Naming and Understanding the Opposites of Desire: A Prehistory of Disgust 1598-1755.

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Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
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Abstract

In the early 17th century, Aristotelian ideas about the passions came under scrutiny. The dominant, if not only, understanding of the passions before that time came from Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas split most of his main passions into opposing pairs – love/hate, joy/sorrow, fear/bravery etc. Aquinas described the opposite of desire as ‘fuga seu abominatio (flight or abomination).’ Although grappled with by earlier philosophers such as Duns Scotus and Thomas Cajetan, it was not until the 17th century that thinkers attempted to challenge Aquinas’s opposite of desire. This thesis looks at five writers who used a variety of terms, often taken to be near-synonyms of disgust in the historiography – Thomas Wright, Henry Carey, 2nd Earl of Monmouth, Thomas Hobbes, Henry More and Isaac Watts – and challenges that view. Each of these men wrote works that, at least in part, attempted to understand the passions and each had a different understanding of Aquinas’s opposite of desire. The thesis uses a corpus analysis to investigate uses of the words each thinker chose as an opposite of desire and then examines each writers’ influences, experiences, and intentions, to analyse their understanding of the opposite of desire.

Secondly, these various opposites of desire appear to bare a family resemblance to modern disgust. All are based upon the action of moving away from something thought of as harmful or evil, and all have an element of revulsion alongside the repulsion. This has led to much of the historiography of these sorts of passions making the assumption that these words simply referred to disgust. This thesis argues that these opposites of desire are not the same as disgust; the differences outweigh the similarities.
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Acknowledgements

Firstly, I would like to thank the Wellcome Trust for their kind support.

Secondly, I would like to thank my supervisors, Professor Thomas Dixon and Dr Elena Carrera, who have gone above and beyond what is expected of them on many occasions, from catching my dyslexia at a critical time to sharing their immense knowledge throughout the process. Their patience and ability to motivate me even at a low has been outstanding.

Next, I would like to acknowledge my good friend Dr Stephen Pigney, whose proofreading eyes and brief discussions helped me find a final shape for the thesis.

My sincere thanks go to my mentor, Professor Kate Lowe, for helping me over the hurdles and always having time for me if I needed it.

Thanks also go to all those at the Centre for the History of Emotions, a fine group of academics who were prepared to support me in ways I did not expect.

I would like offer my heartfelt thank my wife, Dawn. Through all the tests and tribulations that this process has thrown at me, she has been my rock, keeping me together more than she knows.

Finally, thank you to my family, especially my mum and my oldest Brother David, who have always been there when I needed them during some tough times.

I dedicate this Thesis to my late Father, Raymond Godbehere.

This work was supported by The Wellcome Trust, 101961/Z/13/Z
Introduction

There is a widespread belief that disgust is a transcultural, transhistorical emotion, a pre-cognitive sensation of harm avoidance that developed early in human evolution. It therefore seems a little odd that a word to accurately describe this sensation – ‘disgust’ – did not enter the English language until 1598 and did not take on a meaning that would be recognisable to a modern reader until the early seventeenth century. To fill this linguistic gap, words such as ‘loathing’, ‘abomination’, ‘detestation’, and ‘aversion’ have been described as early terms referring to the experience of disgust. However, if, as is often assumed, disgust is a specific affect evolved to help with the avoidance of contaminating pathogens that threaten boundary violations, it would follow that other words must have existed to describe that experience and no other. Certainly, concepts that a modern reader might associate with the disgusting, such as dirt and uncleanliness, have been used as metaphors for immorality in English as far back as we have records. However, many of the pre-disgust words used have as many differences from our ‘disgust’ as they have similarities with it, from the religious connotations of abomination, to Thomas Hobbes’s understanding of aversion as a foundational passion on which other avoidance passions are built. These differences are important, not only because they give us an insight into historical, perhaps even lost, emotions, but because through the divergences between the opposites of desire and modern disgust, glimpses of a prehistory of disgust are possible. Many of the words included in lists of pre-disgust words for disgust were described in the early modern’s literature as some form of opposite to desire. In this prehistory, the disgust-like elements of these opposites of desire became separated from that group of passions and turned into a form of displeasure, described by the seventeenth-century English taste theorists as ‘disgust’.

In the thirteenth century, Thomas Aquinas attempted in his Summa theologiae, among other things, to categorise and explain the passions. Most of his primary passions were named and placed into groupings of opposites: ‘love’ and ‘hate’; ‘hope’ and ‘despair’; ‘courage’ and ‘fear’; ‘pleasure’ and ‘sorrow’.1 One passion, ‘anger’, had no opposite, and the opposite to another, ‘desire,’ needed two terms to describe it: ‘fuga seu abominatio [flight or abomination].’2 Despite challenges from other thinkers, the Thomist groupings of passions remained part of the teaching


of the many Scholastic universities and peripatetic teachers who drew upon Thomist and Aristotelian thought well into the seventeenth century. However, as growing numbers of thinkers began to challenge Aristotelian ideas from the late sixteenth century onwards, Aquinas’s structures of the passions came under increasing scrutiny. English thought began to tackle the passions through the restrictions of the English language, the influence of new philosophies, and the worldviews of each thinker, worldviews that were often influenced by personal religious challenges, political pressures and warfare. Aquinas’s use of two words to describe the opposite of desire appears to have influenced later examinations of them. While those who wrote about the passions in the seventeenth century tended to stick with the same common English translations for Aquinas’s other passions, the slightly ambiguous nature of the opposite to desire resulted in the use of a variety words to name it. The name each thinker chose reflected a slightly different concept that each built around those names.

This thesis examines the ways thinkers attempted to name and understand the opposites of desire in seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century English thought, and the prehistory of disgust that developed through those attempts. By examining five thinkers – Thomas Wright, Henry Carey, Thomas Hobbes, Henry More and Isaac Watts – the thesis explores the subtle ways each thinker conceptualised a passion by deliberately selecting a name for the opposite of desire that best fitted with their understanding of the passions and the mind. Each described something slightly different, something both of the period in which they were writing and of the individual experiences and beliefs of the writer. This work bears some similarities to Begriffsgeschichte. The uses of the opposite to desire were directed at religious or political goals, making them more value-laden than a simple description of a passion. Also, changes in the world, particularly of the world surrounding the individual thinker, precipitated changes in the concepts and so the words used to describe them. This means that each word is examined in the context of both wider usages and the thinkers’ specific understandings of those words that were drawn from their experiences. However, this is not a work of conceptual history. It would be difficult to argue that the opposites of desire are properly ‘basic concepts’, as they form part of a larger web of ideas. None of the thinkers examined in this thesis focus entirely on the opposites of desire. Rather, the opposites of desire are part of larger works, and they play a small part in a greater goal.

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Another approach to the examination of the opposites of desire might be to use Mark Knights’s techniques as explained in the methodological accompaniment to the Early Modern Research Group’s study of ‘commonwealth’. In this, Knights and the research group wrestle with the difficult question of how to understand the relationships between the varied meanings of the keyword and concept of ‘commonwealth’. Describing the changing meaning of a term is simple, as one needs only trace the term over time and describe how it was used. However, this thesis does not take a single word and examine how the concepts related to that keyword changed over time. This is an examination of how a concept with a family resemblance was named and understood differently by different thinkers.

The keywords examined in this thesis are not the only early modern English words that appear to have more than a passing similarity to disgust. Words such as ‘loathsomeness’, as examined by Benedict Robinson, and the words listed by William Ian Miller – abhorrence, fastidiousness, squeamishness, odiousness, and irksomeness – might also be examined and contrasted with modern disgust. However, the words chosen for this thesis represent the names of passions that were examined in a series of works that focus on the passions, rather than being passion-words used in passing.

This thesis’s methodology is closer to that of Raymond Williams’s approach to keywords, which is to find the ‘tendencies within Historical Semantics: a tendency that can be more precisely defined when it is added that the emphasis is not only on historical origins and developments, but also on the present’, or, in this case, the uses to which the words were put by each individual thinker. Williams examined the social, cultural, and historical conditions that have informed how certain keywords words are understood within general conversations, attempting to define those words from ‘a particular set of interrelated words’. Understanding the relationship between word and concept involves getting to know why each thinker chose the name they did as well as the broader usage of that keyword during the thinker’s lifetime.

Having the ability to examine vast numbers of words from the period using techniques from corpus linguistics and the large searchable digital repositories of early modern texts can help this

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4 Mark Knights, ‘Towards a social and cultural history of keywords and concepts by the early modern research group’, *History of Political Thought*, 31 (2010), 427–488.
7 Ibid., xxxiii.
search for the names. In the first four chapters, digital techniques are combined with a close reading of the thinker’s work and an examination of the influences and intentions of that thinker, revealing why they understood each opposite to desire as they did. Finally, each opposite to desire is compared with modern disgust, gradually throwing light on disgust’s uneven prehistory. In the final chapter, this prehistory will come to an end with Isaac Watts’s description of the passions of aversion and disgust. Central to this thesis is the idea that modern ‘disgust’ is an Anglocentric concept, a view that is at odds with much of the historiography.

A Historiography of Disgust

One of the main points of contention within the history of disgust is whether certain words refer to variations that fit within a single category of disgust, or whether those variations are indicators of different concepts. Anna Wierzbicka has shown that the German word most often translated as ‘disgust’, Ekel, does not refer to the same concept as the English word. She writes that ‘[modern] German dictionaries usually describe Ekel as Ascheu or Abneigung, that is, something like “aversion” rather than “disgust”, and link it, prototypically, with spiders, snakes, and worms rather than nausea or vomit.’ She suggests that ‘disgust’ is ‘far more salient than words like revulsion, repugnance, or aversion, which are closer to the German word Ekel.’ Psychologists Michelle N. Shiota and Dacher Keltner have suggested that these linguistic differences are meaningless and that ‘[e]ven psychologists conducting language based research tend to emphasise similarities among states represented by different emotion words.’ However, these researchers are forced to acknowledge the differences that social influences can introduce to language: ‘whether an emotion word is worthy of discussion, what emotions are talked about, and how finely differentiated emotion words in some category needs to be dependent upon the social structure of any given society.’ While some experience of repulsion or revulsion may well be an example of a ‘core prototype’ or ‘core affect’, dégoût, Ekel, Fastidium, asco,厭惡 (Yànwù) and other similar words of revulsion do not appear to refer to concepts identical to modern English disgust.

9 Ibid.
10 Michelle N. Shiota and Dacher Keltner, ‘What Do Emotion Words Represent?’, Psychological Inquiry, 16 (2005), 32–37, 33, 34.
Variations in concept might not indicate new categories, as all these variations might have enough similarities to be considered part of a single set. Many who hold the view that there are a wide set of words that belong to a single category of disgust rely upon Mary Douglas’s investigation of dirt and pollution in *Purity and Danger*. According to Douglas, prior to Pasteur’s work on the germ theory of disease, dirt was ‘the by-product of a systematic ordering and classification of matter, in so far as ordering involves rejecting inappropriate elements.’ Central to this was the idea that dirt and pollution, the body, its boundary, and the world beyond, were closely related. To Douglas, all pollution ultimately referenced the transgression of physical or conceptual boundaries. The details might differ between cultures, but these structures of pollution existed in all of them. The phrase most commonly associated with this concept, and often attributed to Douglas although in fact a direct quotation from William James, is ‘matter out of place’.

However, Douglas did not use the word ‘disgust’ to describe reactions to dirt. In her 1968 article ‘Pollution’, she stated that ‘there is no justification for assuming that terror, or even mild anxiety, inspires [pollution beliefs] any more than it inspires the housewife’s daily tidying up.’ Nevertheless, almost everybody who has written on the subject has referenced Douglas’s ideas of dirt in relation to disgust.

In his book *Ekel*, Winfried Menninghaus provides a thorough and almost complete history of the theory of disgust from what he believed was its birth in Germany in 1751 through to

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12 Ibid, 41 and 165, quoting William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature* (Rockville: Arc Manor LLC, 2008), 104. The earliest example of this phrase is probably Henry John Temple, 3rd Viscount Palmerston, who, in an 1852 debate about urban uncleanliness, commented: ‘I have heard it said that dirt is nothing but a thing in a wrong place. Now, the dirt of our towns precisely corresponds with that definition’: ‘The Royal Agricultural Society’, *The Times*, 16 July 1852, 8. The phrase became popular, quoted in its present form in the 30 January 1858 edition of *Punch* as ‘nothing but Matter left in the wrong place.’ *Punch*, 33 (1857), 9. However, in field notes from 1953 and in her later paper essay ‘Pollution’, Douglas claims to have derived it from Philip Dormer Stanhope, Fourth Earl of Chesterfield. This seems unlikely, given her referencing of James and the likelihood that James would have been aware of this still popular maxim; field notes quoted in Richard Fardon, ‘Margaret Mary Douglas 1921–2007’, *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 166 (2010), 133–58, 150. For the original article: Mary Douglas, ‘Pollution’, *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (1968); available at: http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/pollution.aspx.

13 Douglas, ‘Pollution’.

Julia Kristeva’s 1982 analysis of the concept of the abject in her book *Pouvoirs de l’horreur*. Menninghaus avoids what he calls ‘real’ disgust, suggesting that such a task would be met with ‘insurmountable difficulties’, and instead focuses on ‘the relevant theorising of disgust over the past 250 years.’ At the outset, he acknowledges that subtle conceptual differences existed between languages in the seventeenth century, but he nevertheless categorises those words within a single set: the pollution-related concept of the *Vomitiv*, an experience related specifically to nausea and physical rejection. It is here he finds a common usage among the seventeenth-century terms he investigates: the English ‘disgust’, the French *dégoût*, and the German *Ekel*. The concept of the *vomitiv* may well accurately reflect German thought in the late seventeenth century, but the English taste theorists of the early seventeenth century did not understand ‘disgust’ in this way. Their ‘disgust’ was a type of sentiment – an internal sensation or moral or aesthetic displeasure. If such a sentiment involved feeling nauseated, these theorists did not mention it. While Menninghaus’s study of the history of modern disgust is thorough, the boundaries of his category might have changed had he looked to England and to a point thirty years before his birthdate for modern disgust.

William Ian Miller bases his historical investigation of disgust on Douglas’s notions of dirt as they relate to a ‘lexicon of disgust’. For Miller, there are and were a variety of words used in two related categories of ‘disgust.’ One of these categories related to the words used to define it: ‘a complex sentiment that can be lexically marked in English by expressions declaring things or actions to be repulsive, revolting, or giving rise to reactions described as revulsion and abhorrence as well as disgust.’ Miller claims that these words ‘all suggest the appropriateness, but not the necessity, of accompanying nausea or queasiness, or of an urge to recoil and shudder from creepiness.’ Miller acknowledges that ‘disgust without the word disgust is not quite the same; the words we have and the words we choose to describe things help structure our world.’

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17 Ibid. 40.
18 Ibid. 48, 76–15.
20 Miller, *Disgust*, 143.
21 Ibid. 2.
Although Miller was ‘looking for differences between pre-disgust disgust and our disgust, and in fact, there are some’, he concludes that ‘it may be that these differences pale beside the continuities observable in the broad category of the disgusting as in developed in the last thousand years in the West.’ On this basis, Miller splits his lexicon of disgust into two sets of words: ‘that of Freudian reaction formation with disgust working to obscure desire and to prevent indulgence and that of surfeit with disgust following upon thoroughly indulged desires.’ He suggests the words ‘abomination, abhorrence, fastidiousness, squeamishness, loathsomeness, odiousness, and irksomness’ alongside the interjections ‘pah,’ ‘fie’, and ‘fut’ as examples of the first set. For the second set, he suggests ‘rankness, surfeit, fulsome, cloyingness, and the late mawkishness.’

Miller focuses on ‘abomination’ from the first group for closer inspection. He traces ‘abomination’ back to John Trevisa’s 1398 translation of De proprietatibus rerum and the sentence: ‘The pacient felth abomination … and ache in the mouth and stomak’. It seems odd that Miller missed ‘wlatsomnes’ from the original quote, which was ‘De pacient felip abhominacioun & wlatsomnes & ache in þe mouþ of þe stomak’. He later acknowledges that ‘by the end of the fifteenth century, few if anyone still understood what the word wlate meant, but it too could refer to nausea and more generally to moral failings which generated loathing and abhorrence.’ Trevisa linked ‘wlatomsnes’ to nausea rather than morality, describing cholera as producing ‘wlatsomnes wiþ colerik spewinge’, an excess of meat as initiating ‘wlatsomnesse and spewinge’, and milk mixed with watery humours as the ‘cause of spewyng and wlatsumnesse’. ‘Abomination’, however, had a moral content. It was almost certainly absorbed into English from the Latin Vulgate’s use of abominatio, appearing first in fourteenth-century Bible translations, such as the 1382 translation by Wycliffe. In the Vulgate Old Testament, variants of abominatio occur 132 times. When compared to ancient Hebrew versions of the text, these 132 occurrences are translations of eight different Hebrew words all of which refer

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22 Ibid., 164, 172.
23 Ibid., 165, quoting “Abomination” in MED Online.
24 Trevisa, De proprietatibus, 81b/b.
25 Miller, Disgust, 166.
26 Trevisa (1398), 159/21, 323/6, 1330/20; “wlatsomnes(se)” in MED Online (2001).
27 For example, see Psalm LXXXVII: ‘Thous hast maad fer fro me my knwun; thei han set me abhomynacioun to hem silf’; John Wycliffe, The Holy Bible Containing the Old and New Testamnets With the Apocryphal Books, in the Earliest English Versions Made from the Latin Vulgate by John Wycliffe and His Followers [1382 version], edited by Josiah Forshall and Frederic Madden, 4 volumes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1850), vol. 2, 827.
to sin, but each of which had a subtly different meaning. These range from idolatry to criminal, legal or moral transgressions, including treachery, eating around those considered slaves, the breaking of laws in general, taking prostitutes into the temple, sacrificing animals with blemishes, and the use of sorcery. Not all of these fit neatly into Miller’s categories of disgust. Due to its biblical origins, the Middle English ‘abomination’ continued to refer to a group of immoral, offensive and sinful acts. As will be explained in Chapter One, seventeenth-century uses of ‘abomination’ maintained that association with sin. That this religious element is missing from modern disgust is important, and suggests a conceptual difference between modern disgust and abomination that goes beyond Miller’s categories. Whether each is a separate concept or an example of variation within a group may depend on how broad a definition of disgust one uses.

In an important article on this topic, Benedict Robinson shows how the language used can help us to understand conceptual changes. The central argument of his paper, ‘Disgust c. 1600’, is that ‘the seventeenth century elaborated a new concept of emotion that in many ways put pressure on received theories of the passions.’ According to Robinson, ‘this entailed a shift from an understanding of the passions as forms of thinking with an associated bodily expression to one in which they are primarily bodily events whose relation to thought has become unclear.’ Part of this shift becomes evident when examining small events, one of which, he claims, is the splitting of the concept of disgust from loathing. Disgust, he suggests, contains elements of pleasure. The use of the scatological for humour ranges from François Rabelais’s sixteenth-century work The Histories of Gargantua and Pantagruel to Dominique Laporte’s

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somewhat satirical *History of Shit.*\(^{32}\) Loathing, on the other hand, was intense and serious: ‘[w]e can never loathe our own past pleasures enough: a perfect loathing would refuse all mere bodily life, all of what Spenser calls “mortal slime.”’\(^{33}\) As will be explored in Chapter Five, such a distinction between loathing and disgust appears in the eighteenth-century work of Isaac Watts, the first person to identify ‘disgust’ as a discrete passion, separate from both loathing and aversion. However, Robinson seems to believe that disgust is a universal emotion, initially found embedded within loathing and then extracted from it. He accepts that ‘[d]isgust has been described as one of the basic emotions present in all cultures, a drive coded into us by evolution’. However, he claims that ‘the invention of disgust is part of the history in which aesthetics, hygiene, and etiquette were constituted as significant social practices’, placing disgust ‘above all of the “aesthetics, hygiene, or etiquette” that Mary Douglas identified as the modern forms of the pollution taboo.’\(^{34}\)

Using disgust as the general term for an evolved reaction to pollution that came into its own as soon as English thought could categorise it makes some sense. However, Robinson’s rejection of the passions of aversion and abomination as an earlier container for disgust on the grounds that, from Aquinas onwards, they were ‘folded into either fear or hate,’ seems unusual. Seventeenth-century dictionaries used the word ‘loathsome’ to define ‘execrable’, ‘detestable’, and ‘abomination’. ‘Loathsome’ seems to have shared this element of having been ‘folded into hate or fear’.\(^{35}\) What makes ‘loathsome’ different to words such as ‘aversion’ and ‘abomination’ is that it was not used as the name for a discrete passion in any of the writings on the subject in the seventeenth century.\(^{36}\) Taking Menninghaus, Miller and Robinson together, it becomes clear that there was indeed a varied lexicon of terms for aversion and repulsion in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that had a family resemblance to each other, as well as to modern ‘disgust’, even if they did not refer to an identical concept.

Rather than tighten the definition of ‘disgust’ in our search for its historical precursors, it may be more productive to blur the lines further and accept anything that resembles modern disgust, even slightly, as part of the set. Such a loosening of the definition of ‘disgust’ is exactly


\(^{33}\) Robinson, ‘Disgust’, 569.

\(^{34}\) Ibid., 553, 555.


\(^{36}\) Miller, *Disgust*, 165.
what is attempted in a recent edited collection. In the introduction to *The Ancient Emotion of Disgust*, Donald Lateiner and Dimos Spatharas have chosen to categorise a primary form of disgust using a collection of terms, such as the Greek words ‘αφεδία, bdeluria, and duschereia’. These words, they claim, are akin to ‘annoyance, surfeit, displeasure, distaste, disgust’, even ‘impudence, and so on’, and they join a host of other labels. While they acknowledge that disgust has different uses, they place these variations within two linked categories. As well as the primary disgust that they describe as ‘yuk’, they adopt the Kantian notion of ‘secondary disgust’: disgust that accompanies considerations of ‘the pleasures of literature and art’ and of morality. However, the boundaries of these categories are not clear to see; the work appears to have a ‘we know it when we see it’ approach. Lateiner and Spatharas quote Leon Kass’s question whether anyone can ‘really give an argument fully adequate to the horror which is father-daughter incest, or having sex with animals, or mutilating a corpse, or eating human flesh, or even just (just!) raping or murdering another human being.’ They acknowledge that ‘ancient philosophers failed to explore disgust as a pathos, and one needs to expand their understanding of *pathê* in general’, and that ‘[o]ne struggles to determine the precise place on our modern Anglophone spectrum that each ancient writer intends with his Hellenic or Italic example of the term.’

While the attempt to put seemingly disgust-like terms on an English spectrum may be worthwhile, such an approach can lead to the inclusion of ideas that are anachronistic. For example, in Tom Hawkins’s chapter, ‘Monstrum in Fronte, Monstrum in Animo?’, he draws upon the work of Carolyn Korsmeyer in *Savoring Disgust*, which explores our fascination with the disgusting in the concept of the ‘sublate’. This is an experience not unlike Edmund Burke’s idea of the sublime, in which the fear is removed from underwhelming terror, leaving a sense of awe. For Korsmeyer, a similar form of revulsion-free disgust generates the sublate. Hawkins then links this to the idea that moral disgust is co-opted from pathogen avoidance. The monster of the piece, in this case the ugly, monstrous and ‘subhuman body’ of the slave Aesop, should

38 Ibid., 5, 8.
39 Ibid., 3.
cause him to be expelled in the *pharmakos* ritual, in which a member of an outgroup – a slave, the sick and deformed, or a criminal – is driven from the city to purify it. Aesop was described as ‘loathsome to look at […] potbellied, with a deformed head, flat-nosed, mute, dark-skinned, stunted, splay-footed, weasel-armed, squint-eyed, liver-lipped – a portentous blasphemy.’ This certainly fits Aesop within a loose definition of disgust. However, as Todd Compton has pointed out, the *Vita* is more than the tale of a Master’s fascination with the disgusting. Compton suggests that ‘this *pharmakos* is a satirist, a verbal artist, a blame poet in the archaic tradition.’ This is ‘a crucial element that places him [Aesop] into the scapegoat situation.’ If Aesop was considered ugly, it was because of his powerful and popular satirical poetry that could spread and harm not only his Master, but the city in which he lives. If something disgust-like exists in this situation, it is not something easily identifiable as modern disgust, but something complex that needs to be understood in the context and *mentalité* of the period. One way to do this is by using the technique of *Pre-hisotries* as developed by Terence Cave.

**Pre-history**

The use of prehistory in this thesis is derived from the use of the term by Terence Cave. In his work *Pre-Histories: An Introduction*, he begins with a quote from Montaigne’s ‘Des coches’: ‘Even if all the reports that have been handed down to us from the past were true and known by someone, they would amount to nothing in comparison with what is known.’ Cave acknowledges that ‘memory is a retrospective construction […] is liable systematically to suppress everything that is strange and foreign in the past.’ Concepts and objects in history may appear familiar, and it is all too easy to examine these concepts and objects through the lens of these familiar ideas. Instead, Cave suggested an ‘Archipelago-History’ in which concepts and objects are examined in their direct historical contexts. For example, instead of taking the modern concept of disgust and applying it as an instrumental way of grouping similar experiences in the past, one would attempt to observe concepts which appear familiar as they were at the time.

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47 Cave, ‘Pre-histories’, 100.
What makes this a Prehistory more than just the pursuit of good historicist practice, is, firstly, the acknowledgment that each island on the archipelago does have a relationship to the moment when the familiar objects entered history. Secondly, instead of attempting to ignore those familiar elements and remain entirely in the past, a Prehistory acknowledges what Anna Holland and Richard Scholar have described as ‘hindsight’s ineradicable presence in the writing of all history in order to limit and control, as much as possible, its inferences.’ This means unpacking the familiar concept – in this case disgust – and acknowledging its presence throughout the thesis. The birth of the modern concept of disgust in the mid-eighteenth century acts as a mainland from which the examined archipelago of the opposites of desire extend backwards through time. Although each island is examined independently and their own cultures and worldviews acknowledged, the mainland of disgust is not ignored, and the familiarities opposite of desire caused by hindsight and the modern concept of disgust is acknowledged and explored.

A Definition of Disgust

In the literature about disgust, there are some areas of near consensus and other areas that are still subject to debate. One of the more contentious issues might seem mundane, but it regards the nature of disgust: is it an emotion? Psychologists regularly cite disgust as one of the six ‘basic’ emotions, as supposedly demonstrated by a series of experiments performed by Paul Ekman and Wallace Friesen in the late 1960s. Ekman and Friesen asked people from a range of cultures to select photographs of faces that matched statements about emotions. The results were striking: the photos for six of these emotions – happiness, sadness, anger, surprise, disgust, and fear – were matched with the same emotion statements far more regularly than chance would produce.

Despite becoming more or less canonical within psychology, the results of Ekman’s experiments have come under increasing attack. The tests had methodological problems. They consisted of a closed set of photographs and statements derived from the assumptions of native

English speakers; and the statements were translations of that English into a local language that often changed the original intention of the questions, however careful the translators. Furthermore, the results, though statistically interesting, were not universal. Recent experiments have cast other doubts. For example, in a version of the Ekman experiment that involved arranging a large set of photographs into emotion types as defined by those participating in the test rather than the testers, the Himba ethnic group from Namibia sorted the photos quite differently from those of a test group in the US. More telling is that the American test group’s categories fitted Ekman and Friesen’s basic emotion model perfectly, while the Himba’s did not. These results suggest that it is wrong to assume that the facial expressions associated with emotions are universal.

Jaak Panksepp was an advocate of Lisa Feldman Barrett and James Russell’s ‘Psychological Construction of Emotion’ theory, in which emotions are experiences created by the ‘constructed’ emergent properties caused by different areas of the brain working in parallel. Feldman Barrett and Russell believe that, instead of basic emotions, humans experience ‘core affect’, in which the body creates sensations at various levels of valence and intensity that individual cultures appraise, name, and understand differently. However, Panksepp saw no contradiction between basic emotion theory and construction theory. He suggested that ‘if, in fact, there were no primary-process emotions that we share with other animals, we would still need to credibly answer why it is so easy, even for children, to recognize such a variety of distinct emotional states not only in each other but in other mammals as well.’ He claimed that construction takes place through a combination of these primary, basic emotions with ‘secondary (learning and thinking), and tertiary (thoughts about thoughts) processes.’ The combination creates a single experience ‘so we can barely see the primary process emotions and affects that contribute to the cognitive jungles of our lives.’ Panksepp wrote the names of his primary emotions in capital letters, but did not include disgust amongst them. In response to a paper

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55 Ibid.
asking Panksepp to include DISGUST in his system of primary emotions, he asked: ‘If we consider sensory disgust to be a basic emotional system, then why not include hunger, thirst, fatigue and many other affective states of the body as emotions?’ Considering disgust an emotion would be, he claimed, a category error, pointing out that emotion should be ‘capable of generating affective experiences independently of the external environment’, while disgust ‘only begins to take on an “Emotional” status through learning.’ To Panksepp, disgust was a ‘social affect’: a culturally constructed modern experience built upon a primary affect – to seek safety – with behaviours, expressions, and expectations encoded during childhood.

Valerie Curtis’s parasite avoidance theory notes that at some level all those objects described as disgusting have the potential to harbour parasites or cause the suspicion that others may do so. Avoiding pathogens leads to the avoidance of the type of boundary violations that lead to contamination. According to clinical psychologist Susan Miller, our skin acts as a boundary, both separating us from the outer world and keeping our insides within our body. The skin is a boundary for contaminants entering the body and objects, such as vomit and faeces, exiting the body. Rozin, Curtis and others believe that ‘[c]ontamination may have been shaped as an adaptation for disease avoidance, but it operates largely independently of conscious beliefs about disease.’ Martha Nussbaum also sees disgust as a contaminating boundary violation. Disgust is not the result of a ‘(perceived) danger’ that passes once the danger has gone, but the idea that the self will become contaminated by items that ‘remain disgusting [...] even when all danger is removed.’

In The Hydra’s Tale, Robert Rawdon Wilson agrees that contaminating boundary violations are central to disgust. However, contrary to most psychological takes on the subject, Wilson suggests that it is impossible to claim any single elicitor of disgust to be universal. Rozin has suggested that ‘Animals and their Products’ are a universal cause of disgust. He claims that there is ‘widespread cultural and historical cultural evidence for aversion and disgust to virtually all

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57 Ibid., 1824, 1825.
58 Panksepp and Biven, Archaeology, 31.
60 Miller, Gatekeeper, 17–18.
61 Rozin et al., ‘Disgust’ 759–760.
body products including feces, vomit, urine, and blood (especially menstrual blood). Similarly, Miller suggests a universal disgust chain of being: inorganic is less disgusting than organic, vegetable waste is less disgusting than animal waste, animal waste is less disgusting than human waste. He also believes that objects associated with body openings – the mouth, nose, anus, vagina, and penis – are often related to feelings of disgust. Like Rozin, this is the disgust of contaminating boundary violations. Contrary to this view, Wilson has suggested that ‘Everything and anyone may be experienced as disgusting under conditions in which boundaries break and things appear to slip towards slime or sludge.’ Even then, the slimiest and sludgiest of things, such as the practice of coprophagy, ‘will not seem [disgusting] to members of a group, such as Sadians or people who enjoy roasted intestines fresh from the hunt, who regularly eat excrement in each others’ presence.’

To claim something as universal is to argue that all humans, without exception, retain a similar trait. Objects assumed disgusting in one culture may not be elsewhere. What eighteenth-century aesthetic philosophers found disgusting is quite different from what modern Western psychologists find disgusting.

Some researchers have suggested that certain contaminating boundary violations are more disgusting than others. Rozin took up the work of Andras Angyal’s 1941 expansion on Darwin, which focused on the idea that waste products of the human and animal body triggered disgust by their relation to the mouth. He suggested that a core element of disgust was ‘oral incorporation’, whereby the mouth as the ‘gateway to the body’ produces a sensation that is ‘usually stronger than aversion to the same entity on the body surface near but not inside the mouth’. However, Miller and others have suggested that any potential contaminating boundary violation, from contact with the skin to the visual suggestion of disease, might equally trigger disgust. Seeing, tasting, touching, and smelling a rotten apple all cause an overwhelming need to reject the disgusting object. It is the experience of the overwhelming that lends itself to another area of disgust: the surfeit.

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63 Rozin et al., ‘Disgust’, 759-760.
64 Miller, Anatomy, 27
65 Ibid., 89.
66 Wilson, Hydra’s Tale, 12.
69 Miller, Disgust, 60-108.
The idea of disgust as a surfeit can be traced back at least as far as Descartes’s treatment of *degoust*, according to which an excess of anything can lead to either *degoust* or *ennui*.\(^{70}\) Aurel Kolnai advanced a more complicated idea of disgust and surfeit. In his 1927 essay, ‘Ekel’, he believed disgust to be the result of a surfeit of either life or death. He listed the objects of *Ekel* that remind us of vermin, functionless body intimacy, sex, and exaggerated fertility, such as breasts, swarms, fish spawn and overgrowth. The list of those objects reminding us of death consist of the putrefaction of objects, such as corpses or food, dirt, disease, and the bodily secretions and excretions that remind us of our animal nature, our mortality, and the putrefaction that follows.\(^ {71}\) Kolnai believed that all these sensations had relations to the impurities of the body as defined by stickiness, flabbiness, pastiness, and mushiness. Those elements were ‘in some sense already on course to be realized as disgusting’.\(^ {72}\) However, he claimed that ‘somatic “nausea” could be completely *Ekel* free’, separating the sensation of the emetic from *Ekel*.\(^ {73}\) Rozin is less inclined to base his view of disgust on ideas of surfeit, suggesting that ‘[i]f disgust already functioned to discourage the eating of potentially contaminated foods, then it was well-suited as an “off switch” to discourage eating excessive amounts of uncontaminated foods.’\(^ {74}\) This places surfeit-disgust firmly within the camp of pathogen avoidance, contaminating boundary violation and contamination. Either by the idea that a surfeit might violate the limits of the body through an unwanted passing outward, as suggested by Susan Miller, or by being the by-product of disgust at the body’s attempts to reject pathogens, the experience of surfeit is not the only by-product of disgust that Rozin et al. have suggested. The other is moral disgust.

Jonathan Haidt, along with Rozin and Clark McCauley, have argued that moral disgust is an extension of the reaction of bodily violations to breaches of social boundaries caused by the process of embodiment – that is, when cognitive patterns relating to the body become matched with experiences outside the body.\(^ {75}\) Miller argues that disgust exists as a way of demarcating moral, social, and personal boundaries. Such boundaries are not always a good thing, as they can breed contempt between groups. For example, Miller notes George Orwell’s confession in *The

\(^{70}\) René Descartes, *Les Passions de l’Ame* (Amsterdam: Louys Elzevier, 1649), 87-88.

\(^{71}\) Kolnai, *Ekel*, 29-38.

\(^{72}\) Ibid., 27: ‘im gewissen Sinn schon überhaupt des Weichen, für das Zustandekommen von Ekel werten’.

\(^{73}\) Ibid., 11: ‘die somatische >>Übelkeit<< kann völlig ekel frei sein!’


Road to Wigan Pier that he was raised to believe that ‘The lower classes smell’ [Miller’s italics].

There has been some experimental work that backs up Miller’s position. Haidt has suggested that the more prone an individual is to physical disgust, the more socially conservative and suspicious of out-groups they are.

There is very little that the various theories of modern disgust share. If there is any commonality, it is that disgust is an unpleasant experience associated with the need to seek safety from the threat of a potentially contaminating boundary violation, be that physical or social. All the opposites of desire examined in this thesis incorporate the idea of boundary violation and contamination to some degree. That is why this thesis takes the view that there may well be a basic, common experience of revulsion and repulsion caused by boundary violation and contamination. Whether this is a single evolved core affect, or a cultural element that has been retained by Western culture with each period, language, and group developing their own understanding of it, is not important. What matters is that to insist that the descriptions of earlier disgust-like experiences were the same as experiences of modern disgust is mistaken. There are several important elements, as outlined in the various theories above, that are not always found in the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century opposites of desire. There are also several elements that are found in the opposites of desire, but are at odds with modern disgust. It is by forming an understanding of the period’s concepts, before comparing and contrasting these with modern disgust, that a better understanding can be reached of what a group of thinkers interested in the passions were trying to describe when they discussed the opposites of desire.

Methodology

This thesis focuses on five authors who each used a particular word or words to name the understanding of the opposite to desire: Thomas Wright; Henry Carey, 2nd Earl of Monmouth; Thomas Hobbes; Henry More; and Isaac Watts. Each of them had a different take on what the opposite to desire might have been, each had their own view on the proper use of words, and each had a word for the opposite of desire. The chosen words served a purpose for each of the authors, and, as each author was writing for a readership that he hoped would understand their ideas, those words were drawn from standard English usages of the time. To see why each

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76 Miller, ‘Disgust’, 247.
thinker framed his concept as he did needs more than a standard close reading of his works and the influences upon them. It also requires an analysis of the keywords used in the period. To examine as many instances as possible of the keywords used by those thinkers, this thesis has employed language analysis techniques from corpus linguistics.

**Corpus Linguistics**

A neo-Firthian approach to corpus linguistics is at the core of the examination of the passion keywords used by each of the thinkers in this thesis. Neo-Firthian linguistics, at its most extreme, is an approach to corpus linguistics that examines words in their contexts, avoiding the probability-based linguistics found in machine-reading studies that examine texts from a distance and focus more on the frequency of combinations of words than how those words were used in context. Most neo-Firthian linguists are not so strict; as Tony McEnery and Andrew Hardie have pointed out, '[c]ollocation-via-concordance and the use of frequency data without significance testing are still common in the neo-Firthian studies of concordance analysis.' In other words, most neo-Firthian linguists will use non-contextual methods such as generating lists of the frequency of certain words within a set of texts and collocations (i.e. lists of the most common words found adjacent to a keyword). Many linguists, such as Ramesh Krishnamurthy, use digital techniques as a way of speeding up manual examinations of corpora for frequencies and associations within the texts. This thesis does the same, understanding that, as Stefan Th. Gries has written, '[a]ll of corpus linguistics is by definition based on frequencies'. To manually discover the words most frequently found in proximity to the passion keywords employed by the thinkers in this thesis would be practically impossible across a 125,000-text corpus. However, to examine them free from context would be at odds with the thesis’s examination of the influence usages had on an individual thinker’s process of conceptualisation in context. That need to place quantitative data about frequency and proximity into historical and intellectual context is why this thesis uses a neo-Firthian technique: it utilises the power of machine reading to highlight areas for a closer examination in context.

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78 For a more detailed analysis of this and other neo-Firthian corpus linguistic methodologies, see Tony McEnery and Andrew Hardie, *Corpus Linguistics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 122-167.
79 Ibid., 126.
There are several reasons why the regularity of the incidence of words found in proximity is likely to have an impact on the usage of key words. One is the word frequency effect: as well as being able to recognise common words more easily than rare ones, there is also substantial evidence that word recognition in humans is affected by linguistic structures within phrases. As Inbal Arnon and Neal Snider put it, ‘Sentence comprehension is affected by a multitude of distributional factors, including the frequency of words; the frequency of words in specific syntactic structures (verb-subcategorisation biases); co-occurrence relations between verbs and specific arguments; as well as the overall frequency of syntactic structure.’\(^{81}\) The words and structures surrounding key words influence one’s understanding of them, and the more commonly those structures appear together, the more likely they are to be predicted by the reader and understood as part of the same semantic group.\(^{82}\)

The corpus that was used for the examination of early modern language in this thesis is the TCP-EEBO corpus. The corpus is a collection of fully searchable and encoded texts that ‘consists of the works represented in the English Short Title Catalogue I and II (based on the Pollard & Redgrave and Wing short title catalogues), as well as the Thomason Tracts and the Early English Books Tract Supplement.’\(^{83}\) This collection contains more than 125,000 works printed from 1475 to 1700. The corpus is keyed manually from scratch, meaning it is more accurate that many scanned databases, and it focuses on keying only one edition, usually the first, of each work, and so reducing any skewing of the statistics due to multiple versions of the same texts.

The books in the corpus published between 1560 to 1700 were downloaded and manually sorted using a sorting programme written on Python and then checked manually to avoid reading errors. Each year was then loaded into NVivo for Mac Version 11 to create searchable collections of internal to NVivo sources. NVivo produces consistent raw data, rather than

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relying on an algorithm that might colour the results, keeping closer to the ethos of neo-Firthian searches than other more weighted programs. Dates were then selected, and the key words used by each of the selected thinkers – ‘abomination,’ ‘detestation,’ ‘flight,’ ‘eschewing,’ ‘aversion,’ ‘horror’ and ‘disgust’ – were used to generate a series of reports. The first was a Key Word In Context (KWIC) report. In KWIC, the keywords are displayed as a central column, surrounded by a small amount of the neighbouring text. The clarity of the display allows for searching for patterns of syntax, grammar, and commonly associated words that might shed light on usages of the initial key word. Knowing the words and phrases usually found near a key word can give some insight into how that word was understood. The second was an examination of words that were collocations of those key words, appearing in proximity to the key word up to five words either side.

The problem is that some words may occur more frequently around key words merely because they are common. For example, ‘stop words’, such as ‘the’ and ‘and’, are likely to be the most frequently found words in any analysis. There are a few ways around this. One is to use ‘association measures’, in which an examination of the most frequently associated words is displayed as functional patterns. This final step can be done using a variety of programming methods. The NVivo analysis system can check the expected frequency of words by calculating each collocate wider relevant frequency within the selected corpus or, to put it another way, it can tell if these words are as likely to appear as collocates to any other word as they are with the chosen key word, and allow the user to remove any words that might cause a distortion. This is where neo-Firthian methods score above traditional statistics-based methods. Statistics can suggest when two words are found in regular proximity to each other because one word is more commonly a collocate than another. However, it is tricky to use that reading to discover if the frequency of these collocates a distortion or if there remains a distinct relationship between the keyword and the common word in context even with help from the programme being used.

Once this quantitative step is complete, the information is used as the Launchpad for an examine of how these words are used in the context of the historical record. The examination might involve analysing examples of the word usage. It might also include tracing how the usage suggested by the word combinations connects to definitions of the keywords as found in period dictionaries. By using the contextual investigation of texts and the period’s dictionaries,

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suggested by data from the KWIC and collocation frequency analyses, some of the more
common usages become clearer. However, it is important to bear in mind what dictionaries
from the period were somewhat different to the dictionaries of today.

Lexicography, 1565-1755

As well as the TCP-EEBO corpus, the language analysis draws from definitions in period
dictionaries. Between 1565 and 1755, many English words underwent morphological changes.
At the same time, there was an expansion in the number of words found in dictionaries. English
dictionaries focused on prescribing the meanings of ‘hard vsuall English wordes’. It was not
until Samuel Johnson’s seminal 1755 Dictionary of the English Language, that a dictionary
became truly descriptive.

As new words entered English, most often from Latin and French, the dictionaries grew to
accommodate the expansion. For example, while Robert Cawdery’s Table Alphabetical (1604)
contained roughly 2,400 lemmas, there were more than 14,000 in Elisha Coles’s English
Dictionary (1676). A more significant change was one of word usage. According to Testuro
Hayashi, some of the most popular dictionaries in the seventeenth century were based on Latin-
English dictionaries from the previous century, which had in turn grown out of a classical and
medieval philological tradition of copying and expansion. While some seventeenth-century
dictionaries, such as John Bullokar’s English Expositor, innovated by adding additional
information such as the classifications of words and the situations in which to use them, it is
clear that dictionaries across the period continued to recycle earlier texts. The practice of
copying created rather small lexical sets of interrelated words within the dictionaries. To add to
or subtract from these sets would create additional work for the lexicographer. As a result, the
appearance of a change in definition can suggest that there was a somewhat significant change
in usage. Even the most prescriptive dictionaries, it would seem, must at times describe language
and are updated as usages change. Tracking these changes alongside data from the TCP-EEBO
corpus can provide a glimpse into how each of the thinkers interpreted the words they chose
for their opposites of desire. From this platform, a close reading can uncover how each of them
understood these passions.

Close Reading

Considering the broad understandings of the words used by each thinker for their opposites of desire, the final step is a close reading of each thinker’s works and their intellectual and personal histories. These writers were chosen for two reasons. Firstly, each of these writers wrote works on the passions which contained sections that grappled with the opposites of desire explicitly. Secondly, each of these writers wrote about their particular relationships with language, meaning that the names they chose for their versions of the Opposites of Desire were deliberate and indicated something of how they tried to understand those opposites of desire beyond just using the most common words for those passions.

In the first chapter, the focus is on Thomas Wright and his book *The Passions of the Minde in Generall* (1604). Thomas Wright was an English Catholic who split his loyalties between England and his faith. He believed that writing should be clear. In *The Passions*, he expressed his disapproval of ‘Metaphors, Poeticall phrases in prose, or ink-pot terms’ and works ‘so concise, that you need a commentary to understand them’. He asked: ‘Why [can] not diuers Sciences already invented, be […] deliuered in a more ordinary manner?’ Wright practiced what he preached. For example, he began his discussion of love as a good scholar should: clearly describing it as the attraction to God or the self, and as the source of all the passions, in keeping with St. Augustine.

This focus on common and understandable words may well have been due to his target audience: much of his work focused on the conversion and persuasion of Protestants to bring England back into the papal fold, and there is no reason to think that his *Passions* was any different.

Wright primarily drew on Thomas Cajetan’s reading of Aquinas, creating a complex opposite to desire that combined flight and detestation with a form of hatred – hatred of abomination.

This hatred focused on a hatred of evils that might harm someone you love, while his opposites...
of desire described an experience related to the avoidance of that sort of harm. However, he did not believe all forms of evil were equal. While a neighbour’s fire might bring suffering, it was the plight of the soul, caused by sin, that one ought to more actively avoid. Wright’s opposite of desire was a passion that was supposed to be used to avoid sin and, more importantly, help others to do the same through preaching and conversion back to the Catholic faith. Like disgust, Wright’s opposite of desire acted as a moral gatekeeper by helping to avoid contamination through apostasy and sin. However, they were passions to be used in the service of God, not the preservation of one’s mortal self.

In the second chapter, Henry Carey, 2nd Earl of Monmouth’s 1641 translation of Jean-François Senault’s *The Vse of Passions* introduces ‘eschewing’ as an opposite to desire. Carey’s works were almost exclusively translations; he had no confidence in his abilities as a writer, relying on the voices of others to make political arguments. Instead, he expressed his own ideas about war and power through the translated words of others. Usually, these translations were close to the original, but occasionally, he appears to have purposefully chosen certain words to make a point. ‘Eschewing’ is one such word. Like Wright’s ‘hatred of abomination’, this passion was to be controlled by reason and used for the policing of sin. However, ‘eschewing’, a word chosen as the translation of *fuite* rather than the usual ‘flight’, represented internal as well as external battles. Carey placed it in the context not only of taking flight from an evil, but of avoiding it altogether. Eschewing enabled one to drag oneself back to reason, and away from uncontrolled passions.

Carey was a royalist writing as tension increased between Charles I and parliament. His work was not only about the passions, but the state of politics in the late 1630s. To him, the king was reason, and the unruly passions were parliament whose control was essential for the avoidance of harm. Eschewing the evils that might result in injury could lead the country back to the reason of the monarch, just as it could lead the unruly internal passions back to the safety of the reasonable soul. Carey’s metaphorical understanding of the passions is made especially plain in the frontispiece designed for him by William Marshall, which depicts ‘eschewing’ as running away from hatred back towards ‘reason’ while attempting to avoid sorrow.

Chapter Three discusses Thomas Hobbes, who, over several works, described the passions as part of an argument that a sovereign should act as a final arbiter. Unlike Carey, however, Hobbes

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built his argument for the necessity of a sovereign to act as the final word in dogmatical conflicts without using metaphors. Conflicts were built upon the passions. Hobbes was a foundationalist, and his opposite to desire – aversion – was the foundation on which other avoidance passions began. It was the first experience understood by children when wanting to move away from harm, becoming ever more complicated as that child’s education and experiences increased. Unlike Wright and Carey, Hobbes’s aversion was a passion understood in primarily materialistic terms, as a response to a set of physical evils. Unable to find an English word for one set of these evils, Hobbes decided to describe the ugly, nauseating and other evils that a modern reader might understand as ‘disgusting’ by using the Latin term turpe. With Hobbes, the opposites of desire and what would become the ‘disgusting’ begin to touch, moving away from the more religiously conceived passions of aversion from sin characteristic of the thinkers discussed in the first two chapters.

Hobbes believed that is was language that distinguished humans from other animals. Despite continuing the idea that spoken language came from God to Adam, he believed that the invention of written words was a human creation: ‘[t]he invention of Printing, though ingenious, compared with the invention of Letters, is no great matter.’ Language had two purposes. The first was as an aid to memory: ‘Markes or Notes of remembrance’. The second was in the transfer of thoughts and ideas from one person to another: ‘to signifie (by their connexion and order), one to another, what they conceive, or think of each matter; and also what they desire, feare, or have any other passion for’. Philip Petit has suggested that this ‘invention–of–language theme’ forms the basis of all of Hobbes’s philosophy, his precise use of words, and his examination of the way others used them formed the backbone of his philosophical output. Hobbes examined, analysed, and defined words with particular precision.

The Cambridge Platonist Henry More disagreed almost entirely with Hobbes’s view on the role of names. According to his 1659 work, *The Immortality of the Soul*, the idea that a word

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could be the core of a philosophical understanding of the world was disproven by the idea that other languages have various words for the same objects.

Here Mr. Hobbs, to avoid the force of this Demonstration, has found out a marvelous witty invention to befool his followers withall, making them believe that there is no such thing as these Secundae Notiones, distinct from the Names or Words whereby they are said to be signified; and that there is no perception in us, but of such Phantasmes as are impressed from externall Objects, such as are common to Us and Beasts: and as for the Names which we give to these, or the Phantasmes of them, that there is the same reason of them, as of other Markes, Letters, or Characters, all which coming in at the Senses, he would bear them in hand that it is a plain case, that we have the perception of nothing but what is impressed from corporeall Objects. But how ridiculous an Evasion this is, may be easily discovered, if we consider, that if these Mathematicall and Logicaall Notions we speak of being nothing but Names, Logicaall and Mathematicall Truths will not be the same in all Nations, because they have not the same names. […] Wherefore it is plain, that there is a setled Notion distinct from these Words and Names, as well as from those corporeall Phantasmes impressed from the Object; which was the thing to be demonstrated.95

This passage suggests that More believed that ideas could exist separately from the word that described them, otherwise translation would be impossible. For example, to More used ‘horror’ and ‘aversion’ interchangeably due to the influence of Descartes’s similar concepts.

More based his horror on the writings of Descartes, and like Descartes, he treated ‘horror’ and ‘aversion’ as synonyms. Although the French word horreur and its English equivalent had slightly different usages in the period, with only the French term relating to aversion, More used it in his Latin work Enchiridion ethicum as not quite an opposite of desire, but a negative form of it – the desire to move away from harm. More borrowed from Descartes’s understanding of the passions. Although More listed physical causes of horror or aversion which shared qualities that fell into Hobbes’s category of turpe, he retained earlier ideas of the passions as something to be controlled by reason to avoid sin, merging the two ideas with the suggestion that physical ugliness might be an external manifestation of sinfulfulness.

Finally, Chapter Five examines Isaac Watts’s uses of ‘aversion’ and ‘disgust’. Watts spent lots of time discussing how best to use language, and many of Watts’s contemporaries were aware that this type of clarity was important to him. His biographer and friend, Thomas Gibbons,

described what he called Watts’s ‘perspicuity’: ‘Whatever he discourses upon, be it a theme of morality, a question in philosophy, or the sublimest doctrine of religion, he is every where clear and easy to be understood’.96 Gibbons also pointed out that Watts liked ‘avoiding terms of science and art, obsolete expressions, and words of foreign deviation not familiar to the generality of mankind’.97 He also helped to forge a similar type of clarity in the work of others. Watts edited and published *Devout Exercises of the Heart in Meditation and Soliloquy* by his late and ‘intimate friend’ Elizabeth Singer Rowe in 1737.98 Despite describing her as ‘so sublime a genius’, he honoured her instructions to take ‘full liberty to suppress what you think Proper’, by removing those expressions he thought ‘to be a little too rapturous, too near a-kin to the Language of the mystical writers’.99 Clarity was key. In Watts’s 1629 work, *Logick*, he dedicated a chapter to ‘words, and their several divisions together with the advantage and danger of them’.100 To Watts, words and ideas were closely related. He believed there was a danger that when ‘we use Words in mere Waste, and have no Ideas for them’ and suggested that it was necessary to ‘never rest with mere Words which have no belonging or meaning to them, or at least no settled and determinate Ideas’.101 Words worked best when connected to a ‘thing’. Words played the role of clear signs, allowing the communication of ideas from one to another. Should these become murky or misunderstood, these ideas would, in turn, become confusing. In his work *The Improvement of Mind* he wrote:

> If we would remember Words, or learn the Names or Things we should have them recommended to our Memory by clear and distinct Pronunciation, Spelling or Writing. If we would treasure up the Ideas of Things, Notions, Propositions, Arguments and Sciences, these should be recommended also to our Memory by a clear and distinct Perception of them. Faint glimmering and confused Ideas will vanish like Images seen in Twilight.102

His commitment to clarity is also why he had a disdain for overcomplicated words as used by philosophers, believing that ‘they are but hard Words, which only express a learned and pompous

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101 Ibid. 84.
102 Ibid. 261.
Ignorance of the truer Cause of natural Appearances; and in the sense they are mere Words without Ideas.\textsuperscript{103}

Despite his emphasis on clear writing, he did not dumb-down his language entirely unless he was writing for children. He balanced Hobbes’s need for precision in definitions of names with Thomas Wright’s belief that the words used should be understandable to a wide readership. For Watts, names acted as a clear sign for well-defined ‘things’. Such clarity means not only that Watts use of ‘disgust’ had elements of the vulgar usage of the time so that it would be understandable to a general readership, but also that philosophical uses to the word provided a great deal of its meaning.

Watts’s \textit{The Doctrine of the Passions} was part of a range of works by Watts on a variety of subjects – from hymns to logic – that were joined by a religious thread. On the one hand, Watts was a throwback, relying on some Aristotelian ideas for his opposite to desire: aversion. On the other hand, Watts was a pioneer: the first English-speaking writer to use the word ‘disgust’ as the name of a discrete passion, building upon the changing meanings of the word from the early seventeenth century onwards to signify a type of displeasure. Drawing on earlier works by John Locke and the English taste theorists, Watts’s ‘disgust’ incorporated those elements from previous opposites of desire that might be described as disgusting, separating them from the opposite of desire (for Watts, ‘aversion’) to create a distinct and unique passion. Watts’s ‘disgust’ was a passion of surfeit and overindulgence. However, it was not a passion of total rejection; a surfeit of sin could cause a disgust capable of bringing one back to God, acting, as the earlier opposites of desire did, as a moral guide.

\textbf{Note on Spellings and Punctuation}

This thesis deals with words and concepts. To keep the distinction between the two as clear as possible, words, when being discussed as words, appear in single speech marks – e.g. ‘disgust’ – while concepts appear without speech marks – e.g. disgust. Non-English words and concepts are italicised. An attempt has been made to retain the original spellings in quotations; if clarification is needed, it will be provided in square brackets. When a translation is provided in the body of the text, the original text is included in the footnotes. When it is more appropriate

\footnote{Watts, \textit{Logick}, 84.}
for the original text to be provided in the body of the text, a translation is provided in the footnotes. Translations are my own unless indicated.
Chapter 1: Thomas Wright’s ‘Flight,’ ‘Detestation’ and ‘Abomination’

‘In Middle English, Abomination is used as a medical term to mean nausea’

– William Ian Miller, *The Anatomy of Disgust*

‘He [Thomas Aquinas] had already given it [the opposite of desire] two names, and they are still strong: “flight” and “abomination” or “disgust”’

– Eva Brann, *Feeling our Feelings*

One of the most frequently cited historical works about disgust – William Ian Miller’s *The Anatomy of Disgust* – claims that the similarities between historical uses of ‘abomination’ and modern uses of ‘disgust’ outweigh the differences enough for the two to be regarded as near synonyms. This chapter will demonstrate that this is not the case by considering the writings of the English Catholic missionary, Thomas Wright. Wright’s *Passions of the Minde in Generall* gives an insight into why taking pre-disgust words at face value is to miss an important part of the history. To Wright, ‘abomination’ was not a form of nausea of revulsion, it was a type of hate: hatred of abomination. Hatred of abomination described the experiences caused by a type of evil that could harm those you loved. The hatred would combine with flight and detestation when harm from that evil became a possibility. Flight and detestation were Wright’s opposite to desire, taking their origins from Thomas Aquinas’s phrase *fuga seu abominatio*. They acted with hatred of abomination as a motion away from a possible evil, in contrast to desire and love’s movement towards a probable good. Like Aquinas, Wright thought that the opposites to desire, and hatred of abomination had both a secular and a religious use, and the latter was the proper use of the passion in the service of God and the avoidance of sin.

Wright’s opposites to desire and his use of abomination were embedded in the context of a man who wished to return his country to Catholicism. Wright was aiming his work at a wide range of audiences: gentlemen, physicians, preachers, theologians, philosophers and good Christians. As such, he believed that his writing should not be overly technical. He expressed

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his disapproval of ‘Metaphors, Poetical phrases in prose, or ink-pot terms.’ He asked: ‘Why cannot divers Sciences already invented, be [...] delivered in a more ordinary manner?’ In keeping with this philosophy, Wright built his edifice upon foundations made from the period’s common usage of ‘flight’, detestation’, and ‘abomination’, rather than attempting to define terms of his own. At the same time, he did not choose the terms ‘abomination’, ‘detestation’, and ‘flight’ simply because they were well known. The words he chose retain elements of Thomist and biblical thought. The ‘good Christian’, in other words the Catholic, had a particular relationship with the opposites to desire and abomination. Feeling hatred for those evils that might harm someone you love was an important aspect when saving loved ones from the ultimate harm of hell.

This chapter begins by exploring the usages of those words, before investigating Wright’s personal and intellectual influences, and his understanding of the passions, abomination, and the opposites to desire. The chapter will show that Wright was describing a group of passions that share little with modern disgust.

1.1 Wright’s Linguistic Influences

The word ‘disgust’ cannot be found in any of Wright’s works. This is probably because the word was only introduced into the English language at around the time Wright was authoring Passions. The first known occurrence of the English word ‘disgust’ was in a 1598 Italian-English dictionary by John Florio. Florio was a habitual inventor, or at least adopter, of words. According to John Willinsky, Florio is cited as the source of 3,843 words in the second edition of the Oxford English Dictionary. Of those words, 1,149 existed no earlier than in Florio's work, and 173 are unique to it, putting him eleventh in a list of writers who introduced words into English throughout the history of the language. Florio was certainly aware that ‘daily both newv vvordes are inuented’ and noticed that even dictionaries of supposedly settled languages such as Latin ‘were still increasing’ their contents. He even made plain that he intended ‘to perfect with addition of the French and Latine’. However, Willinsky presents his table with a caveat. John Murray, the editor of the second edition of the OED, was concerned ‘that the

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4 Ibid., 141, 143.
5 Ibid., 142.
7 John Florio, A Worlde of Wordes, or Most Copious, and Exact Dictionarie in Italian and English (London: Arnold Hatfield, 1598), sig. 11.
OED is perpetuating a series of words whose life, according to the evidence assembled, appears to be restricted to dictionaries. It seems unlikely that words were invented for dictionaries by their writers. However, the Italian words Florio translated as disgust – *disgustare, sugusto*, and *sgustare* – also seem to have no direct source. Florio listed his sources at the beginning of his 1598 dictionary, and the closest match among them is Robert Estienne’s *Dictionarium Latinogallicum*. In this work, Estienne defined *fastidium* as *desgouster* and *desgoustment*. Estienne was also one of ‘the Stephans’ to whom Florio referred in his ‘To The Reader’. The problem is that Estienne’s is a Latin-French dictionary; it does not directly link to Florio’s translation of the Italian words *disgustare, sugusto*, and *sgustare* into the English ‘disgust’, ‘distast’, and ‘vnkindness’. That none of the texts Florio mentions contains the Italian words is not a huge surprise. The Google Books Italian Corpus, stretching between 1590 and 1598, contains more than a thousand searchable titles and hundreds of thousands of words, but only 199 instances of any derivative of *disgustare*.

Despite Florio removing the word from his dictionary, the foreign influence on the word ‘disgust’ continued. Perhaps the earliest translation of the equivalent French word *degoust* is found in John Palsgrave’s 1530 *Lesclarcissement de la Langue Francoyse*. Palsgrave translated ‘Je suis degousté’ as ‘I am out of taste, as one’s mouth is that hath no savour in meate nor drinke.’ Cotgrave’s translation was rather different, suggesting something of a change in usage between 1530 and the publication of his French and English dictionary in 1611. To Cotgrave, *degoust* and *desgoust*, which he believed were variant spellings of *degout*, meant ‘a drop, or dropping.’ Taking *degoust* to mean a drop was not new. Claude Hollyband had already translated *degout* as ‘the dropping of a house’ in his 1593 dictionary. He very likely took this from John Baret, who, in his translation of ‘a Droppe’ as *degoutter*, included the definition ‘[t]he dropping of a house, or the eaues of an house, also a synke of little gutter’. This definition appears to be

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9 Florio, *Words*, ‘To The Reader’: ‘The names of the Bookes and Auctors, that haue bin read of purpose, for the accomplishing of this Dictionarie, and out of which it is collected’.
11 Florio, *Words*, ‘To The Reader’.
12 Ibid., s.v. *disgustare, sugusto, sgustare*.
15 Claude Desainlines [Hollyband], *A Dictionarie French and English* (London: Thomas Woodcock, 1593), s.v. *Degout*.
somewhat distant from the understanding of Florio and his Italian *disgustare*. However, it may have been that the French and English words had developed different usages. Cotgrave used the English word ‘*disgust*’ in translations of two other French words, suggesting that he assumed his readers would have some familiarity with the word. *Desaismer* was translated as ‘To vnloue, desist from louing; loath what before was loued; fall into dislike, or Disgust of’, while *desappetit* became ‘Want of appetite; an ill, or no stomache vnto a thing; a queasinesse, or Disgust of stomacke’. This suggests that Cotgrave understood ‘*disgust*’ in two ways. Firstly, it referred to when something loved became something disliked. Secondly, it was when something was unpalatable’. These two meanings – dislike and distaste – certainly seem to be how the words were best understood in the first half of the seventeenth century. Neither of these definitions would have been useful to Wright for his opposite of desire. Instead, he relied on English versions of much older words: ‘flight’, ‘detestation’, and ‘abomination’.

**The Word ‘flight’**

The understanding of the word ‘flight’ that Wright used primarily suggests an action that, while not involuntary, was a somewhat forced action taken to avoid harm. Ordinarily, ‘*flight*’ was not a passion, but an action defined as ‘To Fly over, or beyonde’, ‘To put to Flight’, or ‘To flie or run away’. Period dictionaries more commonly described ‘*flight*’ as ‘running away’. The Old English word ‘*Fleame*’ was also translated as ‘Flight, banisshement, exile’, and the Latin version *Disicio* became ‘put to flight’. The words that might have modified ‘*flight*’ to mean ‘flying in the air’ are varied. Nevertheless, of the 11,250 instances of variants of ‘*flight*’ in the *TCP-EEBO* corpus between 1560 and 1621, the words suggested by period dictionary definitions – ‘over’ and ‘beyond’ – can only be found in proximity to ‘*flight*’ in four and eleven instances respectively. Furthermore, a Key Words In Context analysis appears to yield very few additional instances of this usage of ‘*flight*’ in comparison to its use in relation to the act of fleeing. This common usage of ‘*flight*’ is also found in the KJV Bible, although rarely. All eight

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18 Laurence Nowell, ‘[Vocabularium Saxonicum]’, ca 1567, Special Collections, Bodleian Library, s.v. Fleame; Thomas Thomas, *Dictionarium Linguarum Latinae et Anglicanae* (Cambridge: Thomas Thomas, 1587), s.v. Disicio; Robert Cawdrey, *A Table Alphabeticall* (London: J. Roberts, 1617), s.v. discomfitting.
instances of ‘flight’ in the KJV refer to running away. Similarly, throughout Shakespeare’s corpus, the word ‘flight’ occurs 58 times, with only three instances referring to flying.

In the EEBO-TCP corpus, the action of ‘flight’ was often a somewhat forced action, rather than something planned and executed. The notion of ‘putting to’ or being ‘put to’ flight is common, suggesting a sudden movement away from an overwhelming force. In one example, the respected divine and future Archbishop of Canterbury, George Abbot, described the dispersal of the followers of the early Christian heretic Montanus (after Montanus’s prediction of the end of the world had not come true) as being ‘put to flight’. Among other examples are the poet Samuel Rowlands writing of those who were ‘put to flight by feare’, and an unknown author identifying as A.I. who described a soldier ‘whose strength put thousands vnto flight’.

‘Flight’ can be found in proximity to the phrase ‘put to’ 2,240 times out of 11,250 instances; that is, 19.9% of the time. Such a high correlation that suggests that ‘flight’ was often not something planned, but a sudden action taken when harm became a possibility. It was quite distinct from both ‘detestation’ and ‘abomination’, which had a closer relationship to each other.

‘Detestation’

It seems to have been perfectly acceptable to translate the Latin word abominatio as ‘detestation’, as is evidenced by its use as a translation in the Latin–English dictionaries of Thomas Cooper, Thomas Thomas, and John Rider. ‘Detestation’ appears to have had a connection to sin. Variants of the word ‘sin’ can be found in proximity to 30.14% of the occurrences of ‘detestation’ (see Table 1.1). The combination regularly exists in religious texts across the

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20 William Shakespeare, The Works of Shakespeare [Globe Edition] (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippencott and Co., 1867). The instances occur in: All’s Well That Ends Well, I.509; Antony and Cleopatra, I.2093; As You Like It, I.540; Coriolanus, I.523; Cymbeline, II.2070, 3419; Hamlet, I.4021; Henry IV part I, I.1852; Henry IV, Part II, I.163; Henry VI part I, II.1563, 1573, 1982, 2135, 2155, 2175, 2234; Henry VI part III, II. 732, 851, 1039, 1251, 1712, 2407; King John, I.2537; King Lear, I.1808; Lover’s Complaint, I.240; Macbeth, II. 1162, 1213, 1724, 1741, 1746; Measure for Measure, I.1227; The Merchant of Venice, II. 147, 1261; Midsummer Night’s Dream, II.216, 237, 1650, 2133; Much Ado About Nothing, II.35, 2679; Pericles, I.173; Rape of Lucrece, II.745, 1018; Timon of Athens, I.2556; Titus Andronicus, I.2605; Troilus and Cressida, I.364; Two Gentlemen of Verona, II.839, 931, 984, 1998, 2104; The Winter’s Tale, II.804, 2446, 2488, 2686. In addition, ‘flying’ occurs in: Timon of Athens, I.56; Richard II, I.354; The Winter’s Tale; I.1871.


22 Thomas Cooper, Thesaurus Linguae Romanae & Britannicae (London: [Henry Denham], 1578), s.v. abominatio; Thomas, Dictionarium, s.v. Abominatio, –ones; Rider, Scholastica, s.v. To Detest.
examined period. For example, Thomas Bentley’s 1582 collection of women’s writing, *The Monument of Matrones*, included a phrase supposedly written by a woman called ‘Ladie ELIZABETH Tyrwhit’ who, when reflecting on her actions, would ‘see mine owne sinne with sorrow and detestation’.23 Similarly, George Downname’s 1604 *The Christians Sanctuarie* used the phrase ‘the detestation of our sinne’, and Richard Rogers’ 1620 *Samuels Encounter with Saul* discussed the ‘weariness and detestation for [Samuel’s] sin’.24

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Words in proximity</th>
<th>% (number in brackets)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sin</td>
<td>30.14% (832)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>great/grate</td>
<td>9.28% (182)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>God</td>
<td>14.59% (286)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hatred</td>
<td>8.16% (160)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horror</td>
<td>4.39% (86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I(y)lod</td>
<td>3.37% (66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vtter</td>
<td>3.01% (59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loath</td>
<td>2.96% (58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wicked</td>
<td>2.40% (47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abhor</td>
<td>2.04% (40)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.1 The frequency of the most common words found within five words either side of ‘detestation’ in texts published between 1560 and 1621 in the *EEBO-TCP* corpus (absolute numbers in brackets).

Uses of variants of ‘detestation’ in English Bibles also suggest that it could be related to the specific object of sin. The only English Bible from the period that used the word ‘detestation’ was the Geneva Bible. It occurs twice in Jeremiah: once in 42:18 (‘when ye shall enter into Egypt, and ye shall be a detestation, and an astonishment, and a curse and a reproche’) and once in 44:12 (‘they [the Hebrews] shall be a detestation and an astonishment and a curse and a reproche’).25 It is a word used as a warning of the shame and dishonour associated with any Hebrew leaving Judah and going to Egypt to hide from their enemies. No other English Bible translated this instance of the word as ‘detestation’. The Bishops’ Bible and the Geneva Bible both used the same word, albeit spelt differently: ‘reuiled’ and ‘reuyled’ respectively. The

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Douay-Rheims Bible, a translation of the Vulgate in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries with which Wright is likely to have been familiar, translated *jurisjurandum* as ‘execration’, which is also the word used by the KJV. Of the English Bibles produced in the period, variants of ‘detestation’, such as ‘detest’ and ‘detestable’, were only found in the KJV. On six occasions, where older English Bibles used the words ‘idols’, ‘offences’, and ‘scandals’, the KJV used the term ‘detestable things’, usually with the qualifier or reinforcing term ‘and abominations’ soon after.²⁶ All these uses of ‘detestable thing’ were translations of the Hebrew word 𐤋𐤊𐤉𐤄 (shiqquts). This was a word frequently translated as *abominatio* in the Latin Vulgate and specifically linked to the sin of idolatry. Similarly, where the KJV used the word ‘detest’, the Hebrew Bible used a version of the word 𐤋𐤊𐤅 (shaqats), another of the words translated as a declension of *abominatio* in the Vulgate. This is semantically like *shiqquts*, but refers more commonly to those things that can pollute. This suggests that something ‘detestable’, or that could cause one to ‘detest’ it, may very well be idolatrous and polluting. A ‘detestation’ or a ‘detestable thing’ was something that could turn one away from God and down another path; in the above example, the person who had turned away from God for their own safety would be the idolatrous object, since they would be able to pollute others into taking a similarly selfish course of action. ‘Detestation’ appears to be carrying a great deal of religious baggage that might have appealed to Wright. However, this must be tempered by the wider corpus and its regular use of variants of ‘detestation’ outside this narrow biblical context.

Much like the frequent uses of ‘sin’ in proximity to ‘detestation’, variants of the word ‘God’ can be found 286 times in the corpus in proximity to ‘detestation’, or 14.59% of the time. Despite this, the common biblical and religious use of ‘detestation’ is at odds with some of its wider use in the corpus. Of the 906 texts that contain versions of the word ‘detestation’ in the period, 104 (11.48%) are about non-religious subjects. This secular group of texts was wide ranging: from histories, through guides to good manners and etiquette, to debates about the moral harm of stage plays.²⁷ There is other evidence that ‘detestation’ and its variants had a common secular usage. Within five words either side of variants of ‘detestation’ are seemingly

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secular words, such as ‘great’ and ‘hate’. These usages suggest two things. First, unlike ‘abomination’, which appears to have been an absolute with no variation in intensity, it was possible to experience ‘detestation’ on a scale. Just five authors in this period from the EEBO-TCP corpus mention ‘great abomination’, and there are no examples of other adjectives being used to modify ‘abomination’. By contrast, one in ten uses of ‘detestation’ were accompanied by the adjective ‘great’, suggesting the possibility of a more extreme type of ‘detestation’ than standard ‘detestation’. There are examples from the period across a range of genres, with translations responsible for many of the earlier instances. In a 1567 translation by Sir Geoffrey Fenton of one of Matteo Bandello’s early Italian stories, *Certaine Tragicall Discourses*, Bandello described a woman engaging in activities through necessity that ‘she hath longe refuced with great detestation’. John Pory’s 1598 translation of Leo Africanus’s *A Geographical Historie of Africa* recorded a man who had been charged with so much power by the King of Fez that he had become a ‘petie-god’ and that ‘all the courtiers had him in great detestation’. The relationship entered later works by English authors. A line from Edwin Sandy’s 1605 Catholic polemic, *A Relation of the State of Religion*, suggested that when Lutheran preachers give sermons in Calvinist lands ‘their Princes and people have them in as great detestation’ as the preachers had for the people. A discussion in Walter Raleigh’s 1614 *History of the World* describes the feelings of Pausanias, a Greek ‘Gentleman of the Guard’ who had been ‘first made drunk, and then left to be carnally abused by diuers persons’ with the approval of his King: ‘[t]his Pausanias grew into so great detestation of the Kings partialitie.’

The second thing to consider is that there are 160 instances of variants of the word ‘hate’ found in close proximity to ‘detestation’. The two words can also be found together regularly in period dictionaries. For example, Cotgrave’s English-French dictionary translated *Haine* not only as ‘Hate, hatred’, but also as ‘loathing, detestation’. In the EEBO-TCP corpus, the two

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words are most often found when discussing sin. For example, in Hugues Sureau du Rosier’s 1573 confessional work, *A Lamentable Discourse of the Fall of Hughe Sureau*, du Rosier lamented that sins he had committed that ‘doe engender in my soule such a hate and detestation of the euill that I haue committed’. In 1616, another work discussing sin used the combination in a similar way, ‘for nature hath imprinted in euery man a hate and detestation of sinne’.

To detest something, these examples suggest, is sometimes to hate it. It was not, however, the same as hate. By taking the examples given above together, something distinct takes shape. Detestation could be a passion with strong ties to religion and an intense dislike of an object. It is a need to push something away and, like modern disgust, it can make an object or individual disgusting – detestation for an object or individual could make them detestable. Detestation had a scale, and some things could be more detested than others. Wright also claimed that detestation was something distinct, but not entirely uncoupled, from a type of hatred: the ‘hatred of abomination’. This was a form of hatred that applied to any evil capable of harming someone we love. To fully understand this relationship, the keyword that flavours this related type of hate needs exploration: ‘abomination’.

**Ab(h)omination**

Wright was among those who used the word ‘abomination’ rather than ‘abhominatation’ – two words that may have had distinct meanings, although this is unlikely. Kevin Sienna believes that the two words are distinct. He bases this on the assumption that ‘abomination derives from the Latin “ab-ominare”, to depreciate as an ill omen; but its homonym “abhominatation” derives from “ab-homine”, a deviation away from man.’ In opposition to this view are, among others, William Ian Miller, Ben and David Crystal, and A. S. Palmer, who have claimed that the two versions are variant spellings of the same word. Miller provides the best evidence. He quotes a passage about the mispronunciation of words from *Love’s Labours Lost*: ‘This is abominable, which he would call “abhominable”’. If Miller is correct, Shakespeare seemed to have believed there were two spellings of the same word. However, Shakespeare put the claim into the mouth

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34 Hugues Sureau du Rosier, *A Lamentable Discourse of the Fall of Hughe Sureau* (London: [Thomas East], 1573), 42.
36 Kevin Patrick Siena, *Sins of the Flesh* (Toronto: Centre for Reformation and Renaissance Studies, 2005), 121.
of a character who was complaining about those who were championing, if not inventing, new words. Also, this is the only time Shakespeare used ‘abominable’, and he never used ‘abomination’. ‘Abominable’ occurs in his writing fifteen times, and ‘abomination’ four times. Shakespeare may not be the best example of the interchangeability of the two spellings. There is good evidence elsewhere, however. Between 1560 and 1621, dictionary writers placed both versions of the words within a small set of terms used for definitions and translations of foreign or hard words. Within this set were both ‘abomination’ or ‘abomination’, as well as ‘disdaine’, ‘loathsomenes’, ‘abhore’, ‘detest’, ‘hate’, ‘shun’, ‘yrksome’ and ‘flie’. Some dictionaries made it clear that the two words were the same. For example, John Rider’s Bibliotheca Scholastica defined ‘abomination’ as simply ‘vid. Abomination’. Evidence of this agreement goes beyond period dictionaries; the EEBO-TCP corpus also demonstrates the interchangeability of ‘abomination’ and ‘abomination’.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proximal words</th>
<th>Abomination</th>
<th>Abomination</th>
<th>Both</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lord</td>
<td>19.74% (276)</td>
<td>10.70% (276)</td>
<td>13.98% (542)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>God</td>
<td>10.87% (152)</td>
<td>11.47% (285)</td>
<td>11.25% (437)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desolation</td>
<td>12.87% (180)</td>
<td>8.16% (203)</td>
<td>9.86% (383)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wicked</td>
<td>6.65% (93)</td>
<td>5.67% (141)</td>
<td>6.03% (234)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sin</td>
<td>3.64% (51)</td>
<td>4.71% (117)</td>
<td>4.32% (168)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idol</td>
<td>3.64% (51)</td>
<td>3.70% (92)</td>
<td>3.68% (143)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filth</td>
<td>3% (42)</td>
<td>3.42% (85)</td>
<td>3.27% (127)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sight</td>
<td>3.36% (47)</td>
<td>2.33% (58)</td>
<td>2.7% (105)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.2 % frequency of the most common words found within five words either side of variants of ‘abomination’ and ‘abomination’ in texts published between 1560 and 1621 in the EEBO-TCP corpus (absolute numbers in brackets).

38 ‘Abominable’ can be found in the following Shakespeare plays: As You Like It, l.1801; Henry IV, Part I, 1.1445; Henry IV, Part II, l. 1398; Henry VI, Part I, l.446; Henry VI, Part II, l.2645; Henry VI, Part III, 1.551; King Lear, 1.404; Measure for Measure, 1.1530; The Merry Wives of Windsor, 1.1073; Pericles, 1.2079; The Tempest, 1.1245; Titus Andronicus, II, 3, 807, 2196; Troilus and Cressida, II.3410, 3644. ‘Abomination’ can also be found in Antony and Cleopatra, 1.1925; and The Rape of Lucrece, II.752, 969, 1879.


40 Rider, Bibliotheca, s.v. abomination, abomination.
The results of this analysis reveal that ‘abomination’ occurs much more often than ‘abomination’ throughout the corpus: 2,485 and 1,398 times respectively. It also reveals that the most frequently proximal words of both are the same. These are ‘Lord’, ‘God’, ‘desolation’, ‘wicked’, ‘sin’, ‘idol’, ‘filth’, and ‘sight’ (see Table 1.2). The corpus may also show some differences. The word ‘Lord’ can be found in proximity to 19.74% of the occurrences of ‘abomination’ in the corpus. It occurs close to 10.7% of occurrences ‘abomination’, almost half as often. Nevertheless, the dictionaries and the corpus together suggest that ‘abomination’ and ‘abomination’ were variant spellings of the same word. As a result, future uses of ‘abomination’ in this chapter will refer to both.

Secular Abomination?

Even outside the Bible, there appears to have always been a link between abomination, God, and sin, making it the perfect term for a religious work such as Wright’s. There were few secular contexts in which the word ‘abomination’ would have made sense. Although most works published between 1560 and 1621 were either about religion or had prose that contained religious elements, of the 1,406 texts in the EEBO-TCP corpus that include the word ‘abomination’, only 125 are not sermons, religious polemics, homilies, or theological treatises. These 125 works are a mixture of histories, medical works, works on navigation, mathematics tutorials, and texts about witchcraft and magic. All of them used the word ‘abomination’ in a religious context. Some works used a word derived from ‘abomination’ – ‘abominable’ – with seemingly no link to God or sin. For example, in his popular translation of Juan Luis Vives’ The Instruction of a Christian Woman, Richard Hyrde included the translation: ‘It is no shame for a woman to hold her peace; but it is a shame for her and abominable to lack discretion, and to live ill.’ Despite the seemingly secular meaning, these ‘abominable’ acts are themselves not unlike those mentioned in numerous biblical passages that relate both to women ‘holding their peace’ or keeping silent. Such passages include 1 Corinthians 14:34, ‘Let your women keep silence in the churches: for it is not permitted unto them to speak’, and 1 Timothy 2:12, ‘But I suffer not a woman to teach, nor to usurp authority over the man, but to be in silence’. Vives highlighted this later in the chapter, which Hyrde translated as:

The Apostle Paul, the vessel of election, informing and teaching the church of the Corinthians with holy precepts, saith: Let your women hold their tongue is in congregations: For they are not allowed to speak but to be subject as the law hath bideth.\textsuperscript{12}

He went on to say ‘I give no license to a woman to be a teacher, not to have authority of the man but to be in silence.’ Vives suggested that for a woman to ‘hold her piece [peace]’ required not just a silence born of the period’s ideas about good manners, but also entailed staying ‘subject as the law hath bideth’ so as not to ‘live ill’ of that law.\textsuperscript{43} To speak would be to break ‘holy precepts’ – to commit a sin. Although it is possible that Hyrde’s use of ‘abominable’ had no associated religious meanings, it remains the case that it appears to mirror biblical discussions of women and, if not sin, then certainly transgressions of a biblical command. Abomination almost certainly retained its religious connotations when Thomas Wright used it.

To understand Wright’s usage of these words, it is important to understand the text in which he discussed the opposite of desire: The Passions of the Minde in Generall (1604). Wright seemingly aimed this work at many different readers, but he directed each of the discourses towards a group of readers on whom all his energies were focused: English Catholics. The importance of his mission in England and the role The Passions played in it was an essential ingredient in Wright’s appraisal and construction of his opposite of desire.

\textbf{1.2 Wright’s Mission}

Thomas Wright was born into a Catholic family in York in 1561 but fled to the continent at sixteen years of age during a period of increased hostility against Catholics.\textsuperscript{44} Desiring to become a missionary, Wright attended the seminary at the English College at Douai. Despite Phillip II of Spain having authorised the foundation of a university teaching five subjects – canon and civil law, theology, medicine and the arts – there are good reasons to believe that the English college was set up to follow the pedagogic style of the University of Oxford’s primarily Aristotelian scholasticism. Richard Smith, a former Oxford Regius Professor of Divinity,
founded the English College in 1562 in the image of his former institution, and the expertise of Wright in the traditional Aristotelian trivium subjects would most likely have derived from an Aristotelian environment.\textsuperscript{45} Despite its focus on the trivium, Douai did not lack a robust religious education. In 1569, Cardinal William Allen, the ex-proctor of Oxford University and the principal of St Mary’s Hall, created the seminary arm of Douai to establish a venue for displaced English Catholics to continue with their studies. In 1577, Wright likely followed Allen to his new English College in Rome. Wright was among a group of English students that Father Robert Parsons asked to join the Society of Jesus in 1580. It seems probable that he encountered Francisco Suárez, a Jesuit theologian and philosopher of considerable influence whose structure of the passions was not dissimilar to Wright’s.\textsuperscript{46}

Parsons quickly recognised Wright’s talent for debating and channelled his energies into the teaching of apologetics against heretics at the Valladolid seminary. This ploy did not achieve a great deal of success: Wright soon focused his rhetoric on the group of English Jesuits of which he was a part by disagreeing with their support for a Spanish invasion of England. Instead, he suggested that by submitting to the English Crown, an era of tolerance might begin, since he was convinced that Elizabeth’s successor would be a Catholic. This quarrel caused friction between Wright and Parsons, since the latter not only wanted a Catholic invasion but went as far as to support, if not take part in, a plot to assassinate Queen Elizabeth.\textsuperscript{47} Eventually, this rift forced Wright to leave the Society and return home to England to work as a missionary somewhat independently of Parsons’s Jesuit English Mission.

After upsetting the Archbishop of York and finding himself in prison, Wright appears to have continued to court controversy. Rather than remaining quiet, he seems to have passed his time preaching to other inmates. He is almost certainly the Thomas Wright who converted the schismatic Thomas Kemys in 1599, and it is likely that he is the man responsible for the conversion of the playwright Ben Jonson. Jonson, Wright, and another English Catholic, Hugh


Holland, contributed dedicatory poems to one another’s work. Wright also published two defences of the sacraments in 1596, both of which contained polemics against Protestantism, followed by another anti-Protestant work in 1600. Out of this background sprung The Passions of the Minde in 1601. It seems unlikely that this was a departure from his overall mission. Wright’s mission ran through the centre of everything else he wrote, and that includes his choice of words, whether using them to dissect Protestant thought or to describe the passions. There is a reason why he chose the words ‘flight’, ‘detestation’, and ‘abomination’ when describing the network surrounding his opposite of desire, usages he almost certainly drew from the common understandings of the period.

The Passions of the Minde in Generall

The Passions of the Minde, and the 1604 expanded version, The Passions of the Minde in Generall, have often been taken to be unconnected with Wright’s mission of the conversion and care of English Catholics. This claim may stem from a reading of Wright’s words. On page two of The Passions, Wright listed the various types of people whom he imagined would make up his readership: ‘the Diuine, the Philosopher, the curers of body and soule, I meane the Preacher & Physitian, the good Christian that attendeth mortification, & the prudent ciuill Gentleman. As will be discussed below, historians have taken each of these to be the primary focus of Wright’s work, but this probably reflects their individual interests more than Wright’s. Wright, like many at the time, worked with and across intellectual discourses, unaware of the strict boundaries imposed upon them by modern historiographical boxes such as ‘medical’, ‘philosophical’, and ‘religious’. To provide a theory that was ‘in generall’, or comprehensive, he had to tackle the passions as a whole, developing his understanding from his entire body of knowledge. Nevertheless, there appears to have been particular relationships between two


49 Thomas Wright, A Treatise, Shewing the Possibilitie, and Conueniencie of the Reall Presence of Our Sauiour (Antwerp [London]: Ioachim Trugesius [Valentine Simmes], 1596; Thomas Wright, The Disposition or Garnishmente of the Soule (Antwerpe [England]: Ioachim Trugesius [the English secret press], 1596); Thomas Wright, Certaine Articles or Forcible Reasons Discouering the Palpable Absurdities, and Most NotoriousErrors of the Protestants Religion (Antwerpe [England]: [English secret press]), 1600.


51 Wright, Passions, 2.
groups, the first consisting of gentlemen and physicians of the body, and the second of divines and preachers. Also, the work may be intended specifically for one group who were the focus of Wright’s life and work outside *The Passions*, a group often overlooked in the historiography: good Christians.

**Civil Gentlemen and the ‘Physitian of the Body’**

In her book *Passion and Action* that explores how early modern thinkers understood the passions, Susan James leans towards ‘civil Gentleman’ as the primary target of Wright’s work. She describes Wright’s *The Passions* as part of a ‘genre of works which offer to teach “the art to know men”, construed as including the art to know oneself.’\(^{52}\) *The Passions* existed alongside works aimed at a ‘predominantly male élite who occupy, or will occupy, positions of power […] to identify the acquisition of self-knowledge with the ability to master and manipulate passions, and to associate both with a process of cure.’\(^{53}\) This reading of *The Passions* is valid: Wright spent much of his preface explaining how the English could be civilised, genteel, and educated. Wright assured his readership that the English are just as capable of grasping complex theological issues, such as salvation, as any Mediterranean man.

Mary Floyd-Wilson has also noticed this gentlemanly aspect. In her *English Ethnicity and Race in Early Modern Drama*, she suggests that Wright was proposing that the English should contravene their ‘northern’ excess with ‘southern qualities.’\(^{54}\) For Floyd-Wilson, Wright hoped that the English could tap into a little of the manners, political awareness, and masculinity of dark-skinned southern Europeans.\(^{55}\) She claims that Wright’s text is important ‘for its explicit articulation of the notion that the most potent remedy for the northerner’s plain simplicity and rude behaviour is the adoption of a southern temperament.’\(^{56}\) She also suggests that such manners can be medically understood, pointing out Wright’s use of the ‘inconstant humours and changeable complexion’ in his description of English mannerisms.\(^{57}\) It is certainly the case that Wright described the ways in which climate, skin colour, hair colour, gender, and age could affect manners through the passions they engendered. For example, he stated that ‘the manners

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53 Ibid.
54 Mary Floyd-Wilson, *English Ethnicity and Race in Early Modern Drama* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 64.
56 Ibid., 64.
57 Ibid., 158.
of the soule follow the temperature of the body’ and that the face was ‘the rhinde and leaves’ of
the passions.\textsuperscript{58} It is also true that Wright acknowledged that English temperaments could change.
He likened the English to people living in the countryside who, after being brought to a city,
are at first ‘simple, and vnwarie, but afterwards, by conuersing a while, and by the experience
of other mens behaviours, they become wonderful wise and iudicious’.\textsuperscript{59}

There is more to the difference between southern and northern Europeans in this period
than the colour of skin, however. The changeable complexion of the English was not only a
problem of manners, but was also an indicator of the instability of English faith. The ‘simple and
vnwarie’, light-skinned and effeminate Protestant north was a contrast to the ‘bold and
audacious’ dark-skinned and masculine Catholic south. Wright claimed that he desired ‘the good
of my Countrie; the last end, the glory of God; whereunto all our labours must tend, and all
our actions be directed; and therefore to him let these little sparkes be consecrated, to kindle the
fire in his most holy Temple.’\textsuperscript{60} Wright believed that the English could become more southern
in their thoughts and behaviour. The role of manners in \textit{The Passions}, as with much of the rest
of the work, should be understood in the light of his mission to make England Catholic.

Manners were not the only aspect of the passions in which Wright took an interest from a
medical perspective. Gail Kern Paster has emphasised Wright’s use of ‘early modern fluid
physiology’ as essential to \textit{The Passions}.\textsuperscript{61} Paster claims that ‘for Wright as for other early modern
thinkers on the passions, affects are by definition bodily states.’\textsuperscript{62} It is certainly the case that
Wright was interested in the relationship between the passions and humours. In \textit{The Passions},
he drew heavily from the Greek physician Galen. According to Galen and the medical
understanding of the seventeenth century, the body contained four liquid humours, each of
which was associated with different physical attributes: blood was warm and moist; choler or
yellow bile was hot and dry; phlegm was cold and wet; black bile was cold and dry. Imbalance
or excess of any one of these humours would create a damaging concoction, contaminating the
other humours and causing illness. The removing, or purging, of the excess humour was
believed to be the best way to cure someone. Galen believed that the passions could cause a

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{58} Wright, \textit{Passions}, 38, 30; see also Book I, Chapter X, 37–44.
\item \textsuperscript{59} Ibid., lviii.
\item \textsuperscript{60} Ibid., 137
\item \textsuperscript{61} Gail Kern Paster, ‘Melancholy Cats, Lugged Bears, and Cosmology’, in \textit{Humoring the Body: Emotions and
\item \textsuperscript{62} Paster, ‘Melancholy Cats’, 126.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
similar imbalance of humours in the heart. The resultant concoctions might cause the heart to heat up, cool down, dilate, or contract, depending on the passion. These concoctions would cause harm to both the physical body and the soul if left unchecked. Wright also linked the internal feelings associated with the passions to the heart, believing it to be ‘the peculiar place where that Passions allodge [reside]’. Unpleasant passions, such as ‘feare sadness and despaire’, would ‘coarct [shrink] the heart’ – perhaps a description of a tightness in the chest accompanying the passions. Wright also acknowledged that it was possible to feel the effects of the passions in other parts of the body through the movement of spirits and humours. Types of fear, for example, caused the face to turn ‘either extreme pale, or high coloured’. Paster focused on the area of Wright’s work that related to fluid physiology, even though she acknowledges that The Passions is a work ‘in which ethical, physical, and psychophysiological discourse intermix’.

The ‘Diuine’ and the ‘Physitian of the Soul’

One of the first areas in which Wright blurred the line between discourses was in the relationship between the medical and the theological. Thomas Sloan has read The Passions as a theological work aimed primarily at divines and preachers. Sloan believes that Wright modernised Aristotelian rhetoric while promoting the type of meditation popularised by Ignatius of Loyola. It is true that Wright discussed meditation at the end of The Passions, and that meditation almost certainly remained central to Wright’s spiritual oblation even after his departure from the Jesuit order. However, only Book Six of The Passions contains anything resembling such meditations, but even here they were not the central topic of the book, suggesting that this was not Wright’s focus. Passages in Book Six did include meditative sentiments, such as ‘in my prayer, fire is kindled, because meditation bloweth the coals of consideration, whereunto followeth the flame of love & affection’. However, this part of The Passions is not only about religious meditation but also about the health of the soul, which Wright described using medical analogies:

63 Wright, Passions, 32.
64 Ibid., 61.
65 Ibid., 33-34.
66 Ibid., 27.
67 Ibid., 128.
68 Sloan, ‘Introduction.’
69 Wright, Passions, 346.
Our souls without prayer, meditation, the sacraments of Christ’s Church, exercise of virtue, & works of piety, not unlike a dead body, which for lack of a living soul daily falleth away by putrefaction, leeseth colour, temperature, and all sweetness, and become ghastly, loathsome and stinking; even so, the soul without those blames God hath prepared as preservatiues, it will be infected by vices and stinking sinnes.\(^{70}\)

Wright added that those who do not receive the sacraments of the church were ‘not unlike sicke men, which know where medicines lie but will not seek for them, or receive them’.\(^{71}\) His mention of the sacraments here is particularly suggestive, since Wright’s earlier works suggest his belief that the Catholic rite of Holy Communion was essential to be a good Christian.\(^{72}\) An argument could be made that this passage uses medico-religious language to warn readers of the harm that the wrong faith might cause in all parts of the soul.

Like many of his contemporaries, Wright believed that if the passions were used in the pursuit of self-love, or were ‘inordinate’, they could become the cause of disease in both body and soul. It was not uncommon to describe the uncontrollable passions as potentially harmful to the soul, but to Wright, curative control of the passions was not a purely personal endeavour, because he saw self-love as the source of sin and as the cause of all inordinate passions. Wright believed that ‘an inclination, faculty, or power to consuerue [conserve] it selfe, procure what is needeth, to resist and impugne whatsoeuer hinderth it of that appertaineth unto his good and conservation’ is a law of nature that applied to all things, not just living things. For example, ‘wee see fire continually ascendeth vpward, because the coldnesse of the water, earth, and ayre much impeacheth the virtue of his heate: heauie substances descend to their centre for their preseruation.’\(^{73}\) This passage suggests that something akin to the passions can act without the need for thought, with such inclinations existing independent of the will as part of the fabric of creation. However, God has granted humans ‘a reasonable soule, the which, like an Empresse was to gouern the body, direct the senses, guide the passions as subiects and vassals.’ Unfortunately, ‘Selfe-Loue vpstarts, and for the affinitie whith sense […] wil in no case obey reason, but allured with the baite of pleasure and sensualitie, proclaimeth warres and rebellion against prudence, against the loue of God.’\(^{74}\) Wright is suggesting here that if one were to give

\(^{70}\) Ibid.
\(^{71}\) Ibid., 349.
\(^{72}\) See Wright, Treatise, Wright, Disposition, ‘To the Catholique-Lyke Protestants’ sig. i, 29, 30, 271-280; Wright, Certaine articles, 5v, 13r.
\(^{73}\) Wright, The Passions, 12.
\(^{74}\) Ibid., 13.
in to self-love, the all-important prudence needed to moderate the passions would break down. This would result in one losing oneself to inordinate passions at the expense of reason and the health of the soul. A physician of the soul, or preacher, should also be able to generate passions in others as a weapon against this gateway to sin.

Like Wright’s use of meditation, his attempts to show how best to persuade people to avoid sin was not a purely theological argument; it was also the dispensing of a medical cure to a dangerous disease of the soul. One example of how this treatment might take place involved his use of two passions that will be discussed in more detail later in the chapter: flight or detestation, and fear. These, he believed, should be the focus of a preacher’s speech, gestures, and motions when discussing sin with sinners. Wright likened the behaviour associated with the fear brought about by ‘detesting an eminent euill’ to the actions of a man who discovers his neighbour’s house on fire.75 He suggested that only a fool would react calmly in such a situation. Sensible people are more likely to ‘runne crying into the street’, shouting ‘fire, fire, help, help, water, water’.76 What Wright said next is particularly noteworthy:

The like should a Preacher doe, who knowing his auditours wallowed in sinne, ought not with filed phrases, and mellow mouthed words tickle their ears, but with terrors and feares pierce their hearts: he should cry fire of hell, fire, fire is kindled, sinne is entered into the soule water, water, tears, tears, help, help, repentance repentance, the diuell stands readie to deuoure you, death watcheth at vnawares to strike you, hell mouth gapeth open to swallow you downe, looke about you, stirre your selues […] Leave off your riots, forsake your vanities, abandon your false deceitfull pleasures, put on Christ, imitate his puritie.77

He continued: ‘time is vncertaine, the peril too certain, the punishment eternal, irreparare, inexplicable: thus ought a zealous preacher speak, and so God commnadeth him not to speake, but rather to crie, and that incessantly.’78 Wright was instructing preachers how to cure people of the diseases of sin and self-love that harm the reasonable soul and lead to eternal damnation. Just as a house fire might damage the material world, the ires of sin would damage the spiritual. Wright’s earlier works suggest that the sinners he had in mind were English Protestants. For example, in a passage aimed specifically at Protestants in the Disposition, Wright described them as ‘sinners, a steaned clothe,
abominable in Godds sight, [that] deserue death and hell’.\textsuperscript{79} Even though Protestants were not the only sinners whom Wright wrote about, it seems possible that he was also reminding the readers of \textit{The Passions} of their beloved Protestant neighbours and how they would potentially suffer for eternity. To this end, \textit{The Passions} also served as a guide to preaching and conversion, to the curing of the harm done to the soul by the rejection of the true faith, and to the making of more ‘good Christians.’

\textbf{The ‘good Christian’}

One group that is regularly missed by historians discussing Wright’s intentions are his ‘good Christians’. As we have seen, this group is an important part of all the discourses in which Wright engaged. By setting \textit{The Passions} against Wright’s greater mission – to bring England back to the Catholic Church and to provide pastoral care for English Catholics – it seems strange that no investigation of this angle is to be found in the existing historiography. Coming close, John Staines describes Wright’s work as a guide to controlling the passions of others through rhetoric to bring about moderation in political discourse. Staines notices that Wright’s work on the passions ‘stemmed from his work as a Catholic missionary, preaching in the Protestant England of Elizabeth and James and engaging in print controversies on behalf of his faith’.\textsuperscript{80} Wright’s discussion of rhetoric in \textit{The Passions} was not just part of a call for a ‘public sphere of free religious debate’; it was a guide as to how a Catholic might change hearts and minds. Wright tied his divines, gentlemen, and physicians of body and soul together through the figure of the ‘good Christian whose life is a warrefare vpon the earth; he who if he loue his soule, killeth it, he, whose studie principally standeth in rooting out vice, and planting of vertue.’\textsuperscript{81} It is hard to see who this ‘good Christian’ could be other than English Catholics.\textsuperscript{82}

There is additional evidence that the ‘good Christian’ in \textit{The Passions} referred to English Catholics. Another English Catholic, Valentine Simmes, printed both versions of \textit{The Passions}. Simmes was regularly getting into trouble for printing ‘popish’ works, eventually losing his licence as a master printer.\textsuperscript{83} His involvement in Robert Parsons’s Catholic English secret press

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{79} Wright, \textit{Disposition}, ‘To the protestant reader,’ ii.
\item \textsuperscript{81} Wright, \textit{Passions}, 4–5.
\item \textsuperscript{82} See, for example, Wright, \textit{Dispositions}, ‘To the Protestant Reader’, ‘To the Catholique-Lyke Protestants’.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
seems likely. English Catholics were undoubtedly the most prevalent readers of Simmes’s publications, and there is reason to think that the ‘good Christians’ of *The Passions* were among those readers. In short, Valentine Simmes, a known printer of illicit Catholic materials and a likely member of the Catholic English secret press, published the original edition of *The Passions of the Mind*. Its controversial and Catholic nature was missed, allowing for the subsequently extended version.

1.3. Wright’s Opposite of Desire

This final section will describe how Wright’s instrumental use of a Thomist structure of the passions produced an opposite of desire in the form of ‘flight or detestation’. This passion was intimately related to a particular type of hatred – hatred of abomination – and was an essential ingredient of the passion of fear. When taking the common uses of the words ‘flight’, ‘detestation’, and ‘abomination’ into account, Wright’s opposite of desire becomes quite specific, referring to a passion felt by good Christians and to the dangers of faith faced by English Catholics. These passions were, if controlled, linked to the health of the soul and the avoidance of potential harm in eternity.

Perhaps the most nuanced reading of *The Passions* is in Sorana Corneanu’s *Regimes of the Mind*, in which she describes the discourse Wright had with each of his groups of readers as evidence of a philosophically-informed physician of the soul. To begin with, Corneanu rightly regards Wright’s insistence on controlling the passions to avoid medical harm to both body and soul as a way to unite physicians of body and soul. She then takes this further, claiming that ‘physicians of the soul’ were part of a wider tradition of the ‘regimen of the mind’. Corneanu claims that:

> the physician of the soul stands at the crossroads of practical divinity, medicine, moral philosophy, and rhetoric and uses the analytical tools of theology and natural philosophy. His object is the human embodied mind and the cure of its perturbations.

To her, *The Passions* was part of a tradition of attempting to find ways to reclaim prelapsarian mental clarity and circumvent the intellectual limits placed upon the mind because of the Fall.

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85 Ibid., 48.
86 Ibid., 67–68.
It was a regimen of the mind that she describes as ‘cultura anima’, that is, ‘to offer “medicine” or “Physick”, or else to prescribe the best “culture” for a mind described as “diseased” or “distempered” or “perturbed”’. This fits with the period’s belief that unregulated passions were able to cause harm, but Corneanu goes further, suggesting that cultura anima had an ‘anthropological-therapeutic core’: an understanding of human limitations, and particularly those of the mind, in an attempt to find ways around these limitations through the therapeutic practice of philosophically ordered spiritual meditations, not unlike the ones Sloan identified as being borrowed from Loyola.

Corneanu’s cultura anima sums up Wright’s intentions in *The Passions* quite well. To understand the work as a series of analyses and exercises aimed at the therapeutic control of the passions for the cure of disordered minds is also a good description of Wright’s overall intention across his other more overtly missionary publications. However, her suggestion that it was part of ‘philosophy-as-a-way-of-life’, akin to Pierre Hadot’s conception of spiritual exercises, is only partly right. What she describes as the ‘prescription of remedies’ for the mind in Book Three of *The Passions*, and particularly the ‘exploration of the defects and imperfections of the understanding’ in Book Six, do draw upon philosophical traditions. However, Wright was not trying ‘to make the theological and philosophical traditions compatible with each other’, as Corneanu suggested. These philosophical traditions were already part of his theological education and influences. It is through his knowledge of philosophy that he constructed most of his understanding of the structure of the passions, and where he most clearly described his opposites to desire.

**Flight or Detestation**

At first sight, Wright appears to have adopted Aquinas’s opposite of desire: *fuga seu abominatio*. *Abominatio* may well have been a deliberate biblical choice, allowing Aquinas to describe a feeling opposite to a particular type of desire: the desire to be close to God. The probable source of the word *abominatio* was the Latin Vulgate Bible. While many Hebrew words were translated as *abominatio* in the Vulgate, ancient Greek scriptures referred to just one type of abomination relevant to the New Testament narrative: the abomination of desolation.

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87 Ibid., 4.
90 Ibid., 58.
The abomination of desolation is a biblical expression referring to the desecration or profanation of something or somewhere considered sacred by something profane. In particular, it refers to the introduction of an idol into a place of worship. This term would fit into Aquinas’s overall endeavour. Central to Aquinas’s concept of desire was ‘appetite’, which Aquinas called ‘nothing other than an inclination towards something’. That ‘something’ is finis, which is also sometimes described using the Greek word telos as used by Aristotle, although Aquinas did not use the Greek. Aquinas’s finis was the aim, completion, and perfection of the appetite gained from the pleasure felt after striving towards and acquiring something perceived as good. To Aquinas, ‘desire of the finis is always infinite’, and is only able to be adequately satiated in one way. Rather than a need for earthly riches that could never bring fulfilment, desire, properly controlled, was a movement towards the infinite finis: God. Fuga seu abominatio was the mirror of this. It was the movement away from, or the avoidance of, something that potentially kept the self from the finis, and so from God. Properly used, it was the feeling that might cause a flight from, or an aversion to, sin.

Space and time distinguished fuga seu abominatio from the other passions:

[W]ith regard to good, movement begins in love, goes forward to desire, and ends in hope; in respect of evil, it begins in hatred, and goes on to aversion [or flight], and ends in fear. Hence it is customary to distinguish these four passions in relation to the difference between the present and the future. Fuga seu abominatio was an experience caused by something that might happen, as opposed to something that was happening. It seems likely that Wright was using fuga seu abominatio as the model for his opposite of desire, if Wright’s opposite was not simply basic ‘fear’.

Wright appears to have adopted a Thomist structure of the passions influenced by the work of Duns Scotus, perhaps via Suárez. Aquinas placed his passions into two groups, each

91 See Daniel 9.27, 11.31, 12.11; 1 Macabees 1.54, 6.7; Matthew 24.15-16; Mark 13.14.
94 Aquinas, Summa, 1a2ae, q. 25.
95 Aquinas, Summa, 1a2ae, q. 25 a 4 co: ‘respectu boni, incipit motus in amore, et procedit in desiderium, et terminatur in spe, respectu vero mali, incipit in odio, et procedit ad fugam, et terminatur in timore. Et ideo solet harum quatuor passionum numeros accipi secundum differentiam praeceptis et futuri, motus enim respectit futurum, sed quies est in aliquo praesenti’.
corresponding to one of two basic appetites: the ‘concupiscible’ or ‘coueting’, and the ‘irascible’ or ‘invading’. The former consisted of those passions felt commonly: ‘love’ and ‘hate’; ‘desire’ and ‘aversion/flight or abomination/detestation’; ‘pleasure’ and ‘sorrow’. The latter were those passions that assisted us when taking decisive action, or when a struggle was necessary: ‘hope’ and ‘despair’; ‘courage’ and ‘fear’; ‘anger’. Suárez and Wright both rejected the idea of ‘concupiscible’ and ‘irascible’. In the case of Suárez, ‘they do not signify two appetites but one and the same conceived in different ways’ depending on the object that caused them and the subject who experiences them. In the case of Wright, he stated: ‘for who doubteth but many both loue and desire (which according to all Doctours are operations of the coueting appetite) duers things hard to be compassed.’ He seems to be suggesting that desire and love, both supposedly concupiscible passions, can be caused by objects that are difficult to obtain. Rather than split the passions into the categories of concupiscible and irascible, Suárez suggested a system that took its structure from medieval Scottish theologian Duns Scotus’s understanding of the passions. Suárez and Scotus split the passions into three binary pairs that either tend to good or tend to evil. These were: hatred and love; fear or flight; sadness and pleasure. Wright did the same, but his opposite of desire, at least in this part of the text, was simply ‘fear’. Wright described this system as ‘the best and most easy diuision’, although conceding that ‘I cannot but allow that common disunion of Thomas Aquinas, admitted by scholasticall Doctours as very conveniuent.”

Suárez is a likely candidate for Wright’s source for his Scotist ideas, but Wright was likely to have been taught about Scotus’s theology and philosophy with or without the guidance of Suárez. Wright was familiar with Scotus, whom he mentioned alongside other philosophers:

97 ‘Aquinas, Summa, 1a2ae. 22-30, q. 23: ‘amor’ and ‘odium’; ‘desiderium’ and ‘fuga seu abominatio’; ‘gaudium’ and ‘tristia’.
98 Ibid.: ‘Spes’ and ‘desperatio’; ‘audacia’ and ‘timor’; ‘ira’.
99 Francisco Suárez, Tractatus Quinque Ad Primam Secundae D. Thomae (Venice: Balleoni, 1740), 268: ‘Opinor enim non duos appetitus sed eumdem diuerso modo conceptum significari, in obiecto enim appetitus duo considerari possunt.’
100 Wright, Passions, 20.
102 Suárez, Tractus, 278; Wright, Passions, 22–26.
103 Suárez, Tractus, 278, described the opposite of desire as ‘timor, seu fugi’; Wright, Passions, 22–26.
104 Wright, Passions, 25.
105 Ibid.
‘the Sects of Paripatetikes, Academikes, Stoicks, Epicures, Thomists, and Scotists, Realls and Nominalls’ in *The Passions*.\(^{106}\) However, what suggests that Suárez influenced him is a shared instrumentalist view of any construction of the passions. Suárez claimed that the division of the passions into Aquinas’s eleven ‘is not so necessary; it could be set down in other modes, as others have done.’\(^{107}\) Similarly, Wright claimed that he chose a simplified Thomist structure not because it was true, but because it was ‘more ease to be perceived, more expedient to be declared, and more methollogiell to be remembered’.\(^{108}\) Wright included ‘hope’, ‘ire’ or ‘anger’, and ‘flight or detestation’, but without the concupiscible/irascible division. Instead, drawing from Aristotle, he suggested that the differences between individual passions was one of time, rather than difficulty.

**Wright’s Opposites to Desire**

One of the major differences between Wright’s 1601 *The Passions of the Minde* and the 1604 *The Passions of the Minde in Generall* was an additional section that thoroughly examined some elements of the passions. This new section, ‘The Fifth Book’, is by far the longest segment of the text and, unlike the rest of the work, it is not separated into chapters. Instead, it reads as a single monograph with three themes: ‘*How Senses moues Passions*’, ‘Motiues to Loue’, and ‘*Meanes or Motiues to moue Hatred, Detestation, Feare, and Ire*’.\(^{109}\) The fifth book is different enough from the rest of the work, being longer, and apparently self-contained, that it may have been a separate publication that Wright chose to include in the work.

In the third section of the fifth book, ‘Meanes to moue flight and feare’, Wright described ‘flight’ in a similar way to Aquinas’s description of *fuga seu abominatio*. He began the section by stating that ‘we said that flight and detestation was opposite to desire; & that desire was the wishing of a thing abstracted from hope or expectation thereof.’\(^{110}\) Curiously, there is little discussion of desire, independent of discussions of the other passions. The only thing close to a description is later in Book Five, when Wright likens desire to ‘the motion, passage or voyage’ of a fire, generated by the ‘levity and lightnesse’ of love that ‘inclineth and bendeth it to

\[^{106}\] Ibid., 298. ‘Scotists, Reals, and Nominals’ are also mentioned in ‘The Preface’, lviii.

\[^{107}\] Suárez, *Tractus*, 278: ‘satis esse accomodatum, quamvis non sit adeo necessaria, cum alis etiam modis tradi posset quod fecerunt alii’.

\[^{108}\] Wright, *Passions*, 27.


\[^{110}\] Ibid., 272–273.
motion’. By contrast, his description of the opposite of desire is much more detailed. Soon after declaring that ‘flight or detestation’ is opposite to desire, he continues with a description: ‘flight is a detestation of some evill, though not imminent, nor expected, yet such an evil as we abhorre it and detest it, and possibly may befall vs.’ Like *fuga seu abominatio*, ‘flight’ is dependent on an unlikely, but possible, evil that can cause harm.

Wright’s description of fear was somewhat different: ‘feare is a flight of a probable euill imminent: where fore two things must be proved & amplified to enforce feare: first, that the euil is great: secondly, that it is very likely to happen.’ Wright may have been contradicting himself, or ‘detestation’ and ‘feare’ might be two types of ‘flight’, one an act of flight and the other a passion. He also linked ‘fear’ and ‘detestation’ when he likened the behaviours associated with a neighbour’s fire to the ‘feare [that] participateth of hatred and sadnesse, in detesting an eminent euill, and sorrowing lest it befall’.

This sentence described the detestation of an imminent evil, that is, the detestation of the potential for likely harm that would result in sadness. The fear was of the damage caused by the fire; the detestation was of the harm that the fire had the potential to cause should the neighbour’s fire spread, as well as the possible sorrow should that event happen.

‘Flight and detestation’, it seems, was Wright’s version of Aquinas’s *fuga seu abominatio*. The question that presents itself, therefore, is: why did Wright use the word ‘detestation’ rather than ‘abomination’? Examining the uses of the word ‘detestation’ in the period and putting them in relation to Wright’s use of ‘abomination’ in his description of the species of hatred can answer that question.

**Hatred of Abomination**

The corpus has revealed a link between hate and detestation. Equally, Wright described flight and detestation as arising from hate. Just as flight was a necessary part of fear, hate was part of flight or detestation. Wright only used the word ‘detestation’ during his descriptions of ‘flight and detestation’ in the fifth book. However, he linked the variants ‘detest’ and ‘detesteth’ to hate in other parts of *The Passions*, either by a direct link, such as ‘if a man would haue us to hate and detest any thing’, or by coupling them with something that might engender hate, such

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111 Ibid., 289.
112 Ibid., 273.
113 Ibid., 274.
114 Ibid., 181.
as ‘ill wine’, a ‘hurtful’ person, or ‘sin’.\textsuperscript{115} This linking or coupling mirrors the detest–hate link found in period dictionaries and the corpus. What is interesting about Wright’s text is that he believed that to produce flight or detestation, a kind of hate was required: hatred of abomination.

Wright split hatred into two types that he borrowed from Thomas Cajetan, one of which had a relationship with ‘flight or detestation.’ These two types of hate were \textit{odi} & \textit{inimicitie}, or as Wright described it, ‘hatred of enmity’, and \textit{odio abominationis}, or ‘hatred of abomination’. Hatred of enmity was a hatred caused by an evil person or object, which because it was an opposite, an ‘other’, could harm the self.\textsuperscript{116} Hatred of abomination had two causes: ‘first, the Person beloved, and all those reasons which may stir vp his love: then the hurt of the evill, and all the harms it bringeth with it.’\textsuperscript{117} Hatred of abomination was the hatred of an evil that could harm someone or something one loved. It was a type of hatred caused by the love felt for another person, rather than self-love.

While Wright claimed that all flight and detestation gained its motion from an object of hate, he developed a particularly close relationship between both love and desire, and detestation and hatred of abomination:

\begin{quote}
These two passions of desire or detestation, are stirred vp with the same motives that loue and hatred of abomination, for as all the reasons approvable to render the thing amiable, the same cause it desirable, so all the reasons apportable to render the inducements, which persuade the object of hatred to be abominable, all the same cause it to be detestable.\textsuperscript{118}
\end{quote}

To Wright, the same stimulus caused hatred of abomination and flight or detestation: evil. The experience of an evil that had the ability to harm the people and things one loved moved flight or detestation. Hatred of enmity, on the other hand, would produce ‘ire’, or anger: ‘Ire includeth in it a certain hatred of enmity, and thereunto a supperaddeth a desire of reuenge: the first part hat the same motives as hatred [of enmity].’\textsuperscript{119} Wright’s use of ‘detestation’ rather than ‘abomination’ in his version of \textit{fuga seu abominatio}, while still using the word ‘abomination’ in

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{115} Ibid. 184, 12, 23, 262.
\bibitem{116} Thomas Cajetan, \textit{Secunda Secundae Summae Sacrosanctae Theologiae} (Lyons: Hugonem a Porta, 1558), n.131; Wright, \textit{Passions}, 261.
\bibitem{117} Wright, \textit{Passions}, 272.
\bibitem{118} Ibid., 273.
\bibitem{119} Ibid., 277-8.
\end{thebibliography}
his translation of *odio abominationis*, gave Wright’s concept of abomination a particular meaning that was different to both Aquinas’s and Cajetan’s.

While Wright acknowledged that ‘Hatred of Abomination’ could be experienced anytime and that evil might befall a loved one, he does seem to have had one evil in mind: the sin of apostasy. In his *Dispositions*, Wright described Protestants as those who ‘cuteth upp all good works by the rootes’. Additionally, in a section of text added to *The Passions* but not present in the 1601 version, Wright discussed ‘*apostasie* from the true Faith’ in a paragraph that also covered ‘Atheists’ and ‘heretickes’:

> This maketh so many Atheists: for: *vinum & mulieres apostature faciunt sapientes*, wine and women make men leave religion: for as wine taketh men drunke, and robbeth the use of reason, so inordinate loue and affection make drunke the soule, and deprieue it of iudgement: This in fine, robbeth soules from God, and caryeth them to the diuell. For if we examine exactly the grounds and origins of apostasy from the true Faith, and the causes of heresies, wee shall find them to be some one or other wicked vice of the will.

Atheists were apostates from the ‘true Faith’. Such apostasy or atheism might be the worst harm that could befall someone you love. Wright discussed this immediately after the point at which he claimed that the same thing caused hatred of abomination and flight or detestation:

> As for example, I haue a vertuous friend whom I loue entirely, he cō[n]uerseth with Atheists, the more I loue him, the more I hate Atheisme, as evil to him, and therfore I abhorre it should any way befall him. I am moued to abominate it as an extreme euill, for what can be more sottish, then to deny a God.

Wright had not returned to England to save it from atheism, but from apostasy, two phrases he had used interchangeably earlier in *The Passions*. He had also described apostates as those who rejected the truth; they were synonymous in his mind with those who rejected Catholic sacraments such as Holy Communion. Wright described these people in terms that a modern reader might recognise as disgusting: they ‘fallleth away by putrefaction, looseth colour, temperature, and all sweetness, and become ghastly, loathsome and stinking.’ They were a

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120 Wright, *Disposition*, ‘To the Protestants’, passim.
122 Wright, *Passions*, 54.
123 Ibid., 273
124 Ibid., 346.
potential harm to loved ones, one that should cause hatred of such an abomination and thus feelings of detestation at the potential harm such apostasy might cause. The ordinate form of hatred of abomination was a hatred of apostasy from Catholicism.

**Conclusion: Flight and Detestation, Abomination, and Modern Disgust**

Wright’s opposites to desire and his hatred of abomination were part of a work written by an English Catholic missionary, a work that, among other things, could be used as a guide to conversion. All Wright’s other works fit within a missionary framework, and although his *Passions* was read more widely, it seems his intended audience was other English Catholics who might wish to assist him on his quest to return the people of the country he loved back to the Roman church. It is in this context that Wright chose to use terms drawn from a Thomist education to discuss the passions, particularly hate and the opposite of desire.

Wright left many clues about his opposites of desire. On the surface, he called them ‘flight or detestation’, referring to the feelings created by the approach of possible harm. This passion was accompanied by sensations of hatred caused by an object – an abomination, capable of harming someone or something you love. He left physical clues also. ‘[F]light or detestation’ was a stepping stone between hatred and fear, so the effects on the body he associated with fear might also have occurred during ‘flight or detestation’. These were a tightening of the chest occurring due to a ‘coarct of the heart’, and the face becoming either ‘extreame pale’ or ‘coloured’.

He also provided a description of the behaviours associated with ‘flight or detestation’. When Wright likened a preacher’s actions to that of ‘feare’ or ‘detesting an eminent euill’ – namely a fire at a neighbour’s house that had the potential to spread – Wright described not only the behaviours of fear but of ‘flight or detestation’. The detestation of this potential for personal harm might cause one to ‘runne into the street’ shouting for help, warning of the dangers such harm might cause.

What is also clear is that Wright’s passions could not be slotted neatly into types. Flight, a word commonly known to refer to the action of running away due to the lack of another choice, might also accompany fear. Detestation, a passion linked to offensive, scandalous and negative acts that were often religious in character, accompanied the action of flight when harm was possible but not inevitable. The neighbour’s house fire might not spread should there be a rapid response, so the harm to one’s property is not yet imminent in this instance. Similarly, the

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125 Ibid., 61, 27.
possible outcome of the fire – that the fire spreads – would cause detestation. There is an inordinate version of ‘flight or detestation’, in which the hatred of the material harm that might befall a loved neighbour causes one to act. To Wright and many others in the period, an ‘abomination’ was often a sin: something or someone that was an offence to God. It was this offence to God that should be hated, particularly if that sin had the potential to harm loved ones. Much as an inordinate desire for a vain worldly good should be replaced by the ordinate desire to do God’s will and enter heaven, ordinate flight from, or detestation of, harm to the soul caused by sin ought to replace inordinate flight from, or detestation of, material harm.

Wright’s did not use the word ‘abomination’ to describe a type of disgust. There are some similarities between modern disgust and Wright’s opposites to desire. Both refer to something harmful, physically and morally, that has the power to violate boundaries and cause a contagion. One area where Wright’s opposites to desire and disgust might come together is in the idea of moral policing. Modern disgust is believed to be a moral gatekeeper, keeping societies together through an ethical code, the breaching of which leads to punishment. Wright’s opposites to desire are part of a similar moral policing. His focus on apostasy and sin as the ordinate, or proper, emphasis of those passions was an attempt, he believed, to steer people back to a grander moral code and away from greater punishment: hell.

Despite these similarities there are many more differences. Wright’s abomination was a type of hate; specifically, it was a hate aimed at that which could harm someone or something one loves. Being a type of hatred implies that it had no chance of being what Korsmeyer would call a ‘sublate’, a type of fascination caused by disgust just as fear is part of the sublime. It is hard to imagine something that causes both hate and fascination. While motions away from a disgusting object are involuntary, occurring below the level of attention, flight was subject to the will, even if that will could see no other available options. Detestation was an experience caused by the detestable and polluting, much as disgust is caused by the disgusting. But while an object of disgust need not be hated – one does not hate one’s own intestines, but the sight of them would likely disgust many people, including oneself – detestation was always related to hatred. To Wright, flight and detestation were connected: they were an interrelated experience allied with hatred of abomination. While modern disgust is always human, Wright’s abomination was godly, if not divine.

This chapter begins to demonstrate why it is important to examine the use of passion words – and emotion words – in their historical contexts rather than attempting to map them onto modern understandings of the emotions. Miller’s belief that historical uses of ‘abomination’ were close enough to modern uses of ‘disgust’ to be understood as descriptions of the same experience breaks down under more detailed examination. Similarly, it is better to understand the related words ‘detestation’ and ‘flight’ as they were used in the period rather than as part of the modern category of disgust. More importantly, the structure that connected many of these terms in the early period – Aquinas’s notion of the opposite of desire – led to early-modern thinkers choosing words that, while appearing to describe something akin to modern disgust at first glance, referred to experiences that had significant differences to modern disgust. One of the more unusual of these word choices, Henry Carey’s use of ‘eschewing’ – a translation of the French word *fuite* that was more commonly translated as ‘flight’ – is explored in the next chapter.
Chapter 2: Henry Carey’s *Fuite* as ‘Eschewing’

‘Flight, of course, can also serve to remove the disgusting object from one’s presence’

– William Ian Miller, *The Anatomy of Disgust*¹

‘In disgust, too, we perform a sort of “flight”’

– Aurel Kolnai, *On Disgust*²

This chapter explores the curious translation of the French passion of *fuite* as ‘eschewing’ by Henry Carey, second Earl of Monmouth. *Fuite* would more commonly be translated as ‘flight’, and would refer to one of Thomas Aquinas’s two suggested terms as opposites of desire – it is an action found alongside ‘abomination’. However, Carey chose to use a different word and create his own version of the opposite of desire. Carey’s use of ‘eschewing’ was a deliberate mistranslation. He was a gifted linguist: as a young man, he travelled across Europe becoming fluent in French and Italian. In Carey’s only published translations, he stated that, since his own work was not worthy of publication, ‘if I could coine anie thing out of my owne Braine, worthy of my Countreymen, they should have it: since not, let them accept of this Piece of Gold changed into Silver’.³ Carey’s use of the term is an example of someone selecting an unusual word during the process of translation to deviate from the original meaning to one that he believes would better suit the political message he was attempting to convey.

Although not a courtier himself, Carey was raised around the royal court of England. He was a staunch supporter of Charles I, and became the second Earl of Monmouth in 1639, just as the troubles that led to the British Civil Wars were beginning. Carey translated Jean-François Senault’s *De l’usage des passions* after the execution of Charles I. By that time, Carey was a man on the losing side of a civil war. Senault portrayed the passions as unruly, and ideally controlled by a monarch of reason, imbued by the ‘Grace’ to control them and stop them harming the body and soul. It was an unsubtle attempt to argue for the role of the monarch in disordered times. Carey’s use of ‘eschewing’, a word rarely employed as a noun and more commonly found as the present continuous form of the verb ‘to eschew’, described an action that took place not due to a potential evil in the future, but due instead to the ever-present threat of harm. It became

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a passion used to describe an ongoing struggle with evil, rather than a reaction to a possible future evil. Eschewing was a friend to the power of reason, running back to the monarch whenever hatred appeared. This is perhaps the main reason why Carey chose to differentiate ‘eschewing’ from the better-known passion of ‘flight.’

### 2.1 Carey’s Linguistic Influences

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*Table 2.1. Frequency of the most common words found five words either side variants of ‘disgust’ in texts published between 1620 and 1640 in the EEBO-TCP corpus (absolute numbers in brackets).*

Like Wright, Carey did not use the word ‘disgust’ in any of his translations. This is despite Senault’s *L’usage* using the word *degout.* Carey translated a passage about escaping ‘the punishments of Gluttony’ – ‘quand elle nous a ôté le degout a tous nos desirs naturels’ – as ‘when she [reason] hath freed all our natural desires of distaste’. The French word *degoust* was translated as ‘distaste’ well into the second half of the seventeenth century. At the same time, John Florio dropped ‘disgust’ from his definitions of ‘Disgustare’, ‘Sgusto’, and ‘Sgustare’ in his revised *Queen Anne’s New World of Words* (1611). What seems to be missing from the English usage of disgust over this period is the notion of ‘vnkindnes’. In both of his editions, Florio’s definitions of ‘disgustare’, ‘sgusto’, and ‘sgustare’ included ‘vnkindnes’ as part of their definition. The word ‘vnkindnes’, in turn, is found beside words such as ‘crueltie’, ‘inhumanity’,

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5 John Florio, *Queen Anna’s New World of Words* (London: Melch. Bradwood [and William Stansby], 1611), s.v. ‘Disgustare, Sgusto, Sgustare.’
‘vnenvility’, ‘discoutesie’, ‘vngentleness’, ‘vnlovingness’, ‘wailing’, and ‘moaning’. None of these words were related to disgust in later English dictionary definitions, and the examined corpus shows that these elements were not dominant in the period’s usage of disgust.

Around the period that Carey was translating The Vse of Passions, the most common word found within five words of a variant of disgust in the EEBO-TCP is ‘betwixt’. Examples of this are Samuel Purchas’s collection of voyages, Purchas his pilgrimes, in which a footnote describes the ‘Cause of disgust Betwixt the Achener [people of Aachen] and Hollander [people of Holland]’ as the clearing of a Dutch General of coming ashore without permission by the Aachen king due to the General’s ignorance of the law.7 Another example is Thomas Scott’s suggestion ‘that disgust betwixt the two Nations in the East-Indies [England and Holland], was not sent thither without a Romish practice’. Benedict Robinson has suggested that as ‘the early modern noun typically names an event, it can be either singular or plural; “pikes” and “disgusts” are not private experiences but things that happen between people’.8 Robinson has noted that most uses of ‘disgust’ related to conflict.9 If two people disliked each other, there might well have been disgust or disgusts betwixt them. Throughout the seventeenth century, English dictionaries tended to have the same two definitions of ‘disgust.’ Cotgrave, Bullokar and Cockeram suggested that ‘disgust’ meant ‘dislike’, while for Edward Phillips and Elisha Coles it meant ‘distaste’, and for Cawdrey it meant both. It is an early divergence between Florio’s Italian concept and the English, and may be what led to ‘disgust’ being dropped as a definition of the Italian words in Florio’s New World. ‘Disgust’ remained a rare word with its own lemma in these specialist dictionaries, while ‘dislike’ and ‘distaste’ were common. ‘Disgust’ remained something quite distinct from the opposite of desire, and so it is not surprising that Carey chose not to use it.

Uses of ‘Eschewing’

‘Eschew’ and ‘eschewing’ both appear to have entered the Middle English Lexicon from Old French. ‘Eschew’ appears to have entered English as an adjective in the thirteenth century, and was primarily used to mean ‘skittish’; for example: ‘look that that you are not like a skittish horse

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6 Ibid.
7 Samuel Purchas, Purchas His Pilgrimes (London: William Stansby, 1625), 534, n. 2.
9 Ibid., 557.
[hors eschif] that flees at a shadow’. The placing of an adjective after a noun to modify it, as in ‘hors eshif’ or ‘skittish horse’, is a French construction. Such a construction suggests that the source of the word was the Old French eschever, meaning ‘to avoid danger’. However, Marc Loewenthal has suggested that the similar sounding Old English word ‘sceoh’, translated by Loewenthal as ‘easily frightened, easily startled’, but perhaps better translated as ‘shy’, ‘timid’, or ‘fearful’, predates the Old French. These two origins are not mutually exclusive: it is entirely possible that early Middle English usage combined the semantics of both, as eschever sounds similar to ‘á sceoh’, the Old English for ‘always fearful’ or ‘always shy’. This usage was last found in a fifteenth-century translation of a 1279 French work, La Somme le Roi. By the late fourteenth-century writings of Chaucer, the usage appears to have shifted to something more recognisable to speakers of modern English. For example, in The Parson’s Tale of c.1390, Chaucer suggested that the more often one sins ‘the moore eschew for to shryuen hym (the more he will eschew [or avoid] his confession). In the same work, Chaucer gave us the first example of the present continuous form, ‘eschewynge’, which resembles the more modern English usage of rejection and avoiding; for example: ‘general signes of gentillesse, as eschewynge of vice and ribaudye’. Later this is found in the Coventry Leet Book: ‘in escewyng of perell þat myght fall.’ The element of moving away from impending harm echoes the uses of ‘flight’ discussed in the previous chapter; the two appear to have an old semantic relationship, and this will be explored throughout this chapter.

Many of the earliest dictionaries published in England suggest a relationship between the act of fleeing as found in ‘flight’, and variants of ‘eschew’ and ‘eschewing’. In 1538, Thomas Elyott translated the Latin euito as ‘to flee, to eschew, or beware’. Peter Levens translated effugere as

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12 Marc Loewenthal, Bless the Buccaneer with Barbecued Blood (Raleigh: Lulu, 2012), 48.
‘to eschew’ in 1570, a Latin term related, like ‘flight’, to *fuga*. John Baret, in 1574, defined ‘to Eschewe’ as both ‘to escape priuily’ and ‘an eschewing, aooiding or shunning’, while Timothy Bright used the simple definition ‘flie’ beside the headword ‘eschew’. Little had changed by Carey’s birth in 1595. John Florio used ‘to eschew’ alongside ‘to refuse, to shun […] to flie from, to forsake, to runne away againe’ in his translation of the Italian *rofuggire*, *fuggo*, and *fuggito*. In 1617, Robert Cawdrey described ‘eschewe’ in his dictionary of hard words as ‘shun, aooide, escape’. Randle Cotgrave included ‘eschew’ in definitions of nine French words: *decliner*, *destourner*, *eschever*, *esquiver*, *eviter*, *fuir*, *garer*, *gauchir*, and *refuir*. Gauchir is interesting because it hints at the physical movement associated with the action of eschewing. *Gauchir au coup* was ‘to auoid a blow by winding, turning, bending, or wrenching of the body’.

‘Eschewing’ also appears in the period’s dictionaries with suggestions of more complex usages. Baret translated *Vitatio, Deuitatio, & Euasio, onis* as ‘an eschewing, aooiding or shunning’, the same phrase Thomas Cooper used to translate *Euitàrio*. In 1623, Henry Cockeram called ‘vitiation’ ‘an eschewing’, and his definition was not unique. Thomas Blount, building upon Cockeram’s work, added ‘vitiation’ to ‘voiding, or shunning’ for his definition of ‘an eschewing’. From these dictionaries at least, it would appear that vitiation – used even then as a spoiling, degradation, or reduction in quality or value – was linked to the action of eschewing. This is a different meaning of ‘eschewing’ that is more difficult to translate into modern English. ‘Eschewing’ was not only an act of avoiding or rejecting, but of devaluing that which might cause us harm. An analysis of the corpus can clarify this, especially through the close relationship between ‘eschewing’ and ‘evil’.

**Eschewing Evil**

Examining the EEBO-TCP corpus for words found in proximity to variants of ‘eschewing’ from Carey’s birth in 1595 to the last edition of *The Vse of Passions* printed in his lifetime

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20 Cotgrave, *Dictionarie*, s.v. decliner, destourner, eschever, esquiver, eviter, fuir, garer, gauchir, feuir
(1641) reveals that the words most commonly found in proximity to all variants of ‘eschew’ were almost identical to those found close to ‘eschewing’. However, there are marked differences in frequency. The most noticeable difference is the prevalence of the most common word in proximity: variant spellings of the word ‘euil’. Of the occurrences of all variants of ‘eschew’, 8.7% have ‘euil’ within five words either side of them, but ‘euil’ is close to 22.9% of the occurrences of the single variant ‘eschewing’. Meanwhile, only 10% of all the variants of ‘eschew’ except for ‘eschewing’ are found in proximity to ‘euil’ (see Table 2.1). The especially regular correlation between ‘euil’ and ‘eschewing’ may be due to a function of grammar: ‘eschewing’, as the present continuous form of ‘to eschew’, describes an ongoing struggle with evil.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>‘eschewing’</th>
<th>All variants of ‘eschew’ except ‘eschewing’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>euill</td>
<td>22.94% (39)</td>
<td>10.08% (108)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>good</td>
<td>7.06% (12)</td>
<td>8.87% (95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>god</td>
<td>7.06% (12)</td>
<td>3.64% (39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>thing</td>
<td>5.88% (10)</td>
<td>4.11% (44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>one</td>
<td>5.88% (10)</td>
<td>3.27% (35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sinne</td>
<td>4.71% (8)</td>
<td>4.20% (45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>danger</td>
<td>4.71% (8)</td>
<td>2.24% (24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>great</td>
<td>4.71% (8)</td>
<td>1.59% (17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>like</td>
<td>3.53% (6)</td>
<td>1.87% (20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>haue</td>
<td>2.94% (5)</td>
<td>2.80% (30)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.2 Frequency of the most common words found five words either side of both the word ‘eschewing’ and variants of the word ‘eschew’ other than ‘eschewing’ in texts published between 1595 and 1641 in the EEBO-TCP corpus (absolute numbers in brackets).

The word ‘euil’ related to variants of ‘eschew’ in similar ways. For example, an anonymous 1595 translation of Johannes Justus Lanspergers’ *An epistle in the person of Christ to the faithful soule*, has Christ saying, ‘[e]schew euill and do good for I wil neuer enter into a wicked & malicious soule, neither will I dwell in a bodie subiect to sinne’ during a discussion of the rules

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25 The variant spellings were ‘evil’, ‘evil’, ‘evil’, ‘evil’, and ‘evils’, henceforth represented by ‘euil’.
for the weak and imperfect. In a prayer for the sick from English cartographer John Norden’s *A good companion for a Christian directing him in the way to God*, God is asked to ‘Cause vs constantly to eschew euill, and doe good, to seeke peace, and ensue it’ (1632). Examples of ‘Eschewing’ and ‘eiuil’ reveal a comparable relationship. In 1598, a translation by Polish Bishop Wawrzyniec Goslicki of a guide to the work of counsellors, Laurentius Grimaldus’s *The counsellor Exactly pourtraited*, described the usefulness of bashfulness to the profession: ‘But the bashfulness we seeke for, doth imitate vertue: and therby a certaine habit and exercise of eschewing euill’. Similarly, in 1622 English Clergyman Martin Fotherby wrote: ‘For, there is none other way to come vnto God, but by eschewing of Euiill, and doing of Good’.

Combinations of both variants of ‘eschew’ and ‘eschewing’, when found in proximity to ‘euil’, usually have a religious tone. Examining the source of this tone can provide clues about the narrowing in usage that variants of ‘eschew’ had undergone since the word’s introduction into Middle English. The Wycliffe Bible’s translation of Leviticus 11:11, for example, suggested that ‘ye shall eschew their bodies dead by themselves’ and Leviticus 11:13 tells us of ‘these things of fowls which ye shall not eat and shall be eschew of you’. Wycliffe also provided similar references to the eschewing of the evil of sin in Leviticus 15:31 and Deuteronomy 12:23. Eschewing the evil of sin was often an action related to the sorts of abominations described in Chapter One. The early biblical use of ‘eschew’ and its variants appears to have been a broad term referring to an action used to avoid any possibility of sin. However, uses of ‘eschew’ were not as varied in later English Bibles. By the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, the ‘eschew’ in Leviticus 11:11 had been replaced with the ‘abomination’ in the Geneva Bible and KJV: ‘They shall be even an abomination unto you; ye shall not eat of their flesh, but ye shall have their carcases in abomination.’ This is probably in part because the Vulgate, which used *abominatio*, was also used as a source, but it also may be because the word ‘abomination’ tended

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31 WYC: Lev. 15:31: ‘Therefore ye shall teach the sons of Israel, that they eschew uncleannesses, and that they die not for their filths’; Deut. 12:23: ‘Only eschew thou this, that thou eat not (the) blood; for the blood of those beasts is for the life, and therefore thou oughtest not eat the life with fleshes.’
to refer to the offence that God would take to the action. The same happened in Leviticus 11:13: ‘And these are they which ye shall have in abomination among the fowls.’

In Leviticus 15:31, ‘eschew’ was replaced with ‘separate’: ‘Thus shall ye separate the children of Israel from their uncleanness; that they die not in their uncleanness.’ This translation emphasises the act not as one of simply pushing another group away, but of splitting one part of the population from another.

In Deuteronomy 12:23, the semantics of the phrase had changed, the command to ‘eschew’ replaced with the direction to ‘be sure’.

There were other evils to eschew in the Wycliffe Bible that had also changed by the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. For example, ‘eschewing cursed novelties of voices’ became ‘avoiding profane and vain babblings’ in the KJV and Geneva Bible. The advice in Wycliffe’s Titus 3:9 to ‘eschew thou foolish questions’ became ‘avoid foolish questions’ or ‘but stay foolish questions’, and the next verse, rendered in the Wycliffe Bible as ‘eschew thou a man Heretic’, was instead translated as ‘a man that is an heretick after the first and second admonition reject’ in the KJV, and simply ‘reject him that is an heretic’ in the Geneva Bible. These changes suggest the early modern English Bibles replaced the broad Middle English use of ‘eschew’ in the Wycliffe Bible with two groups of words. The first group comprised sin-related words, such as ‘abomination’; the second was made of specific action-words, such as ‘separate’, ‘avoiding’, ‘stay’, and ‘reject’. This is brought into sharper focus by comparing the corpus analysis above with those few passages in which variants of ‘eschew’ were used in the early modern bibles.

The KJV only used the word ‘eschew’ on four occasions, each of which seems to have been taken word-for-word from the Geneva Bible. Three of these are found in the Book of Job and repeat a similar phrase. For example, Job 1:1 suggests that ‘[t]here was a man in the land of Uz, whose name was Job; and that man was perfect and upright, and one that feared God, and eschewed evil [my emphasis].’ Job 1:8 asks, ‘Hast thou considered my servant Job, that there is none like him in the earth, a perfect and an upright man, one that feareth God, and escheweth evil [my emphasis].’

Finally, Job 2:3 explains that ‘the Lord said unto Satan, Hast thou considered my servant Job, that there is none like him in the earth, a perfect and an upright man, one that feareth God, and escheweth evil [my emphasis].’

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33 KJV, Lev. 15:31.
35 WYC, 1 Tim. 6:20; KJV, 1 Tim. 6:20. Geneva Bible, 1 Tim. 6:20.
These verses are descriptions of the most pious of men, someone who would hold to his faith no matter the evil that might befall him. These Old Testament uses in the KJV and Geneva Bibles are highlighted by a fourth New Testament use, one that is mirrored regularly in the corpus. It occurs in a passage in 1 Peter 3:

For he that will love life, and see good days, let him refrain his tongue from evil, and his lips that they speak no guile: Let him eschew evil, and do good; let him seek peace, and ensue it. For the eyes of the Lord are over the righteous, and his ears are open unto their prayers: but the face of the Lord is against them that do evil.  

It is not surprising to discover that the second most frequent proximal word found close to both variants of ‘eschew’ and ‘eschewing’ in the corpus is ‘good’. The words ‘good’ and ‘evil’ interact in roughly one-in-three instances of ‘eschewing’ and ‘evil’, and almost every instance of other variants of ‘eschew’ and ‘evil’. It is likely that this interaction references the biblical conception of what makes one righteous. These examples also provide a clue as to how best to understand the ‘vitiation’ element of ‘eschewing’. To eschew evil was not just an act of avoidance; it was also the act of reducing the ability of evil to cause harm, to devalue it and to spoil its ability to take control of oneself. It is, therefore, not surprising that variants of both ‘sin’, an evil that was always to be avoided and vitiated, and ‘God’ were regularly placed in proximity with ‘eschewing’. As Table 2.1 demonstrates, variants of sin can be found in proximity to variants of ‘eschew’ and ‘eschewing’ in roughly the same frequency. ‘God’ occurs in proximity to ‘eschewing’ almost as often as ‘good’, although much less frequently than other variants of eschew. The semantic network being pieced together here gives the impression that, like abomination, ‘eschewing’ was overwhelmingly linked to biblical and religious thought. However, Table 2.1 also provides evidence that ‘eschewing’ was found in proximity with ‘danger’ as often as it was with ‘sin’, and many of the proximal words to ‘eschewing’ were unbiblical. The action of eschewing was often, but not exclusively, religious.

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36 KJV, Job 1:1, 8, 2:3. Geneva Bible, Job 1:1, 8, 2:3.
37 KJV, 1 Peter 3:10-12; Geneva Bible, Job 1; Peter 3:10-12.
38 See also Table 2.1 above.
Non-Religious Eschewing

There were several non-religious events related to the action of eschewing. For example, ‘danger’ is found in proximity to ‘eschewing’ as frequently as ‘sin’ is (4.71%). This combination was rarely used in a religious context between 1595 and 1641. More often, it was used to describe actions such as ‘not eschewing any paine or danger’ when resisting enemies and ‘eschewing the present danger’ of a potential overthrow of the Scottish crown. Another non-religious use of ‘eschewing’ is found in its regular proximity to the word ‘one’. This was sometimes employed in the format of ‘one or another’; for example: ‘such a wit turneth and looketh into good and euill, embracing and extolling the one, rebuking and eschewing the other by good discretion’, and ‘looke to what things were necessary to the carriage of my life, and what not: embracing the one and eschewing the other’. The former uses the trope of good and evil, but in the secular context of proper behaviour in government. The latter discusses life choices and the eschewing of those not suited to one’s wishes via the voice of a character in a Ben Jonson play. Some passages suggest that the act of eschewing was also an act of the will. It was possible for people to ‘lieue justly and temperately, with a desire to pay their debts, eschewing suites and contentions’. There were many other words found less commonly in proximity to ‘eschewing’ that were not normally found in a religious context, such as ‘also’ (2.84%), ‘causes’ (2.35%), great (4.71%), ‘either’ (2.35%), ‘man’ (2.35%), and even ‘flye’ or ‘flying’ (2.35%).

Additional examples of the words found less frequently in proximity to ‘eschewing’ can be found in works concerning health and medicine. In Thomas Elyot’s widely read *The Castell of Health*, he suggested that it was possible to increase ‘health of body’ by the ‘eschewing of superfluous expenses in sundry dishes’. He also suggested that ‘Cholerike’ or high-spirited, often angry people should consider ‘eschewing hot spices, hot wines, excessiue labour whereby the body may be much chased’. John Fage agreed, telling ‘The Collericke melancholicke man’ to think about ‘eschewing meat hard to digest’. Thomas Walkington similarly suggested that the choleric should consider ‘auoiding superfluity of meates and surfet of drincks, but also in

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41 Burnaby, *Offices*, 94
43 Elyot, *Castell*, 108.
44 John Fage, *Speculum ægrotorum* (London: [E. Allde], 1606), 55.
eschewing such as are not obnoxious, and least agreeable with our happy temperate state’.\textsuperscript{45} William Bullein also warned his choleric readers of the benefits of ‘eschewing great draughts of drinke, which is used among beasts, and mingle thy meate with mirth’.\textsuperscript{46} It appears that for the choleric, eschewing the sorts of foods they might fancy was the order of the day. Surgeons suggested that harm could be avoided by ‘eschewing nerues, sinewes, veines and arters’, when making an incision, as well as when cutting near ‘the intestine’ and ‘the testicle’.\textsuperscript{47} Eschewing that which might cause physical harm was essential for good health, and neither ‘God’ nor ‘evil’ were a central part of this usage. Eschewing seems to have been the avoidance of many types of harm, both religious and secular. In many ways, it seems similar to ‘flight’ from the previous chapter. However, there are some important differences.

‘Eschewing’ and ‘Flight’

Carey chose to translate the original French word \textit{fuite} as ‘eschewing’ rather than the more common ‘flight’; this, at first glance, is odd. This apparent strangeness is partly because ‘flight’, as shown in the first chapter, was already used to describe either a passion or an action related to a passion in the period. Carey’s translation is exceptionally faithful to the original in almost every other instance (so much so, that the English translations discussed in this chapter will be drawn from Carey’s version unless stated otherwise). Cotgrave, for example, did not use ‘eschew’ in his translation of \textit{fuite} in his popular English-French dictionary, instead opting for ‘a flight, escape, slip, running away; a shunning, avoyding; evasion, shift, excuse, delay’.\textsuperscript{48} Cotgrave described a different version of the verb, \textit{fuir}, as, among other things, ‘to flie, escape, runne fast, scour, scud, or slip away’ and ‘to shunne, auoid, eschew, refuse to deale with’.\textsuperscript{49} As \textit{fuite} and \textit{fuir} were both derived from the same root, cross-pollination of the related concepts was not unlikely. Carey’s linking of ‘eschewing’ and \textit{fuite} might be due to his knowledge of Latin. Earlier Latin dictionaries, such as that of Thomas Thomas, had translated the Latin word \textit{ fuga} as ‘Flight, running away: exile, banishment: a course or running: eschewing, a waie and meanes to eschewe and scape’.\textsuperscript{50} Similarly, John Rider used \textit{ fugio} in his definition of ‘to avoid,
eschew, or shunne’. As Chapter One demonstrated, *fuga* was known in educated circles to have been part of Aquinas’s description of the opposite of desire, and was occasionally translated as ‘flight’ in that capacity. Carey was no doubt well-versed in Latin, and may well have known the works of Aquinas. In such a case, it could have been easy to make the leap from *fuite* to ‘eschewing’ via the middle step of Aquinas’s *fuga*, translated as ‘eschewing’ rather than the usual ‘flight’. However, Carey was far from the only gifted Latinist who wrote about the passions at this time, and the leap does not appear to have been made by anyone else. It remains odd that he was alone in his choice of word.

Not only is there a link through Latin, but a conceptual similarity between ‘flight’ and ‘eschewing’ can be found in the corpus, as well as a major difference. As discussed above, ‘flight’, like ‘eschewing’, was an action as well as a passion, used to describe a movement away from a potential harm. The difference is that ‘eschewing’ referred to an action that one must continuously perform, whereas ‘flight’ referred to an action carried out at the first hint of real danger. In *Passions*, Thomas Wright wrote that ‘the courting appetite, inclineth only to the obtaining of those objects which may easily be come by, and to the eschewing of those that may easily be escaped’. Wright was describing an action related to Aquinas’s ‘concupiscible’ passions, converting eschewing to a noun via the preposition ‘to’ and the article ‘the’. ‘Eschewing’, here, is the name of an act undertaken when in proximity to an object that creates a need for escape; it is an act associated with a category of the passions that Wright thought to be little more than a useful framework. The major difference, then, is one of time. ‘Flight’ was the action of avoiding a possible future harm. The action of flight happened when that harm became possible, if not probable, and resulted in the avoidance of that harm. Conversely, ‘eschewing’ was an action performed in a continuous present – a constant struggle that afflicted you at all times. Evil was not only to be eschewed if it might cause a harm in the future, but taken as constant threat, to be eschewed always. Despite this distinction, and the possible influence of Latin, Carey’s translation of *fuite* as ‘eschewing’ was not an obvious choice. It seems to have been a deliberate attempt to alter the temporal nature of the opposite of desire. To that end, he was taking what had previously been a verb, and occasionally an adjective, and nominalising it.

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52 Wright, *Passions*, 20.
‘Eschewing’ as a Noun

Carey was perhaps the first person to use the word ‘eschewing’ as a noun in work relating to the passions. Previously, eschewing was most commonly a present continuous form of the verb ‘to eschew’. For example, the same year Wright’s *The Passions* was first published, an anonymous work, ‘The genealogie of vertve’, was included in *Two guides to a good life*. The author of this text described how categories of feeling could be used to control one’s feelings. In it, ‘affections’ were described as a category of feeling in which ‘vnderstanding alwaies goes before, and the affections follow’. These affections are different to ‘Passions or perturbations, [which] are vyolent motions which (vnlesse restrained) carrye the Soule headlong into many mischieves’. Affections existed to ‘waken and stir [the soul] vp from being asleepe & oppress with the heaviness of the body, least peraduenture it shuld be negligent in the care of good things’, and ‘to the intent that they might as briddles, stop the hasty course wherinto the soul is some time caried’. The author claimed that:

we may cal the affections those motions of the soule, wherby the heart is stirred vpp to the following after good and eschewing of euill; as loue, hope, ioy, sorrow, indignation, compassion, Ielousy, feare, and manie such, the number where of is infinite, not in respect of their own nature, but in respect of vs that are not able to comprehend them.

The ‘eschewing of euill’ is the action produced by those affections that facilitate the protection of the soul from evil, as might be expected from the textual analysis. This context appears to be using ‘eschewing’ as an action related to another passion.

Carey took the present continuous form of the verb ‘to eschew’ and turned that into a noun that could stand alone as the name of a passion, rather than the action associated with one. The word’s use in relation to time had a significant role to play in Carey’s framework. There is, however, more to Carey’s choice than simply a wish to make a future passion into a continuous one; he also had a royalist, political motive. To understand these additional reasons better, it is

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53 The notes on Early English Books online suggest that Richard Humphrey was the author, but it has proven impossible to verify this.
55 Ibid., 127.
56 Ibid., 120, 125.
57 Ibid., 122-123.
necessary to figure out why Carey might have translated Senault’s *De l’usage des passions* in the first place. The first port of call in this investigation is, therefore, Senault’s life and work.

2.2. Jean-François Senault

Jean-François Senault was born in 1599. His father, Pierre Senault, had been a founding member of The Sixteen, the secret council that governed Paris in the name of Henry, Duke of Guise, during a dispute with the previous king. The dispute was religious: the Catholic League was worried that Henry of Navarre, a Huguenot, might become the next ruler of France. Despite a bitter struggle marking the latter days of the French Wars of Religion, Henry of Navarre was crowned King Henry IV in 1589. Among many acts of reconciliation, including his signing of the Edict of Nantes in 1598, Henry IV chose to employ the fiercely Catholic and tempestuous Pierre Senault as his secretary. It was during this period of reconciliation that Jean-François was born.\(^{58}\)

As so often happened with a second son, Jean-François Senault was sent to the seminary. He appears to have spent his early years building a reputation for rhetoric and preaching that continued throughout his life; by 1662 he had been elected General of the Oratory in Paris.\(^{59}\) The role of the passions in oration, as also found in Wright, does not seem to have escaped Senault, and resulted in him writing a guide to *The Vse of Passions in preaching: De l’usage des passions* (1641). Judging by the content of *De l’usage des passions*, his education included areas of scholastic – particularly Thomist – thought, Augustinian ideas, and classical Stoic and Neo-Stoic works. According to Voukossava Miloyevitch, Senault also quoted Latin authors 370 times in *De l’usage des passions*, 151 of which were taken from Roman Stoic author Seneca.\(^{60}\) As Anthony Levi has pointed out, he was the inheritor of a trend in French Neo-Stoic thought that had become pervasive in the French schools. Nevertheless, he rejected many Neo-Stoic

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elements, dedicating a chapter – ‘An apology for Passions against the Stoicks’ – to taking their advocation of strict control to task. Senault claimed that ‘their [the Neo-Stoics] discourses which ought to be instructions unto virtue, have only been invectives against passions’ making the inability to control the passions at all times a ‘malady greater than it was; and their desire of healing it, hath only served to make it incurable’.  

De l’usage des passions

Like Thomas Wright, Senault’s overall structure of the passions was closest to that of Aquinas. The passions remained perturbations of the tripartite soul, caused by a reaction of the body to the input of the senses. He also used Aquinas’s basic architecture – love/hate; desire/flight; hope/despair; bravery/fear; anger; delight/sorrow – but he did not force them into the categories of concupiscible and irascible. Instead, he drew closer to Augustinian thought than either Aquinas or Wright:

Were it not a error in morality to dispute this Maxim, and were it not rashness to contradict an opinion generally receiv’d for so many ages; I should be much inclined to believe that all these passions are lodged in one and the same appetite, which is divided by the motions thereof, as the understanding is divided by its opinions, or as the will is parted by love and hatred. And I would say with Saint Augustin, that these differing conceits, do not presuppose differing faculties, since one and the same man doth oftentimes desire contrary things, and preserveth the unity of his person in the variety of his desires.

Levi has made a strong argument for the centrality of Augustine to the text, pointing out the similarities between Senualt’s view and the Augustinus (1640) by Cornelius Jansen. According to Levi, Jansen’s work, published just one year before De l’usage des passions, advocated for a return to the ideas of Augustine rather than Aristotelian Scholasticism and Neo-Stoicism. Jansen spent a chapter attacking Pelagianism: a religious sect originated by a contemporary of St Augustine, Pelagius, with whom Augustine had a protracted intellectual battle. The deeper

62 Senault, L’usage, 2: ‘Ils ont fait le mal plus grand qu’il n’estoit, & le désir qu’ils ont eu de le guérir n’a servy qu’à la rendre incurable.’
63 Senault, Passions, 22; Senault, L’usage, 24-25: ‘Si ce n’estoit point vne heresie en Morale de douter de cette maxime, & s’il n’y avoit point de temerité à combattre vne opinion receuë depuis tant de siècles, j’aurois grande inclination à croire que toutes ces Passions logent dans vn messe appetit qui est diuisé par ses opinions, ou comme l’esprit est partagé par ses opinions, ou comme la volonté est diuisée par l’amour & par le hayne. Et ie dirois auec saint Augustin, que ces divers sentiments ne présupposent pas diverses facultez, puis que souvent vn mesme homme desire.’
complexities of the Pelagian controversy are beyond the scope of this thesis. Put briefly, the followers of Pelagianism believed that the human will is capable of choosing from the paths of good or evil without aid from God. To Pelagians, sins were accrued during one’s lifetime. Contrary to Augustine, the Pelagians did not think that people were born sinners in need of grace for redemption, with hearts and wills tainted by the Fall. Instead, good and evil were choices of the human will; grace was not necessary. Although the sect appears to have all but died out in the fifth century CE, Jansen denounced Pelagianism, arguing that its focus on strict control of the will had Stoicism at its root and, due to its focus on the will rather than grace, was responsible for what Levi calls ‘the slurring of Aristotelianism which not only the Pelagian “apes of Aristotle” but also the scholastics were to adopt.’ Jansen’s chapter on Pelagianism, like much of the Augustinus, was not so much an attack on Pelagianism as it was on Neo-Stoicism and Aristotelianism. Jansen so rejected these doctrines that he avoided almost all of the then familiar scholastic terminology, occasionally causing difficulties in interpretation.

Relevant here is the part of Augustinus that echoes Senault. Both took the Augustinian idea of the two loves – the selfish love of the material world and the selfless love of God – as central to their works. To Jansen, the love of the divine held prominence. The unbidden and uncontrolled passions were ‘in a lower part’ of the soul than the will, which was the ‘apex of the mind’. However, some passions could also be ‘affects of the will’, similar to the concept of the affections – those feelings that began in the reason before affecting the body. Love was such a passion, and the choice of earthly of heavenly love was related to whether one is steered by carnal desires, or by charity. Unlike the Pelagians, Jansen believed that the ability to drive love through charity and so towards God was due to God’s grace. Without God’s forgiveness and grace, the control of love, and so the other passions, would be impossible. The Augustinian idea of the love of the divine was also found in Wright’s work, although Augustine most likely used ‘love’ as an example of a type of attraction between two objects than of a passion as Wright would have understood it. Nevertheless, this understanding of Augustine is certainly the plank on which Senault’s version of the passions rests. He wrote that ‘I am inforced to embrace the opinion of Saint Augustine, and to maintain with him, that love is the only passion which doth

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64 Levi, Moralists, 207.
65 Ibid., 209-210, 211-212.
agitate us." Senault, like Jansen and Augustine, believed that the control of love was not possible by reason alone; grace was also needed. According to Senault, the ability to control the passions was lost by Adam at the Fall. Consequently, the grace of God through Christ was necessary to restore that control to us. Salvation, therefore, rested on the control of the passions by the rational soul through grace. It was by grace that we might focus on heavenly love. However, the love resulting from this grace, according to Senault, should be an attempt to emulate God’s love for us; the pure, prelapsarian love that Christ’s sacrifice allowed us to regain.

Despite the strength of the Augustinian thread woven throughout De l’usage des passions, the work contains too many Thomist and Neo-Stoic elements to have been deeply affected by Jansenist thought. One element underemphasised in Levi’s analysis is the influence of Nicolas Coëffeteau’s Tableau des passions (1620). Levi noticed that Senault was ‘drawing on Coëffeteau’ in his description of the physical passions as ‘contrary to the laws of nature’ and so harmful. However, the depth of the influence of the fellow oratorian’s work on Senault has been overlooked.

It seems likely that Senault knew of, and was influenced by, Coëffeteau’s earlier work, Tableau des passions. Coëffeteau was a teacher of philosophy in the Paris seminary, and, at one time, the Preacher in Ordinary to Henry IV of France, so he may well have known the young Jean-François Senault. He published Tableau des passions while confirmed as Bishop of Dardania. Like Senault, he built up a reputation for zealous preaching but with a focus on the summun bonum. His approach eventually led to a largely peaceful re-establishment of Catholic services and ecclesiastical discipline within a predominantly Calvinist area. Coëffeteau was a moderate, with a focus on a form of love that focused on peace as a route to the summun bonum. He believed that such acts of selfless love were only possible through the moderation and control of the passions, an example Senault appears to have followed despite his reliance on Augustinian grace. Coëffeteau summed up the primacy of love himself: ‘to banish love from civill life and the conversation of men, was not only to deprive the year of her most beautiful

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67 Senault, L’usage, 26; Senault, des passions, 27: ‘suis contraint d’embrasser l’opinion de sainct Augustin, & de soustenir avec luy, que l’amour est l’vnique passion qui nous agiute.’
68 Senault, L’usage, 72-79.
69 See Cornelius Jansenius, Augustinus (Leuven: Jacobi Zegeri, 1640), vols 1-3.
70 Levi, Moralists, 218.
season, but would also be like pulling the sun out of the firmament, filling the whole world with horror and confusion.’ The Neo-Stoics claimed that control of the passions relied on the proper use of reason. Using selfless, godly love, Coëffeteau reversed this, emphasising the primacy of love in gaining control. Coëffeteau’s blend of Augustinian love with the Neo-Stoic ideal of control seems to have appealed to Senault.

Senault also adopted Neo-Stoic ideas. After attacking the Stoics outright, he included the thought of Marsilio Ficino and Seneca in his physical description of how the passions operate. Senault, like others, claimed that the passions interacted with reason via the imagination and the senses, which would stimulate esprit or ‘understanding’. This esprit, which was also drawn from Augustine, could be deceived by the senses of the flesh, tricking the rational mind, betraying and overpowering the will and leading to sin. It was ‘the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit [esprit]’ that was ‘not a condition of nature, but the punishment of sin’. Coëffeteau and the Neo-Stoics were closer to Senault than Jansen. If Senault was influenced by the Augustinus, it was through the importance of the role of grace. However, this could as easily have been derived directly from St Augustine’s works as it could Jansen’s.

Another area overlooked in Levi’s analysis of Senault may well be the reason that Carey found the work of interest: the political undercurrent found throughout his work. As well as drawing from influential intellectual figures, Senault developed an understanding of the passions derived from his time spent at the French court. Phrases linking the passions to monarchy litter the text. For example, he suggested that when the passions become unruly, ‘To resolve these difficulties, we must remember that Reason is King over Passions; that their Government is one of her chief employments’.

On the topic of whether a prince should use love of fear for control of his subjects, he concluded ‘briefly, they say, Soveraigny is somewhat hateful, that Love and

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72 Nicolas Coeffeteau, Tableau Des Passions Humaines. (Paris: Sebastien Cramoisy, 1620), 73: ‘que vouloir bannir l’Amour de la civile et de la conversation des hommes, ce serait non seulement comme rauir à l’année sa plus belle saison: mais outre cela, se serait comme arracher le Soleil de monde et remplir tout l’univers d’horreur et de confusion.’

73 Senault, Passions, 15.

74 Senault, Passions, 15; Senault, L’usage, 15: ‘Le faculté que fait toutes ces merueilles s’appelle Esprit, l’Imagination & les sens la reconnaissent pour leur Maistresse, mais elle n’est pas si libre qu’elle ne dépende d’une souueraine, & qu’ell sert de guide.’

75 Senault, L’usage, 59, 64: ‘le revolt de la chair centre l’esprit n’est pas vne condition de la Nature mais vn suplice de peché.’

76 Senault, Passions, 119; Senault L’usage, 130: ‘Pour résoudre ces difficultés il faut se souvenir que la Raison est la souveraine des Passions, que leur conduite est vn de ses principaux emplois’
Majesty agree not well together, that one cannot rule over men and be beloved” while ‘The Choler and Mildness of a king ought to maintain the peace of his Kingdom’.\textsuperscript{77}

The linking of the passions and reason to the monarchy was already something of a trope in early modern writings on the passions. Wright also suggested that at times ‘the passions had so engaged themselves to sense, and with such bondes and seales of sensual habites confirmed their friendship, that as soone as reason came to possession of her kingdome, they beganne presently to make rebellion.’\textsuperscript{78} However, the link to royalty in Senault’s work was not poetic licence: Senault was, as mentioned above, the son of a tempestuous royal secretary whose sudden rages could only be controlled by a king he had once opposed.\textsuperscript{79} At the core of Senault’s work were both instructions on how to rule one’s internal passions, and how to rule externally through the passions. In particular, in one of passage he discussed whether it better or not ‘[t]hat Princes win upon their Subjects either by Love or Fear’, and in another ‘[w]hat passion ought to reign in the power of a Prince’.\textsuperscript{80} Senault made the connection between the passions and monarchy more explicitly later in his life. Senault used an argument that somewhat echoed that of De l’usage des passions in his 1661 work, Le monarque ov les devoirs dv souverain. In this, the ways a monarch might control his people are described in close parallel to the ways in which one should control the passions.\textsuperscript{81} It is unlikely that the political parallels of Senault’s earlier work on the passions were lost on Carey, given his involvement with the English Civil Wars.

### 2.3 Henry Carey’s Opposite of Desire

Like Senault, Carey was raised among royalty. His father, Robert Carey, was the son of the first cousin to Queen Elizabeth, with whom Robert Carey had a rather intimate relationship. The two were close enough that, according to his memoirs, on the announcement of his marriage to the daughter of Sir Hugh Trevannion the Queen was ‘mightily offended’ and for a time ‘she would neither speak with me nor see me’.\textsuperscript{82} They were soon reconciled. Elizabeth requested his presence at the end of her life.\textsuperscript{83} She insisted he stay near her until she passed

\textsuperscript{77} Senault, \textit{Passions}, 435; ‘Senault ‘L’usage, 179, 483: Le croit que la Cholere & la douceur d’un Souverain doiuent entretenir la paix de son Estat.’
\textsuperscript{78} Wright, \textit{Passions}, 9.
\textsuperscript{79} Lezeau and Bailey, \textit{Marillac}, 130, 254, 332, 334, 374; Moréri, \textit{Supplément}, 1095.
\textsuperscript{80} Senault, \textit{Passions}, 175-192; Senault, \textit{L’usage}, 190-212. ‘Que les Princes gagnent leurs sujets par l’amour ou par la crainte’, ‘Quelle Passion doit régner en la personne du Prince.’
\textsuperscript{83} Ibid. 71.
away. Against the wishes of the privy council, Robert claims to have been the first person to tell King James VI of Scotland (and soon to be James I of England) about Elizabeth’s death. He remained in close service to King James I until his death in 1625 and became the first Earl of Monmouth at the coronation of Charles I in 1626. Robert Carey was deeply loyal to the crown, and this loyalty appears to have continued with his eldest son and heir, Henry.

Henry Carey’s loyalty to the crown surfaces most prominently in the historical record at the eve of the Civil Wars. In 1642, as the tension began to rise across England, Ireland, and Scotland, Carey was one of nine Lords who met King Charles I in , against the wishes of parliament. Standing in the House of Lords soon after the King had left London in late 1642, Carey issued ‘an humble petition to his Maiestie that he would be graciously pleased to return to his good city of London, as the safest place we conceive for his sacred Person in these distemper’d times’.

The King had left due to worries about the growing tensions within the Long Parliament and the impeachment of many of the King’s councillors in November 1642 Carey’s speech was published later in that year, but by then the situation already appeared too grave for the King to return. Instead, Carey rode north with eight other peers to join the King. This frustrated parliament and they subsequently threatened further proceedings of impeachment against these nine Lords if they did not return. It appears that Carey ignored parliament and stayed in York, remaining loyal to his King: Carey was a signatory on the King’s declaration of 13 June 1642 (old date style) that ‘he intends not to go to War against the Parliament’. When communication broke down entirely and the wars began, Monmouth kept quiet, focusing on his works of translation rather than participating in the carnage. His eldest son, Lionel, was killed at the Battle of Marston Moor on 2 July 1644, fighting for the King.
Carey’s Translations

Carey’s work fitted into an overall theme. In the dedication to King Charles in his translation of Virgilio Malvezzi’s *Romulus and Tarquin*, in which Malvezzi compared the reign and temperament of Rome’s legendary first and last Kings, Carey wrote:

> How can the happiness your Majesties Realmes enjoy (and long may they enjoy it) under your Majesties blessed Government, better appears, than by the making known what Miseries and Slavery the Romans endured under the Rule of TARQUIN the Tyrant? And how, SIR, can your Pietie, and religious Zeale, bee better manifested, than by the selfe-deification of ROMULUS? 

Carey published *Romulus and Tarquin* at a time when Charles’s Archbishop of Canterbury, William Laud, was pursuing anti-Calvinist reforms of the Church of England through the Courts of the High Commission and the Star Chamber, and inflicting harsh punishments for transgressions, all with the support of the King. This was unnerving to those in the propertied classes, and the attempted imposition of these reforms in Scotland in 1637 would be one of the sparks of the Bishops’ Wars, plunging the first of the three kingdoms into civil disorder. The message of the dangers of ‘religious’ Zeale’ and the threat of ‘Miseries and Slavery’ contained within this translation were ignored by the King, assuming he ever had occasion to read it.

In a similar attempt to show by example, Carey’s dedication to King Charles in his 1641 translation of Giovanni Biondi’s *Istoria delle guerre civili d’Inghilterra tra le due case di Lancaster e di York* as *An history of the civill vvares of England*, contains the sentence:

> So as since we are wanting in the practice of present affaires, the knowledge of what is past is necessary, the which not being to be had but by history, it followeth that history be the safest way to this happinesse, worthy to be with all diligence frequented, not by me alone, but by the very best.

Published as tensions were mounting, and apparently rushed – ‘The reason, Sir, why I write it not from its beginning, is my not being sure to finish it’ – the work contained a history that Carey appears to have thought somewhat analogous, if not identical, to the situation at the time.

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90 Ibid., iii.
Again, the impact of this work on King Charles I can be no more than conjecture, but subsequent events would suggest that these warnings were either not heeded or not read.

**The Vse of Passions**

It might be of little surprise that Carey’s translation of *De l’usage des passions* appears to have continued in a similar vein to his earlier works. John Staines has also noticed this similarity. Staines’s chapter, ‘Compassion in the Public Sphere of Milton and Charles’, focuses on the work’s contribution to rhetoric through the lens of Habermas’s public and private spheres. He makes the argument that Habermas was wrong to suggest that the British public sphere of political criticism was the result of the rise of capitalism. Instead, the imposition of particular passions by a person of power – in this case, King Charles I’s pleas for compassion in the *Eikon Basilike* – undermined the public sphere of debate. *Eikon Basilike* was a hugely popular work, with 35 editions printed in 1649 alone. The work was purportedly written by King Charles I as he awaited execution, but was almost certainly ghost-written from notes, perhaps by John Gauden, a chaplain known for his royalist and Church of England pamphlets. In the work, the soon-to-be-executed King used passionate outbursts of weeping and remonstration to defend his royal authority through the metaphor of ‘Reason and Conscience’. According to Staines, the use of passionate rhetoric by a man of high power would cause ‘the bonds of compassion [to] become the bonds of slavery’, replacing the individual consciences of the public with the conscience of the king. Staines placed the *Eikon Basilike* in contrast to Milton’s response to it in his *Eikonoklastes*, via the control of the passions in Carey’s translation of *De l’usage des passions*. Milton likened *Eikon Basilike* to Mark Antony’s impassioned speech at the funeral of Caesar, able to generate passions in others to bring ‘revenge to his dead Corps’. This opinion was Milton acknowledging the power of the passions in rhetoric, a power that had been described by Wright, Senault and others as able to persuade and control for good or evil.

Carey certainly recognised the royalist and rhetorical elements in Senault’s work. Senault’s description of the control of the people by a monarch as an analogy for the control of reason

93 For more on the authorship issue, see, Madan, *New Biography*, 126–163.
over the passions was hardly subtle. Even if a reversal of this analogy was not Senault’s intention, the reversal was not lost on Carey. In his ‘To the Reader’, he painted upon the landscape provided by Senault. The section begins and ends with monarchical metaphors:

IF to command and rule o’re others be
The thing desir’d above all worldly pelf [money],
How great a Prince, how great a Monarch’s he,
Who govern can, who can command Himself?
If you unto so great a Pow’r aspire,
This Book will teach how you may it acquire.
[…]
Thus, Rebels unto Loyalty are brought,
And Traytors true Allegiance are taught.97

This short poem reflects the frontispiece, a work that ties The Vse of Passions closer to the Eikon Basilike; William Marshall engraved both, and both portrayed the passions. The image of the weeping of ‘Charles I in his solitude and sufferings’ (fig 2.1) was somewhat less blatant than ‘Reason enslaving the passions’ (fig. 2.2). However, as Staines points out, both are linked by their portrayal of the role of the passions in royal power. The frontispiece of the Eikon Basilike was the final act of Charles’s royal power by moving the passions of his one-time subjects, while the frontispiece of The Vse of Passions displayed how such power might be used to control those passions.

‘Reason enslaving the passions’ depicts ‘Reason’, sat on her throne, overseen by ‘Divine Grace’, and holding the two ends of a chain and a leash. On the end of the leash sits a dog, probably depicting faith, who is overseeing the passions bound as slaves by the chain. Joy holds a jug of intoxicating wine in one hand and a harmless drink in the other. ‘Feare’ is depicted attempting to run away from the weeping sorrow, and the hammer-wielding ‘Choller’ stands opposite. Next on the chain is the self-strangulation of ‘Despair’, followed by the serpent-headed and ugly ‘Hatred’. Next is ‘Eschewing’, who, echoing ‘Feare’, has turned to run, arms aloft, this time from ‘Hatred’ towards ‘Sorrow’ or back to ‘Reason’. Despite running away from him, ‘Eschewing’ cannot take her eyes from ‘Hatred’, staring back over her shoulder. As far from reason as is possible, ‘Love’, depicted as Eros, stands with his back to ‘Reason’ and all the other passions. ‘Love’ is the only passion depicted with the chains attached to his hands rather than his

feet. This positioning of ‘Love’ is interesting, given the importance of Love to the rest of the passions within the work. The quote above – ‘briefly, they say, Soveraignty is somewhat hateful, that Love and Majesty agree not well together, that one cannot rule over men and be beloved’, leads to the conclusion ‘the Sovereign being the father of his People, he is bound to treat them as his Children, that fear makes them only Masters of the Body, and that love makes them rule over the heart’. This passage suggests that love, properly controlled, has the power to assist reason in controlling its unruly subjects, hence the chaining of the hands rather than the feet. The chaining of the hands and love’s position facing away from reason might also suggest that selfish love can pull back, able to move the passions away from reason.

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Figure 2.1 William Marshall, ‘Charles I In His Solitude and Sufferings’, engraving; frontispiece to Charles I, King of England and John Gauden, *Eikon Basilike* (London: s.n., 1648).
Figure 2.2 William Marshall, ‘Reason Enslaving the Passions’, engraving; frontispiece to Senault, Passions.
Next in line and closer to reason is ‘Hope’, also with her back to ‘Reason’. She weighs all the passions down with an anchor that she holds in her left hand, while covering her heart with her right hand. ‘Hope’, then, can stop ‘Love’ from pulling the passions too far from ‘Reason’. Next is the naked and angelic ‘Desire’, who lurches towards ‘Love’, hands outstretched. At ‘Desire’, the chain splits into two. On a separate chain, but linked to ‘Desire’, is ‘Boldnesse’, her breasts and stomach exposed, standing with confidence. Finally, the weeping ‘Sorrow’ is coupled with the axe-wielding madness of ‘Choller’ as mentioned above, the latter also on its own section of chain. ‘Reason enslaving the passions’ was a vivid depiction of Senault’s understanding of the passions, with reason, ordained by grace, as their monarch.

Staines is right to suggest that the ‘political overtones were by no means subtle’, and he later makes an important related point.\(^99\)

We could at this point be tempted to assent to a reading of the frontispiece, and Monmouth’s entire book, as an allegory of power masquerading as knowledge […] When we recognize Monmouth’s royalism, however, this simple dichotomy between reason and passion, where reason disciplines passion and puts it in chains, becomes more complicated. We need to remember that Monmouth is out of power, writing as one exiled from the political realm by men he considers traitors.\(^100\)

Carey was certainly aware that he was on the losing side. In ‘The Translation to the Reader’; he describes how he initially wanted to choose ‘the Kings Daughter, his Spouse the Church, who is all glorious within’ as his patron before he ‘called to mind the many Rivals she hath in these days, which might peradventure cause both me and her to suffer’. Instead, he ‘resolved to pass over all Dedications.’ Carey’s understanding, then, is not just an exploration of the role of power, and the role of the passions in the control of that power, internally and externally. Carey’s translation acts, like earlier works, as a warning and a guide. Should the passions of the individual, the state, or even the king, be left unguided by reason, the consequences are sorrow, both earthly and eternal. By controlling the passions through reason and rhetoric, ongoing conflict can end, and further conflict could be avoided. The passion of eschewing, and the act of avoidance it creates, had an important role to play in the avoidance of that sorrow.

\(^99\) Staines, Compassion, 89.
\(^100\) Ibid., 102-103.
The Passion of Eschewing

Through Marshall, Carey also provided us with a visual clue to his opposite of desire in the frontispiece. In this, ‘Eschewing’ was portrayed as a woman, with long hair, wearing a tunic and dress and bound to the changes that enslaved the passions by her right ankle. Her twisted body stares back at ‘Hatred’, with his back to ‘Reason’ and standing firm, with a serpent, perhaps depicting Satan’s potential influence on ‘Reason’, wrapped around his head. Though she stares into ‘Hatred’s eyes, ‘Eschewing’ is twisted, her arms raised up as she runs away from him. As she is not looking where she is running, she could either be running back to ‘Reason’ or into ‘Sorrow’. No matter who it is that she that is running towards, she appears to have enough momentum to drag the passions with her, back into either safety or calamity, depending on the path she takes. The mirroring of ‘Feare’, who also runs with his hands in the air while staring backwards, this time towards ‘Sorrow’, highlights the idea that the two passions were connected. The actions of both ‘Feare’ and ‘Eschewing’ in this work, albeit an exaggerated caricature, seem to be similar, although ‘Feare’ seems somehow more pronounced, more intense. Eschewing, then, is depicted as a passion which, in behaviour, is a mild form of fear. Its role is to pay close attention to hatred and react to those evils hatred brings to our attention, such as the serpent’s ability to take aspects of reason. It could then run from those things. If controlled as it should be, eschewing would run back to reason, guiding the other passions back to their monarch. If used wrongly, it might run into sorrow. In this image, eschewing has a major role as ‘the first succour we have received against evils’, helping reason to mediate and control the passions in the event of evil.101

Carey does use the word ‘flight’ in his translation, but the only occasion in which it is used as the name of a passion occurs not in the translation itself but in an introductory poem by Carey:

Love turn’d to Sacred Friendship here you’l find,
And Hatred into a Just Indignation:
Desires (when moderated and not blind)
To have to all the Virtues bear relation:
Flight or Eschewing, you will find to be,
The chiepest Friend to spotless Chastitie.102

101 Senault, Passions, 300.
102 Senault, Passions, The Translator, Upon the book: i.
It appears that Carey was aware of the passion of flight, as acknowledged here. However, his other uses of the word flight adopt the most common usage of the time: as a form of ‘fleeing’. For example, Carey translates *fuite* as ‘flight’ when discussing Augustine’s words about the movement of love: ‘desire is the course of Love, fear is her flight’. He also uses that translation during a discussion of the ways in which fear can make one act – ‘she makes us resolve to change a fearful flight into an honourable resistance’ – and when describing the sorrow caused after a battle when ‘the Chief of the Enemy hath saved himself by flight’. These are in keeping with Senault’s uses of *fuite* in these instances. Carey specifically chose to use the word ‘eschewing’ for his opposite of desire.

It is important to note that he does suggest one other word for the opposite of desire. In part two of *De l’usage des passions*, Senault split the passions into opposites based upon Aquinas’s eleven passions and discussed the good and evil uses of those passions at length. Each pair had its own book, with the exception of anger. One book, entitled ‘The second book of Desire and Eschewing’, described desire and its opposite. At the beginning of his section investigating ‘the nature, Properties and Effects of the good and evil use of eschewing’, he describes ‘that Passion which we call Shunning, or Eschewing’ where Senault used just one word: *fuite*. This is one of only two appearances of the word ‘shunning’ in the work, although the stem ‘shun’ appears 32 times. The brief use of the word ‘shunning’ as another term for ‘eschewing’ seems to be a clarification, perhaps because Carey was aware that his translation of *fuite* was an unusual one. When Carey used ‘shunning’ elsewhere, he did not use it as the name of a passion. He used it in a passage describing fear as ‘when shunning what is abhorred’. Shunning, here, was a translation of *Fuit*, which could suggest that, as with Wright, flight and fear had a close relationship, with one impossible without the other.

Also like Wright’s ‘flight or detestation’, eschewing rarely acted alone, and when it did act it affected the body:

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As Desire calls in Hope to her succour, to compass the good which she esteems too difficult; Eschewing implopes the aid of Fear, to acquit her self of an evil which surpasseth her power. As Desire is a mark of our indigence, Eschewing is a proof of our weakness; and as in Desiring, we obtain that which we want; by Eschewing we overcome that which sets upon us. In fine, as Desire doth dilate our heart, and make it capable of the good which it endeavoureth; Eschewing by a clean contrary effect, doth close up our Soul, and shuts the door upon the Enemy which would force her.  

This paragraph provides a few interesting glimpses at the structure of eschewing. Firstly, the close link to fear, as hinted at by Carey’s use of ‘shunning’, and similar to the connection between flight and fear found in Wright, is echoed here. Fear was ‘imployed’ by eschewing when evil was impossible to avoid; fear was not a separate passion, but a more powerful part of an evil-rejecting whole. Physically, eschewing opposes the dilation of the heart with the contraction of the soul. However, these are a ‘clean and contrary effect’, suggesting that the contraction of the soul is related to tightness in the chest – another similarity with Wright’s opposites of desire. Eschewing was ‘the first succour we have received against evils; ’tis the first violence, the first salley which the concupiscible appetite makes to free us from them’. Eschewing was the first defence we have against evil and harm. The role, as with Wright’s hatred of abomination and flight or detestation, was to avoid an evil identified by hate: ‘Hatred doth nothing of memorable, unassisted by Eschewing.’

Although eschewing has, perhaps, the shortest individual entry in *The Vse of Passions*, it is, nevertheless, regarded as crucial to a good life. Senault suggested that ‘She is the cause why Chastity reigns in the world; ’tis by reason of her wisdom that men do imitate Angels, and triumph over evil spirits in the frailty of the flesh’. Although ‘all Passions come in to the aid of Virtue when she undertakes a war against Vice’, eschewing has an important role: ‘as Virtue can only make use of Eschewing, to defend her self; and of so many Passions which assist her in her other designs, she is only seconded by Eschewing, in her combate against Impurity.’ Eschewing’s importance is not only earthly but otherworldly: ‘the greatest miracle which she

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109 Ibid., 307.
110 Senault, *Passions*, 300.
111 Ibid., 308.
112 Ibid., 305.
113 Ibid., 304, 304-305.
produçeth, is, when being subservient to Charity, she separateth us from our selves; and when preventing the violence of death, she divideth the soul from the body.'\textsuperscript{114}

Like Wright’s opposites of desire, Carey’s eschewing can be directed either towards the \emph{summum bonum} or to oneself.\textsuperscript{115} In this understanding, ‘Sin and Punishment are the two most ordinary objects of eschewing’, and these were often confused because ‘[p]unishment being more sensible than Sin, it is more carefully shunned; and there are not many people who do not love rather to be faulty than unfortunate’. The most common causes of eschewing are physical, bodily calamities: ‘the plague’, ‘infected places’, ‘the bad are whereof may work an alteration of our health’. However, these are ‘the effects of Divine Justice; that they have Beauties, which though austere, ought not to be the less pleasing’.\textsuperscript{116} Senault pointed out that ‘The greatest Saints have known that our punishments were favours’, coping with terrible hardships in the name of their faith. Like Wright, the genuine target to the opposite of desire was sin: ‘Sin violates all the Laws of Nature, dishonoureth men and Angels; and all the evils which we suffer are the just punishments of its disorders.’\textsuperscript{117} However, ‘Next to sin, nothing ought to be more carefully eschewed, than those that do defend it’. About whom Carey was thinking when translating this line is not clear. Senault gave a brief description: ‘they term Revenge greatness of Courage; Ambition, a generous Passion; Uncleaneness, an innocent pleasure; and consequently they term Humility lowness of Spirit; the forgiving of injuries faintheartedness; and continency, a savage humor.’\textsuperscript{118} Eschewing, therefore, has a focus on New Testament sin – not turning the other cheek, a glut of pride or greed and the squeezing through the eye of a needle, a lack of humility, not being forgiving, and lacking self-restraint; a rejection of the properties of Christ. They are also, from Carey’s point of view, the seeds of war – sins that could result in punishment.

**Conclusion: Eschewing and Disgust**

It has been impossible to find work on the passions or otherwise that used the word ‘eschewing’ as a noun describing a passion, rather than an action associated with one. This result could change given a wider search, but even so, it would remain an extremely rare usage of the word. Could this be an accident, a word Carey misunderstood? Carey’s precision in the rest of

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{114} Ibid., 305.
\item \textsuperscript{115} Ibid., 300.
\item \textsuperscript{116} Ibid., 301.
\item \textsuperscript{117} Ibid., 302.
\item \textsuperscript{118} Ibid., 303.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
his translation suggests otherwise. It seems a deliberate mistranslation, and if it is deliberate, Carey was trying to say something both about his take on this passion as the opposite of desire. To Carey, the opposite of desire should not be to take flight, but to avoid and reject evil, vigilantly watching for and avoiding all the great harm that may come. ‘Eschewing’, more than ‘flight’, was a word commonly associated with the battle to avoid evil, which was a battle to avoid not only external evils, but also internal ones. The attributes of those who defended sin, according to Senault, were the same as the attributes of those who might make war. They are the attributes of those who, without guidance, do not know to what they should and should not direct their opposite of desire. Ambition, a lack of forgiveness, thirst for revenge, and a lack of self-restraint were all displayed by the warring sides. The King could not restrain them in parliament, despite, as far as Carey is concerned, attempting to do so. As the three kingdoms fractured into civil wars, it most certainly was not a time when ‘men do imitate Angels, and triumph over evil spirits in the frailty of the flesh’.119

It seems that Senault and Wright’s opposites of desire had some similarities. Both, when properly controlled, were focused towards the avoidance of harm to the soul rather than to the body. Both created tight physical sensations in the chest. Evil caused both. Both tightly bound the opposite of desire to hatred and fear. Both were based on Augustinian and Thomist frameworks. Most importantly, both Wright’s and Senault’s opposites of desire dripped with religious thought. They were the product of the sensitive part of the tripartite soul, and they existed to aid the *sumnum bonum* by salvation through Christ. They involved the rejection of natural instincts to flee infection or fire, and to control the process at work in the earthly part of oneself, for the betterment of the otherworldly. To both, the opposite of desire was a bridge between a species of hatred and a type of fear; and both described passions charged with the avoidance of sin. Despite these similarities, Wright and Carey’s opposites of desire did have differences.

‘Flight’, with its use in the period as a synonym for ‘fleeing’, as well as a passion, might not provide the necessary image of avoidance that ‘eschewing’ would provide. ‘Eschewing’, as a present continuous verb, described a permanent action. ‘Flight’, as in Wright’s by then well-known work, was a passion experienced because of a possible future event, not a continuous present. It was a passion that one would feel compelled to act upon, not one that needed constant

119 Ibid., 305.
reinforcement. A slip in vigilance might lead to all manner of sorrows not envisaged by Senault when he was writing in Paris, but clearly visible to Carey. Nominalisation of so descriptive a word as ‘eschewing’ covered a lot of ground, expressing to a period audience the interpretation Carey was attempting to convey.

The similarities between eschewing and modern disgust are few. Both refer to something capable of harm, and both related to an experience or feeling that could be used as a form of moral policing, able to drag the unruly passions back to the control of reason, avoiding the physical and moral damage unruly passions might cause. When eschewing was triggered by more earthly causes, it was to be pushed back by reason in the pursuit of the sumnum bonum. However, those earthly causes – disease, places of infection and contagion – sound very much like triggers of modern disgust, especially when interpreted through pathogen avoidance theory. Also, like modern disgust, it was laudable to control the passion for a moral good. In the case of modern disgust, control allows medical professionals and members of the rescue services to learn to deal with what a lay person might regard disgusting. In the case of eschewing, these triggers should be dealt with because they were challenges from God. However, eschewing was to be controlled always, and while it is possible to desensitise to the disgusting, disgust is an immediate and unbidden emotion. Senault’s discussion of eschewing certainly references elements that seem familiar to the concept of disgust, such as the idea of ‘infection’ and the ‘unclean’. However, sensations of disgust are not a constant struggle for most people. Disgust does not cause sensations akin to the chest contracting. Nor is it related to the saving of souls or the avoidance of war, except at its most extreme links with the gatekeeping of morality. Finally, eschewing was a continuous feeling, while disgust reaches its peak in an instant before fading. In short, while eschewing remains somewhat distant from modern disgust, there are familiar elements in the objects that cause both eschewing and disgust.

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Chapter 3: Hobbes’s Aversion

‘Aversion is the Thomistic passion most closely aligned with disgust, its contrary being desire’

- Natalie K. Eschenbaum and Barbara Correll, *Disgust in Early Modern Literature*¹

Thomas Hobbes’s ‘aversion’ was something of a milestone in the prehistory of disgust, partly because he removed the element that connected earlier opposites to desire with sin, instead describing the passion in purely materialist terms, and partly because Hobbes described a type of evil that caused aversion as the ‘Foule, Deformed, Ugly, Base, Nauseous, and the like’.² In modern English, this group would be considered as examples of the disgusting. Hobbes was not able to find an English word for this category, and so borrowed the Latin adjective *turpe*. That Hobbes thought that it important to define a category of evil with a modifying adjective such as *turpe* is significant. Hobbes claimed to have chosen his words more carefully than all but the most fastidious of authors. He avoided metaphors and pinpointed specific names, stating that ‘whereas a Proper Name bringeth to mind one thing onely; Universals recall one of those many’.³ His approach was to avoid ambiguity by defining words with the precision normally found in geometry: ‘Seeing then that *truth* consisteth in the right ordering of names in our affirmations, a man that seeketh precise *truth*, had need to remember what every name he uses stands for; and to place it accordingly; or else he will find himself entangled in words.’⁴

Hobbes’s use of ‘aversion’ to describe his opposite to desire, and his adoption of *turpe* to classify an evil that had the potential to cause aversion, might look like the birth of a pre-‘disgust’ concept of disgust. However, aversion was not disgust; it differed in the way the passion interacted with the evils that caused it, and the passions that were built upon it. Aversion acted as the foundation of all unpleasant passions, and could be caused by evils other than *turpe* ones. Also, Hobbes’s opposite to desire was part of a larger argument supporting sovereignty. Aversion was to be controlled by a king; for Hobbes, passions were not metaphors for the unruly behaviour of that king’s subjects, but rather his subjects were unruly because passions could not be controlled. They caused dogmatic thinking and conflict; and they caused bloodshed and war.

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³ Ibid., 2:51
⁴ Ibid., 2:56
The king’s role was to have the last say in the debates caused by those passions. When Hobbes’s aversion is understood in this framework, the differences from modern disgust become clear.

This chapter examines aversion as understood in the works of Thomas Hobbes via several works in which Hobbes tried to understand the passions and how they influenced humanity and society. Two of his works had the most to say on the topic: *The Elements of Law*, published in 1650 but written a decade earlier, and his 1651 masterpiece, *Leviathan*. The version of *Elements* used in this chapter is the first printed English edition from 1650, while the text of *Leviathan* is a more recent scholarly edition which combines slightly different versions published during Hobbes’s lifetime with notes on those differences. This edition has the 1668 Latin edition of the text that was translated by Hobbes himself set alongside the English version. This chapter sticks to the 1651 English original in most cases.

### 3.1 The Uses of ‘Aversion’

Hobbes never used the word ‘disgust’. ‘Disgust’ appears to have remained a rare and difficult word for the first half of the seventeenth century. N-Grams from Google Books (Graph 3.1) and JISC Historical Texts (Graph 3.2) both suggest that the word ‘disgust’ increased in usage from 1650 onwards, albeit with a spike in the 1630s and 1640s on the Google N-Gram. This period of change may coincide with an uptake in printing before and during the Civil Wars, or it might be an anomaly. Whichever is the case, both collections show the same overall trend after 1650. This predates much of Hobbes’s output.

In addition to the fact that ‘disgust’ remained an unusual word in the English of his day, Hobbes may have had other reasons to avoid it too. As a resident in France and fluent French speaker, he would have known the French equivalents of the word as used in works he is likely to have read. The previous chapter has touched upon Senault’s use of *dégoût*. Descartes’s *Les Passions de l’Ame*, released the same year as *Leviathan*, contained the similar French word *degoust*. In *Les Passions*, Descartes claimed that ‘Et quelquefois le durée de bien cause l’ennuy, ou le dégoût’, translated by an anonymous English writer in 1650 as ‘the continuance of a good sometimes causeth weariness, or Distaste’. Descartes later went on to describe *du dégoût* as ‘a

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sort of sadness’ that occurs when eating and drinking. Descartes, like Senault, used *degoust* as the reaction to a surfeit of something, be that food or any other ‘good’. Perhaps not giving Senault his due credit, Benedict Robinson has noted that in *Les Passions*, ‘Descartes becomes the first philosopher to take Disgust seriously’. In French vernacular works, this may well be the case. However, the English translation remained ‘distaste’ or ‘dislike’, as found in the period’s dictionaries. As shall be discussed, Hobbes did have an adjective for elements we might now describe as disgusting – *turpe* – but for him, the word he used in relation to the passion that was caused by those elements had to mean more than ‘dislike’, ‘distaste’, or the feelings associated with a surfeit of something; it had to more precisely describe a basic passion. Hobbes used another word that described the behaviour of turning away involved when in contact with *turpe* evils: ‘aversion’.

Graph 3.1. Frequency of ‘disgust’ between 1600 and 1700, smoothing of 3, Google Books English Corpus.

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8 ‘The idea of ‘disgust’ or a form of revulsion did not begin with Descartes. For example, Aquinas, *Summa 1a2ae*, q. 33, described the Latin concept of *Fastidium* as the response to an excess of something: ‘Delectationes enim corporales, quia augmentatae, vel etiam continuatae, faciunt superexcrescentiam naturalis habitudinis, efficiuntur fastidiosae; ut patet in delectatione ciborum.’ (‘Because bodily pleasures become fastidium, causing an excess in the natural mode of being, when they are increased or even when they are protracted; as is evident in the case of pleasures of the table.’) This is part of the roman concept of *fastitium*. See Robert A. Kaster, ‘The Dynamics of *Fastidium* and the Ideology of Disgust’, *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, 131 (2001), 143-189.
10 Bullokar, s.v Disgust; Cawdrey, s.v. Disgust; Cockerham, S.v. Disgust; Phillips, s.v. Disugst.
The Word ‘Aversion’

When Hobbes was using it, ‘aversion’ was a surprisingly young word. A use close to the early modern English ‘aversion’ occurs in a work by John Lydgate, the c.1439 *Fall of Princes*: ‘And beasts which are raging as is their nature, He [God] can averte [turn away] and make them fully calm.’ Later uses seem to have been derived from the Latin *aversio*. The English word ‘aversion’ first appears in the surviving printed record in Richard Sherry’s 1550 guide to grammar, *A Treatise of Schemes & Tropes*. He defined *Auersio* as ‘auersion, when we turne our speche from them to whom we dyd speake to another personne, eyther present or absent, or to a thing to the whych we fayne a person’.

Over the course of the seventeenth century, period dictionaries suggest that ‘aversion’ became more complicated than a simple ‘turning away’ from one person to another. In 1616, Cowdrey’s *Expositor* defined ‘Auersion’ as ‘a turning away, a disliking’, and that definition remained mostly intact in 1623 when Henry Cockeram reduced it to simply ‘a turning away’. However, by 1656 Blount had expanded the definition to ‘a turning or driving away, a hating or disliking’. Two years later, Edward Phillips went a step further: ‘a secret hatred without any apparent reason, it may be taken in the same sence as

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Antipathy’ as well as ‘also a turning away’. This trend continues: in 1676, Elisha Coles defined ‘aversion’ as ‘turning away; also Antipathy or secret hatred’. The dictionaries suggest that some change in usage occurred in the mid-seventeenth century. An analysis of the EEBO-TCP corpus clarifies this apparent change to some degree.

‘Aversion’ in the EEBO-TCP Corpus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1590-1650</th>
<th>1651-1679</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>From</td>
<td>41.67% (75)</td>
<td>20.41% (286)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>God</td>
<td>14.71% (25)</td>
<td>5.35% (75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sin</td>
<td>9.41% (16)</td>
<td>3.07% (43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great</td>
<td>4.71% (8)</td>
<td>4.21% (59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soul</td>
<td>5.00% (9)</td>
<td>3.07% (43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hath</td>
<td>3.33% (6)</td>
<td>3.07% (43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turning</td>
<td>3.33% (6)</td>
<td>3.07% (43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heart</td>
<td>2.78% (5)</td>
<td>3.07% (43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thing</td>
<td>2.78% (5)</td>
<td>3.07% (43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conversion</td>
<td>2.35% (4)</td>
<td>3.07% (43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Away</td>
<td>2.22% (4)</td>
<td>3.07% (43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td>2.22% (4)</td>
<td>3.07% (43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hatred</td>
<td>2.22% (4)</td>
<td>3.07% (43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>2.22% (4)</td>
<td>3.07% (43)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.1. The percentage of the occurrence of the words most commonly found within five words of variants of ‘aversion’ in 1590-1650, and 1651-1679, in the EEBO-TCP corpus (absolute numbers in brackets).

The first obvious thing to notice is the increase in the use of aversion in the mid-seventeenth century. Between Hobbes’s birth in 1588 and the year before the publication of Leviathan in 1650, there were only 180 examples of variants of ‘aversion’ in the corpus. In the much shorter period between Leviathan’s publication and Hobbes’s death in 1679, variants of ‘aversion’ appear 1,401 times. The rise in the percentage of overall texts that contain variants of the word ‘aversion’ in the 1650s is dramatic (see Graph 3.3). It appears that the use of ‘aversion’ increased significantly. The corpus contains 3,613 sources between 1588 and 1650, and 3,642 sources

between the shorter period of 1651 and 1679. The earlier period produced 0.04 occurrences of variants of ‘aversion’ per text, the latter 0.39, almost a tenfold increase. The similar N-Gram produced by the JISC Historical Text website after a search for variants of ‘aversion’ provides further evidence of the rise in the usage of ‘aversion’ (Graph 3.4). A steep increase begins after 1650, which the rise in the number of printed works alone cannot account for: there seems to be a genuine rise in use, and that rise coincided with a change in usage. It seems likely that a shift in meaning occurred around 1650.

A proximity analysis of the EEBO-TCP corpus shows the fourteen words found close to variants of ‘aversion’ most frequently over the entire period. These were ‘from’, ‘God’, ‘sin’, ‘great’, ‘hath’, ‘soul’, ‘turning’, ‘heart’, ‘thing’, ‘away’, ‘good’, ‘hatred’, ‘men’, and ‘conversion’. However, many of the words that are proximal to ‘aversion’ occurred less frequently after 1650 than they did before (see Table 3.1). ‘From’, a word found in proximity to 41.67% of the occurrences of variants of ‘aversion’ between 1590 and 1650, appears close to only 20.41% of the instances of aversion between 1651 and 1679. ‘God’ drops drastically, from an occurrence rate of 14.71% between 1590 and 1650, to just 5.35% between 1651 and 1679. ‘Soul’ makes a similarly dramatic change, being found in proximity to only 0.99% of the variants of ‘aversion’ between 1651 to 1679, but 5% of the time before 1650. Additionally, other words that are regularly found in proximity to variants of ‘aversion’ before 1651 – ‘creator’ (2.78%), ‘have’ (2.78%), ‘infinite’ (2.78%), ‘be’ (2.22%), ‘course’ (2.22%), and ‘habitual’ (2.22%) – are not found close to ‘aversion’ at all from 1651 onwards. Except for ‘great’ and ‘hatred’, all the other words are found less frequently in proximity to variants of ‘aversion’. The words ‘love’ (2.43%) and ‘natural’ (2.41%) are found close to variants of aversion only from 1651 onwards, but not before. This suggests a diversification of the word after 1650.

From these data, there are a couple of interesting trends. Firstly, ‘aversion’ seems to weaken its religious aspect with the reduction of its association to ‘God’, ‘sin’, ‘soul’, and ‘creator’. This reduction is particularly apparent when comparing those religious words and the increase in the use of aversion.

Graph 3.5 examines uses of the word ‘God’ as found in JISC historical texts, while comparisons of the common religious words ‘God’, ‘sin’, and ‘soul’ across the period in Google’s N-grams generated Graph 3.6. There does not appear to be a great decrease in the use of religious language over the examined period. If anything, the Google N-Gram suggests that uses of these words, and uses of the word ‘God’, increased significantly after 1640 when the number.
of overall publications also rose. This increase makes the drop in the regularity of the proximity of these words to ‘aversion’ even greater in relative terms. ‘Aversion’, it would seem, became a word with fewer religious connotations and connections in the second half of the seventeenth century.

Secondly, the old usage suggested by the dictionaries – of ‘a turning away’ – was apparently less common after 1650. There was a drop in the regularity of both the words ‘turning’ and ‘away’ in proximity to ‘aversion’. Occurrences of ‘turning’ can be found in proximity to ‘aversion’ 3.33% of the time between 1590 and 1650, but only 1.07% of the time between 1651 and 1679. Similarly, occurrences of ‘away’ dropped from 2.22% to 1.21%.17 The best way to examine this further is to look more closely at some of the works in the corpus.

Graph 3.3. The percentage of published texts in the EEBO-TCP corpus that contain at least one occurrence of a variant of the word ‘aversion’ between 1600 and 1679.

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Graph 3.4. The increase in occurrences of variants of the word ‘aversion’ between 1588 and 1679, searchable JISC Historical Text.

Graph 3.5 Number of uses of the word ‘God’ between 1600 and 1679 in the searchable JISC Historical Texts.
Religious ‘aversions’

Most of the texts published in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries that include uses of ‘aversion’ did so in a religious context. The most commonly found religious words in the corpus – ‘God’, ‘sin’, and ‘soul’ – are often close to the word ‘from’. The new word, ‘aversion’, appears to have been a useful term for writers. For example, books of sermons and religious lectures often contain ‘aversion’, such as John King’s Lectures Vpon Ionas (1599): ‘There must bee an aversion from sinne, and a conversion to God.’ It is also found in Thomas Adams’s collection of sermons, The Deuills Banket (1614): ‘They doe (if I may speake) grieue and mourne at the auersion of our soules, (so hopefull and likely to be brought to Heauen) and at the aspiration of our climbing sinnes.’ Walter Balcanquhall’s 1625 A Sermon Preached at St. Maries Spittle (1625), states that ‘God is said to grieue for the auersion of a sinner from God.’

Sometimes, religious texts used ‘aversion’ in polemics against the views of those across the confessional divide. The Jesuit convert James Wadsworth’s work, The Contrition of a Protestant Preacher (1615), contains a simple warning about the dangers of sin: ‘Mortall sinne consistes in auersion from God.’ On the opposite side of that debate, Thomas Beard used ‘aversion’ in a more complex and explicit discussion of the idea of sin and turning away in his A Retractiue

Graph 3.6 The number of uses of the words ‘God’, ‘soul’, and ‘sin’ between 1600 and 1680 in the Google Books English Corpus.

from the Romish Religion (1632). The work was a response to the first post-reformation English Catholic Bishop, William Bishop, who, according to Beard, had said:

In sinne (sayth hee) there are two things, the one is the turning away from God, whom wee offend: The other is, the turning to the thing, for the loue of which wee offend. Now, the turning away from GOD, both the sinne, and the eternall paine due vnsto it, are freely through Christ pardoned: but for the pleasure we tooke in sinne, wee our selues are to satisfie, and according to the greatnesse thereof, to doe penance.20

Beard responded with the suggestion that this was not necessarily so, because to love other creatures was not sinful if that love was moderate and appropriate:

to vse the Creatures, and to loue the Creatures, is not sinne: but to vse them disorderly, and to loue them immoderately: which disordered vse, & immoderate loue, is the very turning, and auersion from God: and therefore, to say, that wee satisfy not for our auersoin from God, but for our converson to the creatures, is to say, either that wee satisfy for that which is no sinne, or els, that some part of sinne is not an auersion from God.21

Despite the high frequency of finding ‘aversion’ close to ‘God’, ‘sin’, and ‘soul’ in the first half of the seventeenth century, that does not mean that religious texts stopped using the words in proximity after 1650. For example, as late as 1675, physician, magistrate and philosopher Richard Burthogge wrote: ‘[t]here are Three things then that ought to be considered by us in sin: The first is the Aversion that is in it from God; and to this the Pain of Loss which is Infinite is due, forasmuch as it is the Amission of an Infinite Good.’22 Nor does it mean that all the text that used the word ‘aversion’ were religious. For example, Ben Jonson used the word in his play The Alchemist when the owner of the alchemist’s house, Master Lovewit, explains to two officers how he came to learn to whom his house had been let:

    It somewhat mazd me; till my Man, here, (fearing
    My more displeasure) told me had done
    Somewhat an insolent part, let out my house
    (Belike, presuming on my knowne auersion

21 Ibid., 326.
22 Richard Burthogge, Cava Dei (London: for Lewis Punchard, 1675), 372.
From any aye o’the towne there was Sicknesse.\(^\text{23}\)

The word is also used in histories, such as John Speed’s *History of Great Britaine* (1611):

The King was now in so great dislike and distrust with the Lords and Barons, that they would not appeare at *Clarendon*, where hee held a great Councell. To augment this fatall aversion, a certaine Knight belonging to *John Earle Warren*, stole away from *Caneford* in *Dorsetshire*, the wife of *Thomas Earle of Lancaster* (chiefe of the Lords faction) not without the Kings consent (as it was said) and brought her to the said Earle *Warrens* Castle at *Rigate*, with great pompe, and in despight of the Earle.\(^\text{24}\)

What might be of notice in these non-religious texts is a slightly different usage of the word ‘aversion’. Whereas it seems clear enough that the religious uses of ‘aversion’ were meant to express a turning away, the non-religious uses appear to be describing aversion as a hatred or disliking of something without any reference to behaviour or movement. However, some texts that used the word ‘aversion’ in discussions of the passions provide evidence for the use of aversion as a form of ‘hatred’ or ‘disliking’ in works before 1650.

In Henry Carey’s 1649 translation, *The Vse of Passions*, he described ‘eschewing’ as the passion which allows us to have ‘an aversion from vice’, and for which we were ‘endued with aversion; and this aversion cannot be justly employed than in keeping us from a Monster, the abode whereof will be hell’.\(^\text{25}\) Carey’s eschewing had a close relationship to hatred. Carey also used ‘aversion’ in this context in his 1641 translation of Giovanni Biondi’s *History of the civill vvares in England*. In this, Carey translated Biondi as suggesting that ‘All Nations do naturally abhorre being subjected one to another; the diversity of Language, Customes and Humours, causing the reciprocall aversion and hatred which wee find in them’.\(^\text{26}\) Another use of ‘aversion’ in English came from a work by one of Hobbes’s patrons: the *Sylva sylvarum* by Francis Bacon. The *Sylva sylvarum*, published posthumously in 1626, was a collection of experiments from which to build a sound methodology in natural philosophy. In a section discussing ‘The passions of the Minde’, Bacon stated that ‘The *Cast* of the *Eye* is a *Gesture of Aversion, or Loathnesse* to behold the *Object of Pity*’. Here, aversion was not the act of turning away, but a gesture


made by the eyes when encountering something disliked. To both Bacon and Carey, ‘aversion’ referred to dislike and hatred, rather than the physical act of turning away. While the non-religious uses of ‘aversion’ seem to have focused more on the passions than behaviours, the religious uses may well have implied a hatred or dislike of that from which one was turning away, turning an action into a passion. This was especially true in the first half of the century. Hobbes seems to have been influenced by both uses, placing them in in a materialist framework that was more explicit about the role the passions played in the accompanying behaviours. It is this idea of the opposite to desire upon which he built his framework of the passions and his political argument.

3.2 Hobbes’s Thought

Hobbes’s argument has a short and a long description. The short version is that Hobbes believed that while some knowledge is certain, like that found in geometry, the passions influence much of what we believe. Feeling something to be true, he suggested, could be mistaken for knowing it to be true, and being certain of one’s beliefs in this way could lead to dogmatism. These strong passion-led beliefs could mean that two or more parties come to quite different conclusions even when given the same information. The dogmatism of the two parties could then lead to conflict: in the courts, in Parliament, or even in open warfare. Despite what some historians have claimed, Hobbes knew that even he was not immune from dogmatic thinking. Quentin Skinner, for example, has suggested that ‘[b]y the time he [Hobbes] came to publish Leviathan in 1651, he had arrived at the conclusion that, in the moral but not in the natural sciences, the methods of demonstrative reasoning need to be supplemented by the moving force of eloquence.’

However, as early as the writing of *Elements*, Hobbes was aware that passion and cognition interacted:

For the begetting of opinion and passion is the same act; but whereas in persuasion we aim at getting opinion from passion; here, the end is, to raise passion from opinion. And as in raising an opinion from passion, any premises are good enough to infer the desired conclusion; so, in raising passion from opinion, it is no matter

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whether the opinion be true or false, or the narration historical or fabulous. For not truth, but image, maketh passion.\textsuperscript{28}

In a world where ‘image’ rather than ‘truth’ caused passions, and so dogmatic thinking and conflict, the solution was to appoint a final arbiter: a sovereign with absolute power. The sovereign’s authority to make the final decisions would come from people they rule over, and all sides had to accept the ruler’s conclusion. There are echoes here of the argument of Henry Carey from Chapter 2: the monarch as reason, controlling the passions of their unruly citizens. However, the more complicated explanation of Hobbes’s philosophy demonstrates that these two thinkers are quite different.

The longer explanation of Hobbes philosophy draws upon his many influences and involves a close investigation of his opposite of desire: aversion. French and English thinkers, as well as the ancient writings of Euclid, Seneca and others, influenced Hobbes’s thought. Hobbes claimed that his interest in Euclid’s \textit{Elements}, and the certainty of the geometrical theorems it contained, began during his first tour of Europe between 1610 and 1615 as a tutor to the young William Cavendish.\textsuperscript{29} In the 1620s and 1630s, his time with the Cavendish household brought him close to several important intellectuals and natural philosophers. Hobbes travelled once more to mainland Europe, meeting Galileo and Marin Mersenne. Mersenne’s circle were deeply critical of Aristotelianism and scepticism and contained thinkers who were attempting to overturn both philosophical frameworks. Through Mersenne, Hobbes became acquainted with Pierre Gassendi and René Descartes, who appear to have had a great impact on Hobbes’s thought. Gassendi believed that the material world was composed of matter and void. Indivisible atoms made up bits of matter, and each bit was separate from others due to a void between them.\textsuperscript{30} Although Gassendi was often at odds with Descartes – Descartes did not believe in the void, for example – the theories of the two were not incompatible.\textsuperscript{31} Both saw the universe as mechanistic, and both saw matter as a three-dimensional extension in space, built from an indivisible substance. Hobbes also agreed with this cosmology. However, unlike Hobbes, both

\textsuperscript{28} Hobbes, \textit{Elements}, 167
\textsuperscript{29} Hobbes, \textit{Vita Carmine}, xiv; Aubrey, \textit{Brief Lives}, 332.
Descartes and Gassendi were dualists. Gassendi’s emphasis on the mortal, material soul leaned towards a materialist explanation but he, like Descartes, suggested an immortal, immaterial soul as the seat of reason. Gassendi also believed that both the body and the soul were capable of feeling pleasure and pain, but the latter he related to otherworldly pleasures and pains, such as the love of God and hatred of sin. For Gassendi, the material soul caused the passions, but they were governable by the rational soul.32

Sir Kenelm Digby presents another example of the type of thought that was becoming popular in France and the Mersenne circle; Hobbes met Digby shortly before leaving France for the first time.33 Digby was an English Catholic whose father’s supposed involvement in the Gunpowder Plot had led to his execution.34 The younger Digby claimed loyalty to the crown but was nevertheless arrested and imprisoned on his return to England in 1642. It was during his incarceration that he composed at least one part of his Two Treatises, a work of enormous complexity that he published in 1644, a year after his release and arrival back in France.35 Digby’s division of the text between ‘the nature of bodies’ and ‘the Nature of Man’s Soul’ is likely to have been influenced by Descartes, although his focus on unobservable ‘atomes’ was closer to Gassendi. His second treatise’s attempt to prove the immortality of the soul did not refer to God, trusting only in what was knowable through everyday experience.36 Digby, like Hobbes, put forward materialist arguments.

Digby believed that nerves and fibres of the brain attached to the heart caused the passions, moving in almost the same way that a tendon moves a muscle: a tug on one end produces movement in the other.37 He claimed that these motions affected the speed of the pulse, which quickens or slows depending on whether the cause of the passion is close or distant. Like Hobbes, he saw aversion as a primary passion and as the source of any motion away from harm, describing it as ‘fear and trembling, and flying from those that make such impressions’.38

36 Kenelm Digby, Two Treatises (Paris: Gilles Blaizot, 1644), 349–466.
37 Ibid., 293.
38 Ibid., 333.
like Hobbes, Digby believed that reactions to natural substances caused aversion. These triggering substances might differ from person to person:

a Gentleman that had a horour to Garlike, who (though he was very subject to the impressions of beauty) could never wean himself from an aversion he had settled in him to a very handsome woman, that used to eat much Garlike; though, to win him, she forbore the use of that meat, which to her was the most savoury of all others.  

This view of an object causing different passions in different people is key to an important area of thought shared by much of Mersenne’s circle. The view was that the properties of an object were not generated by the object itself, as Aristotle had suggested, but by the mind’s interpretations of those properties. This view meant that reactions to colours, smells, taste and textures – and so the passions – were caused by mental impressions of external objects, impressions that differed from person to person, depending on temperament, education, and experience. Hobbes certainly agreed with this, and he believed that his subjective nature, and particularly the way it interacted with the passions, was the cause of dogmatic thinking.

Hobbes’s writing contains the materialistic and mechanistic ideas of Digby, Gassendi and Descartes. Hobbes also leant towards Descartes’s attempts to base knowledge on first principles. He made this foundational approach clear in his dedication to the Earl of Newcastle in his first political work, *The Elements of Law*. Hobbes claimed that ‘To reduce this Doctrine to the Rules and Infallibility of Reason, there is no way but, first, put such Principles down for a Foundation, as Passions not mistrusting, may seek to displace; and afterwards to build thereon the truth of the Cases in the law of Nature’. The suggestion here is that first principles must form the foundations of law, ethics, and moral philosophy. In the *Elements*, Hobbes claimed that he had found ‘the true and only foundation of such science’.

From the principal parts of our reason have proceeded two kinds of learning, *Mathematical* and *Dogmatical*; the former is free from Controversie and Dispute, because it consisteth in comparing Figure and Motion onely; in which things, *Truth*, and the *Interest of men*, oppose not each other: but in the other there is

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39 Ibid., 332.
42 Ibid., v.
nothing undisputable because it compareth men, and medleth with their Right and Profit, in which, as oft as Reason is against a man, so oft will a man be against Reason. 43

3.3 Hobbesian Aversion

The role of the passions in Hobbes’s political philosophy appears to have been a central part of his thought for a long time before he began writing them down for publication. In August 1635, seemingly unimpressed or unaware of earlier English works on the subject, Hobbes wrote to the Earl of Newcastle asking if ‘he could giue good reasons that ye facultyes & passions of ye soule, such as may be expressed in playne English. If he can, he is the first that I euer heard could speake sense in the subiect’. He continued: ‘If he can not I hope to be ye first.’ 44

There was a great deal about Hobbes’s system of the passions that deviated significantly, if not entirely, from earlier ideas. Despite his early rejection of Aristotelianism, Hobbes was not free wholly from its influence. Leo Strauss claimed that ‘the most detailed reference to scholastic theories are found in Leviathan and not the earlier writings’. 45 According to Strauss, humanism was a major influence on Hobbes, and this is why his first publication was a translation of Thucydides’s History of the Peloponnesian War in 1629. 46 However, Hobbes’s structure of the passions often relied on ideas and language developed by Aquinas and Galen. While he brought in newer ideas from his contemporaries and worked in additional thoughts of his own, he remained indebted to the scholastics he wished to overturn.

Hobbes’s physical understanding of the passions drew upon the works of Galen – albeit with a mechanistic slant – but it was also a little different to that of Digby. Hobbes believed that passions began when the body registered a sensory input that caused motion in the organ associated with that sense. If that were the eye, for example, the motion would produce a visual stimulation in the brain by ‘that motion, agitation, or alteration, which the object worketh in the brain or spirits, or some internal substance of the head’. 47 This ‘motion and agitation of the brain’ also ‘continues to the heart, and there be called passion’. 48 The heart governs the body’s

43 Ibid., ii–iii.
47 Hobbes, Elements, 4.
48 Ibid., 77.
‘vitall motions’: these are involuntary motions that include ‘the course of the Bloud, the Pulse, the Breathing, the Concoction, Nutrition, Excretion, &c.’ Hobbes saw these vital motions as mechanistic and part of the self-regulating patterns of the body. External influences from the senses, like hearing a loud noise, or internal influences like hunger, could cause changes in these vital motions as they enter the body, disturbing the patterns of motion required for the body’s healthy functioning and affecting the heart. In response, the body would endeavour to regain internal balance, creating sensations that the brain would sometimes interpret as passions, thereby triggering a motion towards a solution to the disturbance, such as food when hungry, or a motion away from the cause of the disturbance, such as when harm is imminent. Hobbes believed that when these involuntary motions began, they were undetectably small. He claimed that ‘the small beginnings of Motion, within the body of Man, before they appear in walking, speaking, striking, and other visible actions, are commonly called ENDEAVOUR’.

Endeavour was the body attempting to return to its mechanical patterns. The passions were conscious thoughts created when endeavours reach the level of attention. Hobbes also referred to the passions as ‘Voluntary Motions’, because endeavours were not just a stimulus leading to a physical response, but also interacted with the ‘imagination’.

Michael P. Krom has suggested that Hobbes’s passions can be broken down into two types: sensual and mental passions. The motions from the sense that affected the heart would create an endeavour to return to the body to equilibrium, causing sensual passions. However, ‘unless mental passions arise and are satisfied in the process of reasoning, a man will be unable to secure the objects on which his senses delight.’ According to Krom, the uncontrolled sensual passions can lead to error, or as Hobbes put it, ‘differences of Wit’:

For as to have no Desire, is to be Dead: so to have weak Passions, is Dulness; and to have Passions indifferently for every thing, GIDDINESSE, and Distraction; and to have stronger, and more vehement Passions for any thing, than is ordinarily seen in others, is that which men called MADNESSE.

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49 Hobbes, Leviathan, 2:78.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
Krom’s suggestion that Hobbes split the passions between the sensory and the mental has some merit. The most explicit references to them by Hobbes were from his concepts ‘Pleasures of Sense’ and ‘Pleasures of the Mind’. The first referred to ‘all Operations and Exonerations of the body, as also all that is pleasant in Sight, Hearing, Smell, Tast, or Touch’. The second included ‘the Expectation, that proceeds the foresight of the End, or Consequence of things, whether those things in the sense Please or Displease.’ These sentences are an example of Hobbes’s foundationalism. The immediate pleasures were those presented by the senses, such as good tastes or beautiful objects. It took experience built upon the information from the senses for one to know when something was a genuine good; for example, whether a pleasant-tasting food might have an unpleasant consequence. However, Krom suggests that Hobbes viewed the process much as his contemporaries: information moved from the senses, then to the heart to create feelings, and finally to the mind which evaluated those feelings. While it is true that Hobbes believed that the location of the passions was the heart, and that reason was located in the mind, he also thought that the two worked in parallel, not in sequence, as earlier thinkers had suggested. Hobbes claimed that the passions, interacting with an individual’s experience and education, ask ‘a precedent thought of whither, which way, and what’. As James points out, Hobbes seems to have believed that the passions were ‘conscious thoughts which are our experience of bodily motions’. A motion moves in two directions, inward from the senses and outwards ‘by reason of its own internal natural motion’, which causes and is caused by an individual’s ideas and beliefs, and through which ‘a phantasm or idea hath its being’. People learn to respond to a sensory stimulus by the real and imagined pleasure or pain caused by the experience: ‘when it Helpeth, it is called Delight, Contentment, or Pleasure, which is really nothing but a motion of the heart.’ Hobbes’s understanding of the passions needs neither the soul nor the concept of the immaterial. However, in the Hobbesian view, the mind has to evaluate the passions because they are attempts by an individual to understand the physical sensations – the endeavours – within the material body. This evaluation initially leads to two

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54 Ibid., 2:84.
55 Ibid., 2:78.
56 James, Passion and Action, 129.
57 Hobbes, Elements, 391.
58 Ibid., 2:70.
foundational endeavours from which all the others arise: ‘appetite’ (or ‘desire’), and its opposite, ‘aversion’.\(^5^9\)

In a chapter titled ‘Of the Interior beginnings of voluntary motions commonly called the passions. And the speeches by which they are expressed’, Hobbes claimed that appetite and aversion were the first endeavours of which one becomes aware when the body’s attempts to return to a balance enters the level of attention. At its simplest, aversion is the opposite of the ‘simple passions’, of ‘APPETITE or DESIRE; the latter being the general name; and the other often-times restrained to signify the Desire for Food, namely, \textit{Hunger} and \textit{Thirst}.\(^6^0\) Appetite or desire moves a person ‘towards something’. Aversion is an ‘Endeavour fromward something’, a ‘retiring’ from an object.\(^6^1\) In \textit{De Corpore}, Hobbes described these basic passions in terms of the sensations they cause: ‘this first Endeavour, when it tends towards such things as are known by experience to be pleasant, is called APPETITE (that is, an Approaching) and when it shuns what is troublesome, AVERSION, or Flying from it.’ An individual’s interpretation of feedback of external stimuli is the source of the passions, and aversion and appetite are the simplest forms of those passions, preceding even the knowledge of what might cause pleasure and pain.

Although Hobbes never explicitly stated it, appetite and aversion in their almost pure and foundational forms may have been possible. James has noted that, for Hobbes, appetite and aversion are ‘our conscious awareness of the body’s endeavour to maintain itself, and since internal motions that constitute endeavour persist if the body continues to function in the manner that qualifies it as existing, we can never be without susceptibility to a passion.’\(^6^2\) However, this susceptibility does not have to include a proper understanding of the object in question; suspicion is enough. Hobbes claimed that aversion is caused both by evils that we know can cause harm, and evils ‘that we do not know whether they will hurt us or not.’\(^6^3\) One might experience aversion to a potential harm before any knowledge of the outcome is possible. Hobbes claimed that ‘little Infants, at the beginning, and as soon as they are born, have appetite to very few things, as also they avoid very few, by reason of their want of Experience and Memory.’ They still experience appetites and aversions, however. Just as Hobbes believed that ‘to have no Desire, is to be Dead,’ so too would an absence of aversion signify the absence of

\(^{59}\) Ibid., 2:78.
\(^{60}\) Ibid.
\(^{61}\) Ibid.
\(^{62}\) James, \textit{Passion and Action}, 133.
life.\textsuperscript{64} Hobbes believed that it is through experience that more complex passions become possible.

In the \textit{Elements}, Hobbes borrowed his list of passions and their definitions from Aristotle’s \textit{Rhetoric}.\textsuperscript{65} By the time he was writing \textit{Leviathan}, he had enhanced his ‘simple passions’ to his own collection of ‘aversion’, ‘hate’, and ‘grief’, presenting them alongside and opposite ‘Appetite’, ‘Desire’, ‘Love’, and ‘Joy’.\textsuperscript{66} These passions did not act alone as basic passions but occurred together. One would be aware of the fundamental two, appetite and aversion, from early childhood, but would soon come to understand the experience of what he called ‘TROUBLE OF MIND’, ‘Displeasure’, ‘offence’, or ‘Griefe’.\textsuperscript{67} In the \textit{Elements}, Hobbes wrote that ‘when the object \textit{delighteth}, is called \textit{appetite}; when it \textit{displeaseth}, it is called \textit{aversion’}.\textsuperscript{68} Similarly, in \textit{Leviathan}:

\textit{Pleasure} therefore, (or \textit{Delight}) is the apparence, or sense, of Good, and molestation or Displeasure the apparence, or sense, of Evill. And consequently all Appetite, Desire and Love is accompanied with some Delight more or less, and all Hatred, and Aversion, with more or lesse Displeasure or Offence.\textsuperscript{69}

However, Hobbes did not seem to be able to describe what ‘pure pleasure and pain’ might look like any more than he did pure appetite and aversion.\textsuperscript{70} Arguably, the former of these two extremes was what Thomist philosophers meant by the absolute pleasure of the \textit{f\textsuperscript{\textit{n}}\textit{inis}}, but it is unlikely that Hobbes agreed with this view. The third simple passions were love and hate. Like pleasure and grief, these were forms of appetite and aversion developed through experience. Hobbes claimed that men ‘HATE those things, for which they have Aversion’, but that ‘by aversion, we signifie the Absence of an object’, ‘by Hate, the Presence of the Object’.\textsuperscript{71} This description has echoes of earlier Thomist and Aristotelian thought in which the opposite of desire would refer to an evil not in one’s possession, while both hate and sorrow would refer to

\textsuperscript{64} Hobbes, \textit{Elements}, 110.
\textsuperscript{65} Ibid., 69; mentioned by James, \textit{Passion and Action}, 133, and, as she notes, originally discovered by Levi Strauss, \textit{Hobbes}, 36-41.
\textsuperscript{66} Hobbes, \textit{Leviathan}, 2:84.
\textsuperscript{67} Ibid., 2:82.
\textsuperscript{68} Hobbes, \textit{Elements}, 70.
\textsuperscript{69} Hobbes, \textit{Leviathan}, 2:82.
\textsuperscript{71} Hobbes, \textit{Leviathan}, 2:80.
a possessed evil. Hobbes’s opposite of desire appears to retain the older characteristic of the avoidance of potential harm, rather than a reaction to a present one.

From this base of knowledge, the passions become increasingly complex as one’s experiences and understanding of one’s endeavours become more nuanced. For example, ‘FEARE’ is an understanding of ‘Aversion with an opinion of Hurt from the object’. As experience of the passions becomes still further developed, fear would give way to two more complex passions. The first was ‘Feare without the apprehension of why, or what, PANIQUE TERROR’. He claimed that ‘this Passion happens to none but in a throng, or multitude of people’. The second was ‘Feare of power invisible, feigned by the mind, or imagined from tales publiquely allowed, RELIGION; not allowed, SUPERSTITION. And when that power imagind is truly such as we imagine, TRUE RELIGION.’ The fear that accompanies religion and causes panic are complex enough to be social, rather than individual; they require a consensus or group understanding before they can be understood. Hobbes’s apparent suggestion that religion is a passion, along with his fierce materialist stance, contributed to many contemporaries branding him an atheist. However, in his 1668 appendix to Leviathan, he answered the criticism about his definition of religion by reminding people that ‘Ecclesiasticus says the same: “The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom.” And so does the Psalmist “The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God.”’ Putting Hobbes’s confusion between Ecclesiastes and Ecclesiasticus to one side, this explanation appears to suggest that Hobbes saw the acquisition of true religion as another example of the development of passions through experience. A sophisticated understanding of the invisible would lead to true religion, but a simple, uneducated fear would cause either religion or superstition. This simple fear needs guidance, therefore, according to Hobbes, a final arbiter is needed to decide what is true religion, and what is superstition.

**Hobbes’s Good and Evil**

That Hobbes believed the passions to be predicated on goods and evils has already been touched upon. However, as with the writers in the previous chapters, what constituted evil had a direct effect on how the opposite of desire was understood. Like the passions, Hobbes believed that the understanding of good and evil became increasingly complex as an individual gained

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72 Ibid., 2:84.
73 Ibid., 2:86.
74 Ibid.
75 Hobbes, Leviathan, 3:1232.
experience. These objects of causation begin simply, relating at their most basic to staying alive: ‘in the other animals, the appetite for food and the other pleasures of the senses push aside any concern for knowing causes.’76 From its most foundational form to the more complex understanding, such as of religion, Hobbes believed that aversion is primarily concerned with the avoidance of the evil of death.77 For example, Hobbes maintained that ‘the Passions that encline men to Peace are Fear of Death.’78 He famously reminded his readers that, especially at a time of war, life is consumed with ‘continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish and short.’79 Hobbes did not have a *summum bonnum*, but, as Straus has put it, death acted as his *summum malum*.80

More complex evils were related to an individual’s understanding of power and honour. Susan James has correctly noticed that Hobbes believed that humans naturally strive for power. This striving is not simply the power to survive; it is also the power to excel. Some of these powers are natural, foundational, and instrumental in the avoidance of death – ‘the faculties of the *body*, *Nutritive*, *Generative*, *Motive*, and of the *Minde*, *Knowledge*.’ Beyond this, Hobbes noted that each person compares the experiential elements of their power – such as ‘Riches *Place* of authority, *Friendship of Favour*, and *Good Fortune*’ – with others.81 If another person has more of these powers than oneself, that person deserves honour. Hobbes commented that ‘to honour a man inwardly, is to conceive or acknowledge that that man hath the oddes or excess of that power above him with whom he contendeth or compareth himself.’82 James has claimed that to Hobbes ‘our susceptibility to the passions is, then, a susceptibility to honour.’83 The person with the most complex power is also the person deserving of the most honour. This, Hobbes observed, is also how people chose their soverign. The absolute power of kingship

76 Ibid., 2:86.
79 Ibid.
82 Ibid., 45
83 Ibid., 134.
requires the highest possible honour from his subjects, and so who better to act as the final arbiter than the man with the most power? However, there was a catch. Hobbes believed that to attain all desired power was rare, and when it did happen, it could lead back to sorrow:

Of those therefore that have attended to the highest degree of Honour and Riches, some have affected Mastery in some Art; as Nero in Musick and Poetry, Commodus in the Art of Gladiator; and such as affect not some such thing must finde diversion and recreation of their thoughts in the contention either of play or business: and men justly complain of great grief, that they do not know what to do.

Contentment is not simply about consumption and the acquisition of riches and power, ‘continual delight, continueth not in having and spending, but in prospering.’ In Hobbes’s view, an individual’s death is the only way the motions of desire would cease. In the meantime, the pursuit of contentment would be both helped and hindered by the passions and the objects that cause them.

For the powers to become better understood, one’s experience and knowledge of the good and evil that generated them, and so the passions relating to them, has to do likewise. For these goods and evils, Hobbes drew upon the Latin adjectives pulchrum and turpe, for which he believed no English equivalent existed. He appears to have been correct. The word turpe does not appear in English dictionaries in the period, or even in the period after, although the related word ‘turpitude’ stretches back at least to Sebastian Brant’s 1509 work Shyppe of fooles. It does appear in translation dictionaries, however. As early as 1500, the anonymous Ortus vocabulorum defined the verb turpeo as ‘to be foule’; Richard Huloet used turpe as a description of the adverb ‘Dishonestye’ in his Abecedarium Anglico Latinum; and John Rider used it as a translation of the verb ‘To Disinherit’. Florio’s Italian-English dictionaries from 1598 and 1611, as well as Cotgrave’s French-English dictionary, fleshed turpe out further. Florio defined the Italian turpe as the adjectives ‘filthie, dishonest, shameful, foule, reprochfull, vnhonerable’, while Cotgrave translated the French version also as adjectives: ‘foule, ouglie, filthie, dishonourable,

84 Ibid., 74-75.
85 Ibid., 75.
87 Annonymous. Ortus vocabulorum (Westminster: Wynkyn de Worde, 1500), s.v. Turpeo es; Richard Huloet, Abecedarium Anglico Latinum (London: S Mierdman, 1552), s.v. Dishonestyle; Rider Scholastica, s.v. To Disinherit, or to disherite.
Other than Hobbes’s work, the EEBO-TCP corpus does not provide any examples of *turpe* outside Latin texts or quotations. It appears the word never entered English, and this was perhaps because finding a single word for translation was difficult. For example, a writer credited with being one of Hobbes’s influences, Cicero, used the Latin word *turpe* to describe several moral and physical ills for which his translators had to use a combination of words.89 A 1680 translation of *De officiis* by the journalist, pamphleteer, and royalist Roger L’Estrange, changed Cicero’s original text – *Quibus ex rebus breviter disputatis intelligi potest non solum id homines solere dubitare, honestumne an turpe sit* – into ‘[f]or this Question is not only Whether a thing be Honest, or Not.’90 *Labi autem, errare, nescire, decipi et malum et turpe ducimus* became ‘but on the other side, to Fail, to Wander, to be Ignorant, and to be deceived, we look upon as a wretched and reproachful thing’.91 Similarly, *Quod contra, id ut turpe, sic indecorum* was rendered ‘and the Contrary as Reproachful, and Misbecoming’.92 *Turpe* was an adjective that referred to the dishonest, wretched and reproachful. It was a marker of dishonour. To encounter *turpe* objects – or worse, to be a *turpe* object – would reduce your power, your honour and so your contentment. This use of *turpe* is not far from Hobbes’s use of the word.

Hobbes described the words *pulchrum* and *turpe* using adjectives as follows:

for *Pulchrum*, we say in some things, Fayre; in other Beautifull, or Handsome, or Gallant, or Honourable, or Comely, or Amiable; and for *Turpe*, Foule, Deformed, Ugly, Base, Nauseous, and the like, as the subject shall require.93

*Pulchrum* and *turpe* were adjectives describing the qualities within specific categories of evil. He claimed that:

there be three kinds; Good in the Promise, that is *Pulchrum*; Good in Effect, as the end desired, this is called *Jucundum, Delightful*; and Good in the Means which is called *Vtile, Profitable* […] *Evill*, in promise is that they call *Turpe*; Evil in Effect,

92 Cicero, *De officiis*, 96; Cicero, *Offices*, 51.
and End, is Molestrum, Unpleasant, Troublesome; and Evill in the Means, Inutile, Unprofitable, Hurtfull’.

Hobbes had split Latin categories of good and evil into three kinds relating to the future, the present outcome, and how the evil manifested itself. This categorisation has echoes of the Thomist passions, but it differs because the last two types of evil were built upon the first. ‘Molestrum, Unpleasant’ did not refer to a different type of evil to those described as turpe, but to when the promise of the ‘Foule, Deformed, Ugly, Base, Nauseous’ resulted in harm. When the methods that cause the resulting harm are ‘Foule, Deformed, Ugly, Base, Nauseous’, they are ‘Inutile, Unprofitable, Hurtfull’. These evils are not otherworldly; they are mechanical. They enter through the senses and disrupt the body. Hobbes described Molestrum as ‘the apparence, or sense of evill’ and suggested that both it and its opposite, Jucundum, are caused by the senses:

As in, Sense, that which is really within us, is (As I have sayd before) onely Motion, caused by the the Nostrill, Odour, &c: so, when the action of the same object is continued from the Eyes, Eares, and other organs to the Heart; the real effect there is nothing but Motion, or Endeavour; which consisteth in Appetite, or Aversion, to, or from the object moving.

These evils would cause aversion. That an external evil might cause a passion via the senses was nothing new, but Hobbes’s description of that evil is exclusively material. In Hobbes’s evil, there is no mention of sin, only the way external objects affect the passions through the senses. Aversion, unlike the earlier opposites of desire, is a mechanical reaction caused by the material world. It is a reaction to evils that, at best, might reduce one’s powers and so one’s honour; at worst, it might be responsible for one’s death.

Conclusion: Aversion and Disgust

Hobbes’s aversion is a turning away from something disliked. It is a passion experienced by adults, children and animals, and it might occur even without a full understanding of why the object or action that caused it might lead to harm. It is mechanical, and as one’s experiences increase, the passions built upon aversion increase in complexity. The key to the causes of

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94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
aversion are evils that could affect one’s life by causing harm in the future. Similarly, objects or actions considered as ‘good’ would cause the passion of appetite. According to Hobbes, these goods and evils begin as simple aversion and appetite reactions in children. However, as one gains experiences of these goods and evils, the passions they cause would also increase in complexity and one would learn to understand the nuances of these complex passions. However, an individual’s life experiences would lead to a different understanding of these goods and evils from others. They could lead to dogmatic thinking through the belief that one’s own assessment of good, evil, power, and honour is the only right and proper interpretation of those things. Dogmatic thinking could, in turn, lead to actions contrary to another’s wishes. Differences of opinion might reduce the perception each had for the honour of the other, causing both sides to look at the other as increasingly dishonourable, and increasing the aversion each experienced for the other. The result would be disagreement at best, violent conflict at worst.

Hobbes believed that a sovereign should be the ultimate arbiter. Hobbes had seen what the lack of such an arbiter would cause, having fled to France in fear for his life as the English Civil Wars began. By fleeing, he had avoided the ravages of aversion caused by dogmatism, free from final control, but was very much aware of them. Through the influence of the Mersenne circle on his thought, Hobbes’s universe had become a material universe, formed from the mechanics of motion. Aversion, in this view, is an action caused by the motions created by evil. These evils are not divinely inspired. There is not a true and ordinate evil of sin. If an object or action causes, or has the potential to cause, aversion, it is an evil. A sovereign should be the person affected by the fewest evils and graced by the most good in the eyes of the majority. He would, therefore, be the most powerful and so the most honoured of men. Decisions would rest with the sovereign and the sovereign alone, and society would agree to this in return for the peace and stability that it would provide. Peace required the presence of a powerful, honourable man who by being more good than evil, caused the least amount of aversion.

Hobbes’s aversion is perhaps the first passion analysed in this thesis that shares a great many similarities with modern disgust. Hobbes’s aversion was caused by a series of mechanical actions caused by what Hobbes described as ‘evils’. While disgust sensitivity is regarded as a moral gatekeeper, limiting the transgressions of the members of a culture by the raising of ethical boundaries by that culture, there were no such restraints in Hobbes’s aversion. Individual reactions to an evil were not important, only the judgment of a final arbiter. The proper reaction to the evils that caused this simple passion of moving away was to have its boundaries set by an
individual with the most honour: the sovereign. In Hobbes, the final word in the correct use of the passions had moved from God to a sovereign.

One variety of evil – that labelled by Hobbes with the Latin term turpe – appears to share a great many similarities with the causes associated with modern disgust: the immoral, the foul, the deformed, the ugly, and the nauseating. It is worth noting that Hobbes could not find a word in English that adequately described objects we would now call ‘disgusting’. Hobbes’s use of turpe suggests that this type of unpleasant sensation is a part of a concept of ‘evil’ that people would recognise, but which had not been separated into an individual category of thought until Hobbes had attempted to do so by using the borrowed adjective turpe. The suggestion that turpe evils are those that have the potential to cause harm in the future suggests a turpe-evil-based aversion that, once again, is like the previous opposites of desire: a type of aversion that, when coupled with a specific group of triggers, warns of possible future harm. Like modern disgust, this turpe-based aversion has an element of contamination involved, both physically and morally. Some of the words used to translate turpe – ‘Base, Nauseous’ – also describe things that could be understood as symptoms of a potential moral or physical contaminant – immoral behaviour and pathogens.97 ‘Nauseous’ also suggests an oral fixation, at least in part. However, the other words Hobbes used in his description of turpe – ‘Foule, Deformed, Ugly’ – suggest a visual element was also present, and Hobbes certainly did not restrict the way an evil might affect the body to the mouth alone. While Paul Rozin might claim that this is simply other senses triggering ideas that are incorporated into the oral, there is no evidence of this in Hobbes’s work one way or the other. Additionally, Hobbes’s aversion was at the base of a structure of the passions that was both materialist and foundational: each element of the passions was built on the foundations of the last, getting ever more complex as an individual’s education and experience of the world increased. Sadness, for example, need not be born from disgust, but, to Hobbes, it is always built upon aversion. Similarly, while all evils are built upon the foundations of the turpe, not evils are turpe. Disgusting objects or actions trigger disgust just as the turpe causes aversion. However, there are no non-disgusting objects or actions that trigger disgust, but there are, in Hobbes’s account, non-turpe-evils that cause aversion.

97 Hobbes, Leviathan, 2:82.
Chapter 4: Henry More’s Horror

“We have a name for fear-imbued disgust: horror. What makes horror so horrifying is that unlike fear, which presents a viable strategy (run!), horror denies flight as an option”1

William Ian Miller – The Anatomy of Disgust

Although horror may not seem like a word that is potentially synonymous with disgust, many works on modern horror claim that disgust is as essential a part of the emotion as fear.2 For example, Dale Townshend, who has researched the history of Gothic horror literature from 1740-1820, has suggested that ‘Horror invokes in the spectator and an uncontrolled revulsion and involuntary shuddering,’ suggesting that in horror narratives ‘the forces of horror and disgust become inextricably linked.’3 Similarly, in Noël Carroll’s The Philosophy of Horror, when describing an encounter between Johnathan Harker and Dracula in Bram Stoker’s classic horror novel he states that:

[t]his shudder, this recoil at the vampire’s touch, this feeling of nausea all structure our emotional reception of the ensuing descriptions of Dracula; for example, when his protruding teeth are mentioned we regard them as shudder-inducing, nauseating, rank – not something one would want either to touch or be touched by.4

Some modern translators also appear to think that ‘horror’ meant something like ‘disgust’. Several modern translations of Descartes’s Les passions de l’âme render Descartes’s horreur as ‘revulsion’, and others change it into ‘abhorrence’. This is despite the existence of an English translation published in 1650 – within a year of Descartes’s original – that used the word ‘horreur’.5 Although the modern translators have, perhaps, intentionally avoided the use of ‘disgust’, it does seem odd that the translators chose to use ‘revulsion’, a common

4 Carroll. Philosophy of Horror, 7.
modern synonym for ‘disgust’, rather than ‘horror’. Almost nothing, outside works on the modern ‘horror’ genre, a subchapter in Miller’s Disgust, and Julia Kristeva’s Pouvoirs de l’horreur, has been written on the experience, emotion or passion of horror outside works on literature and the genre of horror, and older uses of the word ‘horror.’

There are a few things that make Henry More and his translator’s use of the word ‘horror’ interesting. The first is that, although More used the word ‘horror’, he used it interchangeably with the word ‘aversion’ when discussing the same passion. More disagreed almost entirely with Hobbes’s view on the role of names. According to More’s 1659 work, The Immortality of the Soul, the idea that a word could be the core of a philosophical understanding of the world was disproven by the fact that other languages have various words for the same objects. He deliberately borrowed both ‘aversion’ and ‘horror’ from Descartes’s Les passions de l’âme, a work highly influential on both his understanding of the passions and his early work. He certainly does not seem to have taken them from the English of the period. ‘Horror’ and ‘aversion’ were not synonyms in More’s native English in the way that their French equivalents were, nor were they synonyms in the Latin More used for his work describing the passions and their role in morality: his 1667 Enchiridion Ethicum.

By the time that the Enchiridion Ethicum had been translated in 1690, the translator, Edward Southwell, did not think it necessary to do what modern translators of Descartes had done and replace horror with another word that might better convey the meaning. Little is known about Southwell other than that, according to Andrew Wood, he was ‘a particularly polished example of the class of middling administrators who, though having no aspiration to the highest bureaucratic offices, nevertheless served with exemplary skill and industry.’ Importantly, he attempted to translate More’s work as closely as possible, writing:

If among many other Faults in this Translation, the Reader finds it not always strict to the Latin; It was hard, where the Quotations were Numerous, and in such different Styles, to keep to that Rule, but at the hazard of a much better, Namely

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That every Translation should look like an Original. Which is somewhat attempted in this Essay.\textsuperscript{9}

Despite the difficulties, Southwell retained More's use of the Latin \emph{horror}. In the years between More's original and Southwell's translation, a French understanding of \emph{horreur} had entered the English language, allowing readers of Southwell's translation to understand it without further explanation.

More's 'horror' is also interesting because, although More thought that the passions ought to be controlled by reason and directed in the service of God, much like earlier writers and at odds with Hobbes's materialist framework, the causes of aversion remained things that a modern reader might consider disgusting, such as the ugly and deformed. More thought that an external deformity was the manifestation of an internal one, and that the control of horror and the accompanying reaction – flight – was necessary to avoid becoming ugly and deformed oneself.

\subsection*{4.1. The Word 'Horror'}

Neither More nor his translator used the word 'disgust'. This may be because no word that could be translated as disgust, such as \emph{fastidium}, \emph{taedium}, \emph{odium}, \emph{molestia}, \emph{offensio} and others, were used in More's original.\textsuperscript{10} It may also be because 'disgust' remained a rare word. However, according to data from both the Google Books English Corpus and JISC Historical Texts, its use increased a great deal more in the second half of the seventeenth century (see Table 4.1). This is backed up by data from the \textit{EEBO-TCP} corpus. Between 1600 and 1649, the word 'disgust' occurred 349 times across 201 texts. Between 1650 and 1690, ‘disgust’ can be found 1,694 times over 989 texts. One reason for this change may be the increased usage of ‘disgust’ at the expense of ‘distaste’ that occurred after c.1685, as demonstrated by the Google English Texts corpus (Graph 4.3).

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
Year Range & Number of Occurrences & Texts
\hline
1600-1649 & 349 & 201
\hline
1650-1690 & 1,694 & 989
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Number of occurrences of 'disgust' in Google Books English Corpus and JISC Historical Texts.}
\end{table}


\textsuperscript{10} For examples of Latin words that are translated as 'Disgust' in 1879, see Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short, \textit{A Latin Dictionary; Founded on Andrews' Edition of Freund's Latin Dictionary}, Online Dictionary, \textit{Perseus Digital Library TUFTS}, 2016: http://perseus.uchicago.edu/perseus-cgi/search3t?dbname=lewisandshort&dgdvhead=&matchtype=sameold&word=disgust&CONJUNCT=PHRASE. It is likely that many fewer words were translated as 'disgust' in 1690 than at the time Lewis and Short was published in 1879. There appear to be no Latin/English dictionaries from the period that contained the word 'disgust' as part of a translation.

Graph 4.2. Frequency of variants of ‘disgust’ between 1600 and 1700, JISC Historical Texts.
During the period, the ‘dislike’ element of ‘disgust’ lost its usage as a passion shared between people, and became increasingly about morality. Between 1650 and 1690, ‘betwix’ is no longer found in proximity to variants of ‘disgust’ in the EEBO–TCP corpus, while ‘between’ is found only 11 times. At the same time, the word ‘much’ became the most common word found in proximity to variants of ‘disgust’, suggesting a shift to a use of ‘disgust’ that had a comparative and quantitative element. For example, in his 1680 anonymous reply to the Royalist Robert L’Estrange’s uses of the terms ‘citt’ and ‘bumpkin’ when describing the types of people living in England, he wrote ‘I suppose the disgust was not so much at the Names of Cit and Bumpkin, as at the matter Cit and Bumpkin discours’d of.’

A similar comparison can be found in the preface to John Dryden’s 1671 play An evening’s love, in which he stated that he was ‘sometimes ready to imagine that my disgust of low Comedy proceeds not so much from my judgement as from my temper’. This comparative change also reveals an increase in the moral element of ‘disgust’. This moral element was previously understood as ‘dislike’, although definitions were beginning to change. Wilkins’s 1668 philosophical dictionary placed ‘disgust’ within the category of ‘displlicence’, meaning ‘displeasure’, and Richard Hogarth’s 1689 Gazophylacium

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12 John Dryden, An Evening’s Love (London: T.N., 1671), preface, i.
Anglicanum described ‘disgust’ as ‘to resent an ill thing’. These changes clearly did not have an impact upon More, and the most likely reason for this is that More would have only come across the word ‘distaste’ in the 1650 English translation of Descartes’s work. At the very least, More found no reason for this element of Descartes’s work to influence his own writing. Instead, More primarily relied on a word that he found while reading Descartes: horror.

‘Horror’

The fourteenth century provides some of the earliest examples of the word ‘Horror’. A c.1382 copy of the Wycliffe Bible, for example, translates the Vulgate’s ‘terrebis me per somnia et per visiones horrore concuties’ of Job 7:14 as the simplified ‘Thurȝorrour thou shalt smyte me to gidere’.

It appears that to Wycliffe frightening dreams and visions could be encapsulated in one word, ‘orrour’. In c.1390, Chaucer wrote that ‘Horrour is alwey drede of harm that is to come, and this drede shal euere dwelle in the hertes of hem that ben dampned’.

Like some of the opposites of desire in earlier chapters, Chaucer’s horror is a fear of future harm. Something of both these Middle English usages continued into the seventeenth century.

The Latin word ‘horror’, as used by More, appears to have had a distinct usage from the English in the century before More was born. As early as 1552, Richard Huloet was defining the Latin word ‘Horror’ as not only ‘Dreade or feare’, but also ‘Quakynge’, ‘Shakinge for colde’, and ‘Shyuerenge or quakynge for colde or feare’.

Thomas Thomas defined the Latin Horror in a similar way: ‘a shivering or quaking for feare or colde’ and added: ‘a dreadfull sound; a reuerent feare. Also a shiuering or shaking fit in an ague, which is with extreame colde. Also the frowning or lowning of the countenance’.

This description of the Latin adds another example of the effect the Latin horror had on the body: a change in facial expression involving the dropping of the face or frowning. However, like the other definitions, the Latin horror could be caused by either fear or the cold.

Cawdrey’s 1617 English dictionary defined the English ‘horror’ differently to the Latin:

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14 Vulgate Job 7:14: ‘then you scare me with dreams, and terrify me through visions’; Wycliffe, Wycliffe Bible, Job 7:14: ‘through horror you shall smite me togethe’.
15 Geoffrey Chaucer, The Text of the Canterbury Tales, edited by J. M. Manley and E. Rickert, 4 vols (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1940), 1.223-4: ‘horror is always dread of harm to come, and this dread shall ever dwindle in the hearts of him that has been condemned.’
16 Huloet, Abcedarium, s.v. horror.
17 Thomas, Dictionarium, s.v. horror, –oris.
‘fearefull sorrow, feare, terrour.’ This appears to have been influenced by Perceval’s Spanish/English dictionary, which defined the French words ‘Horrór’ and ‘Orrór’ as ‘horror, feare, terror, fright’, although Edmund Coote had already described ‘horror’ as ‘fearfull sorrow’ in 1593. The early seventeenth-century lexicographers were not including the physical aspects of the Latin ‘horror’, and instead were describing it using the names of other passions, focusing on associated feelings that were most notably variations of fear – ‘feare, terrour’, ‘fright’. It also seems to be linked to ‘sorrow’, which, according to Thomist ideas of the passions, was the passion that fear can become should fending off a harmful object become unavoidable. Thomas Blount’s 1656 Glossographia defined ‘horror’ as ‘a quacking [sic] for fear and cold, an astonishment’. Blount’s definition reintroduced the physical elements – ‘quacking’ – caused either by the passion of fear or the sensation of feeling cold. It also replaced the sorrow and terror of earlier descriptions with ‘astonishment’, introducing an element of awe, amazement, or surprise to the passion. In 1676, Coles continued with this physical description: ‘a quacking for fear or cold, astonishment.’ Perhaps unsurprisingly, the most physiological description of all the lexicographers is in Steven Blankaart’s A Physical Dictionary. He described ‘horror’ as ‘a Vibration and Trembling of the Skin over the whole Body, with a Chilness after it’. For Blankaart, ‘horror’ was no longer the result of cold, but the cause of it.

What is missing in these definitions is any reference to aversion. This does not seem to be the same with the French version of the word. In Guy Miège’s 1677 A New Dictionary French and English, horreur was translated as ‘aversness, aversion, horror, antipathy’. Certainly, a combination of the French words horreur and aversion can be found reinforcing each other in the period in a way that is not found in English texts. For example, a 1680 translation of Thomas à Kempis’s De Imitatione Christi renders the original’s description of the reaction of a woman to the thought of punishment as ‘ut quod naturaliter semper abhorret et fugit’ as ‘dont elle a nateurellement le plus d'aversion & d'horrour.’ Another example is in a collection of translations published by Fraternités laïques Dominicaines which describes the reaction of a

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18 Cawdrey, Alphabeticall, s.v. Horror; Robert Cawdrey, A Table Alphabeticall (London: J. Roberts, 1604), s.v. Horror.
This reinforcement may also be the description of the physical sensations of *horreur* that could accompany the experience of *aversion*. However, in the first of the above examples, the French word *horreur* was translated from the Latin *abhorret* rather than the Latin *horror*. Nevertheless, it seems that French translators understood *horreur* as an experience that had more in common with *aversion* than did English writers in the period. Whether this was the case is best examined through the *EEBO-TCP* corpus, where it appears that the English ‘horror’ did, indeed, have something of a distinctive usage.

**‘Horror’ in the Corpus**

One of the first things to notice about occurrences of the word ‘horror’ in the *EEBO-TCP* corpus is the increase in its usage around the middle of the seventeenth century. In the 34 years between More’s birth in 1615 and 1649, variants of the word ‘horror’ can be found 2,140 times across 674 sources. Horror and its variants, therefore, occurred on average 2.18 times per publication. Over the 40 years between 1650 and the publication of the English version of the *Enchiridion Ethicum* in 1690, that rose to 4,934 uses of variants of horror across 1,471 publications, or 3.35 uses per text on average. A rise in the number of re-editions in the later half of the century cannot account for the increase because the measure is uses per text, not overall uses. Additionally, as explained in the introduction to the thesis, the *EEBO-TCP* corpus’s data is manually entered, and it attempts to avoid double entries for all but important re-editions. The increase seems to be genuine, and it appears to have taken place between 1640 and 1650 (See Graphs 4.4 to 4.6). The overall trend, in the *EEBO-TCP* corpus, the Google Books corpus, and the JISC Historical texts corpus is a large increase in usage by 1689. The beginning of this increase, as with rises in uses of ‘aversion’, coincides with the English Civil Wars. The troubles in England over this period affected the use of some passion-words. There are, surely, few things as likely to bring home the physical nature of ‘horror’ than the horrors of war. Subtle changes in the words found near variants of ‘horror’ further emphasise the material nature of the word.

The words most commonly found within five words either side of the variants of the word ‘horror’ across the period were ‘fear’, ‘without’, ‘death’, ‘conscience’, ‘full’, ‘from’, ‘soul’, ‘hell’,

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23 Fraternités laïques Dominicaines, *La manière de se donner à Dieu dans le siècle* (Paris J. Villette, 1680), 527: ‘no longer look at it [the creature] without horror or aversion.’
‘great’, ‘much’, ‘despair’, and ‘thy’. However, these words did not remain in proximity to ‘horror’ with any consistency across the entire period. As Table 4.1 demonstrates, many of the most regularly co-occurring words shift in their frequencies after 1650. The most noticeable of these are: ‘fear’, which dropped from being found near to 6.45% of the occurrences of variants of ‘horror’ to 4.7%; ‘conscience’, which dropped from 5.05% to 3.12%; ‘hell’, which dropped from 4.25% to 2.05%; ‘sin’, which dropped from 3.93% to 2.8%. The decrease in the frequencies of ‘hell’ and ‘sin’ suggests that a move away from religious to non-religious uses of ‘horror’ was occurred at some point around 1650.

Graph 4.4. The number of times that variants of the word ‘horror’ appear in texts between 1610 and 1689, EEBO-TCP corpus.

Graph 4.5. The number of times variants of the word ‘horror’ appeared in texts between 1615 and 1689, Google Books corpus, generated using Google N-Grams.
Graph 4.6 The number of times variants of the word ‘horror’ appeared in texts between 1615 and 1689, generated by JISC Historical texts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall: 1615-1689</th>
<th>1615-1649</th>
<th>1650-1689</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fear</strong> 5.26% (372)</td>
<td><strong>fear</strong> 6.45% (138)</td>
<td><strong>fear</strong> 4.70% (232)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Without</strong> 4.07% (288)</td>
<td><strong>conscience</strong> 5.05% (108)</td>
<td><strong>without</strong> 4.50% (222)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Death</strong> 3.93% (278)</td>
<td>death 4.95% (106)</td>
<td>death 3.49% (172)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conscience</strong> 3.70% (262)</td>
<td><strong>hell</strong> 4.25% (91)</td>
<td><strong>conscience</strong> 3.12% (154)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>full</strong> 3.39% (240)</td>
<td><strong>full</strong> 4.16% (89)</td>
<td><strong>full</strong> 3.06% (151)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>sin</strong> 2.77% (196)</td>
<td><strong>sin</strong> 3.93% (84)</td>
<td><strong>sin</strong> 2.80% (138)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>great</strong> 2.50% (177)</td>
<td>from 3.13% (67)</td>
<td><strong>great</strong> 2.70% (133)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>soul</strong> 2.76% (195)</td>
<td>without 3.08% (66)</td>
<td><strong>soul</strong> 2.70% (133)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>hell</strong> 2.71% (192)</td>
<td>soul 2.76% (59)</td>
<td>from 2.61% (129)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>much</strong> 2.37% (168)</td>
<td>thy 2.62% (43)</td>
<td>much 2.53% (125)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>despair</strong> 2.08% (147)</td>
<td>may 2.52% (45)</td>
<td>despair 2.05% (101)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>hell</strong> 2.71% (192)</td>
<td>heart 2.20% (47)</td>
<td><strong>hell</strong> 2.05% (101)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The word found in most frequent proximity to ‘horror’ is ‘fear’. The context of this fear does not seem to change across the period. ‘Horror’ and ‘fear’ remained close bedfellows, if not synonyms, in religious situations such as divine judgment and its consequences. For example, in one of Patrick Gordon’s romances, *The Famous Historie of the Renouned and Valiant Prince Robert*, divine judgment is described as a ‘furious charge’ that ‘let Horror, Terror, Fear, and Death at large’. Using a phrase that is likely to have been borrowed from Descartes, preacher John Rogers claimed in 1650 that:

> When it [sin] is forcible and violent, causing horror and fear, gastliness, terror in the dark, or at the sight of any of Gods Judgements, trembling at the ratling of a leaf, yea, and desperation it self; This, though it be not good of it self, yet turns to the good of the godly; God brings them this way, onely he leaves them not here, but by the voyce of the Gospel doth relieve their mindes, and perswades them to seek mercy, upholdung them with the hope thereof: Some have checks of conscience, but so, as they can bear them out; some again, so as they cannot endure them.  

Descartes’s shaking of a leaf was, as shall be explained later in the chapter, a real and direct cause of horror. It was an example of a sudden fright that might cause one to take flight. Rogers was a Fifth Monarchist who believed that the world had entered its last days. Rather than being a negative experience, Rogers believed that horror acted as ‘the good of the godly.’ It was an experience that could convince people ‘to seek mercy’ before Judgement Day, as the horror one felt for one’s own sins became more intense.

There is a possibility that ‘terror’ and ‘fear’ were sometimes near-synonyms for ‘horror’. The possibility seems particularly likely with ‘fear’, given how often the two words were written in proximity to each other. However, even if this were true of general usage, More used the word ‘fear’ to describe a different, if related, passion to that of ‘horror’. Additionally, given his

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26 Ibid.
looseness with words, it seems odd that More did not choose to use ‘terror’ as a substitute for ‘horror’ at any point. He did use other words as substitutes, such as ‘aversion’. 27

One way to check the similarities between ‘horror’ and ‘terror’ is to examine the EEBO-TCP corpus. If ‘horror’ and ‘terror’ were synonyms, one would expect to find them in similar contexts. That would mean that similar words would be in proximity to both, and this is indeed the case, but not across the entire period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1615-1649</th>
<th></th>
<th>1650-1689</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Horror</td>
<td>Terror</td>
<td>Horror</td>
<td>Terror</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear</td>
<td>fear</td>
<td>fear</td>
<td>From</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without</td>
<td>great</td>
<td>conscience</td>
<td>Great</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>death</td>
<td>from</td>
<td>death</td>
<td>Death</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conscience</td>
<td>conscience</td>
<td>hell</td>
<td>Lord</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from</td>
<td>death</td>
<td>sin</td>
<td>God</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>soul</td>
<td>god</td>
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<td>great</td>
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Table 4.2. Words found most commonly within five words either side of variants of ‘horror’ and ‘terror’ in texts published between 1615 and 1689, separated by two periods either side of the publication of Descartes’s Passions of the Soul in English in 1650. Words in bold are found in proximity to both ‘horror’ and ‘terror’. Generated from the EEBO-TCP corpus (absolute numbers in brackets).

Table 4.2 compares those words found within five words of a variant of ‘horror’ in the EEBO-TCP corpus with those words in a similar relationship to the word ‘terror’. In keeping with the data provided earlier in this chapter showing the change in the use of ‘horror’, the analysis is split between the period from 1615 to 1649, and the period from 1650 to 1689. The words in bold are those found in proximity to both variants of ‘horror’ and ‘terror’. It appears

that ‘horror’ and ‘terror’ shared more than a family resemblance between 1615 and 1649. Early quotes, therefore, are likely to be using ‘horror’ and ‘terror’ together to heighten the impact of the passion within the passage, which was a not uncommon stylistic choice, especially in translation. It is also clear that ‘fear’ is the most common word found in proximity to variants of both ‘terror’ and ‘horror’, suggesting a connection between the three. At some point around 1650, ‘horror’ and ‘terror’ appear to stop being quite such close synonyms: there are now fewer words found in regular proximity to both. Horror seems to be developing a distinctive usage, one that despite being related to sin, hell, and death, is not necessarily religious.

**Horror and Sin**

The words ‘sin’ and ‘hell’ were regularly found in proximity to variants of ‘horror’ over the entire period, although more frequently in the first half of the seventeenth century than in the second. In the case of sin, this may have something to do with a shift from direct discussions of religion, and its increasing use as a metaphor for immorality in non-religious texts. There are some interesting features of texts that used ‘sin’ and ‘horror’ in proximity to each other. For example, in 1631 the Puritan Robert Bolton wrote in a text describing ways to avoid a bad conscience: ‘[w]hen horror for some one hainous sinne hath seiz’d upon thy heart, follow Gods blessed hand leading thee to conversion.’ 28 Similarly, in a 1615 work, theologian Richard Rogers suggested that one should ‘learne, seriously to have all sinne in horror and detestation’. 29 He believed it important to recognise one’s sin, and reject it, pairing not only ‘sin with ‘horror’, but ‘horror’ with ‘detestation’. As explained in Chapter One, it seems that, in the early part of the seventeenth century at least, variants of ‘horror’ could be found within five words either side of ‘detestation’ (see Table 1.1). However, this relationship travelled in just one direction. ‘Detestation’ is found in proximity to only 1.01% of occurrences of variants of ‘horror’ across the period. The difference is probably due to ‘horror’ having been a more common word. As this chapter will clarify, despite a family resemblance, the passion of horror was in many ways different to detestation.

After about 1650, the same relationship between ‘sin’ and ‘horror’ continued, but it was more likely to appear in ostensibly non-religious works. For example, in Thomas Middleton’s *Women Beware Women*, the Duke describes his decision to ‘never know her [his lover] as a strumpet

29 Rogers, *Commentary*, 522.
more’ by killing her husband and marrying her with the words:

    Then will I make her lawfully mine own,
    Without this sin and horror.\textsuperscript{30}

One word found in regular proximity to ‘horror’ – ‘without’ – was often used to describe overcoming the experience of horror. For example, a 1618 translation of the Franciscan friar Marcos de Lisboa’s \textit{The Chronicle and Institution of the Order of the Seraphicall Father S. Francis}, describes an involuntary reaction to a female leper:

    There was in this hospitall a leapresse, whome she [a widow] often purified, though she were so couered with filth and leprosie, that one could not so much as behold her without horrour.\textsuperscript{31}

This description of leprosy has more than a family resemblance to modern disgust. It described the horror caused by the visual and by a material object – a leper. However, the widow who attended to this leper could overcome her horror in the service of God. For the widow, purifying the leper was part of a series of ‘worckes of penance, as fastes, disciplines, and other mortifications’ that acted as self-punishment for failing to live ‘in perpetuall chastity, obedience and pouerty’.\textsuperscript{32} The reaction to horror, however inevitable, could be overcome. In 1655, ‘horror’ was used by a Scottish theologian as a reaction that ought to be overcome in the service of God: ‘Sin is a filthinesse, which neither God can behold, without abominating the sinner, nor the guilty conscience can look upon without horror, except it be covered.’\textsuperscript{33} ‘Covered’, in this sense, is not a physical covering, but ‘the forgivnesse of his evil works’ by Christ.\textsuperscript{34} Filth had a close connection to sin, God and the metaphor of spiritual defilement, as opposed to just physical uncleanness. More curious is the way this passage separates the sin-related passion of abomination from the personal human passion of horror. This examination of ‘horror’ as found in proximity to ‘sin’ suggests the possibility of a strong connection between horror and the realisation of personal sin. This connection is especially prominent when explained through the

\textsuperscript{31} Marcos de Lisboa, \textit{The Chronicle and Institution of the Order of the Seraphicall Father S. Francis}, translated by William Cape (Saint Omers: Iohn Heigham, 1618), 719.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{33} David Dickson, \textit{A Brief Explication of the First Fifty Psalms} (London: T. M., 1655), 189.
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid.
concept of the ‘horror of conscience’.

The Horror of Conscience

There was another religious use of ‘horror’ in the seventeenth century that can be found in the EEBO-TCP corpus: the little-studied ‘horror of conscience’. While an in-depth study of this idea is beyond the scope of this thesis, it seems that ‘horror of conscience’ was a type of realisation: it was a moment when the consequences of an action became understood and either caused or were accompanied by deeply unpleasant feelings of horror. Richard Baxter described ‘horror of conscience’ in his Christian Directory as something which added to the tortures of hell: ‘the horrous of your own Conscience, remembering with anguish the mercy which you once rejected, and the warnings and time which once you lost.’ Similarly, Richard Allestree added ‘that horrour of Conscience that haunts the sinner with fear and astonishment’ to his list of the consequences of sin. Robert Burton also used the phrase to describe the realisation of sin as a symptom in his Anatomy of Melancholy:

And the devil that then told thee that it was a light sin, or no sin at all, now aggravates on the other side, and telleth thee, that it is a most irremissible offence, as he did by Cain and Judas, to bring them to despair; every small circumstance before neglected and contemned, will now amplify itself, rise up in judgment, and accuse the dust of their shoes, dumb creatures, as to Lucian's tyrant, lectus et candela, he bed and candle did bear witness, to torment their souls for their sins past. Tragical examples in this kind are too familiar and common: Adrian, Galba, Nero, Otho, Vitellius, Caracalla, were in such horror of conscience for their offences committed, murders, rapes, extortions, injuries, that they were weary of their lives, and could get nobody to kill them.

Horror of conscience was a feeling associated with the realisation of sin through an early modern understanding of ‘conscience’. Zackariah C. Long has suggested that the early modern conscience was “‘knowledge-with’”: the being with whom conscience shares knowledge is God, and the knowledge shared between them is the moral law as expressed in the biblical injunction to love God and neighbour. When one came to the realisation that one may have committed an act that transgressed those actions, the resulting passion was horror or the haunting sensations

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36 Richard Allestree, A Discourse Concerning the Beauty of Holiness by the Author of The Duty of Man, Laid down in Express Words of Scripture (London: J. C., 1679), 147.
of fear and astonishment. Without examining the horror of conscience exclusively, Long did provide a useful insight into it:

What gets reawakened is not the memory of the original event but the judgment that failed to attach to it along with its attendant affects. This does nothing to lessen the horror of conscience’s accusations, but it does make the resulting ‘narrative’ different from its modern counterpart. The story of a soul unable to comprehend the damage it has done to itself because of an incapacity in judgment is different from the story of a psyche unaware of the hurt it has suffered because it cannot remember what happened.  

Horror of conscience refers to the realisation of sin and the need for repentance. The repentence angle is also found in works that contemplate two other words found in regular proximity to ‘horror’: ‘hell’ and ‘death’. For example, in 1615 the English divine and theologian Thomas Draxe wrote a description of the moment death approached and the realisation of one’s sins:

the feare, trembling, astonishment, horror of conscience and dreadfull despaire in many malefactors (specially persecutors and murderers) eu'en of those that escape the iudgement of the Magistrate, doth evidently argue that there will come a day of reckoning, and that there is an hell fire, whereof these are certaine flashings, and fore-runners.

For those who believed that reason was that part of the soul shared with God and so a divine repository of truth, horror of conscience would refer to a moment when one might turn one’s back on God. Such a view (as will be explored later in the chapter) was held by More and the Cambridge Platonists. However, something not unlike horror of conscience could also exist in non-religious passages.

Uses of ‘hell’ in proximity to ‘horror’ were a little different to uses of ‘sin’ and the ‘horror of conscience’. While ‘hell’ retained a relationship with religious thought, it was just as likely to appear in non-religious texts as religious ones. Religious texts certainly related ‘hell’ and ‘horror’ to death even towards the end of the century, when the two words are less commonly in proximity to one another. For example, in a 1690 collection of sermons, the priest, and eventually Archbishop of Canterbury, William Wake wrote:

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39 Ibid., 57.
I will not now say how unfit a time that of Old Age and Sickness is for so great an undertaking: When the Soul as well as Body is feeble and impotent; when the Memory is decay'd, the Reason fails, and our Afections are dull, our Zeal is cold, and all our thoughts taken up with the horrors of Hell, and the sense of those Infirmities under which the Body labours.\textsuperscript{41}

Wake was explaining how all who reach the end of their life might contemplate what comes next and the punishment they might face. In the case of both ‘sin’ and ‘hell’, the experience of horror is part of that punishment, suggesting that the word ‘horror’ referred to either a passion or the causes of a passion that one would wish to avoid at all costs. Nevertheless, ‘hell’ and ‘horror’ could also be found close together in non-religious works. For example, while discussing the death of a criminal by hanging, constable and Protestant reformer Humphrey Mill wrote in 1639:

\begin{quote}
They’d best to tremble in such sort,  
At thoughts of death that they may know,  
And heare the dreadfull ill report,  
Of sinne, while here they live below:  
Death puts an end to vaine delights,  
Then doth begin, hell, horror, frights. \textsuperscript{42}
\end{quote}

Here, hell is the justified destination of a criminal, and horror the deserved punishment. ‘Horror’ and ‘hell’ could be used even more metaphorically, as in another of Patrick Gordon’s romances, \textit{The Famous Historye of Penardo and LaissaI} (1615). In this, he wrote of a prince contemplating his death after discovering the death of his lover upon returning from his travels:

\begin{quote}
Let brightest heaunes a sable hew vnfold  
Let grasse and hearbes be withert wheir I goe  
Let Sunne and Moone in duskie clouds be rold  
Loathing to shyne shameing my faults to shoe  
Which sould be wrapt in black eternall night  
In hell in paine in horrour and despight. \textsuperscript{43}
\end{quote}

This passage is a description of the pain of loss; it presents the idea that such a loss might compare with the horrors of hell. It is also describing something that the prince believes he deserves as

\textsuperscript{41} William Wake, \textit{Sermons and Discourses on Several Occasions} (London: for Ric. Chiswell, 1690), 110.  
\textsuperscript{43} Patrick Gordon, \textit{The First Booke of the Famous Historye of Penardo and Laissa} (Dordrecht: George Waters, 1615), Caput. XIII: v.23.
the result of his actions. Once again, it is describing horror in the context of punishment. The descriptions of ‘horror’ found in the horror of conscience and the relationship between ‘horror’, ‘death’, and ‘hell’, suggest that horror could be a deeply unpleasant experience, and one that might accompany thoughts of the physical tortures of hell.

Before a close analysis of More’s concepts can take place, it is important to ground his thought in his intellectual background: a group of thinkers that have been labelled the Cambridge Platonism to whom he belonged, and the understanding of the passions in Descartes’s *The Passions of the Soul*. The next section will examine these influences.

4.2. More’s Intellectual Influences

Most prominent among More’s intellectual influences was a group of which More was a member, who have since been described as the ‘Cambridge Platonists’ due to their high regard for the works of Plato and the Neoplatonic thinker Plotinus. This group – including figures such as Ralph Cudworth, Benjamin Whichcote, Peter Sterry, John Smith, and Nathaniel Culverwell – attempted to merge English humanism and Christian Platonism. English humanism can be traced back to two people. The first was John Colet, an Oxford lecturer who in 1496 included elements of Marsilio Ficino’s *De religione Christiana* (1477), a work that merged Platonic and Christian thought. The second was Erasmus, the one-time Cambridge Greek lecturer who found Colet’s approach to Christian Platonism a good model for humanist reform. The group’s Christian Platonism can be traced back to the early Platonic works of Plotinus filtered through St Paul, and the Neoplatonic works of the early Church Fathers Origen and Clement of Alexandria. This section will examine the common threads More shared with this group, and with the thought of Descartes, who was highly influential on More’s understanding of ‘horror’.

**More and the Cambridge Platonists**

Though disagreeing with each other on many of the details, the Cambridge Platonists shared six unifying ideas. The first was the importance of the free will of the soul through the deification of mankind, described by Ernst Cassirer as their ‘central motif’; it was the primary ingredient of the other unifying ideas.\(^44\) The group claimed that all are born aware of the principle of the

existence of God. Benjamin Whichcote, for example, claimed that:

[The] natural Knowledge of God is wrapt up in the Inward of Man’s Mind and Soul; that Men, whether they will or no, whether they be pleased or disaffected, whersoever they look into themselves, and consult with their own Principles, and answer their very Make, so oft are they satisfy’d in the Knowledge, that there is a God.\(^\text{45}\)

Such knowledge was one of a series of innate ‘principles’, but only a particular type of reason could derive any knowledge or understanding of these principles, which might include anything from what is good and evil to the truths of geometry. Principles were similar to the concept of Platonic forms, the inherently known perfect ideas and objects of which all earthly equivalents are imperfect variations. The contemplation of these principles and the knowledge of them as developed through reason were believed to be the mechanism by which one formed conclusions. Reason, or the human intellect, was akin to divinity in a sense similar to the Aristotelian notion of the rational soul. It was that part of being that was an image of the Creator. Reason was the ‘Candle of the Lord’ (Proverbs 20:27), a phrase used so regularly by the Platonists that there were complaints about its constant repetition during the period.\(^\text{46}\) More suggested that there were ‘two Temples of God: the one the Universe, in which the First-Born of God, the Divine Logos, or eternal Wisedome, is High Priest; the other the Rational Soul, whose priest is the true man, that is to say the Intellect.’ He continued: ‘[t]he image of God is the Royal and Divine Logos, the impassible Man; but the Image of this Image is the humane Intellect.’\(^\text{47}\) This belief led to the second common idea: the idea of freedom. Reason allowed anyone to choose their path, but genuine free will was only achievable when the will agreed with reason, free from passions and imagined desires. Therefore, reason was superior to all Scripture because divinelly created knowledge could only be accessed internally through reason. While not being critical in a modern sense, they knew when to take biblical passages as allegorical rather than literal.

The third and fourth shared ideas were closely related to, and developed from, the first two. The third idea was that reason was practical, and its role was primarily one of moral guidance.

\(^{45}\) Benjamin Whichcote, Select Sermons of Dr. Whichcot; in Two Parts, edited by Anthony Ashley-Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury (Delmar: Scholar’s Facsimiles and Reprints, 1977), Pt.1, Sermon 2, 68.


\(^{47}\) Henry More, A Collection of Several Philosophical Writings (London: James Flesher, 1662), v.
Reason, as part of the divine, should be listened to and followed. More particularly believed that ‘The true Ground of our being able and free to chuse what is best, consists rather in the Purity of the Soul from Vice, than in Advertency and Attention to the Object, while the Mind is vitiated and obscured for want of Purification.’ As with the second idea, the Cambridge Platonists, much like the Aristotelians, Wright, and Senault, believed that vice would defile virtue if the passions were controlled by the desires of the imagination. The Cambridge Platonists held the view that the imagination acted as a link between perception and understanding. Imagination merged the impressions from the material world received by the senses and the passions they might cause, with an inherent God-given knowledge of the principles of which those impressions were imperfect versions. However, this could lead to error whenever the material world deceived the senses and the passions. In 1662, More explained that the imagination was ‘the Soul’s weaknessee or unwieldingness, where by she so farre sinks in Phantasmes that she cannot recover her self into the use of her more free Faculties of Reason and Understanding.’ The imagination, like the passions, had to be controlled by reason.

The fourth shared idea was ‘deification’, or the idea that humanity had originally emanated from God. God was, in effect, the perfect form of which humanity was an imperfect image. Nevertheless, because people were created in God’s image, a pursuit of the knowledge of innate principles and virtuous actions by the control of the passions, and developed by trusting reason, could return people to Him.

The fifth common idea was the rejection of Gnostic elements in Calvinism. Some elements of the early Christian practice of Gnosticism believed the body and spirit to be separate entities, the former from the imperfect material world, the latter a representation of the divine. As a result, it did not matter what one did to one’s body as it could not harm the separate soul. The Cambridge Platonists perceived this thread of thought in Calvinism. They believed that having one’s future divinely ordained might mean that the behaviour of the body had no impact on the chances of entering heaven. Calvinist doctrine meant that a holy life of virtue was a key indicator of your acceptance into heaven; however, a period of living such a life could, the Cambridge Platonists thought, lead to vice through certainty and complacency. For example, Cudworth argued against the Calvinist view of virtue as being back-to-front, stating that

creatures ‘are not therefore Good, because God loveth them and will have them be accounted as such; but rather, God therefore loveth them because they are in themselves simply good.’

Similar doubts seem to have manifested themselves in More.

A sixth unifying factor for the Cambridge Platonists, at least in the second half of the seventeenth century, was a rejection of the views of Thomas Hobbes, and particularly the egoism, materialism, and passions-first view of human nature. According to William Whewell in his Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy in England, More’s Enchiridion Ethicum ‘was written with a view of counteracting the poison of the Hobbesian doctrines; yet the name of Hobbes is, I think, mentioned nowhere in the book.’ Whewell was incorrect. Hobbes was berated harshly by More on two occasions in the Enchiridion Ethicum. First, More claims to have refuted the ‘Arguments or Sophisms of Mr Hobbs’ regarding free will in his work The Immortality of the Soul. Secondly, More claimed that Hobbes was trying to draw people into vice:

As this [divine sense] is a most true perswasion, and hath wonderful Power among Men, to draw them to Virtue, and also to corroborate their Minds against the Allurements and Assults of Vice; let those Men be ashamed who have so tamper’d with Mankind to perswade the contrary, This (in truth) has been vigorously and studiously attempted by Mr. Hobbes.

As the third part of this chapter will show, the shift by Hobbes, and indeed Descartes, towards materialism was not something that More accepted entirely. More’s view of the role of the passions remained as steadfastly tied to religion as that of any Thomist scholastic. However, that did not stop More from drawing heavily from Descartes.

More and Descartes

If there was a key element that made More’s ideas different from the other Cambridge Platonists, it might be the reliance, and the later rejection, of Cartesianism in his work. More began his career impressed with Descartes, even attempting to translate his Latin works into English for others to read. In 1650, he wrote to Anne Finch, Viscountess of Conway, a brilliant

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52 More, Virtue, 190.
53 Ibid., 175.
and respected philosopher in her own right, ‘[t]his Translation of Des Cartes is not writ so neatly as I could wish, but I hope legibly, and the Figures are as good for use as those in the printed book.’\cite{morc} More also wrote to Descartes before his death. He saw Cartesianism as a way to blend the otherworldliness of Christian Platonism with the era’s increasingly popular mechanistic philosophies, and described an ideal philosophy as ‘what we now call Platonism and Cartesianism, the latter being as it were the body, the other the Soul of that Philosophy’.\cite{morc2} By 1667, however, More was privately admitting to friends that a close study of Descartes’s writings had ‘derived from thence notions of ill consequence to religion’.\cite{morc3} These ill consequences were those of the detachment of God from His creation. A mechanical universe did not need an interfering God, only a deistic entity able to set all motions in transit. This realisation came to a head in More’s 1671 work, *Enchiridion Metaphysicum*, but was also manifest in alterations to later editions of some of his earlier work that sought to explain his misguided earlier praise for Cartesianism. The *Enchiridion Ethicum*, however, remained unchanged, perhaps because it was not entirely uncritical of Descartes, despite leaning heavily towards the French philosopher’s view of the passions. Understanding how More’s opposite of desire was built upon Descartes’s thought requires an understanding of that thought. The next section will attempt to grasp this, before an examination of More’s view of the passions and his understanding of horror.

### 4.3 More’s Opposite of Desire

More borrowed heavily from Descartes’s *horreur*. Descartes’s theory treated the passions as material and physical, the result of his wish ‘not to lay open the passions like an Oratour, nor yet a Morall Philosopher, but only exactly as a physician’.\cite{morc4} This mechanical, physical approach seems to have appealed to More, as he retained it in his exploration of the passions. For Descartes, the foundational passions were admiration, love, hate, desire, joy and sadness, and all

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\footnote{55 More, *Philosophical Writings*, xviii.}

\footnote{56 John Worthington, entry for ‘November 29, 1667’ in *Diary and Correspondence*, vol. III, ed. James Crossley and R. C. Christie (Manchester: Chetham Society Series, 1847), 254.}

other passions arose from them. Admiration had to be first because it coincided with any first encounter with a new or unusual object, ‘[a]nd because this may fall out before we Know at all whether this object be convenient or no.’

Desire and its opposite could not occur unless an object was first admired, but that which was admired must also be either loved or hated. Desire, for Descartes, did not have an opposite, but rather a negative version:

The Passion of Desire is an agitation of the soul caused by the spirits, which disposeth the Will hereafter the things that she represents unto her selfe convenient. So a man not onely desires the presence of an absent good, but the conservation of a present: and moreover, the absence of an evil, as well of that he now endures, as that which he believes may befall him hereafter […] it agitates the heart more violently than any of the other Passions, and furnishes the brain with more spirits; which passing from thence into the muscles, make all the senses quicker, and all parts of the body more agile.

Desire was as ready to draw one towards and keep hold of a good as it was to move away from and reject an evil. Descartes, like Aquinas and others before him, believed that the rejection of evil was also a desire for a good: ‘in seeking after riches, a man necessarily eschews poverty; in avoiding diseases, he seeks after health.’ Desire, Descartes claimed, existed in ‘many sorts’. Here, the anonymous 1650 English translator rendered Descartes’s word horreur as ‘Loathing’, and this is the only time he/she did this. Throughout the rest of the work, it was translated as ‘horrour’. The reason may have been variety, or to make the text more readable, but it does give an indication that this translator at least thought the two words similar, if only occasionally.

To Descartes, horror was a type of desire often also called ‘flight or aversion’. Much as a type of hate – hatred of abomination – was closely linked to flight in the work of Wright, Descartes believed that horror was related to hate. He claimed that there were ‘two sorts of Hatred, one of which relates to things evil, the other to ugly, and this last, for distinctions sake, may be called

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58 Descartes, Passions, 47.
59 Ibid., 68.
60 Ibid., 68–69.
61 Ibid., 69.
Horror’. Descartes’s ‘horror’ was caused by similar objects to those that Hobbes describes as a ‘turpe’ evil: the ugly, and the deformed. It too had an opposite, ‘liking’, the cause of which were ‘handsome things’. These two passions had great power due to the speed at which they reacted to sensory input, as with many understandings of the word ‘horror’ found in the corpus. Descartes claimed that:

the most observable thing herein, is that these Passions of liking, and Horrour are usually more violent then the other kinds of Love, and Hatred, because that which comes to the soul by the senses, touches her more to the quicke, than what is represented by her reason, and yet more commonly they have lesse truth.

Horror also had a more specific underlying cause than simple ugliness.

Horror is instituted by nature to represent a sudden and unexpected death to the Soul; so that if it be sometimes no more than the touch of a little worrne, the noise of a shaking leafe, or ones own shadow that causeth Horror, a man immediately feeles as great an emotion, as if most evident danger of death were laid before his eyes; this causes a sudden agitation, which enclines the Soul to employ all her strength to shun an evill, if present, and it is this kind of Desire which is commonly called flight or Aversion.

Descartes’s ‘horrour’ would have been different to the flight of Wright and the aversion of Hobbes. This was ‘horrour’ in the French sense, more aligned to ‘aversion’ than the English horror of fear and terror. More would have understood Descartes’s passion as one triggered by an object or action that informs the soul of danger as if it were an impending death, and causes one to feel the desire to escape to safety. Perhaps the little worm may be poisoned, or the shaking leaf may hide a dangerous beast? Horror was not simply Hobbes’s moving ‘fromwards’ due to an unpleasant feeling, nor was it Wright’s ‘flight’ caused by possible harm to a loved one. Horror was invariably mistaken, ‘so that of all the Passions, these [liking and horrour] are the greatest cheaters, whom a man ought most carefully to beware of.’ More would have understood it as physical and terrifying, based upon the potential danger of death rather than anything beyond

63 Curiously, more recent translations use the word ‘revulsion’ rather than ‘horror’. Descartes’s original used the French word Horreur, and was translated as above in Descartes, Passions, 67.
64 Hobbes, Leviathan, 2:82.
65 Descartes, Passions, 67.
66 Ibid., 67–68.
67 Ibid., 70.
68 Ibid., 67–68.
More’s understanding of Descartes’s *horreur* was central to his opposite of desire, despite his overall view of the passions differing slightly. The next section will explore More’s understanding of the passions, and how he wove Descartes’s ideas, and particularly ‘horreur’, into his understanding of the opposite of desire.

**More’s Passions**

More’s *Enchiridion Ethicum* is a work of moral philosophy. It focuses on how one may follow certain virtues for the ‘amendment of life’. More believed that all virtuous acts derived from three primitive virtues: prudence, sincerity, and patience. Prudence is a virtue, by which the Soul has such Domain over the Passions properly so called, as well as other sorts of corporeal Impressions, that the mind can receive on Impediment thereby, in rightly observing, and successfully judgeing what is absolutely and simply the best.70

Sincerity is ‘a virtue of the Soul, by which the Will is intirely and sincerely carried on to that which the Mind judgeth to be absolutely and simply the best.’ It is about being honest and focused on discovering what is good and what is evil. Patience is ‘a Vertue of the Soul, whereby ’tis enabled, for the sake of that which is simply and absolutely the best to undergo all things; even that which, to the animal Nature, is totally harsh and ungrateful.’ It is about suffering harm if the result is a genuine good. These genuine goods are brought about by adherence to ‘eternal and immutable’ laws ‘common both to God and Men’. ‘Right Reason’ is the faculty that understands these laws, and is accessed through the natural knowledge of God with which everyone is born. The ultimate good that More identified was not unlike the Thomist concept of *finis*. More called it ‘that Divine Sense and Relish, which afford the highest Pleasure, the Chiefeft beauty, and the utmost Perfection to the soul.’ This classically Thomist and Aristotelian, but also fundamentally Platonist, stance maintains that only acts of virtue can produce genuine happiness.

More moved closer to Aquinas and earlier systems of the passions than some of his contemporaries, but his system was still his own. He believed, at least to some extent, that it was the use to which controlled passions are put that defines them as good or bad, rather than the

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69 More, *Virtue*, ‘Epistle to the Reader’, A4r.
70 Ibid., 98.
71 Ibid., 104.
72 Ibid., 107
73 Ibid., 115
74 Ibid., 106.
feelings they produce. As might be expected, More believed that the passions are controllable by the divinely inspired right reason. This control allows one to choose a path with the aid of the divine and His knowledge of the principles behind each passion. More called this the ‘boniform faculty of the soul’. Such feelings remain entirely within the mind as part of an ‘inward sense’. An idea brought about without this boniform faculty is as likely to lead to error as a passion.

More used the word passions to describe a larger category of feeling than many of his contemporaries. He wrote that ‘by Passions I do not barely understand such as are commonly handled in Moral Philosophy, but every other corporeal Impression, which hath force to blind the Mind, or abuse the Judgment, in discerning what in every case were the best.’ He thought that passions are able to shake the mind, assuming it to be ‘perverted in the prosecution of that which is simply the best’, and added:

[W]hen Passions happen to be joined with a more vehement agitation of the Spirits, they seem to perform in a Man (whom some call the little World) what the Winds do in the greater. For as these purge and purifie the Blood, and suffer it not in stagnation to corrupt.

Even though More believed that the passions ‘combat with the Understanding’, he also believed that experience makes people ‘stronger by the Warfare’. In his view, the passions serve a purpose in ‘the rating of things that are laudable and just according as we find our Passions excited by them, or as they are felt and relished by a sort of Connexion with our Souls’. More claimed that ‘this is the nature of true Virtue, to love the best things, and hate the worst, even to abhorrence, in whomsoever they appear’.

There appears to be nothing new in More’s passions. If anything, he was staying closer to the sort of Thomist understandings of the passions found in Wright and Senault than to the mechanistic passions found in Hobbes and Descartes. More regarded the passions as unruly, potentially harmful, and so to be controlled by the ‘Regent, which is attended and fortified with numerous guards’ – the mind. His description of the proper use of the passions was also fairly

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75 Ibid., 16.
76 Ibid., 33.
77 Ibid., 34.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid., 39-40.
80 Ibid., 40.
81 Ibid., 38.
unexceptional:

Passions therefore, are not only good, but singularly needful to the perfecting of human life. Yet must they be with these two Conditions. First that our Desires steer towards a proper Object, which may be called, *The true Impulse*. For those who offend herein are the worst of sinners; such as the malicious, and those that delight in Blood and Tortures, and others of the strain.
The second rule is, that the Desires be adequate to the Object, or the End; and that […] the best and greatest things be pursued with our chiefest Passion; the middle with less; and the lowest with the least.82

The similarities between the Thomist notion of *finis* and More’s ‘true Impulse’ are striking. However, the objects that More listed as ‘those that had delight in Blood and Tortures’ are distinctly material. More acknowledged that the passions are part of the ‘region of nature’ that often ‘invade the Limits of Superior Law’. Like Hobbes, More believed the passions to be mechanical motions that can subvert thought processes, leading to unvirtuous actions.83 It was this mechanical aspect of horror that More derived from Descartes. This is particularly clear when exploring More’s passions in detail.

**More’s Horror**

More distinguished four ranks of passions. The first two, admiration, and love and hate, are contractions of Descartes’s six simple passions. Admiration is a little different to the other passions; More believed it is the only passion that resides in the mind or soul alone. Admiration is ‘a Passion of the Soul, which is struck with the novelty of any Object, and attentively engaged in the Contemplation thereof’.84 It can be expressed as other passions such as esteem, or despising, depending on the admired object. The next rank of passions are love and hate. Love is ‘a Passion of the Soul, by which it is excited to join it self unto Objects which seem grateful thereunto’. Conversely, and like Descartes’s hate, More’s hate is ‘inclined willingly to separate itself from Objects which seem ingrateful or hurtful thereunto’. Drawing further on Descartes, though again reducing his categories, More split hate into two main forms: ‘Hatred which refers simply to Evil things is called *hatred*; if to deformed things, then *Aversion or Horror*.’85 Aversion or horror is physical; it is a sensation based upon deformed and ugly objects.

82 Ibid., 41.
83 Ibid., 37.
84 Ibid., 47.
85 Ibid.
More built his third class of passions on the first two. In this class, ‘Cupidity’ is ‘a passion of the soul by which it is carried towards a good as its future’. More mentioned this earlier in the text, at first describing the type of desire that moves one away from harm as ‘flight’. He wrote:

if this Good or Evil be considered by us as remote and future, they kindle in us Cupidity, namely, to join with, and enjoy the first, and to avoid or repel the latter. Both which are by the Schools very properly called Desiderium and Fuga.

More’s cupidity is certainly similar to Descartes’s ‘desire’. More wrote: ‘the Absence of Evil, and the Presence of Good, are both of them good.’ However, he was not precious about this notion, adding that ‘if any man thinks it more proper, that Cupidity about the last Object should be called Desire, and about the first Flight, I am indifferent’. More seems to have not cared whether people used Thomist, Hobbesian, or Cartesian language on this matter. In his view, the words ‘horror’ and ‘aversion’ seem to be synonymous with the hatred of the physically unpleasant, whereas flight refers to an action. The two passions are connected. Describing the extremes of cupidity or desire, he wrote that they ‘spring up either from Horror, or Complacency’, continuing: ‘For nothing kindles Desire so much as Pulchritude or Beauty, and nothing puts sooner to flight, than any horrid Deformity. And the thing which is commonly thought most horrible is Death.’ Flight, it would seem, was an action taken because of the passion of horror. Like Descartes, More based this passion on the possibility of death.

More believed that the passions, including horror or aversion, should be moderated and controlled. In a section that comes closest to Descartes’s treatment of dégoût as the result of excess, More described how overindulgence might lead to death. He discussed ‘natural and radical affections’ that are ‘by God, whom we call Nature’s parent, given and implanted in us, as early as Life it self: such I mean, as are particular in the pleasure of Eating and Drinking’. More reasoned that one should not ‘so far indulge the Pleasure of Eating and Drinking, as to lose the end of that Pleasure, and bring ourselves Diseases and Death’.

86 Ibid., 48.
87 Ibid., 44.
88 Ibid.
89 Descartes, Passions, 68.
90 More, Virtue, 48.
91 Ibid., 48–49.
92 Ibid., 49.
93 René Descartes, Les Passions de l’Ame (Amsterdam: Louys Elzevier, 1649), 53.
94 More, Virtue, 55.
This control also applied to overcoming one’s reactions to objects that might cause horror or aversion:

Tis manifest, we have it in our Power wonderfully to corroborate and extend this faculty [free will]; and that either if we abstain from Indifferent things, when they seem greatly to delight us; or else we submit unto others, merely because harsh and unpleasing; that so, by degree, we may conquer all our Aversions to them.95

Later in the work he added:

But however it be, the Variety of Desires, as well as of Aversions, creep easily upon us; Yet ‘tis in manner, at our own discretion, either to turn away from Objects as are Tempting, or to converse with those that are less Grateful to us.96

More did not think that the threat of physical death should control one’s actions. Those ugly, unpleasant things that caused horror, including death itself, were to be faced and controlled by the boniform faculty.

More reminded his readers that ‘the Soul of Man is not to be scorth’d by Fire, nor choak’d by Water; nor can the Butchers chop it into parcels’. The reason for this is because ‘our life is but a Thing deposited with us by God. Now if God shall call for his own Pledge, How can we, with Sense or Honesty, refuse so just and potent a Benefactor, or be unwilling to restore back what he lent?’97 More also warned that ‘in paths of Darkness and of Worldly Temptations; ‘tis not possible but Offences will come’.98 In his view, death, despite the horror it might cause, should not cause concern. The horror caused by ugliness, deformity, and death are to be controlled by reason. More’s train of thought came from his three primitive virtues. Horror may well be unpleasant, but the use of right reason can overcome any disagreeable experiences. Prudence can help one not react too quickly, sincerity allows one to know whether the causes of the passion are good or evil, and patience allows one to withstand any suffering in order to reach the goal of a good action. More described his idea of virtue as a kind of ‘Moral Beauty’. External beauty was ‘but a poor Ingredient of solid Happiness’, while internal beauty is ‘a continual Feast’.99 At the same time, an inner moral beauty or ugliness might manifest itself

95 Ibid., 194-195.
96 Ibid., 195.
97 Ibid. 264
98 Ibid., 240.
99 Ibid., 249.
externally:

if the Soul be taken up by consuming Cares and Cupidities; If Hatred and Malise
make all things ghastly and sour within: How can it but that the Body must also
droop, the Health wither, and the Force decline.\textsuperscript{100}

The physical droop is, More claimed, ‘for the most part, from the Vices of the Mind’.\textsuperscript{101} His
view was different to that of Hobbes, who thought such passions ought to act as guidance, and
to that of Descartes, who saw the actions associated with the passions as mechanical and so
inevitable. More, like earlier thinkers, saw horror and the other passions as having the potential
to guide one either towards or away from God, and as a way to avoid the harm that may occur
without assistance from right reason.

Horror, for More, is a moment when the conscience becomes aware of the outcome of sin.
Unlike Hobbes’s aversion, More’s horror is not simply a mechanical motion; it is also a warning
against vice. The passions for More, as for Descartes, are caused by external senses which often
deceive the imagination. They remain material, part of the fabric of the creation, while at the
same time being the part of man that God had made in His image. To More, horror or aversion,
and the flight that could accompany it, can be immediate and violent, but not if it is understood
through right reason, by using prudence or caution in thinking, and by being prepared to suffer
the harm of horror if the outcome is a movement towards one’s own internal, albeit imperfect,
image of God. Horror or aversion are part of a divinely created system of information, not the
imperfect result of a subjective dogmatism. More seems to have acknowledged that pleasure and
displeasure are part of horror or aversion, but that those sensations are not the arbiters of good
and evil. It is the control of reason that makes one morally good, not the pleasantness or
unpleasantness of the sensation.

\textbf{Conclusion: Horror or Aversion and Disgust}

When More was writing the \textit{Enchiridion Ethicum}, his philosophical view was still in some
flux and his understanding of horror reflected that. He had embraced much of Plato’s philosophy
and Neoplatonic thought, but he had not yet rejected Descartes’s ideas, nor had he entirely
dismissed the Thomist thought that was still a powerful force in Cambridge, despite it losing

\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., 247.
\textsuperscript{101} Ibid.
some intellectual ground to other ideas. From Descartes, More described a horror that causes a violent sensation reminiscent of the experience of impending death, and a movement away from approaching doom. This feeling may well have been akin to the physical descriptions of horror that appear to date back to at least the mid-sixteenth century: shivering or quaking; the skin feeling cold; a drop in facial expression. Similarly, horror had been linked to passions of fear and terror for almost as long. That does not mean that More’s horror is a mix of passions; it is a specific passion triggered when the senses detect something ugly. Like Descartes, More believed that a major cause of horror was those things which mislead the imagination, causing one to jump at shadows. Also like Descartes, More thought that the words ‘horror’ and ‘aversion’ are interchangeable, both describing a reaction to physical and moral ugliness, and a movement away from potential harm. This also brings More’s understanding of ‘horror’ close to Hobbes’s understanding of ‘aversion’. However, the quality of the passion is not dependent on how pleasant or unpleasant an experience one has. Horror is good or bad depending on how well right reason and the boniform faculty – both parts of the divine found within the mind – are used to dictate the actions taken after experiencing that passion. These actions are to be directed towards an ultimate divine good. More blended older Thomist scholastic views on the opposite of desire with the more mechanistic views of his contemporaries. As such, he represents something of a crossroads, acknowledging the physical while finding a way for it to play a role in the religious. No longer was the ugly and unpleasant the wrong cause of the opposite of desire, and sin the right cause. Instead, in More’s view, ugliness is an outward indication of sin; it combines a material unpleasantness with an underlying otherworldly cause.

As an opposite or negative form of desire, More’s ‘horror’ or ‘aversion’ was something of a departure from previous opposites to desire. There are some similarities to modern disgust, however. Both relate to a potential harm and the need to move away from that harm. One of the interesting aspects is that, despite being couched in religious language and part of a text that was, in the main, an example of a distinct sort of Christian philosophy, More’s horror is caused by many of the material disgusting-like triggers of Hobbes’s aversion, rather than the often abstract idea of sin. Like modern disgust, the causes of horror are ugliness in object and action. Unlike modern disgust, these triggers were described by More using predominantly visual language; although drawing on Descartes, he may well have also had touch and hearing in mind – such as that of a worm or a rustling leaf – but he did not make that explicit. More’s horror certainly is not related to taste or any sort of oral fixation in the ways described in works on
modern disgust. Disgust is a movement away, while More’s horror appears bound with a flight from something feared and hated because it is physically, and so morally, unpleasant, and thus able to cause harm without causing contamination.

All those objects that trigger horror, according to More, are related to, if not the causes of, death. This is in keeping with some of the modern German *Ekel* theorists such as Kolnai, who viewed disgust as the result of reminders of death. It is also, apart from the movement away, a description of a sensation that seems quite different to what most would understand as disgust. Nausea is not mentioned, and while hypervigilance is a common symptom of disgust-based phobias and mental illnesses, the extreme alertness that Descartes and More attribute to horror seems to be something they thought applied to all people, not just those with a high sensitivity to horror.

This chapter highlights how little research has been done into the experience of horror in history outside literature and the cinema. Hopefully, as well as advancing this thesis, this chapter can act as a starting point for further research into an interesting and potentially important area of the history and philosophy of emotions. The next chapter shows how the word ‘aversion,’ synonymous with ‘horror’ in the opinion of More, continued to be used as a passion in the eighteenth century by examining Isaac Watts, the first person to use the word ‘disgust’ as the name of a discrete passion.
Chapter 5: Isaac Watts’s Aversion and Disgust

‘[T]he word’s sensory meanings increase in frequency so that by the 1690s disgust begins to look more as we might expect it to look’
– Benedict Robinson, ‘Disgust c. 1600’

Even when the word ‘disgust’ did start to be used to describe a discrete passion, it did not refer to an experience identical to modern disgust. Isaac Watts was the first person to describe ‘disgust’ as a passion in his 1729 work, The Doctrine of the Passions. By this time, the understanding of the word had changed significantly since its introduction to the English language in 1598. The ‘disgust’ of John Florio of a bad taste or a dislike of something had become a response to surfeit and deformity. It was also no longer a ‘hard word’, used only by a small group. Watts maintained a commitment to clarity in his writing, and had a disdain for overcomplicated words as used by philosophers, believing that ‘they are but hard Words, which only express a learned and pompous Ignorance of the truer Cause of natural Appearances; and in the sense they are mere Words without Ideas’. Nevertheless, he used ‘disgust’. Further evidence suggesting that disgust was more common is its use by early eighteenth-century taste theorists in publications such as the popular The Spectator. While the uses employed by taste theorists suggest that ‘disgust’ had developed a usage that a modern reader might expect, Watts used ‘disgust’ specifically to describe a type of displeasure resulting from a surfeit of something, be that something pleasant or unpleasant initially. In Watts, many of the elements that are found in modern disgust were split across three passions: disgust; his opposite to desire – aversion; and abhorrence, the result of an excess of either of these passions. His list of the triggers of aversion, disgust and abhorrence included overlapping objects, some of which might have caused revulsion, but all of which caused fear. This chapter examines Watts’s understanding of these passions, and how his disgust was different from its modern descendants.

This chapter is a little different to previous chapters. Exploring uses of variants of the words employed by Watts in the TCP corpora is somewhat more complicated than previous analyses, because the relevant dates between Watts’s birth in 1674 and the 1751 edition of his Passions (released soon after his death in 1749) straddle two corpora. The EEBO-TCP corpus includes a total of 53,829 works from between 1470 and 1700, 23,600 of which are books published


2 Isaac Watts, Logick (London: for John Clark and Richard Hett; Emanuel Matthews; and Richard Ford, 1725), 84.
between 1674 and 1700. The *ECCO-TCP* corpus, by contrast, has just 2,231 texts, only 669 of which come from works printed between 1700 and 1751. However, as the thesis has already mapped changing uses of the words ‘disgust’ and ‘aversion’, this chapter will examine uses of the word through dictionaries and the work of a group of thinkers, influential on Watts, who used ‘disgust’ in their discussions on taste and morality: the English taste theorists.

5.1 ‘Disgust’ and Eighteenth-Century ‘Aversion’

English dictionaries published around the time that Watts published *The Doctrine of the Passions* suggest that uses of ‘aversion’ had not changed a great deal since Hobbes had used the word. In 1702, Benjamin Norton Defoe’s *New English Dictionary* defined ‘Aversion’ as ‘a turning from, a Hatred to any thing.’ Nathan Bailey’s *Universal Etymological English Dictionary* of 1737 described ‘Aversion’ as ‘a being averse from, or having no inclination for; also a turning or driving away from.’ These seem like the definitions from Chapter Three. However, a closer look at the dictionaries can tell a different story, particularly in the growing relationship between ‘aversion’ and notions of repugnancy. Defoe defined ‘Repugnancy’ as ‘Aversion, Opposition, Contrariety’, and ‘Reluctance’ as ‘[a] Wrestl[ing] or striving against, Aversion to, Unwillingness’. Earlier, Miège had defined the French *Aversion* as ‘repugnance, aversion, averseness’ and the French *Repugner* as ‘repugnancy, averseness, aversion, reluctancy’. He also, as mentioned in the last chapter, used ‘aversion’ to define ‘horror’. This relationship with repugnancy broadens the potential usage of ‘aversion’. These definitions all describe motions away, and all suggest the presence of what Hobbes called ‘turpe’. The question raised is: why did Watts choose to split repugnance and avoidance, using ‘disgust’ as the name for a passion associated with the former and ‘aversion’ for the latter? The best place to begin is with a thorough understanding of the uses of ‘disgust’ of which Watts would have been familiar.

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As discussed in the previous chapter, uses of ‘disgust’ overtook uses of ‘distaste’ in the 1680s. Uses of ‘disgust’ continued to rise between 1700 and 1755, coinciding with a dramatic change in usage (see Graphs 5.1 and 5.2). In 1702, John Kersey the Younger added the verb ‘To Disgust’
to his *English Dictionary*. He defined it as ‘dislike, Or be averse from’. Kersey’s definition is one of the earliest examples of a direct relationship between ‘disgust’ and ‘aversion’. It was between 1702 and 1755, and shortly before publication of Watts’s *Passions* in 1729, that usages of the word ‘disgust’ changed significantly. By the publication of Samuel Johnson’s seminal *Dictionary of the English Language* in 1755, disgust had become much more varied in its usage. It was now ‘disgust of the palate from any thing […] Ill humor; male-violence; offence conceived’, ‘To raise aversion in the stomach, to dislike […] To strike with dislike; to offend. To produce aversion.’ Johnson also included the word ‘disgust’ in definitions of ‘displacency’, ‘distaste’, ‘disobligingness’ (as ‘readiness to Disgust’), ‘Offence’, ‘Offensiveness’ (as ‘cause of Disgust’), and ‘To Sicken’ (as ‘to be filled to Disgust’). Additionally, Johnson linked ‘disgust’ to ‘nausea’. He defined ‘To Nauseate’ as ‘To grow squeamish; to turn away with disgust’. ‘To Loath’ was ‘to reject with Disgust.’ ‘Nauseous’ was defined as ‘Loathsome; Disgustful.’ ‘Nauseously’ was ‘loathsomely; disgustfully’, and he described ‘Nauseousness’ as ‘Loathsomeness; quality of raising Disgust’. He also added a word that first appeared in Nathan Bailey’s *Universal Etymological English Dictionary* of 1731: ‘disgustful’, meaning ‘unreliable, causing displeasure’. Bailey’s *Dictionary*, a work from which Johnson borrowed heavily, was also the first work to suggest that ‘disgust’ entered the English language from the French word *degoust*. The influences on the usage of the word are likely to be varied, but two interrelated reasons may be central to those changes. The first was a social and environmental change, and the second was opinions about beauty and taste that arose, in part, from those social changes.

**A Brief History of Taste**

The English were not the first to use a version of the word ‘disgust’ in writings about taste and morality. Words that would become near-equivalents to the English ‘disgust’ appeared in most Romance languages in the early sixteenth century, parallel to an increase in the use of words in those languages that meant ‘taste’. From the time of Aristotle, taste was considered one of the lower senses. Along with touch and smell, it was placed below sight and hearing because

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8 Ibid., s.v. To Nauseate, To Loath, Nauseous, Nauseousness.
9 Ibid., s.v. Disgustful; Bailey, *Dictionary*, s.v. Disgust ful.
of the direct physical contact with the natural world that Aristotle believed it involved. Taste, however, also existed at another level. It was believed that unlike the other senses, taste cannot be deceived. This may be why Isidore of Seville linked a word for taste, *sapore*, to discretion and wisdom or common sense. Throughout much of the medieval period onwards, taste was linked to sin and civilisation, be it Anselm’s twenty-eight sins of curiosity in a monastic refectory, or the extension of taste through other sins of gluttony such as carnal knowledge. Taste, sin, and the wrong sort of knowledge remained intimately linked. Adding to this view of taste was the unwitting influence of humanist authors and print. Niall Atkinson has described humanism, through its pursuit of a return to a classical golden age, as attempting to access ancient ideas on food and taste. The pursuit of the golden age was certainly a driving factor for many humanists. Many of the popular Roman works they read, such as Cicero’s *De Officiis*, described objects and tastes of lust and desire while simultaneously referring to producers of food – fishmongers, butchers, cooks and so on – as dishonourable trades. Meanwhile, literature that extolled the virtues of good flavours began to raise the status of taste, with books about food reprinted many times. This increase in the use of ‘taste’ is earlier than Benedetto Croce claimed in his classic *Estetica come scienza dell’espressione e linguistica generale* (1902). Croce did not have access to technology that allows large corpora to be searched and analysed. He viewed the

12 Isidore of Seville, *The Etymologies (or Origins)*, ed. W. M. Lindsay (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1911), 240, 241: ‘Sapiens dictus a sapore; quia sicut gustus aptus est ad discretionem saporis ciborum, sic sapiens ad dnoscentiam rerum atque causarum’, ‘Cuius contrarius est insipiens, quod sit sine sapore, nec alicuius discretionis vel sensus.’
15 Cicero, *De Officiis*, translated by Walter Miller (Boston, MA: Harvard University Press, 1913), passim.
seventeenth century as the period in which taste gained cultural significance, but taste became more relevant in most of Europe earlier than this.

Taste remained in people’s minds for other reasons. The late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries saw repeated famines roll across Europe on which religious polemics sought to capitalise through print. The Reformed and Counter-Reformation Churches were warning of the dangers of gluttony across the confessional divide. For example, in England, a translation of Gui de Roye’s *Le doctrinal de sapience* (c.1489) warned of the harm caused by bad taste: ‘ther be many cristen bothe clerkes and layemen whychely I know God by faith ne by scripture bey cause they haue the taste disordynate by symne they may not sauore him.’ To have the wrong sort of taste – ‘taste disordynate’ – was harmful to the soul. Another example is the famine in Venice in 1518. This one-time capital of taste had become a place where many tasted nothing at all. Alongside a dearth of food, the price for what food there was rose and wages fell. This ‘great divergence’, as analysed by Kenneth Pomeranz and others, no doubt played into religious calls for restraint. Spinning a physical hardship into a Godly or civilised act became common.

It is no wonder that words that referred to a sort of anti-taste came to be either invented or used more often in the period.

It was not uncommon for Romance languages to derive words from an intact Latin stem and a once detachable preposition word that had become a prefix. The Latin word *gustus*, or ‘taste’, arose from the semantically similar Proto-Italic noun *gustu*-, adjective *gusto*– and verb stem *gus*-n-. The Romance languages inherited versions of these such as *gout*, *gusto*, and *gusto*. They then derived a negative version from the Latin prefix *dis*– (later *des*–) to mean ‘[w]ith privative sense, implying removal, aversion, negation, reversal of action’. Although the meanings of

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17 Gui de Roye, *Thus Endeth the Doctrinal of Sapience*, translated by William Caxton (Cologne: Wylyyam Caxton, 1496), f. 59r.


these various forms of ‘disgust’ differ slightly across the languages, they all retain an association with feelings caused by a surfeit of something.

There is evidence that the French version of the word for disgust goes back to the fourteenth century. Dégouzts and desgoutées appear in a French text on shepherding: Jean de Brie’s Le bon berger (c.1379). The first example of a word for which the English ‘disgust’ would later become a near-equivalent in the printed archives is the Portuguese work Cancioneiro de Resende (1516). Meaning ‘general songbook’, this collection of poems, collated by Garcia de Resende, contains just one usage of the word degostar:

Tan estremo de panssar,
Que por martyrie cobrastes
Gostoso de degostar,
Qu’ll deleyte en ell pesar.
Mas os mata que gozastes.

The poem was allegedly written by a Count of Vimioso, presumably Francisco de Portugal, who became the Conde de Vimioso in 1515. The poem may have been written as much as three decades before that, depending on how prodigious a poet Francisco was. However, it is possible, even likely, that the poem was composed not long before De Resende compiled his book. This example was the first of many versions of ‘disgust’. Spanish, French, and Italian texts begin to use versions of the word from 1532, 1539, and 1556 respectively. In England, the word ‘distaste’ had entered the corpora by at least 1566, preceding the 1598 introduction of the word ‘disgust’ by thirty-two years. It took more than a century before ideas of taste and the word ‘disgust’ began to be used in English philosophical works as the word’s equivalents had been across Europe in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

23 García de Resende, ‘Gross de Conde Do Vimioso aEsta Cantigua’, in Francisco de Portugal, Cancioneiro Geral (Stuttgart: Gedruckt auf literarisichen Vereins, 1848), 137: ‘you are so extreme you think through martyrdom you will earn tasty (or taste and) degostar, but the weight of the delight kills what you like.’
English Taste Theorists

The English taste theorists of the early eighteenth century demonstrate the changes in some understandings of the English word ‘disgust’, since they drew on the usages found in the older equivalent European words. For them, the metaphor of taste became a way to understand luxury and beauty as moral goods via the perception of pleasure the senses created, and their arguments often ran in tandem with ideas of morality. Like the humanists before them, these thinkers would draw upon classical ideas of taste and the notion of anti-taste in their explanations of the opposites of beauty and pleasure.

They chose to use the word ‘disgust’ rather than ‘distaste’. It may have been because ‘disgust’, through its relationship with ‘dislike’, had developed a moral element lacking in ‘distaste’. It may also have been that ‘disgust’ sounds like the French degoust, and that this similarity was important to the taste theorists, as they borrowed from the French interpretations of the term found in the works of Senault, Descartes and others. Making use of older French understandings was central to Watts, and to one of the earliest English taste theorists who likely influenced him, Lord Shaftesbury.

The standard of taste set by Anthony Ashley-Cooper, the 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury, became a central point of debate for everyone who wrote about taste and aesthetics up to and including Immanuel Kant. In his 1711 work Characteristicks, he discussed ideas of beauty and sublimity as being affected by objects with certain qualities. These objects need not only be physical objects; they could be anything that a good ‘Judge of Beauty’ will recognise as admirable, such as a friendship.26 To Shaftesbury, ‘disgust’ does not refer to a passion, but to a sentiment. The sentiments refer to a set of feelings that also brought with them judgments:27 moral judgments – a feeling of what is right and wrong – in the case of the theory of moral sentiments, and judgments of taste – or feelings of what is beautiful or disgusting – in the case of taste theory. Shaftesbury appears to have been using the word ‘disgust’ very similarly the French use of ‘degoust’. He claimed that ‘Pleasure is no rule of Good; since when we follow Pleasure merely, we are Disgusted, and change from one sort to another’.28 He also commented that ‘frequent Successions of alternate Hatred and Love, Aversion and Inclination, must of necessity create continual Disturbance and Disgust’ that ‘not only lose their Force, but are in a manner converted

27 Isaac Watts, The Doctrine of the Passions (London: for the booksellers, 1729), 23.
28 Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, 1:309.
into Uneasiness and Disgust’. Shaftesbury’s use of ‘disgust’ was partly a description of a mode of thinking, of making judgments of moral and aesthetic approval. It also described a physical experience. Excessive changes in ‘thoughts’, ‘temper’, ‘Engagements’, ‘Life’, ‘Conversation’, or even ‘a different Passion’ could lead to ‘Satiety and Disgust’.

The second theorist whose use of the word ‘disgust’ provides an example of how the word was coming to be understood was John Addison. Despite only using the word once, the influence of this single application is likely to have been substantial. The reach of the magazine in which Addison wrote, *The Spectator*, went well beyond its impressive daily circulation of 3,000 copies, as people shared issues and read them aloud. Addison claimed that he had ‘[t]hreescore thousand [60,000] Disciples in London and Westminster’. This reach of a tenth of the London population has held up to some scrutiny. As with any publication with an extensive circulation, *The Spectator* would have had something of an influence on the wider use of the English language.

Addison was one among a group of thinkers who mixed taste with the imagination. That does not mean that one imagines pleasure, but that a representation of something in images, sometimes in the imagination, can be a source of pleasure. Taste, to this group, is visual. When perception matches or exceeds one’s imagination, it causes pleasure. Beauty, therefore, is entirely material and consists of mountain tops, sunsets, and attractive human bodies. Joseph Addison described his concept of taste as ‘that Faculty of the Soul, which discerns the Beauties of an Author with Pleasure, and the Imperfections with Dislike’. Addison explicitly stated that ‘Mental Taste’ is derived metaphorically from ‘Sensitive Taste’.

Addison’s single use of the word ‘disgust’ among this set of articles tells us something about possible uses of the word in 1712, just one year after Shaftesbury published his work. For the opening paragraph of his ‘The Pleasures of Imagination’ series of essays, Addison wrote:

I shall first consider those Pleasures of the Imagination, which arise from the actual View and Survey of outward Objects: And these, I think. All proceed from the Sight of what is Great, Uncommon, or Beautiful. There may, indeed, be something so terrible or offensive, that the Horror or Loathsomeness of an Object may over-

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29 Ibid., 2:111, 2:129.
30 Ibid., 2:226.
32 Ibid., no. 409.
bear the Pleasure which results from its Greatness, Novelty, or Beauty; but still there will be such a Mixture of Delight in the very Disgust it gives us, as any of these Qualifications are most conspicuous and prevailing [his emphasis].

Addison’s opening suggests that, by 1712, the word ‘disgust’ already referred to feelings that were ‘so terrible or offensive, that the Horror or Loathsomeness of an Object’ can override its positive aspects. This disgust referred to a surfeit of the physically offensive and the terrible, but not the pleasurable. This use would soon embed itself within wider uses of the word and was certainly used by Watts.

By 1725, ‘disgust’ was being used in a way that is more recognisable to a modern reader. Inquiry into the Original of Our Idea of Beauty and Virtue was published that year by the Professor of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow University, Francis Hutcheson. It owed more than a small debt to Shaftesbury, and it similarly combined ideas of moral sentimentalism and taste. To Hutcheson, a correct proportion and unity of the parts within a whole are the measures of taste. However, perceptions of those proportions could differ between people. Placing the words ‘bad’, ‘offensive’, and ‘Pain’ together, Hutcheson claimed that one’s definition of ‘deformity’ depends on one’s expectation:

Deformity is only the absence of Beauty or Deficiency in the Beauty expected in any Species: Thus Bad Musick pleases Rusticks who never heard any better, and the finest Ear is not offended with tuning of Instruments if it be not too tedious, where no Harmony is expected. A rude Heap of Stones is no way offensive to one who shall be displeas’d with Irregularity in Architecture, where Beauty was expected. And had there been a Species of that Form which we call now ugly or deform’d, and had we never seen or experienced greater beauty, we should have receive’d no Disgust from it, altho the Pleasure would not have been so great in the Form as in those we admire. Our Sense of Beauty seems design’d to give us positive Pleasure, but not positive Pain or Disgust, any farther than what arises from disappointment.

This suggests that disgust is a powerful experience, akin to pain. Hutcheson went on to describe how one might overcome the disgust caused by a deformed face – by either ‘want of

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33 Ibid., no. 412.
34 Ibid.
expected Beauty, or much more from their carrying some natural indications of morally bad Dispositions’ – if something relating to that deformity showed it to be at odds with other positive elements, such as the deformed person’s personality. If no positive element exists, then the experiences he described as not only ‘disgust’, but also ‘displeasure’, ‘pain’, ‘distaste’, and ‘aversion’, would persist. Collectively, he described these as experiences as ‘horrors’, caused by fear for oneself or compassion for others:

[I]f upon long acquaintance we are sure of finding sweetness of Temper, Humanity and Cheerfulness, altho the body Form continues, it shall give us no Disgust or Displeasure; whereas if anything were naturally disagreeable, or the occasion of Pain, or positive Distaste, it would always continue so, even altho the Aversion we might have toward it were counterbalanced by other considerations. These are Horrors rais’d by some Objects, which are only the Effect of Fear for our selves, or Compassions towards others, when either Reason, or some foolish Association of Ideas, makes us apprehend the Danger, and not the Effect of anything in the Form it self: for we find most of those objects which excite Horror at first, when Experience of Reason has remov’d the Fear, may become occasions of Pleasure; as ravenous Beasts, a tempestuous Sea, a craggy Precipice, a dark shady valley.

To Hutcheson, disgust appears to have been a type of displeasure, closely linked to pain, offence, aversion and horror. It is related to the deformed and ugly, but what constitutes the deformed or ugly depends on the experience and expectations of an individual. If fear is removed from the experience of the horrors causing the disgust, the deformed could create a sense of awe. This disgust seems familiar. A mixture of needing to avoid or move away from the disgusting while being fascinated by it is often described as part of modern disgust. Also familiar is the idea that disgust depends on the individual, as the life experiences of different people and cultures impact on what causes disgust. However, Hutcheson uses the word ‘disgust’ as part of a language of ‘displeasure’, ‘aversion’, and ‘horror’, suggesting that he thought of it as a near synonym for those words. Hutcheson’s uses of the word ‘disgust’ appear to have had less of an influence on Watts than did those of Shaftesbury and Addison, since the latter interacted with the intellectual influences that Watts brought to bear when writing The Doctrine of the Passions.

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36 Ibid.
37 Ibid., 73–74.
5.2 Watts’s Intellectual Influences

Isaac Watts was born in 1674, one of nine children to a strict Puritan schoolmaster father. His father’s refusal to conform to the Church of England landed him in jail on at least two occasions. Refusing to abandon nonconformity and enter the Church of England to attend Oxford, Watts joined the dissenting academy at Stoke Newington, a school run by eclectic thinkers Thomas Rowe and Theophilus Gale, the former being responsible for the first teachings of Cartesianism in England while the latter’s work encompassed Platonism, Augustinianism, Jansenism, and Calvinism. On leaving, he became the pastor of an independent chapel where he fostered a non-denominational focus on education and the training of clergymen. Watts suffered from ill health for most of his life, often having to stop work due to crippling bouts of sickness. His illness affected his appearance: he was pale, thin, and his head was disproportionately large. In 1696, Watts began work as a private tutor in the family of Sir John Hartopp. He got to know their neighbours, Sir Thomas and Lady Mary Abney, in whose home he then lived for 36 years.

Watts’s varied work was influential in the period. The impact of his revivalist writings, and in particular his hymns and his work on logic, led James F. Maclear to suggest that ‘his revered position in both English and American Religion in the Eighteenth century was virtually without peer’. At his funeral, his friend Dr David Jennings claimed that ‘there is no man living, of whose works so many have been diffused at home and abroad, which are in such constant use, and translated into such a variety of languages.’ Frustration at the period’s religious attitudes appears to have fuelled Watts’s work. Some of the earliest works on Watts picked up on this. In 1834, Thomas Milner claimed that ‘A large body of dissenters, and nearly the whole of the establishment, agreed in reducing the elements of religion to a few cold theories and formal

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observances’. As a result, ‘dr Watts observed with pain this new divinity dominant in the church, and engrailed among the Presbyterians, and to counteract the growing evil he produced the work now under review [Doctrine of the Passions].’ This view of Watts as someone discontented with the coldness of the theology of his times does appear to have the ring of truth to it. His dissatisfaction affected the composition of more than just Doctrine of the Passions, and he did not reject reason altogether. Thomas Dixon places Watts alongside Jonathan Edwards as one of the ‘revivalists’. According to Dixon, ‘[t]he revivalists were characterised by their zeal for piety and personal experience in religion, but only insofar as it was checked and moderated by right reason’.

Outwardly, Watts’s published works can be split into three groups: hymn books, religious polemics, and works on education and philosophy. However, all three served his mission to advance religious thought. Shortly after Watts’s death, Samuel Johnson wrote: ‘I have mentioned his treatises of Theology as distinct from his other productions; but the truth is, that whatever he took in hand was, by his incessant solicitude for souls, converted to Theology’. The first category – hymns – fitted into Watts’s interest in religious revivalism and his wish to recall to the Gospel the many that he thought had strayed from it. He attempted to breathe life into worship by allowing praise through the singing of more than just the psalms. Watts is, perhaps, best known for his hymns. Many of his biographies tell possibly apocryphal tales of his childhood gift for rhyme. True or not, this gift was present as an adult. Watts was ashamed that singing as a form of passionate devotion had developed no further than putting music to biblical passages. He suggested that was an ‘Eternal Shame’ that the ‘Writers of the first Rank in this our Age of National Christians’ had not ‘surpassed the vilest of Gentiles’. It might seem obvious that the second category – religious polemics – was written with religious advancement in mind. However, it is worth noting that, despite the revivalism, many of his arguments were at odds with the period’s thought. Alan Argent has pointed out that many of his explicitly religious works attacked the growing trend of deism. For example, his 1739 publication, Self-Love and

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43 Thomas Milner, Life and Correspondence, 440-441.
44 Thomas Dixon, From Passions to Emotions. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 68.
46 See Gibbons, Memoir, 5; Johnson, Life, 4-5; Fountain, Isaac Watts, 13.
47 Isaac Watts, Horæ Lyricæ (London: S. and D. Bridge, 1706), ii.
Virtue Reconciled only by Religion, attacked the ideas of Shaftesbury, who claimed that fear of hell and rewards in heaven were not necessary to be morally good.

The most relevant of Watts’s three types of works to the present discussion are his educational and philosophical works. Dixon suggests that Watts’s ‘revivalist’ label maps reasonably well to Harold Simonson’s analysis of British and North American ‘dissenters’. The dissenters insisted upon retaining old doctrines, personal faith, redemption through Christ, and focus on sin. Whether Watts is so easy to pigeonhole as an upholder of old doctrines is debatable; he was not averse to using contemporary ideas. In the preface to his Philosophical Essays, Watts claimed that ‘some of these Essays are founded on the Cartesian Doctrine of Spirits, tho’ several Principles in his System of the material World could never prevail upon any Assent; and what other Opinions of the Philosophy relating to the Phænomena of Heaven and Earth I have imbibed in the Academy, I have seen reason to resign long ago to the foot of Sir Isaac Newton’. He also praised ‘Gassendus [Gassendi] and the Lord Bacon’ and ‘Mr Boyle’, who ‘carried off the noble design of freeing the World from the long Slavery of Aristotle and substantial Forms’. Later in the work, he added ‘the weakness of the Cartesian Hypothesis of Bodies and its utter Demolition does by no means draw with it the Ruin of his Doctrine of Spirits’. Watts was an intellectual hybrid. Like a number of eclectic English thinkers in the period, he took what he believed added to his overall religious message from a range of thinkers.

Another contemporary influence on Watts – one that directly influenced Watts’s Doctrine of the Passions – was John Locke. Watts wrote that ‘Mr. Locke is another illustrious Name. He has proceeded to break our philosophical Fetters, and to give us further release from the bondage of ancient authorities and Maxims.’ Words were as important to Locke as they were to Watts. Like Watts, Locke bridged the gap between mathematical precision and linguistic clarity by holding words to account. He claimed that on examining ‘the Extent and Certainty of our Knowledge I found it had so near a Connexion with Words, that unless their force and manner of Signification were first well observed, there could be little said clearly and pertinently concerning Knowledge’. Locke’s examination of words in Book III of his Essay Concerning...
*Human Understanding* appears to have been an unplanned addition. Locke claimed that ‘when I first began this Discourse of the Understanding, and a good while after, I had not the least Thought, that any Consideration of Words was at all necessary to it’.\(^{54}\) He concluded Book II with the claim that ‘it was impossible to speak clearly and distinctly of our Knowledge, which all consists in Propositions, without considering, first, the Nature Use, and Significance of Language’.\(^{55}\) Hans Aarslef has suggested that this focus on language was not an afterthought, but rather that ‘Locke in the course of writing the *Essay* became more fully acquainted with the vast body of contemporary literature on language and its nature’.\(^{56}\) It seems unlikely, however, that a learned man such as Locke would have been unaware of Hobbes until so late in the composition of his *Essay*.

In Locke’s *Essay*, he suggested that ‘disgust’ referred to an idea that began as a sensory experience, but developed more complex uses. It was one of many ‘common sensible Ideas’ that had since come to represent a ‘notion of knowledge’ that was now ‘quite removed from the senses’. Other words in this category included ‘to Imagine, Apprehend, Comprehend, Adhere, Conceive, Instill, Disgust, Disturbance, Tranquillity, &c.’\(^{57}\) These sensory ideas became more than the name of a sensory experience when the person experiencing them could reflect further on those incidents:

> Because these very Operations of the Mind about Ideas, receiv’d from Sensation, are themselves, when reflected on, another set of Ideas, derived from that other source of our Knowledge, which I call Reflection; and therefore fit to be considered in this place, after the simple Ideas of Sensation. Of Compounding, Comparing, Abstracting, &c.\(^58\)

Disgust was no longer just a feeling; rather, it provided the base for reflections and so was a source of knowledge. Given his definition of the passions, this suggests he could have included ‘disgust’ among them. Sadly, he did not elaborate on disgust further.\(^{59}\) He did elaborate on the passions, however.

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\(^{54}\) Ibid., 238.

\(^{55}\) Ibid., 183.


\(^{57}\) Locke, *Essay*, 185.

\(^{58}\) Ibid., 72.

\(^{59}\) Ibid. Epistle to the Reader, iii. He used it only twice outside the list.
Locke based his passions upon two ‘simple Ideas, which we receive from Sensation and Reflection’: ‘Pleasure or Delight, and its opposite. Pain or uneasiness.’ These are feelings that ‘cannot be described, nor their Names defined’; they are knowable only through experience. Nevertheless, these are the ‘Hinges in which our Passions turn’. Thoughts about those things likely to generate delight or pain produce love and hatred. Desire is the idea of something not in one’s possession, but that is liable to cause delight. In turn, fear ‘is an Uneasiness of the Mind upon the Thought of future evil likely to befall us’. Anger is ‘uneasiness or discomposure of the mind, upon the receipt of injury, with a present Purpose of Revenge’. Envy is ‘an Uneasiness of the Mind, caused by the Consideration of a Good we desire, obtained by one, we think should not have it before us’. Shame is ‘an Uneasiness of the Mind, upon the Thought of having done something, which is indecent, or will lessen the valued Esteem which other have done for us.’

Locke makes clear that his list of passions is not extensive, and that the passions he mentions would ‘each of them require a much larger Discourse’. Aquinas’s unnamed opposite to desire appears to have disappeared entirely, replaced with an all-purpose fear of ‘the thought of future evil’, be it potential or probable. However, that disappearance does not indicate the abandonment of feelings of repulsion and avoidance within Locke’s passions.

Locke’s passions were like Hobbes’s in many ways. As in Hobbes, the judgment of what makes a passion good or bad depends upon an evaluation of the nature of the feelings they produce. Pleasure and pain define what is good and evil: ‘[t]hat we call Good, which is apt to cause or increase pleasure, or diminish pain in us; or else to procure, or preserve us the Possession of any other Good, or Absence of Evil.’ The significant difference between Locke and Hobbes is that Locke subsumed Hobbes’s endeavours of appetite and aversion into the passions of pleasure and uneasiness. Internal feelings were the primary focus of Locke, and not the actions or endeavours they caused or were caused by them. Locke’s use of uneasiness as an opposite of delight is also like Watts’s use of disgust, though the term ‘disgust’ meant something very different to Watts and Locke. Watts’s understanding of disgust came from a rise in usage of the word ‘disgust’ that spanned his lifetime and his wider views on religion and philosophy.

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60 Ibid., 52.
61 Ibid., 114.
62 Ibid., 113.
Watts’s Philosophy

Watts’s use of the word ‘Passions’ in his Logick demonstrates a balancing of the common and the philosophical. For Watts, a name should not be ‘the word Passion in its vulgar sense and most limited Sense’, nor should it be used in its ‘most extensive philosophical Sense’, since that would be difficult for most people to understand.\(^{63}\) Rather, a middle ground of a ‘limited philosophical sense’ should be found. In this case, the middle ground for the word ‘passions’ is ‘the various affections of the mind’ rather than the simplistic ‘anger of fury’ or the complicated and philosophical notion of ‘Sustaining the Action of an Agent’.\(^{64}\)

Watts’s central argument throughout his body of work was the right use of reason and the right use of the passions to discover God. In his Logick, Watts developed a form of logic derived heavily from John Locke. Like Locke, Watts based his logic on the ‘perception’ of ‘simple or complex ideas’ formed of ‘simple and compound substances’. These included ‘judgement, proposition, reasons, and long discourses’ as well as physical objects.\(^{65}\) Unlike Locke, however, Watts believed that the debate about whether ideas are innate or learned was ‘irrelevant’ to the use of logic in the pursuit of God’s truth. Instead, he focused his logical system on how to ‘defend the truth, as well as search it out’.\(^{66}\) Watts took the view that nature reflected God. This reflection was not quite the natural theology that had been increasing in popularity at the time, but was like the older concepts of the microcosm and macrocosm. He clarified this in the introduction to the 1737 edition:

The Pursuit and Acquisition of Truth is of infinite Concernment to Mankind. Hereby we become acquainted with the Nature of Things both in Heaven and Earth, and their various Relations to each other. It is by this means we discover our Duty to God and our fellow-Creatures: By this we arrive at the Knowledge of natural Religion, and learn to confirm our Faith in divine Revelation, as well as to understand what is revealed.\(^{67}\)

Watts did not separate natural evidence from divine revelation. To Watts, these were two sides of the same coin. Logic could ‘guard against the Springs of Error, Guilt and Sorrow, which surrounds in every Stage of Mortality’, and offer ‘a humble Assistance to divine Revelation’.\(^{68}\)

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\(^{63}\) Watts, Logick, 135.
\(^{64}\) Ibid., 135.
\(^{65}\) Isaac Watts, Logick, 15.
\(^{66}\) Watts, Logick, vi.
\(^{67}\) Ibid., 2.
\(^{68}\) Ibid., preface, iii.
The passions, on the other hand, could enhance revelation. For example, real desire was to ‘long for the Presence of God above all Things’; the flip-side of this is that uncontrolled desire could lead to sin.\textsuperscript{69} This desire for the control of passions in the service of God was in part why Watts wrote hymns. He believed that poems and songs were a useful tool for strengthening faith because ‘the advantage for touching the Springs of Passion will fall infinitely on the side of the Christian Poet; our Wonder and our Love, our Pity, Delight, and Sorrow, with the long train of Hopes and Fears, must needs be under the Command of an Harmonious Pen’.\textsuperscript{70} Watts believed that poems and lyrics could create and control strong passions in others, making them ‘refined into devotion’ and restricting the passions to the service of God.\textsuperscript{71} The refinement, moderation, or temperance of the passions through the use of reason remained a core part of Watts’s entire corpus, both before and after his work on the passions. Each of Watts’s descriptions of individual passions ended with an example of how they might best be used in the service of God. The acceptance of disgust as part of God’s plan, and aversion’s role in steering one away from vice through contemplation of the nature of possible evils, are examples of his religious focus.

Watts’s framework was an old one. The relationship between reason and the passions had been a core part of Thomism, not to mention Stoic and Platonic thought. To Watts, moderation was not simply to avoid sin and hellfire – it was an attempt to walk a path between two perceived dangers, described by Dixon as ‘frosty Stoicism and overheated Enthusiasm’.\textsuperscript{72} Losing control of the passions was embodied by the enthusiasts, described by Watts as those who ‘have contented themselves with divine Raptures without seeking clear Conceptions’. ‘This sort of religion’, Watts claimed, ‘lies very much expos’d to all the Wild Temptations of Fancy and Enthusiasm: A great deal of the bigotry of the World, and the Madness of Persecution may be ascribed to this unhappy Spring.’\textsuperscript{73} Stoicism, however, is unlikely to have been of much worry to Watts in the 1720s. Despite its continued existence in the popular conscience, and Alexander Pope’s brief and poetic use of the Stoics in his \textit{Essay on Man} (1733), Watts’s moderation was more likely to have been based upon the Newtonian path of moral rationalism.\textsuperscript{74} One example of this was

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\item \textsuperscript{69} Ibid., Dedication.
\item \textsuperscript{70} Watts, \textit{Horæ Lyricæ}, preface.
\item \textsuperscript{71} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{72} Dixon, \textit{Passions to Emotions}, 63.
\item \textsuperscript{73} Watts, \textit{Passions}, preface, v.
\item \textsuperscript{74} Pope, \textit{Essay on Man}, 9; also quoted in Dixon, \textit{Passions to Emotions}, 63.
\end{itemize}
Samuel Clarke’s *Discourse Concerning the Unalterable Obligations of Natural Religion* (lecture delivered 1705, printed 1706). This work was one of two Boyle lectures given at St Paul’s in London, part of a series of talks dedicated to exploring the relationship between religion and natural philosophy. Clarke reconciled the two by suggesting morality as governed by the relations of duty towards God, a duty to other human beings, and duty to oneself. These duties grew out of the golden rule: a law of nature that exists independent of and before human interaction and the will of God. Clarke being just, his commands align with this eternal law.

Feelings are secondary affects, generated as animal desires struggle with deontological reality. The sanctions imposed by God and the feelings they produce, therefore, are an incentive to follow these laws, and should be regulated accordingly. This advanced moral philosophy is not the only aspect that makes Watts less of a revivalist than he seems.

### 5.3 Watts’s Disgust and Aversion

Watts described the passions as ‘secondary qualities of the modes of the body.’ He believed that the word ‘passions,’ ‘signifies any of the Affections of human Nature’. He further defined a passion as ‘a Sensation of some special Commotion in animal Nature, occasioned by the Mind’s Perception of some Object suited to excite that Commotion’. A passion ‘arises from a Thought or Perception of the Mind, and hereby it is distinguished from Hunger, Thirst, or Pain’. They are ‘those sensible Commotions of our whole Nature, both Soul and Body, which are occasioned by the Perception of an Object according to some special Properties that belong to it.’ These passions are excited by objects or actions that are ‘either rare and uncommon, or good and agreeable, or evil and disagreeable’. This definition has the flavour of an older scholastic, particularly Thomist, view of the passions. However, Aquinas thought that the passions affect the sensitive soul because ‘the apprehensive power [of the soul] is not drawn to a thing, as it is in itself; but knows it [the thing] according to its intention’. Watts, like Aquinas, believed that

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76 Ibid., 2.97–124.
77 Ibid., 2.124–127.
79 Ibid., 136.
these passions affect both body and soul, though he accepted the new philosophy of Descartes and the dualism that replaced the tripartite soul of Aristotelian thought.

Watts’s structure of the passions was rather simple. He arranged them in three ranks, with each playing a role in the proper service of God. The first two he called ‘Primitive’; they are the basic passions. The third rank he called ‘derivative’ as these are important passions that derive from reflecting on the first two ranks. Of the first rank are ‘Admiration, love’ and ‘hatred’ towards anything good or evil. In the second are various forms of love and hatred that are ‘distinguished by their objects’. This group includes the ‘Love of Esteem’ felt towards a valuable object, and the ‘Contempt’ directed at an object of no value. Similarly, objects that create good feelings produce ‘Love of Benevolence, or Good-will’. Objects that are the focus of evil feelings create ‘Malevolence, or Ill-will’. If such an object is ‘pleasing’, it creates ‘the Love of Complacence, or Delight’; if it causes the opposite feelings, it creates ‘displinance’, i.e. displeasure, or ‘disgust’.

Watts claimed that ‘[t]he Word Disgust is borrowed from the Disagreeableness of Food to our Palate, and it is most frequently used in such a Case, where the object has been once agreeable, but now ceases to be so’. Here he was describing the disgust of a surfeit of something as understood by the taste theorists and present in Descartes’s notion of dégoût. Watts suggested that high ‘Esteem of Self’ can grow into ‘Malice and Hatred, especially upon the least Disgust’. In short: too much pride can lead to a fall. Even to a writer as focused on turning people towards God as Watts, disgust and its causes remained material rather than otherworldly. Like Wright and Senault, Watts believed that sin should cause repulsion. Watts’s disgust, like Wright’s opposites of desire, exists to turn us away from evil, and to bring us back to moderation. However, Watts did not believe that sin is the only proper cause for such sensations. Disgust’s role is not only the preservation of the soul; it also preserves the body. To Watts, even ‘[t]he most selfish passions are innocent, when kept within proper bounds, and were designed for the service of man, to guard him from evil, and to promote his welfare’. Nevertheless, the experience of disgust is part of God’s plan and to be endured; this second tier of passions, be they

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82 Watts, Passions, 3.
83 Ibid., 4, 29.
84 Ibid., 47.
85 Descartes, De L’ame, 53.
86 Watts, Passions, 110.
87 Ibid., 49.
disgust or benevolence, ‘must be limited by a submission to the will and wisdom of God, who
governs all things well, and has not seen fit effectually to secure certain happiness to all his
creatures.’

Watts’s aversion was part of the third rank of the passions, the ‘derivative’. His definition of
aversion was a familiar one: ‘[w]hen we look upon an evil, which may possibly come upon us,
it awakens an active passion, which we may call aversion or avoidance, and it implies a tendency
to escape this evil.’ He listed several causes of natural aversions:

there may be some aversion which arise in nature before our mind expressly
conceives the object to be evil or disagreeable, such are some natural antipathies,
which seem to be seated or fixed in the very flesh, or blood, or mere animal, or the
sudden disorders of the body which some persons feel at the sight of a cat, or cheese,
or at the approach of a spider or toad. &c. to which I may add the swift efforts of
nature to avoid sudden and frightfull occurrences as thunder lightening &c. upon
the very first sight of sound of them.\textsuperscript{88}

However, although he thought the ‘natural aversion’ caused by these things could be found
‘mingled with the passions, and not distinguished from them’, he claimed that ‘those aversions
only are in the most proper sense called passions which rise first from the mind, considering the
object as evil’.\textsuperscript{89} A ‘sudden death to the soul’, in the sense of Descartes’s horreur, is not a proper
passion of aversion. Proper aversion requires consideration. In the case of aversion’s opposite –
desire – this meant the contemplation as to whether one’s desires might be vices:

The desire of honour, power, and riches, are usually counted vices, when they rise
high, and especially when they are only confined to selfish ends and designs: but
when they have a design of public good, the may be virtuous and unblameable; for
one may desire riches, honour or power, with a sincere design to do more service
to God and man.\textsuperscript{90}

Reversing this, aversion to power and riches in the service of God might also be vices, while
aversion towards those things for selfish reasons might be virtuous. Like Thomas Wright, the
proper use of this third level of passions is to serve God.

Watts called aversion without consideration ‘natural antipathy’, a form of disprisence or
disgust. Watts described ‘antipathy’ as a passion that occurs between a person and an object, such

\textsuperscript{88} Ibid., 51-52.
\textsuperscript{89} Ibid., 52
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid., 54
as ‘a Cat, or a Spider, or some particular sort of Food’. Its physical effect was ‘oftentimes very sudden and strong; it occasions sweating, paleness, tremors, fainting &c.’\textsuperscript{91} Dictionaries in the period described ‘antipathy’ as ‘a natural dislike to any thing caused without a Cause assigned’ and suggested that the ‘Motion of Antipathy’ was ‘where an unlike body is driven away by its contrary’.\textsuperscript{92} Antipathy appears to be another extreme: a total rejection of something seen as an opposite but for no good reason.

Similarly, Watts claimed that ‘[w]hen any object raises our aversion to a great degree, ’tis usually called loathing or abhorrence, which is a species of dissiliency as before.’ This is where intense experiences of disgust and aversion meet. Earlier he had claimed that the experience of abhorrence could be described using more than one word: ‘sometimes by a Metaphor borrowed from disagreeable Food, ’tis called Loathing’.\textsuperscript{93} This means that the type of bad-tasting, perhaps even nauseating foods that modern disgust researchers take as the most primitive forms of disgust had their own category in Watts’s theory. Watts described the actions associated with abhorrence: ‘This is manifested by some distortions of the countenance, and by shutting the eyes, stopping the ears, turning away the face, or leaving the room.’\textsuperscript{94} This description suggests that abhorrence is both visual and audible; presumably, an unpleasant sound, or perhaps words that one might rather not hear, are as much an evil as an ugly face. Abhorrence or loathing is not as diverse as disgust; it is an absolute. Benedict Robinson, whose paper ‘Disgust c. 1600’ was discussed in more depth in the introduction to this thesis, was correct when he suggested that ‘[l]oathing harbors little of the ambivalence of Disgust and few of its shades of variation. Every loathing is intense, unremitting.’\textsuperscript{95} Abhorrence or loathing is a form of total displeasure caused by something utterly hated.

**Conclusion: Watts’s Disgust and Aversion, and Modern Disgust**

Over the course of the first half of the seventeenth century, the word ‘disgust’ was used to describe bad tastes and offences. In the early eighteenth century, its usage changed, as dislike and bad taste became metaphors to describe the unpleasant. Something akin to the modern usage of the word ‘disgust’ moved slowly into the English language via taste theorists in search of an

\textsuperscript{91} Ibid., 48.
\textsuperscript{93} Watts, *Passions*, 47.
\textsuperscript{94} Ibid., 47–48.
\textsuperscript{95} Robinson, ‘Disgust’, 569.
opposite of the beautiful. Watts’s use of the word ‘disgust’ as a reference for something unpleasant was not original. It stretched back beyond the taste theorists to the late seventeenth century, when John Wilkins, as Watts was to do, categorised ‘disgust’ as a type of ‘dislicence’ in his *Philosophical Dictionary*. Arguably, it stretched back even further than that, to European humanists who used versions of disgust in religious and social commentaries, describing an anti-taste that was a metaphor for the knowledge of evil and its rejection. During Watts’s lifetime, ‘disgust’ had stopped being a hard word. By uniting a metaphor of ‘distaste’ with the rejection and avoidance of ‘dislike’, ‘disgust’ became a more commonly used term. Watts used the word to describe a passion caused by overindulgence.

Like Thomas Wright in Chapter One, Watts’s regarded the primary use of the passions as to serve God. All Watts’s works were, in some way, written as a form of worship or instruction on how to claim rewards in heaven. His hymns, composed in the belief that the act of praise was the closest one could come to the joy to be found in heaven, are an example of how his ideas of the passions combined with worship. Similarly, disgust, aversion, loathsomeness, abhorrence and antipathy play a role in moving one towards God. Watts’s hope was that the thought of sinning would join the cat and the spider to create disgust, aversion, and loathing. Aversion requires a contemplation of the sin, a contemplation that might lead to so strong a reaction that one might come to loathe the sin. Overindulgence might also lead to loathsomeness through disgust, as a surfeit of vice would create an overwhelming experience that might lead one to reject what was once pleasurable as the cause of pain.

Watts had three distinct passions with disgust-like features. In his view, disgust is an unpleasant passion caused by a surfeit of something, first taken from the experience of over-indulging in food. Aversion is a passion caused by the contemplation of potentially harmful evils, some that modern readers might think of as disgusting, such as spiders or toads, and others that are more commonly related to fear in modern literature, such as thunder. However, natural aversion, the automatic reaction to these triggers, is not a passion in his opinion. Finally, when either of these experiences become intense, they are abhorrence or loathing. As with modern disgust, Watts linked this to bad foods which make one wish to turn away from the cause of the experience at all costs. Although Watts has described disgust as a discrete passion, it does not encompass all the elements of modern disgust without these other passions. Watts’s passions were part of a religious

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96 Wilkins, *Philosophical Language*, s.v. Disgust.
outlook; these passions existed, like those of Thomas Wright, as vehicles for serving God. The implication is that the contemplation of an evil, of vice, causes proper aversion. The same is true of disgust, whose proper use is to protect both body and soul from the harms of excess. If anything, Watts’s disgust is as far away from modern disgust as any of the other passions examined in this thesis. This may well not be true of other usages from the period. For example, Hutcheson’s disgust seems to be closer to modern disgust than that of Watts. However, Hutcheson’s use of the word ‘disgust’ among a group of apparent near-synonyms gives no indication as to whether he considered it to be the result of overindulgence and thereby different to aversion, pain, horror, and offence. While the word ‘disgust’ had clearly become a name describing an experience akin to aversion and other passions by the 1730s, it was not describing all the aspects of the modern emotion of disgust.
Conclusion: Afterlives, and the Prehistory of Modern Disgust


Afterlives

Watts’s publication of *The Doctrine of the Passions* in 1729 was not the end of the prehistory of disgust, nor did it mark a moment when the opposites of desire were replaced by the concept of disgust. The word ‘disgust’ did not refer to something recognisable as modern disgust until sometime after Watts’s *Passions*. It took until Samuel Johnson’s 1755 *Dictionary* before a recognisable definition appeared in print. ‘According to the Google English Books corpus, the frequency of uses of disgust began to shoot upwards just prior to 1750, shortly before Johnson’s *Dictionary*, eclipsing all but ‘horror’ and ‘aversion’ in how often it appeared in texts (see Graph 6.1). After 1830, ‘aversion’ also drops below ‘disgust’ in frequency of use. The rise in disgust may have occurred because the names of the opposites of desire examined in this thesis each had elements of modern disgust, but that disgust element was extracted from them and placed in a new usage of the word ‘disgust’. The keywords used by thinkers in this thesis certainly contained elements that appear to be disgust-like. For example, most share the element of being a reaction to contamination. Some, such as ‘aversion’ and ‘horror’, referred to experiences triggered by objects and actions that a modern reader might categorise as disgusting. However, it is dangerous to take any of these words and assume that they contain elements of modern disgust, or to focus only on the similarities. In each thinker’s descriptions of the opposites of
desire differences were already apparent, almost all those words continue to be used in modern English to varying degrees. It is those differences, more than the similarities, that went on to define and shape how those words would be used over the next three centuries.

One way to highlight the differences between the opposites of desire examined in this thesis and modern disgust is by tracing the afterlives of each term, showing how those important early differences continued to be central to their usages, while the elements that appear to be disgust-like remained less important.

**Abomination**

![Graph 6.2. Comparison of occurrences of the words ‘abomination’ and ‘disgust’, between 1730 and 2008, case-insensitive, smoothing of 3, Google Books English corpus.]

Wright used ‘abomination’ not as a word for nausea, as suggested by Miller, but as a type of hate, specifically a hatred of the harm that might happen to a loved one, especially if that harm was damnation through sin. By the mid eighteenth century, abomination was still hatred and the object of hatred, but it was also a form of pollution.\(^1\) Uses of ‘disgust’ appear to have begun to outstrip uses of ‘abomination’ (see Graph 6.2) shortly before 1750. The *OED* still defines ‘abomination’ as a mixture of ‘disgust and hatred’ or a type of ‘physical revulsion’.\(^2\) Examples of ‘abomination’ in the latter sense cannot be found after a 1582 translation of the same passage of *De proprietatibus rerum* that Miller quoted as an example of abomination as nausea by Stephen

\(^{1}\) Samuel Johnson, *A Dictionary of the English Language* (London: W. Strahan, 1755), s.v. abomination.

Examples of the former sense mostly refer to the same religious abomination that Wright was drawing on, if not always from a Christian perspective. Abomination is also used in modern English to describe the utterly hated or feared, especially in the sense of abominable, as in the abominable snowman. There were and are elements of abomination that are found in modern disgust, but ‘abomination’ was, and is, primarily a type of hatred, often related to fear.

**Detestation**

![Graph 6.3. Comparison of occurrences of the words ‘detestation’ and ‘disgust’, between 1730 and 2008, case-insensitive, smoothing of 3, Google Books English corpus.](image)

A link between hatred and fear can also be found in Wright’s use of ‘detestation’ as a reaction to the same triggers and hatred of abomination. Detestation remained a passion term for some time, but was never again described as the opposite to desire in an English work on the passions. ‘Detestation’ changed: the fear element was quickly jettisoned. By 1755, Johnson was using ‘detestation’ in his definitions of ‘abhorrence’, ‘abomination’, and ‘hate’. It is the ‘hate’ element that has persisted, and while detestation has become rare (see Graph 6.3), variations of the verb ‘to detest’ are more common, and usually refer to an intense dislike. Then, as now, there is an element that one might say resembles modern disgust in the notion of detesting: an intense dislike, perhaps even a revulsion, that hatred might not cover entirely. However, it is certainly

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4 Johnson, *Dictionary*, s.v. abhorrence, abomination, hate.
the case that to detest something is not only to be disgusted by it. Like ‘abomination’, ‘detestation’ remains primarily a form of hatred.

**Flight**

In modern English, ‘flight’ is more often used in the sense of something flying in the air, making the production of a representative N-gram difficult. However, flight as a passion persisted at least until 1690. In Johnson’s dictionary, ‘flight’ had become ‘[t]he act of flying or running from danger’. To Johnson, it was no longer a passion, but an action that might accompany a passion. This idea has continued into the modern era. Modern psychologists still use ‘flight’ as an expected response to intense emotional stress alongside fight, freeze, and faint. Although fear is more commonly described as the cause, modern disgust is also viewed as a potential stressor. Another result of intense emotional stress, and one that appears to have replaced fainting in popular culture, is modern disgust’s regular companions: nausea and vomiting. Compare the reaction in films prior to the 1990s, in which shock and stress would be met with fainting, to more recent films in which a sudden shock is regularly depicted as a trigger to vomiting. However, there is no indication that any of the opposites to desire caused vomiting, so this modern link may be coincidental.

**Eschewing**

Carey’s unusual translation of the French word for flight, *fuite*, had a less auspicious afterlife. Carey’s eschewing, describing an experience caused by the need to avoid potential harm that might cross both physical and moral boundaries, differed from other similar passions. It required constant vigilance, working with reason to avoid the greater harms of sin. Unlike the other opposites to desire, eschewing did not catch on. Eschewing cannot be found in Johnson’s dictionary as either a headword or a definition, and while it appears to have had an increase in fortunes in the recent past, this is as the act of avoidance or escape, rather than as a passion or emotion. Eschewing, included as an example of a unique attempt to understand the opposites

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5 Ibid., s.v. flight.


to desire embedded within one man’s experience of the world, demonstrates how, far from being universal, understandings of passions and emotions can be deeply personal.


Aversion

Graph 6.5. Comparison of occurrences of the words ‘aversion’ and ‘disgust’, between 1730 and 2008, case-insensitive, smoothing of 3, Google Books English Corpus.

Aversion, as used by Hobbes, More and Watts, has remained part of the language of emotions, even though it is rarely considered to be an emotion in modern English. Aversion was used in relation to the need to avoid something, be that the foundational moving away from harm and physical unpleasantness in Hobbes, the avoidance of the ugly and deformed that should
be controlled by reason in the service of God found in More, or Watts’s passion that was experienced when a cause of unpleasantness had been considered and its potential role in God’s plan was properly understood. Aversion continued to be linked to avoidance: Samuel Johnson defined ‘aversion’ as ‘[h]atred; dislike; detestation; such as turns away from the object’.\(^8\) One thing that is striking is the correlation between uses of ‘disgust’ and ‘aversion’ after 1790 (see Graph 6.5). This may be because ‘aversion’ became an alternate word for a reaction to the disgusting, or it may be coincidental. Discovering the causation of this correlation is beyond the scope of this thesis.

In the last fifty years, ‘aversion’ has become part of the emotion psychology lexicon, especially in its subcategories of risk and loss aversion.\(^9\) Modern aversion is sometimes described as the opposite to tolerance, rather than desire, with one psychological dictionary defining it as ‘a physiological or emotional response to a stimulus that indicates that an object, organism, or situation, should be avoided. It is usually accompanied by a desire to withdraw from or avoid the aversive stimulus.’\(^10\) This does not sound too far from Hobbes’s idea of aversion as a motion or endeavour accompanying sensations of displeasure. Aversion was once used to correct behaviours regarded as mental health problems. ‘Aversion Therapy’ was administered to people suffering from what were described as types of sexual deviancy, such as homosexuality, as recently as the 1960s. The therapy included electric shocks, a variety of unpleasant or stimulating chemicals such as hydrogen sulphide or testosterone, and techniques using tape recorders as negative reinforcement to produce strong sensations of aversion. The most generous reading of the data suggests that these therapies yielded no better than inconclusive results.\(^11\) Another slightly Hobbesian use of aversion in modern psychology is as part of the valence dimension of core affect. Many proponents of the psychological construction of emotion theory, such as Lisa Feldman Barrett and James Russell, believe that core affects – the experience of any affect – can be placed on a graph with two measurable dimensions. One of these dimensions is the arousal, or how pleasant or unpleasant one’s experience is; the other is valence, or how much aversion

\(^8\) Johnson, *Dictionary*, s.v. Aversion.


or attraction one experiences. While a high level of aversion is linked to core affects which an English speaker might label as ‘disgust’, it is also the reaction to a host of other emotions, including fear and hatred. Similarly, in the work of Hobbes, More and Watts, aversion might have been a response to objects that a modern reader would regard as disgusting, but also objects that could cause hatred, fear, and horror.

**Horror**


Another striking correlation thrown up by Google’s N-gram system is between uses of ‘disgust’ and ‘horror’ (see Graph 6.6). Horror may have the most durable afterlife of all the early modern opposites of desire. Like Hobbes’s aversion, horror was an experience that accompanied potential interactions with the ugly and deformed; a desire to move from an evil rather than simply an opposite to desire. The most potent of these deformities was one’s own death. It was also a passion that should be endured and pushed through for the greater good and the service of God.

More’s horror was related to the passion of fear: words ‘horror’ and ‘fear’ or ‘terror’ can often be found together in the period’s literature. If aversion is to be taken as an early modern near-

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equivalent to modern disgust, then this mixture of fear and aversion has a sense of modern uses of the word ‘horror.’ However, More, like Descartes, believed that both the words ‘horror’ and ‘aversion’ referred to the same experience. Horror was aversion, and both words related to a single experience: an opposite, or a negative type, of desire that could involve fear. That More and his translator regarded ‘horror’ as a synonym for ‘aversion’ suggests that early modern horror, aside from being different to modern disgust, was also different to modern horror. To More, ‘aversion’ and ‘horror’ could by synonymous, while modern horror has been described as ‘fear-imbued disgust.’ There are four possibilities. First, both ‘aversion’ and ‘horror’ are early modern words used for an experience like modern disgust. Second, the early modern experience of ‘aversion’ was closer to that of modern horror than modern disgust, at least to More. Third, that uses of ‘horror’ have changed over time and once referred to something like modern disgust. Fourth, that both early modern ‘aversion’ and ‘horror,’ despite containing elements that are found in the modern concepts of disgust and horror, were unique passions that should be studied in their own historical contexts. Hopefully, chapter four has demonstrated that the fourth possibility is the most likely.

In 1755, Johnson described ‘horrour’ as ‘Terror mixed with detestation’, ‘[g]loom, dreariness’, and ‘such a shuddering or quivering as precedes an auge fit; a sense of shuddering or shrinking’. Johnson, like More, was combining an older English understanding of ‘horrour’ as a physical experience with an older French interpretation of horreur as a passion.

In 1756, one year after Johnson’s dictionary was published, Edmund Burke described horror with more subtlety. To him, horror was part of the sublime: ‘astonishment is that state of the soul in which all its motions are suspended, with some degree of horror.’ Horror could be ‘delightful’ to Burke, as well as reminding us of ‘pain, sickness, and death’. To Burke, the surprise element of horror had become awe and astonishment; horror was neither ugly nor unpleasant. This idea of horror seems to have endured. It remains in the public consciousness as a popular genre of the arts, where one is wilfully scared in the name of entertainment. Through this genre, horror retains its links to death and the deformed. It also often retains a link to otherworldliness, as the supernatural is used to scare and amaze. The disgust-like elements of

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14 Johnson, Dictionary, s.v. Horrour.
16 Burke, Sublime and Beautiful, 129, 257, 58.
horror – the worry of harm, the reaction to the physically unpleasant – remain part of modern horror, but it is nonetheless something different to modern disgust, as it also was for More.

**Disgust**

Usages of ‘disgust’ appear to have been constantly changing. Early uses of the word that might seem familiar to a modern reader do not entirely encompass modern disgust. For Watts, the elements thought by modern psychologists to be a universal emotion of disgust were split between three passions: disgust, aversion, and abhorrence. Disgust was the immediate experience that accompanied overindulgence, while aversion was a considered act of avoiding the physically and morally unpleasant. Abhorrence, or loathsomeness, was the passion experienced when either aversion or any type of displeasure, including disgust, became overwhelmingly intense. Neither Watts’s disgust, nor his aversion of abhorrence, were the same as modern disgust.

Disgust seems to have become a more commonly used word by 1755 than it had been hitherto. Johnson defined disgust as ‘[a]version of the palate from any thing’, ‘Ill humor; male-violence; offence conceived’, ‘[t]o raise aversion in the stomach, to dislike’, and ‘[t]o strike with dislike; to offend. To produce aversion’. He also used the once hard word of ‘disgust’ in the definitions of ‘Displacency’, ‘Distaste’, ‘Disobligingness (“readiness to disgust”), ‘Offence’, ‘Offensiveness (“cause of disgust”), and ‘To Loath’ as ‘to reject with disgust’. Additionally, he linked ‘disgust’ to ‘nausea’. He defined ‘To Nauseate’ as ‘To grow squeamish; to turn away with disgust’, and ‘To Sicken’ as ‘to be filled to disgust’. ‘Nauseous’ was ‘Loathsome; disgusting’, ‘Nauseously’ was ‘loathsomely; disgustfully’, and ‘Nauseousness’ was ‘Loathsomeness; quality of raising disgust’. He also added a word that first appeared in Nathan Bale’s *Universal Etymology* of 1731: ‘Disgustful’ meaning ‘unreliable, causing displeasure.’ Bailey’s dictionary, a work that Johnson borrowed from heavily, was also the first work to suggest that disgust entered the English language from the French word *degoust*.

It appears that Johnson’s use of ‘disgust’ in his *Dictionary* was a response to increase in uses of ‘disgust’ rather than the cause of it. According

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17 Johnson, *Dictionary*, s.v. Disgust, Displacency, Distaste, Disobligingness, Offence, Offensiveness, To Loath.
18 Ibid., s.v. To Nauseate, To Sicken, Nauseous, Nauseously, Nauseousness.
to both the Google Books English corpus and JISC Historical Books corpus, uses of ‘disgust’ began a steep rise just prior to 1750 that continued into the 1760s (see Graphs 6.7 and 6.8).

An example of the change in usages of ‘disgust’ is exemplified by David Hume’s use of the word. In his essay ‘On the Delicacy of Taste and Passions’, Hume wrote:
There is a *delicacy of taste* observable in some men, which very much resembles this *delicacy of passion*, and produces the same sensibility to beauty and deformity of every kind, as that does to prosperity and adversity, obligations and injuries. When you present a poem or a picture to a man possessed of this talent, the delicacy of his feeling makes him be sensibly touched with every part of it; nor are the masterly strokes perceived with more exquisite relish and satisfaction, than the negligences or absurdities with disgust and uneasiness.21

Hume did not use the word ‘disgust’ to describe an excess of pleasure; he used it as a direct response to ‘deformity’. To Hume, disgust was caused by deformities, previously the domain of the post-Humean opposites to desire. By placing those elements within the concept of ‘disgust’, Johnson and Hume mark the end of the prehistory of English disgust, if not the beginning of modern disgust. Here, this thesis has come full circle, back to where the Introduction attempted to explain the difficulties in pinning down a single understanding of modern disgust. Perhaps the last question is to ask why the word ‘disgust’ took on the usage it did.

**Why ‘Disgust’?**

The aim of this thesis was not to explain why ‘disgust’ came to be used as it was, but to demonstrate that it is unwise to assume that historical words that appear to refer to something disgust-like indicate the presence of a supposedly universal emotion of disgust. However, in doing so, there have been hints at why ‘disgust’ might have taken on the meaning it did, and these are ripe for further exploration.

For example, there are indications of a shift from the otherworldly to the material, if not from the religious to the secular. Wright and Senault described their opposites to desire in a religious framework, as did other writers on the passions from the period, such as Edward Reynolds.22 While they acknowledged that physical causes of those passions existed, they suggested that the proper role of hatred of abomination, detestation, flight, and *fuite* was to avoid eternal damnation through sin; either by taking flight from one’s own sins or helping others avoid theirs. Carey’s translation of Senault, while retaining some of the focus on the hereafter, acted as a metaphor for the political state of the country and the need for a strong monarch controlling his unruly subjects. Soon after, Hobbes’s less metaphorical take on a similar position to that of Carey included the *turpe* evils of ugliness, deformity, triggers of nausea, and

ill manners. Hobbes based his passion of aversion firmly within the bounds of what one finds unpleasant in this life, rather than fears of the next. More, while writing a deeply religious text, also claimed that physical and moral ugliness and deformity were the causes of horror and aversion. To him, those deformities were windows into the sinful soul, but they remained material. Finally, Watts used another religious work on the passions to describe the causes of both aversion and disgust in material terms. There seems to have been a shift of some kind from the otherworldly to the material around the 1640s. One event that may well have had an impact are the many wars across Europe in the period. The impact of physical harm may well have produced a vocabulary of the passions across the European languages that focused on the here and now, rather than heaven and hell.

It may be that the otherworldly-material change is a coincidence, even an illusion. It may be that other elements not touched on in this thesis, such as the shift from the concept of nuisances to hygiene – as an eighteenth-century invention that coincided with a shift in the focus of medical policing from that found outside the body to that which might contaminate the inside and surface of the body – as identified by Mark Jenner, has more to do with changes in uses of disgust. Wright’s otherworldly focus may be an aberration, at odds with common understandings of the opposites to desire as experiences of material evils. It may also be that the English taste theorist’s use of disgust as a metaphor for an anti-taste – a use that began in Europe in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and reignited in England in the early eighteenth century around the time of Jenner’s proposed change in medical policing – was entirely responsible for introducing elements to the passion of disgust that had previously been contained in the opposites to desire. It may be all these reasons and others. There is certainly scope for additional research in this area, but that research should not assume that the words for passions that appear disgust-like are simply near-synonyms for a universal modern disgust.

Towards Understandings of ‘Disgusts’

The current focus of the psychology of emotion on putting disgust in a neat box is clearly not working well. While there is some consensus, there is also considerable disagreement – from whether there are universal triggers of disgust to whether disgust is a basic emotion or not an emotion at all. To focus on a universal disgust reduced to an instinct for avoiding pathogens is

to avoid the intricacies faced by those for whom types of disgust are a problem, such as those who suffer from phobias, Huntington’s Disease, or Obsessive Compulsive Disorder. Hopefully, this thesis’s examination of the differences between words that could be near-synonyms for disgust will give those working on the psychology of disgust pause for thought. That so many apparently near-synonyms to ‘disgust’ referred, and continue to refer, to slightly different experiences suggests that there is no single basic ‘disgust’. At the other end of emotion psychology, those who do not subscribe to the basic emotion of disgust, but look instead to the psychological construction model, may want to consider Hobbes. The scale of ‘valence’ used to measure core affect, with its extremes of attraction and aversion, might still imply discrete emotional experiences – much as Hobbes thought of appetite and aversion as simple passions – rather than ways of measuring those experiences. If aversion is still thought of as a type of emotion, this would make accurately measuring core affect difficult using a valence scale.

Aurel Kolnai thought that aversion was an emotional experience. He moved on from his earlier examination of *Ekel* to considering ‘The Standard Modes of Aversion’, consisting of fear, disgust, and hatred. The differences between the many disgusts of modern philosophers might be better understood if it is acknowledged that each is analysing a different experience, despite their family resemblances. The problems caused by this categorising tendency are demonstrated by the attempts to categorise the opposites of desire in this thesis. The various disgusts of modern philosophers are every bit as bound by subjective experiences, contexts, and understandings as they were in the seventeenth century. Even Kolnai simply changed his overarching category from disgust to aversion, placing disgust, with all its complexities, into a subcategory. An acknowledgement that disgust is far from universal or basic might produce philosophies of the many facets of disgust.

The history of emotions, currently increasing its fascination with disgust, might also consider this thesis as a caution against categorisation. That words used to describe experiences change over time and that understandings can be lost and found is nothing new, nor is the study of changes in usage over time. However, in the field of disgust this approach is too seldom employed. Works published as histories of disgust might be better presented as histories of *fastidium*, *degout*, *Ekel*, loathsomeness, squeamishness and other terms that, while having

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similarities to disgust, have many important differences. Even the English word ‘disgust’ has changed its usage over time, suggesting that the study of seemingly familiar emotion words – such as ‘fear’, ‘anger’, happiness’, ‘sadness’, and ‘surprise’, and their apparent synonyms and equivalents in both English and other languages – might yield interesting results through more work on the differences between historical and modern uses rather than the similarities. This sort of analysis is becoming increasingly possible due to advances in digital humanities. Digital humanities can provide apparatuses for in-depth studies of wide uses of words, free from individual contexts. Such wide examinations can help to create greater understandings of popular usages at different times and places. While this thesis only touched upon the tools available, preferring a neo-Firthian approach that uses digital tools as a pointing tool for archival study rather than relying entirely on statistics, it hopefully demonstrates a way of bridging the gap between the contextual and statistical approaches to examining large corpora. A large, statistical, diachronic analysis of uses of ‘disgust’ and other disgust-like words would no doubt produce some interesting results.

That historical words which appear to be disgust-like are as different to modern disgust as they are similar suggests that all seemingly disgust-like words ought to be approached with more caution. There is also another suggestion implicit in this thesis: that modern disgust is not one thing, and that our reaction to the repulsive, revolting, frightening, and horrifying are as complex and overlapping now as they ever were. By broadening, rather than narrowing, possible reactions to and causes of the avoidance of objects and behaviours, a better understanding of modern opposites to desire can be found, a plurality of disgusts can be explored, and more nuanced approaches can be applied in the many fields of study that touch upon this subject.
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