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Title: Defining Man as *Animal Religiosum* in English Religious Writing *c.* 1650–*c.* 1700

Abstract:
This article surveys the emergence and usage of the redefinition of man not as *animal rationale* (a rational animal) but as *animal religiosum* (a religious animal) by numerous English theologians between 1650 and 1700. Across the continuum of English protestant thought human nature was being re-described as unique due to its religious, not primarily its rational, capabilities. The article charts this appearance as a contribution to debates over man's relationship with God; then its subsequent incorporation into the subsequent debate over the theological consequences of arguments in favor of animal rationality, as well as its uses in anti-atheist apologetics; and then the sudden disappearance of the definition of man as *animal religiosum* at the beginning of the eighteenth century. In doing so, the article hopes to make a useful contribution to our understanding of changing early modern understandings of human nature by reasserting the significance of theological debates within the context of seventeenth-century debate about the relationship between humans and beasts and by offering a more wide-ranging account of man as *animal religiosum* than the current focus on 'Cambridge Platonism' and 'Latitudinarianism' allows.

Keywords:
Animal rationality, reason, 17th c. England, Cambridge Platonism, Latitudinarianism.

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Defining Man as *Animal Religiosum* in English Religious Writing *c.* 1650–*c.* 1700

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All students learning logic in seventeenth-century England would have imbibed the definition of man as *animal rationale* (rational animal).[1] While the definition was used to explain *differentia* from *genus*, it fitted in with scholastic orthodoxy's position that man's possession of a rational soul was the principal means of establishing the difference between humans and animals. The distinction was a staple of the anthropocentric Christian world view.[2] This article explores a related development that took place in England during the middle decades of the seventeenth century: within a variety of writings with religious themes and across the continuum of Protestant thought, man was frequently re-interpreted as best classified not as *animal rationale* but as *animal religiosum* (religious animal). The following is not an examination of when and how English Christians started thinking about man as a creature able to be religious, but rather an investigation of the moment when theologians felt the need to explicitly define man as a religious animal. While the understanding of man as a religious creature was widely available to early modern theologians through a variety of patristic, classical and contemporary sources, it is striking that the specific definitions *animal religiosum* and *animal capax religionis* (animal capable of religion) became widely used from around 1650 onwards. Initially the definition was used by writers as part of doctrinal polemics. The definition of man as *animal religiosum* was used subsequently in the 1660s and 1670s by numerous scholars attempting to understand the implications of animal rationality.

The aim of this article is to chart the usages of this re-definition of man, analyze the reasons for why the definition emerged and the different roles it played for different people in different contexts, and offer some suggestions for why it fell into comparative disuse by the beginning of the eighteenth century. It proceeds not by focusing on specific genres of writing,

but by exploring usages of *animal religiosum*, *divinum animal*, *animal capax religionis*, 'religious animal' and 'religious creature' identified during the period. In exploring the explicit redefinition of man as *animal religiosum* and *animal capax religionis* in mid-seventeenth-century England the following breaks new ground by going beyond the previous discussions of the topic in two ways. It might appear at first that one potentially productive way to think about why seventeenth-century English religious writers started defining man as *animal religiosum* as opposed to *animal rationale* would be to examine the debate over animal rationality. Much research has shown how the purported ability of animals to reason raised serious moral and theological concerns about their relative status to humans, and the possibility that animals might have immortal souls.[3] This scholarship has been supplemented by work exploring the satirical purpose to which theriophily could be applied – such as by the Earl of Rochester in his *A Satyr Against Mankind* (1675).[4] Yet this ample scholarship on seventeenth-century English understandings of human-animal relations often downplays the importance of disputes between theologians.[5] The below will make the case, firstly, that it is a mistake to view the reclassification of man as *animal religiosum* as solely resulting from a desire to protect the anthropocentric great chain of being in the face of some unnerving arguments about the reasoning capabilities of animals. The definition of man as a religious animal did not have to relate to concerns about the anthropocentric world order, and often instead played a role in theological disputes about the relationship between religion, reason and human nature.

By re-inserting the theological element in this discussion, this article has new things to say about the sudden popularity of defining man explicitly as *animal religiosum*. Secondly, in the process, it also aims to correct an earlier misinterpretation of the definition as being bound up with the much-disputed categories of 'Cambridge Platonism' and 'Latitudinarianism'. Man as *animal religiosum* has regularly been discussed in scholarship on the 'Cambridge Platonists'.[6] The most sustained treatments of the topic advance the thesis that the leading

'latitude-men', such as Benjamin Whichcote and John Smith through to the Third Earl of Shaftesbury, re-defined man as *animal religiosum* and *animal capax religionis* as part of their campaign to demonstrate the alignment of true religion and reason.[7] The two categories – 'Cambridge Platonism' and 'Latitudinarianism' – have come under serious challenge in recent decades. It has been conclusively shown that the appeal to reason was not limited to those defined as 'latitude-men', nor did they privilege reason over inspiration, works over doctrine, or ecumenical inclusiveness over confessional conflict in the manner set out in earlier influential Anglican scholarship on the period.[8] The coherence of the categories as describing groups of philosophers and theologians with shared intellectual interests and a common philosophical language has been challenged too, with the extent of their utility being limited to them describing groups of theologians and thinkers only bound together by tutorial relationships, friendship, patronage and marriage.[9] While many of those sometimes classified as 'latitude-men' do appear in the below, it is striking that man was being defined as *animal religiosum* by writers across the continuum of Protestant thought in seventeenth-century England, from puritans and nonconformists to various shades of non-'latitudinarian' Anglicanism.

A third proposition offered here is that there are two distinct periods in the discussion of man as *animal religiosum*. The categorization of human nature appeared in mid-seventeenth-century England usually, though not always, in the writings of theologians who were battling over the correct characterization of man's relationship with God. By the late 1660s, the definition of man as a religious animal increasingly appeared as part of debates about the relative standing of man and beast. Of particular importance here are the writings of close-friends and neighbors Sir Matthew Hale (1609–1676), the famous common law judge and philosopher, and the nonconformist minister Richard Baxter (1615–1691). In contrast to the more theological discussions of the mid-century, Hale and Baxter attempted to re-substantiate

the difference between man and beast in response to recent writings about the reasoning abilities of animals. While both were concerned about Cartesian and Gassendian mechanistic theories of animal nature, in their views on animal *rationality* in particular they were prompted to do so by two treatises by the French physician and lay religious writer Marin Cureau de la Chambre (1594–1669). Noticeable here was their strategic willingness to adopt the *animal religiosum* definition, while at the same time rejecting arguments in favor of animal reasoning. The discussion below suggests a modification is needed to the influential view that "the Restoration Englishman," not just the 'Cambridge Platonists' and 'Latitudinarians', took inordinate pride in being "rational" by showing additionally the impact of the potential reasoning capabilities of animals. In many cases, reason was not enough to be proud about.[10]

The specific distinction of man as *animal religiosum* or *animal capax religionis* had largely disappeared in English theology by the early eighteenth century. A detailed account of why is beyond the purview of this article, though some tentative suggestions are offered about how the categorization fell out of use in the pulpit and in the works of philosophers and divines: scholastic reasoning fell out of fashion, and the focus of apologetics moved from atheists to deists. This article, in sum, is a contribution to our understanding of those significant debates over the difference between men and beasts, and the relationship between religion and human nature in seventeenth-century English theology. It charts the rise and speculates on the fall of a distinct categorization of human nature and suggests, at least initially, the overriding concern was not only with new attitudes or experiences of animals themselves but also with theological disputes. Only later in the century did shots across the bow of the anthropocentric worldview lead to recalibrations by some theologians of just why humans were special.

The apparent parochialism of focusing on religious texts published in seventeenth-century England is justified on the grounds that, while absences are impossible to prove, the appearance of discussion of man as *animal religiosum*, *animal capax religionis*, 'animal

religieux', 'animale religioso' and so on in texts produced on the continent is very limited, especially when compared to the English example. One can find scattered instances of man being defined as an 'animal religieux' in French-language texts. For example, in the first volume of his work of Christian humanism which dealt with understanding the relationship between sacred and profane culture, *La méthode d'étudier et d'enseigner chrétiennement et solidement les historiens profanes* (2 vols., 1693), French Orationist Louis Thomassin emphasized that man's inherent religiosity as a means of explaining the otherwise apparently inexplicable religious practices of the pagans. In doing so, he aimed at rebuking arguments, associated with Pierre-Daniel Huet, which suggested the similar natural origins in reason of pagan and Christian belief.[11] Before realizing the heretical dangers inherent in Huet's position, Thomassin himself had set out similar arguments in his earlier discussion of man as a rational, religious creature in *La méthode d'étudier et d'enseigner chrétiennement les lettres humaines* (1681).[12] Yet it seems Thomassin's explicit definition of man as religious animal as opposed to a rational one is a rare case.[13] Moreover, it seems that few seventeenth-century continental authors utilized the definitions *animal religiosum* or *animal capax religionis*. The development discussed below seems to be peculiarly English and, as we shall see, peculiarly short-lived.

I. Whichcote, Smith and the Initial Appearance of Man as *Animal Religiosum*

In terms of their sources, English-language attempts to find the essential difference in man as the uniquely religious animal should be understood with reference to two contexts: patristic apologetics and continental Reformed thought. Writing in 1656, John Evelyn noted the significance of Lactantius's definition of man as *animal religiosum* in the current debate over the religious propensities of human nature.[14] Discussion of the inherent religiosity of human nature was available to all due to its prominent status within the widely-utilized classics of

patristics, Lactantius's *Divinarum institutionum* (b. iii, c. 9–10), and *De ira Dei* (c. 7).[15] The Father's discussion itself was in dialogue with another widely cited one about the uniquely religious nature of humans: Cicero's *De legibus* (1.8.24).[16] And it was to Cicero, rather than Lactantius, that many of the authors below aligned themselves. Cicero's discussions of man as *divinum animal* in *De finibus* (II.41) were regularly cited in anatomical works surveying the various summaries of human nature, though this definition of man did not appear in the religious writings surveyed here.[17] Lactantius' and Cicero's texts were well-known sources and were frequently cited in English publications from the 1640s onwards.

The second sources of discussion were those emerging out of Reformed and Anti-Reformed debate on the continent. Calvin had emphasized that it was only worship of god that rendered "men superior to brutes." Without worship, men were not only on the same level as beasts but "in many respects far more miserable."[18] While the Reformed tradition following Calvin would not inherit his rejection of reason, English Calvinists tended to repeat this means of differentiating man from beast. Followers of Arminius, similarly, would have been aware that he had averred that man was principally a religious, not rational animal, in his 'Fifth Oration' (1606).[19] Simon Episcopius claimed during the Synod of Dort in 1618 that religion, more than reason, was the distinguishing characteristics of man.[20] This could be contrasted with the strong Socinian separation of religion and human nature, which positioned man as a species with no natural framing towards religion besides a reasoning faculty that could interpret scripture.[21] Another influential discussion was Herbert of Cherbury's *De veritate* (1624) which concluded that "religion is the ultimate difference in man" on the basis of the universal appearance of the worship of God.[22]

Despite Evelyn's summary to the contrary, none of these sources actually used the specific definitions of man as *animal religiosum* or *animal capax religionis*. One exception was Tommaso Companella's summary of Lactantius's discussion in *Divine Institutes* as

defining man as '*animal rationale religiosum*' in *Atheismus triumphatus* (1631), but this was not mentioned.[23] The first important discussions appeared in England, most likely, in the preaching of Benjamin Whichcote and John Smith. The Cambridge preacher Whichcote (1609–1683) defined man as *animal religiosum* as part of his outlining of a doctrine of theosis in his posthumously published *Theophorymen dogmata* (1685), also known as the *Select Notions*. These discussions would have been well known to Whichcote's students at Cambridge in the mid-seventeenth century where he was a highly respected and influential figure.[24] Rejecting Plato's definition of man as *animal rationale* given the evident "sagacity [in] inferior creatures," humans were differentiated because "man alone … can take cognizance of God" and thus stood "higher by the head and shoulders" from brute creation.[25] The "essential formality" of man is the "proper motion of the understanding" is "God-ward."[26] Whichcote's discussion of animal sagacity here was not used to level man and beast – "for comparatively, [man's] understanding is the best of the creation" – but to make the point that the perfection of man's nature was "repose with God" (*Deo assidere*).[27] Not reason *per se*, but reason directed to God distinguished man from the rest of creation.[28] It was not appropriate to "define a man *animal rationale* … but *animal religiosum*, a religious creature."

Whichcote's discussion has regularly been cited as characteristic of his anti-atheist apologetics and his optimistic stance on the reliability of reason in religious matters, in opposition to the Reformed doctrine of the depravity of human nature.[29] Often in the story of Cambridge Platonism such discussion has de-theologized Whichcote's understanding of reason and posited him as using reason in a secularized way akin to Cartesian rationalism. What is noticeable about Whichcote's discussion here, however, is that his emphasis is primarily on explaining theosis. He is explaining the Christian vocation understood as the participation in the life of reason, through which one learns to be human.

Moreover, Whichcote's specific definitional phrasing was not present in the known patristic and classical sources. The most commonly referred to passages of Cicero and Lactantius, for example, do not use the definition.[30] Indeed, Lactantius's own definition of man was *animal intelligens et rationis capax* (an intelligent animal and capable of reason).[31] Arguably, the move here was more than the simple regurgitation of a definition of man taken from readily available texts, but an act of definition-establishment at a moment when understanding human nature's relationship with god and reason is being disputed in a major way. This rhetorical move is worthy of note: man as *animal religiosum* served Whichcote's wider purposes of demonstrating the deiformity of common human nature through the participation in divine reason against the Reformed doctrines of depravity and predestination and against the religious enthusiasm of the age. Moreover, it seems plausible, given his well-attested influence on his students, that Whichcote's discussion of man as *animal religiosum* helped initiated the spread of the use of the definition.

The *Select Notions* was published two years after Whichcote's death by "Philanthropus," who positioned himself as Whichcote's former "pupil and particular friend."[32] Subsequent editors of Whichcote's religious writings – Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury and the mid-eighteenth-century clergyman Samuel Salter – were doubtful about the extent to which the *Select Notions* reflected his mature thought or, indeed, whether the work was purely Whichcote's own.[33] Whichcote did not repeat the definition of man as *animal religiosum* in other posthumously published writings, though he set out a similar position about the positive relationship between religion, reason and human nature. In his *Aphorisms* (published 1753) Whichcote maintained that nothing was "more specific to man than the capacity of religion, and sense of God." Without any mention of the possible rationality of animals, he aphorized that religion was "connatural to the frame of man" because it was

"agreeable to his reason" and was as "natural for a man" as it was for a "beast to be guided by his senses and instinct."[34] Similar discussion could be found in his *Select Sermons* (1698).[35]

The re-definition of man as a specifically religious creature was pursued by Whichcote's former pupil John Smith (1618–1652), but in the more cautious form *animal capax religionis* (animal capable of religion). Smith's religious thought was characterized by his emphasis on practical divinity, an ecumenical stance on doctrine, and his belief in the positive relationship between reason and faith.[36] His sermons were originally preached at the chapel of Queen's College Cambridge in the late 1640s and early 1650s and were published posthumously as the *Select Discourses* (1660). The ninth of these, entitled "Of the Excellency and Nobleness of True Religion," focused on the nobility of true religion and contained Smith's discussion on the correct definition of man.[37] His redefinition of man as *animal capax religionis*, a similar act of definition-creation as Whichcote's *animal religiosum*, was a modification of Porphyry's definition of man as a "rational animal, capable of intellect and science."[38] Similarly, Smith's definition was repeated by subsequent authors, though it was not as prevalent as Whichcote's use of *animal religiosum*. Smith's former student Isaac Barrow agreed with his lecturer that man was a "creature capable of religion" because there appears an "instinct and capacity innate to man, (and, indeed, to him alone)" to want to "readily acquainted" with his divine parent.[39] Likewise, Edward Fowler, Bishop of Gloucester, and the theologian Herezkiah Burton paraphrased Smith's account.[40] And, as we will see below, another influential 'latitude-man' George Rust also shared this definition of man with Smith.

As with Whichcote, Smith's focus here was explaining the proper religious "way of life" intended for humans.[41] Smith's position differs, obviously, from the ontologically fixed nature of the definition of *animal religiosum*; Smith informs his audience that they merely have the potential to be religious, but that this requires both effort and divine grace. To fulfil his "own dignity and glory" as a deiform creature, the "good man endeavors to walk by eternal and

unchangeable rules of reason." The human soul when "straightened within the narrow prison of sensual and corporeal delights" is corrupted and limited. By contrast, the individual soul that adopts the "proper motion of religion … upwards to its first original [i.e. God] … lives at the height of his own being." And here is where Smith deemed the definitions of *animal rationale* and *animal capax religionis* as being of equal importance on the grounds that man's religious nature was intimately bound up with his rational nature.[42] Smith cited the opinions of Plutarch and Cicero, not Lactantius, to shore up his view that the "formal difference of man" could be found in the capacity of human beings to converse with God using their reason.[43] These two sources acted as proof that reason was "enabling and fitting [for] man to converse with God by knowing him and loving him" and it was this that was the "character most unquestionably differencing man from brute creatures."[44]

Smith's discussion appeared in a devotional work intended to aid young men in understanding their relationship with their God. His definition of man as *animal capax religionis* was part of an argument that reason and religion went together. Smith's developed his position less in opposition to recent writings about animal reasoning than against stoic philosophy and Reformed thought.[45] The stoic belief that reason could achieve terrestrial happiness through its control of the passions was predicated on a view of human nature's rational self-sufficiency that turned the individual away from God and made an idol of himself. The true source of human felicity involved the progression of human nature's religious capabilities towards their eventual perfection, reunion with God. The stoics negated the spiritual aspect of human nature and downplayed the real life of religion required of a deiform creature such as man. Smith also rejected the Reformed doctrines of the total depravity of human nature and the power and majesty of God. The perfection of human nature was the return to God, though Grace-assisted, which involved fulfilling the religious propensities of the species. Man had the capacity to be religious through the appropriate use of reason.

Another author writing in the mid-seventeenth century who described man as *animal religiosum* was George Rust (d. 1670), the subsequent Bishop of Dromore, in his posthumously published *Discourse of the Use of Reason in Matters of Religion* (1683). The work was written while Rust was at Cambridge and its contents were variously directed against enthusiasts, deists and Socinians. Less concerned with the doctrine of theosis like Whichcote and Smith, Rust's principal focus was the epistemology of belief. His discussion of man as a religious animal came within an explanation of the role of reason in assent to religious beliefs. A positive relationship existed between right reason and religion because "faith consists in assent; the assent follows the judgement, but no judgement can be made of a thing that is not at all known or understood." Rust's citation pointed the reader to Herbert's *De veritate*, though his position was a clear re-statement of the Arminian position on the mechanics of belief: faith involved an act of assent by the faculty of the intellect, in opposition to the Reformed position that faith was the result of God's granting of grace.

The distinction of man as *animal capax religionis* came within a discussion of the corruption of reason. An individual's reason could be "blinded by lusts," leading them to becoming an "animal man" whose reasons were guided only by sensual appetite. The faculty of "right reason," by contrast, was able to discern divine law. The "principal difference between mankind and brutes" was not reason *per se*, then, but man's "being capable of religion" – an *animal capax religionis*. Religion and reason went together when reason was directed in its appropriate fashion as a God-given spark that allowed for apprehension of the divine law. Religion was the "most natural and the sole propriety of man" and could not be "contradictory to his own faculties." To argue otherwise was to claim that "God intended to perplex the humane intellect with inexplicable subtleties" and make people "put off human nature that we may become religious."[46]

In each of the three cases discussed so far, the overriding concern was not that of dealing with anxieties relating to purported threats to the species boundary between man and beast. The re-definition of man as a religious creature by Whichcote, Smith, and Rust were theological explorations of man's relationship with his maker. Reason thereby was identified with faith; the truly religious good individual lived in the manner befitting his nature as a human.[47] Given the role that man as *animal religiosum* has usually played in existing scholarship on the 'latitude-men' such as Whichcote, Smith, and Rust, it has to be also argued that the willingness to redefine the human species as a religious rather than rational animal was maintained by a wide variety of figures within English religious writing during the second half of the seventeenth century.[48] Proponents of other variants of Anglicanism appealed to the categorization, as was the case with the mystic and Oxford divine John Pordage (1607–1681) in his posthumously published *Theologia Mystica* (1683) or another Oxford divine, the Arminian controversialist Thomas Pierce (1622–1691).

To Pordage, a visionary who conversed with angels, our "reason, or faith, intellect, intelligible ideas and eternal verities" would never "conduct us to enter into paradise" unless they were bound together with "our affections." The "old definition *animal rationale*" could not contain the full potential of man's spiritual being, and hence Pordage wished to "define him … rather by *religiosum*" or "*animal divinum*."[49] Noticeably, Pordage viewed this definition as new. Pierce preached before the King in the 1679 on the spread of irreligiosity and atheism due to the "multitudes of deceivers" in Restoration England. Pierce's target were the "disciples of the book which is called *Leviathan*" and its author, and his usage of man as *animal religiosum* was principally an argument of anti-atheist apologetic. Thomas Hobbes's materialist understanding of human nature in *Leviathan* (1651) dispensed with the notion of immaterial spirits. One way to rebuke this argument was for Pierce to maintain that "the perfectest definition of man as man" was *"animal religiosum*, which still includes *rationale*."

The whole framing of human nature was suited to religious belief and worship and, as such, to believe in religious doctrine of the existence of immaterial spirits was to be human. Hobbes and his supporters, therefore, were "monsters."[50] These examples are evidence of the wide usage of the precise definition of man as *animal religiosum*.

The definition of man as the uniquely religious species was, equally, appealed to by the Reformed. They tended to maintain that man had innate knowledge of a deity, though this knowledge was faint and often hidden beneath the general depravity of human nature. Moreover, while man's natural religious propensities allowed for belief in God, faith only truly followed upon an act of redemptive grace granted by God. The scattered discussions amongst Reformed writers during the 1640s and 1650s tended to accept the possibility of semblances of animal rationality, but strongly averred that only humans were religious creatures. The former Parliamentarian soldier and subsequent lay writer on religious topics Edward Leigh, in his *Treatise of Religion* (1656), held that religion alone "distinguishes a man from a beast" given that many animals have a "shadow of reason, but religion is peculiar to man."[51] Leigh's *Treatise of Religion* was dedicated to Archbishop Ussher, whose own *Body of Divinity* (1645) maintained that "beasts have some sparkles or resemblance of reason, but none of religion."[52] The Presbyterian Regius Professor of Divinity at the University of Cambridge, John Arrowsmith, maintained in his *Armilla Catechetica* (1659) that the definition of man as a "creature addicted to religion" was a more appropriate categorization than "man [as] a living creature endued with reason" given the universality of religion, comparative to the use of reason.[53] He did so as part of an argument to demonstrate that, given this universality of belief amongst the world's religions, true religion was not known by "natural reason" but through access to "divine and supernatural revelation."[54]

Similarly, the definition of man as *animal religiosum* was utilized by numerous prominent Presbyterian ministers during the Restoration. Richard Baxter held, in his *The True*

and Only Way of Concord of All the Christian Churches (1680), that "man is naturally *animal religiosum*, made to serve God in order to future happiness."[55] As we shall see in the next section, Baxter was one of the most frequent discussants of the redefinition of man as *animal religiosum* in the latter decades of the seventeenth century. Often this appeared as an anti-atheist proposition. The popular preacher Stephen Charnock, in his two-volume *Discourses upon the Existence and Attributes of God* (1682), concurred that the definition of "*animal religiosum*" was a reasonable inference from the universal consent in the existence of God. Religion was so bound up with reason that "a man cannot be accounted rational, unless he own an object of religion."[56] In the first volume of his *The Living Temple* (1675), John Howe used as a proof for the truth of religion the fact that so many people have "accounted [religion] the most constituent, and most distinguishing thing in human nature" rather than reason.[57] It was more absurd to admit the existence of an "irreligious man" than a "rational beast." The thrust of Howe's usage was an anti-atheist point: those who deny a deity abandon "their own humanity; … by saying there is no God, [they] should proclaim themselves no men."[58]

We find discussion of man as *animal religiosum* just as frequently in mid-to-late seventeenth-century Reformed theology as we do in the writings of the 'latitude-men' or other anti-Reformed religious writers. While Whichcote, Smith, and Rust used their discussions to assert the positive relationship between reason and religion, the focus of the Reformed writers discussed above was primarily to use the definition as an argument in anti-atheist apologetic. This should indicate the various rhetorical uses to which the definition could be put, and certainly warn against any interpretations that limit its associations to those of the 'latitude-men'.

So far, this article has been concerned with indicating how man as *animal religiosum* was used by both Reformed and Anti-Reformed.[59] Following its appearance in the 1650s, the definition quickly became a popular tool to make a number of interrelated arguments. The first,

as has been established, was the use of the definition of man as a religious animal in anti-atheist apologetics, usually used in conjunction with the proof for the existence of god from the *consensus gentium*. The universal consent of humankind in the existence of God demonstrated that the ultimate difference between humans and animals was religion.[60] Conversely, if humans were uniquely religious animals, those who were not religious were less than human.[61] A second common use of the categorization of *animal religiosum* appeared in works of devotion and practical divinity intended to encourage and chide the individual into pious belief and worship. The pious life was the good life, befitting to human nature; the sensual life was one of distraction and dissatisfaction, fitting only for beasts.[62] A comparable example could be found in Mark Hildesley's *Religio Jurisprudentis* (1685), an example of the tradition of layman's faiths, in which the lawyer Hildesley, ostensibly writing for his son, explained that "animal religiosum" was a "more proper definition of a man than animal "rationale" because "1. [Religion] belongs unto all men. 2. It belongs only unto mankind. 3. It belongs at all times unto man. 4. It belongs necessarily to men; but sociability or rationality possibly do to others besides man."[63] The third prominent use was the deployment of *animal religiosum* in arguments about how man's essential religious nature led to specific requirements for church-state relations. Because man was essentially a religious creature civil society was formed, in part, for the purpose of organized religious worship. National religious institutions maintained by the government were necessary for the happiness and perfection of human nature.[64]

II. Man as *Animal Religiosum* amidst other Reasoning Animals

Definitions of man as *animal religiosum* and *animal capax religionis* frequently appeared in the immediate decades after the Cambridge preaching careers of Whichcote and Smith. Most of these took animal rationality as a proven phenomenon needing incorporation into the

understanding of human nature. A new emphasis, however, appeared in discussion from the 1660s onwards: the need to rebut arguments about animal rationality that were seen to challenge the anthropocentric worldview.[65] The issue had achieved a newfound prominence. To one pamphleteer writing in the 1690s, recent attempts to collapse the "essential difference between man and other animals [strike] at the whole of religion, and renders that unnecessary, and man contemptible."[66] To argue that animals could reason raised the possibility that man might be the same as the rest of creation, and that animals too might have rational, immortal souls. Contrastingly, a disputant in a debate over the Cartesian beast-machine hypothesis published in the *Athenian Mercury* in 1693 stressed that there were no heretical consequences to arguing that "brutes have immaterial souls and are rational thinking creatures." Man, unlike the brutes, was created in the image of God and hence "by the prerogative of his nature" is a being "capable of religion."[67] An alternative explanation was the beast-machine thesis associated with Descartes. The view that animals were *automata* devoid of soul or reason raised associations with the Epicurean hypothesis – seen to have been given unnerving plausibility by Hobbes's *Leviathan* – of a mechanical universe that brought into question all notions of immateriality. A third alternative, and the one adopted by Matthew Hale, was some form of nuanced modification of the Aristotelian tripartite soul to allow for evidence of animal rationality while retaining human reasoning superiority. From the 1660s onwards, there is more clear evidence of theologians and philosophers believing they needed to offer a coherent position on the status of man vis-à-vis beast.

A useful bridging case here is that of John Wilkins (1614–1672). Appointed Bishop of Chester a few months earlier, Wilkins preached before Charles II in February 1669 on the topic of man's essential nature.[68] He told his audience that the definition of man could be "rendered as well by the difference of *religiosum* as *rationale*." Religion was the essence, duty, and happiness of man. Given the clear evidence of "degrees of ratiocination" amongst "many brute

creations," it was necessary to emphasize that what defined man was not "reason in general" but reason "as it is determined to actions of religion."[69] While Wilkins's discussion utilized the same *religiosum* definition as his close friend Whichcote[70], he stressed the need to reassert the anthropocentric worldview by using the definition to underline where man comes in the "rank of creatures."[71] This became even clear in the expanded discussion, which incorporated the 1669 sermon, in Wilkins's posthumously published *Of the Principles and Duties of Natural Religion* (1675). The definition of man as *animal religiosum* was used against "such persons as are *sceptical* in [the] first principles" of morals and religion – the first mention of skepticism in discussions of man as *animal religiosum* thus far. Sceptics doubted the religious principles of truth and falsehood, good and evil, and yet, Wilkins averred, it was these beliefs in which "a rational being does consist."[72] A work of anti-atheistic natural theology, Wilkins's *Principles and Duties* was written "in opposition to that humour of skepticism and infidelity, which hath of so late abounded in the world."[73] We can also find a similarly more pronounced concern with distinguishing between man and animal in Henry Hallywell's annotations, probably written in 1682–83, to his aforementioned translation of George Rust's *Discourse on Truth*.[74]

Two of the lengthiest explorations in later seventeenth-century religious writing that incorporated the definition of man as *animal religiosum* discussed in more depth the possibility and meaning of animal reasoning. These were found in the works of Sir Matthew Hale and Richard Baxter. Hale discussed the appropriate definition of man in his celebrated work of natural theology *The Primitive Origination of Mankind* (1677).[75] He had strong personal links with at least two of the figures discussed above, Whichcote and Wilkins, as well as Baxter.[76] Hale probably had his friends Whichcote and Wilkins in mind when he claimed that the view that man could accurately be defined as *animal religiosum* had been put forward recently by "some latter persons" and "some thinking men." Responding to the growing prominence of

writings about animal rationality, Hale rejected any levelling of animal and human rationality on the grounds that the "reason in the brutes" was the "image and analogical representation of that true reason that is in man."[77] Apparently rational behavior in animals was just the "image," the simulacrum, of real human reason. Animals could not reason in terms of universals and incorporeal things in the way that humans could – and hence, as Hale put it in his manuscript treatise 'A Discourse of Religion' (c. early 1670s), animals did not show "any signs thereof" of religious belief and worship.[78] The "specifical difference" of human nature from the rest of creation was not reason but the "propension to religion."[79]

The concern for Hale, in *Primitive Origination* especially but in his other devotional writings too, was to re-affirm that God had made man as a religious, rational animal to "serve and glorify his maker [more] than other visible creatures."[80] This was a necessary move following the spread of philosophical writings which undermined man's superior status to the beasts. To do so he re-asserted an Aristotelian take on the soul, but with an added emphasis on the key role that man's innate religious propensities had on framing religious belief and worship. Man's "intellective faculty" placed him above brute creation. The key point here was not that humans had reason but that "lodged in the intellectual and rational nature" of man's soul were numerous internal aids, *communes notitiae* (common notions), enabling religious belief. Man's innate religious notions meant he should be defined as *animal religiosum*, "arising from the energy of those *infinitae notitiae* relating to God."[81] Hale downplayed the comparison between human and animal reasoning and reasserted a broadly Aristotelian understanding of the soul. In the process he switched the emphasis away from reason *per se* and towards the innate moral and religious propensities of the intellective faculty.

In his *Dying Thoughts* (1683), Richard Baxter developed his earlier claim that "those men seem to be in the right who … make *animal religiosum* to be more of his description than *animal rationale*."[82] A close friend and intellectual interlocutor of Hale, his neighbor in the

village of Acton, Middlesex from 1667, Baxter's position was similar to that set out in Hale's *Primitive Origination*. The *Dying Thoughts* were written by Baxter to provide himself with comforting thoughts on his putatively imminent earthly demise. One constant theme was the place of man within the rank of creatures possessing an immaterial soul that meant man was "differenced formally from all inferior substances."[83] Like Hale, Baxter held animals demonstrated "analogical reason" which, though it was an inferior form of reason, still meant that man could not be defined unproblematically as *animal rationale*. Rather, like Hale, Baxter argued that humans are formally different from animals because their reason is "exercised about things of a higher nature, than the concerns of temporal life."[84] The end of humans was to obey and worship God; those who do not do this "live not as a man, but as a brute."[85] They could not "think of God" like man. Unlike Hale, Baxter stated himself persuaded, in his *Dying Thoughts* at least, by the writings of recent French 'sceptics' that animals had the ability to reason. These writings had shown that the real categorization of man as a "higher species" should be predicated on man not being the possessor of reason but by "having his nobler reason for higher ends."[86] And it was these arguments that were behind Baxter's modification of his understanding of human nature from *animal rationale* to *animal religiosum*.

III. Debate Over the Reasoning Abilities of Animals

The discussions of Baxter, Hale, Hallywell, and Wilkins written during the Restoration were characterized by a greater concern with responding to recent arguments about the reasoning abilities of animals that those written in the 1650s. While Hale and Baxter acknowledged the extensive body of ancient writings that levelled man and beast's reasoning abilities, they both discussed as of particular significance the recent works of the French physician and lay religious writer Marin Cureau de la Chambre (1594–1669).[87] Cureau penned a particularly

influential thesis that tweaked the Aristotelian understanding of the soul, in which he argued both for the existence of limited reasoning capabilities in animals and for the unique ability of man's reason to develop knowledge about higher things.

The position of late Aristotelianism at the beginning of the seventeenth century remained the view that the human soul had a tripartite nature, being made up of three sets of differing faculties. The human soul had: vegetative faculties, of nutrition and reproduction, which it shared with the animals and plants; sensitive faculties, such as memory, movement, perception, which were shared with other animals; and, finally, the human soul was unique in its possession of intellective faculties, such as the capacity to reason about both corporeal and incorporeal objects of knowledge and to exercise will. Such an explanation provided a coherent and still persuasive anthropocentric world view. The Aristotelian position on the existence of animal souls was directly challenged by the 'beast-machine' thesis of René Descartes.[88] He denied that animals had souls or reasoning ability, rejecting such arguments as unwarrantable acts of anthropomorphism. Descartes positioned his denial of animal souls as an argument against atheists who wished to level man with the "flies and ants."[89]

The precise nature of animal souls and animal faculties were a cause of common concern for Hale and Baxter. They had corresponded, amongst other things, over Baxter's manuscript treatise 'Of the Nature and Immortality of Humane Souls" (*c.* 1669–1672). Towards the end of composing this treatise, Baxter read and responded to Thomas Willis's *De anima brutorum* (1672), which offered a Gassendian theory of the corporeality of animals' sensitive souls. While Willis had argued for the existence of an incorporeal rational soul, Baxter and Hale shared the concern that Gassendi and Willis's position, like that of Descartes, offered a corporeal explanation of sensitive souls which potentially lead to a slippery slope to enabling the materialization of human rational souls. This was especially the case given that the sensitive souls of brutes were, as Baxter put it in a letter to Hale written in the early 1670s, "so neere kin

to ye Rationall, as to have Analogicall Reason" – a position which Willis held himself too.[90] The best foundations for defending species difference, Baxter claimed, was that the human soul alone had natural propensities to achieve deiform perfection impossible in the sublunary world – that is, as Baxter put it in a number of other works, that man was *animal religiosum*.

While Baxter and Hale were concerned by the new theories of animal and human souls being offered, their shift from *animal rationale* to *animal religiosum* was encouraged primarily by the issue of animal rationality, a sub-argument within the larger issue of the nature of animal souls. Indeed, it is striking how willingly the writers assessed above accepted the position that animals could reason. Perhaps illustrative of their greater concern over the meaning of animal reasoning, Baxter, Hale and Wilkins all cited considerably more authorities than the writers from the 1640s and 1650s discussed above. Hale, for example, referred to the ancients Porphyry, Plutarch, and Sextus Empiricus, and the sixteenth-century Venetian Platonist Francesco Patrizi as all arguing that "reasonableness [was] not the specifical difference of human nature."[91] The most commonly cited ancient source was Plutarch's 'That Beasts Make Use of Reason' in which Gryllus argued that reason was a facet of animal nature. It is also possible that men like Wilkins, Hales and Baxter were responding to the humility-encouraging writings of theriophiles like Montaigne and Pierre Charron, though they were not mentioned by name.[92]

The most important works, for Hale and Baxter at least, were those of Cureau. The French physician was a figure of considerable contemporary standing within the Courts of Louis XIII and XIV, possibly one of the founder members of the Académie des Sciences and was well-known for his theories of animal rationality.[93] Cureau's first take on animal reason was a lengthy appendix entitled "De la connoissance des animaux" attached to the 1645 second edition of his *Les caractères des passions* (1640). This started a dispute with a more obscure physician Pierre Chanet over the cognitive abilities of animals. Chanet had originally attacked

Pierre Charron's views on animal rationality in his *Considerations sur las sagesse de Charron* (1643). Following Cureau's 1645 appendix, Chanet penned a repost entitled *De l'instinct et de la connoissance des animaux* (1646). To Chanet, animal actions should be understood in terms of a providentially-framed instinct, not reason. Moreover, Cureau had destroyed the doctrine of man's immortal soul by removing the essential difference between man and beast. Stung by this accusation, Cureau penned *Traité de la connaissance des animaux* (1648).

Cureau was a well-intentioned Christian who defended the view that animals could reason as a necessary step in developing an accurate understanding of the natural world and thereby providing a "more solid foundation" for man's dignity.[94] As part of this Cureau rejected "one of the most ancient maxims of philosophy, that defines man as a rational animal."[95] While it was clear that both man and beast had reason, their cognitive abilities differed so tremendously that he did not conclude that there were any inconveniences to believing that beasts reasoned.[96] This position involved the innovative reworking of Aristotelianism: Cureau attributed to the animal sensitive soul certain basic reasoning capacities that would normally be the preserve of the human rational soul.[97] Animals could undertake acts of reason by their faculty of imagination.[98] These acts were limited to specific corporeal objects. Humans could undertake acts of reason by their faculty of understanding. The understanding, unlike the imagination, has the power to "form general notions."[99] Man could not be defined by reason *per se*, but specifically by possessing the "faculty of reasoning universally," given that the "faculty of reasoning simply" was shared with the beasts. Moreover, because of its ability to make universal notions, the faculty of the understanding should be understood as "spiritual." The conclusion was simple: "reason is not the specifick difference of Man, but such a species of Reason, to wit universal Reason."[100] Man's higher reasoning marked "the spirituality and immortality of his soul."[101]

Both Hale and Baxter were thoroughly familiar with Cureau's work. It is not clear whether they were using the French original or, more likely, the English translation of Cureau's *Traité* entitled *A Discourse of the Knowledg of Beasts* published in 1657. The translation was printed by Thomas Newcomb, who had published translations of Cureau's other works, as well as the first English translation of Descartes' *A Discourse on Method* in 1649. Newcomb added a lengthy prefacing essay that summarized Cureau's arguments and defended their Christian orthodoxy. Both Hale and Baxter, by contrast, took a more guarded position. To Hale, the "ingenious and learned" Cureau was the leading figure amongst all writers, ancient and modern, of the view that animals had a "reasoning faculty or power."[102] Hale discussed Cureau's *Traité* within a chapter aiming to demonstrate the "excellency of human nature in general."[103] He summarized "two extreme opinions" on animal nature. The first was the Cartesian view that animals are "no more but barely mechanisms or artificial ensigns [and] all their various motions but the meer modifications of matter."[104] Cureau was the leading proponent of the second, opposing view that denied that "reason to be the specifical or constitution difference of the human nature." Hale observed that Cureau had distinguished between the "*ratio imaginativa*" of brutes, which "keeps still in particulars, and within the verge of particular propositions and conclusions," and the "*ratio intellectualis*" of humans, which "hath to do with universals."[105]

Characteristic of the exploratory and expansive nature of the *Primitive Origination* generally, Hale's own attempt to explain the sagacity of brutes was not consistent. He variously described the ability of birds to build nests and nurture their eggs "with the most exquisite reason and congruity" as both evidence that animals had "instrumental reason" and that animals had inbuilt instincts to undertake such action.[106] In language like Cureau's, Hale also accepted that animals have "imaginative reason" but stressed that this was a "low, obscure and imperfect shadow" compared to man's reason.[107] Yet his discussion ended with a strongly negative

assessment of the existence of animal reason. Hale argued that the "impulses of sense, memory, and instinct" covered all the "sagacities of brutes" and there was no need to appeal to "true ratiocination or discursive reason." He criticized Cureau as one of those "witty men" who had "chymically extracted an artificial logick" out of the sagacity of brutish actions. Whereas Cureau offered examples of the sort of syllogisms a horse's imagination could undertake when deciding to eat grass, Hale thought it far more plausible that the horse ate the grass instinctively.[108]

In the face of Cureau's arguments, Hale offered his own reworking of Aristotelianism. He listed eleven objects that fell under the perception of the faculty of the intellective (or intellect), a faculty which was solely possessed by humans. One key batch of mental objects animals did not have but humans did were "notions of a deity, and the results thereupon, namely, religion."[109] Hale's understanding of the development of religious belief led to an illuminating comparison between animal and human nature. The rational soul of humans was full of connatural principles which, when functioning once an individual had reached maturity, led to the development of certain notions. The "rational instincts" in the soul that led to religious belief were comparable, Hale maintained, to the "animal instincts of brutes." Put differently, humans believed in god as instinctively as the spider knew how to weave a web or a bird knew how to build a nest.[110]

Baxter discussed Cureau repeatedly across his voluminous oeuvre, sometimes positively and sometimes critically, depending on the aim of the particular work in which the discussion appeared.[111] In apologetic works intended to prove the truth of Christianity, such as *Reasons for the Christian Religion* (1667) and *More Reasons for the Christian Religion* (1672), Baxter positioned Cureau as a well-known sceptic of comparable threat to foundational Christian doctrines as Pierre Gassendi and Thomas Hobbes. In these works he simplified Cureau's position as extolling that brutes were rational, and thereby removed the distinction between the

animal and human soul.[112] In more philosophically exploratory works, and particularly his *Dying Thoughts* (1683), Baxter expressed his agreement with Cureau's arguments, praising the convincing way that he "raises the reason of man" by stressing, despite the appearances of comparable reason amongst animals, that only man amongst the creatures had an "intellectual faculty" which tended to divine things. He would have found similar arguments in Chapter 6 of Willis's *De anima brutorum*. The redefinition of man as *animal religiosum*, for Baxter, was a way of circumventing having to provide an answer to the vexed question of explaining those actions of animals that appeared to involve "some kind of reasoning."[113] The point was that humans were deiform creatures, animals were not – regardless of whether they could reason. Certainly, the views of Baxter and Hale were more responsive to the issue of the precise characterization of how animal and human reason differed, than those of the 1650s, and the source of their concern here seems to have Cureau. Their engagements exemplified how discussion of man as *animal religiosum* often took place in a different context in the Restoration to that during the Civil War and Interregnum era.

IV. The Disappearance of the Definition in Theological Writings

The specific reclassification of man as *animal religiosum* was a new development, a rhetorical shift in argument over the relationship between human nature and religion, which took place between 1650 and the end of the seventeenth century amongst numerous English religious polemicists, theologians, and philosophers. The discussions of the 1650s noticed by John Evelyn tended to take place within the framework of doctrinal debate. As such, these discussions were not limited to the purview of the well-studied 'latitude-men', but rather a category available to and utilized by most sections of English Protestantism. The discussions of the 1660s to the 1680s were more frequently, though not always, concerned with the

consequences to the anthropocentric worldview of the possible reasoning abilities of animals. While contributions to a larger debate about animal rationality that included Descartes and Gassendi, these texts took as their main source the lesser-known Cureau. In both cases, this re-examination of the precise quality of the uniqueness of man had less to do with Descartes' beast-machine thesis and its strong separation of rational man in possession of an immortal soul and the automata of nature than current scholarship suggests.

Scattered instances can be found of man being explicitly defined as *animal religiosum* and *animal capax religionis* by a miscellany of writers in the early eighteenth century.[114] The most commonplace location to find discussion about explicitly defining man as *animal religiosum* was in magazines, newspapers and periodicals.[115] The definition's usage, however, ceased to be commonly appealed to in theological works exploring the relationship between religion and human nature. This article will end with a few tentative suggestions as to why this might have occurred.

The definition of man as *animal religiosum* or *animal capax religionis* might have fallen out of common usage in the early eighteenth century due to two consequences resulting from the widespread influence of John Locke's *Essay concerning Human Understanding* (1690). Firstly, as the *Essay* became a textbook, theologians emerging out of the universities in the early eighteenth century would have been taught to focus on the operations of the mind more than on formal argumentative structures, resulting in a move away from repeated use of definitions such as *homo est animal rationale* and, by extension, *homo est animal religiosum.*[116] This is confirmed by the decline of usages of *animal rationale* as much as *animal religiosum* from the early eighteenth century onwards.[117] Certainly the language of finding the *differentia* between the *species* of man and beast, given they shared the same *genus* of *animal*, and the attempt to find the 'specifick' distinguishing feature of man is less common as school reasoning fell out of fashion. Instead, many university students would have learnt from Book II of the

Essay to be sceptical about the possibility of identifying the "real essence, or substantial form, of man." Secondly, the stringent critique offered in Book I of Locke's *Essay* also had seriously challenged belief in religious innatism, either in the form of innate religious ideas or innate religious predispositions, which was often bound up with the definitions of man as *animal religiosum* or *animal capax religionis*.[118] The Lockean understanding of religious belief as framed by exogenous factors made apologetic appeals made about the universal religious characteristics of human nature less plausible.

Alongside Lockean innovations, anti-atheist apologetics had changed dramatically as new natural theological arguments set the appeals of religious innatism, universal consent and man as *animal religiosum* aside. The two key forms were the abstract *a priori* reasoning exemplified in Samuel Clarke's two sets of Boyle Lectures (1704–5, 1705–1706) and the physico-theology, exemplified by John Ray or William Derham, that celebrated the abundant evidence of providential design in the natural world. In neither strand, and in the extensive sermon literature that utilized these approaches, was Christian apologetics seen as being strengthened by an additional appeal to man as *animal religiosum*.

There is also a strong sense that the principal focus of apologetics had changed. The definition *animal religiosum* might have been useful as one of the many arrows launched against post-Hobbesian "atheism" in the third quarter of the seventeenth century. It became less useful as an apologetic argument, however, as the prominent challenges to orthodox belief changed at the turn of the eighteenth century. The threat was less the putative atheists and sceptics of the 1670s, who would be viewed as doubting the relationship between religion, reason and human nature, but the 'deists' and freethinkers of the 1690s onwards – figures who were held to believe in god, but not necessarily the Christian God of Scripture. Regardless of the coherence of 'deism' as a category, it is certainly the case that freethinkers such as John Toland, Anthony Collins and Matthew Tindal were viewed as claiming that only those religious

beliefs understandable by reason could be true.[119] This epistemology of belief had problematic implications for theologians wishing to maintain the definition of man as *animal religiosum.*[120] A key example of this is Collins' characteristically mischievous discussion of the definition of man as religious animal in his *An Essay concerning the Use of Reason* (1707).[121] Collins used the commonplace and uncontroversial categorization to argue that calling for belief in religious truths "above reason" required man to go against his essential nature. The "very proper … distinction between men and brutes" was that "there are no signs of religion observable among brutes." He went on to note that much orthodox religion "consists in the belief of propositions either repugnant to one another, or to propositions which we perceive to be true". From here Collins provocatively concluded that assent to these propositions involved putting off "human nature" and hence it was problematic to argue that "religion can be said to be natural to man, when it is supposed to be contradictory to the perceptions of our faculties."[122] The unstated but clear meaning of this passage was that, given that man was a religious animal, something must be wrong about doctrines that were impossible for man to believe. The 'deist' subordination of revealed religion to the standard of reason lead to the growing preponderance of arguments that emphasized not the relationship between reason and religion, but the inadequacy of natural reason and the importance of revelation and the transmission of tradition. This position also grew in prominence during the related dispute, prompted in part by Locke's *Essay*, over the origins of the knowledge of natural and divine law between the 1690s and 1710s.[123]

In the early eighteenth century it was far less common to find an English religious writer confidently defining man as *animal religiosum* than it had been for any time since the 1650s. A redefinition of human nature that had emerged during the theological disputes of that decade, and then modified in the face of the greater prominence of debate over the significance of animal rationality in the Restoration, no longer seemed as apologetically apt in the face of deism and disputes over the origins of natural law. While eighteenth-century English

philosophers and theologians might still talk about humans as religious creatures, they had abandoned the scholastic language of man as *animal religiosum* and *animal capax religionis*. The phrasing might appear again occasionally towards the end of the eighteenth century, such as in Edmund Burke's *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (1790), though the scattered nature of such usages contrasts markedly with the concentration of use in the mid to late seventeenth century.

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[1] The most commonly cited source was Porphyry's *Isagoge*, the well-known introduction to Aristotle's *Organon*. Strictly speaking, man as *animal rationale* did not appear in Aristotle's works. For instances of use in popular university logic textbooks see: Robert Sanderson, *Logicae artis compendium* (Oxford, 1615), 13–14; Samuel Smith, *Aditus ad logicam* (London, 1613), 13; Francis Burgersdijk, *Institutionum logicarum synopsis* (Amsterdam, 1659), 19 or ibid., *Institutionum logicarum libri duo* (Amsterdam, 1660), 49; Henry Aldrich, *Artis logicae compendium* (Oxford, 1696), 10.

[2] R. W. Serjeantson, "The Soul," in Desmond M. Clarke and Catherine Wilson, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy in Early Modern Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 119–141; Erica Fudge, *Perceiving Animals: Humans and Beasts in Early Modern English Culture* (London: University of Illinois Press, 2002), esp. 1–10; ibid., *Brutal Reasoning: Animals, Rationality, and Humanity in Early Modern England* (London: Cornell University Press, 2006); Nathaniel Wolloch, *Subjugated Animals: Animals and Anthropocentricism in Early Modern European Culture* (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2006).

[3] Matthew Senior, "The Souls of Men and Beasts, 1630–1764," in Matthew Senior, ed., *A Cultural History of Animals. Volume 4: In the Age of Enlightenment* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 23–45; Luciano Floridi, "Scepticism and Animal Rationality: the Fortune of Chrysippus' Dog in the History of Western Thought," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 79 (1997): 27–57; Margaret Wilson, "Animal Ideas," *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association* 69 (1995): 7–25; Peter Harrison, "The Virtues of Animals in Seventeenth-Century Thought," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 59 (1998): 463–484; Philip C. Almond, *Adam and Eve in Seventeenth-Century Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 110–142; Keith Thomas, *Man and the Natural World: Changing Attitudes in England 1500–1800* (London: Penguin Books, 1983), esp. 137.

[4] See, for example, Sarah Ellenzweig, *The Fringes of Belief: English Literature, Ancient Heresy and the Politics of Freethinking 1660–1760* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008).

[5] Though see Gillian Manning, "Rochester's Satyr Against Reason and Mankind and Contemporary Religious Debate," *The Seventeenth Century* 8 (1993): 99–121. Despite its title, Anne McWhir, "Animal Religiosum and the Witches in 'A Voyage to the Houyhnhnms'," *English Studies in Canada* 12 (1986): 375–386 is not relevant to this article.

[6] See, for example, David Pailin, "Reconciling Theory and Fact: The Problem of 'Other Faiths' in Lord Herbert and the Cambridge Platonists," in Douglas Hedley and Sarah Hutton (eds), *Platonism at the Origins of Modernity: Studies on Platonism and Early Modern Philosophy* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008), 93–111 esp. 94–97.

[7] The most significant contributions in this regard are Mario Micheletti, *Animal capax religionis: da Benjamin Whichcote a Shaftesbury* (Perugia: Benucci, 1984); ibid., *I platonici di Cambridge: il pensiero etico e religioso* (Brescia: Morcelliana, 2011). See also ibid., *Dai latitudinari a Hume* (Perugia: Benucci, 1997).

[8] John Spurr, "'Rational Religion' in Restoration England," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 49 (1988): 563–585; ibid., "'Latitudinarianism' and the Restoration Church," *The Historical Journal* 31 (1988): 61–82; ibid., *The Restoration Church of England, 1646–1689* (New Haven, NJ: Yale University Press, 1991), esp. 394–396.

[9] The most adept defence of the categories' coherence on philosophical grounds is set out in Isabel Rivers, *Reason, Grace and Sentiment: A Study of the Language of Religion and Ethics in England, 1660–1780,* 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), Volume 1: Whichcote to Wesley. See also Sarah Hutton, "Eine Cambridge-Konstellation? Perspektiven für eine Konstellationsforschung zu den Platonikern von Cambridge," in M. Mulsow and M. Stamm (eds), *Konstellationsforschung* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2005), 349–358. For a recent critique see Dmitri Levitin, *Ancient Wisdom in the Age of the New Science: Histories of Philosophy in England, c. 1640–1700* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 14–16, 126–138.

[10] Spurr, "'Rational Religion'", 564. Spurr does not discuss the topic of animal rationality.

[11] Louis Thomassin, *La méthode d'étudier et d'enseigner chrétiennement et solidement les historiens profanes,* 2 vols. (Paris, 1693), I:461–462. On Thomassin see Henry Van Camp, "La 'Philosophie chrétienne' de Louis Thomassin, de l'Oratoire (1619-1695)," *Revue néoscolastique de Philosophie* 40 (1937): 242–266; and especially Domenico Bosco, "Rigorismo e perfezione appuntio sull'etica di Louis Thomassin," *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica* 80 (1988), 22–62.

[12] Louis Thomassin, *La méthode d'étudier et d'enseigner chrétiennement les lettres humaines* (Paris, 1681), 365–66 and 410–411.

[13] See also Paul Beurrier, *La perpétuité de la foy et de la religion chrétienne* (Paris, 1680), 394, 442 and 507 where man is defined in line with 'les Anciens' as 'un animal religieux'.

[14] John Evelyn to Edward Thurland, 20 January 1656, in Douglas Chambers & David Galbraith, eds., *The Letterbooks of John Evelyn*, 2 vols. (London: University of Toronto Press, 2014), I:193.

[15] For example, Giles Firmin, *The Real Christian* (London, 1670), 190; Sir Edward Harley, *An Humble Essay towards the Settlement of Peace and Truth in the Church* (London, 1681), 9. See also Jean-Louis Quantin, *The Church of England and Christian Antiquity: The Construction of a Confessional Identity in the 17th Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 17–18, 66–68 and 312.

[16] Wilkins, *Principles*, 289; Richard Fiddes, *Theologia speculativa*, 2 vols. (London, 1718–20), I:110–111.

[17] See also Cicero, *Tusc.* I. 60. See, for example, Richard Saunders, *Saunders Physiognomie*, second edition (London, 1671), 4; Walter Charleton, *Exercitationes pathologicae* (London, 1661), 1; James Wolveridge, *Speculum matricis hybernicum* (London, 1670), a3^{v}

[18] Jean Calvin, *Institutes*, I.iii.3.

[19] Jacobus Arminius, *The Works of James Arminius*, 3 vols., edited by James Nicols (London, 1825), I:374.

[20] Micheletti, *Animal capax religionis*, 51.

[21] Sarah Mortimer, *Reason and Revolution in the English Revolution: The Challenge of Socinianism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 2–3, 13–34.

[22] Edward, Lord Herbert of Cherbury, *De veritate* (London, 1633), 174–175; trans. M. H. Carré (Bristol: J. W. Arrowsmith, 1937), 293–296. On Herbert's significance see R. W. Serjeantson, "Herbert of Cherbury before Deism: The Early Reception of the *De veritate*," *The Seventeenth Century*, 16 (2001), 217–238.

[23] Tommaso Campanella, *Atheismus triumphatus* (Rome, 1631), 67.

[24] James Deotis Roberts, *From Puritanism to Platonism in Seventeenth Century England* (The Hague: Marinus Nijhoff, 1968), esp. 13–16; Micheletti, *Animal capax religionis*, 55–57.

[25] Benjamin Whichcote, *Theophorymena Dogmata: or, Some Select Notions of that Learned and Reverend Divine* (London, 1685), 85–86. For an account of Whichcote's non-Platonist scholastic naturalism see Jon Parkin, *Science, Religion and Politics in Restoration England* (Woodbridge: Royal Historical Society, 1999), 75–80.

[26] Whichcote, *Select Notions*, 96, 88, 85.

[27] Whichcote, *Select Notions*, 92, 99.

[28] Cf. Roberts, *Puritanism to Platonism*, 66, 83.

[29] Micheletti, *Animal capax religionis*, 55–56; ibid., *I Platonici de Cambridge*, 72–73; Frederick C. Beiser, *The Sovereignty of Reason: The Defense of Rationality in the Early English Enlightenment* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 159–165.

[30] I hope the reader will excuse the following lengthy untranslated Latin quotations, but they indicate that the specific wording of *animal religiosum* and *animal capax religionis* were not present in the commonly cited sources. The two most alluded to passages from Ch. 7 of Lactatnius, *De ira dei*, were: "solus enim sapetientia instructus est, ut religionem solus intelligat; et haec est hominis atque mutorum, vel praecipua, vel sola distantia" and "apparet solam esse religionem, cujus in mutis nec vestigium aliquod, nec ulla suspicion inveniri potest". That from Book III Chapter 10 of Lactantius's *Divinarum institutionum* ran "summum igitur hominis bonum in sola religione est; name caetera, etiam quae putantur esse homini propria, in caeteris quoque animalibus reperiuntur". The key passage from Book 1 Section 8 of Cicero's *De legibus* ran: "Itaque ex tot generibus nullum est animal praeter hominem, quod habeat notitiam aliquam dei".

[31] Lactantius, *Divine institutes*, Book 2 Ch. 1. See, similarly, ibid., *De ira dei*, Ch. 14 and *De opifico dei*, Ch. 8.

[32] Whichcote, *Select Notions*, Title-page.

[33] Benjamin Whichcote, *Select Sermons of Dr. Whichcot*, edited by Anthony Ashley Cooper (London, 1698), a[r]; Benjamin Whichcote, *Moral and Religious Aphorisms*, edited by Samuel Salter (London, 1753), xi–xii. See also Roberts's similar assessment in *Puritanism to Platonism*, 273–274.

[34] Whichcote, *Aphorisms*, Nos. 457, 291, 381, 791, 983, 211, 554, 147, 855, 854, 845, 1004.

[35] Benjamin Whichcote, *Select Sermons* (London, 1698), 59–60.

[36] On Smith see Mario Micheletti, *Il Pensiero Religioso di John Smith, Platonico di Cambridge* (Padova, 1976); Jacqueline Lagrée, "John Smith et le Portique," in G. A. J. Rogers, J. M. Vienne and Y. C. Zarka, eds., *The Cambridge Platonists in Philosophical Context* (London: Kluwer Academic, 1997), 79–92.

[37] On this discourse see Micheletti, *John Smith*, 288–313.

[38] Porphyry, *Isagoge*, Ch. 7.

[39] Isaac Barrow, *Theological Works*, 9 vols., (Cambridge, 1859), V:229.

[40] Edward Fowler, *Reflections upon the Late Examination of the Discourse of the Descent of the Man-Christ Jesus from Heaven* (London, 1706), 26; Hezekiah Burton, *Several discourses* (London, 1684), 41–42. See also Sir Edward Harley, *An Humble Essay toward the Settlement of Peace and Truth in the Church* (London, 1681), 9.

[41] Smith, *Select Discourses*, 377.

[42] Smith, *Select Discourses*, 388–389. See also Micheletti, *John Smith*, 293; Micheletti, *Animal capax religionis*, 57; Lagrée, "John Smith," 83–84.

[43] Smith, *Select Discourses*, 388. See also Micheletti, *Animal capax religionis*, 42–45.

[44] Smith, *Select Discourses*, 389.

[45] Micheletti, *John Smith*, 310; Lagrée, "John Smith," 86–89.

[46] George Rust, *A Discourse of the Use of Reason in Matters of Religion*, edited by Henry Hallywell (London, 1683), 38.

[47] Rivers, *Reason, Grace, and Sentiment*, I:63–66, 77–87; Beiser, *Sovereignty of Reason*, 136–37.

[48] Cf. Micheletti, *Animal capax religionis*.

[49] John Pordage, *Theologia Mystica* (London, 1683), 103–104. Pordage was removed from his living because of his practice of purportedly communicating with spirits: see Bodleian Library, Oxford, MS Cherry 22 Henry Dodwell to Francis Lee 23 August 1698, fols. 59–61.

[50] Pierce, *Decad of Caveats*, 2–3. See also Matthew Scrivener, *A Course of Divinity* (London, 1674), 1–3.

[51] Edward Leigh, *A Treatise of Religion* (London, 1656), 1.

[52] James Ussher, *A Body of Divinity* (London, 1645), 3.

[53] John Arrowsmith, *Armilla Catechetica* (Cambridge, 1659), 73.

[54] Arrowsmith, *Armilla Catechetica*, 74.

[55] Baxter, *True and Only Way of Concord*, 270.

[56] Charnock, *Discourses*, I:30.

[57] John Howe, *The Living Temple*, 2 vols. (1702), I:27.

[58] Howe, *Living Temple*, I:28–29.

[59] These distinctions might not necessarily map neatly onto Anglican and nonconformist. For an argument defending the existence of a healthy reformed tradition within the Church of England between 1660 and 1714 see Stephen Hampton, *Anti-Arminians: The Anglican Reformed Tradition from Charles II to George I* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), esp. 1–38.

[60] Robert Fleming, *Confirmation of Religion* (London, 1693), 18; Alexander Ross, *Pansebeia: A View of All the Religions*, second edition (London, 1655), A7^{v}; Robert Leighton,

Prælectiones Theologicæ, in Auditorio publico Academiæ Edinburgenæ, edited by J. Fall (London, 1693), 42–43; George Royse, *A Sermon Preach'd before the King and Queen at White-Hall, on the 28th of December, 1690* (London, 1690), 10; John Cockburn, *Jacob's View, or, Man's Felicity and Duty in Two Parts* (London, 1696), 168.

[61] Stephen Charnock, *Discourses upon the Existence and Attributes of God*, 2 vols., edited by William Symington (New York, [1682] 1856), I:30; John Howard, *The Evil of Our Dayes* (London, 1698), 17–18; Thomas Pierce, *A Decad of Caveats to the People of England of General Use in All Times* (London, 1679), 3; Anon., *The Counter-Plot, or, The Close Conspiracy of Atheism and Schism Opened and so Defeated* (London, 1680), 6.

[62] W. Wilson, *A Sermon Preached before the Judge as the Assizes held at Nottingham* (London, 1689), 7–8. See also Samuel Crossman, *The Young Mans Monitor* (1664), 91; Anon., *A Letter of Advice to a Gentlemen of the Church of Rome* (Dublin, 1709), 9.

[63] Mark Hildesley, *Religio Jurisprudentis* (London, 1685), 22. See also 57.

[64] Simon Patrick, *A Discourse concerning Prayer* (London, 1693), 138; Richard Baxter, *The True and Only Way of Concord of All the Christian Churches* (London, 1680), 270; James Harrington, *The Oceana of James Harrington and His Other Works*, edited by John Toland (London, 1700), 500.

[65] Cf. Micheletti, *Animal capax religionis*, 38–39.

[66] M. S., *A Philosophical Discourse of the Nature of Rational and Irrational Souls* (London, 1695), 34.

[67] *The Athenian Mercury*, No. 18, Saturday 11 February 1693.

[68] John Wilkins, *A Sermon Preached Before the King upon the Twenty Seventh of February, 1669/70* (London, 1670), 18.

[69] John Wilkins, *Of the Principles and Duties of Natural Religion*, edited by John Tillotson (London, 1675).

[70] Rivers, *Reason and Sentiment*, I:44.

[71] Wilkins, *Sermon*, 14–15; ibid., *Principles*, 288.

[72] Wilkins, *Principles*, 292; ibid., *Sermon*, 18–19.

[73] Wilkins, *Principles*, 1.

[74] See Rust, *Discourse*, 15. On Hallywell see Marilyn A. Lewis, "Pastoral Platonism in the Writings of Henry Hallywell (1641–1703)," *The Seventeenth Century* 28 (2013), 441–463.

[75] Alan Cromartie, *Sir Matthew Hale, 1609–1676: Law, Religion and Natural Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1995), 139–192.

[76] Shapiro, *John Wilkins*, 176.

[77] Sir Matthew Hale, *The Primitive Origination of Mankind* (London, 1677), 16, 63.

[78] Sir Matthew Hale, 'A Discourse of Religion' (c. 1670s), *The Works, Moral and Religious, of Sir Matthew Hale*, 2 vols., edited by Thomas Thirwall (London, 1805), I:288.

[79] Hale, *Primitive Origination*, 63.

[80] Hale, *Primitive Origination*, 363. Sir Matthew Hale, *Contemplations Moral and Divine* (London, 1676), 17.

[81] Hale, *Primitive Origination*, 365.

[82] Richard Baxter, *Richard Baxter's Dying Thoughts upon Phil. I. 23* (London, 1683), 38. See also Henry Laton, *A Search after Souls and Spiritual Operations in Man* (London, 1700), 41.

[83] Baxter, *Dying Thoughts*, 14.

[84] Baxter, *Dying Thoughts*, 2.

[85] Baxter, *Dying Thoughts*, 4.

[86] Baxter, *Dying Thoughts*, 20, 37–38.

[87] On Cureau see especially Michael Edwards "Cureau de la Chambre and Pierre Chanet on Time and the Passions of the Soul," *History of European Ideas* 38 (2012): 200–217; Simone Guidi, 'L'angelo e la bestia. Metafisica dell'istinto, tra Pierre Chanet e Marin Cureau

de La Chambre', *Lo Sguardo*, XVIII (2015): 233–258; and Markus Wild, "Marin Cureau de la Chambre on the natural cognition of the vegetative soul: an early modern theory of instinct," *Vivarium* 46 (2008): 443–461.

[88] C. F. Fowler, *Descartes on the Human Soul: Philosophy and the Demands of Christian Doctrine* (London: Kluwer Academic, 1999), 114–160; Lloyd Strickland, "God's Creatures? Divine Nature and the Status of Animals in the Early Modern Beast-Machine Controversy," *International Journal of Philosophy and Theology* 6 (2013): 1–19; Katherine Morris, "*Bêtes-machines*" In *Descartes' Natural Philosophy*, edited by Stephen Gaukroger, John Schuster and John Sutton, 401–419; and Ann Thomson, "Animals, Humans, Machines and Thinking Matter," *Early Science and Medicine* 15 (2010): 3–37.

[89] René Descartes, *Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy,* edited by David Weissman (New Haven, NJ: Yale University Press, 1996), Part V, 36.

[90] Lambeth Palace Library MS 3499 Hale-Baxter Correspondence (undated, *ca.* 1672–73), fol. 113v.

[91] Hale, *Primitive Origination*, 16. On Patrizi see Paul Richard Blum, "Francesco Patrizi's Principles of Psychology" in ibid. and Tomáš Nejeschleba (eds), *Francesco Patrizi: Philosopher of the Renaissance* (Olomouci: Univerzita Palackého v Olomouci, 2014), 185–212; and M. Muccillo, "Il 'De humana philosophia' di Francesco Patrizi da Cherso nel Codice Barberiniano Greco 180," in *Miscellanea Bibliothecae Vaticana* (Vatican City: Biblioteca apostolica vaticana, 1990), 281–307, esp. 293–294.

[92] Montaigne, *Apology for Raymond Sebond*; Pierre Charron, *On Wisdom*, trans. Samson Lennard (London, [1601] 1608), 101–112.

[93] See the praise in Jean Balzac to Cureau de la Chambre 15 September 1645 in Jean-Louis Geuz Balzac, *Balzac's Remaines, or, His Last Letters* (London, 1658), 78–80; Pierre Bayle, *A*

General Dictionary, Historical and Critical, trans. by Thomas Birch et al, 10 vols. (London, 1734–41), VIII:762.

[94] Marin Cureau de la Chambre, *A Discourse of the Knowledg of Beasts* (London, [1648] 1658), 5.

[95] Marin Cureau de la Chambre, "Quelle est la Connoissance des Bestes," in *Les Caractères des Passions*, 2 vols., second edition (Paris, [1645], 1663), II:540.

[96] Cureau, "La Connoissance des Bestes," II:542.

[97] Edwards, "Time and the Passions," 208.

[98] Cureau, "Knowledg of Beasts," 18; ibid., "La Connoissance des Bestes," II:482–483.

[99] Cureau, "Knowledg of Beasts," 195; see also ibid., "La Connoissance des Bestes," II:474.

[100] Cureau, "Knowledg of Beasts," 208; see also ibid., "La Connoissance des Bestes," II:485–486.

[101] Cureau, "Knowledg of Beasts," 7. See also Guidi, 'L'angelo e la bestia', 247–248, 252.

[102] Hale, *Primitive Origination*, 50.

[103] Hale, *Primitive Origination*, 44. See also 48, 52.

[104] Hale, *Primitive Origination*, 48.

[105] Hale, *Primitive Origination*, 50.

[106] Hale, *Primitive Origination*, 51.

[107] Hale, *Primitive Origination*, 52. See also 55.

[108] Hale, *Primitive Origination*, 56. Hale gave an example from Cureau's *Traité* about the sort of artificial logic the Frenchman said a horse would be capable of: "this green is grass / this grass is good to eat / therefore this green is good to eat."

[109] Hale, *Primitive Origination*, 55.

[110] Hale, *Primitive Origination*, 61.

[111] E.g. Richard Baxter, *The Reasons of the Christian Religion* (London, 1667), 523; ibid., *More Reasons for the Christian Religion* (London, 1672), 68; ibid., *Dying Thoughts*, 19–20.

[112] Baxter, *More Reasons*, 68.

[113] Baxter, *Dying Thoughts*, 38.

[114] Sir Richard Blackmore, *An essay upon the immortality of the soul* (Dublin, 1716), 39; Edward Weston, *The Englishman directed in the choice of his religion* (London, 1729), 9; Lawrence Jackson, *An examination of a book intitled The true gospel of Jesus Christ asserted…* (London, 1739), 216; [Philalethes], *A Philosophical Dissertation upon the Inlets to Human Knowlage* (Dublin, 1740), 61. See also Cotton Mather, *Reasonable Religion: or, the Truths of the Christian Religion Demonstrated* (London, 1713), 2.

[115] For example, [Joseph Addison], *The Spectator* (London), No. 201 20 October 1711; *The Weekly Miscellany* No. 6., 20 January 1733, repeated in *The Gentleman's Magazine* January 1733. See also *The British Apollo*, vol. 3 (London, 1726) III:1029–1029 (pagination error means p. 1029 is repeated).

[116] James G. Buickerood, "The Natural History of the Understanding: Locke and the Rise of Facultative Logic in the Eighteenth Century," *History and Philosophy of Logic* 6 (1985): 157–190.

[117] The number of usages is considerably lower than that identifiable in the seventeenth century. Hence the vast majority of usages of 'animal rationale' and its variants, identifiable when searching one relevant database, Eighteenth-Century Collections Online, are found in reproductions of Locke's critique, earlier logic textbooks, Alexander Pope and Jonathan Swift's exchange over Book IV of *Gulliver's Travels*, satirical usage in plays, and a miscellany of unimportant works.

[118] The key work on the extent of religious innatism remains John Yolton, *John Locke and the Way of Ideas* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956), though the picture needs updating.

[119] On this topic see, most enjoyably, S. J. Barnett, *The Enlightenment and Religion: The Myths of Modernity* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003).

[120] Frank E. Manuel, *The Eighteenth Century Confronts the Gods* (London: Harvard University Press, 1959), 60.

[121] See James O'Higgins, *Anthony Collins: The Man and His Works* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), 51–68.

[122] Collins, *An Essay concerning the Use of Reason* (1707), 12.

[123] On this see Homyar Pahlan, "The Reception of John Locke's Religious and Political Thought, 1690–1710," PhD Thesis, University of Cambridge (2009).