts/allertorten). Hyperbole is particularly effective when it occurs in the form of binary opposites (alles/nichts immer/nie), creating polarisation. Using journey metaphors and corresponding vocabulary pertaining to paths, movement, destinations, labyrinths, and guiding, Chamberlain constructs the notion of one single correct way of thinking in terms of the assertion that there is one sole path leading to the desired destination or to achieving the desired objective. By delineating a single route to success, Chamberlain blocks or undermines alternative ‘routes’.

9.2 Methodological Limitations

It is acknowledged that the methodological approach and procedure were subject to limitations, and as such were not flawless. The first limitation concerns historical contextualisation, which proved a challenge for a non-historian. It was particularly difficult to complete a non-interpretative account of Chamberlain’s historical context and to avoid sourcing selective information that corresponded to prior knowledge of his ideology and work.

With hindsight, the construction of the secondary corpus was a flaw in the conception of the thesis. Consisting only of the discourse of one contemporaneous writer, the secondary corpus acted merely as a comparison corpus and not as a
representative reference corpus. In order to really ascertain the linguistic peculiarities of Chamberlain’s discourse, it would have been more fruitful to use a larger contemporaneous corpus of general discourse as a control; for example the corpus resources available at the Institut für deutsche Sprache, or the DWDS corpus (Digitales Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache).

In addition, the analysis may have benefitted from beginning with a corpus analysis: as it is, the pre-reading stage may have led to intuitive bias regarding salient motifs, metaphors and linguistic tendencies. Although corpus investigations depend on human agency to a certain extent, making it difficult to rule out interpretative bias in the selection and analysis of concordance lines, for example, the analysis may prove more objective if it were based on and guided by frequency and collocation statistics from the outset were this research to be repeated. It is also acknowledged that the concordance analysis was limited: selecting certain keywords for concordance analysis inevitably narrowed the research focus onto certain discursive phenomena and neglected other phenomena that may have complemented the analysis results, but that also may have challenged them. In defence of the approach taken, however, the qualitative analysis addressed a broad range of salient words and linguistic devices, and the results of this analysis confirmed and complements the results of the corpus analysis.

9.3 Contribution to Knowledge and Directions for Further Research

The research documented in this thesis makes a three-fold contribution to the body of knowledge within the areas of study. Firstly, it makes a contribution to Chamberlain scholarship by demystifying a number of (albeit not all) discursive mechanisms of manipulation at work in his war essays. Secondly, it has shown that combining CDA with pragma-dialectics is an effective methodological approach to developing a systematic typology of discursive strategies of manipulation. Finally, this research contributes to the body of scholarship that strives to understand the workings of propaganda. It has done this by ascertaining a promising focus on the interplay of the strategic dichotomy ‘justifying the message’ versus ‘justifying the means’, and,
within the latter, of the strategic interplay between author positioning and reader positioning. The revelation that strategies of recipient positioning can play an equally significant role in manipulative political discourse as author positioning is a compelling insight into the discursive mechanisms of manipulation in politics. Furthermore, this thesis has not only shed light on the general significance of reader or audience positioning in Chamberlain’s war propaganda, but more specifically on the manipulative function of reader delegitimisation via the creation of global fuzziness. Analysing strategies of reader delegitimisation could expand the scope of critical discourse analysis, thus the present research has unearthed a promising avenue for future research for critical discourse analysts interested in the mechanisms of manipulation in ideological discourse.

In future, it could prove worthwhile to investigate manipulative strategies of reader delegitimisation in other political discourse. Most immediately in the discourse of Adolf Hitler as an alleged ideological and linguistic successor to Chamberlain, but also beyond the discourse of nationalism and fascism, extending to any political discourse of dominance and power that addresses a mass audience or readership. Such research should aim to confirm or disprove the status of reader delegitimisation as a stable characteristic of manipulative political discourse, and to investigate potential further strategies of reader delegitimisation besides the creation of global fuzziness. In exploring the status of reader delegitimisation as a characteristic of manipulative political discourse, a diachronic study of, for example, twentieth century war essays, could make a particularly important contribution to knowledge.
APPENDIX A: Keyword Lists

Positive Keywords in the Primary Corpus

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APPENDIX B: Keywords in Context (KWIC)

<table>
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<th>ich</th>
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Oskar Meyer. Der Verfasser zeigt, daß zu allen Zeiten Deutschland mehr wahre Freiheit genoß als England; in England ist die Freiheit Schein, in Deutschland ganz vorzügliche Schrift, die dieser Tage erschien, warum zu empfehlen: "Deutsche Freiheit und englischer Parliamentarismus" von Professor Arnold Oskar Meyer. Der

Einzelnen zu Gunsten Aller einzuschränken, so hieße ein Bekenntnis kurzweg zu „Freiheit“ einfach die Verkündigung der Anarchie: soweit dachten diese Leute aber

und ihre Erfinder schreiten sofort zu Unterdrückung, Massenmord und Völkerkrieg. Freiheit im Munde des Franzosen und aller von ihm Belehrten besitzt überhaupt

Zeiten Deutschland mehr wahre Freiheit genoß als England; in England ist die Freiheit Schein, in Deutschland Wirklichkeit. Im Laufe des 19. Jahrhunderts — aufmerksam: „In allen Regierungsformen, wie sie auch heißen, existieren Freiheit und Knechtschaft zugleich polarisch.“ Der dauerhafteste Staat wird

Kopf und Herz von Millionen gefunden haben: und so zeugte denn das Feldgeschrei „Freiheit“ die Guillotine, das Feldgeschrei „Gleichheit“ die Proskriptionen, das

Eingang finden, sich notwendigerweise stets einstellen wird. Die sogenannte „Freiheit“ löst die Menschen in Atome auf, die „Gleichheit“ macht sie zu

hell zu erleuchten: er unterscheidet zwischen „Mensch als Natur“ und „Mensch als Freiheit“: da haben wir die zwei Horizonte, und sowohl Politiker als Historiker

Hat die höhere Bildung des Mittelstandes, namentlich aber die angeerbte innere Freiheit, die den Deutschen auszeichnet, jener verhängnisvollen Wirkung bisher

grenzt“ erreichbar vorgestellt werden kann; dem Menschen unbegrenzte moralische Freiheit zu sichern, wäre die höchste Errungenschaft eines starken, streng
eines starken, streng gegliederten Staates; nirgends wird von jeher wahre Freiheit so schlecht geschützt wie in allen demokratischen Staaten. Diesen Begriff
können der Staat von innen aus umgestaltet und durch weise Begrenzung wahre Freiheit erst möglich gemacht werden; vor Allem: dort das uralte Vorurteil, die
französischen Revolution. In den drei Worten „Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité“ — Freiheit, Gleichheit, Brüderlichkeit — scheint zunächst nichts Gefährliches zu l
Freiheit der Wissenschaft ist ein kostbares Gut; Freiheit der Lüsternheit, Freiheit des Betruges, Freiheit der Ausbeutung, Freiheit des Widerchristentums,
solche Gedanken ist im Glaubensbekenntnis des Materialismus kein Platz; die „Freiheit“, die so laut gepriesen wird, ist die Freiheit, Menschen zu knechten;
in vernünftige Möglichkeiten. Goethe sagt einmal, was wir Menschen Freiheit nennen, ist nichts anderes als „verworrene Willkür“; er hat recht; wir
nach außen die Grenzen der 104 Herrschaft, so nach innen die Grenzen der Freiheit festzustellen und zu bewachen. Diese Worte schreibe ich im Sinne
wäre. Für das, was er Freiheit nennt, hat der Engländer seine wirkliche, innere Freiheit — diejenige, die er zur Zeit seiner absoluten Monarchen, eines Heinrich
er aber bei dem, was er in Amerika entdeckt, dem Lande demokratischer Freiheit, wo er sechsjährige Knaben zwölf Stunden Fabrikarbeit leisten sieht!
Leistungen bleiben muß. In Frankreich glaubten die 73 Bürger auf Freiheit, Gleichheit und Brüderlichkeit zuzusteuern, und sie sind bei einer
<table>
<thead>
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<th>KWIC</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>jeglichen Staates aufhebt. — Nicht in Wahrheit größer, doch mehr in die Augen fallend, ist die Stupidität der zweiten Behauptung: „Tous les hommes sont gleich sind, cela crève les yeux, wie der Franzose sagt, „es drückt die Augen ein“.</td>
<td>jeglichen Staates aufhebt. — Nicht in Wahrheit größer, doch mehr in die Augen fallend, ist die Stupidität der zweiten Behauptung: „Tous les hommes sont gleich sind, cela crève les yeux, wie der Franzose sagt, „es drückt die Augen ein“.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>das Fiasko des Revolutionsideals ist zu offenkundig; man braucht bloß die Augen aufzutun und um sich zu blicken. Wenige aber dringen bis zu den Ursachen</td>
<td>das Fiasko des Revolutionsideals ist zu offenkundig; man braucht bloß die Augen aufzutun und um sich zu blicken. Wenige aber dringen bis zu den Ursachen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>denkenden Mensch; doch schwebt das Künftige ebenso unfaßbar vor unseren Augen wie etwa der noch nicht 44 siegreich durchgedrungene Ackerbau in der</td>
<td>denkenden Mensch; doch schwebt das Künftige ebenso unfaßbar vor unseren Augen wie etwa der noch nicht 44 siegreich durchgedrungene Ackerbau in der</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Staaten leben aus dem selben Grunde in kaum unterbrochener Anarchie, und wer Augen zum Sehen hat, bezweifelt wohl nicht, daß die Vereinigten Staaten und die</td>
<td>Staaten leben aus dem selben Grunde in kaum unterbrochener Anarchie, und wer Augen zum Sehen hat, bezweifelt wohl nicht, daß die Vereinigten Staaten und die</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>hat das Gift dieser drei Worte von Land zu Land weitergewirkt: unter unseren Augen geht Italien daran zu Grunde, die anderen Mittelmeerländer sind bedroht,</td>
<td>hat das Gift dieser drei Worte von Land zu Land weitergewirkt: unter unseren Augen geht Italien daran zu Grunde, die anderen Mittelmeerländer sind bedroht,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>wie ich es jetzt zu tun versuchte, damit eine Tatsache sofort in die Augen springe: im gegenwärtigen Augenblick ist Deutschland allein unter allen</td>
<td>wie ich es jetzt zu tun versuchte, damit eine Tatsache sofort in die Augen springe: im gegenwärtigen Augenblick ist Deutschland allein unter allen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>mehr kann man von mir nicht verlangen; ich bin kein Phantast; was noch kein Auge erblickt, kann kein Mensch schildern. Sollen nichtsdestoweniger einige</td>
<td>mehr kann man von mir nicht verlangen; ich bin kein Phantast; was noch kein Auge erblickt, kann kein Mensch schildern. Sollen nichtsdestoweniger einige</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>auf die Art der politischen Organisation verdient nämlich noch schärfer ins Auge gefaßt zu werden und das Briefliche verleiht den Ausführungen unmittelbare</td>
<td>auf die Art der politischen Organisation verdient nämlich noch schärfer ins Auge gefaßt zu werden und das Briefliche verleiht den Ausführungen unmittelbare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>des gegenwärtigen Krieges allgemein großen Eindruck gemacht und Vielen die Augen geöffnet;</td>
<td>des gegenwärtigen Krieges allgemein großen Eindruck gemacht und Vielen die Augen geöffnet;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>häufig hörte man den Ausruf: „Ach, wenn's nur auch nach dem</td>
<td>häufig hörte man den Ausruf: „Ach, wenn's nur auch nach dem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>sogar Animosität. Bis in diese Kleinigkeiten hinab entdeckt das beobachtende Auge Zeugnisse für die Unnatürlichkeit unserer staatlichen Verhältnisse: wir</td>
<td>sogar Animosität. Bis in diese Kleinigkeiten hinab entdeckt das beobachtende Auge Zeugnisse für die Unnatürlichkeit unserer staatlichen Verhältnisse: wir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>hatten beide Welten (also das Schicksal der Menschen hier und im Jenseits) im Auge, als sie den Fürsten, das überaus große Wesen, schufen, indem sie dachten,</td>
<td>hatten beide Welten (also das Schicksal der Menschen hier und im Jenseits) im Auge, als sie den Fürsten, das überaus große Wesen, schufen, indem sie dachten,</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>auf die Art der politischen Organisation verdient nämlich noch schärfer ins Auge gefaßt zu werden</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>seiner Eigenwert, und selbst der hervorragendste Einzelne verdient in ihren Augen nur insofern Beachtung, als seine Leistung Bezug auf die Gesamtheit gewinn</td>
<td>seiner Eigenwert, und selbst der hervorragendste Einzelne verdient in ihren Augen nur insofern Beachtung, als seine Leistung Bezug auf die Gesamtheit gewinn</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>sich betrübt zu fragen, welcher Teufelsgeist den Deutschen eine Binde vor die Augen hält, daß sie blind ins Verderben laufen. Man wettert gegen Ausländer</td>
<td>sich betrübt zu fragen, welcher Teufelsgeist den Deutschen eine Binde vor die Augen hält, daß sie blind ins Verderben laufen. Man wettert gegen Ausländer</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>wie der französische Text es zeigt</td>
<td>wie der französische Text es zeigt</td>
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<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>beginnt sich schon — wie die Weisen es vorausgesagt hatten — vor unseren Augen etwas Positives aufzubauen: die Schätzung des Staates als Staates, den es</td>
<td>beginnt sich schon — wie die Weisen es vorausgesagt hatten — vor unseren Augen etwas Positives aufzubauen: die Schätzung des Staates als Staates, den es</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>ist uferlos; wer aber will, wer richtig zu wollen versteht, wer die guten Augen besitzt, die Pascal verlangt, wie Gott sie uns in den Kopf setzte und jede</td>
<td>ist uferlos; wer aber will, wer richtig zu wollen versteht, wer die guten Augen besitzt, die Pascal verlangt, wie Gott sie uns in den Kopf setzte und jede</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>steht die Wahrheit strahlend unverhüllt da, der Schleier liegt auf unseren Augen, und wir brauchen den Star nur zu entfernen, so erblicken wir die Wahrheit</td>
<td>steht die Wahrheit strahlend unverhüllt da, der Schleier liegt auf unseren Augen, und wir brauchen den Star nur zu entfernen, so erblicken wir die Wahrheit</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>gegeben, dessen ganzes Entstehen so vollkommen und ausführlich deutlich vor Augen läge, wie das bei dem des Jahres 1914 der Fall ist. Ich will nicht hier</td>
<td>gegeben, dessen ganzes Entstehen so vollkommen und ausführlich deutlich vor Augen läge, wie das bei dem des Jahres 1914 der Fall ist. Ich will nicht hier</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>Augen 36 besitze — und unter „guten Augen“ haben wir nicht bloß scharfe Augen zu verstehen, sondern — wie der französische Text es zeigt — solche, die</td>
<td>Augen 36 besitze — und unter „guten Augen“ haben wir nicht bloß scharfe Augen zu verstehen, sondern — wie der französische Text es zeigt — solche, die</td>
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</table>
Arnold Oskar Meyer. Der Verfasser zeigt, daß zu allen Zeiten Deutschland mehr wahre Freiheit genoß als England; in England ist die Freiheit Schein, in Deutsch
keine Verehrung, keine Dankbarkeit zu bezeihen. Wie genau hiermit die wahre Bedeutung des Wortes getroffen ist, zeigte die Revolution, indem sie die
nur das eine am Herzen: die Überzeugung mitzuteilen, daß im eigentlichsten, wahrsten, ewigen
Sinne der Staat den Menschen erst zum Menschen macht. In dem
Formen könne der Staat von innen aus umgestaltet und durch weise Begrenzung wahre Freiheit erst
möglich gemacht werden; vor Allem: dort das uralte Vorurteil
den altväterischen Plunder, wie die Astrologie und die Alchymie: auf eine Unze Wahrheit
neunundneunzig Unzen Unsin, Wahn statt Wissenschaft, Dogmen statt
Zunächst sind nun, wie gesagt, alle drei Behauptungen Lügen gegen die Wahrheit der Natur. „Les
hommes naissent et demeurent libres“ — die Menschen sind
liegenden Besitz —, den Besitz selbst überflügelt hat, so daß jetzt der wahre Besitz durch einen
Scheinbesitz in den Hintergrund zurückgedrängt wird.
Selbstverwaltung“ wird das ganze Reich umfassen — das Reich eines Volkes, würdig wahrer
Freiheit. Auch die „richtende Gewalt“ hat in Deutschland bereits den
— als ausschlaggebend — peinlich genauer Sachkenntnis, das heißt also wahrhaften Wissens, nicht
bloßen Währens und Behauptens; unter „wissenschaftlich
verbergen, dann ist nicht viel gewonnen: die Natur erwartet von moralischen Wesen Wahrheit, nicht
Schein; dazu sind sie 74 moralische, denkende, nicht bloß
 eines sonst schwer auszusprechenden Gemütszustandes; in Wirklichkeit steht die Wahrheit
strahlend unverhüllt da, der Schleier liegt auf unseren Augen, und wir
unseren Augen, und wir brauchen den Star nur zu entfernen, so erblicken wir die Wahrheit, und der
Wahn entschwimmt. 37 Und noch eine Tatsache gibt es
aus zu einem ausführlichen und abschließenden Urteil. An dieser grundlegenden Wahrheit wird die
Zeit und ihr Schwarm fähiger und unfähiger, redlicher und
in ganz Europa kein Mensch lebe, der fähig sei, den Knäuel aufzudröseln und die Wahrheit den
Blicken freizulegen. Dieser Vorwurf hat mir in einem gewissen Sinne
wo es gilt den Opfermut der Völker anzuschüren, jetzt wird uns Keiner reinen Wahrheit einschenken,
Fühltaster der Liebe ergründen. Hiermit haben wir aber nur die eine Hälfte des wahren Sachverhalts
hervorgehoben; bei der Betrachtung eines Lebendigen gibt es
allder deutschen Lande westlich des Rheins fest beschlossen. Es ist nicht wahr, daß Napoleon III. die
Feindschaft aus dynastischen Gründen aufgestachelt
verantwortlichen Diktator, sondern einem 33 scheinbar konstitutionellen, in Wahrheit absoluten
Ministerium. Hier steckt die Quelle aller Heuchelei und Lüge
Diese dummen Blau- und Rot- und Orange- und Weiß-Bücher, welche die Wahrheit zu Grabe tragen
wollen, können auch zu ihrer Enthüllung dienen:
zugezogen“; das heißt doch die Dinge auf den Kopf stellen! Österreich hat in Wahrheit genau das
Gegenteil getan: es hat nicht ein ganzes Volk angeklagt, viel
den Krieg beschlossen hatte, war es ihr ein Leiches, die ganze Nation über die wahren Vorgänge
vollkommen irrezuführen und die erdichtete Veranlassung des
könnte verhängnisvoll werden. Darum mußte ich, Engländer, den Mut haben, die Wahrheit zu
bezeugen. Uns alle kann einzig ein starkes, siegreiches, weises Deutschland
Ruskin — haben schon seit 100 Jahren und mehr auf die erschreckende Abnahme der
Wahrheitsliebe — einst in England so einzig heilig gehalten! — aufmerksam gemacht

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kein Deutschland mehr; und ebenso ist seit dem Jahre 1870 alles Große, was Deutschland zu dem gemacht hat, was es heute ist, im Kampfe gegen die Volksvertreter untergehn, früh oder spät. Wo Mehrheit siegt und Unverstand entscheidet. In Deutschland merkt man das noch nicht mit aller Deutlichkeit, weil der Bundesrat der bisher allgemein geführten Betrachtung zu dem Problem übergehen, soweit es Deutschland allein betrifft. 67 IV. Wissenschaftliche Organisation
Ideale, deren wir heute bedürfen. Wir müssen nämlich das Eine vor Allem wissen, ja, in der Weise innerlich wissen, daß wir es an uns selber erleben und haben. Die künftige Gestaltung können wir nicht enträtseln, doch das eine wissen wir sicher: von dorther kommt uns wie in der Vergangenheit, so auch in an die französische Revolution anknüpfen, die Grundsätze hergeleitet werden, so wissen wir auch sofort, welche Wege diese Staaten notwendig wandeln müssen: aus machen sie, nicht macht sie der Mensch „als Freiheit“; willenlos hingerissen wissen wir nicht, ob es durch einen himmlischen Wirbelwind geschieht, der uns orientieren kann. Gerade hier nun straucheln die Meisten, 27 weil sie nicht wissen, welcher Schritt zuerst getan werden muß, damit der Mensch aus dem Dunklen sofort von neuem üppig hervorschießen. Millionen 103 von guten Deutschen wissen dies alles, sind darüber trostlos, manche bis zur Hoffnungslosigkeit denen Minister, welche anrüchige Börsenverwandtschaften besaßen, ihr geheimes Wissen von beabsichtigten Verträgen zwischen der Regierung und der Gesellschaft in Deutschland geht das nicht: hier will und muß Jeder von allem Anfang an wissen, woran er ist; denn hier greift ein Krieg jeder Familie des ganzen Landes verschoben werden; denn von den 180 Millionen Einwohnern dieses Reiches wissen gewiß 100 Millionen nicht, wo und was Deutschland ist, und von den Politik rücksichtslos zu führen, sie selbst aber — wie schon ausgeführt — wissen wenig von dem, was da vorgeht, und glauben grundsätzlich ohne weiteres nennt, einen Punkt der höchsten Sättigung; darüber hinaus wird bei zunehmendem Wissen unser Urteil zunehmend trüber. Wie Pascal sich kühn ausdrückt: „Zu viel und unfähiger, redlicher und unredlicher Zeugen nichts ändern; wir werden mehr wissen, nicht aber mehr erfahren; wir stehen dem „Optimum“ schon nahe. Halten wo (wie in Rußland) ein Tyrann befiehlt und arme Völker gehorchen, die nicht wissen, warum und gegen wen sie die Waffen führen, unmöglich dagegen dort, wo denn was Burke laut sagte (siehe Kriegsaufsätze erste Reihe S. 65), das wissen mehr oder weniger genau alle; sie wissen, daß ununterbrochen Intrigue, bisher, ein ekler Wurm — dann unterliegt Deutschland. Was wir jetzt genau wissen, was wir alle wissen sollten, was dieser Krieg uns ein für allemal gelehrt gewaltig erleichtert hatte? Ich weiß es nicht und brauche es auch nicht zu wissen. An diesem Beispiel hat der Leser lernen können, mit welcher Vorsicht werden wird: das vermag kein Orakel zu verkünden; uns genügt es, das Eine zu wissen: wir sind in einen Krieg eingetreten, der — durch (R pax) und (R bellum) Geschieht daß wirklich, so erfolg alles 102 Weitere von selbst; wir wissen es aus dem Leben des einzelnen Menschen; im Leben des Staates kann es aber Wurm — dann unterliegt Deutschland. Was wir jetzt genau wissen, was wir alle wissen sollten, was dieser Krieg uns ein für allemal gelehrt möchte ich dringend empfehlen, es nicht zu versäumen, sich dieses klare Wissen und klare Urteil anzueignen; nur dann ist er gewappnet gegen die Lügenbrut Deutschland jetzt um seine Existenz und um die seines Verbündeten führt — wissen wir zwar noch lange nicht alle Einzelheiten, vieles wird man vielleicht Thomas De Quincey — eine der reichsten Begabungen an Geistesschärfe, Wissen, Gedächtnis, Federkraft, die England je hervorgebracht — zeigt, daß die daß jeder einfachste Mensch etwas davon abbekommt; was damit gesagt wird, wissen wir in Deutschland genau und brauche ich darum nicht zu schildern;
Wir müssen das Bessere wollen, dann gewinnen wir es auch; wollen wir nicht, verstehen wir nicht zu wollen, ist unser Staatsleben schon der greisenhaften menschlichen Politik zu erfassen. Unter anderen Völkern werden nur Vereinzelte verstehen, wovon die Rede ist; eine Gesamtheit dafür gewinnen zu wollen, wäre ganzens Volkes, Mann für Mann, in einer Frage, die jeden betrifft und die jeder versteht, wird oftmals ebenso überwältigend richtig ausfallen, wie die stille Politik losgelöst sein wird — aus allem, meine ich, was wir sonst unter Politik verstehen und als Jagd nach Macht kurz zusammenfassen können. Was auf der Disziplin erzogen werden und die vom Geist der Wissenschaft geleitete Politik es verstehen, daraus eine nationale Präzisionswaffe zu schmieden". „Wir sind Haß weiß {R «la revanche»} wenig oder nichts; dazu ist sie viel zu anämisch. So verstehen man, daß die gebräuchlichste Anwendung des Wortes sich auf das Spielen 36 besitze — und unter „guten Augen“ haben wir nicht bloß scharfe Augen zu verstehen, sondern — wie der französische Text es zeigt — solche, die ein ebenmäßiges bekümmern. Ist jedes Volk — sobald man unter „Volk“ 44 die Gesamtheit versteh — friedliebend, so gilt das vom russischen Volke, nach allem was ich Kriegsaufsätzen* sein konnte, und daß außerdem, wer zwischen den Zeilen zu lesen versteh — wo nach einem alten Weisen immer das Beste für die Besten verborgen ganzen Welt; darum ist Gesellschaft — sonst eine Last — dort ein Vergnügen. Man versteht, daß der Engländer, der einmal drei Monate Ferien dazu verwendet, ir Menschen und Ideen Führung zu vermitteln; von deutschem Empfinden und Denken versteht er weniger als der Mann im Mond, schreibt und redet zwar darüber und man näher hinsieht. Man fasse nur den Begriff {S Freiheit} ins Auge: der Eine versteht unter Freiheit ein jedem Einzelmenschen angeborenes Recht der Willkür, der hohlen Phrasen, das bedarf ebenso wenig Auseinandersetzungen; England aber versteht unter Freiheit nur Faustrecht, und zwar Faustrecht für sich allein; man Vorgang, von dem sie im besten Falle wenig erblicken und auf keinen Fall etwas versteht, da zu einer Beurteilung der Leistung die genaue Kenntnis von allerlei handelt sich nicht um eine Titulatur, durch welche sämtliche Willen, sondern einerseits aus organischer Unfähigkeit, deutsche Ideale zu verstehen, und andererseits aus Mattheit, Bescheidenheit, gar häufig einfach aus die ebenso axiomatisch unumstößlich dasteht wie ein Naturgesetz. Nur dann verstehen wir den Zusammenhang des schon Geschehenen und Erreichten mit dem, was das jenes einfache Volkslied nicht singen, ja, nicht übersetzen und nicht verstehen kann, weil es überhaupt kein Wort für Heimat besitzt! Dem Engländer nicht einmal eingeschlagen wird; einschlagen können ihn nur Menschen, welche verstehen, worauf es ankommt; daß unsere westlichen Nachbarn nicht in Betracht Zeugnis ein geborener Idiot zu sein ausstellen will, kann nicht anders als ihn verstehen: „Das Sollen drückt eine Art von Notwendigkeit und Verknüpfung mit wieder durch ein wenig Freiheit gemildert. Was Freiheit eigentlich bedeutet, verstehen (in England) sehr wenige." ((R Facts and Comments,) 1902, S. 102.) ganzen Volkes, Mann für Mann, in einer Frage, die jeden betrifft und die Jeder versteht, wird oftmals ebenso überwältigend richtig ausfallen, wie die stille trägt es das Gepräge, das Kant ihm aufgedrückt hat, der darunter jenen Menschen versteht, der in die Freiheit eingetreten ist, wodurch „er über sich selbst als macht frei!“ Wer obige Ausführungen gelesen hat, wird diesen Ausspruch sofort verstehen; in seiner Seherart hat der schottische Weise hier das Wesen der
einzig

wo Besitz Anerkennung genießt. Soll aber Proudhon’s Satz gedeutet werden: einzig die abstrakte Allgemeinheit darf besitzen, so ist darauf zu erwidern:

hätte ich mir nicht sagen müssen, das alles sei „lebendige Kraft“, die diesem einzigem Volke über kurz oder lang zugut kommen wird. Ich aber will mich

Sinne, ist das Zugeignenhaben von Grund und Boden, von „liegender Habe“; einzig die Mutter Erde vergeht nicht — wenigstens nicht in den Aonen, die für es hierzu fähig ist, das ist der Trumpf, den Deutschland in der Hand hält, der einzig; weiß es ihn auszuspielen, so kann es die ausschlaggebende Macht unter in einem Zustand ununterbrochener Anarchie und frevelhafter Einzelwillkür: einzig die despotische Gewalt des jeweiligen Präsidenten und die ungläublich Mauer des deutschen Willens; doch politisch ist es für immer zerstört, und einzig eine Wiederholung fränkischer Überflutung könnte es allenfalls zu neuer
die Gipfel ziehen sich die Spuren früherer Kulturen; die Alpeninns müssen einen einzigem herrlichen Gartenhain dem Blicke geboten haben; jetzt starrt der nackte Werk und ruft die das Germanentum bedrohende Gegenwirkung des Panslavismus als einzige mögliche Abwehr hervor; die meisten südamerikanischen Staaten leben aus offen aussprechen, und wo sie sich doch sagen müßten, daß diese verrohte Welt einzig und allein aus dem Einfluß der französischen Revolutionsideale hervorgegangen Ziel, das nur ein sittlich hochstehender Staat sich stellen kann, und das einzig nach Analogie mit Goethe’s Wort „äußerlich begrenzt, innerlich unbegrenzt“
die so laut gepriesen wird, ist die Freiheit, Menschen zu knechten; die einzige Frage lautet: knechtest du mich? oder knechte ich dich? Die brutale Macht unter dessen Wucht eine ganze Lügenwelt zusammenstürzt: im Staate darf es keinen einzigen Menschen geben, der nicht „jederzeit zugleich als Zweck, niemals bloß inneren und äußeren Politik bildet, ist freilich nichts hier zu hoffen; ein einziger Leitaufsatz des „Berliner Tagblatts“ gilt manchem deutschen Staatsmann „gesetzgebendes Amt“ bezeichnen? Staatsrechtslehrer verneinen diese Frage. Einzig die ausführende Gewalt überzieht die gesamte Lage und kann beurteilen,

und sich ihr einziggliedern“, nannte (S. 90). Immer muß ich wiederholen: einzig der Phantast entwirft da fertige Gebäude, als wüßte er, wie die Menschen die schwerste Verantwortlichkeit; will man verwickelte Verhältnisse in einen einzigen Satz zusammenziehen: England regiert durch Charakterstärke. Wohingegen errichtet, gehalten und verwaltet worden. England ist der erste — und bisher einzige — Staat, dem man planetarische Bedeutung zusprechen kann; es hat nicht auch aller Wissenschaft und aller philosophisch besonnenen Überlegung geführt; einzig das unmittelbar Praktische wird geschätzt, das, was auf kürzestem Wege zu Träumerien entsprechen, er aber — bei den Anlagen der Deutschen — führt einzig zum Erfolg. Auf allen Pfaden des sich um uns herum entwickelnden neuen leicht hingeworfenen, witzigen 43 Pasquills, jedenfalls hat es keinen einzigen Zug gemein mit den genannten kriegerischen Schriften der Franzosen und Mitteleuropas ziert den Umschlag: das Deutsche Reich ist verschwunden, 41 einzig ein kleines Königreich Thüringen, das nach Norden Braunschweig umfaßt und things will fall into our laps without trouble or exertion to ourselves“ —) das einzige, was uns obliegt, ist, uns in Geduld zu fassen, bis dieser Krieg vorbei Niemanden — wie sollte man eine (SR „foreign nation“) lieben? — aber es lebt einzig von Industrie, Handel und Finanz, und das führt notwendig von Krieg zu Mensch der Welt hat so wenig Begriff von „Rasse“ wie der Engländer; ihm gilt einzig die politische Nation. Der Japaner spannt seine ganze Energie auf die zu gedungenen Mörder gleich zu Beginn des Krieges erschießen, denn er war der einzige Franzose, der den Mut besaß zu sagen, was viele Tausende denken. Wer sich
| 1 | Deutsche will nicht schlechter gestellt sein als die Bürger anderer Nationen; niemals kann es gelingen, die politische Uhr zurückzustellen; usw. usw.* Diese planvolle (und das heißt wissenschaftlich-organische) Aufbau. Das Zweite wird niemals gelingen, wenn das Erste unbeachtet bleibt. Ein eiserner Besen muß kommen selbstbeherrschten, bewußt aufbauenden Vernunft. Bis jetzt, sagt er, und Niemand wird ihm widersprechen können, ist „die Kultur gleichsam planlos ieden“. „Wir sind heute an einem weltgeschichtlichen Wendepunkt angelangt. Nie, so weit die Geschichte zurückzuschauen vermag, 87 hat eine auch nur Regierung (S aufgezwungen) wird, wenn nötig durch Krieg — aber alles schweigt, Niemand weiß nichts, Fragen, welche die allgemeine Politik des Reiches betreffen „natürlichen Grenze“ zulieb, auf einen Happen hinunterschlucken; ich habe auch nie anders in meiner Kindheit gehört, als daß Belgien nur zeitweilig von Frankreich dieses Recht aber ohne die einmütige, begeisterte Zustimmung des ganzen Volkes nie auszuüben vermöchten. (F1 Man vergl. Bismarck's Rede im Reichstag am 6. Februar einfach weil es nicht die geringste Gestaltungskraft besitzt und darum auch niemals irgendwelche Grenzen als solche erkennen und anerkennen wird; sobald der meine „Kriegsaufsätze“ regten ihn an, mir zu bezeugen, daß auch er niemals einem 18 einzigen auf Krieg lüsternen Deutschen begegnet sei, daß glaubte, edelste germanische Kultur über die Welt zu verbreiten, das ist nie irgend Jemandem gelangen einem Engländer beizubringen. Denn die politische Offiziere waschen sich im ganzen Leben nicht.* Geistig gilt das gleiche: nie hat ein Franzose begriffen, daß man Shakespeare für einen bedeutenden Dichter und so habe es der große Napoleon wieder hergestellt; Frankreich dürfe nie nachlassen, bis es sich diese Grenze wieder erobert habe. Dieser Revanchegedanke und so habe es der große Napoleon wieder hergestellt; Frankreich dürfe nie nachlassen, bis es sich diese Grenze wieder erobert habe. Dieser Revanchegedanke verraten, desgleichen ich in keinem Lande der Welt gefunden habe; mir gelang es nie, festzustellen, wo die eine dieser Eigenschaften aufhörte und wo die andere der Schein, die (R «revanche») wird schon den Gegner eines Besseren belehren. Niemals — weder im Spiel noch in der Wirklichkeit — wird der Franzose loyal Verhandlungen mit Österreich Grey versichert: „Zar, Regierung und Volk werden niemals die feste Haftung Großbritanniens vergessen“ — fest, heißt das, gegen vorliegende Untersuchung für manchen andern schon genügen; denn wir haben mit nie zu widerlegender Bestimmtheit erkannt, wer diesen Krieg heraufbeschworhen hat haben, so antworte ich: Frankreich war die brutaleste, aufrichtigste, es hat nie Versteck gespielt, es brannte auf Krieg, und seine Minister und Diplomaten Wer Osteuropa kennt, weiß, daß Serbien es ist, welches diesen ganzen Weltteil nie zu Ruhe kommen läßt: ganz Serbien ist ein einziges Nest von Verschwörern, also von vornherein auf die Seite der Mörder gestellt: das darf man ebenfalls nie vergessen. Der Zar — genau wie das serbsische Volk — hat kein einziges Wort vielleicht wird darüber lachen können; Rußland ist und bleibt unfaßbar, man hat nie das Gefühl, daß die leitenden Persönlichkeiten wirklich leiten, immer greift — gleich heute — den Sinn dahin richten müssen und auch den Fuß; jetzt oder nie muß der Traum Tat werden; ist die Gegenwart nichtzeugungsfähig, so kann die daß man, will man diese Dinge recht eigentlich 96 gründlich betrachten, nie mit dem einen allein ausgeht. Auch hier wieder kommt uns ein berühmtes Wort Ergebnissen führten; der unhistorische Schwärmer hat, wie vielleicht nie ein einzelner Mann, (S Geschichte gemacht;) verhängnisvolle Geschichte; der |
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