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## **Individual and stage-level predicates of personal taste: another argument for genericity as the source of faultless disagreement**

### **Abstract**

This chapter compares simple predicates of personal taste (PPTs) such as *tasty* and *beautiful* with their complex counterparts (eg *tastes good*, *looks beautiful*). I argue that the former differ from the latter along two dimensions. Firstly, simple PPTs are individual-level predicates, whereas complex ones are stage-level. Secondly, covert Experiencer arguments of simple PPTs obligatorily receive a generic interpretation; by contrast, the covert Experiencer of a complex PPT can receive a generic, bound variable or referential interpretation. I provide an analysis of these facts based on a novel proposal about the licensing of individual-level predicates (the ‘Licensing Condition on ILPs’). This condition states that all covert pronominal arguments of an individual-level predicate must be bound by the generic operator. Finally, I show that generic construal of the Experiencer is a necessary condition for faultless disagreement. This is evidence in favour of treatments of subjective meaning that appeal to genericity, and against relativism about PPTs.

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*'Who is the greatest Italian painter?'*  
*Leonardo da Vinci, Miss Brodie'*  
*'That is incorrect. The answer is Giotto, he is my favourite.'*

-- *The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie*, Muriel Spark

## 1. Introduction

The following pairs of sentences appear to be truth conditionally equivalent.

- 1a. This tea is tasty.
- 1b. This tea tastes good.
  
- 2a. St Paul's cathedral is beautiful.
- 2b. St Paul's cathedral looks beautiful.
  
- 3a. Ben is handsome.
- 3b. Ben looks handsome.

In this chapter, I argue that contrary to appearances, the simple predicates of personal taste in the (a)-sentences differ from their complex counterparts in the (b)-sentences along two dimensions.<sup>1 2</sup> Firstly, the simple PPTs are individual-level predicates (ILPs) in the sense of Carlson (1977), whereas the complex ones are stage-level (SLPs).<sup>3</sup> Secondly, while both can take covert Experiencers, such arguments of simple PPTs obligatorily receive a generic interpretation; by contrast, the covert Experiencer of a complex PPT can receive a generic, bound variable, or referential interpretation. I propose an analysis of these facts based on a novel proposal about the licensing of ILPs: all covert pronominal arguments of an individual-level predicate must be bound by the generic operator (and not only their situation arguments, *pace* Chierchia 1995).<sup>4</sup> Finally, I show that generic construal of the Experiencer is a necessary condition for faultless disagreement. This is evidence in favour of treatments of subjective meaning that appeal to genericity (Anand 2009, Moltmann 2010b, 2012, Pearson 2013a, Snyder 2013, Roeper 2016, Keshet 2020), and against relativism about PPTs.

## 2. Stage-level and individual-level predicates of personal taste

Evidence that PPTs are individual-level is presented in Anand (2009), Pearson (2013a) and Snyder (2013). But Pearson (2013b), citing an observation from Irene Heim (p.c.), argued that *tastes good* is stage-level. In this section, I present further evidence that complex PPTs are stage-level.<sup>5</sup>

SLPs, unlike ILPs, tolerate temporal and locative modifiers (Carlson 1982).

- 4a. ??Ben is tall today/at the zoo.
- 4b. Ben is happy today/at the zoo.

Likewise complex PPTs allow such modification, but simple PPTs do not.

- 5a. ??This tea is tasty in a china cup.
- 5b. This tea tastes good in a china cup.

- 6a. ??St Paul's is beautiful today.  
6b. St Paul's looks beautiful today.

Secondly, with bare plural subjects, modification of an ILP by *always* has little effect on truth conditions – unlike with SLPs.

- 7a. Firemen are altruistic.  
7b. Firemen are always altruistic.

- 8a. Firemen are available.  
8b. Firemen are always available.

Both (7a) and (7b) mean roughly 'All firemen are altruistic'. By contrast, while (8a) means 'there are currently some firemen available', (8b) can be paraphrased as 'there are always some firemen available'.

Similarly, both (9a) and (9b) report that all pineapples are tasty; (10a) seems to have this meaning too. But (10b) can mean that pineapples taste good in all circumstances; one could respond to (10b), but not (10a), by saying, 'That's not true. They taste horrible when you've just brushed your teeth'.

- 9a. Pineapples are tasty.  
9b. Pineapples are always tasty.

- 10a. Pineapples taste good.  
10b. Pineapples always taste good.

Consider also the following pairs. (11a), (11b) and (12a) say roughly that all English churches are beautiful, whereas (12b) is the outlier: one could respond with, 'That's not true. They look terrible when it's dark and there are floodlights on'.

- 11a. English churches are beautiful.  
11b. English churches are always beautiful.

- 12a. English churches look beautiful.  
12b. English churches always look beautiful.

The next observation concerns perception sentences. ILPs cannot be embedded below a perception verb like *saw* (13a), but SLPs can (13b).

- 13a. ??Emma saw Ben tall.  
13b. Emma saw Ben happy.

Again, simple PPT's pattern with ILPs, but complex PPT's pattern with SLPs.<sup>6</sup>

- 14a. ??Emma saw St Paul's beautiful.  
14b. Emma saw St Paul's looking beautiful.

Next, consider what happens when an ILP occurs in a *when*-clause.

- 15a. ??When Ben is tall, everyone feels good.

15b. When Ben is happy, everyone feels good.

(15a) generates the odd inference that Ben is tall only sometimes, but since people's moods can vary over time, (15b) is perfect. Now compare *tasty* with *tastes good*.

16a. ??When Barry and Frieda's wedding cake is tasty, the whole family enjoys it.

16b. When Barry and Frieda's wedding cake tastes good, the whole family enjoys it.

(16b) feels odd out of the blue, but with a suitable context it improves. Suppose that Barry and Frieda have saved their wedding cake. Every year on their anniversary they share some with their family. How the cake tastes varies from year to year depending on how the flavours have matured, how it has been stored, etc. In this context (16b) is acceptable but (16a) is still degraded.

The same point can be made by comparing *beautiful* with *looks beautiful*.

17a. ??When St Paul's is beautiful, tourists like to photograph it.

17b. When St Paul's looks beautiful, tourists like to photograph it.

Again, (17a) suggests that St Paul's is only beautiful sometimes – an inference that is perceived as odd. But (17b) generates an inference that St Paul's only *looks* beautiful sometimes; this inference is acceptable.

Now let's turn to counterfactuals. Kratzer (1989) observes that (18a) and (18b) are both true.<sup>7</sup>

Scenario: There are five people in the room, including Otto and Paula. Of those five, only Otto and Paula are tall.

18a. If Otto and Paula weren't in this room, none of the people who were in the room would be tall.

18b. If none of the people who were in the room were tall, Otto and Paula wouldn't be in the room.

Now let's replace *tall* with the SLP *bored*. Kratzer observes that the resulting (a) sentence is still true, but (b) is false.

Scenario: There are five people in the room, including Otto and Paula. Of those five, only Otto and Paula are bored.

19a. If Otto and Paul weren't in the room, none of the people who were in the room would be bored.

19b. If none of the people who were in the room were bored, Otto and Paula wouldn't be in the room.

Intuitively, (19b) is false because the antecedent of the conditional could be satisfied in virtue of Otto and Paula being in the room, but not being bored: the proviso that none of the people in the room are bored is not sufficient to exclude Otto and Paula, despite our knowledge that they are in fact bored right now. But in (19a), we are reluctant to consider possibilities where shorter versions of Otto and Paula are in the room: the proviso that none of the people in the room are tall is sufficient basis to conclude that they can't be in the room.

This pattern is replicated with PPTs. Simple PPTs behave like *tall*:

20. Scenario: There are 5 desserts leftover from yesterday's party. The desserts are in the fridge, including a chocolate cake and a tiramisu. The chocolate cake and the tiramisu are the only desserts in the group that are tasty (according to the speaker).

- a. If the chocolate cake and the tiramisu weren't in the fridge, no dessert that is in the fridge would be tasty.
- b. If none of the desserts that were in the fridge were tasty, the chocolate cake and the tiramisu wouldn't be in the fridge.

But when *tasty* is replaced with *tastes good*, the (b) sentence becomes false:

21a. If the chocolate cake and the tiramisu weren't in the fridge, no dessert that is in the fridge would taste good.

21b. If none of the desserts that were in the fridge tasted good, the chocolate cake and the tiramisu wouldn't be in the fridge.

To see that (21b) is false, notice that whether or not a dessert that is in the fridge tastes good may depend on whether chilling it improves its flavour. In the relevant scenario, the chocolate cake and the tiramisu taste good served cold, but the other desserts do not. Now, we can evaluate (21b) by considering counterfactual possibilities where *none* of the desserts responds well to being chilled. The sentence is true just in case all such possibilities are such that the chocolate cake and the tiramisu are not in the fridge. But this doesn't follow: intuitively, the antecedent is compatible with the chocolate cake and the tiramisu being in the fridge and not tasting good (in virtue of not responding well to being chilled). But (20b) is true: the antecedent of the conditional is concerned with counterfactual possibilities where none of the desserts in the fridge is tasty *tout court* – regardless of the effect of being in the fridge on its flavour. In such circumstances, the cake and the tiramisu cannot be in the fridge, since it has already been established that they are tasty.

We can make the same point by comparing *beautiful* and *looks beautiful*:

Scenario: 5 buildings in London are lit up right now, including St Paul's. St Paul's is the only building of the group that is beautiful (according to the speaker).

22a. If St Paul's weren't lit up, no building that is lit up would be beautiful. *True*

22b. If none of the buildings that were lit up were beautiful, St Paul's wouldn't be lit up. *True*

Replacing *beautiful* with *looks beautiful* changes the truth value of (22b):

Scenario: 5 buildings in London are lit up right now, including St Paul's. St Paul's is the only building of the group that looks beautiful.

23a. If St Paul's weren't lit up, no building that is lit up would look beautiful. *True*

23b. If none of the buildings that were lit up looked beautiful, St Paul's wouldn't be lit up. *False*

In (23b), we can consider possibilities where St Paul's is lit up but doesn't look beautiful – perhaps St Paul's only looks beautiful in natural light, for example. On this basis, the sentence

can be judged false. But in (22b), it seems that we do not consider possibilities where St Paul's is not beautiful and is lit up; hence the sentence is true.

I have presented an array of evidence that simple PPTs such as *tasty* and *beautiful* are ILPs, and complex PPTs like *taste good* and *look beautiful* are SLPs. In the next section, I present evidence for a second difference between these two classes: when simple PPTs take a covert Experiencer, that argument obligatorily receive a generic interpretation. Complex PPTs are more liberal: covert Experiencers can either be read generically or receive bound variable or referential construals.

### 3. The Experiencer argument of stage- and individual-level PPTs

One point of disagreement in the PPTs literature concerns whether, when occurring without an overt Experiencer such as *to Mandy*, the predicate is one-place (Lasersohn 2005) or two-place (Stephenson 2007a,b, Schaffer 2009, Moltmann 2010b, 2012, Pearson 2013a,b, Snyder 2013, Bylinina 2017). I follow the latter authors in assuming a uniform two-place semantics for PPTs, with bare uses of PPTs involving a covert pronoun in internal argument position:

24a. This tea is [tasty *pro*].

24b. This tea [tastes good *pro*].

I will argue that stage-level PPTs allow bound variable, referential and generic construals of this pronoun, whereas individual-level PPTs allow only generic construals. My evidence includes weak crossover effects and strict/sloppy ambiguity.<sup>8</sup>

#### 3.1 Weak crossover

Lasersohn (2005) argues that if a predicate can take a covert pronoun as an argument, then we should expect that pronoun to show so-called 'weak crossover' effects.<sup>9</sup> Consider (25).

25. ?Whom<sub>i</sub> did the fact that the tiramisu wasn't tasty to him<sub>i</sub> upset t<sub>i</sub>?

On the intended reading (indicated by coindexation of the wh-word *whom* and the pronoun *him*), the sentence asks, 'For which x did the fact that the tiramisu wasn't tasty to x upset x?' *Whom* starts off as the object of the verb *upset* (indicated by the co-indexed trace) and undergoes movement to the sentence-initial position where it is pronounced. In doing so, it crosses over a pronoun with which it is co-indexed, generating a configuration that the grammar rules out: the sentence is degraded.

We can check that the source of ungrammaticality is indeed the crossing over of the pronoun by *whom*, by comparing (25) with (26):

26. Who<sub>i</sub> t<sub>i</sub> was upset that the tiramisu wasn't tasty to him<sub>i</sub>?

Here too, we have movement of a wh-word, but its base-generated position is higher: it is a subject rather than an object and does not cross over *him* on route to its landing site. The sentence is accordingly grammatical.

Lasersohn notes that if a PPT takes a covert pronominal argument, we should expect the same weak crossover effects that we have just seen with overt Experiencer pronouns. But this is not quite right: since crossover only arises when the wh-word and pronoun co-vary, the prediction is that crossover effects will arise if a PPT takes a covert pronominal argument, *and* this argument

is bindable by wh-words. If instead a PPT takes a covert *generic* argument, we should not expect to see crossover effects. This distinction will be crucial for what follows.

In any event, Lasersohn claims that the alleged prediction is not borne out: there seems to be no difference in grammaticality between (27a) and (27b):

- 27a. Whom<sub>i</sub> did the fact that the tiramisu wasn't tasty upset t<sub>i</sub>?  
27b. Who<sub>i</sub> t<sub>i</sub> was upset that the tiramisu wasn't tasty?

Suppose we replace *tasty* with *taste good*:

- 28a. Whom<sub>i</sub> did the fact that the tiramisu didn't taste good upset t<sub>i</sub>?  
28b. Who<sub>i</sub> t<sub>i</sub> was upset that the tiramisu didn't taste good?

Here too there initially seems to be no difference between (a) and (b), suggesting that there is no crossover effect. At this point, it is worth pausing to reflect on what these examples show. We know from (25) that crossover arises, in the appropriate structural configuration, when a PPT takes a pronominal argument whose value covaries with that of the wh-word. That we judge (27a) and (28a) grammatical suggests that either (i) PPTs cannot take such a pronominal argument or (ii) PPTs optionally take such a pronominal argument, but when speakers judge (27a) and (28b) to be grammatical, their judgment is based on a parse where such a pronominal argument is not present. I will argue that (i) is the correct analysis of (27b) (with *tasty*) and (ii) is the correct analysis of (28a) (with *tastes good*).

The first step is to create a scenario that makes a specific individual salient as Experiencer of the PPT. Consider (29).

29. Scenario: Rob is suffering from the aftereffects of a virus. For him, these include an altered sense of taste. Everything tastes horrible to him now, including things that he would normally enjoy. He is looking forward to attending a friend's wedding at the weekend, at which will be served a specially made wedding cake, which by all accounts is expected to be delicious. Rob is disappointed to realize that the cake will taste horrible to him, though it's expected that everyone else will enjoy it – including others who have had the virus, since Rob is the only known patient to have experienced this particular aftereffect.

In this context, we can check whether the following question/answer pairs are felicitous.

30. A: ?Who did the fact that the cake wouldn't taste good because of the virus upset?  
B: Rob.  
31. A: Who was upset that the cake wouldn't taste good because of the virus?  
B: Rob.

A's question in (31) is well-formed, and the dialogue is felicitous. But in (30), A's question is degraded. As we have seen, this contrast is characteristic of weak crossover. This indicates that on the intended interpretation, A's question in (30) has the structure in (32).

32. ?Who<sub>i</sub> did the fact that the cake wouldn't [taste good *pro*<sub>i</sub>] because of the virus upset t<sub>i</sub>?

So we have evidence that *tastes good* can take a covert pronominal argument that can be bound by a wh-word.

Now let's return to what happens when *taste good* is replaced by *tasty*. Above, we suggested that such cases do not give rise to crossover effects. We need to check whether this is so even when the sentences are judged against our richer context.

33. Scenario: Rob is suffering from the aftereffects of a virus. For him, these include an altered sense of taste. Everything tastes horrible to him now, including things that he would normally enjoy. He is looking forward to attending a friend's wedding at the weekend, at which will be served a specially made wedding cake, which by all accounts is expected to be delicious. Rob is disappointed to realize that the cake will taste horrible to him, though it's expected that everyone else will enjoy it – including others who have had the virus, since Rob is the only known patient to have experienced this particular aftereffect.

34. A: #Who did the fact that the cake wouldn't be tasty because of the virus upset?

B: Rob.

35. A: #Who was upset that the cake wouldn't be tasty because of the virus?

B: Rob.

(35) provides a baseline; since the *wh*-word doesn't cross over the putative internal argument of *tasty*, the sentence is expected to be grammatical. I believe that it is indeed grammatical, but infelicitous in context: it presupposes that the cake wouldn't be tasty. Intuitively, in order for this presupposition to be met, there would need to be something wrong with the cake itself. But we are told that there is nothing wrong with the cake: it is only Rob's tastes that are temporarily faulty. A's question in (34) is also grammatical, but infelicitous for the same reason. So unlike its counterpart with *taste good*, (34) does not show weak crossover, suggesting that *tasty* cannot take a covert internal argument that is bindable by *who*. I take it that *tasty* involves a generic construal with respect to the Experiencer, which is therefore not bindable by *who*. That is, I take the class of analyses proposed by Moltmann (2010b, 2012), Pearson (2013a), Snyder (2013) and Keshet (2020) to be along the right lines – at least as far as *tasty* goes.

Now let's check that these observations are replicated with other simple and complex PPT pairs. Take *beautiful* and *looks beautiful*.

36. Sarah is a newly qualified architect. There is a church in her hometown that she has always found beautiful (and everyone else agrees). Returning home after graduation, she discovers that with her trained eye, the church no longer looks beautiful to her.

37. A: ?Who did the fact that the church no longer looked beautiful because of her architectural training upset?

B: Sarah

38. A: Who was upset that the church no longer looked beautiful because of her architectural training?

B: Sarah

Once again, A's question in (37) is degraded with respect to the baseline in (38) – evidence of crossover.

Finally, notice that the questions in both (39) and (40) are odd: they suggest that a single person having trained as an architect could somehow affect whether or not the church is beautiful.



39. A: #Who was upset that the church was no longer beautiful because of her architectural training?  
 B: Sarah.

40. A: #Who did the fact that the church was no longer beautiful because of her architectural training upset?  
 B: Sarah.

If it is correct that stage-level PPTs are susceptible to weak crossover effects, then we should expect that in a language such as German that does not show weak crossover in general, counterparts of sentences like (32) should be acceptable.<sup>10</sup> This is precisely what we find:

41. Wen hat die Tatsache, dass der Kuchen  
 Who.ACC has DET.NOM fact that DET.NOM cake  
 wegen des Virus nicht gut schmecken würde, verärgert?  
 because DET.GEN virus not good taste would annoy

‘Who did the fact that the cake wouldn’t taste good because of the virus annoy?’

42. Wer war darüber verärgert, dass der  
 Who.NOM was about it annoyed that DET.NOM  
 Kuchen wegen des Virus nicht gut schmecken würde?  
 cake because DET.GEN virus not good taste would

‘Who was annoyed that the cake wouldn’t taste good because of the virus?’

The native German speakers I consulted found both (41) and (42) acceptable in the context in (29), with Rob as the intended answer.<sup>11</sup> This is expected on our account given that for these speakers the counterpart of (41) with an overt pronoun is also acceptable:

43. Wen hat die Tatsache, dass ihm der Kuchen  
 Who.ACC has DET.NOM fact that him DET.NOM wegen  
 wegen des Virus nicht gut schmecken würde, verärgert?  
 because DET.GEN virus not good taste would annoy

‘Who did the fact that the cake wouldn’t taste good to him because of the virus annoy?’

This is striking evidence in favour of our claim that the source of the degraded status of (32) is weak crossover: in a language that does not show weak crossover with a variant of the sentence with an overt pronoun, so too is the counterpart of (32) acceptable in context. I should mention, however, that speakers’ judgments about German counterparts of (34) and (35) were more surprising:

44. Wen hat die Tatsache, dass der Kuchen  
 who.ACC has DET.NOM fact that DET.NOM cake  
 wegen des Virus nicht lecker/schmackhaft sein würde, verärgert?

because DET.GEN virus not tasty be would annoy

‘Who did the fact that the cake wouldn’t be tasty because of the virus annoy?’

45. Wer war darüber verärgert, dass der Kuchen  
 Who.NOM was about it annoyed that DET.NOM cake

wegen des Virus nicht lecker/schmackhaft sein würde?  
 because DET.GEN virus not tasty be would

‘Who was annoyed that the cake wouldn’t be tasty because of the virus?’

Both sentences were judged felicitous in the intended scenario, unlike what we saw earlier for (34) and (35). It may be that the German counterparts of *tasty* (*lecker* and *schmackhaft*) are not individual-level predicates; I leave it to future work to investigate this.

To summarize, crossover data indicates that stage-level PPTs like *taste good* and *look beautiful* can take a covert internal argument that is bindable by a *wh*-word, but individual-level PPTs cannot. We should therefore expect to find that stage-level PPTs, but not individual-level ones, show sloppy readings under ellipsis and are bindable by quantifiers. I present evidence for this in 3.2.

### 3.2 Strict/sloppy readings

Consider (46).

46. Everyone who was recovering from the virus was disappointed that the wedding cake didn’t taste good to her.

In a scenario where (i) all of the guests found the cake delicious except those who were recovering from the virus and (ii) all of those recovering from the virus have an altered sense of taste and were disappointed to find that the cake didn’t taste good to them, (46) has a true reading. On this reading, the pronoun *her* is bound by *everyone*.

47. Everyone who was recovering from the virus  $\lambda x_1 [t_1$  was disappointed that the wedding cake didn’t taste good to her<sub>1</sub>].

(48) also has a true reading, in the same scenario.

48. Everyone who was recovering from the virus was disappointed that the wedding cake didn’t taste good.

This suggests that (48) has an LF that is identical to that in (47), except that the bound pronoun is covert:

49. Everyone who was recovering from the virus  $\lambda x_1 [t_1$  was disappointed that the wedding cake didn’t taste good *pro*].

Suppose that we replace *tastes good* with *tasty*:

50. Everyone who was recovering from the virus was disappointed that the wedding cake was not tasty.

Unlike in (48), there is no bound variable reading for the internal argument of the PPT in (50). A way to see this is to consider what happens when (46), (48) and (50) are followed with ‘...*Of course I found it delicious*’. This results in a felicitous discourse for (46) and (48), but not (50).

51a. Everyone<sub>i</sub> who was recovering from the virus was disappointed that the wedding cake didn’t taste good to her<sub>i</sub>. Of course I found it delicious.

51b. Everyone who was recovering from the virus was disappointed that the wedding cake didn’t taste good. Of course I found it delicious.

51c. #Everyone who was recovering from the virus was disappointed that the wedding cake was not tasty. Of course I found it delicious.

Since *disappointed* is factive, (51a) carries a presupposition – namely, that everyone who was recovering from the virus was such that the cake did not taste good to them.<sup>12</sup> This is compatible with the speaker finding the cake delicious (assuming that she is not among the patients herself), and so (51a) is felicitous. (51b) patterns with (51a), as expected if the covert internal argument of *tastes good* is bound. But the discourse in (51c) is infelicitous: the assertion that the speaker found the cake delicious is felt to contradict the presupposed content of the first sentence. This suggests that the first sentence of (51c) presupposes that the group of people who did not enjoy the cake was not confined to the patients, contrary to what would be expected if the internal argument of *tasty* were bound by *everyone*. So (50) cannot have an LF parallel to (47).<sup>13</sup>

Now consider the pair *looks beautiful* and (*is*) *beautiful*. Suppose that everyone who has had architectural training has made the discovery that the church in Sarah’s hometown that they once found beautiful no longer seems beautiful to them. Suppose further that the speaker, who has no expertise in the area of architecture, finds the church beautiful. (52) has a true reading in this scenario.

52. Everyone who has had architectural training is disappointed that the church no longer looks beautiful.

Yet (53) is infelicitous:

53. #Everyone who has had architectural training is disappointed that the church is no longer beautiful.

Further evidence comes from VP ellipsis. Suppose that Sarah and Emma have both had their sense of taste affected by the virus. Tasting the wedding cake, Sarah says, ‘I’m sure the wedding cake is delicious, but it doesn’t taste good to me.’ Emma adds, ‘I’m not enjoying it either, but I’m sure it’s very tasty.’ We can report this with the sentence in (54).

54. Sarah said that the wedding cake didn’t taste good to her, and Emma did too.

This is the ‘sloppy’ reading of the pronoun, which is generally taken as evidence for a bound variable reading. Suppressing the overt pronoun yields a sentence that is also true in this scenario:

55. Sarah said that the wedding cake didn’t taste good, and Emma did too.

But (56), where *tastes good* is replaced by *tasty*, is false: the content conflicts with our knowledge that both Sarah and Emma said that they were sure that the cake must be tasty.

56. Sarah said that the wedding cake wasn't tasty, and Emma did too.

So we have further evidence for a covert pronominal argument for *taste good* that can receive a bound variable reading, and that *tasty* does not take such an argument. In fact, we can go one step further: VP-ellipsis permits *strict* readings for pronouns as well as the sloppy ones we have just investigated. On this reading, the second conjunct of (56) reports that Emma said that the wedding cake didn't taste good to *Sarah*. We can check that this reading is available for (55) by considering the following scenario.

57. Only Sarah has had her sense of taste affected by the virus. Tasting the wedding cake, Sarah says, 'I'm sure the wedding cake is delicious, but it doesn't taste good to me'. Having overheard this, Emma later says to a friend, 'I haven't tried the cake but I'm sure it's very tasty. Unfortunately it doesn't taste good to Sarah though because of the virus.'

(55) has a true reading in this scenario, unlike (56). Again, Sarah and Emma's assertion that the cake must be delicious is sufficient to render (56) false.

The facts replicate with the pair *looks beautiful* and *(is) beautiful*:

58. Sarah and Emma are newly qualified architects. Looking at the church, Sarah says, 'I know most people find the church beautiful, but it no longer looks beautiful to me.' Emma adds, 'Yes, it no longer looks beautiful to me too'.

(59) and (60) both have true readings in this scenario, but (61) does not.

59. Sarah said that the church no longer looked beautiful to her, and Emma did too.

60. Sarah said that the church no longer looked beautiful, and Emma did too.

61. Sarah said that the church was no longer beautiful, and Emma did too.

Moreover, the covert pronoun in (60) can receive a strict reading; (60) is true in the following scenario, but (61) is false.

62. Sarah is a newly qualified architect. Looking at the church, Sarah says, 'I know most people find the church beautiful, but it no longer looks beautiful to me.' Having overheard this, Emma later says to a friend, 'I haven't seen the church but I'm sure it's very beautiful. Unfortunately it no longer looks beautiful to Sarah, because she sees all sorts of faults with it now that she is a trained architect'.

In general, it seems that stage-level but not individual-level PPTs can take a covert pronominal argument that can either receive a bound variable interpretation or be free. In the examples just discussed involving strict readings, the pronoun is free, and is interpreted as a third person pronoun referring to an individual who is salient in the discourse. I'll now show that this pronoun has a construal where it behaves like a first person indexical.

### 3.3 First person indexical readings

To set things up, consider the following examples involving overt Experiencers for *tastes good*.

63a. When I've just brushed my teeth, pineapple juice doesn't taste good to me.

63b. #When I've just brushed my teeth, pineapple juice doesn't taste good to Emma.

63c. #When I've just brushed my teeth, pineapple juice doesn't taste good to people in general.

If I brush my teeth, I temporarily alter my (but no one else's) perception of taste. This is why (63b) and (63c) are infelicitous: the *when*-clause redundantly imposes a restriction to situations where the speaker has just brushed her teeth. (63a) is fine, since it is plausible to think that whether or not the speaker has just brushed her teeth may affect how the pineapple juice tastes to *her*.

We can use this to test whether *tastes good* can take a covert speaker-denoting argument. If so, then (63)'s counterpart with no overt Experiencer should be felicitous. This prediction is borne out:

64. When I've just brushed my teeth, pineapple juice tastes good.

Further evidence for the possibility of a covert 1<sup>st</sup> person indexical argument for *taste good* comes from the so-called 'acquaintance inference' (Pearson 2013a, Ninan 2014, Anand & Korotkova 2018). (65) gives rise to the inference that the speaker has tasted pineapple juice.

65. Pineapple juice tastes good.

One piece of evidence for this is that negating this inference creates an infelicitous discourse.

66. #Pineapple juice tastes good, but I've never tasted it.

It is well known that the acquaintance inference can be suspended by epistemic *must* (Pearson 2013a, Anand & Korotkova 2018).

67. Pineapple juice must taste good, but I've never tasted it.

PPTs with overt Experiencers are also subject to an acquaintance requirement (68). This requirement cannot be suspended by adding *must*, however, as shown by (69) (Pearson 2013a, Anand & Korotkova 2018).

68. #Pineapple juice tastes good to me, but I have never tasted it.

69. #Pineapple juice must taste good to me, but I have never tasted it.

In fact, attempting to combine epistemic *must* with a first person Experiencer produces infelicity, even without the continuations above.

70. #Pineapple juice must taste good to me.

This seems to be because there is a conflict between the inference generated by *must* that the speaker is basing her statement on indirect evidence, and the requirement imposed by *to me* that the speaker has tasted pineapple juice (Pearson 2013a, Anand & Korotkova 2018).<sup>14</sup>

Returning to our *when*-sentences, in these cases the acquaintance requirement takes the form of a condition that the Experiencer must have tasted pineapple juice under the circumstances described by the *when*-clause.<sup>15</sup>

71. #When I've just brushed my teeth, pineapple juice tastes good. But I've never tasted pineapple juice after brushing my teeth.

72. #When I've just brushed my teeth, pineapple juice tastes good to me. But I've never tasted pineapple juice after brushing my teeth.

(73) is odd, due to the mismatch between the indirect experience inference associated with *must*, and the acquaintance inference:

73. #When I've just brushed my teeth, pineapple juice must taste good to me.

Here then is the prediction: if *taste good* takes a covert speaker-denoting argument in an example like (64), then adding *must* should produce infelicity. (74) shows that this prediction is borne out.

74. #When I've just brushed my teeth, pineapple juice must taste good.

This is striking evidence that *tastes good* can take a covert speaker-denoting argument. One question that remains is why the acquaintance inference is suspended by epistemic *must* in (67), repeated below.

75. Pineapple juice must taste good, but I've never tasted it.

Clearly *taste good* does not take a speaker-denoting argument in this case; if it did, the example would be infelicitous. Moreover, the sentence is acceptable without any other salient individual in the discourse to serve as an antecedent for a covert pronominal argument. I propose instead that in this case, *taste good* takes a pronominal argument akin to generic *one*. Evidence that such a pronoun is a possible argument for *taste good* comes from the example in (76).

76. When one has just brushed one's teeth, pineapple juice tastes good.

As we have seen, for these types of *when*-sentence to be felicitous, the subject of the *when*-clause and the Experiencer of *taste good* must co-vary. Now notice that (76) is felicitous even when *must* is added.

77. When one has just brushed one's teeth, pineapple juice must taste good.

I take this as evidence that when *taste good* takes generic *one* as its (covert) argument, it is rendered possible to suspend the acquaintance inference by means of adding epistemic *must*. This suggests that the reason why (75) is felicitous is because here too, *taste good* takes *one* as an argument.

We have now presented evidence that when *taste good* does not take an overt Experiencer argument, there is a covert pronoun present in the structure that can be construed referentially, receive a bound variable reading, or be a covert counterpart of generic *one*. Finally, let's check what happens when *tastes good* in (64) is replaced with *tasty*:

78. #When I've just brushed my teeth, pineapple juice is tasty.

This indicates that *tasty*, unlike *taste good*, cannot take a covert speaker-denoting argument. Instead, I assume, following (Moltmann 2010, 2012, Pearson 2013a and Keshet 2020), that its argument must be the covert counterpart of generic *one*.

This pattern is replicated for the pair *looks beautiful/is beautiful*. Take the following example.

79. When I wear 3D glasses, St Paul's looks beautiful.

Given the argument developed here, the fact that (79) is acceptable suggests that *looks beautiful* can take a covert speaker-denoting argument. This is supported by the fact that adding epistemic *must* renders the sentence infelicitous.

80. #When I wear 3D glasses, St Paul's must look beautiful.

Replacing *looks beautiful* in (79) with *is beautiful* also produces infelicity:

81. #When I wear 3D glasses, St Paul's is beautiful.

For now we can say that *looks beautiful* patterns with *tastes good* in permitting both covert speaker-denoting arguments, and a covert counterpart of generic *one*, while the adjectival PPT *beautiful*, like *tasty*, can only take generic *one* as a covert argument.

Further evidence comes from the following contrasts, which are based on examples discussed in (Pearson 2013b).

82a. Now that the recipe has changed, Nutella no longer tastes good.

82b. Now that I have lost my sweet tooth, Nutella no longer tastes good.

83a. Now that the recipe has changed, Nutella is no longer tasty.

83b. #Now that I have lost my sweet tooth, Nutella is no longer tasty.

(82) shows that whether a foodstuff counts as *tasting good* may change as a result of a change in that foodstuff (82a), or as a result of changes in the taste perception of whoever is eating it (82b). But the contrast between (83a) and (83b) indicates that whether something is considered *tasty* depends purely on the foodstuff itself. The judgments for (82) are unchanged if *taste good* takes an overt first person pronoun as its argument:

84a. Now that the recipe has changed, Nutella doesn't taste good to me anymore.

84b. Now that I have lost my sweet tooth, Nutella doesn't taste good to me anymore.

But the contrast in (83) disappears when *to me* is added:

85a. Now that the recipe has changed, Nutella is no longer tasty to me.

85b. Now that I have lost my sweet tooth Nutella is no longer tasty to me.

I take this as further evidence that *taste good* can take a covert first person indexical pronoun as its argument, but *tasty* cannot.

These facts are replicated with *looks beautiful* and *(is) beautiful*:

86a. Now that modern architectural standards have declined, English churches no longer look beautiful.

86b. Now that I have a trained architect's eye, English churches no longer look beautiful.

87a. Now that modern architectural standards have declined, English churches are no longer beautiful.

87b. #Now that I have a trained architect's eye, English churches are no longer beautiful.

With *looks beautiful*, adding *to me* does not change the judgments:

88a. Now that modern architectural standards have declined, English churches no longer look beautiful to me.

88b. Now that I have a trained architect's eye, English churches no longer look beautiful to me.

But the (b) sentence is improved by the addition of an overt 1<sup>st</sup> person Experiencer in the case of (*is*) *beautiful*:

89a. Now that modern architectural standards have declined, English churches are no longer beautiful to me.

89b. Now that I have a trained architect's eye, English churches are no longer beautiful to me.

The next piece of evidence for the availability of a covert speaker-denoting argument with *tastes good* and *looks beautiful*, but not with *tasty* and (*is*) *beautiful* builds on an observation from Pearson (2013a) that not all taste claims exhibit faultless disagreement: (90) is simply false, even if sincerely asserted.

90. Soapy dishwater is tasty.

On the other hand, if *to me* is added, then the sentence is true, if sincerely asserted.

91. Soapy dishwater is tasty to me.

Pearson (2013b) builds on this observation to argue that *taste good* can take a covert first person indexical argument:

92. That soapy dishwater tasted good.

Intuitively, (92) is not false, assuming that the speaker is sincere. In this respect, (92) patterns with (91). I take this as additional evidence that *tastes good*, but not *tasty*, can take a covert speaker-denoting argument.

### 3.4 Interim summary

We have presented evidence that complex PPTs are more liberal than simple PPTs in the range of covert internal arguments they can take. A covert internal argument of a complex PPT may (i) receive a bound variable interpretation, (ii) be interpreted referentially, or (iii) have a generic construal. Of these three options, only (iii) is available for simple PPTs. We have also seen that option (ii) includes the possibility of a speaker-denoting argument for the complex PPT - a possibility that has been rejected by relativists from Lasersohn (2005) onwards. One of the lessons of this paper is that a first person indexical analysis should be brought back into the fold, although only for a certain class of PPTs.



We also saw in section 2 that simple PPTs are individual-level, while complex PPTs are stage-level. Taking the findings of sections 2 and 3 together, we can state the following generalization.

### 93. *The PPT Experiencer Correlation*

A PPT  $P$  can take a covert Experiencer argument that can receive a bound variable, referential or generic construal iff  $P$  is stage-level. Otherwise, a covert Experiencer argument of  $P$  must receive a generic construal.

In the next section, I propose an analysis of simple vs. complex PPTs that predicts this correlation.

## 4. Analysis

I have been assuming that both simple and complex PPTs are two place-predicates. I will also assume that predicates take situation arguments. Here are two sample denotations.<sup>16</sup>

94.  $[[\text{tasty}]]^g = \lambda x \lambda y \lambda s. y \text{ is tasty to } x \text{ in } s$

95.  $[[\text{taste good}]]^g = \lambda x \lambda y \lambda s. y \text{ tastes good to } x \text{ in } s$

*Tasty* holds between a Stimulus  $y$  and an Experiencer  $x$  in a situation  $s$  just in case  $y$  is tasty to  $x$  in  $s$ . Likewise *taste good* holds between  $y$  and  $x$  in  $s$  just in case  $y$  tastes good to  $x$  in  $s$ . I assume that where there is no overt Experiencer, the argument slot is filled by a covert pronominal *pro*:

96. This cake is tasty/tastes good *pro*.

In principle, the following three options are available to determine the interpretation of *pro*. Firstly, *pro*, like ordinary overt pronouns, may be bound by a lambda abstractor that is present in the Logical Form; it then receives a bound variable interpretation. Secondly, it may be free, in which case it receives its interpretation under a variable assignment, which maps *pro*'s index to some contextually salient individual. In this respect too, it behaves like an ordinary overt pronoun. Thirdly, it may be bound by the generic operator GEN, and receive an interpretation akin to generic *one*.

I assume, following Chierchia (1995), that ILPs are only licensed if GEN is present at LF, adjoined to the VP. Thus (97b) is ungrammatical.

97a.  $[\lambda s_1 [s_1 \text{ This cake}_i [\text{GEN } \lambda s_2 [s_2 t_i \text{ is tasty } pro]]]$

97b.  $*[\lambda s_1 [s_1 \text{ This cake}_i [t_i \text{ is tasty } pro]]]$

We can think of GEN as a covert adverb of (quasi-)universal quantification - an unselective binder of free variables in its scope. In (97a), the variables in question are the main predicate's situation and individual arguments:<sup>17</sup>

98.  $[[ [\lambda s_1 [s_1 \text{ This cake}_i [\text{GEN } \lambda s_2 [s_2 t_i \text{ is tasty } pro]] ] ] ]^g = \lambda s. \forall x, s' [\text{Acc}(s, s') \ \& \ C(x, s')] [\text{tasty}(\text{this cake}, x, s')]$

(98) illustrates that GEN makes two further contributions, in addition to universal quantification over situations and individuals. First, it restricts the situations quantified over to those that are accessible from the situation of evaluation  $s$ . What it takes for a situation to count as accessible is

a context-dependent matter. In this case, a situation  $s'$  will only be accessible if for example the cake has the same ingredients in  $s'$  as it has in  $s$ . So if the cake contains 100g of dark chocolate in  $s$  then it does in  $s'$  too. Secondly, a contextual restriction  $C$  ensures that the individual-situation pairs quantified over  $\langle x, s' \rangle$  are restricted to those that are relevant. In (97),  $\langle x, s' \rangle$  is relevant only if  $x$  eats the cake in  $s'$ . Both the accessibility relation and the contextual restriction are standard components of an analysis of genericity, and independently motivated (see eg. Krifka et al. 1995 for discussion). Something on generic *one*?

Putting everything together, *This cake is tasty* is predicted to be true just in case for every  $\langle x, s' \rangle$  that is a relevant individual-situation pair (eg such that  $x$  eats the cake in  $s'$ ), this cake tastes good to  $x$  in  $s'$ . Crucially, I assume that binding of the pronominal argument *pro* of *tasty* by GEN is obligatory. I propose that this follows from the following constraint.

99. *ILP Licensing Condition*

If  $P$  is an individual-level predicate, then all null pronominal arguments of  $P$  must be bound by GEN.

This ensures that *pro* cannot receive a bound variable interpretation, and that it cannot be referential (and hence cannot be an indexical).<sup>18</sup> I take it that the null hypothesis is that unpronounced pronouns not obligatorily bound by GEN can either be free or can be bound by GEN or some other operator; this is sufficient to derive the PPT Experiencer Correlation.<sup>19</sup>

## 5. Predictions

GEN may or may not be present in the syntactic structure of a clause. With ILPs, this operator is obligatory in order to satisfy the ILP Licensing Condition. With stage-level predicates, the operator is optional. Furthermore, the internal argument of a predicate of personal taste may or may not receive a generic construal. In principle, then, we have the following four logical possibilities for a taste statement containing a bare PPT.

100. (i) +GEN      -generic Experiencer  
       (ii) +GEN      +generic Experiencer  
       (iii) -GEN     -generic Experiencer  
       (iv) -GEN     +generic Experiencer

As I will demonstrate in this section, the account correctly predicts that only (ii) is available for individual-level PPTs, and that (i-iii) is available for stage-level PPTs. We have already encountered examples attesting to options (i-iii) for stage-level PPTs, and showing that only option (ii) is attested for individual-level PPTs. I will review the evidence in this section.

Consider option (i) first. This arises when GEN is present, but the Experiencer is not generic. I propose that this is the proper analysis of (64), repeated below.

101. When I've just brushed my teeth, pineapple juice tastes good.

As shown in section 3, in this example, *tastes good* takes a covert speaker-denoting argument. We also need to show that GEN is present. I assume, following Partee (1984) and Kratzer (1991), that *when*-clauses are restrictors of adverbs of quantification. In an example like (101) where there is no overt quantificational adverb, this role is fulfilled by GEN:<sup>20</sup>

102a. [When I've just brushed my teeth] [pineapple juice; [GEN  $t_i$  tastes good *pro*]]

102b.  $[[102a]]^{c, g} = \lambda s. \forall x, s' [\text{Acc}(s, s') \ \& \ \text{Pineapple-juice}(x, s') \ \& \ C(x, s') \ \& \ \text{speaker}(c) \ \text{has just brushed speaker}(c)\text{'s teeth in } s'] [\text{tastes good}(x, g(1), s')]$

Pick an assignment function  $g$  such that  $g(1) = \text{speaker}(c)$ . The sentence is predicted to be true just in case for every situation  $s'$  and individual  $x$  such that  $x$  instantiates the pineapple juice-kind in  $s'$  and the speaker has just brushed her teeth in  $s'$ ,  $x$  tastes good to the speaker in  $s'$ . Since this matches intuitions about the meaning of the sentence, I conclude that GEN is present in this sentence.

We also predict the contrast between (101) and (103) first observed in section 3.

103. #When I've just brushed my teeth, pineapple juice is tasty.

104a. [When I've just brushed my teeth] [pineapple juice; [GEN  $t_i$  is tasty *pro*]]

104b.  $[[104a]]^{c, g} = \lambda s. \forall x, y, s' [\text{Acc}(s, s') \ \& \ \text{Pineapple-juice}(x, s') \ \& \ C(x, y, s') \ \& \ \text{speaker}(c) \ \text{has just brushed speaker}(c)\text{'s teeth in } s'] [\text{tasty}(x, y, s')]$

Given the ILP Licensing Condition, *tasty*'s Experiencer must be generic as shown in (104b). As argued in section 3, the assumption that the Experiencer of *tasty* is read generically is sufficient to explain the infelicity of (103).

Consider also the following examples.

105. Now that I have lost my sweet tooth, Nutella no longer tastes good.

106. #Now that I have lost my sweet tooth, Nutella is no longer tasty.

As argued in section 3, *tastes good* in (105) takes a covert speaker-denoting argument, but *tasty* cannot do so, and (106) is therefore infelicitous. Additionally, I assume that (105) contains GEN: intuitively the sentence means, 'for any relevant situation  $s'$  and sample of Nutella  $x$ ,  $x$  does not taste good to me in  $s'$ .' I leave it as an exercise to the reader to spell out the LF and truth conditions.

Now let's turn to option (ii), where GEN is present and the Experiencer is also generic. One example of this with the stage-level PPT *tastes good* is found in (107).

107. Pineapple juice must taste good, but no one has ever tasted it.

Recall that epistemic *must* can (under appropriate conditions) suspend the acquaintance inference with bare PPTs, but not when the Experiencer is overt. In section 3 I concluded that in such cases, the covert Experiencer is construed generically. Indeed (107) is felicitous even though it asserts that no one has tasted pineapple juice. Here we have a modal entailment characteristic of generics: intuitively, the sentence means roughly 'if in a situation  $s'$  a person  $x$  were to taste pineapple juice, it would taste good to  $x$  in  $s'$ '; this is compatible with no one having ever tasted pineapple juice in actuality. This too is evidence for the presence of GEN. Unsurprisingly, (107) is also acceptable when *taste good* is replaced with *tasty*:

108. Pineapple juice must be tasty, but no one has ever tasted it.

Further evidence that both stage-level and individual-level PPTs can occur with GEN and take a generic Experiencer comes from the following examples.

109. When one has just brushed one's teeth, pineapple juice tastes good.

110. When one has just brushed one's teeth, pineapple juice is tasty.

We have already argued in section 3 that the Experiencer is construed generically in the case of (109); the same reasoning holds for (110). And as we saw earlier, the *when*-clause in these types of example is the restrictor of GEN.

Now let's turn to option (iii), where the generic operator is absent, and the covert Experiencer of the PPT is not construed generically. Our account predicts that this option is available for stage-level but not individual-level PPTs. Constructing cases where GEN is absent requires some care: Dinges and Zakkou (2020) argue that *tastes good* has a reading reminiscent of dispositionals, which should arguably involve appeal to GEN. Indeed, they argue that this is the most prominent reading out of the blue.<sup>21</sup> It can be seen, for instance, in the following example.

111. The cake tastes good to me. I tried it yesterday.

[Dinges & Zakkou (2020): ex 15]

(111) shows that *The cake tastes good to me* may be true even when the speaker is not currently eating it. In this case it seems to mean roughly, 'Whenever I taste the cake, it tastes good to me'. Dinges and Zakkou argue that there is also an episodic reading, brought out in examples like the following.

112. The cake is done, and when I dig in tomorrow, it will taste good to me.

[Dinges & Zakkou (2020): ex 23]

These are the types of example that we need to show that stage-level PPTs can occur in non-generic environments. We also need to check whether in such cases, the PPT can take a covert, non-generic Experiencer. To do this, I will adapt my strategy of using *when*-clauses:

113. When I had just brushed my teeth, the pineapple juice tasted good.

Given the discussion in section 3, it seems plausible to assume that *taste good* takes a speaker-denoting argument in (113). Moreover, with this particular type of *when*-clause, there is no generic quantification. Instead, I assume that the *when*-clause contributes a definite time, on which the main clause past tense is anaphoric (Partee 1984). The intuitively correct truth conditions relative to a context *c* are in (114). (To incorporate temporal reference I now assume that predicates take time interval arguments).

114.  $\lambda s \lambda t. u' [t' < t \ \& \ \text{speaker}(c)\text{-has-just-brushed-speaker}(c)\text{'s-teeth}(t', s)] [\text{taste-good}(\text{the-pineapple-juice}, \text{speaker}(c), t', s)]$

The sentence asserts that at that past time *t'* at which the speaker had just brushed her teeth, the pineapple juice tasted good to her. Crucially, the claim that the pineapple juice tasted good is limited to a post-toothbrushing situation; no further inferences can be drawn about the taste of the pineapple juice in other situations. Consequently, no generic operator should be posited here.

What about individual-level PPTs? If one subscribes to the view that the characteristic behavior of ILPs should be accounted for by postulating GEN, then the data concerning *tasty* and *beautiful* in section 2 can be taken as evidence that these predicates cannot occur without the generic operator. But we can also check what happens when *tasted good* in (113) is replaced with *was tasty*. Sure enough, the result is infelicitous.

115. #When I had just brushed my teeth, the pineapple juice was tasty.

What has gone wrong here? By hypothesis, the only licit parse of (115) is that in (116).

116. [When I had brushed my teeth] [the pineapple juice<sub>i</sub> [GEN t<sub>i</sub> was tasty *pro*]]

I continue to assume that the main clause past tense is anaphoric on a definite time contributed by the *when*-clause. The truth conditions assigned to (115) are as follows.

117.  $\lambda s \lambda t. t' [t' < t \ \& \ \text{speaker}(c)\text{-has-just-brushed-speaker}(c)\text{'s-teeth}(t', s)] [\forall x, s' [\text{Acc}(s, s') \ \& \ C(\text{the-pineapple-juice}, x, t', s')]] [\text{tasty}(\text{the-pineapple-juice}, x, t', s')]]$

This says roughly that at that past time at which the speaker had brushed her teeth, the generic sentence *The pineapple juice is tasty* was true. But whether or not the speaker has just brushed her teeth has no bearing on whether the pineapple juice is tasty to all relevant people in all relevant situations. So the restriction induced by the *when*-clause is redundant, and the sentence is infelicitous. I take it then that we have evidence that option (iii) is attested for stage-level but not individual-level PPTs: the former, but not the latter can occur in episodic contexts (without GEN), and when they do, their covert internal argument need not be generic.

In fact, it turns out that in episodic contexts, stage-level PPTs *cannot* take generic Experiencers. Recall that epistemic *must* suspends the acquaintance inference when the PPT takes a covert generic argument, but not when the internal argument is referential. Additionally, when a PPT takes a speaker-denoting argument, adding *must* results in a degraded sentence. Sure enough, when *must* is added to (113), infelicity results.

118. #When I had just brushed my teeth, the pineapple juice must have tasted good.

True, the example is ameliorated by considering a context where the speaker has forgotten what the pineapple juice tasted like after toothbrushing and is basing her conclusion on some sort of indirect evidence. But an outright denial of acquaintance is also infelicitous.

119. #When I had brushed my teeth, the pineapple juice must have tasted good. But I have never tasted pineapple juice after brushing my teeth.

I take this to show that a stage-level PPT can only take a covert generic Experiencer if it occurs in a generic context – GEN is needed to license the generic construal of the Experiencer. This is unsurprising given that on our semantics, the generic construal of the Experiencer comes about via binding of *pro* by GEN. Furthermore, it is also to be expected if this argument is the covert counterpart of generic *one*, which Malamud (2006) and Moltmann (2006) argue must be licensed by the generic operator.

In section 4, I have proposed an account of the observation that the covert Experiencer of an individual-level PPT must be generic, whereas covert Experiencers of stage-level PPTs can also have bound variable or referential interpretations. I assume that both classes of PPT take a

covert argument *pro*, which can in principle be generic, referential, or receive a bound variable interpretation. Additionally, I adopt Chierchia’s (1995) view that ILPs require local licensing by GEN, augmented with the assumption that *all* null pronominal arguments of an ILP (and not only its situation argument) must be bound by GEN. Finally, I assume that the generic Experiencer is a null counterpart of generic *one* and is subject to the same licensing condition (binding by GEN). This minimal set of assumptions is sufficient to derive the PPT Experiencer Correlation. In particular, it correctly predicts that of the four logically possible configurations in (99), only (ii) is attested for ILPs, whereas (i-iii) are attested for SLPs. In the next section, I argue that these findings present a challenge for relativism.

## 6. Genericity, not judge-relativism, explains faultless disagreement

The central character in relativist accounts of predicates of personal taste is the phenomenon of faultless disagreement, where two speakers express incompatible assertions, but neither says something false (Kölbel 2002, Lasersohn 2005). In (120), both Ethan and Sarah can be taken to have spoken truly, as long as each expressed her opinion sincerely.

120. Ethan: Pineapple juice is tasty.  
Sarah: No, pineapple juice is not tasty.

An alternative to relativism takes it that the source of faultless disagreement is a generic construal of the Experiencer (Anand 2009, Moltmann 2010b, 2012, Pearson 2013a, Snyder 2013, Keshet 2020). These authors differ on precisely how genericity gives rise to faultless disagreement; according to the account I favour, faultless disagreement is a consequence of a specific type of genericity that is ‘first person-oriented’ in the sense of Moltmann’s (2006, 2010a) analysis of generic *one*.<sup>22</sup> But regardless of the details, if the appeal to genericity is correct, then the current proposal predicts that faultless disagreement will arise only when the PPT takes a generic Experiencer (Moltmann 2010b, 2012, Pearson 2013a, Keshet 2020).<sup>23</sup> More specifically, it will arise if either (a) the PPT is individual-level or (b) the PPT is stage-level, co-occurs with GEN and takes a generic Experiencer. It will not arise if (a) the PPT is stage-level, co-occurs with GEN, and takes a covert non-generic Experiencer argument, or (b) the PPT is stage-level and occurs in an episodic context. I will demonstrate that this prediction is borne out.

We have already seen in (120) that faultless disagreement can arise with the individual-level PPT *tasty*; I take it that this is uncontroversial. Next, let’s show that faultless disagreement also arises with stage-level PPTs (eg *taste good*) and a generic Experiencer argument. Take the following dialogue.

121. Ethan: When one has just brushed one’s teeth, pineapple juice tastes good.  
Sarah: No, when one has just brushed one’s teeth, pineapple juice does not taste good.

We saw in section 5 that in these sentences, *taste good* occurs in a generic context and takes a generic Experiencer. Sure enough, the disagreement between Ethan and Sarah is faultless: so long as each sincerely reports her opinion of the taste of pineapple juice post-tooth brushing, neither has said something false.

Now let’s consider an example where *taste good* occurs in a generic environment, but its Experiencer is not generic. We have seen that (101), repeated below, is such a case.

122. Ethan: When I’ve just brushed my teeth, pineapple juice tastes good.

There is no possible response to (122) that creates faultless disagreement. In (123), the content of Ethan's assertion has been negated, generating a disagreement.

123. Sarah: No, when you've just brushed your teeth, pineapple juice does not taste good.

The disagreement is not faultless: either Ethan or Sarah has said something false. (More likely Sarah, since Ethan has privileged access to information about how something tastes to him.) This is expected: in (123), *taste good* takes a covert addressee-denoting argument. Sure enough, a counterpart of (123) with an overt second person Experiencer fails to generate faultless disagreement:

124. Sarah: No, when you've just brushed your teeth, pineapple juice does not taste good to you.

That indexical pronouns do not generate faultless disagreement has long been considered an argument against analyses of PPTs that appeal to hidden indexicals (Lasersohn 2005). What to my knowledge has not been noticed before is that (i) there are taste statements with bare PPTs that *cannot* yield faultless disagreements, even though they would seem to involve an autocentric interpretation and (ii) these include those taste statements that involve a covert indexical argument.

Finally, we need to show that there is no faultless disagreement with stage-level PPTs in episodic contexts. Consider again (113), repeated here as uttered by Ethan.

125. Ethan: When I had just brushed my teeth, the pineapple juice tasted good.  
Sarah: No, when you had just brushed your teeth, the pineapple juice did not taste good.

We again have a disagreement where only one of Ethan and Sarah can be speaking truly (again, most likely Ethan). This is again expected if in Sarah's reply, the argument of *taste good* is a 2<sup>nd</sup> person pronoun.

This is convincing evidence that faultless disagreement arises only when the PPT takes a generic Experiencer – exactly as one would expect if (first-person oriented) genericity is the source of faultless disagreement. I'll now say more about why judge-based accounts will have difficulty dealing with these facts.

By 'judge-based', I have in mind accounts that posit an individual parameter as part of the evaluation index (in addition to a situation or world parameter) and assign truth conditions such as the following.

126.  $[[\text{Pineapple juice tastes good}]]^{s,j,g} = 1$  iff Pineapple juice tastes good to  $j$  in  $s$

In what Lasersohn calls an 'autocentric' context, the value of the judge is set to the speaker. In such a context, Ethan speaks truly by uttering (125) just in case pineapple juice tastes good to him. Likewise, Sarah speaks truly in an autocentric context by uttering 'Pineapple juice does not taste good' just in case pineapple juice does not taste good to her. The contents expressed are incompatible, but since the judge parameter has a different value in each case, both utterances may turn out to be true.

On this view, faultless disagreement is derived without assuming that the Experiencer of the PPT is generic. So to account for the observation that faultless disagreement arises only with a generic Experiencer, one might give up Lasersohn's assumption that faultless disagreement arises

in autocentric contexts, and instead assume that it comes about when the judge parameter is set to something like an ‘arbitrary’ or ‘ideal’ Experiencer, thereby mimicking the effects that we have discussed in this paper. But to make this work, one would need a story about why the judge is set to this value (i) obligatorily when the PPT is individual-level and (ii) optionally when the PPT is stage-level. Even supposing that this difficulty can be overcome, notice that on this account, the explanation for faultless disagreement is quite different from traditional relativism. This time, Ethan speaks truly by uttering (120) just in case pineapple juice is tasty to an arbitrary Experiencer, and Sarah speaks truly by saying ‘Pineapple juice is not tasty’ just in case it is not tasty to an arbitrary Experiencer. This explains disagreement (since the contents are incompatible), but one needs to say something more to explain faultlessness (since the judge has the same value in both cases). The move to a relativist semantics is then no longer motivated – it does not in and of itself account for faultlessness. Rather, faultlessness must be explained by appeal to genericity itself. But if genericity, not judge-relativity, is necessary to explain faultlessness, then we no longer have an argument (from PPTs at least) for the radical claim that the truth values of sentences with identical contents may vary from speaker to speaker.

## 7. Conclusion

Whether or not Nutella tastes good to me may vary depending on one of two things: properties of Nutella (eg how much sugar it contains) and properties of me (eg whether or not I like sweet things). If over time there is a change along either of these dimensions, then the truth value of *Nutella tastes good to me* might change: I might then be in a position to assert, ‘Nutella used to taste good to me, but it doesn’t any more’, for example. This is also true of certain sentences where *tastes good* does not take an overt Experiencer – namely, those where it instead takes a covert speaker-denoting argument. It is not, however, true of any sentences where *tastes good* is replaced by *tasty*. Nor is it true of sentences where *tastes good* takes a covert generic Experiencer. For the latter two classes of sentence, only a change in the properties of Nutella itself results in a change in truth value. And notice that it is precisely the latter two classes of sentence that give rise to faultless disagreement, and hence it is precisely these that the relativist should otherwise expect to analyse in terms of relativization of truth to the speaker.

These facts are surprising from a relativist point of view, according to which the truth value (in an autocentric context) of *Nutella is tasty* depends on whether or not the property of being an individual to whom Nutella is tasty is true of the speaker. But they are not surprising from the point of view of analyses that explain faultless disagreement by appeal to a generic Experiencer. Relativization of the interpretation function to a judge is neither necessary nor sufficient to explain the full range of facts concerning faultless disagreement with predicates of personal taste.

## Acknowledgments

The initial impetus to consider that predicates of personal taste may come in both stage-level and individual-level flavours was a remark from Irene Heim about a decade ago; I also presented some tentative remarks on this topic to an audience at ZAS, Berlin. I thank Julia Zakkou for extensive comments on an earlier version of this chapter that resulted in significant improvements. Thanks for English judgments to David Adger, Elizabeth Cheshire, Daniel Harbour and Keren Rubner, and for German judgments to Clemens Mayr, Frank Sode and Julia Zakkou. I am responsible for all remaining errors.

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<sup>1</sup> In English, a simple PPT is an adjective, which co-occurs with the copula, while a complex PPT consists of an appearance predicate such as *taste* or *look* plus an adjectival complement. For more on appearance predicates, see Rudolph (this volume).

<sup>2</sup> Throughout this chapter, I focus on gustatory and visual cases for reasons of space. However, Julia Zakkou (p.c.) has pointed out to me that the core observations seem to extend beyond these cases to pairs like *is pleasant/sounds pleasant*, and *is cosy/feels cosy*.

<sup>3</sup> An individual-level predicate (ILP) denotes a (quasi-)permanent property, eg *tall* or *old*. A stage-level predicate (SLP) denotes a temporary property, such as *hungry* or *bored*.

<sup>4</sup> Here I build on Anand (2009), Pearson (2013a) and Snyder (2013), who all appeal to the idea that ILPs are inherent generics in their analyses of PPTs.

<sup>5</sup> I ignore the adjectival PPT *fun* throughout this paper, since it has no complex counterpart. It would be interesting to consider the tests discussed in this chapter in light of the contrast that Anthony (2016) identifies between ‘dispositional’ and ‘experiential’ construals of *fun*. Cf. Pearson (2013b), which tentatively suggests that *fun* may be stage-level.

<sup>6</sup> I ignore *tasty/tastes good* for the purpose of this test, since they do not denote properties that can be detected through visual or aural perception.

<sup>7</sup> It is crucial to this test that the noun phrases be construed de dicto. I have adapted Kratzer’s examples to exclude the de re reading by using subjunctive morphology throughout.

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<sup>8</sup> A precedent for the use of strict/sloppy ambiguity as a probe for the properties of PPTs is found in Snyder (2013). His example involves *fun*.

<sup>9</sup> Lasersohn's original examples involved *fun* rather than *tasty*.

<sup>10</sup> The empirical landscape concerning weak crossover in German is complex; it may be that there is more than one dialect in this domain. See for example Müller 1995.

<sup>11</sup> One speaker reported that (41), but not (42), suggests that there is more than one wedding guest whose taste has been affected by the virus. I suspect that this is due to the different presuppositional inferences induced by *die Tatsache, dass...* ('the fact that...') in (41) and *verärger, dass...* ('annoyed that...') in (42), rather than having to do with the properties of the covert argument of *taste good*. This is supported by the fact that this speaker reported the same thing for (41)'s counterpart with an overt pronoun (43).

<sup>12</sup> I assume that presuppositions project universally under universal quantifiers (Heim 1983).

<sup>13</sup> Julia Zakkou (p.c.) has pointed out to me that this claim is at odds with views found in Cappelen & Hawthorne (2009), Schaffer (2009) and MacFarlane (2014). Schaffer, for instance, claims that 'Everyone got something tasty' can be true in a situation where each of the Smiths had a different flavour of ice cream and each one liked the flavour of ice cream that she had, but none of them liked any of the other flavours. I believe this is compatible with the internal argument of *tasty* being generically quantified rather than bound by *everyone*: as pointed out by Pearson (2013a), generic construal brings with it a restriction to *relevant* tasters. One necessary condition for being a relevant taster is that one must have tasted the item in question; since this condition is only met by one member of the family per flavour, the effects of binding by the universal quantifier are mimicked.

<sup>14</sup> Although (70) is infelicitous out of the blue, it becomes acceptable if used by an amnesiac who after a long stay in hospital finds a lot of empty pineapple juice bottles in her home. Such a context provides an explanation for how on the one hand the speaker could have tasted pineapple juice, while on the other she is forced to base her statement on indirect evidence. Thanks to Julia Zakkou (p.c.) for pressing me on this.

<sup>15</sup> As far as I know this is a novel observation. I won't speculate on how best to account for it.

<sup>16</sup> As Moltmann (this volume) points out, ultimately one should give a compositional treatment of complex PPTs like *tastes good*. I leave this to future work.

<sup>17</sup> I assume that subjects reconstruct in VP-internal position, where they are base-generated.

<sup>18</sup> Notice that (99) also predicts that the situation argument of the predicate (itself a null pronoun) is obligatorily bound by GEN, thus subsuming Chierchia's analysis.

<sup>19</sup> I have no account of why it should be simple PPTs that are individual-level and complex PPTs that are stage-level. I leave this for future work. See also Moltmann (this volume) for critical comments in this vein.

<sup>20</sup> I continue to assume that null situation pronouns (and their binders) are represented in the syntax, although from now on I omit these for readability.

<sup>21</sup> Ultimately, Dinges & Zakkou replace dispositions with what they call 'tendencies'. The details of this need not concern us here.

<sup>22</sup> This view says roughly that when Ethan says that pineapple juice is tasty, he makes a generic claim about the tastiness of pineapple juice to anyone who might taste it, based on his own experience of drinking pineapple juice, together with the assumption that his tastes are representative of the set of (potential) pineapple juice drinkers. The role of first person experience in taste claims ensures that the assertion is faultless as long as it sincerely represents Ethan's own experience. That Ethan and Sarah's assertions involve generalisation across the same population ensures that the propositions they express are incompatible, and hence that there is genuine disagreement.

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(i) [[ [ $\lambda x_1 \lambda s_2$  [ $s_2$  This cake<sub>i</sub> [ $\text{GEN } \lambda s_3$  [ $s_3$   $t_i$  is tasty *one*]] ]]]<sup>s</sup> =  $\lambda x \lambda s. \forall y, s' [\text{Acc}(s, s') \ \& \ C(y, s') \ \& \ I(x, y)]$  [tasty(this cake, y, s')]