Racialised ‘price tag’: Intersectional commodification of Central and Eastern European workers in the UK labour market

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Abstract

This thesis explores the intersectional commodification of migrant labour from post-socialist EU Accession 8 (A8) countries and its effects on Polish and Slovenian migrant workers in the UK. Using historical and macro socio-economic contexts as its point of departure, the thesis aims to uncover how a postcolonial narrative surrounding A8 countries’ transition to market economies and their accession to the EU has legitimised on-going colonial processes that construct A8 countries and their nationals as second class EU citizens and re-evaluate subjectivities in relation to the market. Further, it explores how this narrative has been appropriated by transnational employment agencies that colonise A8 countries and as such play an active role in commodifying A8 workers and supplying them to the UK. Moreover, the thesis sets out specifically to explore how this colonisation and its narrative affect workers’ (self)value and emigration from Poland and Slovenia, as well as the value extraction possibilities and strategies of diverse actors involved in transnational labour relations between East and West. Through a transdisciplinary adoption of a Bourdieuvian conceptual framework, this research offers an original theoretical and methodological toolkit for complex intersectional analyses that uncovers the multiple and misrecognised power relations associated with embodied categories, spatial and temporal dimensions and varying modalities of knowledge. As such, it uncovers on-going colonial processes that characterise a contemporary post-socialist world marked by changed transnationalised consumption and production processes and the marketization of cultural, diversity and identity politics. In this way, the research uncovers symbolic economy hidden under neoliberal (self)colonisation, which enables strategic utilisation of migrant labour and disciplines, segments and divides the global poor. By providing a broader comparative analysis of diverse actors and A8 groups, the thesis widens our understanding of A8 labour migration to the UK and also leads to insights into the remaking of class, race and gender politics on the local and global scales.
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## 4 THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  

List of abbreviations

A2 - Accession 2 stands for two post-socialist Central and Eastern European countries (Bulgaria and Romania) that joined the EU in 2007.
A8 - Accession 8 (A8) stands for eight post-socialist Central and Eastern European countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia) that joined the EU in 2004.
ALP - Association of Labour Providers
AMR – Accession Monitoring Report
AWR – Agency Worker Regulations 2010
BME – Black and Minority Ethnic
CBI - Confederation of British Industry
CDA – Critical Discourse Analysis
CEE – post-socialist Central and Eastern Europe
CIETT – International Confederation of Private Employment Agencies
CWS – Critical Whiteness Studies
DWP – Department for Works and Pensions
EC – European Commission
EEA- European Economic Area
EU – European Union
EU 15 – 15 old EU member states (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom)
HO - Home Office
(I)HRM – (International) Human Resource Management
ILO – International Labour Organization
IMF - International Monetary Fund
LFS – Labour Force Survey
LGBT – Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender
NIN – National Insurance Number
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1 Introduction

1.1 Introduction
This thesis aims to expose the workings of the symbolic economy that makes contemporary transnationalised cultural political economy possible. Specifically, it focuses on the commodification of migrant workers from A8 countries and its effects on Polish and Slovenian migrant workers and the overall social stratification in the UK and across transnational fields. After the EU Enlargement in 2004, which welcomed ten new member states, only A8 countries were problematised, both on the EU level and in specific member states. Consequently, transitional measures were imposed that restricted free movement of A8 workers and effectively produced not just formal second-class European citizenship, but also a culturally subordinate one (Ong 1996; Tutti 2010; Vaughan-Whitehead 2003). In this context, the British government adopted a Worker Registration Scheme (WRS) which allowed A8 nationals to work in the UK, but prevented them from accessing unemployment benefits (Doyle et al. 2006). EU and UK policy has thus constructed A8 nationals as a specific group of workers that needs to be controlled and monitored. Group making through monitoring, censuses and policies has always been an important part of colonial administration, whose key principle has been the division of work and the classification of different groups of people as being suitable for different types of work (Leonard 2010). In this regard many authors argue that for UK policy makers A8 labour migration was not about exercising EU citizenship rights of free movement, but about substituting migrant workers from the non-EU/EEA area in order to fill labour shortages at the lower end of the economy (Anderson et al. 2006; Ciupijus 2011; McDowell 2009a; Wills et al. 2010). This indicates their move from former British colonies towards the European periphery, and the making and utilisation of new colonial subjects arising from them.
This is visible on the UK labour market, where A8 and other CEE workers are most commonly referred to as ‘Eastern Europeans’ and constructed through the narratives of hard work, a high work ethic and their willingness to labour without complaint (Anderson et al. 2006; MacKenzie and Forde 2009; Wills et al. 2010). ‘Eastern European-ness’, apart from class, also entails a cultural inferiority that is visible in employers’ narratives, practices and racism directed towards CEE workers. Research informs us, for instance, that A8 labour faces de-skilling, devaluation, subtle forms of racism and a glass-ceiling (Anderson 2000; Currie 2007; Downey 2008; Stevenson 2007; Wills et al. 2010). It is not uncommon that CEE workers on the EU and UK level are racialised through the jobs assigned to them and imagined with the symbolic image of the ‘Polish plumber’, ‘domestic worker’, ‘fruit picker’, etc. (Campani 2008; Cappusotti 2007; Downey 2008; Nicolaïdis and Schmidt 2007). This suggests that discourse can play an important role in producing intersectionally commodified groups of workers by ‘prescribing’ a certain identity, value and performativity that can involve emotional and embodied labour and can further have class, race, gender and age specific dimensions (Dyer et al. 2008; McDowell et al. 2007; Wolkowitz 2002b). So far there has been quite a lot of evidence produced of the micro or macro socio-economic effects of A8 labour migration to the UK. However, none of the research has detailed how and why A8 and other workers from post-socialist CEE have been objectified and commodified as such.

This thesis addresses this void by exploring the origins of this commodification across transnational fields. In this regard it is important to take into account the wider socio-economic context and global economic processes, which can illuminate global inequalities that fuel migration and uncover the active role played by labour market actors and the state in the strategic use and sourcing of vulnerable migrant workers (MacKenzie and Forde 2009; Wills et al. 2010). Although since May 2011 transitional measures for A8 workers no longer apply and they can work without constraints in any EU member state, their choices
are still shaped by market forces that take advantage of inequalities amongst states and help maintain or even deepen precarious employment (Ciupijus 2011). The evidence presented here suggests that A8 labour migration should first be contextualised within the wider historical, socio-economic and political context that has characterised EU enlargement towards A8 countries and their transition to market economies. This was shaped by the EU and other important actors operating across transnational fields that promote neoliberal policies rather than a European social model (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992; Bourdieu 2005; Harvey 2005; Levitt and Schiller 2004; Stenning et al. 2010; Vaughan-Whitehead 2003). Some researchers saw these processes as a new form of colonial expansion that reinforced the postcolonial binary divisions between East and West (Böröcz 2001; Kovacs and Kabachnik 2001; Owczarzak 2009; Sher 2001; Stenning and Hörschelman 2008).

The A8 countries’ transition to market economies also brought in new labour market intermediaries, such as transnational employment agencies, which have significantly changed the former bilateral national employee-employer relationship into a triangular, transnational relationship (Bonet et al. 2013; Coe et al. 2007). For instance, transnational employment agencies actively source, supply and employ workers from A8 countries in the UK. In this regard, research indicates that Polish and other A8 workers are increasingly using formal channels such as agencies and the internet to organise their migration (Currie 2008; Fitzgerald 2006; ONS 2009a; Ryan et al. 2007; White and Ryan 2008). Agencies play an important role in determining A8 workers for certain sectors or occupations, which results in exploitative relationships (Currie 2007, 2008; Fitzgerald 2006; MacKenzie and Forde 2009; McKay 2009; TUC 2007; Wills et al. 2010). Furthermore, research suggests that A8 workers are often recruited directly from their places of origin through exaggerated portrayals of the benefits of employment in the UK (Currie 2008; Wills et al. 2010). This points towards a symbolic economy, which enables exchange and the attribution of
value across transnational fields (Skeggs 2004b: 15). In addition to focusing on migrant workers, this thesis puts the spotlight on important actors that operate across transnational fields and play a significant role in contemporary colonial projects. Among other things, these latter assign value to A8 countries and A8 workers and strategically appropriate this value across transnational fields. Hence, it is crucial to explore who within these changed triangular and transnational relationships has the power to extract value across transnational fields.

This symbolic economy would, however, not be possible if it did not also affect workers’ (self)value, their imagination of symbolic profits linked to immigration and ultimately their choices to emigrate and take up specific jobs in the West. This thesis thus puts equal focus on production and on consumption within the changed transnational and multirelational processes. It explores how the changed production and consumption patterns that came about during the transition and Europeanisation in two different A8 countries – namely Poland and Slovenia – affected the (self)re-evaluation of subjectivities and Polish and Slovenian workers’ (self)value and emigration. These countries were chosen because they are characterised by very different histories, geographies, and approaches to transition to market economies, and indeed size (Vaughan-Whitehead 2003). There is also variation in immigration to the UK. While Polish migrants are the most visible and numerically the biggest group among A8 workers, Slovenian migrants are the smallest and most invisible (HO 2009). The comparative focus on one hand enables us to expose differences that arise from the very diverse (on-going) colonial histories in Poland and Slovenia, and on the other to uncover commonalities of exclusion that arise from the racialised sameness Polish and Slovenian workers encounter in the UK.

In order to research these differences and commonalities further, the exploration turns towards Polish and Slovenian migrant workers’ encounters
with managerial utilisation and consumption of their identities on the UK labour market and their strategies to generate value for themselves. This can provide new insights to the already important body of research exploring the increasing division and segmentation of a diverse workforce on the UK labour market and migrant workers’ own utilisation of the cultural and embodied markers and discourses that surround them (Dyer et al. 2008; Healy and Oikelome 2011; Healy et al. 2011; McDowell et al. 2007; McDowell 2009b; Perrons et al. 2010; Wills et al. 2010). These insights are not only crucial for understanding the position of A8 workers and the overall social stratification in the UK, but also to expose similar structural forms of exclusion, on various local and global scales, that serve to utilise and discipline the global poor. Conversely the focus on diverse migrant workers’ strategies also entails an emancipatory potential that can retrieve memories of possibilities for class, race and gender politics, which are constantly eroded through the on-going colonial projects that characterise contemporary transnational cultural political economy.

In order to achieve this theoretically and methodologically this thesis offers a transdisciplinary adoption of a Bourdieuan conceptual framework (Adkins and Skeggs 2004; Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999; Hage 1998; Haylett 2003; Kelly and Lusis 2006; Levitt and Schiller 2004; Loyal 2009; McCall 1992; Puwar 2009). This framework enables complex intersectional analysis of class/group formation and its effects at multiple levels, perspectives and scales, by bridging the divide between the economic, cultural and political arenas, between discursive and material positions and between structure and agency. This allows the exploration of the complex, relational, multilevel, transnational and intersectional commodification of migrant labour and its effects within contemporary capitalism, characterised as it is by transnationalised production and consumption patterns.
1.2 Research questions

This thesis aims to explore the commodification of A8 migrant workers and its effects. Specifically it seeks to answer the question: how have A8 workers been discursively and intersectionally commodified, and what are the effects of this on Polish and Slovenian migrant workers and the overall social stratification in the UK and across transnational fields? In order to answer the central research question, in line with the aims of this thesis, three sub-research questions were set out to explore in a multilevel and relational framework. These research questions are:

1. How has A8 labour been discursively and intersectionally commodified by important actors that operate across (trans)national fields and participate in the colonisation of post-socialist CEE?

2. How has neoliberal (self)colonisation affected (self)value and emigration in Poland and Slovenia and the value extraction possibilities of diverse actors involved in transnational labour relations between East and West?

3. How do Polish and Slovenian workers’ embodied places and their encounter with discursive intersectional commodification in the UK, especially in London, affect their strategies to generate value for themselves?
1.3 The structure of the thesis

This thesis contains nine chapters. The present chapter presents the aims and objectives of this study, poses three research questions that this thesis seeks to investigate, and finally offers an overview of the other chapters. Chapter Two contextualises A8 labour migration to the UK through an exploration of the relationship amongst transnational fields. In other words, it exposes the order of discourse on the EU and UK level concerning A8 countries and their nationals that speaks of neoliberal (self)colonisation that shaped the transition and EU accession process within A8 countries. This order of discourse also redefined A8 citizens in relation to the market and thus needs to be taken into account when exploring contemporary East-West migration and its effects. Chapter Three turns towards Polish and Slovenian workers’ places of origin. As such it exposes how the neoliberal (self)colonisation explored in Chapter Two affects Polish and Slovenian workers’ (self)value and emigration. In other words it uncovers how the changed conditions characterised by transition and EU accession have manifested themselves on the micro-level, and how they have affected labour emigration from Poland and Slovenia.

Chapter Four explores the theoretical and conceptual framework adopted in this study, which is devised by transdisciplinary adoption of a Bourdieuian reflexive sociological theory. This framework was adopted because it enables complex intersectional analysis of class/group formation and its effects across spatial and temporal dimensions and varying modalities of knowledge. As such it offers a theoretical framework for researching intersectional commodification of migrant workers and its effects. Chapter Five presents the research methodology adopted in this study, research design, methods and data analysis. Research methodology is developed in line with the principles of a critical realist ontological and epistemological position, which recognises the importance of semiosis and the need for complex and multilevel relational and
intersectional analysis. This methodological framework provides analytical clarity in exploring discursive and material, economic and cultural and structural and agentic processes and their intertwining across temporal and spatial and dimensions. Chapter Six provides critical exploration of UK state taxonomies in order to explore A8 workers’ position on the UK labour market. As such it critically evaluates the national frame of reference that constructs diverse A8 migrant workers as the same and produces their value. Chapter Seven exposes discursive commodification of A8 workers in web based marketing practices of transnational employment agencies. It uncovers how the value of A8 workers is constructed through various embodied markers and spatial and temporal dimensions informed by the hegemonic binary logic of the imperial post-socialist order. Moreover the chapter also demonstrates how discursive intersectional commodification informs Polish and Slovenian workers’ strategies to generate value for themselves and how it legitimises the division and the disciplining of diverse groups of workers on the UK labour market.

Chapter Eight explores the value extraction possibilities of diverse actors involved in changed and transnationalised labour relations between East and West. It demonstrates how transnational employment agencies play a crucial role in on-going colonial processes by acting as intermediaries amongst workers and employers within transnationalised labour market. The chapter reveals that employment agencies and employers that operate across transnational fields play an important role in on-going colonial processes and in supplying and extracting value from vulnerable migrant workers. Lastly, Chapter Nine discusses the findings and contributions of this research and provides its final conclusions. It revisits the research questions, presents theoretical and methodological contributions and the wider social and policy implications of this research, and finally points to its limitations and provides suggestions for future research.
2 The postcolonial re-invention of post-socialist CEE

2.1 Introduction
This chapter exposes on-going colonial processes that re-emerged during the transition and Europeanisation process in post-socialist CEE. Although Soviet influence within CEE is often viewed as a form of colonialism there is much less willingness to examine Western policies towards post-socialist states in terms of postcoloniality (Kuus 2004: 475). Postcolonialism can be useful for theorising postsocialism, because it encourages us to uncover the presence and persistence of a postcolonial binary logic within the East and the West and makes us think about the methodology and epistemology that keeps it alive (Stenning and Hörschelmann 2008). This is maintained by the soft power of Western ideologies and paradigms visible in political, economic and public discourses, knowledge production, policy making and practices on various local and global scales (Böröcz 2001; Inotai 2002; Kideckel 1996; Kürti 2008; Slovova 2006). The application of postcolonialism to the postsocialist context thus demands engagement with the historical, cultural, political and economic dichotomies of West and East, capitalism and socialism, rather than the colonies and the metropole (Owczarzak 2009).

The chapter begins by introducing the very roots of a mythical idea of the so-called ‘Eastern Europe’. This is followed by presenting the postcolonial re-invention of post-socialist CEE that re-emerged through the EU enlargement process and A8 transition to market economies. This process was characterised by neoliberal (self)colonisation that effectively re-evaluated citizenship in relation to the market and produced unequal economic geographies and second-class EU citizens in the political, economic and cultural sense. Finally, the chapter examines how this metagovernance has been take up on the UK level and how this has affected policies and popular discourses surrounding A8 immigration to the UK.
2.2 From Enlightenment to Enlargement

‘The inhabitants of the Ukraine, Russia, the plains of the Danube, in short, the Slav peoples, are a link between civilization and barbarism’ (Honore de Balzac, 1846 cf. Wolff 1994: 13)

The modern invention of ‘Eastern Europe’, which informs the contemporary imagination, was according to Wolff constructed in the age of Enlightenment ‘as an intellectual project of demi-Orientalization’ (1994: 7). For Said, ‘orientalism’ represents a set of mainly discursive practices that in short reflect the ‘Western style for dominating, restructuring and having authority over the Orient’ (1978/2003: 3). The East came to be identified as unmarked by enlightenment and has been painted as underdeveloped, poor, superstitious and irrational ever since (Todorova 1997). This perception was even further enhanced by the bloc divisions in the twentieth century, encompassing two spheres of interests that have been known ever since as ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ Europe. In this binary position, the countries and people of socialist CEE were, from the Western perspective, supposed and imagined to be the same, and this imaginary was used in order to justify Cold War ideology and to idealise capitalist societies (Forrester et al. 2004; Stenning and Hörschelmann 2008). This perception was quite different from the perspective of CEE countries themselves, which never ceased to feel distinct from one another (Marc 2009; Todorova 1997).

This is evident in the concept of ‘Central Europe’, which emerged as a Cold War appeal from Czech, Hungarian and Polish dissidents to the West. At that time, ‘Central Europe’ included an area that stretched from the Baltic to the Adriatic and was portrayed as distinct from ‘Eastern Europe’ exemplified by ‘less civilised’ Russia (Kuus 2004). Contemporary conceptions of ‘Central Europe’ however encompass a different locality that excludes the Balkans and is again grounded in orientalising practices that have been legitimised through the war
that began to rage with disintegration of the former Yugoslavia (Longinović 2002). Here, one can see the workings of differential exclusion and inclusion that does not only come from the West, but is redefined according to local historical and socio-economic imaginaries of what the East and the West consists of. Bakić-Hayden (1995) calls these gradations of the Orient ‘nesting orientalism’, in which everyone has their own East. The perception of the East and the West thus changes with the perspective of the speaker in a certain place and time. ‘Nesting orientalism’ took a specific form after the collapse of socialism, as social inequalities were restructured by the hegemonic liberal ideology (Buchowski 2006). What is important in Buchowski’s new forms is that these nesting orientalisms have escaped former confines of space and time and are not constructed any more solely upon geographic and ethnic maps, but also upon class distinctions and through the discourse of capitalism and socialism. These have created winners and losers of transition and deepened spatial segregation and class divide. Therefore, these examples show that ‘the East is never a fixed location but a characteristic (East Europeaness) attributed differently in different circumstances’ (Kuus 2004: 480). Taking into account these nesting orientalisms is important, because it can help uncover multiple power relations that are significant for contemporary labour migration, as will be explored in Chapter Three.

2.3 The EU enlargement eastwards

‘It is a moment of renewal and of healing, finally drawing to a close Europe’s barbaric 20th century - a century stained by the dark era of communism and fascism’.

Pat Cox, president of the European parliament 2004
(cf. Vousden 2004: 1)

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, ‘Western’ Europe was confronted with the challenge of defining itself and its new role and relations towards its East and
the rest of the world. Until then, ‘Western’ Europe has often simply been referred to and perceived as *the Europe*. The quote above indicates that this redefinition was constructed in opposition to communism, which was equated with fascism and thus represented as barbaric, obsolete and in need of transcending. EU expansion should thus be explored in terms of the interests and power relations that have formed in this process between East and West. In this regard, Böröcz argues that EU enlargement eastwards was characterised by institutional elements of colonial imperial mechanisms, combining four mechanisms of control: namely unequal exchange, coloniality, export of governmentality and geopolitics (2001: 18). In the following years, accession countries were evaluated through various means. With these practices, the EU invoked the old tradition of the colonial bureaucracy that occupied itself with classifications, ethnographies, censuses, monitoring and establishing routines and practices (Sher 2001).

In 1996, the EC published an official paper on *Reinforcing political union and preparing for enlargement*, where it identified its priorities for strengthening political union and for making preparations for the forthcoming enlargement. Here, the EC acknowledged that accession was no longer some far-off prospect, but did demonstrate concerns about it, due to its scope and diversity. The report explicitly points to difference: ‘*this enlargement will be different from previous ones: an extended Europe is bound to be more heterogeneous and therefore more complex*’ (EC 1996: 2). Furthermore, the report also expresses the fear that with the increase of member states there is a risk that the ‘*EU might be watered down*’ and due to that there is a need to ‘*safeguard the achievements of forty years of European integration*’ (Ibid. 1996: 2). In this situation, the EU had to rethink its institutional and voting system, as well as incorporate the ‘*system of flexibility, enabling the Union to move ahead without being held back by its slowest members*’ (Ibid. 1996: 12). According to research analysing EC opinions on applicant countries, ‘Eastern Europe’ was reinvented in the process of EU enlargement,
with the selective aggregation of facts and fiction drawing on the familiar ideological Cold War divide and on the selective assessment of applicants’ economic and political development with regard to an idealised EU state (Kovacs 2001; Kovacs and Kabachnik 2001; Sher 2001). In other words, CEE was assigned a homogeneous, ideological and obsolete socialist history that needs to be overcome by a modern capitalism. These discursive strategies effectively constructed difference and widened divisions, and most importantly gave legitimisation for framing the enlargement as the EU’s civilising mission towards its inferior East.

This othering had a very important temporal dimension, through which CEE became essentialised as being in the past. The rise of nationalism and later on ethnic wars in the Balkans served as a direct ‘proof’ for that. The temporal dimension was thus used for legitimising enlargement with arguments of security and played a crucial role in the exportation of governance, which was framed as necessary for maintaining peace and stability in Europe (Diez 2004; Sher 2001). In contemporary Europe, the element of time thus became one of the most important aspects in differentiating the East from the West. This also has important gender dimensions, where CEE women are on the one hand portrayed as traditional and unspoiled by Western consumerism and feminism and as waiting to be rescued from economic troubles and patriarchal societies by ‘Western’ men (Forrester et al. 2004). On the other hand CEE women’s sexuality and agency can be perceived as a threat to the national symbolic order (Cappusotti 2007; Samaluk 2009). In this regard, Miroiu even argues that “‘Eastern Europe’ has in itself been profoundly “feminised” in the sense of lacking the ability to make normative decisions’ (2004: 216). The resistance to market values imposed by international actors and the EU has for instance often been translated as the inability to make ‘sound’ decisions. In other words, the people of CEE were perceived as subjects who are still insufficiently morally responsible to be able to take decisions (Skeggs 2004b). This ‘inability’
effectively legitimises unequal power relations, which are structurally patriarchal, because CEE countries had to follow the rules that were set for them by the EU and other international actors (Miroiu 2004). The EU strategy towards CEE should thus be viewed as a mode of metagovernance that produces a specific social order and subjectivity legitimised through the order of discourse.

2.4 Neoliberal (self)colonisation

‘Enlargement offers a major political and economic opportunity to a Union which will have almost 30 members. Taking into account its overall economic impact, the first consequence will be the expansion of the single market from 370 million to about 455 million consumers’ (Europa 2004: 1).

Since European agreements with CEE and the Single Market White Paper, the main orientation of the EU policy was ‘to secure the liberalization and deregulation of CEE’s political economies’ (Bohle 2006: 69). These agreements concentrated solely on trade, rather than providing a systemic implementation of all four European freedoms that were so pompously promoted in the EU (Millard 1999). Although political reforms seemed at the end of 1980s the most important in shaping the future of Europe, it was actually the trade liberalisation measures that had the most immediate impact (Gower 1999). As the quote above indicates, the first incentive for EU enlargement was to expand the market and get new consumers. In other words, the main incentive behind EU enlargement was not to grant new political and social rights to new EU citizens, but to transform them into consumers. This transformation of citizenship in relation to the market forms an important part of neoliberalism and effectively turns citizens, political subjects with rights, into consumers.

1 In May 1995 the Commission of European Communities issued White Paper: Preparation of the Associated Countries of Central and Eastern Europe for Integration into the Internal Market of the Union (COM(95))

2 The Treaty of Rome of 1957 established the four basic European freedoms, which are, with the aim of creating a common market, supposed to enable the free movement of goods, services, capital and people within the EU’s internal borders.
(McDowell 2004), purchasers of products, commodified services and subjects and politics with the best pitch.

With this policy alignment, the privatisation of CEE states was coupled with tax preferences for foreign investments that enabled economic colonisation by EU based corporations that are today the biggest investors in CEE (Böröcz 2001). The importance of foreign investors did not manifest itself only in their control over and ownership of economic assets, but also in their political influence on (meta)governance (Bohle 2006: 77). At the same time as CEE countries opened up to foreign investors, they faced restrictions on trade of agricultural and so-called sensitive goods that had represented a comparative advantage of CEE countries and could actually boost their economy (Bohle 2006; Gower 1999). These policies were teleological and reductionist and have, under the guise of modernisation, placed an emphasis on changes that need to be implemented by CEE countries in order to reach the ‘standards’ of advanced economies (Stenning et al. 2010: 5). Apart from the EU itself, a great role in this transformation was also played by international monetary institutions, such as the WB and IMF, building their policy advice on the old ‘Washington consensus’, in which neoliberalism was praised as the answer to global problems (Greskovits 1998; Harvey 2005; Stenning et al. 2010; Vaughan-Whitehead 2003). Rather than a European social model, it was neoliberal politics that penetrated deeply into the future vision of Europe.

Neoliberalism started with economic restructuring in the 1970s, and can be defined as a globalised political, economic and cultural hegemony that is characterised by globalised markets, transnationalised production and services, deregulation, flexibilisation, sourcing and subcontracting of labour (Bohle 2006; Harvey 2005; McDowell 2004; Mohanty 2003; Ong 2006; Skeggs 2004b; Wills 2008). It is based on the principle of a free market, which amongst other things devolves the state’s responsibility for welfare. Neoliberal hegemony is often
presented by political and economic elites in opposition to fascism, communism, socialism and even the Keynesian welfare state, and as such recast as non-ideological, non-political, and universally inevitable and beneficial. In this regard Duggan argues that neoliberalism ‘reinvented practices of economic, political, and cultural imperialism for a supposedly postimperial world’ (2003: xiii). The most effective deception of neoliberalism is that the economic realm is presented as separate from the political and cultural realm. This resulted in the separation of cultural, identity and diversity politics from political economy, as can be seen in the policy discourse of social inclusion, multiculturalism and diversity management (Ahmed 2012; Haylett 2003; Lentin and Titley 2011). Bourdieu and Wacquant identify this dominant narrative as the ‘new planetary vulgate’, the result of a new type of imperialism, a cultural imperialism that has dismissed class inequality as obsolete and non-pertinent (Bourdieu and Wacquant 2001: 2). While class has been effectively dismissed, cultural, diversity and identity politics have been delivered to the market. As Duggan argues, ‘neoliberalism was constructed in and through cultural and identity politics and cannot be undone by a movement without the constituencies and analyses that respond directly to that fact’ (2003: 3).

Neoliberalism found great support in the UK government, firstly under Margaret Thatcher’s administration and later on under Tony Blair’s ‘Third Way’, which was widely promoted to other EU countries, this time in the name of social-democracy (Vaughan-Whitehead 2003: 26). In 1999, Tony Blair and the chancellor of the Republic of Germany, Gerhard Schroeder, prepared and published the manifesto Europe: The Third Way/Die Neue Mitte in which they called for greater flexibility, cutting of public expenditure and reform of the public sector in order to achieve efficiency, competition and high performance. Later on, Blair signed similar documents with leaders of some other member

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states (Vaughan-Whitehead 2003). This neoliberal perspective was greatly encouraged by the business community. On the UK level, the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) has for instance in its manifesto advised UK MEPs that ‘business supports sensible measures to promote environmental and social protection but not at the expense of competitiveness and jobs’ and that they should be building alliances with those that ‘share our view’ (CBI 2003: 3). Similar views were present in industry on the EU level. Both the CBI and UNICE supported neoliberal policies and were against ‘ill conceived social measures’, such as the Temporary agency work directive that ‘would undermine labour market flexibility’ (CBI 2003: 4; UNICE 2002: 5). There were therefore tendencies in the EU to undermine social concerns in the name of better economic performance, which pushed some CEE countries towards ‘shock therapy’, thus imposing rapid privatisation and cuts in welfare spending (Vaughan-Whitehead 2003).

Instead of advocating for the European social model, with regard to the accession and transition of A8 countries, the EU and other international actors were advocating rapid changes with a primary economic imperative. This was legitimised through the hegemonic binary logic of the imperial post-socialist order. Since post-socialism operates within the binary logic of either socialism or capitalism, it masks itself as (post) ideological, while in fact it imposes capitalist ideology, which is represented as the only remaining solution (Kuzmanić 2008). This not only masks the presence and persistence of a postcolonial binary logic of East and West but acts as a legitimisation for neoliberal politics and policies that are presented as the only alternative to all failed models, such as socialism, communism or even the Keynesian welfare state (Duggan 2003; Stenning and Hörschelmann 2008). This seemingly post ideological and a-historical neoliberal project thus resulted in cuts in social protection, which used to be one of the basic pillars of socialist systems and was therefore in some CEE countries above the standards of the EU15 (Ferge 2000; Vaughan-Whitehead 2003). Since there was no consensus about the European social model amongst member states at
that time, neoliberal theories penetrated deeply into the future vision of Europe (Vaughan-Whitehead 2003). In other words this cultural politics served as legitimisation for the global expansion of neoliberalism to societies characterised by different economic models. The imperial logic of contemporary capitalism does not challenge nation states’ sovereignty, but is amongst other things expanding through foreign direct investment (Sassen 2010). Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, post-socialist CEE countries became one of the biggest laboratories for the expansion of neoliberal hegemony.

In a 1998 report, the EC urged CEE countries to ‘speed up structural reform and strengthen economic policy’ (EC 1998). Slovenia and Czech Republic, which were amongst the most successful A8 countries, were also criticised for ‘not showing a sustained political commitment to market reforms’ (Ibid. 1998). Similarly, the main statistical indicators presented in strategy papers and reports monitoring accession show concern only for economic performance (GDP, the inflation rate, unemployment rate, general government spending, external trade and foreign direct investment) rather than for economic well-being (EC 2001; Stiglitz et al. 2009). This selective assessment of applicants’ economic well-being upon an idealised European state enabled the construction of CEE countries as lacking in economic potential (2001: 253).

EU policy thus imposed a Western gaze on the enlargement process, which failed to comprehend cultural, political, social and economic differences and consequently resulted in the imposition of ‘universalistic’ policy models. This ethnocentric universalism has been heavily criticised by CEE feminists, while it often resulted in taking away already achieved rights (Miroiu 2004; Owczarzak 2009; Slovova 2006). In disregarding historical and socio-political differences, the Western gaze and policy orientation were ineffective, and produced not only the rise of masculinism, but a rise in unemployment for both women and men, and the rise of class inequality (Miroiu 2004; Watson 2000). This has
dramatically transformed everyday life in CEE in the spheres of work, housing and social care (Stenning et al. 2010).

Although the enlargement process perceived all CEE countries as one entity, accession was on the other hand viewed differently in different CEE countries. Or, in other words, different CEE countries had different interests in joining the EU (Brinar 1999; Grabbe and Hughes 1999; Henderson 1999; Herd 1999; Mencinger 2004; Millard 1999). These different interests stem from their diverse historical, political and socio-economic realities, and resulted in different degrees of imposition of neoliberal models in different CEE counties (Vaughan-Whitehead 2003). The following chapter explores how these different models of economic transformation have affected workers’ self-value and emigration in Poland – having gone through ‘shock therapy’ – and in Slovenia, which took a gradualist approach. Even though accession countries were very diverse, adopted different transitional models and had different views and interests in joining the EU, they were all more or less passive partners in the enlargement process or the process of ‘Europeanisation’ (Glenn 2004). As applicants, they simply had to accept demands imposed on them by the EU. According to Schimmelfennig, ‘Europeanization was seen as a kind of graduation from Eastern Europe to Europe, a process in which accession countries must prove that they are willing and able to internalize Western norms’ (cf. Kuus 2004: 477).

The Enlargement process was, all-in-all, very bureaucratic, technocratic and basically demanded the adoption of Community legal acquis. This made accession an ‘“elite project” with very limited access for non-state actors’, which produced new discourses, the so-called ‘cognitive Europeanisation’ that has completely altered the way in which policies are handled, discussed, thought of and made (Lendvai 2004: 329). In this regard, in all accession countries leading political parties showed little if any Euroscepticism and in most they very open or even enthusiastic about the implementation of neoliberal models (Beichelt
2004; Stenning et al. 2010). Political elites in A8 countries were thus themselves participating in the re-production of a mythical image of ‘Eastern Europe’. Research shows that not just dominant discourse in existing member states, but also in candidate countries, was part of that process, using the narratives of a ‘return to Europe’ and painting the EU as the panacea. According to Močnik (2002), one of the mechanisms by which relations of economic oppression and exploitation were introduced by political means was the self-image of ‘young democracies’ that had to implement ‘democratic’ standards.

In this sense, Kiossev talks about ‘self-colonising cultures’, referring to the colonisation of consciousness in which these cultures traumatize themselves by adopting their own inferiority (2010: 2). In this regard, Schimmelfennig and Waever argue that the ‘EU is conceived as a disciplining power, operative in the minds of ‘East Europeans’ even if they are not conscious of it’ (cf. Kuus 2004: 477). Europeanisation thus functions as a hegemony that is attained by the majority’s consent to the system that demands their subordination (Gramsci 1971). Or, to be more precise, the major transformations in modes of production, social and political-ideological relations shifted hegemony in the EU towards a specific neoliberal form (Bohle 2006: 64).

This resulted in neo-liberalisation, a historically and geographically differentiated process, which is constructed at the global and local scales, not only by political and economic elites, but also by ‘ordinary’ people in their daily lives (Stenning et al. 2010: 37). Neoliberalism is thus also a process that has diverse effects in different places. Neo-liberalisation was made possible through cultural politics placing responsibilities for exchange on individuals that now have the moral duty to pursue their self interest and compete on the market (Skeggs 2004b: 31). Consequently, social responsibility, solidarity and care are turned into the responsibility of an individual, which effectively increases individualisation, commodification, isolation and the separation of diverse
groups. This cultural project thus effectively enabled the second redefinition of the citizenship in relation to the market, which tied the social status of the virtuous ‘citizen’ to that of the ‘worker’ (Haylett 2001: 364).

In this logic, work has been culturally and morally re-valued in relation to welfare, and therefore participation on the labour market becomes a civic virtue in the modern nation. As Skeggs argues with Perkin (1989) this concept of citizenship ‘located culture as the sole marker of class difference’ which has effectively ‘dislocated class from the economic and firmly located it with moral’ (Skeggs 2004b: 41). Since neoliberal cultural politics ties the definition of citizenship to that of the worker, it constructs morally deserving and non-deserving citizens and legitimises the utilisation of non-citizens through their production function as commodified ‘assets’ within transnationalised labour market. In other words neoliberalism invented ‘the “new equality” politics compatible with a corporate world’ (Duggan 2003: 42).

This new equality politics is a mixture of liberal economics and the morals of social democracy, where seemingly equal political, civil and legal rights can sit alongside economic inequalities (Haylett 2003). This new equality politics also gave birth to diversity management, which enabled instrumental use of the increasingly diverse populations resulting from the global expansion of neoliberal imperial project (Lorbiecki and Jack (2002) The managerial deployment of diversity thus became part of the neoliberal governmentality that characterised both conservative and liberal politics. As Ahmed argues, ‘diversity could be understood as one of the techniques by which liberal multiculturalism manages differences’ (2012: 53).

In this regard, Lentin and Titley point to the detrimental effects of the politics of diversity that represent ‘the institutional and broadly managerial deployment of diversity as a dimension of integration of governance – that contaminates the
space of diversity politics’ (Lentin and Titley 2011: 183). This governance has effectively resonated in policies, organisational practices and employment relations that turned from equal opportunities towards managing diversity. Since managing diversity has been propagated as more positive an approach, it has been perceived as delivering benefits to organisations and the economy. Through this economic turn, diversity management transformed into ‘business case’ for workforce diversity (Kandola and Fullerton 1994). As such it became an important part of human resource management, where diverse workers become ‘assets’ that can be managed and programmed in order to achieve business goals (Lorbiecki and Jack 2002).

The ‘business case’ for diversity is subject to many critiques that broadly point to three main pitfalls. Firstly, it disregards structural, historical and institutional inequalities. Here lies a real danger that the complexity and persistence of inequalities become misrecognised as something that the society has already overcome. Secondly it focuses on individual differences that are underpinned by essentalised, yet politically and economically non-recognised, group differences. In effect this can reinforce stereotypes about specific groups and widen inequality. And thirdly it replaces human rights and social justice arguments with an economic one, and thus strips them from their moral underpinning, which means that inequalities are only worth addressing as long as they have an economic imperative (Ahmed 2012; Bradley and Healy 2008; Kirton and Greene 2011; Lentin and Titley 2011; Lorbiecki and Jack 2002; MacKenzie and Forde 2009; Noon 2007; Wrench 2005).

As Mackenzie and Ford (2009) argue, ‘business case’ debates within HRM can rationalise the employment of minority groups for specific jobs that are assigned to them following stereotypical assumptions. The ‘business case’ for diversity is thus built upon cultural, diversity and identity politics that attribute values, fix certain identities to particular places and require specific persons to
act according to these attributions in order to use them as resources (Skeggs 2004b). In other words, the subjectivity of workers becomes central to economic exchange. This dominant cultural and economic order resulted in increasing marketization of public policies and practise and thus characterises (meta) governance and affects A8 workers position on the EU and UK labour markets. This is explored further below.

2.5 The production of second-class EU citizens
The focus of the EU on economic gains without thinking of the social implications resulted in a lack of strategy, a failure to respond in the social arena and even in the implicit approval of certain ambiguous social protection reforms that have produced or allowed the creation of second-class EU citizens (Ferge 2000). As a result, this practice produced fears of social-dumping, which can take many different forms. According to Albert and Standing, social-dumping ‘implies situations in which standards in one country are lowered relative to what they would have been because of external pressure from all or part of the global economic system’ (2005: 99). This could take various forms, such as for instance the relocation of production to low cost countries, or employers sourcing migrant labour, etc. Social-dumping practices across transnational fields are clearly connected with the increased mobility of capital, goods, services and labour existing within the EU and beyond. These mobilities make it possible to exploit differences amongst nation states or regions in terms of capital and labour costs and thus point to unequal power relations on a a broader scale that affect emigration.

As a result, social-dumping clearly encompasses also the role of the state or supra-state in encouraging or discouraging such practices (Vaughan-Whitehead 2003). By imposing neoliberal policies on CEE, the EU and other international actors were actively participating in creating the conditions for social-dumping
practices. As the actual date for the EU enlargement approached, the fears of social-dumping affected its policy with regard to the free movement of labour. The closure of borders towards the outside was accompanied by fears of free movement in the inside, which were very obviously expressed in one of the progress reports:

'Concerns in the Member States focus on fears about possible negative impact of enlargement - uncontrollable immigration, unfair competition, particularly for jobs, imported crime, environmental dumping and financial burdens. Another identifiable concern is that the EU might be incapable after an enlargement on such a scale of properly achieving its objectives. In particular, the people in the regions bordering the candidate countries need to be reassured of the positive effects of enlargement' (EC 2000: 6).

In this report, the EC also drew a ‘road map’ for further negotiations in which one of the recognised priorities for 2001 was the consideration of transitional measures for the movement of persons: ‘“road map” will allow to address requests for transitional measures which are acceptable or negotiable and may include transition measures in the interests of the Union’ (EC 2000: 31). The EU’s late adoption of the road map resulted in it being poorly prepared for the biggest enlargement in its history, including a lack of financial foundations for its success (Inotai 2002). Realising this, the EC also emphasised the possibility of public pressure and problems that might arise from enlargement, and therefore advised the implementation of a communication strategy guided by principles of decentralisation, flexibility and synergy (EC 2000). In a 2001 report it is stated that ‘the Union has shown the necessary flexibility in taking positions that are important in terms of public acceptability, both in the Union and in the candidate countries’ (EC 2001: 20).

According to Vaughan-Whitehead, ‘migration risks have turned out to be one of the most popular arguments against EU enlargement in public debates’ in member states, regardless of the fact that neither surveys from the EC or any other studies at that time had predicted massive migration flows (2003: 411/18).
Barysch (2006) for instance reports that in a survey by Der Spiegel in 2004, 73 per cent of Germans expressed the belief that enlargement would threaten their jobs. This argument took on special force immediately after enlargement in the case of the services directive,\(^4\) where instead of 'social-dumping at a distance', discourse turned to what could be called 'face-to-face social-dumping' (Nicolaïdis and Schmidt 2007: 726). The principle that was encouraged and used by EU member states throughout the enlargement process has now boomeranged in the form of labour migration. Although A8 nationals faced several restrictions on working in various EU 15 countries, they could still pursue activities as self-employed persons in any member state. Freedom of Establishment is one of the fundamental provisions of the EU, and basically gives nationals of one member state the right to take up and pursue activities as self-employed persons in the territory of another member state.

In this climate, workers from existing member states showed little solidarity with their fellow European citizens, but rather perceived them as strangers, objectified as a group through a metaphor of the ‘Polish Plumber’ (Campani 2008; Nicolaïdis and Schmidt 2007). Moreover, trade unions at the national and EU level often favoured protectionist rules in the host country that impeded the free movement of persons from CEE (Bohle 2006; Nicolaïdis and Schmidt 2007). This was especially the case in those countries that were geographically closer to new member states. According to Nicolaïdis and Schmidt (2007) this lack of solidarity was not defended as protectionist, but as a helpful gesture of solidarity that would guarantee better conditions for A8 workers. This lack of transnational labour solidarity is, according to Bohle, the product of ‘embedded neoliberalism’ in Western Europe that views enlargement as weakening of trade unions’ bargaining power (2006: 74).

\(^4\) The Directive on services in the internal market (commonly referred to as the Bolkestein Directive). Drafted under the leadership of the former European Commissioner for the Internal Market Frits Bolkestein, it has been popularly referred to by his name.
Pre-accession debates, fears and racialisation of CEE countries and their nationals therefore resulted in the Nice Treaty, which allowed old member states to postpone the opening of their labour markets to A8 workers for a maximum period of seven years. Transitional measures had allowed old member states to adapt their policies according to their needs, which finally resulted in four different regimes being put in place in the EU 15 Member States. Candidate countries protested against these measurers and ‘complained of being treated as “second class EU citizens”’ (Vaughan-Whitehead 2003: 437). Unequal power relations amongst states and fears of social-dumping in terms of the movement of labour finally resulted in transitional measures that restricted the free movement of A8 labour and effectively produced not just legally defined second-class EU citizenship, but also a subordinate cultural one (Ong 1996; Tutti 2010). How this informed UK policies towards A8 workers and their utilisation on the UK labour market is explored further below.

2.6 The objectification of colonial subjects in the UK
The UK, which had less trade and investment with A8 countries as well as fewer security concerns, decided to open its borders to workers from A8 countries in order to gain more economic benefits from enlargement and address labour shortages (Lippert et al. 2001). This decision was, furthermore, supported by employers’ organisations and trade unions (Heyes 2009). The UK Government emphasised the economic benefits of free movement, based on arguments that workers from new member states would help to fill job vacancies, work legally and therefore contribute taxes (HO 2004a, 2004b). In 2003 the Home Office issued a report which estimated very low numbers of A8 migrants (Dustmann et al. 2003). These not very solid estimations received a lot of public attention and were used by the press and the opposition to ‘warn’ about floods of ‘Eastern Europeans’ coming into the UK in order to abuse the welfare system (DM 2004a; Green 2004). In this regard Fox et al. (2012), who
analysed media discourse, points towards cultural racism in the coverage of CEE migration.

In these media portrayals, one could read how the Conservative home affairs spokesman at that time, Humfrey Malins, accused the Government of being unprepared for the influx of unskilled workers seeking benefits in the UK, saying ‘immigrants, including Roma gypsies, could become a “burden” on the benefits system’ (DM 2004a: 1). Furthermore, there were fears that now that A8 nationals could enter with only their identity cards, refugees from other countries would use fake documents from these countries in order to enter the UK (Kelly 2004). In these media portrayals, most of the time all A8 countries were regarded as the same, as former Soviet bloc countries and simply reduced to a mythical ‘Eastern European’ imaginary, portrayed as having a ‘catastrophic economic situation’ with high unemployment and only basic social security and medical provisions (Laughland 2004: 59; Eastham an Hickley 2004a). Moreover, A8 nationals were objectified as a group, referred to as ‘Eastern bloc migrants’ that were running away from the ‘bleak concrete slums of Iron Curtain Europe’ and coming to the UK for one and only reason, to better themselves either by offering cheap labour or as ‘welfare tourists’, ‘welfare spongers’ or ‘benefit scroungers’ (Devine 2004; Eastham and Hickley 2004a: 6; Nicoli 2006).

As in the EU level, one could also here find fears of face-to-face social-dumping, again attributed to migration. The social-dumping debate was very much present in the populist press, as can be seen from the following excerpt from Mail on Sunday: ‘immigration tends to shore up a ”sweatshop” economy, rather than making British manufacturing more sophisticated. This is because immigration allows employers to increase profits by driving down wages, instead of increasing productivity by investing in high-tech manufacturing’ (Laughland 2004: 59). Media discourse on social-dumping was very much in line with embedded neoliberalism, which rather than challenging neoliberal policies, blamed migrant labour for the
deterioration of working standards and rights (Kavanagh 2004; Laughland 2004: 59). In terms of skilled labour, there were public concerns regarding professional standards and qualifications obtained in A8 countries and fears that ‘Britain could be inundated with unqualified doctors and nurses from Eastern Europe’ that could put patients’ lives at risk (Nixson 2004; Sun 2004: 1; Yapp 2004).

This was accompanied by popular fears of epidemics of highly contagious diseases coming from the East, especially when ‘East European vice girls’ and ‘criminal gangs controlling them will target Western European clients’, as well as fears of ‘health tourism’ (DM 2004b; Eastham and Hickley 2004a: 59; Hartley et al. 2004: 1; Marsh 2003). Here, one can see the genre chain that follows from the EU level, in which the element of time is translated for this specific field through the discourse of a backward patriarchal ‘Eastern Europe’ where women are exploited by barbarian men. In the popular press here analysed, very few voices challenged these myths, and were to be found only in The Mirror (Prince 2004; Sayid 2004; Williams 2004). Mythical portrayals of CEE countries resulted in the falling in support for EU enlargement by UK voters. Under the pressure of the Conservative party, the British tabloid press and consequently the public the British Labour Government stepped away from its original plan and adopted a policy that prevented A8 nationals accessing unemployment benefits unless they had been working continuously in the UK for more than one year (Doyle et al. 2006). This was announced by the Home Secretary David Blunkett just two months before accession with the following words:

‘The measures we are announcing today send a very clear message – if you register you can come to the UK to work legally and contribute but you cannot claim benefits. The UK has always welcomed hard working immigrants seeking to better themselves and contribute to our prosperity. Tougher benefit rules will make sure our generosity is not exploited. The obligation we have placed on working accession nationals to register with us is part of our wider crack down on illegal working... If
the registration scheme shows an imbalance in the labour market we will re-impose restrictions’ (HO 2004c: 1).

In addition to preventing A8 nationals from ‘exploiting’ the UK welfare system, WRS also allowed the state to monitor where citizens of those countries came into the UK labour market, the type of work they did and the impact this had on the UK economy (HO 2010a). Furthermore, the 12 month uninterrupted working period after which A8 workers could gain the same status as other EU and EEA nationals is, according to UK Border Agency, sometimes called the qualifying period. If A8 workers fail to register, there are no penalties, however they ‘would not be recognised as “a qualified person” for the purposes of EEA Regulations 2006’ (HO 2010b: 1). The above discourse points to the relationship between meta-governance and governance in which colonial subjects are regarded as needing a qualifying period in order to be able to obtain a registration certificate that confirms their graduation into EU citizenship with full treaty rights. Other than the above reasons, registration had no other benefits. On the contrary, the British Chamber of Commerce said ‘it will cause serious worries particularly to builders and manufacturers who use casual staff that a worker with a foreign accent could get them into trouble’ (Eastham and Hickley 2004b: 6). And the Association of Labour Providers called for WRS’s abolition and even advised its members not to comply with it (ALP 2006). Heyes (2009) reports that employers and trade unions have questioned the purpose, value and consequences of WRS. He also shows how the government was criticised by the CBI for not providing sufficient advice to employers in this regard.

The monitoring procedures that were already part of metagovernance on the EU level have thus been effectively translated for the needs of specific member states. In this regard Anderson (2010) argues that migration controls produce status by the creation of categories of entrants, influence on employment relations and the institutionalisation of uncertainty. Group making through
monitoring, censuses and policies has always been an important part of colonial administration. One of its key principles has been the division of work and the classification of different groups of people as being suitable for different types of work (Leonard 2010). In this regard, Ciupijus argues that for UK policy makers CEE migration was not about exercising EU citizenship rights of free movement but ‘about filling the low-pay, low-status niche in the UK labour market’ (2011: 454). Monitoring was introduced as a protectionist policy that would allow the UK government to re-impose restrictions, if the labour market was destabilised.

Since policy makers saw A8 labour as sufficient to satisfy the demand for workers in low skilled jobs in sectors experiencing shortages of labour, they started restricting access to the UK for lower skilled non-EU/EAA workers (Anderson et al. 2006; McDowell 2009a; Wills et al. 2010). This policy alignment was first achieved by the new UK managed migration scheme (Anderson et al. 2006). In 2012 the Government made further changes to the scheme, making it increasingly difficult for non-EU/EEA nationals to enter and work in the UK. There was also an extension of employment restrictions for A2 nationals until the end of 2013, and further for Croatian nationals with Croatian’s entry into the EU in July 2013. Together with a community cohesion race relations policy, the managed migration scheme has also had important racial, religious and class dimensions (Anderson 2010; Cheong et al. 2007; McDowell 2009a).

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7 Working in the UK if you are a Croatian national. UKBA website: http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/applicationforms/croatia/work-uk (20.7.2013)
Although WRS was in place to monitor A8 workers, it has not applied to self-employed A8 nationals who could pursue their activities in any member state without the need to register. This has prompted public concerns expressed in the populist press regarding insufficient migration controls allowing in self-employed businessmen with ‘no evidence of their ability, experience, training or qualifications’ (Darvill 2004). Since the government could not impose any restrictions in this regard, it provided the following guidance for its caseworkers: ‘This guidance is intended to assist caseworkers in distinguishing between applicants genuinely self-employed, and those where the applicant is in disguised employment and who is therefore required to register under the Workers Registration Scheme’ (UKBA 2010: 15). This guideline suggests how A8 workers are – apart from being regarded as lesser Europeans – also regarded as exploiting the system, and as such virtually criminalised. Within the cultural and moral re-evaluation of citizenship discussed earlier A8 workers are on the one hand presented as immoral and as a threat to the UK welfare state, and on the other as colonial subjects that are strategically utilised and welcomed only if they are morally responsible and willing to perform the work ethic.

Since May 2011 transitional measures for A8 workers ended in all EU 15 states. This means that A8 nationals can now freely move across EU and exercise their full rights as EU citizens. Research suggests that EU citizenship enables some groups of A8 workers to adopt a strategy of ‘intentional unpredictability’ in which they adopt a ‘wait and see’ approach until the best option appears (Grabowska-Lusinska 2008; UniS 2006). Although some A8 workers can afford to exercise their right of free movement, one must not forget that not all A8

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8 Following the EU enlargement in 2004, most EU 15 Member States applied transitional measures for A8 labour, with the exception of the UK, Ireland and Sweden, which did allow free movement of labour (Vaughan-Whitehead 2003). At the end of the first transitional period in January 2006, a number of other member states also lifted restrictions, including Spain, Portugal, Greece and Finland (Pollard et al. 2008). Only Germany and Austria kept labour market restrictions up to 2011, and the UK was the only country to maintain transitional measures in the form of a monitoring scheme (MAC 2009).
workers have this privilege. Although they can no longer be controlled by the state, their choices are still shaped by market forces that take advantage of inequalities amongst states and help, maintain or even deepen precarious employment (Ciupijus 2011). It is thus important to take into account the wider socio-economic context and global economic processes, which can illuminate inequalities on a broader scale that fuel migration and uncover the active role played by labour market actors and the state in the strategic use and sourcing of vulnerable migrant workers (MacKenzie and Forde 2009; Wills et al. 2010). In this regard Anderson notes that ‘immigration controls are increasingly presented as a means of prioritising the national labour force in employment at the same time as protecting migrants from exploitation’, while in fact they are doing neither and only help produce ‘precarious workers’ (2010: 301). As such the narratives behind migration policies and politics also risk dividing local and migrant populations, when in reality they are facing similar structural problems (Wills et al. 2010).

As has neoliberalism been exported to post-socialist CEE it has equally affected the local population in the UK, especially those at the lowest end of economy. Due to decades of neo-liberalisation in the UK the low paid jobs have been so devalued that local workers have been better off living on state support rather than taking up low-paid work (Wills et al. 2010). There is thus an increasing divide in income and wealth distribution in the UK, and London in particular, as well as an emerging polarisation of job quality and employment conditions, which makes it one of the most unequal societies in Europe (McDowell 2009b; Wills et al. 2010). Unemployment is particularly high in most deprived areas of London, where also new arrivals are most likely to settle (Wills et al. 2010). It also disproportionally affects young workers, who are further precaritised by increasing rise of unpaid internships and ‘workfare’ programmes (Beetham and Arrigoitía 2012; Lawton and Potter 2010; Pedersen and Samaluk 2012a; TUC 2012, McDowell 2009b).
Recently, workfare programmes were legally challenged because they are perceived by many as a modern-day slavery that enables exploitation and free labour rather than providing a path into paid work. These policies are nevertheless legitimised through culturalist discourse of welfare dependency that recasts British working class as in need of disciplining (Haylett 2001: 363). This cultural politics translates the problems of unemployed not in material but in cultural terms, and as such blames the poor for their own condition. Moreover it results in increasing use of migrant workers for low paid jobs and prioritising migrant over local workers by employers in the UK (Wills et al. 2010). As such this cultural politics creates divisions, disciplines the global poor and disables collective resistance against distributive injustice on local and global scales.

Since neoliberal cultural politics ties the definition of citizenship to that of the worker, it constructs morally deserving and non-deserving citizens and legitimises the utilisation of non-citizens through their production function as commodified ‘assets’ that are strategically utilised for undesirable jobs. In this sense migrant workers serve as a reserve army of labour to employers, which also enables them to drive down wages and decrease labour standards and rights (Wills et al. 2010). Moreover diverse groups of migrants and ethnic minorities are within the racialised class logic of the UK’s and London’s labor markets positioned very differently within the hierarchy of acceptability (Dyer et al. 2008; Healy and Oikelome 2011; Healy et al. 2011; McDowell et al. 2007; McDowell 2009b; Perrons et al. 2010; Wills et al. 2010). Despite the fact that labour migration is a product of the freeing of the global markets and consequent global inequalities, migrant workers are perceived by the local poor as competitors for scarce resources and those who steal jobs and drive down

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labour standards and wages\textsuperscript{10}. Although immigrants have long been viewed as
a threat for jobs and resources by those at the lower ends of economy, with the
current recession this moved into the mainstream politics and is being
legitimised by the ‘Big Society’ and anti-immigration rhetoric of the current
Coalition government. This shift comes from the fact that due to recession
employers are now able to recruit the local workforce for undesirable jobs
previously reserved for migrant workers, which is especially the case in urban
areas and in front-line hospitality jobs (McCollum and Findlay 2011).

Since the economic imperative for employing migrant labour has diminished
with the current recession and since workers from new EU member states can
not easily be prevented from working and living in the UK, they are
increasingly scapegoated by the political and media fields for the diminishing
welfare state (Samaluk 2013). On the other hand, non EU/EEA migrant groups
are being policed and targeted for deportation, which is visible in a recent racist
Home Office ‘Go home’ campaign and in racial profiling that is increasingly
present on the streets of London.\textsuperscript{11} These culturalist discourses and practices act
as a smoke screen that in the name of ending the ‘something for nothing
culture’\textsuperscript{12} justifies distributive injustice and creates divisions amongst the global
poor that share a common space within increasingly diverse metropolitan
centres. This is, according to Fraser (2009), a form of representational injustice
or misrepresentation, as it frames politics within a supposedly sovereign nation
state that is in fact part of a broader scale that constitutes a meta-political frame.

\textsuperscript{10} CEE migrants became the targets of protesters in 2009, with a demonstration calling for jobs to
be given to British people, Guardian website: \url{http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/jan/30/wales}
(accessed 8 April 2009).
\textsuperscript{11} Profile of an immigration campaign creating a climate of fear, Guardian website:
\url{http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/aug/06/profile-immigration-campaign-climate-fear}
\textsuperscript{12} David Cameron’s immigration crackdown unravels, The Telegraph website:
\url{http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/immigration/9952452/David-Camersons-immigration-crackdown-unravels.html}
(accessed: 25.3.2013)
2.7 Conclusions

This chapter has discussed the structural order of discourse that forms the relationship amongst transnational fields and objectifies A8 countries and their nationals. It has demonstrated that through EU enlargement and the transition to market economies, CEE countries and their nationals have been subjected to neoliberal (self)colonisation that has produced a subordinate political, economic and cultural entity and redefined and objectified second class EU citizenship. EU enlargement towards A8 countries and their transition to market economies had clear economic imperative that did not put much emphasis on the socio-economic well being of the populations concerned.

This was legitimised through the order of discourse constructed upon the hegemonic binary logic of the imperial post-socialist order, which positions CEE countries and their nationals as embodying a barbaric and obsolete socialist history that needs to be overcome by a seemingly modern, non-ideological and a-historical neoliberal project. The economic imperative underpinning the EU enlargement and A8 transition enabled neoliberal (self)colonisation and the re-evaluation of citizenship in relation to the market in two ways. New EU citizens were first transformed from political subjects with rights into consumers, and secondly they were re-evaluated through the citizen-worker logic that is constructed in relation to the welfare state and has a specific morality attached to it. Moreover they were denied all social and political rights and thus constructed as second-class EU citizens.

These policies legitimised through the hegemonic binary logic of the imperial post-socialist order have effectively been taken up in the UK, where colonial subjects have been objectified as suitable for specific types of jobs and welcomed only if they are morally responsible, willing to perform a particular work ethic, and not a burden to the welfare state. For that, they also needed to
be carefully monitored and controlled. The monitoring procedures that were already part of meta governance on the EU level have thus been effectively translated for the needs of a specific member state. On both the EU and UK level, the utilisation of new colonies has a clear economic imperative where colonial subjects are perceived as a suitable commodity that can be utilised to fill labour shortages at the lower ends of economy.

The utilisation of new colonial subjects thus needs to be contextualised also within decades of neo-liberalisation in the UK that resulted in increasing social stratification and deterioration of labour standards and rights. This is especially evident in London and particularly affects young people from working class backgrounds, who have been within this imperial logic recast as backward citizens in need of disciplining. Increasingly precarious local workers thus perceive new arrivals as competitors for scarce resources. Therefore this cultural politics creates divisions, disciplines the global poor and disables collective resistance against distributive injustice on local and global scales. How these discourses and on-going colonial practices affect Polish and Slovenian workers’ self value and emigration will be explored in the following chapter.
3 Neoliberalism, workers’ value and emigration in Poland and Slovenia

3.1 Introduction

This chapter explores how the neoliberal (self)colonisation explored in Chapter Two affects workers’ (self)value and emigration in Slovenia and Poland. In other words, it uncovers how the changed conditions that were characterised by transition and EU accession have manifested themselves on the micro-level and how they have affected labour emigration from Poland and Slovenia. Any analysis of immigration should first start with emigration, if we are to go beyond partial and ethnocentric interpretations of migrants’ habitus and their experiences. By incorporating spatial and temporal dimensions, we can understand not only personal but also structural reasons behind emigration, value attribution and consequently choices and experiences of diverse A8 workers.

This chapter commences by exploring the diverse historical and socio-economic contexts in Poland and Slovenia, which mainly arise from diverse approaches to transition to market economies. These diverse approaches have produced quite different political and socio-economic conditions, which had different impacts on Polish and Slovenian workers’ (self)value and emigration. The chapter demonstrates that neoliberal conservative policies in Poland deepened inequalities amongst states and enabled social-dumping that resulted in high unemployment, the lowering of social protection and increased social stratification, which consequently impacted the largest emigration in Polish history. Slovenia on the other hand took a gradualist approach that offered relative social security and consequently also quite modest emigration. Nevertheless, Slovenia, too, is being increasingly subsumed into neoliberal hegemony, which is visible in the current recession and increasing emigration.
3.2 Setting Poland and Slovenia in historical and socio-economic contexts

This section sets contemporary Poland and Slovenia in their historical, political and socio-economic context. It maps colonial processes within the region that have shaped socio-economic reality and emigration since the 19th century and have been resurrected during the transition period and the EU accession.

Figure 1: Political and economic changes in Europe from 1900 until 2004 (clockwise)\textsuperscript{13}.

As the Figure 1 indicates, at the turn of the 20th century Poland was divided between Prussian, Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires. It regained its freedom after the First World War, but this was interrupted by the Second World War. After the war, Poland quite quickly fell under the Soviet bloc, which lasted until the end of the 1980s, when it (re)gained its independence. Poland has been a net emigration country since the late nineteenth century, and has through the centuries provided labour to the US, Canada, Australia, Germany, France and to a lesser extent also the UK. Migration was characterised by economic as well as political motives (Grabowska-Lusinska 2008).

Despite the closure of borders in the communist years, an alternative international mobility developed, so there was labour migration to other Soviet bloc countries and some countries in North Africa and the Middle East (Fihel and Okolski 2009). Taylor and Śliwa (2011), who challenge the binary positions of East and West, argue that socialist Poland was – apart from the already mentioned international migration – also characterised by state-generated rural-urban migration. Once tourist travel became available, Western countries as well as some Soviet bloc countries such as Hungary became attractive for Poles, also because of differences in prices and availability of consumer goods. Since 2004, Poland has been a member of the EU, and it is the largest amongst all A8 countries. It covers 312,679 square kilometres, and comprises a population of 38.1 million, with Polish being the official language and the zloty the official currency.

On the other hand, Figure 1 shows that the territory of present day Slovenia historically first came under the Austro-Hungarian Empire. After the First World War, Slovenia became part of SHS, a Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians. After the Second World War, Slovenia became one of the six constituent republics of the Yugoslav confederation, which, unlike other
socialist countries, was not under the Soviet bloc, but was among the nonaligned nations. In 1991, Slovenia gained its independence and in 2004 entered the EU. Present-day Slovenia is the southernmost of all A8 countries, positioned as it is at the crossroad of four major European geographic regions. It comprises a population of only 2 million, with Slovenian being the official language and the euro the official currency since 2007. Like the whole CEE, Slovenia was characterised by high emigration to the US in the late 19th and early 20th century.

After the First World War, the emigration of Slovenians turned to European countries, mostly France, but also the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Germany and Belgium, which lasted until the economic crises of the 1930s (Drnovšek 2001). After the Second World War, there was at first mainly political emigration to Argentina, Canada, Australia and the US. And later, the opening of Yugoslav borders in the 1960s resulted in economic emigration to Western countries, most commonly Germany, but also Switzerland and Scandinavian countries (Drnovšek 2001). At that time Slovenia, as the richest republic of Yugoslavia, became a very attractive destination for workers from other republics. After 1970, emigration of Slovenians became quite modest and amounted on average to about 5,000 a year from 1982 until 1990 (Bevc 2004; Dolenc 2007).

3.2.1 Transition period

As argued in Chapter Two, during the transition period all A8 countries were impacted by the EU accession requirements and other important transnational actors that focused mostly on trade liberalisation rather than socio-economic well-being. Although in the process of EU enlargement and transition all CEE countries were homogenised through the binary logic of the post-socialist imperial order, and viewed by the EU and other international actors as the same, different countries had very different interests in joining the EU and consequently also adopted different transitional models. In this regard, there
was a stark difference between Poland and Slovenia. The former went through ‘shock therapy’ and implemented violent neoliberal policies, while the latter adopted a gradualist approach, thus progressively upgrading its social protection system while maintaining social cohesion (Mencinger 2004; Śliwa 2009; Vaughan-Whitehead 2003).

In Poland, the movement of liberal economists drawn to the neoliberal theories of the time became prominent during the transition, and it succeeded in implementing swift market reforms with detrimental social costs. This ideologically driven ‘shock therapy’ policy was legitimised by the backing of the WB, IMF and other influential transnational actors, and resulted in rising unemployment and poverty, an increasing income gap and declining working conditions (Stenning et al. 2010). Due to these structural changes, by end of the 1990s Poland had the largest migration potential amongst all A8 countries. Although pull factors such as better living and working conditions were more important, there was also a considerable pessimism about economic conditions in the country.

Although foreign advisors wanted to push ‘shock therapy’ in Slovenia also, the specificities of Slovenian historical context and political and socio-economic situation made it possible for the gradualist route to prevail. As Mencinger (2004) argues, Slovenia had the advantages of pragmatic Yugoslav socialism, which prepared it for transition even before 1989, as well as the disadvantages that came with the political and economic instability of disintegration. It was also one of the richest parts of CEE, had a favourable geographical position and well established economic links with Western markets, thus also producing a healthy scepticism towards the foreign advisors who were advocating rapid transition. The prevalence and success of the gradualist model thus came from the fact that it was pragmatically cautious and contextual rather than ideological.
This enabled Slovenia to keep unemployment at low levels, retain employment protection legislation, ease the wage gap and maintain and enhance the social protection system (Stanovnik 2004; Vodopivec 2004). In comparison to other post-socialist countries at the end of the 1990s, Slovenia had the least migration potential (IOM 1999). Slovenians assessed the general standard of living as high, and many were satisfied with their jobs. Although in general there was no great inclination towards economic migration amongst Slovenians, there has been more interest for emigration amongst the young and highly educated, particularly those who have already participated in international student exchange programmes (Bevc 2004). As we will see later in the chapter, these different approaches to transition had very different effects on quality of life, the work-life balance, (self)value and emigration in these two countries.

3.2.2 EU accession and the current recession

After the accession, pull factors started to determine emigration in Poland even more strongly. As Fihel and Okolski argue, ‘EU enlargement was the most important emigration stimulus in Poland’s contemporary history’ (2009: 189). In the three years since enlargement, emigration jumped from 1 million to 2.3 million. Apart from traditional destinations, such as Germany and Italy, Ireland and the UK became very attractive. In the two years following EU enlargement, the UK became the most important receiving country for Polish migrants. Enlargement also opened up propensity for different groups of migrants.

Although the outflow from Poland has always largely involved males, this was even more marked after the enlargement, including in the case of migration to the UK. There has also been an increase in young persons migrating, mostly between 20 and 34 years old. This is most visible in the case of the UK, which attracted mostly young people: the average age of Polish migrants was 25 (Fihel and Okolski 2009). Emigration after enlargement also points to an increasing
‘brain-drain’. Although most people who migrate have a vocational education, the share of university graduates and emigrants from more urbanised areas has risen significantly since accession. This is especially so in the case of the UK, which attracts Polish university graduates to the greatest extent, indicating that young Poles have most probably sought employment in the UK immediately after their graduation (Fihel and Okolski 2009). There was also an increase in emigrants living in households that were dependent on sources of income other than employment, such as remittances, which further points to a strategy of sending a family member abroad (Fihel and Okolski 2009). Poland thus suffered quite substantial working-age population loss. This has had important economic and social effects, as will be explored later on.

Although Poland has been doing relatively well during the recession and there was a decline of new Polish immigrants coming into the UK, this still does not mean that Poland has become more attractive to those who have left (McCollum et al. 2012). Although macro-economic indicators might be better in Poland during the recession this does not necessarily mean that this has also improved economic wellbeing on the micro level. The scale of poverty in Poland was still in 2009 at the same worrying 40 per cent level created during the transition period (Śliwa 2009). Furthermore Stenning et al. (2010) demonstrate how informal economies have developed in Poland in order to enable people to survive deteriorating conditions and in-work poverty and to secure social reproduction. Moreover, promotional campaigns to attract people back to Poland were not very successful (Clark and Hardy 2011). This was also confirmed by one of my Polish interviewees, Agniezska, who participated in the repatriation programme, but then returned to the UK. Surveys also show that 75 per cent of those who have returned to Poland plan to leave the country again, and 60 per cent of Poles within the UK do not plan to leave within the next two years (Clark and Hardy 2011). The one interviewee, Andrzej, who returned to Poland also said that he is considering returning to the UK.
On the other hand, Slovenian emigration was modest after the EU accession, although it increased until 2009 and there are more Slovenians leaving than returning to the country (MDDSZ 2010; SURS 2010). In general, those with specific job offers or those who are not satisfied with their present jobs are more likely to consider moving to other EU countries (Hanžek et al. 2009). Enlargement has also not affected the destinations of emigrants. Slovenians still migrate to traditional destinations within the EU, mostly Germany, Austria and Italy. Although the UK stands at fourth place amongst EU countries, and migration there increased in the 2005-2007 period, it is still less desired than other non-EU destinations to which Slovenians have historically been drawn (SURS 2007b).

Slovenian emigration is also highly feminised. More women than men have migrated to all four main EU destinations, and those who migrated to the UK also tend to be younger than those to other destinations. The majority that migrate to the UK are between 20 and 34 years old (SURS 2007b). In quantitative terms, Slovenia has been a country of immigration rather then emigration. It features in fifth place amongst the EU27 in the ratio of immigration flows per inhabitant (Herm 2008). Apart from traditional immigration from former Yugoslav republics, Slovenia has, after enlargement, become an interesting destination for some A8 (Slovakian, Polish) and A2 (Romanian) as well as some other EU nationals (SURS 2007a).

Nevertheless, it is important to note that soon after the EU enlargement Slovenia was – with the assistance of conservative politics that promoted neoliberal ideas – subsumed into the neoliberal hegemony of the global market, which according to Mencinger meant a turn towards ‘global casino capitalism’ (Mencinger 2013: 1). Crisis emerged in Slovenia during the first term of conservative government between 2004 and 2008 due to mistaken investment decisions financed by foreign debt (DPU 2012). Up to 2005, Slovenia still acted
as a net creditor, but 3 years later its debt amounted to more than €10 billion. This was followed by a decrease in the demand and its inability to pay off the debt, which amounted to the loss of 60,000 jobs and effectively shifted the crisis to the banking sector (DPU 2012). As such, Slovenia was hard-hit by the recession and the incompetent political responses to it, which has also impacted emigration.

The same politics that created debt is currently trying to impose austerity measures by shrinking the public sector and public expenditure. This has been met by increased protests from social partners and the public (Dnevnik 2012). Although there is growing resistance to austerity amongst the population, an increasingly toxic environment and reduction of jobs has resulted in increased emigration. Statistics show an increase in emigration since 2006 and then a decrease in 2010. Nevertheless the jump in emigration is visible in increased migration to the UK, as can be inferred from the rapid rise in membership of identity networks present on social media websites. This will be discussed in Chapter Five. We are thus yet to see how neoliberal-induced austerity will affect Slovenian population and emigration.

### 3.3 Work and life in Poland

In order to understand Polish emigration and workers’ (self)value, the following section explores how Polish workers assess the quality of life, work-life balance and their work prospects in Poland. In Poland, quality of life is perceived as good in terms of access to nature and possibilities for leisure, but there seemed to be a big difference in how interviewees perceived their socio-economic quality of life. For those who came from more privileged parts of society, Poland offered a comfortable life, and some of them ultimately wish to return. However, others struggled to get work, achieve professional mobility,

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sustain themselves, be self-reliant or, as Joanna put it, ‘to live with dignity’. Most Polish interviewees also had prior experiences of migration, mostly to the USA. Many actually wanted to go to the USA, but then chose the UK, because of its similar English speaking context, as well as its proximity and the opening of the EU borders.

Poland is large geographically and by population, and therefore there are major regional differences in terms of how people self-define and what quality of life or prospects different regions offer. Research already demonstrates that spatial segregation in Poland manifests itself in social stratification and division between rural and urban areas (Śliwa 2009; Taylor and Śliwa 2011). It is not surprising, then, that young people from bigger cities assess their prospects there as good, so their incentive to move was to travel or to have the experience of living in a multicultural society. Those who came from smaller places, on the other hand, pointed to social-dumping and nepotistic practices that destroyed jobs and disabled their participation on the labour market. So while those from urban areas and more privileged parts of society migrated in order to live in a bigger, more cosmopolitan and diverse place, to explore, access goods, seek adventure, study or increase their career or study prospects, those at the lower end of society migrated because of the changed structural conditions in Poland characterised by social-dumping, which resulted in high unemployment, a precarious existence and increased social stratification. The micro-economic effects of these structural changes are explored further below.

3.3.1 Effects of neoliberal (self)colonisation on Polish emigration and (self)value

As argued in Chapter Two, neoliberal (self)colonisation has enabled the conditions for social-dumping practices, through which standards in some CEE countries have been lowered under the external pressures of the global economic system. Earlier in this chapter, I argued that Poland adopted
neoliberal policies that resulted in deregulation and deteriorated labour and social standards. This enabled the movement of capital, goods and services and consequently affected the movement of labour. In this regard, Izabela explains how her town was affected by systemic change and social-dumping that resulted in high unemployment and consequently affected firstly internal and then external migration:

'I taught physics for one year, and then because of changes in educational system I had to move I had to find another job... I had to move to Katowice, I taught in Katowice in gymnasium for 7 years then I decided to move to London, learn the language and probably teach. Because what I really wanted to do, is to move back home, because I don’t like big cities and the place where I was born is beautiful...we are somehow forced to move, because we have no jobs. Because Bielsko-Biala was famous for, it was a great city when it comes to producing like materials, producing wool and sewing clothes, it was a great industry and people had employment in it. 1989 was the start of it and slowly they destroyed, because now we have so many used things from the West... It was difficult to find something professionally. Not like selling in shops or things like that. Because I would like to do something that is connected to my studies... If it looks like it’s better here for me and I can find something, because they lack physics teachers, so I just decided to move here because of that and also because of money issues, because I would like to have my own accommodation in the future, just to live on my own.’

(Au-pair, Polish, Female, 37, PG)

This example points to major systemic changes that took place in Poland during the transition and affected the educational system, labour market, and production and consumption patterns. It shows how clothing and textile production was shut down, regardless of the social costs of unemployment. Pickles and Smith (2010) argue that the clothing and textile industry in the CEE region at first served as a low-cost production location for Western retail firms, but in the late 1990s they started to move from higher-cost (such as Poland) to lower-cost locations further south within the region. The example above further shows that systemic changes offered neither sufficient new nor safe employment prospects for the local population. Consequently this pushed workers to move first from rural areas to bigger cities, and later abroad. These social-dumping practices not only resulted in unemployment, but also enabled
multinational retail firms to expand the consumption of retail goods to Eastern markets. This completely transformed retail and consumption landscapes, with a rapid spread of hyper-markets featuring multinational brands, and brought in different consumption and work practices (Smith 2007). Different types of mobilities thus also transformed the valuing of consumer goods within CEE, and constructed Eastern and Western markets, as explained by Agnieszka:

‘Here [the UK] you could get different things, even though I come from a quite well off family. But you didn’t have the same things in [Multinational retail store] here or in Poland.’

(Administrator/Freelance trainer, Polish, Female, 32, PG)

Agnieszka’s example demonstrates how multinational retail companies saw CEE as a good place to dump goods that they could not sell in the West. Here we see how symbolic economy is still built on the hegemonic binary logic of the imperial post-socialist order that distinguishes Eastern and Western European markets. So although many multinational brands were present in CEE in the 1990s, they were not as attractive to young people, because the goods they provided in the East were not the same and did not have the same symbolic value as the goods they provided in the West. Capacity for consumption also forms the basis for the judgement of taste, in the form of food, dress, etc., and can construct the cultural distinction of groups (Bourdieu 1984/2010).

Judgement of taste is thus intrinsically linked to distributive injustice, which determines different possibilities for accessing and affording the goods and services that can enhance individuals’ cultural, symbolic capital. Self-reflexive accounts of Polish migrant workers on one hand show that they are in the UK perceived as lower-class not only because they are assigned particular jobs, but also because of the way some of these workers dress in order to perform for instance agricultural jobs. And on the other hand self-reflexive accounts of upper class Polish migrant workers show that their fellow citizens from lower classes and rural areas are perceived as lacking in cultural capital that is
embodied in dress. This speaks of new forms of nesting orientalisms that emerged with the new rules of welfth creation in Poland (Buchowski 2006).

Moreover this means that consumption transformed through commodity flows, promoted through culturally chosen ideas of consumer agency and mediated through global and deterritorialised mass-media and other information technologies, has become part of the capitalist civilising process (Appadurai 1996). This civilising process informs contemporary imagination, which fuels action and has become the key component of the new global order. It creates ideas about different localities, consumption possibilities, the labour prospects, wages and standards within them, and can, as such, act as an important stimulus for migration. This is very well demonstrated by the narratives of young Polish workers that generate value for themselves by moving to the West in order to access goods that they could not access in Poland. In this regard Dyta explained how her social status has improved since she moved to the UK because she was able to access and afford the style of a young person:

‘In terms of clothes or food, I would say that probably it was like a better status...it was easier to buy stuff that you would like to buy as a young person.’
(Account partner in marketing company, Polish, Female, 26, BA)

Moving to the UK and London in particular enabled young Polish workers to access goods that increased their cultural capital and their value within the globalised symbolic economy. Here, we see how consumption enables the creation of a homogenised class logic that is effectively moulded into local histories and becomes crucial in constructing a globally homogenised class culture based upon cultivating a specific style unreachable to some due to distributive injustice on a global scale. Many young, highly-educated Polish workers, mainly women, were willing to trade their devaluation on the UK labour market in order to access goods and services that increase their cultural capital.
This civilising process is intrinsically linked to increasing distributive injustice that arose from workers inability to find employment and secure an income. In other words social dumping practice also contributed to the creation of high unemployment and a precarious existence, which affected the whole generation that grew up during the transition period. Anna, for instance, explains how lack of prospects for secure income represented a huge stress for her and all her peers from their teens onward:

‘When I was 19 I started realising that having a job is not an easy thing. It’s very difficult to get a job, it’s a huge problem. Everyone who I knew, since I was actually 14 was already planning what to do to have an income, because we already knew it’s difficult. You have to know people. You have to have a family member who will introduce you to the job. So from very early age we already knew that having a job is a big task and it’s easy to not succeed and we all fought for succeeding. Not to be rich, but we all wanted to have a job. So when I was a student I saw loads of people struggling to have a job, I looked for a job and there was nothing. I wanted to make money when I was a student and I was applying for a variety of jobs and nobody wanted me. So I’m very largely shaped by this huge stress about having an income. That’s really important to me and I just always wanted to improve my chances of finding employment. And Poland always to me was a place where there is a huge problem to find a good job’

(Project manager, Polish, Female, 30, BA)

This data highlights how changed socio-economic conditions in Poland greatly affected the whole generation of young lower- and middle-class workers, who simply could not get work. This precarious existence consequently resulted in competition for scarce jobs, making workers vulnerable to all kinds of exploitation. Furthermore, the excerpt above demonstrates that social capital plays an important role in accessing the Polish labour market. As Anna explains, you get a job by being introduced through family members. As Smith and Rochovská argue for everyday practices within CEE, the above data demonstrates that “context” becomes central to ascribing the assets, resources and skills that individuals, household or family [my emphasis] members can draw upon in the production of non-commodified use- and exchange-values’ (Smith and Rochovská 2007: 36). Since contextually acquired social capital is a crucial
resource in everyday practices in CEE, it is not surprising that self-commodification does not have an exchange-value on the Polish labour market, as explained by Anna:

‘I think Polish people in general don’t understand the importance of selling yourself. I’ve noticed that is something in Poland in the mind of Polish. Do not try to oversell yourself, if you’re good people will find you, whereby in reality you have to so oversell yourself in Britain…In Poland if you said you graduated from university and you had that kind of experience and you say very briefly is good enough.’

(Project manager, Polish, Female, 30, BA)

The avoidance of a formally commodified nature of market transactions within CEE enables an ‘economy outside the economy’ that on the one hand arises from deep-seated cultural practices of production, and on the other from responses and forms of resistance to neoliberal-induced austerity (Smith and Rochovská 2007: 31). This is not to say that all jobs are acquired solely through social capital and that things have not changed with the transition to market economies, but that (self)commodification is still not socially and economically valued. These structures embodied in CEE migrants’ habitus affect their perceptions of (self)commodification processes and their abilities to generate value for themselves across transnational fields as will be explored in Chapters Seven and Eight. Nevertheless, this informal economy enables survival within the new neoliberal hegemony, which did not only affect people’s workings lives but also their ability to contribute to social reproduction (Stenning et al. 2010). Anna, for instance, explains how increased competition for jobs enabled the lowering of labour standards, increased working hours and produced the disappearance of the work-life balance:

‘My impression of Polish working life is that there is no private life, because it’s so difficult to get a job in Poland. People just spend the whole day just working… It’s just very difficult to compete in the market, so people spend as much as the employer wants at work. However when I was young, very young, my father used to come back from work at 4pm and we had dinner. So it’s after the collapse of communism, when capitals kicked in and when working hours expanded indefinitely. So people work between 6am till 10pm, it’s just to compete. So when I
was in Warsaw, I knew of people who never saw each other. They were married couples, who hardly ever saw each other... So Poland to me is because of competition and lack of jobs; people spend too many hours working. When I came to the UK first time, I worked between 6am and 11am and it was enough for me to make a living... And that was the most crap job you can have. I was selling coffees and bagels and if I could live on that. I thought this is paradise, I can do everything.‘  
(Project manager, Polish, Female, 30, BA)

These findings confirm macro-level data that labour standards deteriorated exponentially with the collapse of socialism and economic colonialism that brought in new capital and the freeing-up of the market. As argued in Chapter Two, foreign direct investment had a political influence on (meta)governance, which has effectively changed CEE societies. Śliwa (2009) argues that labour standards have deteriorated in Poland during the transition and created an increased subordination of workers’ decisions in their private lives to issues of job prospects and income. In this regard, Federici\textsuperscript{15} argues that capitalism is re-evaluating, undermining and destroying the most fundamental ways of human reproduction. People’s ability to reproduce themselves is being undermined by capitalism’s endless demands for the constant availability of workers.

Systemic changes that brought in violent neoliberal policies saw a worsening work-life balance and the production of what employment agencies inaccurately brand the ‘socialist’ work ethic of A8 labour (see Chapter Seven). As Anna’s example demonstrates, the work ethic assigned to A8 labour has nothing to do with socialism, but rather with the newly-imposed neoliberal hegemony that has disciplined workers to subordinate their private to their working lives. It provides direct proof that the hegemonic binary logic of the imperial post-socialist order serves only as a screen discourse enabling the imposition of neoliberal hegemony on a global scale. This hegemony is

achieved through cultural politics that impose a homogeneous class culture and morality with the aim of disciplining and utilising the global poor. The ‘success’ of this imperial project is visible in workers’ emigration to the UK and in their willingness to take up low-skilled and low paid jobs.

Furthermore, data analysis indicates that (self)colonial practices create a specific reputation, imagination and expectations of the West that also affect workers’ (self)value. In other words, the UK is often chosen as a destination due to a symbolic economy built upon the hegemonic binary logic of the post-socialist order, which upholds a specific reputation of the West and the organisations within. Izabela, for instance, explains that working in the UK might provide a good opportunity to become acquainted with the higher standards of her professional field:

‘I’ve just seen on the internet or somewhere or my friend told me that they lack physics teachers in this country. So I thought it might be a good opportunity for me to come here and maybe try to find the job within my field, because I think you know this country is. Maybe the level of physics is better than in Poland or I might be mistaken, I don’t know yet, because I haven’t had the chance to check it. But I would like to see the equipment that they provide for physics lessons, because I think, let’s be straight, if they have money, when it comes to income per person they have much better money than we. So in my opinion they provide better equipment for schools, or maybe not all of them I imagine, but I think in many schools they have proper equipment.’

(Au-pair, Polish, Female, 37, PG)

Due to unequal symbolic and economic geographies, workers attribute a higher value to working standards and equipment in the West. Accordingly, they imagine that this will give them valuable experience that they simply cannot get in their original meta-field. As will be demonstrated in Chapter Eight, this (self)colonial imagination is effectively used by employers and employment agencies to extract value from migrant workers that consume these symbolic signs. The symbolic reputation of the West is often also maintained by Polish migrants who are already in the UK, as explained by Andrzej:
'And I was a little bit surprised, because I had impression that in Poland, they, sometimes it’s buried a little bit you know… And I was angry at my friend because he was so irresponsible…this friend of mine told me, there are plenty of jobs…So I thought, if there’s plenty of job, I might go to 50-100 places, pessimistic scenario and I will surely get a job, where I will have let’s say 2 offers, one will be for minimum salary and one for let’ say 7 pounds and full time employment. That was what I thought, it would be. But it wasn’t like that…”

(Door-to-door representative, Polish, Male, 30, BA)

The symbolic economy thus operates through the personal social networks and practices of Polish migrants who preserve their self-value by painting an exaggerated picture of the West. This further indicates that assistance based on identity politics is not necessarily beneficial for new arrivals, as will be further explored in Chapter Eight. As Polish migrants in the UK are trying to increase their value by maintaining the symbolic reputation of the West, those who have not yet migrated use this symbolic reputation to de-value themselves, as explained by Anna:

'When I was in Poland I was convinced that Polish people are poor, uneducated and they are just not… So I was surprised that West, that we see as paradise is not paradise at all. People live in poverty and apparently it is a better world. I just started realising that people here are actually quite poor and they had less and everything is less quality. I started appreciate my country. And it was a shock to me, because I was convinced for all my life, I had complexes; oh, I’m from Poland.'

(Project manager, Polish, Female, 30, BA)

Hence, through (self)colonial imagination Polish workers adopt their own inferiority with regard the West. They perceive themselves as less-worthy because they embody a place that has a lower symbolic value in comparison to their desired destination. All in all, the micro-level perspective of Polish workers indicates that neoliberal (self)colonisation deepened inequalities amongst states and worsened working and living conditions, thus affecting Polish workers’ self-value and pushing them to migrate. Although the findings suggest that workers acknowledge that in recent years Poland’s economy has improved and that the differentials between states have narrowed, Polish migrants still perceive the UK as offering better socio-economic security and
freedom. This is not solely because of inequalities amongst meta-fields, but also because of the rise of inequalities within, as is explored further below.

3.3.1.1 The rise of inequality and intersectional differences in Poland
Political and socio-economic changes in Poland also deepened inequalities and created intersectional differences amongst diverse groups. The transition period and increased liberalisation of the Polish market created big income gaps that have radically deepened social inequalities and produced new forms of social stratification (Śliwa 2009; Stenning et al. 2010). In this regard, Jerzy explains that Poland saw the disappearance of its middle class and an increasingly deep gap between rich and poor:

‘When I lived in Poland, you would probably have three different castes, three different classes. You had really poor, you had average and you had really, really rich people. When I left the country, I saw that it just divided into two classes. You had really poor and really rich people. It changed a lot!’

(HR systems and administrations manager, Polish, Male 31, BA)

Evidence suggests that during the transition period Polish society was radically reshaped, which created massive difference in income distribution. Neoliberal policies have thus resulted in the rise of class inequality, putting at stake the core of collective identities in CEE countries (Watson 2000). These increasing inequalities were legitimised through the restructured nesting orientalism which created ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of transition (Buchowski 2006). Social changes have not resulted solely in increased social stratification, but have also taken away the already-achieved rights of women. Forrester et al. argue that Polish women had more rights under state socialism than now, with the state and powerful Catholic Church using ‘Western’ discourses to legitimise the demands that women return to their ‘natural’ role as mothers and wives (2004: 16). Most Polish women I interviewed were very critical of the re-entry of the Catholic Church into state politics. As Barbara explains, this re-entry legitimised discourses that assigned women traditional gender roles and destroyed work-life balance policies:
‘Not enough kindergartens, people would queue. People would sleep on the street to get their kids in. Maternity policies are better, but we are very paternalistic country. Very patriarchal, very Catholic Church dominated politics. So the political discourse is changing slowly. The political discourse is that women should have babies and you need to be all maternal and womanly and have your baby and your career can wait.’

(Health care assistant, Polish, Female, 25, PhD)

This example demonstrates how the dominant political actors re-evaluated women’s role within society in the name of capital and morality. Re-traditionalisation thus went hand in hand with the decreased role of the state in the provision of work-life balance policies. The return of women to the domestic sphere was often portrayed as a ‘correction’ to socialist policies (Owczarzak 2009). Since the possibility of combining work and life is reduced, women are now expected either to perform only reproductive labour, or, as we saw earlier, give up reproduction. Here, we see how the imposition of neoliberal policies in Poland also deepened gender inequality. This also affects women’s position on the labour market. Maria, for instance, expressed her thoughts that as a young woman she would have less chance of being employed in Poland:

‘I think I would be more worried if I was applying for a job in Poland. First of all I’m a woman and I might have children in the future and I think in Poland it would play a bigger role… I think in my own mind I would think that they are against me because I am a woman, who can have children in the future, in Poland.’

(Lecturer, Polish, Female, 31, PhD)

Here, we see how young Polish women perceived Poland as a place where, they do not have the same chances for achieving their career choices. Joanna, for instance, explains that the imposition of traditional gender roles and expectations represented the main push factor for her emigration:

‘But the main reason was that I felt that I don’t fit anymore in the Polish society, that I don’t find myself comfortable with all the tradition, with all the stereotypes, with all the pressure and all the rules you have to follow to be a good citizen, good daughter, wife or sister.’

(Accounts assistant, Polish, Female, 27, PG)
The data supports the arguments that the transitional period in Poland reintroduced patriarchal relations. In other words, communist patriarchy turned into transitional patriarchy, which enabled ‘men to successfully appropriate the state, while women were simply delivered to the market’ (Miroiu 2004: 207). Apart from reinforced gender inequality, conservative state-level politics married with a powerful Church also re-enforced homophobia. Izabela, for instance, explains how the powerful position of the Catholic Church in state-level politics increased homophobia and prevented her, as a teacher, fighting against it:

‘Oh, religion, this is a big issue… So if you don’t believe, or are a little bit different it’s a big deal. Which I really hate what they introduced after those changes, now religion is obligatory at school. In my opinion religion should be a choice, you shouldn’t be forced. And after changes, that was particularly why I left school…You know with homosexuals there is a big issue within Catholic Church, they don’t approve it. All the people will tell you that you are ill; you know it’s something wrong with you, because you are homosexual…When you have a homosexual pupil other kids don’t like him and it’s like a scapegoat…they try to swipe it under the carpet, so nobody can see it, so it’s not visible. But in my personal view this is not right... That was also part of the reason why I didn’t feel comfortable. You are not completely free; you have to find clever ways to avoid things like that… And even as a teacher I was powerless, because it’s implemented from above, you can’t do anything about it. It’s the government issue; you know how they cooperate with Catholic Church and all that.’

(Au-pair, Polish, Female, 37, PG)

Transitional changes have thus not only affected women, but also LGBT communities and all people who oppose intolerance and do not comply with the new orthodoxy. The example here presented demonstrates that workers felt uncomfortable doing their jobs due to increased intolerance, which also in part affected their decision to migrate. Research also suggests that sexuality is an important dimension of the political economy of Polish migration (Binnie and Klesse Forthcoming). The stigmatisation of LGBT and religious minorities is further legitimised also through right-wing politics, as explained by Dorota:

‘Even like my parents, they are only partly Jewish, they are all Catholics and you can never speak about that in Poland. You can never, your friends cannot know
about that. Then we’ve got this right wing government in power and it seems to be very acceptable to say horrible things about gays and all these things… So all my life I was living in secrecy but you can still feel that something is different with my family. We don’t go to church that often as anyone else and so I felt like you know what, I quite like the fact that I’m different and I would like to celebrate it in some way.’

(Project manager, Polish, Female, 30, BA)

This example points to the detrimental effects of conservative and right-wing politics for several minority groups. It demonstrates how religious minorities are hiding their identities in order not to be stigmatised. Although there are ethnic and religious minorities in Poland, data shows that they are either well-assimilated, segregated, or as Dorota puts, it ‘rather colonised’. Or, as Maria explains, in Poland only certain bodies are accepted as belonging to the nation:

‘I think Polish people are still very sceptical towards people who look differently or speak different languages, especially I think if they are a different skin colour, maybe black people are not very welcomed in Poland. There is, I think, still a lot of prejudice against black people, against gay people, against lesbians. So yes, it is a very traditional society, I think it’s changing. I had a friend who had a boyfriend who was black and she said: “Oh, you know it’s very difficult to take him to the family gatherings because they would all be making jokes.” Of course, not in front of her, behind her back. We are, I think, not very tolerant in Poland.’

(Lecturer, Polish, Female, 31, PhD)

Maria’s example demonstrates ethnic approach to nationality that characterises CEE countries. The ethnic definition of nationality originates from German Romanticism and especially Herder, which influenced the idea of the nation in the CEE region by departing from a state-centred French concept and moving towards a definition that drew political borders along cultural, ethnic and linguistic lines (Batt 2007: 10). CEE ethnic definition of nationality is for instance very visible in racism towards Roma and their constant exclusion from national belonging, which speaks also of embedded whiteness (Imre 2005). This is also confirmed by Maria’s example and can be especially problematic for people with visibly different embodied characteristics, who are perceived as lacking in national cultural capital that would legitimise their belonging to the nation.
Findings demonstrate that neoliberalism, patriarchy and Catholicism also go hand-in-hand with right-wing politics that exclude anyone who does not belong to the ‘national body’. One of the incentives for migration is thus to escape various -isms that position diverse groups in the hierarchy of acceptability. Workers believe that their move to the West will enable their re-evaluation. As we will see in the following chapters, it does so, however, again in accordance with the orthodoxies present in the new meta-field.

### 3.4 Work and life in Slovenia

In order to understand the reasons for Slovenian workers’ emigration and (self)value, the following section explores how they assess the quality of life, work-life balance and their work prospects in Slovenia. Slovenian workers assess the quality of life in Slovenia as good or very good in terms of space, work-life balance and safety. A couple of interviewees compared Slovenia to a 'bubble' that is nice and comfortable, but also very small, narrow-minded and unmotivating. The UK and London in particular are thus interesting, especially for young people that are increasingly mobile. The thrill of emigration and the opening of EU borders seem to be combined with greater prospects, choice and demand for certain professions. Almost half of the interviewees also had prior experience with studying or student exchange in the UK or other European countries. Sometimes student exchange influenced their decision to move to London, either to increase their opportunities, get new experience, enhance their career prospects, maintain transnational relationships, or live in a more diverse society. The UK and London in particular are also chosen because of their proximity and as a place that enables global mobility.
3.4.1 Effects of neoliberal (self)colonisation on Slovenian emigration and (self)value

As argued earlier, Slovenia took a gradualist approach to transition, which enabled the maintenance of its social protection system and social cohesion. A gradualist approach also enabled Slovenia to retain a more equal position with regard to other countries, which impeded social-dumping practices, enabled the maintenance of the quality of life, and consequently lessened emigration. As explained by Marko, wage differentials between the UK and Slovenia are due to stark differences in work-life balance not really an incentive for Slovenian workers to emigrate:

‘I would say that this work-life balance it’s definitely much better in Slovenia. Already like, let’s say working hours... When you look at the numbers, the numbers are really nice... But many times I think people don’t see, how many hours of work this is. They just compare the salaries. In Slovenia they compare the salary which they get for 160 hours a month, with the salary you get here for 300 hours... Then if you like calculate this per hour. It’s not that good salary per hour, because in Slovenia we are paid overtime.’

(Student/Unemployed, Slovenian, Male, 28, PG)

In contrast to Poland or the UK, Slovenia still offers good labour standards, work-life balance and corresponding wages. Therefore, the wage differentials that come with working longer hours are not really an attraction for Slovenian workers. This shows that unlike in Poland, neither wage differentials nor problems with work-life balance act as an incentive for Slovenian workers to migrate. It is, rather, the small size of the place that determines inequality amongst meta-fields and pushes Slovenian workers to leave, as explained by Andrej:

‘I always believe that the quality of life in Slovenia is very high and often Slovenians in the country don’t actually realise how lucky they are and how nice life is back in Slovenia... Prospects are, I would say, good in a regional mind frame. So if you look at Slovenia and its neighbouring countries, especially the ex Yugoslavia, I think it’s quite good to be positioned in Slovenia because it’s far more developed than all the other countries but it has cultural ties with the rest of Yugoslavia, so it can really take that to its benefit. But as the old Slovenian saying goes: ”Do you want to be the first in the village or the last in the city?” I think it’s
Andrej’s example demonstrates that one of the main push factors for Slovenians to migrate is the small size of the place. Although there are regional differences in terms of career prospects, the small size of Slovenia will always place limits on this. As one of the smallest EU states, Slovenia will always have to struggle to strike a balance between formal and actual equality with regard to bigger and more powerful EU members (Šabič et al. 2004). Therefore, the small size of the place will always site Slovenia on the European periphery. Most interviewees said that the small size of the labour market does not offer much choice in terms of career paths or opportunities for career advancement. Slovenians thus chose to migrate because they felt stuck in their jobs and were lacking in motivation. As Veronika explains, she decided to migrate because she needed a challenge and greater independence:

‘I decided to come here, because it might sound a bit weird now. I had everything in Slovenia, so I had no challenge, no goals. I had a great job, I had money for me, I had a flat, I had a car. So basically there was no challenge and as a teacher the only step up would be to have my own language school. So I wasn’t ready to do it yet at this time. I needed some stress obviously, which I’m getting now. And to become independent, to be honest, because I wasn’t independent in Slovenia. I used to live with my mum, so I knew I had a back-up. So basically, new challenge, something new in life. That’s basically it, to get some experience. Although my goal was never to stay here, it was only temporary; for a year, up to 5 years. I think the problem in Slovenia is also, when you get a job, you stay there until you die or until you retire. So basically I had no experience besides teaching and translation. So that was one of the reasons I came here also to look for other work, not just teaching and translation. Maybe travel industry, to try some new fields. So far it’s not very successful, but still; I’m trying to find something on a different field.’

(Translator/unemployed, Slovenian, Female, 33, BA)

Veronika’s experience demonstrates how people in their late 20s or early 30s often have few opportunities for further advancement and feel trapped in routine jobs that offer little motivation or new learning experiences. In addition,
the findings suggest that young people also strive for greater independence, with many in their late 20s or 30s still living with or in close proximity to their families. Workers thus emigrate because they want a challenge to the very predictable life that they have in this small country. Due to limited opportunities and a lack of motivation, they rarely have any chance to discover their strengths. Such opportunities are also hindered due to the informal economy that, in Slovenia as in Poland, significantly affects access to the labour market. As Katarina explains, in the Slovenian labour market job hunting operates through social capital:

‘Back in Slovenia I never had any job interview. I got the job through a friend; I mean her aunt needed some students to help… I got the job and I worked then there at the same office since I moved here... Back home our professional area is so small that we all know each other mostly, so you wouldn’t even need to represent yourself much, that’s the biggest difference…is a bit small space and nobody admires other’s work, it’s very closed, it’s very hard to say it to somebody else, you did this so well.’  
(Architect, Slovenian, Female, 40, BA)

These informal job hunting strategies, similarly as in Poland, are connected with deep-seated cultural practices of production and are likely to play an important role within the increased insecurity associated with the current recession and neoliberal austerity. Moreover, they are connected with the small size of Slovenia. Here, we see the workings of an ‘economy of favours’ that replaces commodified forms of production and monetary exchange (Smith 2007: 17). Katarina’s example demonstrates that the workings of this informal economy of favours affect workers’ (self)value. Moreover it affects workers’ perception of (self)commodifying processes and their strategies to access work as explained by Filip:

‘I think definitely very different mindset from the traditional capitalist societies of the West, the way we perceive careers, the way we perceive ambition, the way we perceive education, the way we perceive competition in a way...I think I was very stressed because I understood the limits of my CV but at the same time, I think I was slightly inhibited by certain perceptions that I had about what it means to look for jobs and how employers perceive candidates…it was a mental hurdle for me to overcome that and to start understanding that I can easily sell myself for a much
broader range of jobs simply by showing what skills I have... And also I think the second thing was, people just kept telling me oh yes, you know, just talk to your career service at the university. And the thing is, I didn’t really understand what it meant to use the careers service because no such thing exists back home.’

(Associate Solicitor, Slovenian, Male, 31, PG)

Here we see how CEE migrant workers approach the UK labour market with very different ideas about labour relations, job hunting and perceptions regarding the exchange- and use-value of their capitals. Filips example also shows that CEE workers are not familiar with various labour market intermediaries to access work. Same is true for employment agencies that have only during the stransition process started to emerge within CEE region (Ward et al. 2005). These diverse job hunting strategies also affect CEE workers’ perceptions of (self)commodification processes and their abilities to generate value within the UK labour market. (Self)value is further affected through a (self)colonial imagination of the West. Similarly to Polish workers, Slovenian workers express a sense of inferiority in relation to the West, as explained by Nina:

‘I was afraid I would say or anxious. I didn’t feel I was up to the standard in the UK.’

(Social worker, Slovenian, Female, 33, PG)

This example demonstrates that Slovenian workers felt they are not up to the standards in the UK. This was so with workers who were aiming to get jobs at their qualification level. The data therefore show a similar (self)colonial imagination embodied in the Polish and Slovenian habitus. All in all, our findings demonstrate that on-going colonial projects not only affect emigration from the peripheries, but also (self)value of workers within. This is further connected with systemic changes within Slovenia that are particularly salient for specific groups of workers. This is explored further below.
3.4.1.1 The rise of inequality and intersectional differences in Slovenia

Although Slovenian workers mostly spoke of not having problems in getting work, getting a permanent job was a problem for young workers, new immigrants and those in the service economy, especially in certain professions such as journalism, workers in the creative industries and the hospitality and catering sector, architecture and social work. Although temporary employment is, according to employment legislation, only permitted in specific cases, it seems that it is nevertheless becoming the norm in Slovenia. According to research, temporary employment amounts already to 30 per cent (57 per cent for those younger than 29 years) and 90 per cent of all newly advertised jobs (Breznik 2012). There is thus a big generational gap between those that were able to secure permanent employment at times of high social protection, and those who have entered the labour market after deregulation began. In this regard, trade unions suggest that most violations of workers’ rights actually arises from temporary contracts (Zupančič 2011). While workers on permanent contracts are fairly well protected, those on temporary contracts face discrimination, not only in employment relations, but also in accessing goods and services, as explained by Tina:

‘I think freelancers are very much discriminated in Slovenia. It’s not like in Britain, where freelancers are the ones who are the best in the business, in Slovenia is different. We get discriminated also from the bank.’

(Reader, Slovenian, Female, 38, BA)

The data demonstrate that temporary employment prevents workers accessing other goods and services. For instance, it impedes workers getting a mortgage, which makes it very difficult for them to achieve housing independence. In this regard, young workers in temporary jobs achieve their quality of life by utilising inherited assets, and this in a way masks their precarious situation. The precarious existence of young workers is further connected with ineffective employment policies for graduates entering the labour market. As Zoja
explains, young graduates do not know how to approach the labour market and thus prefer to prolong their studies, which offer them social security:

‘The problem is you don’t know how to earn money or how to start as somebody who just finished uni. And the easiest way nowadays is just, you apply for Masters because you don’t know another way, so you just apply for another two years. And if you study your parents support you so it’s a good excuse not to get independent...Because if you are a student in Slovenia, it’s quite easy. It’s easier to get part time job, you don’t need to pay for taxes like health insurance and things like that. You can get a scholarship to go abroad for example because if you finish – that’s why I haven’t finished my studies last year’.

(Project coordinator, Slovenian, Female, 23, BA)

In Slovenia, student status offers social security and enables easier access to temporary – but not permanent – jobs. In Slovenia, undergraduate studies are still fee-free, and if one is enrolled as a full-time student, one can get temporary employment through student services, which act as a kind of employment agency for students. Ironically, one of the predominant strategies of young graduates to participate on the labour market is to prolong their studies. Student status thus serves as an asset for young workers to maintain social security and get temporary work. This points to a deployment of inherited assets – material, social, skills and citizenship – also identified by Buroway et al. (2000) in the defensive or entrepreneurial economic strategies of people in post-socialist Russia. Here, we see clear generation gaps in which young people maintain their quality of life through inherited assets.

Although work obtained through student services can be useful for young graduates to gain some initial experiences on the labour market, it also creates a system that actually impedes their career development, prolongs their dependence and masks their precarious existence. Data analysis shows that a lot of young graduates in their 20s face these problems. Young people at the height of their potential thus waste a lot of valuable time, as explained by Irena:

16 If students are employed through student services, their work is tax-free for students and tax-relieved for employers.
'Now I actually see how much time I have wasted... I felt I was half asleep during my university and when I came here I was just you know and then slowly getting in being active all the time... Well, I’m 25 whereas people graduating here are 21... And I am kind of feeling all these young people better than me.'  
(Research assistant, Slovenian, Female, 25, PG)

Hence, this prolonged dependence and precarious existence not only steals precious time, but also affects the (self)value of young Slovenian graduates, who feel uncompetitive in comparison to their peers on the UK labour market. As university-educated young people face precarity due to systemic problems that disable their permanent entry to the labour market, those who do not have a university degree face precarity because their institutional cultural capital is valuable only within a very limited frame of opportunities. As Aleš explains, intermittent employment and a lack of prospects for career advancement makes it impossible to take one’s life seriously:

'I was stuck in the job that I didn’t really like and I didn’t really see any going forward with that. It was just like you know, making it from month to month, so that wasn’t something I was looking forward to. I was waiter mostly, though at some point I worked in IT as well. I did a couple of courses and I sort of freelanced and I was self-taught mostly, although I worked for computer company, but unlike here, back home in Slovenia, without proper qualifications you won’t be taking on jobs. So that’s why I had to put that on a side when I was back home. (...) Sometimes you don’t get money when you’re supposed to, sometimes you get money, you get like minimum wage… and it’s just frustrating… You can’t take yourself seriously, your life seriously, working like that’.  
(Audiovisual technician, Slovenian, Male, 33, SE)

The data analysis indicates that apart from self-employment, workers without university degrees have very few prospects to progress or to find a stable and safe job beyond the assigned frame of opportunities. As we see from the example above, Aleš was in intermittent employment, had very little security and no real prospects that this might change. All in all, data analysis demonstrates that the quality of life of young workers in this study is maintained through the security attained and wealth and assets accumulated by previous generations, which actually masks their increased precariousness and
dependence. Apart from generational differences, there are also other intersections that speak of rising inequality in Slovenia, and these are explored further below. The sample of Slovenian interviewees, presented in Chapter Five, speaks of ethnic diversity and highlights how historical and current immigration flows characterised the region.

During the transition and later on when Slovenia joined the EU, it became a country of immigration. Therefore, traditional immigration from former Yugoslavia is now combined also with immigration from the West and some other CEE countries. Experiences of new immigrants are thus particularly telling for detecting rising inequalities within a society that has a strong informal economy. As demonstrated earlier, workers lean on their social capital in order to get work and preserve their quality of life. Due to this, most Slovenian workers in this study did not perceive themselves as lacking in economic capital. This was, however, different for new immigrants who lacked other forms of capital that could effectively be turned into economic capital. This is well-explained by Jernej, a naturalised Slovenian originating from Ukraine, who migrated to Slovenia from Hungary in 1996 and then left for the UK in 2006:

‘Slovenia is obviously a lot better than Hungary, at least at the time. In 1996 it was a really, really big difference. But as you might have experienced, although seemingly in Slovenia the quality of life is improving, the roads are better, the communication, transport is higher quality. I don’t think that proportion between income and expenses are improving. Actually I think it has worsened. Especially in the sector I worked in, which is art, art ceramics, pottery. So I’ve reached the point, where I just couldn’t sustain myself, so I had to leave.’

(Making and teaching ceramics, Slovenian, Male, 37, PG)

Here, we see how the changed situation in Slovenia pushed Jernej, who lacked social capital, to emigrate. Due to this lack of social capital, new immigrants lack the potential to participate equally in an informal economy that mitigates the effects of the rising systemic inequalities. Although the gradualist model in Slovenia was successful and it eased the transition, the entry of Slovenia into
the EU, the adoption of the euro in 2007 and aforementioned poor investment and political decisions after 2004 created discrepancies between earnings and increasing prices. Migrants’ gaze thus indicates that after Slovenia’s entry into the EU and the Eurozone, life in that country has become increasingly hard for those on the margins of society, who are particularly vulnerable to systemic changes and the deepening of inequalities. As we saw above, there are important temporal dimensions, which indicate stark differences amongst older and newer generations of migrants. Moreover, there are differences amongst diverse ethnic, racial and migrant groups positioned within the hierarchy of acceptability, as is explored further below.

Although Slovenia is quite ethnically and religiously diverse, it is still important to note that nation building\(^\text{17}\) in Slovenia has been built upon ethnicity. This ethnic approach to nationality in Slovenia, similar to Poland, on the one hand implies an unmarked whiteness and on the other the legitimate form of language. Although minorities originating from the South or East are white, they embody their ethnicity through their names, accents and language. This constructs them as lacking in national cultural capital, which thus denies their belonging to the nation and assigns them a specific social position. As Irena explains, Slovenians look down on migrants coming from the East and South, but feel proud to have migrants from the West coming in:

> I’ve never heard anyone complaining about people from England buying houses. They are always very welcome and you know we’re proud that someone from England would be interested in our little country, whereas from former Yugoslavia it would I think be less positive, if not even negative. Again nothing direct but I

\(^{17}\) Negative consequences of nation building are, for instance, visible in the case of ‘the erased’. The erasure from the register of permanent residents implemented by the administrative bodies of the Republic of Slovenia in 1992 was an arbitrary act that did not have any basis in law. The erasure mainly (but not exclusively) affected people born in other republics of the former Yugoslavia who had Yugoslav citizenship and also citizenship of another republic of the former Yugoslavia, but lived in the former Socialist Republic of Slovenia where they had permanent addresses. More on erasure on:
always had a feeling that they weren’t exactly welcome… And again former Yugoslavia and Romania and Bulgaria, there have been lots of talks about migrants coming over and not working.’
(Research assistant, Slovenian, Female, 25, PG)

Irena’s example demonstrates how nesting orientalism positions diverse ethnic groups and migrants in the hierarchy of acceptability. Apart from immigration from the South and East, Slovenia also became an interesting destination for immigration from the West. Official statistics show that in the first years after EU enlargement, approximately the same amount of British nationals migrated to Slovenia per year as Slovenian nationals to the UK (SURT 2007a). In this regard, Irena’s example indicates that there is a fascination with migrants coming from the West and a moral disregard for those coming from the South or East. The moral failings of those from the South and East are constructed upon the narratives of the work ethic and the welfare state, which point to similar class logic to that which operates on CEE migrants in the UK, as was discussed in Chapters Two. Nesting orientalisms are, however, not only related to production but also to the possibilities for consumption, as explained by Filip:

‘I think the fact that Yugoslavia broke out of the general Socialist bloc in the 50s definitely makes for a difference between us and say the more traditional Eastern bloc countries because we had a more open market. So for instance the goods that we had access to, we had a much broader selection, we were able to travel so I think we are less obsessed with that gate having been opened in the 1990s. And the way that that’s reflected is the way that we perceive material goods. And also in terms of what we strive towards…’
(Associate Solicitor, Slovenian, Male, 31, PG)

In contrast to Soviet bloc countries, Slovenia as part of the former Yugoslavia allowed completely free travel to its citizens and also the import of Western goods, which was exercised quite frequently by Slovenians bordering on Austria and Italy. According to Luthar (2006), who researched the memories of Slovene shoppers, these shopping trips had great symbolic value and meaning that offered Yugoslavs not only an escape from the culture of shortages, but
also a less pleasant encounter with feelings of otherness and inferiority when faced with the West. And on the other hand, these consumption trips and diverse history have always served former Yugoslavs to differentiate themselves and construct their superiority in relation to Soviet bloc countries (Marc 2009; Todorova 1997). In other words superiority is constructed upon the judgement of taste\textsuperscript{18}, which is intrinsically linked to consumption capacity and access. Although during the transition Western retail companies colonised Slovenia, as in Poland, and dumped their ‘Eastern’ goods there, this different history points to differences in how Polish and Slovenian workers generate use-value. It further serves Slovenian workers to create their superiority in relation to Polish workers. In this regard, Slovenian workers emphasise their ability to have private businesses, to travel and to access Western goods during the socialist years. As Vesna explains, they perceive themselves as being closer to capitalism and as such more modernised as compared to former Soviet bloc countries:

‘For these people is quite similar like it used to be in Slovenia… They are still a bit, I mean, behind... I would say that Slovenian people are a bit more modernised… But these eastern countries and Hungary, they are still a bit like that, socialistic.’

(Shift leader in a hotel, Slovenian, Female, 26, BA)

This example demonstrates how a (self)colonial narrative is constructed through the binary opposition between obsolete communism/socialism and modern capitalism. It provides evidence of nesting orientalisms that are built upon the hegemonic binary logic of the imperial post-socialist order, and act as a tool for self-evaluation. As we saw in the previous chapter, this logic operates equally on the East and the West, and can be used either for structural economic and political gains or in workers’ personal politics to re-claim their value. Although we saw earlier in this chapter that nowadays it is actually contemporary Poland that is more neo-liberalised, Vesna’s example

\textsuperscript{18} For instance, the word ‘Czech’ was used in the former Yugoslavia as a derogatory marker for someone defined as less modern on account of their consumption capacity and their inability to access and possess Western goods that had a high symbolic value.
demonstrates how self-colonisation acts in the minds of Slovenian workers and materialises in nesting orientalisms redefined according to the political and economic divisions that characterise the post-socialist world. Here, we see how ideological political and economic divisions are maintained through a cultural politics that legitimises neoliberal hegemony as the modernising project. The (self)colonial imagination further dictates who does and who does not belong to the Slovenian nation. Apart from ethnic diversity, Slovenia is also characterised by religious diversity. Although Slovenia has other faiths, it is still predominantly Roman Catholic. Alenka explains that Catholicism and atheism seem to be prevalent in Slovenia, and neither of them is particularly open to other ways of living or believing:

‘I found it very hard to be myself in all ways in Slovenia, especially maybe ways of expressing myself spiritually, because I don’t fit into the Catholic or the Atheist way, which seem to be prevalent, either, or. If you are something else, you are strange.’

(Editorial assistant, Slovenian, Female, 35, BA)

Here, we see how both atheist and Catholic orthodoxy seem to be exclusionary for people who are different, which can also impact migration. However in comparison to Poland, the Catholic Church does not play such an important role in Slovenian institutional politics. Nevertheless, the orthodoxy still excludes ethnic and religious minorities, and as explained by Miha, also sexual minorities:

‘I would say culture wise we are very closed and I have friends that are 25 years old or 30 or 35 and they are scared of gay people. Things like that don’t happen in London, in Slovenia they do.’

(Selfemployed, Slovenian, Male, 36, SE)

Here we see how orthodoxy in Slovenia is built, apart from ‘Slovenian-ness’ and whiteness, upon heteronormativity. All these grounds can thus act as an incentive to migrate to a multicultural metropolis where various forms of diversity are more accepted. In this regard, some Slovenian interviewees also expressed that they chose the UK and London in particular because they
wanted to experience living in a place that is characterised by what some interviewees refer to as a ‘global diversity’.

3.5 Conclusions
This chapter has demonstrated how diverse approaches to transition in Poland and Slovenia created very different political and socio economic realities which also impacted diverse migration flows and self-value of Polish and Slovenian workers. Although in both countries production and consumption patterns and (self)value have been altered, there are substantial differences between Poland and Slovenia that arise from their diverse histories and different imposition of the neoliberal imperial project. While Polish ‘shock therapy’ characterised by neoliberal conservative policies had a ‘push’ effect on a whole generation of young Poles, and even more so on specific groups within, the gradualist approach taken up in Slovenia resulted in modest emigration that is mostly driven by the small size of the country and the limited opportunities therein.

In Poland, the increased competition for scarce jobs enabled the lowering of labour standards, increased working hours, produced the disappearance of the work-life balance and disciplined workers into a hardworking culture. This further had specific class, age, gender, sexual and racial dimensions and resulted in deteriorating rights for some groups. The Polish example demonstrates that the neoliberal imperial project imposes a homogeneous class culture and morality that aims to discipline and utilise the global and local poor. In contrast, the contextually driven gradualist approach in Slovenia prevented unrestricted social-dumping practices, which enabled the maintenance of the social protection system, social cohesion and work-life balance.

Since the neoliberal imperial project has not yet achieved equal ‘success’ in Slovenia, Slovenian workers have not yet been disciplined into a hardworking
culture, and emigration to the UK has been modest. Nevertheless, after EU accession and entry into the Eurozone, Slovenia has been subsumed into neoliberal hegemony, which is visible in the increasing social stratification and emigration of some groups of workers, even if this is often masked by a strong informal economy, inherited assets and social security and wealth accumulated by older generations. As such, this chapter casts a critical perspective on the agentic choices of CEE workers and exposes differences amongst diverse CEE groups. It shows that migrant workers’ movement to the UK is informed by the unequal economic geographies of the East and the West. Moreover, it is informed by increasingly globalised consumption patterns that civilise peripheral subjectivities, increase the global divide and fuel migration.

In this regard there are again similarities and differences amongst Poland and Slovenia, which arise from diverse histories of socialism as well as transition process. Although the opening of post-socialist markets enabled multinational retail firms to colonise both Slovenia and Poland, this form of colonisation had different effects on Polish and Slovenian workers’/consumers’ (self)value. These differences are linked to historically very different possibilities to access Western goods and are also visible in nesting orientalisms through which Slovenian workers construct their superiority in relation to former Soviet bloc countries. These nesting orientalisms speak of self-colonisation that legitimises neoliberal hegemony as the modernising project. Changed consumption patterns and capacities also redefined nesting orientalisms in Poland and moreover act as a migration stimulus to the West. In other words the chapter exposes the increasingly globally homogeneous class logic characterised by the hegemonic binary logic of the imperial post-socialist order, which is not only utilised for structural economic and political gains, but also in order to discipline and divide workers.
The importance of consumption is further visible in the (self)colonial imagination of the West. This is built upon the hegemonic binary logic of the imperial post-socialist order, which creates a specific reputation and expectations of the West and affects Slovenian and Polish workers’ sense of inferiority in relation to the West. This comparison thus provides direct proof that the neoliberal imperial project aims to discipline people on various local scales by imposing a seemingly a-historical, non-ideological and mutually beneficial forms of production and consumption that in fact destroy and disable alternative cultural political economies on a global scale.
4 Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

4.1 Introduction

The theoretical and conceptual framework for this research project is devised by transdiciplinary adoption of a Bourdieuan reflexive sociological theory (Adkins and Skeggs 2004; Al Ariss and Syed 2011; Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999; Hage 1998; Haylett 2003; Kelly and Lusis 2006; Levitt and Schiller 2004; Lovell 2000, 2003; Loyal 2009; McCall 1992; Özbilgin and Tatli 2005; Puwar 2009; Sayer 2005; Skeggs 2004b; Tatli and Özbilgin 2012; Weiss 2011). This framework was adopted because it enables complex intersectional analysis of class/group formation and its effects across spatial and temporal dimensions and varying modalities of knowledge. As such it offers a theoretical framework for researching intersectional commodification of migrant workers and its effects.

The chapter commences by discussing the need to engage with intersectional analysis in all its complexity in order to explore the commodification processes of migrant labour and its effect in contemporary globalised cultural political economy. I then argue that a Bourdieuan (1986; 1990a; 1990b; 1998; 2005) focus on social space and symbolic power enables the exploration of class/group formation and its effects at multiple levels, perspectives and scales, by bridging the divide between economic, cultural and political arenas, between discursive and material positions and between structure and agency. To that end, I offer the adoption of a Bourdieuan conceptual framework of different forms of capitals, field and habitus that enable the exploration of the complex, multilevel, comparative, relational, transnational and intersectional commodification of migrant labour and its effects.
4.2 Intersectional commodification within contemporary globalised cultural political economy

Commodification is a term that originates from the Marxist critique of political economy (Marx 1973). In Marxist terms, a commodity is defined as any good or service that is attributed an exchange-value and acts as a product on the market. Human labour also can act as a specific commodity that can be exchanged on the market. Its exchange-value is constructed through an abstraction. In this regard Hawkes argues that due to “the fetishism of the commodity”, we no longer see the “real” thing, but only its “form of appearance” (2003: 100). It is not labour that represents value, but the objectified and alienated form of life itself. Commodification is thus an ideological act that can only be transcended when human beings understand its alienated and constructed nature.

In this regard Skeggs argues that ‘central to Marx’s perspective was the formation of different subjects known through their relationship to objects’ (2004b: 8). This means that the relationship of subjects to specific commodities also generated different forms of personhood, some associated with exchange and others associated with use-value. As Skeggs argues with Kopytoff (1986) this formed the basis of colonialism, where the colonial subjects were perceived through their attachment via use-value to objects, and the colonisers were able to transcend this ‘primitive’ view and perceive objects as the basis for exchange (2004b: 8). It is thus crucial to explore how and by whom the value of specific persons or groups is attributed. In order to do that, Skeggs points out that:

‘We must keep exchange- and use-value separate, for this enables us to see how different groups have different possibilities for evaluation. It is also important not to reduce everything to exchange-value…By shifting attention away from the object/asset being exchanged to the relationships and power that make the exchange possible in the first place, we focus instead on whose perspective makes something valuable, hence exchangeable. This allows us then to explore the power that exists between groups that enables some to elicit/extract and appropriate dispositions and objects from others. It is also important to think that value may exist beyond the extraction process.’ (2004b: 11)
Marxist critique serves as an important point of departure that necessarily needs to be extended if we want to explore the complex and intersectional commodification of migrant labour and its effects within contemporary capitalism, characterised as it is by transnationalised production and consumption patterns. In this regard, Appaduarai argues that Marxist fetishism of the commodity has been replaced by ‘production fetishism’ and ‘fetishism of the consumer’ (Appadurai 1996: 42). On one hand production fetishism masks the true nature of transnational political economy and disguises global inequalities that drive contemporary production process. This is visible in current anti-immigration rhetoric and scapegoating of migrant workers in the UK, which was discussed in Chapter Two. On the other fetishism of the consumer transforms consumers through commodity flows and fetishises their agency, while in fact they are at best choosers. In this regard Chapter Three demonstrated how consumption became part of the capitalist civilising process in Poland and thus an important stimulus for emigration.

Moreover, within contemporary capitalism many forms of work that were previously done in the private realm have become commodified. This stimulated the rise of ‘consumer services’ that imply place-specific and interactive service work, where workers’ embodied attributes become part of the service and thus crucial within managerial practices, customer service experience and the shaping of workers’ (self)identity (McDowell 2009b: 35). In this regard, Collins argues that 'the treatment of actual bodies as objects and subsequently as commodities within consumer markets as opposed to the appropriation of the labor power that bodies contain may be a more fundamental element of contemporary capitalist economies than is commonly recognized' (2006: 303). In other words, bodies of migrant workers can be turned into objects and thus marketed as specific commodities that can be bought or sold by employment agencies and employers for specific types of jobs, and consumed as such by customers. For that, it is necessary to explore
how value gets ascribed to people and groups; how groups are formed symbolically through marking and categorisation. ‘An understanding of inscription, perspective, value and exchange is central to understanding how difference is made. This is more than economy; it is what makes the economy possible’ (Skeggs 2004b: 13).

In this regard, McDowell et al. (2007) point to the process of dual interpellation within the service sector, where stereotypical assumptions about the value of the embodied attributes of migrant workers are constructed by managers and customers and performed by workers as part of the customer service experience. As such, commodification also prescribes a certain performativity of workplace identities to workers. This indicates that workers’ embodied selves are not only assigned a specific value, but also that they can be disciplined to perform the embodied signs that act as ‘price-tags’ available for consumption. These ‘price-tags’ can on the one hand encompass embodied class, racial and gender identities, and on the other an embodied style that is imposed as part of an organisational brand and which can come in the form of dress codes, ways of addressing customers, etc.

In this regard, Wolkowitz developed a wider definition of ‘body work’ that encompasses not only the bodily performance of workers but also the work on clients’ bodies that ‘involves the care, adornment, pleasure, discipline and cure of other’s bodies’ (Wolkowitz 2002a: 497). In other words, body work encompasses both embodied and emotional labour. Emotional labour was first coined by Hochschild (1983), and has since then been used to denote a requirement to perform certain emotions at work and to manage one’s own emotions in relation to customers or co-workers. It can also involve work in which people are required to interpret others’ emotions and provoke emotional reactions from customers (Dyer et al. 2010: 638). This can be particularly challenging for migrant workers who are required to re-learn ‘cultures of
emotional labour’ in the new context with different norms and expectations (Dyer et al. 2008: 2033). Since performances of identities are culturally defined, the commodification of migrant workers and its effects demands complex intersectional analysis across spatial and temporal dimensions.

4.2.1 Complex intersectional analysis across spatial and temporal dimensions

Intersectionality was first born out of black feminist struggles that challenged the universal conceptions of the category ‘woman’ (hooks 1981). These struggles were recognised when intersectionality experienced academic and political legitimisation in the 90s, the term having been coined by Kimberly Crenshaw (1991). During this time there were many feminists who pointed to the need to carry out intersectional analysis, also including the integration of other categories (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992; Brah 1996; Collins 1991).

According to Brah and Phoenix, intersectionality means ‘the complex, irreducible, varied, and variable effects which ensue when multiple axes of differentiation – economic, political, cultural, psychic, subjective and experiential – intersect in historically specific context’ (2004: 76). This definition is useful because it points to contextual and temporal socio-economic, political and cultural dimensions that influence how multiple axes of differentiation intersect within a specific time and place and the effects that they produce on the micro subjective and experiential level.

In other words, it points to its complexity that is further reflected in the UN’s definition of intersectionality ‘as a form of racism and racial discrimination which is not the sum of race PLUS another form of discrimination to be dealt with separately but is a distinct and particular experience of discrimination unified in one person or group’ (UN 2001). This definition is further important because it denotes that there are no natural or inner attributes that construct race and racial identities, but rather
a set of socially ascribed characteristics that can take different shapes and forms in different historical and socio-economic contexts (Gunaratnam 2003). This aspect is crucial for this thesis as it explores the complexity of on-going and emerging colonial processes and accompanying racisms and their effects.

In contemporary scholarship there are increased calls for engaging with intersectional complexity (McCall 2005; McDowell 2008; Yuval-Davis 2011). In this regard, some scholars call for the transcending of disciplinary boundaries or even for a theoretical promiscuity that could embrace intersectionality in all its complexity (Brah and Phoenix 2004; Healy 2009; McCall 2005; McDowell 2008; Metcalfe and Woodhams 2012; Tatli and Özbilgin 2012). Similarly I argue that there is a need to maintain complexity that can, on one hand, grasp the power and politics of established categories, and on the other not lose sight of the on-going processes that constantly (re)define and (re)produce them. Therefore at the same time as we take into account rapid changes, various mobilities and translations of categories, we must not forget that ‘what appears as mobile and changing can hold its shape’ (Ahmed 2012: 186).

By maintaining the focus on complexity we can uncover how labour identities are constantly shaped and reshaped by class, race, gender and other intersections. This is especially important within contemporary capitalism shaped by neoliberalism, which on the surface acts as a kind of non-politics that is equal to all, while it in fact deepens inequality. As it was demonstrated in Chapter Two this supposed non-politics is achieved through presentation of cultural, diversity and identity politics as being separated from political economy, while in fact they have been marketized. This deception is then used to re-evaluate subjectivities, redefine citizenship in relation to the market and discipline these new subjectivities with the new moral order. This moral is centred around individual responsibility and hard work (Haylett 2001, 2003). The sole responsibility for failure or success on the market lies with the
individual. It is individuals’ fault if they are unable to remain competitive and constantly available.

This moral economy further enables the increased subordination of people’s private lives to their working lives. Neoliberalism, characterised by individualisation, service and knowledge work, thus increasingly blurs the boundaries between work and life (Fleming and Spicer 2004; Lewis 2003b). This economy on the one hand creates work-rich and time-poor knowledge workers, and on the other service workers that provide commodified services to the former in low-paid and insecure jobs (McDowell 2009b). In this regard, Anderson argues that there is an increase in precarious work that acts as a flipside to the work-life balance, because it results in a general insecurity of life that prevents workers from anticipating a future (Anderson 2010: 304). This demands that workplace identities are not explored only through work, but through an interplay between work and life (Leonard 2010). This is even more important when exploring migration processes, where migrant workers do not need to negotiate their (self)positioning only within new working environments, but also to do so within completely new contexts.

Moving beyond workplaces is also crucial for the remaking of class politics. As Wills (2008) argues, class is not only about employment relations, but is about processes in and outside the workplace. If we change the way we think about class, we can find new or retrieve memories of possibilities for class politics that have effectively been forgotten within contemporary capitalism. As Özbilgin et al. argue, the work-life interface should be approached through an intersectional analysis that does not focus on personal attributes, but on employees’ structural location; this can uncover ‘historical and structural power relations and the resulting unequal work-life needs’ (Özbilgin et al. 2011: 190). This is especially important if we want to uncover the effects of subtle and misrecognised power structures that construct the idea and the ideal of a specific
class of worker. By exploring the interplay between work and life, we can uncover multiple power relations that are significant in commodification processes and in workers’ performative, transformative and resisting strategies.

Exploring the commodification of migrant labour and its effects further entails an analysis that is able to grasp how migrants are constructed and perceive this construction differently in different places and times that are part of their migratory trajectory. In this regard McDowell (2008) argues that there is a need to incorporate spatial and temporal dimensions into intersectional analysis, and one way to achieve this methodologically is to take a comparative approach. To explore the intersectional commodification of migrant labour, I compare how intersections play out across and within different places and times, in work and in life and how they affect different in-groups that are constructed as the same. This further calls for engagement with materialised postcolonialism that is able to link the discursive to the material and macro issues to micro lived experiences, in order to expose the global inequalities that prompt and reproduce migration flows and in order to critically evaluate migrants’ agency, choices and strategies (McEwan 2003; McIlwaine 2008). Such a framework enables the exploration of (self)imagination that has become an ‘organised field of social practices, a form of work (in the sense of both labour and culturally organised practice), and a form of negotiation between sites of agency (individuals) and globally defined fields of possibility’ (Appadurai 1996: 31).

Complex, multilevel, transnational, comparative and relational focus is able to uncover not just differences, but also commonalities of exclusion that could provide solidarity and inform collective action towards a fairer re-distribution of resources. As such, it can address the difficult question of scales of justice that on the one hand arise from the balance encompassing a problematic of impartiality, and on the other from the geographical map that stands for the problematic of framing (Fraser 2009: 1-2). In other words, the conceptual
framework adopted can uncover injustices of recognition, redistribution and representation (or misrecognition, maldistribution and misrepresentation) by going beyond nation states and by including a meta-political frame (Fraser 1995, 2007, 2009). Although many scholars mentioned in this section offer methods for how to approach complex intersectional analysis, there are still many unanswered questions about how intersectional analysis can be achieved conceptually, methodologically and empirically.

In this regard, I argue that a Bourdieuan conceptual framework enables intersectional analysis that can uncover multiple power relations associated with social and embodied categories, spatial and temporal dimensions and varying modalities of knowledge. Bourdieuan framework takes into account both production and consumption processes and is concerned with how structural and institutional schemas are assigned to the body and how they affect the body (Adkins and Skeggs 2004; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 127; Lovell 2000; McDowell 2009b; Pettinger 2005; Witz et al. 2003). It achieves that by focusing on the symbolic economy that encompasses the ‘systemic organization of the symbolic, which enables exchange and the attribution of value across a range of fields’ (Skeggs 2004b: 15). Within contemporary capitalism in which cultural symbolic economy drives capital accumulation Bourdieuan framework can uncover and challenge symbolic practices that legitimise and enable current economic practices (Lash 1993). The following section presents the usefulness of adopted Bourdieuan framework for exploring intersectional commodification and its effects in this respect.

4.3 Social space and symbolic power
By bridging the binary oppositions of objectivist and constructivist knowledge production, a Bourdieuan framework enables the exploration of social class formation and its effects. This is achieved by taking into account cultural,
economic and political elements, as well as discursive and material and structural and agentic aspects. In this regard, Bourdieu argues that class or more precisely group making should be studied as a social space where there is a struggle and competition for resources:

‘What exists is not “social classes” as understood in the realist, substantialist and empiricist mode of thinking adopted by both opponents and proponents of the existence of class, but rather a social space… a multi-dimensional space that can be constructed empirically…by discovering the powers or forms of capital which are or can become efficient…in the struggle (or competition) for the appropriation of scarce goods of which this universe is the site.’ (Bourdieu 1987: 3)

The Bourdieuan conception of social class is useful because it is not treated only as economic, but also as a social relation. Rather than presupposing class identity and action, it is concerned with how social class is constructed, how it comes to be through relational, spatial and temporal dimensions (Bourdieu 1989). Instead of ‘imposing a vision of division’, a Bourdieuan framework allows us to uncover how divisions are constructed through symbolic power and what are its effects (Bourdieu 1989: 19). This has important cultural, economic and political implications, because it can expose the cultural construction of class and its economic and political effects. Also, Wills argues that ‘making class a political project would demand a focus on identity-making rather than the excavation and mobilization of identities that already exist’ (2008: 308). In subsequent chapters, this research exposes how the cultural construction of A8 labour came to be across times and spaces and how it affects Polish and Slovenian migrant workers. A Bourdieuan framework thus enables the exploration of symbolic power, e.g. the power to make groups or the power that ‘aims at imposing the vision of legitimate division’ (Bourdieu 1989: 22). In other words, he recognises the importance of knowledge and linguistic production in group making. According to Bourdieu, groups begin to exist only through knowledge and recognition:

‘A group, a class, a gender, a region, or a nation begins to exist as such, for those who belong to it as well as for the others, only when it is distinguished, according
He argues that social space functions as symbolic space that is organised according to the logic of difference and acts 'as distinctive signs and as signs of distinction' (Bourdieu 1989: 20). Bourdieu thus realises the importance of signs and their meanings, e.g. of semiosis in group making. This realisation comes as a critique of Saussurean approaches to semiosis that tend to focus only on the internal constitution of text and ignore the socio-historical conditions of its production and reception (Thompson cf. Bourdieu 1991: 4). He argues that, like any other social practice, linguistic signs, too, are socio-historically produced and if they become dominant and legitimised they have the power to construct social groups and affect the practices and (self)positionality of those that are recognised as belonging to the group.

As he puts it, ‘individuals or groups are objectively defined not only by what they are but by what they are reputed to be, a “being-perceived” which, even if it closely depends on their being, is never totally reducible to this’ (Bourdieu 1990a: 135). Language plays an important role in group formation and assigns certain groups a specific position within a social space. It is thus crucial to first explore the symbolic formation of groups. As Bourdieu argues, one ‘must take into account the symbolic fabrication of groups, of group-making. It is through this needless work of representation (in every sense of the term) that social agents try to impose their vision of the world or the vision of their own position in that world, and to define their social identity’ (Bourdieu 1987: 10-11). In short, if one wants to uncover the symbolic power of group making, one should also engage with the analysis of discourse.
4.3.1 Discourse and symbolic power

Although language has always featured as central in Bourdieu’s work, only in his later work did he start to engage with the analysis of discourse (Bourdieu 1991, 1998b). A Bourdieuan framework could thus benefit by having a more coherent conceptualisation that connect language analysis with sociological analysis and grasp the importance of discourse in group formation in late capitalism. In order to go beyond this, I draw from the scholarly discipline of critical discourse analyses (CDA), which has developed in combination with cultural political economy in critical realist circles (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999; Fairclough 2003; Fairclough et al. 2004; Jessop 2004). Similarly to Bourdieu, this approach to CDA goes beyond the Saussurean approach to semiosis by taking into account also its non-semiotic preconditions (Fairclough et al. 2001). As such, it offers a distinctive vision of the relationship between discursive and material practices and points to how CDA might fruitfully contribute to critical research on aspects of capitalism (Jessop and Oosterlynck 2008: 31).

CDA defines discourse as a form of social practice that produces meanings through various ‘semiotic modalities’, such as language (written, oral, embodied and other text) or visual images and videos, and is socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 8; Fairclough 2009: 163). As such, discourse is only ‘an element of social process that is dialectically related to others’ (Fairclough 2009: 163). This dialectical-relational approach demands that CDA be integrated within other theoretical frameworks in order to explore the role of discourse in producing, maintaining or transforming power relations and its effects on individuals and groups. In this regard, Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999) argue for a transdisciplinary approach in which concepts from CDA can also be usefully internalised into a Bourdieuan conceptual framework.
Also Bourdieu, drawing from Austin’s (1976) performative utterance, argues that the role of utterance is not only “to describe a state of affairs or state some fact”, but also “to execute an action” (Bourdieu 1991: 109). For Bourdieu, language is not simply about information exchange, but also about the pursuit of symbolic profit, about establishing what is to be valued (Crompton 2008). Nevertheless there are differences in the understanding of textual practice between Bourdieu and CDA. Myles argues that ‘CDA’s fundamental concern is with textual orders rather than orders of practice’ (Myles 2010: 36). This can obscure performative practices that are influenced by and influence language. And on the other hand Bourdieu is interested in how language marks out class, race or any other social position and loses sight of the primary role of language (Myles 2010).

In this regard, CDA offers a very useful conceptualisation for interdiscursive analysis amongst fields, which can be particularly useful for uncovering the legitimised language of group making that is discursively mediated and characterised by relationships amongst fields. It offers the uncovering of the order of discourse, ‘a semiotic dimension of (networks of) social practices which constitute social fields, institutions, organizations, etc.’ (Fairclough 2009: 164). The order of discourse can thus be understood as a semiotic form of a regime of (meta)governance (Fairclough 2005). I argue, in this and the following chapter, that the internalisation of CDA into a Bourdieuan conceptual framework offers a useful conceptual and methodological framework for exploring discursive practices amongst fields and their effect.

The focus on discursive practices and their effects enables us to see that the symbolic power to make groups further rests on the condition that those who are imposing a specific vision need to be recognised as legitimate actors. In this regard, Bourdieu argues that ‘a “class”, be it social, sexual, ethnic, or otherwise, exists when there are agents capable of imposing themselves, as authorised to
speak and to act officially in its place and in its name’ (Bourdieu 1987: 15). In other words, agents need to be recognised and granted symbolic power to make groups. ‘As any form of performative discourse, symbolic power has to be based on the possession of symbolic capital’ (Bourdieu 1989: 23). Linguistic exchange, which has the power to create groups, is thus also economic exchange, because it acts as a ‘sign of authority’ (Bourdieu 1991: 66). Or, in other words, there exists a legitimate language and not everyone has the symbolic capital to act as authorities for its legitimisation. Taking into account power dynamics in the language exchange, which is hidden in the history of group making, a Bourdieuian framework also enables the uncovering of the postcolonial condition (Loyal 2009; Puwar 2004, 2009). Or as Bourdieu puts it, in order to ‘escape the effects of the labour of naturalization which every group tends to produce in order to legitimise itself and fully justify its existence, one must reconstruct the historical labour which has produced social divisions and the social vision of these divisions’ (Bourdieu 1991: 248). In other words, he argues that groups are products of history and can be transformed by history.

In order to understand the specific labour identity and value assigned to so-called ‘Eastern European’ workers, there is a need to start by exploring historical and socio-economic origins of this political power of naming. By looking at the origins of group making, we are able to expose colonial history and an on-going colonial condition that is inscribed in the name of development, security and management. This also entails an epistemic move towards the rarely recognised knowledge production that exposes the on-going colonial processes that characterised CEE transition to market economies and Europeanisation, as discussed in Chapter Two. This points to the relevance of postcolonial studies for understanding the complexity of history, geography, sameness and difference within post-socialist world (Owczarzak 2009; Stenning and Hörschelmann 2008). This understanding is crucial not only for critical exploration of how a particular vision of division came to be, but also how
it affects CEE workers and how workers themselves reinvest in symbolic struggles.

As Bourdieu argues in conversation with Wacquant, ‘both spaces, that of objective positions and that of stances, must be analysed together, treated as “two translations of the same sentence” as Spinoza puts it’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 105). It is therefore crucial to explore commodification processes not just on the macro and meso levels but also on the individual micro level. This enables us to go beyond the analysis of discourses and engage also with the material aspects that these discourses produce. Symbolic struggles are fought over representation and can, according to Bourdieu (1989), on the one hand take an objectivist turn, where certain collectives demand their visibility or where individuals manipulate the image of their own position within a social space. On the other hand, these struggles may take a subjective turn and try to transform categories, legitimate classifications and essentially challenge ‘the words and the names that construct social reality’ (Bourdieu 1989: 20). A Bourdieuan relational framework does not only allow us to see how workers’ identities are shaped by dominant discourses within the field and across fields, but also how workers themselves perform or transform them in order to resist or compete on the labour market.

Workplace identities are often multiple and contradictory and encompass compliance as well as resistance (McDowell et al. 2007). It is thus necessary to take into account the fact that workers’ symbolic strategies can consist of ‘the manipulation of the most reliable symbols of social position, those which sociologists are fond of using as indicators, such as occupation and social origin’ (Bourdieu 1987: 12). This last instance is very important because it points to how workers themselves can strategically use these symbols in order to engage within the symbolic struggles of the field. In other words, workers’ performative, transformative and resisting strategies are informed by the
symbolic power of naming. The self is not neutral, but is performatively produced (Skeggs 2004b: 57). In comparing Bourdieu’s and Butler’s take on performativity, Lovell argues that Bourdieu offers both the contestable nature of the social and its compelling presence, which is often lacking in postmodernist ‘performances’ (Lovell 2000: 15). Also Puwar (2004) argues that, unlike Butler, Bourdieu offers a conceptual framework for uncovering the racialised and classed power structures hidden under performances.

A Bourdieuian framework is thus able to transcend the problematic division between structure and agency. We first need to understand how identities are produced and consumed and then how they are performed and transformed. In this regard Skeggs (2004b, 2004c, 2011) further argues that we should also think beyond exchange-value in order to uncover how the dominant symbolic is re-valued. She argues that in order to do that, we must be attentive to ‘periperformative utterances that do not rely on the appropriation of the cultures of others in order to generate value’ (Skeggs 2004c: 90). Migrant workers come from different fields and different social spaces, so they might not fit into the dominant categories of recognition within the new field. They also have very different set of perceptions and values, which might generate unique responses to the dominant symbolic. It is thus crucial to put an equal focus on workers’ agentic strategies. By adopting Bourdieuan conceptual framework in accordance with feminist critiques, it is possible to incorporate agency with the structural and material elements of analysis that are often missing in both structuralist and post-modern feminist research (Adkins and Skeggs 2004; Lovell 2000, 2003; McCall 1992; McNay 2004; Skeggs 1997, 2004b). Nevertheless, there are still many unanswered questions as to how this complex analysis can be achieved conceptually and methodologically. In the following sections, I argue that a Bourdieuan general theory of field, habitus and capitals offers a useful conceptual framework for exploring intersectional commodification and its effects.
4.4 Intersectional markers of difference as forms of capital

Although Bourdieu is often received as a theorist of class, his concepts have been effectively used by scholars exploring class, gender and race relations and their intersections (Adkins and Skeggs 2004; Hage 1998; Paynter 2001; Puwar 2004, 2009; Skeggs 2004b, 2009; Puwar 2004; Skeggs 2004b; Tatli and Ozbilgin 2012; Weiss 2011). To move away from an economic-only logic and to account for the structure and functioning of the social world, Bourdieu (1986) elaborated three forms of capital, namely economic, cultural and social capital. In this typology, economic capital can be immediately converted into material value. Cultural capital is, on the other hand, accumulated through the process of ‘cultivation’ and is, as such, of symbolic value (Brubaker 2005). Social capital is also not immediately recognised, and consists of networks, acquaintances, connections that can be of substantial, also material, value in all aspects of life. The characteristic of all forms of capital is that they have the potential of being transformed into one another.

To this, Bourdieu added symbolic capital, which represents the conversion of any of the above three capitals such that they receive recognition and legitimacy on the field (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). ‘The conversion into symbolic is central in understanding power and inequality’ (Skeggs 2004b: 16). Acting as a form of credential, symbolic capital can assign value to diverse groups of workers by appropriating different forms of capital into what appears to be a distinct human capital. A Bourdieuan conception of different forms of capital thus offers an alternative explanation of human capital (Al Ariss and Syed 2011). It exposes what is realisable as a resource and for whom it creates exchange and/or use-value (Skeggs 2004b). It also offers a framework for exploring intersectionality and stratification (Yuval-Davis 2011). In this regard Tatli and Özbilgin (2012) argue that it provides an emic approach to intersectionality that goes beyond pre-established categorical approaches and allows the simultaneous exploration of disadvantage and privilege. As such, it
enables a simultaneous exploration of cultural, political and economic processes of group formation from multiple levels and standpoints.

As mentioned earlier, Bourdieu offers a useful framework for intersectional analysis because of his focus on the body. This is most visible in his concept of cultural capital that can exist in three forms (Bourdieu 1986). First is the objectified state of cultural capital that can be accumulated in the form of cultural goods, such as books, paintings, instruments, etc.. Second is the institutionalised state that comes in institutionally recognised credentials, such as qualifications. And lastly there is the embodied state of cultural capital, whose appropriation comes ‘in the form of what is called culture, cultivation, Bildung, and presupposes a process of embodiment that implies a labour of inculcation and assimilation’ (Bourdieu 1986: 244). Or, in other words, embodied characteristics, such as phenotype, language or dress can play an important role in the accumulation of cultural capital. Therefore the extent to which different classes, ethnic groups, races or migrants are able to integrate within a specific nation state depends upon their cultural capital.

In this regard, Hage argues that ‘practical nationality is best conceived as a form of “national cultural capital”’ (1998: 53). His conception of national cultural capital captures how whiteness defines symbolic belonging to the nation. According to Garner (2006) whiteness can best be grasped as both a resource and a contingent social hierarchy granting differential access to economic, cultural and social capital and which intersects with different social categories that go beyond hegemonic white/non-white paradigms. Similar to privileged class positions, whiteness often remains unchallenged although it can play an important role in structuring social relations (Weiss 2011). In other words, whiteness can act as ‘ontological denial’ (Puwar 2004: 131). The imaginary nation does not rely solely on essentialising the other, but mostly ‘on the construction of the other as an objects of spatial exclusion’ (Skeggs 2004b: 19). This
exclusion presupposes a centre of ‘real’ belonging, where bodies who do not fit, either because of their phenotype, language, accent or any other disposition that differs from the centre are positioned as strangers. This means that ethnicity and race are very much embedded in the notions of nation and nationality (Balibar 1991a; Silverman and Yuval-Davis 1999). It is thus important to view racism as an on-going history that necessary combines and connects the whole set of practices that produce social normalisation and exclusion. This points to the importance of identifying race, ethnicity and colour as separate yet relational criteria (Garner 2006; Grimes 2001; Nkomo 1992).

Another integral part of nationalism and racism is sexism (Lutz et al. Balibar 1991a; 1995); meaning that gender and sexuality in combination with other intersections can play an important role in defining the ‘national body’. Since Bourdieu (1984/2010) understands different social categories only as secondary variables, I argue in accordance with feminist critiques that gender can be understood as a form of embodied cultural capital, when it is converted into symbolic capital and as such legitimised (McCall 1992; Skeggs 2004b, 2004a). Some researchers have further emphasised the importance of moral boundaries as part of social boundaries, which were missing in Bourdieu’s theory and should be perceived as a form of symbolic capital that determines class habitus (Lamont 1992, 2000; Lyon 2007; Sayer 2005). For instance, Lamont (2000) shows how workers create racial boundaries upon moral failings that centre around work ethic, self-reliance and socio-economic status.

As demonstrated in Chapter Two, with EU borders being opened up for internal migration, as well as the deepening economic crisis, CEE workers are increasingly being used by political elites as scapegoats for the weakening of the welfare state and perceived by the native-born working class as competitors for scarce resources. ‘The moral evaluation of cultural characteristics is central to the workings and transmission of power’ and can further have gender
specific dimensions (Skeggs 2004b: 14). For instance CEE migrant women’s racialised sexuality and agency can, through the moral evaluation of cultural characteristics, be perceived as a threat to the national symbolic order (Cappusotti 2007; Samaluk 2009). All in all, the above arguments suggest that diverse groups of workers, ethnic minorities, and old or new migrants can be positioned very differently in the hierarchy of acceptability within a specific place and time.

Although racisms have always taken from all times, traditions, directions and styles in order to naturalise aspects of people’s culture and provide arguments for essentialised difference, under neoliberalism race has become essentially privatised, in the sense of being silenced or made invisible’ (Kuzmanić 1999; Lentin and Titley 2011: 169). Since cultural, diversity and identity politics have been marketized, race along with other intersections becomes important in commodification of migrant labour. Privatisation of race does not only conceal racism, but enables its re-emergence in the name of profit. In other words, the cultural turn enables the emergence of what Balibar calls ‘class racism’, which is constructed through cultural history and invisibilises the dominant cultural and economic order (Balibar 1991b; Haylett 2001).

In this regard, it is furthermore crucial not to lose sight of the material aspects of analysis in order to realise that class, just as gender and race, is an active, ongoing, mutually reproduced process (Acker 2000). Therefore, in addition to cultural and symbolic capitals, economic and social capitals should also be taken into account when exploring the intersectional commodification of migrant labour and its effects. The Bourdieuan concept of capitals thus offers an alternative approach to both the ethnicity paradigm and the black-and-white paradigm. In relation to migration, it is furthermore crucial to look not just at the intersections of categories of difference, but also at how these intersections are shaped by temporal and spatial dimensions (Leonard 2010; McDowell
By incorporating these dimensions, one can escape the so called 'rucksack approaches' that view migrants' cultural capital as reified and ethnically bounded (Erel 2010). To that end, we further need to engage with the concept of the habitus and the field.

4.5 Relationships amongst transnational fields
The notion of the field is, together with the notion of the habitus and capital, the central organising concept in Bourdieu’s work. In analytical terms, the field is defined as ‘a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 97). In order to describe it Bourdieu often uses the metaphor of the game in which players enter with different capitals that determine their value in the game. The concept of the field thus points to the ways in which social relationships are structured by power (Levitt and Schiller 2004). Bourdieu has recognised through his work that the state represents a sort of meta-field. In the context of migration nation states feature as very important meta-fields. They do not just produce specific migration policies and differentiate nationals from non-nationals, but also have the monopoly over legitimate physical and symbolic violence (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992).

Through official discourse the state produces official classifications that perform diagnostics of individuals and groups and assign them specific identity, determine their rights and obligations and monitor their actions through normative and seemingly ‘universal’ state taxonomies (Bourdieu 1990b: 136). These three functions of the state thus impose a right, correct and dominant vision that legitimises social divisions and inequalities that become a living reality for individuals and groups. This results in ‘doxa, an orthodoxy, a right, correct, dominant vision which has more often than not been imposed through struggles against competing visions’ (1998a: 56). This further entails that any
analysis of immigration should first start with emigration, because the lives of migrants do not commence with their entry into their host society, but with conditions in their countries of origin that have brought them to emigrate in the first place. As Sayad argues ‘any study of migratory phenomena that overlooks the emigrant’s conditions of origin is bound only to give a view that is at once partial and ethnocentric’ (2004: 29). Reflexive sociology of migration thus takes seriously historical and socio-economic realities of both the sending and receiving countries and other fields that influence them.

Although nation states are crucial in exploring migratory processes, it is also important to take into account that the state not only influences but is itself influenced by other fields as well as the global economic field (Bourdieu, 1998, 2005; Jessop and Oosterlynck, 2008). The (global) economic field is thus in tight relation with the field of the state. There is also a very close connection between media and political fields that are at the same time ‘both very tightly in the grip of the market and the referendum’ (Bourdieu 1998b: 76). The relations amongst (global) economic, political and media field are reflecting on the labour market and organisations that can also be analysed as fields that are in mutual relationship with other fields (Bourdieu 2005; Özbilgin and Tatli 2005). The economic field, which used to be confined to national boundaries (technical, legal and political), is now integrated within the global economic field that is characterised by an economic policy, which aims at removing obstacles for this integration (Bourdieu 2005: 230).

This economic policy is characterised by a whole set of political and legal measures that are imposing the rule of free exchange on the global market, e.g. the free movement of capital, goods and services. The freeing of global exchange opens various possibilities ‘to exploit differences amongst regions and states in terms of capital and labour costs’ (Bourdieu 2005: 230). According to Sassen (2010) these unrestricted movements systemically destroy other types of
economies, deepen inequality, weaken and corrupt governments and ultimately cause emigration. Uncovering injustices in a globalising world demands engagement with a broader scale that on the one hand allows the exploration of intersections of spatial processes at different scales, and on the other the exploration of power relations not only within the ‘space of places’ but also within the ‘space of flows’ (Fraser 2009: 26; McDowell 2009b: 15).

Migration should thus be explored across 'transnational social fields' (Levitt and Schiller 2004: 1003) that are characterised by metagovernance, which influences the movement of persons, assigns value and affects individuals that move across them. In this regard Fairclough argues that ‘new regimes of governance are increasingly the object of reflexive processes of design within 'metagovernance', which states and inter-state institutions like the European Union are increasingly involved in, and they are characteristically 'judicious mixtures' of hierarchies, markets and networks (Fairclough 2005: 60). Apart from the EU itself, metagovernance is imposed to a large degree by multinational corporations, the most powerful states and international institutions, such as WB, IMF and WTO, which those states control (Bourdieu 2005: 230). Moreover, Bourdieu recognises ‘the field of local powers’ that encompass a set of agents within any locality, any place that exercises its own interests and reproduces or resists symbolic power entrained within the binary logic of the ‘core’ and the ‘periphery’ or ‘local’ and ‘national’ (2005: 136).

Chapter Two uncovered how CEE countries have during the transition and enlargement process undergone neoliberal (self)colonisation that has been imposed by the EU and other international actors and then also taken up by the powerful local actors. Transnational fields are thus characterised by important actors and cultural intermediaries that establish and translate value across them (Bourdieu 1984/2010). For instance politicians, lobbyists, representatives of international institutions and multinational corporations, journalists, various experts, transnational employment agents and employers have access to
different fields. As such they act as intermediaries, whose role is also ‘the translation and evaluation of other cultures’ (Skeggs 2004b: 148). The specific role that transnational employment agencies play in contemporary colonial projects and in attributing value to migrant workers will be explored in Chapters Seven and Eight. In order to explore how these actors operating across transnational fields assign migrant labour a specific value and place within a social space and how this affects workers, it is further necessary to engage with the concept of habitus.

4.6 Habitus –a sense of one’s place and the place of others

Bourdieu argues that habitus functions as an ‘embodied history, internalized as a second nature that is conveniently forgotten as history’ (Bourdieu 1990a: 56). In other words, migrants carry with them a certain history that, through orientalising practices, is often simply forgotten or rewritten in the receiving society. As McDowell argues, ‘immigrants are differently received and socialised depending on their position within racial hierarchies, gender, class background and income/consumption patterns both in their own country and in the country of immigration’ (2008: 496). Different categories of migrants are thus translated and constructed as having specific class habitus, and they perceive this translation differently depending on their original habituation. ‘Habitus is both a system of schemes of production of practices and a system of perception and appreciation of practices…Habitus thus implies a ‘sense of one’s place’ but also a ‘sense of place of others’ (Bourdieu 1989: 19). Migrants are assigned a specific social position because, according to the dominant social order within a field, they are perceived as embodying a specific place with a certain history. Through classifications, naming and policies migrants are constructed as embodying a specific class habitus (Bourdieu 1990a). Nevertheless, this construction is not simply imposed, but rather is objectified also through the practices of individuals.
Systems of inequality can only fully function when they are objectified not only in things but also in bodies. Habitus inhabits institutions and enables their full realisation exactly through the ‘body’s readiness to take seriously the performative magic of the social’ (Bourdieu 1990a: 57). In other words, habitus is always a product of a specific field and it produces and governs individual and collective perceptions and practices in a particular context. ‘Integral to what is embodied is power…the habitus represents the internalisation of the social order, which in turn reproduces and changes the social order’ (Cresswell 2002: 380). Habitus can seem perfectly adjusted to the field or there may be tensions between the field and the habitus depending on the accumulation of capitals that give the proper ‘feel for the game’. This is very well explained by the Bourdieuan metaphor of a fish in a tank. ‘When habitus encounters a social world of which it is the product, it is like a ‘fish in water’: it does not feel the weight of the water and it takes the world about itself for granted’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 127). The concept of habitus thus functions as a bridge between structure and agency.

As Bourdieu argues ‘habitus changes constantly in response to new experience. Dispositions are subject to a kind of permanent revision, but one which is never radical, because it works on the basis of the premises established in the previous state’ (2000: 161). As such the concept of habitus allows us to comprehend that migrants inhabit social orders of the places that are part of their migratory trajectory, which influence the filtering of new experiences and also their (self)positioning within the new field and in relation to others. The concept of habitus thus enables us to critically explore agency and hybridity. Hybridity refers to the hybrid nature of identity and belonging, and involves the discourses and practices of negotiating multiple identities and constructing new identities that are the product of (post)colonial oppression (Bhabha 1995; Hall 2009; Owczarzak 2009; Young 2003). Habitus enables the exploration of
workers’ performative, transformative and resisting strategies within a specific field. An important part of this research is to encourage and stimulate consciousness and recognise the agentic power of migrant workers. Processes of exclusion or inclusion may be located in different social spheres and can affect categories of persons differently. This also means that agency need not necessarily result in effective change. As Lovell puts it very well:

‘What both “performativity” and habitus permit is the recognition that individual agency is not necessarily aligned with resistance and that neither “dispositions to resist”, nor performative acts of resistance, guarantee political effectiveness. Effective political agency is interactional and collective’ (2003: 14).

We should thus be wary of determining all types of agency as transformative (Adkins 2004). Agency can also result in reinforcing dominant power structures. In her analysis of language and symbolic power Puwar demonstrates how different bodies are allowed amongst the ranks ‘so long as they mimic the norm, whilst the norm itself is not problematised’ (Puwar 2004: 117). Habitus can thus be very useful in uncovering ‘nesting orientalisms’ (Bakić-Hayden 1995; Buchowski 2006) that point to localised orientalising practices within CEE, which were explored in Chapter Three and which also travel with migrants to their new destinations. In any case, agency and reflexivity are rooted in habitus and are not necessarily conscious. Oppressed groups may maintain hidden consciousness as a strategy for self protection (Collins 1986) or differentiation. In this regard it is further necessary not to forget the psychological effects of power endowed in habitus that were not well recognised in Bourdieu’s work (Lovell 2000, 2003). All in all, the concept of habitus enables us to uncover how, on the one hand, power structures travel with migrants as an embodied history. On the other hand, it can be used to explain how power structures re-shape through cultural-economic practices across transnational fields and ultimately how both inform the (self)positioning of migrants within a new meta-field.
4.7 Conclusions
This chapter demonstrated that the transdisciplinary adoption of a Bourdieuan conceptual framework enables the complex, relational, multilevel, transnational intersectional analysis of commodification of migrant labour and its effects within contemporary capitalism, characterised as it is by transnationalised production and consumption patterns. As such it offers a novel approach to intersectional analysis that can uncover *multiple and misrecognised power relations associated with social and embodied categories, spatial and temporal dimensions and varying modalities of knowledge*. This helps reveal how workers’ identities are shaped by dominant discourses within and across fields and also how workers themselves perform or transform them in order to resist or compete on the labour market. This framework can reveal a symbolic power that is often misrecognised.

Symbolic power plays a crucial role in contemporary neoliberal capitalism, characterised as it is by a cultural politics that can act as a (self)disciplining tool that divides and segments, rather than unites, diverse workers. As such, this framework also entails a political potential to collectively challenge the game and its symbolic power in a world in which cultural symbolic economy drives capital accumulation. A complex, multilevel, transnational, comparative and relational focus is able to uncover not just differences, but also commonalities of exclusion that could illuminate common struggles towards a fairer redistribution of resources. The theoretical and conceptual framework presented in this chapter thus sets boundaries for the exploration of research questions and guides the overall analysis. In order to achieve this empirically, the following chapter focuses on operationalisation of the theoretical concepts and overall methodology.
5  Research methodology

5.1  Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to discuss research methodology adopted in this study and to present the research design, methods and data analysis. Research methodology is developed in line with the principles of a critical realist ontological and epistemological position, which recognises the importance of semiosis and the need for complex and multilevel relational and intersectional analysis (Fairclough et al. 2001; Healy 2009; Layder 1997: 24; McCall 2005; Sayer 2000). The critical realist position further entails that methodology should be devised through the operationalisation of abstract theoretical concepts. This chapter thus operationalises the adopted Bourdieuan conceptual trinity of field, habitus and capitals presented in the previous chapter. This methodological framework provides analytical clarity in exploring discursive and material, economic and cultural and structural and agentic processes and their intertwining across temporal and spatial and dimensions.

The chapter begins by presenting reflexivity in practice with regard to this study and its socio-economic and political context, which represents the first step in explaining my epistemological position. This is followed by presenting methodology that has been devised by adopting and operationalising Bourdieuan conceptual framework in accordance with theoretical and methodological approaches from critical realist and feminist scholars that have emphasised the importance of semiosis and the need for complex intersectional analysis. And lastly, the chapter looks at research design and discusses in detail this study’s methods, data sampling, data analysis and research ethics.
5.2 Reflexivity in practice

To start a discussion on research methodology, it is first necessary to address reflexivity with regard to this research project. As Bourdieu argues, ‘the sociology of sociology is a fundamental dimension of sociological epistemology’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 68). This means not claiming reflexivity as a resource for authorising oneself (being), but rather doing reflexivity in practice (Skeggs 2002). This reflexive account is thus not about the telling of the self, but about the power, privilege and perspective presented in this research and the one that brought to this research. It is reflexivity in practice that ‘understands the relations of production, that is aware of the possibilities of appropriation, that knows about the constraints of disciplinary techniques and the power relations of location and position, and that does not reify and reproduce categorization that enables exploitation and symbolic violence’ (Skeggs 2002: 363).

This research project was born out of professional practice, academic attainment and personal experience with the power of symbolic power. It is without doubt that the focus and position that I am taking in this research are shaped by the place, time and social location that brought me to see certain themes as more important than others. The topic of this research project grew out of my MA research and personal experience of migration, which made me question issues around identity, home, positioning and power. One of the starkest revelations I had when I started living in London was that my notions of who I was, were very different from how I was perceived and positioned by wider society. When people asked me where I came from, they always associated me with ‘Eastern Europe’. Never before had I thought of myself as being ‘Eastern European’, therefore this positionality effectively erased my history and my identity. At the beginning, I thus often tried to explain the geographical, historical, cultural and socio-economic differences of the post-socialist CEE. In my attempts to resist this newly imposed identity, I realised that this
I was not unfamiliar with the symbolic power of (re)evaluations and translations, though. Growing up in Ljubljana, which is today the capital of Slovenia, my adolescent years were greatly shaped by the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia as well as the transition to a market economy. This on the one hand affected my early encounter with the negative effects of various nationalisms and racisms that have accompanied Slovenian independence and the overall disintegration of the former Yugoslavia. On the other hand, it represented an encounter with the systemic changes that came with Europeanisation and the transition to a market economy. In other words, already in my teenage years I experienced the effects of symbolic power. With the disintegration of Yugoslavia I got assigned a new identity that enabled access to certain places, but not to others. I used to be fixed as Yugoslav, and now I was re-fixed as Slovenian. The places that were part of my life suddenly became difficult to access in the early 1990s, because they now belonged to a different nation state, where certain identities became more valued than others. In everyday practice, this distinction was most commonly recognised through linguistic differences, which for instance meant that ordering a coffee could in certain places became a political act.

At the same time, changes came with the transition to a market economy and Europeanisation. As a school pupil and a student I experienced this change most notably through the educational system. Another major change was visible in the landscape, which was suddenly polluted by the rapid rise of new shopping centres and giant advertising billboards marketing different goods or services and basically promoting consumerism. This was also accompanied by a
discourse that has completely altered the language used to describe socio-economic reality. Everything was suddenly about marketing and management. New educational programmes emerged in universities, jobs were renamed, and we were all looking into a new and supposedly brighter future. This context has very much influenced my activism and the themes that I pursued during my studies. Very early on, I became interested in symbolic power and symbolic violence, discriminatory discourse, anti-racism, anti-fascism, anti-consumerism and the role of the media. I was especially interested in the ways how discriminatory discourses and practices can be subverted and how media can be used for critical pedagogy. This brought me to engage with various theorists within CDA school of thought, Bourdieuian sociology and critical pedagogy. I continued pursuing these themes later in practice through my work for a human rights ‘watchdog’ organisation as well as in later research.

My new experience of migration and re-evaluation was from my location, my academic and working knowledge thus first approached through symbolic power. In other words, it has even further enhanced my belief that discourse significantly affects practices and should be perceived as such. This notion was further strengthened by my MA research on the intersectional racialisation of Slovenian immigrants to the UK, as well as by the experiences of my new friends, many of whom were migrants. In this regard, I remember a Macedonian friend recollecting in her short movie ‘No visas’\(^{19}\) how she was denied entry to the UK, because she was perceived as a marriage hunter. Also in my MA research I encountered a similar racialisation of Slovenian women. This stimulated me to think that in addition to anti-capitalist and anti-racist struggles, I should engage more with feminism. While doing the MA, I was completely taken by the intersectionality debate, which fitted so well with my working experiences, as well as my new interest in migration studies, not to

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\(^{19}\) Short animation ‘No visa’: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9ILaFFfQ_KAy (accessed: 12.10.2012).
mention my new personal experiences as a young ‘Eastern European’ woman in the UK. All of this encouraged me to continue with this research, while I wanted to explore how discourses that position and construct groups affect material practices. Symbolic power and intersectionality was thus a major starting point also for my PhD research. Nevertheless, I had big problems with doing intersectionality in practice, without falling into the same trap of essentialising and fixing identities. This is when I started engaging more deeply with Bourdieuan reflexive sociology and how I could use it for a intersectional analysis that is able to grasp discursive and material practices.

Since I could already see that discourses construct imagined sameness amongst migrants coming from post-socialist CEE, I decided on a comparative approach. My decision to explore the experiences of diverse CEE groups arose from their (in)visibility, difference in size and also very different histories and places embodied by this diverse, yet homogenised group of migrants. I knew from my MA research that Slovenian migrants negotiate sameness and difference according to racialised processes that they embody from their places of origin, as well as the ones they encounter in the new place. This was an important insight that made me realise the importance of temporal and spatial dimensions in constructing power relations and various forms in which people can be included or excluded.

Carrying out research in multicultural London, I could also notice another sameness/difference positioning in relation to other BME groups. By carrying out interviews for my MA research, I learned more about whiteness as well as realising how racisms can come from all sides and can position people very differently according to different intersections. Although I come from a multicultural environment that consists of different ethnic and religious groups, there is a presence of an unspoken, completely ‘invisible’ and taken for granted whiteness. Therefore, living and doing research in multicultural London
stimulated my interest for CWS. Although I found CWS a useful standpoint, I also found it problematic that too often CWS research is built upon the binary black-and-white paradigm and rarely connected with material practices. By engaging with critical diversity management, I knew that racism can have important material effects. Although CEE workers can be privileged due to their whiteness, they are also racialised and thus currently occupy a specific position on the hierarchy of acceptability in the UK. Temporal and spatial dimensions underpinning the migrant division of labour became even clearer to me when I started engaging with human geography. All this made me realise that instead of exploring categories and fixing people, I must explore power, knowledge and ideas that construct meanings across various scales and critically evaluate how they affect practices. Grasping the power of knowledge, its production and its importance for colonial expansion further stimulated my interest for postcolonial theory.

Although I found postcolonial theory very empowering and stimulating, the problems that I encountered entailed taking into account a different history that is not yet part of mainstream postcolonial theory in the UK. In other words, I had to engage with the knowledge production from the CEE region, which exposed modern colonial practices that started during the transition to market economies and Europeanisation. This entailed not only engagement with the cultural and political, but also with the material. When I was embarking on my research journey to explore the commodification of CEE labour, I realised that the whole economy is built around these racialised markers. For instance, in the contemporary EU, high quality ‘Eastern European’ brands are sold under Western names (Marc 2009). As valuable goods from the East get ‘westernised’, less valuable goods in the West, get ‘easternised’. There exists a whole ‘Eastern European’ market in which Western brands sell less saleable goods. I remember in the late 1990s a multinational retail brand for instance not offering the same goods in the capital of Slovenia (Ljubljana) as in the Austrian town of
Klagenfurt, less than 100 kilometres away and much smaller in population and its consumption capacity. Similarly in London one can find many ‘Eastern European’ shops and restaurants, as well as on an English version of GPS in CEE countries themselves. Their owners would most probably strongly disagree with that mark if they were aware of it. I also came across various websites that market ‘Eastern European’ women in the UK, where a white, ‘traditional’ and ‘loyal’ ‘Eastern European’ bride has become a much desired commodity\textsuperscript{20}. This mythical imagination is further reinforced by mainstream popular culture\textsuperscript{21} (Cappusotti 2007), as well as through the dominant knowledge production. All this significantly informed the politics of this research project, which takes inspiration from postcolonial theory in order to expose on-going colonial processes in CEE, as will be discussed further below.

It is my firm belief that an interdisciplinary, multilevel and relational perspective that takes into account spatial and temporal dimensions and varying modalities of knowledge is crucial also for re-thinking class, race and gender politics and frames of justice. By focusing on one aspect of global injustice, this research ultimately exposes the detrimental effects of the current globalised cultural political economy, which is trying to create divisions and discipline diverse groups that face increasing precarity on various local and global scales. This includes my own position within the academic field, which often makes me comply with the rules of the game, rather than engage more in resistance and transformation. As with most young scholars within the academy, I face precarity, am dependent on intermittent employment and am required to do a lot of free labour in order to get my foot in the door (Pedersen and Samaluk 2012). As an academic, I am also subjected and pressured to meet


the managerial requirements of REF so that I can hope for a more permanent position in the future. All this tames my activism and pushes me to focus most of my efforts to publish in journals with a sufficient reputation, which effectively maintain and reproduce symbolic power. I thus strongly believe – and also try to show with this research – that one way forward is to uncover symbolic power and expose similarities of exclusion that can unite people towards eradicating increasing inequalities on the local and global scales. Exposing symbolic power and its effects was not an easy task, and I spent quite a considerable amount of time to come up with the research methodology that would allow me to combine a diverse scholarship and transcend binary oppositions that keep us in place. This is presented in the following sections.

5.3 Methodological principles and the operationalisation of concepts
The methodology for this research project has been devised by adopting and operationalising Bourdieuvian conceptual framework in accordance with ontological, epistemological and methodological approaches from critical realist and feminist scholars that have emphasised the importance of semiosis and of complex intersectional analysis that goes beyond structure and agency divide (Adkins and Skeggs 2004; Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999; Fairclough et al. 2001; Frankenberg 1993; Healy 2009; Jessop 2004; Joseph and Roberts 2004; Layder 1997; Lovell 2007; McCall 1992; Sayer 2000; Skeggs 2004b).

This methodology thus offers an explanatory critique that focuses on the symbolic power of group making and enables the analysis of causation in a non-positivistic way. Critical realism is further inclined towards methodological pluralism and is as such compatible with a relatively wide range of research methods. A common aspect of critical realist research is that the priority is given to theoretical abstractions and conceptions which are used to define the object of the study. In this regard Bourdieu’s conceptual trinity of
field, habitus and capital represent the ‘orienting’ concepts that define the object of the study and are used to develop methodology (Layder 1998: 101; Sayer 2000).

As argued in the previous chapter, migration should be explored across transnational fields characterised by (meta) governance, which influences the movement of persons and their (self) value. (Meta) governance is semiotically formed through the order of discourse and is actualised through networks of genres that can recontextualise, appropriate or colonise different discourses and forms of capital in order to legitimise a value of a specific region, states and people originating from them (Bourdieu 2005; Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999; Fairclough 2005). To better explain this, the first step in exploring the order of discourse, should be the introduction of its elements, its discourse-analytical categories, namely genres, discourses and styles (Fairclough 2003, 2005, 2009).

Genres can be understood as ways of acting or (inter)acting discursively and can be a particularly useful analytical category for exploring the regimes of (meta) governance (Fairclough 2005). Genres can come in the form of reports, policies, newspaper articles, websites, etc. In other words, different fields are characterised by different governing genres. However, there exists also a network of genres within and amongst diverse fields that act as ‘filtering devices’, selectively including or excluding discourses (Fairclough 2005: 65). Discourses figure in the ways of representing the material world. One can for instance distinguish different discourses that represent the world from different perspectives and positions taken by different social groups or actors (Fairclough 2009). As already argued in the previous chapter, not all social groups and actors have the same symbolic power to make groups and create their value across transnational fields.
In order to explore the order of discourse on post-socialist CEE across transnational fields, one must establish what kind of networks of genres are formed across the (global) economic field, meta-fields, and political and media fields. The global economic field is according to theory and literature review in this research operationalised as the EU governance that forms part of wider global political economy and is influenced by various actors. EU governance is on the one hand explored through the genre of political reports that served as legitimisation for EU policies with regard to A8 countries and their nationals. These reports provided a necessary foreground for political and legal measures that enabled free, yet unequal exchange between newly-joining and old member states of the enlarged EU.

Policies on the EU level are directly connected to the policies and strategies of the UK Government, which is for the purpose of this research operationalised as a political field within a specific meta-field. In other words, discourses found in EU reports form a genre network with political reports, policy papers, public statements, press-releases and political campaigns with regard to A8 migrants in the UK. These in turn both significantly influence and are influenced by the economic and media fields in the UK; therefore, I further explore how these discourses resonate in newspaper articles in the popular press and the documents, statements and press releases of employers’ organisations in the UK. The concrete sampling of specific texts is explored later in this chapter.

Moreover, genres can be classified as governing or governed, which sets up a dialectic between colonisation and appropriation that play out differently in different contexts (Fairclough 2005: 65). The effects of wider global as well as EU governance are, for instance, visible in the rise of transnational employment agencies that not only act as labour market intermediaries within the (global) economic field, but also as cultural intermediaries that establish and translate the value of migrant labour across transnational fields. The translation of value
is possible because there exists a ‘colonising’ order of discourse on A8 countries and their nationals, which has been effectively appropriated by employment agencies to serve an economic function. Changes in (meta)governance further bring changes in the set of genres that govern (Skeggs 2004b). With regards to transnational employment agencies, internet websites emerged as important genres that can operate without limitation across transnational fields. There is thus an unrestricted flow of information that discursively constructs a specific style of A8 labour that encompasses a particular value.

The third Fairclough’s (2003) concept, style, constitutes particular ways of being, particular social or personal identity. In this sense the order of discourse also participates in the invention of specific class habitus by producing a certain style through the conversion of capitals. By appropriating and combining Bourdieu’s (1990a) and Fairclough’s (2003) concepts, I argue that style should on the one hand be perceived as discursively objectified and ‘characterised’ class habitus. In this sense, style represents an aspect of the order of discourse and functions as socially constructed identity, as a marker of identification and behavioural guideline. According to Bourdieu (1990a), discourse contains an ‘objective intention’ that offers a stimuli to a modus operandi of which it is the product. Style thus names the character and the profile, or in other words discursively brands the class habitus that is determined by the translation, appropriation and accumulation of different forms of capital (Bourdieu 1990a; Fairclough 2003).

Style has the ability to produce real material affects not just because it names the character of the structure in habitus, but also because it can be performed in individual habitus. Style should thus on the other hand be perceived also as an individual habitus, as a distinctive way in which individuals assume social roles and perform, transform or resist objectified social identities. Although each individual performs their personal style, this style is always in part influenced by a common style or discursively objectified class habitus. This is not to say that
habitus is a mechanical reaction to the field’s structural conditions, but rather ‘an “intelligent” response to an actively selected aspect of the real’ that links individuals’ past trajectory with the current forces of the field (Bourdieu 2005: 212). In other words, discourse constructs a specific social identity and value that shapes the way people are perceived by others and themselves and therefore the way they perform and transform their identities in order to create value for themselves. In order to further operationalise these concepts within this thesis, I now turn to the research design.

5.4 Research design
Since neither Bourdieu nor Fairclough offer a clear research design, I use Layder’s (1993) research map, which explicitly distinguishes macro, meso and micro levels. Together with a transdisciplinary adoption of a Bourdieuan framework, Layder’s interrelated levels offer analytical clarity in exploring discursive and material, economic, cultural, political and structural and agentic processes and their intertwining across temporal and spatial dimensions. Although this multi-level approach separates out different levels for pragmatic analytical purposes, it also acknowledges that discursive and material, economic, cultural, political and structural and agentic processes are intertwined and at work simultaneously at different scales.

According to Layder’s map, the macro level corresponds with the context and setting of wider macro social forms. As demonstrated in Table 1, the first objective on the macro level is to set the positioning and experience of A8 workers in its historical and socio-economic context by exploring the process of EU enlargement and A8 transition to market economies across transnational fields. This context is significant, because it uncovers the role of various actors in the colonisation of A8 countries and their nationals and thus traces the origins of the order of discourse that forms the relationship between different levels of governmentality and significantly determines the distinctive
commodification of A8 workers on the UK labour market. The second objective on the macro level is then to focus on the setting in order to assess the habituation of A8 labour within the UK state taxonomies that effectively rewrite migrants’ history and objectify them in an essentialist and ethnocentric way. Challenging ‘methodological nationalism’ (Wimmer and Schiller 2002: 304) that takes national discourses, agendas and histories for granted is crucial in uncovering the making of a particular group.

After exposing the problematic context and setting the meso level of research moves to the effects of (meta)governance, which are first explored through web-based marketing practices of transnational employment agencies that act as important labour market intermediaries amongst workers and employers and amongst transnational fields. This level corresponds with Layder’s (1993) situated activity and is concerned with the appropriation of the order of discourse by transnational employment agencies who participate in the colonisation of A8 countries and market and supply A8 labour to the UK.

This enables the uncovering of a specific style that brands A8 class habitus, or in other words commodifies and creates the value of A8 labour. Analysis on the macro and meso levels thus offers analysis of the social order of discourse and its appropriations, which serve as a necessary foreground for critical exploration of the agentic power and ‘choice’ of A8 workers. The micro level corresponds to Layder’s (1993) domain of the ‘self’ and as such focuses on the experiences, perceptions and strategies of Polish and Slovenian migrant workers across spatial and temporal dimensions.
Table 1: Research Map (adopted from Layder, 1993)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research Element</th>
<th>Research Focus and Objectives</th>
<th>Key Methods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Context** *(EU, UK, A8)* | **Focus:** Colonisation process of A8 countries and their nationals  
**Research objective:** To set the commodification of A8 labour in its historical and socio-economic context by exploring the process of EU accession and A8 transition to market economies across transnational fields | Qualitative discourse analysis of official reports, policy documents, public statements and newspaper articles. |
| **Setting** *(UK state and the labour market)* | **Focus:** Construction of A8 labour within the UK state taxonomies  
**Research objective:** To examine how A8 labour is objectified and homogenised and what kind of social position it is assigned within official UK taxonomies. | Review of national and government statistics and official reports on A8 nationals accompanied by literature review of existent research on A8 labour migration to the UK. |
| **Situated Activity** *(Transnational employment agencies specialising in marketing and supplying A8 labour to the UK)* | **Focus:** Colonising strategies of transnational employment agencies and their role in commodification of A8 workers  
**Research objective:** To examine how A8 labour has been commodified in the web-based marketing practices of transnational employment agencies | Qualitative discourse analysis of hypertexts found on websites of employment agencies specialising in supplying A8 labour to the UK. |
| **Self** *(Polish and Slovenian migrant workers)* | **Focus:** Experiences, perceptions and strategies of Polish and Slovenian migrant workers  
**Research objective:** To explore how the colonisation of A8 countries and commodification of A8 workers affects the emigration, (self)value and strategies of Polish and Slovenian migrant workers. | In-depth semi-structured interviews with a sample of Polish and Slovenian workers in London and south east England. |
5.5 Methods
The theoretical position of the research project calls for a multistrategy approach, which requires that qualitative and quantitative data complement each other (Layder 1993). The research first starts with analysis of official national statistics and other systemic information on A8 labour produced by the UK nation state. Official taxonomies in the receiving country are critically evaluated by comparison with taxonomies from the sending countries and the EU as well with the existing research that explores A8 labour migration to the UK. Critical evaluation of quantitative data is thus used in order to expose gaps in existing knowledge that constructs A8 labour in a particular way and to identify what remains invisible through this dominant knowledge production and needs to be further explored through the use of more in-depth qualitative approaches.

Qualitative methods are utilised because they can uncover hidden power relations and the economic, political and cultural pressures that lie behind them (Wrench and Solomons 1993: 159). In other words, these methods can uncover how and why A8 workers came to be defined as such and what kind of lived realities this produces. In order to expose the dominant knowledge production, I employ qualitative discourse analysis of official reports, policy documents, public statements, newspaper articles and hypertext found on employment agencies’ websites. Therefore, qualitative discourse analysis supports and informs more in-depth analysis that is achieved through semi-structured interviews (Ritchie and Lewis 2003). In order to explore how these power relations are lived, a ‘dialogical’ approach (Frankenberg 1993), which seeks to overcome the seemingly neutral researcher’s position to the interviews, was employed. This approach served two purposes. The first was to make research participants more comfortable to discuss their experiences and issues which might be emotionally difficult. And the second was to democratise the research
process and give the participants a political voice. This is further informed by a
dialogical theory of justice that takes into account also a meta-political frame in
which citizens and non-citizens should equally be involved in democratic
deliberation (Fraser 2009). Giving political voice to those who are often
constructed as lacking in value can actually create new value that is not
necessary visible from more normative positions.

5.6 Data sampling
In order to achieve the aims and objectives of this research, I have been
gathering both naturally-occurring (documentary analysis, analysis of different
written texts and images, etc) and generated (interviews) data (Ritchie 2003).
Data on macro and meso levels have been sampled according to the theoretical
determination of genre chains that have been operationalised as forming the
semiotic relationships amongst transnational fields and thus act to construct the
order of discourse on A8 labour. Genre chains thus serve as a framing device
that enables the exploration of the different levels and fields at which the
identity of A8 workers is formed and transformed.
Table 2: Research map on the macro level (adapted from Bourdieu (2005), Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992), Fairclough (2003) and Layder (1993)).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTEXT/SETTING</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>UK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FIELD</td>
<td>GLOBAL ECONOMIC FIELD</td>
<td>POLITICAL FIELD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategies of European commission</td>
<td>Strategies of the UK Government</td>
<td>Strategies of Employers (CBI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENRES</td>
<td>Political reports</td>
<td>Official statistics, political reports, policy papers, public statements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SELECTED TEXTS</td>
<td>EC Progress reports towards accession for A8 countries</td>
<td>HO reports, policy papers and statements on transitional measures for A8 workers, press-releases regarding A8 migration to the UK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.6.1 **Official statistics, reports, policy documents, public statements and newspaper articles**

The setting was first explored through official national statistics and accompanying reports. These include the Workers’ Registration Scheme, Labour Force Survey, International Passenger Survey, Workplace Employment Relations Survey, NiNo allocations, ethnicity monitoring and accompanying reports. This was followed by the exploration of the wider historical socio-economic and political context, which was researched through the order of discourse amongst transnational fields. On the EU level, a selected genre for discourse analyses are political reports; or more precisely the texts here chosen are EC Progress reports towards accession for A8 countries. On the UK level, the texts chosen are HO reports and policy papers and accompanying public
statements on transitional measures for A8 workers. However, reports and policy papers do not stand alone, but form a genre network with genres on economic and media field. On the economic field, I have analysed documents, statements and press releases available on the CBI website that are connected with and thus form a genre network with the adoption of transitional measures for A8 nationals. The CBI was chosen as representative of the economic field because it is the premier lobbying organisation for UK business on national and international labour issues.

Furthermore, I have explored how policies and reports examined on the political field have resonated in the media field. This was done by the exploration of articles in the UK popular press. Only newspapers with five percent or more readership estimates have been selected, because the aim of this research is not to explore overall media discourse but to look at discursive relationship between fields. Newspapers with greater readership were selected because they are important actors that have the power to affect and influence political and economic fields (Bourdieu 1998b). The specific newspaper articles were accessed through Nexis UK database and were selected by using the time limit around EU enlargement in 2004 (between 1.1.2003 and 1.1.2005) and the use of the keywords: ‘EU enlargement’, ‘Accession 8 workers’, ‘A8 immigrants’, ‘transitional measures’, ‘Eastern Europe’, ‘Central and Eastern Europe’. Through this process 102 newspaper articles have been identified in the Sun, Daily Mail, Mail on Sunday, the Mirror and Daily Record. Since the Daily Record did not have many articles on EU enlargement and no real reactions to government policies with regard to A8, it does not form a sufficient genre chain and was as such not regarded in the final analysis. The selection of specific texts for analysis was thus time limited and in accordance with the publishing of reports, policies, public statements and press-releases on the political field. Through selection I was able to focus on a genre chain that forms the relationship
between different fields and thus produces the structural order of discourse on A8 countries and A8 migrant workers.

5.6.2 Hypertext on transnational employment agencies’ websites

The commodification of A8 workers was explored through qualitative discourse analysis of transnational employment agencies’ websites that specialise in marketing and supplying A8 workers to the UK. These specialised agencies act as important intermediaries amongst workers and employers as well as amongst (trans)national fields and thus participate in the construction of CEE class habitus. Research includes the analysis of hypertext\textsuperscript{22} that comprises of written text, documents, images and linked sites to other documents, reports, news and other written text. In this way, hypertext represents a specific genre that in itself offers the exploration of relationship between different and diverse fields while it also provides links to newspaper articles, governmental reports, employers’ testimonials, industry statements, and EU policies. As such the analysis has enabled the tracing of a genre chain amongst diverse fields that commonly legitimise a specific style and value of A8 worker in the UK labour market.

Employment agencies’ websites have been identified through the use of UK version of Internet search engines (Google, Yahoo, Alta vista) by the use of the following keywords: ‘employment agencies’ and ‘recruitment agencies’ in combination with all A8 nationalities (‘Polish, Latvian, Lithuanian, Estonian, Slovakian, Czech, Hungarian, Slovenian’) and regional markers such as ‘Central and Eastern Europe’, ‘Eastern Europe’, ‘Baltic’ and ‘Balkan’. I have only taken into account agencies that are based or also have offices in the UK. The aim of

\textsuperscript{22} Hypertext can according to Nielsen (1995) be defined as a web-based text that consists of many links through which a reader can browse and which take the reader to new texts. In other words it consists of interlinked pieces of text, also different types of texts or media, which can include classical text, videos, images, slide shows, etc.
this research is thus not to generalise the findings to all transnational employment agencies operating in the UK, but rather to explore the explicit semiotic forms that are used to construct a specific style of A8 worker. In total 39 employment agencies that specialise in providing A8 workers to the UK labour market have been identified (see Appendix A). This listing is not exhaustive and includes only those sites that have been accessed during the research period (May to December 2010).

5.6.3 Workers interviews

On the micro level the data was gathered through semi structured interviews that were conducted between February 2011 and April 2012. All interviews were conducted in English and were digitally recorded and later transcribed. This research draws on 36 semi-structured interviews with Polish and Slovenian workers that have been living and working in London and southern England. The small sample size arises from the fact that workers’ interviews represent only one amongst many sources of data collected within the multimethod framework, which also includes various types of texts and hypertext arising from 39 employment agencies websites. As presented in Table 3 and 4, the sample consists of 20 Slovenian and 16 Polish workers, 23 women and 13 men, between 23 and 42 years old, 15 of them were single and 21 either in a relationship or married. All interviewees came to the UK just before or after the EU enlargement. Most of the interviewees, with the exception of one who was employed in construction, worked in the service sector at the time of the interview. Most of the interviewees were highly educated: 15 held a postgraduate degree, 16 held an undergraduate degree and 5 held vocational or secondary education. Eight of them also gained some of their qualifications in the UK. The majority of them spoke, apart from English, at least one other foreign language.
### Table 3: Demographic profile of Polish interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pseudonym</th>
<th>Ethnicity-narrated</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Level of education</th>
<th>Occupation before migration</th>
<th>Current occupation/Type of work</th>
<th>Income p/a</th>
<th>Year of entry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barbara</td>
<td>White European</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>PhD</td>
<td>Student</td>
<td>Health care assistant/FT</td>
<td>£25-30.000</td>
<td>2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maria</td>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>PhD</td>
<td>Student</td>
<td>Lecturer/FT</td>
<td>£30-35.000</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anna</td>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Undergraduate</td>
<td>Student</td>
<td>Project manager/FT</td>
<td>£30-35.000</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krzystof</td>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Postgraduate</td>
<td>Translator/Business assistant</td>
<td>Account manager/FT</td>
<td>£20-25.000</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dorota</td>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Undergraduate</td>
<td>Teacher/Administrator</td>
<td>Project manager/FT</td>
<td>£30-35.000</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerzy</td>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Undergraduate</td>
<td>Clerk/Store manager</td>
<td>HR systems and administrations manager/FT</td>
<td>£30-35.000</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magdalena</td>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Undergraduate</td>
<td>Student</td>
<td>Tax Advisor/FT</td>
<td>£50-60.000</td>
<td>2002</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ania</td>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>Restaurant manager</td>
<td>Receptionist-Admin/FT</td>
<td>£15-20.000</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pawel</td>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>Site manager</td>
<td>Foreman/FT</td>
<td>£20-25.000</td>
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<td>Izabela</td>
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<td>F</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>Postgraduate</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Au-pair/FT</td>
<td>£5-10.000</td>
<td>2006</td>
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<td>Andrzej</td>
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<td>M</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Undergraduate</td>
<td>Administration/Export worker</td>
<td>Door-to-door sales representative/FT</td>
<td>£25-30.000</td>
<td>2006</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joanna</td>
<td>Polish</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>Postgraduate</td>
<td>Student</td>
<td>Accounts assistant</td>
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<td>Agnieszka</td>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Postgraduate</td>
<td>Student</td>
<td>Administrator/FT</td>
<td>£25-30.000</td>
<td>2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iwona</td>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Postgraduate</td>
<td>Student/Teacher</td>
<td>Community manager in social media website/PT</td>
<td>£15-20.000</td>
<td>2005</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dyta</td>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Undergraduate</td>
<td>Student/Teacher</td>
<td>Account partner in marketing company/FT</td>
<td>£30-35.000</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zuzanna</td>
<td>White</td>
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<td>F</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Postgraduate</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Customer advisor-bank/PT</td>
<td>£5-10.000</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Table 4: Demographic profile of Slovenian interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pseudonym</th>
<th>Ethnicity-narrated</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Level of education</th>
<th>Occupation before migration</th>
<th>Current occupation/Type of work</th>
<th>Income p/a</th>
<th>Year of entry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>Not declared</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Postgraduate</td>
<td>Social worker</td>
<td>Social worker/FT</td>
<td>£35-40.000</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katarina</td>
<td>Slovenian</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Undergraduate</td>
<td>Architect</td>
<td>Architect/FT</td>
<td>£35-40.000</td>
<td>2005</td>
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Despite the fact that the sample consists of workers that were highly educated, they occupied very different positions on the labour market. Tables 3 and 4 show that these ranged from unemployed or in intermittent employment, au-pairs, teachers, social workers, and hospitality staff to bankers, architects, researchers, lecturers, etc. Not surprisingly, their earnings also varied from less than £5000 p/a to more than £60,000 p/a. Most Polish workers, except for two, were in full time employment, 13 holding permanent positions and only 3 holding temporary ones. On the other hand, half of Slovenian workers were employed full time and the other half part time or else unemployed, 10 holding permanent positions, six temporary and two being self-employed. The majority of workers who held part time positions were women.

The sample presented in Tables 3 and 4 further indicates that very recent arrivals face difficulty in finding work and experience downward professional mobility. The majority of interviewees also had various temporary jobs before getting to their current position or while occupying it. This on the one hand indicates that over time some migrant workers start experiencing upward professional mobility. On the other it signifies long term dequalification and fixation within the lower ends of economy. The latter was especially problematic for those who had prior working experience. Data analysis indicates that only 10 interviewees arrived immediately after the completion of their study and 16 had prior working experiences in their respective fields, some with many years of experience.

The ethnic and racial composition of the sample shows that all of the interviewees were white; however they identified their etnicity in various ways. I deliberately included the racialised markers found in official discourse in the questionnaire, as well as the possibility for free-form responses (see Demographic questionnaire in Appendix C). I then compared these imposed markers with respondents’ narratives in order to see how imposed power
structures affect them. The questionnaire was thus used at the beginning of each interview in order to start exploring how imposed discursive categories affect workers and to examine demographic similarities and differences amongst interviewees that are according to racialised class logic in the UK often simply homogenised.

In this regard, the findings inform that most of the Slovenian interviewees would tick or write in either Central, Eastern, Southern, White European or Slovenian, and Polish ones would either choose Eastern or Central European. Nevertheless, in our conversations their ethnicity became more complicated than the imposed markers suggest. During the interviews most Slovenian interviewees for instance reported that they would identify as Slovenian, but also as Balkan, Serbian-Slovenian or Ukranian. Many also explained that they have origins from former Yugoslav republics, namely Croatia, Macedonia or Serbia. This indicates an ethnic diversity within their place of origin and highlights how historical and current immigration flows characterised the region. By comparison, most of the Polish participants said that they would identify as Polish and only two would describe their ethnicity as White European or White. In relation to religion, 11 Slovenian participants declared that they do not belong to any religion, four of them declared themselves Roman Catholic, three as Orthodox and one as Pantheist. Only one of them declared that she belongs to a Serbian/Orthodox ethnic-religious community. Some of them also explained that although they believe in God, they do not belong to any religious group. On the other hand, five Polish interviewees declared that they do not belong to any religious group, 10 of them declared themselves Roman Catholics and one a Protestant. Three of them also declared themselves as belonging to a minority, namely Atheist, Jewish and Baptist.

Interviews lasted between one and two hours and explored the reasons and motivation for migration, their position within their places of origin and the
changes that they experienced with migration, migrants’ expectations and experiences in accessing work and working in the UK and strategies to overcome difficulties arising from work and recruitment process (see Interview guide in Appendix B). The themes and questions in the interview guide were developed from the literature review, theoretical and conceptual framework and analysis on the macro and meso levels. In this research, I used a more flexible approach to the semi-structure of the interview guide and the dialogical approach to interviewing, which allowed me to alter the sequence of questions or the way in which they were phrased or to ask additional in-depth questions (Frankenberg 1993; Ritchie and Lewis 2003). The themes and interview questions were addressed in the order that emerged in each individual dialogue. In this regard, I tried to follow my interviewees as much as possible, so I addressed specific themes as they emerged from the dialogue and tried not to enforce the order upon participants. I made sure that I gave my full attention to the interviewees and listened carefully to what they wanted to say, did not want to say, or cannot say without assistance (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009). By doing that I hoped to act sensitively, show my understanding, recognise the need to discuss issues in more detail, to explain the questions or recognise the need for deeper debriefs afterwards.

The dialogical approach to interviewing thus allowed me to make the interviewees feel more comfortable to elaborate what they feel and think. This entailed that I, as a researcher, also at times shared my own experiences and knowledge with research participants in order to try and construct an equal dialogue and to encourage the participants to go beyond the ‘zones of silence’ (Frankenberg 1993: 31). Many times participants wanted to hear about my personal migratory history, before feeling ready to elaborate on their own. On one occasion the interviewee was reluctant to talk and gave me very short answers to my questions; but when we were about to finish the interview, she asked me about my history and after I elaborated on it, we spoke for an
additional hour, during which I was turning my recorder on and off. When I explained my own migratory history, I was careful not to influence my interviewees. Often my interviewees wanted to hear what other people had said. In cases like this I encouraged them to tell me their own story first. As they were explaining their own experiences I encouraged them by providing a debrief or telling them anonymously about similar experiences of others. This was quite reassuring and encouraging to my interviewees and quite often resulted in an in-depth exploration of certain themes.

My own position often also constructed an imagined sameness, which in some ways enabled easier access to some participants and it sometimes made interviewees more comfortable to talk about the way they are positioned and treated on the UK labour market. But on the other hand this also made it more difficult to talk about certain issues because interviewees would often assume that I would understand their unspoken assumptions. In order to go beyond this imagined sameness I tried to interrogate these assumptions through in-depth questions that would provide additional explanations or examples. This was especially so with Slovenian interviewees, who assumed sameness because they perceived me as embodying the same place. In this regard, some Slovenian workers approached me because they did not have any contacts with their native language or people who embody a familiar place.

Some interviewees also agreed to participate, because they felt the urge to elaborate their experience or felt that this is an important topic and that something should be done about it. At times, everything burst out from the person, because they did not have the chance to talk about their experiences with anyone else. For some it represented an important aspect of their personal history, and most participants found the interview to be a useful experience. Some recent arrivals and those who faced long-term deskilling also approached me because they wanted advice on the recruitment process, on how they should
translate and perform their labour identity within the new meta-field. In this case I first asked interviewees if we could do the interview and after we finished I had a look at their CV’s or advised them on specific issues. I am in no way a recruitment expert but I do have many years of working experience. I understand well the translations within the new field and I learned a great deal from interviewees. In this regard, I also started connecting people with similar professions amongst each other, so that they could give each other hands-on advice. There was a willingness to do that on their part, even at the expense of revealing their identity to certain participants. This already points to the difficulty faced by new arrivals and long-term deskilled in securing work and moving up the ladder within the new meta-field.

5.7 Access to research participants
Since I wanted to access workers who would be potential users of employment agencies’ websites, my accessing point was primarily through various on-line channels and identity networks. Identity networks can be based upon diasporic links, family, profession, organisation or community groups (Healy and Oikelome 2011). With today’s information technology, which breaks down any geographical boundaries, identity networks are also importantly present online and on various social media websites, such as Facebook. My first access point was through Facebook groups (‘Slovenija v Londonu’, ‘Slovenci v Londonu’, ‘Slovenians in the UK’ and ‘Polacy w Londynie’). Moreover workers were accessed through on-line forums, communities and organisations that connect Polish or Slovenian migrants in London or the UK, as well as recruitment agencies that specialise in supplying A8 workers in the UK.

In terms of the availability of various identity networks, there was quite a big difference between Polish and Slovenian workers. The difference also arises from the fact that there were no employment agencies specialising for Slovenian
workers. The linkage between the analysed and approached employment agencies, on-line identity networks and workers and the comparative nature of the analysis also explains the predominant focus on the London area. The majority of identity networks through which I accessed Slovenian workers were based or were focusing on Slovenians in London. Moreover also the majority of Polish identity networks and ethnic niche employment agencies’ through which Polish workers have been accessed are based in London.

In order to access Slovenian workers, I approached the administrators on Slovenian Facebook groups (‘Slovenija v Londonu’, ‘Slovenci v Londonu’, ‘Slovenians in the UK’). They were all very helpful and did send my e-mail with the linked invitation to all their members. I also sent an invitation to the mailing list of the Slovenian embassy. The invitation was in English but the e-mail was translated into Slovenian. Facebook and mailing lists proved to be the most successful channel through which I accessed Slovenian workers. Some of them were also accessed through the snowballing technique. Apart from differences between Poles and Slovenians, there are also intersectional differences within these two groups that significantly determine the access to and utilisation of these networks for easier transition to the UK labour market. Despite the fact that there exists a British Slovene society established by older generations of migrants, as well as the LSE’s Slovenian Society – an alumni association that connects former Slovenian LSE students – these both operate more as informal networks that are not really accessible to new arrivals. Similar is true for the Slovenian embassy’s mailing list that serves to inform Slovenian citizens in the UK about events, elections, and sometimes networking or job opportunities, etc.. The differential access presented above points to generational, class and temporal differences amongst Slovenian migrants, and indicates the importance of different forms of capital, which some new arrivals lack in sufficient measure to access certain identity networks.
With regard to Slovenian migrants, data analysis demonstrates that self-organising groups that have been created on Facebook actually act as the only reference point for new arrivals. These self-organised online groups serve new arrivals who lack capitals and knowledge of the field, as an important intermediary where they can get advice on strategies how to access jobs on the UK labour market. Increasing use of this type of information providers is also visible in the rapidly increasing membership of these groups and the demand for work-related advice. The biggest Facebook group *Slovenci v Londonu (Slovenians in London)* has from 100 members in the year 2008 jumped to over 2000 in 2013, with the frequency increasing in the last two years.

Although Facebook proved a useful tool for reaching Slovenian workers, this was not the case with Polish workers. Although the ‘Polacy w Londynie’ Facebook group has almost 5,000 members, I had problems with the administrators of this group who acted as gatekeepers. Since members of the ‘Polacy w Londynie’ Facebook group were not allowed to post on the wall of that group by themselves at that time, I contacted the administrators to ask if they could send my invitation to the members. The letter with accompanying invitation was translated to Polish. I have tried several times to contact various administrators of this Facebook group, but I had no reply. Since I could not access Polish workers through Facebook, I tried other on-line groups. I found it quite challenging to navigate myself through Polish websites. With the help of Google translate, I managed to post a couple of invitations on forums of Polish online newspapers (Cooltura, Polish Times-Goniec), websites (Londynek.net) and professional groups (Polish professionals).

I also approached Polish organisations in London and asked them if they could distribute the invitation to participate in my research through their mailing lists/newsletters. In comparison to Slovenians, Polish workers have a much greater amount and variety of identity networks available. However, despite
this availability, there remain severe intersectional differences amongst Polish migrants in terms of actual access to these networks. This was already visible in problems I encountered with access and was further also confirmed by my interviewees that emphasised generational and class differences. For instance, when I contacted the Polish Cultural and Social Association (POSK) they said that they do not deal with new arrivals, but rather with the older Polish diaspora that settled in the UK after the Second World War. Nevertheless they advised me to contact the Federation of Poles in GB (ZPWB). They were very helpful, agreed to assist me and put my invitation in one of their newsletters that is regularly sent to their members.

I also sent a request to three employment agencies from my meso-level analysis sample, specialising in providing Polish workers (Ania’s Poland, Kasajobs, Asapcareers). Ania’s Poland replied and I used their services, where the invitation for participation was advertised on their website and an email was sent out to their users. I also approached a Polish parish in London, which sent an email with my invitation through their mailing list and put it on their noticeboard. Apart from the above mentioned channels, research participants were also accessed through a snowballing technique. Initially I got quite a considerable response from all these channels, but I also received calls from people that thought that I was Polish and once they found out I was not they were not willing to participate. Ultimately, snowballing proved to be the most effective access-point to Polish workers, which was followed by employment agencies, online newspapers and professional groups.

My lack of Polish language skills seemed to have put off a couple of potential Polish participants. Since I have translated a letter with the link to invitation for participation into Slovenian and Polish, some people started contacting me in their native languages. Although I could respond in Slovenian I could not respond in Polish. Moreover one Polish respondent sent me an email saying
that Slovenian workers are not part of CEE labour and advised me to consult the map. Despite my initial thoughts that I would have more difficulties accessing Slovenian workers due to the small numbers and lack of access-points, I discovered that I had much more problem accessing Polish workers. A couple of workers asked me whether I was willing to pay for their participation in the research. In cases like this, I explained that participation is based on a voluntary basis. Nevertheless, I was well aware of the precarious situation of some of these workers, and therefore I made sure that no costs were incurred by the participants. I always offered to travel to their areas and I provided any refreshments during the interview. The exact location for interviews was thus selected according to the interviewee’s wishes, where they would feel most comfortable. This included various public places, such as coffee shops, restaurants, pubs or parks.

5.8 Research ethics
Since this research explored the working lives of workers that have experienced various forms of discrimination and injustice, special care was necessary in order to provide anonymity and confidentiality as well as sensitivity on my part. Thus building up trust in the research process by providing a safe and comfortable environment through the methodological approaches chosen (Frankenberg 1993) and through reassurance of anonymity and confidentiality was of crucial importance. The nature and aims of the research were clearly set out in information circulated to research participants, so they had a good idea of what the research involved before contacting me. They also gained additional information when making a contact in our telephone or email conversations, which took place prior to our meeting, and they were further briefed before the interview. At the beginning of each interview, participants were again presented with the information sheet and had it explained what their involvement in research entailed, before being asked if they were willing
to give their consent. I also asked them if they consented to the interview being audio recorded. In this regard, it was explained to them that the recordings would be used only by myself and stored in a secure location under a code. They were also informed that they may ask to stop the recording at any time during the interview and that they are free to withdraw from the research at any time. After making sure that participants understood what they were consenting to, I asked them to sign two copies of the consent form. One copy was for them to keep and the other was retained by me.

I made sure that all data collected through interviews for this project was anonymised and stayed confidential. Special care was taken in order to respect the confidentiality and anonymity of the research participants in all stages of the research. The identity of all research participants was anonymised on data files, so that any comments made by participants cannot be attributable to them directly or indirectly, either in published material or presentations (Lewis 2003a). In order to protect participants I also disguised the identity of their employers. Since I was accessing research participants through various ‘gatekeepers’ I made sure that participants could contact me directly thus avoiding exposing their identity to the ‘gatekeepers’. Confidentiality and anonymity was also extended to the storage of data gained in the research process. In order to disguise the identity of participants, research records and participant’s details were stored separately and under a coding system. I made sure that recordings of the interviews, field notes and transcripts were stored under coded names and held securely at a secure location and on a computer with password protection. Participants’ contact information has been stored under a separate file on the computer that has password protection. The signed consent forms have been stored at a secure location, and will be retained for seven years after the work is completed. In all presentations of findings arising from this research, I use pseudonyms and also anonymise any other data that might in one way or another reveal the identity of participants. All data is
5.9 **Data analysis**

The analysis has engaged with three types of texts. First was the analysis of text from publicly available official reports, policy documents, public statements and newspaper articles that form the relationship amongst transnational fields. Second was the analysis of hypertext available on employment agencies’ websites, which comprises of written text, documents, images and linked sites to other documents, reports, news and other written text. Lastly the analysis engages with transcribed interviews with Slovenian and Polish migrant workers. This effectively combines the analysis of semiotic and extra-semiotic elements. Thirty-six in-depth semi-structured interviews as well as data acquired through sampling texts on the macro and meso level have produced a massive amount of (transcribed) text and images. Due to the large amount of qualitative data collected and in order to make the analysis more manageable, I used Nvivo 9 qualitative analysis software to complete the analysis.

The organisation of textual data has been achieved through the process of coding (Charmaz 2006; Layder 1998; Strauss and Corbin 1990). Since this research is positioned between middle range and grounded theory codes were on one hand theory laden and on the other they emerged from findings on the macro, meso and micro levels. Or as Layder elaborates, ‘the search for new codes and concepts goes on in tandem with the use of extant theoretical assumptions and relevancies’ (Layder 1998: 55). Initially I performed qualitative discourse analysis on the macro and meso levels that engaged with various types of texts and genre chains formed amongst these texts. On the macro level, I analysed these texts and genre chains in order to explore what kind of arguments have been used semiotically by important actors across transnational
fields in order to legitimise and rationalise a specific order of discourse on A8 countries and their nationals. This was followed by analysis on the meso level, which specifically focused on how this order of discourse has been recontextualised in order to commodify A8 labour. As Fairclough argues, ‘texts semiotically construe identities and simultaneously seek to make these construals persuasive’ (2009: 180). It is on the meso level that this recontextualisation was organised into codes, which – together with macro level analysis, the theoretical framework and literature review – served to develop the interview guide. Moreover, these codes enabled triangulation amongst textual data deriving from employment agencies’ websites and interviews with workers. Triangulation enables validity, while it can also uncover divergence and contradiction between discourses and participants’ actions and experiences (Wodak and Meyer 2009).

The coding procedure consisted of open coding, axial coding and selective coding (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). The coding process was informed by in-vivo codes, emerging codes as well as the pre-established framework and orienting concepts (Charmaz 2006; Layder 1998). In the first stage, I closely examined the data, in order to identify key codes. Initially I coded data on the meso level of analysis. Amongst the identified codes were different categories of difference (race, ethnicity, religion, nationality, gender, class, age), as well as migration status, language, ‘work ethic’, history, and geography. These codes were reflected in the interview schedule (Appendix B), which explored how workers’ identity is shaped through different intersections and processes within their places of origin and the changes it undergoes across transnational fields and in the receiving country. Further it explicitly explored how different forms of capital can emerge in the form of embodied markers of difference, how they influence workers’ (self)value within these diverse places and times and how this affects their strategies and experiences in accessing work and working in the UK.
After finalising my fieldwork and transcribing the interviews, I started the analysis on the micro level by using the above codes, but after a while some codes merged and new codes and subcodes emerged. Amongst the new (sub)codes were, for instance, labour identity, reasons for migration, strategies to find work, support, imagination, habitus, place of origin, social capital, changes in the new field, future plans, etc. This consequently also made me return to the meso level of analysis and enabled a comprehensive and systemic analysis amongst levels, which brought me to the second stage of the coding process. The second stage involved reading and re-reading the interview transcripts in order to identify relationships between codes, upon which major themes were identified.

While initial codes encompassed the mixture of social categories and concepts, the themes focused on processes that highlight the relationships amongst them. Some of the themes that emerged were work-life balance, social-dumping, (self)colonisation, transnational labour relations, production fetishism, fetishism of the consumers, consumption of workers’ identities, (self)commodification, transformativity, performativity, resistance. Finally, in the last stage of coding, I conceptualised these relationships at a higher level of abstraction, by using a Bourdieuan conceptual framework. Closely connected to development of codes was also the development of new theoretical insights that arose from the research. For this, I used a system of writing memos that ‘provide a means of exploring and teasing out whether or in what sense particular codes, concepts and categories really are illustrated by data’ (Layder 1998: 59). Analysis on the macro, meso and micro levels has finally been compared in order to answer research questions and develop new theoretical ideas.
5.10 Conclusions
This chapter presented the methodology adopted in this study as well research design, methods and analysis. Departing from reflexivity in practice, I showed that this research is grounded within the ontological, epistemological and methodological strand of critical realism and feminism that recognises the importance of semiosis and of complex intersectional analysis that goes beyond structure and agency divide. This offers an explanatory critique that focuses on the symbolic power of group making and enables the analysis of causation in a non-positivistic way. Moreover, the critical realist epistemological positon enables methodological pluralism, demanding the operationalisation of abstract theoretical concepts.

In this regard, transdisciplinary adaption of a Bourdieuian conceptual trinity is used to define the object of study and to develop methodology. Together with Layder’s levels, it offers analytical clarity in exploring discursive and material, economic, cultural, political and structural and agentic processes and their intertwining across temporal and spatial and dimensions. This further allows engagement with various and mixed methods that can explore the phenomenon here studied on various levels and across spatial and temporal dimensions. In this multilevel strategy, I employed quantitative data in combination with qualitative discourse analysis in order to support and inform the more in-depth analysis achieved through semi-structured interviews. By focusing on different CEE groups, this research also offers a comparative perspective that is often neglected due to the dominant homogenisation of CEE workers in the UK. This multilevel, comparative and relational approach was crucial for uncovering symbolic power and its effects, which have already been explored in the previous and will be explored in the subsequent chapters.
6 A8 workers’ position on the UK labour market

1.1 Introduction
As argued in Chapter Two new colonial governmentality that characterised EU expansion eastwards was taken up on the UK level and is used to assign the new colonial subjects a specific place within transnationalised economy. This chapter departs from the UK state taxonomies in order to explore what kind of position is assigned to A8 workers on the UK labour market. By incorporating a Bourdieuian reflexive sociology, this research attempts to avoid the mistake of uncritically using the receiving state’s existent taxonomies as its frame of reference. Rather, it starts with the sociology of the state in order to critically evaluate and question the frame that constructs specific migrant groups and produces their value (Bourdieu 1990b, 1998a; Loyal 2009; Sayad 2004; Skeggs 2004b). The exploration of official taxonomies in the receiving country is critically evaluated by comparison with taxonomies from the sending countries and the EU as well as the existing research that explores A8 labour migration to the UK.

The chapter starts by exploring the flows and socio-demographic characteristics assigned to A8 workers in the state taxonomies. Furthermore the chapter explores the position assigned to A8 workers on the UK labour market within the frame of these state taxonomies, as well as differences amongst diverse A8 workers, with specific focus on Slovenian and Polish workers. Finally it explores strategies of A8 workers to access the UK labour market and the initiatives to reach and provide support for Polish and Slovenian workers in the UK.
6.1 Flows and socio-demographic characteristics of A8 workers on the UK labour market

As argued in Chapter Two the monitoring procedures that were part of the new colonial governmentality on the EU level, were effectively taken up on the UK level and implemented in WRS and overall managed migration scheme. Until 2009 the UKBA had regularly published AMRs that presented the statistics gathered through the WRS. In key AMR findings, A8 workers are presented as contributors to the economy in terms of filling gaps in the UK labour market (HO 2009). They are presented as taking the jobs that are the hardest to fill and going where the jobs are. There were around 1,094,234 workers’ registering from May 2004 until the end of 2009 (HO 2009).

Official data is not very reliable, since it does not measure net migration to the UK or workers who do not need to register, such as the self-employed or au-pairs, or those that fail to do so due to various reasons (Anderson et al. 2006; Anderson et al. 2007; Pribersky 2009; Samaluk 2009). Workers have also been discouraged to register by some employers and employment agencies in order to keep them out of official existence and consequently employment rights (Currie 2008). All in all, research indicates that official estimates might not be a very reliable indicator of the number of A8 workers that are actually present in the UK labour market.

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23 The 2009 number for all applications is an estimate derived upon the first quarter of that year.
Furthermore, Figure 2 demonstrates that there has been a downward trend in registration since the fourth quarter of 2007. Similarly, data derived from LFS and NIN allocations shows an increase in immigration in the first couple of years after enlargement and then decrease after 2007 (Coleman 2010; DWP 2009, 2010; IPPR 2010; ONS 2009b). Data and research highlight that A8 labour migration to the UK was characterised by a short lived boom in immigration at the beginning of enlargement, but it subsequently fell each year (ONS 2008; Pollard 2008). The fall in NIN registrations as well as WRS applications suggests that the fall in numbers of A8 nationals was largely caused by declining immigration rather than emigration (IPPR 2010).

This indicates more permanent integration of those who are already in the UK and a drop of new incoming migrant workers. Despite the fact that immigration from A8 countries has dropped with the recession, many migrants were still arriving between 2008 and 2010 (CPC 2011). For instance, when WRS was still in place, new registrations did not drop considerably in agriculture, this sector being particularly reliant on migrant labour even during the recession.
(McCollum et al. 2011; McCollum et al. 2012). As was demonstrated in Chapters Two and Three inequalities amongst and within states can still be the driving force behind migration and taking dirty, demanding, dangerous and underpaid jobs should not be seen as exercising a right to move, but more a strategy to survive.

Migration patterns and its changes are thus connected with the socio-economic conditions in receiving countries, as well as migrants’ countries of origin. As demonstrated in Chapter Three there are also differences amongst diverse A8 countries, namely Poland and Slovenia, which resulted in quite diverse migration patterns. Due to diversity amongst and within states discussed in Chapter Three, diverse A8 workers can have very different reasons for migration. Also research shows that while financial reasons and unemployment feature as important reasons for some A8 workers, younger respondents and those with higher levels of education are more likely to stress non-financial motives, such as professional and personal development, learning English, living in a more socially liberal society, or simply wishing to broaden their horizons (Pollard 2008; Samaluk 2009; Stevenson 2007; UniS 2006). As a result their reasons to return home can be economic or can relate to their personal and family life and are often different from the reasons for migrating in the first place (Pollard et al. 2008). Although the evidence already points to differences amongst A8 labour, diversity cannot be derived from official data where people from A8 countries are simply constructed as the same. This calls for further exploration of various intersections that diversify often homogenised A8 labour.
6.1.1 Ethnicity, race, religion

Data demonstrates that in official ethnicity monitoring, A8 nationals are constructed as embodying ethnic and racial sameness. Ethnicity monitoring statistics distinguish ‘White Other’ European groups not upon the geographical position of specific countries, but rather upon racialised historical, socio-economic and political divisions that still exist between ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western Europe’ (Gardener and Connolly 2005). This is yet more visible on the labour market. Research identifies that employers refer to A8 nationals as ‘Eastern Europeans’, which apart from A8 nationals includes Russians, Romanians, Bulgarians and other post-socialist states (Anderson et al. 2006). In this regard Marc (2009) argues that the popular mind set of contemporary ‘Western Europe’ very often imagines an ‘Eastern European’ as a Russian Slav. ‘Eastern European-ness’ also entails a cultural inferiority that is visible in employers’ narratives where they refer to A8 migrant workers who have spent considerable time in the UK and are more embedded in the community as being more ‘Westernised’ (MacKenzie and Forde 2009: 151). ‘Westernisation’ entails modernisation and points to a specific construction of new colonial subjects. Constructed ‘Eastern European’ sameness thus speaks of on-going colonial processes, which are problematic also because they fail to expose not only the internal socio-economic but also cultural, ethnic, racial, linguistic and religious differences that characterise CEE and have already been discussed in Chapter Three in case of Poland and Slovenia.

It is hardly surprising, then, that A8 nationals would rarely describe or identify themselves with racialised markers that construct them as the same. Gardener and Connolly (2005) for instance argue that the majority of write-in answers indicating ethnicity in the census detailed a European country, which suggests that ‘White Other’ Europeans often self-identify their ethnicity on the basis of nationality (see also Samaluk 2009). As argued in Chapter Three CEE countries
are also ethnically very diverse and have adopted from German Romanticism an ethnic approach to nationality, which implies an unmarked whiteness and legitimate forms of language. Due to this ethnic politics within CEE, Roma migrants to the UK often have very different reasons for migration related to high levels of racial discrimination in their places of origin (Cook et al. 2010; Poole 2010). Consequently they are more vulnerable and face more problems than some other A8 groups in the UK.

Research further suggests that A8 nationals in the UK self-identify also according to former national, regional or European markers, which may moreover serve for constructing their superiority in relation to other migrant and BME groups (Samaluk 2009; Spencer et al. 2007; Wills et al. 2010). Hence, A8 migrants’ (self)positioning has important racial dimensions that are visible on the UK labour market and speak of embedded and institutionalised whiteness (Dyer et al. 2010; McDowell et al. 2007; McDowell 2009a). The focus on A8 workers’ (self)positioning can thus on one hand expose the commonality built on the history of European colonialism and whiteness as the unmarked and unchallenged regime of power, and on the other hand it can uncover degrees of whiteness that speak of new and emerging colonial projects that also position white minorities in a hierarchy of acceptability – which is, however, not recognised in official state taxonomies.

In LFS and WERS there is, for instance, a tendency to present ethnic minorities only as non-white and make white minorities completely invisible (Kersley 2006; Lindley 2009). The invisibility of homogenised and white minorities has already been problematised in research focusing on historical and contemporary Irish, CEE, Iranian or Kurdish immigration to the UK (Hickman and Walter 1995; Holgate et al. 2012; McDowell 2009a; Nagel 2001). Invisibilisation can have important social, economic and political implications, given the failure to uncover the complexity of ethnic and racial privilege and
disadvantage hidden under embedded power structures. This has further practical implications that can be seen in the lack of provision of sufficient protection, positive measures, support and services for the minority groups that are framed as non-existent. As argued in the previous chapters there is thus a need to go beyond ethnicity and black-and-white paradigms in order to expose the complexity of ethnic privilege and disadvantage at work. For that it is important to challenge the constructed homogeneity that effectively erases history and identity, as well as determining a specific value for A8 workers, commonly defined as ‘Eastern Europeans’. Moreover it is crucial to explore which national groups are visible and which are invisible amongst the so-called ‘Eastern Europeans’.

6.1.2 Nationality

AMR statistics show that the majority of A8 workers in the UK are from Poland. The breakdown according to nationality in the available data shows that 66 per cent of all applications come from Polish nationals (HO 2009). The numbers of registered workers in the top ten sectors demonstrate that there have been almost 700,000 registrations for Polish workers, followed by Slovakian at 96,000. On the other hand there have been fewer than a thousand registrations for Slovenian workers, followed by Estonians at around 7,500 (HO 2009). Polish workers are, numerically, the biggest group in the top ten sectors and Slovenian nationals the smallest.

In the year period until March 2009 there was a fall of 36 per cent in the number of approved applications, mainly due to 43 per cent fall in approved applicants from Polish workers (HO 2009). During the recession there was a decline in Polish and an increase in Lithuanian, Latvian and Hungarian workers, which may be related to labour market circumstances in these countries. Poland is doing relatively well, while the latter three countries are not (McCollum et al.
Nevertheless Polish workers are still the biggest and most visible group, and without doubt symbolise A8 labour in the UK, which also has important implications on the labour market.

For instance, Slovak and Roma workers believe themselves to be disadvantaged in comparison to Polish workers (Cook et al. 2010). The research by Perrons et al. (2010) on male migrant domestic services in the UK argues that, due to popular stereotypes, public discourse and the branding of Polish handymen as high-quality, other A8 handymen also often use the Polish label to market their services. Hence, it is important to explore agentic strategies of migrant workers and critically evaluate if and how are they informed by the structural discourses and mechanisms that constitute their trajectories. Moreover, workers from the various A8 countries use their places of origin in order to assess their migratory and working experiences and to position themselves with regard to other A8 and other migrant and non-migrant labour.

Therefore, A8 workers emigrating from different locations and countries enter the UK with quite diverse self-perceptions. As shown in Chapter Three this is visible in nesting orientalisms that speak of divisions within and amongst diverse A8 groups. The constructed and homogenised subordinate cultural entity that constructs all CEE migrants as the same is thus problematic because it masks the unequal power relations that are present within the artificially constructed in-group. Different origins and social locations indicate that diverse A8 workers are bearers of diverse resources and take up different agentic strategies in order to re-claim their value. It is thus necessary further to take into account the gender and age dimensions of A8 labour in the UK.
6.1.3 Gender and age

A8 migration to the UK has important gender dimensions. WRS statistics indicate that the overall female to male ratio of these migrants was 44:56 from May 2004 until March 2009 and, in the first quarter of 2009, 50:50 (HO 2009). Although the statistics are beginning to show an important gender dimension, the official figures greatly underestimate the presence of women. In this regard Vertovec (2006) argues that 80 per cent of Slovaks, 72 per cent of Czechs and 70 per cent of Slovenians are women. Women from CEE countries are also one of the most common groups of domestic/care and hospitality workers and are often as highly educated as the women they relieve from domestic tasks (Anderson 2000; Currie 2007; Lister 2007; McDowell et al. 2007; Wills et al. 2010). As such A8 women play an important part in the UK’s service economy that is heavily built on the performativity of workplace identities that provide a specific experience for customers and can entail emotional and embodied labour (Dyer et al. 2008; McDowell et al. 2007).

Embodied labour can, in addition, have important age dimensions. Official figures in the UK tell us that most registered A8 workers are very young, 81 per cent being between 18 and 34 years old and only 8 per cent having dependants (HO 2009). Young workers without prior experience of work can be easy prey for exploitation. Therefore one should not rule out the large possibility of age discrimination with regard to A8 labour. Indeed McKay (2009) argues that the likelihood of getting paid less was greater for younger migrants and also for those in hospitality, agriculture and construction, which are amongst the sectors that most heavily depend on migrant workers. The following section examines the position A8 labour occupies on the UK labour market in further detail.
6.2 A8 workers’ position on the UK labour market

This section examines the sectors, occupations and types of work taken up by A8 workers, their earnings in relation to skills and hours worked, as well as their geographical distribution in the UK. According to WRS statistics, the top ten sectors in which A8 migrants work are administration, business and management, hospitality and catering, agriculture, manufacturing, food, fish, meat processing, retail, health and medical, construction and land, transport and entertainment and leisure (HO 2009). The LFS, in contrast to WRS, uses standard classification codes and indicates that A8 workers tend to be concentrated in distribution and the hotel and restaurant industry (Coleman 2010). Official data indicates that the majority of A8 workers are employed in the service sector, most notably in administration, business and management, hospitality and catering as well as distribution.

Nevertheless it is important to note that most of the workers classified in the first category were employed by employment agencies in different sectors. This already points to the important role of various labour market intermediaries (Bonet et al. 2013) in A8 labour migration. As McCollum et al. (2012) argue, this category to a large extent comprised work in agriculture, food processing or hospitality. The allocation of many temporary agency workers to this category disguises the predominance of temporary, low-skilled and low paid manual work (Clark and Hardy 2011). Furthermore there are differences amongst diverse A8 nationals.

The breakdown of data according to nationality indicates that some A8 groups are proportionally more present in some sectors, and some more in others (HO 2009). Figure 3 below demonstrates these differences by showing the percentages of each nationality by sector. Whereas it shows that Polish workers are much more present in business, administration and management (i.e. employed by employment agencies), agriculture and food processing,
Slovenian workers are proportionally the biggest group in hospitality and catering, retail, the health and medical sector and entertainment and leisure. Data further shows that A8 workers are employed in various occupations but are still mainly present in elementary ones (Coleman 2010; HO 2009).

This high percentage in elementary occupations indicates that A8 nationals are employed at the lower end of the occupational scale. In one interpretation of labour statistics, A8 workers are simply portrayed as 'being attracted to elementary occupations and process, plant and machinery operatives, which is in keeping with the assumption made in the industry analysis that A8 workers are finding employment where low levels of training are required' (Clancy 2008: 22). This interpretation completely neglects the serious question of whether workers are really attracted, or whether they are operating within the frame of opportunities that is assigned to them.
Figure 3: Percentages of each nationality by sector.

(Sources: AMR 2009)
Assumptions such as these, however, do not hold true only for the official UK data on A8 nationals, but for European Commission data as well. The Commission’s report on the functioning of transitional arrangements on the one hand provides evidence that A8 workers are highly skilled, and on the other uncritically assumes that these highly skilled workers have positive effects on labour markets by relieving labour shortages in areas such as construction, domestic and catering services that would in some countries risk not being filled otherwise (EC 2006). In this regard, MacKenzie and Forde (2009) argue that utilisation of migrant labour from the new member states does not sit well with the Lisbon strategy to create more and better jobs, which are supposed to make the EU a dynamic knowledge economy. Furthermore official taxonomies and practices point towards a colonial gaze that does not concern itself with brain waste, but with the utilisation and commodification of colonial subjects for specific types of jobs. With A8 labour perceived in official taxonomies and policies as tailored for low skilled jobs, data further indicates that the UK government is not concerned with workers’ qualifications (HO 2009). These are explored further below.

1.1.1 Qualifications and skills of A8 labour

Despite a lack of official UK figures, EU taxonomies reveal that A8 countries have more students in tertiary education and all have average higher youth education attainment levels than the UK (Eurostat 2009). Research also shows that A8 migrants in the UK are highly qualified (FRCG 2007; Stevenson 2007). Nevertheless employers and employment agencies often underestimate and undervalue migrants’ qualifications and instead recognise only their English language abilities, which can provide employers with the opportunity for legitimising unequal treatment (Currie 2007; Samaluk 2009; Stevenson 2007). A8 workers therefore face de-skilling, devaluation and a glass-ceiling, which can have further gender specific dimensions (Anderson2000; Currie 2007; Lutz
This may explain why, regardless of relatively high levels of qualifications and skills, A8 workers are disproportionally employed in elementary occupations. Deskilling and devaluation is further evident in salaries that A8 workers receive, which are explored further below.

1.1.2 Earnings and hours of work

Research on Polish nationals informs us that the educational attainment of A8 workers has no significant impact on their earnings (Pollard 2008). On the contrary, workers who have higher education qualifications are more likely to work in elementary occupations such as cleaning than those with vocational skills, who are able to find work in skilled trades. The AMR identifies that the hourly rates of workers are getting higher, however 93 per cent of A8 workers were still in 2009 earning only between £4.50 and £7.99 per hour (HO 2009). This is supported by LFS data indicating that A8 workers are in a very disadvantaged position in terms of payment in comparison to UK as well as other non-UK-born workers. Almost 76 per cent of A8 workers are found in lower-earning groups that earn between £200 and £399 a week, compared to 36 per cent of UK born workers, 33 percent of other non-UK born workers and 29 per cent of EU14 (Coleman 2010). According to a COMPAS report on migrant workers in vulnerable employment, workers from A8, A2 and other European countries were generally worse off in terms of pay, hours and insecurity than other larger categories of recent migrants and those from South Asian countries that arrived in the UK earlier (Jayaweera and Anderson 2008).

Nevertheless it is important to note that the presented statistical evidence only shows partial results, while many undocumented workers fall out of official numbers. In this regard, a study on the migrant division of labour (Wills et al. 2010) uncovered that the largest proportion of migrant workers in London’s low wage economy actually come from sub-Saharan Africa, many of whom
have been working illegally at least for some time. It is important to acknowledge that the comparisons might be partial and that migration status can render some groups visible and others not. Nevertheless, data still speaks of a concentration of A8 labour in the lower end of the economy where workers face various problems. TUC research on Polish and Lithuanian workers found that over half of those surveyed had problems at work, a quarter of them had no written contract and had problems with payment, and they had experienced various forms of discrimination (Anderson et al. 2007). A more recent report has also highlighted that A8 workers experience forced labour in the UK food industry (Scott et al. 2012). The type of work and geographical distribution of A8 labour is explored further below.

1.1.3 Type of work and geographical distribution

The AMR informs us that 51 per cent of workers were in temporary employment and 46 per cent in permanent employment (HO 2009). Temporary workers represented 78 per cent of registered workers who applied to work in agriculture and in administration, business and management. In hospitality and catering and in manufacturing the pattern was reversed, with respectively 79 and 67 per cent indicating permanent employment (HO 2009). Furthermore the AMR shows that 86 per cent of workers work more than 35 hours per week, which means that there is a high percentage of full-time employment amongst A8 workers (HO 2009). Due to the high costs of registration and various reasons mentioned earlier, workers often do not register, especially in temporary work, therefore this figure may well be highly underestimated (Currie 2008; Samaluk 2009).

Research informs us that A8 labour is more likely utilised for temporary work than native workers and is less likely to be on standard employment contracts. This means that migrant workers can be excluded from important employment
rights (McKay 2009). In this regard Anderson argues that A8 workers’ position is ‘Piorean’, i.e. seeing ‘the temporary migrant as “the true economic man”’ suited for precarious work that ‘captures both atypical and insecure employment and has implications beyond employment pointing to an associated weakening of social relations’ (Anderson 2010: 303-05). In this regard McCollum and Findlay (2011) argue that CEE workers on the one hand serve a complementary function for employers who employ native workers to fill their permanent positions and migrant labour to fill their flexible and seasonal needs. On the other they serve a substitutional function, when employers struggle to recruit local workers. The latter category has started to be seen as dispensable with recession, while employers are able to recruit local skilled labour for undesirable jobs that have previously been reserved for migrant workers. This is especially the case in urban areas and in front-line hospitality jobs (McCollum and Findlay 2011).

Despite the recession A8 labour still serves a complementary function, while it is perceived as having the appropriate ‘soft skills’ for flexible types of work (McCollum and Findlay 2011: 50). Research shows that A8 workers are stereotyped as having a superior work ethic and as being willing to work long and flexible hours without complaint (Anderson et al. 2006; MacKenzie and Forde 2009; Wills et al. 2010). This positioning points to the commodification of A8 workers, no longer seen as human beings but as products available for specific types of jobs. Evidence suggests that A8 workers’ social identity is often constructed solely through labour. In this regard Downey (2008) argues that they are simply perceived as seasonal workers, racialised through the jobs assigned to them and as such simply referred to as ‘strawberry pickers’, for instance. Official data also indicates that A8 labour is simply reduced to a ‘guest-worker’ paradigm. In its interpretation of data, the AMR highlights only the 62 per cent of workers who intend to stay for only three months, and neglects the 33 per cent who are undecided and those who intend to stay 1 or 2
years or more than two years (HO 2009: 16). One survey (UniS 2006) on Polish nationals indicates that only 22 per cent of the respondents identified themselves as seasonal migrants and only a third of respondents stated that they intended to stay less than two years in the UK. In this regard evidence suggests that there are considerable differences between workers with lower educational levels who identify themselves as seasonal workers, and workers with higher educational levels who adopt a ‘wait and see’ approach (Pollard 2008; UniS 2006). Apart from employment, work also offers a resource through which individuals construct their identity and make sense of their world (Bradley et al. 2000; McDowell 2009a). Therefore, the aspirations of migrant workers may change over time and people who came with the intention to stay temporary might settle permanently (MacKenzie and Forde 2009).

The geographical distribution of A8 workers is quite distinctive in comparison to other migrant groups. Analysis of WRS registrations and NIN allocations by local authority area show that as well as being present in major cities such as London, A8 nationals are disproportionately represented in towns and rural areas in the east, where there is a seasonal trend in registrations (i.e. agricultural workers), with September being the peak (CRC 2007; LGA 2008). The highest percentage of A8 workers can be found in East Anglia, the Midlands and London (HO 2009). London has the highest percentage of workers in hospitality and catering, East Anglia the highest percentage of those working in agriculture and the Midlands the highest percentage of those working in administration, business and management. The North East has a high proportion of people employed in business, management and administrations (i.e. by employment agencies). Migrant labour is more likely to be viewed as essential by rural employers than those in urban areas. This divide has increased even more with the recession, with fewer jobs and increased competition for them (McCollum et al. 2012). This poses the serious question of
what is happening to migrant workers who have spent years in certain jobs and locations but have during the recession simply become dispensable.

6.3 Strategies of A8 workers to access the UK labour market

Research informs that Poles are increasingly using formal channels such as agencies and the internet to organise their migration (Currie 2008; Ryan et al. 2007; White and Ryan 2008). Fitzgerald (2006) and Currie (2008) argue that Polish workers accessed work in the UK mostly through direct agency recruitment, as well as direct company recruitment or through family or personal networks. Also my access to research participants, discussed in the previous chapter, demonstrates that Slovenian and Polish workers tend to use the internet and various types of labour market intermediaries to access work. There are also intersectional differences amongst and within these two groups.

Moreover research focusing on the globalisation of temporary employment agencies shows that they have expanded into several A8 countries since the late 1990s (Coe et al. 2007). As these authors argue, the particular geography of agencies is determined by deregulation. As such they can be found in the low-wage segments of economies that have been particularly open to liberalisation, such as some A8 countries as well as the UK. Direct company recruitment within the EEA is also supported by EURES24 and its local branches, which come in the form of public employment services in A8 countries (Fitzgerald 2006). This further indicates the importance of the EU in regulating labour migration within the EEA.

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24 EURES is a network of co-operation between the European Commission and the Public Employment Services of the EEA Member States. The purpose of EURES is to provide information, advice and recruitment/placement (job-matching) services for the benefit of workers and employers as well as any citizen wishing to benefit from the principle of the free movement of persons.
Despite the fact that A8 workers come from places where various labour market intermediaries have only recently started to emerge, data analysis indicates that different employment agencies that operate transnationally either through communication technologies or by moving their services to A8 countries act as an important gateway through which workers gain information and access jobs in the UK. Similarly ONS data shows that apart from Australian and New Zealander workers, A8 workers were the most likely non-British group to use employment agencies to access work. In this regard, 19 per cent of A8 workers used private employment agencies that specialise in certain jobs or sectors, and another 5 per cent used public ones (ONS 2009a). Nevertheless, the data shows that the largest share of people received no help at all in finding employment, while the second biggest group received help from relatives or friends. Only 2 per cent gained access to work through migrant or ethnic organisations and 9 per cent used other help (ONS 2009a). Although almost one third of A8 workers received help from relatives or friends, it is still important to take into account that new arrivals mostly lack social capital, which makes them even more vulnerable to exploitation by employment agencies and employers.

As discussed in the previous chapter there are important class, generational and temporal dimensions that influence how workers access work. Migrant workers that lack social capital and have no prior experience of working, studying or living in the UK are most likely to use these intermediaries to access work in the UK. This is so because these are often falsely perceived as trustworthy and as experts who could provide a safe and secure passage to the UK labour market (Currie 2008). In support of this point, WRS data indicates that temporary agency employment is the single largest category for A8 labour (Clark and Hardy 2011; Currie 2008). Furthermore, the research of Wills et al. (2010) shows that migrant workers have most commonly used agencies to access low-paid jobs in the hospitality and catering sector in London, and that a number of Poles
have been recruited in Poland often with exaggerated portrayals of the benefits of employment in the UK.

It is thus crucial to turn the spotlight on the practices of transnational employment agencies and employers that actively source, supply and employ workers from A8 countries. These involve employers’ agreements with agencies to source and supply labour, agencies opening offices in A8 countries or advertising on the internet or in local media, and employers organising job fairs and advertising their positions in A8 countries or using snowballing techniques with their existing staff (Currie 2008; Fitzgerald 2006; MacKenzie and Forde 2009). Employment agencies can take up various functions that importantly change the former bilateral employee-employer relationship into a ‘triangular’ relationship (Bonet et al. 2013: 340). Research indicates that within these triangular relationships, a worker’s employment status is often unclear (McKay 2009: 39).

Agency work can effectively blur the legal relationship and responsibility of an employer towards workers. As Currie argues, agency workers are in an extremely vulnerable legal position because various forms of subcontracting create new, unrecognised forms of employment, which make it increasingly difficult for workers to satisfy ‘employee’ tests and claim their rights (2008: 59). Furthermore, in the UK there is no licensing scheme to control the conduct of employment agencies, but just a self-regulatory body, the REC, which can only advise its members on codes of good practice. Migrant workers do not only use agencies to enter the UK labour market but also to search for jobs within it (Currie 2008). According to CIETT25, in 2010 the UK had by far the greatest number of active or inactive employment agencies in Europe and the greatest

agency work penetration rate\textsuperscript{26}. It is no surprise, then, that in the last two decades there has been a rapid increase in the UK of workers who have been placed by temporary employment agencies (Forde and Slater 2006).

Furthermore research informs us that employment agencies play an important role in determining A8 workers for certain sectors or occupations (Currie 2007; MacKenzie and Forde 2009; McKay 2009). They may encourage employers to adopt poor practices with regard to A8 labour, and often give A8 workers false expectations, thus leaving both workers and employers dissatisfied (Pemberton and Stevens 2010). Research indicates various abuses by employers – particularly via agencies – including charging individuals to find them work, docking money from wages when paying by cheque, paying lower hourly rates, excessive working hours and providing poor or substandard accommodation, as well as fines for calling in sick, charging deposits for work uniforms and unpaid training days and finally getting workers without sufficient English language skills to sign contracts that they are unable to understand (Fitzgerald 2006; McKay 2009; TUC 2007; Wills et al. 2010). In this regard it is important to note that agency work may also be the most accessible form of work for those who lack sufficient English skills (McCollum et al. 2012).

In summary, temporary agency migrant workers are often perceived by employers as ‘a “tap” of labour that could be turned on in times of peak labour demand and easily turned off again when extra workers are no longer required’ (McCollum and Findlay 2011: 41). Furthermore, migrant workers represent an additional way to accumulate economic capital for those employers who are hiring out this ‘hardworking and reliable workforce’ (MacKenzie and Forde 2009). These strategies on the part of employers and employment agencies further impede relations between new arrivals and the settled population,

\textsuperscript{26} Penetration rate signifies the daily average number of agency workers [in full-time equivalents] divided by the total active working population [as defined by the ILO].
therefore preventing them ‘sharing in the collective values of the workplace’ and employment rights (Hickman et al. 2008: 73). The presented evidence poses additional questions with respect to the protection of workers’ rights and the support provided in this regard, which are explored further below.

6.4 Initiatives to reach and provide support for Polish and Slovenian migrant workers in the UK

Research reveals that A8 labour has very little contact with institutions outside work and that only three per cent of these workers had joined a trade union (Anderson et al. 2007). The precarious situation of many A8 workers, characterised by long working hours, prevents them from finding any time to build up new relationships within the host community (MacKenzie and Forde 2009). Furthermore, differences exist among the diverse but artificially homogenised groups who have come from different A8 countries. Here it is again important to take into account various intersections, as well as temporal and spatial dimensions, and look at transnational labour processes and government and social policies in the two selected countries.

Since Poland has experienced the largest emigration of its population in recent history, it has focused a lot of government and social policies on reaching and assisting its citizens abroad. Currie (2008), for instance, describes a helpline in Poland set up by the International Organization for Migration, aimed at informing people about the WRS and rights of Polish citizens in the UK. This in practice meant providing information on living and working conditions in the receiving countries and developing contacts with new organisations of Polish workers abroad with the aim of connecting them with existing organisations deriving from older generation of migrants. Since the Catholic Church has always played and important role in assisting Polish migrants, contacts with Polish Catholic missions have also been intensified (Szewczyk and Unterschutz 2009).
These initiatives were accompanied by government repatriation policies aiming at attracting Polish nationals to return by promoting new and changing opportunities in employment and the establishment of new businesses in Poland, with measures such as tax privileges and reduced social security contributions for a limited period upon return (Szewczyk and Unterschutz 2009). As argued in Chapter Three these promotional campaigns were not very successful. The Polish government also developed a specific scholarship programme in order to encourage Polish scientists to return to Poland and continue their research there, as well as to maintain international cooperation (Szewczyk and Unterschutz 2009). This orientation has further been extended to other social partners, such as trade unions.

Bilateral relations amongst Polish and UK trade unions have focused on providing information on working conditions in the host countries, on local trade unions in host societies and identifying Polish speaking persons who could organise Polish workers there. As a result, today a lot of host country trade unions, such as the British GMB, employ Polish speaking organisers (Heyes 2009; Szewczyk and Unterschutz 2009). The research of Heyes (2009) shows that most of the efforts of social partners in the UK are directed specifically towards Polish workers but not towards other A8 nationals. For example, in the UK the TUC has, in cooperation with the Citizens Advice Bureau and Solidarność, developed a specific Polish-language website27 in order to assist Polish migrant workers in the UK (Heyes 2009).

Unions have also engaged in educational and organisational activities to provide access to migrant workers, resulting in an increased membership among these latter. Apart from English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL), the TUC is for instance offering free training for Polish workers employed in cleaning, security and construction in London (Heyes 2009). These

initiatives came out of bilateral cooperation with trade unions in the sending countries: in the A8 case, this has mostly involved Poland. Though some workers from Poland benefit from this bilateral cooperation, the same can not be said for workers from Slovenia, which has very different priorities – as is explored further below.

Slovenia, as a country of immigration, focuses its governmental and social partner policies mostly on immigration rather than emigration. Although the proposed strategy for economic migration in Slovenia has expressed concerns with regard to a brain-drain and has recognised the need to adopt measures to prevent it (such as easier recognition of degrees, knowledge and experiences gained abroad) and to stimulate Slovenians living abroad to return, not much has in fact been done in this regard (MDDSZ 2010). There is no real willingness on the part of government or business to adopt any practices to this end. Although the Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has a special office for Slovenians abroad, their main preoccupation seems to be solely the preservation of Slovenian culture and identity amongst Slovenians living abroad.

This is reflected in the activities of the Slovenian embassy in the UK, whose occasional emails inform its nationals of cultural events or opportunities to learn the Slovenian language. Similarly, trade unions are not putting any efforts in assisting Slovenian workers abroad. Furthermore, the Association of Employers of Slovenia only gives information to businesses in Slovenia on how to direct their managers and employers to work abroad, and does not focus at all on how to attract Slovenian workers abroad to return. There are thus

considerable differences in the support available for Polish and Slovenian workers.

Although nationally organised community groups can be beneficial to workers, we still need to be careful not to fall into the trap of constructing a false commonality of workers based upon national markers or to automatically presuppose that some A8 nationals are better off because of nationally organised community support groups or bilateral agreements amongst governments and social partners. Wills et al. (2010) for instance informs us of internal divisions amongst national groups. These would arise either from increasing individualism, where everyone is seen as a potential competition, or from discriminatory experiences or a treat arising from in-group or out-group. This speaks of structural forces that also produce self-discriminatory practices amongst the members of the constructed in-groups. Furthermore, this indicates that diasporic communities are not necessarily safe places or places of support (Holgate et al. 2007; Holgate et al. 2012).

For instance, ‘support’ provided by diasporic communities can also take the shape of ‘exploitative solidarity’, where established and powerful members can take advantage of others’ vulnerability (Erdemir and Vasta 2007: 22). Although new arrivals from A8 countries might find support to get work within their ethnic communities, there is no guarantee that the working relations therein cannot be equally exploitative. Spencer et al. (2007) further points to the lack of information provided for new arrivals from A8 countries. This points to differences amongst newly arrived and already established A8 workers and communities in the UK. Diverse groups and generations of A8 workers might have very different needs and support available. This indicates that an ethnic approach to solidarity might not be the most useful in uncovering the complexity of disadvantage and privilege.
6.5 Conclusions
This chapter has demonstrated that A8 workers are assigned a specific identity and position within official UK taxonomies and their interpretations. Within the frame of UK taxonomies, A8 labour is portrayed as ‘tailored’ and as being attracted to low skilled and low paid jobs where there are labour shortages, despite their qualifications and skills. In official taxonomies A8 workers are dehumanised and objectified as temporary economic workers and perceived by employers and employment agencies as a useful commodity for taking up dirty, dangerous and demanding jobs. This assigned social identity and position is very problematic, and does not challenge the reasons behind deskilling and dequalification.

Furthermore, it is problematic because it constructs A8 labour as a homogeneous community and masks the multiple and complex power relations therein. In this regard data indicates that homogeneously constructed A8 labour is internally very diverse and characterised by various intersections that shape multiple power relations, which often remain invisible. Moreover the evidence presented suggests that workers from diverse social, economic, political, geographical and historical locations carry with them diverse resources and might take up different agentic strategies in order to re-claim their value. It is thus necessary to explore workers’ agentic strategies and critically evaluate if and how they are informed by the multiple structural relations operating across (trans)national fields.

The identity assigned to A8 labour also masks spatial dimensions that affect A8 labour migration to the UK and these workers’ (self)positionality within it. Contextualising this research within a wider historical, socio-economic and political context illuminates the on-going colonial processes that characterise contemporary capitalism, fuel transnational migration and assign specific value to A8 labour. The presented evidence indicates that transnational employment
agencies play an important role in providing A8 labour to the UK and in determining their position within its labour market and wider society. This suggests that such agencies might act as one of the crucial transnational actors that assign identity and value to A8 labour and as such play an important role in on-going colonial processes. The role of transnational employment agencies within on-going colonial processes and value extraction possibilities and strategies of diverse actors involved will be explored in the following chapters.
7 Commodification of A8 workers and their value strategies

7.1 Introduction
The following chapter explores discursive commodification of A8 workers in web based marketing practices of transnational employment agencies. As such the chapter exposes the important role of transnational employment agencies in the making of new colonial subjects. In this regard it uncovers how the value of A8 workers is constructed through various embodied markers and spatial and temporal dimensions informed by the hegemonic binary logic of the imperial post-socialist order. Moreover the chapter also demonstrates how discursive intersectional commodification informs Polish and Slovenian workers’ strategies to generate value for themselves and how it legitimises the division and the disciplining of diverse groups of workers on the UK labour market.

The chapter commences by exposing the role of transnational employment agencies as legitimate actors in the making of colonial subjects with specific value on the UK labour market. This is followed by exposing the discursive and intersectional commodification of A8 workers. In this regard the chapter reveals how A8 workers are commodified through spatial and temporal dimensions and embodied markers of difference. As such, they are assigned a specific value, position and performative roles. Moreover it reveals how this commodification affects Polish and Slovenian workers performative, transformative and resisting strategies. In summary, the chapter exposes how cultural, diversity and identity politics have been marketized in order to legitimise the utilisation of the global poor and in order to self-discipline and divide diverse groups of workers.
7.2 Transnational employment agencies as legitimate actors in commodification of A8 workers

The analysis of employment agencies websites reveals that they act as some kind of representatives of A8 countries and A8 workers. As argued in Chapter Four, the symbolic power to make groups rests on the condition that those who are imposing a specific vision need to be recognised as legitimate actors. In this regard, data analysis shows that 80 per cent of analysed employment agencies specialise for specific nationalities, most commonly for Polish workers. Ania’s Poland has for instance started its business as a promoter of cultural and business relations between Poland and Britain and is now acting also as an employment agency that specialises in Polish emigration to the UK:

‘Ania Heasley is a well known specialist on Poles in the UK and has appeared in numerous articles and news programs discussing various issues relating to Polish people who have immigrated to the UK as well as general European immigration discussions’. (Ania’s Poland)

The above example indicates that the agency is authorised by the media field to speak in the name of Polish immigrants and about general CEE immigration, and as such acts as a kind of representative of CEE migrant communities within the UK. Apart from specialising for specific nationalities agencies also brand their services as experts on the so-called ‘East European community’31. As such, agencies help create the stereotypical sameness of all CEE countries and their nationals, and thus reinforce the hegemonic binary logic of the imperial post-socialist order. I other words they utilise cultural, diversity and identity politics for ethnic marketing that exemplifies a clear business case for diversity that acts as an important tool in group making; in producing value of new colonial subjects.

31 New Europe Personnel website.
7.3 Marketing unequal relationships amongst meta-fields

Findings demonstrate that colonial subjects are assigned a specific value through similar postcolonial discourses found on the level of the (meta) governance, which have already been presented in Chapter Two. Data analysis shows that spatial dimensions play an important role in the intersectional commodification of A8 labour. In this regard data shows that employment agencies specifically refer to the colonisation of A8 countries and social-dumping practices presented in Chapters Two and Three in order to make A8 workers more attractive to employers and to source workers. For instance, Central European Staffing promotes migration as an attractive opportunity for workers:

‘In recent years a large number of companies have moved their call centres to Central and Eastern Europe. The Czech Republic has over 300 call centres with firms like DHL and IBM setting up in the country. In Hungary, the industry is estimated to employ over 10,000 people. Even if your stay in the UK is only temporary, you can gain the relevant skills here and transfer them back to your native country’.
(Central European Staffing)

This example shows that agencies market labour migration as a learning and business opportunity for workers. In other words, they enhance the reputation of the West and try to convince workers that they could benefit from transferring the capitals accumulated in the West back to the East. Agencies thus impose a colonial gaze that presents the practices of the West as necessarily better and as an added value that can be transferred to the East. Findings further suggest that agencies refer to the negative effects of social-dumping practices within A8 countries in order to make A8 labour more attractive to UK employers:

‘Wages on UK farms appear highly attractive to Poles who can expect to receive only £200 to £300 per month in their home country. A fair proportion of the Polish workers are former farmers who have found it impossible to remain in business following admission to the EU. Their small farms are increasingly being swallowed
up into larger areas with a substantial number of investors moving in from western Europe.’

(Central European Staffing)

Here, the agency points to differentials between meta-fields that have been widened through social-dumping practices. As such, they market affordable A8 workers for exploitation in specific sectors that have been destroyed as a result of the other types of movements discussed in Chapters Two and Three. Wage differentials amongst states are further promoted as a great asset and incentive for A8 workers to migrate and be grateful for their underpaid jobs:

‘In order to understand where the economic emigration of Poles comes from we have to compare the standard of living of an average employee in Poland and Great Britain. It is difficult for an employee in Poland to meet the most urgent needs when the minimum salary equals GBP 150.00 monthly...Whereas, the minimal salary in Great Britain supported by inborn thriftiness of Poles not only enable them to live on the ordinary level but also to save money and buy a car or repay the mortgage instalments...Being offered a job in Great Britain they repay their employer showing respect and working hard which is reflected in increased efficiency and eagerly performed duties’.

(Polish Staff Recruitment)

This excerpt demonstrates that agencies market colonial subjects as willing to take up lower labour and living standards. Because they come from a less wealthy country they are assigned a specific value and characteristics, such as being thrifty, hardworking and grateful for undesirable and underpaid jobs. Despite the fact that agencies use differentials amongst states as a marketing tool, there is little reflection on how movement to another field might affect workers and whether the minimum wage will be sufficient to cover expenses in the UK, where migrant workers also lack cultural, social and economic capital. The examples here provided thus demonstrate that agencies use inequalities amongst countries as a marketing tool that legitimises exploitation of migrant workers from the European periphery. In other words, the business case for diversity effectively utilises global inequalities. How this affects workers and organisations will be explored in Chapter Eight. As the evidence above points
to spatial dimensions of commodification processes, it is important to further explore temporal dimensions.

7.4 Assigning A8 workers a socialist history and work ethic
Findings demonstrate that on both the macro and meso levels, temporal dimensions play an important role in assigning A8 labour a specific identity. Through temporal dimensions, A8 workers are constructed as being from the past and embodying a socialist history that is supposed to influence their work ethic and characteristics, as can be seen from the following excerpt:

‘The work ethic is stronger with people born in Eastern and Central Europe as well as the Baltic States who come from a background where governments dictated that everyone should work and that a person’s value within their society was gauged by their usefulness to a society with high ideals. This means that people coming from Eastern and Central Europe are generally more diligent and productive than their Western European counterparts, understanding work as being central to their existence rather than just something they do in order to earn a living. This fundamental difference in attitude has led many recruiters to prefer such candidates above others’.
(Eurosource International)

This example shows how the hegemonic binary logic of the imperial post-socialist order, discussed in Chapters Two and Three, is utilised for economic purposes to assign specific value and position to colonial subjects. Here, socialism is presented as an ideological tool that is supposed to discipline workers to perform the work ethic. Although socialism is generally demonised within the order of discourse on CEE (discussed in Chapters Two), this is not the case with regard to the discipline imposed on workers. This indicates that the binary logic of imperial post-socialist order is utilised and strategically moulded for various economic purposes. This inconsistency in strategic use of cultural politics also indicates that contemporary capitalism is ideological and inherently undemocratic and would strategically utilise any politics in order to accumulate capital. Since A8 workers are branded as embodying a form of socialist history that translates into superior work ethic, they are presented as
an asset for employers who can increase the productivity and decrease the costs of production, as seen on the Eurolink Scheme website:

‘Polish workers, Bulgarian and Lithuanian workers offer not only skills and experience but also their “live to work” attitude very much sought after by our clients. Let us solve your staffing shortages! Increase your productivity with high staff retention, their “Live to Work” attitude and staff who are there when you need them!’

(Eurolink Scheme)

Hence, this cultural politics legitimises the utilisation of migrant workers for precarious jobs. It rationalises the business case for diversity that enables employers to continue decreasing labour standards and rights of workers in the name of the profit. Moreover it acts as a disciplining tool for workers and legitimises the imposition of the neoliberal work ethic on various local and global scales.

7.4.1 Learning, performing and resisting the neoliberal work ethic

As demonstrated in Chapter Three, the work ethic was part of the (self)disciplining process in the neoliberal (self)colonialism in Poland, which went through an ideologically imposed ‘shock therapy’, but not in Slovenia, which took a gradualist approach. Entering the UK labour market where the work ethic represents the highest moral standard thus presents a self-disciplining curve for Slovenian workers. Although some of my interviewees perceive themselves as having a strong will to work, because they have moved to another country and are motivated to prove themselves, findings also demonstrate that Slovenian workers start performing the neoliberal work ethic once they learn how to operate on the field and generate exchange-value. In this regard Irena points out that she started using ‘the cliché of being hardworking’ in order to present herself to employers. Also Tilen explains how he added the work ethic to his CV, upon a friend’s suggestion:

‘I know everyone is hardworking that was added… [A friend] suggested me…That the English people like hardworking people!’
Performing the neoliberal work ethic on the entry level is especially important for low-paid and -skilled jobs. Workers in these jobs speak of how employers are not really interested in education, experience or working skills, but rather in workers’ willingness to be flexible, hardworking and to work without complaint, as explained by Vesna:

‘Here you just need to tell them how much hard working person you are and that you are quite flexible…and able to work under the pressure, which is not that important in Slovenia... It’s much more important here, I would point out this flexibility and working under pressure much earlier than in Slovenia.’

(Shift leader in a hotel, Slovenian, Female, 26, BA)

Performance of the neoliberal work ethic thus becomes a strategy for workers to compete for low-skilled and low-paid jobs. In this regard some workers also inform that they have intentionally left out their qualifications and rather emphasised the compliance with the neoliberal work ethic in order to access jobs. Although in highly-skilled and better-paid jobs workers increase their self-worth and power through other means, the findings still demonstrate that they also self-discipline according to the neoliberal orthodoxy present in the UK and perform the work ethic. As Andrej explains:

‘I think London…gives you certain values that are not necessarily that present back home. For example, just being aware of the fact that everything in life you have to work really hard for… I would consistently work about 12 hours a day starting at 7 or even before 7 every morning and working until around 6.30-7 in the evening… It was hard work and even taking holidays yes, I was taking holidays but probably not as much as most of my colleagues in other jobs. Lunch breaks were limited to going to the canteen and bringing something back to the desk and eating at the desk… I wouldn’t say it’s healthy… Your whole job there is stuff that’s outside of your job description because the job description says something like, you work 9 to 5 every day and if necessary you have to stay longer. But it turns out it’s necessary every day to stay longer and every day to come in at 7 and not at 9. But it’s a funny culture because it’s just – banking is a very special world and people do things just so it makes them look good. And sometimes people stay late just to show their managers they’re staying late. And even if not formally asked to do certain tasks that are outside of your remit, informally especially when you’re
By performing the work ethic, even workers in high-skilled and better-paid jobs increase their reputation as committed and devoted workers and thus deserving and modern citizens or citizens-to-be. Data analysis thus points to the increased importance of symbolic economy, which demands compliance with unwritten rules. Increased deregulation and the normalisation of the long working-hours culture thus acts as a disciplining tool for all workers who want to increase their exchange-value. This suggests that neoliberal hegemony is increasingly built upon symbolic violence that is effectively hidden from view, but acts as a (self)disciplining mechanism for workers. Moreover, it speaks of the power of symbolic power entrenched within the current economy. This symbolic power not only disciplines, but also effectively creates divisions amongst the global poor that share a common space within increasingly diverse metropolitan centres. For instance, the dominant rhetoric of ‘welfare dependency’ (Haylett 2001: 363) that is increasingly used to maintain and reproduce class divisions in the UK, also turns those at the lower end of society against one another, as Ania explains:

*I worked here ever since from the first day I came to this country, I worked, I paid my taxes, I never asked for anything back. No benefits, nothing like this. And there was a lot of people in this country that it’s a third generation now of people who never worked a day in their life. And that pisses me off because, of course, I’ve lived here now for 7 years and of course I’m a Londoner, I live here, and because I pay for those people as well.*

(Receptionist/Admin, Polish, Female, 34, SE)

Ania’s example demonstrates that instead of showing solidarity with native workers who are affected by similar structural changes, migrant workers instead distance themselves by pointing to their cultural and moral failings. As already argued in Chapter Two this rhetoric translates the problems of unemployed not in material but in cultural terms, and as such blames the poor
for their own condition. A moral citizen (to be) should thus not be dependent on state provision, but rather take the individual responsibility to compete on the market, pursue self-interest and work hard. This cultural politics creates divisions, disciplines the global poor and disables collective resistance against distributive injustice on local and global scales. For that it is crucial to further expose the resisting strategies of workers that come from different system and carry with them different values in order to re-evaluate the dominant symbolic.

Since the imperial neoliberal colonial project had very different ‘success’ rates in Poland and Slovenia, this is also reflected in Slovenian workers’ resistance to the neoliberal work ethic in the UK. Vesna, for instance, explains how she resisted the long working-hours culture in the UK, because she values her work-life balance above her career:

‘I get hours back, I don’t get paid for extra hours, but I get free days. I am a bit stubborn about that. I can see my colleagues are willing to stay extra hours even if they are not paid for it. Every time I need to stay longer, I am like common, I am going to stay longer, but I want to get this hour back, because my salary is, sorry, is not that big that I would be willing to stay extra hours… I appreciate my free time much more… They already know that I will not stay longer, if I am not going to get hours back, so they are not asking me that much.’
(Shift leader in a hotel, Slovenian, Female, 26, BA)

Chapter Three showed that Slovenian workers still enjoy a good work-life balance in comparison to Polish and UK counterparts. As such, they also tend to resist the neoliberal work ethic. Vesna perceived her poor work-life balance as unacceptable and therefore challenged it. The place embodied in Slovenian workers’ habitus played an important role in some workers’ non-compliance with neo-liberalisation, despite the fact that their jobs were threatened. Slovenian workers’ rejection of the neoliberal work ethic in the UK also has a specific gender dimension. Many Slovenian women expressed the view that they would not feel comfortable having children in the UK. As Veronika explains, this is not only due to long working hours, but also poor work-life balance policies and a lack of public services and social capital:
‘Now that I’m single I’m willing to work that much, but in the future I hope to have a family and I don’t see myself here, because I wouldn’t say that it’s a friendly place to raise children. But not because it’s not safe, but because of the work. It’s either only work and I don’t want kids to be raised by their nanny, but on the other hand I don’t want to be a house wife. Because in Slovenia wherever you live it takes you 30 minutes to get there, you work 8 hours and everything is taken care of, you have nursery or school. You also have people. I would really have to get a great job to stay here.’

(Translator/unemployed, Slovenian, Female, 33, BA)

Due to its socialist history, Slovenia has a strong and long-standing tradition of high employment amongst women, and thus their economic independence is one of their most important values. This is still today visible in quality work-life balance policies and very high participation of women with children on the labour market (EC 2010; UEM 2005). Slovenian women thus perceive the UK’s poor work-life balance, unaffordable childcare and lack of social capital as a big problem in terms of women’s participation on the labour market. The socialisation and professionalisation of care and domestic work originates from the socialist alignment to enable women’s participation on the labour market, achieve equality amongst sexes and to control the population and was in different varieties present in all socialist states (Einhorn 1993: 151; Weiner 2009). Nevertheless there are important differences between the re-evaluating strategies of Slovenian and Polish women, which arise from different imposition of neoliberal hegemony in their places of origin.

As discussed in Chapter Three, Polish women lost women-friendly policies during the transition, which in the name of the new morality introduced privatisation of state provision and the re-traditionalisation of gender roles, thus resulting in increased gender inequality and the emigration of Polish women. In summary, this comparative gaze points to the detrimental effects of the binary logic of the hegemonic imperial post-socialist order in recasting everything connected to socialism as unmodern and everything connected to capitalism as modern and beneficial. Further it shows how this binary logic is
utilised in order to legitimise inequality. In this regard findings further show that the assignment of socialist history to A8 workers is translated also into suitability of this class of worker for specific types of jobs and social position on the labour market, which is explored further below.

7.5 Assigning a specific position to A8 labour

Through temporal dimensions, A8 workers are branded for specific sectors. As seen on the Global Choice website, the assigned history plays an important role in branding A8 and other CEE workers as being ‘traditionally’ suitable for the agricultural sector:

‘Most of the Eastern European countries have a developed agricultural sector. Traditionally, farming is a common activity in Eastern Europe…A lot of students and graduates from agricultural universities and other people from Eastern Europe are interested in UK agricultural jobs. Therefore we highly recommend employing farm workers from countries of Eastern Europe for jobs in agriculture. Eastern Europeans are hard working, committed and well motivated’. (Global Choice)

The excerpt here presented also indicates that agencies are promoting highly skilled workers for low skilled and low paid jobs. This specific class of worker is thus praised in terms of the cost efficiency that arises from deskilling. In this regard, the data analysis also repeatedly demonstrate that employment agencies encourage and brand highly qualified workers for lower skilled and lower paid jobs in specific sectors. Apart from agriculture, healthcare and hospitality feature as assigned sectors for CEE workers. In this regard, Global Choice also brands CEE workers as a perfect match for the hospitality and catering sector:

‘The hospitality industry is changing very fast. It is demanding and requires reliable and hard working staff. Our applicants from Eastern Europe completely match the requirements. These recruits are professional; they have an eye for detail and are highly motivated. They are committed to improving life standards for themselves and their families’. (Global Choice)

Because they are marketed as lacking in economic capital, they are branded as suitable and motivated to take up demanding jobs in specific sectors. Through
postcolonial discursive strategies, A8 workers are constructed as colonial subjects from the past that show their gratitude for being allowed to enter and benefit from the ‘modern world’, by doing lower skilled and paid jobs. This postcolonial narrative legitimises the utilisation of A8 labour for specific jobs. Apart from their work ethic, productivity and cost effectiveness, the distinctive value of A8 workers is branded with their migration status. As a result, A8 workers are commodified through their entitlement to work in the UK, which provides less risks and problems for employers. They are thus promoted as more desirable migrant workers.

Although employment agencies provide A8 labour for all types of work, there is a tendency to promote the benefits of temporary work that provides employers with greater flexibility. How this affects workers and what changes the AWR brought in this regard will be explored in Chapter Eight. Regardless of these changes, the discourse of flexibilisation and temporality points to a commodification process in which A8 workers are completely dehumanised. In this regard, findings show that agencies for instance offer workers for a free trial:

‘TRY BEFORE BUY! Get staff free. No obligation to use our recruitment services after you have had your quota exhausted’.
(Euro link schemes)

This example points to the dehumanising act of commodification discourse that sells workers as any other product on the market. As such, it can also serve as legitimisation that strips workers of their rights. It is thus questionable what conditions and salaries workers get if agencies are providing them without fees. This dehumanising discourse further completely neglects and undervalues the whole process of migration and how relocation to another country might affect workers. In the previous chapter, I showed that A8 workers are reduced in UK state taxonomies to a ‘guest-worker’ paradigm and perceived by employers as a

32 European Recruitment agency website: http://www.polish-recruitment.co.uk/ (9.11.2010).
'tap’ of labour that can be turned on and off. In this regard, agencies also market migrant workers as a flexible and cost-efficient solution for employers. They brand workers as being readily available, flexible and willing to take up undesirable jobs in any kind of location:

‘Jobs in remote locations or with antisocial hours or challenging working conditions can be difficult to fill and this has led to a high level of Eastern European workers being used’.
(Acorn)

By offering flexible and cost-efficient solutions to employers, agencies commodify A8 labour for specific types of jobs, precarious jobs. The vulnerable and precarious situation of migrant workers thus becomes a marketing tool for employment agencies to provide employers with flexible labour solutions that enable them to compete on the global economy. In summary, the data presented in this chapter supports the argument that the role of employment agencies within the colonial project is to construct and supply a specific class of worker. As visible from the Acorn website, the motivation behind supplying CEE workers is:

‘to provide a better class of worker than was typically available through traditional High Street recruitment agencies or government agencies such as Jobsite.’
(Acorn)

As is demonstrated in the example, this ‘better class of worker’ is constructed in opposition to the British working class that is, according to Haylett (2001), recast through cultural discourses of welfare dependency as immoral, unmodern and in need of disciplining. Although the CEE and the British working class are racialised through a similar postcolonial logic, which casts them as in the past and unmodern, the binary logic of the hegemonic imperial post-socialist order assigns CEE workers a different history, a socialist history that is supposed to influence their distinctive work ethic. Since A8 workers come from less wealthy economies and since they have, until recently, had
temporary restrictions to welfare benefits, they are more vulnerable and will accept poor working conditions and pay. This is well explained by Andrzej:

‘I had depression in Brighton the first week when I didn’t get the job and then for the next weeks I wasn’t so happy... because the money wasn’t. Because when going to Britain... I took a trust credit. My father didn’t want me to go, and he said I would get back with debts. We are not rich family, so he thought, you earn much more in Britain, but you also spend much more. He thought, if I don’t get a job in few months I would get back with such debt that I or the family will have to work for the next half a year in Poland. So he was against it, he didn’t want me to go. I went there, but I promised myself, I will get a job, I’ll save money, I’ll get back with money. I’ll prove it was a good decision... I was an educated person and I went there and started working at MacDonald’s... If they pay me more sweeping a floor in McDonalds, then as a person who is working at exports, it doesn’t matter. At the end of the day, it’s the money we are working for.... I was a little bit happier getting there and being a sales person, because it was slightly higher in social status to be a sales person. Despite the fact that many people told me, you shouldn’t do this, knocking on people’s door, when being an educated person, you should go and have an office job.’

(Door-to-door sales representative, Polish, Male, 30, BA)

Andrzej’s example demonstrates how ‘strategies’ of workers are informed by unequal economic geographies that drive workers to emigrate and take up low-skilled and low-paid jobs. As example demonstrates migration as a survival strategy bring huge pressures on workers that arise from fears of debt and the fall in social status. As Andrzej explains, he took a ‘trust credit’ from his family and thus needed to prove himself, which meant taking any kind of job in order to accumulate economic capital. Moreover different types of work have different values within society and for individuals’ self-identity (McDowell 2009b). Andrzej’s example demonstrates how types of work are connected with a specific social status, with privilege and prestige and ultimately with self-worth. Nevertheless, his example also indicates that symbolic capital achieved by doing certain types of work was overshadowed by unequal economic geographies and his need to accumulate sufficient economic capital. Due to unequal economic geographies and new European colonies A8 worker are, in relation to the British working class, recast as a
morally better class of worker and in relation to other migrant workers as more reliable and ‘less risky’ workers. In other words cultural politics legitimises the utilisation and disciplining of the global poor.

The evidence thus indicates how the business case for diversity used by transnational employment agencies is actually a form of class racism that shifts the social ordering and disciplining from a national to a transnational space. As demonstrated through provided examples class racism is justified through the binary hegemonic imperial post-socialist order, which serves in order to legitimise the utilisation and disciplining of workers on various local and global scales. As Stenning and Hörschelmann (2008) argue, in this binary logic socialism has always been not only important in shaping socialist countries but also the West. By showing how post-socialism and neoliberalism operate in different places and times, one can challenge these misleading discourses and practices and open up possibilities for an alternative politics that is able to transcend this binary logic altogether in order to begin imagining alternative solutions for current local and global socio-economic problems. Apart from pointing to on-going colonial processes analysis of commodification also reveals how class racism is built upon old colonial legacies and visible in marketization of the embodied cultural capitals of CEE workers.

7.6 Creating a distinctive image of A8 labour
Data supports the argument that employment agencies create an image of A8 labour that has a racialised ‘price-tag’. In other words, data analysis demonstrates that A8 labour is branded through ethnic, racial, national, religious, gender and age dimensions. As such, it is also marketed for specific jobs that entail the embodied and emotional labour discussed in Chapter Four. The commodification of A8 bodies is immediately apparent with the analysis of
images found on employment agencies websites. These images at first instance demonstrate that A8 labour is branded through gender and age dimensions. Findings suggest that construction, engineering, manufacturing and security are highly masculinised and the service sector is more feminised. The images in Figure 4 show that CEE men’s bodies are branded for their strength and ability to perform physically demanding and dangerous jobs.

*Figure 4: Images of men taken from employment agencies’ websites.*

Images in Figure 4 indicate that CEE men are branded mostly for heavy manual, manufacturing and security work and less so for catering and administrative work. Many images also feature men with masks, helmets, and gloves, which indicate that they are branded for work that involves a lot of health and safety risks. On the other hand, findings demonstrate that A8 women workers are branded for emotional and embodied front-line service sector work. In most of the images that show both sexes, it is women that are fore-grounded. Embodied attributes are especially desired in the service sector,

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namely administration, marketing and sales, hospitality, domestic services, catering, leisure and healthcare.

Figure 5: Images of women taken from employment agencies’ websites.34

Embodied labour is also greatly connected with age. As can be seen from the images presented in Figure 5, it is not just any women that are branded to do this type of work, but rather young attractive women. However, age does not feature only in gender terms, but is connected with able and flexible bodies in general. Images presented above further suggest that CEE workers are also branded in racial terms. Out of 71 analysed images presenting the workforce, only three of them feature also non-white persons, and even these are hardly visible amongst the majority-white frontline staff. This is further strengthened also through religion, or more precisely through religious proximity to the

norm of the field. It is not just the ‘unmarked’ skin colour that represents an economic capital, but also less problematised religion. Findings demonstrate that A8 workers are also branded as being Catholic:

‘Within Eastern Europe, Poles make up 50% of the population eligible to work in the UK.
98% Catholic by faith.
Strong family values.
High education levels with English being the second language.
Generally respectful, although the younger element are more independently minded.
Flexible and adaptable, coming from a mend and make do background.
The facts are, employers cannot afford to ignore the talents available from Poland and Eastern Europe’.
(European Recruitment Agency)

The racial and religious traits here promoted act as ‘unmarked’ embodied cultural, symbolic capitals that produce a distinctive value for A8 labour. Despite the fact that CEE countries are ethnically, religiously and racially diverse, CEE workers are branded through religious, racial and ethnic sameness, most commonly constructed upon the symbolic image of the Polish worker. Although some agencies specialise for other A8 nationalities, data shows that Polish workers symbolise A8 and other CEE labour in the UK. It was demonstrated earlier how agencies use identity politics to brand themselves as representatives of specific ethnic or national groups. Here, we further see how they utilise this politics to assign stereotypical ‘national’ characteristics to workers.

The Acorn website for instance promotes ‘Polish workers’ and ‘Polish jobs, Polish full satisfaction guarantee’ and ‘the UK’s army of Polish workers’ that ‘have built the reputation of reliability and fair prices’, arguing that ‘Polish workers have been in demand’. Data shows that workers’ cultural, symbolic capital is turned into economic capital for the purposes of the UK labour market. In this regard, some employment agencies even promote specific ‘national occupations’. On Central
European Staffing, one can find ‘Romanian and Polish welders’ and on Peak staff recruitment they are promoting ‘nurses and care assistants from Poland’. Eurosource international and HR Builders are promoting and providing links to a whole army of occupations and businesses which have a distinctive ‘Polish touch’. There one can find: ‘Polish Plumbers, Polish Electricians, Polish Bricklayers, Polish Plasterers, Polish Roofers, Polish Painters, Polish Decorators, Polish Kitchen fitters’ and more. These national occupations are promoted as a distinctive quality with the following words: ‘Polish Builders are a breed apart’ and they ‘provide a courteous, polite and honest service’.

The reputation of the Polish worker is further legitimised through the order of discourse that forms relationship with other fields. For instance, employment agencies provide links to newspaper articles, government reports, statistics and political speeches. Through these diverse genres, they represent the views of famous employers, politicians or celebrities and as such legitimise the distinctive commodification of A8 labour. One of the newspaper articles found on Ania’s Poland websites for instance presents the views of a former prime minister:

‘Mr Blair said: “I have to say that the vast majority of Polish people who come to work here are working very hard. They are very well regarded”’.
(Ania’s Poland)

In this example, we see how employment agencies promote views of important politicians that legitimise the distinctive reputation and value assigned to A8 workers, most commonly symbolised through the Polish worker. By utilising cultural, diversity and identity politics, agencies rationalise the business case for the utilisation of A8 workers for specific jobs on the UK labour market. The business case for diversity utilised in marketing practices of agencies further prescribes a specific performativity of workplace identities to A8 workers.
7.6.1 Prescribing a specific performativity to A8 labour

As argued in Chapter Four, embodied and emotional labour encompass specific expectations that are based on prevailing social norms, beliefs and stereotypes that construct identities and assign them specific roles. The images presented above already indicate that agencies prescribe specific performativity that entails embodied and emotional labour. This is even more evident if we look beyond images in marketing strategies of agencies. Data analysis for instance uncovers how A8 women workers are branded as ‘Office Einsteins’ suitable for representing the face of the company:

‘They are intelligent, professionally trained and immaculately groomed, multilingual typists who are qualified in all Microsoft programs. Office Eyensteins™ are well mannered and articulate; the ideal ephemeral staff, competent in professionally representing the face of your company in any spoken language. Office Eyensteins™ - the perfect flexible solution’.

(2B Interface)

The example above demonstrates how the ‘skills’ of these women workers come with their embodied cultural, symbolic capital, which is turned into economic capital and marketed as a distinctive value that can represent the face of the company. White, young and beautiful CEE women bodies are branded as suitable for aesthetic labour (Witz et al. 2003) that can become part of organisational aesthetics or organisational ‘image management’ (Ahmed 2007: 605). Commodification of A8 workers for embodied labour is further visible in practices of some employment agencies that screen for the general appearance of candidates or conduct video interviews or require a photograph with the CV. This is, for instance, a practice that is strongly advised against by Employment Service due to possible discriminatory effects (Warhurst et al. 2000). Moreover, the analysis of employment agencies’ websites also points to

36 Eurosource International website: http://www.my-resource.co.uk/about.htm (9.11.2010)
37 Eurosource International website: http://www.my-resource.co.uk/about.htm (9.11.2010)
38 European Recruitment Agency website: http://www.polish-recruitment.co.uk/ (9.11.2010)
the sexualisation of CEE women workers. In this regard, Skills Provision reports an unusual demand for labour that is visible from the following excerpt:

‘We want beautiful women…, we run a company called naked cleaners and we want 6 beautiful Polish girls’.
(Skills Provision)

The data supports the argument that the image of A8 and other CEE women is not just gendered, but is translated through the colonial gaze as a specific type of femininity that has gender, sexual, age, class and racial dimensions. Since they are perceived as embodying a place with a specific history, their embodied cultural, symbolic capital translates into economic capital suitable for front-line embodied, sexual and emotionally intense labour. The history thus assigned on the one hand turns CEE women into objects of desire, and on the other into caring and docile workers that still possess traditional skills that are especially desirable in domestic care work:

‘Now there are lots of them happy and working in the UK making delicious bread and butter puddings,…teaching children Polish, singing and playing chess with their elderly charges, knitting cardigans.’
(Many Hands)

Hence, CEE women are branded as suitable domestic care workers that can take good care of the children and the elderly. In this regard, data analysis further tells us that employment agencies are not only offering individual workers, but full-time couples\(^39\) as well. This further extends from domestic care work to other types of work and can be seen from an excerpt representing the testimonial of an employer found on the Skills Provision website:

‘I could do with another chef/cook with maybe a wife who could clean and wait on tables preferably with a little knowledge of English…’
(Skills Provision)

The example above informs about the gendered nature of work as well as the translation of women’s private roles into a public sphere that not only positions

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\(^{39}\) Many hands website: [http://manymanyhands.co.uk/index.html](http://manymanyhands.co.uk/index.html) (9.11.2010).
them on the front-line, but on ‘all fronts’ (Conley 2005: 479). Similar practices used by employers in the catering and hospitality sector have already been highlighted in Adkins’ (1995) research. She reports that married couples are seen by employers as an asset, because the labour of wives enables a reduction in labour costs, increases sales and ensures a reliable and disciplined workforce. In this regard, Dyer et al. (2008) also argue for a wider definition of caring work that can actually uncover emotional labour undertaken by those doing less obvious types of caring work at the lower end of the economy, with the least autonomy and most precarious conditions. The need for a wider definition of caring work is further visible in agencies’ strategies to assign A8 workers a specific duty to act in accordance with the assigned racialised markers. On European Recruitment Agency A8 workers are assigned a particular responsibility that comes with the assigned national identity:

‘Our skilled workforce are multi talented and extremely hard working, they are not only an asset to every company they are employed by, they are also ambassadors for their Countries, a responsibility they are fully aware of’.

(European Recruitment Agency)

This example shows that the commodification of A8 workers also comes through the assignment of a specific duty and responsibility to perform the assigned identity. It encourages workers to play the game, the game determined by identity politics that also assigns specific ‘national emotional labour’ to workers. In this regard, findings further indicate that identity politics is also used for marketing (self)care and (self)control of workers:

‘Such an English speaking person would not only work as a translator but would generally be the foreman of the group and would also work in his own profession (if applicable) or as a general labourer.’

(Central European Staffing)

This example demonstrates that marketing practices built upon nationally constructed identity politics assign workers a specific responsibility to take care of and control their fellow co-workers with insufficient English language skills.
These marketing strategies on the part of employment agencies are in many ways problematic, and will be explored through the experiences of workers in Chapter Eight. Although groups based upon identity politics can offer support or can act as mitigators of work related stress, research also tells us that they can act as a threat and can have discriminatory effects (Dyer et al. 2010; Holgate et al. 2012; Wills et al. 2010). In this regard also, data analysis deriving from employment agencies websites points to differences within national groups, between new arrivals and older generations of migrants:

‘Each of these generations keeps mostly to themselves, as they come from different backgrounds and they have had very different experiences and goals in their life as immigrants. That is why there is often talk about several Polish communities in London, and England, not one’.

(Ania’s Poland)

All this suggests that it would be a distortion to simply presuppose commonality upon fixed categories. As already argued in Chapter Six, there are divisions amongst and within national groups that arise from a competitive environment and limited resources. This further affects the different strategies of diverse A8 workers. In this regard, employment agencies themselves increase the reputation of specific CEE workers by pointing to symbolic power and its material effects:

‘Today, the reputation of Polish construction workers, nannies and caregivers is so high that other East Europeans sometimes say they are Polish to increase their chances of being hired’.

(Ania’s Poland)

This example shows how agencies increase the reputation of specific national groups. Further, it demonstrates how struggles are fought over symbolic representation in which the self-appropriation of cultural capital becomes a strategy for workers to compete for scarce resources. This indicates that cultural, diversity and identity politics do not only play an important role in marketing strategies of employment agencies and in employers’ recruitment practices, but also in workers’ tactics to compete for scarce resources.
7.7 Polish and Slovenian workers’ utilisation and appropriation of (trans)national cultural capital

Since cultural, diversity and identity have been strategically utilised and marketized in order to commodify migrant workers, it is not surprising that once workers learn how the game works, they also themselves start to utilise diversity and identity politics in order to enhance their exchange-value. Since Polish and Slovenian workers come from different fields and bring different cultural capitals, they also use different strategies to generate value for themselves on the UK labour market. While Polish workers utilise their national cultural capital, Slovenians on the other hand self-appropriate their cultural capital according to the order of discourse within the new meta-field. Andrzej, for instance, explains how he strategically used the ‘Polish label’ in order to increase his exchange-value:

‘Because he probably heard quite good things about Polish workers, he wanted to have hard workers. And that was something that I will always remember until the end of my life, he was always. I also somehow boosted, increased the strength of this feeling in him, that Polish workers are the best workers in the world, you know.’
(Door-to-door sales representative, Polish, Male, 30, BA)

Andrzej’s example demonstrates how workers strategically use racialised discursive markers they encounter in the UK in order to access jobs. While embodied national cultural capital can be exchanged and utilised for ‘ethnicised’ and low-paid and low-skilled jobs, it cannot be used for high-skilled jobs. In a field where identity and diversity politics plays a major part in the symbolic economy, the specific image of the Polish worker, as tailored for ‘ethnicised’ or low-skilled and low-paid jobs, also fixes workers in place and prevents them to utilise their embodied cultural capital beyond this narrow frame. It also pushes workers into ‘ethnicised’ jobs despite their aspirations. This can also result in internal discrimination which will be discussed in the following chapter. In contrast to Poles, Slovenian workers could rarely utilise their embodied national cultural capital, because there are few jobs on the UK
labour market where this would be an asset. In this regard, they also consider themselves disadvantaged with regard to Polish workers. In order to increase their capitals, Slovenian workers start appropriating their embodied cultural capital, as explained by Tina:

‘The problem with Slovenia is that lots of people don’t know what it is, where it is. I would emphasise the multicultural part, because I am also half Serbian and I lived in lots of different countries. So I emphasise that, the multicultural thing, but I don’t like to point out Slovenia, because it’s not that well known... Slovenia, they don’t know it well enough to sort of get any advantage from that.’
(Reader, Slovenian, Female, 38, BA)

Due to the small size of Slovenia and its relative unfamiliarity in the UK, Slovenian workers would often not put much emphasis on Slovenia but rather on their multicultural habitus and transnational cultural capital. This transnational cultural capital gets further hybridised according to racialised expectations and discourses within the new meta-field. Slovenian workers thus start appropriating their embodied cultural capital according to the hegemonic binary logic of the imperial post-socialist order that constructs cultural sameness amongst so-called ‘Eastern Europeans’, as explained by Marko:

‘My strategy now is to look a bit if there are companies that have interest in the countries around Slovenia, let’s say Serbia, Croatia. Because I speak the languages and I also know the local business let’s say, because I worked in the legal field. And I could be very useful for this kind of companies. And this is like my advantage and here I can compete... So I’m looking for these kinds of opportunities, but this is quite hard to find. To be honest, there’s not many, because Slovenia and I call this Balkan, we are so small market. You know they even don’t know us. And here I think even like Polish are in big advantage... I can only look for the once connected with Balkans... I would emphasis in general that I know the culture of Eastern Europe... In general Eastern Europe, as they think everything is the same... And I say I studied in Poland as well and I speak Polish. They would say, OK this guy can also do Czech Republic and Bulgaria... I don’t know anything [about these markets], yes but of course they would think that I’m an expert on these countries as well... I definitively would, and I also do this in some firms, where I see that they... are looking for someone for Eastern Europe.’
(Student/unemployed, Slovenian, Male, 28, PG)
In order to increase their employment chances, Slovenian workers first start branding themselves as experts for the Balkans, because due to historical ties they often know the markets and languages in the region. But once they learn about the racialised discourse within the UK, they also start re-branding themselves as experts on so-called 'Eastern Europe'. They appropriate their cultural capital in order to become economically valued and thus better-positioned to extract economic capital from their commodified embodied transnational cultural capital. Several workers in high-skilled jobs were appropriating their embodied cultural capital according to the hegemonic binary logic of the imperial post-socialist order. They further increase their value also by emphasising their European-ness. Although this is to some extent connected to their migration status, this also has to do with symbolic economy, where European still means Western and also entails an embodied whiteness. All in all data analysis demonstrates how racilised symbolic economy is not only used to commodify and utilise the global and local poor but also to discipline and divide them.

7.7 Conclusions
This chapter has exposed the commodification of A8 workers in marketing practices of transnational employment agencies and their effects on Polish and Slovenian workers strategies to generate value for themselves. It uncovered transnational colonising and racialising practices that participate in the creation of a specific class of worker with distinctive value on the UK labour market. Findings show that employment agencies utilise cultural, diversity and identity politics in order to brand themselves representatives of CEE countries and CEE labour. As such they legitimise their authority and their voice in group making. They thus participate in assigning a specific identity, value, position and performative roles to A8 labour. Through utilisation of the business case for diversity they participate in the making of new colonial subjects. The analysis
demonstrates that colonial subjects are discursively constructed through spatial and temporal dimensions and embodied markers of difference that assign specific position and performativity to A8 labour.

In their marketing strategies, agencies use unequal relationships amongst meta-fields, assign a specific history to workers that embody these diverse fields, and consequently determine their value, social position, frame of opportunities and assign them specific social roles. A8 labour, most commonly symbolised through the Polish worker, is branded as possessing a superior work ethic, being cost-effective, flexible, traditional, legal, second-class labour. Through their marketing practices, agencies produce a specific style or class of worker that is available for demanding, dangerous, dirty, flexible, insecure and temporary jobs at lower costs. In other words, they commodify A8 workers for precarious jobs. The data analysis further reveals that employment agencies market and commodify A8 labour through various embodied markers. A8 labour is branded through ethnic, racial, national, religious, gender and age dimensions. Through this image management, A8 labour is prescribed a specific performativity that entails emotional and embodied labour. In summary, data analysis reveals how the binary logic of the hegemonic imperial post-socialist order recasts CEE workers in opposition to the British working class as a morally better class of worker. This indicates how cultural, diversity and identity politics legitimises the utilisation and the disciplining of the global poor.

The chapter thus exposes the global racialised class logic characterised by the hegemonic binary logic of the imperial post-socialist order that also play an important role in workers’ self-disciplining and in their tactics to compete for scarce resources. In this regard the chapter demonstrates how some Slovenian workers get disciplined into the neoliberal work ethic, which acts as a form of symbolic violence demanding the complete subordination of people’s lives to
production processes. Apart from encountering and learning *the work ethic*, CEE workers also start learning and utilising diversity and identity politics in line with the racialised class logic they encounter in dominant discourses in the UK. The material utilisation of cultural politics of sameness and difference on the one hand shows that diverse CEE groups have different possibilities and use different strategies for generating value, and on the other hand that the racialised class logic of the new field creates a cultural hybridity that informs workers’ transformative strategies. While Polish workers utilise their national cultural capital, Slovenian workers instead self-appropriate their transnational cultural capital according to the order of discourse within the UK.

Nevertheless CEE workers’ habitus also enables an emancipatory potential that goes against neoliberal morality and the commodification of all forms of life. This was seen in Slovenian workers’ resistance to neoliberal work ethic, which also has important gender dimensions. Exposed symbolic power hidden in the commodification processes thus enables critical assessment of how symbolic positioning affects workers and their strategies to perform, transform or resist dominant discourses in order to assign value to themselves. By showing how post-socialism and neoliberalism operate in different places and times, this chapter challenges the hegemonic binary logic of the imperial post-socialist order, delegitimises a seemingly beneficial neoliberal imperial project, and opens up possibilities for an alternative politics.
8 Value-extraction and transnational labour relations between East and West

8.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the value extraction possibilities of diverse actors involved in changed and transnationalised labour relations between East and West. It demonstrates how transnational employment agencies play a crucial role in on-going colonial processes by acting as intermediaries amongst workers and employers within transnationalised labour market. This chapter explores who within this trinity has the power to extract and appropriate value across transnationalised labour market and how this affects the well-being of migrant workers. The chapter reveals that employment agencies and employers that operate across transnational fields play an important role in on-going colonial processes and in supplying and extracting value from vulnerable migrant workers. As such it exposes how the movement of employment agencies’ services affect Polish and Slovenian migrant workers and also what kind of human resource management and ethical problems these changed triangular and transnationalised labour relations create.

The chapter commences by exposing the function of transnational employment agencies as intermediaries amongst workers and employers as well as intermediaries amongst transnational fields. As such, it reveals their role within contemporary colonial projects and their function in enabling triangular and transnational labour relations amongst East and West. This is followed by uncovering various value extraction strategies of employers and employment agencies that are informed by marketization of cultural, diversity and identity politics and unequal economic geographies. And lastly, the chapter reveals human resource management problems within organisations and the wider globalised economy, which arise from these changed labour relations.
8.2 Transnational employment agencies as important actors in on-going colonial processes

Previous chapter revealed the role of transnational employment agencies in the making of new colonial subject. This chapter further focuses on agencies’ role in on-going colonial processes that arise from their actual movement to new colonies and their value extraction strategies as intermediaries within changed and transnationalised labour relations. Employment agencies act as ‘labour market intermediaries’ (Mangum and Mangum 1986). Moreover, findings show that employment agencies do not just act as intermediaries amongst workers and employers, but also as intermediaries amongst diverse meta-fields. As Ward et al. argue, ‘temporary employment agencies play a key role not only within the various national territories, but also through their ability to mediate migration flows ‘between countries and regions’ (Ward et al. 2005: 6). This section reveals how employment agencies colonise CEE and use inequalities amongst countries in order to market and commodify migrant labour.

By extending the frame of this analysis beyond nation states and specific mobilities, this research shows that the movement of employment agency services represents an important part of new and emerging colonial projects. The sample used already tells us that agencies nowadays operate also through their websites, and as such move across geographical and national boundaries without much constraints (Bonet et al. 2013). Data presented in Figure 6 further shows that apart from websites, many analysed employment agencies have established networks in the form of offices or business partners in A8 countries in order to actively recruit A8 workers.
The captions in Figure 6 demonstrate that the movement of employment agencies’ services plays an important role in a contemporary colonisation of a European periphery. As Ward et al. (2005) argue, temporary employment agencies mushroomed in CEE during the transition with foreign direct investment, and were first introduced by foreign firms. As already argued in Chapter Six, this is also supported on the EU level by EURES and executed within each nation state through local public employment services (Fitzgerald 2006). The captions in Figure 6 also demonstrate that apart from those in the UK, also local agencies within A8 countries have become a growing area of business, which further points towards the (self)colonising practices of those who have access to resources and can use inequalities among states for their own business pursuits. The findings show that employment agencies offer recruitment services by placing job advertisements and organising recruitment.
events in A8 countries in order to provide a specific type of labour that can
match employers’ unique and changing needs. They are thus important agents
in the provision of A8 labour to the UK. In this regard, data analysis shows that
employment agencies market A8 countries as providers of labour from which
the UK and the rest of the world can benefit:

‘The integration of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia into the European Union a few years ago created a
large labour pool from which the UK and the rest of the world can benefit’.
(Eurosorce International)

The data thus illustrates how A8 countries are becoming modern colonies that
amongst other things service the West by providing colonial subjects for
specific types of work. Apart from A8 countries, agencies are turning further
towards the European periphery, which is becoming the terrain of
contemporary colonisation and thus an important geography for sourcing
colonial subjects:

‘Generally when employers think of non-EU labour, their thoughts turn to the
traditional UK recruiting grounds of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the
Philippines. Although we have entered into agency partnership agreements with
companies in each of these countries and are always delighted to promote their
candidates, more and more we are bringing into our Candidate database, people
from former parts of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries not yet within
membership of the EU. In particular we have an excellent portfolio of candidates
from Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Croatia, F.Y.R. Macedonia and Russia itself.’
(CZM Recruitment)

Hence, employment agencies play an important role in contemporary and on-
going colonising projects that are turning away from traditional UK colonies
towards the European periphery. Agencies offer the movement of services to
new colonies, which enable and stimulate the movement of colonial subjects
suitable for specific jobs. By producing transnational and triangular labour
relations, agencies challenge the existing paradigms of employment relations
and human resource management, and this can have various effects on workers
and organisations (Bonet et al. 2013). These intermediary arrangements can
produce the vulnerable and precarious position of migrant labour and can also cause problems for employing organisations (Currie 2008; Elcioglu 2010; McKay 2009; Ward et al. 2001). The following section explores value extraction strategies of agencies and employers engaged in triangular labour relations across transnational fields and identifies unequal power relations amongst various actors involved.

8.2.1 The role of transnational employment agencies within changed and transnationalised labour relations

The most obvious function of employment agencies is to act as intermediaries between employers and workers. The data analysis indicates that they offer recruitment and human resource management services to employers, and some agencies themselves act as employers of supplied workers. In this regard, Bonet et al. (2013) distinguish between Information Providers, Matchmakers and Administrators. Within this taxonomy, Information Providers engage in the triangular relationship by providing information about jobs to workers and candidates to employers through job boards, social-media sites, membership-based intermediaries and outplacement agencies. They are thus important actors within the recruitment process. On the other hand, Matchmakers are search firms and placement agencies that recruit, select and promote candidates to employers. And Administrators are professional employment organisations or temporary help services, which have an on-going relationship with workers. Often they act as employers and can share with the hirer a variety of human resource management responsibilities. As such, labour market intermediaries importantly ‘change the bilateral employee-employer relationships into a three way “triangular” relationship’ (Bonet et al. 2013: 340).

As already argued in Chapter Seven data analysis demonstrates that transnational employment agencies market themselves also as representatives of
CEE countries and workers. This function does not only enable them to produce the value of workers but also to extract it from them, which will be explored further below. Moreover it enables them to successfully brand themselves as being experts in connecting diverse meta-fields. On one hand they promote services that could assist workers in their adjustments to the new meta-field and on the other they offer advice, consultancy, market research and translation services to employers and businesses that are trying to recruit migrant labour or move their capital, services or goods to CEE countries. This can be seen from Ania’s Poland website:

‘Aniaspoland.com is a highly targeted niche website extremely popular with Poles in the UK or those still in Poland researching their move to Britain. Our site serves as an excellent initial point of contact and source of information for people seeking work, accommodation and education in the UK. From a British customer’s point of view, Ania’s Poland offers advice and information on travel to Poland as well as assistance for British companies wishing to establish points of contacts in Poland including interpreters and translators. (Ania’s Poland)

As the above example demonstrates, the agency is acting as an intermediary between UK and Poland and is as such acting as an expert in connecting diverse meta-fields. Moreover agencies act as experts that can secure travel arrangements, accommodation or can assist migrant workers with opening a bank account, NINo applications, WRS registrations or provide other post-relocation and pre-location assistance. Moreover they also provide cultural training sessions in which they can show the way to new employees and help them settle in their new environment

‘We can also arrange a Cultural training session for your new employees to help them settle in much more comfortably in their new environment…’
(New Europe Personnel)

Assisting workers to settle within the new environment can be useful and can ease the way for workers to become adjusted to the field and for employers to

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40 New Europe Personnel website.
understand the ‘translations’ amongst fields. However, research tells us that agencies are often ill-equipped to provide workers with sufficient assistance, which makes workers vulnerable to exploitation (Currie 2008). Whether agencies are doing what they claim or whether this only acts as a branding exercise to extract value from workers will be explored further below.

8.3 Extracting economic capital through the administration function

The most common extraction strategy of employment agencies is to charge for their services of supplying and managing workers. Data analysis indicates that agencies that have an on-going relationship with workers on average take up to 50 percent of what an employer pays for the worker. In minimum wage jobs, the gap between the profits of agencies and workers’ salaries can be even wider. The analysis further demonstrates that agencies with an on-going relationship with workers are specifically interested in migrant workers that are prepared to take up temporary jobs, as they represent a commodity that can be sold over and over again in order to meet employers’ flexible needs. This is explained by Ania:

‘You could see that the agencies…are using people; I didn’t have that much knowledge at that time about how the agencies work. But they wanted you to temp for them as long as possible because for every hour they get 50 per cent of what you get so they get on top of that 50 per cent. So of course they want, you’re the money making machine for them basically and the better you are, the longer they want you to temp for them… When I started saying I want a permanent job, then they were giving me jobs with such a low salary and I was like no, no, this is ridiculous, I can’t do that, I’m not going to be able to support myself… They are just using your lack of knowledge about things.’
(Receptionist/Admin, Polish, Female, 34, SE)

Because of this ability to duplicate economic capital, agencies are very keen to assist workers in getting temporary jobs. They are however less keen in assisting them to get permanent positions, because this would mean only a one-off extraction of economic capital. This however changed once AWR came into force in 2011, recognising temporary agency workers’ new rights to equal treatment, especially after a 12-week period. In order to bypass these rules,
several agencies started to switch their temps onto permanent contracts (TSSA 2011). AWR enables an exemption as concerns equal pay for workers who have a permanent contract and are paid between assignments, regardless of whether they have exceeded a 12-week period or not (TUC 2011). This exemption is also referred to as a ‘Swedish derogation’ model, and is according to REC41 often requested by client employers under the mistaken belief that it removes workers from the scope of AWR entirely. We are thus yet to see how these new regulations and bypassing strategies are going to effect migrant agency workers. Despite these changes, it is still important to note that AWR do not apply to information provider intermediaries or placement agencies that only provide recruitment for a hirer (TUC 2011). It is thus crucial to explore the problems that arise from changed and transnationalised labour market relations, which can be especially problematic for migrant workers who are particularly drawn to specialised information providers and placement agencies. This is explored further below.

8.4 Extracting economic capital through the ‘representation’ function

As argued in Chapter Six, agencies market their services in accordance with identity politics and thus act as representatives of A8 labour. Data analysis shows that this acts as an important value extraction point, because workers do respond to the ethnic marketing of employment agencies’ services. Polish workers reported using information provider intermediaries in the form of portal websites that address their national identity, as explained by Andrzei:

‘I used to look at portal, because I had this desire to go West, as I told you, I looked at a portal Polishworkers.co.uk. It was a website; it doesn’t show up this way anymore because they changed the name, because… Czech workers were not happy about it. I found this advert, where he was looking for some sales people’.
(Door-to-door sales representative, Polish, 30, BA)

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An important aspect of this thesis is that migrant workers are also consumers who respond to the ethnic marketing of agencies and employers that use identity politics to extract economic capital from uninformed workers. This is not only the case with workers who have yet to migrate, but also for workers who lack in capitals and are still learning the rules of the game within the new meta-field. As Joanna explains, once she learned that agencies play an important role in accessing work in the UK she responded to ethnic marketing and started using agencies that specifically target Polish workers:

‘When I was looking for a change I had to register with some agencies. I registered with that website I told you about, the Polish website, which I think it’s really bad website. Not the website, but the jobs that are advertised there, even if there are office jobs, they are very particular. If English employer is advertising on that website, all he wants is just cheap labour, someone who works for less money than an English person… Because they think you have to be grateful for you work in an office within the English company and you should kiss our toes… On the advert it looks OK, it’s not enough information definitively. But you can see the duties and you see the salary and you go on Reed and Guardian website and it’s completely different salary. Here you earn 15,000 p/y, there you earn 20,000-25,000 p/y and you do more or less the same things. So I got the job via that website with… a designer company and there were quite a lot of Eastern European people working there… And I had an impression that the company basically wants to have cheap labour.’

(Accounts assistant, Polish, Female, 27, PG)

Hence, employers are, with the help of ethnic niche employment agencies extracting economic capital from new arrivals lured by symbolic signs that address their identity. Identity politics thus serves as a marketing and management tool that points to institutionalised racism within the contemporary transnational economy. As Joanna’s experience shows, this has detrimental effects on Polish migrants, especially new arrivals, who are particularly vulnerable to abuse, because they are not yet familiar with various labour market intermediaries and their value extraction strategies. This is also visible through workers’ changing job hunting strategies. Data suggests that workers that lack in knowledge and capitals most commonly start by using generic and identity politics based websites or agencies, but once they get
familiar with the field they move to employment agencies that specialise in specific sectors as well as leaning on their newly built social capital.

On the other hand, Slovenian workers do not have the opportunity to respond to ethnic marketing because there are no ethnic niche agencies that specifically target Slovenian workers. Nevertheless also Slovenian workers assumed that country specific agencies could be useful in providing advice on how to approach the UK labour market. These examples indicate that migrant workers perceive agencies based on identity politics as useful in easing their way into the new field and assisting them in re-learning their labour identity. Despite the fact that agencies rather use their representation function in order to extract economic capital, it is still important to note that they partly do that in order to respond to the racialised demands of client employers. As such, they might as well offer an emancipatory potential that could be explored by workers’ organisations and trade unions to reach the most vulnerable workers. As discussed in Chapter Five, also I as a researcher, utilised agencies’ services in order to reach these workers.

Similar beliefs are held also for ethnic niche businesses. In this regard, there is again a difference between Polish and Slovenian workers. While the Polish community within the UK has seen the rise of many ethnic niche businesses (Vershinina et al. 2011) nothing similar exists for Slovenians in the UK. In this regard data analysis demonstrates that also ethnic niche businesses successfully utilise identity politics in order to extract economic capital by actively recruiting migrant workers directly from Poland, as explained by Iwona:

‘I think now, because they know if someone who has half brain they are going to run away very quickly from there. So now it’s more hiring people from Poland, they think that that’s a great jump from there, come from Poland and working in London on a Polish website. I think they use this now. I think they are going to use people that don’t know the language and they will stay with them, they won’t complain they will be happy, because they now have a guy and he doesn’t speak a word of English, he can’t even go to the bank and open the account. And now they
take those kinds of people, because they know if someone is too smart, they are just not going to stay there for long... A Polish company, I think it was a website as well, they recruited him from Poland, he came here, they said: “Yeah, we’re going to find you a flat, we’re going to find you anything, don’t worry about anything.” And he came here and the guy told him: “Well I don’t have a job for you.” And he was left without money, without job, without flat, just on his own...’

(Community manager in social media website, Polish, Female, 30, PG)

In other words, employers are converting workers’ unfamiliarity with the field and lack of cultural capital into economic capital. These employers use the (self)colonial gaze in order to sell the reputation of the West to workers who are still in Poland and lack sufficient English skills. In this case, workers’ lack of cultural capital does not only serve as a temporary but rather a more permanent extraction strategy. The detrimental and discriminatory effects of ethnic niche businesses for ethnic minority workers have already been documented in research and discussed in Chapter Six. In this regards data analysis further exposes intersectional differences amongst often homogenised Polish community, which have important temporal dimensions and can position different generations of migrants differently. As Joanna explains, she experienced discrimination when she was working in a Polish school in London:

‘I was teaching in a Polish Saturday school...I think this school actually disillusioned me... I had a few bad moments in that school, especially with the headmistress. She was from a WW2 generation who came here... Actually I think she was one of the worst employers that I ever had... I was working in an admin role during weekdays and the other teacher she was a teaching assistant in the other school. And the rest of the teachers they didn’t really speak English, they were just baby-sitting or cleaning or working in TESCO... But headmistress was really treating us disrespectfully and I remember her saying like: “You know, you should appreciate the job you have here, because in weekdays you have to go back to TESCO or your cleaning duties and you have to kiss my toes because I give you this opportunity to fulfil your dream and be a teacher in a Polish school!” (…) And I think all the disrespect, like the biggest disrespect and the biggest negativity and discrimination; I had from Polish people actually.’

(Accounts assistant, Polish, Female, 27, PG)
Joanna’s example points to nesting orientalisms that have been redefined upon the racialised class logic present within the new meta-field and which serve older generations of Polish migrants to construct new arrivals as an inferior class. Although ethnic niche employers use cultural sameness and workers’ national cultural capital to extract value from them, they at the same time also appropriate this cultural capital to fix workers in place in accordance with the racialised symbolic hierarchies that exist in the UK. As was demonstrated in the previous chapter workers also themselves utilise national cultural capital in order to compete for assigned and ethnicised jobs, often under the belief that ethnicised jobs might protect them from discrimination. Data analysis further demonstrates that these ethnic niche businesses are quite often family businesses, which brings a whole new dimension to employee-employer relationships. Iwona, for instance explains, that it was impossible for her and other employees to complain about bad management in a family-owned Polish company she worked at, because the line manager was the owner’s partner:

‘She got the job because she was with the boss… She didn’t have any qualifications to manage people. So everybody left… It’s a lot of abuse in these Polish companies towards workers and there was a lot of bullying and it was very bad… And the boss knew about it and he didn’t do anything because they are together and there was no way to complain… If I’m going to go and say she’s like that, he will say alright but then at home she will say, no it’s not true… So it was like a vicious circle and we had to leave, because it was going from bad to worst… Like the fact that officially we were paid just part-time and the second money was coming from a different account so the boss didn’t have to pay a lot of taxes for us. We had to clean the toilets in all the office, because we are like family company… So we were expected to do a lot of staff for free, because we’re such a nice company! You know, clean toilets. Come on! (…) It was a small office; yes we had to do the cleaning… And at the beginning it was like; 5.30 we were finishing and like: “So girls, let’s do the cleaning!” The boys would never clean, they would never clean. They said they won’t and they didn’t have to, while we were always like a bit scared sometimes to just say no, I’m not going to do this, I am not being paid for… The guys were with the boss and we were with her. So he said to the boss: “I’m not going to do that.” And he wouldn’t have to do that, while we were expected to do that.’

(Community manager in social media website, Polish, Female, 30, PG)
Iwona’s example illustrates how small ethnic niche businesses often operate in line with close family relations, where meritocracy plays little role. Moreover, the above example demonstrates that these informal family relationships were simply extended to all other employers on the basis of national cultural capital, which in effect constructed a sort of ‘national family’. Here, we see how the marketization of identity politics serves to extend family production to all workers who embody the appropriate national cultural capital. Hence, employers extract economic capital by constructing an imagined national sameness. Iwona’s example further speaks about specific gender divisions of labour that are part of this constructed ‘nation family’. As was demonstrated in the previous chapter, family production on the labour market has important gender and sexual dimensions. The data presented in this chapter further demonstrates that it also has ethnic and national dimensions. In other words, employers appropriate workers’ embodied cultural capital by utilising national, ethnic and gender dimensions. Here, we see how identity politics has intersectional, temporal and spatial dimensions that are often overlooked when exploring migratory processes. All-in-all, the findings demonstrate that within the individualised and commodified logic of contemporary capitalism the utilisation of diversity and identity politics, sameness and difference has a primary business-case imperative also within often-homogenised community groups. Apart from extracting value from representation, intermediaries also extract value from their expert function, explored further below.

8.5 Extracting economic capital through the ‘expert’ function

As argued earlier employment agencies act and are often perceived by migrant workers as experts that can provide safe and secure passage for migrant workers into another meta-field. This is especially so in relation to workers who are yet to migrate and thus need assistance with regards to their overall relocation and placement, which effectively blurs the work-life binary.
Although the work-life binary is blurred with any type of labour migration, this is even more so with domestic workers that are very often in live-in arrangements. Due to their work location, domestic migrant workers are particularly vulnerable to exploitation (McDowell 2009a). Due to this vulnerability, they are more likely to turn to matchmaker placement agencies with the expectation that they will provide safe and secure passage to the new working and living environment. Although agencies often get paid to provide this service, the data shows that workers’ safety and security has been compromised, as explained by Zuzanna:

‘When I was working as a teacher I really wanted to get out of the country because of poor wages and I found this agency of au-pairs in England and they had a special base in (Poland). I went to their office and I had to pay a 1000 zloty, which is equivalent to 300 pounds. I paid to them to find me a family…in England. (...) The family had literally a book of photos, everything about me. I didn’t know anything about them. That’s why, when I came over… I didn’t know where I’m going, I didn’t know the family, I didn’t know who to expect. We had emails, but I asked many times if she could send me some photos. No, nothing. I was a bit upset about the agency in Poland how could they let me down that much…It was horrible. (...) I wasn’t angry, but I just said, listen you put me with this family, now the woman told me literally to pack my bags and go, she told me that after two months. And if I didn’t have friends from Church I would be on the street basically. And they were really apologetic…Sorry! You know, I paid a lot of money. They said to me: “We will find you another family.” I was waiting for another three weeks to get another family… My parents were furious about this. They said: “You were a teacher, you put all your saving into this.” I didn’t ask my parents for any money.’

(Customer advisor-Bank, Polish, Female, 35, PG)

This example demonstrates that placement agencies are accumulating economic capital by charging for their ‘expert’ services not only to employers but also to workers. Despite using all her savings to pay fees to an agency, Zuzanna did not receive any information about her future employer and thus lacked safety and security when she was coming over. Hence, agencies extract economic capital by exploiting workers’ unfamiliarity with the field and by selling them false security. Migrant workers who are in live-in working arrangements are furthermore specifically vulnerable because their job is directly tied to their
accommodation. Its location within the home makes this type of work distinctive in comparison to other interactive services (McDowell 2009a). The example above shows that by losing her job Zuzanna also lost her accommodation. Since domestic workers in live-in arrangements are very poorly paid, they lack economic capital that would allow them housing security until they find new employer. Although migrant domestic workers are particularly vulnerable in this regard, the overall findings indicate that new arrivals in general face many obstacles that affect their daily and working lives and the types of jobs they end up in. Since new arrivals are unfamiliar with the field and have no sense of the market worth of their labour, they often miscalculate the exchange-value of their salaries on the housing market. Consequently they can end up living in places unofficially, leaving them unable to open a bank account and preventing them from working legally. Here, we see how housing and work are very much interrelated and that migrant workers who cannot afford proper housing are also denied access to legal and safe jobs.

The position of A8 workers on the UK labour market is also affected by the assigned value and unequal possibilities to convert it across transnational fields. As presented in Chapter Seven, employment agencies devalue A8 labour. The data analysis in this chapter further shows that ‘expert’ employment agencies, which specialise for specific sectors, do indeed extract value from migrants by appropriating their capitals across transnational fields. As explained by Marta, this strategy on the part of employment agencies is again possible because of migrants’ unfamiliarity with the new meta-field and intermediaries’ strategies to extract capitals:

‘Firstly there was an agency for social workers that had the representation at the faculty [in Ljubljana], where I was studying. That was like the first time that I ever started to think about going to England and starting to look for a job here… It was a bit strange because at the beginning, when they had the representation, was like, everything goes really smoothly, and it’s not a problem at all. But then, when I
started applying it was like, it’s really hard to get work if you are not registered with the general social care here... The main thing that I would say that it was a mistake that they didn’t tell us that it’s quite hard to get work as an unqualified social worker. And is much easier for a qualified social worker and by that I mean that you are qualified with the general social care council... We even asked them about how it is and they said that it’s not a problem.’

(Bar staff, Slovenian, Female, 28, BA)

Hence, agencies use colonial practices to target highly skilled workers in order to provide high value labour for lower skilled and lower paid jobs. In order to do that, agencies appropriate workers institutional cultural capital across transnational fields, while at the same time they use their ‘expert’ status to convince workers that this capital will have the same exchange-value in the UK. As Marta explains, this ‘expert’ misinformation acted as an incentive for her to migrate to the UK. Due to her unfamiliarity with the UK labour market, she only found out that she cannot actually work as a qualified social worker once she had already arrived in the UK and started looking for work.

In this regard, the data analysis shows that most of the participants, especially those who lacked in capitals and knowledge of the field, faced downward professional mobility. Since workers embody a different place, their institutional cultural capital becomes devalued and is converted into economic capital by employers and employment agencies, but not by workers themselves. The ‘expert’ function is however not just utilised by placement agencies across transnational fields, but also within the UK, to extract value by targeting workers that are not yet familiar with the field and by invoking doubt in already experienced migrant workers. As Joanna explains, agencies actively seek naïve migrant workers in order to extract economic capital:

‘I’ve been to few agencies, when I first started looking for office jobs and I didn’t know they were scam. They call you: “We are really happy to meet you for an interview, we have certain job offers for you, bring your CV, bring your passport all the standard procedures.” And when I came there, it happened that they were selling me some course. They were offering me, you know: “Well, your education was in Poland, that’s not really relevant, it doesn’t really matter because you
should have education from here.” They told me basically, you have to sign up on a 15,000 pounds course for a year or something with administration-business-accountancy, stuff like that, so after that we will be able to get you a job. But first you have to pay the money in, start the course, which is on-line and then we will probably get you a job… I really started thinking about it, because I was like, maybe he’s right, maybe this is why I can’t get an office job. It took me two days to think about it, I was ringing my friends, what I should do, should I sign up, maybe you lend me some money and I will pay, I will do this course and be able to get more job offers and stuff… I think, they are really thinking especially Eastern European people, or people with foreign qualifications and they try to brainwash them.’

(Accounts assistant, Polish, Female, 27, PG)

Joanna’s example demonstrates how migrant workers who are unfamiliar with intermediary value extraction strategies are very vulnerable to the ‘advice’ they get from ‘the employment experts’ within the new meta-field. Here we see how matchmakers use their ‘expert’ function to extract economic capital from migrant workers’ unfamiliarity with the new field. This trend seems even more present with the recession. During the recession, agencies have been targeting not only new arrivals but also already established migrants with many years of experience and high qualifications, as explained by Iwona:

‘At some point someone found my CV on Monster and I was called by one of the agencies and despite my three degrees and my experience and my years here, I was treated like a complete beginner, like 18 year old girl that is trying to look for a job. The guy was trying to tell me: “Oh yeah, you know languages, yeah you know galleries and stuff, but it’s very hard at the moment.” They were trying to push some kind of courses, like for jobs in offices, like basic admin jobs. And I felt that the guy wants to seize and convince me that I have no skills at all... And he was trying to convince me that all my CV is nothing and that I have to take their course and I need to get this office job, because that’s my future... “We’re going to train you and then you’ll get an office job and you are going to be a manager.” He was really trying to brainwash me and it was like never again.’

(Community manager in social media website, Polish, Female, 30, PG)

Here we see how Iwona was actively targeted by an employment agent because she is a migrant and thus perceived as potential for exploitation, especially during the recession when jobs are scarce. Despite her working experience and already accumulated institutional cultural capital within the UK, the
employment agent was trying to devalue both. This example demonstrates how employment agents are using the current economic recession as a tool to scare migrant workers and devalue their capitals in order to extract value from them. While during the recession they have less chance to extract economic capital from employers’ use of workers, they try to extract economic capital by selling migrant workers the opportunity to accumulate legitimised forms of capital. In this regard, the data shows that workers do in fact often get additional qualifications in order to accumulate legitimised institutional cultural capital. These examples speak of the importance of a symbolic economy within triangular and transnational labour relations, which is further visible in agencies’ strategic utilisation of migrants’ (self)colonial imagination and inequalities amongst fields.

8.6 Extracting economic capital by utilising migrants’ (self)colonial imagination and inequalities amongst transnational fields

As argued in Chapter Seven, the order of discourse on CEE is constructed upon spatial and temporal dimensions, which legitimise the workings of symbolic economy built upon the hegemonic binary logic of an imperial post-socialist order. In this chapter, we can further see how this symbolic economy acts a push factor for Polish workers to migrate and how it enables employment agencies to extract economic capital by using migrants’ (self)colonial imagination, which results in an inability to assess and convert value across transnational fields. This is explained by Krzystof:

‘They recruited, actually from Warsaw directly. I think over 100 or 200 people and brought them to this call centre. I think the reason is because their local staff was very highly rotated… It worked mostly like this, that this employment agency in Warsaw made very nice, colourful advertisement in the biggest Polish daily Gazeta Wyborcza… I noticed the big, colourful advertisement saying: “Giving UK salary!” It was really good for Polish standards. Somebody who doesn’t know the costs and how much one will need to pay for the room, it sounded very attractive… The impression I had, and that is the impression of many people in Poland, is that obviously after communism our companies were working in a lousy way and not effective. So I expected that in the West many things are organised better… And to
the name [Internationally known company] while in reality it was outsourced company, but they did not use the name of the company but [Internationally known company], which is a known brand. So I thought it will be very professional and they mentioned training and I thought, that is very professional company with the training with everything and so on. Definitively, I did not expect I will see things, which I did after coming...it was a great, great disappointment, when I saw the reality in comparison to what was in advertisement. I wanted to change quite quickly and I wanted to move to London... I went to some agencies and they told me you have to work in the UK for six months at least to leave the CV with them. So they don’t want to speak with anybody who has been working less than six months...

(Account manager, Polish, Male, 32, PG)

As seen above, agencies that colonise A8 countries deliberately enhance, through exaggerated advertisements, the symbolic value of the jobs advertised in order to attract highly skilled Polish workers to enter the UK labour market. Due to a (self)colonial imagination of the West, presented in Chapter Three, A8 workers cannot realistically assess exchange- and use-values. Therefore, they imagine that the professional standards and salaries offered in the UK can increase their capitals, while in fact they do not. As Krzystof clearly explains, (self)colonial imagination is built upon the hegemonic binary logic of failed communism and the organised, promising capitalism of the West. Here, we see how workers consume this binary logic, which plays an important role in the neoliberal imperial project.

This (self)colonial imagination is further coupled with inequalities amongst countries, thus impeding migrant workers, who are unfamiliar with the new meta-field, to realistically assess the exchange-value of their work. Employers and employment agencies thus extract economic capital from migrant workers precisely through their inability to realistically assess value across transnational fields and within the new meta-filed. Krzystof’s case further demonstrates that although the cultural capital of A8 workers is exchanged by agencies and employers to accumulate economic capital, it cannot be exchanged in the same way by A8 workers who strive towards upward professional mobility. The
presented example shows that migrant workers have difficulties in accessing other jobs if they have not worked in the UK for at least six months. This does not only result in disappointment, but also temporarily fixes workers within the assigned frame of opportunities.

Although the need to have UK experience might be important in certain professions where workers have to learn how things operate on a specific field, the data analysis shows that the lack of UK experience is often used solely as an excuse to seek and provide skilled but cheap labour. In this regard, data analysis further shows that employment agencies extract economic capital from workers by offering them the opportunity to accumulate legitimised (institutional) cultural capital in exchange for free labour. They thus offer practical work experience that is formally regarded as training, as unpaid internships. Magdalena explains:

‘When I was still in Poland I found an agency which provided English courses for Polish people, but also opportunity to get practical experience in English company, so they found a job placement for me… The agency was English…I found them on the website. It was English, so I really was organised by telephone, internet… They just wanted to make money, they found the market in Poland, so it was directed to Polish people… My first nine months were formally training contract for which the employer could pay if they wished so, but they didn’t have to. My employer chose not to pay. So I had to support myself, I had to work Monday to Friday in the office and weekends in the pub. I was working a lot. Often I would go already on Thursday to the pub and Friday all evening, from 7 to 2 at night all Saturday and then Sunday all sleeping… When you don’t know what is waiting for you, you take it as it comes along. In Poland, I only had university degree which was in international trade, but it wasn’t even recognised here. So after doing the training in order to get a work permit, I had to do, apart from work, I had to do additional qualifications in accountancy.’

(Tax Advisor, Polish, Female, 33, BA)

As argued in Chapter Two unpaid internships are part of a wider problematic in the UK that is not detrimental solely to migrant workers, but to all young people who lack sufficient capitals to support themselves while taking up unpaid work as to get their foot in the door. There is, however, some specificity
in the migrant condition as concerns their lack of social capital, unfamiliarity with the field and unrealistic assessment of exchange-value. Due to the (self)colonial practices explored in Chapter Three, migrant workers are prepared to take up precarious jobs within the West because they perceive them as temporary and as an investment for their future. As explained by Magdalena, due to their unequal position of power and their insecurity workers go along with precarious jobs because they hope that the experience and qualification gained within the reputed place will enable them to extract economic capital for themselves in the future. Although many migrant workers were later able to climb the professional ladder, this strategy does not necessarily pay off for all, because migrant labour serves employers as an alternative, cheaper workforce. This is visible from Jernej’s example, which shows how employers lower wages for migrant workers by using inequalities amongst fields:

‘There were quite a lot of frictions of how much I was going to get paid. There was this stereotype idea, OK, this one is coming from abroad, from a poorer country, so he will be satisfied with lower wages. But you realise immediately, now your life is going on here. What you are earning here, you are spending here, not there. So you have to earn at least as much as others. But than soon enough I realised that my qualifications are a lot, a lot ahead from best British makers. And so I started demanding a corresponding level of treatment, which I am approaching, but not getting yet’
(Making and teaching ceramics, Slovenian, Male, 37, PG)

As argued in Chapter Seven, A8 labour is commodified through spatial dimensions that assign a certain exchange-value to this group of workers. In this section, we see what strategies employers use to convert this exchange-value and to legitimise the lowering of wages for these workers. Many A8 workers reported being perceived as more willing to accept lower pay than native workers. Here, we see how employers extract economic capital from migrant workers by abusing inequalities amongst countries and their unfamiliarity with the new meta-field. Spatial dimensions thus play an important role in the managerial deployment of diversity, whose purpose is to
lower the overall costs of labour. Here, we see how racist exploitation forms an important part of a (trans)national economy that can be used by actors who have the power to utilise spatial exchange means in order to accumulate economic capital. This is further achievable by blurring the employment status of migrant labour employed within these triangular relationships and across transnational fields.

8.7 Unclear employment status and working conditions
As argued by the TUC (2011), most agency workers within the UK are legally categorised not as ‘employees’ but as ‘workers’, which means that they are not entitled to key statutory employment rights. Some of these have now been recognised within AWR. Although those categorised as ‘workers’ now have better protection, there are still several holes within these triangular arrangements that can be particularly utilised with regard to migrant workers who lack in capitals and knowledge of the field. As argued in Chapter Six, agency work can blur the legal relationship and responsibility of the employer towards workers. Although this may have changed with AWR for workers that have contracts with administrator-intermediaries, this is still not the case with workers who use information providers and placement agencies that only provide workers for a hirer (TUC 2011). Furthermore, AWR also does not apply to ‘self-employed’ agency workers. For these workers, the achievement of equal rights is still left to their own ability, knowledge and courage to challenge their employers.

Data analysis presented in this chapter demonstrates that A8 workers placed by agencies often had unclear employment status, which also resulted in various abuses. Several participants were facing difficulties with getting official confirmation and papers for their work. This can be particularly problematic for domestic migrant workers who were placed by agencies in live-in arrangements.
with employers. In this regard, Zuzanna explains how she was not provided with any official contract and that working duties were simply imposed on her by the family that was employing her:

‘I don’t think this was like a proper contract, because the family issued me with a contract. It was saying au-pair and then their names. It was simple; much better then the first family. In the first family obviously the woman gave me a list [of working tasks]...I was supposed to do everything, cleaning everything. I was au-pair, take the kids to school, cook for them... And I was also ironing and washing their stuff... I found it a bit odd and too much. I felt, God, Zuzanna you’ve got master’s degree, what are you doing. You just waste your life. It was really upsetting for me... And the family had another couple of people who were living in the same area. And one day they said, because I only got paid 50 pounds a week, they said, would you like to clean our house for three hours. I said yes...I was doing the cleaning for three weeks at other family and one week, I cleaned the whole house it took me three and a half hours, because it was really messy and the 20 pounds was left in the envelope on the table... But then I said to them: “It took me three and a half hours.” And the father said: "Oh, just do till the three hours, because we won’t pay you extra.” OK, so next week I went there to do the three hours, so I decided whatever it will take me. I didn’t do the mirrors or something. The woman came out and said:”How come you didn’t do this and this?” And I said:”You pay me for three hours 20 pounds, fine, but that’s how much it took me.” And then the three weeks was the same and then they said: ”Thank you, we don’t want you.”’

(Customer advisor-Bank, Polish, Female, 35, PG)

Zuzanna’s example demonstrates that workers are basically left in the hands of individual families to formalise their working relations, decide their duties and as such extract economic capital from workers without much constraint. While the assignment of tasks is in the hands of much more powerful employers, au-pairs can end up doing several jobs for the price of one. The example further demonstrates that domestic migrant workers can also be hire out to other families. It was not only the host family that was extracting economic capital from Zuzanna but other families in the area as well. MacKenzie and Ford (2009) have already highlighted the fact that organisations ‘hire out’ migrant labour, and presented findings show that so, too, do families who act as employers. Unlike organisations, families do not directly accumulate economic capital by ‘hiring out’ their domestic workers; however, they are increasing their social
capital. This shows how employers can exchange migrant workers and extract value from them, precisely because they are in a vulnerable position and because they lack economic capital. Most workers in temporary and low-paid jobs reported that they often had to look for additional jobs in order to cover living expenses.

Although workers that have temporary employment contracts with administrative agencies now have some protection under the AWR, this is not necessarily the case with migrant agency workers who lack in capitals and familiarity with the field, as well as those who are self-employed. In this regard, Anna explains that migrant workers who lack sufficient English-language skills are very vulnerable in the hands of agencies and might sign contracts to do lower-paid and dangerous jobs without being aware of it:

‘I heard my friend, he phoned me up: “I need your help, I don’t speak English and I signed up with an agency that specifically recruits Eastern Europeans and then they send us for jobs and they’ve done is, they lowered our salaries... My British equivalents make more money than me. Can you speak to the agency, what’s going on?”’ And secondly that was really bad. He said that the agency picks Polish or Eastern Europeans because they know they will do any job and they were sending them for example to dig in the ground with asbestos, without any protection. He said that this agency was sending the whole van of Eastern Europeans in a construction site, where there were dangerous substances... And they wouldn’t send a British worker there. And I also lived with Polish workers, who worked with an agency and the only reason they were taken on, because unlike their British equivalents, they decided to work on the site, in rain, in snow, in wind, on Saturdays and Sundays. So that’s why they had a job... They signed papers; they didn’t even know what they are signing for. They can breach law, especially in construction and men.’

(Project manager, Polish, Female, 30, BA)

This example demonstrates how employment agencies accumulate economic capital by abusing workers’ lack of knowledge of the field and their lack of institutional cultural capital. Where workers lack English-language skills, they can be tricked to sign employment contracts for dangerous and underpaid jobs. Although employers are still liable with regard to risks, unless workers
are self-employed, workers signing contracts to undertake dangerous work provides employers with a symbolic and legal relief for these high health-and-safety risks. Moreover the TUC (2011) reports that within the construction sector unscrupulous employers and employment agencies also tend to use ‘bogus’ self-employment in order to avoid employment rights obligations, as well as taxation. Two research participants pointed to various exploitative and unlawful practices within the construction sector, where employers were using new arrivals’ lack of capitals and unfamiliarity with the law of the field in order to cheat them. In summary, data analysis demonstrates that managerial deployment of diversity is predicated on unequal power relations within and across fields that enable employers and transnational labour market intermediaries to use new arrivals’ (at least temporary) inability to appropriate and extract-value for themselves. In other words, agencies and employers strategically utilise a business case for diversity across transnational fields to extract value from migrant labour. This is, however, detrimental not only to migrant workers, but to all workers, to organisations as well as for the sustainability of the globalised economy. This is explored further below.

8.8 Human resource management problems that arise from transnational and triangular labour relations
As we saw earlier, information providers and placement agencies whose function was mostly to supply workers to employers, did not provide the promised services despite the fact that often they branded themselves as able – and received payment to – provide ‘safe and secure’ transfer and placement to workers. On the other hand, those agencies that had an on-going relationship with workers took their human resource function more seriously. Where migrant workers represented constant extraction of economic capital, they maintained a good relationship and often managed or at least tried to assist workers in re-learning their labour identity. This is, however, not predicated
upon a social justice imperative, but upon a clear business case. This section explores how this business-case imperative, which views migrant workers only as assets, is not problematic solely for workers but also for organisations.

8.8.1 The transnationalised business case for diversity is not good for business

Although data indicates that administrative and matchmaking employment agencies that had an on-going relationship with workers often assisted migrant workers in re-learning their labour identity, some workers also emphasised that agencies often lacked the expertise that could have provided sufficient assistance in re-learning their labour identity and in easing their way to the new meta-field. Data analysis demonstrates that agencies as well as employers in the UK often lacked cultural sensitivity and understanding of various appropriations that a migrant experiences, is exposed to or assigned to when entering a new field. This is also visible in the poor performance of the agencies and employers that share the human resource management of migrant workers. This is explained by Krzystof, who was part of a workforce that was selected, sourced and then managed without taking into account the specificity of the migrant condition, which resulted in a lack of satisfaction among the workers and poor customer services:

‘You sent your CV, they called you and checked your language and then they invited chosen people for the interview in Warsaw, which was more a formal thing. They checked how fast we type and we had additional conversation in English as well and that was it. (...) When we saw the first day how the work looks like, we wanted to leave. Some people left actually... We had a training which was not related, completely not related to the job we had later...we had no clue how gas and electrics work in the UK. Because that was our job, gas and electricity. They thought maybe that’s easy. But in Poland we don’t have the prepayment things, we don’t have the direct debit, this is all a new thing. And at training they didn’t really; because they couldn’t invent the training with their knowledge, with this management there for a foreigner. They couldn’t get into the minds. I don’t think they had any Polish person involved in preparing of this training. This training was done exactly like for the people from UK. And then if you grow up you know some things, which you don’t. And then we started to pick up the calls. Some
people couldn’t understand what people were saying. And some people couldn’t speak English. So they learned just one sentence: “Please wait, I’ll put you through to the next available.” And then bam to the queue, or then disconnect. (...) They should have had some training and some information how to handle things; some intercultural training, basically. There was a complete barrier; there was no communication in the call centre, between workers and managers. Even asking for help and advice was much more difficult.’

(Account manager, Polish, Male, 32, PG)

Hence the shared responsibilities for (I)HRM firstly resulted in poor selection and screening processes, insufficient training and management and consequently in poor performance. In this regard, Ward et al. (2001) argue that managers within organisations were often unhappy about agencies they used, while their poor performance directly effected the performance of workplaces. This is visible in Krzystof’s example above, and indicates that organisations that use agencies should be more careful and should better check their supply chain and the quality of services that these agencies are actually providing. Krzystof’s experience further demonstrates that migrant workers also require different diversity management approaches that go beyond the current frame and take into account the spatial and temporal dimensions.

The example above shows that work-related tasks that are often simply taken for granted might not be considered as such by migrant workers that come from a different field and have yet to re-learn their labour identity. Their understanding of working tasks or processes might be very different from what is expected of them, because they are not yet familiar with ‘the ways things are done around here’. By ignoring migrant workers’ specific needs, organisations do not just end up having to deal with unsatisfied employees, but also with the poor quality of services. Shifted and vague (I)HRM responsibilities and disregard for migrant workers’ condition is thus not only unethical and problematic for workers, but is ultimately also bad for organisations themselves. This indicates that migrant workers should not be perceived as
assets, but as human beings with specific needs and histories that should be taken into account by organisations that utilise migrant labour. In other words, it demonstrates that a business case for diversity that excludes a moral argument is insufficient because it dismisses a necessary human condition that is crucial for sustainable business.

This, however, does not mean that employers should only be cognisant of this fact but also need to provide professional and specialised induction and training for migrant workers. Nevertheless, data analysis indicates that employers prefer to utilise the capitals of migrant workers by shifting managerial tasks on to them, rather than providing specialised HRM services for this type of worker. As already argued in Chapter Seven, employment agencies use identity politics in order to market a shift of responsibility from employer to worker, in terms of providing care and control of co-workers. The findings in this chapter further demonstrate that employers are, indeed, extracting economic capital from workers by using them as ‘translators’ amongst fields, as explained by Pawel:

‘Where I work, there are many people from Poland, Lithuania and England. And the owner of the company get to know that I have experiences from many countries and sometimes this is very helpful, because Polish people in the construction, they are trying to do many things by themselves and they are trying to do, like they used to do, and they don’t understand that here things are done differently. And maybe he thought that it will be easier for me to explain them, why we do this or this or this... Many people in construction that came from Poland, Lithuania, their English is not that well and I think, when they get some advice, how to do it, they are actually thinking that their work is bad, but it’s not true, they maybe make it better, but our building law says that this should be done that way, and they don’t understand these things. It’s very important, how you explain it to people. If somebody spent many days building something that looks fantastic, but somebody comes and says: “Sorry man, you must do this that way.” (…) So I try to explain, why it is working like this, why you need to change, why you should do this. And I explain: “You didn’t do anything wrong, just do it this way.” Everyday I learn something new, because it’s so different than Polish construction... When somebody asks me about this, I switch to another type of thinking. If you are talking about Polish, I am trying to think how he or she is thinking, because he’s from my country. And I try to think about, how he, who is asking me for help, is
thinking, and I try to find a way to connect this... It’s not only language. Here we are talking about different culture.’

(Foreman, Polish, Male, 39, SE)

This example highlights the fact that migrant workers are often expected to train their fellow co-workers who are not yet familiar with work expectations in a new context. It demonstrates that employers are extracting economic capital from workers by shifting their managerial tasks onto workers. Similar strategies were exposed in relation to BME workers and their unpaid linguistic services for employers (Healy et al. 2011). Here, we see, however, that workers do not operate only as translators of language but also as ‘translators’ amongst diverse fields and ‘translators’ of different rules of the game. Since they embody the same place or have the awareness that by moving to another field one needs to re-learn one’s labour identity, they operate not only as workers, but also as ‘translators’ of the field. While employers cease to take into account the moral arguments for diversity and the need to apply a specialised HRM approach towards migrant labour, workers, who act as ‘translators’ between fields, are also required to perform emotional labour and hidden caring work, while training and inducting their co-workers. Moreover HRM problems arise from the constructed sameness grounded within the hegemonic binary logic of the imperial post-socialist order, as Krzystof explains:

‘I’m dealing with Eastern European customers. But even [Multinational company] there was a situation, when I came, the Eastern European team was consisting of two people and there was one girl from Poland and one from Czech. And what happened is that they replaced this Czech girl to me and these Czech customers immediately asked, they sent an email to management that they are not really happy that there would be a Polish rather than Czech person, who was servicing them. Well, with Czech they could speak in Czech and with us they needed to speak in English. For them it’s significant market enough to have their own speaking customer representative.’

(Account manager, Polish, Male, 32, PG)

Krzystof’s example shows that the managerial deployment of diversity, through which all post-socialist Europe is simply recast as the same, can also have
negative effects for organisations. The company received a complaint because it did not take into account the fact that diverse CEE workers embody diverse cultural capitals. The binary logic of an imperial post-socialist order that enables the maintenance of global inequalities is thus not only detrimental to workers and organisations from the East, but also those in the West. This is yet another case that demonstrates that the stereotypically utilised business case for diversity is not really good for business. The problematic lack of a social justice imperative within the business case for diversity utilised amongst transnational fields is further visible in the shifted and shared recruitment tasks and liabilities for sourcing workers with a racialised ‘price-tag’. This is explored further below.

8.8.2 Shared recruitment tasks and liabilities for sourcing migrant workers with a racialised ‘price-tag’

It is not only various labour market intermediaries that are utilised by employers to recruit migrant workers, but also already employed migrant workers themselves. In this regard, data analysis shows that CEE workers’ social and cultural capital is utilised by employers to actively source migrant labour with specific embodied characteristics. As Anna explains, her friend was expected by her employer to manage transnational recruitment on his behalf and provide workers with specific embodied characteristics:

‘My friend, she worked in Bradford and her manager said to her: “I want you to run recruitment for me. I’m running a care home for old people. Now, can you go to Poland”, because she’s Polish, “and arrange for 25-30 years old women to come to work at my care home.” So he knew, she can go to Poland and literally put an advert saying, 25-30 years old women needed for care home. And he’s Asian; he wanted his clients to pay for the service that their grandmothers and grandfathers are cleaned by beautiful Polish women… And by the way my friend actually struggled to. And this guy was surprised, what do you mean they don’t want national minimum wage. Working with old people in a remote Bradford; OK the accommodation was provided, but very poor. And he was surprised that Polish women do not fight for these jobs. It was ridiculous’

(Project manager, Polish, Female, 30, BA)
This example demonstrates how employers try to utilise migrants’ cultural social capital in order to actively source workers according to their gender, age and race in order to provide workers with a ‘racialised ‘price-tag’ for their clients. By doing that, employers instruct migrant workers to engage in discriminatory recruitment across transnational fields. An instruction to discriminate\(^{42}\) on all grounds, as found in this example, constitutes unlawful discrimination – defined as such in EU antidiscrimination directives\(^ {43}\) and legally enforced in all EU countries, including the A8. By giving discriminatory instructions, employers are not only trying to extract economic capital through unlawful practices in other countries, but also make migrant workers complicit in them. This example further indicates that social-dumping practices also enable the exploitation of the weaker procedural justice for relatively novel legislation\(^ {44}\) in the European periphery, in order to unlawfully recruit workers with particular embodied characteristics.

Employers’ discriminatory instructions are however not limited just to the recruitment process outside the UK, but also within. But the difference is that within the UK employers do not instruct workers to do it in a blatant way through direct advertisements, but in a more subtle way through the selection process, as explained by Joanna:

‘He asked me to put an advert on some websites, Gumtree and DirectGov website. DirectGov is not so bad but still you don’t find really good job offers there. So it already gives you an idea what kind of people you want in the office. When I was looking I had so many CV’s and I just asked him: “What do you want me to look for, what is your criteria?” And he said: “Well, probably Eastern European, single, in their 20s, probably with some kind of degree, not married, doesn’t have to have

\(^{42}\) An instruction to discriminate against persons on any of the grounds is defined as a form of discrimination within the EU COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation.


\(^{44}\) EU anti-discrimination directives needed to be implemented within national legislation of all A8 countries by the time of their accession into the EU in 2004.
too much experience, maybe she can have experience within her own country within admin, but she doesn’t really have to have experience within the UK.” So I already knew, this is how you recruited me, you bastard, this is why I got that money for my job. Employer knows that they can get, that there are so many, especially Eastern European people, they have masters, they have PhD’s and they come here because they look for, I don’t know more money or they look for different way of living in London. And employers are being really sneaky and they just want to pick those people who are really vulnerable, who came recently, who don’t really know what’s going on yet in the country and they just can offer them whatever they want. And they find people who take it.’
(Accounts assistant, Polish, Female, 27, PG)

Hence, employers extract economic capital with unlawful discriminatory practices that enable them to target new arrivals that are not yet familiar with the extraction strategies of employers and who are lacking in legitimised forms of capitals. All in all, the findings demonstrate that employers abuse their position of power not only to extract economic capital from migrant workers, but also, in some instances, to make them execute discriminatory instructions. As such, they not only partially shift a burden for human resource management, but also for unlawful actions on migrant workers. Furthermore, these strategies allow employers to fix workers within the assigned frame of opportunities and segment them according to customers’ racialised expectations. Chapter Seven showed that CEE workers are branded due to their work ethic as well as their whiteness and European-ness. Below, Marjan explains how his embodied cultural capital is turned into economic capital in the recruitment process:

‘Eastern European otherwise opens all doors in these basic jobs. You can get jobs much easier than people from Africa or Brazil… To get a job on the lowest level, nothing else; just to get employed… Just because in their eyes we are very reliable, we are very easy, we are not smart enough to complain, we work longer hours… They don’t expect you to know English well. No they don’t. But they expect that you are very strong, that you will do much more than they ask you… They prefer to employ a white person, this is my experience... I did work through many different catering agencies and I was talking also to them. When they realised about my place, we talked deeper.’
(Selfemployed, Slovenian, Male, 42, SE)
Many CEE workers have expressed that they are favoured by employment agencies and employers due to their ‘European-ness’ which comes in the form of migration status as well as their embodied whiteness. This points to the segmentation of migrant labour and reveal the material aspects of whiteness that utilise migrant workers as lower classes with more or less desirable shades of blackness and whiteness that define their suitability for low paid and low skilled jobs. Moreover agencies and employers’ utilisation of CEE workers further has important gender dimensions. As argued in Chapter Seven, CEE women are heavily sexualised and prescribed emotional and embodied labour. In this regard, the data exposes the vulnerability of A8 women who are perceived and treated as a commodity that is sold for embodied and emotional labour, as explained by Anna:

‘I had a contact, so I knew where to go, I knew which location to turn up to and queue for a job... He ran illegal job agency and there were mostly people from Eastern Europe, but loads of Asian people too. And he used to come around out that shabby meeting room and look around... If he didn’t like someone’s physicality he kind of didn’t get them anything. So my friend was a beautiful blond, really pretty. So once she came in to see him, he got her a job on a third day. It wasn’t that easy from then on, because the job wasn’t that nice and so on. Well, he got me a job as well, but it was a horrible thing. This guy was; he was an Arab, it was a Café and I was supposed to make coffees and drinks. But as it turned out this guy wanted me to go to his house and do his cleaning and catering. And I had no idea what I was doing, I agreed. He wouldn’t let me go, so I had to actually run away from him… He thought that this guy from the agency is sending, I’m not saying a sex worker, but a Polish person, who is just going to go to bed with him… He literary assumed that someone sent for work from that agency is just an easy woman to just take home and take care of.’

(Project manager, Polish, Female, 30, BA)

This example demonstrates how employment agencies extract economic capital from CEE women by appropriating the value of their embodied cultural capital. It indicates that CEE women are marketed by agencies and consumed by employers/customers as available for emotional and embodied labour that can come also in the form of sexual exploitation. Since they are attached a specific history, their embodied cultural capital gets appropriated and re-evaluated in
the UK. This example shows that due to temporal and spatial dimensions that co-construct workers’ identities, migrant workers often have difficulty in reading the newly assigned performative roles (McDowell 2009a: 54). Moreover, it indicates how trafficking of migrant workers might begin. Spatial and temporal dimensions thus play an important role in producing an unequal playing field amongst agencies and employers on the one hand and migrant workers on the other. Employers and agencies are well equipped to appropriate migrant workers’ embodied cultural capitals within the new field in order to accumulate economic capital, but workers, often unaware of this appropriation, are paying the price for it. All-in-all, findings demonstrate that cultural, diversity and identity politics importantly shape symbolic economy, which makes unequal transnationalised economy possible.

8.9 Conclusions

The analysis in this chapter has emphasised the changed nature of transnational labour relations that characterise contemporary labour migration and affect workers’ well-being, organisations and the overall globalised economy. This chapter has revealed the role of transnational employment agencies as important actors within new and emerging colonial processes of contemporary globalised capitalism marked by changed and transnationalised labour relations. It has exposed the value extraction strategies of transnational employment agencies and employers. In this regard chapter demonstrates how these actors extract economic capital from migrant labour by using inequalities amongst fields, migrants’ unfamiliarity within the new field and shifted and blurred responsibility for (I)HRM. In this regard, it has also uncovered various intersectional differences amongst often homogenised CEE migrants that affect migrant workers’ access to the UK labour market and their vulnerability to the transnational value extraction strategies of various labour market intermediaries and employers.
All-in-all, findings demonstrate that migrant workers, who are unfamiliar with the UK labour market and value extraction strategies of various labour market intermediaries, are in a much less powerful position in comparison to employers and employment agencies to exchange their capitals or to realistically assess exchange-value across transnational fields. As such, they become easy prey for ‘entrepreneurial’ employers and employment agencies that are aware of value differences and can use them in order to accumulate economic capital. In this regard, the chapter exposes the importance of consumption processes within changed transnationalised labour relations. In other words, migrant workers are also consumers that consume symbolic signs that various labour market intermediaries direct towards them through their marketing strategies. Identity, diversity and cultural politics thus play a crucial role in workers’ consumption of symbolic signs sold to them by transnational employment agencies and employers.

In this regard the chapter exposes the increasingly globally homogeneous class logic visible in the nesting orientalisms that exposes the variation amongst different generations of Polish migrants, which is informed by the racialised class logic of the new meta-field and can result in exploitative relationships. In summary, the chapter shows that within the individualised and commodified logic of contemporary capitalism, cultural, diversity and identity politics have been marketised and as such act as exchange mechanisms also within identity and community groups that are often deemed as homogeneous and emancipatory. This points to the need to focus on power rather than the fixed categories that can keep diverse workers fixed in place. Just as consumption is crucial in understanding changed transnationalised labour relations, it is also crucial in rethinking class politics and organised struggles by engaging with them at a broader scale. Since consumption is utilised by employers and employment agencies to extract value from vulnerable migrant workers, it can
also be used by workers’ organisations and trade unions to reach the most vulnerable migrant workers that lack in capitals and familiarity with the field, and thus fall for symbolic signs that address their identity.

Moreover, changed labour relations across transnational fields also enable the peculiar sharing of (I)HRM responsibilities amongst diverse actors involved. As data has demonstrated, this is not only unethical, but often unlawful and detrimental to workers as well as for organisations. The focus on power relations amongst various actors revealed that changed transnational labour relations are not only triangular but multi-angular and include various labour market intermediaries, employers that are also customers, workers that can at the same time act as consumers or HR managers, and the actual clients that consume workers’ commodified selves and their services at the end of the chain. In conclusion, the data analysis indicates that (I)HRM needs a new paradigm that is able to maintain complex, multilevel, relational and transnational focus on contemporary globalised production and consumption processes. In other words, it demonstrates that a business case for diversity that excludes a social justice argument across spatial and temporal dimensions is insufficient because it dismisses a necessary human condition that is crucial for a sustainable business and economy.
9 Conclusions

9.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the findings and contributions of this research and provides its final conclusions. This thesis makes a contribution to the growing body of literature focusing on labour migration from post-socialist CEE to the UK. By uncovering the commodification of migrant workers from A8 countries, its effects on Polish and Slovenian migrant workers and on the overall social stratification on the UK labour market and across transnational fields, the thesis’s specific contribution is to expose the workings of a symbolic economy and its effects on various local and global scales. Through a transdisciplinary adoption of a Bourdieuan conceptual framework this thesis contributes by providing a complex intersectional analysis across spatial and temporal dimensions and amongst diverse actors and A8 groups involved. As such it offers original insights into on-going colonial processes in Europe that characterise contemporary transnationalised cultural political economy, affect emigration from post-socialist CEE to the UK and divide diverse groups of workers on various local and global scales.

This complex analysis is, in Chapter Four, grounded within the transdisciplinary adoption of a Bourdieuan theoretical framework that is further operationalised and put into work in Chapter Five. The thesis’ contribution is thus to offer an original theoretical and methodological toolkit for the exploration of complex, relational, multilevel, transnational and intersectional analyses. It uncovers the multiple and misrecognised power relations associated with embodied categories, spatial and temporal dimensions and varying modalities of knowledge. As such, it can be used to reveal the postcolonial condition and the on-going colonial processes that characterise a contemporary post-socialist world marked by the cultural turn and changed transnationalised consumption and production processes.
The first stage of the analysis was to uncover the postcolonial narrative that surrounds EU enlargement into A8 countries and their transition to market economies. In this regard, Chapter Two exposed the order of discourse that represents a semiotic form of a regime of (meta) governance on the EU and the UK level. This order of discourse is constructed upon the hegemonic binary logic of the imperial post-socialist order, which legitimises on-going colonial processes within contemporary Europe. It constructs A8 countries as backward and in need of transcending the socialist past by adapting new forms of production and exchange. In other words, it exposes the neoliberal (self)colonisation that characterised the process of A8 countries’ transition to market economies and their accession to the EU. As such the thesis contributes by providing evidence of how A8 nationals have been re-evaluated in relation to the market and constructed as second-class EU citizens in an economic, political and cultural sense.

Since the aim of this thesis was also to transcend discursive and material boundaries, it further contributes by providing evidence on how this order of discourse affects material practices in the everyday lives of Polish and Slovenian migrant workers. In this regard Chapter Three first turned towards Polish and Slovenian workers’ places of origin. In this regard, the thesis contributes by showing the everyday material effects of the changed structural conditions characterised by transition and EU accession in Poland and Slovenia. By presenting Polish and Slovenian workers narrations it contributes by exposing the effects of neoliberal (self)colonisation on workers’ (self)value and emigration. By using a comparative approach, it also points to differences that arise from the different histories and impositions of the neoliberal imperial project in these two countries and exposes nesting orientalisms and self-colonial practices that legitimise neoliberal hegemony as the modernising project.
In Chapter Six the thesis turns towards the UK in order to explore A8 workers' position on the UK labour market. The chapter shows that from the point of entry into the UK, the state constructs diverse A8 workers as homogeneous and as such produces a specific identity and value for this group of workers that is partial and ethnocentric. This is further strengthened by transnational employment agencies that act as representatives of A8 workers in the UK. In this regard, Chapter Seven contributes by exposing the role of transnational employment agencies in commodification of new colonial subjects suitable for precarious jobs within (trans)nationalised economy. By strategically utilising cultural, diversity and identity politics, agencies assign A8 workers a specific identity, value, position and performative roles. As such they construct a specific class of worker and legitimise its strategic utilisation for low-paid and low-skilled jobs in sectors and places experiencing labour shortages that also entail emotional and embodied labour. The thesis thus contributes by exposing the racialised class logic characterised by the hegemonic binary logic of the imperial post-socialist order.

This racialised class logic acts as a symbolic violence that demands complete subordination of life to production and consumption processes and thus also effectively (self)disciplines and divides an increasingly diverse workforce. In this regard, the thesis uncovers the performative, transformative and resisting strategies of Polish and Slovenian workers, informed by the order of discourse and other orthodoxies within the new meta-field and diverse histories and structures embodied in migrants’ habitus. By showing how post-socialism and neoliberalism operate in different places and times, this thesis ultimately challenges the hegemonic binary logic of the imperial post-socialist order. It does so by delegitimising a seemingly a-historical and beneficial neoliberal imperial project and by opening up possibilities for alternative politics.
Furthermore, Chapter Eight focuses on the material practices that arise from the changed transnational labour relations emerging from the unrestricted movement of various transnational labour market intermediaries, such as employment agencies who play an important role in on-going colonial processes and in commodification of A8 labour. As such, the thesis exposes unequal power relations between employment agencies and employers operating across transnational fields, and migrant workers. By focusing on both production and consumption, the thesis contributes by uncovering various abuses of vulnerable migrant workers/consumers and the ethical problems that arise from marketization of cultural, diversity and identity politics in the value-extraction strategies of agencies and employers operating across transnational fields.

In this regard, the thesis further contributes by exposing differences and exploitative relationships amongst diverse A8 workers who are often simply homogenised through cultural, diversity and identity politics. As such, the thesis exposes the importance of symbolic economy within complex, multi-angular and transnationalised labour relations of contemporary globalised capitalism. These contributions are laid down in detail in the following four sections. The first section revisits the research questions. This is followed by summarising its theoretical and methodological contributions and wider social and policy implications. The final section points to the limitations of this thesis and gives suggestions for future research.

9.2 Revisiting research questions
This thesis explored the commodification of CEE migrant workers and its effects. Specifically, it sought to answer the question: how have CEE workers been discursively and intersectionally commodified, and what are its effects on
Polish and Slovenian migrant workers and overall social stratification on the UK labour market and across transnational fields? In order to answer the central research question, three sub-research questions were set out to explore the issue in a multilevel and relational framework. In this section, I revisit and answer these questions.

9.2.1 **How has A8 labour been discursively and intersectionally commodified by important actors that operate across (trans)national fields and participate in colonisation of post-socialist CEE?**

The macro- and meso-levels of this research have explored how A8 labour has been discursively and intersectionally commodified by important actors that operate across (trans)national fields and participate in colonisation of post-socialist CEE. The macro level set the positioning and experiences of A8 workers in its historical and socio-economic context by exploring the process of A8 countries’ accession and their transition to market economies. The meso-level of research further explores the commodification of A8 workers in web-based transnational employment agencies’ marketing practices. Analysis on the macro- and meso-levels thus offered structural analysis of a social order of discourse that serves as a necessary foreground for critical exploration of the agentic power and ‘choice’ that A8 workers have at their disposal across transnational fields and on the UK labour market.

Macro-level analysis has demonstrated that through EU enlargement and transition to market economies, A8 countries and their nationals have been subjected to neoliberal (self)colonisation that has produced a subordinate political, economic and cultural entity and redefined and objectified second-class EU citizenship. Apart from the EU itself, a great role in this transformation was played by political leaders, the business community and international monetary institutions such as WB and IMF that promote neoliberal policies in
CEE. These policies had primarily an economic imperative which did not put much emphasis on people’s socio-economic well-being. The imposition of these policies was legitimised through the structural order of discourse that forms the relationship across transnational fields. This order of discourse is constructed upon the hegemonic binary logic of the imperial post-socialist order, which positions A8 countries and their nationals as embodying a barbaric and obsolete socialist history that needs to be overcome by a seemingly modern, non-ideological and a-historical neoliberal project. It thus plays a crucial role in a symbolic economy that enables the creation of new colonies and colonial subjects within.

This discursive strategy, with its economic imperative, also enabled the re-evaluation of EU citizenship in relation to the market in two ways. Firstly, new EU citizens were transformed into consumers; and secondly, they were re-evaluated through a citizen-worker logic that is constructed in relation to the welfare state and has a specific culture and morality attached to it. This morality places the responsibility for welfare upon the individual and her/his willingness to comply with a hardworking culture and perform the work ethic that acts as a flipside to work-life balance. This order of discourse surrounding A8 countries and their nationals has effectively been taken up in the UK, where colonial subjects have been objectified as suitable for specific types of jobs and welcomed only if they are willing to perform the work ethic, without being a burden on the welfare state. The appropriation of the order of discourse on A8 workers also had a clear business-case imperative, where colonial subjects were perceived as a commodity that can be utilised to fill low-skilled and low-paid jobs in sectors and places experiencing shortages of labour.

The commodification of colonial subjects is even more visible in meso-level analysis exploring how the order of discourse on A8 workers has been taken up and appropriated in web-based marketing practices of transnational
employment agencies in order to commodify A8 workers for the UK labour market. Findings demonstrate that transnational employment agencies act as cultural and employment-relations intermediaries across transnational fields. They utilise cultural, diversity and identity politics in order to brand themselves as experts for and representatives of A8 countries and A8 labour. As such, they legitimise their authority and voice in establishing and translating value across transnational fields and in the making of new colonial subjects suitable for specific types of work.

The analysis demonstrates that colonial subjects are discursively constructed through spatial and temporal dimensions and embodied markers of difference that assign a specific position and performativity to A8 labour. In their marketing strategies, agencies use unequal relationships amongst transnational fields, assign a specific history to workers embodying these diverse fields, and consequently determine their value, social position, and frame of opportunities, and assign them specific performative roles. A8 labour, most commonly symbolised through the Polish worker, is branded as possessing a superior work ethic, and being cost-effective, flexible, traditional, legal, second-class labour. A8 workers are further branded through various embodied markers that speak of gendered and racial divisions of labour and prescribe a specific performativity to this class of worker that encompasses embodied and emotional labour.

In summary, agencies produce a specific style or class of worker that is available for demanding, dangerous, dirty, flexible, insecure, temporary and precarious jobs at lower costs. Due to unequal economic geographies, CEE workers are marketed as a useful commodity and as such recast, in relation to British working class, as a morally and economically better class of worker and in relation to other migrant workers as more reliable and ‘less risky’ workers. The legitimisation for this re-evaluation is achieved through the order of
discourse found already on the macro level that is constructed upon a hegemonic binary logic of imperial post-socialist order. This binary logic constructs A8 workers as possessing a seemingly ‘socialist work ethic’, supposedly the result of ideologically-driven cultural disciplining during socialism. The discourse on CEE class habitus is further legitimised by pointing to relations amongst fields and important actors within.

In other words, transnational employment agencies use cultural, diversity and identity politics in order to legitimise the strategic utilisation and disciplining of the global poor. In this regard, macro- and meso-level analysis also indicates that cultural, diversity and identity politics could play an important role in workers’ tactics to compete for scarce resources. Exposing the symbolic power hidden in commodification processes thus serves as a necessary foreground for critical exploration of how this symbolic economy affects the power dynamics between the East and the West, amongst workers, employers and transnational employment agencies and, ultimately, how it affects workers’ agency, their re-evaluation of the new place and their ‘choices’ to transform, resist or perform assigned identities in order to assign value to themselves in the UK. This was explored in the remaining two research questions, addressed further below.

9.2.2 How has neoliberal (self)colonisation affected (self)value and emigration in Poland and Slovenia and the value extraction possibilities of diverse actors involved in transnational labour relations between East and West?

With the second question, research moved to micro-level analysis, offering Polish and Slovenian workers’ perspective on the effects of neoliberal (self)colonisation on (self)value and emigration in Poland and Slovenia, on changed transnational and triangular labour relations between East and West, and the value-extraction possibilities of various actors involved. In order to go
beyond partial and ethnocentric interpretations of migrants’ habitus and their experiences, micro-level analysis first turns to migrants’ places of origin. Although in both Poland and Slovenia production and consumption patterns and (self)value have been altered through transition and Europeanisation processes, there are substantial differences between these two countries arising from their different histories and impositions of the neoliberal imperial project.

Ideologically-driven neoliberal ‘shock therapy’, adopted in Poland, resulted in rapid transition characterised by social-dumping practices, high unemployment and a precarious existence that became a big problem for the whole generation that grew up during this period. It increased competition for scarce jobs and enabled the lowering of labour standards, increased working hours, and produced the disappearance of work-life balance. In other words neoliberal (self)colonisation in Poland disciplined workers in accordance with the neoliberal work ethic. The Polish example demonstrates that the neoliberal imperial project imposes a homogeneous class culture and morality that aims to discipline and utilise the global and local poor. This is further visible in rising inequalities and social stratification in Poland, with specific class, age, gender, sexual and racial dimensions, resulting in deteriorated rights for some groups. The ‘success’ of the neoliberal imperial project is thus visible in the emigration of young Polish workers, particularly among the lower and middle classes, women, and religious, ethnic or sexual minorities, and in their willingness to take up low-skilled and low-paid jobs in the UK.

In contrast, the contextually-driven, gradualist approach in Slovenia prevented unrestricted social-dumping practices, which enabled the maintenance of the social protection system, social cohesion and work-life balance. Since the neoliberal imperial project has not yet achieved equal ‘success’ in Slovenia, Slovenian workers have not yet been disciplined into a hardworking culture and emigration to the UK has been modest. Nevertheless, after joining the EU
and Eurozone, Slovenia has been subsumed into neoliberal hegemony, which is visible in increasing social stratification and the emigration of some groups of workers, even if this is often masked by a strong informal economy, inherited assets and the social security and wealth accumulated by older generations. This informal economy is connected with the small size of Slovenia and also, similarly to Poland, with deep-seated non-commodified forms of production and exchange, which also affect workers’ strategies to access the UK labour market.

Moreover neoliberal imperial project altered consumption patterns, also enabling the (self)re-evaluation of subjectivities in CEE. The opening of post-socialist markets enabled multinational retail firms to expand the consumption of retail goods to Eastern markets, including Slovenia and Poland. The hegemonic binary logic of the imperial post-socialist order enabled Western brands to dump goods in the East that they could not sell in the West, which effectively constructed Eastern and Western markets and affected CEE workers’/consumers’ (self)value. Since Polish and Slovenian workers/consumers had historically very different possibilities to access Western goods, there are differences between these two groups in (self)valuing strategies in relation to consumption. These differences are visible in nesting orientalisms related to consumption possibilities, through which Slovenian workers construct their superiority in relation to former Soviet bloc countries.

This demonstrates that consumption plays an important part in the capitalist civilising process, crucial in maintaining global inequality and in affecting workers’ (self)value and emigration. Workers’ personal politics speaks of (self)colonisation, which evokes an old colonial legacy and also an on-going colonisation that is in constant flux and visible also in workers’ own legitimisation of neoliberal hegemony as the modernising project. The importance of consumption is also visible in the (self)colonial imagination of the
West. This is built upon the hegemonic binary logic of the post-socialist imperial order, creating a specific reputation and expectations of the West and affecting Slovenian and Polish workers’ inferiority in relation to it. The effects of these changed production and consumption patterns and the re-evaluation of subjectivities are further visible in transnational and triangular labour relations and the value-extraction possibilities of diverse actors involved.

In this regard, the analysis finds that migrant workers unfamiliar with the UK labour market and the value-extraction strategies of various labour market intermediaries are in a much less powerful position than employers and employment agencies to exchange their capitals or to realistically assess the exchange and use-value within and across transnational fields. As such they act as easy prey for ‘entrepreneurial’ employers and employment agencies that are aware of value differences and can use them in order to accumulate economic capital. By putting equal focus on consumption, the findings reveal that commodified migrant workers are not only being consumed, but also themselves become consumers of symbolic signs that various labour market intermediaries direct towards them through marketing strategies. Identity, diversity and cultural politics thus play a crucial role in workers’ consumption of symbolic signs, sold to them by transnational employment agencies and employers. As consumption is crucial in understanding the changed triangular and transnationalised labour relations between East and West, it is also crucial in rethinking local and global class politics and organised struggles, which will be explored later in this chapter.

Moreover, changed labour relations across transnational fields also enable the particular sharing of (I)HRM responsibilities amongst the diverse actors involved. The thesis shows that these relations are not only triangular, but multi-angular, and apart from different roles played by workers, employers and employment agencies, include the customers that consume workers’ identities
at the end of the chain and further complicate the unequal power relations among them. In summary, the findings demonstrate that the transnationalised business case for diversity used by transnational employment agencies and employers is ultimately good neither for migrant workers nor for business or a sustainable global economy. The thesis demonstrates that a business case for diversity that excludes a social justice argument across spatial and temporal dimensions is insufficient because it dismisses a necessary human condition crucial for a sustainable business and economy. How this transnationalised and racialised economy operates in the UK is explored below with the last research question.

9.2.3 How do Polish and Slovenian workers’ embodied places and their encounter with discursive intersectional commodification in the UK, especially in London, affect their strategies to generate value for themselves?

This question also arises from micro-level analysis, and thus focuses on the perspective of workers in order to explore how Polish and Slovenian workers’ embodied places and their encounter discursive intersectional commodification affect their strategies to generate value for themselves. Since CEE workers embody places with quite different historical and present forms of production and exchange, they offer a comparative perspective that challenges the neoliberal imperial project on various local and global scales. Since the neoliberal imperial project had different ‘success’ rates in different places, CEE workers also oppose neo-liberalisation they encounter in the UK. This is especially the case with Slovenian migrant workers, who come from a place that has not yet been completely subsumed into neoliberal hegemony. Slovenian workers’ embodied place thus make them resist the neoliberal work ethic they encounter in the UK. As such CEE migrant workers offer new or already forgotten possibilities for the re-evaluation of neo-liberalisation in the UK. In other words their acts of resistance point to already forgotten history and
memories of possibilities that have been erased by a seemingly a-historical and non-ideological neoliberal project. As such, they also challenge the hegemonic binary logic of the imperial post-socialist order and delegitimise a seemingly beneficial neoliberal imperial project.

Reviving forgotten history and exposing comparative re-evaluations that arise from different forms of production and exchange is crucial, because the imperial neoliberal project tends to erase this history and impose homogeneous class logic on global and local scales, which is visible also in workers’ strategies to generate value for themselves in the UK. For instance, the thesis finds that unequal economic geographies of globalised production and consumption encourage Polish workers’ ‘willing’ self-devaluation on the UK labour market. In other words, the thesis exposes an increasingly globalised and homogenised racialised class logic characterised by the hegemonic binary logic of the imperial post-socialist order. This logic does not only inform workers’ choices, but also their (self)valuing and (self)commodifying strategies, which effectively self-disciplines and divides diverse workforce. The data analysis shows that Polish and Slovenian workers’ strategies to generate exchange-value on the UK labour market are informed by the order of discourse characterised by neoliberalization in the UK, as well as their embodied places, diverse histories, and the effects of on-going colonialism.

Due to the different ‘success’ rates of the neoliberal imperial project, there are also differences between Polish and Slovenian workers. Entering a new labour market where the work ethic represents the highest moral standard thus presents learning and self-disciplining curve for Slovenian workers. In this regard, the evidence suggests that Slovenian workers competing for low-skilled entry-level jobs self-discipline according to the work ethic present in the new meta-field and start performing the hardworking culture in order to demonstrate their commitment, flexibility and compliance within low-skilled and low-paid jobs.
Although in high-skilled and better-paid jobs workers increase their self-worth and power through other means, findings still demonstrate that they, too, self-discipline according to the expected performace of the neoliberal morality. By performing the neoliberal work ethic, even workers in high-skilled and better-paid jobs increase their reputation as committed and devoted workers and thus deserving and modern citizens (to be). Here, we see how the neoliberal imperial project disciplines workers to embrace the neoliberal work ethic, a form of symbolic violence, which demands complete subordination of people’s lives to production processes.

Moreover, the thesis exposes nesting orientalisms and cultural hybridity which serve as workers’ personal politics to reclaim their value in the UK. As such, its contribution is to reveal and theorise differences and exploitative relationships amongst diverse CEE groups that are often homogenised through cultural, diversity and identity politics. In this regard data analysis reveals how nesting orientalisms are redefined by localised racialising practices and by the political and economic divisions that characterise the post-socialist world. The thesis provides evidence that the neoliberal imperial project not only legitimises unequal economic geographies, but also makes them possible by (self)disciplining migrant workers to perform, transform and strategically utilise this racialised class logic. Within the individualised and commodified logic of contemporary capitalism the utilisation of cultural, diversity and identity politics has a primary business-case imperative, and thus it also becomes important in workers’ strategies to compete for scarce resources.

In this regard, data analysis finds that Slovenian workers self-appropriate their transnational cultural capital according to the order of discourse within the new meta-field. Polish workers, on the other hand, utilise their national cultural capital, which also exposes variation and exploitative relationships amongst different generations and groups of Polish migrants. This creates a vicious circle
where the utilisation of diversity and identity politics on the surface acts as a measure against misrecognition, but in practice works as a managerial and (self)disciplining tool that not only covers up distributive and representational injustice on a broader scale, but also legitimises the strategic utilisation of the global poor. The comparative perspective across temporal and spatial dimensions provides direct proof that the neoliberal imperial project aims to discipline the global poor by imposing seemingly a-historical, non-ideological and mutually-beneficial forms of production and consumption that in fact mask a transnationalised racialised economy and disable alternative local and global politics. CEE migrants’ gazes, experiences and strategies thus offer a fresh re-evaluation of class, race and gender politics and fresh ideas to start imagining alternative, more equal and sustainable cultural political economy on global and local scales.

9.3 *Theoretical and methodological contributions*

This thesis contributes to the scholarship exploring transnational labour migration and globalised cultural political economy in a theoretical and methodological sense. It offers a novel transdisciplinary adoption of Bourdieuian conceptual framework of field, habitus and different forms of capital in order to explore the intersectional commodification of migrant workers and its effects. This transdisciplinary adoption enables the exploration of the symbolic power hidden under class/group formation and its effects at multiple levels, perspectives and scales, by bridging the divide between the economic, cultural and political arenas, between discursive and material positions, and between structure and agency. This allows for the complex, relational, multilevel, transnational intersectional analysis of commodification of migrant labour and its effects within contemporary capitalism, characterised as it is by transnationalised production and consumption patterns. However in
order to achieve that empirically this theoretical framework further links to methodological contributions of this thesis.

Methodologically, this thesis offers an original attempt to operationalise this abstract conceptual framework for empirical research. This was achieved by further engaging with critical realist and feminist scholarship that recognises the importance of semiosis and the need for complex and multilevel relational and intersectional analysis (Fairclough et al. 2001; Frankenberg 1993; Healy 2009; Layder 1997: 24; McCall 2005; Sayer 2000). This, combined with Layder’s multiple levels of analysis, offers analytical clarity in exploring discursive and material, economic, cultural, political and structural and agentic processes and their intertwining across temporal and spatial and dimensions (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999; Layder 1993; 1998: 101; Sayer 2000). In summary, the theoretical and methodological toolkit adopted for this research project offers a novel approach to a complex intersectional analysis that can uncover *multiple and misrecognised power relations associated with embodied categories, spatial and temporal dimensions and varying modalities of knowledge.*

Instead of starting with fixed categories, this approach focuses on processes of power across (trans)national fields and amongst various actors involved in changed transnationalised production and consumption processes, thus enabling the exploration of social class formation and its effects on a broader scale. As such, this theoretical and methodological toolkit offers an alternative approach to an ethnicity paradigm on one hand and to a black-and-white paradigm on the other by taking into account structural, temporal and spatial elements of racialization and commodification processes. In other words it enables the exploration of (trans)formation and (re)evaluation of subjectivities within and across (trans)national fields and the role and power of various actors involved in these processes.
Moreover this framework enables the exploration of class formation, not just within production but also within consumption processes. Evidence suggests that diverse and mobile labour is constructed within the hierarchy of acceptability also through customers’ consumption of workers’ identities. Furthermore it demonstrates that also workers themselves become consumers of symbolic signs that affect their emigration strategies as well as their strategies to re-claim value for themselves. This enables critical evaluation of what lies beneath the differential (self)positioning and agentic ‘choices’ of workers. It can expose symbolic power that is often misrecognised although it plays a crucial role in the contemporary neoliberal imperial project characterised by globalised production and consumption that utilises cultural politics to discipline, segment and divide the global poor.

As such it also enables the uncovering of the postcolonial condition and ongoing colonial projects that characterise contemporary post-socialist world and affect (self)value and strategic managerial utilisation of CEE migrant workers. It exposes the hegemonic binary logic of the imperial post-socialist order that imposes a homogenised class logic that utilises and disciplines the global poor and prevents alternative politics. As such, it provides novel insights for postcolonial theory, which in the UK is still mostly concerned with the ways the history of British colonialism has shaped contemporary minority-identity politics and critiques of the West (Hall 2009; Ong 1999). Moreover, this thesis demonstrates that alternative politics demands serious engagement with the material and materialised postcolonialism visible in increasingly globalised production and consumption patterns that impose a homogeneous class culture on various local and global scales, discipline workers/consumers and enable strategic utilisation of the global poor.

The thesis also demonstrates that such a postcolonial approach should include comparative perspectives. For instance the thesis on one hand reveals how
workers habitus affects nesting orientalisms, which have not only been redefined upon localised racialising practices, but also upon the political and economic divisions that characterise the post-socialist world. These can on one hand expose differences and as such offer fresh or forgotten possibilities for the re-evaluation of the dominant symbolic, and on the other uncover commonalities of exclusion that create cultural hybridity and construct sameness that could be utilised to unite precarious workers on various local and global scales. These insights are important in understanding contemporary globalised production and consumption patterns and their effects on increasingly diverse populations. Furthermore, they are important in re-evaluating class, race and gender politics and in the search for alternative politics. As such, this theoretical and methodological toolkit also entails a political potential to collectively challenge the game and its symbolic power in a world in which cultural symbolic economy drives capital accumulation.

9.4 Policy and wider social implications
Several findings of this research have wider social and policy implications. The evidence laid down in this thesis demonstrates that the transnationalised business case for diversity used by transnational employment agencies and employers is neither good for workers nor for organisations or a sustainable global economy. Data analysis demonstrates that employment agencies as well as employers in the UK often lacked cultural sensitivity and understanding of various appropriations that a migrant experiences, is exposed to, or assigned to, when entering a new meta-field. Hence, data analysis shows that shared responsibilities for (I)HRM resulted in poor selection and screening processes, insufficient induction, training and management and consequently in poor performance. This indicates that migrant workers require different diversity management approaches that go beyond current frames and take into account spatial and temporal dimensions.
In other words, diversity management approaches should go beyond mere business-case imperatives, and, rather than perceiving migrant workers as commodified assets, should perceive them as human beings with specific characteristics and needs to be taken into account by organisations that utilise migrant workers. Furthermore, it indicates that organisations that use employment agencies to source migrant workers should be more careful and should better check their supply chain and the quality of services that these agencies actually provide. In other words, it demonstrates that a business case for diversity that excludes a moral argument is insufficient because it dismisses a necessary human condition crucial for effective and sustainable business. While these insights are important in rethinking (I)HRM policies and practices, they are also crucial in rethinking class, race and gender politics and organised struggles on a broader scale.

A transnational, relational and comparative focus does not only allow us to discover differences amongst diverse groups, but also to understand commonalities of exclusion that can have wider social implications. The thesis finds that in the UK’s transnationalised economy, cultural, diversity and identity politics has been marketed and as such has a primarily business-case imperative. This not only enables the strategic utilization of diverse and globalised workforce, but also acts as a screen discourse or a branding exercise that effectively covers up historical and structural inequalities arising from (on-going) colonial projects. This demands that a UK equality, diversity and anti-discrimination framework, in addition to a politics of recognition, also incorporates a politics of redistribution and representation on a broader scale.

Moreover, awareness of on-going colonising processes can form a basis for solidarity not solely built upon recognition, but also upon redistributinal and representational justice which takes into account a meta-political frame.
Engagement with materialised postcolonialism on various local and global scales has demonstrated that on-going colonial conditions and changed transnationalised consumption and production patterns can also be explored by workers’ organisations and trade unions in order to reach and organise the most vulnerable migrant workers/consumers, who are lured by symbolic signs that address their identity.

The uncovering of the postcolonial condition on various local and global scales further demonstrates that there is also great value in the different knowledge and practices that come from often de-valued peripheries. This speaks of the need to widen the political voice to also include those often perceived as lacking in value, due to the dominant symbolic. CEE workers’ gaze, experiences and strategies across spatial and temporal dimensions on one hand point to increasingly homogenised global and local class divisions. On the other, they challenge a homogenised neoliberal racialised class logic that dismisses distributive injustice by subsuming the politics of recognition to the logic of the market and by misrepresenting the politics of scale. This thesis thus offers a forgotten re-evaluation of class, race and gender politics and fresh ideas for an alternative, more equal and sustainable transnationalised cultural political economy.

Apart from engaging in academic debates, I try to communicate the policy and wider social implications of this research through my public engagement. As an active member of Migrant Voice, I write commentaries and participate in a media-response team in order to provide insights that steam from this research and oppose the scapegoating UK immigration debate. With the increasing imposition of the neoliberal imperial project in Slovenia, I also cooperate with various counter-movements and media in Slovenia and try to illuminate, using the comparative perspective of my research, the effects that ideologically-induced austerity measures could have on work and life, (self)value and
emigration in Slovenia, if alternative solutions are not found. In the future, I hope to engage in counter-mapping and knowledge-transfer projects that could offer other insights on the neoliberal imperial project, to provide ideas for alternative politics and bring effective change.

9.5 Research limitations and suggestions for further research
While this research has engaged with multiple theories and mixed methods that are partly an asset, they can also act as limitations. Due to the limited scope of this thesis and time available for research, I without doubt could not engage in-depth with various disciplines that inform this study. Engagement is thus limited to the research that either engages with Bourdieu or the migrant division of labour, with specific focus on CEE labour migration to the UK. Similar limitations exist in my use of mixed methods. My discourse analysis across (trans)national fields is limited through genre chains and temporal and spatial restrictions. Similarly my findings deriving from workers’ interviews offer solely workers’ perceptions and understandings of their experience and do not engage directly with experiences of other actors involved in changed and transnationalised labour relations. Given its exploratory nature, this study is not representative enough to allow for a generalisation of the findings. However, it has illuminated how CEE workers have been commodified and what its effects are on Polish and Slovenian migrant workers and overall social stratification on the UK labour market and across transnational fields. It also offered a theoretical and methodological framework for its exploration.

It would be worthwhile if future research exploring CEE labour migration scrutinised power relations and class making not just across various fields, but also within each specific field. This could offer greater depth and could inform relational and comparative analysis. Future research should also continue exploring the complexity of intersectional positioning and on-going colonial
projects by including other CEE ethnic, religious and national groups. It would be worthwhile to make comparisons with other minority-ethnic and dominant groups in order to explore the effects of materialised postcolonialism on diverse groups and in different places. Future research should also further scrutinise the ways and novel possibilities for exploring on-going colonial processes and the complexity of class/group formation and its effects on various local and global scales. This could offer new insights as well as theoretical and methodological approaches for complex intersectional analysis that takes into account spatial and temporal dimensions and varying modalities of knowledge. This could provide a comprehensive counter-map of the neoliberal imperial project and offer novel solutions how to counteract it.

9.6 Concluding remarks
This study has explored the commodification of CEE workers and its effects on Polish and Slovenian migrant workers and overall social stratification on the UK labour market and across transnational fields. It has provided original knowledge that has wider social and policy implications. I wish that I could overcome my own location and time limitations in order to use this research for more political engagement and change. I feel uncomfortable laying down my findings and giving policy recommendations without being included in their development. I thus want to finish by making clear that I would like this research to be used for positive change that strives towards providing a better quality of life, better work-life balance for all and to stimulate creative solutions that go beyond a neoliberal hegemony still built upon the ideologically-driven binary logic of the imperial post-socialist order.

Resistance slogans all over the globe remind us that those who oppose the imposition of the neoliberal imperial project are being re-evaluated as looters (‘capulchu’ in Turkey) or as zombies from the past (‘zombiji’ in Slovenia). These
attacks point to a false morality that is imposed in the name of profit in order to cover up globally very similar forms of exclusion and precarious existence. These should serve as a point of departure to challenge our being defined in such terms and to find new or already forgotten possibilities to reclaim our humanity and non-commodified forms of existence.
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Appendix A: List of investigated employment agencies’ websites

2B Interface  <http://www.2binterface.com/>
Acorn <http://www.acornrecruitmentsw.co.uk>
Aligra <http://www.aligra.co.uk/index.asp?m=1>
Ania's Poland <http://www.aniaspoland.com/recruitment.php>
Baltic Recruitment and Translation <http://www.job-in-uk.com>
Baltic service <http://www.balticservices.co.uk/>
Baltic staff <http://www.balticstaff.co.uk/index.php/en/>
Central European Staffing <http://www.cestaffing.co.uk/>
Chefs from Poland <http://www.chefsfrompoland.com/>
CML Topstaff <http://www.clydemarine.com/content/cml/index.asp>
Concept staffing <http://www.conceptstaffing.co.uk/>
CSA recruitment <http://www.csarecruitment.co.uk/index.php>
CZM Recruitment <http://www.czechmatch.co.uk/index.htm>
East West Recruitment <http://easttowestrecruitment.com/>
Eastern Europeans <http://www.easterneuropeans.co.uk/?page=111>
Easy Poland <http://www.easypoland.co.uk/>
Eurolink Schemes <http://www.euro-ls.co.uk/>
Europe Solution <http://www.europesolutions.co.uk/>
European Recruitment Agency <http://www.polish-recruitment.co.uk/>
Europepeople <http://www.europepeople.co.uk/index.php?name=about>
Euroresource International <http://www.my-resource.co.uk/about.htm>
Freelabour <http://www.freelabour.co.uk/>
Global Choice <http://recruitment.globalchoices.co.uk/?id=31>
HR Builders <http://www.polish-builders-uk.co.uk/polish-builders.html>
IGD Recruitment <http://www.igdrecruitment.co.uk/default.html>
Jobs 4u <http://www.job4u-uk.com/Welcome.html>
KASA recruitment <http://www.kasajobs.co.uk/default.html>
KCI Group <http://www.kcigroupltd.co.uk/index.php?s=1&lang=En>
Appendix B: Interview guide

PhD QMUL
Interview Guideline A

Reasons for participation

1. Why have you decided to take part in this research?

Place of Origin

1. I would like to hear bit about your place of origin and where you lived before you migrated to the UK? I’m especially interested in two things:

   - What ethnic, religious, racial, cultural groups lived there and what were relationships between them?
   - How would you assess the quality of life there as well as prospects for achieving your goals?

Migration

1. Why did you decide to leave and come to the UK?

2. Have you experienced any changes when you migrated? (work-life balance, social status)

Identity
3. Have you experienced any changes in the way you perceive yourself since you have migrated? Have some parts of your identity become more or less important?

4. How do you think other people perceive you here? Do you feel you stand out in any way? How in what way?

5. UK is quite diverse and multicultural, so have you experienced any changes in the way you perceive other ethnic, racial, religious, national or other groups since you have migrated?

6. Have some groups been more visible to you then others? Which, how, why?

7. Have you experienced any changes in the way you understand and perceive the so called ‘Eastern Europe(ans)’ since you have moved the UK?

**Searching for work**
1. Have you had any experiences with work before migration?

2. What ideas and expectations did you have about working in the UK when you first arrived or started looking for work?

3. How did you go about finding work in the UK (information, channels)?

4. Did you encounter any problems in the recruitment process?

5. Were all your qualifications and skills recognised by recruiters?

6. As A8 national you needed to register (WRS) in order to work in the UK. Had this had any effects in the recruitment process?

7. Have you ever felt that your appearance, age, gender, nationality or your cultural background was in anyway important when you were looking for work? Why in what way?

8. Have you ever been offered any other jobs instead of the one you were applying for?

9. Have you ever heard or experienced any stereotypes or unequal treatment in the recruitment process?

10. How do you present yourself to the recruiters? I would particularly like to know if your self presentation at application or on interviews would in anyway differ if you would be applying for the same job in P/S?

11. Would you say that you possess any distinctive skills or characteristics that might be particularly interesting for recruiters in the UK? Which, why?
12. Have you ever felt that you have any advantages or disadvantages in the recruitment process with regard to other migrant or ethnic minority groups?

13. Have your strategies in finding work in any way change? How and why?

**Work and employment relations**

1. What is your current work and how are you satisfied with it? Was that your initial motivation?

2. Did you have any other jobs before?

3. What kind of working relations have you had with your supervisors and co-workers?

4. Have you ever felt that you stand out in any way? How, why?

5. Have your accent or your appearance ever had any effects on your work performance, with regard to customers, supervisors or co-workers?

6. Have you ever had any special requirements for your job performance? (such as prescribed attitudes towards customers, dress codes, ways to perform work …)

7. What are your relations with diverse national, racial, religious, ethnic groups at work?

8. Have you ever noticed any differences amongst diverse (national, racial, religious) groups at work in the way they are perceived or treated by supervisors, customers and co-workers?

9. Have you ever felt that you have any advantages or disadvantages at work in comparison to the groups that you have just described? Which, why?

10. Have you ever been asked or expected to offer assistance or take care of co-workers due to cultural, linguistic or any other proximity? How did you feel about it?

11. Have you ever had to perform any tasks that were not officially recognised through your working position or salary?

12. Have you ever heard or experienced any stereotypes or felt discriminated by customers, supervisors or co-workers?
**Addressing potential difficulties arising from work**

1. Do you get any support from your co-workers or supervisors, if you encounter any difficulties at work?

2. Have you ever used any other channels to address difficulties arising from work or recruitment process? (such as TU, NGO’s, P/S organisations or groups, online groups, forums, friends, family)

3. Would you like to have additional channels and networks to address work related issues? What kind? Why?

4. Do you feel the need to form alliances with any other groups, with whom you could share more general migratory experiences? Why? Which? How?

**Time outside work**

1. Do you have any connections with other P/S or CEE groups in the UK? Is this important to you? Why?

2. In general do you feel that P/S government and/or business community is interested in using the skills, knowledge and experiences of its emigrants in the UK? Would you like this to change? Why? How?

3. What are your future plans? Where do you see yourself in the next years?

4. Would you say that there are any important lessons that migration has thought you?

5. Would you like to add anything to our conversation before we finish?

**Feelings/thoughts about the interview**

We are now at the end of the interview therefore I would like to thank you for your time and account.

1. Before we finish, I would just like to ask you how did you feel about the interview?
Appendix C: Demographics and status questionnaire

PhD-QMUL
Interview Guideline B

Occupation
What was your occupation before migration (if worked in several occupations, please list all)?

When did you migrate to the UK? (please indicate a year)

What is your current occupation in the UK?

What type of work do you currently undertake? (permanent/temporary, full-time/part-time)

Where in the UK is your current work located at?

What is your annual income? Please tick the appropriate box.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Range</th>
<th>Box</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 5,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,000 to 10,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000 to 15,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15,000 to 20,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,000 to 25,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>25,000 to 30,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>30,000 to 35,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>35,000 to 40,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>40,000 to 45,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>45,000 to 50,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50,000 to 55,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55,000 to 60,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60,000 +</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Education**

Please tick the appropriate box or write in to indicate type and country of schooling.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years of schooling</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-12+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of schooling and country of schooling</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary education</td>
<td>Specify</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational education</td>
<td>Specify</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Further Education</td>
<td>Specify</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>Specify</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-graduate</td>
<td>Specify</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Ethnicity**

What is your country of birth?

What is your ethnic group? Choose ONE section from A to D, then tick the appropriate box or write in to indicate your cultural background.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A White</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern European</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central European</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western European</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any other White background</td>
<td>Specify</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Mixed</td>
<td>Specify</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Black</td>
<td>Specify</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D Any other background</td>
<td>Specify</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
If you had a choice, would you use other terms and categories to describe your ethnic/racial/cultural identity?

What is your nationality (what passports do you hold)?

What is your religion?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>None</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Other Christian faith, please specify</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any other religion</td>
<td>Specify</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Do you feel you are part of an ethnic/religious or any other minority in your country? Which one?

What languages do you speak?

What is your age? (Please write in)

Gender Please tick the appropriate box

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
**Marital Status** Please tick the appropriate box

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced/Separated</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living with a partner</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having a partner but not living together</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**By whom have you been informed about the research?**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Facebook</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other online community</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By a friend/colleague</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish/Slovenian Embassy in the UK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment agency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (please specify)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>