1 **Opinion**

2 **Theory of Animal Mind: Human Nature or**

3 Experimental Artefact?

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11 Abstract

12 Are animals capable of empathy, problem-solving or even self-recognition? 13 Much research is dedicated to these questions and yet few have considered 14 how people form beliefs about animal minds. Evidence suggests our 15 mentalising of animals may be a natural consequence of Theory of Mind 16 capabilities. However, where beliefs regarding animal mind have been 17 investigated, this review reveals slow progress in establishing the mechanism 18 underpinning how this is achieved. Here, we consider what conclusions can 19 be drawn regarding how people theorise about animal minds and the different 20 conceptual and particularly methodological issues that might limit the 21 accuracy of conclusions currently drawn from this work. We suggest a new 22 empirical framework for better capturing people's theory of animal mind, which 23 in turn has significant political and social impacts.

25 *"The difference in mind between man and the higher animals,*

26 great as it is, is certainly one of degree and not of kind." [1]

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- 28 **Thoughts on Animal Thinking**
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30 Scientific debate regarding the existence and nature of mental states in 31 animals has a longstanding history [2,3] and covers an extensive range of 32 topics from mirror recognition to numerosity (Box 1). Yet the majority of 33 people form beliefs about animal minds based on everyday occurrences, such 34 as when caring for pets [4] or consuming animal products. Understanding how 35 people construct this "Theory of Animal Mind" (TAM) is therefore likely to 36 reveal important insights, based on their experience and influence in relation 37 to animals. Additionally, as a form of internal construal of other minds, 38 examination of the psychological mechanisms generating TAM will likely have 39 broad implications on account of behavior interpretation not being limited to 40 human-animal relationships [5]. However, little research has been dedicated to exploring the basis on which mental abilities are attributed to nonhuman 41 42 animals, despite few doubting the existence of animal mind [6,7]. 43 Furthermore, when directly questioned, people often substantiate their beliefs 44 with explanations from personal experience or media sources [7]. As a result, 45 it is highly unlikely that the psychological mechanisms that contribute to TAM 46 are analogous to the reasoning used by scientific experts to support judgements on animal cognition [8]. This mismatch gives rise to several 47 48 ethical, scientific and societal issues. Ethical issues arise because views on

49 the sentience of different species are correlated with attitudes towards their 50 use and treatment by humans [9,10]. Therefore, not only is TAM a potential driver of positive human-animal interactions [11], but also welfare-related 51 52 decisions for millions of animals that are currently based upon psychological 53 mechanisms we know little about. Scientific issues emanate from empirical 54 approaches to animal cognition, which likely contaminate research design and 55 produce a biased or inaccurate snapshot of the overall picture of TAM. Social 56 issues are associated with decision-making in related policy areas such as animal welfare, food security and climate change that are, understandably, 57 58 driven by current scientific opinion. The behavior change envisaged by policy 59 makers is unlikely to be realised if supporting evidence does not accurately 60 capture peoples actual thought processes [12,13].

61 As such, this article is important and timely, and designed to expose 62 some of the core issues regarding the evidence available in relation to TAM 63 as well as the research methods commonly used to investigate the 64 phenomenon. Therefore, we start by identifying, and later proposing, a 65 candidate mechanism underlying the development of TAM that generates 66 judgements on the mindedness of non-human animals. Because TAM 67 involves animal 'agents', several theories of relevance from social psychology are also discussed. Following on from this, we discuss ways in which 68 69 research methods might be affecting the results gained from previous TAM 70 research, and thus pose validity (see glossary) and reliability issues. We 71 propose a model that allows both conceptualisation and empirical 72 investigation of the initial stages of TAM using a measurement scale model 73 (specifically Churchill's Scale Development Paradigm [14]), which in turn,

allows mechanisms contributing to TAM to be determined. We conclude by
discussing the importance of reframing TAM in terms of wider relevance to
ethical and policy issues than just animal welfare.

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78 **TAM as a Mechanism of Belief Formation**

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80 Often, people's views on animal mind have been speculated to reflect a 81 simple accumulation of various disparate attitudes and beliefs that are often 82 informed by general society. In essence, we suggest that TAM is more 83 nuanced. It is based on a belief-generating cognitive mechanism that begins 84 by drawing on multiple sources of experience and knowledge that are 85 integrated in order to formulate a judgement (e.g., to what extent is this animal 86 intelligent?) or belief (e.g., I'm of the view that most animals are intelligent); the belief/judgement is thresholded, requiring the establishment of criteria on 87 88 which to assign mindedness to some species over others. The mechanism underpinning TAM consists of multiple components (Figure 1), similar to 89 90 general models of belief formation [15]. For example, relevant information is 91 encoded for later use in generating beliefs about TAM. Encoded information 92 may be descriptive, e.g. chimpanzees can use tools to harvest food, or 93 inferential, e.g. my dog wags his tail when we play ball, playing ball makes my 94 dog happy, ergo my dog experiences emotions. These different types of 95 information become integrated to produce stored schemas or constructs 96 regarding TAM. People may actively retrieve, or through associative memory 97 processes are prompted to draw, information from this store as a way of 98 establishing the certitude of their beliefs regarding TAM [16]. In other words,

99 cumulative perceived knowledge/experience from multiple sources allows an 100 individual to make an estimate that a specified animal possesses a particular 101 mental attribute that is indicative of TAM. If the estimate reaches a threshold 102 limit as determined by that individual, the concept of mind is bestowed upon 103 the animal. This process of belief formation is similar to many models 104 attributed to other domains [16,17]. Below we consider evidence that supports 105 speculation on several psychological theories in this mechanism and later, we 106 outline a framework that helps clarify conceptual and empirical issues when 107 investigating some of the key components of TAM.

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109 TAM: Evidence of Influencing Psychological Theories

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Because views on the existence of animal mind are influenced by the idea of animals as social agents [7], we consider four theories, with origins in social psychology, and their supporting evidence: **Simulation Theory**, **Cognitive Dissonance** Theory, **Terror Management** Theory and **Social Dominance** Theory.

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117 Simulation Theory (ST)

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In interacting with social 'others', we attempt to make sense of behavior
and predict future actions. Therefore, TAM, as the capacity to attribute mental
states to non-humans, is likely to be influenced by Theory of Mind capabilities.
This is supported by evidence suggesting that, similar to human-human
attributions [18], we confer greater mind to animals as we age [19][11]; most

124 likely because we generate more experiences on which to form the 125 beliefs/judgements, and to specify the details of the criteria on which they are 126 evaluated. The influence of ToM (specifically as Simulation Theory) is also 127 supported by people's use of context and behavioral similarity between 128 animals and humans as a central factor in the psychological interpretations of 129 an animal's actions [20]. Notably, people consider species an important 130 determinant of animal mind: 72% of survey participants believe chimpanzees 131 have human-like capacities to feel pain, while only 30% believe worms can 132 feel pain to a moderate degree [21]. Previously, this has been interpreted as a 133 cognitive ability being derived from phylogenetic similarity [20], with 134 evolutionarily more recent animals being seen as in possession of greater 135 mental abilities [9,22,23]. We suggest this finding is more likely due to the 136 influence of mental simulation within a TAM mechanism based on the 137 following evidence: 1) where differences in perceptions of species were found, 138 results varied in degree rather than kind [20], suggesting we are extrapolating 139 or 'simulating' from a human model, and 2) mirror neuron activation occurs 140 when people observe both human and non-human animals performing similar 141 actions [24].

The idea that people view specific behaviors and then attribute mind based on this is a common description of how we achieve TAM, and is also supported by findings that when viewing animal behavior videos, participants broke down scenarios into specific behavioral 'event units' [5]. Despite not using every event unit to describe the behaviors seen, there was near perfect agreement on the event unit nature/meaning and the total number present per video. This evidence suggests that judgements were made based on

recognition of agent's discrete actions rather than on their similarity tohumans.

151

152 **A note on Simulation Theory as anthropomorphism**

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154 Skilled mind reading of a human target (in relation to ST) requires an 155 accurate replication of their mental states, but a simulator's own mental states 156 may contaminate this process [25]. Because our interactions with animals 157 naturally preclude verbal confirmation of inaccurate mental states, it is unlikely 158 that over time, with more feedback from our interactions, we will develop 159 improvements in our mindreading. This, combined with the necessity of 160 simulating within a human mind, means attribution of anthropomorphic 161 mental abilities to animals is unavoidable (e.g. deception, self-recognition). However, labelling these errors as anthropomorphic is unhelpful when 162 163 investigating TAM. In describing animal minds, people assign psychological 164 terms to specific shared behaviors, regardless of species [20] suggesting 165 'interpretative' anthropomorphism rather than 'imaginative' [26]. Along with 166 accumulated knowledge and experience, this work shows that we look to 167 simulate the mind of animals, by assuming that similar actions to our own 168 reflect similar cognitions.

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170 Cognitive Dissonance Theory (CD)

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172 Empirical evidence suggests predominant societal attitudes to meat 173 eating underpin production animals being ascribed lower mental capacities;

174 an attempt to reduce the cognitive dissonance arising from this ethically 175 contentious yet widely adopted societal custom [27,28]. As such, these 176 mechanisms of dissonance reduction are likely to impact upon TAM and 177 manifest as opposing correlations between TAM and support for i) animal use 178 (negative) [19] and ii) animal welfare (positive) [10]. Because criteria upon 179 which this dissonance reduction is achieved may vary, we consider CD in 180 relation to TAM as two forms, terror management (TM) and social dominance 181 (SD).

In individuals with a preference for social hierarchies, dehumanisation 182 183 by ridding animals of mind and therefore moral worth [29], allows their 184 conception as an out-group and subsequent exploitation [6]. For example, 185 those who support animal experimentation endorse a greater mental divide 186 between humans and other species [9,30]. Conversely, experimental framing of human-animal similarity has been shown to increase moral concern for 187 188 animals and human outgroups simultaneously [31]. This concept of out-group 189 dementalization can also be seen in our reduced attributions of mind to pest 190 species in comparison to other animals [32].

191 In contrast to our social dominance orientation, which acts to reduce 192 animals perceived cognitive abilities, mechanisms of terror management aids 193 dissonance reduction by elevating humans in comparison to other animals. In 194 order to avoid the cognitive and emotional experiences inherent in awareness 195 of human or animal death (mortality salience), particularly as a result of 196 human activity (e.g., farming), we advocate the anthropocentric view that 197 humans rights be prioritised on the basis of sophisticated cognitive abilities 198 [6,31,33]. This elevation of own cognitive capacities can be seen in our

consistent segregation of humans at the top of mental ability scales [22,30](for a notable exception see [34]).

However, despite employing different criteria to create distinctions between human and animal mentality, SD and TM show similarities in that they likely depend upon the same belief formation processes. In contrast, simulation theory, and anthropomorphism, are designed to develop criteria for detecting similarities between humans and animals.

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207 Theory of Animal Mind: Innate or Acquired?

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209 Having set out what we propose as a candidate mechanism that 210 underpins TAM, as well as current theoretical proposals regarding TAM, we 211 now consider a key question that all theories need to address, namely that 212 TAM is innate or acquired. In other words, should a special status be 213 attributed to the formation of TAM? From the theories reviewed, the basic 214 mechanism of TAM is much like other processes/theories of belief formation. 215 However, the bank of perceived knowledge the mechanism employs is 216 subject to several influences that would likely predict individual differences in 217 the types of beliefs formed. For example, factors such as education [9], 218 exposure to media [7] and political orientation [35] are likely to cause variation 219 in TAM. Therefore, despite evidence of similarities across cultures when 220 ascribing mental states [36], individual and cultural context are likely to affect 221 the mechanism, as seen in Japanese students who ascribe greater 222 intelligence to crows compared to other nationalities [10]. However, while 223 observed variations may be considered the result of social traditions and

practices, the contribution of specific societal influences on TAM is
unsubstantiated as previous research has predominantly sampled WEIRD
(Western, educated, industrialised, rich and democratic) populations [37].

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Are there limitations to conclusions drawn from empirical research onTAM?

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231 To summarise, the effects of individual and social factors on the 232 mechanism of TAM is clearly interactive, fluid and warrant investigation. Yet 233 despite several variables such as age, species of animal and cultural 234 background being of consequence, based on the evidence we have at 235 present, the direction and magnitude of effects is often disputed e.g. meat 236 consumption based on gender. Additionally, even for those factors considered 237 influential, the variance in TAM they account for is typically small [11,19]. 238 These issues suggest that research methods may be a potential barrier to not 239 only understanding the underlying mechanics of TAM but also in clearly 240 identifying predictive factors. As discussed above, human tendency to 241 anthropomorphise has received much academic attention, predominantly as a 242 methodological and individual weakness [38]. TAM research often proposes 243 avoidance of the former by claiming to purely substantiate beliefs, rather than 244 test accuracy of knowledge. While valid, this perspective is problematic, 245 primarily because variation in experience and encoded knowledge is likely a 246 determinant of beliefs formed [29,39], (as evidenced by the demonstrated 247 effect of psychology-focused education on TAM [40]).

In conjunction with this issue, heavy reliance on scale-based methods may exaggerate the influence of cognitive dissonance on judgements. TAM research typically presents animals as phylogenetic bands on the basis of mapping onto confirmed, yet incorrect, evolutionarily linear beliefs held by non-scientists [30,32,41]. This runs the risk of reducing TAM to a simple ranking exercise against 'advanced' humans.

254 These methodological problems combine to perpetuate the idea that TAM is easily explained, prompting a 'dumbing-down' of the parameters 255 256 investigated. Much research has focused on a single attribute or dimension of 257 TAM [42,43], perhaps because evidence suggests that there are 258 commonalities in assigning TAM across the board [44]. This approach 259 promotes a narrow and unsophisticated demonstration of TAM and distorts 260 the manner in which variation in knowledge/information is used to consider 261 the multiple attributes/dimensions on which to assign TAM. If the devil is in the 262 detail, understanding specific and unexpected results (e.g. 25% of Finnish 263 people surveyed believe shrimp can remember conspecifics) is surely 264 imperative [45]. Furthermore, restricting the TAM constructs considered 265 worthy of investigation not only limits opportunities for understanding but also 266 assumes an even weighting in the importance of mental attributes.

The consequences of this inflexibility and lack of precision when employing rating scales is highlighted by use of the 'belief in animal mind' scale [41]. When originally devised, the four-part scale showed high internal consistency. No subsequent study has managed to reproduce this level of reliability. This issue could be attributed to views on animal mind having undergone temporal changes, a credible theory since i) the amount of

273 research on animal cognition has increased over time [11] and ii) exposure to 274 animals via influential media e.g. TV [46] has increased. However, minor 275 changes to the scale may well be affecting the reliability of findings on the 276 basis that TAM is more nuanced than previously claimed (for instance, 277 inclusion of the term "human-like" in surveys appears to reduce participants 278 willingness to ascribe emotions to animals [40]). Additionally, in its original 279 use, specific categories of animals were provided (mammals excluding 280 humans, birds, fish and insects) on a 5-point scale. Much subsequent work 281 condensed the four groups into "most animals" (a term typically construed as 282 a mammal [47]) alongside a variety of scale measurements [19,32,47,48] and 283 subtle changes in wording. This highlights the crucial issues of scale 284 construction and vague or dual meanings for cognitive terms.

285 Much research on TAM has hinged on the generalised concept of 286 intelligence. While this widely used term allows rapid entry into our 287 frameworks of mind [49], there is often little confirmation of what constitutes 288 intelligence to sample populations despite evidence that it comprises varying 289 constructs to different individuals [50]. Intelligence also involves associations 290 alien to the natural world (e.g. IQ tests). With no specifics to work from, 291 people may simply execute cognitively accessible judgements of 'advanced' 292 mammals, generating repeated correlations between intelligence and 293 phylogeny [43].

We suggest this inconsistency in methods accumulates to produce the varied reported findings detailed previously. Hence, while regression and correlation analysis has provided evidence for relationships between TAM and several other factors, findings have rarely been repeatedly substantiated.

These discrepancies are understandable on the basis that TAM comprises different constructs within a study, as well as variation for the different species on which TAM is being investigated [48].

301 Taken together, these concerns reassert the need to have precise 302 scale items for establishing factors that truly influence TAM formation as well 303 guarding against experimenter bias when designing such scales. As noted, 304 'respondents are constrained by the categories provided' [44], which are often 305 transferred directly from animal cognition literature to social science studies 306 [51]. This is acceptable if testing transmission of scientific knowledge is our 307 aim, but precludes accurate understanding of how we construct TAM. Despite 308 suggestions that our attributions of emotion to animals aligns with scientific 309 views of a basic/higher emotional divide, only a minority of participants believe 310 that animals experience disgust [32]. This demonstrates the importance of 311 ascertaining specific meanings of participant-generated constructs before 312 overlaying scientific theory.

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314 Targeting Issues and Improving Tools of Assessment

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In order to align scale use with meaningful comparisons between findings investigating TAM, we propose a more focused research programme examining the construct formation in TAM. To achieve this, we propose a **Reflective Measurement Model** [52] (Figure 2). This model would allow movement away from considering TAM as a single dimension (supported by the results of [21,35]), allowing greater analysis of the role of specific mental capacities within an overarching belief in animal mentality.

323 We suggest the use of Churchill's measurement model [14] in order to 324 generate a valid and reliable model. While full discussion of the model is 325 beyond the scope of this article, in figure 3 we detail the way in which this 8-326 step approach to measurement will aid the development of reliable tools for 327 generating theoretical predictions as well as empirically testing a critical but 328 often neglected component of the TAM mechanism, namely construct 329 formation; the way in which knowledge and experience is integrated in order 330 to formulate constructs that are used to make decisions/judgements, and form 331 beliefs.

332 The benefits of this model are that, it would more likely reveal the types 333 of dependencies that have been speculated over, such as the association 334 between TAM and empathy. Furthermore, a reliable scale would support 335 empirical work that continues to employ innovative methods to assess animal 336 behavior through videos [5,20]. People's beliefs, judgements and decisions of 337 animals is context sensitive [23], and so using techniques like this can allow 338 comparison of how animal mentality may be viewed in both imagined and real 339 terms. Having a measurement framework that comes with the theoretical 340 apparatus to generate testable predictions around construct formation that 341 underpins beliefs, judgements and decision-making behavior, will elucidate a 342 richer understanding of how we come to our TAM.

343

344 **Concluding Remarks and Future Perspectives**

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346 People's views of the mental abilities of animals, and the resulting 347 moral duty for their welfare, have considerable economic, social and political

348 consequences. Despite this, TAM has received relatively little scientific 349 attention and the ambiguity in the findings generated from work in this area 350 may be attributable to methods and tools. More to the point, we propose that 351 construct formation, a core component of the mechanism of TAM, has been 352 particularly underexplored. Future progress on the subject will likely be 353 mediated by the convergence of scientific approaches to determine a wider 354 range of cognitive constructs (see 'Outstanding Questions'), a process that 355 application and examination of the proposed model should aid. Certainly, the 356 use of validated scale measurements in combination with other methods 357 would shift focus away from confirming unwarranted assumptions around 358 TAM. In addition, a richer conceptual framework for generating hypotheses 359 would improve ways of uncovering people's assumptions of animal's mental 360 capacity. Moreover, focusing TAM research away from seeking correlation 361 with diverse attitude measures in an attempt to predict human treatment of 362 animals, would allow exploration of other potentially substantial influences 363 such as an individual's history of interaction with specific species. This 364 redirection is important because TAM is supported by work from many areas 365 of psychology (e.g. attribution theory, cultural norms, Theory of Mind). In 366 reducing TAM to a single predictable component within a decision-making 367 system focused only on humane animal use, we ignore its diverse 368 implications by omission.

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




Fig. 1 Proposed Mechanism of Belief Formation underpinning Theory of 573 574 Animal Mind. The proposed mechanism is conceptualised as a series of 575 connected components allowing relevant information to be perceived, 576 encoded, integrated and subsequently utilised when forming judgements on the mindedness of non-human animals. Judgements are computed 'online' 577 and represent confidence estimates of belief validity [15]. Formulated 578 579 judgements may be integrated into an individual's bank of perceived knowledge to be reused in future estimates. Each component of the 580 581 mechanism is susceptible to the influence of specified social theories (ST: 582 Simulation Theory, TM: Terror Management Theory, SD: Social Dominance 583 Theory, CD: Cognitive Dissonance Theory). For example, we propose that simulation affects perception and encoding of information relevant to TAM 584 585 through recognition of cross-species behaviors/actions. Thus, Simulation

586	Theory, as a rule, acts to increase the likelihood of exceeding the judgement
587	threshold required to attribute mind to animals purely as a result of observing
588	non-human species. This mechanism is seen by the higher levels of TAM
589	reported by owners towards their pets [53,54]. Conversely, CD, TM and SD all
590	influence the judgement process by reducing the likelihood of exceeding this
591	judgement threshold.
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




Fig. 2 Reflective Measurement Model depicting Theory of Animal Mind 600 601 as a multidimensional construct. Within this model (indicated as blue), 602 mechanism of TAM is conceptualised as a second order, latent construct that 603 underlies multiple first order constructs (dimensions). Dimensions would be 604 expected to consist of mental traits considered attributes of mind e.g. agency 605 as seen in [35] (Note: this prediction, based on previous findings, would need 606 confirming as part of the process). Several specific indicators are used to 607 capture the constructs. The model acts to provide a way to both conceptualise 608 and investigate (indicated as purple) the initial stages of TAM development 609 i.e. construct formation.





611 Fig. 3 Use of Churchill's model to improve scale development (indicated 612 as blue). Definitions of TAM are numerous [19] and often overlap, resulting in 613 conceptual confusion. Step 1 is designed to address this by providing a 614 delineated definition, thereby improving scale validity and transferability. Use 615 of Rossiter's 5 definition rules may aid the definition process [55]. Employing a 616 multi-item scale would ensure capturing each dimension in its entirety i.e. for 617 all animals rather than overly broad groups e.g. mammals. Because TAM is a 618 perceptual attribute/implicit theory [50], it is unlikely that literature reviews and 619 researcher introspection will generate sufficient scale items [56]. Use of 620 developmental gualitative research proposed by Churchill would allow rater 621 consultation in Step 2 (namely the public), improving validity. This is 622 particularly important because a significant proportion of TAM research has 623 been based on student populations. Subsequent completion of steps 1-6 of 624 the paradigm avoids subjective 'cherry picking' of cognitive terms [51] and 625 assumes the generation of a measure that is content or face valid [14]. 626 Construct validity could then be assessed by a) correlating similar measures 627 or b) confirmation of the scale behaving as predicted (e.g. can it predict an 628 associated measure?). Correlation with connected constructs such as 629 anthropomorphism should be assessed to ensure discriminant validity. The 630 final step of developing norms would ensure BAM research extends beyond 631 the Western demographics typically sampled, an important exercise since the 632 role of culture has not been thoroughly explored and is likely to influence the 633 development of TAM [10]. A scenario to illustrate the steps is detailed 634 (indicated as red). For methods of statistical analysis to support each stage, 635 refer to [14].

637 Box 1. Scientific Theory of Animal Mind

638

639 Peoples beliefs regarding the nature of mind are typically dualistic, with mind and body being viewed as separate entities [57]. In contrast, scientists 640 641 working in areas relevant to animal cognition predominantly support theories 642 of materialism, in that all mental phenomena derive from the physical brain 643 [8]. Additionally, while most individuals consider mind as 'thoughts' or 644 'consciousness' [58], among academics, there is no universally agreed 645 definition of mind, animal-based or otherwise. In combination with the 646 currently limited understanding of neural correlates of cognitive traits, this 647 means empirical validation of mental states in animals is problematic [59], 648 although increasing use of modern techniques such as fMRI promises the 649 visualisation of neural states/activity such as consciousness [60,61]. 650 Consequently, scientific views on animal mentality center on examination of specific mental processes that are i) empirically measurable and ii) 651 652 considered meaningful components of human mind, thereby suggesting 653 comparable mental experiences when evidenced in nonhuman species. To 654 this end, a range of cognitive capacities have been investigated including tool 655 use (acknowledged in a range of species [62,63]), numeracy [64] and varying 656 forms of memory, with evidence of chimpanzees outperforming humans in 657 short term memory tasks [65] and facial recognition in sheep [66]. Indeed, 658 mounting evidence hints at unexpected abilities in long derided species such 659 as spiders, tortoises [67,68] and mice, which recent findings suggest might 660 experience ownership of their body parts (an aspect of self-consciousness) 661 [69]. Previously, notions of self-awareness among nonhumans have met with

662 resistance, particularly because only a few animals (e.g. chimpanzees, 663 dolphins, elephants) pass the 'mirror test', a gold standard for self-recognition 664 [70,71]. Similarly, when considering the emotional lives of animals, it is noted 665 that while the 'nature and range' of emotional experiences is debated, the 666 literature widely assumes their occurrence in animals [72]. And yet empathy, 667 although acknowledged in terms of emotional contagion or sensitivity to 668 conspecifics [73], is often disputed when defined at the level of perspective 669 taking [74] or related to Theory of Mind [75]. As such, many capacities 670 considered integral to human cognition are still contested in the literature e.g. 671 language, mental time-travel, relational reasoning or mentalising [72,76,77]. 672 These views may also be bolstered by the historical accumulation of 673 experimental evidence (as a proxy for widely held scientific belief) favouring 674 particular animals e.g. primates or dogs [78], despite modern scientists 675 employing a range of models [79]. Hence, current scientific opinion remains 676 that animal mentality lies on a varied spectrum with only humans possessing 677 the combination of complex abilities and thoughts required to generate our 678 unique minds [80].

679

680 Glossary:

681

Anthropocentrism: the belief that humans are the most important species in
existence and source of all value, resulting in the interpretation of reality
according to human values, needs and experience.

685

686 Anthropomorphism: the attribution of 'uniquely' human characteristics to

non-human entities. Originally viewed as a hindrance to scientific methods,
increasing understanding of animal cognition has generated issues in
delineating anthropomorphism as the unjustified attribution of mental states
vs. interspecies behavior recognition.

691

692 **Churchill's Scale Development Paradigm**: an 8-step framework for the 693 systematic development of multi-item measurement scales when measuring 694 latent constructs.

695

696 Cognitive Dissonance: a state of tension arising from inconsistent thoughts,
697 beliefs, attitudes and actions.

698

699 **Conspecifics**: individuals that belong to the same species.

700

701 Construct: an abstract, psychological concept or variable that cannot be 702 directly observed (latent) and exists independently of any resulting 703 measurable phenomenon e.g. intelligence. Since constructs such as TAM 704 represent psychological attributes that between individuals, vary 705 operationalization of constructs should allow for participant involvement 706 (participant-generated).

707

Fince the processing and conversion of perceived information into aform suitable for storage in memory.

710

711 **Phylogenetics:** the study and taxonomical classification of organisms based

on evolutionary relatedness. Proposed relationships between groups of organisms, inferred from similarities in genetic or physical attributes, are presented as a **phylogeny** or phylogenetic tree. For simplicity when investigating beliefs, animals are often presented as '**phylogenetic bands**' or classes e.g. mammals, birds, etc.

717

Reflective Measurement Model: a type of structural equation model that
depicts the relationship between a latent, unobserved construct (e.g.
personality) and its corresponding indicators within a measure.

721

Reliability: the degree to which an instrument measures a specified construct
both across time (repeatability) and across scale items (consistency) e.g. testretest reliability.

725

Simulation Theory: psychological theory of mind in which individuals use
their own mind to model a targets mental state, to make inferences about a
target.

729

Social Dominance: an individual's preferences for inequality and hierarchy
among social groups, typically measured using the Social Dominance
Orientation Scale.

733

Terror Management: psychological theory that individuals are motivated to
manage the anxiety caused by awareness of death through investment in
belief systems or culture that provide value and meaning.

Validity: the degree to which differences in observed scores on an instrument reflects true differences in the variable of interest. Validity may be confirmed by assessing the ability of an instrument to i) effectively and specifically measure the theorized latent construct (construct validity), ii) capture all facets of the construct's theoretical domain (content validity) and iii) differentiate between individuals in order to allow the predict future outcomes of a related variable (criterion validity).

745

746

747

748 **Outstanding Questions**

749

What are the critical constructs that form TAM and in what way are
these are odds with those held by the scientific community?

752

Which mental attributes of animals are considered of greatest
 importance when judgments are made about how ethical it is to
 consume animals?

756

How do specific cultural influences or practices affect the development
 of TAM?

759

To what extent can TAM be considered a distinct psychological
 phenomenon rather than the byproduct of other processes such as
 anthropomorphism or adherence to cultural norms?

If high order mental faculties form the basis of moral worth, is
 anthropocentrism the dominant mechanism in disqualifying objections
 to the use of animals that are viewed as 'of mind'?

770 Trends Box

Current evidence suggests widespread belief in the mental lives of animals, which has serious consequences for human-animal interactions.

- The scientific community has been slow to investigate the mechanism
 underlying our Theory of Animal Mind (TAM), due to oversimplification
 and limited objectivity.
- By expanding the study of TAM to encompass a richer multi dimensional approach, it is possible to more accurately theorise and
 empirically validate investigations of TAM.