The Masters of Requests: an Extraordinary Judicial Company in an Age of Centralization
(1589 - 1648)
by
C. R. E. Kaiser

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# The Masters of Requests: An Extraordinary Judicial Company in an Age of Centralization (1589-1648)

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## Part One: The Masters of Requests at the End of the Sixteenth Century

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General Introduction

As readers of the journal of the marquis d'Argenson will know, the maîtres des requêtes ordinaires de l'hôtel du roi were "la vraie pépinière des administrateurs" in the eighteenth century. (1) From this judicial company were drawn the intendants of the provinces, finance and commerce, most of the councillors of state and, sometimes, secretaries of state, keepers of the seal and chancellors. (2) The term "pépinière" could also be used to describe the masters during the reign of Louis XIV, at least after 1660.

Yet, before the reign of Louis XIII the description was not an accurate characterization, for the simple reason that the centralized administration of later Bourbon France did not exist. To be sure administrators abounded, even though they were fewer in number in sixteenth than seventeenth-century France. As a well-known article by Gaston Zeller illustrates, Valois France was ruled by a decentralized administration. (3) "Before the intendants" the realm was under the supervision of governors, parlements, estates and local functionaries. Representatives
from the centre made few appearances in the provinces, for the centre was composed of the king and his court and only a handful of robins and scribes.

From the end of the religious wars until the Fronde this system began to crumble under the assault of what historians refer to as administrative centralization. To say that the monarchy "undertook" this policy would be misleading since it was mainly a consequence of the efforts of the crown, supported by much of the elite, to liberate itself from both the Protestant state-within-a-state and the Spanish hegemony. Obliged to mobilize resources, to control internal conditions which became more alarming in the 1620s and 1630s and to handle the growing influx of administrative and judicial business which was the result of its policies, the crown required a group of officials who would be responsible first and foremost to itself. Local magistrates and administrators, whose reliability was sometimes undermined by provincial loyalties and attachments to venerable institutions disposing of much independence from the crown, could not be entrusted with all the necessary tasks. But the company of masters, originally a tiny group of magistrates who had traditionally received placets presented to the king, was the tool to which the king had recourse. One of our intentions is to show how the monarchy adapted this traditional group to serve ends which were revolutionary.
This work traces what can only be called "the rise of the masters", a phenomena which coincided with their metamorphosis into the "pépinière" of a central administration which was busier and more involved in local affairs under Louis XIII than under the Valois. The period covered is one which would have seemed coherent to men of the 1640s, for as Pomponne de Bellièvre, a councillor of state, wrote:

"de temps en temps les fonctions de leurs charges s'estoient allevés et quelquefois diminuées, il est advenu que les guerres civilles de la ligne finissantes après la diminuation de leurs charges, elles se relevèrent beaucoup, en sorte que le prix d'icelles estant d'un tiers moindre que les offices au parlement, aujourd'hui, cinquante ans après, le prix en est augmenté pardsseus les offices au parlement de plus du tiers, l'assurance du droit annuel donna courage d'y entrer et l'es-pérance et comme certitude d'en sortir conseiller d'estat: en y ayant beaucoup porté qui autrement n'y fussent pas entrés". (4)

However, ideally we would be obliged to follow the history of the company into the 1660s. This has been done in some, but not all, sections of this work.

The story of the group is a complicated and rich one, as scholars who have ventured in this direction—especially Professors Mousnier and Antoine—are well aware. (5) Although the most important cause of the magisterial success is the one noted above, it will be necessary to explain other factors— the conditions of success, some of which lay in the chaotic financial conditions of Valois France, and other forces which propelled the masters along an advan-
tageous itinerary, such as their skill as a pressure group. Attention will also be given to the ambiguities of their position, for they were tied closely professionally and socially to judicial companies which drifted steadily into opposition to the crown under Louis XIII.

The work is divided into three parts. The first describes the role of the masters in the royal administration in the sixteenth century. It also outlines the crisis which they underwent during the reigns of the last two Valois monarchs and follows the beginning of their rise under Henri IV. Part Two breaks the chronological flow of the work in order to trace one of its main themes—the drift of the company away from the professional world of the Paris parlement to that of the royal council. This is measured by such factors as the professional heritage of the masters, their training, material incentives and career opportunities. The third part continues from the point where Part One stopped and demonstrates how the tasks which the company willingly pursued under Louis XIII gradually isolated it from the other courts, particularly the Paris parlement, but also how the masters too were affected by the financial crisis caused by French involvement in the Thirty Years War. A brief epilogue, which acts as a reminder that the chronology of this study must be extended, speculates that the Fronde was a last explosion which drove the masters from
the other courts. The conclusion ties together the various threads and mentions other areas within the subject which require further study.

Notes

1 - D'Argenson, Journal et mémoires, ed. Rathery, 9 vols., Paris, 1859-67, vol. 7, pp. 45-6. The entire sentence runs as follows: "Leur vil prix désigne la vilenie des emplois qu'elles (the masterships) procurent et cependant le collège des maîtres des requêtes c'est la vraie pénétration des administrateurs". As we will see, the divorce between the office and its potentialities (provincial intendancies and councillorships of state) took place in the period under study.

2 - This has been well demonstrated in the first three works listed in note 5.


4 - Bibliothèque Nationale (hereafter BN), fonds français, (hereafter f.f.), 18415, fo. 231 in the "mémoire sur l'explication du 33e article de l'ordonnance de Blois".

5 - Roland Mousnier, Lettres et mémoires adressées au chancelier Séguier, 2 vols., Paris, 1964, introduction. More useful for the masters by the same author (particularly for the post-1660 period) is Le Conseil du roi de Louis XII à la Révolution, Paris 1970. The articles in the second work on individual council robins (by Mousnier's collaborators) are especially good.


Part One: The Masters of Requests at the End of the Sixteenth Century
Introduction

A typically appreciative juridical opinion of the masters was that of Charles de Fignon, a magistrate from Montpellier. In the Discours des estats et offices... de France, published first in 1579, he wrote:

"les maistres des requestes ordinaires de l'hostel du Roy sont presque ceux entre tous les autres officiers et magistrats de la France qui ont retenu le nom et titre de la magistrature à laquelle appartient le vrai exercice et administration de la justice. Aussi ne pourroient-ils estre appellez à plus grand auctorité ny dignité qu'ils sont, demeurans près la personne du Roy, quand il se présente au peuple pour entendre les plaintes et doléances d'iceluy y prenans et recevans les placets et requestes qui luy sont présentées, et pareillement au conseil d'estat, auprès de mondit sieur le Chancelier et garde des sceaux, pour rapporter et expédier ce qui dépend et appartient au fait de la justice..." (1)

The differentiation between the masters and other judges, based upon nomenclature, should not be taken to mean that other judges did not hear requests. But the duties of the masters, unlike those of other magistrates, threw into relief the judicial role of the monarch. As Fignon made quite clear, that role was not figurative. The king was not hidden behind royal scribes, bureaucrats and "MM. du conseil", for he appeared personally before his subjects in order to hear their placets. The masters, as magisterial auxiliaries of the sovereign and the chancellor, were therefore called to the highest function to which a robin
could aspire.

It comes as no surprise that the jurists wrote about the masters in glowing, even exaggerated terms. La Loupe, whose *Origines des dignitez, magistratz, offices et estats de France* was published first in 1551, noted that after the chancellor the masters were "les chefs de la justice". (2) Other legists repeated and embroidered upon this theme throughout the sixteenth century. For Pierre de Miraulmont, whose treatises on public office began to appear in the 1580s, the masters were

"comme un soleil, éclairant par toutes les terres et pays de l'obéissance du Roy, au moyen de la justice qu'ils exercent par tout, comme premiers iuges, et plus anciens magistrats." (3)

This theme also, that the masters had appeared at the side of the monarch before the rest of the magistrature came into existence, was invoked by the jurists. On this subject they always reached a consensus in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Even La Roche-Flavin, an enemy of the royal council, where the masters did much of their work, awarded them more venerable credentials than the Paris parlement. Only with the Fronde, when the council and its servants came under heavy attack, would this opinion be partially reversed. (4)

Yet all was not well with the masters at the end of the sixteenth century. Miraulmont wrote about them in terms of lost grandeur and former functions. (5) The masters themselves gave the lie to the splendid portraits drawn by the
legists. In a memoir composed in the reign of Henri IV one of them commented in an embarrassed way:

"plusieurs calomnient le trop grand nombre de messieurs les maistres des requestes, remply nantmoingts de tant de personnes d'honneur, qu'il fait le plus fort corps de justice qui sont maintenant en France, encore certainement que, ou par le trop grand nombre, ou par d'autres considérations que je ne sçay pas, leur qualité soit fort abaisée, et leur fonction à présent sy reculée de leur institution et premier dignité, que les autres officiers de moindre qualité les mesprisent, et ciroyent que l'exercice de ladite office soit quasi borne à rapporter des procès au conseil privé..." (6)

Grandeur and decadence: the hyperbolic statements of jurists and masters provide us with two motifs in Part One. A third and equally important one will be the gradual emergence of the masters from other professional groups, such as the Paris parlement and the grand conseil. This was accompanied by the formation of an esprit de corps unimaginable under Louis XII, when the eight masters were constantly separated from each other in the exercise of different tasks.

Chapter One evaluates the place of the masters in the royal administration by examining their diverse duties—particularly those near the king. The second chapter follows the company in its struggles both before and after the League, and describes how general financial, institutional and political developments influenced its destiny.
Chapter One: The Pattern of the Masters' Activities

The registers of the requêtes de l'hôtel for the 1550s and 1560s indicate a tripartite division of labour in the company—"service en cour envers la personne du dict seigneur (the king) et son conseil", "service du palais (of justice at Paris)", and "département des chevauchées". (7) A quorum of eight to a dozen masters would divide the company into quartiers, each of which served three months in the first two areas of duty and part of the remaining six months on tour in the provinces. These three branches of employment incorporated many different tasks.

In the royal entourage the masters served the monarch personally in the manner noted by Figon. They were also employed at the royal council and the grand conseil, and they assisted the chancellor at the audience of the seal. As judicial commissioners they sat with the lieutenant of the grande prévôté, and sometimes constituted an ad hoc version of the requêtes de l'hôtel.

At the palais de justice the masters took their places at the parlement and the requêtes de l'hôtel, and held the seals in the chanceries of both courts.
In the provinces, whether officially on tour or not, they had the right to enter the parlements, bailliages, sénéchaussées and présidiaux, to preside in the last three courts, including the châtelet at Paris, and to hold the seals in the chanceries of all these tribunals.

On orders from the crown the masters also travelled about the provinces, carrying out general inquiries about judicial and financial administration and, as royal commissioners, implementing specific royal acts. Masters were also sent overseas on diplomatic missions. The edict of 1553, which has often been referred to by historians, specified that a few masters were to remain in their houses "pour donner ordre à leurs affaires particulières et domestiques". (8)

This continuous rotation of company personnel set the masters apart from the judges of the sovereign courts, who usually carried out most of their duties within the walls of the same institution. Only the members of the grand conseil and the chambre des comptes, working according to a semester system, were regularly available for service elsewhere. The judges of the parlements and cours des aides were liberated from their chambers only in the period of vacations, which lasted from September to November. (9) However, the differentiation between the masters and the other judges must not be exaggerated, for the king could always call a magistrate out of his court and order him to carry out a particular mission. The result
of this practice, particularly in the sixteenth century, was that the masters were only one group in a large pool of servants at the beck and call of the monarch. Moreover, the paucity in the number of masters, at least until the reign of Charles IX, obliged the kings to seek their auxiliaries from other judicial companies.

From time to time a councillor or a president from a sovereign court might find himself in an equivocal situation—representing the monarch on a mission within France, but answerable to his company for what he had done in virtue of the king's commission. For the masters ambiguity was institutionalized, because they were members of both centralizing institutions and courts which were annoyed by the encroachments of royal power. The plethora of tasks carried out by the masters has rarely been given its just measure by historians, who tend to identify the company too closely with the council and the provincial intendancies. Yet in the sixteenth century the masters were an especially amphibious group on account of their close association with the Paris parlement.

(a) functions at the palais: the relationship between the masters and the parlement

The former palace of the kings was the home of numerous courts, of which the most important were the parlement, the chambre des comptes, the cour des aides and, until the middle of the sixteenth century, the cour du trésor. The
masters had nothing to do with the last three, but were related in a complex way to the parlement. Juridical and possibly public opinion regarded this bond in one manner, while practising magistrates saw it rather differently.

All jurists accorded the masters membership at the Paris parlement. In the words of Miraulmont, quoting from royal letters of 1494, "ils sont du nombre et corps de la cour". (10) To demonstrate this the legists drew upon a host of proofs—edicts and ordinances (some of them false), lists of royal confirmation for parlement membership, lists of indults, attendance of councillors and presidents at the funerals of masters, payment of wages to both companies by a common payeur des gages, use of the same entrance to the palais, etc. (11) In practical terms this incorporation meant, according to La Roche-Flavin, the right to

"entrée, séance, voix et opinion délibérative en tous les Parlements de France, tant ès audiences, que ès rapports des procès par écrit". (12)

The jurists ranked the masters after the présidents à mortier and before the mature and prestigious councillors of the grand'chambre in the giving of opinions, seating and public processions. This precedence was dear to the company, since it allowed young masters to precede venerable councillors.

The relationship between the masters and the councillors was a somewhat confusing one. The legists described the masters as "conseillers-nés" at the parlement and, from
time to time, litigants addressed the masters as \textit{first} councillors of the parlement. (13) This impression was possibly reinforced by their appearance, since there was no way to distinguish a master from a councillor by their dress: both wore black silk robes. (14) In the sixteenth century the continuity of individual careers at the parlement justified the description "conseiller-né". Until the League the majority of masters had served as councillors there before acquiring their offices. (15) The parlement did not take the time to examine former councillors on their legal prowess when they became masters, since that test had already been passed when the individual concerned had become a councillor. A brief scrutiny of "bonne vie, moeurs, conversation et religion catholique, apostolique et romain, et fidélité au service du roi" was sufficient. After this the master took the same oath of loyalty to the king and the parlement as that required from both councillors and presidents. (16)

In underlining the "connexité" between the parlement and the masters, the jurists had much to say about the requêtes de l'hôtel. La Loupe referred to this tribunal as the sixth chamber of the parlement, the seventh being the requêtes du palais. As late as 1617 La Roche-Flavin wrote that the masters were "censés conseillers-nais au-dict Parlement: à cause de quoi ils ont leur chambre au-dict Parlement composée de maîtres des requestes". (17) It may be technically correct to say, with Georges Bailhache, that they were members of the parlement only "à titre per-
sonnel" and not "comme tribunal constitué", but the misconceptions of legists were well-founded in sixteenth-century judicial practice. (18)

To begin with, the first instance jurisdiction of the requêtes de l'hôtel, like that of the requêtes du palais, was composed mainly of suits involving the holders of committimus. (19) Appeal could be made from both chambers to the grand'chambre. In the second place, there was much overlapping of personnel at the requêtes de l'hôtel and the requêtes du palais throughout the first half of the sixteenth century. As late as 1541 masters could be called upon to assist the councillors of the requêtes de palais, and until the 1560s councillors were regularly asked to assist the masters in judging cases heard without right of appeal, for which a minimum of ten judges might be required. (20) As the increase in the number of masters eliminated the need for auxiliary magistrates, the councillors made fewer appearances. Their presence from time to time at the audiences of the requêtes de l'hôtel in the seventeenth century was a relic of judicial custom. (21)

The proliferation of new masterships also had a negative effect upon the company's rights of attendance at the parlement. Henri II had restricted the delegation of masters sitting at the grand'chambre to three judges in 1553, but Miraulmont commented in 1584 that they could go to the parlement "quand bon leur semble, en tel nombre qu'il est par eux advisé ès départemens qu'ils font des quartiers". (22)
In this Miraulmont was not mistaken. The registers of the grand'chambre for 1582 reveal that the average number of masters in attendance was three. (23) The seventeenth-century compiler of the Le Nain collection on the parlement noted that on many occasions in the sixteenth century half a dozen or more masters could be found at the grand'chambre. (24) For the masters attendance there was perceived as highly prestigious. One of them wrote at the beginning of the seventeenth century:

"Il me semble que...pour les occuper et faire de ressentir l'honneur de leur charge à un chacun, qu'en celuy qu'ils servent au parlement". (25)

The desire to put in an appearance at the court was so strong that in 1579 the masters decided that the audiences of the requêtes de l'hôtel would be held "à la levée de la cour". (26) In this way there would be no conflict in attendance.

Such devotion to the sessions of the parlement was all very well for the masters, but if they began to come in half-dozens, they would soon be as numerous as the senior councillors. This may have been the fear of the parlement, which pestered king and chancellor about the number of masters which could sit "à un coup". Remonstrances were presented to the chancellor Sillery in 1614, and thereafter no more than four masters were allowed into the grand'chambre. (27) The rule was respected, but for the masters it had by then become irrelevant: increasing employment elsewhere meant that the number of attending masters decreased and that fewer sessions
of the grand'chambre were graced by their presence. (28) But in the sixteenth century the right to be present was treasured and used.

This bickering over attendance suggests that relations between the masters and the parlement were not as smooth as the judicial treatises implied. Generally the jurists failed to assess the limitations imposed on the masters' rights at the parlement. For example, the company could claim little advantage from its supposed precedence over the councillors beyond the right to opine first. The councillors never allowed the masters to preside over them at the grand'chambre in the absence of the presidents. At the procession in 1594 celebrating "l'heureux success et entrée dudit seigneur (Henri IV) en ceste ville de Paris", the eldest master walked "à costé et au dessous" the eldest councillor of the grand'chambre, who led the parlement. (29)

Juridical ignorance reigned too about the role of the masters in the daily activity of the parlement. Although they could sit and opine at the grand'chambre, they could neither present (rapporter) cases there nor could they attend the judgement of criminal suits at the tournelle. (30) The provincial parlements (and possibly that of Paris) excluded the masters from discussions of controversial royal edicts. In Cruseau's journal of the sessions of the Bordeaux parlement the masters were described as "estrangiers" in such situations—a polite
euphemism for spy from the royal council. (31) In addition the masters were not allowed into the disciplinary sessions known as the mercurialles, which took place in the tournelle. (32)

The parlements sensed that the masters formed a corps within a corps, which explains why they were granted only second-class membership. But let the masters beware of parading as an independent company! Much annoyance was displayed when the chancellor entered the Paris parlement attended by masters other than those duly seated, for this implied that they had a separate identity derived from their relationship to the chancellor. The ceremonies of August 1660 in celebration of the king's marriage dramatized the drift of the masters away from the great court during the preceding fifty years. On this occasion they splendidly made good their claim to independence. Prior to the entry of the king and the queen at the parlement they decided

"faire avec Monsieur le Chancelier un corps et porter des cordons et ceintures d'or et prendre en la marche un rang audessus de cette compagnie (the parlement)..." (33)

When the parlement learned about this, it voted to present remonstrances to the king. But its complaints were of little avail, for a few days later when the sovereign courts went to salute the king and his wife, they found

"un peu derrière la chaise du Roy...Monsieur le Chancelier...debout, vestu de son habit de cérémonies, et derrière luy dix des messieurs les maistres des requêtes en robes de velours noir avec cordons et ceintures d'or, les autres maistres des requestes qui n'avoient pu avoir place sur le trosne (the em-
The principle of the separate company triumphed, possibly due to royal connivance, and fortunately for the parlement the ceremonial entry of the monarchs did not take place. As if to irritate the parlement still further, the masters began to smash holes through the wall of the palais de justice a few days later in order to construct a separate entrance to the requêtes de l'hôtel. (35) All this was far from the mood of the masters under the last Valois kings, when they were content to be incorporated into the greatest sovereign court of the kingdom.

Despite the restricted role played by the masters in the daily life of the parlement and the tendencies pushing them away from that tribunal, membership there was convenient for masters and parlement alike. The court could admonish them as "casseurs d'arrêts", though the effectiveness of such reproofs was doubtful. (36) It could also seek displays of robe solidarity by requesting the presence of the masters at discussions of edicts involving the public good—such as office creations. (37) In return the masters were sure to troop off to the grand'chambre when the king's ministers decided to provide them with new colleagues. (38) On issues affecting the magistrature as a whole the masters would sometimes act before being asked by the parlement. For example, when in 1612 the masters feared that the paulette would not be renewed, they sent a deputation to the grand'chambre in order to ask that
It should be stressed that the daily intercourse of the two groups under the Valois and Henri IV gave way to rarer and more opportunist contacts in the seventeenth century.

(b) **functions near the king**

Service "à la cour et suite du roi" found the masters acting in the double capacities of magistrates and members of the royal entourage. Traditionally commensaux (literally table-companions) of the king, the masters should not be confounded with the courtiers who surrounded the royal person. In connection with this it should be noted that archbishops and bishops, who were frequently masters, were formally banished by the king from the ranks of the company in 1566. The reason for this may have been the incompatibility of the Catholic clergy with the role of commissioners for the edicts of pacification, for sometimes masters of requests were chosen to carry out these edicts. This secularization did not, however, entirely match the quasi-religious character of the masters' functions near the king, but it allowed the judges more time to fulfil their tasks. Presumably the bishops too would have less distraction from their duties, and in this sense the measure was in the spirit of the Tridentine reforms.
The list of functions carried out by the masters at court was a long one. They attended the king when he went to Mass or Vespers, receiving the placets brought to him by his subjects. They presented requests for évocations and other matters at the exclusively judicial sessions of the royal council (conseil des parties), and presented other types of requests less frequently at its administrative sessions (conseil d'État). They examined letters drawn up for sealing at the great chancery in order to ensure the legality of the documents. They presided at the grand conseil, formed ad hoc judicial commissions, and assisted the lieutenant of the grand prévôt in registering letters of remission of penalty (often for duelling aristocrats) and judging criminals guilty of crimes committed in the royal entourage—from the cutting of purses to plotting against the monarch. (42) The jurist La Loupe ascribed to the masters the "police des victuailles", a task which seems to have been transferred to other authorities in the distant past. (43) Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the company battled the grand almoner of France (usually a cardinal or archbishop) for another employment—the release of prisoners at royal entries, marriages and births. (44)

This string of activities had sprung from two relationships enjoyed by the masters. La Roche-Flavin summed up the opinions of many legists when he wrote that the masters had been
We will first consider the less exalted of these ties.

(i) the masters and the chancellor

The masters regarded the chancellor as the head (chef) of their company. (46) This was underlined by the fact that they lacked a president, unlike the other sovereign companies, and were customarily presided over by a dean (doyen). Moreover, in the past the chancellor had acted as president at the requêtes de l'hôtel. (47) The masters took the oath of entry into their offices between his hands, a practice unknown for all other magistrates except the first presidents of the sovereign courts and the trésoriers de France. (48) Among his prerogatives was the disposal of "le premier estat de maistre des requestes et de secrétaire du roi qui viennent de vacquer par mort ou autrement" in favour of his own candidate. (49) He also kept "une table ouverte" or "pension" for the masters, whether in Paris or with the king on his voyages. The masters were, in effect, the commensaux of the chancellor rather than those of the monarch. The magnificence of the welcome depended on who held the seals: with Séguier the judges hardly enjoyed "la bonne chère", and they were obliged to contend with the larceny of his servants. (50)

Inevitably the chancellor played an important part in the
affairs of the company. Assisted by the dean, he allotted the provinces to specified masters at the "détartements des chevauchées". (51) Later chancellors were not as fortunate with appointments to provincial intendancies, about which court grandees, provincial governors, superintendents of finance and secretaries of state had much to say. (52)

Although, according to Hélène Michaud, the masters were not "proprement dit" members of the chancery, they were the most important officials there after the chancellor and the keeper of the seals. Two masters were supposed to verify the legality of the documents presented by the rapporteur of the chancery, and one would sign them. Since the chancellor could not attend to the presentation of all documents, the masters expedited much material on their own authority. Complacently they would seal letters patent allowing litigants to arraign one another before the royal council, where the masters were sure to be rapporteurs of the suits. (53) Independently of the chancellor the masters were allowed by an edict of 1493 to hold the seals in the chanceries of the provincial parlements (petites chancelleries), where a different sort of abuse arose. (54) There the masters tended to act as little dictators, sealing letters "extraordinarily" (in their lodgings or outside the usual hours), and locking up the seals beyond the sight of chancery personnel. (55) The masters' cognizance of seal forgeries and other crimes of chancery understandably derived from their experience in the grande and petites chancelleries. (56) A last activity in this domain deserves
brief mention. Once a year at Good Friday a conseil des rémissions, comprising the chancellor, some councillors of state and a few masters, would sit at an audience of the great seal, registering letters of pardon, abolition, and remission of penalty for crimes whose punishment called for a death sentence. (57)

The role of the masters at the grand conseil, a prestigious if not very old sovereign court, also benefitted from this bond with the chancellor. The grand conseil, originally part of the royal council, was presided over by the highest judge in the land in the early sixteenth century. (58) Miraumont wrote that the "maistres des requestes sont nez Présidents au Grand Gonseil, et y ont toujours présidé en l'absence de Monsieur le Chancelier". (59) The creation in 1540 of a presidency was done on condition that the function be a commission attached to a mastership. When president Breslay sold his mastership in 1549 and attempted to preside over the conseil, the masters banded together to oust him. (60) Apart from the automatic protests which greeted edicts creating offices, this is the first recorded manifestation of corporate spirit shown by the masters. Although successful against Breslay, they were not to be so fortunate with other resigning president-masters, who would regularly be provided with letters patent allowing them to "separate" the two functions. (61) The issue obsessed the masters until 1621, but the decline of the grand conseil made the problem trivial afterwards. (62)
In 1635 the creation of two presidencies without the obligation of holding masterships aroused no comment from the company. (63)

The masters were tied to the conseil in other ways. La Loupe wrote that eight of them could sit there in the absence of the chancellor. (64) But the multiplication of presidencies under the Valois had the effect of driving masters who were not presidents out the conseil; their vanity precluded their serving under a younger colleague. (65) By the reign of Louis XIII the grand conseil, possibly following the example set by the parlement, restricted the number of masters not holding commissions of presidencies to four, as irate delegations of five discovered from time to time. (66)

The sixteenth century also witnessed much overlapping of personnel from the two groups. Masters were sometimes detailed as investigating magistrates or rapporteurs for suits heard before the conseil (67), and councillors from that court were occasionally asked to attend judgements at the requêtes de l'hôtel. (68) Both sat on special judicial commissions. (69)

Paradoxically the grand conseil was both the bête noire and the goose of the golden eggs for the masters. Too often historians have forgotten that the councillors had been as important as the masters to the operation of
the royal council at the end of the fifteenth century. Instead of creating new masterships for the council, Charles VIII and Louis XII erected councillorships. By 1498 there were twenty such offices and only eight masterships. Certainly the attention of the councillors was fixed more upon their own court than upon the council itself, but the insignificant volume of business initially handled by the grand conseil released its members for tasks elsewhere. Like the masters they went on chevauchées and embassies. (70) Even worse, they aspired to judicial matters which the masters considered as their own. Unlike the masters they were numerous and usually assembled together in one place—factors which made the councillors a strong pressure group. Hence, it is no surprise that the battle between the two over the rights to judge suits involving titles to office and to issue opinions (avis) about demands for évocation lasted nearly a century. (71) The masters ultimately emerged as victors, but this was due partially to the excessive good fortune of the grand conseil in other ways. Showered with areas of cognizance, that court enjoyed an extraordinary rise in the level of its business. Possibly hoping to obviate the difficulties of litigants in following the conseil around the country, Henri III and Henri IV increasingly lengthened its sojourns at Paris. Occupied by a glut of cases and less well represented in the royal entourage, the conseil became a weaker opponent for the masters. However, it remained a tempting source of profits for them.
The masters who bought the presidencies at the grand conseil were attracted by the enormous épices paid by the court clientele, which included cardinals, bishops, and wealthy religious communities. A memoir drawn up by other company members in 1606 suggests their covetousness with regard to the conseil. They asked that three of their number continuously be present there, and that the chancellor allow them to present all the cases sent there by the royal council, for which they would receive half of the épices. (72) Needless to say this proposed raid on the grand conseil came to nought.

(ii) the masters and the king

As important as was the association between the masters and the chancellor, it could not compare to the splendid bond between them and the king. There lay the raison d'être of the company, suggested by the key word requests. For the masters it included a multitude of tasks, and underlined the character of their office as a vital link between the monarch and his subjects.

In a conception of the monarchy widely held in the sixteenth century the king was seen stripped of bureaucratic and administrative services. He had the power, the expertise, and the time to decide all types of problems, whether they be demands for erections of baronies, reductions in the amount of the taille, or transfers of legal suits from one tribunal to another. The masters were to act as a channel.
of access to the sovereign for subjects bringing judicial, financial, or administrative requests. The differences among these matters were immaterial, because equity was natural to the monarch. If he needed assistance, the masters with their knowledge of his ordinances, edicts, and regulations were present to offer an opinion.

Although the legists and the masters sought Roman and even Greek precedents for the requests—thus stressing the similarities between French monarchy and antique imperium—the most striking illustration of the requests and the judge-king came from a well-known scene in French history. (73) This was Saint-Louis in the wood of Vincennes and the royal garden:

"Maintz foiz que en estei il se alloit seoir ou bois de Vinciennes après sa messe, et acostoit à un chesne et nous fesoit seoir entour li; et tuit cil qui avoient afaire venoient parler à li, sans destourbier ne hui- ssier ne d'autre. Et lors il leur demandoit de sa bouche: "A-il ci nullui qui ait partie?" Et cil se levoient qui partie avoient, et lors il disoit: "Tai- sies-vous tuit, et on vous déliverra l'un après l'autre." Et lors il appeloit monsigno'ir Perron de Fonteinnes et monsignour Geoffroy de Villete, et disoit à l'un d'aus: "Délivrez-moy ceste partie." Et quant il veoit aucune chose à amender en la parole de ceus qui parloient pour autrui, il meismes l'amendoit de sa bouche. Je le vi aucune foiz en estei, que pour délivrer sa gent, il venoit ou jardin de Paris...et fesoit estendre tapis pour nous seoir entour li; et tout le peuples qui avoit afaire par devant li, estoit entour li en estant; et lors il les faisoit déliverer, en la mani're que je vous ai dit devant dou bois de Vinciennes". (74)

It hardly mattered that Villete and La Fonteinnes were not masters of requests, that the king himself did not judge the requests but only exercised a distant surveillance, or that the issues brought before him were probably private suits among members of the royal entourage and not requests
of a financial or administrative order from across the realm. The scene was a seedbed which the masters and the jurists could cultivate to their own tastes. (75)

From Vincennes the locale passed to the entrance of the royal palace where, according to La Loupe, "les bons Roys tenoyent les plaids en personne; (and) eux-mesmes respondoyent les Requestes ". (76) However, the kings did not have time to answer all the requests on the spot. This task was confided to magistrates stationed at the king's door. These juges de la porte, later called maîtres des requêtes,

"n'eurent plus loisir (que) de se tenir sur la porte, et ne bougoient d'après du Roy, qui leur donnoit toutes les requestes qui luy estoient présentées". (77)

There, continued the account of the jurist du Haillan, they

"vuidoient les choses dont le jugement estoit facile, et portoient les requestes de conséquence au Roy au- quel ils les rapartoient, ou dans sa chambre, ou lors qu'il alloit à la messe ou qu'il se pourmenoit". (78)

In this description the masters were allowed to judge trivial cases (this practice was seen as the origin of the requêtes de l'hôtel and du palais), while the king decided the more serious ones. From this setting to the royal council was but an easy step for the jurists. As Miraulmont wrote,

"ceux (the masters) qui estoient à la suite du Roy recevoient à la porte de la salle, ou de l'hostel du Roy, les plaintes et Requestes faicts à sa maïesté, et iugeoient ce qu'il leur sembloit iuste et raisonnable; et quant aux Requestes qui estoient d'importance et difficile à expédier, ils les gardoient pour en faire rapport en la présence du Roy, qui à ceste fin.
Miraumont added complaints to requests and surrounded the king with aristocratic councillors; thus the council was born.

In the pseudo-historical elaborations of the legists two ideas were constantly present—the active role of the sovereign (or at least his presence), and the primordial function of the masters in acting as a means of communication between subject and king.

Three types of activity followed from the contact enjoyed by the masters with their monarch. The first of these, and the least important from a purely judicial viewpoint, was the service of the placets. The others were their duties as rapporteurs at the royal council and those associated with the chevauchées. For the placets it is convenient here to discuss long-term changes as well as the task such as it existed in the sixteenth century. The second set of functions will be given a brief outline for the sixteenth century, though the contestations arising from them will be treated in the following chapter. The problem of provincial employment, of less concern to the company in the sixteenth century than later on, will also be discussed here.

Under the Valois the masters enjoyed their closest physical contact with the king at the presentation of pla-
This activity was sufficiently prestigious that one council regulation described how the masters were "faire leur estat" by fulfilling this duty, which implied that it was their primary task. (81) Under Henri III two masters were to accompany him to Mass and Vespers, "d'aller devant sa dite majesté, pour recevoir les requestes qui seront présentées, quand il leur sera commandé..." (82)

It is not known how the pair were chosen, but the regulation just cited mentioned how the chancellor was to assemble the company every morning before Mass, which implies that either he picked them, or else the king did so. Afterwards the same two masters were to assist the chancellor in the great chancery. But the king did not receive placets only on route to and from his devotions.

Under both Charles IX and Henri III special audiences existed for the same purpose. The council regulation of 1563 established (or continued) a royal audience of an hour's duration, "incitement après disner", on Sundays and Wednesdays, "à tous ceux qui auront affaire". (83) Two masters were to be present, but also a secretary of state—an ominous sign for the masters if ever there was one. The secretaries of state, who have come to light particularly because of the work of Nicola Sutherland, represented both a new concentration of power in the hands of administrators and a new style of governing. (84) As will be seen in Chapter Two, they and the councillors of state who worked close to them posed a threat to the masters and the ideal of the judge-king. Here too at the reception of
placets they threatened the masters. By 1585 it seems that the secretaries had evicted them from the audience, for the council regulation of that year makes no mention of their presence there. (85) Possibly the continuing advance of the secretaries explains why the regulation of 1630 mentions that the masters were to attend the king at Mass only on feast days in order to receive placets. (86) By the reign of Louis XV the Sunday Mass was added to those of red-letter days, but the duty remained only a relic of the old placet presentation. In the eighteenth century that was taken over by a special bureau under the control of a secretary of state. (87)

In the sixteenth century the ceremonious reception of petitions had little do to with the judge-king, although certain aspects of it (the connection with Mass and Vespers) looked back to the days of Saint-Louis. The subjects who approached the sovereign were in search of "liberalités", which were not usually of an administrative or financial nature. The council regulation of 1585 listed royal favours in a slightly vague way: "Grâces, Bénéfices, Dons, Honneurs, Bienfaits, Charges, Estats ou Pensions, et autres Liberalités". (88) Indispensable in rewarding and honouring the king's subjects, the service of the placets was also proof that he could be physically approached by them.

The masters also served their sovereign at his council, but there they were frequently confronted by an empty throne. Louis XIV and Louis XV deserted the judicial and administra-
tive sessions of their councils. Only extensive research will establish if Louis XIII was a more assiduous monarch in this regard. It appears that the Valois would have set him a bad example. The insistence of the masters that they had always presented their reports directly to the kings in the past was one indication of royal preoccupation elsewhere. (89) In 1585 Henri III specified in a council regulation that he would henceforth honour the conseil d'État (conseil d'État et des finances in the seventeenth century) with his presence once every two weeks. (90) If such was the fate of this mainly administrative council, it can be doubted that Henri displayed much interest in the sessions of the less important conseil des parties (conseil privé in the following century). (91) Unfortunately for the masters their primary duties in the royal entourage—outside the placet service—were carried out at these two councils.

The history of these institutions in the sixteenth century has been outlined at length (though not without some confusion and error) by Noël Valois and, more briefly, by Roger Doucet. (92) The following sketch is based mainly on these two accounts and upon an inventory of decrees issued by the conseil des parties for the reign of Henri III. (93)

The conseil d'État combined financial, administrative and judicial functions. Decisions to raise taxes and create offices, verification of receipts and expenditures, preparation of leases on the royal tax farms, and regulation of expenditure by the royal household made up the financial
activity of this council. Specialized personnel monopolized these tasks—the intendants of finance and the trésorier de l'épargne.

A second area of administration involved the scrutiny of requests and doléances drawn up by provincial estates, governors, parlements, towns and other communities. A wide range of financial and judicial matters could be contained in these requests. The masters, supported by the views of the légists, believed that they had the right to present these items of business. Traditionally, the company thought, it was at the council

"où sa majesté se trouvait le plus souvent en sa personne, et les maîtres des requêtes pour par leur ministère entendre les plaintes et doléances de son peuple... soit pour le fait de justice, soit pour le fait de finances". (94)

Unfortunately for the masters the rise of the secretaries of state made the realization of this wish unlikely, as will be seen in the following chapter.

Litigation formed the third area of activity, with the conseil d'état overseeing the implementation of royal ordinances and edicts, and judging "affaires des particuliers qui touchent Sa Majesté au fait des finances", embezzlers of royal funds, counterfeitters, and disputes among the clergy. In the last three domains the conseil d'état often ceded ground to special commissions, the cour des monnaies, and the grand conseil respectively. Whether the masters predominated in presenting the rest of the litigation
heard by the conseil d'État, is difficult to answer in the absence of council archives, but they probably did so, because the suits heard at the conseil d'État were similar to those handled by the conseil des parties.

Here the masters monopolized the presentation of business, as is revealed by the few extant registers of this council for the reign of Charles IX. (95) Constituted by the kings (robing habitually blamed Chancellor Duprat) at the expense of the regular courts and, therefore, much maligned by them and the estates-general, the conseil des parties was occupied in judging the request of private parties. Two types of cognizance existed there.

As would any ordinary tribunal, the council decided suits where were, strictly speaking, litigious—disputes over titles to royal office (though these were sometimes heard by the requêtes de l'hôtel or the grand conseil), tax status, and titles to benefices conferred at royal nomination. In this last category the council was often opposed by the grand conseil, which claimed jurisdiction in this domain. The continued existence of a procureur-général at the conseil des parties well into the 1560s demonstrates that it operated very much as a sovereign court near the king. Therefore the masters functioned much as would their colleagues in other tribunals when confronted by disagreements over titles to property.
The second variety of cognizance elevated the masters to a higher role. (96) Demands for the revision of the verdicts of sovereign courts and complaints about corruptible or "interested" magistrates (accompanied by requests for transference of the suits to other tribunals) furnished the conseil des parties with most of its business, as is immediately evident from the published inventories of its decrees. In presenting the complaints of the king's subjects the masters carried out at least part of their august function of transmitting "plaintes et doléances" before the sovereign. Although the parlements and cour des aides judged similar causes arising from courts within their jurisdictions, the masters were set above these great courts, who therefore reacted in a bellicose way to the conseil des parties.

A good king could not rest content to have his subjects come to him with their requests. He had to send trusty servants into the realm in order to hear about the needs of his people, but also to ensure that they were not maltreated by his judges and other powerful subjects. The chevauchées of the masters also grew from the bond of the company to the monarch.

(c) employment in the provinces

Much has been written about the significance of the chevauchées, but little research has been done on them. (97)
Traditionally seen as forerunners of the provincial inten-
dancies of justice, police and finance, they are rarely
considered as reflecting the ideal of the judge-king
attending to the needs of his people. Except when the
masters referred to the exceptional edict of 1553, which
endowed them with a wide range of tasks, they regarded the
chevauchées mainly as an aspect of conveying requests of
a non-litigious nature concerning particularly the adminis-
tration of justice. (98) Returning from the provincial
tours, they presented the king with procès-verbaux which
contained complaints "ausquelles il falloit pourvoir par
nouvelles lois, ordonnances, édits et déclarations". (99)

The edict of 1493, which described the tasks of the
masters in the provinces, also underlined the judicial
nature of the visits. (107) The masters could hold the seal
in the parlements, preside in the bailliages and sénéchau-
ssées and also receive "les plaintes des sujets des torts
à eux faict par les officiers des lieux". A vaguely worded
power "to correct" the officials was allowed the masters.

The inadequate number of masters (there were only
eight until 1522) and the multiplicity of their duties
elsewhere suggest that their impact in the provinces was
minimal. It is possible that the councillors of the sove-
reign courts were called upon to carry out the chevauchées,
but given the rarity of official statements about the tours,
it does not seem that they often took place. Not until the
last financial reforms of François I and the spread of Protestantism did the chevauchées undergo an important if apparently short-lived expansion.

The establishment of sixteen généralités and recettes générales in the provinces by the edict of Cognac (1542) has been lauded by scholars as a masterpiece of Renaissance financial reform. (171) It may be wondered whether the chevauchées of 1549 were consequent upon it. In a copy of the registers of the requêtes de l'hôtel is preserved the

"Département par nous, Jean, Cardinal de Sens, garde des sceaux de France, pour les Chevauchées que Messieurs les Maistres des requestes ordinaires de l'hôtel du Roy doibvent faire par chacun an es provinces et généralités de ce royaume, lequel sera par eulx gardé". (102)

The wording of the preface is ambiguous: it is not clear if the decision to send the masters into the provinces is a new measure or a continuation of old policy. However, the appearance of the word généralité is noteworthy because in the list which follows the preamble, the seat of the recette générale rather than the name of the province is usually written beside the name of a master. This occurs in fourteen of the seventeen assignments. Fortunately the financial purposes of the chevauchées are clearly outlined in the edict of 1553 and the département of 1555.

The edict which created four masterships described their functions in great detail. (103) The chevauchées were to include activities of a judicial, financial, and even religious nature. The masters were to see that the

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magistrates of the recently created présidiaux carried out their duties and that the local courts prosecuted marauding soldiers. Among financial responsibilities were injunctions to assist the newly created trésoriers in the recovery of taxes, to investigate the administration of the receivers for the domaine, aides, tailles and gabelles, to establish syndics for the communities who would make sure that taxes raised for military purposes were properly distributed, and to supervise the administration of municipal finances. In addition the masters were to investigate the religious practice of the king's subjects.

This edict should not be regarded either as a summary of what masters had traditionally done in the provinces or as part of a vast new administrative structure. It appears to have been an attempt to respond to a mass of new and sometimes critical conditions by resorting to a traditional if little-used institution. French and Habsburg armies had been in the northern and eastern provinces since the 1540s, thus creating the problem of marauding soldiery. The edict of Chateaubriand suppressing heresy had been promulgated in 1551. Substantial judicial and financial reforms (the creations of the présidiaux in 1552 and the trésoriers de France in 1551) had been carried out. The crown had begun to resort to forced loans from the municipalities since 1547. It seems that the chevauchées offered the king a means of observing and possibly controlling these phenomena.
However, the preamble to the département of 1555 emphasized the financial aspects of the provincial tours:

"C'est le département des chevauchées que Messieurs les Maîtres des requêtes de l'hôtel ont à faire cette présente année, que nous avons déparé par les recevances générales afin qu'ils puissent plus facilement servir et entendre à la justice et aux finances ainsi que le Roy veult et entendent qu'ils facenter". (104)

Questions arise as to whether these chevauchées actually took place and if they were effective. Barthélémy, one of the masters listed in the département of 1555, appeared at the sénéchaussées of Aix, Hyères, Draguignan and possibly Marseille. (105) He exercised the usual duties of the masters by presiding in the sénéchaussées, but he also took part in discussions of municipal finances (at Draguignan). He was accompanied by one of the newly created trésoriers, which implies that he took part in other financial activities. There is some doubt as to his effectiveness in the judicial domain: after he left Draguignan at least one of his ordinances was annulled by the Aix parlement. However at Lyon, where the relationship between the local and central government has been studied in detail for the sixteenth century, not a single master on chevauchée appeared throughout the 1550s or the 1560s. (106) This is surprising, given the importance of that city.

Doubts about the frequency of the tours may be inferred from other sources. First of all there is the ambiguity of the preambles to the départements—the determination of the king and the keeper of the seals to see
that the masters would carry out the visits, which may well imply that the masters were unwilling to do so.

Proof for this reluctance exists in the edicts of 1553 and 1557. The first specified that masters who were sent on chevauchée would be paid more than their usual wages—that is, more than company members who remained in Paris. Secondly it made the provision that masters who failed to serve on their allotted tours would be penalized in their wages. Furthermore, the local parlement was to replace the delinquent master with one of its own judges, a measure which may be seen as both a threat and an incentive. (107)

The edict of 1557 is even more significant, because it enjoined the presidents and councillors of the parlements to visit the présidiaux, preside in them, see to the prosecution of unruly soldiers and oversee the implementation of the royal ordinances in general. No mention was made of financial powers, but similarly not a line was devoted to the masters of requests. (108) It is tempting to regard this edict as proof of the abandonment of chevauchées by masters for exclusively judicial purposes. As for tours with an exclusively financial end in mind, the provincial trésoriers de France could take of that. In 1557 their number was even doubled.

The last départements of chevauchées preserved in the copies of registers of the requêtes de l'hôtel are for 1560 and 1561. (109) In these the names of the provinces
figure slightly less frequently than the locations of the recettes générales. Although this suggests the financial aspect of the chevauchées, too much should not be read into it. However, the ordinance of Orléans (January 1561) points to the re-emergence of the chevauchée as a mission of enquiry. The masters were "enjoined"

"faire les chevauchées qu'ils sont tenus à faire, et mettre les procès-verbaux par devers nostre Chancelier: en faisant lesquelles chevauchées par les provinces de leur département, pourront recevoir les plaintes de toutes personnes, et les inférer en leurs procès-verbaux". (110)

Word for word the ordinance of Moulins (1566) repeated the commands of the chancellor L'Hôpital. (111) Yet it may be suspected that the tours fell into disuse, for not one of the départements of quartiers preserved in the copies of court registers for 1563, 1567, 1569, 1583, and 1585 includes a list of chevauchées. The disappearance from the edicts creating masterships of these tours as one of the prérogatives of the office suggests that the company no longer sent its members into the provinces. (112) The complaints of the clergy at the estates-general of Blois (1576) and the remonstrances of the masters in the 1580s, both calling for the return of the chevauchées, strengthen the impression that they had fallen into decadence. (113)

By and large these were the only provincial employments to which the company could lay claim. (114) The installation of new officials and local courts within the jurisdiction of the parlements and cours des aides was usually entrusted to members of those sovereign courts.
The commissioners for the edicts of pacification, who were sent into the provinces from around 1565 until 1572, carried out a delicate and time-consuming task. Hence they could not be chosen indiscriminately among the masters who, at any rate, were held to duties elsewhere. Though members of the company were sometimes entrusted with these missions, special preference was given to the councillors and presidents of the parlements. (115) Incidentally, it appears that the first intendants or superintendents of justice to be designated as such were these commissioners. (116) In order to enter the local courts and preside there—necessary rights if the edicts were to be implemented—the commissioners required special powers. Similar to the prerogatives of masters on chevauchée but more extensive inasmuch as they concerned the edicts, these powers were described as the "surintendance de la justice". It may be speculated that these missions replaced the tours of the masters. But the company may have encountered opposition from another quarter.

Doucet points out that the powers of the provincial governors and their lieutenants expanded under Charles IX and Henri III. (117) Mandelot, governor of Lyon and the Lyonnais from 1571 to 1588, was given extensive authority over judicial affairs, and during his tenure not a single intendant de justice served in the region. (118) The same situation may have been common in other areas.
The concentration of judicial powers in the hands of magistrates and aristocrats did not prevent the crown from sending out agents for specific tasks—implementing the currency edicts in the 1570s and drumming up financial support, prosecuting corrupt officials and financiers (also to obtain money) and carrying out unpopular edicts of taxation in the 1580s. (119) The last months in the reign of Henri III witnessed the dispatch of commissioners to combat Guisard influence. (120)

For all these activities the crown called upon a wide variety of servants. A master of requests like Jean-Jacques de Mesmes, who was also a councillor of state and chancellor of both Catherine de Médicis and Henri de Navarre, was an obvious choice for a delicate financial mission to Lyon in 1572. Two other masters, Jean Chandon and Pierre Dauxerre, happened to be natives of the Lyonnais, and they were chosen for special missions there in 1584 and 1586. But the masters were not especially favored in the distribution of commissions. It may be wondered if the masters would have shirked these employments in the way they seem to have avoided the chevauchées. Denis Richet believes that the commissions extraordinaires were profitable to their holders. (121) This may be true, because by 1578 the masters were beginning to clamour for provincial missions.

* * * *

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Roger Doucet described the masters in the following terms:

"ce petit personnel de juristes, aptes à toutes les tâches,... l'auxiliaire indispensable de la monarchie administrative". (122)

This may be correct after the League, but it does not at all correspond to the institutional realities of Valois France. This chapter has discussed the dispersion of the company across courts and provinces— a dispersion which might have passed for flexibility until it is pointed out how absorbed the masters were in each of their various tasks. Rather than "juriste" it is the word judge which comes most readily to mind in connection with the masters. Whether at the parlement, grand conseil, grande prévôté, requêtes de l'hôtel, requêtes du palais, bailliages, or conseil des parties the masters spent most of their time deciding disputes between the king's subjects. Only in drawing up opinions for évocation and in presenting them did they rise to a higher role— that of judging the judges. The masters were far from being qualified for all assignments: their excursion into provincial financial administration seems to have been brief. Treatise after treatise might sing their praises, but these "chefs de la justice" held no commanding position in the administration of the Valois. In fact the reigns of Charles IX and Henri III, marked by the advance of the secretaries and councillors of state, the enterprises of the grand conseil and the multiplication of offices pushed the company further away from the monarch whom the masters desired to serve and further into the "sac et corde" of judicial business.
Notes


3 - Pierre de Miraumont, *Traicté de la chancellerie, avec un recueil des chancelliers et gardes des sceaux*, Paris, 1610, p. 76. See also his *Mémoires...sur l'origine et institution des cours souveraines et autres juridictions subalternes encloses dans l'ancien palais royal de Paris*, Paris, 1584.


6 - BN f. f. 16216, fo. 82 (undated memoir on council reforms inserted amidst other documents for the reign of Henri IV).

7 - BN f. f. 18234-35 are copies of the recorders' registers of letters patent and company discussions compiled around 1661-62. The originals for the sixteenth century have disappeared. The départements of the quartiers and chevauchées are in f. f. 18234, fo. 167 (1544), 202 (1549), 186 (1553), 194 (1555), 198 (1556), 204 (1559), 207 (1560), 210 (1561), 213 (1563), 281 (1567), 285 (1569), 321 (1583), 354 (1585). Throughout most of the century a master could be shifted from quartier to quartier. By 1582, however, the structure of the quartiers began to harden: a regulation (ibid., fo. 324-5) mentioned how the quartier was to be made up of an equal number of "anciens" and "nouveaux". The disappearance of the départements was caused by the fixing of each master to a specific quartier.


9 - Roger Doucet, *Les Institutions de la France au seizi-
10 - Miraulmont, Traité, p. 64. The jurists did not regard the judges of the requêtes de l'huiél and du palais as distinct personnel in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. According to Guillois, op. cit., pp. 30-3, they formed two separate groups.

11 - BN f.f. nouv. ac. 2236, pp. 27-9, for subsidiary proofs.

12 - La Roche-Flavin, loc. cit.

13 - Ibid., p. 31. AN V-4 car. 7, decision given at the quest of Léonard d'Estart, 24 December 1585. See also AN X-1-A, 1585, fo. 395, 10 May 1557, for another source of confusion; a bishop master was described as "conseiller des requestes ordinaire de l'hostel du roi".

14 - Jean-Paul Charmeil, Les Trésoriers de France à l'époque de la Fronde, Paris, 1964, p. 62. AN KK 625, fo. 154 (dress regulation of 1585). On ceremonial occasions involving the entry of the chancellor the masters could dress in red robes (infra, note 27).

15 - Infra, Part 2, Chapter 3.

16 - Infra, Part 2, Chapter 4.


18 - Bailhache, position de thèse.

19 - For the jurisdiction of the court, infra, Part 3, chapters 1 and 2.

20 - Nouv. ac. 2236, p. 470. Last letters patent committing a case to both masters and councillors in f.f. 18234, fo. 122, 20 September 1557, but examples can be found after this in the minutes of the court. See V-4 car. 9, 1584 (16, 23, 24 October).

21 - V-4 car. 1140, 11 and 23 July 1619.

22 - BN f.f. 16218, fo. 364. Miraulmont, Mémoires, p. 32.


24 - Nouv. ac. 2236, pp. 82-93.

25 - BN f.f. 3947, fo. 85, "règlement par moi dressé pour la direction de la justice au conseil estant maistre des requestes par commandement de M. le chancellier de'

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Sillery-1606". In 1582 the masters did not miss more than three sessions out of twenty to twenty-five per month, with the exception of June, when they did not attend nine out of twenty-three sessions, and the vacation court of September-November, when they were absent nearly all the time.

26 - F. f 18234, fo. 127, 14 January 1579.


28 - Infra, Part 3, chapters 1 and 2. Already in 1607 the attendance of the company was becoming discontinuous (X-1-A, 1811-16, registers for two months missing): throughout four months the masters came to less than half of the sessions; in four more than came to over half. The average number of attending masters was 1.7. In 1632 (X-1-A, 2048-56) the average fell to 1.4, and the company missed more than half of the sessions for every month except March.

29 - X-1-A, 1730, fo. 1, 29 March 1594. Since the Paris parlement claimed precedence over the chambre des comptes, the masters tried unsuccessfully to do the same. For an uncharacteristically ironic account of blows exchanged at a funeral (frequently moments of contention) see the letter from Génicourt to the chancellor in BN f.f. 15898, fo. 43, 2 September 1603. The bitterness of these affairs should not be underestimated. In 1625 the company was prepared to use proof of corruption collected by investigating magistrates at the chamber of justice against the presidents (V-4, car. 1498, 14 June 1625). The significance of the incident is that two of the presidents concerned, Robert Aubery and Jacques Jubert, were former masters. Similar skirmishes were waged with the presidents of provincial parlements (for example at the trial of the maréchal de Marillac), whom the masters claimed to precede outside the jurisdictions of the parlements.

30 - The exceptions were important political cases in which the masters were ordered to act as investigating judges by patent letters: nouv. ac. 2236, p. 490, the case of Noël Morgard, an astrologer who had predicted dire political events (1614), p. 499, La Vignouville (1625), p. 508, the ducs de Guise and Bouillon (1640), etc. The same volume mentions a case in 1595 where a master was allowed to make the report. A few cases of attendance by a company member at the tournelle are recorded, for example in X-2-A, 960, September 1599, by Gourreau, dean of the company. However, an attempt by three masters to sit at the tournelle in 1627 raised the hackles of the parlement and threatened to stop the operation of criminal justice until letters patent ordered the masters to desist (V-4, car. 72, 19
April 1627.


32 - X-1-A, 9325-6 (mercurialles).

33 - X-1-A, 3592, fo. 145, 19 August 1660.

34 - Ibid., fol. 159, 26 August.

35 - Ibid., fo. 166, 30 August.

36 - X-1-A, 1733, fo. 146, 3 December 1594.

37 - X-1-A, 1730, 7 June 1594.

38 - Infra, Chapter 2, Part 3, Chapter 4 and Epilogue.

39 - F.f. 16218, fo. 374 (extract from archives of the Paris parlement).

40 - The jurists pointed to an edict of 1545 as proof of this status, but the act was probably only confirmation of customary practice.

41 - Nouv. ac. 2236, p. 475, notes that in 1551 six masters (one of four masters) were also bishops or archbishops. Ibid., p. 482, 3 December 1566.

42 - AN V-3, car. 85 (minutes of decisions for criminal prosecutions, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries).

43 - La Loupe, op. cit., p. 106.

44 - For the innumerable disputes between the company and the grand almoner in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries see BN Colbert Cinq Cents, ms. 136, fo. 139-51. In V-4, car. 42, 27 December 1617, is a decree issued by an ad hoc session of the requêtes de l'hôtel at Rouen, forbidding the jailors of the city prisons to release prisoners without the assistance of the masters.

45 - La Roche-Flavin, loc. cit.

46 - F.f. 18234, fo. 332. In 1584 the masters had difficulties with the parlement over the arrangements for the funeral cortège of the former chancellor, Birague, so they decided to send a deputation to the new chancellor "comme estant chef de la compagnie".

48 - Charmeil, op. cit., p. 41.

49 - F.f. 16218, fo. 321 ("estat des droits qui appartiennent à Monseigneur le Chancelier").


51 - Supra, note 7.

52 - Antoine, op. cit., p. 47, believes that the chancellor lost this right in the 1660s.

53 - Michaud, loc. cit., and p. 80.

54 - Giraud and Jolly, loc. cit.

55 - V-f car. 11, interrogation of 4 June 1594. One Guillaume Langlois, accused of having counterfeited the privy seal, explains how he "s'en vint à la chancellerie pour faire sceller lesdictes lettres, et ayant esté adverty que le seau estoyt levé, il s'en alla au logis de Monsieur Viette, conseiller du roi et maistre des requestes ordinaire de son hostel, qui avoyt lors le seau affin de faire sceller extraordinairement lesdictes lettres..." For a typical complaint of provincial officials see BN f.f. 17367, fo. 34, Trinquère to Séguière, March 1633.

56 - Infra, Part 3, Chapter 1.

57 - D'Ormesson, loc. cit. and KK 625, fo. 32, letters of François I to the chancellor Duprat, 7 April 1527, asking him to hold "les Requestes et Rémissions le jour du Vendredy Saint" in his absence.

58 - See the article by Jean-Paul Laurent in the Guide des recherches dans les fonds judiciaires de l'ancien régime, Antoine et al., Paris, 1956.

59 - Miraulmont, Traicté, p. 68.

60 - The attempt is mentioned in nearly all the remonstrances of the masters. Infra, Chapter 2, note 36.


62 - V-f car. 53, 23 May 1621 (minute of a company discussion).

63 - BN (imprimés) F 42601, piece 36.

- 50 -
64 - La Loupe, loc. cit. BN f. f. 7495 ("dictionnaire du conseil du roy"), fo. 165, mentions that two masters were detailed to sit there in 1544, three in 1553.

65 - F. f. 16218, fo. 351.

66 - D'Ormesson, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 188. BN f. f. 18158, fo. 346 (extract of registers of the grand conseil), 20 August 1626.

67 - U 635, p. 556 (commission of 23 September 1580 for a master rapporteur) and U 636, p. 169 (commission of 1584 for a master as investigating judge).

68 - F. f. 18234, fo. 104 (1539), 118 (1548), are letters patent specifying that councillors from either the parlement or the grand conseil were to be called upon.

69 - U 638, p. 207 (1656), is a commission for four masters and four councillors and a royal almoner to adjudge sums to various "pauvres gentilshommes, capitaines et soldats".

70 - Article by Laurent in Guide and Doucet, op. cit., vol. 1, Chapter 7.

71 - Infra, Chapter 2.

72 - F. f. 3947, fo. 85.

73 - La Roche-Flavin, loc. cit., goes back to Byzantium: "Comme à Constantinople Agathian en l'histoire de Justinian dit, qu'il demeuroit depuis le matin jusques au soir à l'entrée du Palais de l'Empereur, pour répondre les requestes pleins des ennuis et fascheries des proces". Miraulmont, Traité, pp. 56-7, describes "le département des requestes pour les Empereurs". According to him Papinian was master of requests under the emperor Severus Pertinax.


75 - The masters referred to the scene in all their remonstrances. Infra, Chapter 2, note 36. For a typical mention by a jurist see Miraulmont, Traité, p. 47.

76 - La Loupe, op. cit., p. 103.

77 - Du Haillan, op. cit., p. 138.

78 - Ibid.

79 - Miraulmont, Mémoires, p. 42.

80 - We are ignoring here the police of the royal entourage.
and the requêtes de l'hôtel.

81 - KK 625, fo. 103 (regulation of 1578).
82 - Ibid.
83 - Ibid., fo. 74.
85 - KK 625, fo. 131.
86 - Ibid., fo. 292.
87 - Antoine, op. cit., p. 223.
88 - KK 625, fo. 131.
89 - Antoine, op. cit., pp. 63, 140. F.f. 18234, fo. 363 (remonstrances of 1610), includes a demand that the king come to his council. F.f. 16218, fo. 395.
90 - KK 625, article 17 of the regulation for the conseil d'état (1585).
91 - Doucet, op. cit., vol. 1, Chapter 4.
95 - BN f.f. 16221 and 16223.
96 - The masters had the right to present requests in these matters in virtue of the edict of La Bourdaisière (1529). See Pierre Neron, Recueil d'édicts et ordonnances royaux sur le fait de la justice et autres matières les plus importantes, 2 vols., Paris, 1720, vol. 1, p. 92.
97 - The old resume by Doucet in Institutions (vol. 1, Chapter 19) is still the most useful general statement which we have.
98 - For example, the masters proudly pointed to the edict creating the Rennes parlement (1553), wherein they were described as "ceux qui sont les plus près de nostre personne par lesquels nous pouvons souvent entendre quel ordre, police ou défaut se trouvent en nos parlements et cours souveraines" (BN f.f. 23677, fo. 17).
99 - F. f. 16218, fo. 394.

100 - Girard and Joly, loc. cit.


103 - Girard and Joly, op. cit., p. 668.

104 - F. f. 18234, fo. 197.


107 - Girard and Joly, loc. cit.

108 - Although this edict exists in the collection of Isambert, Pallasse was the first institutional historian to call attention to it (op. cit., p. 286).

109 - F. f. 18234, fo. 208, 211.


112 - The chevauchées are mentioned in the edict of 1575 but not in that of 1585. See BN f. f. 16467, fo. 525, 567. They are also absent from the long list of prerogatives in the earliest preserved letters of provision for a master in the V-4 sub-series (ca. 13, 6 March 1598).


114 - The following paragraphs are based mainly on the monograph of Pallasse.

115 - V-4 car. I, undated minutes of judgements of appeals from the decisions of a master and a councillor from the Toulouse parlement, commissioners for the edicts of pacification (ca. 1570-1).

116 - For example, the first "superintendant de la justice" at Lyon was Pierre de Longueil, councillor from the Paris parlement (Pallasse, op. cit., p. 294). See Doucet, op. cit., vol. I, p. 428.
118 - Pallasse, op. cit., p. 307.
119 - Ibid., pp. 348, 352, 364, 369, 379.
121 - Denis Richet, Les Seguier, p. 47.
122 - Doucet, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 159.
Chapter Two: The Masters in Crisis

The prestige of the mastership towards the end of the sixteenth century is an unresolved problem of institutional history. Two well-known scholars have left two completely different opinions on the matter. Noël Valois, in the introduction to his *Inventaire des arrêts du conseil d'État*, referred to the exclusion of the masters from presenting financial reports and petitions of communities at the council, and to their loss of séance at its administrative and financial sections. He concluded:

"la plupart résignèrent leurs charges, qui tombèrent alors en des mains inexpérimentées, ce qui ne contribua pas à relever le prestige de l'emploi. La décadence des maîtres des requêtes est constatée dès le seizième siècle". (1)

For Roger Doucet the point of departure was different: his curiosity in the masters lay in their connection with the progress of absolutism, as marked particularly by the development of the provincial intendancy. Whereas Valois had thought that the complaints of the company about the role of the councillors of state concerned the activity of the latter at the royal council, Doucet interpreted them as fears that the councillors would succeed in seizing the lion's share of provincial employment. Unlike Valois, Doucet noted the increase in the number of masters, but
he thought that

"les créations répétées ne suffisaient pas aux besoins, bien loin de déconsidérer la dignité des maîtres des requêtes et de nuire à leur autorité, comme le laissaient entendre certains". (2)

In his view contemporary jurists who denigrated the company could be discounted, for the masters had seized a secure vantage point on the ever progressing ship of absolutism.

Valois had some acquaintance with the remonstrances of the masters, and he believed these judges when they moaned about the decline of their office. However, Doucet seems not to have read their complaints at all. Both historians are partly mistaken in their evaluation of the masters' petitions, Valois for accepting too uncritically the rhetoric of the company, and Doucet for failing to sufficiently investigate the council world and for neglecting the impact of creations upon the activity of the masters. Yet both caught a part of the truth, for under the Valois monarchs the masters had no end of problems, while under Henri IV they increasingly acquired provincial commissions.

The reigns of Charles IX and Henri III were characterized by a double crisis for the company—the attack upon its right to exercise certain functions and the creation of masterships. But all was not hopeless during this period. The mastership remained much in demand. Moreover, the expansion in numbers and the troubles encountered by the
company strengthened corporate spirit and aided in the recovery of the prestige of the office.

(a) the crisis under the last Valois kings

(i) the creations

The jurists who wrote at the end of the reign of Henri IV were certain about the connection between the decline of the mastership and its increasing numbers. La Roche-Flavin presented a list of creations for the reigns of François I, Henri III, and Charles IX and commented that

"depuis par les Roys Henry 3 et Henry 4 en ont esté créées d'autres, iusques au nombre de cent ou six vingts, lequel nombre immodéré a beaucoup diminué leur autorité et créance envers le peuple". (3)

Miraumont was more discreet. As lieutenant of the grand prévôt he was often assisted by the masters, and it is possible that he had no desire to wound their sense of honour. At the beginning of the reign of François I, according to him, there were only eight masters, "tous les autres ayans esté retranchez, ou supprimez paraventure à cause que la multitude rendoit ces Officiers contemptibles (my italics)". (4) Practically in the same breath he noted a few creations for the sixteenth century and then added: "Et depuis d'autres jusques au nombre excessif, qu'ils sont à présent". Even the masters were aware of a decline in their prestige, as one of them testified in a memoir already quoted: "plusieurs calomnient le trop grand nombre des maîtres des requêtes". (5)
Contemporaries were always sure that a greater number of officials was less respectable than a smaller one, though they did not like to say why. Magisterial sense of exclusiveness was one reason, the motives for the creations another, but the effect of new offices upon the division of the spoils of labour was probably the most important. Taken together such considerations led judges to fear the collapse in the value of their offices, and to oppose in various ways the implementation of edicts providing them with new colleagues. However, opposition to the multiplication of judicial and financial offices had deeper motivation than magisterial greed, and it enlisted the support of social groups other than the robe. The sword nobility and other defenders of the social system regarded the new functions, which were usually provided with fiscal and social privileges, as dissolvents of the time-honoured order of things. The judges themselves perceived additional officials to be useless burdens upon tax-payers and litigants. Well might judges, gentilshommes and the estapes-general complain, for the multiplication of public functions was one of the disturbing novelties of the sixteenth century. (6)

From the 1520s until the League the Valois showered the land with officials. Royal motives were partly pecuniary, since the new offices were sold by the crown and their transmissions could be taxed. A second reason was administrative, for it seems that the volume of judicial business turned sharply upward under François I. (7) The effect of creations upon Parisian courts varied: the number
of judges at the parlement did not quite double from 1498 to 1559, rising from eighty-five to 130 magistrates; the grand conseil, cour des aides, and cour des monnaies witnessed the doubling of their complement; the strength of the chambre des comptes quintupled. (8) Apart from this last institution, no Parisian judicial company witnessed as significant an expansion as the masters. In 1498 there were only eight. In 1589 there were forty-nine. Royal motives for this inflation are something of a mystery. Did the Valois need so many masters, or did they shrewdly grasp that masterships could easily be sold?

The company was aware of the ambiguity in the crown policy of creations. Dumée, the master who delivered remonstrances to the king in 1578, suggested that the number of masters was "sans borne et raison" because of "l'ambition des hommes et nécessités des temps". (9) On the one hand masterships quickly found purchasers. On the other there were royal exigencies which had to be met. The question arises as to whether the needs of the times were financial or administrative.

In the middle of the sixteenth century it seems that the crown needed new masters more than the money from new masterships, but by the reign of Charles IX the priorities were reversed. Henri II was careful to stress the functions of the four new masterships which he established in 1553—almost proof of administrative necessities. (10) The creations of single offices in February 1555 and September 1556
were also ostensibly for "le bien de justice et la chose publique". (11) Charles continued to stress administrative requirements. Thirteen masters and twelve lay councillors at the Paris parlement were created in October 1567 because "il est très nécessaire d'envoyer en plusieurs et divers des contrées de nostre royaume quelques bons et notables personages, maistres des requestes pour y policer et remettre en bon ordre plusieurs choses que la malheur des temps y a jà gastée et dépravée". (12)

As has been suggested in the preceding chapter, it does not seem that the masters were favoured in the distribution of commissions implementing the edicts of pacification. Furthermore, in the case of the October 1567 creation the parlement was impressed only by the financial needs of the monarchy, and it verified the edict as a gesture of support for the war effort of Charles. (13) The edict of October 1572 explained that an additional mastership was needed in order "advancer l'administration de la justice". (14) Yet the establishment of four offices in December 1567 turned out to have other motives, as a delegation of judges from the Paris parlement discovered:

"Ce jour après avoir oy le rapport fait par Messire Christophe de Thou, chevalier, premier président, qui a dict que Maîtres Jacques Roillart, François Briconnet et luy avoient faites les remonstrances ordonnées estre faites sur le edict de creation de quatre maistres des requestes autrue les nouveaux érigez, ausquels ledict seigneur (Charles IX) a dict que quelques des anciens maistres des requestes avoient esté devers luy pour luy faire quelques remonstrances de leur part, ausquels il ait fait responces que s'ils vouloient bailler 72,000 livres il ne érigeroit pas les quatrers et que quatre n'estoit pas tant et promist qu'il n'en feroit plus d'autres, mais que la nécessité de ses affaires désiroit que le edict passast..." (15)

Without a doubt "nécessité de ses affaires" must be given a financial interpretation.
The edicts of Henri III were more honestly drawn up than those of his predecessor. The edict of September 1575 admitted that the reason for creating several masterships was "pour le bien et urgence nécessité de nos affaires". Resistance from the parlement drew forth the reply from Henri that he could not wait, since the payment of his guards was allocated from this particular revenue. (16).

The establishment of four offices in October 1585 was justified in heart-rending terms:

"Les grandes affaires recognisees d'un chacun esquelles nous sommes maintenant reduits par les troubles et esmotions de nostre Royaume et le désir que nous avons d'y pourvoir nous contraigent a nostre très grand regret de rechercher et user de tous moyens". (17)

The last erection of masterships, commissions of presidents, and councillorships at the grand conseil under Henri III joined urgent necessity and speedy justice, but the magistrates of that court were not fooled: when the king came to register the edict, they removed their mortar boards and spoke to him of the howling of office-seekers. (18)

The complement of the company increased by leaps and bounds. François I began his reign with only eight masters. By 1549 there were eighteen. The départements of 1553 listed only fourteen masters, while those for 1555 included twenty-one, an increase which can be explained in terms of two edicts establishing new offices in 1554. An account of wages for 1554 noted twenty-four "ordinaires" and five "extraordinaires". The quartiers for 1559 and 1560 listed only twenty-two masters, and the roll for 1561 subtracted one. The quartiers for 1568 reveal the effect of
the 1567 creations—thirty-six masters. The role for 1570 added one more. A list confirming judges in their offices on the advent of Henri III to the throne (1575) enumerated forty-one masters, which is the number given in the remonstrances of Fumée in 1578. The quartiers of 1583 included only forty, while those for 1586 contained forty-nine names. Such was the effect of the creations in 1585-6. The list of confirmation of Henri IV (1594) had only forty-nine masters. This figure was slightly low, and the addition of new offices raised the strength of the company to fifty-five by 1612. (19) This somewhat tedious enumeration demonstrates that the number of masters rose most rapidly at critical moments: in 1554, when Henri II attempted to find funds by doubling the complement of the sovereign courts; in 1567, at the beginning of the second civil war; and in 1585-6, with the reappearance of the League and the declaration of war against the Huguenots. The motives of the crown for most of these establishments were pecuniary and not administrative. Incidentally, it is worth stressing that the numbers of masters given by historians are wrong. There were not thirty-five masters in 1559, fifty-five in 1569, sixty in 1574, or 120 by the end of the century. (20)

However, the list of verified edicts given by La Roche-Flavin and Miraulmont add up to more than fifty offices for the reigns of François I, Henri II and Charles IX. (21) Yet, as noted above, there were only forty-one masters in 1575. The discrepancy can be explained by
reference to the praiseworthy and often successful efforts of the monarchy, admittedly under pressure from the estates-general and the sovereign courts, to suppress offices whenever possible. Hence the edict for a mastership created in 1554 provided for the disestablishment of the first vacant office, with tenure of the new post to begin only at that moment. This condition was specified for the creations of October 1556, February 1572, August 1575 and October 1585. (22) On rare occasions the parlement boldly took the initiative in suppressing masterships (May 1578, March 1597), and multiple suppressions took place as part of the sporadic attempts of the crown to diminish the number of officials everywhere. In 1560 the masters "extraordinaires" were abolished. The edict of June 1573 reduced the company to twenty-four members, to be arrived at through the resignation or death of officers than holding masterships. But this legislation was never implemented. When Henri returned from Poland to take up the throne, he almost immediately presented new edicts (September, October 1575). (23) Yet even Henri made some efforts to reduce the number of masters: in January 1580 he ordered into operation the ordinance of Blois, which provided for the diminution of the company to sixteen members. It is true that he revoked this part of the ordinance in July of the same year, but in July 1582 he reinstated the measure. According to Miraulmont, writing just afterwards, it was in the process of being carried out. However, it was revoked again in October 1585, just before Henri's last big battle with the parlement over new masterships. (24)
There was at least one other means of suppression: evidence that Jacques Mangot paid for the commission of avocat-général at the Paris parlement with two masterships suggests that new offices were sometimes bought by company members. (25) Disestablishment, it should be added, probably worked to the advantage of the crown, since offices supposedly non-tenable after resignation were re-established when candidates applied to the crown for letters of provision. The favour must have been worth a price. (26)

Resistance to the edicts of creation took a variety of forms, at times continuing after acceptance of the legislation by the parlement. (27) Yet the most spectacular opposition to new masterships occurred during the process of registration. Refusals, accompanied by remonstrances and delegations to the king, would be followed by one or more jussive letters. Such battles took place in 1556, 1567, 1568, 1571, 1572, 1575, 1585 and 1586. (28) Though they were engaged mainly by the parlement, sometimes merging into the larger struggle against office creations (29), the masters were behind much of the resistance. For example, in 1586 they sent a "syndic" before the parlement to oppose the reception of two new masters. (30) The monarchy usually had the last word in the skirmishes, although an edict for seven masterships was withdrawn in early 1568. Possibly the crown realized that it was straining the patience of the parlement, which had already verified two edicts for seventeen masterships in October and December 1567. (31)
It is difficult to assess the effect of the creations upon the activity of the masters, since sources for many central institutions are all but non-existent for the sixteenth century. A regulation for service in the privy chanceries (3 September 1594) "pour oster tous désordres et confusion provenus du grand nombre desdites maistres des requestes qui ont esté nouvellement créées" (four offices in March and April that year), describes how the regulation of 1574 became inoperative. It had ordered that the magistrates of the quartier "tiendroient le seau les ungs après les autres par esgall. e pourtion de temps", but because "le temps n'estoit limitté" each judge tried to hold the seal longer than the preceding master, thus dragging out the service. Succeeding regulations (1582, 1594) eliminated all but the eldest judge of the quartier. (32) Probably the masters had retained an old practice well past the time when it had become inconvenient, having become so with the expansion of the quartiers.

The problem of measuring the impact of the creations upon the activity of the masters at the privy council is especially acute. The decrees of this council body exist continuously, only from the reign of Henri III, and then only for certain quartiers. There is no way of knowing if the quartiers are complete. Therefore it is impossible to compare the activity of the privy council at a given moment to the number of masters. Another complicating factor arises in the pressure exerted on the privy council by the estates-general. It is possible that the volume of
business deflated when the estates presented their cahiers for reform—especially in the 1560s (33), but also after 1576. Given that the distribution of presentations at the privy council was not equitable after the reign of Henri III (34), and that the volume of business handled there under Charles IX and Henri III was probably less than under Henri IV, it may be thought that the life of most masters at the privy council of the last Valois monarchs was not very bustling.

One complaint made by the masters in 1578 and 1585 about their rights at the council may have been linked to the expansion of the company. The masters pointed out that they were no longer able to offer their viewpoint at the privy council without having previously been asked for it. (35) Obviously, the operation of the council would have slowed down if the entire quartier of masters were allowed to opine with the councillors of state, who might number several dozen. Since the dignity of the councillors could not be affronted, the exclusion of the masters may have been seen as a way of increasing the efficiency of the council.

It may be doubted that the creations had much effect upon the share of the company in provincial employment; the major problems there were the irregularity of the chevauchées and the penchant of the crown for using other judges in provincial commissions. Nonetheless, it is easy to demonstrate that by the 1580s a large proportion of masters were tied to Paris. In 1583 thirty-three per
cent of the company served each quartier at the requêtes de l’hôtel. Therefore a minimum of one-third did not serve in the provinces. (36)

There are numerous remonstrances drawn up by the masters during the reign of Henri III, and the question which comes to mind is whether or not the masters related the creation of offices to the problem of employment. After what has been said, it might be thought that they would have been strenuous in denouncing crown policy and clamouring for reductions in numbers. Such was not the case. In 1578, when the flow of new offices had dried up, Fumée recounted for the benefit of the king the progression in the size of the company, and explained how the Roman emperors reduced the number of their assessors, “affin que la multitude ne les a rendu contemplikes”. (37) But he did not place a demand for suppressions among his other requests. A later remonstrance suggested only that by employing them, would the “multitude” of masters which crowded into the royal council be diminished. (38) Yet at no time during the reigns of Henri III and Henri IV did the company strive for mass suppression, and the reason may be guessed. If the monarchy found the means to get rid of some masterships, their tenants would find themselves without a post.

Numbers certainly bothered the company, but the miseries of its members were basically the results of royal flexibility in provincial administration and of

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events at the council, namely, the growth of the council bureaucracy, the aristocratic reaction against the role of the council robe, and the renewed assaults of the grand conseil. To these phenomena and the reactions of the company, we now turn.

(ii) the remonstrances and the problems at the royal council

The complaints of the masters explain Valois' belief that the company was in decline. This impression is easy to acquire from most of their petitions: by adopting a piteous tone they hoped to achieve results. Fumée begged the king for "quelque chose de leur ancienne splendeur", while other remonstrances claimed that

"la misère et calamité du temps passé a amené telle confusion en tous ordres qu'ils ont quasi esté dépouillés du tout de leur première et ancienne dignité et de leurs charges ils sont demeurés avec un beau titre desuni de toute fonction".

Still another lamented that the judges were "inutile à vostre suite, sans autorité ny dignités, exposés à la mocquerie d'un chacun". (39) The masters were careful to point out that they were the victims of the greed of others, who, encouraged by the general chaos, had overturned the order of things. All they wanted was a restoration. As Fumée argued, "jamais les maistres des requestes ne demandent aucune ampliation de jurisdiction". Needless to say, there is a certain amount of hyperbole in these petitions which must be separated from genuine grievances.
Before the remonstrances are examined, a few observations are worth making about them. Five of these documents, dating from 1578 to 1585, have been preserved in copies of the clerk's registers of letters patent at the requêtes de l'hôtel and in the collections of various magistrates. (49) The earliest, indicated in the Séguier papers has having been made by Antoine Fumée, is dated 1578 in both the collection and the clerk's registers. A second, by Charles Chanteclerc, was probably delivered shortly thereafter. Two, maybe three, were drawn up in early 1585 after the council reform in January. It is possible that Jean Chandon, a client of the duc de Nevers, presented one or two of these. Each of these masters was a relatively junior member of the company when he delivered a petition. As on other occasions when the king or his ministers were to be confronted, the senior masters shunned the defence of their company. (41)

Although the remonstrances range over a short period, it can be wondered if the complaints of Fumée marked the beginning of the magisterial agitation. The copies of the court registers are of some use in answering this question, since they signal all the petitions existing in other sources. In the court registers there are none before 1578. There appear to be no gaps in the previous years. Therefore it is probable that the masters did not begin remonstrating about a wide range of subjects until the reign of Henri III. Although the masters were decidedly on the defensive, the date 1578 is suggestive of opportunism on their part.

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It is likely that the earliest presentations of remonstrances were encouraged by the meeting of the estates-general at Blois (November 1576 to March 1577). At least one of the standard complaints of the company (non-master presidents at the grand conseil) was mollified by the ordinance of Blois (1579). (42) As this grievance is not in the petition of 1578, the masters may have agitated about it during the sitting of the estates. The remonstrances of Fumée contain an echo of one of the propositions put forth at Blois—the demand of the clergy for the restoration of the chevauchées.

However, interest in the chevauchées was not uniform in the petitions presented before the drawing up of the ordinance. Chanteclerc did not mention the provincial tours among his other requests, and Fumée argued weakly that the chevauchées were less expensive for the crown when masters were used instead of other judges. (43) The later remonstrances noted sadly that "les visitations des provinces par le malheur des temps sont venues en des accostumacies et (sont) coulées en perpétuel oubli". (44)

A major intention behind the earliest petitions was to settle old scores with the master-presidents of the grand conseil and the councillors of the parlement. Fumée was angered at the sight of young masters presiding over old ones at the grand conseil, and he complained that the councillors of the parlement would not permit the masters to preside over them. (45) Chanteclerc mentioned similar
problems at the grand conseil, and demanded that the company be retained in its "ancienne dignité" at the parlement. (46) These requests were significant inasmuch as they demonstrated the attachment of the masters to their service in the sovereign courts.

The early petitions had less to say than later ones about the royal council. Chanteclerc asked vaguely only that the masters be restored to their former role there, while Fumée hoped for the return of the rights to present all requests and to be heard equally with the councillors of state. (47) But the elaborate remonstrances of 1585 discussed the decadence of the masters at the council in considerable detail. The opportunism encouraged by the estates-general of Blois, though mixed with defensiveness, was replaced by a desperate rear-guard action in 1585.

The three major grievances involving the council were the presentation of various matters, the right of séance, and the right to issue judicial opinions about demands for évocation or révision of cases. The first two of these complaints were the ones to which Valois was most sensitive. The third was unknown to him, but it was not less important than the others.

Most of the remonstrances demanded the restoration of "le rapport des requêtes des villes et provinces et communautés et rabais et modérations des conventions à vos ordonnances, des plaintes de vos juges et cours
souveraines, bref tous rapports, fors ceux lesquels regardent l'ordre et direction de vos finances..." (48)

It must be asked if the masters had lost the right to present these reports, when they had done so, and to whom.

Given the rarity of council archives, it is necessary to turn to the council regulations. Here are encountered problems of imprecise terminology. The regulation of Saint-Germain-en-Laye (1546) describes how the councillors and secretaries of state would meet each afternoon to hear

"les requêtes des poursuivans, sur les rapports qui leur seront faits par les conseillers des requestes, qui pour ce seront appellez, feront et conclurront les dépêches et provisions qu'ils verront estre requises et nécessaires, pour le bien et service du roy, de ses subjects et de la chose publique de son royaume". (49)

The councillors of requests were probably the masters, sometimes referred to as "nos conseillers, maîtres des requêtes". These "conseillers" were summoned (appellé), which reveals that they were not on the same footing as the councillors of state, who had the right to sit at the council. But the major problem encountered with this passage is whether the masters, who presented the requests of litigants (poursuivans), were also rapporteurs for the administrative questions about which dispatches would be concluded.

Similar difficulties are encountered with the memoir drawn up by the chancellor Olivier in the 1560s "pour l'ordre du conseil privé" (meaning: all sessions of the royal council). At the privy council
"autres affaires d'estat pour la direction, conduite et gouvernement du dedans du Royaume...sur remonstrances faites par un Parlement ou autre officiers, villes et communautes en corps...raport en est fait au Roy, pour entendre sa volonté". (50)

No mention was made about who the rapporteurs were. Yet,

"il y a autres affaires, comme bon marché, coupes de bois, rabais (of taxes and leases), suppressions, érections des offices, procès à cause de bénéfices à la vocation du Roy qui se traitent au conseil privé, sans travailler sa Majesté, d'ouyr le raport par après de Messieurs des Requestes pour luy oster l'importunité". (51)

These affairs concerned in part the financial administration (whether of the domain or of "extraordinary" revenue), the demands of some communities, and litigation. Their presentation belonged to the masters, as the following passage, which describes the judicial activity proper of the privy council, makes clear. The memoir continued:

"tous procès, différents entre parties au conseil privé, soit en première instance, ou par évocation... s'expédient aussi (my italics) au raport des maistres des requestes et est reçu audict conseil par les conseillers séans au conseil privé, et so chargeront du raport, sinon qu'il leur soit ordonné par le Roi ou le chancelier parce que leur autorité apporte grande conséquence à la suite des opinions". (52)

Notwithstanding the ambiguity of the passage, which seems to imply that the councillors sometimes presented requests, the range of the activity allowed the masters is clear. By the 1560s their official status at the council was as rapporteurs of suits between private litigants, some requests of communities and some financial matters. In the more general administrative questions affecting the kingdom, their role is unclear. As late as 1566 a few masters entered the administrative conseil des finances, but by that date such appearances were rare. (53)
Therefore, when the masters demanded the report of general administrative matters in 1578 and 1585 there was a certain amount of opportunism on their part, since their status in regard to these questions had not been clearly defined in at least thirty years. Yet, when they asked for the return of presentations involving financial différend, rabais, et plaintes particuliers" (54) they were justified. In these matters they were the victims of the rise of the specialists.

The intendants of finance, who have yet to find their historian for the sixteenth century, were partly to blame. But their tasks kept them mainly in the "ordre et direction" of the royal finances, domains to which the masters laid no claim. More guilty were the councillors of state and, behind them, the secretaries of state.

One of the interesting if still unclear institutional developments of the sixteenth century is that of the bureaux of the secretaries of state. The division of France into regions under each secretary has been outlined by scholars, particularly by Nicola Sutherland. But attention has not been paid to the further division of each region among councillors of state, who would present at the council the requests, not all of them of an administrative nature, contained in the dispatches of provincial authorities. The first council regulation to describe the functioning of this "département des provinces" was that of 1585, but it is possible that this bureaucratic structure existed before. (55) The
problem is why the masters were excluded from the bureaux.

As late as 1560 the masters formed the most numerous robe group at the council. There was only a handful of magistrate councillors of state. (56) Furthermore, the company enjoyed considerable support against the inroads of robins from outside the royal entourage; in 1560 the ordinance of Orléans excluded the members of the sovereign courts from making presentations at the council. (57) Yet gradually the number of robe councillors of state augmented. By 1572 there were sixteen. (58) The masters had an explanation for this increase. According to them the edicts of pacification, the treaties with the grandees, and the search for money were responsible for an inflation in the volume of business handled by the council. This in turn meant that the king required more servants. (59) Though the company did elaborate further, it is likely that the crown began to feel the need for both experienced and politically reliable personnel; some of the robe councillors, like d’Avenson and Lamoignon, were former masters; others, like Mesmes de Roissey and Bellièvre, were close to Catherine de Médicis. (60) Moreover, delegations of power were increasingly made to the secretaries of state, who might have been expected to favour judges whose "chef" was not the chancellor, rival of the secretaries. Amidst political upheaval and bureaucratic reorganization designed to cope with the growing burden of government, it is easy to imagine how the masters were slowly pushed to one side. The proof lies in the council regulations; Olivier's memoir
demonstrates that the masters were still rapporteurs at what was later known as the conseil d'état, but the regulations for the 1570s and 1580s are silent about their duties there. (61) André Lefèvre d'Ormesson, referring to the conseil d'état of 1586, commented:

"Je vis par les registres qu'aucun maîtres des requêtes n'y entrait ni ne rapportoit mais seulement tous ces seigneurs dont les noms sont ci-dessous écrits. Forces requestes s'y rapportoient et fort peu d'instances". (62)

The list of councillors copied out by d'Ormesson was made up overwhelmingly of conseillers de robe courte (gentilshommes) and ecclesiastics. The professional rivalry between masters and councillors was complicated by a social dimension, for in the 1580s the number of robins was steadily reduced, while the number of gentilshommes continually grew. In 1574 there were still ten robe councillors, in 1584 seven and a year later only six. In 1584 there were fifteen conseillers de robe courte, and the next year there were twenty-one. (63) Contrary to the favourite stereotypes of historians, the gentilshommes took their task to heart. Four of the provincial bureaux were in their hands in 1585. D'Ormesson, referring to registers no longer in existence, wrote that the "seigneurs" had taken over the presentations made before the conseil d'état. The masters themselves were outspoken about the industriousness, though not the efficiency, of the prelates and gentilshommes. These councillors made their reports "laborieusement". They could not offer their opinion "sans peine". (64)
For the masters there was only one solution to their problem. The ordinances had to be obeyed. The council could not take cognizance of anything forbidden to it. (65) This request could be found in the cahiers of the estates-general or in the remonstrances of the parlements. Coming from the masters, its sincerity may be doubted. As long as they felt excluded from the government of the kingdom, they could complain in the fashion of other judicial companies and public assemblies. Their request was reiterated in 1610, but that was the last time. (66) Afterwards they were drawn further into the council world, and they had little desire to see limitations imposed upon the range of business which might come their way.

Driven from the domains of finance and administration into a purely judicial sphere, the company came under heavy attack there. Part of the pressure came from the estates-general, for in 1580 a council regulation ordered that all "procès et incidens" (i.e. complaints about expenses and council procedures) at the registry of the privy council be sent to the parlements and the grand conseil. (67) The appearance of the conseil in the regulation reveals that the old rivalry with the masters was about to re-emerge.

The only bright spot for the masters in the institutional developments of the 1560s and 1570s had been their acquisition of the right to give judicial opinions to the privy council over demands for évocations. A vague clause in the ordinance of Orléans sanctioned this, though it did...
not overrule the edicts of La Bourdaïsière (1527) and Chanteloup (1545), which attributed cognizance of these demands to the grand conseil. (68)

The conseil was busily pressuring the king for the opinions, arguing that "la plus grande partie de la connaissance qu'ils aient auparavant a esté renvoyée ou pardevant autres jugés (the masters) ou aucunement décidée". (69) But it also wanted to hear cases judged by the masters involving the "salaires, frais et vexations des avocats" and appeals against minor council procedures. It even offered to hear litigants "sans épices". Here was a pointed reference to the masters, about whose corruption there had been some comment within recent years. Several petitions of the company mentioned those complaints, and volunteered collective actions against dishonest members of the company. (70) In August 1583, at the request of the procureur du roi of the requêtes de l'hôtel, the privy council forbade the masters to take épices for cases heard at the requêtes in last resort. (71)

In January 1585 a worse blow fell; the masters were to send all demands for évocations to the grand conseil. (72) The value of the court registry fell rapidly as the business of the requêtes de l'hôtel shrank to a thin stream made up mainly of cases in first instance. An office of bailiff at the tribunal was suppressed in July 1587, possibly because of the lack of business. (73) The company
asked for the return of the opinions, but to no avail. The measure of January seems to have broken the patience of many masters, for eleven of them—25% of the company—resigned in early 1585. Within a year and a half the masters suffered the additional burden of nine new offices.

In 1585 they complained about the "multitude" of idle company members attending the royal council. The council regulation for the same year implied that there was, in fact, a neglect of duty on their part:

"leur enjoignant Sa Majesté de ne faillir désormais à servir tout leur quartier sur peine de leur estre rabatú autant sur leurs gaiges...et d'estre baillés à ceux qui auroient servis à leurs places". (74)

The contradiction can be resolved with reference to the regulation of 1578, which specified that "ne fauldront ceux qui sont en quartier, et non autres". (75) It is likely that the council was attended by unemployed masters who came in the place of those who were lucky enough to serve in the provinces or who were simply too discouraged by their meagre chances in picking up requests at the council. The last regulation of Henri III (at Blois in 1588) suggested that the masters were failing to come to the council, to assist in the great chancery, or even to accompany the sovereign to Mass. (76) The demoralization of the masters had reached the point where they were abandoning the most precious of their tasks.

The fate of the masters in the 1570s and 1580s roughly follows the miseries of Henri III. Both suffered from the growth of a specialized council bureaucracy outside the
control of the monarch and from the resurgence of aristocratic power at court. It may be wondered if the emphasis placed by the masters on the "malheurs de temps" was a deliberate psychological ploy designed to strengthen the ties between the company and the hapless king. In 1588 Henri III fought back against the aristocratic enemies and his robe assistants, both of whom had severely reduced his freedom of action. Although the reasons for the dismissal of the secretaries of state are still debated, it should be noted that the successors of the secretaries were little more than clerks. (77) Had he have lived, would Henri have played to the fantasies of the masters, who looked back to the simple days when the monarch, served solely by his masters, dispensed justice to the people?

(b) the League and the reign of Henri IV

The division of the kingdom into League and Henrician forces split the company like every other robe group into two factions. A few masters performed important services for the League. Claude Hennequin, dean of the company, was a close relative of Aymar Hennequin, the extremist Leaguer bishop of Nantes. Claude voyaged on behalf of the Union to the parlement of Toulouse. Charles Boucher d'Orsay, prévôt des marchands in 1590, became keeper of the seals for Mayenne. (78) Twelve masters remained at Paris and two outsiders to the sovereign court magistrature, Malenfant and Bastom, were admitted into office there. (79) The public pros-
execution of the requêtes de l'hôtel remained in the capital, revealing a pro-League stance commonly chosen by men of the lesser robe. (80)

A dozen masters followed the Henrician parlement to Tours and still others served Henri in the provinces—Le Camus de Maillebois in Normandy, Bourgneuf and Avril in Brittany. François Viète had no choice but to leave Paris: a client of the Rohan and Henri de Navarre, he was also a Huguenot. His mathematical abilities were of much use to the royal cause, particularly in decoding League dispatches. The parlement at Chalons was presided over at first by Charles de Chanteclerc, the master who had defended his company's interests back in the 1570s, and then by Claudio Perrot, president and former master. Another eleven judges were admitted into the company at Tours before 1594, most of them councillors of the grand conseil and the parlement who had rapidly heeded the call of the two Henris. (81) Urbain Roissey, the chief clerk of the requêtes who had seen the value of his office tumble so drastically in 1585, also came to Tours, equipped with a frightening tale of ransom and ruin at the hands of the Leaguers. (82)

Though institutional grievances can hardly account for the political behaviour of the masters, both the Conseil Général de l'Union Catholique and Henri IV demonstrated some sensitivity to their complaints. In April 1589 the Conseil permitted the company to give opinions about demands for
évocations. Henri allowed the masters into his conseil d'État et des finances as rapporteurs. (83) In some ways the masters who remained at Paris were better off than their former colleagues at Tours: the requêtes de l'hôtel at the capital continued to function, while the lease on the registry of the requêtes at Tours fell to less than twenty écus per annum. (84) Still, the complement of masters in the service of the League diminished rapidly. Claude Hennequin, Nicolas Viole, and Jean-Jacques de La Vergne (representative of Mayenne at Lyon) died, François Huraut met a violent end, and others deserted the cause. Antoine at Tours Briçonnet was reintegrated into the company/in November 1590, Jean Huault in January 1591, and even Malenfant was present at the council of Henri before the entry into Paris in 1594. (85)

The members of the company shared the political sentiments and social fears of their confrères in the sovereign courts, which explains their desertion of Mayenne, and they were probably none too pleased to discover that the League was as willing as the Valois to supply them with new colleagues: in 1591 Mayenne tried to force the parlement to re-establish two masterships. (86)

The final success of Henri brought few problems for the masters who had remained in Paris. All with the exception of Baston, who had signed the League with his blood, were reinstated. (87)
If the two League masters and an absent judge loyal to Henri (Menardeau), are added to the magistrates on the list of confirmation of parlement membership, the company was fifty-two strong in 1594. (88) This number included two offices created by Henri IV against the wishes of the masters, but with the approbation of the Paris Parlement, anxious to prove its loyalty. The recipients of the new posts were Guillaume du Vair, a councillor of the parlement famous for his timely address on the Salic law, and Martim Langlois, an alderman of Paris who had opened the gates of the capital to Henri. Langlois became a master on 1 April and prévôt des marchands on 16 August. The "politiques" were not forgotten: Jerôme de Hacqueville and Michel de Marillac acquired vacated offices in late 1594 and early 1595. (89) Still other judges of the grand conseil and the parlement who had opportunely crossed into the camp of Henri in the early 1590s became masters. (90) Other robins were promised the post, and only waited a vacancy. (91) Various loyal masters were made councillors of state or received special privileges. (92)

The masters were not the only magistrates to be the recipients of royal favours. At the council Henri reversed the aristocratic reaction of the 1580s, and the lists of "MM. du conseil" which head the decisions of the council for the reign reveal the influx of royalist judges. (93) This promotion of robins was to be of the utmost importance in drawing the company further into the council. For the moment, however, the masters did not demand to be made

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councillors of state.

Hoping to share in the spoils which Henri IV would be bound to distribute, the company immediately returned to agitation. On 18 April 1594 a delegation of ten masters turned up at the parlement with the intention of reducing the number of their company, but second thoughts prevailed and they did not present their opposition when asked for it. (94) On 28 June they assembled in order to draw up remonstrances. Significantly these were not to be delivered to the king, but to the chancellor, Hurault de Cheverny. The masters demanded that

"ils rapporteront au Conseil du Roy tous procès, requêtes et affaires qui sont de justice, privativement à tous autres et que Messieurs les conseillers du Conseil du Roy laisseront lesdits rapports auxdits maistros des requestes selon l'ancienne forme".

They also asked "que les visitations des provinces seront remises en leurs formes anciennes" (i.e. chevauchées by masters), and

"sera supplié de renvoi de toutes les requestes sur lesquelles est besoin de donner avis à Sa Majesté ausdites requestes de l'hôtel et principalement celles qui tendent afin d'évocquer d'un Parlement et aultres pour parents et alliances". (95)

A few other requests reveal the effects of institutional disorders during the wars. All cases involving titles of offices would be sent to the requêtes for first instance judgement, as had been the custom, and the civil cases of the councillors of the requêtes du palais (as holders of committimus) would also be heard before the masters. A council decree confirmed their cognizance of offices in 1596, and another of 1602 sent them the suits of the coun-
The remonstrance confirms the existence of a new realism in the expectations of the masters, for they accepted the superior status of the councillors of state inasmuch as their rights of séance and opining were concerned. Furthermore, no mention was made of presiding at the Paris parliament or of the annoyances caused by young masters presiding at the grand conseil, which suggests that the company saw its fortunes as being linked more to the council than to the sovereign courts.

We are fortunate in possessing a document which seems to be a direct response to the petition of the masters. The chancellor, who had witnessed their decadence in the 1580s, composed a memoir in which he recommended that they draw up the judicial opinions about demands in évocations, present all requests of justice at the council, and deliver the reports of "lettres d'assiette ou impositions sur le peuple". Inclusion of the last type of business looks like an attempt to involve the masters in the presentation of financial litigation at the council. It may be wondered if this solicitude for them was an effort on the part of the chancellor to reassert himself against the council specialists by giving a greater role to the judges of "his" company. At any rate the masters began to come increasingly to the financial councils with reports. The favourable attitude of Hurault marked the beginning of a new relationship between the masters.
and the chancellors and keepers of the seal: we will find Guillaume du Vair, Michel de Marillac and Pierre Séguier—like Hurault all former masters—at work on their behalf. (99)

The petition brought to Hurault raises the question of whether the king had become less accessible to the company. According to L’Estoile, when Estienne du Breuil, a master of fifteen year’s experience and one of the first to join Henri at Tours, importuned the the monarch with a remonstrance, he was hustled out of the royal chambers in a most insulting way. (100)

Though the old relationship with the sovereign may have been on the wane, the fortunes of the company were taking an upward turn. In the summer of 1594 the judicial opinions slipped back into the requêtes, though it took a few years before they disappeared entirely from the grand conseil. (101) Individual masters began to enter the conseil d’état et des finances with presentations. Although the crown was still fertile with edicts creating offices, the masters were not ill-treated in this regard. The establishment of four new offices in March and April 1594 and of one more in September 1595 did not augur a vast inflation in the strength of the company: the new offices were less financially motivated than intended as rewards. By 1600 the company comprised fifty-five judges, a number which had not changed by 1612. (102)
The docility of the masters in the period 1596-1610 owes much to the number of provincial commissions which came their way. The wars of the League had been an encouragement in this regard, for the armies which had fought the partisans of Mayenne were supplied with intendants charged with policing the troops, procuring funds and provisions, and sometimes negotiating with the enemy. The value of these commissions is not to be underestimated. The intendants of the army facing the duc de Mercoeur were paid from 450 to 600 livres per month by the estates of Brittany, considerable sums when it is pointed out that a chevauchée of unknown duration under François I brought in only 250 livres and that the yearly wages of a master under Henri IV were 1300 livres. (103) When the armies were disbanded, the intendants sometimes remained in place in order to carry out the tasks of reconstruction and repression. (104) In place, they would receive commission after commission from the king. But the royal council also resorted to a steady stream of commissioners. The tasks were numerous—the re-establishment of municipal governments, the implementation of the edict of Nantes and the punishment of plotters against the king. (105) Inevitably the masters (among other judges) were useful.

In the financial domain the use of special functionaries was also frequent. The post-League period witnessed the appearance of "directeurs" and intendants of finance endowed with wide-ranging financial powers. Here it seems
that specialists were called upon rather than the masters—local trésoriers de France and financial officials from the council. (106) However, the commissioners for the "réglement" of the taille who visited the généralités during the first decade of the new century were often masters, though usually accompanied by a Parisian accounting official and a local trésorier. (107) The use of chambres de justice at Paris was matched by commissions of investigation into the activities of provincial officials, and here too the services of the masters were not spurned. (108)

This plethora of touring functionaries has caused some modern historians to see powerful intendants de justice everywhere under Henri IV. Intendants enjoying wide judicial and financial prerogatives were installed permanently at Lyon from the first decade of the century. Yet this is not surprising since Lyon, the second city of the realm after Paris, had no troublesome sovereign courts to meddle in the activities of commissioners from the council. Moreover, its governors were the Villeroy, devoted servants of the crown unlikely to set obstacles in the way of council representatives. (109) If Doucet is correct, the powers of many intendants were narrowly restricted to matters involving justice and extended no further than the area immediately surrounding the town where they were installed. (110) It is possible that many of these "intendants" were masters on chevauchée, content to preside in the bailliages and sénéchaussées. Needless to say, much more research must be done on these problems.
What is not to be doubted about these commissions is their lucrativeness. At Lyon the intendants received from 7,200 to 10,000 livres per annum, plus expenses, which explains why the masters were so vigilant about the intendancies in 1610. (111)

The good fortune of the masters in the provincial commissions is not to be explained solely by the multitude of available assignments. Scarce among the commissioners were the councillors and presidents of the Paris parlement (though this was not the case for the provincial sovereign courts). The work of Chamberland and Maugis has demonstrated that the relations of Sully and Henri IV with the parlement were poor, due in part to the pretention of that court to interfere with the royal financial administration. (112) It is possible that the masters acquired some commissions by default. The parlement may also have disapproved of its members undertaking some missions.

Fifteen years of relative favour only whetted the appetites of the masters. On 4 June 1610, less then a month after the assassination of Henri, they were busy assembling. They gave as their reason

"qu'estant advenu le décès du deffunct Roy le Roy à présent regnant et messieurs de son conseil estoient sur le point de faire des règlements concernants le fait et affaires qui se traitent audit conseil à quoy il seroit a propos de pourvoir à ce que les règlements cy-devant faicts concernants la charge desdites sieurs soient observés et qu'il ne se face rien au préjudice de la compagnie sur laquelle plusieurs ont entrepris, a esté ordonné que
Once again the chancellor (Brûlart de Sillery) was to be consulted. In late July a lengthy document with the unsurprising justification "pour estre conservés en leur antienne dignité" was copied into the registers of the requests de l'hôtel. (114) Although this petition does not exist in its entirety, certain articles have been preserved.

The masters turned their attention to an institution of fairly recent development: in 1555, they noted,

"le seigneur de Roissey, maître des requêtes, (was) surintendant de la justice et des finances en l'armée Royale qui fut envoyée en Toscane sous la conduite de Monsieur le Duc de Guise, laquelle charge d'intendant auparavant et depuis, jusques aujourd'hui a esté continuée aux maîtres des requêtes". (115)

Furthermore, they asked

"que la visitation des provinces sont par eux continuée comme elle a esté instituée et observée ensemble l'intendance de la justice, tant en ses armées qu'aux principales villes du royaume".

In addition the masters required that

"tous rapports des requête de justice et finance (my italics) et instances réglées soient faictes par eux seuls et que l'honneur, l'entrée et voix délibérative en ses conseils leur soient conservées". (116)

The requests about the council formed a blatant attempt to exploit the favour shown to the masters by Hurault
and to break into all bodies of the council "en quartier" instead of singly. Although none of the demands of the company were immediately granted, new successes were not far away.

* * * *

The period 1560-88 was a time of troubles for the masters. Creations of their posts, the rise of the council specialists, the flexibility of the royal provincial administration, the assaults of the grand conseil, and the aristocratic reaction of the 1580s understandably left them demoralized.

The wars of the League were a turning point in the fortunes of the company as the combatants sought the support of the judicial companies. In general robins were to be the recipients of favours on the part of the victor; specifically the fifty or so masters, the judicial group traditionally closest to the king and now full of Henri's adherents, had a right to special consideration. Hence the masters enjoyed a significant victory over the grand conseil and the extension of their employment opportunities at the council and in the provinces.

* * * *

The sixteenth century witnessed important changes in the company and its attitudes. In the first place it can
be said that the increase in the number of masters, when combined with their habits of concerted action acquired in facing crises under the Valois, turned the company into an effective pressure group.

Secondly the relationship of the masters with the monarch and their conception of their place within the royal administration evolved considerably. Gone was the medieval image of the king surrounded only by a handful of masters. It was replaced by a more modest self-image and a more realistic outlook. The robe councillors, the financial technicians, and the secretaries of state could not be dislodged; the increasing amount of activity handled by the council made them indispensable. The king too seemed to be disappearing behind the burden of his métier. He could no longer be present at all the sessions of his council. The result of this was that the relationship of the company with the chancellors and keepers of the seal proved to be more useful than in the past. They rather than the monarch could be counted upon to enlarge the place of the masters within the royal administration.

In the third place the interests of the company became less diffuse: its position in the sovereign courts concerned it less and less. The council and the provincial commissions seemed to offer a wider field of opportunity.

The focal point of the company interests changed, and
the result was to be of much importance in the development of a council robe. In a somewhat pompous memorandum offered to the king in 1610 the masters commented that the crown ought to take care in selecting its councillors. (117) This statement was just one step away from the demand that the councillors of state be chosen among the masters. The 1610s was to witness the beginning of an important process—the formation of a council robe schooled in the company of masters.
Notes

1 - Valois, op. cit., vol. 1, p. CXVIII.


3 - La Roche-Flavin, op. cit., p. 30. For a similar mistaken view by a contemporary see Histoire de l'année 1607 in Archives Curieuses, 1re Série, ed. Camer and Danou, vol. 14, p. 375: "cette multitude inutile qui, pâns par l'accroissement d'ambition que des affaires, est fossoissée au plus de six-vingt testes".

4 - Miraumont, Traité, pp. 59-60.

5 - Supra, Chapter 1, note 6.


7 - Unpublished research of the author.

8 - Doucet, op. cit., vol. 1, chapters 6 and 7.

9 - F. f. 16218, fo. 349.

10 - Girard and Joly, op. cit., p. 669.


12 - Ibid., fo. 415-9.

13 - Nouv. ac. 2236, p. 56.


15 - X-1-A 1622, fo. 63, 8 January 1568.

16 - F. f. 16467, fo. 524-7. Nouv. ac. 2236, p. 64.

17 - F. f. 16467, fo. 566-9. When a delegation from the parliament went to see Henri (X-1-A 1694, fo. 281, 26 October) it was told "que le seur duc du Maine estant icy qui ne pouvait partir (to fight the Huguenots in the south-west) sans avoir somme d'argent".


21 - La Roche-Flavin, loc. cit. Miraumont, loc. cit.

22 - F.f. 16467, fo. 280, 295, 488, 519, 567.

23 - Miron, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 283, article 33 (Orléans), F.f. 16467, fo. 500-4 (1573).

24 - Nouv. ac. 2236, p. 66. Miraumont, Mémoires, p. 27

25 - Nouv. ac. 2236, pp. 485, 487.

26 - Infra, Part 2, Chapter 1, note

27 - The parlement would drag out the reception of the magistrate. Lower courts would use all sorts of intimidation, including physical violence.


29 - For example, in January 1576 one edict was verified "à la charge de la suppression générale des offices de ladite cour" (f.f. 16467, fo. 527), and in October 1585 the parlement delayed registration, declaring "que très humbles remonstrances luy (Henri III) seront faites de trois mois en trois mois de mettre fin aux créations des offices" (X-1-A 1694, fo. 281).


31 - Nouv. ac. 2236, p. 57.

32 - V-4 car. 11, minute.

33 - F.f. 16221, 16223 (decrees of privy council for the period 1560-69). Though there are gaps for April 1566 and December 1567, the decree count is suggestive of reactions to the estates: 1566—284 decrees; 1567—244; 1568—159.

34 - AN V-6 1177-8 (registers of decrees for January and October quartiers of 1603). In January Charles Durant, an old master (received in 1584) presented 35% of the decrees, and five other masters presented 51%. In October Etienne Tenon, received in 1598, was rapporteur for 32%, while five other masters presented 60% of the decrees. The three or four other masters attending their quartier handled only a few reports.

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35 - F. f. 16218, fo. 351. F. f. 16216, fo. 205.

36 - V. 4 car. 7-8 (derived from lists of judges present for judgement at each decision).

37 - F. f. 16218, fo. 348.

38 - F. f. 23677, fo. 18-9.

39 - F. f. 16218, fo. 351, 397. F. f. 16216, fo. 204.

40 - F. f. 16218, fo. 348-53 (delivered by "feu M. des Roches-Fumée"). The version in f. f. 18234 (fo. 304-20) has a more elaborate historical background, which may have been left out to spare the king. The remonstrances presented by Chanteclerc (f. f. 16218, fol 360-2) contain very similar demands. F. f. 7495, fo. 161, notes remonstrances made in 1582, but the short description of them suggests that they were made after June 1584 (the death of the chancellor Birague). F. f. 18234, fo. 338-51 and f. f. 16216, fo. 394-8, are the same. A remonstrance in f. f. 23677, fo. 16-9, is similar to these two and was made after the council reform of January 1585. The remonstrance in f. f. 16216 (fo. 201-7) is the same as the one in f. f. 18234 (fo. 353), and because the latter appears in the court registers before August 1585, was made shortly after the council reform.

41 - Fumée was received into office in 1574, and both Chanteclerc and Chandon entered the company in 1578. Chandon claimed that he represented the company before the king on two occasions. See the Vie de Jean Chandon, seigneur de La Montagne... suivie de son testament..., manuscrits copies par M. F. C(handon) de B(rialilus), Epernay, 1657, p. 11. Infra, Part 3, Chapter 4.


43 - F. f. 16218, fo. 351, 361.

44 - Ibid., fo. 397.

45 - Ibid., fo. 351.

46 - Ibid., fo. 362.

47 - Ibid., fo. 351, 362.


49 - KK 625, fo. 40.

50 - Ibid., fo. 71-2
51 - Ibid., fo. 71.
52 - Ibid., fo. 72.
53 - BN f.f. 18154 (register of conseil des finances for 1566), fo. 20, 140.
54 - F.f. 16218, fo. 351. F.f. 23677, fo. 19.
55 - KK 625, fo. 145-6.
56 - Ibid., fo. 69.
57 - Neron, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 383.
58 - KK 625, fo. 69, 87.
59 - F.f. 23677, loc. cit.
60 - KK 625, fo. 69 (d'Avenson), fo. 85 (brevet of retention for Lamoignon). Both Roissey and Belliévre were chancellors of Catherine (ibid., fo. 94).
61 - Ibid., fo. 95ff. Supra, note 51.
63 - KK 625, fo. 95, 127, 145.
64 - F.f. 16216, fo. 206.
65 - F.f. 23677, loc. cit.
66 - F.f. 18234, fo. 364.
67 - KK 625, fo. 113.
68 - Neron, loc. cit., and pp. 92, 265. There are many opinions in V-4 car. 1.
69 - U 949 (mémoires et pièces concernant le grand conseil et la prévôté de l'hôtel), pp. 161-87, ("remonstrance très humble que les gens tenans le grand conseil ont ordonné estre faites").
70 - F.f. 16216, fo. 206, 362.
71 - BN f.f. 18157, fo. 134, 12 August. This public-spirited gesture would have cost the procureur du roi little, for he had only a tiny cut in the épices of the court.
72 - KK 625, fo. 146.
73 - F.f. 18157, fo. 211, 31 July.
74 - KK 625, fo. 149.
75 - Ibid., fo. 103.
76 - Ibid., fol. 165.
77 - Sutherland, op. cit., pp. 301-3, believes that Henri intended to recall the secretaries after the estates-general was dismissed, but Dickerman, in Belliévre and Villeroi, Power in France under Henry III and Henry IV, Providence, 1971, pp. 55-66, demonstrates quite convincingly that the king was trying to enlarge his possibilities for free manoeuvre and, maybe, hoping to dismantle an all too powerful institution.
79 - Claude and René Hennequin, Charles Boucher, Antoine de Beauvais, Nicolas Vialle, Jean Tronçon, Antoine Brandon, François Charles, Jean Barjot, Nicolas Brûlart, Jean Huault (V.4, car. 10). Only five of these judges were declared rebels by the declaration of 14 May 1589 (Édouard Maugis, Histoire du parlement de Paris de l'avenement des rois Valois a la mort de Henri IV, 3 vols., Paris, 1913-6, vol. 2, p. 136). For Jean Baston, member of the council of forty, ibid., vol. 2, p. 195. For Jacques Malenfant, see nouv. ac. 2236, p. 353.
80 - V.4 car. 10, 15 June 1589 at Tours (minute of decision replacing the procureur and the avocat du roi).
81 - Frédéric Saulnier, Le Parlement de Bretagne, répertoire alphabétique et biographique de tous les membres de la Cour 1554-1790, 2 vols., Rennes, 1909, vol. 2, pp. 823-5, (Viète). V-4 car. 10 has Viète, Nicolas Hector de Marle, Antoine Rancher, Philippe Gourreau, Charles Turquant, Jacques Viart, Antoine Érignon, Étienne du Breuil, Guillaume Courtin, Charles de Chanteclerc, Michel Hurault de l'Hôpital, Méric de Vic, Pierre de Lion, Paul Hurault de l'Hôpital, Palamède de Foudriac, and Charles Billard were among the first councillors of the parlement to go to Tours or be reintegrated there, and all became masters in 1592-3.
82 - V.4 car. 11, 7 July 1593.
83 - F.f. 18234, fo. 136. AN E-1, fo. 36, 72.

84 - Supra, note 82.


87 - Baston fled the kingdom and died on foreign soil in 1613 (Maugis, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 195). For reintegration of Brandon and Malenfant at the parlement, see X-1-A 1730, fo. 93, 18 May 1594.

88 - F. f. 16467, fo. 585-6.

89 - X-1-A 1730, fo. 4, 30 March 1594, fo. 5, 1 April, fo. 14, 5 April. F.f. 32765, passim.

90 - François de Claris, avocat-général of the grand conseil, had remained in Paris at the beginning of the League, apparently on the orders of both Henri III and Henri de Navarre (U 637, fo. 57-9, letters of reinstatement, 12 December 1589). In 1591 he delivered a ferocious harangue against those members of the court who had remained in Paris at the beginning of the League but who wished to be reintegrated (Remonstrance faicto au grand conseil du Roy sur le restabilissement requis par les officiers qui ont suivi la Ligue, British Museum 8050 a. 6). He was also the author of four Philippiques, contre les bulles et autres pratiques de la faction d'Espagne, the first two dedicated to Henri IV on 19 April 1592 and published at Tours. In 1595 Claris was reimbursed his expenses for printing these works, a sum of 3,000 livres (E-1, fo. 200, 16 October).

The letters of reinstatement for Charles Huault de Montmagny (U 637, fo. 95, 27 January 1591) mention that he had fought for Henri IV at the sieges of Crespy-en-Valois and Provins). Like his colleagues at the grand conseil Barthélémy Hallé and Jean Le Gai (reinstated in 1591 and 1593 according to U 637, fo. 260-2) he became a master in 1594.

91 - BN f.f. 18159, fo. 153, 24 May 1594, is a decree for Nicolas Barthélémy, procureur du roi at the présidial of Senlis, which mentions that "en consequence des services dudit Barthélémy" he was to be awarded the post of Tronçon. When Tronçon was allowed to keep his office, the council promised that he would receive the first vacant mastership, but this was not done.
W—v 637, fo. 407ff (letters of councillorships of state for Le Camus and Huault de Vais, the latter "aussi en recommendation de Mgr le prince de Conti").

E-L, A-C (registers of the conseil d'état et des finances 1593-98) and V-6 1177-8.

X-L-A 1730, fo. 28.

F.f. 23677, fo. 1. The assembly took place at the requêtes de l'hôtel, the masters being present "en grand et bon nombre" (twenty in fact).

Girard and Joly, op. cit., p. 673, 19 June 1596, p. 677, 16 December 1602. The masters took steps to guarantee their cognizance of offices. In V-4, car. 12, 21 August 1596, there is an order to pay one Mestayer, imprimeur et libraire ordinaire du roi, four écus for having published the council decree of June "duquel arrest a délivré certaine quantité pour envoyer aux bailliages". In V-4 car. 31, 14 March 1612, there is an order to pay Boucher, bailiff of the court, thirty livres, which he was to turn over to various printers "qui ont imprimé, relié et fourni cent exemplaires des édits et ordonnances des privilèges des officiers domestiques et commensaux de la maison du Roy concernant la jurisdiction desdites Requestes de l'Hostel..."

BN f.f. 7007, fo. 308 ("advis donne par M. le Chancelier pour l'ordre du conseil privé").

E-L-C, fo. 26, 36, 54, 72, etc.

Infra, Part 2, Chapter 5, Part 3, Chapters 2 and 3.


V-4 car. 11, 27 August 1594 (the first opinion to be given in 1594). See the article by Laurent in Guide aux recherches, p. 36.

Nouv. ac. pp. 69-70. V-4 car. 14 (list of masters, 18 May 1600) and supra, note 19.

The case of Charles Turquant, who remained in Brittany until 1604. He was involved in the debarkation of the Spanish troops. He assisted in implementing the edict of Nantes and establishing municipal officials loyal to Henri (Canal, op. cit., pp. 39-47).

For example, we find Palamède de Foudriac at Montauban and Montpellier carrying out the edict of Nantes (BN f.f. 23196, fo. 190, 27 December 1600, fo. 196, undated). Jean-Jacques de Mesmes was at Aix for the same reason (ibid., fo. 110, 1 July 1600). Raymond de Verteuil and Mesmes were sent to Limoges in 1605 in order to prosecute the supporters of Bouillon (nouv. ac. 2257, pp. 479-80).


For example, Denis Morely, master of requests sent into Poitou in 1603 with a commission "pour la vérification des fautes commises ès finances" (BN f.f. 15899, fo. 842, 16 December). He had been preceded in the same commission by Jacques Merault, also a master (f.f. 15898 fo. 37, 16 September 1603).

Jacques Permezel, La Politique financière de Sully dans la généralité de Lyon, 1935, pp. 16-9, 24. Permezel gives little attention to the Villeroy.


Permezel, op. cit., p. 19.

Maugis, op. cit., vol. 2, passim. Albert Chamberland, Le Conflit de 1597 entre Henri IV et le parlement de
Paris, 1904.

113 - F.f. 18234, fo. 358-9.

114 - Ibid., fo. 361-7.

115 - Ibid., fo. 361. This may have been an allusion to the two royal armies which were shortly to be sent into foreign soil (the armies of Champagne and Dauphiné).

116 - Ibid., fo. 363.

117 - Ibid.
Part Two: Change in the Professional World of the Masters (1575 - 1660)
Introduction

The most important feature of the history of the company in the reigns of Henri IV and Louis XIII was a slow shift away from the milieu of the Paris parlement to that of the royal council. The dissolution of the masters' ties with the parlement has already been broached in Part One, with reference to the decline of both judicial cooperation and the attendance of the masters at the sessions of the grand'chambre. (1)

This section describes changes in the immediate professional milieu of the masters, in the type of training they underwent before acquiring the office, and in the direction of their careers after they resigned it.

As will be demonstrated below in Chapter Two, under Henri III a quasi-monopoly on tenure of the mastership was exercised by the great families of the Paris palais de justice. The office passed to robes whose fathers had sat in the parlement, whether as presidents, masters or counselors. The inclusion of the masters in the activity of the parlement does not need explaining here. But if their physical presence at that court was one factor integrating
them into curial life, there were others. Notwithstanding their service at the privy council, the masters could not hope to end their days as councillors of state, as would be the case under Louis XIII. Instead, they would die in office or, if more fortunate, sell their posts and acquire presidencies in the parlements. Therefore, from the beginning to the end of his career a master could expect to pass most of his professional life within the walls of a parlement, usually that of Paris. From time to time the mastership would be bought by the scions of members of the other Paris sovereign courts, but only rarely in the sixteenth century did it pass to judges whose fathers were not among the great families of the Paris palais.

The steady erosion of royal power under the assault of the Catholic ultras marked the opening of a long upheaval in the professional traditions of the masters. Over a period of thirty years the company was very nearly reconstituted by men drawn from other backgrounds. The robins of the parlement made room for men whose socio-professional promotion was due to their services to the royal cause. Although some outsiders securely established their families in important Parisian offices, their descendants usually disappeared from the company of masters, returning to the provinces or moving into the lower levels of the Parisian magistrature. A modicum of professional purity in the company reappeared early in the reign of

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Louis XIII. Yet the professional locus was a different one.

Noteworthy among the masters admitted into office after the League were those whose fathers had been called to the royal council as conseillers d'État or financial administrators, either by Henri IV or by his predecessor. From the reign of Henri IV to that of Louis XIV this council world steadily grew in the patrimony of the company.

At the same time as the experience of fathers changed, so too did the training, activity and future prospects of the masters, in line with both the needs of the monarchy and the desires of the company.

In the first place the Paris parlement, which had accounted for the experience of half the judges received into a mastership under Henri III, encountered a new rival in the grand conseil. Service exclusively as a barrister at the palais became less frequent, and fewer years were spent at the parlement as a councillor.

Secondly, the advance of the company into the conseil d'État et des finances during the 1610s, thereby giving the masters a deeper acquaintance with the business of the council, resulted in the promotion of many masters to the status of conseiller d'État upon the resignation of their posts. As they slowly acquired the majority of
councillorships of state, they became less interested in acquiring presidencies or in remaining masters. Unfortunately the king's ministers reduced the number of councillorships. Opportunities for promotion decreased, but there was, as one might say, "no going back to the palais": professionally the masters were in the thrall of the royal council.

The drift of the company away from the palais corresponded to the ejection of the palais from the council. The monopoly over councillorships of state held by the masters, their appropriation of the increasingly powerful provincial intendancies, and the expansion in the activity of the royal council at the expense of the sovereign courts were also the signs of a scission in the most prestigious elements of the Paris robe. Though the exclusion of the Paris parlement from a share in the ever more complicated affairs of state was to be one of the causes of the Fronde, the rise of the masters would sow dissension among the rebellious magistrature in 1648-52, and ultimately weaken the judicial Fronde. Some of these points will be discussed in Part Three.

The first chapter of this section describes the importance of family and clientage in the acquisition of the mastership. The second follows the long-term evolution of the immediate professional milieu, as represented by the
office of the father. The third deals with the trends in
the training of the judges. A fourth outlines the rise
in the price of the mastership and enumerates its per-
quises. The last chapter describes the change in career
patterns.
Chapter One: The Importance of Family and Clientage in the Acquisition of the Office

(a) controls on acquisition

It might be thought that a prospective candidate for the mastership would have required nothing more to enter the company than a resigning master with an office for sale. Such was not always the case for the mastership of requests which, because of its proximity to the king and his council, could not be given to any magistrate with minimum qualifications. Yet it is difficult to follow the operation of royal control over the transmission of this office.

Although the nomination of new masters belonged to the monarch in the early sixteenth century (2), it is impossible to discover the special status of the mastership afterwards by comparing the letters of provision for that office with those for other posts. The king seemed personally to be aware of the excellent services of all clerks, sergents and wax-heaters, not to forget more considerable robins. The earliest extant provisions for a master (1598)
vaguely imply royal influence, but also the freedom of the contracting parties. The formula can be found for all offices, mentioning "la pure et simple resignation que ledit de Sève a fait en nos mains au proffict dudit Tenon". (3) In a few provisions for the seventeenth century mention is made of nomination for the office by the resigning party, which strengthens the impression that royal control was rather distant. (4) For only a handful of instances are there letters which seem to indicate the personal intervention of the king.

The provisions for Jacques Dyel (1631) contain a formula which underlines the importance of the office to the monarch, though the suggestion of contact with His Majesty may only have been a stylistic device:

"la satisfaction des services qui nous a rendus en divers occasions par nostre amé et féal conseiller en nostre cour de parlement de Normandie, Jacques Diel, nous a fait désirer qu'il entrast en quelque charge d'honneur où il peut approcher de nous et nous continuer les mesmes services, suivant nostre dessain l'office de maistre des requestes dont estoit pourveu nostre amé et féal conseiller en nos conseils, secrétaire de nos commandements et finances Abel Servien estant venu à vacquer, nous avons désiré qu'il fust remply dudit Diel". (5)

Louis XIII wrote to the heir of one master who had died in service, asking him to sell the office to Isaac Laffemas. (6) Yet it is likely that Louis had been petitioned on behalf of Laffemas by Richelieu, his protector.

Few magistrates directly approached the king. Jacques-
Augusto de Thou, received as master in 1584, commented:

"si quelqu'une (charge) venoit à vacquer par mort ou par confiscation, ou elle etoit supprimée ou l'on commettoit ou l'on choisissoit quelque personne capable de la remplir; ordonnance advantagéuse s'il out été permis paisiblement des charges dans un siècle rempli d'esprits si turbulents. Il ne restoit plus de voie que celle de permuter, et elle n'étoit accordée que par grâce. La Reine-mère l'obtint pour de Thou, en considération du premier président son père". (7)

The account of Thou demonstrates how the transmission of an important office sometimes required the assistance of an intermediary who had royal favour, or whom the king could not afford to displease.

Yet it does not seem that the sovereign would much concern himself with the qualifications of a candidate for even top-level offices. For example, in 1608 Henri IV wrote to Sully that Jean-Jacques de Mesmes, a former master, had asked him if he found

"sa personne agréable pour entrer en l'office de président des comptes à Paris, vacquant par la mort du feu sieur de Vienne, duquel il m'a assuré avoir traité avec la veuve, que j'ay remis cest affaire à vous et à monsieur le chancelier; et pour ceste effect je le vous renvoie, pour me donner vostre advis si pour le bien de mon service il est propre en ceste charge". (8)

Obviously the principal minister of the king and the chancellor (or the keeper of the seals) had some influence over office transactions. However, the initiative for the transmissions of posts came, by and large, not from court, but from the magistrates. Masterships were passed among families serving in the same professional world. There were
two exceptions to this rule. The first involved the transfers of masterships in the period 1589-1610, when many supporters of Henri IV were rewarded with these offices. The second was derived from the influence of powerful agents other than the king—ministers or court grandees who intervened in favour of their candidates in order to strengthen their position at the royal council.

There is no better way of examining the role of family and patronage in the acquisition of the mastership than by taking a large section of the company for a particular period. The forty-nine masters received into office during the first turbulent decade of the reign of Louis XIII have been chosen as a sample. Genealogical data is more satisfactory for them than for their colleagues received in the preceding reign. In addition the historian is aided by lists of councillors of state for the regency. (9) The overwhelming significance of the council world in determining the transmissions of masterships is typical of the period 1611-60. But the regency was also a sort of watershed, looking back to older declining structures of patronage. For this reason the masters received in 1611-20 will be considered first under each of the following headings, and then examples will be drawn from both before and after the period.
(b) family: presence in the council

One cannot fail to be impressed by the number of company members who had near relatives actively serving in the royal council as masters, councillors of state, or specialized financial officials. Thirty-two (65%) of forty-nine masters had fathers, uncles, brothers, cousins, fathers-in-law, or brothers-in-law serving the king in one of these ways. These family relationships can be classified according to the diverse functions of the relatives.

First of all there were new masters related to men of ministerial rank. These prestigious robing would sometimes intervene in impressive ways on behalf of their younger relatives. In 1611 Pierre Jeannin de Castille was received into the company despite the objections of his colleagues, who had hoped to see his mastership suppressed. His father was one of the closest advisers of Marie de Médicis during the regency. (10) Two years later Edouard de Ligny, son of the trésorier des parties casuelles, also became a master. He was Castille's brother-in-law. Another link in the chain is provided by the future chancellor, Pierre Séguyier, brother-in-law to Ligny, but this would mean forgetting that the regency council was served by at least one Séguyier and that the family had already served the Valois and Henri IV with distinction. (11) Family ties to a minister obviously
did not exclude links with less important personnel.

Thomas Morant (received in 1611), Noël Brûlart, and Charles Durant (both admitted into office one year later) were relatives of the chancellor, Brûlart de Sillery. But it seems that Morant owed acquisition of his office to his father, a trésorier de l'épargne, who purchased it directly from the ailing Martin Langlois. The father-in-law of Thomas, Laurent Cauchon, was a master until 1612, when he became a councillor of state. He may even have sold his mastership to his nephew, Durant. (12) Balthazar Gobelin, received in 1612, was related to Balthazar Phélippeaux, secretary of state. His father was a councillor of state during the regency, and one brother-in-law had been a master. (13) François Fouquet, later a friend and client of Richelieu, was the son-in-law of Gilles de Maupeou, intendant and contrôleur des finances during the regency. (14)

A few masters were the descendants of long dead, illustrious judges. Pierre Hurault was the son of Michel Hurault de L'Hôpital, who had served Henri IV as ambassador and chancellor before the collapse of the League. Although the elder Hurault had died in 1592, the grandeur of the name was carried on by Pierre's uncle, a former master, archbishop of Aix since 1595 and councillor of state during the regency. Pierre was received into office the same year as his uncle, Henri du Faur, whose father...
had been a well-known man of letters, a président à mortier, and a councillor of state under Henri III. The elder Faur had died in 1584. (15) The father of Charles Faye had been ambassador to Venice under Henri III, avocat-général of the Paris parlement, and had followed Henri to Tours, where he was made président à mortier. He died in 1590. But Charles Faye was not unprovided with useful living relatives. In 1617, the year before he acquired a mastership, he married the daughter of Jean de Fourcy, surintendant des batiments. (16)

Most of the noteworthy living kinsmen were either councillors of state or masters of requests. Several masters were closely related to Louis Lefèvre de Caumartin, councillor of state since 1605, and particularly famous as the negotiator of the divorce of Marguerite de Valois. In 1614 his son Louis became a master, as did in 1616 his nephew Jean du Tillet and in 1619 another nephew, Charles de Machault, the renowned "coupe-tête" of the 1630s. (17) Christophe de Sève, first president of the Paris cour des aides and a councillor of state, saw his son join the company in 1620 (18), as did Michel de Marillac, a councillor of state, in 1617. (19) Both Sève and Marillac were former masters. The fathers-in-law of Tanneguy de Lannoy and Elie Laisné were councillors of state, while that of Claude Marcel (admitted into office in 1612) was secretary of the royal council. Marcel’s brother, also a Claude, was the
farmer of the paulette in 1611-3. (20) The father-in-law of Pierre Habert became a councillor of state during the regency. Habert's brother-in-law was also a master. (21)

Family networks among masters alone were frequent. The father of Henri Loaisel, a pensioner of Louis XIII and one of the judges of Chalais, was a former master. Henri's cousin, Faucon de Ris, was also in the company. (22) Nicolas Lefèvre, uncle of the memorialist, joined his younger brother André as a master in 1618. (23) Nicolas de Bailleul, François de Riant, Jean Hallé, Nicolas de Pastey, and Jean de Bérulle all met their cousins in the company. (24) In 1613 Jacques Jubert became a master, and was known as "le jeune", since his father was also a senior colleague. (25) The office of Claude Menardeau, who was dean, went to his son Claude in 1620. (26) François Courtin joined his brother René in 1613, and François Bitault, his father-in-law, was received into office a few months later. (27)

Such genealogical linkages, which could be multiplied endlessly across the seventeenth century, would be of little interest if the reception of the masters did not correspond to the simultaneous presence of relatives in the company or the royal council. These coincidences reveal one of the necessary conditions for becoming a master. A would-be company member had to have familial support in the council.
His kinsmen would recommend him to the chancellor or the ministers, and they would also serve as a network for information on offices for sale. In this second way the action of the family is sometimes very easy to follow, particularly when a mastership was transmitted from one member of a clan to another.

The resignation of a mastership directly from father to son occurred rarely, since a judge would be obliged to remain in his post until his son came of age. This type of transmission correspondingly took place more frequently in the sixteenth than in the seventeenth century, for in the earlier period not many masters could expect to resign after a few years in office and be promoted as councillors of state. (28) They would hold on to their offices for many years. There are five known resignations from father to son from 1575 to 1599, but only three from 1600 to 1660, the period for which there is more information. It might be thought that a resignation by one brother in favour of another would have been frequently encountered. Yet this too was rare, happening usually as a result of premature death (the examples of Pierre Fieubet and François Daguesseau in the 1650s). Similarly, the sale of a mastership to brothers-in-law, sons-in-law or nephews was uncommon (three cases in the 1520s, only seven from 1600 to 1660). In general resignations made in favour of family members were few and far between, probably taking place
more often in the sixteenth century than in the seventeenth: of 131 transactions from 1575 to 1660 where the contracting parties are known, only twenty (15%) took place within families. (29) The near monopoly exercised by the council clans over tenure of the mastership, which can be dated from the regency of Marie de Médicis, was not accomplished by familial transmissions of the office, but by holding a commanding position on the route across which information about available offices passed.

(c) in the service of the powerful

By the reign of Louis XIII the prospective master usually had a close relative in the royal council. In an earlier period he would be less likely to have that contact, since fewer robinges served near the king. Though news about offices would still circulate around the palais de justice, the candidate would require contacts at court— with the chancellor, the secretaries of state, members of the royal households, grandees and heirs presumptive. This was particularly true during the reign of Henri III for, as has been seen in the testimony of Thou, the crown intended to suppress many posts, and the intervention of the powerful was necessary if the royal will was to be changed. (30) It is not surprising to find that men without a reputation at the palais and even those with one became masters because of some personal tie to an influential figure. The group

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of 1611-20, to which the present analysis returns, is useful in plotting out varied forms of such service, some of which were in decline.

A few magistrates were connected to the regent. Though Charles Le Roy de La Potherie was related to the Mangot, a number of whom were masters under the regency, he was also brother to a maître de l'hôtel of Marie de Médicis who had served on mission to Metz in 1611. Le Roy became a master two years later. (31) Guillaume Marescot's father, who died in 1602, had been a doctor of Henri IV. Since 1610 Guillaume had been avocat-général of the queen mother, as well as master of requests at her personal council. He became a member of the company in 1611. (32) Jean de La Croix, bishop of Grenoble and councillor of state during the regency, was made councillor at the regent's council in 1611. His son Félix became a master in 1619. (33) Similarly Jean de Bérulle, whose brother Pierre, founder of the Oratoire, had such important influence with the queen mother, became master of requests in 1619 and later her avocat-général. (34) Claude Le Doux, son of a lieutenant-civil at Rouen, attracted attention as a Norman delegate to the Estates-General of 1614, where he was a reliable supporter of the government. His entry to the company dated from 1617. (35) Their close links to Marie de Médicis explains how these robins became masters, but it should also be stressed that their acquisition of the office was probably an
attempt on the part of the queen mother to strengthen her position at the council.

The regency marked the decline in importance of personal service to a regent, king, or heir to the throne as a means of obtaining a mastership. During the sixteenth century a number of masters owed their post to their activity in the service of the heir presumptive. Antoine Rancher, son of a barrister of Tours, became councillor in the exchequer of Alençon, councillor of the duc and later president in his chambre des comptes at Tours, before becoming a master of requests in 1580. (36) Jacques Faye had been master of requests in the household of the duc d’Anjou, and followed Henri to Poland where he was a member of the royal council. He entered the company in 1575 upon the king’s return to take up the French crown. (37) Méric de Vic had also been master of requests to the duc. (38) The case of François d’Amboise is worth mentioning in some detail because the royal presence was never very far away.

The father of d’Amboise had begun as a valet de chambre at court, and finished as médecin du roi. Henri sponsored the education of both François and his brother and, in 1574, asked François to accompany him to Poland, as well as to draw up a description of that country. Thereafter d’Amboise acquired a variety of offices and, because his marriage brought him little in the way of capital, it may
be assumed that there was much royal favour on his behalf. He became a councillor and later president of enquêtes at the Rennes parlement, but was received into neither post. He became avocat du roi at the chambre du trésor and, in 1585, avocat-général at the grand conseil, which was then at its zenith. With the death of his patron his career stagnated, and it was only in 1596 that d'Amboise acquired a mastership. (39)

Guillaume Fouquet de La Varenne became lieutenant-général des postes and later governor of Angers because he had been both valet de chambre and personal friend of Henri IV. One of his daughters married Claude de Bretagne, comte de Vertus, bastard of the house of Brittany, while one son, Guillaume, became master of requests in 1609 and bishop of Angers in 1616. Without a doubt the friendship of Guillaume the younger for the Breton François Thévin, an outsider to the royal council, accounted for Thévin's acquisition of a mastership in 1613. (40)

Yet friendship for royalty or personal attendance upon them was never the means by which more than a minority of judges entered the company, and it practically disappeared during the reign of Louis XIII. Alexandre de Sève may have been secrétaire du cabinet of Louis before becoming a master, but it should not be forgotten that his family had been closely tied to the council. (41) François
d'Argouges was son of the intendant of the household of Anne of Austria, exiled on the suspicions of Richelieu. She forgave the defiance of François as councillor at the grand conseil in 1648 and, in 1655, he purchased a mastership. (42) With the possible exception of René Le Voyer d'Argenson, whose military lore amused Louis XIII, it seems that Sève and d'Argouges were the only two masters who had some intimate connection with a monarch or regent after 1620. (43)

Much more important than personal service, particularly in times of political disorder, was the activity of a magistrate in the cause of the monarch. During and after the League Henri IV was obliged to reward the politiques of Paris, the councillors of the grand conseil and the parlement who had flocked to the royal camp, and those provincial robin's, great and small, who had served him. (44) Some royal servants suffered materially and physically for their devotion to the royal cause. Faucon de Ris, first president of the Rennes parlement (and one of the executors of the will of Catherine de Médicis), one of his sons and Isaac Loaisel, his son-in-law, were imprisoned by the duc de Mercœur, and the elder Ris was released only upon payment of a large ransom. In recognition of his services Faucon was retained in the exercise of the first presidency even after was signed over to Jean de Bourgneuf. Loaisel became a master in 1592, and the sons of Faucon entered the company
By the regency it seems that such factors were becoming less important in determining the recruitment of the company. As will be pointed out in the next chapter, social mobility, which is one of the indicators of a politically motivated reward, was lessening. After the next national cataclysm, the Fronde, only a few men outside the council families acquired masterships in virtue of their services or those of their fathers in the royal cause. Among these were Antoine Lefèvre de La Barre, son of the prévôt des marchands of Paris in exercise in 1652, and Claude Bouchu, son of the pro-Condé first president of the Dijon parlement who had been pensioned in order to change sides. (46) Mention might also be made of Gabriel-Nicolas de La Reynie, the royalist president of the présidial of Bordeaux who was chased out of that city in 1649 along with the provincial intendant and the governor, Epernon. La Reynie was also the intendant of the duc, but he became a master in 1661, only after the death of Epernon. (47)

La Reynie had served both the royal cause and a grandee, but some masters owed more to their ties to court aristocrats than they did to the monarch. While it is true that magistrates of important families were sometimes close to princes and ducs (for example, Honoré Courtin was sent to the château of Vincennes in 1652 because of his
friendship for Conti) (48), it is more interesting here to examine how outsiders used their connections with the great nobility and the royal ministers in order to rise to significance.

Several masters among those received in 1611-20 probably owed their position to their proximity to the grandees, who hoped to strengthen their place at the royal council by getting their clients into posts there. Nicolas de Pastey, though a relation of the Turquant who were masters of requests and councillors of state, was son of a bourgeois of Paris who had been treasurer of the duc and duchesse of Nemours and Genevoise. (49) Silvestre Le Normand was son of a well-known politique who had been nothing more than a commissioner at the châtelet, but he was also the head of the council of the comte de Soissons. He was received as master in 1612. (50) Charles de Machault, though nephew to Lefèvre de Caumartin, acquired a reputation in later years of closeness to the father of the Great Condé. It may be wondered if he was already a friend of the prince under the regency. (51)

With little exaggeration it can be said that in the reign of Henri III newcomers (that is, provincials and Parisians of obscure robe families) were almost always tied to a patron by personal service. One of the best documented cases of rapid professional and social pro-
As Chandon tells us in his autobiography (52), he was son and grandson of avocats du roi at the bailliage of Mâcon. He himself took the oath of barrister at the Paris parlement in 1554 and returned to the south to become a councillor at the présidial of Lyon. Yet that office displeased him, for he saw no future in it. Chandon entered the service of a local gentilhomme, the seigneur de Freluc, "pour luy aider en ses affaires, qui estoient grandes et importantes". In other words Chandon, like many lawyers, became the intendant of a nobleman. He accompanied Freluc to court, married a daughter of a former barrister of the Paris parlement, and made a number of contacts with the great robe of the palais. The decisive stage in his career came in 1566 when he became intendant of Louis de Gonzagues, duc de Nevers, who, having married Henriette de Clèves, "voulut disposer l'estat de ses affaires, qu'il avoit grandes, tant de son chef que de celui de madame son épouse"—another way of saying that Nevers had a great many lawsuits to fight. From 1566 to 1578 Chandon actively served the duc, pleading at the parlement for the rights over various estates (in one case he saw "prez de cent sacqua" of documents) and voyaging to court and to Flanders for other suits. Eventually he became "chef du conseil de la maison de Nevers", and handled the correspondence from the exchequer of the duc at Nevers. It was the duc who acquired the
mastership for Chandon, as the robin recounted in later years:

"je m'estoys acquis quelque réputation, ce que ledit seigneur duc connoissant très bien, comme il estoit pourveu de grande prudence et qui aymoit bien ce qu'il aymoit, en l'an cinq cent soixante-dix-sept, il truaicta à mon desceu et composa en mon nom d'une office de maistre des requestes ordinaires de l'hôtel avec monsieur Barthélémi, seigneur de Grammon, qui entra en un Estat de président au Parlement de Toulouse, et aiant fait expédier mes lettres sans que j'en eusse rien scceu, au commencement de janvair soixante-dix-huit, comme je l'allay voir en son hôtel de Nesles, il me demanda ses estreines. Ne sçachant à quoy cela tendoit, je luy dis que je ne luy en pouvois donno aucunes que la continuation de mon humble service, lors il me declara qu'il m'avoyt préparé leurs miennes, et fit tirer de son cabinet un pacquet qu'il me comman- da d'ouvrir. Je trouvay la procuration, la quittance et les dictes lettres en bonne forme." (53)

This anecdote reveals the decisive role of Chandon's service to the duc in his professional advancement. But he also had other protectors: although his Parisian property was sacked by the Leaguers when he took asylum at Nevers, Chandon had relations with the Guises which embarrassed him and which he did not elucidate in his autobiography. Given this range of contacts, it is no surprise that such a junior master was called upon twice to speak for the masters in their deputations before Henri III.

It must be suspected that during the wars of the League there was a strong coincidence of "royal" and aristocratic clientage systems. Many men who were rewarded for their service in the royal cause were conspic-uous followers of loyal grandees. Pierre Lubert, son of
a procureur in the bailliage of Châlons, was a member of the entourage of the duc d'Aumont. (54) In 1588, while still only a councillor at the grand conseil, he was charged with combatting the Guise influence in Champagne and two years later he was sent into Brittany for the same reason. In 1589 Lubert went on mission with Brûlart de Sillery to the Swiss Leagues and later on the same year he became a master. In 1592 Lubert was intendant in an area of vital importance to the royal cause, Burgundy. Another example of the benefits of patronage during the League is Jean Le Gai, son of a docteur en médecine at the Sorbonne. Le Gai was also the superintendent of the comte de Scissons, a politique grandee, and he was received into the company in 1594 before the occupation of Paris. (55)

Well after the League magistrates from outside the great robe were able to become masters by means of their adherance to a minister or grandee. Yet, as the influence of the court aristocracy waned, the newcomers were either the clients of the king's principal advisers (56) or, as we will see in the following chapter, they were sons of wealthy managers of royal funds. A last example of rapid professional though not social mobility concerns a master who had links with ministers, grandees and financiers, Jean Balthazar. (57)
The "portraits" of the masters drawn up in the early 1660s at the orders of Foucquet characterize Balthazar as an "homme de fortune, desvoué aux partisans et aux puissances; dangereux, est capable de faire toutes choses pour la Cour et pour ses intérêts". An analysis of his career reveals that this judgement was not far wrong.

Balthazar was the son of a councillor at the présidial of Sens. It seems that the members of his family were minor robins, intermarried with the local merchanty. They had had least one contact with the royal court, for the father of Jean was a maître de l'hôtel of Marie de Médicis, though it is not known when the senior Balthazar acquired this post. In 1618 Jean, at the age of thirteen, became secretary to Henri de Gondi, cardinal de Retz and head of the royal council. He accompanied the cardinal to the siege of Montpellier, where Retz died. After the disappearance of this protector Balthazar found another, the maréchal de Schomberg, who had been the grand master of the artillery at the siege. He became intendant and secretary to the maréchal and followed him around France and Italy— to the siege of La Rochelle in 1627-8, to Susa in 1629 and Casal in 1630, and to the battlefield at Castelnauaudry in 1632. In the 1620s he was given a brevet as councillor of state, an unusual privilege for a mere barrister, which was what Balthazar had become in addition to his other activities. Only in 1635 did he acquire a councillorship at the Paris
The same year he married, and an interesting collection of friends were present for the signing of the contract. (58) The father of the fiancée was only an avocat at the privy council, which is not too surprising given that Balthazar was an outsider to the great Parisian robe. The father of Jean was the only member of his family to appear before the notary. Of the higher magistrature there was only one representative among his friends, though admittedly an important judge, Tanneguy Séguier, former master of requests and president at the parlement. Among other witnesses for Balthazar were a procureur at the parlement, a maître de l'hôtel du roi, an auditor of accounts, a trésorier de France from Tours, a contrôleur-général de l'extraordinaire des guerres, a trésorier and payeur of the gendarmerie de France and a secretary of the king. Hence Balthazar counted among his friends members from the milieu of the partisans. The intendants of the duc de Retz and the comte de Beaumont were also present, as were "hault et puissant seigneur Messire Pierre de Gondy, duc de Retz, marquis des Îles d'Or, chevalier des ordres du roi, lieutenant-général pour Sa Majesté ès mers de Levant, général des gallères de France" and "hault et puissant seigneur Messire Roger Duplessis, chevalier des ordres du roy, seigneur de Lyancourt, comte de Beaumont et de La Roche Guyon, marquis de Monfort, premier gentilhomme de la chambre du roi".

In 1642 Balthazar became master of requests and, im-
patient for honours, wrote to Richelieu asking to be given letters for a councillorship of state. (59) Instead he became intendant in Languedoc, where the governor was the son of Schönberg. He served there until 1647 and became, in 1648, intendant in the army of Italy as well as ambassador to the Italian princes. While his colleagues, not to mention the rest of the robe, worried about the renewal of the paulette in early 1648, Balthazar was guaranteed the certain disposition of his office by his heirs by a council decree handed down in the presence of the king. (60) In 1649 he returned to France and followed the court on its uncertain travels. He served on various missions in the Limousin, Saintonge, Angoumois, Aunis and at La Rochelle, and on his return to Paris he may very well have been called to the council; he was certainly not retained after the reform of 1657. His chief claim to fame was his report at the council in 1660, which recommended that Les Provinciales of Pascal be burned. Balthazar resigned his mastership in 1662 but, significantly enough, he was not called to the council. A last honour was the gouvernement of Villeneuve-le-Roi in the Senonais. Notwithstanding his long service to the royal cause Balthazar was strangely neglected in the distribution of rewards at the end of his life. Possibly his unsavoury friends and his social isolation from the great Paris robe accounted for the mediocrity of his later career. His two sons were not able to take up offices in the Paris courts, but
had to be content with councillorships in the parliament of Metz. The case of Balthazar and his family demonstrates a commonplace about success at the council. The insertion of a family there depended upon more than protectors; it was desirable to marry into the Parisian magistrature.

* * * *

In attempting to answer the question of how a judge became a master of requests, this chapter has outlined various structures used by would-be masters—a network of families in the royal council among whom the mastership would be passed, and patronage systems, whether royal, aristocratic or ministerial, which would permit outsiders to enter the company. These structures are by no means to be opposed to one another, for the council robe, though obviously in the service of the king, contained many clients of the powerful. Similarly, clients who were newcomers to the Paris robe sought to marry into it. As has been suggested, the weight of any one structure in determining who would enter the company varied from time to time, and one approximate way of following these variations is to turn to the careers of the masters' fathers. This is the subject of the next chapter.
Notes

1 - Supra, Part 1, Chapter 1.

2 - Bailhache, position de thèse.

3 - V-4 car. 13, minute of 6 March 1598.

4 - V-4 car. 1498, 1 April 1623, letters of provision for Jean Dyel in which are mentioned that the office was "vaccant à présent par la nomination qui nous a été faite par Messire Claude Mangot, néveu dudit résignataire et légataire universel (Anne Mangot)".

5 - Ibid., fo. 182, 3 January 1631.


AN Y 149, fo. 168, 21 November 1609 (marriage contract of Ligny, councillor at the parlement). Present were Philippe de Castille, écuyer de la grande écurie, Jacques Ollier, a master and client of Marie de Médicis, Félix Vialart, uncle, master of requests and councillor of state under the regency. Present for Charlotte Séguiier were Antoine, président à mortier and councillor of state, Pierre, the future chancellor, and Philbert de Thurin, master in 1617.

11 - Richet, Les Séguiier.

12 - Y 149, fo. 71, 23 July 1609 (marriage contract of Morant). Present were Cauchon, Brûlart de Puisieux, secretary of state, Brûlart de Sillery, Jacques Poirier, a master of requests.


14 - Ibid., p. 314. This source makes François Fouquet "premier du conseil de Richelieu". In 1640 Henri Arnauld wrote (BN f.f. 20632, fo. 358, 29 April) "M. Fouquet mourut dimanche M. le Cardinal l'a extrê- 


16 - Ibid., pp. 22, 335.

17 - Ibid., pp. 85, 286, 352. For Machault's friendship for the Condé see AAE France 842, fo. 33, 1 February 1642, in which it is mentioned that the prince and Machault always had the same opinion on an issue.


24 - Y 147, fo. 245, 12 June 1608 (marriage contract of Bailleul). Bailleul married with the "avis et consentement" of his cousins, Charles Malon, a master, and Pierre Habert, a future company member. Among those present for his fiancée was Antoine Le Camus, councillor of state.

When François de Riant married (Y 146, fo. 81, 25 February 1607) there appeared for him Barjot, a master, and Jacques-François Doramy, secretary at the conseil des finances, a cousin. François' brother was an ensign in the gens d'armes of the prince de Conti and a chevalier des ordres du roi, which suggests strong links to the grandees and court. Histoire, vol. 1, p. 281.

Present at the signing of the marriage contract of Bérulle (Y 143, fo. 182, 9 June 1604) were the elder Turquant, whose son became a master in 1614, Pastey,
Jean Hallé (received in 1615) and Barthélemy Hallé (then a master) were grandsons of Laurent, bourgeois de Rouen (Henri de Frondeville, Les Conseillers du parlement de Normandie...1599-1640, Rouen, 1964, pp. 142-5.

26 - Ibid., pp. 130, 359.
27 - Ibid., pp. 274, 302, 366.
28 - Infra, Chapter 5.
29 - The sources for these figures are in the preambles of the letters of provision in V. car. 1497-1500 and in f. f. 18234. The Histoire mentions a few other transmissions.
30 - Supra, note 7 and Part 1, Chapter 2.
32 - BN Colbert Cinq Cents, 91 (accounts of the queen mother's household), fo. 190, 22 April 1613, His son Michel became one of her secretaries in 1618 (ibid., fo. 144, 31 December).
33 - Ibid., fo. 12 2 25 June 1611.
34 - AN K 189 ("trésor general de la Reyne Mère du Roy"), p. 2,331, qittance for Bérulle, 31 December 1626. According to Hanotaux (Origine de l'institution des intendants des provinces..., p. Paris-Le Puy, p. 175) he was intendant in 1619-20 in Anjou, the gouvernement of the queen mother.
35 - J. Micheal Hayden, France and the Estates General of 1614, London, 1974, pp. 124, 137. Following the day of the dukes Le Doulx was sent to the Bastille (AAE France 802, fo. 154). He resigned his office in 1632 and entered the council of Gaston d'Orléans. Histoire, vol. 1, p. 325.
37 - Ibid., p. 22.
38 - Ibid., p. 66.
39 - Saulnier, op. cit., vol. 1, 26-7. BN pièces originales
50. piece 10 is an extract of an order to pay François and Adrien d'Amboise, "scoliers estudiants à l'université de Paris" the sum of ninety écus (14 August 1584), and mentions that they had been receiving this pension since 1581. Histoire, vol. 1, p. 171.


41 - Infra, Chapter 5.

42 - Balteau et al., Dictionnaire de biographie française, vol. 3, columns 600-1. D'Argouges was executor of her will.


44 - Supra, Part 1, Chapter 2. Infra, Chapter 2.

45 - Saulnier, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 344.

46 - Mazarin, Lettres du cardinal de Mazarin pendant son ministère, ed. Avenel, 9 vols., 1872-1906 (hereafter cited as Mazarin, Lettres), vol. 5, p. 47, 15 February 1652, notes the services of the elder La Barre. A few months later (ibid., p. 136, 29 June) Mazarin says that if La Barre can negotiate the return of the king "sans conditions", he "n'aura qu'à demander, et il verrà de quelle façon je serviray et lui et M. de la Barre (his son)". In early 1653 the younger Lefèvre de La Barre became a master.

Balteau, op. cit., vol. 6, columns 1241-2.


48 - BN f.f. 4197, fo. 148, 14 August 1653.

49 - Y 132, fo. 481, 9 July 1592.


51 - Supra, note 17.

52 - Supra, Part 1, Chapter 2, note 41.

53 - Chandon, op. cit., p. 10.

55 - L'Estoile, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 479 mentions his dismissal from this position in 1609.


57 - Duleau, Portraits des Membres du parlement de Paris et des maîtres des requêtes vers le milieu du 17e siècle..., Paris-Angers, 1863, p. 78. Balteau, op. cit., vol. 5, column 6, deals with his career only from around 1642. His lettres honoraires (V-4 car. 1500, fo. 53, 21 April 1662) contain a detailed resume of his career.

58 - AN min. cen. étude 24 (Chappelain), liasse 342, 19 February 1635.

59 - AAE France 842, fo. 30n, 18 April 1642.

60 - BN Clairambault, ms. 569, p. 95, 11 March 1648.
Chapter Two: The Professional Milieu from 1575 to 1660

The careers of the masters' fathers are interesting for several reasons. They suggest the role of service to the royal cause or to a grandee in allowing an outsider to enter the company. A master whose father was a solicitor in a distant province or even a bourgeoisie of Paris required special assistance in order to acquire his office. It would be instructive to know how many "new" men became masters across the period under study, and if the means by which they did so evolved.

Analysis of the careers also raises the problem of the professional traditions bequeathed to the company—those of the sovereign courts (particularly the Paris parlement), the lesser legal world, the milieu of provincial and Parisian financiers, or the royal council. From this it will be seen that a council heritage, and therefore a council robe, was in the process of formation during the first half of the seventeenth century. At the same time other traditions of service, such as those in the Paris parlement, were on the decline.
(a) the sources and their limitations

The primary source used here for the 392 masters and their fathers is the well-known manuscript numbered 32785-6 (fonds français) preserved at the Bibliothèque Nationale. (1) As Professor Mousnier notes, this is more detailed than a similar manuscript in the same series numbered 14018. In fact, some masters received in the reign of Henri IV are absent from the second source. Both manuscripts were probably authored by Guillaume Blanchard, son of the genealogist and hagiographer of Parisian judges. However, this basic source is incomplete and it is necessary to incorporate some masters from the Le Nain tables of receptions of magistrates. Although it is still likely that a few masters from the earlier part of the period are missing, it has been possible to compile an exhaustive list of company members—though not their fathers—for the period 1594-1660 by drawing on supplementary sources such as letters of provision, registers of attendance and minutes of the requêtes de l'hôtel.

The manuscript 32785-6 nearly always gives the name of the masters' fathers, but there are numerous difficulties in confirming both titles and professions. Blanchard was uncritical in describing the offices and families of many provincials. For example, he heedlessly passed on the tale that Paul Hay du Châtelet was descended from the
Carlisle's of Scotland, but he forgot to mention Paul's father, a lieutenant-général criminel et civil at Laval. (2) Blanchard also had the tendency to leave out functions held by the fathers other than their most important offices. Hence the father of Jacques (not François, as Blanchard wrote) was described as an auditor of accounts, whereas one modern genealogical work adds that he had also been a trésorier de l'extraordinaire des guerres. (3) There is also difficulty in knowing if a robin served as councillor of state, especially in the sixteenth century, and the silences of the Blanchard manuscript are not to be trusted here. Although it is true that the numerical strength of the robe at the councils of the Valois was not important, it is often uncertain whether or not a particular individual was called to the council. At the same time the flexibility of royal administrative practice—for example the use of magistrates other than the masters in the provinces—meant that some judges were on close terms with the council. Hence the incomplete nature of the following account, at least for the earlier period, must be stressed, although it is improbable that the lacunae detract from the basic argument.

(b) the milieu (4)

(i) the domination of the Paris parlement: 1575-88

Under Henri III the Paris parlement was the dominant
professional world experienced by the fathers of the masters. This should come as little surprise, given the proximity of the company to the parlement. Of fifty-two there were twenty-nine (56%) who had served there as councillors, masters of requests or presidents. The company itself accounted for less than half of them: eleven. Three fathers who had been barristers must also be taken into consideration, although in adding them one blurs social distinctions between the bar and the magistrates. (5) Fully 62% of the fathers of the masters had served within the walls of the parlement. (6)

The council milieu was frequented by notably fewer fathers. The masters penetrated into the privy council, but there were only a few master-fathers whose role went further—one as ambassador to Constantinople and another as councillor of state. There was, apparently, little overlapping between the council and the highest offices of the parlement, though Pierre Séguier, president at the parlement, had been entrusted with a number of missions by the king. (7)

Altogether 65% of the fathers came from the Paris robe elite (including the members of the other sovereign courts), and when the judges of the provincial sovereign courts are added, the percentage of "establishment" fathers climbs to seventy-one.
Only from 1585 did newcomers to the dominant professional world begin to make a significant appearance. (8) Two of the three sons of Parisian barristers entered the company after 1584. There were also the sons of a général des finances established at Paris, a contrôleur des rentes of the hôtel de ville, a secretary of the dauphin (also a treasurer at Paris), and a secretary of the king. Although Guillaume Courtin, son of a bourgeois of Blois, was not a Guisard, his brother was a well-known Leaguer. This suggests that the hand of the Guises was not far away from Courtin's appointment. In general it seems that the appearance in the company of sons of outsiders was a reflection of the breakdown of royal power and the struggles of grandees to place their clients near them in the privy council.

Hence the end of the reign witnessed an acceleration in socio-professional mobility. Satisfactorily identified individuals accounted for 25% of the fathers, but the percentage of outsiders could have been as high as twenty-nine. (9) Parisians, among whom are included transplanted provincials, outnumbered provincials at a ratio of about four to one. (10)

(11) the breakdown of the old dominating milieu: 1589-1610

One of the characteristics of the period was the decline in the number of magistrates who had experience only as a
councillor or president at the parlement; of eighty-six fathers only ten (12%) were from this group as opposed to seventeen (33%) in the previous reign. Elite fathers with some experience at the parlement made up 26% of the group. (11)

Among the master-fathers were an ambassador to Charles V and one of the great servants of both Catherine de Médicis and Henri de Navarre, Henri de Mesmes, the father of two masters received in this period. (12) At the same time a small number of fathers emerged who, while not having experience as masters of requests, had served at the council; four were financial officials and five others were ambassadors or councillors of state. Of these categories six had previously been members of the sovereign courts. (13) The overall percentage of fathers with experience at the council did not diminish, but remained at twenty-one.

However, the place occupied by the great Paris robe became smaller. Adding the members of the other Parisian sovereign courts, we arrive at 41%, much less than for the reign of Henri III. Even when the robe elite from the provinces is added, this rises to only 47%.

The corresponding development was the arrival en masse of the sons of outsiders. The fathers whose positions are
known comprise 35% of the masters received in this period, and if the unknowns and the "sieurs" or "seigneurs" are added, the percentage swells considerably, to fifty-three. Similarly, the percentage of provincials rises from twenty-six to forty or more if these other categories are added. (14)

From Paris (15) for the first and last time there were the sons of councillors of the trésor and the châtelet, and the son of a lawyer from the second of these courts. There were also seven bourgeois and marchands bourgeois, three avocats from the parlement, a trésorier de l'extra-ordinaire des guerres, a secretary of the king, and a surgeon of the king. Seventeen per cent of the outsiders were Parisians, but as many as 36% were provincials. Among the latter were six aldermen and bourgeois, and six financial officials. (16)

The reasons for this important promotion are not elusive. While the political services of some lesser robin were rewarded, the financial services of other men came under consideration. The wars had brought fortunes to perspicacious local notables, who placed their money at the disposal of the king. Furthermore, wealth facilitated the social mobility of the financiers' children. For example at Paris there was Claude Aubery, a former marchand mercier who had become a consul des marchands and later
a partisan involved in the royal salt-farms. He died in 1587, a secretary of the king. One of his sons, a future master, married a daughter of Pomponne Bellièvre, the chancellor. All four of his sons acquired offices in the Paris sovereign courts, two of them as masters, and all four of his daughters were provided with doweries. (17) Ogier de Gourgues, mentioned by Blanchard as intendant and directeur des finances in Guyenne, typified many of the rich men from the provinces. According to Estienne Cruseau he came from a "fort bas lieu", was "nourri chès ung bourgeois" of Bordeaux, became farmer of the royal domain and later of the infanta of Portugal, rose to the post of receiver-general of the taille and then to an office of treasurer in the bureau des finances of Bordeaux, and finally died "riche de près de deux cons mille oscus", not counting the value of his estates. (18) His eldest son, Marc-Antoine, married a Séguier, became master of requests and finally first president at the Bordeaux parlement. Two of his brothers acquired offices at that court and a third became almoner of the king. A certain amount of opprobrium was attached to rich newcomers or their fathers by lesser robins or envious colleagues, but the great magistrature easily accommodated the outsiders. (19) After the death of Henri IV money counted even more than reputation in aiding the sons of obscure robins to enter the king's council and to sink roots into the council robe.
The disappearance from the company of the parlementaires continued during the early years of the reign of Louis XIII. The percentage of councillors and presidents was ten in 1611-20, thirteen in 1621-40 and only ten in 1641-60, a significant decline from 33% under Henri III.

At the same time the percentage of fathers with experience at the royal council rose. Those who had been a master at some stage in their career formed 25% in 1611-20, 20% in 1621-40 and 31% in 1641-60. Fathers who had closely served the crown not as masters but as financial administrators at the council, councillors of state, ambassadors, or presidents of the courts with access to the council were not a negligible element. They made up 12% of the fathers in 1611-20, 7% in 1621-40 and 12% in 1641-60. This means that never less than 27% of the fathers had some experience at the royal council. In 1641-60 this rose to forty-four, and in the last decade of the period — though slightly exceptional due to the hostility of the crown to the parlement — it was forty-nine, as opposed to 5% for fathers who had been only a councillor or president at the Paris parlement.

Yet the decline in the number of members from the Paris parlement did not bring about the exclusion of those
from the other Parisian sovereign courts: if this group retreated noticeably during the League (from 12% to 5%), it gradually recovered after the regency of Marie de Médicis and surpassed the parlement, averaging about 13% for each decade in the rest of the period except in 1651-60, when it rose to 16%. (20)

The reconstitution of the elite went together with the increasing superior status of the fathers. The great robe as a source of fathers partially recovered its former importance during 1611-20, when it accounted for 61% of the fathers (57% from Paris). Over the next two decades the percentage of the elite remained stagnant (54% for Paris, 63% in general), but in 1641-60 it moved above that for the reign of Henri III (70% for Paris, 78% in general). The last decade witnessed a rapid decrease in the mobility of outsiders, whether provincial or Parisian, into the company: 81% of the masters' fathers came from the elite magistrature of France.

The shift in the careers of fathers towards the council implies that family dynasties of masters and council servants were becoming common. Though it is true that masters could increasingly point not only to fathers but also to uncles and grandfathers who had been masters, councillors of state of financial specialists at the council, only towards the end of the period did the percentage pass ten. When
council traditions going back through the male line are compared for the masters received in the 1620s and those admitted into office in the 1640s, the difference is significant. In the 1620s only the Mesmes brothers could look back upon two generations of masters and council servants. By searching back through uncles and cousins (both on the male side), it is possible to add a few more families—the Séguier and the Laubespine. However, neither of these two clans would place a son in the company throughout the rest of the century. By limiting the criterion to two or more council servants in the preceding generation, the two Mangot brothers could be added. In the 1640s Jean and Charles Amelot, Charles Maignart, Michel de Marillac, Jean Turquant, and Charles de Riant could have boasted of two consecutive generations of master ancestors. By adding forbears who had been either councillors of state or financial specialists, the number rises with Nicolas Jeannin, Olivier Lefèvre d'Ormesson and Thomas Morant. By working back through paternal uncles and cousins one can add Jean Bochart and Jacques Jubert. The last Mangot to be received into the company, Mathurin, should also be mentioned, while Louis de Machault's uncle and father had both been masters. Therefore, only 5% of the masters received in the 1620s strictly fulfilled the two-generation rule, whereas 16% did so in the 1640s. Such figures must be interpreted with caution, since they do not correspond to the total percentage (which was undoubtedly higher) of masters who would
have thought of their families as servants of the king at his council. The addition of relatives from the distaff side would also change the results. But the percentages suggest that a numerous group of council robins with familiar traditions of service near the king was coming into existence under Louis XIII.

(iv) the evolution of mobility from groups of lesser status: 1611–60

The high degree of social mobility provoked by the wars of the League did not suddenly diminish during the regency; grandees were still placing their candidates in the company and the crown was still rewarding outsiders for their services to the late monarch. 31% of the fathers exercised activities other than important judicial office, not to forget a further 6% who were completely non-robe in orientation (for the most part seigneurs or members of the royal household). In the period 1621–40 the percentage of the first group barely diminished (it even rose for the second group), while it fell quite spectacularly to twenty-one (and to 1% for other categories) during the last twenty years. The main problem here is whether or not throughout the period 1611–60 the newcomers were drawn from the same social and professional groups. The answer is that they were not, and in fact the nature of the mobile groups was steadily changing: it was money more than political loyalty
or even insertion into a clientage system which accounted for mobility in the later part of the period.

One of the indicators of declining mobility was the fate of the provincials. They may have formed more than 40% of the fathers during the reign of Henri IV. Under the regency known provincials declined in percentage to eighteen, a return to the 1570s and 1580s. A slight recovery is discernable in 1621-40, to 25%, but in 1641-60 the provincials were once again in retreat, forming only 14%. The questions which come to mind are which provincials, and more generally, which outside groups were being excluded.

The first socio-professional group to disappear were municipal notables other than financial officials or royal judges. In the regency they still made up 12% of the fathers (half from Paris, half from provincial cities). In 1621-40 they comprised only 4%, and afterwards they disappeared altogether. (21) It may be speculated that they withdrew from the scene because the monarchy no longer needed to reward them. There is something symbolic in the case of Antoine Daguesseau, who was the last son of a municipal notable (involved in the reduction of Amiens in 1594) to be received into the company (1621). But the 1620s witnessed an upward swing in the value of the mastership, which may have pushed the office beyond the resources of this group. (22)
Here care must be taken not to interpret too narrowly the activities of municipal elites, since some, like Claude Aubery, were *partisans*. The career of Cybard Laisné, father of the master Elie, demonstrates the multiplicity of roles. (23) Cybard's father had been a councillor of Angoulême, and his brother Elie councillor, mayor (1586, 1590) and alderman (1614). Cybard himself had been mayor in 1594 and continued to appear in the town council. Hence the Laisné had an important function in Navarrist territory during the League. But in 1594 Cybard was described as *receveur pour le roy des aides et des tailles d'Angoulmois*, which does much to explain how his son Elie could establish himself in Paris and purchase a councillorship at the parlement. Although simple *bourgeois* and aldermen rapidly became scarce among the fathers of the masters, it was because they moved into local offices which were both more lucrative and more important than municipal functions.

This can be shown by considering the percentage of judges of the présidiaux, bailliages and sénéchaussées among the fathers. In 1575-88 it was six, in 1589-1610 four, in 1611-20 only two, but in 1621-30, when the municipal notables began to disappear, 12% of the fathers were royal officers in the local courts. To be sure, the percentage diminished rapidly: to five in 1631-40, six in 1641-50 and zero in the last decade of the period. Yet these later tendencies corresponded to the further metamorphosis of
local bourgeois into financial administrators and lenders to the crown.

In the example of François Lasnier it can easily be seen how continuing civil disorder, but particularly the growing burden of royal taxes, could contribute to the advancement of local judges and their sons. Lasnier, lieutenant-général of Angers, had been representative of the sénéchaussée of Anjou at the estates-general of 1614. The province was in the gouvernement of the queen mother and there can be little doubt that Lasnier was in her clientele: it is well-known that Marie successfully influenced the election of delegates. There are a number of entries in the Journal of Louvet, clerk at Angers, which substantiate the tie between Lasnier and Marie de Médicis. (24)

In August 1620 Lasnier, then also "capitaine" of the city, left Angers at the command of the queen mother, thus hoping to alleviate her suspicions that he intended to deliver the city to the king. She called him back a few weeks later. In August 1621 he went with the governor of Angers to Bourgeuil, "pour saluer la royne, mère du roy". The accounts of Marie de Médicis give further proof of his ties to her, but they also introduce another element in the success of the Lasnier: on 24 March 1622 François was to be reimbursed 60,000 livres which he had lent her. (25) It must be wondered how a provincial robin could come across such a large sum, unless he had been involved in royal finances.
Again it is Louvet who provides proof for this. In December 1620, ostensibly for the reduction of certain duties on the town and for permission to raise a municipal tax, Lasnier voyaged to Paris. This trip gave

"subject au peuple de murmurer et de se plaindre de tant de maltoustes et subsides qui se lèvent sur le pauvre peuple, que tout ce qu'il (Lasnier) peut faire est pour les maltoustiers et volleurs qui desrobent et trompent le roy, et ruisnent et appauvrissent son peuple". (26)

In October 1626, accompanied by other alderman, Lasnier again went to the council about another tax. In 1627 Louvet wrote that Lasnier was president of the sénéchaussée of Angers, denoting a professional advance which required no small investment. When Angers was the scene of tax riots in 1630, Lasnier was identified as one of the "maltoustiers" (though he suffered no material losses in the disorders. (27) His contacts with the royal council succeeded in bringing about both the transfer of the subsequent criminal proceedings from overheated Angers to Tours and the choice of the master Lemaître de Bellejamme as judicial commissioner. It was even rumoured that Lasnier intended to marry his daughter to Lemaître's brother! (28)

In the meantime his son François had become councillor at the grand conseil and, in 1632, master of requests— a sign that the Lasnier had succeeded in disassociating themselves with Marie de Médicis. In 1633 the president wrote to Séguier, congratulating him on his reception of the seals and asking him to look after François. (29) Without a
doubt the political contacts and financial services of the elder Lasnier stood for something in the advancement of the son.

As the number of fathers who had served in the bailiages decreased, the percentage of provincial trésoriers, receveurs, contrôleurs and commissaires grew. This tendency reflected the reliance of the monarchy upon the trésoriers in a time of financial crisis in collecting taxes as well as advancing funds at the local level. Like Lasnier, some officials would build up useful contacts with the council and its agents. Some trésoriers even became provincial intendants or intendants des vivres in the armies. Only one master received in the 1620s had a father who began as a provincial financial official, but in the 1630s, with the crisis deepening, there were eight (12%). The percentage remained at about eleven in 1641-60. (30)

Unlike the officers of the bailiages, the geographical and professional mobility of the provincial financial officials was sometimes impressive. Although Parisian financial functionaries had traditionally been able to enter the magistrature of the chambre des comptes, the rise of provincials was a bit of a novelty and it testified to the extent of their wealth. Claude Mallier, trésorier de France at Orléans, became intendant des finances at Paris. Raymond Ardier, receveur-général des finances in Champagne,
became trésorier des parties casuelles. The list could be continued. Yet financial service was not the only element in the rise of these provincials, for where there were intriguing princes there were bound to be ingratiating robins. Gaspard du Gué, trésorier at Lyon and intendant des finances in the army of Italy, was suspected by Richelieu for his ties to Gaston d'Orléans. Although du Gué received a pension as councillor of state, he was daring in his solicitude for Cinq-Mars and Thou in their last moments at Lyon. Both his son Guillaume and his nephew François entered the company, but only after the disappearance of the cardinal and Louis XIII. (31)

Altogether the percentage of financial officials (Parisians, transplanted provincials and provincials) came to seventeen for the period 1621-40 and twenty-two for 1641-60. (32) However, a number of these functionaries came from top-level robe families. If only those fathers who began their careers holding financial office outside the council are considered, the preceding percentages shrink to fourteen for each twenty-year period.

Many of these fathers fell into the ill-defined group of partisans. A few others were identified by pamphlet literature of the 1640s as the "blood-suckers" of the nation—Jacques Forcoal, greffier of the privy council, fermier-général des aides, a former lackey according to the Catalogue
In the 1630s the invasion of the company by the sons of financial functionaries, partisans, and court clerks accounted for most of the high rate of mobility. Even when mobility lessened in the last decade of the period, the only newcomers to be completely eliminated were the judges from the bailliages. The handlers of royal funds remained in place. As the price of the mastership rose and as the search for funds by the government became more desperate, the financial administration and lending to the crown remained the easiest means for an outsider to provide a son with a mastership.

The long path followed by François Verthamon de Ville-mon toward the company reveal the benefits of having partaken in financial activities. Cousin to the famous master-intendant of Guyenne, Verthamon began as receiver of the taille at Limoges, became receiver-général and finally trésorier at the bureau des finances. In the 1640s he came to Paris, where he married (the presence of his cousin at the signing of the contract reminds us of the importance of family contacts), and in 1647 François became a councillor at the parlement. Six years later he acquired a mastership.
At the age of forty-eight he was one of the oldest judges to be received into the company. The "portraits" of the masters reveal two of the keys to his success, for Verhamon had "plus d'esprit que de conscience, et plus de biens que d'honneur".

* * * * *

Three phases marked the evolution in the careers of fathers over the period 1575-1660. The first (1575-88) reflected the predominance of the Paris parlement and the numerical insignificance of the council magistrature in the professional life of the fathers. The second period, corresponding to the reign of Henri IV, was characterized by the appearance of men with provincial and lesser robe origins—the result of distributing favours to men who had served the royal cause in a financial way or otherwise. The share of the Paris parlement in the type of service known by the fathers diminished drastically, and it was not to be reasserted. The period 1611-60 witnessed the constitution of a council elite, as fathers increasingly had some experience at the royal council. Prominent among the new men were the sons of provincial and Parisian financial officials, rewarded because the wealth of their fathers put them into contact with the council. The post-Fronde period was not characterized by a recurrence of rapid mobility, thus suggesting that the aristocratic patronage system, which had carried many outsiders into the company under the Valois and Henri IV, was less operative in the 1650s. The crown was
sufficiently strong to recompense whom it pleased, and in particular this meant allowing the members of the council world to transmit the masterships among themselves and their near relatives. The result was that the council was moving in the direction of self-recruitment.

The significance of this for the political and institutional evolution of the ancien régime must be stressed. By the 1640s two elite magistratures existed side by side at Paris—that of the sovereign courts and that serving near the king. The division of this Parisian elite probably weakened the unity of one of the most potent forces of opposition to the centralizing monarchy, but this is an hypothesis which awaits further investigation.

For the masters this development meant that they were becoming of more use to the monarchy: increasing numbers of masters could point to two or more generations of ancestors who had served in the council. This is not to say that a familial tradition tied to the sovereign courts formed a less zealous or able royal servant, for when a young robin entered a judicial group he became a "bête de compagnie". He would defend the prerogatives of his colleagues and would seek the employments offered to his group. Presentations at the council and the requêtes de l'hôtel and provincial intendancies would weaken the effects of tradition if the judge came from a parlementaire family. If his forbears
were council servants the tradition would be strengthened.

Family was just one influence in the formation of a master of requests. In the following chapter we turn to another.
Notes

1 - BN f.f. 32785-6, "Histoire des Maîtres des Requetes depuis 1575 jusqu'en 1726, pour servir de continuation à l'ouvrage de François Blanchard". See the commentary of Mousnier in the introduction of his edition of Séguier correspondence. Boislisle (vol. 4, p. 413 of the Mémoires de Saint-Simon) believed that the author of the manuscript was Chassabras de Breau. However, the writing is identical to that of the manuscript on the avocats in the library of the Paris bar, authored by Guillaume Blanchard, son of François. It appears that Guillaume continued the work of his father on the masters. See also f.f. 14018, "Biographies des Maîtres des Requetes depuis l'année 1575 jusqu'en 1722, suite des généalogies des Maîtres des Requetes de François Blanchard".

The additional masters, drawn from n.a - 2236, pp. 353 ff., are Jacques Malenfant and Jacques Baston, both received by the League, Jean de Paix, sieur de Grossy (received in 1594), Guillaume de Montholon (1605) and François Tardieu (1611).


3 - Frondeville, Conseillers (1594-1640), p. 178

4 - See appendices, tables 1 (a-b) and 2.

5 - Histoire, vol. 1, p. 190 (Mangot), p. 79 (Hector de Marle), p. 118 (La Vergne). The first two provide examples of rapid mobility due partly to excellent marriages: the father of the master Jacques Mangot acquired the seigneuries of Villeran, Dréville and Orgères for his descendants from his wife, and René Hector, father of a master, married Nicole de Marle, descendant of a chancellor of France. Christophe Hector, the master, was made the universal heir of his uncle Christophe de Marle upon adding the name of that family to his own. Links with the great aristocracy must not be forgotten. In Y 123, fo. 111, 114, Jacques Mangot, father of the master, appears as procureur for François de Bourbon, prince dauphin of the Auvergne, in a transaction over the succession of the wife of Louis de Bourbon (1581).

6 - In arriving at this figure we have included the father of Jean Tronçon, a former councillor and later prévôt des marchands (Histoire, vol. 1, p. 87)
8 - Eight of fifteen outsiders were received after 1584: Hector de Marle, La Vergne, Louis Lefèvre (brother-in-law of La Vergne and son-in-law of Marc Miron, premier médecin du roi and councillor of state), Antoine de Beauvais (Histoire, vol. 1, p. 93), Jean Veau (ibid., p. 117), Jean Huault (ibid., p. 141), and Guillaume Courtin. The description of Courtin's brother comes from a somewhat dubious source, La Chesnaye-Desbois and Badier, Dictionnaire de la noblesse..., 19 vols., Paris, 1863-76, vol. 6, p. 389.

9 - The activity of Claude Doron's father (Histoire, vol. 1, p. 56) is unknown. Raymond de Vic (ibid., p. 66) is given as a seigneur.

10 - Appendices, table 3.

11 - This includes Gabriel Miron, lieutenant-civil (and possibly a councillor of state), former councillor at the parlement, and Claude Faucon, also a councillor, later first president at the Rennes parlement and councillor of state (Histoire, vol. 1, pp. 174, 167).

12 - Antoine Fumée, also a chevalier of the order of Saint-Michel (ibid., p. 134), and Mesmes (ibid., p. 154), councillor of state, chancellor of Navarre (1572), chancellor of the queen mother (1572, if not before), ambassador, soldier, and intendant of the army sent into Tuscany.

13 - Guillaume de Marillac, général des monnaies, intendant and contrôleur-général des finances until his death in 1573, ibid., p. 160; Jacques Vallée, also contrôleur-général (died 1600) about whom the Histoire (p. 221) notes, "si considéré sous le règne de Henri III et au commencement du règne suivant, qu'il eut beaucoup de part dans les conseils, que le Roy tint souvent chez luy"; Olivier Lefèvre d'Ormesson, the father of three masters, who had begun as a clerk of the dauphin (Henri II), rose through the offices of trésorier de l'extraordinaire des guerres, trésorier des parties casuelles, général des finances, intendant des finances (1573), finally becoming a president in the chambre des comptes (d'Ormesson, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. v-xviii). "A career finishing in the chambre des comptes was common among financial functionaries (infra, note 20). Jean Grangier, trésorier des ligues suisses, had also been ambassadôr "pour les ligues suisses" (Histoire, vol. 1, p. 253). For Faucon see note 11.
14 - The reason we may assume that the "unknowns" were provincials is because members of their families are not to be found in the registers of insinuations of contracts at the châtelet of Paris—not a definite proof of provincial origins, but a strong one.

15 - The robins from the lesser courts were Augustin Morely, Antoine de Saint-Yon and Jean Langlois (Histoire, vol. 1, pp. 203, 250, 146). Nicolas Lescalopier began as a payeur des gages at the parlement (Maugis, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 313). Jean d'Amboise, possibly a native of Douai (BN dossiers bleus, 16, fo. 382), began as a valet de chambre (1566), became chirurgien juré at the châtelet and later a surgeon of the king, but the entry in the Histoire (vol. 1, p. 1/7) mistakenly makes him surgeon to both François I and Henri II. Antoine de Chaulnes, trésorier des guerres for the Piedmont, later was trésorier-général des guerres (ibid., p. 3/42). The lawyers were Jacques Mangot and Antoine de Sèvè. Jean Lescalopier, marchand bourgeois of Paris according to the Histoire (vol. 1, p. 1/3), is also given as a city alderman by BN f.f. 11427, fo. 48. Jean Le Gai was a docteur régent en la faculté de médecine à l'université de Paris (Y 119, fo. 293, 13 February 1578). Jean Merault and Baptiste de Bermond were marchands bourgeois of Paris (Histoire, vol. 1, pp. 201, 264). For Claude Aubery see note 17.

16 - Barthélémy Hallé had been an alderman of Rouen (Histoire, vol. 1, p. 159). Guillaume Tenon is given by the same source as "capitaine de Nevers pendant la ligue" (p. 177) and it is possible that he was known to Jean Chandon, who sojourned at Nevers during that period. It may be recalled that Christophe de Sèvè, son-in-law of Chandon, sold his mastership to Estienne Tenon (supra, Chapter 1, note 3). François Colas was mayor of Orléans (1580-4) and alderman (1588) according to Valois, Histoire, vol. 1, pp. 240, 348. Girard Frère was a bourgeois of Lyon, Estienne Bigot an alderman of Bourges, and Mathurin Barentin was a bourgeois of Blois (Histoire, vol. 1, pp. 204, 215, 228).

17 - The Histoire (vol. 1, p. 257) mentions only that Claude was a secretary of the king, but an extremely critical note on the proofs offered by the Aubery for entry into the ordrr of the Knights of Malta (pièces originales, 123, piece 319) points out as "certain que Claude Aubery...estoit comme son père marchand grossier mercier demeurant rue neuve St. Mery, et qu'il fut élu ler consul des marchands le 31 Janvier 1570...il servit ensuite dans les fermes et fut fermier et partisan du sel, puis receu secrétaire du roi...le 24 Septembre 1578 et mourut revêtu de cet office avant le 16 Décembre 1587".

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19 - L'Estoile noted at the death of Marcellet de Guillon, contrôleur-général de l'artillerie, (Journal...Henri IV, vol. 2, p. 376): "Les plus grands biens que possèdent cet homme luy avoient donné (vu le peu qu'il avoit de son commencement) nom et réputation de très habile homme, sage et vertueux, suivant la manière de nos mondains d'aujourd'hui, qui tiennent le seul riche pour sage et vertueux". The truth of this statement was demonstrated at the reception of his son Jacques, later a master, refused entry into a councillorship in 1607 because of his ignorance, but accepted in 1608. L'Estoile noted (ibid., p. 359) that "beaucoup de conseillers (were)...priés d'avoir égard à la vie et âge du père".

20 - The percentages are for fathers who served only in other sovereign courts. Thirty-two of the forty-five fathers in the group served in the Paris chambre des comptes. Although we have not examined in depth the careers of these fathers, it is highly probable that rapid social and professional mobility was common: Jean Le Boulanger had been trésorier at Amiens, Antoine de Petremol a greffier at the exchequer of Alençon, and Nicolas Séguier contrôleur-général de l'artillerie.

21 - François Bitault had been a barrister at the présidial of Angers and an alderman in 1560, 1562, 1582 and 1596 (pièces originales, 357, piece 27), and later mayor. Laurent Davy was mayor of Angers in 1606 (Histoire, vol. 1, p. 344), Laurent Hallé consul des marchands and later alderman of Rouen (1599) according to the same source (p. 313), Bènigne de Pastey a bourgeois of Paris (ibid., p. 311, entry for the Turquant), Nicolas de Paris and alderman in 1616 (ibid., p. 341), and François Daguesseau (ibid., p. 379)

22 - Infra, Chapter 4.

23 - Vigier, Histoire de l'Angoumois suivie du recueil en d'histoire de ce qui se trouve par écrit de la ville et des comtes d'Angoulême...et des noms des maires, échevins et conseillers de la maison commune d'Angoulême, ed. Michon, Paris, 1846, p. CXXIV.


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In the tables fathers have been placed according to the last position held by them.

1631-40:


1641-50:

Cosme Breaux, lieutenant-général and president at Reims and president in the bureau des finances of Champagne (ibid., p. 625), Estienne de Fleux, contrôleur des domaines of Soissons, receveur-général des finances at Rouen (ibid., p. 635), Jacques Rouillé, receveur-général des finances at Rouen and receveur-général des bois of Normandy (ibid., p. 632), Jean Le Boulanger, trésorier at Amiens and master of accounts at Paris (ibid., p. 668), Claude Pellot, trésorier at Lyon, prévôt des marchands there and envoy at Cologne (ibid., p. 648).

31 - Histoire, vol. 1, p. 568. See the commission of intendant in the army of Bourg-en-Bresse in 1629 in Hanotaux, op. cit., p. 292. He was paid "appointments du conseil" (AAE 835, fo. 43, 10 February 1642) and he complained a few weeks later of having been eliminated "du nombre des conseillers d'estat" (Richelieu, Lettres instructions... du cardinal de Richelieu, ed. Avenel, 8 vols., Paris, 1853-77, vol. 8, p. 378, 24 February 1642). For ties to Gaston, ibid., vol. 4, p. 296, 15 May 1632. F. f. 20635 (copies of letters of Henri Arnauld), fo. 115, 1 October 1642, mentions that "M. du Gué feit enterrer M. le Grand. Il ne se trouva personne des siens pour luy rendre de ce dernier debvoir. Et le mesme M. du Gué feit louer un carrosse pour le mener et M. de Thou de Pierre de Sise au palais et au palais au supplice, sans cella ils fussent allés dans le coche de Lion".

32 - For transplanted provincials see note 30. The following are fathers who were neither intendants des finances or holders of other offices giving them entry at the council.

1621-30:


1631-40:

Jean Fabry, trésorier de l'extraordinaire des guerres (ibid., p. 480), Guy Blondeau, trésorier de l'écurie (ibid., p. 496), Pierre Chomel, trésorier des ligues suisses (ibid., p. 514).

1641-50:

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Charles Le Boulanger, trésorier de l'extraordinaire des guerres (ibid., p. 6/7).

1651-60:

Nicolas du Bois, receveur des finances at Paris (ibid., p. 647), Timoleon Hotman, trésorier at Paris (ibid., p. 666).

33 - Catalogue des partisans ensembles leurs généalogies...

1649, for Forcoa y Tanament and Gallard. Other wealthy and disliked fathers for masters received in 1641-60 were Daniel Voisin, greffier at the parlement (see the opinion of L'Estoile about this "petit larron de greffier" in op. cit., vol. 2, p. 3), two of whose sons became masters, Isnard Jassaut, contrôleur of the chancery of the parlement, receveur des consignations at the chateaulet and first clerk of the secretary of state, Potier de Gesvres (Histoire, vol. 1, p. 538), and Bonaventure Quentin, mentioned in the Histoire (p. 679) only as a secretary of the king, but also adjudicataire-général des gabelles (f. f. 11427, fo. 91).

34 - The dossiers bleus, 664, fo. 1-14, make apparent the relationship between the two Verthamonss, their grandfather was Jean "dit le riche". For his marriage contract see min. cen. étude 51, liasse 205, 10 February 1642. Among his cousins were the Voisin brothers, future company members. Duleau, op. cit., p. 79. Verthamon lost his mastership for having insulted the archbishop of Paris, Hardouin de Pèrefixe (Histoire, vol. 1, pp. 641-2).
Chapter Three: The Training of the Masters

The curriculum vitae of the masters is well-known: a few years spent as a barrister followed by a longer period passed as a councillor in a sovereign court, the acquisition of the mastership, intrigue for remunerative employment and the search for the honorable post which would justify the sale of the mastership. Throughout the last two centuries of the ancien régime this pattern would be repeated hundreds of times. Yet it was subject to distortions brought about by changing political conditions and modifications in royal needs. At times the masters served more in one court than another. Gradually they spent fewer years as councillors than previously. The period under study was a time of slow change, with the result that by the 1650s the experience of the masters in the sovereign courts and particularly the Paris parlement was less than it had been sixty or seventy years before.

As interesting as this data is in its own right, its main use is in posing a question that few historians have bothered to ask, that is whether or not the candidates for the mastership were well prepared for the office by their
previous training. Only more research in the archives of the sovereign courts would permit a complete answer to this question, but some hypotheses may be offered here. The present chapter discusses this problem and furthers the discussion about service as barristers and councillors, the length of that service and the age of the master upon the purchase of his office.

(a) the training of the masters at the bar

The literature devoted to the masters and in general to the judges of the ancien régime rarely examines a significant aspect of their training—service at the bar. (1) This problem is of interest because the amount of time served as a barrister before becoming a councillor must have been an important factor in the formation of a professional outlook. Lengthy experience might leave the imprint of "la petite chicane" upon the temperament of a judge. Long years at the bar might also be the mark of the outsider, a man who sought the favour of the grandees. It would be useful to know how many masters were only barristers upon entering the company and how long the others served at the bar before becoming councillors.

Unfortunately these questions can not easily be answered. The researcher is severely hampered by the disappearance of the registres de matricules of the barristers at the Paris
parlement. As a part of the library of the Paris bar, these were destroyed during 1871. Had the registers escaped, there would still have been another problem, for even in the eighteenth century there were no registers prior to 1611. (2) Furthermore, many barristers were left out in later registers. It is possible to amass information on the masters who were barristers in provincial parlements, but so few of them served in the provinces before acquiring councillorships that it is probably too time-consuming to seek out these sources. (3) It would also be interesting to know how many masters pleaded before the privy council, since this would have been invaluable training for the company members. Unfortunately the register of receptions of lawyers at the privy council, covering the period 1584-1640, appears to be deficient: Isaac Laffemas is the only master to appear on this list. (4) Another serious problem is encountered in finding out if a future master actually pleaded at the bar. Although article 105 of the ordinance of Blois stipulated that all judges in sovereign courts were to have "hanté et fréquenté les barreaux et plaidoiries" before becoming magistrates, the work in verifying this is enormous. (5) It is probable that all masters had been titular barristers before entering the company, but the extent of their real activity in this profession is unknown.

The main sources used in this section are the notes on the councillors contained in the work of Maugis for the
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, and the "Liste des avocats au Parlement de Paris, depuis son institution", compiled in the 1720s by Guillaume Blanchard. (6) The second source is far from complete for the period prior to 1686, and its main use is in providing relevant information for a score or so of masters.

From the middle of the sixteenth century until the 1620s one encounters masters who exercised no function (excepting minor judicial employment or the undemanding office of royal secretary) other than that of lawyer. Blanchard mentions only two for the sixteenth century: Claude Prévost and Jean Chandon, both on lists of lawyers drawn up by the parlement in 1562. (7) Since the former judge was received master in 1585, he spent at least twenty-three years at the bar. Chandon, on his own testimony, passed twenty-four years there. It must be suspected that other masters served solely as barristers: Méric de Vic, Claude Perrot (who also became procureur du roi at the hôtel de ville of Paris), Jacques Mangot, Jean Bochart and Jacques Viart. (8) A maximum of 13% of the masters received from 1575 to 1588 spent most, if not all, of their early career as lawyers. The percentage declined during the following reign—only four judges (5%) (9)—and it fell further to 2% (one master, Guillaume Marescot) in 1611-20. The very last barristers to be received into the company were Pierre Morant and Isaac Laffemas, in the 1620s. It is not possible
to calculate the duration of service for most of these judges, but it should be noted that royal legislation accepted by the Paris parlement in 1602 specified that if a master was not a former councillor he had to have pleaded at the bar for twelve years. (10) Laffemas was a lawyer for twenty-one years and Guillaume Marescot for twenty.

It is difficult to account for the decreasing number of lawyers in the company, but a number of factors may be regarded as potential explanations—the decline of aristocratic influence in the designation of magistrates and the rapidly rising price of the mastership in the 1620s, which would have put the office beyond the resources of many barristers. (11) It may be wondered if the disappearance of the barrister-master corresponded to a slow shift in the training of the company as a whole away from the "sac et corde".

Assuming that all masters had been barristers, it is important to know how long they had served at the bar before they became councillors. Unfortunately the sources are inadequate, particularly for the sixteenth century, and it is necessary to include masters admitted into offices before 1575. The Blanchard manuscript mentions Jean de Thou, member of a prestigious parlementaire family, who became a barrister in 1564 and a councillor at the parlement in.
1566. (12) Yet Jean de Bullion, enjoying no important family reputation, was a barrister on the list of 1562 and a councillor in 1567. (13) Therefore he was a lawyer for five or more years. Three more examples from the end of the sixteenth century have terms of service of five or six years, but this handful of masters does not permit us to conclude that the average number of years passed at the bar in the sixteenth century was five or six. (14)

A larger number of examples for the rest of the period does, however, imply the significance of family in allowing a young robin to avoid practising as a barrister for many years. Guillaume de Lamoignon, son of a president of the Paris parlement, was a lawyer for only a few months, Charles Menardeau, son of the company dean, a year, Pomponne de Bellière, son of another president, and Nicolas Fouquet, son of a councillor of state, also for a year, Jean Molé and Guillaume de Nesmond, sons of presidents, two years, and Achille de Harlay, son of an ambassador, and Jean de Longueil, son of a president, for five. Only outsiders, and even here there were exceptions, were barristers for five or more years. Louis Boucherat, son of a master of accounts, was a barrister for only two years, Elie Laisné, son of a municipal alderman and receiver of the taille, for only four, but Daniel Voysin, son of the greffier civil of the Paris parlement, was one for five years, Louis Chauvelin, son of receiver of the woods and domains of the Île de France,
for six, and Pierre Poncet, son of an auditor of accounts, pleaded at the bar for ten years. (15) It may be suggested that the sons of the prestigious Parisian robe were lawyers for less than five years on the average during the first half of the seventeenth century, but that outsiders could expect to spend usually more than four years in that occupation. Inasmuch as the masters came to be recruited increasingly from an elite social and professional group, it is probable that their experience at the bar diminished. This hypothesis may be applied to the masters received in the last twenty years of the period as compared to those admitted into office under Henri IV. It cannot be used in comparing the masters of the later period with those received under Henri III, for the earlier group was frequently recruited from parlementaire families.

(b) the training of the masters as councillors

The young man of means with a few years experience as a lawyer behind him had a choice of courts in which to become a magistrate, but if he wished eventually to acquire a mastership his choice was limited to a few tribunals. The service requirements for reception as a master specified three areas of experience: in one of the sovereign courts as a councillor, as a lieutenant-général in a bailliage or sénéchaussée, or as a practising lawyer. (16) However, the sense of exclusiveness of the Paris parlement meant that
there were a number of exceptions to the rule, not all of which necessarily ameliorated the skills of the future master.

Though the cour des monnaies was a sovereign court, not one master from the period under study served there. The reason had little to do with the activities of the tribunal, which were of the utmost importance to the crown (supervision of the mints, judicial pursuits against counterfeiters, coin-clippers and corrupt mint officials). Yet the sovereign status of the court dated only from 1552, and professional snobbery on the part of the older courts resulted in the judges of the cour des monnaies being recruited among the sons of merchants and municipal officials. (17) Hence this tribunal was avoided by prospective candidates for the mastership because of social rather than professional reasons.

As for officials from the chambres des comptes, it was imperative that they find another reputable function before becoming masters. They were regarded by the Paris parlement as accountants and clerks rather than judges. Furthermore, the Paris chambre des comptes was full of men who had made their money as partisans. It appears that only three masters, all received into office during the 1640s, had experience in the chambres des comptes. In all three instances the candidates required special backing from court in order to

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be accepted by the Paris parlement, and in two the roblins were quick to stress their additional experience in other institutions. (18) The effect of the parlement's prejudices was that very few masters had any experience of royal accounting practices, which explains why the commissioners for the "régalement" of the taille in the early 1600s included members of the chambres des comptes.

Perhaps the most serious bias— from the viewpoint of the crown— was that against the cour des aides. The parlement would receive masters who had served in this court, but only if they had been councillors for a very long time. (19) The cour des aides, handling civil suits involving the tax-status of individuals and criminal proceedings about the taille, gabelles, aides and traites foraines, offered a very useful training for masters admitted into office during the Thirty Years War. Company members, whether as provincial intendants or as judges sitting at the requêtes de l'hôtel, would be obliged to consider similar matters, and the gaps in the expertise of the masters would sometimes be manifested. (20)

(1) principal areas of service (21)

Under Henri III the principal area of service for one of every two masters was the Paris parlement. This should come as no surprise, given the tradition of the masters as consellers-nés" of this court. The grand conseil account-
ted for a much smaller percentage of recruits (15\%) and other sovereign courts accounted for another 14\%. Although the pattern modified considerably during the reign of Henri IV, with a much increased percentage of masters coming from the grand conseil, the Paris parlement returned to its former predominance in 1611-60. In the same period the provincial sovereign courts were the areas of training for as much as 16\% of the masters.

The preponderant role of the Paris parlement in the instruction of the company members must not been seen as much of an advantage to either the crown or the company itself. In the sixteenth century the gaps in the training of the masters may not have been serious, but during the Thirty Years War the company was called upon to handle matters in which the parlement had little expertise. Such cases as the prosecution of tax-rioters and peculating taxation officials and disputes over the fiscal status of the king's subjects did not usually pass through the parlement. Questions which did interest the masters, such as jurisdictional disputes and the regulation of the duties of royal officials in lower courts belonged to the mature councillors of the grand chambre and enquêtes and not to the young magistrates of the enquêtes or requêtes. The future master would spend several years presenting demands for interlocutory decisions or reports of trivial criminal suits heard in appeal. At the tournelle he would witness the judgement
of numerous petty thieves, murderers, adulterers, sorcerers
and notaries — crimes and criminal types which he would
rarely encounter later on (exception made for counterfeitters
of the royal seal). In civil suits he would attend the
judgement of property disputes — matters which he could
expect to hear at the requêtes de l'hôtel. For the most
part the future master received a training in method rather
than a foretaste of what would greet him at the council,
the requêtes de l'hôtel, or in the intendancies. Well might
the crown attempt to allow prospective company members es-
cape the drudgery of the parlement before the young judges
became too proficiently schooled in questions which did
interest "MM. du conseil". A few future masters extricated
themselves from the parlement by laziness or a desire for
travel. In the 1620s François de Verthamon and Antoine; d'Aubray
spent more than a year voyaging in southern France while
they were still councillors. (22)

Despite the predominance of the parlement in the
training of the company, it appears that some royal ministers
had preferences for the grand conseil: Marillac, keeper of
the seals, recommended it "pour ceulx qui aspiroient aux
charges de M's des Requêtes". (23) The grand conseil
relied closely upon the royal council for much of its busi-
ness, and it was similar to the requêtes de l'hôtel in that
the same sorts of cases were sometimes sent to both courts.
Its cognizance of jurisdictional disputes among tribunals
and, from time to time, of demands for évocations meant that it was an excellent preparation for a career at the privy council. Yet it may be wondered if service at the grand conseil was actively promoted by the chancellors and keepers of the seal. Under Henri IV one-third of the masters had served at this court, but it seems that this was due in part to the readiness of the judges of the grand conseil to follow Henri III to Tours. Even afterward the court remained a more important area of training for future masters than under Henri III, for 26% of the company members received in 1611-60 served there. No doubt a slight favouritism was shown to the grand conseil in this period: the ratio of councillors of the Paris parlement to the councillors of the conseil was about three to one, but the ratio of masters trained at the parlement as compared to those instructed at the grand conseil was usually between 1.5 and two to one. (24)

The parlement had the lion's share in the training of the company. Though this may not have entirely suited the crown, it would not have dared to go against the age-old tradition which tied together masters and parlement. However, there was a way which would allow the prospective master to elude, to some extent at least, the grasp of the palais.
Royal legislation regarding the minimum term of service prior to the acquisition of the mastership was nonexistent throughout most of the sixteenth century. This allowed the parlement to oversee the professional qualifications of the candidates. Only after the League did the court become adamant in attempting to impose a minimum term, in this way ensuring that the master was an experienced judge, well-schooled in the jurisprudence and attitudes of the parlement, and worthy of sitting there. Well might the parlement do so, since the crown was attempting to reduce the traditional length of service. In 1596 the parlement voted to make ten years service a necessary qualification for entry into a mastership. (25) A year later, at Rouen, the crown decided that the minimum service term would be six years as a councillor or lieutenant-général. (26) In 1602, after a number of bitter disputes over receptions, the parlement was obliged to retreat, but it added an important condition to the royal legislation: no master would be allowed to sit at the council chamber of the parlement until he had fulfilled the ten-year rule. His service as master would be counted in order to enable him to sit there. Therefore some judges, despite their traditional status as "conseillers-nés", would not be allowed to exercise that honour in its plenitude. The parlement and the company were pushed just a bit more away
from each other. (27) The question which immediately comes to mind is whether or not the legislation of 1602 was effective.

From 1575 to 1588 the masters spent an average of 9.5 years in the courts—very near the minimum required by the parlement in 1596. (28) Company members having passed through the Paris parlement spent less time there (8.6) years than those with experience in other courts. The undoubted delays in receptions caused by the disorders of the League meant that from 1589 to 1602 the average increased to 11.1 years for the group as a whole, and to 9.9 for the members of the parlement. Even after the royal victory over the court in 1602, the averages did nothing more than revert to the level of the previous reign; to 9.4 and 9.1 respectively in 1603-10. They even improved during the first decade of the following reign (to 9.6 and 10.6), no doubt because the monarchy felt itself in no position to push its candidates upon the court.

But in the 1620s the figure fell drastically, and the reason was not royal pressure. At least there is not a single example of the ministers attempting to force the reception of an underqualified magistrate. The cause probably lay in the ineffectiveness of the parlement's threat to exclude inexperienced judges. Although under Henri IV the masters thought that it was a great honour to attend
the sessions of the court, the decline in their attendance there during the first thirty years of the seventeenth century demonstrates a singular lack of interest. Hence in the 1620s the average fell to 7.8 years for the group as a whole (a decline of 1.8 years), and to 7.3 for the parlement masters (a decrease of 3.3 years). Terms diminished still further in the 1630s (to 7.7 and 6.3) as the crown provided one out of every eight candidates with letters dispensing them from ten years service. (29) In the face of this assault the parlement was forced to retreat: in 1637 the court decided that no magistrate would be received into a mastership unless he had served six years. No mention was made about excluding those without the required amount of service from the sessions of the court. (30) Of course the terms began to sink below the six-year limit. (31) However, in 1641-50 the overall average was 7.8, whereas for the parlement masters it was 7.6. In 1651-60 the first was 8.1, while the second did not change. It should be recalled that these averages were, respectively, only 1.4 and one year lower than those for 1575-88. Yet the slight rebound in the averages for the 1640s and 1650s was due to delays in receptions because of the Fronde and the tendency of fewer masters to resign their offices in the 1650s. The overall trend in the service term was downward, and it would continue: in 1688-1704, according to Mousnier, the masters served an average of only 5.3 years in the courts. (32) Across the seventeenth century increasing numbers of masters
with fewer years in the sovereign courts were being liberated from the influence of the palais.

The beneficiaries of royal favour and the indulgence of the parlement (which, in the 1640s and 1650s, allowed many underqualified candidates to sit at the grand'chambre) were of two categories. The first was comprised of robins who either had served as councillors at the parlement or had fathers who were holders of important offices there. (33) In the second were judges who either had solid support at court or were the sons of masters or councillors of state. (34) Hence the factors determining the decline of the service term were the decision of the crown to reduce the minimum period from ten to six years and the favours which prospective masters, who were increasingly members of an elite professional and social group, could count upon from court and the parlement.

(iii) age

Although royal legislation required a minimum age of twenty-five for both councillors and masters during the reign of Henri III (35), the newly received master was usually a man of considerable experience at the palais. The ages of only six masters admitted into office in this period are noted by our various sources and their average is high—36.5 years. Yet this is not a figure to be
trusted, since five of the six came from the milieu of outsiders.

The debate between the parlement and the crown over the term of service also included a minimum age. The parlement demanded forty, at least for the lieutenants of the bailliages, and the king prescribed a minimum of thirty. Here, as in other qualifications of service, the parlement sought to impose its own standards on the judges who were to serve in the council. Furthermore, it probably intended to make certain that the age-experience hierarchy within its walls would not be overthrown. The parlementaire sentiment was expressed by La Roche-Flavin, president at the Toulouse parlement:

"Oh ne sçauoit user de trop de soing et de vigilance à maintenir la dignité de cest office en sa première splendeur, n'y ayant d'apparence, que de jeunes gens du premier bond passent de l'escole au Conseil du Prince; et avant qu'avoir sceu que c'est du Barreau, et du Bureau, se voir chargez d'un office qui leur donne séance en tous les Parlements de France après les Présidens; et de présider en tous les Bailliages et Sénéchaussées". (37)

Only 15% of the ages of the masters are known for the League period and its aftermath, and their average is 32.3—a most unlikely figure given the increase in the number of years served by the masters in the courts. (38) Only after 1620 is the sample large enough to merit attention. In 1621-30 the average was 31.5 years. A sharp decrease came in 1631-40 (to 28.8), which corresponds to the plummeting
length in the service term. In 1641-50 the average rose to 30.1 and in the following decade it increased further to 31.5—tendencies which also followed the duration of service in the courts. (39) It is probable that the general trend in ages was downward, following the terms of service, and the socio-professional background of the candidates.

Generally the masters who had served in the parlement or the grand conseil and who came from the robe of the council or the Paris parlement were younger than thirty and almost never older than thirty-three (Tanneguy Séguier, at forty, was very old to come from this milieu). The averages were dragged upward by the lawyers, members of the other Parisian courts, and provincials. Chandon and Marescot, barristers, were forty-three and fifty respectively. Pierre Poncet, lawyer and auditor of accounts, was forty-two and Louis de Machault, councillor at the cour des aides, was thirty-nine. Gilbert Gaulmain, who began as lieutenant-criminel at Moulins, was forty-five, and François Verthamon de Villemon, whom we have already met, was forty-eight. The professional prejudices of the great robe and the effort of geographical and social mobility left a physical cleavage between the scions of well-established Parisian families and outsiders.

* * * * *

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In regard to the training of the company, the period extending from the League to the Fronde witnessed a gradual breakdown in the contact of the masters with the palais. Fewer masters served exclusively as barristers, and it is possible that their experience at the bar also diminished. The grand conseil accounted for an increased share in the formation of the company. The amount of time spent as a councillor also diminished. Yet there was considerable slowness in this movement. The parlement accounted for the training of half the company after 1610 and the average term of service, though constantly moving in a downward direction, periodically rebounded upward. The palais did not suddenly cease to be a school for masters of requests, leaving them to be formed at an impressionable age in the ways of the royal council. The skills of the candidates for masterships were not administrative, but judicial, and even this judicial training did not fully correspond to the needs of the monarchy, particularly during the Thirty Years War. The imprint of the parlement was unavoidable, partly because of respect for magisterial traditions, but also because the notion of administration was still basically a judicial one.
Notes

1 - Maugis, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 213-5, assumes that all councillors had been barristers, but does not attempt to appreciate the depth of their training. François Bluche, in Les Magistrats du parlement de Paris au XVIIIe siècle, 1/15-1/71, Paris, 1960, p. 101, considers that the period passed at the bar by young councillors was "extrêmement brief". The assertion by Roland Mousnier in Conseil, p. 62, that under Louis XIV the masters served an average of six years as attorneys, is insufficiently documented.

2 - Guillaume Blanchard, Liste des avocats au parlement de Paris, depuis son institution, p. xxiv. This manuscript, contained in the library of the Paris bar, "est tout écrit de la main de M. Blanchard".

3 - A. Décorde, in "Les avocats au parlement de Normandie", Tr. Acad. Rouen, 1870-1, p. 99, notes that there are no registers of matricules of barristers for the seventeenth century.

4 - BN f.f. 18233.

5 - Neron, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 568.

6 - Supra, note 2.

7 - Avocats, pp. 142, 162.

8 - These judges do not seem to have been councillors in the sovereign courts or magistrates in the bailliages. According to the regulations of service, the only other route left them was the bar. Infra, note 10.

9 - Martin Langlois, Charles Bigot and René Le Beau according to the Histoire, vol. 1, passim. Christophe de Sève appears not to have served in the courts as a councillor.

10 - Joly, op. cit., p. 676, letters patent of 5 February 1598.

11 - Infra, Chapter 4. Tallémant des Réaux, op. cit., vol. 2, recounts that the king gave Laffemas part of the price.

12 - Avocats, pp. 146-7.

13 - Ibid., p. 171.


15 - Avocats, pp. 344, 320, 333, 337, 345, 365, 329, 343, 280,
16 - Supra, note 10.


18 - F. f. 20634 (letters of Arnauld), fo. 314, 19 January 1642, recounts that Pierre Poncet, who had been a barrister "plaidant" for ten years and an auditor of accounts for twelve, "a eu besoin pour cella (his reception) de grande faveur. Mr le chancellier le porte entièrement". For the receptions of Jacques Paget, son of a receveur des tailles, president in the chambre des comptes of Montpellier, and Louis Boucherat, son of a master of accounts and himself a former correcteur des comptes, see d'Ormesson, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 127 and 131.

19 - Charles Barentin for thirteen years, Jean de Sève for twelve, Michel des Champs, ten, Louis de Machault, fifteen, Charles de Netz, twelve, Jean Rouillé, for sixteen.

20 - V-4 car. 81, 20 March 1630, decision against the rioters of Laval in which reference is made to a riot case judged by the cour des aides in 1625 and another (the Troyes case) heard before the Paris parlement in 1628.

21 - See appendices, Table 4.

22 - AN KK 1373.

23 - Seguier, Lettres, vol. 1, pp. 334-5, 16 November 1636, letter from Guillaume du Gue to the chancellor, asking him where his son should serve.

24 - Another way of looking at this problem is by asking what percentage of the councillors from each court became masters:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade of Reception</th>
<th>Parlement</th>
<th>Grand Conseil</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1601-10</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>55.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1611-20</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1621-30</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1631-40</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>37.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1641-50</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Sources: BN f.f. 14015, list of councillors and presidents of the grand conseil. François Blanchard, Les Présidents à mortier du parlement de Paris...ensemble un catalogue de tous les conseillers, Paris, 1847, and additions made from n.a. 2233-4.)

26 - Isambert, op. cit., vol. 15, p. 121, edict "sur l'administra- 
mination de la justice, les évocations, etc."

27 - X-1-A 1782, fo. 171, 9 March 1602.

28 - These figures are based upon the following percentage 
of respondents per-period: 1575-88 (75), 1589-1601 (72), 
1602-10 (78), 1611-20 (79), 1621-30 (83), 1631-40 (89), 
1641-50 (96), 1651-60 (98). The calculation is made 
from the year of reception to the year of resignation.

29 - Most of these judges were holders of new offices created 
in 1631 and 1635.

30 - N. a. 2236, p. 391, 1 December 1637.

31 - Charles Le Jay, four years, Antoine de Bordeaux, two 
years, Mathurin Mangot, six months.

32 - Mousnier, Conseil, p. 61. Dainville, op. cit., p. 155, 
gives six years as the average for 1700-52.

33 - Pomponne de Bellièvre, son of a president, Jean and 
Francois Molé, sons of the first president, Charles 
Le Jay, nephew of a first president, Jean de Longeaul 
and Jean-Jacques de Mesmes, sons of presidents, and 
Blaise Méliand, son of the procureur-général.

34 - Guillaume Foucquet, son of a friend of Henri IV, 
Charles Le Roy, brother of a maître d'hôtel of Marie 
de Médicis, Michel de Marescot, son of a master, Alexandre 
de Sèze, secrétaire du cabinet du roi, Hercule de Vaucq- 
lin, nephew of the preceptor of Louis XIII, Jacques 
Mangot, son of a former keeper of the seals, brother of 
two masters, Nicolas Foucquet, son of a master and 
councillor of state, Jean-Louis Faucon, son of a former 
master, Antoine de Bordeaux, son of a council secretary, 
Honore Courtin, son of a master, etc.

35 - Supra, note 5.

36 - Supra, note 10. The edict given at Rouen had originally 
specified thirty-two (supra, note 26).

37 - La Roche-Flavin, op. cit., pp. 30-1.

38 - The percentage of respondents per period is as follows: 
1575-88 (11.5), 1589-1610 (15.1), 1611-20 (18.3), 
1621-30 (27.9), 1631-40 (20.0), 1641-50 (29.0), 1651-60 
(39.5).

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The edict "pour les offices de judicature" of August 1669, which reiterated the edict of December 1665, specified that a master was to have served in a sovereign court for ten years and was to be thirty-seven years old (Neron, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 94). This may be perceived as one of many panaceas thrown to the parlements during the 1660s. Unlike some (the reforms of the privy council and the requêtes de l'hôtel), it was not respected by the crown. The registers of letters patent for the second half of the seventeenth century (V-4 car. 1500-1) are full of letters of dispensation of service, which explains the continued decline in years of service during this period. Mousnier does not give any figure for ages in the post-1660 period, but Antoine, Conseil, p. 232, mentions an average of twenty-nine for the masters received in the eighteenth century and Dainville, op. cit., p. 156, gives twenty-eight for the period 1700-71.
Chapter Four: The Price of the Office, Reception and Installation of the Master, Emoluments and Privileges of the Post

a. (i) the price rise

Like other offices, the mastership became steadily more expensive across the first half of the seventeenth century and, like other posts, its rising value was caused by a combination of factors—especially the paulette, but also inflation. The edict of La Rochelle (1628) singled out the mastership as the principal culprit in the general movement upward of office prices. Since the post brought with it the possibility of entering the council upon resignation, outgoing masters were, according to the edict, able to ask exorbitant prices. (1) Although this line of reasoning was faulty inasmuch as it concerns the overall rise in office prices, it suggests that there were factors specific to the mastership which explain why its value rose. Here particular attention will be given to such factors.

By and large our earliest extant figures for prices of the mastership are not drawn from completely reliable
sources, the notarial archives. The reason for this seems to be that in the sixteenth century the judges of the sovereign courts were obliged to take an oath that they had not bought their offices. Hence they did not wish to leave traces of office transactions. As attitudes to the sale of posts changed, the contracts began to appear in the minutes of notaries.

L'Estoile provides the earliest figures for masterships, 25,000 livres in 1580, from 27,000 to 30,000 in 1584. (2) A council decree gives a lower figure, 21,000 livres, for 1585— the year of the council reform which was so disastrous for the company. (3) Contemporaneous with the second group of figures furnished by L'Estoile there is one for a councillorship at the parlement, also from the Registre-journal, 21,000 livres. This suggests that the ratio of the value of the mastership to that of the councillorship before the council reform was 1.3–1.4 to one.

According to prices provided by L'Estoile for the first decade of the seventeenth century, it appears that the disparities in the value of the two offices narrowed somewhat. In 1607 a mastership was worth from 50,000 to 55,000 livres, while a councillorship could be sold for sums ranging from 42,000 to 45,000 livres— a ratio of about 1.1 to one. (4)
From about 1604 to 1610 the price rise of the mastership was steady, following the increases for other Parisian posts. If the paulette seems to have been the major reason, the return to the normal operation of the judicial system may have counted for something. For example, the requêtes de l'hôtel showed an increase in the number of decisions handed down after 1606. (5) Furthermore, as noted in Part One, the company benefitted in the distribution of provincial commissions.

The value of the mastership seems to have stagnated in the period 1610-17 at around 65,000 to 80,000 livres. (6) The cause of this was uncertainty as to the future of the paulette. (7) Its renewal brought about an upward swing in the value of the mastership. Three consecutive prices for 1619, 1620 and 1621 point to a rise which may well have been as much as 25% within a few years. (8) The increase continued steadily and spectacularly, so that a mastership which sold for 102,000 livres in 1621 was worth from 70% to 80% more in the early 1630s, attaining even 182,000 livres. (9) The ratio of the price of the mastership to that of the councillorship also underwent a change: from 1.3 to one in 1627 it increased to 1.5 to one in 1634. (10) Factors peculiar to the mastership were probably responsible for this disparity. The 1620s witnessed the steady entry of former masters into the council. (11)
Yet a halt to the rise came in 1636.

The reason was the creation of eight new masterships in December 1635, which inaugurated a period of considerable uncertainty. (12) Prices even fell. Throughout 1639 the Parisian magistrature knew that the government intended to establish an unknown number of masterships, and the presentation of the edict, followed by considerable uproar over its acceptance and implementation, kept prices down. During the worst days of the crisis in 1640-1 these fell to the 1627-8 level. (13)

In 1642 the prices rose to the levels of the early 1630s, partly because of the promotion of numerous masters to the council. (14) Until the Fronde the prices were from 170,000 to 185,000 livres. The office became more scarce due to the spate of selling which took place in the first two years of the regency (nearly thirty offices changed hands), and this dearth kept up prices during the crisis of 1648-52.

A certain stagnation lasted into the middle of the 1650s, but after 1656 the prices underwent an extraordinary inflation, from 200,000 to 300,000 livres. (15) The council reform of 1657, which eliminated most councillors of state who had not been masters, probably added impetus to the movement, but it should be noted that posts in the Paris
parlement rose significantly in value in the 1650s. Hence, the return to normality was probably important. In addition, there were never more than three masterships for sale each year after 1656.

It can be seen that several factors were decisive in moving the price of the mastership: whether or not the office was the necessary step in acquiring a place at the royal council, the readiness of the ministers to give the company new members and the number of available posts. Finally, the movement upward fit into the general rise in the value of offices.

(ii) the purchase of the office and specific factors affecting its value

The sale price of a particular post was determined by numerous factors, among which knowledge of the going rate ranked high. Magistrates had no objection to spreading around information about how much they had been paid or how the payment was made. The frequency with which one or two notaries handled the affairs of many considerable families made the retailing of this knowledge all the more likely. Therefore it should come as no surprise that robins such as Olivier d'Ormesson, Henri Arnauld and, to a lesser extent, Pierre L'Estoile knew the prices paid for individual offices.
The price also depended upon the party to whom one sold an office. Thus Achille Courtin sold his master-ship to his son Honoré in 1649 for the very low price of 150,000 livres. (16) The financial solvency of the seller was also important. In 1636 Charles Sévin sold his master-ship for 157,000 livres, taking a loss of 18,000. He had bought the office only two years before, but he owed money to so many people that he had no choice but to sell. He offered to "raise oppositions" at chancery when the letters were expedited, because his creditors would be sure to delay the transfer of the post. (17)

A few inflated values were caused by the sale of augmentations de gages with the office. In 1627 François Fouquet sold his post to Claude Mangot for the enormous sum of 199,700 livres, but this included 58,000 livres representing the capital invested in order to obtain 5,800 livres additional income per year. (18) Although very few offices were sold with their augmentations de gages (which, as a rule, were too valuable), Fouquet made it very clear why he was selling them, since he "ne demeura garand desdites augmentations de gages".

The conditions of sale were usually similar. In ex-
change for a part of the price the seller agreed to present to the purchaser, usually within a few weeks, either sealed letters of provision or the procuration ad resignandum in
virtue of which the purchaser could have the letters drawn up. In addition he would be provided with quittances des finances for the paulette for the year and the marc d'or (the latter being a droit de mutation collected by the king). A part of the price went to pay for the marc d'or and the expenses of the seal, which could come to as much as 4,000 or even 6,000 livres. Upon delivery of the letters of provision or the procuration a second payment followed, and deadlines for further payments in cash, at rates of interest which varied according to the official rate, would be agreed or else an annuity would be constituted. If the second arrangement were adopted, the purchaser would agree to pay never less than a certain sum in order to clear the capital. Annuities on third parties were never used as a means of payment, since this might condemn the seller to see the disappearance of his capital or bring about expensive lawsuits in order to collect the interest. The seller usually agreed to pay off debts at the chancery and a clause of "pure perte", from 12,000 to 20,000 livres, was provided in case a party reneagued.

A single payment was rare, occurring only when the son of a wealthy robin bought an office or when another post of great value had been previously sold by the purchaser. (19) Much of the money came from the sale of a purchaser's former position. Sometimes the office was handed over directly as part of the price. Parents would
sometimes put up a part of the price; on other occasions part would come from the dowry of the wife. The councillors of the grand conseil had to come up with larger supplementary sums than the councillors of the Paris parlement, since the difference in the value was as much as 27,700 livres in the 1630s, rising still further afterwards as the status of the grand conseil declined. (20)

The contract passed between Nicolas Lefèvre, seigneur de Lezeau, and the Barrin was a fairly typical transaction. (21) On 27 September 1639, Lezeau agreed to sell his office, with an official income of 1,300 livres per annum, to Jacques Barrin, avocat-général at the grand conseil, for the price of 161,700 livres. Barrin was aided by his father, his mother and his wife (apparently a minor), who guaranteed to oblige themselves towards Lezeau. Barrin would take his wages from 1 October, the last quartier of the year. For Lezeau's "greater security" the Barrin offered to pay the paulette for the rest of the year. The same day Lezeau received, in money, 37,000 livres. For the rest the Barrin agreed to pay 15,000 livres by 15 October, 36,000 by 19 August 1640 and 44,000 livres within four years, with interest in accordance with the royal ordinances. The rest of the price was to come from Jacques' office of avocat-général, worth 65,000 livres. The second payment of 15,000 was not made until 8 February 1640, a third, 34,229 livres including interest, was made on 26 May 1640 by the new avocat-général

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of the grand conseil. The same day the Barrin also paid 27,427 livres, including interest. Another payment (17,029 livres) followed on 11 December 1641, still another, of 31,371 livres (from the avocat-général), on 4 June 1643 and the last (4,884) from the Barrin on 12 October 1643. The total paid to Lezeau was 166,943 l. 21s. 6d., nearly 6,000 livres more than the sale price. Most of the interest (5,540 livres) was paid by the Barrin.

Although the Barrin required four years to pay for the mastership, the majority of masters took from two to four. However, Jean de Choisy needed seven, Louis Girard nine and Claude Mangot fourteen. These inordinately long periods suggest that even for the families of the great magistrature it was sometimes difficult to find the resources to pay for a mastership. A few of these posts were seized (Lauson, Berthier de Montrave), others were sold to clear debts (Tallément, Sévin) and at least one (Bragelogne) was given back to its former owner when none of the payments were met. (22) In light of these problems encountered by members of the Parisian robe elite, particularly after 1625, it should come as no surprise that lawyers and the sons of municipal officials disappeared from the company.

(b) taking up the office

After acquisition of letters of provision, the master
was required to be received and installed by his colleagues. He usually did this as soon as possible, for fear of losing his share of the épices earned by his quartier. He was traditionally expected to treat (fêter) his companions, but neither the frequency nor the burden of this practice are possible to ascertain. D'Ormesson was horrified to discover that it would cost 1,000 livres for the celebration of his entry into the office of councillor at the third chamber of enquêtes in the parlement; there is no doubt that the masters paid more than that. (23)

The master was admitted into office three different times— at the Paris parlement, before the chancellor and at the grand conseil, usually in that order. At the parlement he would not be examined for his knowledge of the law, since he had already passed such a test when he had become a councillor. The barristers, if they had pleaded for more than twelve years, would not be examined. (24) Only two types of officers would sometimes be questioned on the law: the members of financial and bailliage courts. A master would, however, be examined on his "vie, moeurs, conversation et religion catholique apostolique et romaine et fidélité au service du roy", though for Eustache de Refuge the parlement waived this, "en considération de M. le Chancelier, son beau-père". (25)

The master then took an oath, which went as follows:
"Pour parvenir à cet effect vous n'aves bâillé ny fait bâiller, espérer bâiller ou faire donner par vous ou pour autre ou argent ou chose équipolent (and after the response) vous jures et promettes de bien et fidèlement exercer cet Estat de Maistre des Requestes administrer la Justice aux pauvres comme aux riches garder les ordonnances tenir les délibérations de la Cour closes et secrettes en tout et partout vous y comporte comme en bon notable Maistre des Requestes en cour souveraine doit faire. Puis va faire profession de Foy jures Fidélité au Roy". (26)

The oath clearly bound the master to the parlement in an age when he was increasingly obliged to act against it and its provincial equals. Having thus perjured himself for his past as well as future conduct, the master would take his place (and retire if he did not have the required length of service). This constituted the installation of the magistrate. The next oath took place before the chancellor in his chambers. The masters were the only judges besides the provincial trésoriers and the first presidents of the sovereign courts to take this oath, which unfortunately is unpreserved. The third oath, taken before the grand conseil, is also not extant. In the 1650s the master was sometimes admitted into office a fourth time, at the royal council. (27)

No ceremony of installation took place at the requêtes de l'hôtel, the only court staffed exclusively by the masters, until 1640, when the company decided to introduce it. (28) Of course no real control was exercised by the masters. They simply deliberated and then installed their new colleague. Yet both reception at the council and installation at the requêtes de l'hôtel was symbolic of the increased status of
the requêtes and of the ever stronger ties between the company and the council.

The rituals finished, the new master now entered a sphere of activity which was different, more ambiguous and more promising than any which he had known.

(c) emoluments and privileges

(i) income

There were five sorts of income which the master could collect: first his stipend (of two sorts, ordinary wages and *augmentations de gages*), secondly the bourses paid by the great and privy chanceries, thirdly the épices gained from his activity at the royal council and the courts, fourthly the wages, expenses and gifts which came his way as commissioner in the provinces and, lastly the pensions which he might receive in virtue of either a brevet as councillor of state or simply the generosity of the ministers. The ambitious and quick-witted master had no reason to regard his position as an "honourable servitude", at least by the 1630s.

It is customary for historians to regard the ordinary stipend of office as the interest on an investment. If this is a convenient term, it must be noted that this "interest" bore little similarity to what we regard as such.
It had no relationship to the monetary value of the post. That could rise and the sum paid in "interest" would remain the same. Under Henri IV the master received 300 livres per quartier (plus another 100 for his robe de paques). This sum did not change until the crisis of 1640-2, when it was raised to 400. (29) There were difficulties in the regular payment of the stipend. In the 1640s the government was regularly obliged to cut back quartiers, and all the time much depended upon the solvency of the paymaster of the Paris parlement, who was charged with paying the company. From time to time the requêtes de l'hôtel became a collection agency, engaging quite illegally in prosecutions in final instance against the defaulting paymaster. (30)

The so-called augmentations de gages were interest (usually 10%) on a loan. While it is frequent to regard this income as one of the tribulations of the magistrature, which was often forced by the crown to buy the augmentations, the masters probably collected their increases rather more easily than other judges, since we find certain masters positively speculating in augmentations. Claude Mangot bought 58,000 livres worth of extra wages from Fouquet, and he acquired still 10,000 more from other sources. The contracts of sales for the masterships make no mention of the augmentations during the early 1620s, but after 1625 or so such indications are common. The extra wages might range from as little as 600 livres per
annum enjoyed by Jacques Lefèvre (1640) to 3,495 livres held by Jean Le Camus (1648) or even to 16,000 held by Charles Amelot (1664). Very often they were acquired in virtue of the exercise of other offices and were merely transferred to the mastership; sometimes extra wages were acquired with it.

The bursaries of the chanceries formed the second regular source of income for the masters. The origin of the bursaries was tied to the role of the company in assisting at the great chancery. Letters patent of 1566 (these were probably only reiterations of earlier legislation) allocated a bursary from the chanceries of each présidial, cour des aides and parlement to the masters. Later legislation added the chambers of the edict. The sum was to be paid to the grand audiencier of the chancery, who would see that the money reached the masters. The religious wars and the disorders of the League brought about the complete breakdown in these payments. In 1610 the masters complained that they were owed sums from as far back as 1595. Only in 1612 did the chancery of Bordeaux pay sums owed from 1599. Proceedings against the officials of the chanceries took place at the requêtes de l'hôtel, which ascribed to itself jurisdiction in final instance over these matters. In 1617 and 1618 the court handed down decisions against the chancery of Brittany, which had not paid up since 1614; by 1643 the Bretons were
thirty years behind. Yet the chanceries of Languedoc, Dauphiné and Paris were also tardy. (33)

During the first two decades of the seventeenth century the masters would depute the local provincial commissioner drawn from their company to collect the money, but for some of the chanceries the masters decided to farm out the collection, usually to one of the officials of the local chancery.

The value of the bursaries was not high. That for Paris was worth 630 livres per annum in 1617, 545 in 1619, those for Toulouse were farmed out at 350 livres in 1618, 300 in 1623 and 450 in 1626, while that for Rouen was farmed for 600 livres in 1618 and only 450 in 1625. Burgundy brought in 160 livres in 1621 and only 140 in 1627, Dauphine 200 livres in 1622 and the cour des aides of Montferrand 500 in 1618. The fluctuation of values is suggestive both of the masters' decreasing interest in this form of income, which certainly failed to keep pace with inflation, and of the difficulties in collection. In Languedoc the farmers were hampered by the wars in 1623 and the plague in 1631, and the value of the farm had to be diminished accordingly. The sum total of all the bursaries may have brought each master an additional income of from fifty to one hundred livres per annum, but unfortunately a closer estimate cannot be made.
The third source of income came from the épices which the masters collected at the council, the great chancery, the requêtes de l'hôtel, the prévôté de l'hôtel, the grand conseil, the Paris parlement and, when the masters served in the provinces, in the provincial courts. In general the assessment of épices is a difficult task. Inasmuch as the masters are concerned the problem is much more complicated than for most companies, due to the wide range of activities exercised by the masters and to the lamentable condition of certain archival series.

The amount of épices was not written down on the minutes of council decrees, and the memoranda of expenses for council procedures do not exist for the period prior to 1650. Even after that date they are evidently far from complete. For the early part of the seventeenth century there are enormous lacunae in the criminal archives of the prévôté de l'hôtel, and for this period the relevant archives of the great chancery no longer exist. Yet without a doubt the masters earned a very considerable sum in the royal entourage. From 19 February until the end of May 1643 d'Ormesson picked up 1,250 livres at the council. (34) The same year the masters at the council demanded a rate of four livres "pour chacune vacation" and forty sous for a "demi-consignation" (activity shared with another magistrate), which meant that every time a master worked a few hours on a case he would earn from two to four livres.
This sum did not include whatever the litigants chose to pay above that rate. It did not include sums paid for procedural presentations, the definitive judgement or the allocation of expenses. It was not the sum which the masters expected to receive outside Paris, which they hoped to see raised to ten livres. (35)

The minutes of the requêtes de l'hôtel offer the historian a source for determining the amount of épices earned by the masters in one chamber of the requêtes—the council. Unfortunately there is no way of establishing how many épices were paid at the audiences of the court, in the investigation of criminal cases or at the awarding of expenses (before 1649). In addition it is impossible to know how much was paid to a rapporteur "under the table". However, the totals of one year's épices for the principal chamber of the court are important because they reveal that the masters rapidly realized a return upon the investment made in their offices from one of their lesser areas of activity.

1647 was not a typical year for the requêtes de l'hôtel in terms of the first half of the seventeenth century, but it was typical of the court in the 1640s and 1650s. (36) By the 1640s the volume of judicial business handled by the tribunal dwarfed the amount handled in earlier decades. The cause of this was the crisis of the Thirty Years War,
and the agent which created the increase in the number of cases passing through the auditory of the company was the royal council. The totals of épices for 1647 reveal, therefore, the way in which an elite of the magistrature profited from the crisis.

The épices were written down in the left-hand margin of the minutes by the dean of the quartier or by Denis Amelot, the company dean. Sums ranging from one-half to seven écus (one écu was worth three livres) were paid for procedural decisions. These sums were not always for the judges of the quartier or even for the tribunal present. Usually they were collected by the presenting magistrate. But definitive judgements required the attendance of seven judges (for cases heard without appeal) and fewer than that for suits heard in first instance. The minutes of the definitive decisions indicate the amount of épices for the rapporteur, the tribunal, the court clerk and the bailiffs. These sums cause some difficulty in interpretation, since a quartier contained from fourteen to sixteen masters, of whom only the presiding magistrate and the presenting judge signed. Here the assumption has been made that the distribution of épices over a three-month period would bring an approximately equal sum to each master of the quartier. It can, however, be suspected that the magistrates favoured by the dean and "MM. du conseil" gained at the expense of their colleagues, but by how much is impossible to determine.
Two types of totals have been made— one for each rapporteur based entirely on épices gained by presentations and another for all judges who attended their quartier.

Table 1: A presents six different levels of income for the rapporteurs. Table 1: B is an upward revision for the July quartier, which is lacking the minutes of September. Although it is easy to justify moving the masters from this quartier into the next higher income level (the last month in a quartier was always the busiest), no fixed sums of épices have been assigned them.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 1</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>amount of épices</td>
<td>number of judges in each category and %</td>
<td>number of judges in each category and %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1: 200- (+) écus</td>
<td>5(8)</td>
<td>5(8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2: 150-199</td>
<td>4(6)</td>
<td>6(10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3: 100-149</td>
<td>9(15)</td>
<td>10(16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4: 50-99</td>
<td>12(19)</td>
<td>14(22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5: 25-49</td>
<td>21(34)</td>
<td>18(29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6: 1-24</td>
<td>11(18)</td>
<td>9(15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>62</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: A gives the date of reception (five year intervals) for the magistrates in each of the categories contained in Table 1. Table 2: B reduces the six groups to two: one earning more than 100 écus and one earning less than that.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 2</th>
<th>A (for six groups)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>group number</td>
<td>date of reception (during or before): number of judges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1: (5 judges)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2: (6)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3: (10)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4: (14)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5: (18)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6: (9)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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In the first income group Denis Amelot earned the largest sum—706.5 écus, and this figure is a minimum because Amelot would have been a presenting judge in September. This large amount should come as no surprise, since the dean was charged with the distribution of all instances in which the rapporteur had not already been named by a council decree or chosen by the chamber of audiences. He simply retained the presentation of many lucrative suits for himself. (37) Unfortunately both Pierre Thiersault and Isaac Laffemas were from the July quartier and it is possible that they would have surpassed the earnings of the second highest gatherer of épices, Charles Pinon, who earned 477 écus. Jean de Montchal, admitted into office the same year as Pinon (1637), was last, with 264 écus.

Although these five senior magistrates rarely presented interlocutory sentences before the court, they were rapporteurs for unremunerative but important procedural decisions. They introduced cases, ordered litigants to present evidence, sent the investigation of criminal suits to local courts and ordered the implementation of the requêtes' verdicts. They were the rapporteurs for the most
valuable cases. Pinon, for example, earned seventy-two écus for the final report of the Meaux tax-riot case and 186 for a civil suit concerning the title to a priory.

The next group presented similar matters, with less emphasis upon important procedural decisions. However, besides five senior judges one encounters a younger one. Jean Amelot, son of the dean, brought in a total of 151.5 écus. He was received into office only in 1642. Yet Amelot presented mainly trivial interlocutory matters and gained his largest sums from two presentations (seventy-eight écus), which suggests that he capitalized upon his relationship to the dean.

At the third level mainly insignificant interlocutory decisions were presented by the judges, who managed, nonetheless, to become rapporteurs for expensive lawsuits. Hence François Montescot, a veteran of twenty-five years service, earned 112.5 écus, eighty of them in virtue of one definitive judgement.

Twenty-one of sixty-two masters belonged to this elite group whose income was acquired mainly from a few bulky dossiers. Just under half of them were veterans of twelve or more years service. Nearly the same number were experienced magistrates and only four were junior ones.
The last groups, which earned less than 100 écus, made their money almost entirely from trivial interlocutory decisions. Over two-thirds of these judges had been admitted into office in the 1640s. Yet not all the junior masters lost out in the distributions simply because the elder company members and the dean's favourites received the most valuable cases. Guillaume de Lamoignon, son of president of the Paris parlement and a master since 1644, was simply lazy. He appeared for only six of sixty-six sessions of his quartier. Claude de Maulnorry, abbot of Gailhac, also missed nearly all of the hearings of his quartier. His épices of presentation totalled two écus. Some masters were busier elsewhere, Jean Balthazar and Jean Le Camus, each of whom earned only about seven écus, were provincial intendants. Some elder masters were indifferent to the activity of the tribunal—Claude and Anne Mangot, Etienne Foullé and Gilbert Gaulmain.

The next question involves the amount of épices made from the distribution of sums among the members of the tribunals. This varied with the quartier of service: the July term was usually the most busy; January and April were less active; October was often the slowest. The total amount of épices for the members of the tribunals was 663 for the January quartier, 1,306 for the April one and 1,764 for the autumn term. The total for the July quartier is only 483. Hypothetically it could be tripled or even qua-
drupled, but here it is only doubled. Each judge in the January quartier could add 41.4 écus to the sums earned as rapporteur. A member of the April quartier could add 81.6. The distribution from the July term could bring 64.4, and the autumn term would bring 103.7 écus extra income. The compensation for the July quartier which was made in Table 1:B has also been made in Table 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>amount</th>
<th>number of magistrates and percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1: 1,000 écus</td>
<td>1(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2: 500-599</td>
<td>1(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3: 400-499</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4: 300-399</td>
<td>3(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5: 200-299</td>
<td>12(20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6: 100-199</td>
<td>35(58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7: 1-99</td>
<td>8(13)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Earned income fluctuated considerably, depending upon the quartier in which one served. Only the dean could take advantage of the distribution from all quartiers. Hence his gains just passed the 1,000 écu mark (1,000.3), which explains why the deanship came to be coveted by elder masters.

An already favoured magistrate like Pinon was fortunate to be in the October quartier. His income rose over 20%, to 580.7 écus. Less favoured juniors could also take advantage
of their quartier. Hence Le Camus, member of the autumn term, had an income which was multiplied by fifteen. On the other hand a junior judge who made few presentations and who was a member of the January quartier stood to gain very little. Thomas Morant's twenty-three écus were increased to only 64.4.

The most important result of this demonstration is that only 13% of the magistrates at the requêtes de l'hôtel gained negligible sums from their activity at the council chamber. Most masters saw a return from that chamber alone which was the equivalent of one or more quartiers of the official stipend. Hence they could hardly react with indifference when the Paris parlement attacked the requêtes in 1648.

The masters took part in the activity of the parlement and the grand conseil, for which they were paid a right of attendance (droit d'assistance). For sitting at the grand'chambre on the day he took the oath for the mastership, d'Ormesson received sixty-three livres. (38) As noted above, the masters rarely bothered to attend the parlement by the 1630s. Thereafter only older masters and particularly maîtres honoraires without employment at the royal council took advantage of this form of income. (39)

The fourth source of income came from the masters.
functions in the provinces as commissioners and intendants. In Part One it was pointed out that in the first decade of the seventeenth century the intendants of Lyon often earned more than 600 livres per month in wages. However, it seems that well into the 1630s the standard wage was only 600 livres; only by the end of the reign were the intendants enjoying a monthly stipend of 1,000 livres. (40)

Yet no provincial intendant needed to rest content with this salary, as high as it was. In 1625 Denis Amelot, returning from his mission in Poitou, was paid 3,000 livres "pour le parfait et entier paiement des despences que nous (Amelot) avons faicts en plusieurs voyages que nous avons faicts et fait faire en divers endroicts de la province que pour autres frais extraordinaires que nous avons faicts avec un greffier, sergent et archers". (41)

In 1617 Thomas Morant, trésorier de l'épargne, paid his son Thomas, master and intendant in Normandy, 1,504 livres as reimbursement for expenses incurred in sending messengers in Normandy and to Paris during the year! (42) The total sum paid to Jacques Foulle, who had served only two months as commissioner in the Ile de France and Picardy in 1623, came to 1,612 livres, certainly more than the standard wage paid to the intendants. (43)

Of course the reliability of the payment was a problem and, to make matters worse, the master could be called upon to advance sums in the royal service. In 1637 Lauson,
intendant at Aix, complained that he had not been paid a teston in eight months, while his confrère, Bochart, had received only 1,000 livres. (44) In 1645 Bosquet, a non-master intendant, complained that he had not touched his stipend in twenty-three months, and he feared that in leaving his employ he would be forgotten by the ministers. (45) A series of council decrees given in the presence of the king reveal how the government unsuccessfully attempted to make the estates of Provence pay Bochart's wages. (46) The council ordered payment in March 1646, again in June of the same year and finally in November 1647. Intendants like Jacques Charreton de La Terrière, who advanced money to the royal service, risked incurring total loss. (47) Under such circumstances the masters would have felt justified in indulging in chicanery.

The intendancies and provincial commissions had numerous sources of income which can never be totalled with any certainty. There were the épices and rights of attendance which the masters received in provincial tribunals. The entry of the intendant and his sojourn in provincial centres brought numerous gifts and attention. When in 1619 Jean Aubery, intendant of Anjou, arrived at Angers, he was given "de grands présents de flambeaux, bougies, confitures sèches et liquides par MM. les maire et eschevins". When he left the city a few months later, Louvet, the clerk of the présidial, commented bitterly that the intendant had been
“chery et traité par les maltoustiers de la ville en
bancquets et festins dont le peuple a grandement murmuré”.

The appearance of a commissioner from Paris was a boon for those who required favours from the council such as the discharge from payment of taxes or the successful conclusion of a lease for a tax-farm. As the intendants became increasingly involved in the collection of royal taxes, their opportunities to do favours for particular inhabitants and parishes, for the local tax-farmers, for trésoriers and élus of a somewhat unscrupulous character multiplied. Henri Arnauld thought that the intendance de justice, police et finances was lucrative only because of its financial aspect.

A last source of income, and one which was far from available to all masters, was the pension which came with the brevet of councillor of state. According to an eighteenth century authority, until the letters patent of 1629 (which distributed a stipend of 2,000 livres and allowed séance at the royal council for the eldest masters), eight appointements were rather indiscriminately given to company members. In addition, it was not necessary to be a senior master in order to receive a pension "en considération de ses services". For a brevet of councillor of state Baptiste de Bermond received 2,000 livres in 1626; for his services Denis Amelot was paid the same amount in 1619. As in the case of other stipends, the appointements du conseil were not certain income. The further away one was from the council, the more
difficult was the collection. Verthamon complained to Séguier "je n'ay pas peu avoir les gages du conseil pendant ces deux dernières années"; for the last ten he had been in the provinces. (52) Bosquet moaned similarly that for three years he had not seen his council income. (53)

Although we cannot posit a round sum for the income of the masters, it is possible to comment on the trends in that income. In the sixteenth century it depended on an official stipend, bursaries, rights of attendance, épices and indemnities for infrequent provincial tours. In addition the master might receive a pension for his participation in the council of a grandee or of a member of the royal family. (54) In the seventeenth century the value of the stipend rose only slowly, while the sum brought in by the bursaries diminished. However, a number of the masters' activities underwent expansion: the company was allowed into the council bodies which handled financial litigation, the requêtes de l'hôtel and the privy council heard increasing numbers of cases and the financial aspects of the provincial intendancies were developed. (55) The basis of their income shifted away from ordinary wages, bursaries and rights of attendance at the parlement, as the masters partook in the process of administrative centralization. There can be little doubt that the company members gained a much greater income in 1640 than in 1580: they were profiteers of the crisis brought about by French involvement.
in the Thirty Years War.

(ii) rights and privileges

The letters of provision invariably mentioned "honneurs, auctorités, prérrogatives, prééminences, privilèges, exemptions, franchises, pouvoirs, facultés", usually without indicating precisely their nature.

A few letters, such as those for Jacques Barrin (1610), noted incidental rights which can be counted among incidental sources of income—"livraisons, hostellages, droits de bourses, bougies et esmoluments accoutumés". (56) Apart from this exceptional mention of a consignment of candles and lodgings in the royal entourage, the letters are not very helpful in outlining the prerogatives of the mastership.

The office brought with it many exemptions in virtue of the masters' status as commensaux du roi—from the taille personnelle, from aides and octrois, from lodging soldiers. (57) Furthermore the masters, their wives and their children had the right of committimus of the great seal, which allowed them to transfer their civil litigation from most of the subordinate tribunals of France to either the requêtes du palais or the requêtes de l'hôtel. There the cases would be judged, if the opposing party had the courage to plead, by chambers full of magistrates among whom would be colleagues,
relatives and friends of the masters. In virtue of their attendance at court, they could also use the prévôté de l'hôtel for the prosecution of criminals undertaken at their demand. This tribunal too was staffed by masters. It should not be forgotten that the privy council and the council bodies specializing in financial litigation were also at the service of the company, as the unpublished inventories of council decrees reveal. Such opportunities were not written up in the letters of provision, but their existence must be counted as customary privileges of significance.

Special prerogatives came the way of the company during the period under study. In January 1642, in exchange for accepting an edict establishing six new offices, the masters acquired two privileges of a useful nature. They were allowed to acquire two minots of salt without having to pay the gabelle. Furthermore, they were given

"les privilèges, franchises, et exemptions dont jouyssent nos conseillers et secrétaires, pour les droits seigneuriaux, rachapts, lots et ventes des acquisitions qui se feront par eux seulement, pour en jouyr de l'exemption desdits droits seigneuriaux". (58)

As their deliberations reveal, the masters were worried about the problem of acquiring parts of the royal domain without having to pay the rights of mutation or running the risk of seeing these acquisitions fall into the apanages of the royal family. As the crown needed more money it increasingly alienated parts of the domain, and it is probable
that masters were among the more important categories of purchasers.

In August 1644 the masters were the recipients of another royal gift, though one of dubious utility. Declarations providing for "first-degree" nobility had been showered upon the magistrature of the Paris sovereign courts. The motivation of the regency was probably to ensure better relations with the elite robe. Not having been mentioned specifically in the letters patent granting nobility to the members of the parlement, the masters demanded to be accorded the same privilege. They were duly declared "nobles, ceux d'entre eux qui n'estoient pas issus de noble race, avec leur postérité". (59) The masters would hardly have cared to be ennobled; there was not a man among them who would have admitted to roturier status. Of greater significance was the company reaction: the separate declaration was symbolic of the growing distance between the masters and the parlement.
Notes


2 - L'Estoile, op. cit., pp. 126, 177. These prices compare very unfavourably with a presidency in the grand conseil (60,000 livres) and the commission of avocat-général there (40,000), figures also furnished by L'Estoile.

3 - F.f. 18159, fo. 161, 28 May 1594 (council decree).

4 - These figures are accepted, though with caution, by Mousnier in Vénalité. We believe that they are not far wrong. Cruseau, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 45, mentions that Pichon bought his mastership for 57,000 livres in 1608. Other prices cited by L'Estoile turn out to be close to prices mentioned in notarized documents. For example, he gives 49,000 livres as the price of a councilorship at the parlement in 1609, and we know that Elie Laisné bought his office there for 50,000 livres in 1610 (Y 151, fo. 215, 15 May 1611).

5 - See appendices, Graph 5.

6 - Min. cen. étude 51, inventories for 1647, Faucon (purchase in 1610 for 65,000), étude 54, liasse 38, inventory of wife of Jüye (81,000 in 1616), étude 16, liasse 37, 16 April 1619, Turgot purchase (75,000).

7 - Mousnier, Vénalité, pp. 373 ff.

8 - Etude 51, liasse 60, 9 May 1620, Lannoy purchase (90,720), D'Ormesson, op. cit., vol. 1, p. xxiv, sale by Le Prévost (102,000), étude 51, liasse 140, 14 December 1623, Le Charron purchase (114,000), Ségrier, Lettres, vol. 1, p. 171, La Guette-Chazé purchase (153,000), ibid., Laffemas (154,000), étude 110, liasse 162, 19 September 1626, Lemaître (159,000).

9 - Infra, note 12.

10 - Based upon two prices: 106,700 for a councilorship (étude 24, liasse 319, 27 January, fo. 87) and a mastership in the same étude (liasse 321, 25 September 1627, fo. 930). The 1634 ratio is similarly based on two prices: 115,000 for a councilorship (étude 51, liasse 172, 7 January) and 175,773 for a mastership (same étude, 2 January).

11 - Infra, Chapter 5.
12 - In 1634-5 the office was sold at prices ranging from 175,000 to 182,000. Harlay bought his in January 1635 for 180,000 (étude 73, liasse 342, 21 April 1636). In 1636 two were sold for 157,500 (étude 51, liasse 180, 7 January, 23 February). In 1637 one was sold for 166,500 (ibid., liasse 180, 14 August), in 1638 for 163,000 (ibid., liasse 191, 2 December), in 1639 for 161,000 (ibid., liasse 194, 27 September), in 1640 for 148,500 (ibid., liasse 196, 20 June) and another for 150,800 (étude 110, liasse 59, 16 March).

Arnauld, a less certain source, noted two high prices in 1639 (f.f. 20632, fo. 91, 24 August)—165,000 and 168,000. He notes a low price in early 1640 (f.f. 20633, fo. 316, 7 March), 150,000, and even comments "mais ce seroit beaucoup pour la saison". In f.f. 20634 we learn that the new offices were being sold for 150,000 (fo. 319, 29 December 1641), but another source (AAE France 842, fo. 29-30, 1 February 1642) mentions that the government hoped to receive 162,000 for each new post. The one contract which we have for early 1642 (étude 110, liasse 65, 9 January) has a price between the ones just noted, 157,000.

13 - Infra, Part 3, Chapter 4.

14 - Arnauld mentioned a price rise to 183,000 one year later (f.f. 20635, fo. 210, December 1642). Our one contract for 1643 is for a low price (étude 51, liasse 209, 2 September), 173,000. Prices found in contracts, in the letters of Arnauld and in d'Ormesson cover a wide range, but there is little doubt that the direction was upward: 183,000 in February 1643 (d'Ormesson, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 45), 186,000 (f.f. 20635, fo. 325, 29 March 1643), 172,000 (étude 110, liasse 71, 27 January 1644), 185,000 the same year (pièces originales, 2976, Verthamon, piece 43, parchment copy of contract), two prices of 180,000 and one of 181,000 in 1646 (d'Ormesson, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 230, 235).

15 - Etude 51, liasse 225, 7 November 1648, 187,000, étude 110, liasse 86, 25 September 1650, 190,000, étude 51, liasses 238 (30 March 1653, 176,000), 240 (18 December 1653, 180,000), étude 110, liasse 93, 14 April 1654, 204,000, étude 51, liasse 253, 9 October 1657, 320,000, Moussiner, Conseil, p. 43, 300,000 in 1660, Neveu, "Un parlementaire érudit... Jean Le Nain", Mém. Paris et Ile de France, 1967 (1965-6), vol. 16-7, p. 199, 334,500, also in 1660. In December 1665 the price was fixed at 150,000, but d'Ormesson sold his office in 1667 for the official rate plus a pot de vin of 84,000 livres (d'Ormesson, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 424, 521-3). By the late the 1660s the price was beginning
to decline, which it would continue to do until the
revolution.

16 - Etude 51, liasse 227, 11 December 1649.

17 - Supra, note 12, contract of 7 January 1636.

18 - Supra, note 10, contract of 25 September 1627.

19 - Michel Le Tellier, Guillaume de Lamoignon and Charles
Amelot, all scions of the Parisian robe elite, paid
in one installment.

20 - Contracts for these offices in the 1640s and 1650s
reveal a price range of 80,000 to 90,000 livres.
Gilbert Gaulmain bought the commission of avocat-
général for 75,000 in 1625 (pièces originales, 1294,
piece 3, parchment copy) and Jacques Barrin sold the
same post for 65,000 in 1639 (infra, note 21). In
1644 d'Ormesson noted the sale of a presidency for
only 72,000 (op. cit., vol. 1, p. 172). Supra, note
2, for sixteenth century comparison.

21 - Etude 51, liasse 194, 27 September 1639.

22 - Seizures of masterships: V-4 car. 125, 11 December
1640 (Lauson), pièces originales, 1422, piece 49,
sentence of requêtes du palais, 26 January 1661
(Berthier). Distribution of sums from sale of office:
pièces originales, 2897, piece 30, sentence of requêtes
de l'hôtel, 5 March 1668 (Tallémant). Return of office:
f.f. 20632, fo. 91, 24 August 1639 (Bragelogne).

23 - D'Ormesson, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 2, Dainville, op. cit.,
p. 126.

24 - N.a. 2236, p. 374.

25 - Ibid., p. 369. In 1547 (ibid., p. 411) letters patent
established that a master could be blocked at his re-
ception if he did not have four fifths of the votes,
but in 1553 this was reduced to two-thirds.

26 - British Museum, Harleian ms. 4358, fo. 389.

27 - V-4 car. 1499, fo. 199, etc.

28 - The earliest installation was that of Ricouart (f.f.
18234, fo. 493, 1640). The factum for Claude Mangot
(f.f. 16218, fo. 440) notes the frequency of receptions
of masters by the chancellor alone. In fact, a project
for reforming the council in the 1660s (ibid., fo. 213-
22, article 7) proposed to allow the masters to enter
the council immediately after taking the oath before the chancellor, "sans attendre leur reception au parlement".

29 - Numerous quittances in the pièces originales. For the circumstances of the increase, infra, Part 3, Chapter 4. Expenses were also allotted to the masters following the council outside Paris. In 1617 they were allowed eighteen livres, ten sous per diem as well as a further seven livres, ten sous for their horses (ff. f. 30531, Loménie collection, fo. 166).

30 - Reductions in quartiers in BN ms. Clairambault 569, pp. 28, 29, 46. Proceedings against Jehan de Bordeaux, payeur des gages, in V-4 car. 49, 26 October 1619, etc.

31 - Étude 51, liasse 196, 20 June 1640, liasse 225, 7 November 1648, pièces originales, 52, piece 27.

32 - V-4 car. 57, 5 July 1622 (references to legislation of 1566 and 1582).

33 - V-4 car. 1140 (November 1616), 45 (14 August 1618), both against Brittany, 147 (30 January 1643), also against Brittany, 50 (29 January 1620), against Languedoc, 56 (22 April 1622) and 57 (5 July 1622) for Dauphiné, and 83 (18 December 1630) for Paris. See also n.a. 2236, p. 115.

The values of the leases are in the following cartons: 50 (19 March 1620) for Paris, 46 (1618), 60 (13 July 1623), 84 (26 February 1631) for Toulouse, 52 (26 February 1621), 73 (7 June 1627) for Burgundy, 56 (22 April 1622) for Dauphiné, and 51 (3 December 1620) for Montferrand.

Five and a half years of bourse from the chanceries of the Bordelais were distributed in 1612 (V-4 car. 31, list, n.d.). Each master would have received twenty-five livres—five livres per annum.


35 - F.f. 16218, fo. 379.

36 - V-4 car. 191-200 and register of audiences in V-4 car. 1146.

37 - F.f. 23677, fo. 8 (regulation of 1574), 9 (regulation of 1582).

39 - X-1-A 3592, register of the council chamber (1659-62). Geoffroy Luillier, a veteran of twenty-six years service, and Claude Maulnorry, abbot of Gailhac, with twenty years behind him, frequently attended the sessions of the court.


41 - Pièces originales, 52, piece 89.

42 - Pièces originales, 2042, piece 35.

43 - Pièces originales, 1215, piece 23.

44 - Ff. 17373, fo. 197, 25 July 1637.


46 - Ms. Clairambault 569, pp. 72, 74, 89.

47 - The problems of Charretton have been well outlined by Mousnier in Séguien, Lettres, vol. 1, pp. 173-4.


49 - Ff. 20632, fo. 87, 10 September 1642.


51 - Pièces originales, 52, piece 83, pièces originales, 300, pieces 31 and 32.

52 - Ff. 17370, fo. 148, 15 December 1636.

53 - Supra, note 44.

54 - Jean de Bérulle, avocat-général of Marie de Médicis, received 1,270 livres wages and "pension" in 1626 (KK 189, unpaginated) and Charles de Laubespine, chancellor of Gaston d'Orléans after he resigned his mastership, received a pension of 2,000 livres in 1640 (KK 275, unpaginated).

55 - Infra, Chapter 5, Part 3, chapters 1-3, appendices, graphs 1 and 4.


57 - Declaration of 1545 in Joly, op. cit., p. 666. For the
masters' resort to the requêtes de l'hôtel, infra, Part 3, Chapter 2. See the inventories of the privy council, V-6 registers 1224-6 (January quartier, 1602-1660). A sample from the administrative and financial bodies of the council can be found in ms. Clairambault 569, passim.


The holder of the mastership was presented with a wide range of future prospects. In office he could acquire intendancies in the royal armies or provinces, if he had powerful friends, ambition and ability. These functions, thought by some historians to have been both a kind of proving ground required for future advancement and a foundation of experience for the post of councillor of state, are not considered here. The reader will find a brief sketch of changes in opportunities of obtaining provincial commissions under Louis XIII in Part Three. This chapter describes the evolution in opportunities presented to the master after the resignation of his office—an evolution which reflected the growing involvement of the company in the council world, and its gradual withdrawal from the palais.

(a) length of career as master

In the introduction to his edition of the Séguier papers Roland Mousnier has suggested that the master usually served from six to ten years before selling his office. (1)
While this is true for many masters received into the company, during the 1630s, the period as a whole was characterized by considerable fluctuations in the duration of the service term.

The sources for our calculations are the lettres honoraires of the masters, the date of resignation or, when these two pieces of information are lacking, the date of tenure for another office or commission. The lettres honoraires were usually issued shortly after the resignation of the master. They permitted him to retain the privileges of his post (committimus, tax-exemptions), attend the assemblies of the company and sit at the parlement. However, the maître honoraire could not exercise any judicial duties outside the grand'chambre. Judging from the copies of registers of letters patent addressed to the masters, it does not seem that the company registered these letters before 1615. Until this date it was the parlement which recorded them. Their appearance in the records of the requêtes de l'hôtel stands as another assertion of company independence. (2) The lettres honoraires must be used with some care, for they were sometimes issued years before a master resigned, or years afterwards. (3)

When the lettres honoraires are no longer preserved, the length of service can be calculated from the date of the provisions of a new master. These letters name the
resigning magistrate. The acquisition of another office, except in the later sixteenth century, was usually attended by the resignation of the mastership, since the scruples of robins were against pluralism and magistrates often needed the capital invested in the post. (4)

From the beginning of the seventeenth century until 1640 from fifty to sixty per cent of the masters received into office served from six to fifteen years. (5) During the last two decades of the period such men made up 44% of the company. Those who served the term mentioned by Mousnier, from six to ten years, never made up more than 25% until the 1630s, when the average increased rapidly to 42%. It fell swiftly in the 1640s (to 26%) and utterly collapsed in the 1650s (6%). Very short careers (i.e. less than six years) followed a similar pattern, increasing considerably during the 1630s and dropping to nothing in the 1650s. (6) The reason for the swelling in the number of tenures lasting ten years or less among the masters received in the 1630s was simply the massive promotion of many company members to the council during the regency.

The career of medium length (eleven to twenty years) was well-represented from about 1589 to 1630; always 44% of more of the company held the post for this length of time. Here rapid advance to the council was responsible for drastically lowering the average to 21% for the masters received
in the 1630s.

The overall tendency across the first half of the seventeenth century was a decline in the length of the average term of service. (7) From 1575 to 1600 the master could expect to serve an average of seventeen years in office. The following two decades saw this fall to about fourteen. The trend continued in the period 1621-40 to thirteen. But the reign of Louis XIV witnessed a halt to the process and a significant swing in the other direction—to sixteen for masters received in the 1640s and eighteen for those admitted into their posts in the 1650s. The reason for this that the council was able to restrict the size of its membership. Simultaneously two sorts of masters emerged into prominence—the hard-working master-intendant who often died in his province and the maître "demeuré" described by Saint-Simon who hung about the council waiting for the day when a minister would assure him that the next vacant seat in the council would be his. As the average fell, the long-serving master (twenty-one or more years) had become somewhat scarce. Yet the reform of the council brought about a return of this category: 30% "demeurés" among the masters received in the 1640s and 24% for those received in the next decade. When the masters serving near the average (from sixteen to twenty years) are added, the percentage of masters with considerable experience in their offices climbs even higher—48% and 58% for the two last decades of the period.
Pomponne de Bellièvre believed that the status of the mastership increased partly because the holder of the post could almost be certain that he would acquire the much coveted councillorship of state upon resignation of his office. But the councillorship was far from being the only employment to which a master could aspire. He might become a president in one of the parlements or, more rarely, in a chambre des comptes or cour des aides. Aiming higher, he might serve as an envoy overseas, keeper of the seals, chancellor or minister of state. These futures had their advantages and drawbacks.

In favour of the presidencies was their relative security of tenure, at least for the présidences à mortier which, unlike the first presidencies and the posts in the public prosecution, were offices and not revocable commissions. Presidencies in the provinces were not usually as expensive as a mastership. Yet, to leave Paris, a master would have to be a provincial at heart. He would have to have friends and family in the provinces. The confidence of his new company would have to be earned for, as Cruseau wrote in his journal, the masters were "estrangiers". As master-intendants were increasingly called upon to interfere in the administration of the provinces during the 1630s and 1640s, the more they merited this epithet.
The problems associated with becoming a président à mortier at the Paris parlement were different. Many of these offices were in the patrimony of a few families. Moreover, they were very expensive. (10) The first presidencies of the Paris parlement and cour des aides could not satisfy the ambitions of many senior masters, and they too were highly priced. (11)

The disadvantage of positions closer to the centres of power—embassies, secretaryships of state and chancellories—was that their holders ran the risk of disgrace. Furthermore, a very considerable financial outlay had to be made, in expenses for ambassadors and, for the holders of ministerial posts, in the acquisition of the position. (12) Fewer embassies and ministerial offices than presidencies were available, and secretaryships of state tended to pass among members of the same family. To acquire these posts one had to have the backing of powerful friends and more than magisterial ambitions.

Not many masters aspired to officiate in the temples of the government. To become a councillor of state would provide the loyal and experienced company member with both an honorable retreat and the free disposition of his capital in favour of his family. The councillor sat at the king's council table (where he had stood for years as master). He did not remove his bonnet when he opined, which he was free
to do on almost all occasions (as a master he would have been bare-headed when he opined and he would often have had to await the order of the chancellor before he could speak). (13) He would have the not negligible pleasure of snubbing older colleagues who had remained masters. Above all, the councillor was part of an organ which, in its own eyes if not those of the sovereign courts, was the first company in the kingdom because it was synonymous with the royal will.

The wages of the councillor varied with his status. A councillor in ordinary was paid more than a councillor in semester, who was paid more than a councillor in trimester (the latter rank disappearing in the 1630s). (14) The differences were not arbitrary, for only the councillors in ordinary had the right to sit at the most important sessions of the conseil de direction des finances. (15) The others were restricted to the litigious financial sections of the council and to its exclusively judicial body, the privy council. Few former masters ever reached the conseil d'en haut or the conseil des dépêches, where state policy was discussed and urgent matters deliberated upon, unless they attained ministerial position. Jean-Jacques de Mesmes was one of the few former masters to enter the conseil des dépêches solely as a councillor of state (1627). (16)
To acquire the dignity of councillor the favour of grandees and ministers was needed, but from the reign of Louis XIII the masters became councillors of state so frequently that they came to regard promotion to this post as a right inherent to the mastership.

(1) sources and problems in identifying the councillors

The identification of councillors of state is not a simple task before the reign of Louis XIV. There are neither extant registers of attendance for the council nor registers of brevets. (17) There are copies of brevets and lists which were drawn up at the various reformations of the council, but such lists indicate only who was retained. (18) Some lists, particularly those for the regency of Marie de Médicis, annoyingly add "et altrès". Only from 1643 to 1657, and even here there are doubts, do we seem to have a fairly complete list which mentions the coming and going of councillors. In addition to these documents there are other sources. The manuscript genealogies of the masters note when a company member became a councillor of state. Yet it is difficult to verify the information in the genealogies, and recourse to the cabinet des titres at the Bibliothèque Nationale is not wholly satisfactory. The pièces originales, the dossiers bleus, and the carrés and cahiers of Hozier are as blandly reassuring and ill-documented as the "Histoire des maîtres des requêtes". If certain sources may be suspected because
they are habitually over-optimistic, the silence of others is equally problematic. As noted elsewhere, some lacunae exist for the sixteenth century, particularly in the manuscript genealogy. This often has only the scantiest of career information and lacks even dates of death. For example, the entry for Guillaume Courtin, master in 1585, mentions nothing about his career after his entry into the company, but we know from a passage in the Registre-journal of L'Estoile (August 1605) that when Courtin died, he was "un des nouveaux conseillers d'Etat de Sa Majesté". (19)

One supplementary source is found in the lettres honoraires of the masters, which sometimes mention when a company member had resigned in order to serve "avec plus de commodité en nosdits conseils... où nous l'aurions appelé". (20) After 1629 certain masters automatically became councillors of state without having to resign their offices. Letters patent of 21 November allowed the deans and sub-deans of the quartiers to receive a pension of 2,000 livres, while the deans were permitted to sit at the council as councillors for an extra quartier after the expiry of their usual council quartier. (21) In January 1642 the dean of the company became a councillor of state in ordinary. (22) This meant that a master of phlegmatic temperament did not have to worry about the future. By sitting peacefully amidst the hum-drum litigation of the council and the requêtes de l'hôtel, even without courting the grandees or ministers, he could automatically rise to the dignity of councillor of state. Yet
he could not dispose of his capital and, except for the dean, the privilege was most inadequate from the viewpoint of dignity: the dean of the quartier was only a second-rate councillor of state.

Confusion is sometimes created for the historian by the date of the brevet (or letters) for a councillorship of state. The brevets were usually given to a master before he resigned and sometimes even before he became a master. (23) Daguesseau received his in 1620 while still lieutenant-civil at the châtelet and d'Argenson was so favoured in 1625 while still a councillor at the parlement. Alexandre de Sève was provided with a brevet in 1618 before he acquired any office whatsoever and Jean Fabry, the rich if unable brother-in-law of the chancellor, received his in 1634, two years after Séguiier acquired the seals. The possession of a brevet did not allow its holder to enter the council. It only assured his precedence there when he was finally called to serve near the king.

In examining the evolution of the company's opportunities of acquiring councillorships an attempt will be made to determine the number of masters who acquired this post. Above all it will be important to find out why the masters, as a company, came to be favoured over other groups.
Prospects for masters received in the reigns of Henri III and Henri IV

Throughout the sixteenth century the small number of masters, their relative lack of favour at court, and the predominance of advisers drawn from the aristocracy meant that only a handful of company members became councillors of state. Among the masters received into office under François I it seems that only 10% entered the council after resigning their offices (three of five as keepers of the seal and chancellors). (25) This small rate of promotion probably continued under the last Valois monarchs. (26)

Only a few masters admitted into office during the reign of Henri III became councillors of state before 1588. (27) Possibly a dozen more entered the council during the reigns of Henri IV and Louis XIII, taking advantage of both the honours showered upon the magistrature in general following the collapse of the League and the confusions of the regency. (28) Similar good fortune greeted the masters admitted into office under Henri IV: if a councillorship greeted 33% of the masters received in the preceding reign, the percentage fell only a bit, to twenty-eight, for the next group. (29)

At the same time the percentage of masters who did not advance beyond their office diminished. Of the company members received under François I fully 65% died
without having acquired another post (including presidencies in the sovereign courts). For the masters admitted into office under Henri III and Henri IV this fell to 44% and 39%. (30)

The regency of Marie de Médicis marked the acceleration of entry to the councils by masters, not to mention the appearance of other magistrates. At the councils of the regent appeared a host of former masters: Jacques-Auguste de Thou, directeur des finances and président à mortier, Claude de Bullion, a company member of only two years experience, Jean Bochart, Méric de Vic, Louis Lefèvre de Caumartin, Antoine Le Camus, président à mortier, Jacques Viart, president at the grand conseil, Charles de Chanteclerc, Hector de Marle, Pierre Hurault, archbishop of Aix, Eustache de Refuge, son-in-law of the late chancellor, Christophe de Sève, first president of the cour des aides, Félix Vialart, Michel de Marillac, Jacques Vignier, Guillaume de Montholon, Laurent Cauchon and Martin Langlois. A few masters who had not sold their offices (Menardeau, Ollier, Barentin and Foudriac) also found their way into the council.

It is not possible to consider this group of masters as proof that the crown desired to reward the company. Their appearance coincided with the expansion in the number of councillors, traditionally justified by the letters of regency, which urged the regent to seek advisers from all over
the kingdom. (31) Certain of the masters had already proved their capacities as councillors of state in previous reigns. Others (Langlois, Ollier, Bullion) had ties to the queen mother. (32) Others (Vignier, Barentin) had links with the princes, who obviously hoped to increase their power at the council by putting forward their clients as candidates for councillorships. (33) There was little intention of promoting masters in recognition of their service in office for, as in former reigns, a few masters entered the council without having had to resign their offices. Furthermore, the majority of masters present at the council (ten of fourteen according to one list) were "ordinairement au conseil des parties" and not at the financial bodies of the council. (34) This stands as proof that well into the regency the skills of the masters did not warrant their promotion into areas of financial litigation and administration.

(iii) prospects for masters received between 1611 and 1640

The earliest lettres honoraires registered at the requêtes de l'hôtel make no mention of promotion to the royal council, even when the resigning master had, in fact, been called there. (35) However, after 1620 indications of promotion and of prior service in the different bodies of the council become fairly frequent. (36) Quite suddenly a bureaucratic, administrative justification for the promotion of a master became important. The masters, it seems, had
become more useful to the crown, and this usefulness would rebound to the benefit of the company. Fully 59% of the masters received in 1611-20 eventually found their way to a councillorship of state, even if some did not acquire that post in the 1620s. (37)

The cases of this rapid growth in opportunity lay partly in the technical innovations permitted at the council by the chancellors and keepers of the seal in the 1610s and 1620s. It will be remembered that at the end of the sixteenth century the masters had little to do with the various councils of finance. Their activity was restricted mainly to demands for évocations and for regulations at jurisdictions made at the privy council. There they had the monopoly of presentations. From time to time individual masters entered other council bodies with rapports, but a whole quartier was not permitted to attend those other sessions. Under the chancellor Brûlart de Sillery and the keeper of the seals du Vair this situation changed.

The master (one of the Laisné) who drew up the "Abrégé de ce qui est porté par les règlements faïcts par Louis Treizième" described the progress of his company:

"Auparavant M. le Chancelier de Sillery jamais les maistres des requestes n'entroient au conseil des finances (i.e. the conseil d'état et des finances) que pour y raporter, et leurs raports faïcts ils sortoient, depuis insensiblement ledict sieur Chancelier faisoit entrer les maistres des requestes qui avoient assisté à la visite du procès raporté et ceux qui n'avoient
assisté estoient exclus d'y opiner, de même M. du Vair, 
estant garde des sceaux qui ne scavait l'usage du Con- 
seil souffrit que tous les maistres des requestes du 
quartier entrassent audit Conseil des finances, dont 
est venu peu après que ceux mesme hors du quartier y 
ont entrée". (38)

Brûlart de Sillery became chancellor in 1607, which means 
that he may have allowed a number of masters into the con-
seil d'état et des finances before the death of Henri IV.

In 1615 a council regulation permitted three masters to 
enter this council body (39), and in 1616 du Vair acquired the 
seals, shortly losing them to Claude Mangot, another ex-
master, then holding them again for a brief period in 1617.

If the author of the manuscript quoted above is correct, 
it would appear that an entire quartier of masters entered 
d'état 
the conseil/from 1616 or 1617. This right was not guaran-
teed by any regulation, and the company was careful to take 
advantage of any occasion in order to confirm the new coun-
cil practice.

In January 1623 the four quartiers met when 

"il a esté donné avis à aulcuns de ladite compagnie 
qu'il se projecte depuis quelques jours des reglements 
aux Conseils d'Estat, des finances et Conseil privé du 
Roy, ausquels reglements ladite compagnie a notable 
intérêt pour l'honneur et dignité des charges desdits 
sieurs maistres des requestes, a ce qu'il ne soit rien 
fait contre et au préjudice des ordonnances et regle-
ments anciens". (40)

Six masters were sent to confer with "MM. du conseil".

Nothing was done "to the prejudice" of old ordinances by the 
council regulation of June 1624, except to allow the masters 
to send an entire quartier to the conseil d'état et des finances
The specific motive for the innovations is unknown. According to the number of registers of decrees for the financial bodies of the council it does not appear that the assistance of the masters in financial questions was required. At least it is doubtful that the number of decrees issued during the early years of the reign of Louis XIII increased drastically. It is possible that du Vair deliberately broke the rules in order to annoy Sillery— their mutual detestation was proverbial. Given the mediocrity of the royal government at this period, it would have been difficult to go back on such a reform once it had been carried out. Although the men at the top bore some responsibility for the innovations, it should not be forgotten that just after the death of Henri IV the masters began remonstrating the chancellor for just such a reform. Amidst the coming and going of chancellors and keepers of the seal the force of the company as a pressure group would have increased in the 1610s.

Whatever the cause, the appearance of the company at the conseil d'état et des finances is important because it demonstrates that the masters had acquired the right to present requests involving two types of financial litigation— between the king and his subjects, particularly the tax-farmers, and among the king's subjects over offices and taxes. The masters were to acquire a monopoly of the rapports involving these matters under Louis XIV, but as late as the
1640s they still encountered stiff competition from the councillors of state and intendants des finances. (45)

The masters had never wanted to handle only litigation. They had aspired to the role of presenting to the king the requests of communities, corporations, judicial companies and provincial estates. Although the council regulation of 1615 allowed three masters to enter the council body which considered the "requêtes, cahiers, articles et remontrances des provinces envoyez et présentez à Sa Majesté tant par les Gouverneurs, lieutenants-généraux et cours de Parlement et autres officiers de Sa Majesté et par les villes et communautés", the same regulation handed the presentation of these matters to the councillors of state and intendants des finances. (46) Just as the masters began to enter this council in considerable numbers it was decided to shift these questions to the conseil de direction des finances (1619). (47), where they were to be presented by the same personnel as before. When the masters finally acquired the right to enter the conseil de direction, it was only because the old conseil d'état et des finances, burdened by the growing amount of business, had split in 1630 into two sections—a "conseil de direction" which heard litigation between the king and his subjects, and the conseil d'état et des finances which heard financial litigation among the king's subjects. (48) The dream of the masters continued to elude their grasp as "MM. du conseil" seemed determined to chain them to the growing
beast of financial litigation, but their entry into the conseil d'État et des finances was not without direct benefit to them. For the lettres honoraires of the 1620s began to mention this service in the conseil d'État et des finances, sometimes even indicating the year the master began to appear there. (49) The 1620s marked the beginning of steady promotion of ex-masters to the council. It also marked several attempts of the crown to discourage and exclude from the council those magistrates who had not been trained in its ways.

In 1622 was promulgated the brevet of Montpellier, which awarded rank at the council from the day a judge entered it after resigning his office. (50) In effect this measure favoured the masters over the presidents of the sovereign courts. The former could sell their offices at any time to any buyer in order to take up a councillorship, whereas the latter would hope to retain their more prestigious offices within the family. Hence they were less free to become councillors of state. The councillors of state who held offices naturally objected to the brevet, since it meant that they would lose their rank to former masters.

In the 1624, the reform of Compiègne introduced an order which was even more unacceptable to the magistrates of the sovereign courts. According to André d'Ormesson,
"il fut dit que les maistres des requestes prendroient leur rang, lorsque le roy les appelleroit au conseil, du jour de leur brevet; ce qui fut une exception à la règle générale, de laquelle ils ont joui sans aucun contredit; ce qui leur a esté un grand privilège, qui m'a servi, ayant précédé, dans le conseil, beaucoup de conseillers d'Estat qui avoient pris leurs places devant moi dans le conseil". (51)

Thus the masters were placed in the same category for rights of séance as more prestigious personnel—the secretaries of state, the archbishops and bishops, and the provincial governors and their lieutenants. D'Ormesson believed that "le vrai auteur" of this change was Michel de Marillac, a former master, rather than Etienne d'Aligre, the chancellor, who had not been a member of the company. This seems to reflect Marillac's attitudes towards the sovereign courts a few years later when, as keeper of the seals, he was obliged to confront the Paris parlement over the jurisdiction of the requêtes de l'hôtel. (52)

A few months later the presidents of the Paris parlement demanded that they be given the same rights as the masters, and a special brevet was issued in their favour in November. However, it is obvious that "MM. du conseil" did not immediately pay attention to this exception, because it had to be reiterated in February 1625. (52) But the two brevets remained without practical effect, for not a single president from the Paris parlement was included in the new reformed council. The presidents of the provincial courts also complained in 1627, but their remonstrances were ignored.
The reform of Compiègne was revoked in 1629 and the brevet of Montpellier was reapplied, but exception was made for the masters of requests, who could take rank at the council from the day on which they received their brevets as councillors of state. (53)

Despite the desire of the ministers to reward the company, most councillors of state were still not former masters under Louis XIII. The reformed council of June 1624 numbered thirty-seven members (including the keeper of the seals, the surintendant and contrôleur-général des finances). Only a dozen were former masters. (54) No councillor was still in possession of a mastership. Therefore, at least the indiscriminate favouritism which had made one company member a councillor while he still held his office, but which had prevented his colleagues from finding a retreat in the council, was a thing of the past. Although former masters did not take the council by storm in the mid-1620s, the edict of La Rochelle mentioned that, of all judges, they had the most likely chance of becoming councillors of state. (55)

During the regency of Anne, Séguier drew up a memoir which recounted the progress of the masters in the matter of acquiring brevets:

"il est à remarquer que lors que le Règlement fut fait en 1624 il y avait peu de Messieurs les maistres des requestes qui eussent brevets de conseiller d'Estat tellement que la conséquence n'estoit pas grande,
The changing composition of the council bore out the comment of Séguier and leads to the reflection that, even if special administrative considerations and hostility towards the robins of other companies were responsible in part for the good fortune of the masters, both favour from "MM. du conseil" and determination on the part of the company were important causes in the change of council personnel.

After 1624 the promotion of ex-masters into the council was noteworthy. Of forty-five councillors in ordinary and by semester allowed seance by the reform of 1630, eighteen (40%) were former masters. A list for the end of 1632 notes forty councillors, of whom sixteen (40%) were former company members. (57) In 1630 and 1632 the remaining councillors were ecclesiastics, aristocrats, magistrates from the sovereign courts (particularly the grand conseil and the cour des aides) and robins from the council world. A list for 1637 notes twenty-one former masters among forty-three councillors—nearly 50%. (58) The advancement of company members in this period owed much to Richelieu, who had a number of clients among the masters—Jacques Barrin, Isaac de Juyé (usually called Moricq by contemporary sources), François Fouquet and Paul Hay du Châtelelet, all of whom advanced rapidly to the status of councillor in ordinary. (59)
Yet not only clients came to expect promotion, for in 1641 the company demanded that members of the corps who had served twenty years should automatically be promoted to the royal council. (60) During the regency they took for granted the acquisition of a councillorship of state, although the ease with which brevets were distributed to other magistrates also encouraged this sentiment. Hence, in 1643 Gaudart and Tillet, former masters, pestered their colleagues to gain them entry to the council. (61)

In a now classic article Roland Mousnier remarked that towards the end of the reign of Louis XIII the masters seemed to be losing out in preferential treatment in the dispensation of councillorships. (62) This interpretation is incorrect. Although the crown distributed numerous brevets among the judicial companies of the kingdom, it had no intention of calling their holders to the council. The regency situation was the cause of an invasion of non-master robins. However, even in the vanguard of the crowd rushing into the council after the deaths of Richelieu and Louis XIII were a great many masters. Eighteen resigned in 1642-4 in order to become councillors. Of 114 councillors listed by d'Ormesson in April 1644, fifty (44%) were former masters. (63) The beneficiaries of this massive promotion were, by and large, the masters admitted into office in 1621-30, of whom 68% became councillors. (64)
Ex-masters rapidly came to predominate among the senior and busier councillors, which proves that the new government had no desire to reverse the evolution of council personnel begun in the 1620s. Furthermore, none of the old councillors, including those clients of Richelieu who were still alive, lost their places. Of thirty-four councillors in ordinary listed by André d'Ormesson for June 1643, the company furnished sixteen (47%). (65) In May 1644 the number of "anciens"— that is, senior councillors and possibly those in ordinary— was twenty-two. Over half of them (twelve) were former masters. (66) A working list of councillors of state, dated December 1645, names twenty-six councillors, of whom eighteen (69%), were former company members. (67) When the masters went on strike in 1648, nineteen councillors of state took over the rapports, and thirteen of them were ex-masters. (68) Even during the period of disorder of the early regency the masters gained much real ground, as opposed to the purely ephemeral rewards earned by outside magistrates, who were avid for honours but were ill-equipped to handle the business of the council.

The council reform of 1657, which definitely eliminated the outsiders, confirmed the working order of the council as it was during the regency: of twenty-nine councillors nineteen (66%) were former masters. (69) As the work of Michel Antoine on the royal council has revealed, the monopoly of the masters extended still further and, in the eighteenth century, 90% of the councillors had been masters. (70)
Among the masters received in 1631-40, the percentage who became councillors of state fell significantly—to fifty. For those admitted into office during the 1640s and 1650s, it dropped still further—to thirty-eight for each decade. (71) The reason was simply that the council reform of 1657 was well-kept. Councillorships, which previously had often existed for only as long as their holders, practically turned into offices. From the 1660s onward, every death of a councillor of state would find senior masters crossing each other's paths in the antechambers of royal ministers, hoping to be chosen for the vacant post. (72) The element "demeuré" increased: from 5% among masters received in the 1620s to 33% in the 1630s, 30% in the 1640s and 24% in the 1650s. Yet the respite of the 1650s was temporary. Fifty-five per cent of the masters received in 1661-87 and, according to Mousnier, 49% of those admitted into office in 1688-1704 were "demeurés". (73)

This is not to say that an experienced though unrewarded master had reason to be unhappier than a company member who had become a councillor of state, only to be eliminated by the reform of 1657. Such was the fate of several masters who lost out possibly because they had attached themselves closely to the grandees. (74) Both types of masters had good reason to feel disappointed. The description
"tristes personnages", applied by Saint-Simon to senior masters, is particularly pertinent to company members received after 1630. In the 1660s old masters could remember the expanding opportunities at the council during the 1630s and 1640s, but they often had to remain satisfied with the deanships of the quartiers. Yet dissatisfaction should not obscure the fact that gradually the masters had become committed more to careers at the council than in the courts.

(c) employment in the courts (75)

This was a second route in the search for honours after resignation of the mastership. Service in the sovereign courts could be the final stage in the career of a master, particularly if he acquired a présidence à mortier. However, if he became first president of a tribunal, he would often return to Paris afterwards in order to become a councillor of state. In the early part of the period able, wealthy and well-connected masters went through one or more presidencies— they even had them created— as a prelude to ministerial careers. (76) The decreasing interest of the company in posts in both Parisian and provincial courts is of the utmost importance in suggesting the shifting aspirations of the masters.

The overall tendency of the period was a general with-
drawal from the courts, with the decrease more marked in provincial than Parisian jurisdictions. Among the masters received from 1575 to 1610 a minimum of 35% served at least for part of their career after resignation in the regular courts (excluding the grand conseil). Posts in the provinces were more numerous than Parisian offices—19% to 16%—but this was because a considerable number of presidencies were given to masters during the reign of Henri IV. In the rest of the period the overall percentage fell to seventeen, and the provincial-Parisian balance reversed: 11% were Paris-bound careers and 6% were in the provinces.

In the earlier period présidences à mortier, presidencies of the lower chambers, and even offices in courts below the parlements held a certain attraction for the masters, thus demonstrating their commitment to the magisterial life. (77) The patterns of provincial employment are interesting inasmuch as they reveal that the company lost interest in certain regions and functions.

While masters admitted into office in 1575-88 were willing to acquire présidences à mortier at Toulouse, in 1589-1610 they restricted themselves to the first presidency. (78) After 1610 the court no longer attracted them. At Bordeaux five out of six masters held the first presidency, but all were purchased by masters before 1631. (79)
Of the four masters from 1589 to 1634 who went to Aix, three held this post, a pattern which was repeated for the Grenoble parlement. (80) Three out of five masters who entered the Rennes parlement and chambre des comptes also held first presidencies. (81) The new parlement at Metz drew one company member for the commission of procureur-général, and the parlement of Dijon interested another with its first presidency. (82) Only one provincial city, nearby Rouen, attracted a large number of masters. Of eleven presidencies held there five were à mortier and all of these were bought by masters admitted into office before 1630. (83)

Often a master acquired a presidency because he was a native of the region. (84) Sometimes the post had become a family fief. (85) Generally these two factors explain the movement of masters into the provinces during the first half of the period. During the second half many appointments to first presidencies reflected not a taste for provincial existence on the part of the masters but rather the breakdown in good relations between the council and the sovereign courts.

In 1630 Abel Servien was named first president of the Bordeaux parlement when the commission of the former first president (Marc-Antoine de Gourgues, an ex-master) was suppressed. The cause of this harsh treatment was the
opposition of the parlement to the activities of Servien as a provincial intendant. Given the choice between the commission and a post as secretary of state, Servien naturally chose the latter. The first presidency went to Antoine Daguesseau, another master and a stranger to the province. (86) The appointment of Elie Laisné to the first presidency at Aix in 1632 followed the revolt of the Cascaveaux. Tanneguy Séguyer, président à mortier at Paris and former master of requests, came to Rouen in 1640 following the revolt of the Nu-Pieds as first president in the commission of councillors of state and masters which replaced the parlement. Louis Laisné, intendant in Burgundy at the end of the Fronde, became first president at Dijon at the death of the pro-Condé holder of that commission.

The causes of the withdrawal of masters from the provincial posts were probably several—the decrease in the number of provincials in the company, the attractiveness of careers at the council and the increasing antipathy between the courts and "MM. du conseil", among whom the courts would have been quick to identify the masters of requests.

Despite an overall decline, the Parisian courts were a constant factor in the promotion of masters. Throughout the period twenty-seven masters took up offices at the Paris parlement, four entered the cour des aides, thirteen
went to the chambre des comptes, six became lieutenants-civils at the châtelet and seven prévôts des marchands. (87)

The choice of offices at the Paris parlement at different times is suggestive of the prestige enjoyed by the mastership. Five company members received in 1575-1610 became presidents of enquêtes or requêtes, but only two afterwards. (88) This implies that early in the period under study the office of president in one of the parlement's lower chambers was considered to be an improvement over the mastership.

Over half (seventeen) of the masters who entered the parlement eventually became présidents à mortier. (89) Jerôme de Hacqueville and Jean Bochart became first presidents after long years in other functions; André Maillard and Guillaume de Lamoignon were promoted directly from their masterships. Achille de Harlay and Nicolas Fouquet became procureurs-généraux. In the sixteenth century two of the master-presidents had been avocats-généraux, as well as another master. However, company members were not attracted to this commission after the League.

The office of président à mortier, unlike the first presidency of the Paris parlement, almost became the property of a few families whose members had usually been masters. Of twenty-nine présidents à mortier admitted into

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office from 1589 to 1672, eighteen (62%) were former masters. The palais adage "de mesmes toujours de mesmes" was absurdly apt in describing the movement of one such office, which went from Henri de Mesmes (not a master) in 1650 to his nephew Jean-Antoine (a former master), to his son Jean-Jacques (a master) in 1672, to his brother (another company member) in 1688 and then to the nephew of the last judge in 1709. Similar familial transmissions of offices abounded during the period: to Jacques-Auguste de Thou from his uncle in 1586, from Antoine Séguier to Pierre in 1624, then to Tanneguy in 1633, from Pomponne de Bellièvre to his son in 1642, from André Potier to his son in 1645, from Nicolas de Bailleul to his son in 1652, from René de Longueil to his son in 1672 and from François de Nesmond to his son, also in 1672. With the exception of the transmissions made in the Bailleul and Potier families, resignations were made to a relative who had been a master. This implies only that the office of master was sought by the great robe and not, as some historians have thought, that it was a necessary step on the way to the presidency.

The first presidency was too important a function to be left in the hands of either a few families or the company: of ten first presidents received from 1572 to 1678 only five were former masters and two of these, Hacqueville and Bochart, each with practically one foot in the grave, acquired it as a sort of last honour.
The cour des aides drew three masters among those received before 1601 and only one in the rest of the period. All were first presidents. (90) The presidencies and commissions of the public prosecution of the chambre des comptes were acquired by a few masters every decade until 1630, but afterwards only two bought offices there. (91)

Lieutenants-civils and prévôts des marchands were often former masters. Some masters acquired the commission of lieutenant-civil without having to resign their offices—the example of Laffemas is noteworthy. But when Dreux d'Aubray acquired the post in 1643 the masters forced him to resign his mastership. (92) Similarly, company members were simultaneously prévôts des marchands in the sixteenth century, but by the 1660s they usually had resigned their offices (the cases of Sève and Pomereu) before being designated for the position. (93)

Tendencies to heredity were noticeable in the transmission of offices outside the Paris parlement. Chandon resigned the first presidency of the cour des aides to his son-in-law, Christophe de Sève. Gobelin became president in the chambre des comptes upon the resignation of his father, which was also the case of Olivier d'Ormesson (uncle of the memorialist). Louis Girard became procureur-général at the chambre des comptes when his brother died. The commission of lieutenant-civil went from Antoine Séguiere to his
brother Jean and from Dreux d'Aubray to his son Antoine.

Presidencies at the grand conseil held a special category in the careers of the masters since, until 1635, presidents were required to be masters. Thirty-nine company members (10%) were presidents of this court, which steadily lost prestige and failed to partake in the rising value of offices after 1630.

(d) ambassadors and envoys (94)

Although most masters would aspire either to a councilorship of state or an office in a sovereign court, a few could hope to find their way into more challenging positions. Missions beyond France form the first category of these special employments.

The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries witnessed the extensive use of ex-masters overseas as regular ambassadors, special envoys and assistants to aristocratic ambassadors. Some of the greatest negotiators of the seventeenth century came from the ranks of the company—Claude de Mesmes and Abel Servien, the plenipotentiaries at Munster, Paul Barillon and Honoré Courtin, emissaries to the congresses of Cologne, Heilbronn and Breda. Important missions were undertaken in earlier periods by Michel Hurault for Henri IV, sent to England and the Low Countries during the civil wars,
by Bullion and Bailleul, envoys to the duke of Savoy at a later date, and by Marescot, ambassador to the Protestant princes of Germany. A few, such as Gaspard Coignet and Pomponne de Bellièvre, spent most of their careers after resignation of the mastership outside of France, moving from country to country. Coignet served in Venice, Holland and Denmark, at the courts of various Italian princes, and again in Holland, returning to France in 1648, where he was to die five years later. His career as envoy had begun in 1632, when he left the company. Bellièvre was sent first to Italy (1635-40), then to England (1646-49) and finally to Holland (1650-1). Faye d'Espeisse served seven years in Holland (1624-31) as ambassador in ordinary.

Yet most of the masters served only for brief periods (one to four years) overseas. As in the case of first presidencies, such service was often no more that a step towards the councillorship of state. The embassies had distinct disadvantages before 1660: they were lonely and expensive. Expenses and wages were not always paid, and at least one ambassador (René Le Voyer d'Argenson) ruined himself by trying to maintain a fitting style of life. (95) After 1660 the embassies could bring one a pension of 36,000 livres per annum, but after this date fewer ex-masters had the privilege of going overseas. (96)
The masters served in only a few states. Twelve went to the Venetian republic, twelve went to Switzerland, nine to Holland, six to England and a few to the duke of Savoy and various Italian princes. (97) One (François Lasnier) served briefly as agent to Portugal. The choice of envoys reveals considerable care: notwithstanding the magnificence of some robe families (like the Mesmes or the Courtin)(98), there was no question of sending them to Spain, Portugal, the Holy See, Austria or Sweden. For the most part only the greatest families of the robe were chosen, even for the briefer missions—Etampes, Hurault, Faye, Spifame, Laubespine, Béliévre, Bailleul, Mesmes, Courtin. When more obscure men went overseas it was often because they had excellent connections; Eustache de Refuge, ambassador to Switzerland, was son-in-law of a chancellor and François Foucquet, also sent to Switzerland, was a friend of Richelieu. However, social considerations and political connections did not explain all these appointments. The enthusiasm of the elite magistrature of France for the economic and maritime plans of Richelieu had been demonstrated at the assembly of notables in 1626, and it is probable that a number of ex-masters became envoys because of their interest or expertise in these matters. (99)

There was a certain family continuity among overseas agents. The Faye d'Espeisse, father and son, were ambassa-
dors, and the second was conducteur des ambassadeurs at court
even before he became ambassador to Holland. Louis Lefèvre de Caumartin had been envoy to Switzerland and two of his sons, Louis and Jacques, were sent on foreign missions. René Courtin was ambassador to Venice and his nephew Honoré served in several embassies under Louis XIV. The d'Argenson, father and son, served in Venice, the latter while still a master.

A minimum of thirty-nine masters (10%) were envoys and ambassadors. It seems that the ministers' interest in using former masters in overseas missions lessened after the 1650s: only three masters admitted into office in the 1650s became ambassadors, and the bad fortune of the company was not to change in the eighteenth century (10%). In other ways too future opportunities for the masters were diminishing.

(e) the central financial administration and ministerial functions

A handful of masters penetrated into the higher spheres of state. Some became the subordinate financial administrators who handled the king's money (trésoriers de l'épargne) or presented the financial problems of the realm before the council (intendants des finances). Others acquired the direction of financial affairs, whether as surintendants, contrôleurs-généraux or directeurs. A few became secretaries of state, keepers of the seal or chancellors.
Two masters became trésoriers de l'Épargne and, in doing so, followed careers similar to those of their fathers: Thomas Morant senior had also been a trésorier and the elder Jeannin de Castille had been an intendant des finances.

Although the trésoriers had to resign their masterships, the intendants des finances of the later period were not obliged to do so. One master received in 1611 and five admitted into office after 1620 acquired these posts, most of them during the worst period of financial disorders, the 1640s and 1650s. Le Charon became an intendant in 1643, Foulle and Le Tillier in 1649 and Paget in 1654. Furthermore, the direction of finance witnessed a remarkable coming and going of former masters—Claude Bullion (surintendant from 1632 to 1640), Nicolas de Bailleul and Claude de Mesmes (surintendants in 1643), Antoine Le Camus (contrôleur-général in 1648), Antoine Bâillon (directeur in 1648), Nicolas Fouquet (surintendant in 1653) and Louis Le Tonnellier and Louis Laisné (directeurs in 1657). It may be thought that the experience acquired by the masters in the financial sections of the council fitted them for these functions. Yet experience must not be mistaken for competence, and ex-masters proved unable to sort out the financial muddles of the crown. They may even have increased them.

This invasion of the financial direction came to a
halt at the end of the 1650s. Foucquet suppressed all but two of the twelve intendances des finances (Foullé and Paget died masters and Le Tillier died penniless in Venice). But it was Colbert, no rival himself, who decided to push the magistrates out of the financial direction. The directeurs disappeared, the councillors in ordinary were driven from the most important financial bodies of the council and Colbert retained the most important functions. (101) Only one master received in the 1650s went on to acquire financial office—Vincent Hotman, a relative of Colbert, intendant des finances in the 1660s. Altogether only twenty-two masters (5%) became handlers of royal funds, most of them in the last thirty years of the period.

Three masters became secretaries of state—Claude Mangot, Abel Servien and Michel Le Tellier. All of them were also keepers of the seal, as were six other masters, most of them for only a brief period—Méric de Vic, Louis Lefèvre de Caumartin, Guillaume du Vair, Michel de Marillac, Pierre Séguiier and Louis Boucherat. (102) The last two also became chancellors. These men, along with those who became surintendants des finances, constituted the elite coming from the company. Their experience was wide: thirteen had been provincial intendants or commissioners, nine had been presidents in sovereign courts, nine had been envoys and eight had been councillors of state. Yet they were only fourteen in number—barely 4% of the company.
In Part One it was seen that the reign of Henri IV coincided with the expansion of employment in the provinces for the masters and their acquisition of the right to issue judicial opinions. The end of the League also witnessed the arrival at the council of many company members, but in this they did little more than share in the rewards distributed among the robins of the kingdom in recognition of their support for the cause of Henri—decisive in bringing about his victory. The magistrature of the sovereign courts continued to benefit from royal largesse well into the reign of Louis XIII.

In the 1620s the masters began to acquire the preference of the ministers in appointments to councillorships of state. The causes of this were numerous. The company was a vigorous pressure group. It had more expertise in financial matters because of its entry into the litigious financial bodies of the council. The ministers increasingly distrusted the robe of the sovereign courts. The company enjoyed the favour of former masters (du Vair, Marillac) who had risen to prominence as royal advisors. A number of masters were clients of the principal minister. Hence the reign of Louis XIII was an endlessly broadening field of opportunity.
Masters also served as ambassadors, and when the financial stability of the crown was progressively undermined by the involvement of France in the Thirty Years War, they were able to advance to positions of responsibility in the financial administration. The spreading centralization of Richelieu was to their advantage, but no less so was the chaos of the 1640s and 1650s, when the council doors opened wide to robins and bankruptcy faced the government. These were probably the most splendid years in the history of the company. They ended with the administrative and, as will be noted briefly below, the judicial reforms of Colbert and Louis XIV.

* * * *

The corollary of the company's engagement in careers in the central administration was its flight from the tribunals. In general Part Two has been a sketch of the various elements in the movement pushing the masters away from the sovereign courts. It has been seen that fathers came increasingly from the council world, that the contact of future masters with the bar and the métier of councillor became more superficial and that the sources of income for the company lay ever more in its activity in council bodies and their auxiliaries (the requêtes de l'hôtel, the intendancies).
The critical period in the drift of the company from the courts, the Paris parlement in particular, lasted from the 1620s until the Fronde. This section has outlined the signs of the drift and its result—the formation of a council magistrature recruited in the company. It has not dealt with the judicial activities and battles which were more responsible than anything else in thrusting apart masters and other robins and creating a distinct council outlook. These questions and the dilemmas caused by the adherence of the company to "MM. du conseil" are the subject of Part Three.
Notes

1 - Séguiier, Lettres, vol. 1, p. 58.

2 - N.a. 2229, p. 373 (earliest lettres honoraires registered at the parlement, 1595), f.f. 18234, fo. 371 (1615).

3 - N.a. 2229, p. 384 (letters for Girard in 1635 following a resignation which had taken place nine years before), V-4 car. 1500, fo. 39 (letters for Lefèvre de Caumartin, who resigned in 1640, dated 1649, registered in 1659), V-4 car. 1499, fo. 68 (letters dated 1643 for Courtin, who resigned to his son in 1649).

4 - N.a. 2236, pp. 14-6 mentions cases of pluralism among masters. Most of these concern posts which were considered as commissions—presidencies of enquêtes and requêtes, the position of lieutenant-civil. One of the last cases of pluralism was that of Étienne Foulé, also first president of the Guyenne cour des aides.

5 - See appendices, Table 5. Aborted careers (ending in death in less than ten years of occupation) have been eliminated.

6 - Short tenures were sometimes caused by rapid promotion to another office, particularly to presidencies of the parlements (among those masters received during the reign of Henri IV) and to councillorships of state in the 1630s and 1640s. However, they were also signs of ruin (supra, Chapter 4, notes 17 and 22).

7 - The exact averages are as follows: 1575-88 (16.5), 1589-1600 (17.3), 1601-10 (14.0), 1611-20 (13), 1621-30 (14.2), 1631-40 (13.7), 1641-50 (15.9), 1651-60 (17.8). They are easier to calculate than those for tenure of councillorships, since masterships had to be bought and sold in the same quartier.

8 - Prices for first presidencies (the most valuable posts in the courts): 30,000 livres at Aix at the beginning of the seventeenth century (f.f. 15898, fo. 679), 40,000 at Rouen in 1600 (Mousnier, Vénalité, p. 33), 30,000 in 1608 at Rennes (Saulnier, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 1), 100,000 at Rouen in 1609, 120,000 in 1623, 100,000 in 1632 (Mousnier, loc. cit.), 100,000 at Aix in 1643 (V-4 car. 157, decision of 12 December), 130,000 at Rennes in 1651 (Saulnier, loc. cit.) though d'Argouges bought it in 1660 for only 75,000.

9 - Infra, this chapter and Part Three.

10 - Charles Colbert sold his for 800,000 livres in 1696.
11 - In 1643 the first presidency of the cour des aides was bought for 521,000 livres (f.f. 20635, fo. 256-7). The commission of procureur général at the chambre des comptes was worth 275,000 livres in 1625 (étude 51, liasse 263, inventory of goods and titles of Louis Girard).

12 - Prices for secretariats of state: 180,000 in 1608, 200,000 and 350,000 in the 1620s, 700,000 in 1643 (Mousnier, Venalité, p. 363, Conseil, p. 133), 307,000 in 1643, 440,000 for the same post in 1677 (Histoire, vol. 1, p. 524), 300,000 in 1670, 200,000 in 1674, 700,000 in 1679 (Mousnier, Conseil, pp. 134, 159).


14 - Stipends of councillors of state: 6,000 livres for a councillor in ordinary in 1624, 3,000 for a semester councillor and 2,000 for one in trimester (Chérual, op. cit., vol. 1, passim), 2,000 for deans of the quartiers in 1629 (infra, note 21), 6,000 for the company dean in 1642 (infra, note 22), 1,500 for councillors in 1648 (d'Ormesson, Journal, vol. 1, p. 424), 2,000 after the reform of 1657 (Saint-Simon, op. cit., vol. 4, pp. 399-400), to which was added 3,600 livres derived from the status of councillors as commensaux of the king, and 5,100 in 1670 for a councillor in ordinary (Mousnier, Conseil, p. 171).


16 - AN 0-1, 7, fo. 42, September 1627.

17 - However, for the reign of Henri IV some registers of the privy council contain lists of councillors present on certain days.

18 - André Lefèvre d'Ormesson furnishes several (Chérual, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 352-60); for the Conseil du Roi of 1586, the Conseillers du Roi in 1596, the Conseil du Roi au mois de février (1605), the Conseil de 1611, the Conseil du Roy à la fin du mois de mai 1616. F.f. 18152, fo. 117 has a list for the early regency. For the reformed council of 1624 see ms. Clairambault, 651, fo. 292. F.f. 18152, fo. 130, 132 are lists for 1630 and 1632; fo. 133 is an incomplete list for 1637. A number of lists have been published in the Journal of d'Ormesson for the regency period (vol. 1, pp. 78, 176-7) and the treatise on the council by Nicolas Lefèvre de
Lezeau (f. f. 18155, fo. 15-8) has a list for May 1644, as well as a most useful continuation until 1657. F. f. 16152, fo. 119-25, and f. f. 16218, fo. 33, have a number of lists for the period 1643-4, which rank the councillors according to their seniority and give the dates of anterior service in the council. In Colbert, Lettres, vol. 1, pp. cviii-cix, is the Etat de La France for 1658, which includes a list of councillors. See also the various published Etats de La France for the reign of Louis XIV.


20 - See the lettres honoraires in V-4 car. 1496-1500.


22 - F. f. 16218, fo. 379.

23 - Ibid., fo. 33 and F. f. 18152, fo. 119.

24 - See appendices, Table 6.

25 - Mousnier, Conseil, p. 54.

26 - Supra, Part 1, Chapter 2.

27 - Antoine Séguyier, councillor in ordinary in 1586 (Histoire, vol. 1, p. 38), Jean Chandon (Vie, passim, ordinary in 1585 according to own account, spurned a post in the council of Henri IV because of the plethora of councillors), Jean Bochart, as a master (lists of 1586 and 1605), and possibly Jean Le Charon (Histoire, vol. 1, p. 26)

28 - Charles Boucher, in 1595 (E-l, A, fo. 107, 259), Charles Chanteclerc in 1599, as a master (Histoire, vol. 1, p. 43, regency lists); Louis Lefèvre, in 1594 probably as a master (Histoire, vol. 1, p. 89, ordinary in 1599, on regency lists); Méric de Vic (lists of 1605 and regency), Guillaume Courtin (supra, note 19), Antoine Le Camus in 1595 (Histoire, vol. 1, p. 90, and regency lists), Jacques Viart in 1604 (Histoire, vol. 1, p. 111, and at privy council according to regency lists), Claude Menardeau in 1598 (Histoire, vol. 1, p. 130, and regency lists at the financial bodies of the council) while still a master, Jacques-Auguste de Thou (regency lists), Félix Vialart (ibid., but only at privy council, Christophe Hector de Marle (ibid., but only at the privy council), Jean Huault, in 1595 (U 637, fo. 407).
Christophe de Sève (regency lists, in council "tenu pour les finances" in 1614-5), Palamède de Foudriac, as master (regency list, died dean of his company in 1626 and was possibly a councillor), Paul Hurault (regency lists), Martin Langlois (regency lists, but only at privy council), Jean-Jacques de Mesmes (Histoire, vol. 1, p. 154, ordinary in 1607 while still a master, regency lists, conseiller d'état d'honneur at the parlement, dean of the council at death in 1642), François d'Amboise (dossiers bleus, 16, in 1604, while still a master, Histoire, vol. 1, p. 171), Michel de Marillac (regency lists, Histoire, vol. 1, p. 160, at conseil des finances in 1619, but at regency conseil des finances, and at reformed council of 1624), Samuel Spifame (regency lists at conseil des finances, ordinary on lists of 1624 and 1630), Jérôme Séguier (U 638, fo. 41, 1602, regency lists), Jacques Frévois (ms. Clairambault 651, fo. 292, trimester in 1624), Vincent de Génicourt (lists of regency of Anne), Eustache de Refuge (regency lists), Laurent Cauchon (regency lists, lists of 1624, 1630 and 1632 mention him as trimester and quadrimestre only), Antoine Fajot (promoted at resignation of mastership, V-4 car. 1498, fo. 12, 1624), Jacques Vignier (regency lists, semester at reform of 1624, ordinary in 1626), Guillaume de Montholon (regency lists), Jacques Vallée (Histoire, vol. 1, p. 221, semester at resignation), André Lefèvre d'Ormesson (quadrimestre on list of 1630, ordinary before 1637, died dean of the council), Jacques Favier (at resignation in 1626 according to V-4 car. 1498, fo. 112, quadrimestre in 1630, ordinary in 1632, at regency council), Jean Amelot (semester on lists of 1630 and 1632, ordinary on regency lists), Charles Barentin (regency lists while still a master, semester in 1624), Simon Marion (Histoire, vol. 1, p. 230, 1618), Maximilien Grangier (trimester in 1624), Jean Aubery (ibid., p. 257, no date), Robert Aubery (ibid., p. 259, ordinary in 1651), Charles Malon (at resignation in 1623, V-4 car. 1497, fo. 127), Jacques Barrin (semester in 1630 and 1632, died ordinary during regency), René Courtin (semester in 1630 and 1632, died ordinary), Denis Amelot, as master (quadrimestre in 1630 and 1632, ordinary in 1642), Jacques de Chauntes (semester at resignation in 1634 according to regency memoir of brevets, probably before as dean of a quartier), Claude Bullion (regency lists, ordinary in 1624).

For some masters this retirement came as a blessing—relief from the burdens of public office and from the intrigues of the council world. See Les Oeuvres d'Estienne Pasquier... et les lettres de N. Pasquier, 2 vols., Amsterdam, 1723, vol. 2, letters of Nicolas Pasquier.

See the various letters of regency for the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries in KK 625.

32 - Oilier assisted Marie de Médicis in her flight from Blois in 1619 (Richelieu, Lettres, vol. 1, p. 757). Bullion was the beneficiary of a pension from her (BN Colbert Cinq Cents, vol. 91, fo. 10, 1611). Langlois was in her council (E. L.-G., fo. 149).

33 - For Vignier and the Condé see Séguier, Lettres, vol. 1, pp. 137-8. He was also tutor of Marguerite and Charlotte de Luxembourg. Barentin was intendant in the army of the comte de Soissons at the siege of La Rochelle in 1622 (Histoire, vol. 1, p. 228). There is a quittance for the sum of 775 livres for Barentin "pour un voyage que j'ay fait au commandement de Sa Majesté avec le comte de Soissons" (pièces originales, 195, pièce 58, 29 December 1610.

34 - F.f. 18152, fo. 117.

35 - V-4 car. 1497, fo. 18, 22, 44, 52, 56, 63, 70.

36 - Ibid., fo. 110, 112, 114, 128, 182 and V-4 car. 1498, fo. 10, 12, 62.

37 - Pierre Hurault (at resignation in 1621, V-4 car. 1497, fo. 112, in financial bodies of the council), Pierre Castille (regency lists), Pierre Habert (semester in 1624, quadrimestre in 1630 and 1632), François de Riant (Histoire, vol. 1, p. 281, probably as dean of a quartier), Guillaume Marescot (regency list of 1643 as semester, but probably before as dean of a quartier), Thomas Morant (semester in 1643), Jacques du Tillet (first probably as dean of a quartier, ordinary in 1643), Noël Brûlart (dean of a quartier), Charles Le Roy de La Potherie (trimester in 1624, 1630 and 1632, ordinary in 1641 and at reform of 1657), François Bitault (at resignation in 1624, V-4 car. 1498, fo. 10), Louis Lefèvre (Histoire, vol. 1, p. 312), François Fouquet (at resignation in 1627, V-4 car. 1498, fo. 107, ordinary on lists of 1637 and 1632), Isaac de Juyé (ordinary at resignation in 1632), Elie Laisne (semester in 1634, ordinary in 1644), Jacques Oilier (regency lists, semester in 1624, ordinary in 1626), Nicolas Lefèvre de Lezeau (semester, ordinary in 1643, died dean of the council), Jacques Gaudart (semester in 1637 and 1643), Charles Faye (ordinary in 1632), Henri du Faur (at resignation in 1621, V-4 car. 1497, fo. 112), Charles de Machault (as dean of a quartier, semester in 1637, ordinary in 1643 and 1657), Jean de Bérulle, quadrimestre in 1629, 1630 and 1632, semester in 1634 and 1643), Jean de Sève (at resignation according to the Histoire, vol. 1, p. 357), Tanneguy de Lannoy
(semester in 1643), Jacques Turgot (dean of a quartier, immediately ordinary at his resignation in 1643, V-4 car. 1499, fo. 130), Claude de Paris (semester in 1643), Charles Durant (at resignation in 1626, V-4 car. 1498, fo. 62).

38 - Ms. Clairambault 651, fo. 339.
39 - Mousnier, "Règlements", p. 149.
42 - See the inventory of the E series at the Archives Nationales.
44 - Supra, Part 1, Chapter 2.
45 - Infra, Part 3, Chapter 4.
46 - Mousnier, "Règlements", p. 150.
47 - KK 625, fo. 228-9.
49 - Elie Laisné (V-4 car. 1498, fo. 122), Philbert de Thurin (ibid., fo. 186), François Fouquet (ibid., fo. 187).
51 - Ibid., p. 364.
52 - Infra, Part 3, Chapter 3.
54 - Ms. Clairambault 651, fo. 292.
56 - F.f. 18158, fo. 184 ("observations sur les rangs du conseil").
57 - Supra, note 18.
58 - Ibid.
59 - The role of Hay and Moricq in the prosecution of Marillac is outlined in Pierre de Vaissière, *L'Affaire du maréchal de Marillac, 1630-2*, Paris, 1924. For the unusual advantages enjoyed by Moricq as rapporteur at the requêtes de l'hôtel, see Part 3, Chapter 2. For Fouquet's relationship to Richelieu, supra, Chapter 1, note 14 and infra, Part 3, Chapter 2. For the Barrin and Richelieu see Part 3, Chapter 4, note 33. The will of Hay (étude 73, liasse 342, 2 April 1636) contains interesting evidence of Hay’s links to the cardinal.

60 - F.f. 1823 4, fo. 502. The council regulation of 1644 (ms. Clairambault 651, fo. 346) stood this formula on its head: if a master had not served twenty years (including his term as councillor in a court) or ten years in the company and ten in another post (first president, etc.) he would not be called to the council when he resigned. The intention of this measure was to have only experienced masters promoted to the council.

61 - D'Ormesson, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 121.


63 - Supra, note 18.

64 - Gilles Ruellan (semester at resignation in 1636, ordinary in 1641 according to Histoire, vol. 1, p. 363, but still semester in 1643), François Lambert (quadrimestre at resignation in 1628, on lists of 1630 and 1632, semester in 1643), Achille Courtin (ordinary at resignation in 1643, V-4 car. 1499, fo. 68, but already dean of a quartier), Gaspard du Fay (dean of a quartier and ordinary at resignation, ibid., fo. 135), Jean de Lauzon (semester at resignation in 1633, still semester in 1643, but ordinary in 1657), Paul Hay (probably at resignation, étude 73, liasse 343, 2 April 1636, titles in inventory of his goods), Claude de Mesmes (Histoire, vol. 1, p. 373, ordinary in 1636), Michel Larcher (ibid., p. 376, in 1629), Henri Le Grand (ibid., p. 372, n.d. but possibly during the regency), Antoine Daguesseau (semester in 1643), Jean Dyel (semester in 1643, ordinary in 1657), Claude Le Charron (ordinary in 1643), Abel Servien (possibly in 1624, while still a master, Histoire, vol. 1, p. 390), François de Pomerieu (after 1644 according to Lezeau), Jacques Le Prevost (dean of a quartier and company dean after Amelot), Pierre Gobelin (made ordinary at resignation in 1637 according to the Histoire, vol. 1, p. 403, on lists of 1643), Gaspard Colgnet (in 1632, semester in 1637 and 1643), Antoine Barrillon (ordinary at resignation in 1643, V-4 car.)
1499, fo. 66, ordinary in 1657), Henri de La Guette (Histoire, vol. 1, p. 406, in 1645), Jean d'Etampes (ordinary in 1643 and 1657), François de Verthamon (ordinary at resignation in 1643, V-4 car. 1499, fo. 72, and in 1657), François de Villemontée (semester in 1637, ordinary in 1657), Louis Lemaitre (semester in 1643, ordinary in 1657), Anne Mangot (as dean of a quartier, then as company dean after the death of Le Prévost), Isaac Laffemas (as dean of a quartier, then as company dean after Mangot), Gilbert Gaulmain (on regency lists, while still a master, as dean of a quartier and as company dean after Laffemas), Rene Le Voyer d'Argenson (semester in 1639, ordinary in 1643), Jean-Antoine de Mesmes (ordinary in 1643, not retained by the reform of 1657).

65 - Supra, note 18.
66 - Ibid.
67 - F.f. 18158, fo. 224.
68 - V-6 car. 227.
69 - Supra, note 18.
70 - Antoine, Conseil, p. 188.
71 - 1631-40:

Jacques Lefèvre (at resignation in 1640, V-4 car. 1500, fo. 39, semester in 1657), Barthélemy du Pré (regency lists), Jacques Dyel (in 1640, ordinary in 1643, but only semester in 1657), Claude Mallier (ordinary in 1643, became bishop of Tarbes and was not retained in 1657), François de Thou (list of 1637), Antoine Le Camus (Histoire, vol. 1, p. 442, says ordinary, but eliminated from council after 1657), Pomponne de Belliève (ibid., apparently ordinary), Claude Gobe- lin (ibid., p. 446, semester in 1662), Henri-Louis Habert (as dean of a quartier, then as company dean after the death of Gaulmain), François Lasnier (semester on list of 1637), Alexandre de Sève (promoted semester at resignation, V-4 car. 1499, fo. 171, semester at reform of 1657, ordinary on list of 1670), Jean de Choisy (semester in 1643 and 1657), François Bochart (semester in 1643, while still a master, semester at reform of 1657), Jean de Mesgrigny (in 1643 at resignation, semester in 1657, ordinary at death as sous-doyen of the council), Charles Malon (as dean of a quartier, then as company dean after the death of Le Lièvre), Thomas Le Lièvre (dean of a quartier, then as company dean after the resignation of Habert), Gabriel du Puy de Four
(ordinary on lists of 1643), Hercule Vaquelin (ordinary at resignation in 1643, V-4 car. 1499, fo. 148, not retained after reform of 1657), Jean Fabry (ordinary on lists of 1643, also became conseiller d'état d'honneur at the parlement), Jacques Favier (dean of a quartier), Jean-Jacques Renouard (semester at reform of 1657, ordinary in the 1670s, died dean of the council), Etienne Fouillé (dean of a quartier), Jacques Chaumes (ordinary in 1646, two years after resignation), Charles Pinon (councillor according to Lezeau, eliminated by the reform of 1657), Jacques jubert (Histoire, vol. 1, p. 515, eliminated by the reform of 1657), Jacques Barrin (ibid., p. 532, semester in 1672), Nicolas Jassaud (dean of a quartier, then dean of the company), René Le Roux (regency lists), Nicolas Bretel (regency lists), Antoine Ricouart (list of Lezeau).

1641-50:

Pierre Poncet (Histoire, vol. 1, p. 542, ordinary, councillor at the conseil royal des finances, died dean of the council), Jean-Baptiste Le Picart (semester on regency lists), Jacques Charette de La Terrière (regency lists, eliminated at or before the reform of 1657), Nicolas Jeannin de Castille (regency lists), Jean Molé (Histoire, vol. 1, p. 561, councillor of state and d'honneur in 1646, not retained after 1657), François du Gué (ibid., p. 569, semester in 1666, ordinary 1667, died sous-doyen of the council), Michel de Marillac (ibid., p. 567, ordinary in 1660, conseiller d'état d'honneur), Charles de Bérulle (list of Lezeau, not retained after the reform of 1657), Guillaume du Gué (Histoire, vol. 1, p. 573), Louis Boucherat (ordinary in 1651, eliminated in 1657, ordinary in 1660, ibid., p. 587), Louis Le Tonnellier (ibid., p. 582, semester in 1666, ordinary in 1680), Louis Laisné (semester in 1658, ordinary in 1671, ibid., p. 590), Jean Le Camus (on list of Lezeau, not retained after 1657), Daniel Voisin (conseiller d'état d'honneur in 1664, semester 1666, then ordinary), Louis Le Boulzé (on list of Lezeau), Cyprien Benard de Rezay (Histoire, vol. 1, p. 604, semester in 1669, ordinary in 1683, died sous-doyen in 1702), Bernard de Fortia (dean of a quartier, died dean of the company), Pierre d'Albertas (dean of a quartier), Jacques Paget (dean of a quartier).

1651-60

Honoré Courtois (semester before 1670, ordinary in 1676, declined to become councillor at the conseil royal des finances, died dean of the council, Saint-Simon, op. cit., vol. 4, pp. 15-6), Jacques Amelot (dean of a
quartier, company dean), Louis Lefèvre (Histoire, vol. 1, p. 632, semester in 1672, ordinary in 1685), Jacques Rouillé (ibid., semester in 1687, ordinary in 1687), Gaspard de Fieubet (ibid., semester in 1671, ordinary in 1683), Louis Girard (dean of a quartier, company dean), François d'Argouges (Histoire, vol. 1, p. 655, ordinary in 1685, at conseil royal des finances in 1685), Auguste-Robert de Pomereu (ibid., p. 663, semester in 1674, ordinary in 1684, at conseil royal des finances in 1697), Jean-Jacques de Mesmes (ibid., p. 673, semester in 1670, but lost his place when he became a président à mortier, as did Jean Molé, cited above), Paul Barrillon (ibid., p. 671, semester in 1672, ordinary in 1681), Henri Daguesseau (ibid., p. 682, semester in 1683, ordinary in 1694, at conseil royal des finances in 1695), Claude Bouchu (ibid., semester in 1672, ordinary later on), François Molé (dean of a quartier), Antoine Ladvocat (dean of a quartier).

72 - D'Ormesson, op. cit., vol. 2, passim.

73 - Mousnier, Conseil, p. 61 has considered the masters for the period 1661-77, to which we have added those received in 1678-87. The rate of promotion to the council was only 23% in this period.

74 - This is a hypothesis which remains to be verified.

75 - See appendices, Table 7.

76 - Méric de Vic was president at the chambre des comptes and at the Toulouse parlement. Jean Bochart became président aux enquêtes at the Paris parlement and later first president, Claude Bullion was président à mortier at the Grenoble parlement and had a similar office established at the Paris parlement.

77 - Infra, note 88. Jacques Viart became president in the justice souveraine of Metz (1601) and Jean de Maniban became lieutenant-général at the présidial of Bordeaux around 1611.

78 - Présidences à mortier: Méric de Vic, Jean Potier. First presidencies: François de Clarys (also juge-mage of Toulouse), Gilles Le Mazuier (until 1615).

79 - Présidence à mortier: François Pichon (1611). First presidencies: Gerard Cotton (1589), Claude Mangot (briefly in 1616), Geoffroy de Pontac (a former président à mortier), Marc-Antoine de Courgues (1616), Antoine Daguesseau.
Presidence à mortier at Aix: Honoré d'Aymar (1610).
First presidencies: Guillaume du Vair (1599), Elie Laisné (1632-4), Jean de Mesgrigny (1643-57).

Presidence à mortier at Grenoble: Claude Bullion (1607).
First presidencies: Claude Frère (1607), Louis Frère (1642), Denis Le Goux (1653).

Présidences à mortier: Nicolas Le Roux (1601), Bernard Potier (1608).
First presidencies: Jean de Bourgneuf (1590s), François d'Argouges (1661-76), Jacques Barrin (1619, the chambre des comptes).

Claude de Paris at Metz in 1634. Louis Laisné at Dijon in 1654-7.

Présidences à mortier: Nicolas Le Roux (1602), Charles Maignart (1608), Jacques Poirier (1610), Tanneguy de Lannoy (1632), Charles Maignart (1621).
First presidencies: Alexandre Faucon (1608-28), Charles Faucon (1628-47), Jean-Louis Faucon (1647-63), Claude Pellot (1668-83), Tanneguy Séguiier (1640), Jean Dyel (first president at the cour des aides).

Bourgneuf, Barrin, Gourgues, Pichon, Pontac, d'Aymar, the Frère, the Faucon, the Maignart.

Bourgneuf (three generations), Faucon, Frère-Le, Goux, Claris-Gourgues, d'Aymar, Pontac and Pichon from fathers-in-law.

Boscheron des Portes, Histoire du parlement de Bordeaux depuis sa création jusqu'à sa suppression (1451-1790), 2 vols., Bordeaux, 1878, vol. 1, passim.


For Bouchu, the pro-Conde Bourguignon, supra, Chapter 11, note 46.

Lieutenants-civils: Antoine Séguiier (1580), Jean Séguiier (1586), Nicolas de Bailleul (1624-7), Isaac Laffemas (1637-43), Dreux d'Aubray (1643) and his son Antoine (1661).

Prévôts des marchands: Boucher d'Orsay (1597), Martin Langlois (1594), François Miron (1604), Bailleul (1626), Alexandre de Sève (1654-62), Daniel Voysin (1662), Auguste-Robert de Pomereu (1676-82).
88 - Hacqueville, Bochart and Charles Billard (enquêtes), Claude Perrot and Pierre Lescalopier (requêtes) — all before 1610. Antoine Le Camus (1636) and Claude Baillet (1659).

89 - Apart from those in the text there were Jacques Faye (1589), Jean Lescalopier (1614), Antoine Le Camus (1602), Claude Ballion (1636).

90 - Jean Chandon (1592-7), Christophe de Sève (1597), Nicolas Chevallier (1610) and Jacques Amelot (1643).

91 - Jean Nicolay, Olivier Lefèvre d'Ormesson, Jean-Jacques de Mesmes (1609), Balthazar Gobelin and Jacques Jubert in 1618, Robert Aubery (1619), Antoine Le Camus (1637), Claude Gallard (1651). Jacques Mangot (1587) and Louis Girard (1626) were procureurs-généraux.

92 - Vell, cer. 1499, fo. 74.

93 - This was possibly because they held the offices for a long time (six years for both Sève and Pomereu).

94 - Unless noted otherwise the principal source of information on the masters and their embassies is, as in the preceding section, the Histoire.

95 - D'Argenson, op. cit., vol. 1, passim.

96 - Mousnier, Conseil, p. 171 for appointments of Charles Colbert as ambassador to England.

97 - Venice: Faye d'Espeisse, Antoine Séguyer (1598-1601), Jean Bochart (1607-11), René Courtin (1620-23), Louis Lefèvre (1624, died en route), Claude de Mesmes (1627-30), Gaspard Coignet (1635-7), Claude Mallier (1639-40), Jean Dyel (1643-5), Nicolas Bretel (1645-7), René Le Voyer (father and son, 1650, 1651-5, as ambassadors, see Duparc, Recueil des instructions aux ambassadeurs et ministres de France, Venise, 1958, p. 3).

Switzerland: Méric de Vic (1593, 1600-2, referred to as ambassadeur ordinaire près des seigneurs des ligues suisses in Henri IV, Lettres, vol. 8, p. 772), Louis Lefèvre (1604-6, noted as ambassadeur in ibid., vol. 7, p. 69), Eustache de Refuge (1606-11), Guillaume de Montholon (1621, 1627, to the Grisons), Claude Mangot (probably before his disgrace in 1616), Pierre Jeannin de Castille (1611-2), François Fouquet (1627), Charles de Laubespine, Jean d'Etampes, Jacques Lefèvre (1640), François Lasnier, François Lambert.

Holland: Michel Hurault (before 1592), Eustache de Re-
fuge (1612, 1614-5), Claude Bullion (1610), Charles Fay d'Espeisse (1624-31), Abel Servien and Claude de Mesmes (1647), Gaspard Coignet (1640-4), Jean d'Etampes (1637), Pomponne de Bellièvre (1650-1, see André and Bourgeois, Recueil... Hollande, 2 vols., Paris, 1922, vol. 1, Chapter 1.), Honoré Courtin and Paul Barrillon, ambassadeurs extraordinaires with the duc de Chaulnes in 1673-4 (ibid., Chapter 6).

England: Michel Hurault (before 1592), Samuel Spifame (1606-14), Pomponne de Bellièvre (1637-40, 1646-7, ambassadeur extraordinaire, see Jusserand, Recueil..., Angleterre, Paris, 1929, Chapter 1), Antoine de Bordeaux (1652-60, envoy, ambassadeur, ambassadeur extraordinaire, ibid., Chapter 6), Honoré Courtin, with the duc de Verneuil and the comte de Comminges (1665 as ambassadeur extraordinaire, ibid., Chapter 13, 1676-7, ambassadeur extraordinaire, ibid., Chapter 17), Paul Barrillon (1677-88, ambassadeur extraordinaire, ibid., Chapter 18).

Italian princes: Michel de Marillac at Mantua (1611), Abel Servien, with the maréchal de La Force (1630), Gaspard Coignet (1638), Pomponne de Bellièvre (1635-40), Nicolas Bretel, to the pope (1645), Jean Balthazar (1647).

Savoy: Claude Bullion, with the maréchal de Lediguiers (1609-11), Bailleul, Guillaume Foucquet (1604, 1611), Abel Servien (1631), René Le Voyer d'Argenson fils (1651-6).

98 - The inventory of René Courtin (étude 51, liasse 257) reveals a life-style extraordinarily different from that of most masters. He possessed 330 paintings and works on copper, many of which were by Italian painters. In addition he owned a valuable collection of plate and jewellery (22,004 livres) and his tapestries were worth far more than those of the average robin (9,880 livres).


100 - Antoine, Conseil, p. 228.

101 - Ibid., p. 71-2. Another reform of significance was the gradual disappearance of the contentious financial councils in favour of the bureaux, which were not sufficiently numerous to accommodate all the masters. In the eighteenth century the intendants des finances handled much financial contention which, during the reign of Louis XIII, would have been given to the
masters (ibid.).

The other financial functionaries were Jean Bochart and Michel de Marillac, surintendants des finances in 1624, Simon Marion, contrôleur-général during the 1620s, and André Lefèvre d'Ormesson, directeur.

A number of masters became ecclesiastics. For a few this was a question of retirement from the world at the end of a long career (Petremol, Elie Laisné, Palamède de Foudriac, the elder Le Voyer d'Argenson), but for others it was a matter of promotion. Guillaume Foucquet became bishop of Angers in 1616 (his father was the city governor). Paul Hurault was archbishop of Aix, Guillaume du Vair bishop-count of Lizieux (1618), Pierre Habert bishop-count of Cahors (1621), François de Villementée bishop of Saint-Malo (1659), Claude Mallier bishop of Tarbes (1640) and Nicolas Choart bishop-count of Beauvais (1651).

Numerous ex-masters acquired posts in the royal households: Langlois as councillor of the queen, Miron as chancellor of the dauphin, Bullion as surintendant de Navarre and chancellor of Marie de Médicis, Pierre Habert as councillor and first almoner of Gaston, Claude Le Doulx as head of his council, Jean de Choisy and Charles de Laubespine as his chancellor, Bailleul as chancellor of Anne of Austria, Antoine de Bordeaux, Jean de Longeuil and Gaspard de Fieubet as chancellors of Marie-Thérèse.
Part Three: The Masters between the Royal Council and the Courts
(1611 - 1648)
The rise in the prestige of the masters and the increase in their career opportunities occurred at the expense of other judicial groups. This can already be inferred from the gradual elimination of councillors of state who had not been masters, but it took place in a more spectacular way with the expansion in the activity of the requêtes de l'hôtel and the ever greater intervention in local affairs by the provincial intendants. The jurisdiction of the requêtes was constituted by removing litigation from other tribunals and the intendants were chosen not from the personnel of the sovereign courts, but from the company of masters.

The requêtes and the intendants were regarded by the members of the ordinary judicial hierarchy—the parlements, cours des aides and bureaux des finances—as unnecessary interlopers in the normal operation of business. The parlements were to judge among the subjects of the king, the cours des aides were to consider such questions as the fiscal status of his subjects, and the bureaux des finances were to bring in the taille. But "normal" conditions did
not exist in the France of Louis XIII.

Crown expenditure had grown steadily from the mid-1610s. The wars against the Protestants in the 1620s required still more money. To these sums were added the subsidies to the king's allies—the Dutch, the Swedes and the Bavarians. The armies fielded in Italy in 1629-30 and in Lorraine three years later necessitated other outlays. The "guerre ouverte" which began in 1635 brought about the highest royal expenditures ever seen. To pay for its wars the crown resorted to enormous borrowing, augmentation of the taille, new indirect taxes and forced loans, and to the inevitable creations of offices.

To bring in the taxes, to install new officials, and to suppress the urban riots and country uprisings which resulted from the search for more money, the monarchy needed loyal judges and sure courts. The king could always count upon individual magistrates and administrators in the judicial companies of the realm, but there was only one group which as a whole was not suspect—the masters of requests. The masters wholeheartedly threw themselves into the tasks demanded of them—at the requêtes de l'hôtel and in the provinces, with the result that the rest of the robe came to regard them as the lackeys of "MM. du conseil" and, which was worse, the servants of the financiers, traitants and partisans who bled the nation. The masters became the
enemies of the other judicial companies, and this accentuated the drift of the company away from the robe of the palais.

Yet almost simultaneously the company found reason for dissatisfaction with its protectors. As has been seen in Part One, under Henri III the masters complained of the decline of opportunities at the royal council and in the provinces. One of complicating factors in these troubles was the decision of the crown to increase the number of masters. In the 1630s and 1640s the company once again confronted a needy monarchy which was willing to upset its most useful legal auxiliaries by giving them new colleagues. The interplay of numbers and professional activity is much easier to demonstrate for this period than for the earlier one, due particularly to the existence of much more administrative correspondence.

The difficulties of the masters took place at a moment when the government was alienating most of its subjects, and in the 1640s the ministers succeeded in driving even the masters into opposition. There were two crises of particular sharpness, in 1640 and in 1648. Both were provoked by the establishment of offices. The second crisis proved to be the spark which set off the Fronde. The problems of the masters illustrate the desperation of the ministers during this period, and for this reason the relationship
of the company to the government is worth considering in some detail. Richelieu and Bullion felt that they could make demands upon a group which had benefitted so much during the preceding two decades, but their successors withdrew the benefits, and in 1648 they made an intolerable demand.

The decision to create more masterships in 1648 was a blow which threatened not only one judicial company, but also seventy-two powerful families of the Paris robe, some of whom had already experienced the banishment of individual members for acts of opposition to the royal will. For a brief moment the various professional elements of the same social milieu were welded together and the first Fronde began. But how could the masters oppose the monarchy over security of office and functions while at the same time undertaking employment which threatened the prestige of their colleagues? The masters were rapidly obliged to face this dilemma when their brother magistrates at the Chambre Saint-Louis and the grand'chambre successfully attacked the intendancies and the requêtes de l'hôtel. Although in this work the reactions of the company have not been followed very far into the Fronde period, it can be said that the dilemma was resolved in two different ways. The masters as a group became ambivalent towards the robins in opposition and swung back slowly to support the ministers, whereas individuals joined the "revolt of
the judges" and served it loyally. For the company 1648 was a revealing moment. The traditional judicial hierarchy, invoking royal ordinances, would have wiped out twenty years of gains made by the masters. Although the problem of the masters during the Fronde awaits further study, it can be suggested that the crisis marked a last leap by the company away from the palais.
The requêtes de l'hôtel is one of the least known judicial auxiliaries of centralization. Understandably no study of the court exists for the period prior to 1572, the date before which the minutes of the court are more or less inexistant. A recent theèse by Mme Oudot de Dainville examines the operation of the institution for the period 1715-71. (l) While this work presents a quantitative approach of considerable interest, the results have not been sufficiently explained by the author. In the eighteenth century the volume of judicial business handled by the requêtes steadily declined—a very different trend from the one outlined in the following chapters.

The intention here is to study the development of the requêtes and the judicial commissions attached to it for the reign of Louis XIII, forgetting neither important precedents nor tendencies which developed afterwards. The increasing activity of the tribunal, combined with the more important changes in the provincial intendancy, were elements which augmented the prestige of the company and
accounted for the mounting hostility of the traditional judicial hierarchy towards the masters. Therefore, this and the following chapters form an appreciation of the requêtes less for its own sake than for the light which the court sheds upon its members and their role in the internal crisis caused by the involvement of France in the Thirty Years War.

There are three parts to this chapter— a rapid résumé of juridical views of the court during the last part of the sixteenth century and the first half of the following one, a quantification of its activity from 1603 to 1647, and an evaluation of the qualitative changes in the jurisdiction without appeal of the masters until the death of Henri IV.

(a) Juridical descriptions of the requêtes

The views about the court which date from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries approximately reflect its evolution as well as the attitudes of robins both within and outside the council world. Since these learned opinions were based upon royal legislation, it is worthwhile reviewing the relevant ordinances and edicts.

Three royal ordinances determined the sixteenth century attitude towards the requêtes— those of 1318,
The ordinance of 1318 established that the competence of the court concerned royal offices and the suits of the king's domestics. This legislation was important because it set up the two-headed jurisdiction in first instance which the requêtes was to have throughout much of its life: cognizance of the litigation of privileged parties and of disagreements over titles to royal offices. The ordinance of 1499 added the judges of the requêtes du palais to the commensaux who pleaded before the masters in civil suits. An edict of 1482 (3) included the secrétaires du roi, who were allowed to choose between the requêtes du palais and the requêtes de l'hôtel, a right enjoyed by all members of the royal household except the magistrates of the requêtes du palais, who were obliged to plead before the masters. The right of the others to choose (committimus du grand sceau) reflected the inconvenience of pleading before the requêtes de l'hôtel. This tribunal was frequently rendered non-existent in Paris by the mobility and scarcity of its members. (4) Furthermore, the number and the duration of its audiences were strictly circumscribed. An edict of 1544 prescribed two séances (Monday and Thursday), each lasting an hour. (5) Appeal could be made to the grand chambre of the Paris parlement over the committimus jurisdiction, but disagreements over offices seem to have reached
definitive resolution at the royal council.

Yet no royal ordinances mentioned any last resort jurisdiction exercised by the masters at their auditory. The ordinance of Blois even forbade the masters to judge anything, "en dernier ressort, ni souverainement", a proscription which reveals that some of these cases had come into the hands of the company. (6)

The manner in which most jurists saw the requêtes is, accordingly, easy to predict. They treated the first instance jurisdiction with a certain amount of realism, even noting changes within it not sanctified by royal legislation. (7) Yet any jurisdiction without appeal exercised by masters was all but ignored. Loyseau, whose Cinq Livres du droit des offices was published in 1613, came closest among jurists outside the council world to admitting its existence: "quant aux renvois qui leur sont faicts du conseil privé, ils ne les ont que de legate non ordinario jure". (8) La Roche-Flavin, a president from the Toulouse parlement and a contemporary of Loyseau, was silent about this type of competence by the masters, and even later treatises (for example, the Trois Livres des offices published by Girard and Joly in 1638) did not mention it. The silence of the sixteenth century treatises corresponded fairly closely to reality: as will be explained below, the regular jurisdiction of the requêtes was one thing; the irregular
commissions attached to it were yet another. However, robins close to the council offered other views which reflected the changing competence of the requêtes.

Miraumont, councillor at the trésor and later lieu-tenant-général at the prévôté de l'hôtel, was probably the first jurist to note that the masters judged counterfeiters of the royal seal, but he did not indicate that this involved definitive judgement. (9) Charles Chappuzeau, barrister at the privy council, noted in his Traité des diverses juridictions de France (1618) that "causes extraordinaires" including falsifications of the seal were sent to the requêtes by council decree or letters patent. (10) More significant was a thin guide brought out by Lazare du Crot, also a barrister at the council, in the regency of Anne of Austria.

The Vrai Styl des requestes de l'hôtel à l'extra-ordinaire purported to help litigants at a rather special court with its own style of legal procedure. In the introduction to the work the author noted the traditional cognizance of offices by the requêtes, and considered that the requêtes du palais, to the detriment of the requêtes de l'hôtel, judged the cases of most of the king's domestics. (11) He offered a list of those who could plead by right before the tribunal in virtue of their letters of committimus—officiers de la couronne (the chancellor, keeper of the
seals, grand maître des eaux et des forets, etc.), commen-
saux, members of the royal family, chevaliers des ordres
du roi, councillors of state, presidents of the Paris par-
lement, masters of requests, the judges of the sovereign
courts, secrétaires du roi, certain religious foundations,
members of colleges and communities created by the king and
barristers of the royal council, all of whom "aiment mieux
 PLAIDER ausdites requestes de l'hostel qu'ausdites requestes
du palais". This claim may well have been flattery on the
part of the barrister, but it should be noted that the
masters prided themselves on the rapidity of their proce-
dure. (12) The list covered a great many more categories
than the few groups mentioned by the jurists of the six-
teenth and early seventeenth centuries.

The introduction is particularly interesting because
it includes a list of cases judged "souverainement" at the
requêtes, some of which had already been noted by Chappu-
seau. (13) These involved falsifications of the great and
privy seals, other cases sent by the privy council, proposi-
tions d'erreur against the verdicts of sovereign courts,
"toutes sortes d'instances qui se forment ou s'entendent
en exécution des arrêts du conseil privé", appeals from the
ordinances of the rapporteurs at the royal council, appeals
over expenses awarded there to litigants, the claims of
barristers at the council concerning their fees, and "d'aultres
causes et matières semblables". His list was almost iden-
tical to that contained in the ordinance of 1667, which mentioned cases arising from the implementation of lettres d'imprimerie but omitted the *propositions d'erreur*, which had been lost to a bureau of the council. (14)

The very considerable discrepancies between the descriptions of the court given by du Crot and earlier jurists were not due mainly to the more accurate knowledge of the practitioner. The period between the death of Henri IV and the publication of the *Vrai Styl des requestes à l'extraordinaire* was revolutionary for the tribunal in both quantitative and qualitative terms.

(b) the growth of the requêtes de l'hôtel

Ideally the archives of the requêtes would consist of about half a dozen series (15), but the damage suffered by the court archives has been very serious and the condition of what remains continues to worsen. (16) The minutes of the court's decisions begin only in 1573, although there are a few from 1571-2. Between 1618 and 1630 about 15% of the quartiers have completely disappeared and a further 10% have suffered partial damage. Between 1631 and 1640 20% of the quartiers are a total loss and there is partial damage to another 10%. There are no registers of court sessions before 1603 and, except for the years 1613-26, it is only after the Fronde that they
are continuously and well preserved. However, these registers are for the sessions of audiences only. There are no records of the sessions of the chambre du conseil, apart from the minutes of decisions, until the end of the seventeenth century. The list of missing archives is easy to continue—no criminal dossiers (which contain inquiries and interrogations) before 1654, few registers of the greffe, etc.

It is obvious that any attempt to write a history of the requêtes de l'hôtel for the period covered from 1572 to 1648 is doomed to failure. Nonetheless, a few possibilities are open to the historian. By examining the minutes of the court he can follow changes in jurisdiction. By counting the decisions recorded in the registers of audiences and collected in the minutes of the conseil he can acquire an idea of the rate of growth undergone in the activity of the tribunal. The first of these possibilities is the approach adopted in most of this chapter as well as the following one. It is the second possibility which immediately receives attention.

Two graphs have been constructed in order to outline overall growth between 1603 and 1647 and to investigate the rate of expansion in both first and final instance jurisdictions of the court during the period of most rapid evolution, from 1618 to 1638.
Two sources have supplied the information for the first graph (see appendices), which traces the overall movement of business—the registers of audiences and an inventory of the court archives drawn up in 1784, in the days of the tribunal's decadence. The first source records the interlocutory decisions, procedural ordinances such as the appointment of parties to the conseil and the choice of rapporteur, orders relative to adjudications of goods and definitive decisions in simple cases pleaded by the counsel of the litigants. (17) In addition to this basically reliable source there is the numerical inventory of 1784, quartier by quartier after 1610, of all the acts contained in the minutes of both the audiences and the conseil. (18) Although the counts were fairly accurate, the inventory included records of appearances of parties at the court registry. These pieces could constitute as much as 10% of the documents for a quartier.

An important limitation concerning the use of these sources must be noted. The first graph can represent the activity only of the requêtes de l'hôtel at Paris and does not include the decisions issued by the ad hoc versions of the tribunal attached to the council on its travels. Unfortunately there are no registers of audiences for the masters in service at the council. (19) These judges handled appeals against council procedures and the awarding of expenses. It is likely that the movement of
the king was responsible for the troughs registered.
in the volume of decisions issued in the audiences for
some years.

The number of decisions and the totals given in the
inventory form the two lines of the first graph. There
are four periods which mark the movement of business from
1603 to 1647.

The first complete register of audiences presents the
image of a very minor tribunal. In 1603 there were only
700 decisions handed down in the audiences, an average of
eight for each session. The impression of mediocrity is
confirmed by the number of judges who missed their quartier—
nearly a score. Yet it appears that the business of the
court expanded somewhat in the first decade of the century.
In 1609 about 1,200 decisions were recorded.

If these years formed a period of limited growth,
those extending from 1613 to 1624 made up the second
period. The decisions given in the audiences varied in
number from 1,000 to 1,600 each year, an average of ten
to fifteen decisions per séance. When the number of acts
recorded by the inventory after 1618 are added (20), it
can be seen that the total number of decisions for both
the conseil and the audiences was never higher than 500
per quartier. The registers of sessions reveal that the
requêtes interested the masters much more than in 1603. Usually less than half a dozen judges missed their quartier.

A third period opened with the last months of 1624. Until 1626 there was a sudden increase in activity, recorded by both registers and inventory, but from 1627 to 1632 the amount was more or less stationary. In 1626 the average number of decisions given in the audiences each session was eighteen. Unfortunately there are no registers of audiences from 1627 to 1630 and the quartiers of minutes have suffered very much. For those which remain largely intact the inventory records a range of from 500 to 750 preserved acts.

The fourth period, one of steady growth, began in 1633 and continued until the last year of the reign, after which the amount of business stagnated. The number of decisions handed down in the audiences leapt from 1,900 in 1632 to 2,900 in 1636 (an average of twenty-four per session). For 1634, which has the best preserved minutes of the decade, the inventory gives 3,128 acts; ten years later it notes 5,775, an increase of over 82%. (21)

A question which comes to mind is how the growth was divided between first and final instance jurisdictions. An approximate answer is found by tracing the
activity of the chambre du conseil. The decisions of this chamber concerned cases which were deemed to require a presenting magistrate. The business of the conseil did not accurately reflect that of the audiences, since litigation did not always enter the first chamber by way of the second. Criminal cases and the more important civil suits were handled at every stage by rapporteurs. The real significance of the number of decisions given by the chambre du conseil is in following the fluctuations of the most lucrative and, in final instance, the most controversial activity of the requêtes.

There is a fair degree of certainty in having the exact number of judgments because the court clerk always numbered them and wrote down "et dernière du present quartier" on the last minute for both first and final instance decisions. Even when this minute is missing we are still sure of having nearly all the decisions as long as the last or penultimate day of the chamber's sessions are preserved. At times there is the good fortune of having the last decision of a quartier which is almost wholly missing.

On account of difficulties in verifying the completeness of the archives of this chamber before the fire of 1618, the second graph begins that year. There are four results. First of all there was a regular progression...
the first instance competence from 1623. In fact it appears that the high level of activity of the court after 1626 was due to the number of decisions in first instance. Secondly there was a noticeable stagnation of the jurisdiction without appeal from 1621 to 1632. After 1626 there was even a period of decline. The third result was a sudden increase in the number of judgements in 1624-6 for both types of cognizance. Finally there was a steady advance in both first and final instance jurisdictions from 1633. Thus the volume of business passing through the chambre du conseil followed the same fluctuations as that handled in the audiences. It can be imagined that changes in the amount of first and final instance activity in the audiences would be similar to that in the other chamber. These variations require an explanation.

For cases heard with right of appeal the increase came with an influx of beneficiaries of committimus, since the number of suits concerning titles of office remained constantly low. (22) The explanation lies in a council regulation drawn up in February 1621. (23) This measure had the advantage for the tribunal of fixing with precision who could plead at either the requêtes de l'hôtel or the requêtes du palais. Legislation prior to this regulation had directed only a few specific categories to the requêtes de l'hôtel. (24) None had justified the right of counselors of state and masters of requests (not to mention
their widows) to plead before a tribunal staffed by their relatives, friends and colleagues. The reason for the good fortune of the company is not clear, but it should be noted that it coincided with the increasing number of masters who were made councillors of state. The company may have been expressly rewarded by the chancellor or keeper of the seals. Another possibility is that the masters pressed the government for a wider range of cases. Without a doubt the measure enhanced the prestige of the group and increased its épices.

For the jurisdiction in final instance the generalized stagnation could have been caused by the diminution of the number of cases of a certain type, particularly those involving the more trivial aspects of council litigation. (25) The continual movement of the council around the south and west of France during the 1620s would account for the decline in the number of such suits heard at Paris. But for the sudden increase in 1624-6, the period of stagnation in 1627-32, and the upsurge after 1632 political causes were decisive. These will be discussed in the following chapters. The institutional seeds of growth had been placed before the reign of Louis XIII and it is consequently to the earlier tribunal which we now turn.
The sixteenth century jurists may be partly forgiven their ignorance of what was judged without right of appeal at the requêtes. This sort of competence played no part in the life of a tribunal called the requêtes de l'hôtel. All sovereign courts began their verdicts with "il sera dit" or "la cour déclare", but the masters were obliged to call themselves "juges souveraines en cette partie" and this practice continued well after certain sorts of cases (for example, falsifications of the seal) became part of the jurisdiction of the court. In the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries masters judging cases in final instance at the requêtes formed a sort of standing judicial commission whose personnel, including the crown prosecutor and the chief clerk, made up part of a regular tribunal which had been legalized by royal ordinances. Decisions in both first and final instance were made in the same sessions. Yet some types of suits were so frequently sent to the masters that they came be recognized as part of the de facto jurisdiction of the requêtes de l'hôtel, notwithstanding the silence of the ordinances.

These judicial commissions, whether acting at the auditory of the company at Paris or outside the capital in the service of the king, owed their existence to the
activity of the royal council, the chanceries and, under Louis XIII, the provincial intendants. Institutional reasons suffice to account for the more trivial aspects of the competence of the requêtes. However, there is a "political" explanation which must be considered for other types of case. In the sixteenth century, when the status of the company was low, its activity resulting from the second cause was of little importance.

(i) towards the end of the sixteenth century

Four sorts of business were heard in the auditory of the masters: minor problems surrounding council procedures; demands for évocations by the privy council; suits about crimes committed concerning the expedition of chancery letters; and rare "miscellaneous" cases transmitted by the council for judgement without appeal.

The royal council risked losing much time if it heard litigation involving the technical aspects of its procedure such as appeals against ordinances issued by a rapporteur, appeals against expenses awarded to a winning party and disagreements over the salaries of barristers. (26) In fact council decrees for the reigns of Charles IX and Henri III reveal that the council sometimes statuated on these matters. (27) Resort to the requêtes de l'hôtel was an easy way of unburdening "MM. du conseil".
Although the masters encountered some opposition from the Paris parlement over these matters in the sixteenth century, the most serious threat came from the grand conseil in the 1580s. (28) In that terrible decade the masters may well have seen the disappearance of these trivial cases. There was little glory in having them, but some financial loss in their removal. In the seventeenth century the masters were left to judge the council trivia in peace by the Paris parlement and the grand conseil. Only provincial courts continued to challenge the requêtes. (29)

More important was the giving of opinions to the council. There were three sorts of "avis", each involving the administration of royal justice: for évocations, for judicial review and for the functions of magistrates and other officials.

Before 1585 the masters handled many instances submitted by the privy council, for the most part demands for the transfer of a case from one court to another for reasons of suspected judicial dishonesty (i.e., usually the presence among the judges of the court where the original litigation had taken place of friends or relatives of one of the parties). In 1583 more than 470 decisions on or about these demands were issued by the masters. (30) Yet these judges handed down no judgement; rather, they sent their opinion to the privy council. Although it is possible
to classify this activity as other than "sovereign", the preamble of the verdict, the number of judges whose presence was required, the habit of the chief clerk of keeping the opinions with decisions for cases heard in final instance and, above all, the willingness of the council to follow the advice of the masters, reveal that the opinions were little less than decisions in last resort subject to authentication by the privy council. The form in which the judgement took place merely placated the legal scruples of the council in regard to the royal ordinances.

In Part One it was discussed how the masters lost the right to issue opinions in 1585 and how they regained them in 1594. However, during the regency of Marie de Médicis they once again disappeared from the competence of the requêtes de l'hôtel. This probably coincided with their transfer to the council quartier of masters, whose archives, by and large, have not been preserved. (31) The disappearance of these affairs at the requêtes undoubtedly masks a slight increase in the number of cases actually judged there in the early 1610s.

Opinions were also given about the propositions (or moyens) d'erreur offered against the decisions of the sovereign courts in civil litigation. A favourable opinion would lead to a rehearing of the case by the court where the case had been judged. The verdicts of the Paris par-
element especially challenged, which explains the bitterness of that court over the propositions. (31) These opinions were very expensive for litigants, which may have caused the parlement to suspect the integrity of the masters. (32) As scandalous and expensive as they were, there were rarely more than half a dozen given each year. (33)

The council asked for a third type of advice, concerning the regulation of the activities of judicial and financial officials. The creation of new offices usually upset the organisation of work among the personnel of an institution, and the officials would resort to the king for arbitration. The masters would be called upon for an opinion which turned out to be both long and costly. (34) It might be thought that these recommendations would be encountered frequently among the archives of the court, but there was rarely more than one each year even during the reign of Louis XIII. (35)

The transference of the opinions for évocations in 1585 left the masters with one important area of competence—the counterfeiting of documents which had passed under the seals of the great and privy chanceries. The falsified documents were usually letters of provision for offices, letters of nobility, or decrees relating to legal proceedings. On the rare occasion imaginative counterfeiters made up new taxes. The culprits were usually members of the low
runners of errands at the council or chancery and sometimes even officials of the chanceries. The falsification of letters of the great seal was a capital offence, since it involved the appropriation of royal power. Hence the punishment carried a symbolic importance: the faussaire would have to beg the pardon of the chancellor; the king and God; the seals and documents would be suspended from his neck as he was led through the streets and they would be destroyed on the scaffold; and, in the sixteenth century, the counterfeiter would sometimes have his hand severed before execution and be hanged in front of the residence of the chancellor. However, the counterfeiters who fabricated documents emanating from the privy chanceries were treated less severely, because the falsified papers were only ordinances of the courts. (36)

The origin of this jurisdiction lay in the role of the masters in the chanceries, but they began to handle these cases regularly only from the early sixteenth century. (37) Even then, because of the small number of their company, they were required by the ordinances to have the assistance of magistrates from other courts. Furthermore, some counterfeiters were handed over to commissions of masters and officers of the grande prévôté or to masters "à la cour et suite du roi". There was uncertainty as to the legality of sending these cases to the requêtes de l'hôtel and only in the 1620s did letters patent always specify the masters
in their auditory at Paris. (38)

The Paris parlement seems not to have contested the jurisdiction as long as the masters were obliged to call upon the assistance of their colleagues. There were skirmishes in 1582, 1598 and 1621, but thereafter until the regency the masters were left in peace. (39)

Cases involving falsifications of the seal entered the requêtes de l’hôtel at a rate of about three a year until the end of the 1620s. Then they all but disappeared, probably because the provincial intendants acquired them. (40)

(ii) evolution of the jurisdiction during the reign of Henri IV

The impressive expansion of the requêtes in the 1630s had precedents in the reign of Henri IV. There were four innovations, three of them of particular importance in the later evolution of the tribunal.

The first was the acquisition of the cognizance of rebellions committed against the executors of council decrees—that is, any sort of opposition ranging from an impolite refusal to murder. The council traditionally disclaimed cognizance of criminal matters. (41) Hence it required the assistance of a regular tribunal. Before the
League it is possible than the sovereign courts handled these cases, but after 1596 the council called upon the requêtes de l’hôtel. (42) This is a sign of the increased vigour of the council in retaining competence over business which was properly that of the monarch. In addition it was a minor gain for the masters. After 1600 several cases were sent to the tribunal every year, and gradually this jurisdiction spread to include not only rebellions against executors of decrees of the privy council but also those involving the ordinances of the conseil d’état et des finances. Eventually the requêtes also turned into an agency for the reiteration of council decrees. (43)

Another area of final instance cognizance slipped into the hands of the masters in 1609. Authors registered permits to print their works at the court, and it protected them from pirate editions. The number of permits was never very high, even if the authors were illustrious, and only a few contraventions were judged at the court each year. (44)

Suits arising from important political issues also began to appear before the masters. Although they had been allowed to hear appeals from the decisions of the Toulouse parlement in the early 1570s over the implementation of the edicts of pacification, no similar cognizance of political cases was granted to the tribunal under Henri III. (45)
In the 1590s competence in an area of serious contention appeared, and it was to grow throughout the first half of the seventeenth century. While the masters had been ordered to install a number of officials at the cour des monnaies in 1579, they had never received into office judges who had been refused admittance by their companies. (46) After the civil wars this practice became frequent. The situation of Guerin de Bourgneuse, would-be messenger in ordinary at Rouen and Paris, though not concerning a magistrate, was typical. In 1605 letters patent were addressed to the masters explaining how Bourgneuse

"ayant porté les lettres à nostre dourt de parlement de Rouen afin d'y estre receu, elle n'y a pointc voulu entendre quelques jussions que ledit de Bourgneuse ayt porté à ceste fin..." (47)

After an examination of the professional and personal qualities of the candidate, the masters were to receive him, which they did. They were rarely called upon to admit into office the judges of sovereign courts (the exception being a few magistrates from the chambers of the edict in the parlements). Reception did not always finish the affair and the requêtes usually judged the obstructions, violent and otherwise, offered to an official by his colleagues after his admittance. (48) The requêtes did not handle only individual cases: by the 1630s the officials of whole new jurisdictions were being sent to the masters, thus bypassing the sovereign courts, much to the annoyance of the latter. (49)
The reign of Henri IV also witnessed the emergence of a miscellaneous competence made up of suits sent by the royal council, some trivial and others important. Under Henri III a few cases were sent to the masters, who were often asked for an opinion rather than a judgement, thus keeping within the ordinances. (50) After the League a steady trickle of instances ranging from abuse of official functions to treason came their way. The most controversial was probably the imposture of Lanceschi, so-called son of the pope, which is recounted in an old though detailed article by F. T. Perrens. This case suggests the reasons why the ministers sometimes resorted to a tribunal made up exclusively of masters. It also demonstrates the dilemma often faced by a company which was both anxious to present an image of magisterial probity and attentive to the interests of the king. (51)

Barthelemeo Lanceschi was a typical impostor of the ancien régime: he was something of an alchemist, a seeker of lost goods and buried treasure, a man who never stayed in one place very long. A victim of the Italian inquisition, he set himself up in Paris as a member of the Borgia, relative of an Italian cardinal and indirectly, the pope. On the strength of his connections he began to borrow money, much of it from personnel in the chancery. But it was not this which made trouble for him. Rumours spread about that Lanceschi was the son of the pontiff and, unfortunately,
he did nothing to discourage them. Understandably the
Protestants gleefully seized upon the issue and finally
the papal nuncio, Ubaldini, decided to take steps to
eliminate this nuisance.

Henri IV was informed of the activities of Lanceschi,
and he sent his confessor to the Italian. The confessor
was convinced of his good faith. Then François Miron,
lieutenant-civil and master of requests, was sent along,
and he too was convinced. Lanceschi even had several au-
diences with the king, who realized eventually that delays
in the arrival of a promised commission from the pope to
the Italian were very suspicious. Finally Paul V sent a
letter to the nuncio, asking the king to begin investiga-
tion of the adventurer. Henri was obliging. Such an action
would satisfy French Catholics, and it would gain the much-
needed approval of the pope himself. Equally, it would
appease the powerful Borgia, who otherwise might drift
further into the Spanish camp, with the result that one
day the Holy See be occupied by an anti-French pope.

In July 1608 Lanceschi was imprisoned. The investi-
gation was entrusted to Miron, who proceeded slowly, ignoring
the questions which the nuncio wished to have asked, and
even sending copies of the interrogation to the ambassador
of Venice. The exasperated nuncio demanded to direct the
interrogations and asked that a special commission be set
The Paris parlement, suspected by the nuncio for its gallicanism, could be trusted neither to continue the investigation nor to offer a verdict against the adventurer. Initially Martin Langlois and Jacques Ollier, two masters known for both their connections at court and their willingness to serve the papal cause (Ubaldini referred to them as "sinhora valorosi, Prattichi e disiderosi di haver honore da questa causa e servir bene sua santità") were chosen to carry out the investigation, using the questions specified by the nuncio. The investigation dragged because Lanceschi could not be made to admit anything; only the testimony of former servants and particularly Lanceschi's Dominican confessor finally compromised him.

The nuncio wanted to see the impostor condemned to death, and he found suitable French judicial precedents. In addition he needed reliable judges. Twelve masters were added to the two investigating magistrates, who were to be the rapporteurs. According to L'Estoile the nuncio challenged several of them, including Palamède de Foudriac, whose ultramontanism was suspect. (52) Although a verdict against Lanceschi was more or less guaranteed, six masters were initially unwilling to hand down a death sentence. However, none of them persisted and the adventurer was condemned to be hanged. But the question arose
as to whether mention should be made in the sentence of the alleged papal descent of Lanceschi or only "equipo-
llentia verba". The populace would be sure to misunderstand in the former case. The masters refused to statuate and the problem was given to Sillery, the chancellor, who turned it over to Ubaldini, who in turn decided that the sentence would condemn Lanceschi "d'avoir calomnieusement et meschamment et contre vérité pris le nom et armes de la maison de Bourghese et s'estre dict de la qualité portée par ledict procès". (53)

The nuncio had nothing but praise for Langlois and Ollier and wanted to offer each of them fifty or sixty écus, but rumours that the judges had been bought discouraged this distribution of épices. Instead, the nuncio offered to aid the career of Ollier's son in the church. Although the masters had not, strictly speaking, been bought, they expected Ubaldini to pay a very large sum, and the nuncio was shocked by the bill which they sent him. Apart from monetary compensation for their services, the experience must have been demoralizing. The masters had been manipulated in both the investigation and the judgement of Lanceschi by an Italian ecclesiastic. Certainly contemporaries of gallican or "politique" tendencies like L'Estoile found the prosecution scandalous. (54)

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Under Henri IV the masters were favoured by the crown in a number of ways, among which must be included changes in the competence of the requêtes de l'hôtel. By the beginning of the regency of Marie de Médicis this tribunal housed a company which was less an advisory body to the council than an executive one. It constituted a way for "MM. du conseil" to retain indirectly the cognizance of important judicial cases. In the reign of Louis XIII it would be exploited by the crown even further.
Notes


4 - U 521 (propositions d'erreurs, etc.), p. 433, notes how in 1557 the parlement sent for the masters at the requêtes and were told "il n'y en a aucun d'eux en cette ville hormis Maître Boucher qui...a dit ne pouvoit assister...parce qu'il est contraint aller précéder au grand conseil".

5 - Miraulmont, Mémoires, p. 37

6 - Supra, note 2.

7 - See du Haillan, op. cit., pp. 138-9, Duret, op. cit., pp. 126-7, Figon, op. cit., p. 13, and Miraulmont, loc. cit., most of whom mention the loss of cases concerning royal domestics. In the minutes of the requêtes for 1583 the suits of the domestics are third in numerical importance after the cases of the judges of the requêtes du palais and secrétaires du roi.

8 - Loyseau, op. cit., p. 32.

9 - Miraulmont, op. cit., p. 35


11 - Lazare du Crot, Le Vrai Styl des requêtes de l'hostel à l'extraordinaire, Paris, n.d. (but obviously published during the regency, since mention is made in the text of "Monsieur le duc d'Orléans, son oncle i.e. of the king"), pp. 1-4.

12 - See the Journal of Le Boindre, councillor in the Paris
parlement (British Museum, Egerton ms. 1680, fo. 1-2, new pagination fo. 173) for the hardly modest claim of Amolot, the company dean, that at the requêtes a case could be heard and judged in one quarter of the time required at the parlement.

13 - Du Crot, op. cit., p. 4.

14 - Antoine Conseil, passim, for a description of the bureau de cassation in the eighteenth century.

15 - These would consist of the dossiers of criminal suits, the minutes and registers of decisions, the registers of the sessions of both chambers of the court, the registers containing the distribution of cases, épices and the reception and return of documents, the archives for seizures and finally the registers into which were copied letters patent and the deliberations of the company.

16 - Some of the damage was due to the tendency of court clerks and bailiffs to regard the papers of the tribunal as personal property. In 1627 (V-4 car. 72, 7 January) the crown prosecutor complained that the heir of the former chief clerk had "plusieurs minutes d'arrests desdites requestes de l'hostel" and in 1643 the clerk demanded that the widow of one of the court bailiffs hand over a number of registers of consignments (ibid., car. 155, 18 October).

More serious was the effect of two fires which devastated the palais in 1618 and 1776. The first, mentioned in a request of the clerk Angran before the court (V-4 car. 43, 31 March 1618) "a consommé non seulement la grande salle du palais et chambres desdites requêtes, mais aussi und grande partie des sacs, registres et papiers dudit greffe, dont le reste qui a esté sauvé fut promptement jeté par les fenestres dudit greffe respondant devant l'esglise Saint Barthélémy en grand désordre et confusion parmy une multitude de personnes". Later, in 1621 (ßi-4 car. 55, 17 January) payment was made to a carpenter for "ung grand coffre pour serrer les pappiers restes do l'incendie du palais", which suggests that very little was saved of four hundred years of archives. The registers of letters patent were, however, saved, since copies were made around 1660. The originals may have disappeared in the fire of 1776. According to Poitevin, the master charged with drawing up an inventory in 1784 (U 1001, fo. 1) "les minuttes furent jetées dans la cour de M. le premier président, de là transportées dans son jardin où elles ont séjournées, conduites ensuite au couvent où elles sont restées dans une grenier pendant
plus d'une année".

A third source of damage was the activity of the revolutionaries, who destroyed much which they considered of little interest but also documents of importance which took up space— for example, the criminal dossiers.

A fourth source is the condition under which the archives are presently kept, which perpetuates the effects of neglect caused by the functionaries and the policies of successive empires and republics.

17 - V-4 car. 1139-44.
18 - U 1001.

19 - However, there are a few "feuilles d'audience" for sessions near the council: V-4 car. 42 (December 1617 at Rouen), ibid., car. 46 (October 1618 at Poissy), ibid., car. 47 (April-June at Poissy, Amboise and Tours), car. 63 (October 1624 at Poissy).

20 - The damage prior to 1618 is evident from a comparison of counts from the registers of sessions with those from the inventory. For example, in 1613 the first source gives 1,591 sentences, while the second notes only 1,008 acts.

21 - Across the reign of Louis XIII the number of sessions increased: 104 (1618), 105 (1626), 103 (1632), 116 (1633), 123 (1636), 148 (1647).

22 - Dainville, op. cit., p. 74, notes that a council regulation of 1615 had removed these cases from the requêtes. However, they are still found in the court archives after this date.

23 - Tessereau, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 330-1 (9 February 1621), mentions a clientele substantially the same as indicated in du Crot, but adds the trésoriers de France, the clerks and bailiffs of the council, the domestics of royal and princely households and the officials of the châtelet, trésor, table de marbre, admiralite, connétable, élection of Paris, bailliage du palais and hôtel de ville of Paris.

24 - Dumont, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 82-3, includes a committimus regulation for 1598 which makes no mention of the requêtes de l'hôtel.

25 - Du Crot, op. cit., p. 4, gives a detailed list of these: "les apppellations des instances poursuites
audit conseil privé, appointemens en droit et règles ordinaires à communiquer et produire (i.e. the dossiers for the rapporteur), ou sommaires à escrire et produire dans trois jours, par eux rendus aux instances desquelles ils sont rapporteurs, des forclusions de produire, bref tout ce qui s'ordonne par lesdits maîtres des requêtes.

26 - Expenses were usually considerable, due in part to the chicanery of litigants who multiplied the number of rolls of procedures, exaggerated the number of arraignments made by bailiffs and inflated travelling expenses. The sums mentioned in 39 cases in six months of activity in 1635 range from 116 to 2,493 livres; 29 (75%) were for sums over 500 livres and 11 (28%) for more than 1,000.

27 - Dumont, op. cit., vol. 1, passim. See also V-4 car. 1, undated opinion for Julien Texier, upon which the council was to statuate.

28 - N.s. 2236, p. 143 (a dispute with the parlement in 1543) and supra, Part I, Chapter 2.

29 - V-6 car. 1213, fo. 196, 19 November 1621 (a dispute with various Normand courts over the salary of a council barrister).

30 - V-4 car. 7-8 and confirmations in Dumont, op. cit., vol. 1, passim.

31 - Under Charles IX the council secretaries included their acts with the minutes of the council. See f.f. 16221, fo. 198, 275 and f.f. 16223, fo. 65, for opinions and decisions of the masters.

31bis - U 521, pp. 417-23, records the scandal of one opinion given in 1552 in a suit between the king of Navarre and the duc of Nevers, when the latter told the parlement that two masters had taken only fifteen minutes to reach an opinion after looking over a lengthy dossier.

32 - Cosmé Clausse paid 443 écus to the-court for an inadmissible moyen d'erreur in 1618 (V-4 car. 45, 18 July), just a few days before Nicolas de Bourgeys paid 152.

33 - For example, in 1615 five opinions were issued, two against decisions of the Rennes parlement and three against those of the Paris parlement.

34 - The opinion for the officials of the présidial of Limoges (V-4 car. 116, 1638) brought the tribunal 360
écus, the rapporteur (Amelot, the dean) 216, the petits commissaires (other masters assisting Amelot) 40 and the clerk and bailiffs 32, making a total of 648 écus.

35 - We have found only three such opinions for the sixteenth century, of which only one is in the preserved minutes of the court (V-I car. 12, 22 October 1597, for the clerks of the sénéchaussée and présidial of Guyenne). From 1617 to 1643 (the minutes for 1641-2) have not been examined seventeen others have come to light.

36 - Unpublished research of the author.

37 - The earliest example of cognizance by the masters is f.f. 18234, fo. 98 (1531). Prior to this date it appears that the parlement (f.f. 16270, fo. 8, extract of registers for 1528) and the grand conseil (ibid., fo. 17, extract of registers for 1505) handled these cases.

38 - The last commissions to specifically named judges (rather than a requetes quartier) are in V-4 car. 1497, fo. 23-4 (1617).

39 - V-4 car. 7, 19 January 1583 (minute of a decision involving the Turgots of Normandy), f.f. 16270, fo. 13, infra, Chapter 3.

40 - AN 0-1, register 3, fo. 52, commissions of the 1630s and 1640s to provincial intendants for the purpose of enabling them to prosecute faussaires de sceaux.

41 - Doucet, op. cit., vol. 1, Chapter 4. See V-4 car. 95 (5 January 1634) for the request of Pierre Moitie "à ce que attendu que le conseil du roy ne congnoist de crimes".

42 - V-4 car. 12, 5 February 1596 (proceedings against Jean Conseil, Jean Amelot and others).

43 - Infra, Chapter 2.

44 - V-4 car. 25, letters of 6 February 1609 for Jacques Le Roy, marchand libraire at the University of Paris, permitting him to make "sphères, globes, quarres, géométriques, astralabes... et autres instruments de mathématique" as well as to print a book "L'Usage réformé d'iceux (instruments) for ten years.

Among other authors and printers were Urfe (the fifth book of Astrée), Richer (the Mercure françois), Chappelain (Mémoires de la royne Marguerite), Renaudot
(the Gazette), a work on the establishment of the French academy by its first director, Le Gras, Bessin (L'Apologie du Roy), Barbet (Reveil, ou Histoire générale de ce qui s'est fait et passé au siège de la Rochelle), etc.

The requêtes played only a negligible role in censorship. The masters dispatched Grane and Castrain (infra, Chapter 2) and in June 1634 they registered a decree of the council "par lequel très expresses inhibitions et défences sont faites à toutes personnes de quelle qualité et condition quelles soient et à tous imprimeries et libraires de faire doresnavant imprimer, vendre, ny publier aucuns livres ou escripts touchant les affaires de son (the king's) estat en quelque sorte et maniere que le soit sans permission expresse de Sa Majesté". The decree levied a 10,000 livre fine against the author and printer of Les Questions sur la justice des Royzs de France et sur les alliances avecq les hérétiques et infidélles (V-4 car. 96, 8 June). There are no traces of judicial proceedings made at the requêtes in virtue of this decree.

45 - V-4 car. 1, undated minutes of the early 1570s.
46 - F.f. 18234, fo. 321.
47 - V-4 car. 19, 21 April 1605.
48 - For example, the request of Mathieu Froger, prêtre curé of La Poste, dean of La Roche Mabelle, and holder of a recently created councillorship for clerics at the bailliage and présidial of Alençon (V-4 car. 152, 26 July 1643), mentions "les indignités" which Froger had to put up with "dans la chambre du conseil, qu'en public, dans l'auditoire".

49 - See the lists of officials received at the requêtes in f.f. 18234, passim. In 1637 the court registered council decrees ordering it to receive and install the officials of the waters and forests of Normandy and the newly created sénéchaussée of Saint-Léonard de Noblat in Limousin (V-4 car. 112, 14, 28 November).

50 - See lists in f.f. 16218, fo. 389 ff, and 18158, fo. 321 ff for a wide variety of cases sent to the masters from 1540 to 1571 involving pillage, military disorders, malversations, séditation populaire, abuse of functions and even sodomy. Unfortunately the lists were compiled in 1648 in order to justify the final instance competence of the requêtes and some of the information (for example whether the case was to be judged or simply advised upon) was falsified. For opinions in crimi-
nal suits at the requêtes see f.f. 18234, fo. 336, 1583 (falsified bankruptcies).

Cases involving malversations (after 1594): V-4 car. 19, 24 May 1605 (prosecution of Errard, lieutenant-général in the court of waters and forests of Seignes); ibid., car. 20, 31 January 1606 (prosecution of Boissonnet, sergent); ibid., car. 26, letters patent of 5 November 1609 (prosecution of the officers of the prévôté provinciale at Montfort l'Amaury), etc.

Subversive activities and treason: ibid., car. 13, 2 January 1598 (the trial of Balthazard and Lafont, who publicized a false edict ordering the remission of the taille throughout Champagne); ibid., 9 February 1598 (the trial of Rehault, inhabitant of Compiègne, for intelligence with the Spanish); ibid., car. 23, 3 May 1608 (the trial of Jean-Paul Pigousse and others for sorcery, murder, treason, falsification of the royal seal), etc.

51 - Unless otherwise noted, this account is based entirely on F.-T. Perrens, "Un Procès criminel sous le règne de Henri IV, (1608)" in vols. 9 and 10 of Séances et travaux de l'académie des sciences morales et politiques, 26e année, 5e série, 1867. Perrens used mainly the dispatches of Ubaldini.

52 - L'Estoile, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 394-95, noted that the nuncio directed the prosecution "avec une extrême animosité, par le commandement de son maître, jusques à recuser quelques juges, sur des soupçons de rien".

53 - Minute of decision in V-4 car. 24, 22 November 1608.

54 - L'Estoile, loc. cit., regarded Lanceschi as innocent of the charges.
Chapter Two: The Evolution of the Tribunal during the Reign of Louis XIII

The reign of Louis XIII witnessed an extensive evolution in the final instance jurisdiction of the requêtes. The giving of opinions on demands for évocations disappeared early in the reign and cases concerning the royal seal were rarely heard after 1630. The royal council discreetly unburdened itself of some items of business and allowed other cases, for which cognizance by the masters would have caused scandals in former days, to be sent to the company. The masters, relying upon their ties to ministers and members of the council (many of whom were former colleagues), could do judicial favours for their relatives and friends, and they were able to exclude from commissions those judges whom they had traditionally assisted, such as the personnel of the grande prévôté. Clientage, combined with the expertise acquired by the masters as members of the chambre de justice of 1625 or, more importantly, as provincial intendants, led to the acquisition of numerous cases.

The court came to be affected by the larger issue of the Thirty Years War. The partisans, a pressure group of
influence with the government, found in the tribunal a reliable instrument for prosecuting rioters and seizing the property of defaulting tax-payers. Increasingly the court also began to prosecute military marauders. Hence this inflated and— as we will see— often ineffective tribunal reflected both the disorders which beset a war-weary France and the centralizing tendencies of the government.

In many ways the requêtes expanded within the areas of competence which it had acquired before 1610. Such was the change which occurred over the implementation of council decrees and rébellions against them.

(a) extensions of the rébellion jurisdiction

In the early 1620s formal changes occurred in the introduction of these cases. Until then they had been heard at the royal council, which would send them on in virtue of a decree and accompanying letters patent, but gradually the sergents and bailiffs who had been assaulted appeared directly at the court with their procès-verbaux and after 1626 the instances were usually introduced without a covering council decree. The use of letters patent disappeared entirely. (1)

Another activity developed which involved the direct substitution of the requêtes for the council. In the 1620s
the masters began to issue writs of execution for council decrees and particularly those which emanated from the conseil d'État et des finances. The request of Nicolas Sadet (1628) is suggestive of why the habit developed. He asked to plead at the requêtes simply because the council was absent from Paris. (2) In 1636 Louis Bevrin asked to be heard because

"il n'est pas raisonnable de les (the litigants) faire appeler au conseil qui se peut eas-\nloigner de ceste ville et constitueront en trais grands frais ains susdites requêtes juges naturels de l'exécution desdits arrests et règlements". (3)

Physical convenience only partly explains the development of this competence, since the council had always been peripatetic. The institutional reason coincided with the rébellions, for decisions against assailants were, in effect, judgements ordering implementation of council decrees. This was implicit in the clauses of the verdict which enjoined a culprit "à l'advenir porter honneur et révérence aux arrests de conseil". (4)

The treatment of rébellion suits by the masters prompted a new type of litigant to seek the services of the court. In 1622 Julien Prêche, inn-keeper at Rennes, his wife and several solicitors from the parlement were prosecuted at the requêtes by a bailiff and a local tax-farmer "pour raison d'exceeds, rébellions et violences" committed during the implementation of a decree of the council which had ordered them to pay a local duty. (5)
Four years later Nicolas Dusault, who had several contracts with the king for the sale of offices of notaries and inspectors of cloth in the jurisdiction of the Toulouse parlement, brought several complaints before the court of assaults upon him, his clerks and various bailiffs. (6) Although indicative of the court's activity in the 1630s and 1640s, such instances were rare during the 1620s.

Not all the royal ministers accepted this somewhat informal competence of the implementation of council decrees. The code Michau (1629), the work of Michel de Marillac, keeper of the seals, forbade the masters "prendre aucune connaissance de ladite exécution". (7) Marillac may have feared that the council would be dragged into unnecessary disputes with the sovereign courts by an agent which had no right to make decisions in the name of the king. Yet little effort was made to put this command into effect, as is revealed by the court archives.

More important than this competence was the growing habit of the council of sending other types of cases to the requêtes. Theoretically the sovereign courts could have been used. According to the ordinances they had a better legal claim than the requêtes de l'hôtel. But the resort by the council to this tribunal testified to the favouritism shown to the masters and to their own opportunism—tendencies which, in the long run, were often of
little benefit to the crown, since they only antagonized the other courts. It may be wondered why the masters should want to hear suits of such diverse types. The answer to this can be found in the amount of épices written in the margin of the decisions made by the court.

(b) the court at the service of the company

Increasingly the masters acquired cognizance of lengthy cases which brought large sums to both rapporteur and tribunal. For example, the épices for an opinion given in 1625 on behalf of Jean Artaud, voiturier-général des gabelles de la ferme du Lyonnais, a case involving damages suffered by the farmer because of military disorders, came to 300 écus for the rapporteur and 523 for his fellow judges. (8) Moricq, the presenting magistrate for suits sent for definitive judgement which involved illegally claimed expenses in the farms of the gabelle in Provence and Dauphiné, earned 820 livres for three long reports in 1627 and 1628, while the tribunal gained 1,484 livres. (9) Partisans could pay these épices and hence were welcome litigants. When it is considered that the losers easily obtained letters at the great chancery for a requête civile, which allowed a re-hearing at the case, the value of lengthy dossiers concerning the royal finances can easily be appreciated. Many of these suits (including the two just mentioned) legally fell within the competence of the cour des aides, but the
name of the **rapporteur** suggests how the requêtes acquired
cognizance of them. Moricq was a creature of Richelieu.

Other profitable items were reports of distributions
of sums to creditors, whether of queens, bank-
rupt **partisans** or traitors. (10) In 1630 Moricq earned 368
livres for one report for the creditors of Antoine Philippes,
a murderous and corrupt provincial trésorier who had been
executed at the order of the chamber of justice. (11)
The three rapporteurs for the creditors of Antoine Feydeau,
a famous **partisan**, gained 1,476 livres, while their coll-
eagues received 2,940 livres. (12) The **rapporteur** for the
creditors of Lauson, a former master, was paid 834 livres
for his work. (13) In these cases too there was no legal
justification for cognizance by the masters, except the
arbitrary decision of the royal council.

Apart from the opinions for moyens d'erreur, lucrative
cases at the requêtes are frequently encountered in the
archives of that court only after 1620. This extension
of cognizance suggests the efficacy of the company as a
pressure group within the council and also the complicity
of "**MM. du conseil**".

(ii) **opportunism**

The **rapporteur** of a suit and the assembly of masters who
prepared the business of the privy council had considerable control over the ultimate destination of a case, and many a party without strong preferences of jurisdiction found himself being sent to the requêtes. Very often the rapporteur had already written down the decision of the council and had signed the minute, which then awaited only official approval. (14) Yet the council was not content merely to nod at every presentation and sometimes the decision was changed, as is revealed by the insertion of a new decree below the original one. Thus in 1634 Turgot, rapporteur at the council, sent to the requêtes for judgement in final instance a case involving the recovery of merchandise taken by Spanish privateers, even though the parties had not specified that the matter be sent there. This decision was crossed out and a new one was substituted: the litigants would be sent to the requêtes only for an opinion. A short time later the masters sent along their advice, that the case be evoked from the parlements of Rennes and Paris and sent to the requêtes, where it would be decided "souverainement et en dernier ressort". (15) The council did as advised, in this way doubling the opportunity of the masters to collect épices for the suit. On another occasion (1621) the cunning of the judges took a different form. In the list of documents seen by the council the rapporteur included alongside the request for évocation the interesting precedent that two years previously a similar matter had been sent to the masters. So the council sent
If the masters were careful to siphon business from the council, they also stole cases from judges whom they were supposed to be assisting. In February 1617 Menardeau, dean of the company, complained to the king that he had been burgled of several jewels. The case was immediately sent for judgement to the grand prèvôt, aided by the masters. The investigation was to be carried out by the famous legist, Pierre de Miraumont, lieutenant of the prèvôté. As more and more suspects were rounded up, it became obvious that the lieutenant required assistants. Menardeau asked the council to depute two masters to help him, and this was duly authorized. However, the dean encountered problems from the investigating judges (one of who was Moricq):

"lesdits maistres font difficulté de vacquer à l'instruction des accusés et complices... sous couleur que ledit arrest semble ne les avoir commis que pour le procès dudit Baron". (19)

They wanted to investigate everything and the council allowed them to do so, although the lieutenant continued to help out. Yet their opportunism was far from being finished. Menardeau had previously succeeded in having a clause included in a decree ordering that no writ would be issued for the épices of the investigation, which would normally be paid by the plaintiff. Not surprisingly Miraumont, the crown prosecutor and the chief clerk, all personnel of the grande prèvôté, objected. Menardeau returned
to the council and asked that it replace Miraumont, "qui a jà longuement travaillé ausdits procès...pour son soulagement (sic!)". (20) Another lieutenant was substituted, but the council decree went further. The crown prosecutor and the chief clerk of the prévôté were replaced by the equivalent officers from the requêtes. From the month of June the orders for arrest and various interlocutory decisions were made by the requêtes, as were the last death sentences (December 1617 and December 1620). (21)

The prosecutions undertaken by Menardeau suggest another aspect of opportunism on the part of the masters. Company members might arrange for suits in which they were involved to be sent to the requêtes for judgement in final instance. It has already been seen that in 1621 the council legitimized the pleading by masters at their court in virtue of their committimus—an intolerable situation which was changed only by the ordinance of 1667. The scruples of the company were alleviated on such occasions by the temporary withdrawal from the tribunal of the master whose case had come up for judgement. But at least a party could appeal to the parlement; judgement in final instance rendered this impossible.

Not all attempts to plead "en souverain" at the requêtes met with success. In 1625 Jacques Fouillé failed to have his family disagreements sent to the court for definitive reso-
lution. (22) More luck attended suits involving orders of creditors. Mathieu Lallemant, crown prosecutor of the requêtes and creditor of his predecessor, was able to have such a case sent to his court, after having explained at the council that interminable pursuits would arise in virtue of appeals made to the parlement (1622). (23) François de Montescot brought into court the order of creditors for his brother Jacques, executed for counterfeiting, and emerged, not surprisingly, as the preferred creditor (1634). (24) A dozen masters of requests and councillors of state pursued Jean de Lauson, an ex-master of requests, at the court, which divided up the value of his office among them and others to whom he owed money (1635). (25) These examples are far from being unique. (26)

Criminal prosecutions concerning masters appeared at the requêtes for definitive judgement mainly for the simple reason that the company, notwithstanding its various exemptions, turned out to be no more fortunate than other royal subjects in escaping the ravages of French armies. The masters too complained of burned crops, battered country houses and stolen livestock. One discovers prosecutions begun by Nesmond (1635), Bochart and Sève (1637), Verthamon, Turgot and Guillon (1638), Mangot and La Ferté (1643), not to forget other pursuits begun at the request of relatives of masters and council robins. (27)
The dominant force behind the acquisition of profitable suits and cases involving masters came from the company or its members. Their motives were simple—to exploit a tribunal in their own interests. To do so they solicited "MM. du conseil" who, in the 1620s, were increasingly responsive to the requests of the masters. But the requêtes de l'hôtel was used by the ministers for political and institutional reasons. Just as a master who was well-connected at court (like Moricq) could count upon acquiring a lucrative case, so too a minister could expect to find a reliable rapporteur for a criminal prosecution charged with political significance. The requêtes also developed into a kind of judicial auxiliary to the provincial intendancy—a development which, as will be seen below, encouraged a judicial war between the Paris parlement and the council in the 1620s. Furthermore, the 1620s and 1630s witnessed the evolution of the court into a chamber for the partisans, proof of both the proximity of the council robe to that key group and the breakdown of royal confidence in the traditional judicial hierarchy.

(i) treason cases

The political context of the struggle against the grandees during the youth of Louis XIII and the consoli-
dation of power by Richelieu had only a limited quantitative impact upon the activity of the tribunal. However, it should not be forgotten that in both periods a number of cases were judged by masters and the lieutenant of the grande prévôté, but the disappearance of most of the criminal archives of the prévôté makes it difficult to follow the role of the masters in treason prosecutions there. At the requêtes de l'hôtel, whether at Paris or attached to the council, there were only a few suits—five in 1615-7 and seven in 1625-32. The principal interest of these cases is in discerning the close links between individual masters and the ministers.

Hence, in the commission which sent Pierre Geoffroy, lackey of one of Condé's retainers, to the galleys in 1615 were Claude Mangot, candidate of Concini for the seals, and François Foucquet, friend of Richelieu. (28) Another expert in treasons was present—Jacques Renar, principal investigating judge in the case of Pierre de Grange, judged and banished at Rouen in 1617 for having published information regarded as state secrets and in the inquiry about the escape of Condé from Paris the same year. (29) Tried and trusty magistrates constantly turned up for the treason cases heard in 1625-32. In 1626 François Foucquet, who had served on the commission which had condemned Chalais, and Martin Deschamps, a judge of no certain affiliation with the ministers, interrogated Denis
Hervey, so-called abbot of Vallant, who had in his possession memoirs and letters supposedly written by grandees and the kings of England and France. (39) The pair also investigated the cases of François Castrain, accused of "lèze majesté et d'avoir composé et publié plusieurs escripts diffamatoires contre le Roy, les princes et les principaux ministres d'estat" (31), Laurent Gadoulleau, maître raquettier et paulmier in the entourage of the king, accused of "pernicieux desseings et discours" (32), an impostor named Murats Sultan, who aroused suspicions when he claimed to have been attacked at court (33), and Gaulcher Bousigault, who was found seated in the throne of the king with a sword, uttering "parolles mal à propos" (34). In the cases of Castrain and Bousigault (who had been refused a post in the guards of the cardinal) the defendants were probably regarded as threats to Richelieu, which explains why Fouquet, if not necessarily Deschamps, was chosen. In order to make a safe judgement still more certain the tribunals were constituted, not by the requêtes quartier, but by commissions of judges drawn from all the quartiers or specifically named judges from the quartier at court. (35) The trial of Castrain reminds one of the darkest images of the reign concocted by nineteenth-century novelists. He was judged the day following registry of letters patent committing the case to the masters. The trial did not take place in the auditorium of the requêtes, but in the council chamber of the
Fort L'Eveque, where he was imprisoned. Cattrain was executed immediately in the yard of the prison and not in public, as was the usual practice.

In 1632 an ad hoc version of the requêtes was created near the council at Beziers and Toulouse, and the report of two treason cases, one involving Louis des Hayes, agent of Gaston d'Orléans, and the other the Cariolles, parlementaires implicated in the revolt of the Cascaveaux. at Aix, was entrusted to Lauson. (36) This master, a collaborator of Richelieu in marine affairs, had also been entrusted with the interrogation of Montmorency.

(ii) expertise

The diversified employment held by the company provided an institutional explanation for part of the court's activity. The masters often had an acquaintance with a specific lawsuit. When the chamber of justice of 1624, which several of them attended, was dissolved, the unfinished malversation case of Louis Le Brumen, receiver of the domain of Neufchâtel, was sent to the requêtes. (36) Similarly, on the suppression of the so-called chamber of justice at the Arsenal in 1643, which they also attended, a number of uncompleted prosecutions were handed over to them. (37)
Yet the masters did not acquire mere scraps. Important commissions of wider range flourished briefly at the requêtes as part of the ministerial effort in the 1620s to extract funds from the financiers. In this type of pursuit the judges were asked either for an opinion or a judgement in final instance. In 1624 a commission for "la recherche des abus qui se commettent à la levée des droits qui se perçoivent le long des rivières de la France" was given to them. (38) Two years later the financial officials of the army of Picardy were prosecuted by the masters and this, as will be seen in the next chapter, raised a storm of protest from the parlement. (39) In 1628 investigation was begun by them into the "abus qui sont faictes au faict des poudres, salpêtres et munitions de l'artillerie depuis l'année 1610". (40) Such extensive prosecutions rarely continued to a successful conclusion, probably because the officials concerned quickly offered to pay a sum to the treasury in exchange for the discontinuation of the pursuits. However, in the 1630s the masters continued to judge, or rejudge, dishonest royal officials from time to time. (41)

More important in keeping the requêtes busy, particularly after 1624, was the activity of the masters in the provinces. As a provincial commissioner, the master had often investigated a case. Traditionally it would be left with a local parlement, cour des aides or présidial, but
the provincial commissions given to the masters after the regency of Marie de Médicis specified that appeals of the procedures of the commissioners would be sent to the council. In practice this meant that many cases were turned over to the requêtes, where they would be presented by the master who had undertaken the initial investigation. Hence the Heurtémont treason prosecution, which caused a scandal when it was begun by Morant in Normandy (1617), ended up before the requêtes (42), as did the assaults of local gentilshommes upon the agents of the nuns of Holy Trinity of Caen (43), begun by Lauson in Normandy (1626). While intendant at La Rochelle, Etampes de Valenciay had investigated the corsairs of the western coast, who were ultimately judged at the requêtes. (44) Pomereu, who had undertaken the prosecution of the Dieppe pirates while serving as intendant of the marine in Normandy, also presented the case before his colleagues. (45) Moricq had drawn up the opening decrees in the prosecution of rioters of Laval (1628) (46), as had Lemaître de Bellejamme for those of Angers (1630) (47); Laffemas had begun the Jollybois salt-smuggling case in Champagne (48), and Aubray that of the mardi gras rioters of Coucy in the Soissonais (1635) (49). All presented the cases at the requêtes.

Their provincial activity was not without relevance for the quantity of business heard in final instance at the requêtes. The sudden if brief expansion of 1624-6
was due in part to the influx of appeals against the decrees of the commissioners for the taille in Normandy and, to a lesser extent, from Poitou. Laurent Davy, one of the commissioners, was rapporteur for a number of these suits before the court. (50) Thereafter, though on a diminished scale, the requêtes continued to hear appeals against the decisions of the intendants in Normandy and regions within the jurisdiction of the Paris cour des aides over tax-status. (51)

(iii) the court and the tax-collectors: 1622-43

The intendants often discovered that local courts were wayward in prosecuting criminals and tax-evaders, sometimes because of the influence of the culprits or because of magisterial sympathy for the defendants. Yet when the intendants began the investigation the courts would immediately try to obstruct the prosecution. This was particularly the case in suits involving tax-collectors. The requêtes was seen by "MM. du conseil" as a way of side-stepping this problem.

When Lauson went to Normandy he discovered that the parlement had done nothing in three years to bring to justice the Thieuvilles. When he began his inquiry he naturally raised the hackles of the court. (52) In Normandy, Davy complained, notables who illegally refused to
appear before the commissioners, but rushed off to the
cour des aides and the parlement "et ne tiennent pas
compte de les faire juger"— a sign that these courts
would drag out the suits. (53) At Rennes in 1622 the
problem was of a different order, for the resistance of
an inn-keeper to the collectors of a municipal duty was
sustained by the parlement, which went as far as to annul
a number of council decrees. Loysel, a master on the
spot, investigated the disturbances, and sent the dossier
to the requêtes. (54)

Notwithstanding the deepening crisis, illustrated by
the wave of rural and urban riots which increased after
1623, the role of the requêtes in the repression of the
disorders remained limited until the 1630s. This was
due partly to the war between the Paris parlement and
the council in 1626-31. The consolidation of power by
Richelieu and the acquisition of the seals by Séguier
(1633) removed all scruples on the part of "MM. du conseil".
The requêtes de l'hôtel was turned into a weapon at the
service of the partisans, pursuing the implementation of
council decrees. The result is translated by the graphs
in the appendices.

If only assault cases on collectors and their agents
and pursuits for reasons of damages are noted for the
period 1629-38, the evolution roughly follows the graphs.
From 1629 to 1633 only nine such suits left traces in the minutes of the courts, whereas from 1634 to 1638 there were fifty-five. The geographical range ran from Champagne south to the Bourbonnais, west to the Ile de France, including the capital, north to Picardy, then westward into Normandy, the Blésois, Touraine, Anjou, Le Maine, Limousin and Poitou. Until 1637 most of the cases concerned aides, with assaults on collectors of beverage taxes being particularly frequent. In 1637 and 1638 disorders concerning the collection of the forced loan on the towns of the realm, the subsistance and taxes on greffes began to appear. (55)

Yet the partisans made a variety of pursuits. Beside those involving violent assault and damages, there were requests for reiterated orders to pay a tax and demands to announce seizures and proceed to the adjudication of goods. The partisans also undertook the prosecution of defaulting guarantors, sub-farmers and clerks. In addition, tax-payers sometimes brought complaints against excessive seizures and violence used by bailiffs.

The eleven cartons of minutes of 1643—a completely preserved year—allow us to follow some eighty-three partisans, sub-farmers, porteurs des quittances and clerks, collecting forty-three different duties. (56) The geographic range is much the same as in the 1630s, with a
few cases coming from the Lyonnais, Burgundy, Brittany and Guyenne. Sixty-seven pursuits (including three for expenses) are carried out against non-paying royal officials, their farmers and tenants, inn-keepers and the proprietors of royal greffes. There are traces of forty-eight procedures against associates, sub-farmers, receivers, clerks and sergents. There are twenty-six cases of violent assault on bailiffs undertaken by members from all levels of French society, from wine-growers to élus, from inn-keepers to gentilshommes and their domestics. Among these cases have been included a few assaults made by sergents on tax-payers. In addition there are eleven disputes among the subjects of the king over the non-payment of allotted shares in the taxes. Conflicts of jurisdiction arise with fifteen provincial courts (below the sovereign level) and judges. Undoubtedly there are more proceedings arising from the activity of the partisans than those enumerated above, since rébellions against the executors of council decrees have been left out when the specific issue of the decree has not been mentioned. Equally some seizures have not been included, since the reasons have not been indicated.

The requêtes was not the only court used by the partisans. They remained within the traditional judicial structure when it suited them and resorted to the requêtes either for cases which had become bogged down
in local courts through the complicity of the magistrates or for the purposes of reaping the benefit of expenses and damages awarded in multiple pursuits, among which the most lucrative were sure to be Parisian. This second reason probably explains why a case would be brought before the requêtes even though a local court had found against defaulting tax-payers or rioters.

This happened in the affair of the brewers of Rouen, accused of "émotions populaires, rébellions, menaces et assemblées illicites" committed in August 1631 against the collectors of the gros and quatrième on beer. (57) Estienne Bryois, fermier-général des aides de France, went on behalf of the farmer at Rouen to the council of state and asked "qu'il pleust à Sa Majesté pourvoir sur l'exécution desdits arrêts", that is the decrees in virtue of which the tax had been levied. The case was sent to the masters in November, and decisions of the Rouen parlement, which had attempted to take cognizance of the case, were annulled. Yet Bryois had previously begun procedures at the Norman cour des aides, the Rouen élection and the lieutenant-général of another local court. All handed down decisions against the brewers even before the wheels of the requêtes had been put into motion. The masters adjudicated damages a year after the other courts had found against the unruly brewers (December 1632).
Fortunately the archives of the requêtes contain the definitive judgement for the Rouen case. In the period after 1632 many prosecutions involving fiscal disorders leave only a few procedural decisions in the minutes of the court. The reason for this is partly the damage suffered by these archives for the 1630s. Every year in that decade except for 1631 and 1634 lacks one or more quartier of minutes. In 1636, the year that Antoine Landrin, fermier-général des six droits unis (taxes on consumer goods), was given a general évocation to the requêtes of all cases involving his lease (58), the first three quartiers are severely damaged and there is a complete gap from September 1636 to March 1637.

Notwithstanding these gaps, it does not appear that the requêtes was the most effective of judicial instruments of repression. The explanation lies partly in the organization of the public prosecution. Unlike his counterparts in the sovereign courts, the crown prosecutor of the requêtes was not a prestigious official. (59) Moreover, it does not seem that the number of his assistants increased during a time when the amount of work was continually rising. The system of prosecution also made conclusion of a case uncertain: the plaintiff had the largest share of the responsibility and if he dropped proceedings because of a change in the proprietor of a tax-farm or because the parties had reached an agreement outside of court, the
prosecution might be discontinued.

The requêtes was weak for another reason, which applied to all of its criminal proceedings. Most of the time it relied upon local magistrates to undertake the investigation. The court would order the nearest provincial royal judge to begin an inquiry, to round up the suspects and to undertake the interrogations and the confrontations of witnesses and suspects. Unlike the sovereign courts the requêtes had no disciplinary power over the judges of the bailliages and élections, and if the lower courts set aside many of the ordinances of the requêtes or dragged out the investigation, the prosecution might come to a halt. One way of getting around this was by ordering the master nearest to the scene of the crime to take over the case. In the long run it probably proved more effective to leave these suits in the hands of the intendant, and this is a potential explanation for the disappearance of the pursuits of the partisans at the requêtes de l'hôtel after the Fronde. Hence, although in the 1630s and 1640s the requêtes became a favourite tribunal for the tax-collectors, the growing burden of their cases did not mean that the court was capable of punishing the perpetrators of tax-disorders.

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In the 1620s and 1630s the new areas of cognizance and extensions in old ones at the requêtes reflected the flexibility of "MM. du conseil" (changes in the rébellion jurisdiction), their spirit of laisser aller and the success of the company as a pressure group (acquisition of profitable suits and litigation concerning individual masters), the contact between ministers and company members (treason cases) and the attempt of the council to find a solution to the crisis engendered by French intervention in the war (the influx of cases involving the partisans). Alongside the provincial intendancy the requêtes was a way of escaping the obstruction of local institutions to the enormous fiscal effort of the crown. Hence it was a tool of centralization, if one of uncertain efficacy. But its use did not go without challenge from the most prestigious sovereign court of the realm, which is the subject of the following chapter.
Notes

1 - Of a half-dozen cases introduced in 1621-5, two were
sent by letters patent. Of another dozen introduced,
in 1626-33, only one was sent by a council decree.
The blurring of the line between council and requêtes
may have been assisted by the proximity of the quartiers
of the council and the requêtes. The former worked on
the floor above the latter (V-4 car. 106, 6 June 1636).

2 - V-4 car. 75, 20 March 1628.

3 - V-4 car. 106, 4 June 1636.

4 - For example, the decision for Jean de La Rivière
(V-4 car. 24, 6 September 1608): "ont enjoint et
enjoignent (the defendants) d'estre à l'advenir plus
respectueux et obéissans en ce qui touche et regarde
l'effet des commandements du roy et des arrestes de
son conseil".

5 - V-4 car. 57, 30 September 1622.

6 - V-4 car. 69, 18 June 1626 (against nine merchants from
Montpellier), ibid., car. 70, 21 August (against nota-
rices, consuls and inhabitants of Rodes and elsewhere),
ibid., 19 September (assault on his clerk).

7 - Neron, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 805 (article 99).

8 - V-4 car. 66, 30 September 1625.

9 - V-4 car. 73, 9 June 1627, ibid., car. 78, 3 March
1629, ibid., car. 79, 28 June.

10 - For queen Marguerite (decree of retention, V-4 car.
1140, register of audiences, 9 April 1615), for the
queen of England (ibid., car. 83, 10 September 1630),
for Guillaume Herail, engagiste for the cleaning of
Parisian streets (ibid., car. 50, 12 February 1620),
for Raymond Martin, former fermier-général of the
domain of Navarre (f. 1823-4, decree of 1618), for
Alexandre Alexandrin, clerk at the toll of Lyon and
partisan (V-4 car. 1498, fo. 65, 4 March 1626), for
the comte de Monsoreau, condemned to death in absentia
for counterfeiting (ibid., car. 99, 19 October
1634), for the Thieuvilles (ibid., car. 92, 1633),
for André Guibert, executed for counterfeiting (ibid.,
car. 94, 12 December 1633), for the marquis de Sour-
diac and the bishop of Leon, who had followed the
queen mother into exile (ibid., car. 94, 4 November
1633), for the maréchal de Marillac (ibid., car. 98,
3 August 1634) and for Montmorency in first instance

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only (ibid., car. 105, letters patent). These are only the more important examples.

11 - V-4 car. 83, 27 September 1630.

12 - V-4 car. 97, 15, 16 May 1634.

13 - V-4 car. 103, 5 October 1635.

14 - Only this explains the rapidity with which the council could get through so much business in a day. See Pages, "Le Conseil du roi sous Louis XIII" in the Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine, 1937, p. 314.

15 - V-6 car. 94, 21 March 1634, V-4 car. 98, 11 August 1634.

16 - V-6 register 1213, 5 October 1621 (at the request of Redolin, bailiff).

17 - The documents relating to this interesting prosecution are scattered throughout the registers of the privy council, the registers of letters patent at the requêtes and the minutes of the court. However, lacunae for this last source, not to mention the almost total disappearance of the archives of the grand prévôt for this period make it difficult to reconstruct the incident.

18 - About 100 suspects were rounded up (V-4 car. 43, 8 February 1618).

19 - V-6 register 1203, 6 March 1617.

20 - V-4 car. 1497, fo. 21, 10 April 1617.

21 - Supra, note 18, V-4 car. 51, 2 December 1620 and a parchment copy of a decision made for Menardeau by the clerk in pièces originales, 1921, piece 4.

22 - V-4 car. 1498, fo. 21, 18 March 1625.

23 - V-4 car. 1497, fo. 142, 31 March 1622.

24 - V-4 car. 95, 14 January 1634, ibid., car. 1465 (reper- tory of decrees of adjudication, 29 December 1636).

25 - Supra, note 13.

26 - See the case of Renouard de Villayer, master, who had a suit begun in first instance (V-4 car. 150, 22 April 1643) shifted into final instance (ibid., car. 155, 28 August).
27 - V-4 car. 103, 29 October 1635, ibid., car. 108, 19 May 1637, ibid., car. 129, 17 November 1637, ibid., car. 116, 14, 19, 21 June 1638, ibid., car. 1499, fo. 59, 71. For relatives see V-4 car. 116, 28 June 1638 (for Dominique Séguier, bishop of Meaux) and ibid., 8 June, for Dame Charlotte de Lige, widow of Michel Vallart, ambassador to Switzerland. The comments made below about geographical range and inefficacy of prosecution apply here.

28 - V-4 car. 38, 26 September 1615. Geoffroy was accused of wanting to assassinate the king.

29 - V-4 car. 42, 30 December 1617, V-3, 85, fo. 313, 7 November 1617.

30 - V-4 car. 72, 20 April 1627.

31 - V-4 car. 78, 15 January 1629.

32 - V-4 car. 81, 16 January 1630.

33 - V-4 car. 1498, fo. 140, 13 October 1629.

34 - V-4 car. 81, 22 January 1630.

35 - The tribunal which judged Gadoulleau had three judges from the April quartier, one from the October quartier and another from the July one.

36 - V-4 car. 90, 12, 16 October 1632.

36bis - V-4 car. 73, 5 May 1627. The Chastenet-Roquelaure case, involving the falsification of regimental rolls, was pulled out of the chamber of justice at the clamour of the crown prosecutor of the requêtes "attendu qu'il ne soit question d'aucun fait de finance" (V-4 car. 62, 8 November 1624). The prosecution of Claude Bezard, clerk of a trésorier des parties casuelles, was begun by the chamber and was sent to the masters in 1631 (ibid., car., 1498, fo. 193).

37 - V-4 car. 154, 23 September 1643 (a prosecution undertaken at the request of Puget, father-in-law of Tallémant, involving a false denunciation made before the chamber), ibid., car. 155, 21 October (the re-trial of Lamont, condemned to death in 1633 by the chamber), ibid., car. 156, 10 November (disputes over goods claimed by the crown).

38 - V-4 car. 64, 9 April 1625 (opinion only).
It is interesting to see that the value of épices in these cases was very high. For example, Charles Le Comte, maître des eaux et forêts at Rouen, prosecuted in 1639 (V-4 car. 119, 18 March) advanced 787 livres within a few days after being absolved of the charges. The total bill of épices came to 900 for the rapporteur and 1,338 for the tribunal. The two reports (by Moricq) absolving Le Brumen and condemning his accusers (ibid., car. 74, 2 December 1627; ibid., car. 78, 9 January 1629) brought the rapporteur 534 livres and the court 1,146. On this occasion the requêtes was convinced of his innocence, but eight years later (ibid., car. 115, 19 March 1638) Le Brumen came to the court with letters of abolition for the murder of a local receiver. If not corrupt, Le Brumen was certainly violent.

There are traces of seventeen cases in the last quartier of 1624 (V-4 car. 65).

For example, see V-4 car. 107, 11 August 1636 (appeal of Morice against the decision of the commissioners in Touraine) and ibid., car. 111, 3 September 1637 (appeal of François against the commissioners in Auvergne).

The plaintiffs complained of "les suppôrs et faveurs notoires qu'iceluy de Thieuville a en ladite cour" (V-6 car. 62, 9 February 1627).

Y-6 register 1216, fo. 68, 15 October 1624.

E-71-B, fo. 339-43, 28 March 1622, supra, note 5.
55 - See appendices, Table 8.

56 - V-4 car. 147-57.

57 - V-4 car. 90, 13 December 1632 (levied a fine of 6,000 livres).

58 - V-4 car. 105, January-March 1636. In late 1635 Samuel Royer, fermier des aides in southwestern France, brought in several dozen procès-verbaux against seventy-five inn-keepers. Unfortunately there is only one minute concerning these prosecutions in the archives of the requêtes (ibid., n.d. January).

59 - The crown prosecutors of the requêtes came from the low robe, from families which had not yet acquired councillorships in the sovereign courts. Their share in the épices was negligible, judging from the rarity with which the sums are indicated and their modicity when they are. One avocat du roi assisted the crown prosecutor.
Chapter Three: The Paris Parlement and the Requêtes de l'Hôtel

For the parlements in the sixteenth century the commissions of masters sitting at the requêtes de l'hôtel were not legal, but not significant either. The exception to this was when the masters advised the council to transfer a suit from one court to another, or when they recommended that a case be re-judged by the court where it had first been heard. The Paris parlement accepted the competence over council trivia and affairs of the royal seal, as long as the masters called upon the services of their colleagues from time to time. For their part the masters respected the jurisdiction of the Paris parlement. In 1596 they even refused to admit into office a councillor at the présidial of Alençon, notwithstanding authorization to do so by the council. "Sans au surplus préjudicier à l'autorité et souveraineté des courts de parlement", the official was to be sent, at his choice, before the Paris parlement or the grand conseil. (1) However, there were minor skirmishes between the requêtes and the parlement in 1598, 1601, 1612 and 1617. (2) Although these problems of jurisdiction were solved with
little fuss, they offer proof that the parlement was increasingly aware of the final instance competence of the requêtes. Certainly the reputation of this hitherto insignificant tribunal had spread far and wide by 1614, for in that year the Third Estate asked the king to forbid the masters to judge anything "sovereignly". (3) In 1617 occurred an incident which could not fail to go unnoticed by the magistrates of the sovereign courts. Moreover, it revealed a new arrogance on the part of the masters.

In early 1617 the Rouen parlement refused to allow Thomas Morant, a master en chevauchée, to carry out his commission in Normandy. (4) Morant had been entrusted by the council with the prosecution of Heurtemont, a Norman nobleman who had raised troops and money for Condé. The council annulled the orders of the court against Morant, and sent the case for definitive judgement to the requêtes. The parlement persisted in its opposition and ordered the arrest of Morant, who in the meantime had continued his chevauchées and had meddled in the operation of local courts. The parlement also sent a delegation to Paris in order to explain the Norman side of the problem.

When the masters heard of this the entire company assembled at the requêtes, annulled the measures taken by the Rouen parlement and issued a writ for the arrest of
the delegation, which included a former master. This was a foolhardy move, since the masters had no permission from the council to handle the dissension between Morant and the parlement. In turn the council annulled the decisions of both the masters and the parlement, ordering the former to tear their decree from the registers of the requêtes. According to Floquet, who cites a letter to the parlement from the keeper of the seals, du Vair, the masters did not remove the offending document and he himself ripped it from their registers. He either lied or was fooled by the company, since the registers still contain it. (5) In Part Two it has been seen how du Vair assisted the company at the council in 1616-7. Therefore the keeper of the seals may have chosen the first course of action. If so, it suggests one reason why the masters behaved so aggressively: they counted upon support in the council to back them up.

For the Rouen parlement the handling of the affair by the government was bound to be disturbing. The council did not allow the parlement, the "natural" judges of Heurtemont, to retain cognizance of the case, but instead expedited it to the requêtes de l'hôtel. The potential danger for the courts offered by the connection among the provincial commissioner, the council, and the requêtes was evident. It is probable that the magisterial notables convoked to Rouen later that year from across the realm
heard about the Hourtemont affair from the Normans. The
government was willing to allay magisterial fears, and
in its propositions about the chevauchées of the masters
it restricted their judicial activity to the investiga-
tion of a case, "et le procès tout instruit, il le ren-
verra au parlement". But the notables recommended, as
had the Third Estate in 1614, that the masters "ne pourr-
ont toutefois juger en dernier ressort". (6) For a few
years the government took care not to allow the intendants
and other commissioners to divert litigation to the counc-
 cil, whence it would be directed to the requêtes. Yet
that did not prevent a number of potentially touchy
situations from developing between the Paris parlement
and the requêtes de l'hôtel.

It was one thing for the masters to threaten pro-
vincials and quite another to stand up to the Paris par-
lement. An encounter between the two in 1621 demonstrates
the continuing respect of the company for the parlement.
In November Claude d'Assédat, a gentilhomme accused of
having fabricated several council decrees in order to
save his lands from seizure, appealed to the parlement
against a verdict of banishment given by the masters. The
court asked them to send two of their company to the
grand'chambre for a conference about the case. Jacques
Favier, who had investigated the crime, was accompanied
by the future dean, Denis Amelot, who would be put in a
similar position in 1648. They went

"pour ladite conférence et faire entendre à la cour
que le procès dont est question est jugé souverai-
ment et en dernier ressort en vertu d'une commission
du Roy".

This answer obviously went unappreciated, since the judges
were invited to return the following day. This time the
masters had a more mollifying justification:

"le lendemain matin...lesdits sieurs Favyer et
Amelot sont entrés en la grande chambre dudit
Parlement où après avoir conféré de faire entendre
le sujet du procès dont est question, et comme de
tout temps messieurs les maîtres des requêtes ont
jugé souverainement semblables affaires et souventes
fois avec eux aulcuns des messieurs les conseillers
dudit parlement venir en l'auditoire desdites re-
questes de l'hostel pour faire nombre ainsi qu'il
se veoid par les antiens registres...le Parlement,
amplement esclaircy de la jurisdiction souveraine
des sieurs maîtres des requêtes sans vouloir
prendre connaissance dudit prétendu appel, a arresté
que la requête dudit d'Assédat luy sera rendu". (7)

In stressing tradition and the links between masters and
councillors, Fävier and Amelot found reasons which the
parlement could appreciate.

However, by 1624 there were signs that magisterial
tensions were beginning to rise. Early that year the
parlement attempted to take cognizance of an incident
involving a rebellion against a council decree. The chief
clerk of the requêtes seems to have willingly sent the
dossier of the case when the parlement asked for it, but
intervention by the council was necessary to return the
suit to the requêtes. (8) In September there was a more
ominous encounter between the courts which seemed to announce
the violent skirmishes of 1626-7. When a bailiff of the requêtes delivered an arraignment to a councillor of the parlement, that court promptly ordered that the bailiff be arrested. He took shelter in the chambers of the requêtes de l'hôtel. Undaunted by this, the parlement ordered a councillor and a bailiff "faire faire ouverture des portes". (9) The masters promptly issued a decree against the bailiff who had made the arrest, though not against the councillor. The avocat du roi of the requêtes even went to the council in order to obtain an annulment of the parlement's decision. A decree was handed down, but the chancellor, d'Aligre, cancelled it. When the avocat du roi was questioned about the matter, he said that he knew nothing about it. The insult to the masters and their auditory was evident, but neither they nor the crown prosecutors of the requêtes were willing to defend openly their bailiff.

In August 1624 La Vieuville, surintendant des finances, lost his position of supremacy and Richelieu, assisted in financial affairs by Marillac and Bochart, two former masters, entered the council. Investigations were in the air—against La Vieuville (his dossier was established by four masters), the financiers of Paris as well as those in the provinces, and subordinate financial officials. The masters played an important part in these prosecutions, but at the chamber of justice in Paris they were only part
of a commission composed of magistrates from other courts, whatever their efforts to acquire a greater share in the investigations and precedence in the seating. (10) Events following the collapse of the chamber of justice gave the Paris parlement reason to worry about the judicial policy of the government. Although the ministers were able to extract considerable sums from the purses of the financiers, they did not intend to allow the "chasse aux larrons" to evaporate entirely. Furthermore, they were ready to call upon the services of commissioners from the council to begin investigations in the provinces.

Early in 1625 Charles Turquant, a master with considerable experience in the provinces, was sent into Picardy as intendant of justice. He was back in Paris in November and was given another commission to go into the Lyonnais, where his activities were opposed by the parlement. (11) It is probable that his task in the north had been to investigate the finances of the army of Picardy. At any rate the king received word of "grandes voleuries" committed by the army paymasters. (12) The prosecution was first turned over to the provincial prévôts, but

"depuis voyant que le crime estoit trop espandu (the king) voulut en commettre le jugement en dernier ressort à un nombre de maistres des requestes...et nomma de son propre bouche ung partie de ceulx qu'elle voulust en estre".

The commission which was set up was revealing in its
composition. Laffemas, who had been assistant crown prosecutor at the chamber of justice and who had not yet been admitted into office as a master, was the crown prosecutor. The tribunal itself consisted of Thévin, Paris and Turgot, who had been intendant of the royal army at the Ponts-de-Cé in 1619-20. The chief clerk of the requêtes, Angran, was the clerk. The Fort L'Eveque, the prison for criminals prosecuted at the requêtes, was used to confine the suspects.

The lack of respect for legal forms made at least one minister nervous. Marillac, now keeper of the seals, remembered that d'Aligre had made "difficultés" over the expedition of the commission, which comment earned him "parolles bien rudes" from Louis XIII. (13) Judgements without right of appeal were given by not less than seven magistrates and commissions to masters involving such decisions were always registered at the requêtes. Here there were only three judges and the registers of letters patent of the clerk, complete for this period, do not include the commission.

On 15 July 1626 the three masters sentenced to death in absentia a provincial treasurer, his clerk and a commissaire ordinaire des guerres. Still others awaited judgement. The relatives and friends of the criminals went before the parlement on the same day. A particular
factor conditioned the response of the court, for the king and his council were at Nantes. Mathieu Molé, the crown prosecutor, brought a request ringing with aggression before his colleagues:

"pour contre les loix du Royaulme à la fouille et oppression des subjectis du Roy et au prejudicce des defenses plusieurs fois reitérees par les arrestis d'executter aucunes commissions sans qu'elles soient vérifiées en ladite cour aucuns maîtres des requêtes qui ont l'honneur d'estre du corps de ce parlement entreprendent de procedder à l'exécutio de quelques commissions eux disans juges souveraines en ceste partye". (14)

Although the affair of the paymasters was the excuse for Molé's request, it is obvious that his complaint, which mentioned a plurality of commissions, concerned the requêtes de l'hôtel and its judges, whom he treated as disloyal colleagues. The decision of the parlement went even further.

The assembled chambers

"a fait trés expresses inhibitions et defences à tous maîtres des requêtes, conseillers et tous autres officiers de... mettre en exécutio aucune commission ny faire aucun acte de justice en vertu de lettres patentes portans attribution de jurisdictio pour quelque cause que soit tant en matière civile que criminelle qu'elle n'ayant esté vérifiée en ladite cour".

Hence the decrees of the requêtes de l'hôtel to provincial magistrates were to be rendered ineffective. Furthermore, the maîtres en chevauchée were equally struck by the ordinance of the parlement, since the judges of the bailliages and sénéchaussées were forbidden to allow magistrates
bearing unverified commissions to enter their courts. The chief clerks of the commissions were ordered to hand over all their procedures and the decree was to be read and published at the châtelet, the bailliages and sénéchaussées within the jurisdiction of the parlement and at the requêtes de l'hôtel.

Two bailiffs of the court, "obéissant plusost aux passions des parties, qu'à l'intention et l'arrest de la cour"—as a later council decree generously put it—went to the Fort L'Évêque in order to demand the release of the remaining prisoners, which in fact the parlement had not ordered. Aided by prévôts, archers and "le peuple", they broke into the prison, carried off four prisoners and disrupted the executioner "desià saisy du tableau pour exécuter par effigy un nommé Jolly". (15)

Not too surprisingly the masters at Paris remained silent. Earlier that year the requêtes had even been unwilling to oppose the parlement when it demanded the arrest of the jailor of the Fort L'Évêque. (16) The jailor had only released a prisoner on orders of the masters, but then as now the company would not risk opposing the great court. As for the special commissioners, they continued to send the results of their investigations to Nantes.

Molé had been in touch with Marillac on the subject
of the commission, and the keeper of the seals had written to him on 28 July:

"j'espère que le Roy trouvera bon de surseoir pour peu de temps (its activity) afin que les choses se passent plus considérément, ce que nous puissions s'il en a moyen trouver les voyes de contentement un chascun dedans l'ordre nécessaire". (17)

Even after the incident at the Fort L'Eveque was known to Marillac, he chose to act in a conciliatory way. He attempted to convince the king to stop the activity of the commission, but he told Molé:

"le Roy s'est souvenu luy-mesme des commandeinents qu'il en donna, de la nomination des juges...Je ne pense pas que jamais commission fut plus vrai-ment et immédiatement ordonné de la bouche du maistre. Vous verrez l'arrest que Sa Majesté en a donné auquel outre ce qui est de son autorité qui ne peut obmettre. J'espère que vous trouverez un grand soin de séparer toute aigreur..." (18)

Considering the personal role of Molé in the affair, Marillac could have been more reproachful than he was. All he had to say was:

"J'ay regret que je voy passer à ces choses si promptement et sans conference, car par cette voye nous trouverions le chemin de composer beaucoup de differens sans bruit".

The day before (13 August), Marillac wrote this:

Louis handed down a decree "en commandement" (i.e. given in his presence) which was both authoritative and placat-or.

"l'exécution d'une commission commandée par sa propre bouche n'est point contre les loix de son royaume, que ses commandements donnés à une cause si importante du péril iminent de son estat pour
The decision of the parlement was annulled, Angran was forbidden to give the dossiers to the court and the prisoners were to be sent back to the Fort L'Eveque. Yet Marillac had a clause omitted which threatened the jailor of the Conciergerie (where the prisoners were held) with incarceration if he did not return the culprits. The spontaneous nature of the attack on the Fort L'Eveque was mentioned and the provocation by the parlement minimized. The operation of the commission was suspended by "une lettre particulière" to its members. Notwithstanding the regal tone of the council decree there could be little hiding the fact that the government had retreated before the parlement. In September that court released three of the prisoners on bail. It had never sent them back to the Fort L'Eveque. The fourth was released in the course of the Easter visit to the Conciergerie. (20) The verdicts of the special commission were overturned in 1630 by the requêtes de l'hôtel. (21)

The incident was shortly given a wider airing among the magistrature of France, for in late 1626 an assembly of notables was convoked at Paris. Brought together in order to provide support for the maritime policy.
of Richelieu as well as to offer advice about financial reforms, the assembly was not to be consulted about judicial matters, unlike its predecessor in 1617. In light of the skirmish of 1626 the reason may be imagined. However, it was not to be expected that a group of magistrates which included all the first presidents of the parlements, chambres des comptes and cour des aides of France, not to forget many members of the crown prosecution from these courts, would remain silent about the administration of justice. A cahier made up of a dozen lengthy articles was presented at the end of the assembly. (22) Its rapporteur was Mathieu Molé. Six of the articles were about évocations, and the sixth specified that the royal council

"ne retienne point la connaissance du fond des droits contentieux entre les parties, et ne se fasse renvoi d'iceux par devant les maîtres des requestes de vostre hostel, qui ne sont fondés en juridiction par vos ordonnances, de connaître de telles affaires". (23)

The notables were well aware that a third guilty party (besides the requêtes and the council) was involved in the évocation issue—the provincial intendants, who were responsible for

"plusieurs inconvénients, et entre autres soustraire de la juridiction, censure et vigilance de vosdits parlements, des officiers des bailliages...et autres juges subalternes; prennent encore connaissance de divers faits dont ils attirent à vostre conseil les appellations, au préjudice de la juridiction de vosdits parlements". (24)

As in 1617 the government was warned, but the question
was whether or not it would react in accordance with the wishes of the notables.

In late 1626 Lauson, intendant of the marine at Rouen, encountered problems with the Rouen parlement over the investigation of a murder committed by country gentlemen. The plaintiffs, the nuns of the order of Holy Trinity of Caen, had originally brought their complaint before the parlement in April 1623, but the court ordered inquiries from time to time until June 1626, at which point nothing had been accomplished. The privy council ordered Lauson to undertake an investigation in September and the parlement suddenly awakened, pushing forward with its own inquiry. It was too late. The nuns went to the council, which ordered on 9 February 1627 that the dossier be sent to it and then, on 12 February, that the requêtes judge the case. (25) The gentlemen, Hervé and Jacques de Thieuville, and their domestics appealed against the decrees of the court to the Paris parlement. Twice that year (30 July, 12 August) the council was obliged to confirm the competence of the requêtes. When the king and his council went to La Rochelle the parlement took the opportunity to receive an appeal from one of the domestics of the Thieuvilles, and to order the parties to plead after Martinmas. The masters moved quickly. On 15 October death sentences were given in the absence of the gentlemen and enormous
fines and compensations were levied. The domestics promptly appealed again and another assault took place at the Fort L'Évêque, with the prévôt of the Ile de France and a bailiff of the parlement removing the prisoners "avec force et violences". (26)

There can be little doubt that the touchiness of the parlement over the Thieuville case was caused in part by its anxieties about the competence to be awarded by the king in the Troyes riot case. In August 1627 Louis Berthault, merchant and reputed gabelleur, was mobbed in that town along with his family. Although they succeeded in escaping with their lives, the municipal authorities did nothing for three days, enough time for the populace to sack Berthault's property. (27) Both the council and the parlement received word of the sedition and on 2 September Marillac wrote to Molé to tell him that the king intended to send a master, accompanied by officers of the grande prévôté, "pour informer et instruire le procès et pourvoir après le jugement ainsi que de raison". (28) This was hardly reassuring to Molé, since Troyes was within the jurisdiction of the parlement, which automatically was entitled to hear the case. Molé wrote back to the keeper of the seals:

"J'ay vu Messire Prévost, maître des requêtes, qui a exécuté sa commission à Troyes, il a fait amener quantité de prisonniers qui a présenté requête à la cour pour être reçus appelans. On a différé de toucher à cet affaire jusque à ce que j'eusse
Molé would appreciate it if the king sent the dossier and the prisoners to the parlement, where "on y suivroit tel ordre que vous presciverez".

Yet the council did not immediately make a decision. The incident at the Fort L'Eveque had aroused the anger of even Marillac, who made only the slightest effort to appear conciliatory. His letter of 8 December to Molé was blunt in pointing out the gravity of the parlement's obstruction:

"J'estime que si vous vous souvenez des termes portés par les arrests donnés en la cour, vous estimerez par cela une acte de contention avec le Conseil du Roy... décréter contre ceux qui ont recours au Roy, défendre aux juges de prendre connaissance des commissions que le Roy leur adresse. Jugez, s'il vous plaist, de quelle sublimité l'on establit un trosne par dessus celuy du Roy. Je suis en grande appréhension de ce que dira Sa Majesté lors qu'elle entendra ce qui c'est passé au For Levesq. J'en diffère le raport autant que je puisse et ne puisse éviter pour lontems, en esté pressé". (30)

Forgetting that the parlement was both defending its prestige and upholding the ordinances of the king, Marillac warned Molé not to see "l'essentiel en ces bagatelles".

The court persisted in refusing competence over the Thieuville case and the ministers continued to withhold cognizance of the Troyes affair. (31) On 26 December Marillac wrote a curt letter to the procureur-général:

"Pour l'affaire de Troyes, elle est importante."
Le Roy a commandé que le procès en soit aporté afin d'aviser où il en renvoyra le jugement ou s'il le fera juger et que l'expédient sera meilleur pour donner ordre qu'à l'advenir cela n'arrive plus (my italics). (32)

But the "expédient"—an obvious menace for the parlement—was not carried out, and on 15 March the council sent cognizance of the sedition to the court. The case was not judged until December 1628, and although the parlement levied heavy fines and damages against the inhabitants of Troyes, it decreed corporal punishment which was relatively light. (33)

Just two days before the council sent the sedition case to the parlement, the king handed down a decree "en commandement" against the court, forbidding it to meddle in the affair of the Thieuvilles. (34) The temerity of the parlement reached new heights when Jacques de Thieuville gave himself up at the Conciergerie on 2 August 1628, in order "estre à droict à la cour suivant l'arrest du conseil privé du Roi du 12e Februrier 1627". (35) That decree, it will be remembered, had not sent the Thieuvilles to the parlement, but to the requêtes de l'hôtel. Immediately the court arraigned the commissioners established by the masters on the Thieuville property and, in exasperation, the council discharged the commissioners. (36) The parlement, ignoring the decrees of the council, which was far away at the siege of La Rochelle, continued to block

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successful prosecution. Finally the plaintiffs, undoubtedly frustrated in their hopes to see the defendants brought to justice, were willing to plead at the parlement. Mole wrote to Marillac late in 1628 with this news and with a justification of the court's obstruction of the prosecution:

"C'est un gentilhomme justiciable au Parlement de Rouen, duquel il a plu au Roy de l'évoquer. L'ordonnance de Blois porte qu'en ce cas le renvoy s'en doit faire au plus prochain (parlement), la même loy ne veut que les requêtes de l'hôtel jugent en dernier ressort, ce n'est point un affaire où le Roy soit partie, car en ces cas je sçay ce que vous a plu de me dire de telles commissions. On ooste guère la voie d'appel aux accusés. Celuy est gentilhomme qui doibt estre jugé en un parlement la grande chambre assemblée". (37)

This was very theoretical, since the contention aroused by the prosecution of the paymasters in 1626 demonstrated that the parlement would meddle in any affair which it chose.

The answer given by Marillac on 26 October ignored the question of the ordinances—the sixteenth century legislation was about to be superceded by an ordinance drawn up by Marillac himself. He had delayed the most recent council decrees, trusting to the reasonableness of the parlement, but now with the court summoning the litigants "le Roy a commandé que l'on signifiast, trouvant bien mauvais qu'il y fust si peu déferé, sachant mesme qu'il l'a prononcé de sa bouche". (38) There was no need to discuss law with Mole, since
"ceux qui ont esté raporteurs de cette affaire au Conseil et devant le Roy en rendront, à mon avis, si bon compte à Sa Majesté qu'elle aura suict de se louer de son conseil et de voir que le zèle nécessaire aux souverains deslivrer les foibles de l'opression des puissans a donné le principal mouvement de cette affaire".

The keeper of seals had, in effect, told Molé that the council, and particularly the trusty masters, had the largest part of the responsibility for the development of the case. Molé would not have been surprised to discover that the most recent decree of the council concerning the Thieuville case was given after a master had pored through the registers of the requêtes, looking for precedents. (39) Whatever Marillac might say about the king making decisions in person, it was "MM. du conseil" and the opportunistic masters who influenced him. Yet from the viewpoint of the masters the Thieuville case was an example of the traditional role of monarch and company: the former had the duty to protect his people; the latter were to help him to do so.

The Thieuville case momentarily ceased to cause contention between the parlement and the council. The last council decree was partly responsible for this, but there was also another factor which contributed to the judicial peace throughout much of 1629: the code Michau, which was the first royal ordinance to allow the masters to judge in final instance both the council trivia and other matters sent to them, had been passed by the Paris
parlement in January, though after some opposition. (40) But the seeds of further dissension had been sown some seven months before.

In June 1628 Daniel Pellisson, first captain and élu at Laval in the Maine and involved in the establishment of wine and cloth duties, was badly beaten in a riot of cloth workers. Moricq was promptly sent out to oversee the implementation of the duties, as well as to begin investigation of the riot. He did not bother to pursue his inquiry with much vigour and left the case in the hands of local magistrates. (41) The provincial authorities moved slowly and Pellisson was the victim of another sedition in November 1628. Finally the council sent the case to the requêtes de l'hôtel on 23 June 1629. The parlement was expressly forbidden to interfere. (42) The letters patent, given at Alès, were not registered at the requêtes until late September and delays caused by distance and provincial authorities contributed to slowing down the progress of the prosecution. On 20 March 1630 the masters judged the rebels: a half-dozen were sent to the galleys for three years and twenty-seven others were sentenced to death in absentia. (43) Only in June, with the king and his council far away at Grenoble, did the parlement receive the appeal of the city aldermen, condemned to collect 8,000 livres worth of damages for Pellisson. At the same time the parlement ordered remonstrances "sur
la conséquence des commissions addressantes aux maîtres des requêtes pour instruire et juger les procès en dernier resort". (44) A month later (5 August) a decree of the council of state, given in the presence of the king, annulled the parlement's decision. In addition

"faict Sa Majesté inhibitions et deffenses audit parlement de prendre connoissance à l'avvenir des procès et affaires renvoyés aux sieurs maîtres des requêtes pour estre jugés souverainement ny de recevoir les apppellations de leurs jugements". (45)

This was the second occasion in 1630 that the parlement had been admonished, for in January the court had been told to refrain from summoning the the commissioners established on the Thieuville lands. (46) Beaten in two places the parlement struck in another direction. In June, September and December it received appeals made by the domestics of the comte de Flers, still waging the suit which had briefly caused problems between the parlement and the requêtes in 1624. Angran, the court clerk, was repeatedly ordered to send over the dossiers and he repeatedly refused. On 5 December the privy council reiterated the old interdictions. (47)

The decree was not given under the auspices of Michel de Marillac. A member of the party of the queen mother, he had been turned out of office after the day of the dupes. Although Marillac may not have been the ideal collaborator for Richelieu in foreign affairs, he was more than adequate for the judicial problems of the realm.
Inasmuch as the sovereign courts were concerned, the attitudes of Marillac had become ever more royalist: although he had reservations about a commission created by the king in 1626, he had none about the cases sent to masters afterward. One reason was that the Paris parlement behaved in such a precipatory fashion in matters of controversy, favouring strong decisions over negotiations. Another is found in a letter written by the keeper of the seals to Richelieu on 15 July 1630:

"Tout est plein de séditions en France, les Parlements n'en châtient aucune. Le Roi a donné des juges pour ces procès et le Parlement arrête l'exécution de ces jugements et par conséquent les séditions sont autorisées". (48)

Marillac may or may not have had in mind the record of the Paris parlement in the Troyes case. The court had taken nine months to reach a decision even when it already had most of the culprits locked up in the Conciergerie. Furthermore, apart from the fines, most of the penalties which it decreed were relatively light. But the masters, having to rely on provincial authorities to round up the prisoners and complete the investigation, took only six months to hand down a verdict in the Laval case, and they were less lenient than the parlement. Whereas the sovereign courts only encouraged sedition by the laxity of their procedure, the masters of requests treated rioters as they deserved. After his disgrace Marillac wrote a treatise "principallement contre l'autorité du Parlement", in which the requêtes de l'hôtel was por-
trayed as one of the tribunals whose use by the king demonstrated the boundless range of his magisterial powers. (49) It is possible that the government would have handled the next controversy with the parlement in a different way had Marillac and not Châteauneuf held the seals.

Having word of the pillaging of a gabelleur's property, accompanied by the killing of two archers of the gabelle and the appearance of seditious posters at Angers in June 1630, the council sent a master, Lemaître de Bellejamme, both to investigate and to judge the culprits. (50) Possibly it was hoped that the guilty would be speedily despatched. Lemaître arrived at Angers in August and immediately discovered that the local authorities, from mayor to governor, were not wholly reliable. Unable to carry out his commission, he was obliged to leave the city, returning only in December, but accompanied by several dozen archers and gentilshommes. Five suspects were imprisoned and led off to Tours, whose judges were considered more reliable than their colleagues at Angers. (51) Two rioters were condemned to death and executed. Antoine Brillet, a lawyer and one of the defendants, avoided a similar fate by craftily telling the magistrates that he had something to say to the king. Lemaître was obliged to lead him to Paris. En route to the monarch Brillet was able to bring a complaint before the parlement,
and he published a factum in which the scandalous methods of the royal commissioner were brought to light. (52) Lemaitre was accused of having kidnapped an absolved suspect, of having used the falsely fabricated testimony of "un foible d'esprit" (one of those executed at Tours), of having prosecuted Brillet without an adverse party or crown prosecutor, of having interrogated him in the dead of night, surrounded by musketeers "leurs mèches allumés", of having used a personal servant (and not a legally recognized clerk) to record the interrogation, etc. In short Lemaitre was "un juge qui prostituoit l'honneur de sa profession et sa dignité". When the parlement saw the complaint of Brillet, it made the unusual move of directly summoning Lemaitre (27 January 1631). The royal council, at Paris and in the presence of the king, annulled the summons and promptly sent the case to the requêtes. (53) On 6 February the crown prosecution of the parlement presented a petitiori which stressed the illegality of the royal decision. (54) The code Michau, which had legalized the final instance jurisdiction of the requêtes, was forgotten by the very institution which had registered it.

The master then attending the grand chambré was sent to find two "anciens" of the company, who were lectured by Le Jay, the first president, on "la conséquence desdites commissions extraordinaires". They were asked to delay judgement. (55) The two returned later that day and said
that a decision would be delayed for one day only, a firm response which angered the parlement. The next day they returned to the grand'chambre and rather daringly told the court that their company had already sent a deputation to the new keeper of the seals, Châteauneuf, "qui avoit trouvé bon que les maîtres diffèrent juger le procès criminel...pour ce jour seulement". (56) Smoothly paying their respects to the parlement, "n'ayant autre dessein que de satisfaire à l'ordonnance de la cour", the two retired. This must have caused a flurry of excitement, since the parlement immediately decided to send a delegation to Châteauneuf, "pour lui faire entendre la conséquence des commissions extraordinaires", as well as to show him the request of Brillet, who demanded that Lemaître be brought to trial.

The next day no masters came to the parlement, which heard the results of the consultation with Châteauneuf. The delegation had asked that "ledit Le Maistre, estans du corps de ladite cour, ne pouvoit estre traduict en autre lieu que ladite cour". Châteauneuf did not comment on this innovatory way of handling commissaires extraordinaires, but he told the delegation that the affair was of such importance that the king himself would deliberate upon it with his council. (57) The parlement decided to assist the decision-making process by sending the first president, three présidents à mortier and three councillors
directly to the king.

The crisis deepened as the parlement began to discuss other issues, notably the investigation of the malversations of the maréchal de Marillac, which had been confided to two masters. The atmosphere was all the more highly charged because the judges had stopped deliberating upon an edict establishing offices in order to discuss the Brillet affair. (58) When the deputation appeared before the king, the keeper of the seals recalled certain discourses at the grand'chambre, and said that the parlement was not to touch the Marillac prosecution. As for the case involving Brillet, no decision had been reached. Le Jay delivered the remonstrances and the delegation departed, no doubt disappointed. Back at the grand'chambre an extraordinary discussion of the assembled chambers took place, lasting until eleven o'clock that evening. Unfortunately the exact nature of that discussion is unknown, but there can be no doubt about the excitement generated for, as the court clerk wrote later, "il restait beaucoup de Messieurs à opiner, la délibération a été continué demain huit heures du matin". (59)

On 11 February it was decided that each chamber of the parlement would draw up remonstrances. The following day the keeper of the seals told yet another delegation that judgement of the Brillet case would continue to be
delayed, and that the king had still not decided what to do. (60) But the government was seeking a compromise: Châteauneuf told the delegation that if the parlement had been more cautious it would have received competence over several cases begun by the masters.

The uproar over the Brillet case was finally hidden by another storm. On 17 February the parlement ordered remonstrances over the creation of nine offices at the court. Judges and ministers tackled this problem and Brillet was forgotten. (61) Yet the masters did not judge him. In June he was released from the Fort L'Eveque and his case was sent to the Rouen parlement where, early the next year, he was discharged—a decision which must have justified ministerial disillusion with the parlements. (62) The outcome of the Brillet affair was defeat for both the council and the masters. Its significance was in demonstrating the recently acquired assurance of the company in confronting the parlement; it should not be forgotten that from 1627 to 1631 the council had always supported the requêtes de l'hôtel. The Brillet affair also revealed the bitterness of the parlement towards the commissioners "in extraordinary", for the court was even willing to bring them to trial.

Thereafter the requêtes de l'hôtel received little attention from the parlement, since there were larger
issues at stake. That same year the banishment of the supporters of Gaston d’Orléans, the replacement of the Paris cour des aides by a commission of masters and councilors of state, and the creation of the chamber of justice at the Arsenal for counterfeiters from which the members of the parlement were excluded, brought about more confrontations between council and court. Royal patience was finally broken and in 1632 the king, then at Metz, ordered the parlement to send a delegation before him. The judges were told by the king himself:

"Vous n'êtes établis que pour juger entre maître Pierre et maître Jean... et si vous continuez vos entreprises, je vous rognerais les ongles de si près qu'il vous en cuira". (63)

Thereafter the parlement found itself on the defensive, and the practice of évocations grew at an impressive rate.

The effects of the judicial battles on the activity of the requêtes de l'hôtel and the attitudes of the masters must not be underestimated. The first serious skirmish with the parlement came amidst an increase in the volume of business and there was an immediate change in the number of cases sent to the requêtes either for definitive judgement or for an opinion. Of thirteen cases sent in 1626, nine were given to the court before the decree of the parlement in July. (64) In 1627 and 1628 there were only seven cases sent and one of these in 1628 was for the masters at the royal council. Of the thirteen cases

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sent in 1629 (the year the code Michau was promulgated) two were for an opinion and four were for masters at the council. In 1630 there were only six cases attributed to the masters, half of them for opinions, whereas in 1631 there were nine, two of which were totally inoperative because they concerned the Angers riot prosecution. In 1632 there were only eight cases sent to the masters and two of these were for company members attached to the council. Hence, throughout the judicial war the ministers remained prudent about the activity of the requêtes and the obstruction of the parlement must have seemed all the more unreasonable to them. In 1633, the year Pierre Séguiier acquired the seals, there were twenty-two cases sent to the masters, of which only two were for opinions.

The annoyance of the company towards the parlement can only be guessed at, but there are signs that the masters became increasingly touchy over their final instance jurisdiction. In June 1630 Lemaitre de Bellejamme was asked to present a suit at the council of the queen mother involving an assault upon a provincial treasurer. Raincé, bailiff at the requêtes, carried the ordinance to a servant of the judge. For this case, Raincé told the servant, he considered the sieur de Bellejamme "comme commissaire extraordinaire". When Lemaitre discovered this, he went directly to the requêtes, which ordered the arrest of the bailiff. (65) The poor man hid for two weeks, but was
finally able to get a discharge from the decree when tempers cooled down. The action of the court reveals that the colleagues of Lemaître were as incensed as he was over the description "commissaire extraordinaire".

From 1632 to 1643 there were no judicial skirmishes between the parlement and the requêtes de l'hôtel. This was partly because the council had won its war with the parlement, but also because many of the cases concerning fiscal disorders sent before the requêtes were transferred from the competence of the Paris cour des aides—an institution whose resistance to the council had been broken back in 1631. (66) The death of Louis XIII encouraged a counter-attack by the Paris parlement. The chamber of the Arsenal was abolished, and in 1644 the parlement chose to interfere with the final instance jurisdiction of the masters in a very ominous way, since the contestation involved cognizance over falsification of the royal seal, which the parlement had traditionally left to the requêtes.

Scipion Paullin, prévôt des maréchaux in the Lyonnais, and his son Arnauld had been prosecuted since 1633 by one Chrétienne de Paris, who claimed to have been sexually assaulted by Arnauld. (67) In their attempts to avoid successful prosecution the Paullins made the mistake of fabricating a variety of royal documents. In 1639 the pair were sent
before the requêtes and a year later cognizance of an assassination attempt on Chrétienne, for the Paullins did not give up easily, was sent in first instance to the châtelet and on appeal to the requêtes. The Paullins, astute and desperate, were able to drag out the case until 1644, a record for a seal prosecution. Scipion successfully applied for letters of remission, but on 22 September the court ordered the Paullins to be beheaded, fined them 3,000 livres which was to go to the king and the poor and awarded 35,000 livres in damages to Chrétienne. (68) Arnauld, who had intelligently given himself up at the Conciergerie and had not been transferred to the Fort L'Eveque, immediately appealed to the parlement, as had Claude d'Assédat nearly a quarter of a century before. Whatever the specific reason for the decision of the parlement to hear Paullin's appeal (his presence in the Conciergerie, the attribution of appellate jurisdiction to the requêtes from a tribunal under the parlement, the notoriety of the plaintiff, a prostitute and impostor), it meant challenging the requêtes on territory usually recognized as its own.

The president de Mesmes, brother of the famous ambassador and distinguished for his defence of the parlement against royal encroachments (69), invited the dean of the quartier, Le Prévost d'Herbelay, to take his place at the court. Mesmes asked him about the Paullin
case. D'Herbelay retorted in a manner which was hardly respectful:

"ne luy devoir demander attendu c'estoit souverain à souverain, que Messieurs les maistres des requestes en ces rencontres ne rendoyent point compte de leurs jugements au parlement et néanmoins s'il désiroit savoir ce que s'estoit du procès il luy diroit comme à un estranger, ce que ledit sieur d'Herbelay auroict fait". (70)

The dean returned to his company, which displayed much satisfaction with his stand. The chief clerk was sent to the Conciergerie to pronounce the death sentence, and the executioner and the confessor were ordered to make ready. (71) But the jailor refused to hand over Paullin, since "ledit parlement luy avoit faict deffence". In addition the parlement had forbidden execution of the verdict of the requêtes by any bailiff and had ordered the court clerk to hand over all the procedures on penalty of imprisonment. The court clerk was sent again to tell the jailor that if he did not hand over Paullin he would be declared a "rebelle à justice". His second refusal was followed by a warrant for arrest which, for unknown if imaginable reasons, could not be carried out. The enraged masters then despatched d'Herbelay and another company member to Fontainebleau in order to obtain justice. They returned in the afternoon with crushing news—a delay of execution until further royal command.

A few days later the crown prosecutor of the requêtes went to the council, complaining of
On 30 September the council, in the presence of the little king, annulled the decree of the parlement, forbade it to take cognizance of the case, but did not allow the masters to execute their sentence. In the meantime the comte d'Harcourt intervened on the behalf of Paullin. He recommended that the king employ "son (Paullin's) courage et subject pour service aux occasions de la guerre". Letters of pardon were drawn up in October, but the requêtes did not register them until July 1645. Arnauld was not let off lightly: the fines remained and he was banished from the kingdom. Scipion was not included and the masters had the satisfaction of executing the sentence upon his effigy on 8 November 1644.

The incident is a useful indicator of the attitude of the masters towards their colleagues. Although their nastiness can be explained initially in terms of the cantankerous behaviour of one master, it still stands in contrast to the respect shown in 1621 and even 1631. The answer of d'Herbelay was more than curt: it included the epithet "stranger", a deliberate insult to the bonds between masters and parlement. Moreover, d'Herbelay emphasized equal status between the two groups when he said "souverain à souverain". As important was the reasoning
of the crown prosecutor and d'Ormesson. It is not known if d'Herbelay stressed the chancery aspect of the case when he confronted the parlement, but neither the crown prosecutor nor d'Ormesson did so. The former simply drew the line between the parlement and the council. The latter wrote in his Journal:

"tous les gens du bien avoient un tel sentiment qu'ils disoient que, pendant un gouvernement absolu, cela méritoit une interdiction et que si la reyne et son conseil n'y prenoient garde et ne faisoient quelque coup hardi pour restablir l'autorité du roy et l'obéissance parmi les peuples, il n'y auroit plus dans peu de temps, les parlements dans les provinces entreprenoient avec tant de liberté que les ordres du roy n'y estoient observés qu'autant les parlements l'agréoit". (75)

For d'Ormesson royal authority was at stake and not the traditional chancery competence of the requêtes. The masters had clearly taken a stand: they identified themselves with the council and placed the parlement in the ranks of the enemy.

The skirmish over the Paullins had another significance. For the first time in thirteen years the requêtes de l'hôtel had been let down by the government. Hence the incident fits into the pattern of growing dissatisfaction of the company with the government— the subject of the following chapters.

* * * *
The period 1626-31 was decisive in the relationship between the Paris parlement and the royal council and between the Paris parlement and the masters. For the parlement the masters emerged as the representatives of an illegal judicial order sustained by "MM. du conseil". The key feature of this new order was that it bypassed the sovereign courts. To be sure, the council had always meddled in the operation of justice in the courts. In the sixteenth century it removed cases from one parlement and sent them to another. It instituted the grand conseil. But in the first case the évocations were approved by the ordinances since, as Molé would have pointed out, the cases were sent from one regular court to another. The grand conseil, by and large, handled a well defined group of cases. The dangers posed by the requêtes de l'hôtel were, however, novel and diverse.

In the first place, any type of suit could be sent there. Secondly, the requêtes was fed by another menacing innovation—the provincial intendancy of justice. Together these two agents represented a threat to the traditional judicial hierarchy, with its system of appeals leading up to the parlements and the cours des aides. Not only were the courts deprived of cases, but also the individuals called before the requêtes saw themselves deprived of the right to an appeal, as Molé complained to Marillac.
The sudden sensitivity of the parlement to the requêtes de l'hôtel was based upon important judicial developments at that court under Louis XIII. In 1621 it was granted a greater share of the litigation carried on by the beneficiairies of committumus. After 1623 cases sent back to Paris by the provincial intendants became increasingly common.

The anger of the Paris parlement against the royal council went further than the use of the requêtes by "MM. du conseil". In 1626 Molé complained before the assembly of notables that the intendants were not drawn from the personnel of the parlements (76) Had they been so chosen, as Molé probably knew, they would be subject to the supervision of the parlements, and they would not send litigation to the council. Molé also objected to the brevet of Montpellier, which obliged presidents of the parlements to resign their offices before they could become councillors of state. (77) He probably knew that this was an effective way of excluding the presidents from the royal council. In short Molé saw not only that the council robe was acquiring an ever larger share of the business of the tribunals, but also that the sovereign courts were losing a say in affairs of state.

Although Molé never blamed "MM. du conseil" in his letters to Marillac, there can be little doubt that he
would have regarded them as responsible for the innovations. Richelieu, Marillac, the councillors of state and the masters of requests, all hiding beneath the name of the king, were responsible. The collusion of the masters was particularly shameful, for they had the honour of serving at the parlement.

The masters were the advance guard of the council. As intendants they invaded the provinces, and as judges at the requêtes they received the first blows from the parlement. One result of the judicial war was that they found themselves becoming outcasts from the world of the sovereign courts.

The judicial war also reveals the nuances in the behavior of the masters towards the parlements. In 1617 they reacted sharply to the decrees of the Rouen parlement. Yet in the confrontations with the Paris parlement from 1621 to 1631 respect and submissiveness were the rule. This did not mean that they were not exasperated by these confrontations, as their reaction to the expression "commissaire extraordinaire", idly dropped by a bailiff, proves. By 1633 the judicial war was won, as the rapidly rising curves of volume of business at the requêtes reveal. The masters could be sure that the council would back them up. The results of this certainty can be seen in 1644, when a confrontation with the parlement brought to light a proud,
combative, even belligerent company, forgetful of its membership at the parlement.

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Although the history of the requêtes de l'hôtel after the Fronde is not outlined in this work, it should be pointed out that the parlement continued to combat the requêtes. It is likely that the reform of the requêtes in the 1660s, resulting in a considerable reduction in the amount of business heard there, was an attempt of the government to keep the judicial peace—particularly when the efficacy of the tribunal in question was, as has been seen above, open to doubt. (78)
Notes

1 - V-14 car. 12, 20 April 1596.

2 - F.f. 16270, fo. 13, n.a. 2236, pp. 150-1.

3 - Florimond Rapine, Recueil... de tout ce qui s'est fait en l'assemblée générale des estats tenus à Paris en l'année 1614, Paris, 1650, pp. 61-2.

4 - Floquet, Histoire du parlement de Normandie, 7 vols., Rouen, 1840-3, vol. 4, pp. 484-94.

5 - V-14 car. 1497, fo. 20, 18 March 1617.

6 - Mathieu Molé, Mémoires de Mathieu Molé, ed. Champollion, 4 vols., Paris, 1855-7, vol. 1, p. 176. The projected ordinance of July 1618 (f.f. 23396, fo. 320, article 107) did not allow the masters to judge anything except crimes involving the security of the state "ou aultres affaires grandement urgentes", which seems to be a direct reference to the Heurtemont affair.

7 - V-14 car. 54, 1 December 1621.

8 - V-6 car. 48, 24 May 1624.


10 - See the article by Bosher in the Cobban memorial volume and f.f. 23396 (acts relating to the chamber of justice). For the pretensions of the masters over seating, supra, Part I, Chapter 1, note 29.

11 - V-1 car. 1498, fo. 54 (Picardy), fo. 55 (Lyon).

12 - Ibid., fo. 71-3, "Sa Majesté y estans le 13e jour d'Acoust 1626".

13 - Colbert Cinq Cents, number 6, fo. 65, 14 August 1626, and Mole, op. cit., vol. 1, passim.


15 - Supra, note 12.

16 - V-14 car. 68, 28 April 1626, the request of Freret, jailor of the prison.

17 - Cinq Cents, 6, fo. 60, 28 July 1626.

18 - Ibid., fo. 65, 14 August 1626.

19 - Supra, note 12.
20 - Archives de la Préfecture de Police de Paris, AB (registers of the Conciergerie) 28, fo. 325.

21 - V-4 car. 81, 7 March 1630 (opinion), ibid., car. 83, 4 December 1630 (judgement in final instance).

22 - Petit, op. cit., pp. 256-70.

23 - Ibid., p. 262.

24 - Ibid., pp. 266-7.

25 - Supra, Chapter 2, note 52.

26 - V-4 car. 1495, fo. 109-11 (decree, 16 March 1628), ibid., car. 74, 15 October 1627.

27 - X-2-B, 378, 12 December 1628 (judgement of the rioters given under the presidency of Pierre Séguier).

28 - Cinq Cents, 6, fo. 118, 2 September 1627.

29 - Ibid., fo. 136-7, n.d.

30 - Ibid., fo. 142, 8 December 1627.

31 - Supra, note 26 (decree).

32 - Cinq Cents, 6, fo. 145, 26 December 1627.

33 - Supra, note 27. Ten culprits were banished for terms of three and five years; two more were condemned to death in absentia. Damages came to 20,000 livres.

34 - Supra, note 26 (decree).

35 - AB 28, fo. 338.

36 - V-4 car. 100, 18 April 1635 (reference to an earlier decree).

37 - Cinq Cents, 6, fo. 173, n.d.

38 - Ibid., fo. 179, 26 October 1628.

39 - F.f. 16218, fo. 394.

40 - Neron, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 841.

41 - V-4 car. 81, 20 March 1630.

42 - V-4 car. 1498, fo. 138, 22 September 1629.

43 - Supra, note 40. The damages were only 8,000 livres.
44 - V-4 car. 1498, fo. 159, 5 August 1630 (in the presence of the king).

45 - Ibid.

46 - Supra, note 36.

47 - Supra, note 44.

48 - Tapie, op. cit., p. 205.


51 - Ibid., pp. 178-80, 284-290.

52 - Supra, Part 2, Chapter 2, note 28.

53 - V-4 car. 1498, fo. 163-4, 1 February 1631 (in the presence of the king).

54 - X-l-A, 2037, fo. 674, 6 February 1631.

55 - Ibid., fo. 675.

56 - Ibid., fo. 688, 7 February.

57 - Ibid., fo. 703.

58 - X-l-A, 2038, fo. 303, 17 February.

59 - Ibid., fo. 117.

60 - Ibid., fo. 136.

61 - Supra, note 58.

62 - V-6 car. 82, 17 June 1631. Louvet mentions the return of Brillet and another suspect (op. cit., p. 330).


64 - This excludes cases involving falsifications of the seal.

65 - V-4 car. 80, 7, 21 July 1630.
66 - Infra, Chapter 4.


68 - Ibid.


70 - Supra, note 67.

72 - Ibid.

73 - Ibid.

74 - Ibid.

75 - Ibid.

76 - Petit, op. cit., p. 266.

77 - Ibid.

78 - Supra, Chapter 2, and appendices, Graph 3.
Chapter Four: The Return of Tension between the Company and the Ministers—the Creations of 1639

(a) sources of tension: 1631 and 1635

As noted above, 1631 was a difficult year for the masters and the parlement. Although the company voluntarily identified itself with the council in these skirmishes, on one occasion early that year the masters found themselves linked to it in an uncomfortable way.

In December 1630 letters patent established two masterships and seven councillorships at the parlement. (1) The court voted to remonstrate and on 21 January a delegation was sent to see the king. It was greeted by the monarch, two cardinals (including Richelieu), four marshals of France, various court nobles, the keeper of the seals, the secretaries of state, the surintendant des finances, a number of councillors of state, and "quelques maîtres de requêtes". (2) The deputies were probably impressed by this display of might, and they could not help but notice the solidarity of the council world and the presence of the masters. It was almost as if the ministers
sought to admonish the parlement by pointing out the loyalty of the masters. Yet on such occasions the masters usually preferred to be on the side of the parlement. In the ensuing magisterial opposition to the edict the masters played no role and a reduction in the number of new offices was made only for the councillor-ships.

In March an embarrassing contest over precedence suddenly thrust the masters between parlement and council. When the cour des aides refused to verify some edicts in February the council suspended it and established in its place a commission made up of masters of requests and councillors of the grand conseil. Amidst much booing and mockery from a crowd which had penetrated the chambers of the cour des aides, possibly at the instigation of its judges, the commission began its functions. When Cardin Le Bret, councillor of state, took up the presidency of the commission, the masters refused to be presided over by him, saying that he "n'avait jamais été juge, mais simplement avocat-général en ladite cour des aides et au Parlement". Lest the commission fail then and there to begin its activity, it was decided

"que dans la commission il ne seroit point fait mention de présidents et qu'il y avoit des maîtres des requêtes qui seroient au banc des presidents". (4+)

But the incident did not end there because Chaulnes, the dean, and Thévin and Turquant, deans of the quartiers,
complained to Châteauneuf. In the exchange which followed the keeper of the seals called Turquant "un fou", a not very diplomatic way to treat a senior master. (5) The masters refused to sit on the commission. They were suspected of discussing the question in their auditory and they were told to hand over their registers. The three senior judges were promptly exiled and the company was forbidden to deliberate on the issue. But the exile lasted only a few days, for the parlement entered the lists, deciding to make remonstrances.

"sur le sujet des commissions extraordinaires et principalement sur celle de la cour des aides, puis sur l'interdiction des trois maîtres des requêtes". (6)

The parlement was forbidden to remonstrate and the judges were immediately reinstated in the exercise of their offices. The incident demonstrates how the masters were prepared to act against the ministers when they felt that their dignity had been affronted and how the old solidarity between the parlement and the company could still be of use to them.

The beginning of the "guerre ouverte" in 1635 witnessed the immediate swelling of royal financial needs. In December the king went to the parlement with a stack of bursal edicts. Dozens of offices were added to the Parisian sovereign courts and the masters saw their number expanded by eight new offices. (7) The parlement
went into opposition only after verification of the edicts, but from the company there was not a move. This was surprising, inasmuch as the masters had simultaneously suffered other blows. The creation of four presidencies at the grand conseil without the obligatory tenure of a mastership ended the monopoly of the company there, and the masters were obliged to pay part of the 800,000 livres in augmentations de gages created for the Parisian sovereign courts. (8)

The company did not oppose the reception of the new masters and all eight were admitted into office within the first two months of 1636. (9) Yet it is possible that an acrimonious discussion had taken place behind the scenes at court, since Gilbert Gaulmain, in a harangue delivered four years later, commented that the last establishment of offices had cost the company 500,000 écus. (10) If this figure was not an exaggeration, then the masters came up with enough money in order to suppress from eight to ten offices in 1635.

(b) the fight over the sixteen: December 1639 - January 1642

Although the preceding creations have left no traces of open opposition from the masters in the registers of the parlement or the requêtes de l'hôtel, their obstruction of the creations of 1639 can be followed in both of these
sources. But the heart of this account is drawn from the "Récit de ce qui s'est passé touchant l'édit de seize maistres des requestes en 1640 dans leurs assemblées qui se sont tenues pour cet effect aux requestes de l'hôtel, chez Monsieur Amelot, Doyen, et au Parlement de Paris", and from the letters of Henri Arnauld, future bishop of Angers, to the exiled president Barrillon, brother of a master. The first source, by an anonymous master who was hostile to the edict of 1639, covers only a few months in the opposition of the company, whereas the letters of Arnauld begin before the crisis, in January 1639, and end long after it, in 1643. (11)

These and other sources allow the historian to grasp the activity of the masters as a pressure group in a way that no prior event has permitted. They demonstrate what has so often been only hazily perceived behind the remonstrances of the 1570s and 1580s, the meetings in 1594 and 1610 and the cryptic mentions of deliberations encountered here and there.

The ambiguity in the relationship of the masters with the parlement and the council become clear, along with the pressures, subtle or obvious, which the ministers could exert upon the company. But the crisis of 1640 is not interesting simply because it is well-documented. It represents a serious turning point in the relations be-
tween the crown and the company, albeit prepared in part by the creations of 1631 and 1635. From 1640 onward those relations would worsen.

Rumours of an edict had been in circulation from at least January 1639, when Arnauld mentioned them in his earliest letter to Barrillon. (12) But the edict for the masterships was, as usual, only one of a number of similar expedients, and all were similarly exaggerated. In November Arnauld wrote that it was thought that the government would create 100 secretaries of the king and a chambre des comptes at the hôtel de ville, and in December there was even talk of another châtelet! Speculation of the number of new masterships was equally rife, varying from sixteen to thirty-two. (13) Either figure was bound to upset the company, which seems to have been as uncertain of the plans of the ministers as anyone.

Proof of the ignorance of the masters is given by Arnauld, who describes the results of a magisterial delegation to Bullion, though initially for another matter. In November members of the grand conseil, the chambre des comptes, the parlement, and the company went to the Chambre Saint-Louis to discuss a reduction of the official stipends decided upon by the ministers. A joint delegation was sent first to Séguier, who answered with "parolles générales". Then it went on to see Bullion, who at first
refused to receive them on the pretence that he was sick. He finally confronted them in "sa camisolle rouge et son bonnet de nuict". Nothing was resolved about the stipend, but

"en mesme temps Monsieur de La Porte se presente de la part de sa compagnie de laquelle il dict avoir charge de scavoir de luy s'il estoit vray que l'on voulust faire une nouvelle creation de maîtres des requêtes, il luy respondit, c'est au Roy à qui il le fault demander, addresssez vous à luy". (14)

The answer of Bullion was, in effect, unanswerable, but at least it told the masters what to expect.

The ministers were worried more about the reception to be given the edict at the parlement than about the feelings of the masters. The third chamber of enquêtes had been banished in 1636 over its opposition to edicts creating offices and the parlement might rouse a storm in order to make the ministers bring it back. It was known that the ministers hoped to make at least 2,000,000 livres from the sale of the masterships and that the money would immediately find its way to the royal coffers, since the office was in great demand. (15) Yet, as Arnauld repeated in November 1639, "si le Roy a la peine d'y aller, nulle grâce". (16). In other words, determined resistance on the part of the court would bring about a lit de justice, and the third chamber of enquêtes would remain in exile. However, the ministers probably did not want a lit de justice, because the constant resort to the king's person was like using the peau de chagrin. They could not indefinitely
banish chambers of parlements or replace sovereign courts with commissions made up of masters and councillors of states, as they had done in 1631 and as they were to do for the Rouen parlement in December 1639. Hence the ministers and the presidents of the court were in negotiation several weeks before the presentation of the edicts.

Again Arnauld serves as our witness for an interesting scene which took place between Richelieu and the presidents Nesmond, Potier and de Mesmes. The last named judge argued that the edict of the masterships ought to be sent to the parlement before the others, since it was the only one which required the assembly of the chambers, concerning as it did the composition of the court. Richelieu feebly disclaimed the importance of the legislation and drew out a rejoinder from Potier:

"et quoi Monsieur, ne comptez vous pour rien de faire tant de casseurs d'arrests, à quoy Monsieur le Cardinal ayant respondu que ce n'estoient pas eux qui cassoient les arrests mais Monsieur le Chancellier et tout le Conseil, il eust pour replique que l'on sçavoit bien comment cella se faisoit". (17)

Such testimony as to the methods by which the annulment of the decrees of the parlement took place ought not to be forgotten by institutional historians, and it reinforces what has already been said about the acquisition of cases for the requêtes de l'hôtel. Nesmond then asked Richelieu if a lit de justice would follow the refusal of the par-
lement to verify the edicts. He would not answer. Other consultations probably took place but we have no knowledge of them.

As late as 28 December, according to Arnauld, it was not known how the edicts were to be presented, but on 8 January he reported that six edicts would be sent to the court before the one for the masterships. (18) These were registered with little delay, although there were minor problems over an edict for court registries, which concerned the requêtes du palais and de l'hôtel. (19) But the first signs of serious opposition came before the presentation of the last edict, and it came not from the parlement, but from the masters themselves.

On 13 January two quartiers of masters assembled in their auditory and decided "qu’on feroit remonstrances sur le sujet de cette érection et vers Monseigneur le Cardinal". (20) However, difficulties were encountered in finding one of their number who was willing to present their complaint. The elders of the company were approached, first Denis Amelot, the dean, who refused on the spot, and then François de Verthamon, who offered to give his answer in a few days. Amelot had been approached out of respect for his office, whereas Verthamon, a friend of the chancellor, was held in esteem by the cardinal. But this master eventually refused, telling his colleagues
"qu'il avoit appris que sa personne n'estoit pas un sujet propre". (21) A third choice, made at a second meeting held at the requêtes, was an easy one: "toute la compagnie jetta les yeux sur Monsieur Gaulmain qui accepta cet honneur sans aucune restriction". (22) No one better could have been chosen. Although Gaulmain had been the recipient of royal favour in the past, he was not attached to the ministers. (23) Since his reception in 1631 he had held no provincial employment and, at the age of fifty-five, he could hardly expect spectacular advancement. He was a well-known scholar, a frequenter of libertine circles and, in addition, had a reputation as orator and raconteur. This was not the last time that he would defend the masters, for in 1656 he would be as free, even brutal, in his language against the Paris parlement as he was against the government in 1640.

A third meeting, for the purpose of drawing up memoirs to be presented to Richelieu, was held in the chambers of the dean. Yet the confection of remonstrances was not the only intention of the masters. They were realistic, knowing that they had to find a way of directly countering the plans of the ministers. Several means were proposed, including "faire offices" and "produire de l'argent pour le roi". (24)
The first of these involved the creation of offices for other courts. The masters initially showed some pride and rejected this, not for reasons of solidarity with their colleagues, but "n'ayant pas semblé ausdits maistres des requestes de proposer des avis à la foule du peuple (i.e. the partisans)." (25) The second, which would take the form of a chamber of justice, was equally unsatisfactory, since the masters knew what institutional historians have often enough told us: "qu'il n'estoit pas de mise en un siècle où les ministres de finances estoient les colonnes et le soutien de l'estat." (26)

In need of guidance, the company sent fifteen or sixteen of its members directly to Amelot, who had abstained from this particular discussion, even though it had taken place in his quarters. Both the rejected notions were again mentioned, but in very specific terms this time. Types of offices were proposed and the heirs of Cornuel, an intendant des finances who had recently died, were singled out in place of a full-scale chamber of justice. These projects were once again discarded, since they were both shameful and unrealistic. (27) A third expedient, all too indicative of the genuineness of the concern of the masters for robe solidarity, was proposed: the acquisition of all évocations and commissions extraordinaires. This suggestion was blown away by the more
perspicacious judges:

"que toutes choses venant à estre remises en leur ordre comme on le debvoit espérer après la paix, on leur osteroit assurément cette attribution sur le plainte qu'en feroient les parlements, les cours des aydes et les estats généraux". (28)

Thomas Le Lièvre was chosen to communicate on behalf of the company with his cousin, Bouthillier de Chavigny, secretary of state, who, it was hoped, would be able to change the mind of the cardinal. His embassy failed ("la nécessité de l'estat", Richelieu told Bouthillier), and the masters prepared for the worst. (29) None of the new officers would be received at the requêtes de l'hôtel, unless the four quartiers were assembled, "les nouveaux n'auront aucune part aux émoluments" and "les anciens n'auront aucune communications avec eux...mais les traiteroient comme des excommuniés maudits de dieu". (30) A desperate appeal to robe solidarity would be made:

"chacun des maistres des requestes voiroit par forme de visite ceux du parlement de sa connoissance et les exhorteroit à n'abandonner pas les dits maistres...en une occasion où il s'agissoit de la ruine totale de la justice, de toute la robe et de plusieurs familles d'honneur". (31)

The company was close to giving up all hope of a peaceful accommodation with the ministers when Henri Le Grand, one of the oldest judges, complained that they were not acting "comme personnes qui avoient connoissance de la cour et de la façon en laquelle on y vivoit". (32)
A delegation was chosen to ask the cardinal for an audience. Jacques Amelot, nephew of the dean, and Jacques Barrin, the most recently received master, were to go to Rueil. The Barrin, frequenters of the grandees, were also known for their contacts with Richelieu. The father of Jacques, a former master and then a councillor of state, had been chosen by the cardinal to straighten out the financial disorders of Richelieu's nephew. (33)

Their first visit ended disastrously. Amelot was as tactless and "hardi" as his uncle was timid. Barrin stood stock still without saying a word. Richelieu became angry and mockingly asked Amelot "sy la harangue du Sieur Gaulmain estoit preste", a suggestion that at least one master had been free with company secrets. The reaction of the cardinal thoroughly consternated the company, which wondered how to influence Richelieu, "dont l'esprit estoit merveilleusement délicat". Finally Barrin was sent alone, and the cardinal granted the masters an audience. (34)

The new deputation to Rueil was composed of thirteen masters, but two of the oldest, Barrillon and La Guette, withdrew. The former was considered by the cardinal as one of the most useful company members, and La Guette was to be one of the judges of Thou and Cinq-Mars. (35) Barrin and the younger Amelot took their places. The rest of the delegation was formed of judges whose careers had
not been very impressive. There were old masters, such as the dean, the quartier dean Achille Courtin, Georges de La Porte and Henri Le Grand, and there were also officers of less experience, Jean de Mesmes, Gilbert Gaulmain and Henri-Louis Habert. Two more, Bon Broé and Guillaume Bide, had only a few years as a master behind them. Except for the dean and Le Grand, only two of the delegates had been provincial intendants—Jean-Jacques Renouard and Humbert de Chapponay. Compared to the company as a whole, the delegation was made up of mediocrities. As if to spare as many masters as possible from contact with the cardinal, it was decided that only the four eldest masters and Gaulmain would confront him.

They were well prepared since, in addition to the harangue of Gaulmain, they had drawn up an opinion. If Richelieu asked them for a substitute for the proposed masterships, the dean would propose the creation of four contrôleurs and a trésorier for the parties casuelles, two secretaries of the council and twelve intendants des finances. These last offices would be bought up by the company at 50,000 écus per office. This was very cunning, since the masters would acquire the monopoly of the activity in the financial bodies of the council and could make fortunes at the same time. (36)

Gaulmain's address, made on 16 January, was praised
by the author of the "Récit" as "très hardi". It is worth a brief analysis because it bears resemblance to earlier remonstrances, though adding one or two new elements. (37) The masters were as old as the monarchy, Gaulmain was careful to point out, and the monarchy had always showered them with honours. François I had given them "les plus beaux emplois du royaume". Yet they had received blows which would have fallen elsewhere: "il n'y avoit point de quartier que par leurs soings et vigilances chargées de la haine des peuples et bien souvent au point de leur propre vie". (38) There was much truth in this, particularly after 1625, and the comment demonstrates a sense of isolation on the part of the company. However, there was little truth in the following statement: "(the masters) entroient dans leurs offices avec d'honnestes richesses, vivaient avec esparagne et toutefois en sortoient quasi tous incommodés". (39)

Gaulmain explained that previous creations had resulted in service at the council becoming no more than "une honorable servitude", an unmistakable reference to a diminishing share of work for each master. Then Gaulmain became "hardi". The company had received all new judges with good grace, but "il lui (Richelieu) faut voir enfin le dommage qu'apportent cette création aux affaires du roy par l'aliénation qu'elle ferait de l'affection de ses principaux sujets". He was quick to add that Richel-
lieu had uttered similar warnings in a harangue made in 1619. Yet he returned to potentially seditious thoughts:

"et sur ce sujet se servoit d'une forte belle pensée, qu'il avait bien appris que l'obéissance tenoit lieu de sacrifice mais qu'il n'avoit point encore vu que l'on eust sacrifié les obéissances". (40)

A brief tale of Persian monarchs followed. There was once a king who sold offices and another who did not. Upon the tomb of the former was written "à celluy qui a divisé l'empire".

Richelieu displayed no reaction to these veiled threats, but merely asked the masters if they had any suggestions. Amelot proposed the new offices, but Richelieu rejected the intendants as so many "argentiers". He wondered if the company knew of a criminal prosecution which could supply the necessary funds, upon which Gaulmain asked for a commission to bring to trial five or six financiers. The cardinal thought that the moment was not ripe, but that when the time came the funds would be used to abolish the new offices. He suggested a sixth chamber for the parlement and then twenty masters of accounts, but the masters were unwilling to support these suggestions, knowing that the sovereign courts would see the poltroonery of the masters behind these creations. The company turned back to the idea of a chamber of justice and thought that the church had not been sufficiently taxed. This trading of ideas came to an end only when Courtin blurted out that the creations would ruin the
sixty-six families of the company. If Barrin had paid 55,000 écus for his office the year before, Choisy could not find a buyer who would put up 30,000—such was the effect of the rumours. The only answer of the cardinal was "nécessité d'estat", but he would see what could be done. (41)

The masters were in a quandary. At their next meeting some thought that it would be "mauvaise grâce" to continue to resist the edict by sending deputies to the parlement. (42) They thought that if a delegation was sent to the court it ought not to include those judges who had accompanied Gaulmain, lest they appear to be the leaders of the opposition. But these masters "estimoient bien plus à propos de n'y envoyer point du tout". The more aggressive magistrates believed that the cardinal had given them no hope and that the only means of stopping the creations was to press the parlement to resist. The sessions of that court, which for the last while had been attended only by a maître honoraire, old Génicourt, suddenly became interesting. The dean, Le Grand, La Porte, and Gaulmain would be sent. But when the delegation arrived at the parlement on 17 January the edict was not presented, and a week elapsed before it was.

On 24 January the delegation, minus La Porte, took up their places. His absence was "causée ou plutôt pré-
texte d'une indisposition laquelle l'avait obligé de prendre médecine". Amelot was no more steadfast. (42) When Le Jay, the first president, sent to the chambers "pour les assemblées, que l'on alloit parler de l'édict des maistres des requestes", Amelot took the order "pour un commandement de la part du roy de se retirer", which he promptly did.

The rapporteur of the edict was of the opinion that it should be verified, but for six offices only. He commented that if the parlement had not been under constraint (i.e. hoping to bring about the return of the third chamber of enquêtes), it would probably not register the edict at all. If the court did not let it through in some form, he urged, the king would hold a lit de justice, finding it a good occasion to force through other legislation, "dont le public et les parlements receyroient de grands préjudices".

When asked for their opinions the two masters responded differently. Le Grand opined at first "d'un ton si bas qu'il ne fut attendu que de peu de personnes et quelques uns mesmes creurent qu'il avoit esté de l'opinion du rapporteur". (43) Asked again, he offered the opinion of Scarron, one of the councillors opposed to the edict: "nec possumus, nec debemus". Gaulmain made a daring speech in which Authority, Utility and Necessity took
issue amongst each other, the latter two outvoting the first. Most of the councillors of the enquêtes were with Gaulmain for completely blocking the edict, whereas most of the grand'chambre held to the opinion of the rapporteur. A handful of perennial trouble-makers, including the famous Laisné, expressed the decisive argument—since only three chambers were assembled, the king should be asked to send back the exiled councillors before the edict could be registered. So the verdict was "nec possumus, nec debemus" and the edict was "mise en délibération". Even the judges who were in favour of passing it in some form—(thirty-four of one hundred judges present)—called for remonstrances. The first president and de Mesbes—who, according to Arnauld, had assured the ministers that the edict would be registered

"se trouverent bien em-peschés et le premier leur (the assembled chambers) dict qu'ils prissent bien garde à ce qu'ils feroient et qu'il arrivast quelque désordre de tout cela". (44)

Later the same day the masters censured their timid colleagues, and chose new delegates. Mesmes d'Irval and Jean de Mesgrigny, the latter a master-intendant, were singled out, but they both refused. Finally Achille de Harlay and Alexandre de Sève (another master-intendant) agreed to replace them, but they vowed not to opine at the parlement if the crown sent jussive letters. The
author of the "Récit" had nothing but contempt for the discretion of these two. As it turned out, Sève did not go to the parlement and finally both were replaced by Michel de Marescot and Guillaume Bidé, two undistinguished members of the company. (45)

On 28 January jussive letters were drawn up. Two days later they were given to Molé, procureur-général, who presented them the same day. (46) The letters berated the court for delaying the war effort and demanded that "aucune longueur, restriction, modification, ni difficulté quelconque" obstruct the passage of the edict. But the parlement did not discuss the letters.

On 31 January they were finally voted upon. The masters were against the edict and the opinion of Gaulmain was one of the most "hardi" which the parlement had heard for some time:

"lequel fonda son opinion sur la raison que la jussion ne changeoit rien en l'affaire que par cela la volonté du roy n'estoit pas mieux manifestée que par l'édict, que la volonté du roy soit en l'édict, soit en la jussion ou elle estoit absolue ou elle estoit conditionnée, qu'on ne la pouvoit pas dire absolue, car en ce cas il ne faudroit point de vérification or il suffiroit que le roy fist de son mouvement ce qui estoit dans l'édict et dans la jussion". (47)

The jussive letters were refused by a wide margin (forty-four to twenty-six), but the absence of many magistrates revealed that the will to resist was weakening. Le Jay
and the présidents à mortier, visibly shaken, had the opinions taken three times in the hope that the more nervous councillors would change their minds. Le Jay voiced fears for the return of the banished members and even warned that the court might be dissolved. But this was to no avail, for the matter was "mise en délibération".

The crown lost patience. That evening Gaulmain was sent to the Bastille, Laisné was ordered to Rueil and Scarron was sent to his home at Amboise. Of Gaulmain, Arnauld commented, "ce qui fait le plus contre luy est que depuis quelques années il a eu des biens faicts du Roy de la valueur de plus de 25,000 escus". Gaulmain took his incarceration philosophically:

"il dict qu'il a fait son devoir de parler comme il a fait, et Monsieur le Cardinal le sien de le faire mettre où il est". (49)

Apparently the masters were too frightened even to assemble the following day, but Le Grand, to his credit, went alone to the parlement. When the judges finally met, "tous les esprits estoient extrêmement abattus". (50) Le Grand asked to be excused from attending the sessions of the parlement for fear that "son assiduité...passeroit pour une affectation et pour un desseing à l'autorité royale...il ne désiroit point aller à la Bastille ny en exil". He was allowed to withdraw. There was a sense of loyalty to the proscribed magistrates. Those masters with
friends at court were to render "office d'ami" for Gaulmain and a fund was set up for Scarron, "qui estoit pauvre". According to Arnauld even these efforts were ill-appreciated at court and the judges who wished to aid their afflicted colleagues were "menacés". The reason may well have been due to something mentioned by Arnauld:

"voici une autre intrigue. C'est qu'on tient qu'au-paravant le reffus de l'édict il ny avoit pas à demy les seize charges, il ne se trouve quasi plus personne qui en veuille maintenant". (51)

It seems either that would-be buyers began to doubt that the new offices would come into existence or that the Parisian magistrature withdrew offers made in advance.

The next jussive letters (dated 8 February) were not presented for several days because, according to Arnauld, "Monsieur le premier président a voulu se donner ces deux ou trois jours pour essayer de ménager les esprits". (52) In the opinion of Arnauld the royal order was "fulminante et conçue en des termes nouveaux et extraordinaires". Even Molé commented that "ces lettres ont esté...présentées non sans aucun regret d'y avoir veu les termes avec lesquels il plaist au Roy de déclarer sa volonté". The letters noted the obstruction of the court

"dont la continuation nous obligeroit à vous en tesmoigner notre indignation mais comme nous avons tousjours considéré vostre compagnie nous avons voulu prévenir les témoignages du juste ressentiment" (my italics). (53)

Obviously the ministers expected that the growing ner-
vousness of the magistrates could be encouraged by vaguely worded, if easily interpreted, threats.

The second jussive letters were finally presented on 13 February before four masters who had not been present at the refusal of the first letters, Habert de Montmort, Broé, Mesgrigny and Bidé. (54) Chaulnes, a master-intendant who had attended the four preceding sessions of the parlement, withdrew on the basis that he had fulfilled his required service there. The company had lost heart for a direct confrontation, and all it sought was a dignified method of abandoning its allies. Transgressing rules of procedure turned out to be a simple answer to the problem of the masters. The new delegation would ask for a second reading of the jussive letters, knowing well that it would be refused them because they had not been present at the discussion of the first letters. They would then walk out, using the affront to their dignity as an excuse for not taking a stand. (55)

So, when the second jussive letters were read, Habert asked that they be read again. The first president refused and the masters stood up and left. But they were promptly followed by the councillors of the enquêtes. "Monsieur le premier président (and probably the masters) demeura fort estonné, ne s'attendant nullement à cet incident", wrote Arnauld. The letters were not passed because of
Lest the masters create more havoc at the parlement, thereby troubling "par leur pratique et empescher l'effect de nostre volonté", letters patent were drawn up the same day forbidding them to attend the parlement. These and a third set of jussive letters were read on 15 February. (57) The ministers and the presidents must have been enraged when the legislation passed, by thirty-two voices to twenty-four, but for only eight offices. Arnauld picked up rumours that the third enquêtes would be re-established, but also that the king himself would come to Paris in order to forbid the enquêtes to meddle in the registration of royal edicts.

In the meantime the company was in despair. (58) Anne Mangot, an elder judge who had managed to keep out of all delegations, proposed that they reach accommodation with the ministers. Against this it was argued that if they gave in, the ministers of finance would supply them with colleagues whenever the crown needed money. The grand conseil, they thought, was an excellent example of a company which had been ruined by an excessive number of creations. But Mangot argued back that they could be compensated by wage increases and entry into the chambres des comptes; the bureaux des finances, the cour des monnaies, and the tournelle; enquêtes and chambers of the edict in
the parlements. Renouard, a master-intendant who had also remained inconspicuous in the uproar, seconded Mangot, but Sève, whose role had been equally discreet, objected that they already had entry to the tournelle (false) and that it would be shameful to enter inferior tribunals. Mesmes d'Irval put forward the old demand that they acquire cognizance of all évocations. The deliberation finished with the company resolving to oppose the edict in any way possible. The motif of compensation, put forward by older or well-connected magistrates, was a realistic argument. It will be seen shortly that these demands appeared in the memoirs presented by the masters to the ministers in 1641. But the resistance of the company was not over. At this point, on the last page of the "Récit", our detailed knowledge of the company assemblies ends.

The ministers waited a few days before drawing up the fourth jussive letters (20 February). (59) As the correspondence of Bullion with Richelieu reveals, Particelli d'Emery, one of the intendants des finances, was busily negotiating with Le Jay. (60) The first president may have sensed the unwillingness of the ministers to use a lit de justice, since he argued that the third enquêtes should be returned before the court considered the last royal command (23 February). On the 26th Arnauld believed that the ministers would be willing to accept
eight masterships in return for the restoration of the exiled councillors. (61) Two days later Bullion saw the first president and told him that the third would be allowed back only after the passing of the edict for sixteen—and no fewer—masterships. (62)

On 29 February there was an astonishing scene at the parlement, recounted by Molé:

"J'ay présenté ces lettres et les chambres ont esté assemblées, il y a eu deux avis, l'un à vérifier l'édict pour dix et l'autre pour demeurer en deliberatis, et ayant esté relue en plusieurs fois ils sont demeures partés, ce qui sera trouvé très extraordinaire puisqu'aux affaires du Roy tels que celuy qui se présente il ny doit avoir aucun partage". (63)

Arnauld said that only forty-three councillors had the courage to opine (thirteen less than at the previous reading). At first twenty judges were willing to settle for four masterships only (according to Arnauld), while the rest wanted to keep talking about the edict. Young Molé crossed over to those who would accept four and the president Bellièvre decided that he was willing to accept two. This total blocking of the edict enraged Bullion, who wrote the same day to Richelieu, "Vostre Eminence voit la bonne affection de ces messieurs". (65)

The government had now to choose between an extreme measure (banishment, a lit de justice) and accommodation. This is probably why the affair disappears from all sources for a month. In the second week of April Molé was asked
to come to the chambers of the cardinal. (66) There he found Ségui er and Bullion. Le Jay had also been asked, but he stayed away for reasons of illness. The "partage" would be annulled and the king would accept the verification of twelve offices. Yet no mention was made of the return of the third. It was decided to allow the masters who had been present at the first vote (minus Gaulmain, still in the Bastille, but shortly to be exiled to Dijon) to opine.

Two days after the discussion with Richelieu the last letters were drawn up (16 April). (67) Two days later they were presented, but registration was delayed because there was not the same number of councillors and presidents in attendance as on 29 February. Yet this absenteeism was surely to the advantage of the ministers. On 20 April, with most of the enquêtes not present and without the masters, the last jussive letters passed, by sixteen votes to seven. The same day letters patent ordering the reinstatement of the third enquêtes were drawn up. (68)

Yet the ministers were unable to sell the new offices. Notwithstanding the withdrawal of the support of the parlement and the poltroonery of individual masters, the company entered into an unspectacular if efficacious resistance. On 23 May Arnauld wrote: "il ne se présente
Point du tout de marchands pour les douze maîtres des requestes". (69) Bullion fumed at the lack of funds and threatened to take vengeance on the third enquêtes by seizing their wages. The usual intrigues for employment caused him much worry. When Vautorte, who was not a master, became intendant in Provence with the help of Noyers, secretary of state, Bullion argued that it would be impossible to sell the new offices as long as the company could not be guaranteed employment. (70) But this uncertainty was not the reason that the offices were not selling. On 10 June Arnauld wrote that "pour débiter les douze offices... on croit que l'on recevra nulle resignation des charges anciennes que ces douze ne soient vendus"— hence the masters were creating the difficulties. (71) These tactics were adopted in 1640, but by September Bullion had not succeeded in selling one office. Furthermore, at least one master, Frère, was allowed to resign in order to become first president at Grenoble. (72) Bullion adopted other forms of pressure. He proposed a reform of the council in which the number of masters allowed into certain council bodies would be reduced. (73) In December he became angry when the intendancy of Lorraine was given to Vignier, a master. He wanted to exclude the company from the provincial intendancies because

"il n'y avoit point d'autre moyen de réduire les maîtres des requestes à souffrir la vente des douze charges nouvelles qu'en leur ostant

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les emplois et la liberté de se diffaire de leurs charges". (74+)

Had not Bullion died the same month the masters might well have entered a crisis of employment sooner than they did.

Yet the question remains of how the masters succeeded in preventing the sale of the new offices, for indeed none of the new posts acquired holders in 1640 or 1641. In early 1640 the company had resolved "intimider les marchands de ses nouveaux offices". (75) A slight difficulty lies in knowing who the "marchands" were. They were probably not individual judges but rather partisans. The methods of intimidation would have been relatively simple. The masters would refuse to present the cases of the partisans at the council and the requêtes de l'hôtel or, more efficaciously, they would undertake a legal prosecution against them, which would not be a difficult feat. (76)

Arnauld records the re-emergence of the affair in November 1641: "il n'y aura que six et on accordera à tout le corps les privilèges des secrétaires du roy". (77) In December it was rumoured that the number would be reduced to four, "dont le corps fera ce qu'il voudra en donnant au Roy 200 mil écus". (78)

On 27 December the masters held a series of meetings, first of the assembled quartiers and then of the eight
eldest magistrates. The latter judges decided to ask the chancellor and Bouthillier to suppress the new offices. (79) Obviously they would not have their way, so they drew up a series of requests which would serve as compensation if carried out.

They would ask to be allowed to sit in both the grand'chambre and tournelle of the parlement "au nombre porté par les règlements (i.e. probably more than four) afin que Sa Majesté soit pleinement informée de la justice que se rend audit parlement et chambre de tournelle". This was an odd way of justifying attendance at the court, when fifty years before they would have conceived it as an honour. They now phrased it in terms of surveillance. (80) The legislation concerning the rights of the deans of the quartiers was to be implemented. Although the exact reason for this request is unknown, it is possible that these masters were not receiving their stipends. Annexed to this was the request that the dean be made a councillor of state in ordinary and be paid accordingly. (81) The judges also asked that the official stipend be increased from 300 to 500 livres per quartier, that they be allowed the right to purchase two minots of salt each year without having to pay the gabelle and that the privileges of the secrétaires du roi be granted them. (82) They also demanded that every master who had served twenty years should automatically become a councillor of state on resignation of
the mastership. (83)

Equally interesting were their requests about employment at the council and in the provinces. The first of three demands about council service specified that

"les présidents des cours souveraines et autres personnes de quelque qualité et condition qu'elles soient ne rapporteront aucunes requestes à la personne du Roy, ny en ses conseils de direction, finances et privé conseils ny aucunes affaires, requestes et instances concernant la justice et police des finances autant que le nombre des maîtres des requêtes est si grand qu'il suffist pour faire raport des doléances et plaintes des peuples". (84)

This request was not all-inclusive, since it did not exclude the intendants des finances from presenting business involving the management of royal finances. The second concerned the commissions given to the councillors of state. No commission would be distributed to them "d'examiner les affaires des gabelles, aydes, sol pour livre, subvention et autres affaires du Roy et des traic-tans qu'il n'y ayt pareil nombre de maîtres des requêtes". (85) In addition only the masters were to be allowed to conduct inquiries ordered by the council. By and large the masters hoped to recoup their losses at the expense of the councillors of state.

These requests were followed by an important one which concerned the provinces:

"que l'ordonnance concernant les chevauchées sera exécutée et suivant icelle sera fait le département des provinces pour en chacune d'icelle y envoyer un maître des requêtes servir
le Roy". (86) For its efforts the company was greeted with success, but at a cost.

The edict of February 1642, which referred to the remonstrances of the masters, abolished ten of the sixteen offices, made the dean into a full councillor of state (such were the rewards of timidity), guaranteed the rights of the deans of the quartiers and increased the official stipend to 400 livres per quartier. The two minots of salt and the privileges of the secrétaires du roi were also given to the company. But the demands about employment were ignored. (87) In exchange, according to Arnauld, the company was obliged to pay 900,000 livres. (88) Within a few days of registration of the edict the six new masters were received at the parlement.

The skirmish of 1640 brings to light the forms of leverage at the disposition of the company, the relations between the masters and the parlement and both the internal and external pressures which played upon the company.

The masters had three means of influencing the ministers—by action at the parlement, by remonstrances made to the ministers and, when the other two methods had failed, by sabotage at the council. A sense of corporate solidarity
had very little to do with bringing about the resistance of the parlement. On the one hand, that court had little desire to see sixteen "casseurs d'arrêt" added to the sixty-six already in existence. On the other, it realized that obstruction could be a useful way of ensuring the restoration of the third chamber of enquêtes. Self-interest motivated both groups and a genuine sense of solidarity can be said to have existed only at one moment, when the masters began to collect funds for Scarron, the councillor who was exiled because he opposed the edict. Once it appeared that the third enquêtes would be recalled, the parlement refrained from further resistance. For their part, the masters made ready to acquire compensations which were sure to enrage the parlement (évocations, entry at the tournelle).

Remonstrating the ministers proved to be the weakest weapon of the masters. More effective was their discreet opposition at the council. It was probably this which made more likely that the demands of the company for compensation would be met.

The author of the "Récit" commented that

"la compagnie des maistres des requestes...est pour la plus grande partie composée des personnes qui réservent tout à leur intérêt et lesquels par cette raison sont toujours fort divisés parce que leur but principal estans de faire fortune dans la cour, pour y parvenir comme ils recherchent tous les mesmes emplois et qu'ils ne les peuvent tout posséder au même temps, aussy sont-ils obligés de faire bande..."
The success of the masters was all the more impressive because the truth of this account was demonstrated time and time again. Fear of spectacular punishment obviously encouraged cautious behavior, but one of the most effective means by which the government could prevent individual masters from opposing the edict was undoubtedly by threatening their careers. Master-intendants were conspicuously absent from the delegations sent to the parlement at critical moments. Some older company members who were on the point of retiring were probably cautious because they knew that they might not be called to the council. Still others, clients of the ministers, would not dare to oppose their patrons. The burden of the open opposition fell upon a few judges who did not quite fit into the master "type"—older robins who had not been intendants and provincials (like the Breton, Guillaume Bidé, who went to the parlement seven times as a company delegate).

The description of the masters cited above applies particularly in the case of open opposition. However, the theme of compensation, around which the company rallied, was put forward by ambitious masters. Furthermore, a fairly united front must have been presented to Bullion in 1640-1 in order for the resistance to last as long as
it did. The company was most effective as a pressure group when it acted patiently and discreetly, as it did after April 1640. There can be little doubt that this method was also behind many of its successes in the preceding twenty years.

In this chapter one of the reasons for the hostility of the masters to the edict of 1639 has not been fully examined. Uncertainty over employment was one of the motives for the resistance of the company. To this insecurity we now turn.
Notes

1 - BN (imprimés) F 42601, piece 23.

2 - X-1-A, 2038, fo. 117, 10 February 1631.

3 - AN U 951, "Mémoire de ce qui est arrivé de plus remarquable en la cour des aides depuis l'année 1609", fo. 66-70. F.f. 16218, fo. 128-9 (copies of council decrees, 11 March and afterwards)

4 - U 951, fo. 66, 10 March 1631.

5 - F.f. 14033 (journal of Jean Le Cocq, councillor at the parlement), fo. 75.

6 - U 951, fo. 68, 15 March 1631.

7 - F 42601, piece 12.

8 - Ibid., piece 36. F 46988, piece 1.

9 - AAE France 820, fo. 87, Richelieu to Bullion, January 1636.

10 - F.f. 16218, fo. 417.

11 - Ibid., fo. 411-35. F.f. 20632-4. Colbert Cinq Cents, 213, fo. 422-32 (jussive letters and comments of Molé). F.f. 18234, fo. 498-504 (deliberations of the company). On this incident Glasson is of little assistance; he gives it only passing mention.

12 - F.f. 20632, fo. 1.

13 - Ibid., fo. 171, 16 November 1639, fo. 177, 20 November, fo. 199, 4 December.

14 - Ibid., fo. 188, 27 November.

15 - Supra, note 12, and AAE France 835, fo. 31, 3 February 1640 ("nouvelles de Paris"), which makes an estimate of 2,000,000.

16 - F.f. 20632, fo. 171.

17 - Ibid., fo. 220-1, 18 December.

18 - Ibid., fo. 237, 28 December, fo. 245, 8 January 1640.

19 - Ibid., fo. 247, 8 January.

20 - F.f. 16218 (hereafter cited as Récit), fo. 411.
21 - Ibid.
22 - Ibid., fo. 413.

23 - See Duleau, op. cit., p. 71, where Gaulmain is described as "Hardy, brusque, frondeur contre le Parlement, entend les langues orientales, a beaucoup de science, mais un peu confus. Assez bon ami et obligeant". Almost all these points are confirmed in the 1640 incident. For his role in the skirmish of 1656 see British Museum, Harleyian ms. 4489, fo. 164-7, and ms. 1680, for the harangue.

24 - Récit, fo. 411.
25 - Ibid.
26 - Ibid.
27 - Ibid., fo. 412.
28 - Ibid.
29 - Ibid., fo. 413.
30 - Ibid.
31 - Ibid.
32 - Ibid.

33 - Richelieu, Lettres, vol. 8, p. 348, 3 November 1638. Present on behalf of Marie Barrin at her marriage with Jean de La Barre were the duchesse de Vendôme, her daughter, and the duchesse d'Aiguillon, niece of Richelieu.

34 - Récit, fo. 414.
36 - Récit, fo. 415.
37 - Ibid., fo. 416-8.

38 - The property of Thomas Morant was sacked during the revolt of the Nu-Pieds (Foïs, op. cit., passim). François de Pomeru was chased from Amiens in 1628 (V.-L'car. 1498, fo. 183), and Jacques de Chaulnes was run out of Clermont in 1643 (Bercé, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 477).

39 - Supra, Part 2, Chapter 4, note 22, for a few cases of masters who did not live "avec espargne".

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40 - Récit, fo. 418.
41 - Ibid., fo. 418-9.
42 - Ibid., fo. 419.
42bis - Ibid., fo. 420.
43 - Ibid., fo. 420-1, and f.f. 20632, fo. 270, 25 January 1640.
44 - Ibid., fo. 272, 25 January.
45 - Récit, fo. 423.
46 - Ibid., fo. 417.
47 - Ibid., fo. 424.
48 - Ibid., fo. 425, and f.f. 20632, fo. 284, 5 February.
49 - Ibid., fo. 294, 12 February.
50 - Récit., fo. 425-7.
51 - F.f. 20632, fo. 285-6, 5 February.
52 - Ibid., fo. 293-4.
53 - Cinq Cents, 213, fo. 425.
54 - Récit, fo. 430.
55 - Ibid., fo. 429.
56 - F.f. 20632, fo. 299-300, 15 February.
58 - Récit., fo. 433-5.
59 - Cinq Cents, 213, fo. 428.
60 - France 835, fo. 41, 7 February, fo. 46, 12 February, fo. 53, 23 February, fo. 56, 28 February, fo. 58, 29 February.
61 - F.f. 20632, fo. 396, 26 February.
62 - France 835, fo. 56.
63 - Cinq Cents, 213, fo. 427.
64 - F.f. 20632, fo. 312, 4 March.
65 - France 835, fo. 58.
66 - Cinq Cents, fo. 427, 432.
67 - Ibid., fo. 428.
68 - F.f. 20632, fo. 294, 12 February.
69 - Ibid., fo. 383, 23 May.
70 - Ibid., fo. 391-2, 3 June.
71 - Ibid., fo. 400, 10 June.
72 - F.f. 20633, fo. 174, 26 September.
73 - F.f. 16216, fo. 99-103.
74 - F.f. 20633, fo. 165, 12 December.
75 - Récit, fo. 413.
76 - Infra, Epilogue.
77 - F.f. 20634, fo. 274, 30 November 1641.
78 - Ibid., fo. 304-5, 21 December.
79 - F.f. 18234, fo. 498-504.
80 - Ibid., fo. 498.
81 - Ibid., fo. 499.
82 - Ibid., fo. 500
83 - Ibid., fo. 572.
84 - Ibid., fo. 499.
85 - Ibid., fo. 502.
86 - Ibid.
87 - F.f. 16216, fo. 436-7.
89 - Récit, fo. 426.
From 1631 to 1642 the company saw its membership increased by sixteen new offices. Therefore, unless employment at the council, the requêtes de l'hôtel, and in the provinces increased by about thirty per cent, the opportunities for each master to realize a return upon his investment would decrease by just as much. At the requêtes there was no problem, since the amount of business had steadily risen from the early 1630s. The privy council too was increasingly busy after 1632, and it is probable that the bodies of the council which handled financial litigation also heard more cases. (1) Yet the attention of the company was turned to the provincial commissions as much as to council employment, for reasons noted elsewhere. (2) Outside Paris the field of opportunity widened until the mid-1630s, but then began to shrink. As it did so a period of tension opened up between the masters and the crown, and the creations of 1639 embittered relations further. Under the regency the tensions worsened.
(a) the expansion of provincial employment: 1616-36

It is easy to demonstrate the good fortune of the masters under Louis XIII by referring to the famous (or infamous) lists of "intendants" published by Boyer de Sainte-Suzanne and Gabriel Hanotaux in the nineteenth century. (3) These lists were sharply criticized by Esmonin and Doucet. As they pointed out, it is not certain whether or not some of these "intendants" were only simple commissioners endowed with limited powers. While this criticism must be taken seriously, it does not render the lists useless for our purposes. What is interesting about them is that for the reign of Louis XIII the overwhelming majority of the "intendants" were masters. Most of the rest were councillors of state who had been masters, and only a few others were trésoriers de France or councillors from the parlements. The monopoly which the masters claimed in 1610 actually came about.

One reason for this preference was that the masters had traditionally held the right to enter lower jurisdictions. This power was mentioned in the earliest commissions which have come down for the reign of Louis XIII. As was mentioned in the commission given to Elie Laisné and Robert Aubery for Touraine (30 July 1618),

"suivant les pouvoirs, auctorités et prérogatives attribués à vostre estat et office de maistre des des requestes (vous pourrez) entrer, seoir et
présider toutesfois et quantes que besoing vous semblera en tous les sièges de nostredite ville (Tours) et aultres juridictions particulières dudit pays en audiences civiles et criminelles, chambre du conseil..." (4)

Therefore the relationship between the masters and the local magistrates was regulated by tradition. By using masters rather than other officials the crown avoided the controversy of delegating "extraordinary" powers, and hence averted the risk of having its commissioners rejected by punctilious locals. Yet the councillors of the parlements also had the right to enter the lower courts. However, they were excluded from intendancies.

As has already been noted in Part One, the disappearance of the councillors from the provincial commissions goes back to the reign of Henri IV. (5) It seems that the only novelty of the following reign was the extension of this tendency to the judges of the provincial parlements. If a certain hostility on the part of the ministers to the robins of the sovereign courts was bound to be to the benefit of the masters, the large number of company members and their proximity to court was also in their favour. Yet the opportunities themselves were created by civil disorder and the crisis generated by French involvement in the Thirty Years War.

The wars against the princes, the queen mother, and the Protestants could only be a boon to the masters.
Hence we discover Jacques Turgot as intendant of the royal army at the Ponts-de-Cé in 1620. In 1621 Pierre Séguiier became intendant in the army led by Epernon against the Protestants in Saintonge, Aunis and Limousin. In 1623 René de Marillac, son of the future keeper of the seals, died at Montpellier, intendant of the army there. Coignet de La Thuillerie, Etampes de Valençay, and François de Verthamon were intendants of the army besieging La Rochelle in 1628. (6)

The struggle with the Habsburgs was even more fruitful for the masters. The army of Italy required the services of Verthamon in 1629 and Paul Hay du Châtelet, René Le Voyer d'Argenson and Etampes de Valençay in 1630. Gilles de Maupeou was one of the intendants of the army in Bourg-en-Bresse in 1629. The army of Lorraine found master-intendants in the persons of François de Nesmond (1632), and Pierre Gobelin and Nicolas Lefèvre in 1634. (7) The "guerre ouverte" opened up the northern frontier to invasion, and no fewer than ten masters were busily engaged in Champagne and Picardy in 1636, raising troops, securing provisions, hunting down deserters and bringing to trial military marauders. (8)

Pacification of the Protestants and the integration of outlying areas into the kingdom also required the services of the masters. In 1623 Denis Amelot was sent into Poitou,
Saintonge, Aunis and La Rochelle as intendant of justice in order to oversee implementation of the peace treaty with the Huguenots. In 1625 François Thévin was dispatched to La Rochelle in order to transfer the présidial of that rebellious city to Marans. Claude Le Doulx was sent to the Protestant citadel in 1626 to carry out the treaty concluded that year with the Rochelais. François de Villemontée began his long sojourn as intendant in western France in 1631 as guardian of the peace with the habitants of La Rochelle. (9) The conquest of Lorraine brought manifold opportunities to the company in 1633-5, such as the establishment of a parlement, the levying of new taxes, the verification of titles, etc. (10)

Obviously the masters profited from the vigorous policy against Protestants and Habsburgs alike. Yet there were never more than a few armies in the field at any one time, and they could hardly accommodate the entire company of masters. Their interest was also turned towards other provincial commissions, particularly the intendancy of justice, police and finance.

If the intendancy has often confused historians, it is partly for reasons of nomenclature. It cannot be assumed that any commissioner in the reign of Louis XIII who called himself an intendant held the wide-ranging and effectively asserted judicial, financial, and administrative
powers of the intendants of Louis XV. Richelieu noted that the term "peut plus servir à leur vanité qu'à la utilité du public". (12) Furthermore, far from being a counterpoise to the provincial governors, as some scholars have written, the commissioners were often their clients, and one preoccupation of both Marillac and Richelieu was to make the commissioners more dependent upon the ministers. (13)

Throughout much of the reign of Louis XIII the "intendants" were commissioners who, though often endowed with considerable theoretical powers, were sent out for very specific missions. For example, the "intendants de justice" given assignments in 1616 after the arrest of Condé, fulfilled an eminently political mission. They were to prosecute the followers of the princes, make sure that the chateaux of the king and his cities were secure and see that royal funds found their way to the treasury. (14) The royal agents who passed through Angers from 1616 to 1633 and were noted by Louvet were usually referred to by the memorialist as "commissaires" sent out to "reform" the gabelle or establish duties on consumer goods. (15) He took less note of the fact that many of the commissioners were also referred to as "intendants".

Yet the commissions of these emissaries from the period before the "guerre ouverte" often contained wide
ranging powers, particularly of a financial nature, which are associated by historians with the intendants of the late 1630s. For example, the earlier commissioners could usually enter the bureaux des finances and elections and sometimes preside there, whether at their ordinary sessions or at the assiette (distribution) of the taille. (16) Since, as some commissions put the matter, "il se peut rencontrer plusieurs affaires à nostre service", it was useful for the commissioner to have "contingency" powers. (17)

The degree to which these other powers were effectively carried out must be questioned, for one of the results of the specificity of the missions was that the commissioner was sent across enormous areas. In 1620 a commission was given to Moricq to investigate the "mauvais mesnage au maniment des deniers affectés aux réparations des chemins, pans, ponts et chaussées, digues, levées et turcies tant de la rivière de Loire qu'au autres et autres ouvrages publicques en nos provinces, généralités, bailliages, prévostés et sénéchaussées d'Orléans, Touraine, Le Maine, Anjou, Poictou, Berry, Xaintonge, Angoulmois, Aulnis, Limousin et Guyenne".

As if this was not enough, Moricq was also made intendant de justice et police in the same regions. (18) Other similar cases could be cited. (19)

The specificity of the assignment and the size of the intendancy meant that in many provinces few royal commissioners were seen before the "guerre ouverte". Moreover, when they made an appearance it was usually
brief, lasting from a few days to a few weeks in a particular area. For example, in 1616-33 only eight commissioners passed through Angers, a major city of the realm, and only three of them stayed for more than a few weeks. Longer and more frequent visits were the results of special conditions. Guillaume Foucquet and Jean Aubery remained at Angers for several months at a time during the period of disorder created by the princes and the queen mother. (20) Once these crises were past it does not seem that the city received another royal commissioner until 1629. From then until 1633, with the burden of taxes growing and the peace of the city disturbed by tax-disorders, four commissioners put in appearances. (21) In general, until the fiscal screws began to turn it is probable that the flow of commissioners—and hence the number of opportunities for the masters—was dependent particularly upon changing political developments within the realm. (22)

The doubling of the royal income in 1632-4 and its continuing high level throughout the 1630s and early 1640s favoured the use of commissioners serving a longer period of time in smaller administrative regions. Historians have underlined the reforms of the 1630s and 1640s in the administration of the taille. (23) If the revenue from this tax were to remain high, the distribution had to be fairly made. As events such as the
"réglement" of the taille in Normandy in 1624 demonstrated, the élus and trésoriers were not to be entirely trusted to do their duty, and in 1633 the intervention of the intendants in this domain was sanctioned by royal edict. In 1642 they even took over the supervision of the tax. This activity demanded that the commissioner be intimately acquainted with the economic conditions of a region, and to acquire this expertise he could not be assigned two or more généralités. Large intendancies were broken up into smaller units and new généralités provided with their own intendants were created. (24) As long as this trend continued, the masters could be assured of ever more opportunities to serve in the provinces.

Other factors contributed to more numerous appearances by the commissioners and longer sojourns by them. As has been seen in the case of the Angers riot, a commissioner could require several months in the provinces in order to bring tax-rioters to trial. (25) It is well-known that the 1630s and 1640s were characterized by waves of rural and urban riots, and there can be little doubt that the prosecution of the culprits consumed much of the commissioners' time, even when they were able to trust local judges with the investigation.

It might be thought that such developments, not to
forget the establishment of new duties, forced loans and new officials, would multiply the employment possibilities of the masters. To some extent this did happen and a few regions (such as Provence) seem to have received their first "intendants" since the reign of Henri IV only after they were the scene of tax-disturbances. (26) Yet, judging from the Ségurier correspondence of the 1630s, few master-commissioners appeared at the same time in a généralité: a single commissioner would amass the assignments concerning the area. Hence, once the subdivision of the realm into smaller administrative units began to slow down, so too did the multiplication of provincial missions for the masters. (27)

A phenomena which is equally important in the evolution of the intendancy was the emergence of the master who had passed many years on chevauchées in the provinces. The requirement of expertise on the part of the commissioner sent to supervise the distribution and collection of the taille meant that the same royal agent would return to a region during two, three or more consecutive years. (28) Yet the notables convoked to Paris in 1626 complained "d'un nouvel usage d'intendants de la justice...fonctions qu'ils veulent tenir à vie". (29) This implies either that the same commissioner came to an area year after year or that some masters were specializing in provincial employment. The lettres honoraires of several masters received into
office during the 1610s suggest, without excluding the first development, that the second was taking place. (30) This resulted in some masters being less acquainted with the judicial routine at the requêtes de l'hôtel and probably the royal council. The registers of audiences of the requêtes provide proof that these judges escaped their judicial duties there, usually because they were holders of provincial commissions or intendants in the armies. However, it was only after 1626 that their numbers grew at a significant rate. In 1618 five masters failed to attend the audiences of the court, in 1626 six, in 1632 ten and eleven in 1636. (31) The appearance of the master-intendant, moving from province to province year after year, was a boon to the government because of the experience accumulated steadily by the commissioner. Yet he may also have posed a problem to his colleagues inasmuch as his very skills meant that the rotation of personnel serving in the provinces was bound to be slower.

Hence the changes in the number of opportunities in the provinces for the masters followed closely both political events within the kingdom (the struggles against the princes, the queen mother and the Protestants) as well as without (wars on the frontiers) and innovations in the commissioner system designed to make it more effective in bringing in the taille, establishing duties and punishing tax-rioters. In general it appears that the
masters had little reason for complaint until the mid-1630s.

(b) the crisis of provincial employment: 1636-47

The company was fortunate in that the creation of 1635 practically coincided with the Spanish offensive in the north. Of twenty-seven masters serving in the provinces in 1636, ten were busy on the northern and northeastern frontiers. Thirty-eight per cent of the company was employed provincially. (32) Undoubtedly the percentage was never again to be so high. The year of Corbie passed and many commissioners were recalled. From 1638 to 1641 it is difficult to follow the employment situation, since the Séguier correspondence, our principal source on this subject, contains numerous lacunae. However, by 1641 it seems that eighteen masters (27%) were serving in the provincial intendancies or with the armies. (33) Seven interior intendancies were in the hands of councillors of state, some of whom were former masters. The company, threatened by the still inoperative edict for sixteen new offices, was sufficiently nervous to ask for the return of the "département des provinces" as outlined in the code Michau, "afin que chacun desdits maistres des requestes puisse servir le Roy dans ses provinces". (34)

Registration in 1642 of the edict creating new offices
could hardly have increased the opportunities of the masters. They had six new colleagues and they were obliged to face an employment situation which was clearly deteriorating. In 1643 probably only fifteen masters, 21% of the company, were busy outside Paris. (35) This was a situation which they could not accept, and in response to it articles "pour les droits et fonctions de leurs charges" were probably drawn up the same year. (36) Again they demanded that the ministers establish "les départements des provinces en la manière accoutumée pour y faire leurs visites et chevauchées, suivant les ordonnances". (37)

Other articles "présentés au Roy et à la reine régente sa mère" were delivered in the summer of 1643, as indicated by d'Ormesson. Here for the first time in many years the company lashed out at other robins. (38) The masters demanded all commissions of intendancies in the provinces as well as the implementation of the "derniers des provinces". (39) In justification a history lesson was forced upon the regent, reminiscent of the remonstrances made to Henri III. The general assembly of 815, the regent was told, created the masters and gave them "puissance souveraine pour aller par toutes les provinces". The masters were the "grands réformateurs" of the kingdom during the reigns of Charles V and Charles VI, and they continued their "visitations" under François I. The suppression of the "maistres des requêtes extraor-
In reality these "extraordinary" masters had been the holders of real offices, and the company was drawing a false parallel between past and present problems, providing at the same time a historically justified solution.

More bending of the facts was offered by the interpretation of the edict of 1642 which, they said, had mentioned the "département des provinces". The "proofs" sustained a categorical demand on the part of the company for the recall of all "qui ne sont pas maistres des requestes actuellement servans". (41) The masters "sous la foy publique ont mis de grands sommes en l'achapt de leurs charges" and hence deserved employment. (42) Had not the reason for each successive creation of offices been the administrative necessities of the crown, the masters asked. Then why not use the company before resorting to the services of "personnes privés"? (43)

The articles touched upon the inconveniences attending the use of other magistrates. Only masters were traditionally received in local jurisdictions. An "extraordinary" delegation of power was required simply to put a commissioner into a regular relation with local officials. And, according to the company, these "extraordinary
commissioners" found their decrees constantly appealed against, which resulted in "une estrange vexation au peuple et aux pauvres gens estans obligés de venir d'un bout du Royaume à l'autre". (44) The sovereign courts and the assemblies of notables had constantly complained about the activity of these irregular personnel. (45)

The masters had all but argued that the difficulties of the kingdom could be explained in terms of their exclusion from provincial intendancies. It was a wrong-headed, even cynical argument, for the masters were the commissioners hated by "les peuples", trésoriers, élus and sovereign courts. It was their decisions which were appealed to the council and then sent for judgement to the requêtes de l'hôtel. This the company could not help but know.

The journal of d'Ormesson offers a few glimpses of the masters worrying the ministers of the regent. In February 1644 Séguier promised to re-establish the chevauchées, which he never did, and in June the company sent delegates to Mazarin in the hope that he would oust the non-master intendants. (46) Feigning helplessness, Mazarin said that when he came to power he had found as many intendants who were not masters as intendants who were. He did little to placate the deputation, and a few days later Nicolas Foucquet, a master, was driven
from the intendancy of Dauphiné by Lozieres, a councillor from the parlement. The company complained, but not no avail. (47) The situation worsened, but no more remonstrances or deliberations appear, in either the journal of d'Ormesson or the registers of the requêtes de l'hôtel. The reason may have been that the intendancies, the masters, and the requêtes had become topics of interest at the Paris parlement, finally liberated from silence by the disappearance of Richelieu and Louis XIII.

In January 1645 Omer Talon, avocat-général at the parlement (and brother of a councillor of state who had been intendant in Dauphiné), attacked the judicial administration of the council and évocations in particular. (48) A few days later Séguier defended the actions of the government on this score and also in the matter of the masters' activities in the provinces. He explained the advantages of using the masters, stressing their rights of entry into local jurisdictions. A remarkable echo of the complaints of the company came back from the public prosecution of the parlement. They protested about the exploits of the intendants "dont la pluspart n'estoient officiers du roy". And so the masters had found allies! Yet the parlement was worried about the institution rather than the personnel, whereas for the masters it was the other way around. The silence of the company may have been due to the realization that its dissatisfaction
over the intendancies could be used by the enemies of that institution.

In the meantime the employment situation steadily deteriorated, so that in 1647 probably only nine masters (13%) were busy in the provinces. (49) In January 1648 d'Ormesson noted the presence of fifty-eight at a meeting over the proposed edict of creations; not all of the fourteen missing magistrates would have been intendants. (50)

From 1636 until the beginning of the regency the problems of the masters over provincial commissions came largely from the reforms undergone by the intendancies and the addition of new masters. The regency brought other problems, for it was responsible for the promotion of many masters into the royal council as councillors of state. (51) Many of them had been excellent provincial commissioners, and the government saw little reason to evict them from the provinces. In 1647 Lauson, Chaulnes, Faucon, Machault, Sève, Villemontée, Molé, Bragelogne, and Marle, all former masters and most of them councillors of state, were provincial commissioners. To be sure the regency was only partly to blame for this situation. Lauson had resigned in 1633, Villemontée in 1636, and Bragelogne in 1641. These examples demonstrate the perspicacity of a comment made by Tapié, that Richelieu tended to govern more with men than with institutions. (51)
The regency was also characterized by a resurgence of aristocratic power, and this too told against the masters. Lozérières, a mere councillor from the Paris parlement, was a friend of Retz, and Louis de Machault had numerous contacts with the Condé, who held the governorship of Burgundy, where Machault became intendant.

With regard to provincial employment the masters had little to rejoice about the regency and the return to political importance of the grandees. Their rage at the decision of the ministers to provide them with more new colleagues in 1648 is wholly comprehensible.

(c) the counter-attack at the royal council 1641-4

Although the masters had acquired a position of strength at the council, that stronghold was all the more necessary to them. Losses sustained in the provincial commissions and due to additional masters could be compensated for at the expense of the intendants des finances and the councillors of state. Such had been the object of the articles drawn up in December 1641, in which the masters had demanded, among other things, "qu'eux seuls rapportassent requestes et instances concernant la justice et police de ses (the king's) finances". (52) The examination of the activity of the royal council for the single month of January 1641 shows

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that there was considerable room for expansion along the desired lines.

The minutes of the council are organized into two series, the "council of finance" and the privy council. The first contains the activity of three council bodies—the administrative conseil de direction, the litigious conseil de direction and the conseil d'état et des finances. It is not difficult to separate the minutes of the decisions of the first body from those of the other two, for the first dealt with such questions as expenditures, resignations of offices, etc., while the others handled the contentious questions which arose concerning the royal finances. The following tables reveal which personnel presented the business of the three council bodies. (53)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE OF SESSION (JANUARY)</th>
<th>NUMBER OF SIGNED ARRTS</th>
<th>NUMBER OF REPORTS BY INTENDANTS DES FINANCES</th>
<th>NUMBER OF REPORTS BY COUNCILLORS OF STATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE TWO: CONSEIL DE DIRECTION (LITIGATION), CONSEIL D'ETAT ET DES FINANCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE OF SESSION (JANUARY)</th>
<th>NUMBER OF INTENDANTS SIGNED ARRETS</th>
<th>COUNCILLORS DES FINANCES OF STATE</th>
<th>MASTERS OF REQUESTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td><strong>347</strong></td>
<td><strong>129</strong></td>
<td><strong>52</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PER CENT</strong></td>
<td><strong>37.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
<td><strong>47.5</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The *intendants des finances* dominated the administrative conseil de direction (96% of the presentations), but they had much stiffer competition from the masters in the council bodies which handled financial litigation. From the viewpoint of the company, there was plenty of room for compensation in these sections, since most of the matters presented there by the intendants and the councillors could as easily have been reported by the masters. But the *intendants des finances* were less exposed to the effects of company agitation than the councillors. They were important personnel in the hierarchy of council robins and furthermore they were often sources of credit to the crown. (54)

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In December 1641 the masters also demanded equal representation with other personnel on the judicial commissions which were attached to the council for complicated matters often involving multiple lawsuits. These commissions are indicated in the minutes of the "council of finance" by one or more signatures which follow that of the rapporteur on a council decree. In the following table the first type of magistrate is the presenting judge and the others are assisting members of the commission.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE THREE: COMMISSIONS AT THE &quot;COUNCIL OF FINANCE&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COMPOSITION OF GROUP: RAPPORTEUR OTHERS NUMBER OF OTHERS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUMBER OF EACH GROUP TYPE: 2 master intendant 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 intendant master 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 master &quot; 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 &quot; councillor 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 councillor &quot; 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 &quot; &quot; 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 &quot; intendant 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 intendant councillor 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 master &quot; 2 (+)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL NUMBER OF GROUPS: 27

In only eight cases were the masters equally or better represented than other council magistrates. In six there were more councillors of state and in thirteen there were not masters at all. Therefore the company was justified in hoping that agitation over the commissions would be fruitful.
At the privy council there was little room for improvement, for of 268 reports made at eight sessions in January only two were made by councillors of state. (55)

Just as the regency aroused in the masters the hope that they could reverse the deteriorating employment situation in the provinces, it also inspired in them the expectation of changes at the council. During this period a number of figures came to commanding positions at the council, particularly Gaston d'Orléans and the younger Condé. They had little respect for council traditions and no reservations about playing upon the aspirations of the groups which served the council in order to enhance their own position. Their relations with the magistrates were ambiguous, as a great deal of aristocratic contempt for the robins was intermingled princely intrigues. The chancellor, the provincial intendants, and individual councillors and masters presented a spectacle of pretention, pedantry, buffoonery and corruption which the grandees found hard to resist. (56)

In June 1643 Gilbert Gaulmain, back from exile, was told by Gaston that the prince would assure the masters of "une protection particulière". He even asked for "une instruction" of their functions, all the more to maintain the company in its rights. (57) Immediately, as d'Ormesson noted, "nous étions assemblés pour concerter
des mémoires afin de restablir l'autorité de nos charges”. The result may have been the aggressively entitled “Règlement fait entre Messieurs les Maistres des Re-questes pour les droict et fonctions de leurs charges soubs le bon plaisir de Monseigneur le Chancelier”. (58)

In addition to demanding the return of the "départe-
ment des provinces", the masters made very extravagant claims for functions at the council. All requests were to be presented by them there and they were to be allowed to opine there whenever they wanted, a reflection of the careless behaviour of the princes, who had made the masters opine in matters concerning the royal finances, much to the annoyance of Séguier. (59)

The articles presented to the regent and the king in the summer of 1643 showed a slight retreat from preceding claims. While over half of the remonstrances concerned the provincial intendancies, the masters carefully stressed that "leur emploi principal" was the presentation of business at the council. They asked to be rapporteurs for "toutes requestes et doléances de ses peuples" and all contentious matters and to opine "en toutes affaires qui seront rapportées ausdits cons-seils". (60)

According to d'Ormesson, a council regulation of
October 1643 mentioned that the masters "rapporteront toutes sortes d'affaires", a positive sounding formula which dealt no blows to the enemies of the company. (61) The regulation of June 1644 was even more equivocal. The masters were to be allowed to present matters at the administrative conseil de direction, if called to do so. (62) They were to present all affairs of justice. Yet there was an escape clause:

"si ce n'est que pour quelques considérations il en fut autrement ordonné par Monseigneur Le Chancelier, auquel cas ledit sieur Chancelier commettra tels des conseillers d'estat qu'il jugera à propos".

This was no victory for the company and, contrary to the opinion of one historian, the regency did not witness any spectacular advance of the masters. (63) The relative silence which characterized the behaviour of the masters over these matters in 1645-7 in no way marked satisfaction, but only realistic disappointment. The ministers had no intention of acquiescing to the wishes of the company.

Epilogue: The Significance of 1648 for the Company

The anger of the masters in January 1648 was understandable, given the decline of provincial opportunities and the failure to satisfy aspirations at the royal council, but their opposition to the ministers had already been manifested in a little-known way in 1647.
In August and November 1646 the king created thirty new posts of barristers at the royal council. As these measures concerned no tribunals other than the council and the requêtes de l'hôtel, the edicts were sent to the masters for registration. (1) This placed the masters in an awkward situation, since they could not risk incurring the wrath of "MM. du conseil" over a fairly trivial issue by obstructing verification of the edicts. Yet, if they ignored the plight of the barristers, they might see the operation of the privy council and the requêtes de l'hôtel come to a halt, since the barristers might call a strike. The entire company assembled in May 1647 and decided that, before registering the edicts, the syndics of the lawyers would be asked "pour contre icieux dire ce que bon leur semblera dans trois jours". In effect this was a convenient way of shelving the legislation, for the masters did not press the syndics for a response. Tiring of this subterfuge, the ministers sent letters patent to the masters, ordering them to register the edicts. Again the masters delayed, this time simply ignoring the letters for about a month. In December the quartiers assembled and simply reiterated the decision of May. (2) The incident was a typical example of how "solidarity" among robins was created by constraints.

The intention of the ministers in December to establish twelve masterships (at first rumours had put the
figure as high as a quartier—twenty-four) placed the company in a dangerous situation. (3) Although d'Ormesson did not clearly outline the fear of the masters for the future of their employment, he was certain that the edict would reduce them to the fate suffered by other officials, notably the élus. (4) The ministers did not display the slightest willingness to negotiate the question with the masters and the queen made matters worse by threatening to confiscate their offices if they opposed the edict. (5) Under considerable pressure from the government, the parlement quickly registered the legislation. When the masters first came to the court in order to oppose the implementation of the edict (10 January), they were greeted in an equivocal way. Mathieu Molé, the first president, listened to their request and 

"repondit que messieurs les maîtres des requêtes se souvenoient être du corps du parlement lorsqu'ils en avoient besoin, mais qu'ils avoient peu de mémoire dans la fonction ordinaire de leurs charges, lorsqu'ils rapportoient des requestes de cassation contre les arrêts du parlement, ou qu'ils prenoient connaissance par jugement souverain des affaires qui n'étoient pas de leur juridiction; que cela n'empecheroit pas que le parlement ne fit considération sur leur demande". (6)

Seemingly forgetful of the membership of the masters at the parlement and their right to express themselves, Omer Talon appointed counsel to speak for them. (7)

Despite this cool reception, the masters were sure that they powerful weapons on their side. It was imprudent, wrote d'Ormesson,
The first threat, the example of disobedience, was already bearing fruit in the opposition of the Paris robe to the government. The second, reminiscent of the "opinion" put forward to Richelieu in 1640, was equally serious, since the masters were willing to create difficulties for royal ministers and not just for a few partisans. Given the demands of the Paris magistrature for a chamber of justice, this was very ominous indeed.

A third weapon was the judicial strike. The masters refused to act as rapporteurs at the council. Although some councillors of state manifested sympathy for the company, the wheels of the privy council turned again, though more slowly, and the masters found themselves out of work there. At the same time the final instance competence of the requêtes deflated as the council refused to send any business there and as the councillors took over the council trivia. The government did not merely adjust to the strike, it hit back. The masters as a group (some judges benefitted from decrees in their favour) were excluded from the advantages of the paulette, a move which brought about panic-stricken
measures of self-defence. (11)

As the company found itself dangerously exposed, opposition gave way to the desire to be re-established at the council. The masters sent delegations to Gaston d'Orléans and the parlement, which resolved in March to present remonstrances for revocation of the edict. (12) The desired re-establishment and revocation did not take place until the summer. (13) In June the masters finally returned to the council, and in July the edict was revoked by a general declaration which reflected a changed in the financial and administrative policies of the crown. (14) Yet the masters were still unhappy. There were the old fears for provincial employment and d'Ormesson noted the resolution of the company "que personne des nôtres n'irioit que le département général des provinces ne fust fait". (15)

At the same time as there were grounds for wondering about appointments to the intendancies, the masters found themselves under fire from their unwilling allies. The masters had been asked in June by the parlement to take part in the discussions at the Chambre Saint-Louis, but they refused, because "cela préjudiciait à l'honneur qu'ils ont d'être du corps du parlement". (16) In other words, they wished to have no part in the activities of the general movement for reform.
On 4 July the Chambre Saint-Louis drew up its famous articles, among which were two forbidding the arraignment of partisans before the council and the attribution of final instance competence to the requêtes de l'hôtel. (17) As serious were the discussions about the intendancies. On 4 July Bérulle and Morant, two junior masters, went to the parlement in order to thank it for having intervened on behalf of the company. The two were drawn into a defence of the provincial intendancies. (18) Bérulle argued

"que les intendants estoient portés jusqu'â ce point de désordre principalement par ceux qui n'avaient point de caractère de juges (i.e. they were councillors of state and not masters)".

For good measure Morant added a request that the court have

"la même justice et bonté pour les maîtres des requestes qu'elle avoit eu pour les Elus et Trésoriers de France en leur conservant leurs droits de chevauchées que les ordonnances leurs enjoignent de faire dans les provinces".

On the one hand Bérulle argued indirectly for the conservation of the intendancies in the hands of the company, on the other Morant settled for the chevauchées. The suppression of the intendancies of the interior provinces demonstrated the greater realism of Morant, even though it was unlikely that masters en chevauchée would be greeted any more favourably. (19)

The parlement also began to berate deputations of
masters for their activity at the requêtes de l'hôtel and this attack acquired serious dimensions, since it involved a challenge to one of the most traditional aspects of the requêtes' jurisdiction.

On 15 July Molé criticized the requêtes before a delegation of masters because that court had annulled a decision of the parlement. (20) Ricouart answered in a smooth and ambiguous way that

"il ne sçavoit rien du fait mais qu'il étoit assuré que l'on n'approuvait dans leur compagnie les cassations sy les arrêts n'estoient contre les ordonnances". He was answered "avec chaleur" by Molé.

On 17 August the judges of the parlement argued before a deputation from the company that there ought to be no évocations by the council, no propositions d'erreur and that the masters should judge nothing in final instance except what was allowed by the ordinances—that is, nothing. (21) The masters present, Le Nain and old Courtin, seemed willing enough to go along with most of this

"sinon en ce qui regarde la jurisdiction souveraine pour la fait du sceau dont les maistres des requestes estoient en possession de juger souverainement".

Molé sharply retorted that there was no sovereign jurisdiction at the requêtes. Yet the masters refused to give up their seal cases, though few in number (22), and on
28 November Denis Amelot was called in to account for their persistance in retaining cognizance of a seal case.

The scene was a curious one. Amelot had been one of the two masters who had "enlightened" the parlement about the seal jurisdiction in 1621. Then the parlement had quietly accepted the arguments which Amelot was now prepared to offer:

"que dès le commencement de la monarchie les maistres des requêtes avoient été juges non seulement en le cas du sceau mais de tous les autres dont ils prenoient connoissance et qu'ils avoient plusieurs exemples de procès jugés dans leur auditoire esquels Messieurs de la Grand Chambre estoient mandés pour y assister, qu'à la vérité leur principale fonction n'avait jamais été attachée à ces matières, esquelles néanmoins ils seroient bien aise de se veoir rétablis, mais que cependent il estoit juste de les maintenir dans la possession qu'ils avoient de juger souverainement de sceau laquelle ils pouvoient justifier non seulement depuis trente ou quarante ans mais depuis 120 années et audelà". (23)

In 1644 the masters had appealed to force majeure rather than to tradition and co-operation between company and court. In November 1648 they were not so confident.

In fact, from early August the content of the "sovereign" jurisdiction of the requêtes had shown the results of robe agitation at Paris. Evocations completely disappeared and the masters were left with council trivia. (24)

The double onslaught upon intendancies and the re-
quetes de l'hôtel demonstrated to the company that other jurisdictions (the cour des aides had grievances similar to those of the parlement) had little liking for the masters. When, at the end of 1648, Mazarin and the king left the capital, the masters were placed in the dilemma of having to decide whether or not to follow the council. On 7 January 1649 they ordered a bailiff of the requêtes to leave the city and "aller trouver Monseigneur le Chancelier de leur part pour demander l'ordre de ce qu'ils avaient à faire". (25) Although he was unable to leave Paris, the dean of the company received a bailiff from the council, who carried a message from the queen to the January quartier, asking it to leave the city and come to the council. When Laffemas and three other masters asked the parlement for a passport, they were refused it. On 24 January the quartier sent a letter to Séguier, expressing regret "de n'avoir pas receu vos ordres pour suivre le roy et la Royne régente lors de son départ de Paris" and asking his instructions "sur ce refus (of the parlement)". Although the company had done no more than the minimum of its duty towards the chancellor, its credit with the parlement was not improved. As early as 4 January the requêtes de l'hôtel had ceased to function and it did not begin again until 8 April, after the peace of Rueil. (26) The masters were learning well the lessons of disobedience under conditions which endangered royal power: once "MM. du conseil" were on the defensive, the masters could expect no mercy from the other judicial companies.
Notes

1 - For 1633 the financial bodies of the council left twelve registers of decrees, for 1636 seventeen, for 1639 fifteen, for 1642 twenty, and for 1646 twenty-four. For the privy council see appendices, Graph 4.

2 - Supra, Part 1, Chapter 2, Part 2, Chapter 4.

3 - Gabriel Hanotaux, *Origine de l'institution des intendants des provinces*, Paris, 1934, pp. 163-70, and Boyer de Sainte-Suzanne, *Les intendants de la généralité d'Amiens*, Paris, 1865, appendix. Hanotaux does little more than reproduce the lists in Boyer. For the period 1611-36 the classification is as follows—100 commissioners who were also masters, 15 who were former masters, 11 councillors of state, 4 councillors of sovereign courts, 2 trésoriers de France, and 20 individuals of unidentified professional status (some of whom may have been masters called by Hanotaux according to the names of their seigneuries).

4 - V-4 car. 1497, fo. 36.

5 - Supra, Part 1, Chapter 2.


8 - Seven masters leave tracks in the Séguier correspondence published by Mousnier (vol. 1, passim): Laffemas at Abbeville and Senlis, Choisy at Compiègne, Lemaître at Saint-Quentin and Roye, Luillier near Montdidier, d'Aubray at the camp of Lussi, d'Argenson at Péronne and Corbie, and Sève at Abbeville. It seems that Gobelin, intendant in Lorraine, passed through Champagne on his way to the requêtes. Heer was at Abbeville and Machault at Meaux (f.f. 17372, fo. 172, 190) and Vignier at Provins (ibid., fo. 232).

9 - V-4 car. 1497, fo. 158-9 (commissions for Amelot and Challas), Guillaumeau, *Diaire*, ed. Richmond, La Rochelle, 1908, pp. 323-5 (Le Doulx), 0-1, 2, fo. 27, (commission to Thévin).

10 - F.f. 17541 is full of these commissions.
11 - No note.


13 - Neron, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 803, article 81 of code Michau: "Que nul ne puisse être employé es Charges d'intendants de la Justice ou Finances, que nous députons en nos Armées ou Provinces, qui sont domestiques, conseil ou employé aux affaires ou proche parent des Généraux desdites armées ou Gouverneurs desdites Provinces. Ce que Nous défendons très étroitement à nos Chancelier et Garde des Sceaux, et de leur faire expédier aucunes commissions".

14 - Hanotaux, op. cit., p. 234 (commission for Gourgues), V-4 car. 1497, fo. 14, 6 October 1616 (Hurault), fo. 15, 13 November (Aubery), fo. 156, 24 December (Amelot). For the activities of Morant, supra, Chapter 3.

15 - Louvet, op. cit., passim.

16 - Supra, note 14.

17 - V-4 car. 1497, fo. 76, 9 May 1620.

18 - Ibid.

19 - In 1616 Gourgues was given the two large généralités of Guyenne and Poitou. The same year Aubery was assigned to a similarly large region comprising the Bourbonnais, Nivernais, Haute and Basse Auvergne, while Hurault was to carry out his chevauchées in the jurisdiction of the Toulouse parlement— usually assigned to two masters in the 1630s. In 1633 d'Argenson was made intendant of Touraine, Berry, Limousin, La Marche and Auvergne (Hanotaux, op. cit., passim).

20 - Louvet, op. cit., 1855, vol. 1, p. 161 (Fouquet was "sous-intendant de la justice au siège présidial d'Angers" in the winter of 1615-6), pp. 282-8 (Aubery was "intendant de justice en sa province d'Anjou, Tourayne, et Le Mayne, commissaire ordonné par sa dite majesté pour la reformation de ses gabelles" and was present at Angers from January 1619 until April, making another appearance in 1621, ibid., vol. 2, p. 300).

21 - Ibid., 1856, vol. 1, p. 138 (Bragelogne, not a master,
"commissaire député pour la réformation des gabelles", in October 1629), pp. 178-91, ibid., vol. 2, p. 284 (Lemaître, "commissaire deputé pour ouyr les temoins" of the riot, from August to December 1630), ibid., p. 351 (Jacques Le Prévost, "intendant de justice en la généralité de Touraine, lequel est venu à Angers pour y establir des subsides sur le vin et autres subsides" in November 1632), p. 363 (Jean du Tillet, establishing a "subside et tribut...sur toute sorte de poisson de mer", in October 1633).

22 - Exceptions made, of course, for areas which had a tradition of visiting royal commissioners, like Lyon.

23 - See the excellent articles by Mousnier in La Plume, la faucille et le marteau, institutions et société en France du Moyen Age à la Révolution, Paris, 1970.

24 - The généralités of Montauban and Alençon were created in 1635 and 1636. The intendancy held by Laubardemont in the mid-1630s comprising Touraine, Anjou, Le Maine and Orléanais acquired two intendants and an "adjoign" by the end of the decade (François Lebrun, "Les Intendants de Tours et d'Orléans au XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles", Annales de Bretagne, 1971, vol. 78, pp. 287-305).

25 - Supra, Chapter 3.

26 - See the appendix in Marchand, Un Intendant sous Louis XIV: étude sur l'administration de Lebret en Provence (1687-1704), Paris, 1889.

27 - This is also the evolution proposed by François Loirette in "Un Intendant de Guyenne avant la Fronde, Jean de Lauzon (1641-8)", in Bull. phil. et hist. du Com. des Tr. hist., 1957.

28 - Turgot in Normandy (1630-6), Le Tonnellier at Chartres (1633, 1635), d'Argenson (1633, 1635), Le Camus and Miron (a councillor of state) in Languedoc (1633-6).

29 - Petit, op. cit., p. 266.

30 - Supra, note 6 for Turgot, received in 1619, intendant in the army at the Ponts-de-Cé (1620), in Picardy (1620), in Blésois, Berry and La Marche (1623), in Caen (1632) and Rouen (1630-2). V-5, register 1231, lettres honoraires for Jean Turquant (fo. 91), received in 1614, intendant in Anjou, Touraine, Berry, Le Maine, Normandy, Languedoc, Dauphiné, the army of Picardy, and the Lyonnais, Forez, Beaujolais, Maconnais, and as commissner implementing the edict of Loudun; and for
Charles de Machault (fo. 251), who "a esté employé dans presque toutes les provinces".

31 - V-+ car. 1140, 1142, 1143, 1144.

1618: Faur, Brulart, Le Doulx, Ollier (intendant at Lyon) and Bitault (intendant in Languedoc).

1626: Servien, Etampes, Turgot, Daguesseau, Mesmes, Le Charron.

1632: d'Aubray (at Aix with the councillor of state La Potherie), Charles de Machault (intendant in Languedoc), Etampes (in the army of Italy), Hay du Châtelet (Burgundy), Turgot (Normandy), Villemontréal (Poitou), Verthamon (Montauban), Claude Mangot, Lauson, Laubespine, Gobelin.

1636: Turgot, Claude and Jacques Mangot, Le Gras, Choisy, Verthamon, Etampes, Sève, Dyel, Laffemas, Le Prévost. For their employments see notes 8 and 32.

32 - Mousnier's edition of the Séguière correspondence has letters from Le Prévost (Lyon), La Ferté (Mortagne and Bernay), Claude Mangot (Nancy and Bar), Etampes (Saint-Brieuc), Le Gras (Le Mans), Claude Gobelin (Lorraine), Dyel (Rouen), Louis de Machault (Dijon), Mesgrigny (Clermont in Auvergne). In f.f. 17371, fo. 26, there is a letter from Bénigne Blondeau at Nancy, in f.f. 17370, fo. 150, a letter from Jacques Mangot at Bourges, and in f.f. 17372, fo. 160, a letter from Turgot at Argentan, and Verthamon left Paris for his intendancy at Bordeaux (f.f. 17371, fo. 9, 11). The Histoire, vol. 1, p. 457 mentions that Chapponay was intendant at Moulins. Boyer makes Vaucquelin intendant in Languedoc, Thiersault intendant at Alençon. Hano-taux includes Le Camus as intendant in Languedoc.

Only a few non-master robins held commissions in the provinces, judging from the letters published by Séguière—Laubardemont (Tours), Villemontréal (Poitou), La Fosse (Angoumois) and Guittoneau (Picardy). It does not seem that the last two were intendants. Miron was in Languedoc (Lublinskaya, Lettres et mémoires adressés au chancelier P. Séguier, Moscow, 1966, p. 28).

33 - The Séguière correspondence contains only one volume for the period 1642-2 (f.f. 17374) and so other sources must be called upon as supplements. Mousnier published letters from Chapponay at Moulins and Heers at Angers. Chaulnes was first sent into Picardy (Séguière, Lettres,
Le Picart, a master, acquired the intendancy of Soissons (f. f. 17375, fo. 51, 8 November), Denis Le Goux acquired the commission of d'Argenson (f. f. 17377, fo. 259, 25 September), Louis Chauvelin replaced Le Tellier as intendant in the army of Italy (f. f. 17379, fo. 158, 27 June). Mousnier's edition of the Ségui er correspondence contains letters from Sève (who had moved to Auvergne), Heer (in Anjou and Touraine), Charretton (Montauban), Favier (Alençon), Chazé (Dauphiné), Bochart and Faucon (Lyon), Chaulnes at Amiens (he had replaced Lemaître). Jacques Mangot, intendant at Dijon, returned to Paris to fight out his divorce suit (d'Ormesson, vol. 1, p. 98). Barrin was at Bourges (f. f. 17375, fo. 67, 17 November), Jeannin was in Champagne (f. f. 20632, fo. 87, 10 September, 1642) and Balthazar arrived at Montpellier (Lublinskaya edition of Ségui er correspondence).

36 - F. f. 16218, fo. 379-81.
37 - Ibid., fo. 381.
39 - F. f. 18235, fo. 396.
40 - Ibid., fo. 399.
41 - Ibid., fo. 402.
42 - Ibid., fo. 403.
43 - Ibid., fo. 403, 406.
44 - Ibid., fo. 404-6.
45 - Ibid., fo. 406.
47 - Ibid., p. 199.

From 1644 to 1646 the situation steadily worsened, with only nine interior intendancies in the hands of the masters by 1646 and eleven held by councillors of state. Louis de Machault, former master and a councillor of state, acquired the intendancy of Burgundy in 1644 (Boyer, passim), Lozières, councillor at the parlement, acquired the intendancy of Dauphiné the same year. Many problems came from resigning masters: Sève remained in Auvergne, Faucon de Ris at Lyon,
vol. 2, commission in appendix), but was later sent into Auvergne (vol. 1, passim), Vignier was in Lorraine and the Barrois (ibid.), Pinon was in Berry (ibid.), Sève and Chazè were in Dauphiné (ibid.), each intriguing to have the other ousted. It is possible that both Vaucquelin and du Pré were at Montauban and Montpellier (f.f. 16218, commission of April 1640). Boyer believed that Vaucquelin was still there in 1642. However, du Pré may have been ousted by the newly arrived councillor of state, François Bosquet, intendant at Montauban (Boyer, passim). Renouard was at Tours (Lebrun, op. cit.), Barrin at Bourges after Pinon (Histoire, vol. 1, passim), Montescot at Paris (Boislisle, Mémoires des intendants sur l'état des généralités, Paris, 1681, vol. 1, p. LXXV), Bochart, formerly at Aix, had been transferred to Lyon (Marchand, op. cit.), either Favier or Thiersault was at Alençon (Boyer, passim), Jacques Mangot in Burgundy (ibid.), Lemaître at Amiens (ibid.), Béret at Châlons (Histoire, vol. 1, passim) and Le Tellier in the army of Italy (Richelieu, Lettres, vol. 7, p. 872, note).

Seven intendancies or important provincial commissions were in the hands of councillors of state or other robins. François Bosquet, procureur-général at the Rouen parlement and councillor of state, went to Montauban, Villemontée was still in Poitou, Lauson in Guyenne (Loirette, op. cit.), Cazet de Vautorte, avocat-général of the grand conseil, had acquired the intendancy of Provence (Marchand, op. cit.), Le Roy de La Potherie, was intendant at Caen (Séguler, Lettres, vol. 1, p. 147), Bragelonne, who had resigned his mastership in 1639, was at Orleans (Lebrun, op. cit.), Pussort, counsellor at the grand conseil, was sent as commissioner for the taille into the généralité of Soissons (Mousnier, Conseil, p. 258), which implies that the prospective candidate for the intendancy, a master, was ousted (f.f. 20632, fo. 172, 12 December 1640, Claude Mangot).

34 - Supra, Chapter 4. The code Michau repeated the ordinances of the sixteenth century about the "département".

35 - Phellipeaux, son of a secretary of state, became intendant at Moulins (Boyer, passim). Vignier sold his mastership and remained intendant in Lorraine (Séguler, op. cit., vol. 1, passim). Six other interior intendancies were held by councillors of state, all mentioned in note 33 (although Vautorte was sent to Limoges later in the year). Choisy, a former master, was intendant in the army of Enghien (Mazarin, Lettres, vol. 1, pp. 258, 407) and d'Argensson was in the army of Catalogne (ibid., pp. 165, 342).
Chaulnes at Amiens, Le Picart at Soissons, Mole in the army of Enghien (Mazarin, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 313). Former masters and their relatives created other problems: Marie de Beaubourg, who had resigned in the 1630s, became intendant of Lorraine in 1646 (f.f. 4171, commission, fo. 139, letters in f.f. 17386, fo. 198, 27 March 1646); René du Tronchay, relative of La Potherie, became intendant at Caen much to the anger of the masters (d’Ormesson, vol. 1, p. 344). Villemontée remained in Poitou and d’Argenson acquired a number of posts (briefly replacing Villemontée, the intendancy of the army of Thomas of Savoy, f.f. 4171, fo. 175, commission of 4 April 1646, letters in f.f. 17384, fo. 5, 22 April). Vautorte became intendant at Spire, Worms and Mayenne (Ségui er, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 1071, commission of 21 January 1644). Lauson remained in Guyenne.

The following active masters were intendants: Bochart in Provence, Gamin in Picardy (when Chaulnes became ill in 1646), Louis Laisné at Montauban, Corberon at Limoges, Jean Le Camus at Chalons, Heer at Tours, Fevier at Alençon, Balthazar at Montpellier, and Barrin at Bourges.

48 - F.f. 22183, fo. 69-70 (statement of Ségui er), n.a. 2236, p. 124 (reply of the public prosecution) and p. 161 (attacks on the requêtes de l'hôtel 10 April, 29 August 1647).

49 - Five master-intendants are drawn from f.f. 17387, the only volume in the Ségui er collection for 1647: Barrin at Bourges (fo. 62), Le Tonnellier at Montpellier (fo. 79), Bochart in Provence (fo. 115), Heers at Tours (fo. 87), followed by Paget (fo. 227). Corberon may still have been in the Limousin (Histoire, vol. 1, passim), Gamin was in Picardy (Boyer, passim), Laisné may have been in Guyenne (Histoire, vol. 1, passim) and Fouquet acquired an intendancy in the army of Flanders (f.f. 4175, fo. 351, commission of 5 May 1647).

50 - D’Ormesson, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 404.

51 - Supra, Part 2, Chapter 5.

51bis - Tapie, op. cit., p. 253.

For non-master intendants in 1647 see Ségui er, op. cit., vol. 2, passim (Phéllipeaux, Chaulnes, Lauson) and f.f. 17387 (Lozières in Dauphiné, fo. 2, though replaced by Heers later than year, Sève, fo. 12, Villemontée, fo. 54, Erageloge, fo. 89,
Faucon, fo. 91, Marle, fo. 117). For Molfé, at Chalons, see Boyer, passim, and then as intendant in the army of Catalogne, f.f. 4175, fo. 135). Machault was intendant in Burgundy and Bazin de Besons had acquired the Intendancy at Soissons (Boyer, passim).

52 - Supra, Chapter 4.
53 - E-159, A-B.
54 - Dent, op. cit., passim.
55 - V-6 car. 153.
57 - Ibid., p. 63.
60 - F.f. 18235, fo. 396, 409.
61 - D'Ormesson, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 112.
62 - F.f. 16218, fo. 203.
63 - Mousnier, "Conséil", p. 56.

It seems that their position at the financial bodies of the council remained static. If they been rapporteurs for 166 of 439 decrees in January 1641, in January 1647 (E-219, A-B) they presented only 169 of 514.

Notes to Epilogue

1 - V-4 car. 195, 22 May 1647.
2 - Ibid., car. 200, 7 December 1647.
3 - D'Ormesson, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 404. F.f. 18158, fo. 359 (edict of creation) confirms that this had been the original intention of the government.
4 - D'Ormesson, p. 406.
5 - Ibid., p. 420.
6 - Omer Talon, Mémoires, in Nouvelle Collection des

7 - Ibid., p. 212.
8 - D'Ormesson, p. 407.

10 - V-4 car. 201 (January-February) and 1148 (register of audiences) reveal a complete stop in final instance activity from 16 January to 3 August.

11 - D'Ormesson, p. 419, and table of contents in f.f. 18158 which notes an "Arrêté de Messieurs les Maistres des Requestes en leur assemblée générale de donner chacun trois mille livres à la veuve et héritiers de ceux qui viendroient à décéder avant qu'il eust plu au Roy leur donner le droit annuel 1648", which was torn from the manuscript.

12 - D'Ormesson, p. 533.
13 - Ibid., p. 540.

14 - Neron, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 18-20 ("Déclaration sur le fait de la justice", 31 July).

15 - D'Ormesson, p. 592. It is ironic that the revoked edict guaranteed that the masters would hold all provincial intendancies (supra, note 3).

16 - D'Ormesson, p. 532.

17 - British Museum, Eg. 1681-2, "Débats du Parlement de Paris pendant la minorité de Louis XIV...par un Conseiller Jean Le Boindre" (sessions of 1648-9, 1651-2), pp. 173-4 (article 18). Courteault, in the introduction to Un Journal inédit du parlement de Paris pendant la Fronde, 1er Décembre 1651-12e Avril 1652, Paris, 1917, notes the existence of a manuscript also entitled "Débats" by a young councillor, preserved at the Archives Nationales (U 336), of which the second part (1651-2) is missing. This exists at London as Eg. 1682.

18 - Ibid., pp. 182-4.

19 - See Esmonin, "La Suppression des intendances pendant la Fronde", in Bull. soc. his. mod., 1935.

20 - Eg. 1681, p. 213.
21 - Ibid., p. 261.

22 - F.f. 18262, fo. 332 (printed copy of an ordinance of the parlement which traces one struggle over a seal case from 1649 to 1652).


24 - The "Déclaration portant règlement sur le fait de la Justice, Police, Finances et Soulagement des Subjects de Sa Majesté", 22 October 1648, in Neron, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 200-3, knocked the last props from under the requêtes de l'hôtel. The parlement received a number of appeals against decrees of the requêtes (eg. X-1-A 2253-A, fo. 2, 13 November, for Domingo Durquixe). See V-4 car. 205-6 (July-December).

25 - Seguier, Lettres, vol. 2, pp. 902-4. D'Ormesson, p. 606, says that the masters, the grand conseil, the cour des aîdes and the chambre des comptes were all ready to leave Paris. Only four masters were present at Saint-Germain-en-Laye from January to April—Jacques Le Tillier (intendant des finances in 1649), Antoine de Bordeaux, Nicolas Foucquet and Denis Le Goux.

26 - V-4 car. 1148, register of audiences.
General Conclusion
General Conclusion

It seems appropriate to draw together the threads of this work first by asking how a master admitted into office in the 1640s differed from his predecessor under Henri III and secondly by summarizing the conditions and forces which brought about the "rise" of the masters and their evolution into the "pépinière des administrateurs". Afterwards areas for further research will be mentioned.

A robin who acquired a mastership in the 1640s was much different from one who entered the company sixty years before. He was dissimilar because of his professional heritage and training. The disparities would be accentuated once in office because of the tasks demanded of him. The contrast would become even more marked because of what he wished to become once he had ceased to be a master.

The father of the master received in the 1640s was likely to have sat (or stood) at the king's council table, whereas that of his predecessor would have spent most of
his professional life on a bench in the Paris parlement. The later magistrate had only a scanty experience as a lawyer; it is possible that this was not so for the master admitted into office under Henri III. The later one would have passed fewer years in the parlement (or any other court) as a councillor than his predecessor. These contrasts partly reflected the dissimilarities in the activities of the mastership itself in the two periods.

In the 1640s a master would be confronted by tasks with which his predecessor had little acquaintance—presentation at the royal council of litigation involving the king's finances, provincial tours on which he would be expected to use extensive judicial and financial powers and judgement at the requêtes de l'hôtel of tax-rioters. His contact with the monarch— the glory of the office in the sixteenth century— would have lessened through the success of the secretaries of state in taking over the service of the placets. He would spend less time at the sessions of the parlement than the earlier master and, unlike him, would have little experience in collaborating with the councillors of the requêtes du palais. He would enjoy a greater income, derived from the provincial commissions and plaintiffs who were partisans and tax-collectors. Similarly, he would have more judicial privileges, whether legal as in the case of committimus of the great seal or extra-legal because of his contacts with the royal council.
Content to die neither a master nor a president in a sovereign court (partly because of the hostility with which his reputation as a master might be remembered there), the later company member would hope to become a councillor of state. Aware of the disasters confronting France and its various professional, social and geographical communities, he would not fail to know that he and his colleagues did not share, by and large, the tribulations of others. This he owed to the king and the council. But the masters of the 1580s would have felt engulfed in administrative, political and religious disorder—victims, like many others, of the "malheurs des temps".

The progress of the company can be accounted for by many factors. Certain conditions did the masters little good under the Valois—their growing numbers, their proximity to the king and his closest advisers. Others did not affect only them—for example, the general rise in magisterial prestige in the 1590s because of the role of the great roblins in bringing about the end of the League. Yet all these conditions contributed significantly to their advancement. By the end of the sixteenth century the crown had at its beck and call a numerous group of legal auxiliaries tied to it by tradition. Once the grand conseil was fixed at Paris the masters became the only company continuously present at court.
When Henri IV called judges to his side as councillors of state, the masters were sure to be among them.

The skill and determination of the masters as a pressure group proved to be a major cause of their success. Their numbers and the disasters which they encountered in Valois France brought them the habit of meeting, discussing and drawing up memoirs and remonstrances. Their sense of the opportunities provided by moments when the crown was in much need of support, for example in 1594 and 1610, stood them in good stead. Even on the defensive against ministers whom they feared they were a force to be reckoned with. In 1640-1 they blocked implementation of an edict which the Paris parlement itself had registered. Yet they did not further their position solely in open confrontations with, or pressure exerted upon, "MM. du conseil". Daily chicanery at the council too had its rewards, for the masters were expert in diverting all sorts of judicial business to themselves.

However, their progress was not accounted for mainly by their agitation and opportunism. Although it is true that they were engaged in a long dialogue with the king's advisers (of which only the more spectacular parts are revealed in the sources), they often wanted what the ministers were prepared, even happy, to give them.
They sometimes benefitted from favouritism not caused by administrative considerations— for example, from the partiality of keepers of the seal and chancellors who had sprung from their ranks and of ministers whose clients they were and who sought to strengthen a position in the council by rewarding them.

Yet there were other factors which convinced royal advisers that the masters, and not other robins, should be used. Whatever the political services of the sovereign courts at the end of the League, their pretensions to have a share in the financial direction of the crown struck the ministers as intolerable, and it may be speculated that ministerial preference for masters in provincial commissions was linked to the resistance of the courts over such issues. Already under Henri IV such favouritism was evident. The great tribunals (and the local magistrates subordinated to them) also began to reveal themselves to be unreliable in the repression of fiscal disorders in the 1620s, which explains why the masters acquired cognizance of many (though not all) such cases.

It is somewhat facile to assume that the robins of the sovereign courts were entirely responsible for their own elimination from provincial commissions and the king's council. The masters did all they could to assert a
monopoly over provincial intendancies and councillorships of state. They were willing to do the king's will when other judges were hesitant. In this sense they only filled a vacuum.

But the rising tide of business at the council—obvious in the 1630s and possibly dating from even earlier—meant that a premium was placed on expertise in the choice of councillors of state. They had much business, and it was useful to the crown that the councillors should have the experience gained from having served as masters of requests. Similarly, the diversity of the tasks demanded of the provincial commissioners in the 1630s meant that more than the judicial skills of councillors from the sovereign courts was brought into play. Hence the frequent unreliability of magistrates from the great courts and the expertise of the masters (which increased with each little gain) resulted in a larger role being granted to the company in the provincial and central administration during the Thirty Years War.

The two schema presented above—the contrasts between the master of the 1580s and that of the 1640s and the factors accounting for the rise of the company—oversimplify our subject. We have had opportunities to observe the ambiguities in the relationship of the company with both "MM. du conseil" and the sovereign courts.
Moreover, our knowledge of the masters' progress remains full of lacunae.

It is not only necessary to follow these judges through the Fronde to the end of their rise with the reforms of 1657-67, but also reasonable to hope that further research will be able to clarify important causes of their advancement—for example, what the ministers thought about them at crucial moments (the regencies). We would like to know more about them under the later Valois, more about their ties to grands and more about their relationship to other judicial companies. What other contrasts may be drawn between them and other robins? It would be interesting to know if the masters profited financially more than others from the crisis of the 1630s and 1640s. It would be instructive to compare their conception of the monarchy and the state with that of other magistrates. But inevitably the study of the masters takes the historian to nearby groups, to enquire about the growth of the central administration in the period of the Thirty Years War—a subject which has yet to be exhausted.
Appendices: Graphs and Tables
GRAPH I: The Activity of the Requêtes de l'Hôtel by Quarter
Sentence counts at the Chamber of Audiences (1603-1639) and piece counts from the inventory of 1701 (1618-1647)
GRAPH II: The Activity of the Council Chamber
In First and Last Instance, by Quarter
(1618-1638)
GRAPH III: NUMBER OF ACTS AT THE REQUETES DE L'HOTEL
RECORDED IN THE 1784 INVENTORY (1641-75)

- Includes decisions and appearances at the registry by litigants.

*Years for which a month of acts are lacking.
GRAPH IV:
NUMBER OF DECREES ISSUED BY THE JANUARY QUARTIER OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL (1623-73) (SECRETARIES' INVENTORIES V-6 1224-8)

ALL LOCATIONS PARIS UNLESS NUMBERED
1. LA ROCHELLE - PARIS
2. PARIS - TROYES - VALENCE
3. PARIS - FONTAINEBLEAU - TROYES
4. PARIS - AUXERRE - DIJON
5. METZ - VERNON - PARIS - RUEL - ST. GERMAIN
6. PARIS - ST. GERMAIN
7. ROUEN - CAEN - BAYEUX - COUTANCES
8. PARIS - ST. GERMAIN
9. POITIERS - SAUMUR - LOIS - SULLY
10. LYON - SULLY - PARIS
GRAPH IV: The Price of the Mastership in Livres
(1604-1660)

! = sale of a single office
a = sale of two or more offices
Table One: Fathers from Elite Groups

Table One-(a) : The Sovereign Courts and the Royal Council (1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of fathers per decade or period:</th>
<th>1575-88</th>
<th>1589-1610</th>
<th>1611-20</th>
<th>1621-30</th>
<th>1631-40</th>
<th>1641-50</th>
<th>1651-60</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Parlement of Paris(2):</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>43</td>
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<td></td>
<td>17(32.6)</td>
<td>10(11.7)</td>
<td>5(10.2)</td>
<td>8(18.6)</td>
<td>6(9.2)</td>
<td>8(14.5)</td>
<td>2(4.7)</td>
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<td>2) Parisian sovereign courts</td>
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<td>(cours des aides, chambre</td>
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<td>des comptes, prévôt des marchands,</td>
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<td>lieutenant-civil):</td>
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<td></td>
<td>7(13.5)</td>
<td>5(5.8)</td>
<td>4(8.1)</td>
<td>5(11.6)</td>
<td>9(13.8)</td>
<td>7(12.7)</td>
<td>7(16.2)</td>
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<td>3) Provincial sovereign courts</td>
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<td>(parlements, cours des aides,</td>
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<td>chambres des comptes):</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2(3.8)</td>
<td>7(8.1)</td>
<td>2(4.1)</td>
<td>5(11.6)</td>
<td>4(6.2)</td>
<td>2(3.6)</td>
<td>4(9.3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>4) Royal Council (masters of requests,</td>
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<td>councilors of state, ambassadors,</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>presidents not included above, financial technicians, ministers):</td>
<td>11(21.2)</td>
<td>18(20.9)</td>
<td>18(36.7)</td>
<td>8(18.6)</td>
<td>22(33.8)</td>
<td>22(40.0)</td>
<td>21(48.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals:</td>
<td>37(71.1)</td>
<td>40(46.5)</td>
<td>29(59.1)</td>
<td>26(60.5)</td>
<td>41(63.1)</td>
<td>39(70.9)</td>
<td>34(79.1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Revised totals (including fathers who, while not holding offices, are members of important robe families): -1(71.1) -1(46.5) +1(61.2) -1(60.5) +1(64.6) +3(76.3) +1(81.4)

(1) Figures in brackets are the percentage of the whole group in the period or decade represented by the sub-group.

(2) As councillors and presidents only.
Table One-(b) : The Royal Council (Group Analysis) (1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of fathers per period or decade:</th>
<th>1575.88</th>
<th>1589.1610</th>
<th>1611.20</th>
<th>1621-30</th>
<th>1631-40</th>
<th>1641-50</th>
<th>1651-60</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

1) Masters of requests
   a) Masters only: 7 4 5 - 4 7 3
   b) Presidents in sovereign courts: 2 2 1 - 3 1 3
   c) Presidents and councilors of state: - - 2 - 3 1 2
   d) Councillors of state and ambassadors: 2 3 4 4 7 6 5
   e) Financial administrators at the council (contrôleurs-généraux, intendants des finances, trésoriers de l'épargne):
      - - - - - 3 -

Totals: 11(21.1) 9(10.0) 12(24.4) 5(11.6) 17(26.0) 18(32.7) 12(30.2)

2) Councillors of state, financial administrators and ministers
   a) Councillors of state, ambassadors, keepers of the seal:
      - 1 - 1 1 1 3
   b) Financial administrators at the council:
      - 2 2 - 3 1 3

Totals: -0.0 3(3.4) 2(4.0) 1(2.3) 4(6.1) 2(3.6) 6(13.9)

3) Sovereign courts
   a) Presidents and financial administrators:
      - 2 2 2 - 1 -
   b) Only as presidents in courts and councilors of state:
      - 4 2 - 1 1 2

Totals: -0.0 6(6.9) 4(8.1) 2(4.6) 1(1.5) 2(3.6) 2(4.6)

(1) Figures in brackets are the percentage of the whole group in the period or decade represented by the sub-group.
Table Two: Fathers from Outside Groups (1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period or decade:</th>
<th>1575-88</th>
<th>1589-1610</th>
<th>1611-20</th>
<th>1621-30</th>
<th>1631-40</th>
<th>1641-50</th>
<th>1651-60</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Parisians</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Councillors of courts</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(trésor, châtelet, eaux et forêts):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Low robe (greffiers, avocats):</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Bourgeois (échevins, bourgeois, marchands, banquiers, secrétaires du roi without other qualifications, doctors):</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Financial officers (receivers, controllers, trésoriers de l'extraordinaire des guerres et parties casuelles):</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals:</td>
<td>6(11.5)</td>
<td>15(17.4)</td>
<td>9(18.4)</td>
<td>7(16.2)</td>
<td>9(13.8)</td>
<td>8(14.5)</td>
<td>4(9.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Provincials</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Bailliages, eaux et forêts:</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Low robe:</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Echevins:</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Bourgeois:</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) Financial office (bureaux des finances, élections, etc):</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4(2)</td>
<td>3(3)</td>
<td>3(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals:</td>
<td>6(11.5)</td>
<td>17(19.7)</td>
<td>7(12.2)</td>
<td>8(18.6)</td>
<td>7(10.7)</td>
<td>6(10.9)</td>
<td>3(7.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Other (seigneurs, valets, unlocated secrétaires du roi):</td>
<td>2(3.8)</td>
<td>6(7.0)</td>
<td>3(6.1)</td>
<td>2(4.7)</td>
<td>6(9.2)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1(2.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Unknown:</td>
<td>1(1.9)</td>
<td>8(9.3)</td>
<td>1(2.0)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1(1.5)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals (1+2):</td>
<td>12(25.0)</td>
<td>32(34.9)</td>
<td>16(30.6)</td>
<td>15(34.8)</td>
<td>17(26.1)</td>
<td>14(25.4)</td>
<td>7(16.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals (1+2+3+4):</td>
<td>15(28.8)</td>
<td>46(53.4)</td>
<td>20(38.7)</td>
<td>17(39.5)</td>
<td>23(35.3)</td>
<td>14(25.4)</td>
<td>8(18.5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table Two: Notes

(1) Bracketed figures are percentages.

(2) Eight fathers began as provincial treasurers, two of which entered the royal council, while another took up financial office close to the council (as trésorier des parties casuelles).

(3) Six fathers began as provincial treasurers. One became a councillor of state, another secretary of the royal council and yet another took up financial office at Paris.

(4) Five fathers began as provincial treasurers. One became resident at Cologne and another master of accounts.
Table Three: Fathers' Geographical Area of Activity (1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period or decade:</th>
<th>1575-88</th>
<th>1589-1610</th>
<th>1611-20</th>
<th>1621-30</th>
<th>1631-40</th>
<th>1641-50</th>
<th>1651-60</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Parisians and</td>
<td>41(78.8)</td>
<td>50(58)</td>
<td>36(73.4)</td>
<td>28(65.1)</td>
<td>45(69.2)</td>
<td>47(85.4)</td>
<td>36(83.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>transplanted</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>provincials</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Provincials</td>
<td>8(15.3)</td>
<td>22(25.5)</td>
<td>9(18.3)</td>
<td>13(30.2)</td>
<td>13(20)</td>
<td>8(14.5)</td>
<td>6(13.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(known)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Unknowns</td>
<td>3(5.7)</td>
<td>14(16.2)</td>
<td>4(8.1)</td>
<td>2(4.0)</td>
<td>7(10.7)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7(2.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Total (2+3)</td>
<td>11(21)</td>
<td>36(41.7)</td>
<td>13(26.4)</td>
<td>15(34.2)</td>
<td>20(30.7)</td>
<td>8(14.5)</td>
<td>7(16.2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Figures in brackets are the percentages of the whole group in the period or decade represented by the sub-group.
Table Four: Areas of Service by Masters of Requests prior to Acquisition of the Office.

Table Four-(a) Type of Court (1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period or decade:</th>
<th>1575-88</th>
<th>1589-1610</th>
<th>1611-20</th>
<th>1621-30</th>
<th>1631-40</th>
<th>1641-50</th>
<th>1651-60</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Paris parlement (councillor, président aux requêtes):</td>
<td>25(48.0)</td>
<td>35(40.6)</td>
<td>22(44.8)</td>
<td>29(67.4)</td>
<td>27(41.5)</td>
<td>28(50.9)</td>
<td>23(53.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Grand Conseil (councillor, avocat-général):</td>
<td>8(15.3)</td>
<td>30(34.8)</td>
<td>15(30.6)</td>
<td>7(16.2)</td>
<td>19(29.2)</td>
<td>13(23.6)</td>
<td>11(25.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Cour des aides (councillor, avocat-général, president):</td>
<td>4(7.6)</td>
<td>2(2.3)</td>
<td>2(4.0)</td>
<td>1(2.3)</td>
<td>2(3.0)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1(2.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Châtelet (lieutenant-civil or procureur du roi):</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2(4.0)</td>
<td>1(2.3)</td>
<td>2(3.0)</td>
<td>1(1.8)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Other Parisian area (avocat, member of chambre des comptes, prévôt des marchands, échevin, etc):</td>
<td>7(13.4)</td>
<td>5(5.8)</td>
<td>1(2.0)</td>
<td>2(4.6)</td>
<td>1(1.5)</td>
<td>1(1.8)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Provincial Sovereign Court:</td>
<td>4(7.6)</td>
<td>5(5.8)</td>
<td>3(6.1)</td>
<td>3(6.9)</td>
<td>11(16.9)</td>
<td>10(18.1)</td>
<td>7(16.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) Baillage (lieutenant-général):</td>
<td>2(3.8)</td>
<td>5(5.8)</td>
<td>1(2.0)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3(4.6)</td>
<td>1(1.8)</td>
<td>1(2.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) Other Provincial:</td>
<td>1(1.9)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9) Unknown:</td>
<td>1(1.9)</td>
<td>4(4.6)</td>
<td>3(6.1)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Figures in brackets are percentages. Position given is last one held before the mastership.
(2) Throughout the period under study 6 councillors at the grand conseil, 2 from the cour des aides, 7 from the châtelet, 2 members of the chambre des comptes, 11 from provincial sovereign courts and 2 from bailliages became councillors at the parlement. (3) 10 members of provincial sovereign courts entered the grand conseil, but only 2 councillors from the Paris parlement did so, not to forget 1 lieutenant-général of a baillage and 1 councillor from the châtelet. (4) The lieutenants-civils and procureurs du roi were former councillors of the parlement, grand conseil or châtelet.
Table Four (b) : Service in Provincial Sovereign Courts (1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period:</th>
<th>1589-1630</th>
<th>1631-1660</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parlement or sovereign court</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Brittany</td>
<td>8 (34.7)</td>
<td>6 (15.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Normandy</td>
<td>6 (26.0)</td>
<td>8 (20.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Languedoc</td>
<td>2 (8.6)</td>
<td>9 (23.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Metz</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13 (33.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Dauphiné</td>
<td>2 (8.6)</td>
<td>2 (5.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Guyenne</td>
<td>3 (13.0)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) Burgundy</td>
<td>2 (8.6)</td>
<td>1 (2.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes.
(1) Includes judges who began in provincial sovereign courts but who later went elsewhere. Data is probably incomplete for period 1575-88. The interesting trends were the decline in importance of the parlements of Brittany and Normandy and the rapid rise of the Metz parlement - the so-called pons asinorum for the magistrature of the eighteenth century - as well as the increased number of judges who served at Toulouse (and the cour des aides of Montpellier). Those who went to Metz were usually the scions of Parisians who were outsiders to the magistrature of the parlement or who were members of the king's council. The same comment can be made for the judges who served at Toulouse or Montpellier.

Figures in brackets are the percentages of the whole group in the period or decade represented by the sub-group.
Table Five: Tenure of the Mastership (1).

Table Five-(a) Duration of Tenure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period or decade:</th>
<th>1575-88</th>
<th>1589-1600</th>
<th>1601-10</th>
<th>1611-20</th>
<th>1621-30</th>
<th>1631-40</th>
<th>1641-50</th>
<th>1651-60</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>office held:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) 1 - 5 (very</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>short tenure) :</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) 6 - 10 (short)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) 11 - 15 (medium)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 - 20 (medium) :</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) 21 - 25 (long)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 - 30 (long) :</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 + (long):</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Totals and percentages of received masters:

|                  | 26(50) | 13(28.2) | 26(65) | 31(63.2) | 32(74.4) | 52(80) | 43(78.1) | 31(72.1) |

(1) The years in the table are complete years, since the office was sold in the same quartier in which it was bought.
Table Five-(b) Averages for Categories 1 - 4 transformed into percentages.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period or decade:</th>
<th>1575-88</th>
<th>1589-1600</th>
<th>1601-10</th>
<th>1611-20</th>
<th>1621-30</th>
<th>1631-40</th>
<th>1641-50</th>
<th>1651-60</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Category:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1)</td>
<td>(15.3)</td>
<td>(7.6)</td>
<td>(11.5)</td>
<td>(9.6)</td>
<td>(9.3)</td>
<td>(17.3)</td>
<td>(13.9)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2)</td>
<td>(19.2)</td>
<td>(7.6)</td>
<td>(19.2)</td>
<td>(19.3)</td>
<td>(25.0)</td>
<td>(42.3)</td>
<td>(25.5)</td>
<td>(6.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3)</td>
<td>(23.0)</td>
<td>(46.1)</td>
<td>(46.1)</td>
<td>(54.8)</td>
<td>(43.7)</td>
<td>(21.1)</td>
<td>(23.2)</td>
<td>(64.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4)</td>
<td>(34.6)</td>
<td>(38.4)</td>
<td>(19.2)</td>
<td>(19.3)</td>
<td>(21.8)</td>
<td>(19.2)</td>
<td>(37.2)</td>
<td>(29.6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table Six: Unpromoted Masters and Masters who become Councillors of State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period or Decade:</th>
<th>1575-88</th>
<th>1589-1600</th>
<th>1601-10</th>
<th>1611-20</th>
<th>1621-30</th>
<th>1631-40</th>
<th>1641-50</th>
<th>1651-60</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Number of masters whose careers are aborted by early death (1)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-?</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Careers possibly ended as in 1)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Masters of requests only</td>
<td>21(43.7)</td>
<td>18(39.1)</td>
<td>6(15.7)</td>
<td>9(20.4)</td>
<td>2(4.8)</td>
<td>20(33)</td>
<td>15(30)</td>
<td>9(23.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Masters who become councillors of state</td>
<td>16(33)</td>
<td>13(28.2)</td>
<td>18(47.3)</td>
<td>26(59)</td>
<td>28(68.2)</td>
<td>30(50)</td>
<td>19(38)</td>
<td>14(37.6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Only masters in 1) have been eliminated from the calculation.

Figures in brackets are the percentages of the whole group in the period or decade represented by the sub-group.
Table Seven: Masters of Requests who enter Courts upon Resignation of Office or before (1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period or decade:</th>
<th>1575-88</th>
<th>1589-1600</th>
<th>1601-10</th>
<th>1611-20</th>
<th>1621-30</th>
<th>1631-40</th>
<th>1641-50</th>
<th>1651-60</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Parisian courts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Parlement:</td>
<td>7(2)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2(7)</td>
<td>2(7)</td>
<td>3(9)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Cour des aides:</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Chambre des comptes:</td>
<td>2(3)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1(8)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Châtelet, hôtel de ville:</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals:</td>
<td>11(22.9)</td>
<td>8(17.3)</td>
<td>2(5.2)</td>
<td>4(9.0)</td>
<td>6(14.6)</td>
<td>6(10.0)</td>
<td>6(12.0)</td>
<td>4(10.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Provincial courts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Président à mortier in a parlement:</td>
<td>2(4)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6(5)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) First president in a sovereign court:</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2(6)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Provincial court (bailliage, justice souverain):</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals:</td>
<td>5(10.4)</td>
<td>7(15.2)</td>
<td>13(34.2)</td>
<td>4(9.0)</td>
<td>4(9.7)</td>
<td>4(6.6)</td>
<td>1(2.0)</td>
<td>1(2.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals of 1) + 2):</td>
<td>16(34.3)</td>
<td>15(32.5)</td>
<td>15(39.4)</td>
<td>8(18.0)</td>
<td>10(24.3)</td>
<td>10(16.6)</td>
<td>7(14.0)</td>
<td>5(13.1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Only one position in a sovereign court was usually held, but see below.

(2) Antoine Séguier had been lieutenant-civil at the châtelet before becoming avocat-général.

(3) Jacques Mangot had been avocat-général at the parlement before becoming procureur-général at the chambre des comptes. (4) Vic was apparently president in the chambre des comptes of Paris. (5) Claude Bullion had a présidence à mortier created in his favour but he did not exercise office. (6) Elie Laisné is mentioned by some sources as president in the chamber of accounts. (7) Nicolas de Baillleul was also lieutenant-civil; (8) Antoine Le Camus had been président aux enquêtes at the Paris parlement. Tanneguy Séguier was briefly first president in the commission which supplanted the Rouen parlement after the revolt of the Nu-pieds.

Figures in brackets are the percentage of the whole group in the period or decade represented by the sub-group.
Table Eight: Tax-disorders leaving Traces in the Archives of the Requêtes de l'hôtel (1629-38)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plaintiff</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Type of disturbance</th>
<th>Carton, date</th>
<th>Tax</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Péronne</td>
<td>Auxerre</td>
<td>assault on official</td>
<td>80, 21 July 1629 (definitive judgement)</td>
<td>livestock and fish taxes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Packers</td>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>threats, riots, etc.</td>
<td>1498, fo. 138, 22 September 1629 (letters patent), 96, 14 March 1634 (d.j.) other disturbances 1636-37 in carton 111 (Oct. 1637)</td>
<td>new offices of packers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Pellisson</td>
<td>Laval</td>
<td>riot</td>
<td>81, 20 March 1630 (d.j.)</td>
<td>cloth-tax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Bollain</td>
<td>Moulines</td>
<td>riot</td>
<td>82, 17 May 1630 (avis for damages)</td>
<td>beverage tax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) La Lande</td>
<td>Angers</td>
<td>riot and following disturbances</td>
<td>1498 fo. 163-64, Feb 1631, (l.p.) 85, 20 April 1631 (registry of l.p.)</td>
<td>activities of officials of the prévôté</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Bryois-Bullet</td>
<td>Rouen</td>
<td>riot</td>
<td>90, 13 Dec 1632 (d.j.)</td>
<td>b.t.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) Bryois</td>
<td>St. Flor-entin</td>
<td>riot</td>
<td>93, 7 Sept 1633 (d.j. for damages), 111, 24 Oct 1617</td>
<td>b.t.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) Bucaille-Hardy</td>
<td>La Haye (Normandy)</td>
<td>opposition by gentilshommes</td>
<td>93, Sept-Dec 1633 (pieces of procedure only)</td>
<td>b.t.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9) Moitié</td>
<td>Péronne</td>
<td>sedition</td>
<td>95, Jan 1633 (p.p.)</td>
<td>b.t.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10) Brabant</td>
<td>Rouen</td>
<td>riot</td>
<td>96, 10 April 1634 (d.j.)</td>
<td>b.t.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12) Bryois</td>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>assault on tax official</td>
<td>97, 12 June 1634 (p.p.)</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plaintiff</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Type of Disturbance</td>
<td>Carton, date</td>
<td>Tax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13) Méquignon</td>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>assault on tax official</td>
<td>97, 30 June 1634 (p.p.); 100, 22 May 1635 (p.p.)</td>
<td>wood tax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14) Trois Varlets</td>
<td>Laval</td>
<td>opposition by gentilshommes</td>
<td>113, 12 Jan (d.j.), 4 Feb, March 1638 (p.p.)</td>
<td>b.t.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15) Brabant</td>
<td>Bas-Caumont (élection of Ponteaudamer)</td>
<td>assault on tax official</td>
<td>98, 16 Oct 1634 (p.p.)</td>
<td>b.t.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16) Pocachard</td>
<td>Lyon(?)</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>98, 19 Oct 1634 (p.p.)</td>
<td>hide tax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b.t. (?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19) Fouquet</td>
<td>Ponteaudamer</td>
<td>assault</td>
<td>100, 30 April 1635 (p.p.)</td>
<td>paper tax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20) Thomas</td>
<td>Xaincte</td>
<td>riot</td>
<td>101, 26 June 1635 (p.p.)</td>
<td>tax on offices (conservateurs des aides)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21) Chaudonnay</td>
<td>Toque (élection of Ros- ay)</td>
<td></td>
<td>104, 29 Dec 1635 (p.p.)</td>
<td>cloth tax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22) Royer</td>
<td>various loc- riots, etc. in généralité of Limoges (and elsewhere)</td>
<td></td>
<td>105, n.d. Jan 1636 (p.p.)</td>
<td>b.t.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23) Morel</td>
<td>Melun</td>
<td>resistance by élus</td>
<td>105, 4, 14 Jan 1636 (p.p.)</td>
<td>taille</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plaintiff</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Type of Disturbance</td>
<td>Carton, date</td>
<td>Tax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>24- Landr</td>
<td>Coulommier + La Ferté-Gaulcher Pithiviers Montégu, Montluçon, Moulines</td>
<td>resistance by local officials</td>
<td>104, 24 Nov 1635, 105, 18 March 1636, 106, 18 April 1636 (p.p.)</td>
<td>six droits unis (combination of various aides)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30- Landr</td>
<td>Suron, Mont- rift, Sillé-Le Guillaume</td>
<td>resistance</td>
<td>106, 18 April 1636 (p.p.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provins</td>
<td>resistance</td>
<td>106, 3 May 1636 (p.p.)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>33- Landr</td>
<td>Chastres, Mousett, Meaux</td>
<td>resistance</td>
<td>106, 4, 14 June 1636 (p.p.)</td>
<td>hide tax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36) Puy</td>
<td>Rye (élection de Sables d'Ollones</td>
<td>assaults</td>
<td>106, 4, 27, 30 June 1636 (p.p.)</td>
<td>taille</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37) Landr</td>
<td>Fontenay</td>
<td>riot</td>
<td>107, 29 July 1636 (p.p.)</td>
<td>aides</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38)</td>
<td>Vézelay</td>
<td>riot</td>
<td>108, 7 April 1637, 31 July 1636 (p.p.)</td>
<td>six droits unis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40) Bishop of Mande</td>
<td>Mande.</td>
<td>resistance</td>
<td>108, 28 May (p.p.)</td>
<td>cloth tax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plaintiff</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Type of Disturbance</td>
<td>Carton, date</td>
<td>Tax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>41) Pelet</td>
<td>Dreux (and assault at Vire-en-Condé)</td>
<td>assault ¹</td>
<td>108, 9 May (d.j.); 113, Feb 1638</td>
<td>b.t.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42) ?</td>
<td>Noyon</td>
<td>assault</td>
<td>109, 26 June 1637 (p.p.)</td>
<td>hide tax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43) ?</td>
<td>St. Loup d'Ingres (in Isle de France)</td>
<td>assault</td>
<td>111, 20 Oct 1637 (d.j.)</td>
<td>emprunt of 1637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44) Echevins</td>
<td>Dreux</td>
<td>riot</td>
<td>111, n.d. Dec 1637 (p.p.)</td>
<td>emprunt of 1637</td>
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<tr>
<td>45- 46) Piry</td>
<td>Bourges, Orléans</td>
<td>assaults</td>
<td>111, 4 Sept (p.p.)</td>
<td>tax on greffes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47) Le Sage</td>
<td>Nemours</td>
<td>imprisonment of tax official</td>
<td>111, 19 Sept (p.p.)</td>
<td>emprunt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48) ?</td>
<td>Milly-en-Gatinois</td>
<td>assault (by a collector)</td>
<td>110, 4 August, 111 17 Sept (d.j.)</td>
<td>emprunt</td>
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<tr>
<td>49) Vigean</td>
<td>Poictiers</td>
<td>riot</td>
<td>112, 29 Dec 1637 (d.j.); 113, 5 Jan 1638 (p.p.)</td>
<td>tax on greffes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50) Chantereau</td>
<td>Dammartin</td>
<td>assault</td>
<td>113, 26 Jan (d.j.)</td>
<td>emprunt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52) Husson</td>
<td>Nime (?)</td>
<td>assault</td>
<td>115, May (p.p.)</td>
<td>b.t.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

¹ assault (by a collector)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plaintiff</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Type of Disturbance</th>
<th>Carton, date</th>
<th>Tax</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>53) Andoux</td>
<td>Issoudun</td>
<td>riot</td>
<td>115, 4 May (p.p.)</td>
<td>aides</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54- Moitie</td>
<td>Montreau, Faux, Yonne</td>
<td>assault</td>
<td>115, 17 May (sentences in audiences)</td>
<td>b.t.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56) Ardier</td>
<td>Bilhon</td>
<td>riot</td>
<td>116, 19 June, 117, 16 Oct (p.p.)</td>
<td>?</td>
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<tr>
<td>58) Pelletier</td>
<td>Lynois</td>
<td>resistance</td>
<td>116, 2 June (p.p.)</td>
<td>emprunt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59) Rochechouart</td>
<td>Coulommiers</td>
<td>assault</td>
<td>116, 21 Oct (p.p.)</td>
<td>hide tax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60) Baudouin</td>
<td>Baugency (généralité of Orléans)</td>
<td>assault</td>
<td>116, 19 Oct (p.p.)</td>
<td>establishment of greffes</td>
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<tr>
<td>61) Cousturier</td>
<td>Dieppe</td>
<td>assault</td>
<td>116, 12 Oct, Nov (p.p.)</td>
<td>hide tax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62) Governor of Chateau of St. Malo</td>
<td>Mortaigne</td>
<td>assault</td>
<td>117, 29 Nov (p.p.)</td>
<td>subsistence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63) Dessault</td>
<td>Vailly (élection of Soissons)</td>
<td>resistance</td>
<td>116, 23 Oct (p.p.)</td>
<td>aides</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64) Duplessis-Drouin</td>
<td>Vouvray (élection of Dourdun)</td>
<td>assault</td>
<td>117, 23 Dec (p.p.)</td>
<td>aides</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
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(iii) manuscrits Clairambault
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651 (treatise on the council)

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91 (accounts of household of Marie de Médicis)
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Edict...portant création en titre d'office formez, seize conseillers et maistres des requestes ordinaires de l'hostel, pour jouir à l'instar et aux mesmes honneurs, autoritez, prérogatives...attribués aux autres maistres des requestes...avec la déclaration de
Sa Majesté sur ledit édict, portant réduction à douze officiers le nombre de seize... à Saint-Germain-en-Laye, décembre 1639 (See Isnard and Honore, op. cit., vol. 2).

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