

Secularization versus Religious Revival in Eastern Europe: Church Institutional Resilience, State Repression and Divergent Paths

Abstract

Despite continuing for over two decades, the debate about the nature of the trends in religiosity in post-Communist Eastern Europe remains unresolved: some arguing that these countries are undergoing the same process of secularization as the West, while others insist that the entire region is experiencing a religious revival. Using national sample surveys from the early 1990s to 2007 to examine the change in demographic predictors of religiosity, we show that Catholic and Orthodox countries are experiencing different trends, the first group displaying evidence of secularization and the second of revival, and that these two different trends are likely to derive from the legacies of state repression and the differing abilities of the churches to resist such repression. We argue that the current literature has thus taken a mistakenly general approach, and that the post-Communist region consists of at least two distinct groups of societies with different trends in religiosity.

Ksenia Northmore-Ball
Nuffield College
University of Oxford

Geoffrey Evans
Nuffield College
University of Oxford

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The collapse of communism, by ending the epoch of atheist state repression, has naturally sparked a vibrant and ongoing debate on the direction religiosity has taken in Eastern Europe. Although the debate has continued for almost two decades, the question about the general direction religiosity has taken in post-Communist Eastern Europe remains unanswered: some arguing that these countries are undergoing the same process of secularization as the West (Norris and Inglehart 2004; Pickel 2009), while others insisting that the entire region is experiencing a religious revival (Greeley 1994, 2002, 2003; Tomka 2011).

The competing characterizations, secularization (Norris and Inglehart 2004) and revival (Greeley 1994, 2002, 2003; Tomka 2011; Müller and Neundorf 2012), have taken a general approach, dismissing large numbers of countries as special cases. The Russian case in particular has posed a challenge for the secularization approach. As time elapsed since the collapse of communism allowing for a longer term analysis, Russia has emerged as a clear case of religious revival with no evidence of having undergone secularization (Evans and Northmore-Ball 2012). Several other countries including Romania (Voicu and Constantin 2012) also do not fit into the secularization paradigm. In addition, the persistent religious vitality of Poland is difficult to fit into the secularization paradigm (Pickel and Sammet 2012: 8). On the other hand, countries such as the Czech Republic and traditionally Protestant East Germany do not fit with the religious revival trend (Muller 2011; Pickel and Sammet 2012). Thus the two dominant approaches had limited success in providing a unified theoretical explanation for trends in religiosity in Eastern Europe.

Our aim in this paper is to move the debate beyond this deadlock by showing that both trends are in fact present and to refocus attention on the role of history, particularly past state repression and its interaction with the institutional nature of the dominant churches, in shaping today's trends in religiosity. Furthermore we aim to move the discussion beyond the dominant secularization paradigm and the bottom up approaches to religiosity and to emphasize the importance of considering the macro-level institutional context in explaining the micro-level trends in religiosity in Eastern Europe.

In this paper we re-examine patterns in religious affiliation and church attendance across twelve Eastern European countries and over time, comparing them in the early 1990s and late 2000s. We argue that post-Communist Eastern Europe is best understood as consisting of two sets of cases, Orthodox countries and Catholic countries, each of which follow different dynamics in

religiosity owing to the different institutional natures of the two churches, and their consequent ability to resist state repression under communism. Given its powerful international structure, the Catholic Church managed to retain adherents even under communism, and consequently levels of religiosity in predominantly Catholic countries were quite high immediately following the collapse of communism and have remained steady. In countries where Orthodoxy has traditionally been dominant, the Orthodox Church was suppressed, and the collapse of communism has opened the way for Orthodox Churches to rebuild themselves and regain adherents. We also show that the effects of denomination cannot be definitively disentangled from the effects of state repression itself; with most Catholic countries being outside the Former Soviet Union, we cannot be certain about how well the Catholic Church would have resisted the worst years of Stalinist repression. Although all the Eastern European countries share the experience of communism, they do not share the same patterns in the development of religiosity in the post-Communist period, thus the micro-level approaches need to be considered within the greater framework of the institutional context particularly religious denominations and the intensity of state repression. While the revivals in Orthodox countries may be temporary and primarily consist of 'lukewarm' or 'fuzzy' religiosity that represents a stage on the path towards dominance of a secular majority (Voas 2009, Voas and Doebler 2011), we emphasize that at least in the short-term Orthodox and Catholic countries represent different trends.

Explanations for trends in religiosity in Post-Communist Eastern Europe

We start by discussing the micro-level bottom up approaches to examining religious trends (the secularization and revival paradigms). We show how these two approaches help characterize the micro-level trends as being representative of either a religious decline or revival. However these approaches are limited to helping us identify the type of 'imprint' we would expect to see as a result of an overarching decline or revival but do not extend to identifying the cause of these trends. We propose to macro-level contextual factors, the legacies of communist state repression and the institutional resilience of the Catholic and Orthodox Churches, as possible causes of the micro-level trends in religiosity.

Secularization is the process by which religion loses relevance in all spheres of life as societies modernize. As societies become more industrial, urban, wealthy and educated, the increasing dominance of scientific rationality (Swatos and Christiano 1999) and as well as greater

existential security (Norris and Inglehart 2004) discourage religiosity. In modern societies religiosity loses social relevance as religious institutions and rituals become increasingly “differentiated” from most spheres of social life (Tschannen 1991: 403). For most of the 20th century scholars have agreed that all Western European societies are undergoing secularization. While recently the secularization approach has been challenged in a few respects - most notably for Euro-centrism, using a romanticized religious past as reference point, and ignoring the effects of religious competition - secularization remains the dominant paradigm for understanding dynamics in religiosity (Swatos and Christiano 1999; Pickel 2011; but see Bruce (2011) for a defence of the theory).

Several scholars argue that post-Communist Eastern Europe is no exception to the secularization paradigm (Norris and Inglehart 2004; Need and Evans 2001, 2004; Stolz 2009; Pollack 2008; Muller 2009). In their analysis of three waves of the World Values Survey, Norris and Inglehart (2004) point to the linear decline in religiosity over birth cohorts as evidence that with each passing generation religiosity is waning in post-communist countries. As further evidence for secularization, the authors point to the negative association between overall levels of religiosity and human development (Norris and Inglehart 2004). Need and Evans (2001) also argue that the positive effects of age on religiosity indicate that these countries are undergoing secularization.

While some studies are arguing that post-Communist societies are secularizing, another set of primarily empirical studies argue that these societies are actually undergoing a religious revival (Greeley 2002, 2003; Tomka 2011; Pickel 2009). The main thrust of the revival arguments is based on empirical evidence of the persistence of religiosity despite the experience of communism in the Catholic countries of Central Europe, and signs of strengthening religiosity in eight post-socialist countries (Greeley 2003; Tomka 2011). Orthodox countries, particularly Russia, are noted as experiencing strong religious revivals (Greeley 2002, 2003; Evans and Northmore-Ball 2012). Critics of the revival argument, however, point to the ‘little grounding in sociological theory’ while acknowledging the theoretical value of links that revivalists make between national identity and religiosity (Pickel and Sammet 2012).

The two stylized macro-level trends of revival and secularization can be identified and distinguished by the ‘imprint’ of the overarching processes (whatever their causes may be) on the micro-level patterns of religiosity (Evans and Northmore-Ball 2012). An overarching process of

secularization will be characterized by sustained or even strengthening effects of socioeconomic predictors on religiosity reflecting continued strong appeal of religious to economic insecure and vulnerable populations such as the uneducated, the poor, the old and those in low status occupations and the converse lack of appeal of the young, economic secure professionals and high income individuals. According to the secularization paradigm, economic downturns may trigger may brief religious resurgence, but as long as the secularization process is still the dominant process, we would expect new religious adherents to mainly come from economically vulnerable social groups, because in difficult economic conditions, the economically insecure will seek support from religious institutions (Norris and Inglehart 2004; Immerzeel and Van Tubergen 2011). At such times, we would expect to see a temporary uptick in overall levels in religiosity and an increase in the predictive power of socioeconomic factors on religiosity.

On the other hand a true religious revival would involve a strengthening of religiosity among all social groups even the economically secure. The process of religious revival would therefore be reflected in a weakening of demographic predictors of religiosity (. For example a young wealthy professional such as a lawyer or banker would be as likely to be espouse a religious affiliation and attend church as a vulnerable poor pensioner. A case in point would be the growing appeal of Orthodoxy to the professional urban classes in Russia as well as the numerous instances of wealthy Russian oligarchs and their families funding new churches and monasteries (Garrard and Garrard 2008; Evans and Northmore-Ball 2012). In the presence of a powerful and genuine religious revival we may even see a complete absence of social differentiation in religiosity as all social groups become equally religious. In the first half of the analysis in this paper, we examine the presence of the larger processes by looking the ‘imprints’ of these process in the trends in the micro-level predictors of religiosity.

Proponents of both the secularization and revival arguments note cross-national variation that does not fit with either over-arching approach, but neither argument can explain the variation in a systematic manner; a large number of countries are dismissed as exceptions. In depth country case studies which reveal the varied dynamics further highlight the challenge of arriving at a general explanation for the trends in religiosity in post-communist countries. Individual country cases show instances of both revival and secularization. Close examinations of two Orthodox countries, Romania and Russia, show clear evidence of revival rather than secularization. In Romania, the gap in religiosity between generations has narrowed since the early 1990s as young

Romanians join the Orthodox Church (Voicu and Constantin 2012). Likewise Russia defies the secularization trends as all Russians, even the young and economically secure, are identifying in ever greater numbers with the Russian Orthodox Church (Evans and Northmore-Ball 2012). Evidence in studies covering several countries suggests that the trend of revival may be more widespread across Orthodox countries. On the other hand, traditionally Protestant East Germany and the Czech Republic are clear examples of societies where religion is of little and even declining importance (Froese and Pfaff 2001, Froese 2005; Muller 2011). The absence of religious growth in these countries despite the new religious freedom following the collapse of communism present a challenge to the revivalist argument. Several note that the variation in levels of religiosity over time seems to be particularly linked to whether countries are traditionally dominantly Orthodox or Catholic (Need and Evans 2001; Sarkissian 2009; Müller and Neundorf 2012), however so far denomination differences between the Orthodox and Catholic churches have not been examined as source of the variation.

Norris and Inglehart aim to reconcile the two seemingly contradictory trends of secularization and revival by attributing the variation to levels of economic development. Although economic development appears to account for much of the purely cross-sectional variation among Eastern European countries, Norris and Inglehart's analysis does not account for the variation in longitudinal changes, as well as why relatively high levels of religiosity persisted in several Catholic countries despite the communist past as the proponents of the revivalist argument note.

In this paper, we argue that the respective institutional abilities of the Catholic and Orthodox Churches to resist state oppression may help explain why religiosity revived in Orthodox countries but remained at steady levels in Catholic countries. The strong political character of the Catholic Church and its ability to resist the communist state has been noted by several observers of the third wave of democratization. Huntington dubbed the third wave of democratization the "Catholic wave of democratization" highlighting the crucial role of the Catholic Church in bringing down authoritarian regimes (1991). Linz and Stepan go so far as to argue that a totalitarian regime is impossible in a society where the Catholic Church has a strong presence historically, because it is constant source of "latent pluralism" (Linz and Stepan 1996: 260; Pfaff and Froese 2001). The strong political role played by the Catholic Church under communism (Gautier 1998, Varga 1994) contrasts with the Orthodox Churches' largely apolitical role (Cipriani 1994). Froese and Pfaff (2001) capture some of these differences between churches in their categories of the

“state” and “national” church, particularly the greater abilities of the “national” churches in providing “free social spaces” for political and social competition against the state to which Froese and Pfaff attribute the popular appeal of the “national” Polish Catholic Church under communism. While the Orthodox Church may not have willingly complied with the communist regimes, its weakness as a source of political opposition and the domination of its hierarchy by the communist state is starkly apparent. The legacies of the abilities of the two church to resist the communist state are reflected in the levels of religious adherence following the collapse of communism: in Catholic countries, where the state never completely stamped out official religion, people retained their open affiliation with the Catholic Church and continued to attend church, however in Orthodox countries, where the institutionally weaker Church was easily made subservient to the state, the Church lost credibility and open adherents who are only now returning to Church.

We argue that four factors reflecting the institutional characters of the Churches and their stances towards temporal power determined the relative abilities of the Catholic and Orthodox Churches to resist state oppression. Firstly, as Linz and Stepan point out, the trans-nationality of the formal institutional base is the primary source of the Catholic Church’s power and, inversely, the cause of the Orthodox Church’s lack of power. The strongly centralized hierarchy of the Catholic Church that insured that all church appointments of the clergy had to be approved by the Pope meant that communist governments could never usurp the power of appointment without illegitimizing clerical appointments. On several occasions in Poland the Communists tried to require government approval of the appointments of cardinals but the attempts at control failed because the Pope refused to share authority (Dinka 1966). The Orthodox Churches, on the other hand, have been traditionally organized by nation, and while the various national Orthodox Churches acknowledge one another, the church hierarchies are organized nationally and are independent of one another administratively. The lack of formal institutional ties beyond each country’s border and nationally-organized Orthodox Church hierarchies meant that the communist governments could control the appointment of the national patriarch and the entire church hierarchy. The fate of the Orthodox Church in Poland provides an excellent illustration: even though the Polish communist regime was considered as one of the least restrictive (Stepan and Linz 1996), the Polish Orthodox Church was still extremely weakened by the communist regime with the government controlling its church appointments (Wynot 2002). The second factor determining a church’s power was the maintenance of foreign links and having part of the church’s

institution beyond the national border. By having a significant portion of the church institutions beyond the reach of the communist government, the Catholic Church could not be delegitimized.

The Catholic and Orthodox Churches also differ in their theological and traditional approaches to relations with the state determining their willingness to resist the state. From the theological point of view the Catholic and Orthodox Churches differed in their understanding of the relation between the church and state. The Orthodox Church is associated with the idea of 'caesaro-papism' or, more accurately in the theological sense, with the idea of a 'symphony between church and state' (Kalkandjieva 2011). In the Orthodox tradition, the church and the state should complement one another: one acting in the temporal sphere and the other in the spiritual rather than compete; as a result, the Orthodox Churches were cautious and indecisive in opposing the Communist regimes. The Russian Orthodox Church oscillated from an uncompromising anti-Bolshevik stance (expressed by anathematization of the Soviet regime by Patriarch Tikhon in 1918 through letter in which the Patriarch called all Orthodox to rise up against the regime) to a stance of neutrality (Wynot 2004). The challenge of dealing with communist governments resulted in divisions and splits within the Orthodox churches and further institutional weakness.¹ The Catholic Church has, on the other hand, explicitly expressed a far more political role. Starting with the Second Vatican Council, the Popes explicitly supported democracy as the form of government most compatible with Christianity and the Catholic Church withdrew support from several authoritarian regimes including Franco's (Philpott 2004).

The argument for two general temporal patterns in religiosity reflecting the institutional character of the Catholic and Orthodox churches is complicated though by the effects of state repression and state-led religious favouritism in the post-communist period. Sarkissian (2009: 492) attributes the religious resurgence in Orthodox countries that were once part of the Soviet Union to the more intense state repression than in Eastern Europe. Sarkissian argues that Catholic countries in Eastern Europe have not experienced a resurgence because these countries have not experienced much of a decline in religiosity under communism. Several particular cases, however, do not fit the state repression explanation. Some communist regimes in Eastern Europe were quite restrictive most notably Czechoslovakia, but levels of religiosity have remained stable in these countries without any resurgence. Also, despite the comparably weaker state repression in Poland,

¹ For more about the internal splits over Metropolitan Sergei's submission to atheist communist authorities in the USSR ("Declaration of 1927") see Chapter 3 in Wynot (2004) and Shkarovskii (1995).

the Orthodox Church in Poland was repressed and forced to accept government appointments of clergy unlike the Catholic Church. Maybe state repression and the institutional ability of churches to resist repression would be best understood as two sides of the same coin; Linz and Stepan (1996) actually use the presence of the Catholic Church as an indicator of degree of authoritarianism. Linz and Stepan go so far as to argue that the presence of the Catholic Church precludes totalitarianism, and a strong Catholic church indicates a weaker form of authoritarianism. However, we still attempt to account for the possibility that state repression can account for the patterns of resurgence and stability in religiosity. If state repression can explain the variation, we would expect a resurgence in religiosity in countries where state repression was stronger under communism, and stability in religiosity where repression was weaker.

Finally our consideration of role of the state in explaining the trends in religiosity would be incomplete without due attention to possible role of state favouritism of religious revivals in the post-communist period (Gill 2008; Froese 2004; Müller and Neundorf 2012²). Grim and Finke (2006) define religious favouritism as “subsidies, privileges, support, or favourable sanctions provided by the state to a select religion or a small group of religions.” Measures of religious favouritism rather than religious regulation capture the most direct and targeted methods in which a state can aid the revival of particular denomination; measures of religious regulation do not necessarily capture state support for a single denomination. Several note how the post-communist efforts at reconstructing national identities coincided with state support for established churches (Tomka 1995, Borowik 2002, Modeley 2003). In examining the applicability of the “religious economies,” or “supply-side,” approaches to Eastern Europe, Froese (2004) notes the importance of the combination of Soviet legacies of atheism (i.e. suppressed religiosity) and the role of religious regulation in the post-communist period in explaining the growth of religious monopolies. Although recent studies show that the “supply-side approaches” are limited in explaining the post-communist religious trends (Müller and Neundorf 2012), we could expect that religious revivals in Orthodox countries may be still in part reinforced by state favouritism.

Hypotheses

² Muller and Neundorf (2012) examine the impact of religious regulation on religious trends, however the measures of religious regulation do not capture state favouritism of particular denomination.

We present two sets of hypotheses based on the prior discussion which reflect the expectations if the trends in religiosity reflected the different institutional resilience of the Catholic and Orthodox Churches or if the trends reflected variation in state repression under communism. The sets of hypotheses are do not represent completely alternative and exclusive explanations but rather serve as guide for how to link the empirical patterns to macro-level processes. Predictions consistent with church institutional/denomination context effects:

1. Religiosity should be stronger in Catholic countries than Orthodox in the period immediately following the collapse of communism.
2. Religiosity should revive in Orthodox countries.
3. Religiosity should remain at the same level over time in Catholic countries.

Predictions consistent with state repression:

4. Religiosity should be stronger in the early 1990s where state repression was weaker.
1. Religiosity should increase most over time where state repression was strongest.

Data and Methods:

This analysis uses national randomized surveys conducted between 1993 and 1996 and replicated in 2007 in 13 Eastern European countries: Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, and Ukraine. The 1993-1996 surveys were conducted through the UK ESRC East-West and the EU INTAS Programs. The 2007 surveys were conducted through the EUREQUAL EU Framework VI project. Further details are given in Appendix 1.

The dependent variables are religious affiliation and church attendance (described in Appendix 2). We choose these two indicators of religiosity because the focus of the analysis is on the institutional resilience of the churches and the communist regimes' repression of any organizations, which could serve as a latent basis for political opposition. Openly stated affiliation with official churches and the physical attendance at church services best capture the institutional links between the churches and potential individual members. While an analysis of corresponding patterns in religious belief can help establish how genuine the religious revival is, affiliation and church attendance are sufficient measures of the ability of the churches as institutions to maintain and/or regain members.

The analysis of religious affiliation in the next section uses multinomial regression models to analyse the patterns in religiosity in Orthodox and Catholic countries. First we seek to establish the pattern in demographic predictors of religious affiliation. Rather than deploying an extremely complex single model with triple interactions with each demographic factor, we run four separate multinomial logit models (Models 1 through 4): one each for the first wave in Catholic countries, the second wave in Catholic countries, the first wave in Orthodox countries and the second wave in Orthodox countries. To account for country characteristics we include country fixed effects in Models 1-4 which is appropriate given that each model is cross-sectional and includes one observation in time per a country. In each of these models religious affiliation is a six category dependent variable with the non-religious as the reference category (for more details see notes below Table 1). We compare the results across the models using predicted marginal effects of demographic factors from each of the four models. Next to establish whether an increase in affiliation is indeed greater in Orthodox countries, we use a single three level hierarchical multinomial logit model (Model 5) which combines both Orthodox and Catholic countries. This model has random intercepts for country-years and countries. The intercepts for both country-years and countries estimated as random effects so as not underestimate the fixed effects for wave (over time change) which would be a country-year level variable and majority denomination (Catholic versus Orthodox) at the country level. We illustrate the substantive findings with predicted probabilities based on model 5.

To compare the changes in church attendance among Orthodox and Catholics we use a two level hierarchical ordered logit with random intercepts for countries (Table 2, Model 7). Over time change is captured by the fixed effect for wave.³ The dependent is a three category variable for church attendance.

In all the models (1-7) we also include individual level controls such as age, self-identified social class, income quartiles, education, and membership in the majority ethnic community (see Appendix 2 for further details on coding). The aim of controlling for these predictors is both to analyse the strength of their effect in predicting religiosity as well as to estimate the changes in religiosity while holding the demographic characteristics of the samples equal.

³ As additional robustness checks we have excluded each country one at a time from the model. The results remain stable.

Finally we use a rudimentary two stage analysis to compare the denominational and state repression contextual effects: we estimate the predicted probabilities of religious affiliation and the change in probabilities of affiliation by country, and then we use a simple scatterplot for analysis at the second level given the few number of country cases. Given the small number of higher level cases (no more than 22 in the first scatterplot and 11 in the second) we do not deem a more complex regression analysis to be prudent.

Analysis

In the previous section we discussed the difficulties faced by existing analyses of religiosity in post-Communist Eastern Europe in identifying a single over-arching trend in religiosity in this region. A cursory glance at the rates in denominational affiliation across the region shows that these countries form two large and quite distinct groups, the historically Orthodox and Catholic countries, which are characterized by quite different patterns in religiosity; the distinctiveness of the Catholic and Orthodox countries underscores the difficulty of applying a single paradigm to both.

Figure 1 shows the overall change in affiliation for all thirteen Eastern European countries. The Orthodox and Catholic denominations are dominant in Eastern Europe. While Protestants are the third largest religious denomination, they constitute little over five percent of the total population of the twelve countries, and Protestants are concentrated in the two historically Protestant countries of Estonia and Latvia. As we are examining the strength of general conclusions for the entire region, we will focus our analysis on the two main denominations. Figure 1 clearly shows that while affiliation increases for both Catholics and Orthodox, the increase in Orthodox affiliation is much greater.

[Insert Figures 1, 2 and 3 about here]

Figures 2 and 3 show the rates of affiliation for Orthodox and Catholic countries separately.⁴ In the early 1990s, affiliation is very slightly higher in Catholic countries than Orthodox countries: about 67% of the population in Catholic countries identified with the Catholic Church and 64% of the population in Orthodox countries claimed an affiliation with the Orthodox Church. Higher levels of affiliation in Catholic countries than in Orthodox countries fits with the

⁴ Catholic countries: Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia
Orthodox countries: Belarus, Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine.

expectation that an institutionally more resilient Catholic Church was better able to retain adherents under Communism, however the difference in affiliations between the two groups of countries is very small. The similar levels of affiliation in both sets of countries in the early 1990s is rather surprising from the secularization perspective as religiosity should be lower in the more economically developed Catholic countries. The high rates of affiliation in Catholic countries are largely driven though by Poland where Catholicism is particularly vibrant (Need and Evans 2001).

The differences in temporal changes in affiliation are far more stark, however. Affiliation increased much more in Orthodox than Catholic countries: 18% compared to 5% respectively as shown in Figures 2 and 3.⁵ These temporal changes fit with the expectation that the re-uptake of adherents will be greater in Orthodox countries where the Orthodox Church is recovering its position after being suppressed. However, there is a small increase in affiliation in Catholic countries; the significance of the increase in affiliation in Catholic countries will be tested in the regression analysis in following section.

The regression analysis confirms that as expected the increase in affiliation is far greater in Orthodox than Catholic countries even if country and country-year differences as well as demographic characteristics of the population are accounted for. Model 5 shows the results of a three-level hierarchical multinomial logit regression with random intercepts for country survey years and countries, which combines Orthodox and Catholic countries together. The coefficient for the interaction between the second wave of surveys done in the late 2000s and the majority denomination of the country (Orthodox versus Catholic) is significant indicating that by 2007 far more people re-joined the Orthodox Church in Orthodox countries than re-joined the Catholic Church in Catholic countries. To facilitate the interpretation of these results in substantive terms, we have calculated the predicted probabilities of affiliation with the majority denomination. In Catholic countries, Catholic affiliation rates have remained stable: in the early 1990s in Catholic countries the probability of being choosing a Catholic affiliation was 57 percent and by the late 2000s the probability slightly declined to 55 percent. In Orthodox countries on the other hand, affiliation with the Orthodox Churches increased significantly: in the early 1990s the probability of being Orthodox was 6 percent but by the late 2000s it increased to 75 percent. Therefore any religious revival seems to be primarily confined to Orthodox countries.

[Inset Table 1 about here]

⁵ The over time change in affiliation by country is shown in Appendix 3.

To further test the differences in trends in religiosity between Catholic and Orthodox countries we examine the strength of the demographic predictors of affiliation. If the Orthodox countries are experiencing a revival while religiosity remains stable in Catholic countries, we would expect stability in demographic predictors of Catholic affiliation, and decline in the strength of the predictors in Orthodox countries as the Orthodox Church attracts more people across all demographic groups. To illustrate the effects in substantively, Figures 4, 5 and 6 show the marginal effects of various demographic factors on religious affiliation in Catholic and Orthodox countries. In Catholic countries there is a slight change in predictors, most notably a weakening of the effect of income. In the early 1990s wealthy people were far less likely to claim to be Catholic than the poor. Overall however, Catholic affiliation reflects the pattern predicted by the secularization thesis: better educated and more economically secure people are less likely to be religious. In Catholic countries manual workers are much more likely to be Catholic, whereas wealthy people are less likely. Also in keeping with the argument that as societies modernize younger people should be less religious than the old, older people in Catholic countries are more likely to be religious and this effect remains stable over time as shown in Figure 6.

[Insert Figures 4, 5 and 6 about here]

If a society is undergoing a religious revival and people from all social backgrounds become more religious, we expect demographic predictors of religiosity to weaken which is indeed the case in Orthodox countries. In the early 1990s better educated and wealthier people were less likely to be Orthodox. Though interestingly, peasants were also less likely to be Orthodox contrary to the secularization thesis. In the early 1990s peasants may have been less religious as the religious revival in Orthodox countries was concentrated in large cities where some churches survived religious repression; whereas rural areas underwent intense communalization and almost all village churches were destroyed by the Communists. By 2007, however, people across all demographic groups, whether socioeconomic or age groups, were equally likely to be Orthodox. No single demographic predictor has marginal effects which are significantly different from zero. This pattern of weakening socioeconomic and age bias in religiosity fits with patterns found in Russia where there is a clear religious revival (Evans and Northmore-Ball 2012). If, on the other hand, economic security was the driving factor behind the revivals (Norris and Inglehart 2004), we would have expected new adherents to be primarily from economic vulnerable groups, but this is not the case. While societies undergoing secularization may experience fluctuation in the strength of

demographic predictors of religiosity, we would certainly not expect all predictors to completely lose their effect as in Orthodox countries in the late 2007s. A complete lack of social differentiation in religiosity as we see in Orthodox countries in the late 2007s indicates that new adherents are drawn from all social groups even the economically secure.

To further examine the differences in trends in religiosity between Orthodox and Catholic countries we examine church attendance. Table 2 shows the results of a two-level hierarchical ordered logit regression analysis of church attendance among Catholics and Orthodox in Catholic and Orthodox countries. Actively attending liturgical services is a more rigorous measure of religious commitment than affiliation (Evans and Northmore-Ball 2012). During a genuine religious revival, we would expect not only affiliation to increase but also frequent church attendance. As shown in Figure 7, church attendance increases slightly among the Orthodox: since the early 1990s, the probability of never attending church among people who claim to be Orthodox declines from 22% to 16%, whereas the rates frequent church goers increases from 13% to 18%; both changes are significant as confidence intervals do not overlap. Occasional church attendance among the Orthodox remains stable. On the other hand, Catholic Church attendance patterns do not visibly change. In so far as frequent church attendance is an indicator of a more committed form of religiosity, the increase in frequent church attendance in Orthodox countries would suggest this is something more than a purely nominal revival.

[Insert Figure 7 about here]

The trends in religious affiliation and church attendance clearly show that Orthodox and Catholic countries are undergoing different processes: in Catholic countries religiosity is relatively stable and effects of secularization are visible, but Orthodox countries are clearly undergoing a revival. However the question remains what is driving these different patterns. Most Orthodox countries are in the former Soviet Union where under communism state repression was harsher than in Central Europe. So could the revival in Orthodox countries be a reaction to the end of the much harsher levels of state repression? On the other hand, the increase in religiosity seems to be confined largely to Orthodox countries, so is the revival the result of denominational effects thus present only in traditionally Orthodox countries?

The intensity of state repression across communist regimes was not uniform to the extent that the communist regime in Poland is classified as authoritarian rather than totalitarian (Linz and Stepan 1996, Linz 2000, Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2013); also each regime went through phases of

intensification and relaxation of repression. The readily available measures such as the component of the Polity IV score measuring the competitiveness of political participation (PARCOMP), which is said to be closely related to state repression (Hill and Jones 2014, Bueno de Mesquita *et al.* 2005) does not capture the changes which occurred in communist regimes over time and also fails to account for differences between the regimes.⁶ To create a more nuanced measure of state repression we use the classification of communist regime ‘types’ devised by Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2013) (see Appendix 4 for tables of regimes types and scoring). We score the regime types from least to most repressive and multiply by the duration of each phase. We include both the elements of duration and intensity of repression to account for the possibility that short period of intense repression may have less of a secularizing effect than several decades of moderate but sustained repression. We are therefore interested in the cumulative past effects of repression when considering the impacts of communism on the religiosity in the post-communist period. Only periods under atheist Communist rule are included, so periods of pre-communist military dictatorship are not counted in the measure of state repression. We expect to find that initial levels of religiosity in the early 1990s will be lower in countries that experienced the longest periods of the harshest levels of repression (Stalinist, post-Stalinist hardline), and that the growth of religiosity should be greatest also in the latter countries.

To attempt to disentangle the effects of state repression and denomination, we follow a two stage analysis (Jusko and Shively 2005). First we estimate the changes in affiliation between the early 1990s and 2007 by country for the dominant denominations by running multinomial logit regressions for each country; this procedure allows us to keep the demographic characteristics fixed across survey waves. Figure 9 shows a scatterplot of changes in the predicted probabilities of religious affiliation over state repression. The analysis is limited to a scatterplot, since there are only twelve countries – too few for a regression analysis. The scatterplot suggests that state repression plays the dominant role. Bulgaria and Romania which had milder levels of state repression than the Soviet Union, experienced much smaller increases affiliation. Whereas Lithuania, which was the only Catholic country within the Soviet Union, experienced a much greater increase in affiliation than other Catholic countries, which experienced weaker state

⁶ With a few exceptions such as in 1980 after which the state of emergency was announced in Poland and the last few years (from 1988) before the collapse of communism in a few countries, all the communist regimes are given the same scores (1 – completely repressed political competition). Therefore communist Poland is given the same rating throughout (except for 1980) as the Soviet Union in the Stalinist period.

repression under communism. However, we still clearly see that levels of state repression are associated with the majority denomination: the low repression countries are predominantly Catholic and high repression countries are Orthodox. Therefore we cannot exclude the possibility that the abilities of national churches to serve as a latent source of political opposition may be interrelated with the communist regimes' ability to implement high levels of repression.

[Insert Figures 8 and 9 about here]

We still need to account for the possibility that state favouritism may have contributed to explaining the changes in religious affiliation. Figure 9 shows a scatterplot between levels of religious favouritism⁷ and change in affiliation. We can clearly see that religious favouritism does not have a strong association with the change in affiliation. Setting aside Estonia and Latvia where the Catholic and Orthodox denominations are not majority denominations, the change in religious majority affiliation is not greater in countries with higher levels of religious favouritism. If religious favouritism had played a strong role in explaining the differences between Orthodox and Catholic countries, we would have expected religious favouritism to be higher in Orthodox than Catholic countries, however, several traditionally Catholic countries, most notably Hungary and the Czech Republic, have experienced only very slight increases in religious affiliation despite high levels of religious favouritism. While Russia and Ukraine, both which experienced the largest increases in Orthodox affiliation have only average levels of religious favouritism; therefore religious favouritism does not appear to have clear role in explaining the religious revivals in Orthodox countries.

[Insert Figure 10 about here]

Latvia serves as a useful case to further probe whether the character of churches themselves or the level state repression is more influential.⁸ In Latvia, Protestants, Catholics and Orthodox

⁷ Religious favouritism is measured using the Government Favoritism of Religion Index (GFI) developed by Grim and Finke (2006). The GFI, which is based on coding US State Department religious freedom reports from the early 2000s, combines measures of the following five factors: the degree to which one religion is favoured in government funding, the degree to which a single religion is favoured through government privileges, the degree to which a single religion received 'in-kind' subsidies, the extent to which government funding is concentrated on one religion and finally the schools, media and charities associated with a single religion are favoured by the government. The index has been retrieved from the Association of Religious Data Archive (ARDA) is a collection of surveys, polls, and other data submitted by researchers and made available online by the ARDA. The GFI index is coded on a scale from 0 (no favouritism) to 10 (maximal favouritism). For further detail see Grim and Finke 2006.

⁸ Ideally, we would examine patterns of religiosity among minority Catholic groups in Orthodox countries and minority Orthodox groups in Catholic countries to further examine whether the trends in religiosity are linked to the countries and their history of state repression or to the institutional character of the respective churches.

each constitute about 25 percent of the population. By testing the changes in affiliation within one country we can hold the level of state repression constant. If the character of the Churches themselves determined the extent of revival, we would expect to see a revival among the Orthodox and steady levels of affiliation among the Catholics. However, the predicted changes in religious affiliation for both Catholics and Orthodox in Latvia are similar and are not statistically different from each other⁹, therefore affiliations for both denominations remain steady. This pattern suggests that the institutional character of the churches themselves may not be the only factor determining the degree of religious revival. The extent of the revivals in given countries may depend on the state support for the national churches and legislative restrictions on minority denominations (Sarkissian 2009). The Latvian case provides further evidence in favour of the state repression argument: in the absence of variation in levels of state repression, the two denominations have the same levels of affiliation over time. Furthermore, in the Latvian case religious regulation has been minimal in the post-communist period and the state has not favoured any particular denomination giving equal chances of revival (Sarkissian 2009).

Finally, while there appears to be some association between state repression and the extent of religious revival after the collapse of communism, state repression does not predict the initial levels of religious affiliation in the early 1990s. As Figure 8 shows, with the exception of the Czech Republic, levels of affiliation in Orthodox and Catholic countries were quite similar in the early 1990s following the collapse of communism. The relatively low levels of Catholic affiliation in the Czech Republic are explained by the conflicted relationship between Czech nationalism and the Catholic Church which was viewed by the Czechs as an imposition by the Austro-Hungarian Empire (Froese 2005). Figure 8 suggests that the level of religious affiliation immediately following the collapse of communism is not a direct function of the level of state repression.

However, we are faced with the problem that these minority groups make up less than 4 percent of the survey samples, making the judgement of any changes in affiliation and church attendance levels hard to judge for meaningfulness against changes in the majority denomination: is a 100 percent increase in Orthodox affiliation among the Orthodox in Poland from a .25 percent to a .45 percent comparable to the increase in Orthodox affiliation in Russia from 49 percent to 78 percent of the sample?

⁹ Predicted change in Catholic affiliation in Latvia is .0114 (with confidence intervals -3.99 to 4.02) and the predicted change in Orthodox affiliation in Latvia is .0254 (with confidence intervals -5.10 to 5.15). Estimated by running a multinomial logit with the six category religious affiliation measure as the dependent variable including both waves (early 1990s and late 2007). Model coefficients not shown in paper.

To conclude the evidence provided by the analysis partially supports both the denominational and the state repression explanations. In support of the denominational institutions argument, religiosity does revive in the Orthodox countries but remains steady in the Catholic countries (Hypotheses 2 and 3), and also demographic predictors remain steady in Catholic countries and weaken in Orthodox ones further indicating that Orthodox countries are experiencing a revival while Catholic ones are not (Hypothesis 4). In favour of the state repression argument, the size of the religious revival does seem to be associated with state repression (Hypothesis 6): where state repression was harsher, the revival was greater. However, neither of the two contextual factors, state repression or denomination, seem to account for the initial levels of religious affiliation immediately following the collapse of communism (Hypotheses 1 and 5), suggesting that connections between national sentiment and denominations also play a very critical role especially among Catholic countries (Froese 2004, 2005; Gautier 1998). The analysis does, however, show that Orthodox and Catholic countries are experiencing two quite different *trends* in religiosity: in Catholic countries religiosity is steady and characterized by socioeconomic bias suggesting a process of secularization, whereas Orthodox countries are clearly undergoing a revival as affiliation is increasing and socioeconomic bias in religiosity is weakening.

Conclusions.

Our analysis of religiosity in post-Communist Eastern Europe confirms Orthodox and Catholic countries are undergoing two different trends: the first of revival and the second of stable religiosity but with some evidence of secularization. We clearly show that the increase in religious affiliation in Orthodox countries is several magnitudes greater than that in Catholic countries. We also show that, as expected of societies undergoing a religious revival, socioeconomic and age bias in religiosity has declined in Orthodox countries. By 2007, even wealthy and highly educated people, who are economically secure, as well as the young, are as likely to be Orthodox as the rest of the population, which is a pattern contrary to the one seen in Western societies undergoing secularization. Catholic countries in Eastern Europe, on the other hand, do display the socioeconomic and age bias seen in Western societies: older people as well as the economic insecure are more likely to claim a Catholic affiliation. The arguments in the current literature that suggest Eastern Europe is undergoing either secularization or a revival are mistakenly generalized;

both trends are visible. We would conclude that the two groups of countries should be considered as distinct groups.

We attempt to explain the two different trends with contextual factors such as the institutional ability of the two churches to resist state repression and as well as the degree of state repression itself. The extent of the religious revivals does appear to be greater where the state repression under communism was stronger, however we show that the legacies of state repression and denomination cannot be completely disentangled. Orthodox countries whose nationally-based churches were institutionally less able to withstand control by the communist regimes were also the countries that experienced the most severe years of repression under Stalin in the 1930s. So did Orthodox countries experience a revival after the collapse of communism because the Orthodox Churches were recovering their former positions lost because of their own institutional vulnerabilities or because they experienced the worst communist repression? While various institutional and ideological aspects of the Orthodox Churches make them appear less able to withstand state repression, we cannot be sure how the Catholic Church would have fared under Stalin in the 1930s. Only one traditionally Catholic country, Lithuania, found itself within the Soviet Union, but even so only after the worst years Stalinist religious repression were over. By the time, the Soviet Union re-annexed Lithuania in 1944 and installed a communist government, Stalin had softened his policy towards religion in Soviet Union allowing Orthodox churches to re-open. Even the Catholic Church in Poland, which is the chief example of Catholic resistance to communism, was quite weakened and the head of the Polish Catholic Church Cardinal Wyszyński was imprisoned in 1953 and only released with the beginning of Khrushchev's Thaw in 1956. We will never know in what state the Polish Catholic Church would have been if it had experienced the full effect of pre-WWII Stalinist repression. We will never know if Lithuania or Poland had experienced the full extent of Stalinist repression, would they also have experienced as great a rebound in religiosity as Orthodox Russia.

Also we do not exclude the possibility that the religious revival in Orthodox countries is a temporary reaction to end of state repression.¹⁰ Possibly as David Voas (2009, with Doebler 2011)

¹⁰ Birth cohort patterns in frequent church attendance which is a more rigorous measure of active religiosity than affiliation shows that older birth cohorts tend to attend church frequently more so than younger birth cohorts. This pattern of decline over age cohorts is preserved even though church attendance increases slightly over all birth cohorts in Orthodox countries suggesting that in the long term religiosity may decline through generational replacement as Voas argues (2009, with Doebler 2011). Analysis of generational patterns in affiliation and church attendance can be shown upon request.

suggests, the revivals may be a temporary increase primarily in 'fuzzy' (Voas 2009) or lukewarm (Evans and Northmore-Ball 2012) religiosity, which can be a stage on the path towards the dominance of the non-religious. In this analysis, we have primarily focused on religious self-identification which is not an indicator of strong religious commitment. On the other hand, frequent church attendance has also slightly increased in Orthodox countries.

Our analysis does, clearly show that at least in the medium term the religious trends in Orthodox and Catholic countries are different. Future research can investigate whether other measures of religiosity, such as the strength of religious beliefs, also reflect the dual pattern of stability in Catholic countries and revival in Orthodox countries. If all measures of religiosity including measures of religious belief indicate the same pattern of revival in Orthodox countries, then it is more likely that the Orthodox revival is a genuine rather than nominal across all these countries.

Our analysis is able to show that generalizing micro-level trends across both Orthodox and Catholic countries in post-Communist Eastern Europe is not advisable as the two groups of countries are quite clearly experiencing different trends in religiosity. Combining all the countries in one analysis obscures the distinctiveness of the two trends. Furthermore as the countries show very little overlap in denominations and experiences of state repression, the effect of these contextual factors on micro-level trends in religiosity cannot be accounted for satisfactorily.

APPENDIX 1: THE SURVEYS

This paper uses data collected through surveys organized by Geoffrey Evans and Stephen Whitefield of the University of Oxford conducted in Eastern Europe between the years 1993 and 2007. Data collection was funded by grants from the ESRC (1993-94) (for the project ‘Emerging Forms of Political Representation and Participation in Eastern Europe,’ directed by Geoffrey Evans, Stephen Whitefield, Anthony Heath and Clive Payne, as a part of stage II of the ESRC’s East-West Programme), and European Union INTAS programme (1995, 1996). One of the principal aims of these surveys was to collect high quality data in countries which did not have a tradition of democratic polling. The studies employed teams of interviewers and coders from the respective academies of science. The respondents were samples randomly from electoral registers or censuses.

The 2007 wave of surveys were funded through the EUREQUAL project “Social Inequality and Why It Matters for the Economic and Democratic Development of Europe and Its Citizens: Post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe in Comparative Perspective” funded by the European Commission under contract number 028920 (CIT5), Framework 6. Fieldwork was conducted by national survey or polling institutes in each country (using face-to-face interviews) on the basis of stratified national random probability samples. Further detailed information can be provided upon request.

APPENDIX 2: SURVEY MEASURES

1. Religiosity is measured in the following manner:

Religious Affiliation: 0- Non-Religious 1-Orthodox 2 -Catholic 3 -Muslim 4 -Protestant 5 - Other

Church attendance: a three category variable with the following values: 1-never attend church 2-occasionally, varies, don't know and 3-frequently (once a month or more).

2. Social characteristics

Age is the actual age of the respondent.

Education: Education measures the highest level of education completed. Primary -1, Secondary -2, and Tertiary -3.

Social class: Social class is measured using the question "Here is a list of social groups in [country] today. To which of these social groups do you feel you belong?" The variable is coded into six categories: 1 "Intelligentsia" 2 "Managers" 3 "entrepreneurs" 4 "Manual workers" 5 "Peasants" 6 "None of These / Don't know."

Ethnic majority 1 –member of ethnic majority group in country, 0 –not member

3. Survey level

Wave: 0 – survey waves in early 1990s, 1 -2007 wave

APPENDIX 3: RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION BY COUNTRY

	Denomination	Early 1990s	Late 2000s	Change in majority denomination
Catholic Countries				
Czech Rep.	Catholic	34.8	37.51	2.71
Hungary	Catholic	56.39	55.92	-0.47
Lithuania	Catholic	72.85	86.83	13.98
Poland	Catholic	93.75	97.19	3.44
Slovakia	Catholic	71.67	73.84	2.17
<i>Mean</i>		<i>65.89</i>	<i>70.26</i>	4.366
Orthodox countries				
Belarus	Orthodox	62.4	78.1	15.7
Bulgaria	Orthodox	63.37	78.36	14.99
Moldova	Orthodox	78.05	95.78	17.73
Romania	Orthodox	81.98	87.67	5.69
Russia	Orthodox	49.63	78.1	28.47
Ukraine	Orthodox	53.37	76.07	22.7
<i>Mean</i>		<i>64.8</i>	<i>82.35</i>	17.54667
Protestant countries				
Latvia	Not Religious	21.45	28.17	
	Catholic	21.25	24.08	
	Orthodox	24.9	26.07	
	Protestant	28.9	19.68	-9.22
	Other	3.45	2	
Estonia	Not Religious	65.99	57.43	
	Catholic	0.75	1.32	
	Orthodox	16.41	23.75	
	Protestant	14.98	15.33	0.35
	Other	1.87	2.18	
<i>Mean change in Protestant affiliation</i>				-4.435

APPENDIX 4: STATE REPRESSION MEASURE

Table A3.1 Classification of communist regime types by Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2013).

Country	Transition to communism	Stalinist	Post-Stalinist Hardline	Post-Totalitarian	Reformist
Belarus (USSR)	1922 ^a	1928-1952	1953-55; 1965-69	1970-84	1922-27; 1956-64; 1985-1991
Bulgaria	1945	1946-53	1954-89		1990
Czechoslovakia	1945-47	1948-52	1953-67, 1969-89		1968
Hungary	1945-47	1948-53	1957-60	1961-1989	1954-1956
Moldova (USSR)	1940 ^b	1940-1952	1953-55; 1965-69	1970-84	1922-27; 1956-64; 1985-1991
Poland	1945	1946-1956	1982-83	1963-1981, 1984-87	1957-62, 1988-89
Romania	1945--47	1948-1964	1971-89		1965-70
Russia (USSR)	1918-20	1928-1952	1953-55; 1965-69	1970-84	1921-27; 1956-64; 1985-1991
Estonia (USSR)	1945	1945-1952	1953-55; 1965-69	1970-84	1956-64; 1985-1991
Latvia (USSR)	1945	1945-1952	1953-55; 1965-69	1970-84	1956-64; 1985-1991
Ukraine (USSR)	1922 ^c	1928-1952	1953-55; 1965-69	1970-84	1922-27; 1956-64; 1985-1991

a The Polish-Soviet War ended in 1922 and the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic was annexed to the USSR.

b Bessarabia which constituted most of the Moldovan SSR annexed only in 1940

c The Ukrainian SSR in 1922 already covered most of the territory of the future Ukrainian SSR with the exception of Galicia.

State repression measure: Regime type score multiplied by duration (number of years). The regime types are scored as the following: transition to communism – 0, Stalinist –4, post-Stalinist hardline –3, post-totalitarian –2, and reformist – 1.

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TABLES AND FIGURES

Figure 1: Religious Affiliation over waves across all countries.




Figure 2: Religious Affiliation in Orthodox Countries




Figure 3: Religious Affiliation in Catholic Countries




Table 1: Six models examining religious affiliation in Catholic and Orthodox countries (reference category: non-religious)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	
					Orthodox & Catholic Countries, BothWaves	Protestant Countries Both Waves	
Predicted affiliation	Catholic Wave 1	Catholic Wave 2	Orthodox Wave 1	Orthodox Wave 2	Majority denom.	Orthodox	Catholic
Education	-0.292*** (0.0549)	-0.0268 (0.0787)	-0.298*** (0.0422)	-0.149* (0.0713)	-0.239*** (0.0240)	0.0445 (0.0804)	-0.00950 (0.0909)
Income	-0.128*** (0.0272)	-0.154*** (0.0406)	-0.215*** (0.0227)	-0.0900* (0.0418)	-0.150*** (0.0128)	-0.134*** (0.0446)	-0.134*** (0.0493)
Intelligentsia (ref.)	-	-	-	-	-		
2. Managers	-0.0114 (0.127)	0.0468 (0.240)	-0.111 (0.106)	0.339 (0.307)	-0.0621 (0.0672)	0.139 (0.226)	0.311 (0.242)
3 Entrepreneurs	-0.118 (0.134)	0.214 (0.221)	-0.243 (0.129)	-0.488* (0.246)	-0.187** (0.0704)	0.137 (0.244)	-0.0526 (0.321)
4. Manual Workers	0.0965 (0.0878)	0.358** (0.154)	-0.171* (0.0691)	-0.378* (0.151)	-0.0388 (0.353)	-0.00617 (0.151)	0.166 (0.169)
5. Peasants	0.351* (0.138)	0.286 (0.169)	0.430*** (0.0937)	0.149 (0.171)	0.424*** (0.0544)	-0.126 (0.220)	0.409* (0.220)
6. None /DK	-0.172 (0.0957)	0.176 (0.164)	-0.204** (0.0774)	-0.547*** (0.155)	-0.209*** (0.0456)	-0.287* (0.170)	0.139 (0.187)
Age	0.0252*** (0.00187)	0.0224*** (0.00243)	0.00561*** (0.00159)	0.00742** (0.00256)	0.0131*** (0.000845)	-3.694*** (0.130)	0.112 (0.120)
Ethnic majority	0.332*** (0.0773)	-0.290** (0.125)	0.885*** (0.0621)	0.733*** (0.116)	0.415*** (0.0344)	0.0172*** (0.00298)	0.0220*** (0.00323)
Wave					.152 (0.129)	0.565*** (0.104)	0.217* (0.111)
Orthodox country					-132 (.458)		
Orth.centry.XWave					1.07*** (.174)		
Constant	-1.226*** (0.197)	-1.233*** (0.299)	1.114*** (0.184)	1.732*** (0.308)	0.976*** (0.349)	-0.506 (0.312)	-5.202*** (0.409)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Random intercept country-year					Yes		
Random intercept country							
Individuals	11,393	5,796	10,971	6616	29345	5,431	5,431
Country-years					22		
Countries	6	6	5	5	11	2	2

Standard errors in parentheses. All coefficients are log-odds. Models 1-4 and 6 are multinomial logits with a six category dependent variable for affiliation (non-religious (ref.), Orthodox, Catholic, Muslim, Protestant, and Other) and country dummies, and only the coefficients for the Catholic and Orthodox are shown. Model 5 is a three-level hierarchical multinomial logit with random coefficients for country-year and country with a three category dependent variable (0 non-religious (ref.), 1 majority denomination (Catholic in Catholic countries or Orthodox in Orthodox countries and 3 all other minority denominations). Only the coefficients for comparison between majority denomination and non-religious are shown. Model 6 is multinomial logit model with a country dummy and six category dependent variable for affiliation. Only the coefficients for Orthodox and Catholics are shown. For all the models the reference category is non-religious. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Figure 4: Marginal effects of demographics on probability of religious affiliation for Orthodox over waves (early 1990s and 2007)¹¹





Figure 5: Marginal Effects of Demographics for Catholic Affiliation in Catholic countries over waves (early 1990s and 2007)¹²



¹¹ Marginal effects based on estimates from Models 3 and 4 shown in Table 1.

¹² Marginal effects estimates based on Models 1 and 2 shown in Table 1.

Figure 6: Marginal effects of Age on Catholic affiliation in Catholic Countries and Orthodox in Orthodox Countries by wave





Table 2: Church attendance among Catholics and Orthodox over waves in Catholic and Orthodox countries

	(Model 7)
Wave	-.217*** (.0486)
Orthodox country	-1.226*** (.0389)
Orth.cntryXWave	.628*** (.0604)
Education	-.104*** (.0252)
Income	-.0978*** (.0138)
Intelligentsia (ref.)	-
2. Managers	-.0708 (.0799)
3 Entrepreneurs	-.0916 (.0833)
4.Manual Workers	-.177*** (.0460)
5. Peasants	.153** (.0534)
6. None of These/DK	-.124* (.0507)
Age	.0101*** (.000902)
Ethnic majority	-.00623 (.0422)
Cut 1	-2.518** (.105)
Cut 2	.683*** (.103)
<i>Random intercept country</i>	<i>Yes</i>
Individuals	21620
Countries	11
BIC	35736.11


Notes: Model estimates as two-level hierarchical ordered logit with random intercepts at the country level. Standard errors in parentheses. All coefficients are log-odds. The dependent variable is church attendance (1 never attend church, 2 occasionally attend church 3 frequently attend church) *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Figure 7: Predicted probabilities of church attendance levels for Catholics in Catholic countries and Orthodox in Orthodox countries at two points in time (Early 1990s and late 2000s)




Notes: Predicted probabilities based two level hierarchical ordered logit model (Model 7) from Table 2 . Demographic factors such as education, age, membership in majority ethnic group, and social class are included. Confidence intervals shown.

Figure 8: Association between the change from the early 1990s to 2007 in affiliation with majority denomination and state repression (measured using communist regime classification)




Notes: The change in predicted probabilities is obtained by running multinomial regressions of affiliation on demographic characteristics and surveys waves for each country. Demographic factors such as education, age, membership in majority ethnic group, and social class are included. The predicted changes are included for Latvia and Estonia are included for reference even though these countries are classified as Protestant.

Figure 9: Association between state repression (measured as communist regime types) and affiliation with majority Christian denomination in early 1990s



Note: Estimated affiliation with majority denomination obtained by running multinomial regressions by country for the survey wave in the early 1990s. Demographic factors such as education, age, membership in majority ethnic group, and social class are included.

Figure 10: Association between the change from the early 1990s to 2007 in majority denomination affiliation and religious favouritism



Notes: The change in predicted probabilities is obtained by running multinomial regressions of affiliation on demographic characteristics and surveys waves for each country. Demographic factors such as education, age, membership in majority ethnic group, and social class are included.