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Vulnerability • Anat Pick

Santa Cruz Biotechnology, dubbed, “the Walmart of biotech,” is one of the largest purveyors of antibodies in the U.S. biotech market. Until 2013, the company held tens of thousands of animals, including goats, rabbits, rats, mice and birds for the in vivo “harvesting” of antibodies. To produce antibodies, animals are injected with antigens that trigger the immune system. The animals’ blood is then drawn, and the antibodies isolated and sold to researchers.[1] In addition to the large-scale confinement and harming of animals, the operation relies on animals’ natural resistance as a source of profit. Animals are thus at once vulnerable and resistant, a fact that shapes the violent mechanism used against them.

Like all living beings, animals are temporal and finite: they are born, they live, and they die. This fact is mundane. In their peculiar relations to human beings, however—as agricultural, medical, symbolic and emotional fodder—animals are uniquely vulnerable. This, as the example of Santa Cruz Biotechnology shows, is a mundane if highly lucrative fact.

The reality of animals’ lives and deaths concerns the duality of vulnerability as the condition of fragility and finitude shared by everything that lives, and as susceptibility and exposure to orchestrated violence that impacts on some lives more than others. In other words, vulnerability is universal but unequally distributed. This duality is not easily parsed. The tension inherent in the concept of vulnerability as something shared yet disproportionately endured animates the field of animal studies. To speak of the vulnerability of animals is not, then, to resort to convenient jargon. Animal vulnerability asks us to confront the host of phenomena, ideas, and sensations that define our living alongside animals, yet separately from them, in the midst of so great a violence that it has no clear beginning and end.

As universal and shared, vulnerability blurs species distinctions since humans and nonhumans alike are subject to natural law, to injury and death. As purposeful and targeted, vulnerability singles out animals as vulnerable outliers at the mercy of mechanisms that serve and stimulate human desires and needs. Industrialized farming and medical research, for example, painstakingly refine specific physical and mental attributes in animals that render them more pliable and profitable commodities. If vulnerability connects humans and animals via our shared corporeality, it also sets animals apart from most humans most of the time in the scale and reach of the infliction of harm. This makes vulnerability an urgent critical site in which questions of cross-species ontology, ethics, and, policy intersect.

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[1] Santa Cruz Biotechnology has a checkered history of grave violations of the federal Animal Welfare Act. Currently before the California Court of Appeal is a lawsuit brought by The Animal Legal Defense Fund for violations of the California Cruelty Code. See Cat Ferguson’s “Valuable Antibodies at a High Cost,” *The New Yorker* February 12, 2014, http://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/valuable-antibodies-at-a-high-cost, accessed December 4 2016, and “Animal Advocates Appeal Case Against Santa Cruz Biotechnology, http://aldf.org/press-room/press-releases/animal-advocates-appeal-case-against-santa-cruz-biotechnology-2/, accessed 4 December 2016.

The aim of this essay is twofold: to define and contextualize vulnerability and to explore the ramifications, and tensions, of vulnerability as a focal point of pro-animal thought. I begin by pointing out the explicit and implicit place of vulnerability in theories of animal liberation and in recent ethical philosophy that does not pertain directly to animals. My argument is, first, that despite their proximity, vulnerability and ethics are, in a sense, incompatible. The two are what Lissa McCullllough calls "correlative oppositions" (McCullllough 2014, 15). For not only does the state of being vulnerable *not* call forth any given ethical response, it may incite, indeed entrench, a recoiling from, even retaliation against the weak. Nevertheless, it is precisely this strange twinning, the correlation of opposites of vulnerability and violence that illuminates the lived intricacies of our dealings with other creatures. To think of vulnerability as a complicated site allows for a clearer understanding of the dynamics of power that brutalize animals. I will therefore insist throughout on the inextricability of vulnerability and violence, a connection that is reluctantly pondered by theorists and activists because it is too painful, seemingly hopeless, or inordinately dark.

Emerging in the past two decades in fields as diverse as human rights, bioethics, philosophy and the social sciences, the discourse of vulnerability encompasses two main ideas: the state of exposure to injury and risk, and the understanding that in being exposed, individuals are mutually dependent. My discussion is restricted to those strands of theory and philosophy that have been most influential for animal studies, in particular those areas of inquiry that at the turn of the twenty-first century underwent a so-called "ethical turn," inspired by the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas in response to the modern perpetration of mass violence.

Vulnerability and Animal Ethics

It is possible to trace the notion of vulnerability across the field of pro-animal theory. In his *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (1780-1823), Jeremy Bentham, philosopher, social reformer, and the founder of utilitarianism, declared pleasure and pain (not right and wrong) to be the guiding moral principles. In his oft cited passage on animals Bentham argued that feeling pain and the ability to suffer, not cognitive or discursive abilities, make animals morally significant. Following Bentham, Peter Singer argues in the utilitarian tradition that the morality of an action is determined by the balance of suffering and pleasure produced by the action, regardless of the species experiencing the pain or pleasure. But vulnerability is not reducible to the capacity to feel pain. Its remit is far wider.

For Jacques Derrida, Bentham's question marks a significant break in moral thinking: "'Can they suffer?' asks Bentham simply yet so profoundly…. the form of this question changes everything" (Derrida 2002, 396). The question, Derrida says, is "disturbed by a certain *passivity*."

> It bears witness, manifesting already, as question, the response that testifies to a sufferance, a passion, a not-being-able…. "Can they suffer?" amounts to asking "can they *not be able*?" And what of this inability [*impouvoir*]? What of the vulnerability felt on the basis of this inability? What is this nonpower at the heart of power? (396)

Susceptibility to suffering "changes everything" insofar as it does not provide new answers to old questions. The neural or mental fact of sentience is hardly the point. Vulnerability shifts the terms of the debate: it disrupts the familiar logic that grants animals moral consideration in accordance with certain innate capacities (to speak, to reason, even to suffer). In place of capacity, ability, capability—euphemisms of power—Bentham's question introduces the notion of powerlessness, what Derrida enigmatically calls "nonpower." Vulnerability as nonpower is not the absence of force, but its suspension. In the apparent paradox of a power-without-power lies the true radicalism of an ethics of vulnerability.

Attention to vulnerability is also central to feminist care ethics and ecofeminist thought. Care ethicists and ecofeminists like Josephine Donovan, Carol J. Adams, Val Plumwood, and Marti Kheel avoid analytical quarrels "over what should constitute the basis of an appropriate ethics for the natural world" (Kheel 1993, 243). In place of general moral principles, these feminists propose a relational approach to ethics as "a natural outgrowth of how one views the self, including one's relation to the rest of the world" (244). Not all animals are vulnerable in the same way all the time, and different cases require different responses, decisions taken from the ground up, as it were.

In the tradition of care ethics, Lori Gruen's approach is rooted not in abstract principles (the calculation of suffering or weighing of interests) but in the specificities of context and the cultivation of "caring perception," which Gruen calls "entangled empathy" (Gruen 2015, 28). Here, the perception of vulnerability is part of one's "moral experience" rather than an ethical rule that applies across the board of different situations. "Empathetic attunement or perception is directed toward the wellbeing of another" (45) in a particular situation and context. Empathy acknowledges the dependence and fragility of others, and by extension, our own.

If entangled empathy is the concrete response to another's vulnerability, how far could, or should, it be stretched? And what of the relation between vulnerability and violence? Might intimately linking vulnerability and violence itself betray a patriarchal worldview that overemphasizes aggression and domination and ignores the realities of empathy and cooperation?

Precarious Creatureliness

"To be a created thing," writes the philosopher and mystic Simone Weil, "is not necessarily to be afflicted, but it is necessarily to be exposed to affliction" (Weil 1998, 66). Creatureliness is an iteration of vulnerability as "a mark of existence" (Weil 2004, 108). Weil's work is devoted to the elucidation of vulnerability as a state of creaturely exposure and a gauge of reality. When someone is utterly vulnerable, they are stripped of the privileges of species and social rank. Although such stripping is often the result of injustice, it invariably reveals the contingency of species identity (as well as the identities of race, gender, and class).

Creaturely vulnerability opens up zones of "indistinction" (Calarco 2015), where species identities blur and where different beings, or creatures, are perceived as corporeal and vulnerable. More radically still, creaturely vulnerability, as I understand it, calls for the *contraction* of humanity rather than its benevolent extension to nonhumans. Creatureliness—the state of being exposed to natural necessity and the ravages of power—does not call for the alleviation of vulnerability via gestures of "humanization," but for more profound forms of "dehumanization."[2] The creaturely, then, is focused on unseating the structures of human exceptionalism (less on the generation of empathy). By imbuing materialism with a sense of reverence for everything that *is*, creatureliness encompasses all life, from animals to plants.

Creatureliness also informs the ways we think about art. In refusing the cliché of art as an expression of "the human condition," that ill-begotten, passive-aggressive idiom desperate to shore up the human as a unique ontology, creaturely vulnerability sets into motion different modes of artistic expression, and crucially, an alternative poetics and critical practice rooted in what I have described as the contraction of humanism and an exploration of affliction (Pick 2011).

No such contraction is found in Judith Butler's influential work on "precariousness," which, despite being anonymous and universal, remains the exclusive marker of human existence. For vulnerability to become such a marker is already to challenge deeply held beliefs on human prowess, and while Butler's "new corporal humanism" (Murphy 2011, 589) is neither forthright nor sure-footed, it is expansively, not contractedly, humanistic. Though she does not specifically speak about animals, Butler's telling omission can help to unsettle "the human condition" and draw attention to the mechanisms that brutally subject animal life.

All lives are vulnerable, but the loss of some lives goes umourned. Butler's *Precarious Life* (2004) and its companion piece, *Frames of War* (2009) explore the ideological apportioning of value that makes some lives matter, and others not:

> the differential allocation of grievability that decides what kind of subject is and must be grieved, and which kind of subject must not, operates to produce and maintain certain exclusionary conceptions of who is normatively human: what counts as a liveable life and a grievable death? (Butler 2004, xiv-xv)

Butler is careful to avoid appealing to universal humanity as the source of value. "The point will be to ask how such norms [of what or who is human] operate to produce certain subjects as 'recognizable' persons and to make others decidedly more difficult to recognize" (Butler 2009, 6). Recognition is an act of framing by which those in the frame assume reality as living beings, while others are edited out: "the frame tends to function... as an editorial embellishment of the image," and "implicitly guides the interpretation" of what we see (Butler 2009, 8).

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[2] The problem of violence cannot be understood solely as the result of a so-called "humanist deficit," and the remedy to violence cannot, therefore, be more humanity. For a more sustained critique of the accepted wisdom that violence depends primarily on processes of "othering" and dehumanization see my essay "Turning to Animals Between Love and Law," *New Formations* 76 (2012), pp. 68-85.

Using Butler's approach, it is clear how commonplace violence against animals remains invisible *as* violence. By framing animals as "food," for example, we can go on killing and eating them and not see such killing as violence. The editorializing that removes animals from the epistemic, legal, and emotional frameworks that would make their lives matter ensures that violence continues and animals go ungrieved. Consequently, writes James Stanescu, "[t]hose of us who value the lives of other animals,"

> live in a strange, parallel world to that of other people. Every day we are reminded of the fact that we care for the existence of beings whom other people manage to ignore, to unsee and unhear as if the only traces of the beings' lives are the parts of their bodies rendered into food: flesh transformed into meat. To tear up, or to have trouble functioning, to feel that moment of utter suffocation of being in a hall of death is something rendered completely socially unintelligible. (Stanescu 2012, 568)

Vulnerability, then, does much more than argue for animal rights or the reduction of suffering. It brings another world into view in which animal are not food. As the frame shifts and perception transforms, different moral arguments are possible.

Though Butler herself stops short of claiming that animal life, too, is grievable (Butler 2009, 16), her work on precariousness and framing is central to the formulation of an inclusive ethics of vulnerability.[3] Butler's residual anthropocentrism aside, I want to reflect on her difficult pairing of vulnerability and violence.

As a counter to acts of exclusionary framing that make some lives (white, male, human) matter, Butler offers an ethics of precariousness inspired by Emmanuel Levinas. For Levinas, the other person, in its very fragility, calls the self into being. In the sway of responsiveness to someone else, subjectivity forms. In this way, Levinas argues, the other precedes the self, and *ethics*—the primordial encounter with another—precedes *ontology* (my existence as an autonomous subject). Neither Levinas nor Butler envisages the self-other encounter as naturally harmonious. On the contrary, the threat of violence hangs over the encounter with alterity. Vulnerability is central to the encounter with the other, which, though wordless, Levinas subtitles with the words: "Thou shalt not kill." To encounter another is to come into being via the threat of violence and the possibility of care. Like talk of "inalienable rights," the prohibition on killing would be unnecessary if at the outset life were not already exposed to violence (and rights were precisely alienable). And so, for Levinas and Butler, vulnerability and violence are copresent.

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[3] On Butler's anthropocentrism, see Chloe Taylor's "The Precarious Lives of Animals: Butler, Coetzee, and Animal Ethics" *Philosophy Today* 52.1 (2008), pp. 60-72, and Anat Pick's "Animal Rights Documentaries, Organized Violence, and the Politics of Sight," *The Routledge Companion to Cinema and Politics.* Yannis Tzioumakis and Claire Molloy, eds. New York: Routledge, 2016, pp. 91-102. Stanescu offers a more favorable assessment of Butler's contribution to animal ethics.

In *Precarious Life*, Butler spends some time on this problem. Why should the other's vulnerability "prompt in anyone a lust for violence?" (Butler 2004, 136). Various explanations come to mind (self-preservation; fear of the other), but Butler concedes that Levinas "presumes that the desire to kill is primary in human beings" (137). In this view, vulnerability functions as a *provocation* and an *invitation*, and the relation between vulnerability and violence is tautological: for where else would violence turn if not toward vulnerability? This, it seems, is something that the political Left (and some in the animal movement), forever aghast at the crushing of the weak, has yet to fully grasp. Vulnerability offers violence the path of least resistance. To imagine the flow of violence in the other direction, toward power, is to imagine politics under the conditions of zero gravity.

Animals are the clearest case of the doubling of vulnerability and violence. A nonviolent ethics of vulnerability that recognizes and grieves not just human but *all* life is one that recognizes the threat of violence wherever vulnerable life presents itself.

Horrorism and Violence

The philosopher Adriana Cavarero coined the neologism "horrorism" to name forms of contemporary political violence that she perceives as new: "a certain model of horror," she writes, "is indispensible for understanding our present" (Cavarero 2009, 29).[4] Twentieth and twenty-first century political violence targets the most vulnerable, mainly unarmed civilians, whose destruction is not merely physical but ontological: an uprooting of the victims' very humanity.

"If we observe the scene of massacre from the point of view of the helpless victims rather than that of the warriors... the picture changes.... More than terror, what stands out is horror" (1). While terror is dynamic, prompting a flight for survival, horror is passive and petrifying, like the look of the mythical Medusa. Here, again, vulnerability and violence are strangely entwined: "[i]rremediably open to wounding and caring, the vulnerable one exists totally in the tension generated by this alterative" (30). Wherever there is need for care, there is already the potential for violence. The vulnerable body is the site of this tension.

Vulnerability is an optic that conveys violence from the point of view of the victim:

> Today it is particularly senseless that the meaning of war and its horror… should still be entrusted to the perspective of the warrior.... The civilian victims, of whom the numbers of dead have soared from the Second World War on, do not share the desire to kill, much less the desire to get killed. (65)

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[4] Cavarero's *Horrorism* and Butler's work on precarity and war can be compared to Steven Pinker's *The Better Angels of Our Nature: A History of Humanity and Violence* (2012). All are attempts to come to terms with forms of contemporary violence in an era that seems, superficially at least, particularly volatile. In a section entitled "Animal Rights and the Decline of Cruelty to Animals" Pinker marshals familiar arguments against animal liberation and in favor of vague notions of animal welfare to support his thesis of modernity's gradual reduction of violence (548-572). Although they differ markedly in their assessment of contemporary violence, Cavarero, Butler, and Pinker are also invested in narratives of violence as a gateway to the human condition.

Although Cavarero does not see animals as particularly vulnerable ("a child is the vulnerable being par excellence" [30]), horrorism aptly captures the ferocity and unilateralism of violence against animals as well as the ambivalence of killing and care.

Yet to what extent does horrorism reveal something new about contemporary violence, especially once animals are brought into the mix? While horrorism offers a way of dealing not only with mass violence but with responses to it (Stanescu's grocery store scenario is one example), other terms do similar work. Weil's "affliction" describes states of profound vulnerability and violation. Like horrorism, the destruction wreaked in affliction is total: the afflicted person is not only physically damaged, but "loses half his soul" (Weil 1998, 41). For Cavarero, terrorism and war fail to properly address the nature of contemporary violence. While, in the case of human victims, a military focus risks obscuring the significance of violations incurred by civilians, in the case of animals, whose victimhood is profound but remains largely invisible, the frame of war has the opposite effect of brining violations into view. Derrida and J. M. Coezteee, among others, have described violence against animals as a war. But in *The War Against Animals* (2015), Dinesh Wadiwel provides a comprehensive exploration of the ramifications of animal vulnerability, intelligible precisely as war (See also Chapter 5).

Vulnerability and Resistance

In Elizabeth Bishop's frequently anthologized "The Fish," vulnerability arises in a state of conflict, and designates both violence and resistance. This tough-minded, deeply moving poem about a fish caught, observed, then returned to the water, pays close attention to bodily detail, its ethical coda a startling response to the facticity, or reality, of the titular fish.

As the speaker pulls out the "tremendous fish" and holds it "beside the boat half out of water, with my hook fast in the corner of his mouth," she takes her time, sadistically we might say, to peruse the physical minutia of the dying animal. There are the "the frightening gills, fresh and crisp with blood," breathing in "the terrible oxygen." Though initially the fish "didn't fight. He hadn't fought at all," later the speaker notices the marks of past struggles:

> I admired his sullen face,
> the mechanism of his jaw,
> and then I saw
> that from his lower lip
> - if you could call it a lip
> grim, wet, and weaponlike,
> hung five old pieces of fish-line,
> or four and a wire leader
> with the swivel still attached,
> with all their five big hooks
> grown firmly in his mouth.
> A green line, frayed at the end

> where he broke it, two heavier lines,
> and a fine black thread
> still crimped from the strain and snap
> when it broke and he got away.
> Like medals with their ribbons
> frayed and wavering,
> a five-haired beard of wisdom
> trailing from his aching jaw.

Breaking the fishing line must have been excruciating, but the poem makes scant mention of suffering. Instead, what matters is the constellation of forces: the apparatus of fishing, the "battered" body of the fish, and the speaker-fisherwoman. Fish vulnerability and resistance go hand in hand. Although at certain moments the fish is personalized ("his sullen face") the bulk of the poem is descriptive, and the situation that of war: the old fish lines are "weaponlike," worn as military decorations. The fish's past triumphs make his capture even more exhilarating: "victory filled up the little rented boat… until everything was rainbow, rainbow, rainbow!"

Vulnerability in this case is not a prompt for humane treatment due to fish sentience. Instead, the activity of fishing itself confirms animal resistance. As Wadiwel points out, "[i]t is precisely because fish resist… that recreational fishing becomes a 'sport'; since the supposed pleasure and art of these fishing practices relies upon the capture of an animal who eludes the recreational fisher, and will struggle against the line when hooked" (Wadiwel 2016, 208).

The time that Bishop's detailed descriptions require (in the real time of fishing and reading) makes the poem a ticking clock. By its end, we, too, are out of breath. The closing line—"And I let the fish go"— directly follows the speaker's celebration of victory in the battle of fishing, and is a visceral relief. If it is possible to speak of empathy here, it's of the respiratory kind. The poem's surgical precision is the source of its ethical charge. When imagining the inside of the fish, "shiny entrails, and the pink swim-bladder like a big peony," we are still on the outside, at the level of vulnerable but resilient flesh. The fish is let go. The poem ends. But compassion, too, is a winner's whim.

The most intriguing, and important, animal artworks are those, like Bishop's poem, that capture something of the collision between human might and animal life, an encounter in which human dominance exercises its prerogative semi-automatically yet at the same time stands to discover, in the midst of power, its own contingency and automation, its own afflicted animality.

J. M. Coeztee's *The Lives of Animals* (1999) is a foundational text on vulnerability and affliction. In it, the elderly writer Elizabeth Costello grapples with the horrors of the reality of animals' lives and deaths. Costello does not lay out a systematic argument about the rights of animals. Instead, she invokes animals' aliveness, pitilessly extinguished on farms and biomedical facilities. Costello does not believe that violence is primarily a philosophical matter. "Philosophy can… no longer be seen as a mastery, as a kind of clutching or grasping via analytical categories and concepts" (Wolfe 2008, 8). But Costello seems on shaky ground. Her comparison between factory farming and the Nazi death camps meets with derision. Her belief in poetry's capacity for "sympathetic imagination" (reminiscent of Gruen's entangled empathy) is thought to lack analytical rigor.

Part of what is dramatized in *The Lives of Animals* is the vulnerability of Costello's stance on animal ethics: the somewhat vague appeal to animals' lives over rights, the absence of clear concepts in support of animal protection, and Costello's own inconsistencies (a vegetarian with leather shoes). As a text, *The Lives of Animals* is also vulnerable. Delivered as lectures by the real Coetzee at Princeton University, then published as a novella about lectures given by the fictional Costello at the made up Appleton College, we are never sure whether the views expressed in the piece are Costello's or those of the author.

Interpretive instability, the questioning of authority and mastery, and the anti-Platonic preference for poetic modes of address over philosophical argument is all cleverly metafictional, of course, but it is much more than that. For Cora Diamond, writing in *Philosophy and Animal Life*, the novella is concerned with the state of "a profound disturbance of soul" (Diamond 2008, 54). This is the real theme of the piece and it takes precedence over the question of the moral status of animals, and how we should treat them.

Costello is a wounded creature. "What wounds this woman, what haunts her mind, is what we do to animals. This, in all its horror, is there, in our world. How is it possible to live in the face of it? And in the face of the fact that, for nearly everyone, it is as nothing, as the mere accepted background of life?" (47). This woundedness is also the weakens of Coetzee's text. But the privation is really the heart of the work and a demonstration of the creative force of vulnerability.

In arguing from a place of vulnerability, and in making a vulnerable argument *The Lives of Animals* avoids what Diamond calls "deflection": philosophy's fortifications against potentially unbearable realities. Deflection is "what happens when we are moved from the appreciation, or attempt at appreciation, of a difficulty of reality to a philosophical or moral problem apparently in the vicinity" (57). In the translation from concrete difficulty to abstract problem thought does not merely shield us from pain, but contributes to the sense of impregnability that has a hand in the creation of difficulty in the first place. Formulating a strong argument for a general case is satisfying (and elegant). But abstractions can harbor deflection. And where deflection lurks, we are also likely to find injustice.

For Diamond (as for Gruen, Butler, and Cavarero) the work of philosophy and the work of critique must connect to the lived experience and embodied knowledge that guard against deflection:

> The awareness we each have of being a living body, being "alive to the world," carries with it exposure to the bodily sense of vulnerability to death, sheer animal vulnerability, the vulnerability we share with them. This vulnerability is

> capable of panicking us. To be able to acknowledge it at all, let alone as shared, is wounding; but acknowledging it as shared with other animals, in the presence of what we do to them, is capable not only of panicking one but also of isolating one…. Is there any difficulty in seeing why we should not prefer to return to moral debate, in which the livingness and death of animals enters as facts that we treat as relevant in this or that way, not as presences that may unseat reason? (Diamond 2008, 74)

The Lives of Animals illustrates the meaning of vulnerability for thought as it struggles to take in reality. Coetzee's text is the incarnation of vulnerability as critical practice.

Beyond Vulnerability

I have argued that in virtually all of their dealings with humans, animals are extraordinarily (yet mundanely) vulnerable. Animals are on the receiving end of violence exercised with the fewest moral, legal, and technical restrictions. As such, animals are outliers in the operation of power, and its most commonplace case. The few controls placed on inflicting "needless suffering" on animals are little more than window dressing, and this too in order to render animal use even more total and secure.

There is a risk of becoming too attached to vulnerability as the sole prism for viewing animal life, reducing animals to the status of victims, adopting a paternalistic attitude with regard to their protection and welfare, and failing to offer workable alternatives to our current treatment of animals. To avoid these pitfalls, I have suggested that vulnerability be seen in the wider context of critiques of power, and in relation to the perpetration of violence. Vulnerability is not the absence of power but the product of relations of power. To speak of an ethics of vulnerability is to apprehend the ubiquity of power *and* imagine its suspension (as, in different ways, do Levinas, Derrida, and Weil).

But most importantly, perhaps, vulnerability is the tug of reality, an attunement to "the difficulty of staying turned… toward flesh and blood" (Diamond 2008, 77). Acknowledging vulnerability in its three manifestations—a living body, a biopolitical resource, and a critical practice—chips away at established ways of thinking and acting that continue to deny animals their place in the sun.

Suggestions for further reading

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