Heritage destruction in Myanmar's Rakhine state; legal and illegal iconoclasm

Journal:	*International Journal of Heritage Studies*
Manuscript ID	RJHS-2019-0219
Manuscript Type:	Original Article
Keywords:	Heritage destruction, Myanmar, UNESCO, Iconoclasm, Rohingya genocide

SCHOLARONE™
Manuscripts

Map of Myanmar

209x297mm (150 x 150 DPI)

Heritage destruction in Myanmar’s Rakhine state; legal and illegal iconoclasm

In this article we map heritage destruction in Myanmar’s Rakhine state. We outline the historic and contemporary political context in Myanmar explaining the background of the Rohingya Muslim ethnic group and addressing the contribution of religion and political change to anti-Rohingya discrimination and violence in Myanmar. We trace patterns of heritage destruction as legal and/or illegal iconoclasm and specify the key elements of heritage destruction in Rakhine state. Our analysis focusses on the use of heritage destruction in Rakhine state as a tool of genocide, and we suggest that heritage destruction in Myanmar’s Rakhine state ought to be understood as part the authorities’ policies of genocide against the Rohingya. We conclude the article with a call for UNESCO to act to extend its Unite4Heritage campaign to include the destruction of heritage by state actors.

Key words

Heritage destruction, Myanmar, Rohingya, Genocide, UNESCO, iconoclasm

For Peer Review Only

Introduction

In recent years, the deliberate destruction of cultural heritage, particularly in conflict contexts, has become increasingly visible. Heritage destruction in Afghanistan, Iraq, Mali, and Syria drew the attention of the world’s media, caused public outcry, and in one instance led to a successful International Criminal Court prosecution (Burke 2016; González Zarandona, Albarrán-Torres and Isakhan 2018; Kraak 2018; Moffett 2017; UN News 2017a). Although the deliberate destruction of cultural heritage in Myanmar has been less visible internationally, throughout the 2017 Rohingya refugee crisis there were numerous documented examples of cultural heritage destruction both by the Myanmar authorities and by ordinary residents of Myanmar. The 2017 Rohingya refugee crisis drew world attention to the circumstances of this persecuted Muslim ethnic minority and to the nature of the military crackdown that caused around 700,000 Rohingya to flee their homes in Rakhine state for Bangladesh (OCHA 2018; UN News 2017b; UNHCR 2018).

During 2017, Myanmar’s military, known as the *Tatmadaw*, partially or totally razed almost 300 Rohingya villages and destroyed numerous mosques in northern Rakhine state (Human Rights Watch (HRW) 2017a, 2017b, 2018). The Myanmar authorities have subsequently remodelled large parts of northern Rakhine state which has included constructing at least one military base on lands previously occupied by the Rohingya (Amnesty International (AI) 2018a, 2018b; Associated Press 2018; Child 2018). Largescale destruction of cultural heritage in Rakhine state did not begin in 2017. During 2012, conflict between Buddhists and Muslims caused the destruction of entire neighbourhoods around the state capital, Sittwe,

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

displacing more than 140,000 people, overwhelmingly Muslims, in Rakhine state (see Map; HRW 2012; Republic of the Union of Myanmar 2013).

In this article we map heritage destruction in Myanmar's Rakhine state from the time of this 2012 violence to the present. We also outline historic heritage destruction in Myanmar, before considering the role of religion and recent political change in violence in contemporary Myanmar. We next trace patters of heritage destruction as legal and/or illegal iconoclasm specifying the key elements of heritage destruction in Rakhine state. Our analysis focusses on the use of heritage destruction in Rakhine state as a tool of genocide, and we suggest that heritage destruction in Rakhine state ought to be understood as part the authorities' policies of genocide against the Rohingya. We conclude the article with a call for UNESCO to act to extend its Unite4Heritage campaign to include the destruction of heritage by state actors.

We characterise heritage destruction by ordinary residents, mobs or violent extremist groups as "iconoclasm from below" or illegal iconoclasm. This is iconoclasm which may be deemed illegal by the government. This type of deliberate cultural heritage destruction has been the focus of UNESCO's "Unite4Heritage" campaign which urges state actors to highlight and tackle cultural heritage destruction by violent extremist groups (UNESCO 2018). However, much of the deliberate cultural heritage destruction in Rakhine state, including most destruction of mosques, is perpetrated by state actors and is appropriately characterised as "iconoclasm from above" or legal iconoclasm – the destruction of material culture that is perpetrated by the state and therefore perceived as legitimate within that state's legal framework. Characterising the destruction of cultural heritage in this manner allows for a nuanced account of the recent landscape of heritage destruction in Rakhine state. This leads us to argue in this article that UNESCO's focus on preventing the deliberate destruction of cultural heritage is too heavily focused on preventing iconoclasm from below and does not adequately seek to prevent iconoclasm from above.

Myanmar: historic and contemporary political context

Myanmar, often still known as Burma,[1] is an overwhelmingly Buddhist Southeast Asian nation located on the Bay of Bengal. Bordered by Bangladesh, China, India, Laos, and Thailand, its controversial 2014 census – the first in three decades – reported a national population of around 50 million people (Myanmar Information Management Unit, 2014). However, enumerators were prevented from collecting data from more than one million people who wished their ethnicity to be recorded as "Rohingya", an ethnic identity the authorities do not acknowledge. Living mostly in Rakhine state, close to Myanmar's westerly border with Bangladesh, the Rohingya are a persecuted Muslim group and are denied citizenship rights by Myanmar's Buddhist dominated authorities (AI, 2017a; HRW, 2012; Lee, 2014). By 2018 the Rohingya represent one of the world's largest stateless groups and with this statelessness has come waves of destruction of Rohingya heritage (Ibrahim, 2018), as has been the case in other similar contexts (De Cesari 2010; Saunders 2008).

For Peer Review Only

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Nationwide, 87.9% of Myanmar's residents are Buddhist and only 4.3% Muslims, but in Rakhine state the Muslim population is greater than 35% (Department of Population 2015). The most populous ethnic group in Myanmar is the "Bamar" (also known as "Burman"). This mostly Buddhist group comprises close to three-quarters of Myanmar's population and has dominated the institutions of Myanmar since the country gained independence from Britain in 1948. The dominant ethnicity in Rakhine state is a Buddhist group known as the "Rakhine" who account for a little under 2 million of Rakhine state's around 3.2 million people (Republic of the Union of Myanmar 2015). The Rakhine are acknowledged as citizens of Myanmar but are independent minded and harbour resentments towards the central authorities whom they consider do not adequately prioritise ethnic Rakhine concerns, although in recent years the Rakhine have had some success communicating their priorities onto Myanmar's national political stage (International Crisis Group 2014). The Arakan National Party (ANP), a nationalist and pro-Rakhine group is the largest block in the Rakhine state parliament and the third largest party in Myanmar's national parliament (International Crisis Group 2015). In recent times, the ANP has found common ground with Bamar and Buddhist nationalists, particularly in their opposition to improved rights for Muslim groups in Myanmar (Mathieson 2016; Su-Ann Oh 2016).

The area today known as Rakhine state had been an independent kingdom (known as Arakan), with a Buddhist ethnic Rakhine majority but with a sizeable and well-integrated Muslim minority when it was invaded by the Burmese in 1784. This was less than four decades before the Burmese subsequently lost this territory to the British during the 1820s. Burma's Konbaung dynasty, which ruled Burma from the early 1750s was militarily aggressive and claimed territory in areas that are today parts of Bangladesh, India, Laos, and Thailand (Hall 1950). Conflict with the British who had relatively recently gained control of territory adjacent to Arakan and subsequent defeat in the first of the three Anglo-Burmese Wars saw Burma's Arakan territory ceded to the British (Treaty of Yandabo 1826). Military defeat ended Burmese sovereignty in 1886 and Burma became a province of British India, ruled from Calcutta and later New Delhi (Hall 1950; Myint-U 2007; Phayre 1883). The ultimate humiliation for many Burmese Buddhists at this time came when the British, during December 1885, exiled the last Burmese king, Thibaw, to India (Christian 1944).

These military and political reversals significantly dented Burmese pride, leaving many among the country's Buddhist population resentful of the British, and over time, of those perceived to have benefited by British colonial rule. These resentments were fuelled by perceptions, often valid, that the British privileged those of Indian origin, frequently Muslims and with darker skin than many Buddhist Burmese and Rakhine, for plum roles within the colonial administration (Charney 2009; Steinberg 2010; Taylor 2009). The British imported large numbers of administrators from the sub-continent and encouraged the inward migration of low-income labourers into the province of Burma which was considered underpopulated for Britain's commercial purposes. Indian moneylenders arrived too and through loan defaults would become major landowners in colonial Burma (Taylor 2009; Turnell and Vicary 2008; Steinberg 2010).

This colonial-era migration contributed to attitudes that persist in contemporary times; namely, that migrants flooded into colonial Burma from the sub-continent and then gained an

For Peer Review Only

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

economic advantage over the country's mostly Buddhist indigenous population. These attitudes greatly contribute to contemporary ethnic and religious tensions, as does the perception among many Myanmar Buddhists that Rakhine state Muslims, by supporting the British rather than the Japanese during the Second World War, demonstrated a disloyalty to Burmese aspirations for independence (Charney 2009; International Crisis Group 2013, 2014; Steinberg 2010). Today, colonial era migration to Burma, particularly to Arakan, is a commonly raised grievance by Myanmar's Buddhist nationalists who suggest the ancestors of the contemporary Rohingya were colonial-era imports who ought not to be considered a group indigenous to Burma and thus not entitled to collective rights to citizenship as other ethnic groups are in Myanmar (Freeman 2017; Peck 2017).

The Burmese independence movement led by Aung San, father of Myanmar's current de-facto civilian leader, and Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, auspiced a Japanese occupation during the Second World War to push out the British. A change of heart and of sides by Aung San's Burmese forces, and Japanese wartime defeat saw the return of the British to power in Burma and the grant of independence in 1948. Independent Burma was democratic only for a brief period that ended with a military coup in 1962. The subsequent military-led governments crushed political opposition, sealed the country from the outside world, oversaw an economic collapse, continual conflict between the military and dozens of ethnic armed groups, and enforced one of the world's most restrictive media environments. Military-led governments remained in power until a quasi-civilian administration led by former general Thein Sein won the stage-managed 2010 general election. The subsequent election in 2015, saw the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) party led by Aung San Suu Kyi win a substantial majority of elected constituencies. An NLD administration took political power in 2016, with Aung San Suu Kyi becoming State Counsellor – a Prime Ministerial styled role created to overcome a constitutional hurdle barring her from the Presidency because of her marriage to a foreigner and her children's foreign citizenships.

For Peer Review Only

Religion, anti-Rohingya discrimination and violence in Myanmar

In a Myanmar where ethnicity and religion have the potential to be major political fault lines, greatly improved access to communication technology and political freedoms, allowed by the country's quasi-civilian governments, meant Myanmar's residents could receive and disseminate opinions about political and social issues, including issues of ethnicity and religion, with the click of a button. Myanmar's education system has been poorly funded for decades, and internet and media literacy are low (Baker 2016; UNESCO and IMS 2016). Journalists working in Myanmar often report that people accept news posted to Facebook as being as reliable as news sourced from mainstream media sources (Douek 2018). Among the most active political users of social media in Myanmar are extreme nationalist groups like the monk-led *Ma Ba Tha* (Association for the Protection of Race and Religion), and figures like the activist monk Ashin Wirathu, dubbed the "Buddhist Bin Laden", who argue Myanmar's national interest is served by the protection of the special place of the Buddhist religion that is threatened by other religions, especially Islam. Wirathu, in a widely publicised interview with *Time* magazine, claimed that: "[Muslims] are breeding so fast, and they are stealing our

women, raping them…They would like to occupy our country, but I won't let them. We must keep Myanmar Buddhist" (Beech 2013). Wirathu is also reported to have described 90% of Muslims in Myanmar as, "radical, bad people" (Beech 2013). Wirathu and other Buddhist nationalists tap into dissatisfaction at immigration from the sub-continent during the British colonial period, beliefs that many Muslims did not adequately support the Burmese independence movement, and perceptions that Myanmar's Buddhist character is threatened by Islam, to call for restrictions on the rights of Muslims in Myanmar.

Despite less than 5% of Myanmar's residents being Muslim, Wirathu and other nationalists argue Myanmar's Buddhist religion is at an existential threat from the encroachment of Islam. They point to former Buddhist countries that are now majority-Muslim like Afghanistan, Indonesia and Malaysia to suggest that unless local Islam is held in check, Myanmar and its Buddhist character could follow a similar path. By doing so, they elevate anti-Islam attitudes and actions to a nationalist's moral duty. In this context, with Myanmar's Buddhist religion considered by many to be under siege from Islam, nationalists have successfully used Myanmar's new media and political freedoms to marginalise Muslims, particularly the Rohingya Muslim minority (Lee 2018). This marginalisation has included successfully pursuing the enactment of the "Protection of Race and Religion" laws, which limit the rights of ethnic and religious minorities and women, and by convincing both the pro-military Union Solidarity and Development Party and Aung San Suu Kyi's opposition NLD to field no Muslim candidates at the 2015 general election. As a result, there are no Muslim representatives in Myanmar's parliament, and in Rakhine state, the Rohingya who were disenfranchised prior to the 2015 polls, often live in areas represented by Buddhist nationalist politicians.

The Rohingya have been victims of official discrimination in Myanmar for decades which has been documented by human rights groups including AI (1992, 1997, 2004, 2016, 2017a), HRW (1996, 2000, 2002, 2009, 2012, 2013), Physicians for Human Rights (2013, 2016), and Refugees International (2014). A 2015 academic study by the International State Crime Initiative concluded the Rohingya were victims of genocide, having found

> ample evidence that the Rohingya have been subjected to systematic and widespread violations of human rights, including killings, torture, rape and arbitrary detention; destruction of their homes and villages; land confiscation; forced labour; denial of citizenship; denial of the right to identify themselves as Rohingya; denial of access to healthcare, education and employment; restrictions on freedom of movement, and State-sanctioned campaigns of religious hatred (Green, MacManus and de la Cour Venning 2015, 15).

Periodically, this discrimination manifests violently, and actions by Myanmar's military contributed to a series of large-scale forced migrations of Rohingya to Bangladesh during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s (AI 1992; HRW 2000; Ware and Laoutides 2018). In recent years, two periods of violence stand out as significant inflection points: the 2012 Rakhine state violence between Buddhists and Muslims—characterised by the authorities as communal conflict—and the military's 2017 "clearance operation" (UN Human Rights Council 2018; UN News 2017b).

For Peer Review Only

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

During 2012, violence between Buddhists and Muslims left almost 200 dead and displaced around 140,000 people, the overwhelming majority of whom were Rohingya Muslims (International Crisis Group 2013). Despite rising ethnic tensions in Rakhine state, Buddhists and Muslims told HRW that the, "authorities provided no protection and did not appear to have taken any special measures to pre-empt the violence" (HRW 2012). This violent episode resulted in the razing of entire Muslim-majority areas of Sittwe, leading to the large-scale displacement of Rohingya Muslim residents. During the violence, Sittwe's most prominent Muslim site, the oldest mosque in Sittwe, the Jama Mosque, was ransacked by a Buddhist mob. The authorities' eventual response to the violence was to separate Buddhist and Muslim populations but the Muslim community bore the brunt of this policy with more than 120,000 of those originally displaced during 2012 remaining confined in internally displaced person (IDP) camps or locked down in their neighbourhoods more than seven years later (UN News 2019; UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2017). Their former communities, their homes having been turned to ash, were mostly not actively remodelled but instead left so that nature reclaimed this land with foliage. By 2019, much of these areas resembles scrub land or disused agricultural land – most traces of these areas as former Rohingya communities have been erased. Seven years after it was desecrated, the Jama Mosque remains closed and despite its location on Sittwe's main thoroughfare, access is blocked by an armed military guard who also actively prevent photography of the site.

Despite the appalling discrimination suffered by the Rohingya, mainstream Rohingya political opinion in recent decades has rejected a strategy of political violence. However, by late 2016 this attitude appeared to be changing for some Rohingya living in northern Rakhine state with the emergence of the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) militant group and its claims to represent the interests of the Rohingya community (International Crisis Group 2016; Lee 2017). ARSA's August 2017 attacks on security posts in northern Rakhine state, precipitated a brutal crackdown by the *Tatmadaw* on the Rohingya. Myanmar's military actions in northern Rakhine state led to the largest displacement of civilians in the region since the end of World War II. During a ten weeks' period from late August 2017 more than 600,000 Rohingya fled Myanmar for Bangladesh. This crackdown was described by United Nation's High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein as an "example of ethnic cleansing" (UN News 2017b). The military's "clearance operation" was characterised by extra judicial killings, arbitrary arrests, sexual violence, and the razing of hundreds of villages, including the destruction of mosques.

Within this violent environment, and as part of the clearance operation that the *Tatmadaw* performed in northern Rakhine state Rohingya communities during 2017, a particular type of destruction of culturally significant sites emerged. Witnesses of the violence have spoken about how entire villages were burned by the military, and HRW used satellite images to confirm the widespread destruction of Rohingya villages by fire (HRW, 2017b). AI (2018c) described this as a land grab by the military who constructed bases on the sites of razed Rohingya villages. The scale of the destruction of Rohingya villages and of the forced migration that accompanied it drew widespread international condemnation (Al Jazeera 2017a; The Economist 2017). While numerous Rohingya arrivals at refugee camps in Bangladesh described how the military set fire to Rohingya homes, including by using

For Peer Review Only

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

military helicopters, and machines akin to flamethrowers, blame for this destruction was contested. Myanmar's military, which has rejected accusations of wrongdoing during the 2017 "clearance operation" claims Rohingya villagers set fire to their own homes to gain international sympathy (Wa Lone 2017). The military's claim was undermined during a media tour of Rakhine state when journalists witnessed an apparent staged burning by residents pretending to be Rohingya and saw villages in military controlled areas burning days after the Rohingya residents fled (BBC 2017a; Head 2017). As witnessed in other cases, the destruction of material culture and significant sites does often draw the attention of the international media, generating sympathy towards the minority which suffers the trauma (Isakhan, González Zarandona and Jamal 2019). Likewise, the destruction of significant sites is a tool that has been used by perpetrators as an extension of the genocidal campaign they exercise against a particular group, as was the case in the former Yugoslavia, where entire villages including their mosques where razed (Walasek 2015), to erase evidence of previous occupation by Muslims and thus enable the rewriting of history.

Violence and heritage destruction

The destruction of material culture that belongs to a social group for religious and/or political motivations has been used as a tool since Antiquity by countless armies and empires to demonstrate power over conquered people. This practice has often been used as part of a strategy to destroy groups' identities, histories and memories, their past and property. Clay (2012, 181) explains this by asserting: "The breaching of representational objects' physical integrity continues to be a means by which diverse groups and individuals represent and imagine contested power relations between a state, its citizens and wider communities". The study, analysis and interpretation of this phenomenon has taken a turn in the last two decades thanks to a series of studies that have established that many acts of physical violence against people are usually accompanied by the destruction of heritage with different consequences and motivations (Bevan 2006; Mitchell 2015; Walasek 2015). A useful case study is the destruction of heritage in the territory of the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s, including the destruction of mosques and significant cultural sites such as the National and University Library in Sarajevo in 1992, that demonstrated an explicit link between the destruction of heritage and the genocide that was perpetrated on the ground. Thus, the acts of heritage destruction were not considered isolated events but acts of violence that sought to erase the past embedded in archives, buildings, and traditions, deeply affecting the targeted group's identity and memories.

Feierstein (2014, 2015) explains that erasing the past is often a tactic used by perpetrators of genocide to reorient societies for the future. The deliberate destruction of cultural heritage often involves the systematic targeting of cultural property to erase the traces left by a cultural group and claim the group has never existed or inhabited that territory, thus allowing history to be rewritten through the creation of new symbols – the destruction of an image always entails the creation of a new one (Latour 2002). The motivation to destroy the material culture arises from a mandate that seeks to delimit the territory that the group inhabits (Mitchell 2015). By destroying the cultural features that are considered to make the territory unique (these characteristics might include buildings of religious or political

For Peer Review Only

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

significance, images and traditions), the perpetrators claim the territory for themselves. The destruction of cultural heritage symbolizes, by proxy, the destruction of the group to which the targeted material culture belongs. Research on this topic has framed the destruction of certain sites and places as part of the objective of erasing and destroying not only the past but also the memories associated to those sites and places (Bevan 2006). The memories attached to certain sites can be of a historical or personal nature. By erasing the site and the features in it, the memories associated with the place are also obliterated.

Beyond the work of these scholars that have established the links of heritage destruction with the destruction of the past and memories, the concepts of iconoclasm (destruction of images for political and religious reasons), defacement (destruction of human or facial characteristics in images) and vandalism (thoughtless and wanton destruction of property) are also often employed by scholars to explain why and how a destruction of cultural heritage occured and the motivations behind it (Freedberg 1989; Mitchell 2015; Taussig 1999). For example, destruction of heritage in Iraq and Syria has been characterized as iconoclasm (Isakhan and González Zarandona, 2018) due to theological arguments that the so-called Islamic State (IS) put forward in their digital mediated propaganda through social media to justify the destruction of archaeological artefacts (González Zarandona et al. 2018). A key argument present in the literature is that the act of destruction is not meaningless, but instead it has a meaning in itself and occurs in the first place due to the symbolic power that the object exudes or possesses – this is a form of communication with a specific message. As Gamboni claimed (1997, 22), iconoclasms "must be considered as means of communication in their own right, even if the 'material' they make use of is – or was – itself a tool of expression or communication". However, heritage destruction is only meaningful as far as the message delivered resonates within the targeted group and other stakeholders and produces a reaction. An attack upon a Shia mosque, for example, will not have the same resonance in a Christian community as in the Shia community where the attack took place. In fact, as Isakhan (2015, 274) has demonstrated, the targeting of a culturally significant site may trigger violent acts against people perceived to be the perpetrators, in retaliation for the attack on the heritage site, thus unleashing catastrophic consequences as was the case in Iraq, when the Shia Al-Askari mosque was targeted by Al-Qaeda in 2006.

During the 21st century, the Taliban's 2001 destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas to avoid idolatry amongst the Afghan population, inscribed the destruction of heritage as part of the deliberate intent to destroy religious images. The notion of iconoclasm was mainly adopted to characterize the destruction of these statues, but there was also emphasis on the primitive and barbaric nature of the Taliban regime – a claim that resurfaced during 2015 when IS released their infamous video shot at Mosul Museum. However, in defining the destruction of the Bamiyan statues, an array of scholars including Falser (2011), Flood (2002), and Gamboni (2001) were successful in framing the destruction as an attack not to the idol of Buddha, but instead upon heritage, as exercised by international bodies, such as UNESCO, that oversee the safekeeping, preservation and conservation of cultural heritage. The fact that this infamous example was characterized as an iconoclasm, in the form of heritage destruction, reflects the emergence of this phenomenon in recent decades as a violent act that fuses political and religious motives and at the same time attacks where it most hurts. In this case, Western values attached to conservation and cultural heritage issues. The Buddhas of

For Peer Review Only

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Bamiyan destruction highlights how the task of defining heritage destruction is not always straightforward and depends on the context of the destruction.

Patterns of heritage destruction in Rakhine state

Scholars working on the destruction of religious images during the Reformation in Europe including Eire (1989) and Christin (1991) claim there are two types of iconoclasm, based on who is the perpetrator. We argue that the destruction of heritage in Myanmar's Rakhine state in recent times can be characterized using a similar framework. In adapting the framework that Eire, and Christin used to explain some of the consequences of Reformation in Europe to the destruction of Rohingya heritage in Myanmar we point to Freedberg's (2018) work, which demonstrates that the resonance of past acts of iconoclasm is astoundingly high in present acts. He successfully demonstrates how, for example, some of the destructions are actually replicated (perhaps unconsciously), thus drawing a line from the past to more recent moments of iconoclasm. Freedberg shows the ways in which some statues in Europe during the Reformation were defaced and humiliated – to dispossess them of their power – and how similar actions have been enacted in more recent times, with statues of Saddam Hussein targeted after his fall and statues of the Shah of Iran similarly treated. Likewise, adapting a framework that satisfactorily explains the form that the destruction of religious imagery took in Europe suits the Myanmar case, not because we believe that the political instability that occurs in Myanmar is identical to that of Northern Europe, but because the destruction of heritage occurs in a similar fashion to these historic European examples.

Accordingly, iconoclasms that are sponsored and encouraged by a state are considered as *iconoclasm from above*, or legal iconoclasm. That is, the state can use iconoclasm as a tool to obliterate certain ideologies and promote others, including communities' rituals that the State may estimate "traditional, superstitious, and idolatrous" (Noyes 2016, 1). By erasing these communities and their material culture, iconoclasm becomes an instrument of power used by the state to re-assert its authority. As such, the state validates the destruction as it appears that it is operating within the law. Eire (1989, 154) identified this type of iconoclasm as "that which is effected with government approval (though not necessarily under its direction)." Freedberg (2018) has extensively documented how, for example, the revolt in the Netherlands, the *Beeldenstorm*, during the sixteenth century that caused the destruction of statues and images was encouraged, in some instances, by the same local authorities. Likewise, since the military coup of 1962, Burma/Myanmar's ethnic Bamar-dominated central authorities have regularly been accused of undertaking a nationwide campaign of Burmanisation with the aim of homogenising the country's ethnic, religious and cultural minorities into a hegemonic Bamar state (Berlie 2008; Holmes 1967; Rogers 2013). A frequently referenced element of this campaign has been the destruction of non-Buddhist religious icons and structures, and often their replacement with Buddhist icons, particularly in areas with higher numbers of non-Buddhist residents like Chin, Kachin, Karen, and Rakhine states (Coconuts Yangon 2018; Sithu Aung Myint 2016; US Department of State 2001, 2017).

For Peer Review Only

An alternate type of iconoclasm is the destruction perpetrated by individuals or by mobs which can be considered illegal and *from below*. These destructions are considered illegal because they are not allowed by the state and break the law. Removing or destroying cultural property regarded by the state as part of their heritage is also deemed illegal. The main difference between these two types of iconoclasm is that the perpetrator either fulfils the law or not. In some cases, one may ensue the other. For example, in 2003, the army of the USA performed a staged iconoclasm by toppling the statue of Saddam Hussein in Baghdad's Firdos Square to signal the end of Hussein's regime. The toppling of the statue, albeit an orchestrated performance by the USA military, motivated people to start attacking and hitting the statue once it was on the ground. In this case, we can see both iconoclasms being performed concurrently. However, in some cases it is only possible to discern one type of iconoclasm and at another times it can be difficult to draw a line to show when one finishes and the other starts. According to Warnke, while iconoclasm from above can be celebrated as a great moment in history precisely because it erases the old symbols and prepares the way for the new symbols to come, iconoclasm from below is often considered "blind vandalism" (cited by Gamboni 1997, 23). Groys (2002) elaborates on this point, calling for careful consideration of who wins and who loses in this war of symbols, because the victors may lose the battle in the end and their symbols be removed in the future.

Tackling such a sensitive phenomenon can be challenging given the context and circumstances specific to Myanmar. Studying the destruction of cultural heritage in the context of Myanmar's Rakhine state should therefore not be seen as a sideline from important humanitarian considerations: the welfare of more than one million Rohingya displaced from Myanmar and forced to live as refugees in Bangladesh. Studying the destruction of heritage as part of the genocidal campaign orchestrated by the Myanmar state can show the extent to which the recent destruction and remodelling of parts of northern Rakhine state forms part of a long-term campaign by Myanmar's authorities against the Rohingya.

For Peer Review Only

Key instances of heritage destruction in Rakhine state

Both key instances of destruction we consider – associated with Rakhine state's 2012 violence, and the Myanmar military's 2017 "clearance operation" in northern Rakhine state – involves instances of destruction from above and below. However, in each case the destruction is mostly of one type. The destruction undertaken during the 2012 violence we characterise as mostly iconoclasm from below, while the destruction undertaken during the Myanmar military's 2017 "clearance operation" we characterise it as mostly involving destruction from above.

The 2012 violence involved the active participation of both ethnic Rakhine Buddhist and Rohingya Muslim communities and has been often characterised as communal conflict. This violence resulted in the deaths of around 200 people and displaced more than 140,000 people (International Crisis Group 2013). Most of those killed and the overwhelming majority of those displaced were Muslims from the Rohingya community, and this occurred in a context of decades of official discrimination against the Rohingya. President Thein Sein's announcement that the "only solution" was to remove the Rohingya to other countries added

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

credibility to Rohingya accusations that anti-Muslim violence formed part of an official Myanmar strategy (HRW 2012, 19; Mizzima News 2012). There were reports of security forces committing abuses, including arbitrary arrests and unlawfully using force against Rohingya communities, and of security forces working in concert with ethnic Rakhine mobs to target Rohingya communities (AI 2012; BBC 2012; HRW 2012). Witnesses describe Myanmar's security forces disarming Muslim communities before retreating and not intervening while armed Buddhist mobs attacked the defenceless Muslims (HRW 2012; Wade 2017).

The 2012 violence occurred following weeks of rising sectarian tensions. Yet despite this, both Buddhist and Muslim communities reported Myanmar's authorities as providing little or no protection and having seemingly not made preparations to prevent conflict (HRW 2012; Wade 2017). The proximate sparks for widespread violence in Rakhine state were the rape and murder of a young Buddhist woman by three Muslim men, and the retaliatory murders of ten Muslims and one Buddhist mistaken as Muslim who were dragged from a Yangon bound bus by a Rakhine Buddhist mob (Al Jazeera 2012; HRW 2012). HRW (2012, 18) described how, during June 2012

> Arakan [Rakhine] and Rohingya mobs attacked homes, shops, and houses of worship. Witnesses described mobs from both populations storming neighbourhoods, pillaging and setting fire to homes and other buildings, and beating those they found with crude weapons, such as swords, bamboo sticks, metal bars, and poles.

At least five thousand buildings, overwhelmingly homes in Muslim areas of Rakhine state's capital Sittwe like the Nasi Quarter were razed to the ground (HRW, 2013). This 2012 violence involved not only the destruction of entire Muslim neighbourhoods of Sittwe displacing tens of thousands, but also involved symbolic acts of destruction like the ransacking of the historic Jama Mosque, a previously prominent feature of Sittwe's main commercial street. Built in the mid-nineteenth century, in Arabesque-style, Jama Mosque's location close to the Rakhine State Parliament and other official buildings like the Rakhine State Museum made it a key representation of the long-term and legitimate presence of Muslims in Rakhine state. Its ransacking represented a symbolic rejection of Rakhine state's Islamic history. Since its sacking, Jama Mosque has been closed and is guarded by armed government security who prevent all access and routinely prevent photography, even by tourists, thus exercising a form of iconoclasm by prohibiting the production of images.

Myanmar's authorities treated the violence as a communal dispute between Buddhist and Muslim communities (Cheesman 2017). The Myanmar authorities' strategy to prevent further outbreaks of violence was to separate both communities, but the burden of this policy fell overwhelmingly on the Rohingya Muslims who found their rights further restricted and were confined to IDP camps or locked down in their neighbourhoods or villages. More than seven years later, 120,000 of those Rohingya originally confined to IDP camps during 2012 continue to be prevented from leaving (UN News 2019; UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2017). Many thousands of those Muslims who lost their homes to fire were confined to IDP camps on the outskirts of Sittwe, while others were locked down in their neighbourhoods. Mosques that were damaged during the violence have remained closed

For Peer Review Only

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

since 2012. While much of this violence is appropriately characterised as destruction from below and thus illegal destruction, the authorities' subsequent actions indicate official approval of its outcomes.

Restricting a minorities' access to sites of worship may not only be considered an iconoclasm from above, but it also contributes to create an ambience of tension between Buddhists and Muslims who are sharing the same space. As Eire (1986) discusses, it is the friction of two groups co-existing within the same space that motivates the destruction of the Other's heritage in an attempt to control the territory and erase the signs of occupation. Moreover, strategies that restrict the access to and enjoyment of cultural heritage have an impact on its conservation, not only affecting its integrity but also on the well-being and rights of the people associated with that particular cultural heritage, as noted by the UN Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights, Karima Bennoune (United Nations Human Rights 2017). By accessing cultural heritage, the identity of the people associated with that heritage is not only asserted but it is also exerted as a right. Without this interaction, the process of heritage simply cannot exist. In contrast, limiting the access "to and enjoyment of cultural heritage" is a tool to "exert political or social pressure" (Shaheed 2011, 5), thus the destruction of cultural heritage "with discriminatory intent against a cultural community can be charged as a crime against humanity", as well as "evidence of an intent to destroy a group within the meaning of the Genocide Convention" (Shaheed 2011, 7). The evidence so far collected in Myanmar certainly speaks about the Myanmar military's 2017 violence in Rakhine state as a tool of genocide.

Despite being prompted by attacks on security posts by a newly emerged Rohingya militant group, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), the violence in northern Rakhine state during 2017 was overwhelmingly undertaken by Myanmar's military and was more comprehensive in its destruction than that of 2012. Around 300 Rohingya villages were partially or totally razed during a campaign the UN's High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein described as, "A textbook example of ethnic cleansing" (HRW 2017b; UN News 2017b). HRW (2017a) considered the military's actions as amounting to, "crimes against humanity", and AI (2017b) characterised the situation as a "human rights and humanitarian catastrophe". Hundreds of thousands of Rohingya fled their homes and villages in terror, and by year's end there were 650,000 more Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh (Al Jazeera 2017b; BBC 2017b; Inter Sector Coordination Group 2017). The immediate spark for this violence was attacks on security posts by ARSA militants. The *Tatmadaw*'s response, was a "clearance operation" claimed as a search for ARSA militants that employed brutal tactics and made little distinction between civilians and potential militants. In contrast to the violence of 2012, which has often been characterised as inter-communal and which we describe as overwhelmingly involving iconoclasm from below, the violence of 2017 involved destruction undertaken by the authorities.

Rohingya refugees arriving in Bangladesh routinely described how Myanmar's military came to their villages, forced out the population using violence, and then burned villages in their entirety. This destruction was documented by media, humanitarian groups, and by UN Human Rights Council (2018, 9) investigators who used satellite images and collected first-hand accounts to report

For Peer Review Only

> systematic, deliberate and targeted destruction, mainly by fire, of Rohingya-populated areas across the three townships. At least 392 villages (40 per cent of all settlements in northern Rakhine) were partially or totally destroyed, encompassing at least 37,700 individual structures. Approximately 80 per cent were burned in the initial three weeks of the operations, a significant portion of which after the Government's official end date of the "clearance operations". More than 70 per cent of the villages destroyed were in Maungdaw, where the majority of Rohingya lived. Most destroyed structures were homes. Schools, marketplaces and mosques were also burned. Rohingya-populated areas were specifically targeted, with adjacent or nearby Rakhine settlements left unscathed.

Myanmar's authorities claimed Rohingya burned their own homes to gain international sympathy (Associated Press 2017; Head 2017; Ratcliffe 2017). The credibility of this claim was seriously undermined when international media, during an official tour of northern Rakhine state, encountered ethnic Rakhine men setting fire to Rohingya homes in an area that had been under the control of the Myanmar military for weeks (Head 2017). Further undermining the claims of Myanmar's military is satellite imagery showing how Rohingya villages were burned while adjacent Buddhist homes remain untouched by fire (Whiteside 2017). After Rohingya villages were depopulated and razed to the ground, many Rohingya villages were quickly remodelled by Myanmar's authorities, erasing evidence of Rohingya connections with those places (Goldberg 2018; Miller 2018). In late 2017, HRW published satellite images showing that the Myanmar authorities had used heavy machinery to clear all structures and vegetation from more than 50 villages, while AI documented the building of roads and structures including at least one military base over burned Rohingya villages and land (AI 2018a, 2018b, 2018c; Associated Press 2018; Child 2018; HRW 2017b, 2018).

Discussion

These examples of destruction include both iconoclasm from above and iconoclasm from below. Moreover, the destruction taking place in Myanmar described here, ought to be considered in the context of ongoing policies of genocide targeting the country's Rohingya ethnic minority and described by the UN Human Rights Council's Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar (UN Human Rights Council 2018). Together, the destruction of villages, the targeting of culturally significant sites such as mosques, restricting access to them, and erasing evidence of Rohingya connections with these sites are strong indications that the state of Myanmar is pursuing a genocide against the group. According to the *Framework of analysis for atrocity crimes: a tool for prevention* developed in 2014 by the Office on Genocide Prevention and Responsibility to Protect, the destruction of culturally and religious significant places is a significant indicator to prevent further crimes that put in risk the existence of groups, and assess the risk of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity (United Nations 2014). Indeed, as we showed above, the destruction of heritage is in many cases a sign that a genocide is taking place, or it will take place. When claiming genocide, one of the signs that precedes it is often the targeting and destruction of monuments and sacred spaces. Throughout history this type of destruction has been witnessed and it was

For Peer Review Only

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

listed by Raphael Lemkin as one of the eight techniques of genocide, with the deliberate intent to destroy a group in whole or in part (Lemkin 1944). Lemkin's point is echoed too by Feierstein (2014, 2015) who suggests a final step in the genocide process is the employment of strategies to erase the collective memory of the victim group. Moses too has argued (2010, 34), the destruction of cultural symbols and heritage is always ahead of the physical and biological genocide. Examples such as the destruction of Armenian churches and Yezidi mausoleums in Iraq and Syria by IS are among recent examples (Isakhan et al 2019). However, in the case of Myanmar, official attacks on the Rohingya were not preceded by the destruction of their mosques, but happened at the same time, perhaps in an effort to accelerate the deliberate intent to destroy the group as a whole. The speed in which the process of destruction took place in Myanmar perhaps explains why the international community was, at first, slow to condemn the genocide. Accustomed to seeing signs of destruction of cultural symbols before physical and biological genocide takes place, the international community and organisations like UNESCO may have maintained hopes that a genocide was not occurring in Myanmar. When evidence provided by people in the refugee camps and the satellite images corroborated the destruction, it was too late.

UNESCO is a global organization with limited power when it comes to stopping the destruction of cultural heritage—the case of Syrian conflict is perhaps the most notorious example (see Van der Auwera 2013, 2014; Cunliffe, Muhesen and Lostal 2016 and Meskell 2018 for main reasons). The organisation's limited capacity means that its efforts to fight extremism and genocide can only focus on a limited number of international crisis. However, crisis can be condemned in the media and global attention drawn to them. Media is a powerful ally of heritage protection since it provides much of the information regarding the specific aspects of the destruction of heritage. Likewise, it is in media that heritage destruction becomes a reality for most people, particularly for those outside the conflict zone. Media translates the destruction into an intelligible discourse that usually differentiates between the perpetrator and the victim. In recent years, UNESCO has adopted a strategy to fight extremism and cultural cleansing by producing "declarations, speeches … and a robust social media campaign" (Meskell 2018, 182). Meskell urges caution about such an approach, suggesting this tactic is both flawed and dangerous because it indicates "culture and education" can "promote peace", by focusing on the monuments while disregarding the people in conflicts and crisis, thus "fetishizing the loss of things over life itself" (Meskell 2018, 180). Indeed, speeches and declarations not only often backfire, particularly when they are expressed by international organisations such as UNESCO (see Isakhan and González Zarandona 2018), but they are also quite limited in scope if they condemn iconoclasm from below, while other actors perpetrate iconoclasm from above, as is the case in Myanmar. Fighting iconoclasm from below is the focus UNESCO's Unite4Heritage campaign.

In the same way that heritage destruction in Myanmar requires an interpretation against the suppression of human rights and the deliberate intent to destroy the Rohingya, we must also interpret the heritage destruction against the broad geopolitics of heritage in Asia, and the heritage management of Rohingya heritage by the Myanmar state. While heritage is considered by experts as a process (Harvey 2001; Smith 2006), where particular parts of history are carefully selected and celebrated in official discourse, the management of heritage is a mandate which many countries puts in place to preserve and conserve certain elements of

For Peer Review Only

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

history to pass them as heritage. A country rich in heritage sites brings more tourists and thus creates an industry that economically benefits the country, particularly when the country's authorities succeed in inscribing a site into the UNESCO World Heritage List (Di Giovine 2009). Regarding the heritage crisis in Myanmar, UNESCO has made, so far, no effort to address heritage destruction in Rakhine state, except for the race to inscribe the old city of Mrauk-U to the World Heritage List. The city has been on the tentative list since 1996. The city contains Buddhist monuments and it is located within Rakhine state. It was the seat of the powerful Arakan kingdom from 1430 to 1785. Early in 2018, the Italian and Myanmar governments signed a pact to safeguard, manage and improve the conditions of the old city – a common conservation practice that has seen a rise in heritage diplomacy conservation efforts in many heritage sites, particularly in Southeast Asia (Winter 2015). Perhaps the most ambitious of these is the Chinese economic initiative known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) which seeks to assert Chinese cultural connection in different Asian and African locations by activating heritage sites located on historic trade routes, known as the Silk Road (Winter 2017). According to the *Myanmar Times* (2018), the Myanmar government "duly acknowledged the role that the preservation of Mrauk-U…may play in the sustainable development of the region, and committed to support the listing of Mrauk-U as a UNESCO World Heritage Site." The site was scheduled to be nominated in 2017 but the violence in Rakhine state forced the nomination to be shut down (Hogan 2018). The safeguard pact should be seen as a response of the Myanmar government's wishes to attract tourists to admire Buddhists temples in a conflict site, perhaps trying to replicate the successful tourism industry that has burgeoned in Cambodia around Angkor Wat, since it was inscribed into the World Heritage List in 1992 (Winter 2007). However, the pact may also be seen as a response to accelerate heritage conservation work in a post-conflict landscape that will agree with the Chinese partners who invested in the construction of a Chinese-controlled deep-water port in Kyaukpyu in Rakhine State (Tiezzi 2016), as part of China's BRI Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar corridor. It is then important to consider why UNESCO has not been involved in a place like Rakhine compared to the efforts in Syria or in other places of conflicts. Perhaps the answer is not in the historical disinterest of the West in Rakhine state, and the Rohingya's fate, or the lack of classical monuments, Biblical or historical sites in Rakhine, or the limited funds that the organisation possesses. While these reasons may be sensible enough to account for UNESCO's lack of interest in this crisis, the fact that Rohingya's lands in Rakhine state have acquired a new value (Berthet 2018), due to China's construction of the port, the building of international free-trade zones around it and even transnational gas and oil pipelines in Rakhine state (Forino, von Meding and Johnson 2017), may play a bigger role in the destruction of Rohingya's heritage.

In terms of heritage, tourism and media, it is clear that Myanmar is now emerging from isolation since the new civilian government was installed in 2011, and what can it offer in terms of resources and tourism is much less compared to many other Southeast Asian tourism destinations. A contradiction is thus present in how Myanmar is embracing its inclusion into the international club, including China's BRI, by sponsoring the listing of Buddhist sites to the UNESCO World Heritage register, supported by foreign governments and experts supervising the nomination dossier, and the listing of the Buddhist Pyu Ancient Cities (Beikthano, Halin, and Sri Ksetra) in 2014, while at the same time perpetrating heritage destruction that belongs to the Rohingya, suppressing their human rights and access to their

For Peer Review Only

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

places of worship – an action that contravenes current UNESCO's ideals of heritage as a tool to unite rather than divide (Meskell 2018, 198).

In Myanmar, as in many other places where a conflict occurs, heritage is weaponised to create a strict division between different religious heritages, in this case Buddhist and non-Buddhist heritage. Myanmar authorities have historically privileged Buddhist heritage over the heritage of other minorities present in the country (Philp 2010). Neglecting Rohingya heritage in Myanmar is thus not an uncommon strategy. However, destroying it is indeed extreme but, as we have shown, a tool as part of the Myanmar state to deliberate destroy the Rohingya. According to Philp (2010), the military junta that governed Myanmar for decades used the conservation efforts to restore Buddhist heritage to legitimize their position. For scholars like Logan (2007) and Morris (2015), the issue of privileging and using a certain type of heritage is entangled with human rights issues. The fact that Rohingya people were denied access to their places of worship by the Myanmar government is also an example of how their human rights were supressed together with the destruction of their heritage. As we have outlined above, it is difficult sometimes to know which iconoclasm comes from above and is thus, tolerated and encouraged, and which one comes from below and punished. The case of the destruction of Rohingya heritage presents a case study to not only better understand this phenomenon, but also how it is framed by the geopolitics of heritage which have an interest and a stake in protecting World Heritage, while neglecting unlisted heritage. Although several organisations have condemned the genocide against the Rohingya with various results, the destruction of their heritage has fallen, unfortunately, unto deaf ears. Condemning iconoclasm from above would be a first step towards the prevention of further destruction. By demanding that iconoclasm from above ceases and making it clear that it is as destructive as that of below, some prevention might be achieved. The case of Myanmar is a reminder that the destruction of cultural heritage during a conflict is a sign of further destruction to come. In the past, several case studies prove that in many instances is not always possible to prevent destruction by condemning it, but in other cases, efforts were successful in preventing further destruction of heritage thus allowing a recovery process. For example, during the Spanish Civil War, propaganda from both sides was created to stop the destruction of cultural heritage, appealing to all Spaniards to consider the effects of their actions before they would even think about destroying it (Barrios Rozúa 2008). The claim was based on the fact that regardless of who owned the heritage, it belonged to everybody, regardless of religious or ideological affiliations.

Conclusions

There is a lack of a nuanced analysis of the destruction of Rohingya heritage in Myanmar in media and academic literature today. Historically, the destruction of heritage has always been politicised and used by governments in order to sway the course of conflicts and war. Likewise, the destruction of heritage acts as a proxy way towards the extermination of particular groups, when governments and military forces aim to destroy a cultural minority or group. In the case of the Rohingya in Myanmar, we have demonstrated that the destruction of heritage can be characterized as iconoclasm of above, and iconoclasm from below. In this article we have mapped cultural heritage destruction in Myanmar, specifically in Rakhine

For Peer Review Only

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

state and we have argued that much of this heritage destruction should be understood as a tool of the genocide being committed against the group by Myanmar's authorities. We have acknowledged that while international bodies like UNESCO might have limited capacity to intervene to prevent heritage destruction, they are not completely powerless. Bodies like UNESCO, can for instance, bring heritage destruction to the attention of key decision makers and the global community. This point is acknowledged by UNESCO who have started the Unite4Heritage campaign to address the deliberate destruction of heritage by violent extremist groups (UNESCO 2018). However, in light of the evidence of heritage destruction in Myanmar's Rakhine state, we suggest UNESCO extend this campaign to include addressing the deliberate destruction of heritage by state actors.

Notes

1. In this article our aim is to maintain meaning and avoid confusion where names are concerned. We use the name "Myanmar" to refer to the country from the time its name was officially changed by the military junta in 1989. In referring to the country's history prior to 1989, the name "Burma" is used. Where necessary, to preserve meaning and avoid confusion, both the former and official name will be used in tandem as "Burma/Myanmar".

For Peer Review Only

References

Al Jazeera. 2012. "Death sentence in Myanmar sectarian killing." *Al Jazeera*, June 19. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia-pacific/2012/06/201261961612641965.html

Al Jazeera. 2017a. "Myanmar faces international condemnation over Rohingya." *Al Jazeera*, September 5. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/09/myanmar-faces-international-condemnation-rohingya-170904195521296.html

Al Jazeera. 2017b. "UN: Rohingya exodus to Bangladesh exceeds 400,000." *Al Jazeera, September 16*. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/09/rohingya-exodus-bangladesh-exceeds-400000-170916125050337.html

Amnesty International. 1992. *Union of Myanmar (Burma): Human Rights Abuses against Muslims in the Rakhine (Arakan) State*. https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa16/006/1992/en/

Amnesty International. 1997. *Myanmar/Bangladesh Rohingyas – The Search for Safety*. https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/160000/asa130071997en.pdf

Amnesty International. 2004. *Myanmar The Rohingya Minority: Fundamental Rights Denied*. https://doc.es.amnesty.org/cgi-bin/ai/BRSCGI/MYANMAR%20THE%20ROHINGYA%20MINORITY:%20FUNDAMENTAL%20RIGHTS%20DENIED?CMD=VEROBJ&MLKOB=25897364242

Amnesty International. 2012. *Myanmar: Abuses Against Rohingya Erode Human Rights Progress*. https://www.amnesty.org/en/press-releases/2012/07/myanmar-abuses-against-rohingya-erode-human-rights-progress/

Amnesty International. 2016. *Bangladesh pushes back Rohingya refugees amid collective punishment in Myanmar*. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/11/bangladesh-pushes-back-rohingya-refugees-amid-collective-punishment-in-myanmar/

Amnesty International. 2017a. *"Caged Without A Roof" Apartheid in Myanmar's Rakhine State*. https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ASA1674842017ENGLISH.PDF

Amnesty International. 2017b. *Myanmar: Crimes against humanity terrorize and drive Rohingya out*. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/10/myanmar-new-evidence-of-systematic-campaign-to-terrorize-and-drive-rohingya-out/

Amnesty International. 2018a. *Myanmar: Remaking Rakhine State*. HTTPS://WWW.AMNESTY.ORG/EN/DOCUMENTS/ASA16/8018/2018/EN/

Amnesty international. 2018b. *Myanmar's apartheid campaign against the Rohingya*. https://www.amnesty.org.uk/myanmar-apartheid-campaign-against-rohingya-burma

Amnesty International. 2018c. *Myanmar: Military land grab as security forces build bases on torched Rohingya villages*. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/03/myanmar-military-land-grab-as-security-forces-build-bases-on-torched-rohingya-villages/

ANU College of Asia and the Pacific. (2018). Myanmar base. http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/mapsonline/base-maps/myanmar-base

Associated Press. 2017. "'They burned their own houses and ran away': Myanmar police tell journalists Rohingya torched their own village." *South China Morning Post*, September 7. https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/south-asia/article/2110155/they-burned-their-own-houses-and-ran-away-myanmar-police-tell

For Peer Review Only

Associated Press. 2018. "'Everything is gone': satellite images in Myanmar show dozens of Rohingya villages bulldozed." *The Guardian*, February 24. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/24/myanmar-rohingya-villages-bulldozed-satellite-images

Baker, N. 2016. "How social media became Myanmar's hate speech megaphone." *Myanmar Times*, August 5. https://www.mmtimes.com/national-news/21787-how-social-media-became-myanmar-s-hate-speech-megaphone.html

Barrios Rozúa, J. M. 2008. "Las destrucciones iconoclastas durante la Guerra Civil y su papel en la propaganda franquista." *Investigaciones Históricas,* 28: 185-200.

BBC. 2012. "Muslims in Burma's Rakhine state 'abused' – Amnesty." *BBC*, July 20. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-18921960

BBC. 2017a. "BBC reporter in Rakhine: 'A Muslim village burning'." BBC, September 7. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-41189564

BBC. 2017b. "Extra £12m in UK aid pledged for Myanmar's Rohingya." *BBC*, November 27. www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-42129844

Beech, H. 2013. "When Buddhists Go Bad." *Time* 181 (1): 14–21.

Berlie, J. 2008. *Burma: The Burmanization of Myanmar's Muslims*. Bangkok: White Lotus Press.

Berthet, S. 2018. "New Silk Roads and the Bay of Bengal. Trade in, people out". *Le Monde Diplomatique*, https://mondediplo.com/2018/11/12bayofbengal

Bevan, R. 2006. *The Destruction of Memory: Architecture at War*. London: Reaktion.

Burke, J. 2016. "ICC ruling for Timbuktu destruction 'should be deterrent for others'." *The Guardian*, September 27. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/27/timbuktu-shrines-icc-sentences-islamic-militant-nine-years-destruction-ahmad-al-faqi-al-mahdi

Charney, M. 2009. *A History of Modern Burma*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

For Peer Review Only

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Cheesman, N. 2017. "Introduction: Interpreting Communal Violence in Myanmar." *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 47 (3): 335-352.

Child, D. 2018. "Myanmar building military bases over Rohingya villages: Amnesty." *Al Jazeera*, March 12. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/03/myanmar-building-military-bases-rohingya-villages-amnesty-180312150129214.html

Christian, J. 1944. "Thebaw: Last king of Burma." *The Far Eastern Quarterly* 3 (4): 309-312.

Christin, O. 1991. *Une révolution symbolique. L'iconoclasme huguenot et la reconstruction catholique*. Paris: Editions de Minuit.

Clay, R. 2012. "Re-Making French Revolutionary Iconoclasm." *Perspective* 1: 181-186.

Coconuts Yangon. 2018. "Myanmar bombs Christian churches, making way for Buddhist pagodas." *Coconuts Yangon*, July 6. https://coconuts.co/yangon/news/myanmar-bombs-christian-churches-making-way-buddhist-pagodas/

Cunliffe, E., N. Muhesen, and M. Lostal. 2016. "The Destruction of Cultural Property in the Syrian Conflict: Legal Implications and Obligations." *International Journal of Cultural Property* 23 (1): 1–31.

De Cesari, C. 2010. "World Heritage and mosaic universalism: A view from Palestine" *Journal of Social Archaeology* 10 (3): 299-324.

Department of Population. 2015. *The 2014 Myanmar Population and Housing Census Rakhine State Census Report Volume 3-K*. http://myanmar.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/Rakhine%20State%20Census%20Report%20-%20ENGLISH.pdf

Di Giovine, M. 2009. *The Heritage-scape: UNESCO, World Heritage, and Tourism*. Lanham: Lexington Books.

Douek, E. 2018. "Facebook's Role in the Genocide in Myanmar: New Reporting Complicates the Narrative" *Lawfare*, October 22. https://www.lawfareblog.com/facebooks-role-genocide-myanmar-new-reporting-complicates-narrative

For Peer Review Only

Eire, C. 1989. *War against the Idols: The Reformation of Worship from Erasmus to Calvin*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Falser, M. 2011. "The Bamiyan Buddhas, Performative Iconoclasm and the Image of Heritage." In *The Image of Heritage. Changing Perception, Permanent Responsibilities,* edited by Simone Giometti and Andrzej Tomaszewski, 157-169. ICOMOS Proceedings.

Feierstein, D. 2014. *Genocide as Social Practice: Reorganising Society under the Nazis and Argentina's Military Juntas*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.

Feierstein, D. 2015. "Debates on the Criminology of Genocide: Genocide as a Technology for Destroying Identities." *State Crime Journal* 4 (2): 115-127.

Forino, G. von Meding, J. and T. Johnson. 2017. "Religion is not the only reason Rohingyas are being forced out of Myanmar." *The Conversation,* https://theconversation.com/religion-is-not-the-only-reason-rohingyas-are-being-forced-out-of-myanmar-83726

Flood, B. 2002. "Between Cult and Culture: Bamiyan, Islamic Iconoclasm, and the Museum." *The Art Bulletin*, 84 (4): 641-659.

Freedberg, D. 1989. *The Power of Images. Studies in the History and Theory of Response*. Chicago and London: Chicago University Press.

Freedberg, D. 2018. *Iconoclasia. Historia y psicología de la violencia contra las imágenes*. Bilbao: Sans Soleil.

Freeman, J. 2017. "Can Anyone Stop Burma's Hardline Buddhist Monks?" *The Atlantic*, September 6. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/09/can-anyone-stop-burmas-hardline-buddhist-monks/538992/

Gamboni, D. 1997. *The Destruction of Art: Iconoclasm and Vandalism since the French Revolution*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Gamboni, D. 2001. "World Heritage: Shield or Target?" *Conservation: The Getty Conservation Institute Newsletter* 16 (2): 5-11.

For Peer Review Only

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Green, P., MacManus, T., and de la Cour Venning, A. 2015. *Countdown to Annihilation: Genocide in Myanmar*. London: International State Crime Initiative.

Goldberg, J. 2018. "'No one wants the terrorists back': signs of Rohingya erased in Rakhine state." *The Guardian*, October 30. https://amp.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/30/no-one-wants-the-terrorists-back-signs-of-rohingya-erased-in-rakhine-state

González Zarandona, J. A., Albarrán, C., and Isakhan, B. 2018. "Digitally mediated iconoclasm: the Islamic State and the war on heritage." *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, DOI: *http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13527258.2017.1413675*

Groys, B. 2002. "Iconoclasm as an Artistic Device: Iconoclastic Strategies in Film." In Iconoclash. Beyond the Image Wars in Science, Religion and Art, edited by Ed. Bruno Latour and Peter Wiebel. Karlsruhe: ZKM.

Hall, D.G.E. 1950. *Burma* London: Hutchinson's University Library.

Harvey, D. 2001. "Heritage Pasts and Heritage Presents: Temporality, Meaning and the Scope of Heritage Studies." *International Journal of Heritage Studies* 7 (4): 319–38.

Head, J. 2017. "Rohingya crisis: Seeing through the official story in Myanmar." BBC, September 11. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-41222210

Hogan, L. 2018. "Mrauk U: In the Shadow of the Rohingya Crisis." *The Diplomat*, April 16. https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/mrauk-u-in-the-shadow-of-the-rohingya-crisis/

Holmes, R. 1967. "Burmese Domestic policy: The Politics of Burmanization." Asian Survey, 7 (3): 188-197.

Human Rights Watch. 1996. *The Rohingya Muslims: Ending a Cycle of Exodus?* https://www.hrw.org/legacy/summaries/s.burma969.html

Human Rights Watch. 2000. *Burmese Refugees in Bangladesh: Still No Durable Solution*. https://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/burma/index.htm

Human Rights Watch. 2002. *Crackdown on Burmese Muslims*. https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/asia/burmese_muslims.pdf

For Peer Review Only

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Human Rights Watch. 2009. *Perilous Plight: Burma's Rohingya Take to the Seas*. https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/05/26/perilous-plight/burmas-rohingya-take-seas

Human Rights Watch 2012, *"The Government Could Have Stopped This"*. https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/07/31/government-could-have-stopped/sectarian-violence-and-ensuing-abuses-burmas-arakan

Human Rights Watch. 2013. *"All You Can Do Is Pray": Crimes Against Humanity and Ethnic Cleansing of Rohingya Muslims in Burma's Arakan State.* https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/burma0413webwcover_0.pdf

Human Rights Watch. 2017a. *Burma: Military Commits Crimes Against Humanity*. https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/25/burma-military-commits-crimes-against-humanity

Human Rights Watch. 2017b. *Burma: New Satellite Images Confirm Mass Destruction*. https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/10/17/burma-new-satellite-images-confirm-mass-destruction

Human Rights Watch. 2018. *Burma: Scores of Rohingya villages Bulldozed*. https://www.hrw.org/news.2018/02/23/burma-scores-rohingya-villages-bulldozed

Ibrahim, A. 2018. *The Rohingyas: Inside Myanmar's Genocide*. London: Hurst.

International Crisis Group. 2013. *The Dark Side of Transition: Violence Against Muslims in Myanmar*. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/251-the-dark-side-of-transition-violence-againstmuslims-in-myanmar.aspx.

International Crisis Group. 2014. *Myanmar: The Politics of Rakhine State*. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/261-myanmar-the-politics-of-rakhine-state.aspx.

International Crisis Group. 2015. *The Myanmar Elections: Results and Implications Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°147*. https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/myanmar-elections-results-and-implications

International Crisis Group. 2016. *Myanmar: A New Muslim Insurgency in Rakhine State*. https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/283-myanmar-new-muslim-insurgency-rakhine-state

For Peer Review Only

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Inter Sector Coordination Group. (2017). *ISCG Situation Update: Rohingya Refugee Crisis, Cox's Bazar, 26 December 2017*. https://reliefweb.int/report/bangladesh/iscg-situation-update-rohingya-refugee-crisis-cox-s-bazar-26-december-2017

Isakhan, B. and González Zarandona, J. A. 2018. "Layers of religious and political iconoclasm under the Islamic State: symbolic sectarianism and pre-monotheistic iconoclasm." *International Journal of Heritage Studies* 24 (1): 1-26.

Isakhan, B., González Zarandona, J. A., and T. Jamal. 2019. "Cultural Cleansing and Iconoclasm under the 'Islamic State': Human/Heritage Attacks on Yezidis and Christians Humans/Heritage." In *Sites of Pluralism: Community Politics in the Middle East*, edited by F. Oruc. London: Hurst.

Kraak, A-L. 2018. "Heritage destruction and cultural rights: insights from Bagan in Myanmar." *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, 24 (9): 998-1013.

Latour 2002. "What is Iconoclash? Or Is there a World beyond the Image Wars?" In *Iconoclash. Beyond the Image Wars in Science, Religion and Art*, edited by Bruno Latour and Peter Wiebel, 14-37. Karlsruhe: ZKM.

Lee, R. 2014. "A Politician, Not an Icon: Aung San Suu Kyi's Silence on Myanmar's Muslim Rohingya." *Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations* 25 (3): 321–333.

Lee, R. 2017. "How Militants Blew Chance To Improve Rights of Rohingya Muslims." The Globe Post, September 2. https://theglobepost.com/2017/09/02/myanmar-rohingya-annan-refugees/

Lee, R. 2018. "Facebook is Hurting Democracy in Myanmar." AsiaGlobal Online, May 10. http://www.asiaglobalonline.hku.hk/facebook-hurting-democracy-myanmar/

Lemkin, R. 1944. *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, proposals for Redress*. New Jersey: The Lawbook Exchange.

Logan, W. 2007. "Closing Pandora's Box: Human Rights Conundrums in Cultural Heritage Protection." In *Cultural Heritage and Human Rights*, edited by D. Ruggles Fairchild, 33-52. New York: Springer.

For Peer Review Only

Mathieson, D. 2016. "The electoral aftermath in Rakhine State." *Myanmar Times*, January 6. https://www.mmtimes.com/opinion/18353-the-electoral-aftermath-in-rakhine-state.html

Meskell, L. 2018. *A future in Ruins: UNESCO, World Heritage, and the Dream of Peace*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Miller, J. 2018. "Rohingya return: On the trail of the destroyed villages in Rakhine". *Channel 4*, November 13. https://www.channel4.com/news/rohingya-return-on-the-trail-of-the-destroyed-villages-in-rakhine

Mitchell, W. J.T. 2015. *Image Science: Iconology, Visual Culture, and Media Aesthetics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Mizzima News, 2012. "Citizenship issue complicates Rohingyas' plight." *ReliefWeb*, August 3. https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/citizenship-issue-complicates-rohingyas'-plight

Moffett, L. 2017. "Timbuktu destruction: landmark ruling awards millions to Malians." *The Conversation*, August 17. https://theconversation.com/amp/timbuktu-destruction-landmark-ruling-awards-millions-to-mallians-82540

Morris, J. 2015. *Rebuilding a Troubled Nation, One Brick at a Time: Cultural Heritage and the Law in Myanmar*. https://law.wm.edu/academics/intellectuallife/researchcenters/postconflictjustice/documents/morrison.paper.pdf

Moses, D. 2010. "Raphael Lemkin, Culture, and the Concept of Genocide." In *The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies*, edited by D. Bloxham and D. Moses, 19-41. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Myanmar Information Management Unit. 2014. *The 2014 Myanmar Population and Housing Census*. http://www.themimu.info/census-data

Myint-U, T. (2007). *The River of Lost Footsteps*. London: Faber and Faber.

Noyes, J. 2016. *The Politics of Iconoclasm. Religion, Violence and the Culture of Image-Breaking in Christianity and Islam*. London and New York: I. B. Tauris.

For Peer Review Only

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

OCHA. 2018. *Rohingya Refugee Crisis*. https://www.unocha.org/rohingya-refugee-crisis

Peck, G. 2017. "Myanmar Rohingya hatred has roots in Buddhist nationalism." *Associated Press*, September 29. https://apnews.com/bcf889617f2341e5888019937595431d

Phayre, A. 1883. *History of Burma*. London: Trübner & Co.

Philp, J. 2010. "The political appropriation of Burma's cultural heritage and its implications for human rights." In *Cultural Diversity, Heritage and Human Rights Intersections in theory and practice*, edited by M. Langfield, W. Logan, and M. Nic Craith. Oxon: Routledge.

Physicians for Human Rights. 2013. *Patterns of Anti-Muslim Violence in Burma: A Call for Accountability and Prevention*. Https://physiciansforhumanrights.org/library/reports/patterns-of-anti-muslim-violence-in-burma.html

Physicians for Human Rights. 2016. *Where There is Police, There is Persecution – Government Security Forces and Human Rights Abuses in Myanmar's Northern Rakhine State*. https://s3.amazonaws.com/PHR_Reports/Burma-Rakhine-State-Oct-2016.pdf

Ratcliffe, R. 2017. "Fake news images add fuel to fire in Myanmar, after more than 400 deaths." *The Guardian, September 5*. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/sep/05/fake-news-images-add-fuel-to-fire-in-myanmar-after-more-than-400-deaths

Refugees International. 2014. *Myanmar: A tipping Point for Rohingya Rights*. https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports/2015/10/4/myanmar-a-tipping-point-for-rohingya-rights

Republic of the Union of Myanmar. 2013. *Final Report of Inquiry Commission on Sectarian Violence in Rakhine State*. Yangon: Republic of the Union of Myanmar.

Republic of the Union of Myanmar. 2015. *The 2014 Myanmar Population and Housing Census, Rakhine State Report, Census Report Volume 3–K*. Naypyitaw: Ministry of Immigration and Population, Union of Myanmar.

Rogers, B. 2013. *Burma: A Nation at the Crossroads*. London: Rider & Co.

For Peer Review Only

Sauders, R. 2008. "Between Paralysis and Practice: Theorizing the Political Liminality of Palestinian Cultural Heritage". *Archaeologies* 4 (3): 471-494.

Sithu Aung Myint. 2016. "Of pagodas, churches and mosques." *Frontier Myanmar*, May 15. https://frontiermyanmar.net/en/pagodas-churches-and-mosques

Shaheed, F. 2011. *Report of the independent expert in the field of cultural rights.* https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G11/122/04/PDF/G1112204.pdf?OpenElement

Smith, L. 2006. *The Uses of Heritage*. Abingdon: London.

Steinberg, D. 2010. *Burma/Myanmar What Everyone Needs to Know*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Su-Ann Oh. 2016. *Making Sense of the Election Results in Myanmar's Rakhine and Shan States*. Singapore: ISEAS – Yasof Ishak Institute.

Taussig, M. 1999. *Defacement. Public Secrecy and the Labor of the Negative*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Taylor, R. 2009. *The State in Myanmar*. Singapore: NUS Press.

Tiezzi, S. 2016. "Chinese Company Wins Contract for Deep Sea Port in Myanmar." *The Diplomat,* https://thediplomat.com/2016/01/chinese-company-wins-contract-for-deep-sea-port-in-myanmar/

The Economist. 2017. "The Rohingya refugee crisis is the worst in decades." The Economist, September 21. https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2017/09/21/the-rohingya-refugee-crisis-is-the-worst-in-decades

Treaty of Yandabo. 1826. https://www.assamtimes.org/sites/default/files/yandaboo-treaty.pdf

Turnell, S. and Vickary, A. 2008. "Parching the Land: The Chettiars in Burma." *Australian Economic History Review*, 48 (1): 1-25.

For Peer Review Only

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

US Department of State. 2001. *Burma: International Religious Freedom Report*. https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2001/5581.htm

UN Human Rights Council. 2018. *Report of Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar*. https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/MyanmarFFM/Pages/ReportoftheMyanmarFFM.aspx

UN News. 2017a. *ICC orders former Mali Islamist to pay more than $3 million for damage to Timbuktu cultural sites*. https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/08/563502-icc-orders-former-mali-islamist-pay-more-3-million-damage-timbuktu-cultural

UN News. 2017b. *UN human rights chief points to 'textbook example of ethnic cleansing' in Myanmar*. https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/09/564622-un-human-rights-chief-points-textbook-example-ethnic-cleansing-myanmar

UN News. 2019. *Myanmar: Conflict resolution at 'total standstill', military commanders must answer for crimes against humanity*. https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/05/1038501

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 2017. *2018 Interim Humanitarian Response Plan for Myanmar.* https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/2018-interim-humanitarian-response-plan-myanmar

UNESCO. 2018. *Unite4Heritage*. http://www.unite4heritage.org/

UNESCO and IMS. 2016. *Assessment of media development in Myanmar: based on UNESCO's media development indicators*. Retrieved from https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000244760

United Nations. 2014. *Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes - A tool for prevention.* https://www.refworld.org/docid/548afd5f4.html

United Nations Human Rights. 2017. *Statement by Ms. Karima Bennoune, Special Rapporteur in the Filed of Cultural Rights at the 34th Session of the Human Rights Council*. https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21423&LangID=E

For Peer Review Only

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

UNHCR. 2018. *2018 JRP for Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis*. http://www.unhcr.org/uk/partners/donors/5ab8e23a7/2018-joint-response-plan-rohingya-humanitarian-crisis-march-december-2018.html?query=rohingya population

US Department of State. 2017. *2016 Report on International Religious Freedom*. https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2016/eap/268718.htm

Van der Auwera, S. 2013. "UNESCO and the Protection of Cultural Property during Armed Conflict." *International Journal of Cultural Policy* 19 (1): 1–19.

Van der Auwera, S. 2014. "'Culture for Development' and the UNESCO Policy on the Protection of Cultural Property during Armed Conflict." *International Journal of Cultural Policy* 20 (3): 245–260.

Wa Lone. 2017. "Myanmar military denies atrocities against Rohingya, replaces general." *Reuters*, November 13. https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-myanmar-rohingya-general/myanmar-military-denies-atrocities-against-rohingya-replaces-general-idUKKBN1DD18E

Wade, F. 2017. *Myanmar's Enemy Within: Buddhist Violence and the making of a Muslim 'Other'*. London: Zed Books.

Walasek, H. 2015. *Bosnia and the Destruction of Cultural Heritage*. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing.

Ware, A. and Laoutides, C. 2018. *Myanmar's 'Rohingya' Conflict*. London: Hurst.

Whiteside, P. 2017. "Satellite images 'prove Rohingya villages were burned'." *Sky News*, October 18. https://news.sky.com/story/satellite-images-prove-rohingya-villages-were-burned-11086627

Winter, T. 2007. *Post-conflict heritage, postcolonial tourism. Culture, politics and development at Angkor*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Winter, T. 2015. "Heritage diplomacy." *International Journal of Heritage Studies* 21 (10): 997-1015.

Winter, T. 2017. "Conflict Heritage, Preservation Diplomacy and Future Corridors of Smuggling." *Future Anterior* 14 (1): 7-23.

For Peer Review Only

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

For Peer Review Only