Henry de Lacy, Earl of Lincoln (1272–1311), as locum
\textit{tenens et capiteus} in the duchy of Aquitaine

by

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This thesis is a detailed reconstruction and analysis of the terms of appointment, functions, events and success of Henry de Lacy, Third Earl of Lincoln, as locum tenens et capitaneus in the duchy of Aquitaine. He acted in these capacities in the years 1295-1298 during the second half of the Gascon war. Although the earl of Lincoln's tenure of office was brief, it was important for the outcome of the Anglo-French struggle for possession of the duchy. Henry de Lacy's great contribution lay in his success in stabilising the military conflict and maintaining ducal resistance to French attempts at a total annexation of Aquitaine. By so doing, he ensured the duchy's continued existence as a Plantagenet fief.

Through examination of contemporary diplomatic and narrative sources, both published and unpublished, I have been able to clarify Henry de Lacy's particular role in events, to identify beyond question the site of the battle of Bellegarde, to examine the battle itself more fully than before, to establish the paucity of Henry de Lacy's troop-resources as capitaneus of the King's men in the duchy, and to confirm in greater detail than hitherto the measure of Gascon loyalty to King Edward I throughout the war. The administrative and military powers of the earl of Lincoln have been analysed in relation to royal authority, and thereby the King's personal continuous involvement in the affairs of his duchy has been established. I have based this work on contemporary evidence, mainly at the Public Record Office, London, and on both English and French chronicles of the period. I have also compiled an appendix on Gascon troop-resources and a Calendar of references to Henry de Lacy found in contemporary records, which can be submitted to the examiners if they wish it.
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<td>'Extraits d'une Chronique Anonyme' in Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France.</td>
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<td>Annales de Dunstaplia</td>
<td>Annales Prioratus de Dunstaplia in Annales Monastici.</td>
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<td>J.Balasque et E.Dulaurens,Les Études historiques sur La Ville de Bayonne,II.</td>
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<td>Introduction of Rôles Gascons,III.</td>
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<td>C.C.R.</td>
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<td>C.Ch.R.</td>
<td>Calendar of Charter Rolls.</td>
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<td>C.Chy.W.</td>
<td>Calendar of Chancery Warrants.</td>
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<td>C.F.R.</td>
<td>Calendar of Fine Rolls.</td>
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<td>Chronica Buriensis</td>
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<td>Chronica Monasterii de Melsa,II.</td>
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<td>Chronicon Brevius</td>
<td>Chronicon Brevius ab incarnatione usque ad annum domini MCCCLXIV</td>
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<td>Chronographia Regum Francorum</td>
<td>Chronographia Regum Francorum,I.</td>
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<td>COMPAIGNÉ</td>
<td>Bertrand Compaigne,Chronique de la Ville de Bayonne.</td>
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<td>COTTON</td>
<td>Bartholomaei de Cotton,Historia Anglicana.</td>
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<td>C.P.</td>
<td>Complete Peerage.</td>
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<td>C.P.R.</td>
<td>Calendar of Patent Rolls.</td>
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<td>CUTTINO</td>
<td>G.P.Cuttino,English Diplomatic Administration 1259-1339.</td>
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<td>D.S.</td>
<td>Summons of the Nobility,ed.Sir W.Dugdale.</td>
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<td>E.H.R.</td>
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<td>Eulogium Historiarum</td>
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<td>Foedera</td>
<td>Foedera, conventiones, litterae by Thomas Rymer.</td>
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<td>GERVAISE</td>
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<td>GUIART</td>
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<td>GUISBOROUGH</td>
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<td>KNIGHTON</td>
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<td>Miss E.C. Lodge, Gascony under English Rule.</td>
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<td>LOT</td>
<td>F. Lot, L'Art Militaire et les Armées au Moyen Age en Europe et dans le Proche Orient.</td>
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<td>LOT &amp; FAWTIER</td>
<td>Histoire des institutions françaises au moyen âge, ed. F. Lot and R. Fawtier.</td>
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<td>LUBIMENKO</td>
<td>I. Lubimenco, Jean de Bretagne, Comte de Richmond.</td>
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<td>MONLEZUN</td>
<td>L'Abbé Monlezun, L'Histoire de la Gascogne depuis les temps les plus reculés jusqu'à nos jours, III.</td>
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<td>J.E. Morris, The Welsh Wars of Edward I.</td>
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<td>F.M. Powicke, <em>The Thirteenth Century</em>.</td>
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<td>Willelmi Rishanger, <em>Chronica et Annales</em>.</td>
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<td>The Gascon Calendar of 1322, ed. G.P. Cuttino.</td>
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<td>Trivet</td>
<td>Nicolai Trivet, <em>Annales</em>.</td>
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(N.B. Unless otherwise indicated, all manuscripts cited are in the Public Record Office, London).
On 3 December 1295, Henry de Lacy, third earl of Lincoln, was made lieutenant of Aquitaine and given command of King Edward's war in the duchy against the French. The appointment was laconically recorded as follows:

'Memorandum quod ista littera et littera proximo sequens mutate per regem, ets quod eandem potestatem quam rex commiserat Edmundo, fratri suo, in ducato Aquitannie, commisit postmodum de verbo ad verbum Henrico de Lacy, comiti Lincolnis; nec erat alius mutatum quam nomen unius pro nomine alterius.

Datum apud Westminster tiercio die Decembris, anno regni regis E. xxiiij (1295)'.

The above memorandum, written in the margin of a letter dated Westminster 20 October 1295 concerning powers in the duchy of Aquitaine granted to Edmund, earl of Lancaster and brother of the King, transferred those powers to Henry de Lacy. This supreme command that he received superseded the existing commands in the duchy accorded to John of Brittany, the King's nephew, who had sailed for Guienne on 9 October the previous year in command of the first expeditionary force, and to Earl Edmund, who was yet to embark.

The royal letter of 20 October in favour of Edmund shows the magnitude of the powers bestowed. They were 'absolute and general' - governmental,

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2. For the text of it v. infra, Cap. V, where it is more fully considered.
administrative, financial and diplomatic — and extended even to counter-
manding or replacing any previous ducal appointment, provision or award.
The letter of appointment and memorandum conferred full military and
civil authority to act in every way and with the same legal validity
as would the King-duke himself: 'omnia alia faciendi, ordinandi,
disponendi et affirmandi que nos ipsi faceremus .... si ibidem adesset
et interesset nostra presentia personalis ...'
A letter to all the inhabitants of Aquitaine, the Agenais and all other
ducal lands in Guienne outlines the same broad and unlimited powers and
requests their acceptance of and obedience to Edmund: 'vos rogamus,
mandantes quatinus predicto fratri nostro .... intendentes sitis, et in
omnibus respondentibus, et sicut etiam nobismet ipsis essetis, si ibidem
adesset vel interesset nostra presentia personalis ...' (Datum ut supra).²

Similarly, the memorandum of 3 December is echoed in a letter of 10
December (responsiones regis facte Anglicis et Vasconibus in Vasconia
commorantibus): 'E mesme le power qu' il avoit de nous en ladite duché
avons doné au counte de Nicole, quant a ore.'³ This particular letter has
a counterpart in another written by the King-duke two days later to
Barram de Sescars, 'gardein de la flote de Baione', declaring 'nous
avons ordene e establi nostre feal e loial Henry de Lacy, conte de
Nicol, nostre lieutenant en la duché ...', and that he was coming with
'graunts gentz a armes de nostre reyume', together with the English navy

1. The term 'King-duke', as applying to Edward, who was both King of
England and Duke of Aquitaine, is used in this thesis to remind the
reader of his vassal status vis-à-vis King Philip IV of France.
under 'admirals' William de Leyburne and John de Butecurt, all to agree, when met, on a common course of action.1

The man granted such wide powers and command of Edward's armies in Guienne during the greatest crisis of the reign was of considerable stature as a senior earl, was extremely wealthy and influential, had a long-standing proximity to king and Crown, and had won the royal confidence by years of devoted and skilful service. By his background, training, experience and association he was an eminently suitable choice for the Gascon command and could not be bettered outside the royal house. Indeed, Henry de Lacy was very much more than a conventional 'king's man'. His own interests, both public and private, were wholly devoted to those of the Crown by 1293, when war with France became a prospect.2 In Guienne he was

1. R.G., 4134.

2. For his military, diplomatic, judicial, comital and public record see


entering a field of responsibility that was familiar, and for which his
excellence in administration well fitted him.1

His experience in the company of the King-duke in France and Guienne in
the years 1286–9, when Edward last visited his duchy, especially prepared
the earl for his task in 1295. On that three-year progress began the
major involvement of his political career: the problem of Guienne. The
English king had arrived in Paris in May 1286 to do homage, in his
capacity as Duke of Aquitaine, to the new king of France, Philip IV, and
to settle outstanding commitments of the treaty of 1279.2 Lacy's
immediate experience of Gascon affairs began with Edward's journey south
in August. In probably the latter half of 1287 the earl sat on the
'Grilly' commission at Oloron and while there, on 22 July 1288, was a
party with the bishop of Bath and Wells, lord John of Chester, Otto de
Granson, John de Grilly and others to a grant of rights of justice to
the town of St-Émilion.3 The royal tour was an extended one. Lacy was in
the duchy with King Edward for three years, gaining knowledge of every
part of Guienne. Most important was his presence when Edward enacted his
great legislation for the duchy, which systematised its administrative

1. See J.F. Baldwin, 'The household administration of Henry Lacy and
Thomas of Lancaster', English Historical Review, XLII (1927).
2. For details see F.M. Powicke, The Thirteenth Century, Oxford, Clarendon
Gascony in these years is evident from extended letters of protect-
ion (C.P.R., 1281–92): 18 & 26 April 1286 (pp. 231, 240); 5 May, 14 June,
10 August & 15 October 1287 (pp. 268, 276, 278); 28 April & 23 October
1288 (pp. 294 & 302).
3. Archives historiques du Département de la Gironde (hereinafter:
Archives hist. Gironde), XXXII, pp. 195–8). According to Trabut-Cussac
the commission was in July (TRABUT-CUSSAC, L'Administration Anglaise
en Gascogne, p. 154); according to Bémont it pronounced on 22 July 1297
(BÉMONT, ixvi); when it began sitting is not clear.
structure. Two great ordinances were produced in April and June 1289 at Condom in the western Agenais for Gascony, Saintonge and the dioceses of Limoges, Perigueux and Cahors; and at Condat for the Agenais. The need for reform had been highlighted by the maladministration of John de Grilly, seneschal of Gascony, whose use of his authority for the benefit of his own domains terminated his career in the 'process' at Oloron.

Perhaps most important of all for a prospective lieutenant of the duchy was a proper understanding of the Gascon mentality and Gascon politics. De Grilly's maladministration and the judgement on him were in typical Gascon tradition. Further, King Edward's ordinances of 1289 were in themselves a culmination of his earlier efforts when, as the Lord Edward, he began the process of transforming local Gascon faction into a stout general devotion to himself. Gradually over the years, Edward managed to bring stability to Gascon politics and consolidate his own personal hold over Gascon loyalties. That final situation was very different from the one which pertained on his first acquaintance with Guienne.

1. Lacy's presence at or participation in these events is clear by his witnessing a covenant at Condom on 10 April between Walter d'Escurton and his wife Juliene on the one hand and John Barton on the other (R.G., 1353); and a royal grant there on 20 April to Roger Bigod, earl of Norfolk and marshal of England (R.G., 1425). Lacy attested another grant on 9 June at Condat, namely, a market and fair to Roger, bishop of Ossory (Ireland), (R.G., 1708). Charles Bémont has fixed Edward's court at Condom from 1 April to 6 May and at Condat from 20 May to 13 June (Introduction of R.G. (hereinafter: BÉMONT), xiv) and F.M. Powicke substantially reproduces these dates (POWICKE, p. 298, n. 2). But J-P. Trabut-Cussac in his L'Administration Anglaise en Gascogne sous Henri III et Édouard Ier de 1252 à 1307, Paris, École des Chartes, 1949 (hereinafter: TRABUT-CUSSAC, L'Administration Anglaise en Gascogne), p. 154 writes 'Tous les itinéraires ... publiés jusqu'ici sont erronés', and 'En conseil se réuni à Condom en mars-avril 1289... This corresponds with Lacy's own movements.

2. He was vicomte de Benaige et de Castillon. See TRABUT-CUSSAC, L' Administration Anglaise en Gascogne, p. 154.
Although Henry III of England had presented Prince Edward with Gascony in 1252, it was not immediately in a fit state for him to receive. In 1253 King Henry had to visit Guienne in person to suppress a revolt that was general, with the exceptions of Bordeaux, Bayonne, Bourg sur Mer and Blaye. The estranged Gaston de Béarn ravaged Dax and adjacent lands; his allies, the vicomtes de Gramont, Soule, Tartas joined with the Navarrese in attacking Labour; bitter conflict raged between Bertrand de Bouville, Bernard de Podensac and Guillaume-Séguin de Rions. Amaubin de Barès and the vicomte de Fronsac fought a pitched battle over Blaye. The towns of La Réole, Bazas and Castillon were similarly plagued with civil war. A Bayonnais faction under Arnaud de Ladils committed 'deeds of violence' at Bazas. The many regions from which the dissidents arose show the ubiquity of disaffection. The military superiority of the King


2. BEMONT, Simon de Montfort, p. 109, Appendice V.

3. The league of 1250-1 included Gaston de Béarn, Amanieu d'Albret, Arnaud de Blanquefort, Bernard de Bouville vicomte de Béasme, Raymond vicomte de Fronsac, Arnaud-Guillaume vicomte de Gramont, Pierre vicomte de Castillon, Élie Rudel eldest brother of the vicomte de Bergerac et Gensac, the vicomtes de Soule, Béarn, Sault-de-Navaillles et Tartas, and notables like Guillaume-Ayquem de Lesparre, Guillaume-Arnaud de Tontoulon and Gaillard del Soler, who headed the exile civic causes of Bordeaux and La Réole. Charges were brought against Simon de Montfort, lieutenant of the duchy 1248-52, by citizens of Bordeaux, Bayonne, Dax, La Réole, Saut, Bazas, Gosse, St-Sever and from the poor men of Marsac. Thus, revolt was general throughout Guienne, from the Bordelais in the north to the Basses-Pyrénées in the south.
and the prestige of his presence in the duchy ended resistance. In November 1253 Gaillard del Soler, head of one of the two major factions in Bordeaux and recently acting in alliance with the leaders of the rebel nobility, made his submission; and on 4/5 August 1254 peace was at last officially proclaimed and the rebels pardoned, first by Prince Edward then by the King. Their possessions and rights were restored to them.

When King Henry left Gascony early in November, however, he bequeathed to the young Edward a still complex and difficult situation. Powicke remarks how the political system of the duchy was federal rather than unitary; how diverse was local custom; how vassals of the King-duke were independent and fiercely jealous of their local rights and privileges; how 'cities and towns managed their own affairs and maintained their own cliques and family vendettas'; how many of the King-duke's subjects claimed to be holders of allods rather than fiefs. Towns and cities held their liberties as of right. Repeated administrative failure, most recently Simon de Montfort's, made the task of government a daunting one.

Before leaving for England the King and the Lord Edward successively took hostages as an assurance of continued Gascon loyalty. When Edward finally departed at the end of October 1255, he had already decided on the methods for making his rule in the troubled duchy a success. For in the course of the ensuing year he received in England oaths of loyalty and of submission from a number of 'hostages' in his entourage. Eminent Gascons such as Rostand del Marquet and Gaillard del Soler of Bordeaux, del Soler's associate Bertrand de Ladils of Bazas and his brother Arnaud, Doat de Pins of La Réole and Pierre Viger of Sauve-Majeure, did homage to their new lord and undertook to remain wholly loyal, to give counsel and to denounce his enemies. This binding to his person of some of his leading vassals marked the start of Prince Edward's policy of
building a personal party of his own in his lordship; a royal party set above local rival factions, and with a view to implementing his own policy at Bordeaux and elsewhere, rather than his father's policy of reconciliation between parties or the earlier plan of lieutenants such as de Montfort to ally with one faction against another. Thus, antagonistic lords or towns like La Réole, the last rebel centre to capitulate, were to be transformed into protagonists.

To control Guienne meant first controlling Bordeaux, the seat of its administration. Here faction was most bitter, the respective parties of Guillaume-Raymond Colom and Rostein del Soler being at daggers drawn. From 1254 Edward undercut faction by attaching men to himself. Since, despite his enfeoffment with Gascony, the King's authority still prevailed there, to pursue such a private policy contrary to his father's project of reconciling warring groups was a delicate undertaking. Not surprisingly, a personal 'treaty' between Prince Edward and Gaillard del Soler in England on 9 September 1256 was contracted in secret. That its guarantor was Amanieu d'Albret further indicates the Prince's success in attracting the leading nobility of his lordship to him in personal allegiance from the outset. By the terms of the agreement, del Soler undertook to win for Edward the control of the mayoralty of Bordeaux – a preliminary to Prince Edward acquiring personal control of Gascon administration in Bordeaux and thereafter throughout the duchy as a whole. Further, del Soler bound himself on no account to make peace with

1. "Edward, so long as his father lived, never bore the title of duke of Aquitaine .... His father had granted Gascony and Ireland to him as a source of maintenance (ad se sustentandum), not as independent fiefs, and though he apprenticed his son as an administrator in Gascony, he retained his authority. Only during the last five or six years of Henry's reign did Edward exercise full responsibility in the duchy and its neighbourhood." (POWICKE, p.274). See also TRABUT-GUSSAC, L'Administration Anglaise en Gascogne, p.153.
political rivals without the Prince's sanction, nor to contract his
children in any marriage which might prove prejudicial to Edward's
interests. Such an undertaking was in direct contravention of the King's
settlement of 1254, by which Henry had tacitly confirmed the independence
of the municipal institutions of Bordeaux and had recommended peace and
inter-marriage between the rival Colom and del Soler families.
The reverberations in Bordeaux in reaction to this intended secret
'treaty' reached the King in the shape of a rumour that he was trying
to violate the liberties of the city. In June 1257 he solemnly confirmed
the statutes of Bordeaux, affirming that he had never had the slightest
intention of interfering with them as he had been accused. In December
of the same year, at the request of the ever restive officers and
community of Bordeaux, he granted in advance to the Colom and del Soler
his full permission to conclude any marriages between them. The King
must have been aware of his son's contrary activities, for on 7 April
1258 Prince Edward, by command of his father, was made in his turn to
confirm the municipal rights of Bordeaux.
Edward, however, persisted in his secret personal policy. On 19 November
1259, at a time when Henry III was away in France, del Soler renewed in
England his undertakings of 1256 to the Prince, promising on no account
to make peace with the Colom. It was a significant promise, for it was
made only one week before del Soler was due to answer in person before
Henry III for recent misbehaviour, which had led to his imprisonment by
the pro-Colom mayor of Bordeaux - his misdemeanours had included
boasting locally of his secret 'treaty' with the Lord Edward and the
prospective authority over Bordeaux that it implied. In the event, del
Soler was finally absolved from the charges brought against him by
reason of the absence of Colom, who for the fourth time had defaulted to
appear as arranged to testify. It gave Prince Edward the lever which he
needed to prise open the exclusiveness of the Bordeaux administration.
At his instigation, the King was obliged to institute proceedings against
Colom for infringement of the terms of the royal arbitration of 1254 by the imprisonment of del Soler. Guillaume-Raymond Colom was duly condemned at Bordeaux and leading Colomists dispossessed and imprisoned. The impediment to Edward's jurisdictional aims in the city had been removed.

On 22 October 1261 Edward and his counsellors promulgated new statutes for the commune, by which the mayoralty no longer belonged as of right to the Bordelais but to the Lord Edward, who acquired the entire power of naming mayors and made the municipality subject henceforth to the supervision of one of his clerks. Edward then proceeded to appoint as mayor 'un inconnu', Guitard de Laporte. Thus, instead of involving himself in local faction, the Prince had circumvented and excluded party-politics and introduced his own jurisdiction.

His success in establishing his lordly authority over the administrative seat of Aquitaine served notice that in future there would be no independent jurisdictions in Bordeaux or elsewhere. Rather, the coming years were to see a steady and deliberate extension of Edward's control over the duchy and its affairs. It would be done by binding the subject in loyalty to his lord rather than by involving the lord in the local ambitions and rivalries of the subject. The course of events at Bordeaux was the model for developments in other towns and cities, the prelude to ducal control of Gascon municipalities. 1

Since before the lieutenancy of de Montfort, Gascon towns had been distraught with faction, the countryside torn by feudal war. Similar

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1. 'Bayonne, Dax, Saint-Émilion, Libourne, toutes les villes avec lesquelles le pouvoir anglais aura des difficultés se verront appliquer le même procédé: suppression temporaire de la municipalité élu, nomination du maire par le roi ou son représentant et surveillance étroite' (Trabut-Cussac, Revue hist. Bordeaux (1952), 199.
party divisions to those in Bordeaux rent Dax, La Réole, Bazas; but it was in contrast to Bordeaux, where 'the Coloms and Delsolers... were opposed as clans or families, not a popular to an aristocratic party, nor as pro-English to anti-English'. 

De Montfort had seen fit to exile from La Réole a certain Jean Gast, a leading citizen, together with members of other bourgeois families. At Bazas the earl had sided with Guillaume-Arnaud de Ladils and his civic party against that of Bertrand and Arnaud de Ladils. At Bayonne, a growing pro-English mercantile and democratic party was challenging a more independent aristocratic and elitist one. The latter was trying to maintain municipal office as the preserve of a few privileged families. In Béarn and Labour, the nobility were torn between loyalty to the king of England and the king of Navarre. Such local party faction, as at Bordeaux, indulged itself to the full in the civil war of de Montfort's lieutenancy.

The Lord Edward's success in gradually gaining control over the administrations of Gascon municipalities was a milestone along the road by which ducal authority was effectively introduced into central and local affairs; by which ducal government was at last stabilised during Edward's reign as King-duke; and by which the power of the King-duke in Guienne was indisputably established. It began a new phase in Anglo-Gascon relations by which the men of Aquitaine looked increasingly to their lord in England in jurisdictional and juridical matters and for his judgements. This new identity of outlook between the King-duke and his Gascon subjects bore fruit also in closer military and commercial ties, which gave added strength to the Anglo-Gascon partnership in the test of war against the King of France.

1. POWICKE, King Henry III, p. 213.
The events of the years 1286–9 in the duchy to which Henry de Lacy was a party, were then, a systematic continuation of the policies inaugurated and pursued by King Edward in the years of his own introduction into Gascon politics. Edward's building of loyalty had progressed steadily as the years passed. For example, in the long-lasting altercation of 1273–8 between the King- duke and his most recalcitrant of vassals, Gaston de Béarn, Edward changed his vassal's enmity into adhesion by a mixture of diplomacy, firmness or even severity, and eventually by magnanimity. A more general exercise in fostering Gascon loyalty was the Inquest of 1273–4, a Domesday-style investigation, which not only acquainted the new King- duke in detail with the extent of his rights and jurisdictions, but also served to make his subjects aware of where their obligations lay and bind them closer to him in their feudal relationship.¹

For his part, Edward was devoted to Guienne; the land held a special place in his affections. On his return from crusade in 1273, he delayed his English home-coming and coronation to stop off and attend to the affairs of his duchy; 'he acted, as he explained in his letters to his council in England, in the firm belief that his first duty was to Gascony.'²


² POWICKE, p. 280.
At Edward's side and in almost continual attendance on him for three whole years, Henry de Lacy must have acquired an intimate understanding of the King-duke's thinking and feelings towards his Gascon fief and of the special place that it held in his affections. He witnessed, too, the early harvest of the King-duke's consistent policy of fostering Gascon loyalty, when in 1288 no less than thirty-six Gascon lords, 'principaux seigneurs de la suite du roi d'Angleterre' served as hostages for him to the king of Aragon to obtain the release of Prince Charles of Salerno, his brother-in-law. The imposing list included Gaston de Béarn, Etienne brother of the viscomte d'Orthe, Raymon-Robert viscount de Tartas, Amanieu VII d'Albret, Fortaner lord de Lescun, Guillaume-Seguin lord de Rions, Gaston viscount de Pezen-Saguet, Arnaud de Marmande and Arnaud de Gavaston. The late harvest of Edward's Gascon policy was to be reaped in the war of 1294-8, as seen in the intense Gascon loyalty of that period. The earl's education in Gascon matters had been a comprehensive one; he must have gained considerable insights into both the intricacies of internal Gascon politics and the broader aspects of

1. OGILVY, III, p. 100; Monlezun, Histoire de la Gascogne, t. III, p. 42. - Rymer, t. I, part iii, p. 29 et 30. Powicke refers to Lacy as being a hostage (POWICKE, p. 283), but his name is not in Poedere (pp. 694-7).

2. Lacy acquired administrative experience not merely by attendance on the King. In addition to his membership of the Grilly commission, he participated in the practicalities of ducal government as is seen in LETTRES, I, p. 369, where is entered a petition of Bernard de Ravignan, seigneur de Buzet, which refers to an 'ordonnance que fust faite ... entre le conte de Nicole (Lincoln) et monsieur Othes de Granson et lui, sealé de lor trois seals, et dont li avant dits conte et sir Othes lui promistrent faire avoir la lettre le roi.'
international relations. He must also have established an invaluable rapport with the many influential members of the nobility of Guienne. All were to stand him in good stead when, only seven years later, he was called upon to shoulder the onerous responsibilities of administering, sustaining and defending Gascony in the struggle for dominion over it between the kings of France and England. Highly pertinent in this was Lacy's familiarity with the background to current Anglo-French relations over the duchy.

It was no coincidence that Henry de Lacy's name was still associated, albeit tenuously, with Gascon matters after his return to England in 1289. Thus, he is found witnessing the royal grant of a Gascon fee on 16 May 1290 to Guillaume de Monte Revellis and heirs. A month later, on 16 June, he was appointed to a commission to hear complaint of various men of Scotland against John le Mazun of Gascony for monies due to them, and to view the inquisition taken by sheriffs of Northumberland, Norfolk and Suffolk and the coroners of Cumberland, York and Lincoln concerning goods of theirs seized at the suit of the said John. It was also no coincidence, but almost to be expected, when Lacy was chosen as emissary to France in 1293 in an attempt to halt a slide into war over Guienne. His selection is intelligible by virtue of his knowledge of the Anglo-French-Gascon situation, his affinity to the English royal family, and his already wide experience as a negotiator.

1. Presumably with Edward, i.e. 12 August.
2. R.G., 1785.
and diplomat for the Crown. He had acted in such a capacity in the affairs of Wales, Scotland, Brabant, Germany, France, Spain and, most important of all, Guienne. His most valuable diplomatic experience to fit him for the mission of 1293 was obviously that of the years 1286–9; in particular the three months of diplomatic exchange at Paris in May to July 1286.

The cause of the embassy to Paris in 1293 was self-evident: a rapidly worsening situation in the internecine rivalry on the high seas between the maritime subjects of the English and French kings. Initially and fundamentally the conflict was Gascon, but spread in concentric circles from Bayonne, now a traditional centre of maritime dispute. Privateering was international, but, significantly, there were few actions at sea in which the Bayonnais were not involved. The spark which made a spluttering piracy flame into a full-scale naval war was a port brawl in 1292, described by most chronicles as between English and French or Norman sailors.¹ Nicholas Trivet² gives it a Gascon flavour: 'Post Pascha ....

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¹. e.g. William Rishanger, Chronica et Annales, ed. H.T. Riley, Rolls Series, 1865 (hereinafter: RISHANGER), p. 130. The Rishanger compilation is of unknown authorship for the years 1272–1306 and its account of events follows the Opus Chronicorum, in Johannis de Trokelowe et Henrici de Blaneford, Chronica et Annales, ed. H.T. Riley, Rolls Series, 1866 (hereinafter: Opus Chronicorum) and Nicholas Trivet (great sections are verbatim with his Annales.

². Nicholai Triveti, Annales, ed. T. Hog, English Historical Society, 1845 (hereinafter: TRIVET), p. 323. Trivet’s Annales were apparently original and the author was familiar with the English royal household and court. He lived c. 1258–c. 1328, studied English, French and Norman chronicles, sought reliable witnesses, is accurate in extractions from other authors and official documents, wrote in the thick of events, and is ‘judicious’ (Hog). He seems to have been plagiarized for this period verbatim and at length by the later chronicler Thomas Walsingham, perhaps following RISHANGER. See Historia Anglicana Thomasæ Walsingham, ed. H.T. Riley, Rolls Series, 1863 and Ypodigma Neustriæ a Thoma Walsingham, ed. H.T. Riley, Rolls Series, 1876.
in statione navium, quae solet esse apud Sanctum Matthaem in Britannia, suborta est inter nautas Baionenses et Normannos discordia, coeperuntque se terra marique mutuo impugnare: roboratisque partibus crevit sedition, dum Baionensisibus adhaerent Anglici; Normannis vero nautae ceteri, qui erant de ditione regis Francorum.1 Trivet's account is supported by the Dunstable annals, which identify the slain man as 'a noble of Bayonne'. Additional disputes in the months that followed exemplified a steady acceleration to open war. The situation was so serious that on 4 May 1293 Philip IV issued a proclamation against 'foreign' injury of merchants of France in regard to either their goods or persons. Significantly, it was published at Bordeaux and Bayonne.2 The French action was reinforced by Count Guy of Flanders, who was simultaneously impelled to write to King Edward over 'discordia' between his men of Flanders and the men of Bayonne and England.3

It was against such a background of buccaneering, and with Bayonne as the eye of a whirlpool which was sucking the various combatants into war,4


2. BEMONT, cxxvii: Arch. nat. J. 631. No. 8, and Flores Historiarum, ed. H. R. Luard, 3 vols., Rolls Series, 1890, III (hereinafter Flores Historiarum), Appx. I, p. 268. In this period the Flores Historiarum is the work of a succession of authors and is not always very reliable.

3. Foedera, p. 788 (6 May 1293): 'timendum est ne quasi universalis status negotiationum turbetur, nisi celeri remedio occurratur.'

4. Nangis commented 'Rex Angliae Edwardus ... per homines suos de Baionia in Gasconia et quamplures alias regni sui, sumptis sibi navibus et armis in magna multitudine, fecit gentes et subditos regis Franciae de Normannia et locis aliis per mare et terram nequiter invadere...' (Chronique de Guillaume de Nangis, ed. H. Géraud, Paris, 1843 (hereinafter NANGIS), p. 280).
that the diplomatic mission of May 1293 was launched. Commerce as a whole was endangered. It was no wonder that English merchants petitioned their King: 'Mercatores Anglici, variis in mari lacesiti periculis super mercium suarum amissione regi Angliae conqueruntur; qui comitem Lincolniae Henricum de Lacy ad regem Franciae transmisit, suppliciter petens, ut de assensu ipsius per reges et eorum concilia, contra hujusmodi maritima dispendia provideretur cum celeritate de re medico competenti.'¹ Both England and France needed to be recalled from the brink of the Bayonnaise vortex. In the event, Lacy's mission was to be sucked into it.

On 10 May 1293 the earls of Lancaster and Lincoln had letters of credence to Philip IV to treat touching 'the discord between the seafaring men of Normandy and England', and to make a truce between the disputants until 15 August so that peace be re-established.² Edmund of Lancaster had already received letters of protection and attorney on 8 May.³ The Gascon Calendar of 1322 has an entry referring to a 'responsio regis Franciae facta regi Anglie super nunciatione facta domino regi Francie per dominum Edmundum, fratrem regis, et comitem Lincolnie de transgressionibus factis in mari.'⁴ Both the letters of credence and powers to Edmund and Lacy to conclude a truce were 'vacated because surrendered in Chancery', however, and the replies to the earls are undated later copies.⁵ It may be that two separate embassies undertaken by Edmund and Lacy are retrospectively recorded here as one. For, Trivet and Rishanger clearly assert that Lacy was sent to negotiate, but make no

¹. TRIVET, p.325/RISHANGER, p.136.
². C.P.R., 1292-1301, p.15.
³. Ibid., pp.14, 16.
⁵. Ibid.
mention of Edmund; and they mention his, but not Edmund's presence at the French court later in May. The 'vacation in chancery' may have been due to inappropriate terminology or unsuitability if the departure of the embassy was delayed; but no alternative credentials are, unfortunately, on record and there seems to have been no special reason for any such delay. It is possible that Edmund could not, after all, undertake the mission and that Lacy continued alone. A change of plan could well have involved the reservation of Edmund for a future diplomatic effort, as indeed he made later in the year.

Lacy's embassy is also corroborated by Patent roll entries; and the joint attendance of the two earls at the French court could have been at a later date. Miss Salt refers to an undated report from Edmund while

1. Cuttino (following 'Hemingburgh') incorrectly states that Trivet mentions only Lancaster; but this refers to an embassy subsequent to Philip IV's demands after the battle off Cap St. Matthieu.

2. Examples periodically occur in the Patent rolls of 'vacation' because of change of personnel or plan, e.g. an entry under 29 June 1290 refers to the appointment of a commission to treat with the Guardians of Scotland; the letters of appointment being vacated because surrendered by the bishop of Durham. Again, there was a change of plan under 10 January 1303 when plenipotentiaries to France, Amadeus of Savoy, Lacy, Otto de Granson and others, had their schedule entirely altered (C.P.R., 1301-7, pp. 105-6).

3. An entry under 4 May 1293 Westminster (C.P.R., 1292-1301, p. 11) records the presentation of Llewelin, son of Bleiniu Vaghan, to the church of Nanclyn in Rewynnok, by letters of the earl of Lincoln rather than at the usual 'instance of' or 'by information of'. In contrast, see (a) the presentation on 14 November 1293 Westminster of John de Barchem to the church of Newchurch in the diocese of Canterbury 'on information of the earl' (C.P.R., 1292-1301, p. 41); and (b) an appointment to custody 4 March 1309 'on the information' of Lacy - he was present (C.P.R., 1307-13, p. 103).
at the French court, in which he mentions an interview with the Queen of France on 11 July and a council proposed for the octave of Michaelmas (October 6) to discuss maritime disputes.\textsuperscript{1} Letters of protection and attorney for him for one year, dated 24 and 26 July, would support the prospect of that council.\textsuperscript{2} Yet their issue would have been unnecessary after similar letters of 8 May for one year which had not been vacated, if Edmund had gone to France as originally intended.

Moreover, Edmund was in London in June. On the 21st he received a licence to crenellate his house of Savoy 'in parochia S. Clementis Danorum';\textsuperscript{3} and on the 28th he and his wife, Blanche of Navarre, founded the abbey of Nuns Minoresses in London.\textsuperscript{4} A few days earlier, on 18 June, he had licence at Westminster to alienate in mortmain land in St. Botolph's without Aldgate to the said nuns, whom Blanche was bringing to England.\textsuperscript{5} Finally, if Lacy was already en route for Paris on 4 May,\textsuperscript{6} Edmund was not with him, for he gave an undertaking dated 6 May to merchants of the Society of Pulci and Rembertini of Florence in respect of £10,000.\textsuperscript{7}

\textsuperscript{1} M.C. Salt, 'List of English embassies to France, 1272-1307', \textit{E.H.R.}, XLIV (1929); C47 29/3/2.
\textsuperscript{2} C.P.R., 1292—1301, pp. 27, 33.
\textsuperscript{3} Ibid., p. 30; \textit{Foedera}, p. 789.
\textsuperscript{5} C.P.R., 1292—1301, p. 24; \textit{Foedera}, p. 789.
\textsuperscript{6} See f. 24, n. 3. The enrolment date of credences and powers were not necessarily, of course, the date of issue.
\textsuperscript{7} C.P.R., 1292—1301, p. 12; \textit{Foedera}, p. 788. Nevertheless, although Edmund was not with Lacy in May, his presence in France by late June is clear: at Nogent-le-Rotrou on 24 June (SCI 30/39); and at St-Marcel on 12 July (C47 Dipl. Doc. 29/3/11) as noted by P. Chaplais, 'Le duché-pairie de Guyenne: l'hommage et les services féodaux de 1259 à 1303', \textit{Annales du Midi}, LXIX (1957), 26, n. 100.
It seems that Henry de Lacy either led the mission to Paris or at least went on ahead; Edmund may have joined him there later in June or July as an extension of Lacy's embassy; or perhaps Lacy led an advanced party which was set to do the diplomatic groundwork. The earl of Lincoln was back in England on 9 November, but there is no record of his earlier return. He may well have remained in France on Edmund's later arrival. Whether the two earls initially crossed the Channel together or not, there is no doubt that Lacy himself was in Paris in May 1293, as the chronicles attest: 'Interim vero, dum comes (Lincoln) responsum expectat, classis ducentarium navium Normannicarum et amplius, quae coadunata ut hostes vituosius invaderet, et invadentes fortius propulsaret, in Vasconiam profecta fuerat, quicquid de parte adversa obvium habuit praedae ac morti facile destinando, dum onusta vino reverteretur gloriarunda, quasi sibi soli maris cessisset libertas, sexaginta navibus Anglicanis capitur, et in Angliam adducitur, feria sexta ante vigiliam Pentecostes; submersis aut caesis hominibus omnibus, qui erant in navibus, solis illis exceptis, qui in scaphis vix sibi salutis fuerant fugiendo.'

This was the sea battle of Cap St-Mathieu, the flashpoint for open war.

Accounts of the scale of the battle are probably exaggerated, but it was a sufficiently severe defeat for French pride to move Philip IV to re-assert definitively his impugned sovereignty. The earl of Lincoln at

1. C.P.R., 1292-1301, p. 42: John Broyl of Turberville received custody of the bailiwick of the forestership of the cantred of Meryoneth on Lacy's information.

2. TRIVET, p. 325/RISHANGER, p. 137. NANGIS, p. 280: 'innumerum ex ipsis' credeliter occidendo, capiendo et detinendo, ac quamplures naves ipsorum frangendo, et aerum superstites cum bonis et mercibus in Angliam transvehendo.'

3. St.Mahé, Brittany. It would explain the vacation of Edmund's powers and credentials, in favour of strengthened diplomatic authorisation.
Paris could hardly have been more embarrassed diplomatically. There is no valid reason why he should not have been successful in his mediation of Anglo-French maritime differences, but for the battle of St-Matthieu on 15 May. It presumably robbed him of success; for a French court which was normally responsive to such overtures was antagonised and outraged by an action in open defiance of King Philip's mandate of only eleven days previously, which had been specifically directed against just such violence, and had been publicly proclaimed in Bordeaux, Bayonne and 'aliiis multis locis'.

In fact, Lacy may already have been successful in reaching some truce or agreement, only to see the fruits of his labours ruined when the news of Cap St-Matthieu broke. For a mandate of 22 May from Edward I to the men of the commonalty of the whole fleet of England and Bayonne ordered them 'to observe the RECENT PEACE with the King of France and as God has given them victory over the malice of their enemies, to abstain from hurting the Normans or others in the dominion of France.'

Since the negotiations and treaties of Amiens and Paris in 1279 and 1286 were hardly compacts of peace, but settlements of outstanding differences from the treaty of Paris of 1259; and since references in this reign to that treaty of 1259 were usually in such terms as 'the peace concluded between our fathers' or, as in the homage of Edward as Duke of Aquitaine to Philip IV in 1286, 'the form of peace made between our ancestors'; and since there had been no 'recent peace with the King of France'; it follows that Henry de Lacy must have concluded some form or draft of peace with the French court. If so, the cream of English diplomatic success, which has gone unrecorded by history but which Henry de Lacy had achieved at Paris, had been curdled by English naval success at Cap St-Matthieu; a reconciliation of Anglo-French differences and Franco-Bayonnais differences had foundered with the Norman fleet.

1. Which his credentials presumably empowered him to make, as those of 10 May had done.
2. C.P.R., 1292-1301, p. 16.
3. POWICKE, p. 291.
King Philip demanded speedy restitution.¹ Trivet writes: 'Ordinatigitur sunt ambassatores, qui ex parte regis Francorum a rege Angliae pectorent, ut absque mora navescum mercibus per homines suos raptas, et in regno suo receptas, restitueret ....' The extent to which Anglo-French relations were shaped at this time by Gascon affairs finds emphasis, if any were needed, in the concluding words of Trivet's sentences: 'si vellet sua negotia pro terra Vasconiae in curia Franciae favorabiler expediri.'²

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1. LETTRES, p. 424.
2. TRIVET, p. 325.
After Cap St-Matthieu, the sea-war continued unabated despite King Edward's efforts to restrain his subjects and to negotiate a settlement with France. Fruitless diplomatic exchange also continued. Philip spurned conciliatory approaches and cited Edward to his Paris Parlement at Christmas—an exceptional demand. The dénouement, Edmund's agreement to the temporary surrender of Aquitaine for a token period of forty days, was a diplomatic charade to satisfy French honour. King Edward was to have safe-conduct to Amiens for a royal reconciliation. The French retention of the duchy with the forts and hostages made over as surety; the renewal of the citation; the withholding of the safe-conduct; the denial of stay of sentence; Philip's personal disavowal of the secret compact over the duchy through the French Queens Joanna and Maria, the queen mother; the refusal by Philip's sister Margaret to marry Edward as agreed—the means by which the seisin of the duchy was to be re-granted as a marriage endowment with remainder to Edward; and the rejection of his consequent claim for restitution; all made the French king's duplicity abundantly clear. Edward was condemned by the French court as a contumacious vassal, his duchy declared confiscate, his apprehension ordered as a capital enemy. In the face of such diplomatic and political catastrophe, Edward's sole remaining course was to resort to war. On 24 June 1294 he sent envoys renouncing his homage as Duke of Aquitaine.

The earl of Lincoln was happily not a party to these negotiations; they had been entirely a family matter; and he was not allied by marriage to the House of Plantagenet until October 1294. He had made his diplomatic contribution in 1293 and had then given way to his diplomatic senior, Earl Edmund. Indeed, historians have failed to recognise how entirely personal was the surrender of Guienne, that the negotiations and agreement of 1294 were without the consent or counsel of prelates, earls, barons or

1. 15 May 1294—a year to the day after Cap St-Matthieu.
other magnates of the realm and were strictly a royal exercise. It is evident that there was ministerial apprehension at the King's trusting surrender of his duchy; John Langton, the chancellor, refused to seal the appropriate letter of relinquishment and the Great Seal had to be appropriated by the King, so that his letter could be sealed instead by the treasurer of the wardrobe, Walter Langton. King Philip's duplicity did not invalidate the considerable merits of the French case. It did, however, commit the litigation to the judgement of the sword.

Early in June 1294, Lacy was summoned with his fellow peers to a Great Council to agree action over the French retention of Guienne. On 14 June, writs of military summons went out to the sheriffs for assembling the feudal host at Portsmouth on 1 September. Lacy had respite of all debts of his own, his wife and their ancestors on 12 June and letters of protection on the 26th, both in preparation for going to Guienne; they were followed on 14 August by letters of attorney on his behalf to Thomas Fissheburn and John Hubert. From June 1294 the earl was active in his preparations for the impending campaign for the recovery of Aquitaine. There are numerous examples in the Gascon rolls of men being enlisted by him and also receiving letters of attorney, protection, remittance of debts and quittance of the tenth granted by the laity for the war. Examples also exist of his collecting and conveying provisions to Guienne from his own estates. The earl's loyalty and aid to the Crown


2. COTTON, p. 232 (misdated 1293).

3. C.P., p. 683; C.P.R., 1292-1301, p. 72; R.G., 2594.

4. R.G., 2942 (20 June 1294) mandate of Edward to William de Leyburne to ensure safe conduct for men sent by Lacy to arrange the despatch to Gascony of 'victualia et alia necessaria'; R.G., 2947 (5 July); Edward to his bailiffs not to take purveyance from Lacy's manors etc. in Somerset, Dorset, Wilts and Berks.
is reflected at this time in royal grants to him of fairs, markets and free warren, presumably both in appreciation and anticipation of faithful service.\(^1\)

King Edward was at Portsmouth in person from 24 June to 14 September, avidly supervising the preparations for his Gascon expedition.\(^2\) These were vital and anxious months for the King-duke as regards the precarious situation in the duchy pending the arrival of an English army; and his concern over surviving Gascon loyalties is evident in his letter of early July to his subjects there. He actually apologised for surrendering his duchy to France without consulting them, promised that in future he would not act in matters touching them and the duchy without prior consultation, and exhorted their resistance to French aggression.\(^3\) They were informed of his appointment of John of Brittany and John de St-John as lieutenant and seneschal of Gascony to begin the recovery of the duchy.

Brittany and St-John, with the veteran commander from the Welsh wars Robert Tiptoft, headed the vanguard of the forces assembling at Portsmouth.\(^4\) They waited there for fair winds from Pentecost to nearly 15 August.\(^5\)

1. C.Ch.R., 1257-1300, pp. 435 (9 December 1293) and 436 (6 June 1294).
2. BEMONT, cxxvi; Flores Historiarum, p. 89.
3. R.G., 2934 & Foedera, p. 805 (5 & 1 July); and BEMONT, cxxx: 'Vos rogamus quatinus nos inde habeatis exorsatos....Et Dei adjutorie, amodo taliter nobis cavebimus, quod nichil, contingens vos seu ducatum antediticum, faciemus sine vestris consilio et assensu. Per quod, quam carius possimus, vos rogamus, quatinus... nos juvetis ad dictum ducatum recuperandum et manutenendum....'
4. TRIVET, p. 331/RISHANGER, p. 143.
Walter of Guisborough records that the fleet with the vanguard put to
sea 1 August, but was forced by adverse winds to re-form at Plymouth
after being scattered off Cornwall.1 Perhaps it put into Plymouth by
design to take on extra troops or supplies, or as a better final port
of departure for a shorter crossing to the duchy. It may be noted that
the second force under Edmund and Lacy finally boarded there. The August
sailing of the first expeditionary force, as it turned out to be, is sup-
ported by a royal letter of 4 August to 'justiciariis suis de Banco',
which refers to Lacy as 'cum prisis transfretantibus prefecturus est ad
partes Vasconiae' and thus implies that his expedition was to be the
next to depart. The first must therefore already have gone. Its second
and successful sailing was 9/10 October.2 Meanwhile, on 3 September the
King ordered the Cinque ports to provide ships at Portsmouth for Edmund's
transportation to Guienne on 8 September.3 His imminent departure was
three weeks overdue when about 29 September the Welsh rose in revolt,4
and the earls of Lancaster and Lincoln were diverted from embarkation
to help re-pacify Wales.5

3rd ser., LXXIX (1957) hereinafter GUISBOROUGH, p. 244. The Chronicom
of Henry Knighton for this period follows GUISBOROUGH verbatim, i.e.
Chronicon Henrici Knighton Monachi Leicestrensis, ed. J. R. Lumby, 2 vols.,
Rolls Series, 1889–95, I (hereinafter KNIGHTON). TRIVET, p. 332/RISHANGER,
p. 144; the fleet left c. 29 September, was driven to Dartmouth, and
resumed its voyage 10 October.
2. John of Brittany and John de St–John were in command with William
Latimer, Raoul de Gorges (marshal) and Robert Tiptoft (GUISBOROUGH, p. 244;
3. Foedera, p. 809.
4. GUISBOROUGH, p. 250; Gesta Regum in Gervasii Opera Historica, ed. W.
Stubbs, Rolls Series, 1880, II (hereinafter GERVAISE), p. 310.
5. GUISBOROUGH, p. 251.
Lacy was occupied in Wales until the spring of 1295, was summoned to the 'Model Parliament' on 24 June, attended parliament at Westminster from 1 to 4 August to receive legates from Rome, and seems to have remained in London for the whole month. Further decisions on the Gascon war were apparently taken about this time. Edward's further efforts on behalf of his duchy had necessarily been limited to despatching small reinforcements of foot under John de Butecurte on 4 July and some funds and further small reinforcements in late August, but thereafter the intended full-scale resumption of preparations was apparent. On 10 September Lacy and ten others, eight of them earls, received quittance of the tenth because about to sail for Guienne. He was omitted from the summons to parliament at Westminster for 13 November, as on 3 October


2. Two charters of his were inspected and confirmed by Edward at Westminster on 12 August (C.O.H.R., 1257-1300, p. 460); a pardon was granted there on Lacy's information on the 20th (C.P.R., 1292-1301, p. 141); and on the 26th an exemption at his instance and Edmund's (C.P.R., 1292-1301, p. 144).

3. See the transcript of the letter of the traitor Thomas Turbeville in COTTON, Appx. F, p. 437, where Turbeville, writing about 7 August, states that 'the King is sending into Gascony 20 vessels laden with wheat and oats, and other provisions and a large amount of money; and Sir Edmund the King's brother will go there, and the earl of Lincoln, Sir Hugh le Despenser, the earl of Warwick and many people of note'.


5. P.P.W., I, i, p. 391; similar writs were issued for 68 others going to Guienne with Edmund, Lacy, Richard Fitz-John and others. See also R.G., 3953-61, 4203-17.

6. The summons of 30 September (D.S., p. 10; P.P.W., p. 32). Nor was he summoned for the parliament prorogued to 27 November (D.S., p. 12; P.P.W., I, i, p. 32).
new levies had been ordered to muster at Plymouth on 1 November, the new intended date of embarkation. Commissions of Array for crossbow men and archers in sixteen counties called for a muster at Winchelsey 4/5 November; and orders for a new fleet were issued. A writ of aid authorised John of Maidstone to purvey grain for the expedition and for Walter Beauchamp to purvey corn and prepare ships at Plymouth on All Saints.

Arrangements were now moving quickly again. On 4 October, Lacy had letters of protection at Canterbury; in October, a letter in respect of debts; and on the 13th letters of attorney. Five days later is recorded respite of debts to Edmund 'while on Gascon service' and a grant regarding his debts in the event of his death there. In the latter months of 1295, Lacy was regularly requesting of the chancellor such letters for his followers.

The Welsh and Scottish risings had made Edward's own participation in the Gascon war a present impossibility. This left the duchy in a difficult plight; and Edward's letters of 19 October and 10 December 1295 show that he was under considerable Gascon pressure for military action. In the

2. P.P.W., I, i, p.270; C.P.R., 1292-1301, pp.151, 153.
4. C.P.R., 1292-1301, p.151 (3 October); BÉMONT, cl; E101 5/30.
5. R.G., 3893, 3966, 3996.
first, he praised and encouraged the Gascon lords for their loyalty and steadfastness, telling them of the impending reinforcement under Edmund, and promised not to desert them in their tribulations. The second letter shows that the troops at Blaye were desperate for relief. The appointment of Edmund was an immediate implementation of the King's word, for his commission was granted on 20 October. Draft letters of credit and a draft commission to Edmund, as lieutenant of Aquitaine, underline the anticipation of the long-delayed and awaited undertaking.

The Gascon command was essentially the King-duke's own. Edmund was the automatic choice as deputy in Edward's absence, both by birth and experience in French affairs. Lacy seems to have been an equally automatic second choice. Indeed, from the very outset the two earls were associated in the venture as a partnership. Their past association militarily, diplomatically and personally well fitted them for such a joint command. Their close co-operation in the raising of their force for Guienne is revealed in the grant to them of joint powers to institute general attorneys for the men going with them, and in Lacy's frequent letters to the chancellor requesting quittances, protections, letters of attorney and in respect of debts for members of the expedition, as well as the pardon of prisoners at his instance to serve in Gascony. An example of how they kept each other informed of developments is Lacy's letter of 23 November 1295 to Edmund referring to the illness of John de Cogan, one of Lacy's troop, on the way from Exeter to Plymouth where they were to muster.

On 1 December, Edmund is himself recorded as having fallen sick, with the serious consequent delay of the expedition's departure and the transfer...
of its command to Lacy. When the fleet finally sailed from Plymouth in January 1296, Edmund was again officially in command. The King—duke's letter of 10 December 1295 to English and Gascons in the duchy intimates his brother's impatience to be so; but whether he was properly recovered in health is doubtful. He may well have been a sick man, perhaps more of a figurehead than he wished. Fortunately, the expedition of January 1296 was in every way a joint undertaking from the outset. By Edmund's early death in June, a loss which strongly reinforces doubts as to his supposed earlier recovery, the command was to become quite quickly the earl of Lincoln's, if it were not in reality his already.

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1. R.G., 4132 (10 December 1295); Foedera, p. 833 (1 December).
The second expeditionary force under Edmund and Lacy was the second stage of King Edward's grand strategy for recovering Guienne; an intended three-part invasion, of which the first expeditionary force, headed by John of Brittany and St-John, and the second embarked as planned, if belatedly, and the third was to be led by the King- duke himself. As early as 1 July 1294 Edward had informed his Gascon subjects of this master plan,¹ and in January 1296 he was still adhering to it.

In actual fact, this tripartite campaign was a modification of his original intention of leading a combined onslaught in person, as he informed the Gascons in his letters: 'cum hiis primis venissemus, nisi aliquae rationes subfuisse'. The Great Council which had met with the King early in June 1294 to answer the French challenge over Guienne had underwritten a campaign in the duchy under his personal banner. The writs which summoned the feudal host to Portsmouth for 1 September were for service in Gascony WITH THE KING.² On 18 June, Edward had also requested the prayers of the clergy for himself and his cause as he was going to Gascony.³ Within a month of the June Council, however, the King had been obliged to amend his early plan of personally heading an invasion force for a modified three-stage expedition. Nevertheless, by the revised timetable announced 1 July 1294, the three-part force was being assembled at an urgent pace; and the three sections of the invasion programme were evidently to follow one another in quick succession. After yet a further month, on 17 August, the original embarkation date still

¹. R.G., 2934; Foedera, p.805.
². E.g., R.G., 3416, the writ of 26 June to Geoffrey de Joineville to muster 'cum equis et armis et toto servicio quod nobis debetis, parati trans fretare nobiscum (my italics) in succursum dicte terre' (Vasconie). See the like to 55 others on the same date (R.G., 3417, 3418) and on 29 June to 6 others of Birmingham and Ireland to muster London 1 September (R.G., 3372, 3373).
³. R.G., 3451; Foedera, p.802.
adhered to by the King for his own sailing had to be postponed 'ex certis causis from 1 September to 30 September.¹ This postponement applied, of course, only to the third embarkation under King Edward himself, not to the whole expedition. The first stage had already left by the 17th, and on 3 September Edward was to order the preparation of ships for transporting the second leg of the army on 8 September, as has been noted. Indeed, he intended to see Edmund off in person.² Further, royal letters confirm that the embarkation on 30 September was to be Edward's.³ That he was straining at the leash to be in Guienne with his troops is attested by the Melsa chronicler, who records how he despatched John of Brittany and his fellows 'and strove to follow them himself straight away'.⁴

If the second and third expeditionary forces had departed according to the revised schedule on 8 and 30 September, the tripartite force would have fallen on the French army of occupation in Guienne in the space of a mere nine weeks and the cumulative effect could have been decisive. The consequences of the successive Welsh and Scottish insurrections were, therefore, disastrous from King Edward's point of view. The first force had to be left out on a strategic limb; and by the time that the second arrived, the original advantages and momentum of the whole project had been lost. Well before January 1296 the military situation of the men in

¹ *Foedera*, p.808.
² Ibid., p.809: 'apud Portsmuth ... ubi tunc personaliter esse proponimus.'
³ See R.G., 3682-91, e.g., 3690(to Peter son of James of Birmingham):
   'vobis iterato requirimus et rogamus, in fide et homagio quibus nobis tenemini firmiter injungentes, quod sitis ad nos in propria persona vestra apud Portsmuth ad predictum crastinum sancti Michaelis, cum equis et armis, ita decente prompti et parati ad transfretandum nobiscum (my italics).'
⁴ *Chronica Monasterii de Melsa*, ed. E.A. Bond, 3 vols., Rolls Series, 1867, II (hereinafter *Chronica de Melsa*), p.258.
Gascony was desperate. After a highly successful campaign by the ducal forces in late 1294 and early 1295, the fortunes of war had favoured King Philip's men under the command of his brother Charles of Valois, and the troops of the King-duke were soon in dire straits. 1

The ducal situation is reflected in the chronicles, where there are some recriminations against King Edward himself. The Welsa chronicle reports how the lords of Gascony, awaiting the intervention of King Edward and of the kings of Germany and Aragon, and, in expectation of their help, having been engaged in fighting Charles of Valois from the outset, were carried off to Paris in chains. 2 Langtoft is openly critical. He accuses Edward, Edmund and Lacy of failing in their promise to their colleagues in Guienne to come to their aid, and instead needlessly occupying themselves with a war against the Welsh. Although Langtoft's criticism is unjustified, 3 it indicates the depth of feeling in England over the Gascon war and the extremity in which the first expeditionary force found itself. Quite a number of important knights had been captured by Charles at Rions. Trivet lists five notable English lords, including Raoul de Gorges, marshal of the army, 4 and thirteen other knights and thirty-three squires. Guisborough names twelve 'knights' in all. 5

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2. CHRONICA DE WELS, p. 259.  
3. LANGTOFT, p. 219: 'through his folly and his misbehaviour  
The king has lost his possession  
Of all Aquitaine ...'  
   - a major criticism of Edward's strategy.  
4. TRIVET, p. 336/RISHANGER, p. 149.  
5. Five correspond to those in TRIVET (GUISBOROUGH, pp. 246-7). Included is Thomas de Turbeville who turned traitor and French spy. His change of side must to some extent reflect current military prospects.
King Edward was by no means so unmindful of the situation in Guienne as some chroniclers suggest; but his anticipated personal campaign there had unavoidably been set back by the Welsh rising at the very outset. Even the critical Melas chronicler displays the King-duke's concern at the turn of events in Guienne, recording his preparation to send Edmund and Lacy 'et alios plures de optimis terrae' to relieve the beleaguered ducal forces, 'when he heard of the capture of his magnates and knights in France'.

In late August 1295, as observed, Edward had sent sufficient reinforcements and funds minimally to sustain ducal resistance. About the same time, on 22 August, Edward sent thanks to Henry, regent of Castile, for his great offer of aid by knights of the realms of Castile, and requested that he assist John of Brittany and John de St-John as they should ask.

By October 1295, however, in the knowledge of Franco-Scottish intentions, Edward knew that an unambiguous announcement of a further expedition to Guienne under Edmund and Lacy was imperative. At the same time, the King-duke promised his men in the duchy help from the king of Castile, Ferdinand IV through the medium of his regent, Henry.

Throughout the whole of this difficult period Edward was, as an intermediate policy, striving to prop up his duchy. His correspondence at this time regarding Geoffrey Rudel, lord of Blaye, is an example of his efforts to stiffen and maintain resistance in the north against the enemy; in this case by favours to a loyal and influential local Gascon magnate. On 15 November 1295, Edward wrote to Edmund as his lieutenant of Aquitaine,

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3. The two countries were alloying against England. For details see POWICKE, p. 613.
4. Preparations had been fully underway since early September (supra, ff. 33-4).
5. BALASQUE & DULAFRENS, p. 544.
regarding rents of £55 to be assigned to Rudel as part of an outstanding dower from his parents-in-law, John de Landa and his wife Fina. On 16 November, the Patent rolls record a licence to Rudel to return to Gascony with his household clearly, the presence in Blaye of its lord could be an important strengthening factor in this time of crisis. On the same date, the Gascon rolls record the King's promise to restore to Rudel the castle and town of Blaye and its environs after the war, in accordance with the sealed letters of Edmund lieutenant, John of Brittany as his predecessor, Amanieu lord de Lebret and Hugh de Vere. Finally, on 9 December 1295, Edward wrote to Lacy as his lieutenant to inquire into and report 'with due speed' regarding Rudel's claims concerning supplies of corn, wine, victuals and so forth provided by him for the ducal forces in Blaye.

As already noted, on 19 October, the King-duke wrote to his Gascon nobility exhorting them to continued loyalty and steadfastness, promising not to desert them in their tribulations for commitments in his kingdom, and informing them of the imminent expedition to be led by Edmund in place of himself. As it had been anticipated both in Guienne and in England that Edward would be in his duchy by autumn, encouragement to his subjects there was now even more important than it had been earlier in the year. The ducal cause in Guienne was probably suffering as King Philip's had at the end of 1294 from troop-desertion; the treachery of Turbeville and the similar desertion of another English knight at Rions, Walter Giffard, are examples. It was presumably

1. R.G., 4081; SC1 13/102 dated 16 November 1295. For amended versions to Lacy as lieutenant see R.G., 4222 (7 December 1295) and SC1 13/102 (amended 8 December 1295).
2. C.P.R., 1292-1301, p.156.
3. R.G., 3496. Edmund's name was changed for Lacy's on 6 December on the change of lieutenancy (R.G., 4133).
5. TRIVET, p.336/RISHANGER, p.149.
to offset ducal troop-losses that the King- duke had sent 13,000 foot
to Guienne on 4 July and both funds and reinforcements in late August.¹

Meantime, the command-situation must have seemed confused to Gascon eyes.
A letter from Lacy to Edmund dated 23 November suggests that the earl
of Lancaster was still commander of the forthcoming expedition and
lieutenant of the duchy.² A bond dated 22 November, however, for £20
sterling was issued by John of Brittany, still as lieutenant at Bayonne,
to a certain Stephen deu Brot of that city.³ As Edmund’s appointment as
lieutenant had been announced to the King- duke’s Gascon subjects by a
letter dated 20 October,⁴ either that letter had not reached them, or
John of Brittany was maintaining a de facto authority pro tempore or
his clerks were behindhand in the recording or issue of obligations. The
difficulties and delays of communication and winter conditions in the
Channel make the first possibility the most likely. To complicate
matters at the Gascon end, December witnessed the further postponement
of the departure of the second English expeditionary force because of
the sudden illness of its commander, and the transfer of command to
Henry de Lacy.⁵

Edward’s letter of 10 December notifying Guienne of Lacy’s anticipated
arrival was partly in response to pressure for help,⁶ and at first

¹. Annales de Wigornia, p. 521; and ibid., p. 522; BEMONT, cxlix: ‘200
chevaux tout harnachés et 10,000 fantassins’, and his n. 2.
². i.e., when he reports to Edmund the illness of John de Cogan, a
member of his retinue, travelling from Exeter (SCL 31/102).
³. E101 154/7/31.
⁴. R.G., 3945. BEMONT, lxiv and n. 4: a letter patent (R.G., 3946) of 16
November from Edward refers to Brittany as ‘recent’ lieutenant.
⁵. Foedera, p. 833 (1 December); memo (3 December) attached to R.G., 3944
& 3945; notification to Guienne, R.G., 4132 (10 December) & 4134 (12
December).
⁶. V. supra, ff. 34-5.
sight might seem to have forced Edward's hand; but, as already mentioned, and as the King-duke himself there pointed out, arrangements had been in hand for some months for the early despatch of the expedition. Indeed, he took such an urgent view of the situation in Guienne that he was launching the second offensive late in the year, long past the accepted campaigning season, rather than delay till early spring. When it came to it, the fleet actually put out in mid-winter - an extremely hazardous sailing. It was a dramatic commentary on the seriousness of the plight of the duchy. Either Edward doubted the ability of his troops there to maintain even their reduced hold on Guienne, or he must have feared an early French offensive which would finally ruin ducal prospects irreparably.

In the north, the twin towns of Bourg and Blaye were beleaguered outposts in an otherwise French terrain; in the south of the duchy, the recruitment of troops at Bayonne at the end of the fighting season suggests that the local ducal high-command was deeply concerned with survival. The secret Franco-Scottish alliance of October, of which Edward was well aware, had transformed his summer hopes of peace by diplomacy into autumn certainty of further commitment to war. Whereas in August the King-duke could demand that papal mediators stipulate the French release of hostages and prisoners of war, by November his concern was to rescue the survivors of the first expeditionary force.

This, then, was the historical backcloth against which the earls of Lancaster and Lincoln made their eventual entry on the scene of war, eager for the limelight of the fray.

1. See BEMONT, clviii, where the names of 17 mercenaries appear as hired at Bayonne on 1, 22, 28 September and 3 November, some singly, some with companions. If the numbers raised are small, it was doubtless because the prevailing situation discouraged recruitment to a cause that looked increasingly lost.

When Edmund and Lacy finally sailed for Guienne, all earlier ducal initiatives had been lost. The earls had to begin afresh the reconquest undertaken by the first expeditionary force, with the added disadvantage that any surprise element was now totally lacking and the enemy already conversant with ducal strategy.

The surrender of Guienne on Edmund's orders to the constable of France, Raoul de Nesle, in March 1294 had included the handing-over of the military strongholds Saints, Talmont, Tournon, Puymirol, Penne and Monflanquin in Saintonge and the Agenais, in addition to Bordeaux. Twenty ducal officers were rendered up as hostages. So, the duchy's defensive shield against French aggression was removed, and, at the same time, future ducal ability to resist French expansion was undermined by the arrest of key officers of the ducal administration. The extent of the French occupation can be deduced from the lists of 'dispossessed Gascons', who were later such a costly responsibility of the King-duke. These lists, dating from 1299, register quite closely the territorial apportionment of Guienne in January 1296. They include some 450 to 500 names which are drawn especially from the areas of the Bordelais and Landes. Dispossessed landholders were refugees from throughout Medoc, Buch, Born

1. BEMONT, cxxviii, 'en somme, la Saintonge et l'Agenais'
2. Foedera, p. 795; TRIVET, p. 329/RISHANGER, p. 140: 'De miniistris quoque per regem Angliae in Wasconia positis, aliiis per totam terram .... obsides tradarentur.' The seneschal of Perigord, Lord Elias de Caupenne, was one of them (see BEMONT, clix-clx; E101 152/14).
3. C47 26/6, 26/7 & 35/16 (all unpublished); and R.G., 4528-32, 4984-5, and R.G., Appendix I (Plympton Pleas). In my Appendix I these lists are analysed, and in conjunction with Map I show interlocking areas of French and ducal occupation.
in the west; throughout the Bordelais, the Basadais, Périgord, the Agenais to much of the Landes and Basses-Pyrénées in the south. Dispossession in the Landes as far west as Mimizan, Pôsse and Dax and as far south as Ordos near Peyrehorade and Sorde, and Salies near St-Palais (Béarn), all French show an at least nominal control or influence over most of the duchy. Only the immediate surrounds of Bayonne and St-Sever in the south, and the two citadels of Blaye and Bourg in the north, formed ducal enclaves. These comprised the two ducal command areas and the only remaining ducal strongholds when Edmund and Lacy landed in Guienne. Lacy's first offensive as commander (capitaneus) in the summer of 1296 was to be against Dax, a fortress held by the French only forty kilometers to the north-east of Bayonne.

The strategy adopted by the first English expeditionary force prevailed until well after Lacy's succession as capitaneus of the King-duc's men in the duchy in June 1296. The keynote of it may be described as 'citadel warfare', and it was first applied against the enemy in the north. The aim and need was to re-capture, in turn, each strategically important fortified town, which with others dominated the northern approaches to the duchy. Bemont has indicated some of them when he writes of 'the commanding positions occupied by Castillon, Fronsac, Cubzac, Bourg-sur-Mer, which line the right bank of the Dordogne, or by La Réole, St-Macaire, Gironde on the Garonne.' The Gironde provided a natural waterway into the heart of Guienne via the Dordogne into Périgord, or up the Garonne into the Agenais, Quercy and Basadais. It was therefore the obvious invasion route. But the capture of Bordeaux remained the prime objective as the military and political pivot of the duchy. In addition, of the two river lines, the Garonne took precedence, being the natural northern border of the duchy. The King-duc's dominions to the north of

1. BEMONT, Simon de Montfort, p. 99. Bourg's geographical eminence is evident in its ancient name, Mons Albani (GUISBOROUGH, p. 244).
the Garonne, namely, the Saintonge, the Agenais, Périgord and Quercy had been areas of disputed lordship ever since the treaty of Paris in 1259 and were therefore likely to be less dependable. Bourg and Blaye on the northern littoral of the Gironde were vital bases for the prospective re-capture of these northern provinces, the fortress of Blaye commanding the first crossing up-river on the north bank, the lower reaches being marshland. Naturally, ducal commanders made stringent efforts to regain and retain them. As long as Bordeaux remained in French hands, however, the prospect of such a northern re-conquest remained military theory; for Bourg and Blaye merely served to keep open a northern option and as prerequisite footholds for attempts on Bordeaux. As Bordeaux was the greatest single prize – the metropolis of the duchy, the military key to victory, the political and administrative capital whose possession gave also an overwhelming prestige to its possessor – it was to the capture of Bordeaux that ducal commanders looked.

In keeping with this strategy, the second expeditionary force struck, like its predecessor, in the north. The aim was still to re-establish the northern border, the natural defence-line of the duchy. The immediate task was to recapture forts which had originally been handed over, or had fallen to the enemy. If successful, the plan would impede further attack by the troops of the King of France, or their reinforcement. It would also cut the supply and communication lines of Philip's forces to the south of the river-line. Thus, the occupier would become the besieged – a complete reversal of the situation.

Of the two ducal military command areas, that in the north-west, centred now only on Bourg and Blaye, was a bridgehead for carrying the fight to the enemy; that in the south, centred on Bayonne and St-Sever, was in

1. I am indebted to Professor J. Gardelles, professor of the history of medieval architecture at the University of Bordeaux, for drawing my attention to this strategic fact.
contrast more of a reserve base, essentially defensive, in extremity an H.Q. for ultimate recourse in a military storm. Yet of the two command areas, the Bayonne - St-Sever axis was potentially the more important as long as King Philip's troops held the pivot of the north, Bordeaux. When Edmund and Lacy finally withdrew to Bayonne, it spelt the abandonment of the northern command area. For Edmund and Lacy did not divide their army as Brittany and St-John had done in 1294; they merely left garrisons in the outposts of Bourg and Blaye and staged a general withdrawal to the south. The retreat indicated a change in military outlook. It marked the advent of a new and defensive phase in ducal strategy, symptomatic of failure to achieve primary objectives and of recognition of the inability to do so.

When Edmund and Lacy had begun their thrust in the north, there was a general flocking to the ducal standard.\(^1\) It comprised not only Gascons, but also supplementation by the contingents of Brittany and St-John. A charter granted by Edmund as lieutenant at Langon on 14 April shows that the commanders of the first expeditionary force had joined up with him by that date, their names appearing with Lacy's as witnesses.\(^2\) John of Brittany's name also appears on two other grants at Langon of the same date, again with Lacy's, in testation.\(^3\) The French chronicler Guiart also associates the names of Brittany and St-John with Edmund and Lacy in his version of events.\(^4\) So, as would be expected, the first expeditionary force ceased to exist as a separate entity on the arrival of the second.

As its remnants were absorbed in the new army, there was now only one

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3. Ibid.
military campaign being pressed—in the north.
The campaign began with great zest.\(^1\) Its interest lies chiefly in its strategic resemblance to that of Brittany and St–John. The main body of the second expeditionary force landed at Blaye and its horses were disembarked at Castillon. As it reached Bourg and Blaye at the start of March and remained there almost until Easter,\(^2\) its commanders obviously did so to allow the muster of ducal forces and for recruitment to augment the size of the army for the coming campaign.\(^3\) This proved to be a repetition of the first expedition's exercise, first against Bordeaux, and then up-stream beyond the capital. The optimistic or perhaps symbolic move on the city began with a naval attack on the 24th. As a prelude or pretention to serious assault, the army encamped outside Bordeaux on the 27th,\(^4\) heavily repulsed an enemy sally, and lost five or six men who were captured through impetuously pursuing enemy fugitives inside the city walls. But although a land–sea assault at the end of the month penetrated the outer defences and fired the suburbs, the assailants lacked the siege engines for a proper investment. Their inability to take Bordeaux must have been self–evident to the ducal commanders from the outset, or certainly on the repulse of their amphibious assault. They cannot have had any hopes of military success and were presumably relying on a loyalist rising, which would render up the capital in the fashion of Bourg, Blaye and other northern citadels in 1294. There were some grounds for such hope, as events were to show; but first, abandoning the siege, Edmund and Lacy moved their forces on to Langon, about three leagues beyond Rions, the former surrendering after

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1. For a fuller narrative see BEMONT; and W.E. Rhodes, op. cit.
2. Easter Sunday was 25 March.
3. GUISBOROUGH, p. 261/KNIGHTON, p. 360: 'in brevi creverunt in numerum plusquam duo millia armatorum.'
4. TRIVET, pp. 340–1 / RISHANGER, p. 154; at Bègles, about two miles south.
the French had fled. Rions was, of course, no longer a military asset since Charles of Valois had destroyed its defences. The ducal army finally tried to take St-Macaire, another two miles to the east. After a respite for three days to seek aid from Bordeaux, but in vain, the town surrendered but its French garrison, under a doughty commander Thibaut de Cheppoix, stubbornly and successfully resisted daily assaults for three weeks, until relieved by the approach of a new French army under the comte d'Artois. Cheppoix had significantly demonstrated the sobering limits of ducal siege capabilities.

It was at this juncture in late April, with ducal weaknesses clearly revealed, and as d'Artois approached to the relief of St-Macaire, that there arose the possibility of delayed subversion in Bordeaux. It was an eventuality that posed the chance of an eleventh-hour redemption for the reputation and achievements of the King-duke's army. Five burgesses of Bordeaux came secretly to Edmund offering the city's surrender, and agreeing a plan for effecting it at dawn two days hence. The key which gave control of the north of the duchy was about to be delivered up before the arrival of a new French army. It was this opportunity which apparently caused the ducal forces to return to

1. Guisborough writes that the English stayed at Langon for only three days; but at least Edmund's chancery remained longer. Edmund issued a certificate of service at Langon on 7 April for three soldiers of the first expeditionary force who had been serving in the Blaye garrison (C47 2/13/1 unpublished); and on 12 and 14 April he made four grants as lieutenant at Langon, as has been noted (C47 25/1/18). Guisborough states that the army had reached Langon on 30 March.

2. GUISBOROUGH, p. 261.
Bordeaux on raising the siege of St-Macaire. It must have been the crowning disappointment for Edmund, when his troops began an anticipated unopposed entry into the city, only to find the enemy waiting. The plot had been discovered.

After this latest repulse, the recognition that Bordeaux was impregnable against their resources, and that their situation was desperately vulnerable with d'Artois' arrival, and their own mercenaries deserting apace for the lack of money to pay them, forced upon the ducal commanders in a council of war the bitter necessity of leaving the field to the enemy and retreating to the military fastness of Bayonne. Edmund's limelight had spluttered out after a bare two months' desultory promise.

Once again, the King-duke found himself struggling to prop up his cause in the duchy as a consequence of military incapacity there. In particular, he now concentrated his efforts on the community of Bayonne, which had displayed such exceptional loyalty already - a loyalty which he must do his utmost to confirm; for if Bayonne should go the way of Bordeaux, so would Gascony. Edward was quick to reward loyalty and give recognition where recognition was due. His most striking act, on 14 May 1296, was to

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2. By Guisborough's chronology, about 23/24 April.
declare the community of Bayonne united indissolubly to the English Crown. Equally striking is the fact that he did so at the community's request. There could be no greater testimony to Gascon fidelity and devotion. The Bayonnais request at a time of such extremity must have been heartwarming to Edward; his declaration in response was in itself a repetition in miniature of King Henry III's similar declaration forty years earlier of the inseparability of Aquitaine as a whole from the English Crown. In the current circumstances, Bayonne and Gascony were synonymous. No other allegiance of substance now remained to ducal jurisdiction. The indissoluble and irrevocable unification of Bayonne and the English Crown was more, however, than just a heartening show of Bayonnais loyalty at a moment of disillusion and reversal. It was, from the community's point of view, a calculated quest for a positive insurance against any second cession of the duchy under the pressure of adversity. Against that, the men of Bayonne were giving notice that they would fight to the bitter end. They and the King-duc were thus of one determination. It was an alliance that made Bayonne the one major bastion which King Philip could not recapture and which thus balked his territorial ambitions.

The special relationship which the vicissitudes of war fostered between the King-duc and his sub-capital is graphically illustrated in a ducal grant of privileges on the same date, 14 May, to the mayor and community of

1. R.G., 4186; LETTRES, p.415; BALASQUE & DULAURENS, pp.687-8 (referred to by Bémont, R.G., p.327, n.4). There is also a copy in Gascon in the Inventaire-Sommaire des Archives Communales antérieures à 1790, ed. E. Dulaurens, Ville de Bayonne, t.I, Bayonne, A. Lamaignère, 1894 (hereinafter: DULAURENS), AA.2. (Registre), p.40, entry xviii, which may be consulted in the archival collection of the Bibliothèque municipale, Bayonne.

2. i.e., in his grant of Guienne to Prince Edward in 1254 (see J. le Patourel, 'The Plantagenet dominions', History, L(1965), 301).
Bayonne. The grant, 'as far as was possible and appropriate', met their request for exemption 'imperpetuum' from tolls, customs and maltots (malis tollis) throughout all England and Aquitaine; for the appointment of local men to the command of the castle of Bayonne; and for the freedom of the jurisdiction of the mayor and court of Bayonne from intervention by ducal officers, except for appellate jurisdiction. The exemptions were quite exceptional; the assent to the principle of local military appointees quite remarkable, although not unprecedented; the grant of autonomous jurisdiction utterly contrary to Edward's whole administrative policy for his duchy and his consistent attempt over a period of forty years, steadily to subject it to an increasing measure of ducal authority—a policy which had finally come to fruition only seven years before in the ordinances of Condom and Condat. In pursuance of this revolutionary policy of ingratiating himself with his Gascon subjects, Edward extended his royal amenability to individual nobles, and even to Bayonnais citizens. In the Gascon rolls under 18 May are the names of five Gascon nobles, Arnald—William de Marsan domicellus, Count Arnold—William d'Andoine, Lord Guy d'Andoins, Lord Guy de Castetpugnon and Lord Arnold de Engyne, to whom the King-duke promises prompter payment of debts, gratefully acknowledges his indebtedness for their past loyal service in war, and exhorts its continuance. Four days later, 22 May, Edward in a letter to Edmund concerning the granting of a special licence of conveyance to a certain merchant of Bayonne, John de Vignac, is at pains to ensure that the licence be granted only if the citizens of Bayonne are agreeable, and if it be not prejudicial to either his interests or theirs.

1. R.G., 4247; Foedera, p. 839.
2. e.g., the recent successive ducal appointments of Pascal de Vielle and Garzia Arnaldi as mayor and custodes at Bayonne in March and August 1295 (R.G., 3884 and C.P.R., 1292-1301, p. 142).
5. R.G., 4254.
After the re-occupation of Bayonne at the turn of 1294, the King-duke had rewarded his Bayonnaic subjects for their considerable part in its capture. For example, in a letter of 1 March 1295 to John de St-John as seneschal of Gascony, Edward informed him that he had assigned to the community of Bayonne rents and all other issues and income of the mayoralty accruing to the offices of provost and castellan of the town for a period of five years, excepting those deriving from the salaries appertaining to the mayor and custos of the said town. Also on 1 March 1295, he granted to the smiths of Bayonne protection against the foreign entry of competing iron manufactures not authorised by them for sale or purchase in Bayonne, with the sole exception of suits of armour. On the same date, he informed all his subjects in the duchy, military and civil, of his appointment of Barran de Sescars, miles to supreme naval command at Bayonne as admiral, because of his loyalty and great service.

Edward also, it seems, informed the seamen of Bayonne separately of this appointment of Sescars as admiral and captain of all the shore ships and seamen of Bayonne, after thanking them for their recent services.

In thanking Pascal de Vielle for the part that he had played in the taking of Bayonne, Edward gave visible proof of his appreciation by informing him and the community of Bayonne, in separate letters, of Vielle's appointment as both mayor and custos of the city.

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1. R.G., 3885; the grant is mentioned in BALASQUE & DULAURENS, pp. 535-6; 24 February 1295. The military titles custos and castellan were
2. R.G., 3882; C47 26/1/3; BALASQUE & DULAURENS, pp. 535-6; Bréquigny, COLLECT.
4. 23 February. See BALASQUE & DULAURENS, p. 536; Bréquigny, COLLECT.; LETTRES, p. 410; Bréquigny, t. XVI.
5. 1 March. See R.G., 3884; LETTRES, p. 422; Bréquigny, t. XVI; BALASQUE & DULAURENS, p. 537; Bréquigny, COLLECT.
In comparison with these earlier grants of 1295 to Bayonne and its distinguished sons, however, Edward's grants of May 1296 were more extensive, and his concern, acknowledgements and exhortations betray an attitude which is deferential. For a monarch who was an autocrat it is astonishing. Even more astonishing is the King- duke's letter to Bayonne of 13/14 May in which he declares 'vobis concedimus et restituimus maioriam predictam habendam tenendum et explectandum pacifice et quies...'

To restore to the community of Bayonne its right of mayoralty ran completely counter to Edward's deliberate policy, since his original enfeoffment with the duchy as the Lord Edward in 1254, of diminishing the rights of a community which made for its independence, and extending ducal jurisdiction over local authorities at every opportunity. Nor is there any doubt as to the genuineness of the ducal re-grant of mayoralty. The Bayonne archives contain a document dated 15 March 1298 by which the commune of Bayonne fixed the annual date (the first Sunday in April) for the civic election of its mayor and 100 'peers': 'Item lo dissapte(Saturday) apres le feste de san Gregori en lan de nostre seinhor m.cc.xvij,, en le maiertat dou diit en Pelegrina de Viele, so seit establiment per lo maire e per los cent pars et autreiat per lo conseilh communau a le claustre amassats, que todz temps mes (my italics), sober lo mandement dou maire et doux jurads et doux cent pars, qu es fasse la election dou maire et doux cent pars qui en lan seguent deurant esser e gouernar le bisle per lo maire et per los cent pars e per los autres jurads qui lor an auran complit, et que sien esliits cascun an a todz temps lo primer dissapte dou mes dabriu(month of April) .......

1. R.G., 4187s, 14 May; BALASQUE & DULAURENS, p. 688; Archives de Bayonne, AA. 1, p. 66, 13 May; DULAURENS, AA. 1 (Registre), 1170–1625.

2. V. supra, f. 16 & n.

3. BALASQUE & DULAURENS, p. 689; Archives de Bayonne, AA. 1, p. 112.
This extraordinary re-grant of mayoralty illustrates, more than anything else does, the magnitude of the crisis which the King-duke and his lieutenant faced in Guienne. In a matter of mere weeks, the lieutenant in question was to be Henry de Lacy; and the King-duke's letters to Bayonne underline the sobering fact that the Gascon crisis was one with which Edward still could not personally come to grips; that he still had his hands full with the aftermath of the Scottish war. The ducal cause in Guienne was in dire straits. Nothing less than a crisis situation can serve adequately to explain the very exceptional extremes to which the King-duke went in order to accommodate and confirm Bayonnais loyalty.

In accordance with his military summons of 16 December 1295 for a muster against the Scots, King Edward had invaded Scotland on 28 March.¹ The rapidity with which he re-established his suzerainty in Scotland and then precipitately hastened south, illustrates yet again his impatience to be about the affairs of Guienne and to be at the head of his troops there; who, when he was invading Scotland, were set for a second tilt at Bordeaux and all that that signified. At last, on the conclusion of his Scottish campaign, Edward seemed able, after two frustrating years, to concentrate his full energies once more on his war with France; and, free now from the menace of enemies at his back, Edward set out hot-foot for England on 16 September 1296 with a view to recovering his beloved duchy.

Meantime, in Guienne Edmund had borne himself as a traditional chivalric and valiant knight in his campaign, but his unrealistic openhandedness towards the many mercenaries whom he had recruited 'had exhausted many coffers', and in consequence he had exceeded his military means and could not maintain his army.² His financial distress and self-recrimination

¹ For details of the Scottish campaign see POWICKE, pp. 614-18.
² GUISBOROUGH, p. 262/KNIGHTON, pp. 361-2.
in defeat were both reflected in the will that he made before his death on 5 June: he asked, it is recorded, that his bones remain unburied until his troops were paid. To his friend and military successor, Henry de Lacy, he bequeathed unhappily a bankrupted enterprise.

Edmund's death after only three months in Guienne raises again the question of his health in this crucial period of the war and thus of Lacy's role in his campaign. It is unlikely that a commander who was a fit man would have become so dispirited as to die almost of remorse at his military failure, which is what the chronicles relate, even allowing for his understandable feelings of having lost Edward his duchy in the first place by naivety in negotiation, and in the second place having failed him in the attempt to re-win it. A man in a sound mental and physical condition would not be a prey to delusory self-recrimination. Therefore, although Edmund had been the titular head of the second expeditionary force, his satisfactory recovery from illness at the end of 1295 must be questionable in the light of his subsequent early death.

His indisposition in late 1295 must have been quite serious to warrant his supersession in command and lieutenancy by Henry de Lacy in December. Such a conclusion is reinforced by Edward's statement to his men in Guienne that his brother was impatient to be well again, so as to be with them. His return to duty was probably premature, his recovery incomplete, and it may be surmised that Henry de Lacy, his co-commander, was prominent in the direction of the ducal campaign in the early months of 1296. He was of course with Edmund throughout. He was at Béges on 30 March and at Langon, as observed, in mid-April. Although it may not

1. GUISBOROUGH, p. 262/KNIGHTON, p. 362.
2. Supra, f. 36 and R.G., 4132.
3. SC1 27/63 (unpublished) : a letter dated Béges 30 March 1296 from Lacy to chancellor John Langton on behalf of some seamen, and, as noted on f. 47, 047 25/1/18.
in itself mean much; it worth noting that Lacy's letter from Béglès to chancellor John Langton in England on behalf of two seamen is the type of communication the commanding officer himself would normally pen. This suggests that Edmund may already have fallen sick again, or at least was not enduring very well the rigours of the campaign. Guisborough dates his final illness from about Whitsun,¹ that is, some three weeks after the ducal withdrawal to the south of the duchy; but his earlier indisposition cannot be ruled out. In that case, Lacy was already effective commander of the army. Remorse probably only further undermined an already weakened constitution.

Any assessment of Edmund's command is bound prima facie to be unflattering. He had achieved nothing of importance. The strategic goals he had pursued had all eluded him. The military capabilities of his forces had been exposed as flimsy. He had been unable to take even the citadel of St-Macaire in a three-week siege, after the town itself had gone over to him. Yet the adverse military reflection on ducal efforts at the time must apply to the whole ducal command, not merely to Edmund alone; and it must be remembered that another royal brother, Charles of Valois, had been equally unsuccessful at St-Sever against the ducal garrison of Hugh de Vere the previous year. A successful siege normally required a heavy concentration of fire-power and military resources of disproportionate dimensions, both of which Edmund lacked. The real assessment of Edmund's effectiveness — or was it Lacy's? — must lie in the reaction that it evoked from King Philip. It must have been seen in Paris as a very serious threat to French retention of the duchy; for Philip was impelled to despatch his foremost general, the comte d'Artois, 'with a great French army' to retrieve the situation.

¹. Whit Sunday was 13 May.
². NANGIS, p. 294.
rescue-operation was occasioned by the ducal siege of St-Macaire which, if it fell, would provide Edmund and Lacy with an important central bastion on the Garonne. Much more than a relief-column was being mounted, however, by the French. The army of d'Artois, a bitter enemy of the English, was intended to sweep the second expeditionary force out of Guienne altogether—otherwise, it would not have been so formidable as to compel an immediate ducal withdrawal at its approach. Edmund and Lacy's

1. King Philip 'manda au conte Robert d'Artois .... aler lever le siège de Saint-Macquaire, et pour maintenir la guerre en ces parties: qu'il fît de bon cœur, car mout desirroit à soy vengier sur les Anglois pour aulcuns outrages (presumably a backwash of the current Channel piracy) que les plusiours avoient commis en son pays' (Anciennes Chroniques de Flandre, p. 356). His anglophobia is also recorded over the proceedings at the Parlement de Paris in 1293; after Charles of Valois had made misrepresentations of King Edward, Count Robert is reputed to have brought the case for the Normans, Picards and Flemish—their ships and goods seized by sailors of the Cinque ports, the dead that they had sustained (Chronica de Melsa, pp. 257-8). See a similar reference in Langtoft, p. 200. A family enmity of d'Artois towards Earl Edmund may also be deduced, in that Edmund had taken as his second wife Blanche d'Artois, widow of King Henry III of Navarre and Countess of Champagne. By the marriage Edmund became 'count regent of Champagne and lord ... of the five châtenies which formed her dowry...' (Rhodes, op.cit., 219). Count Robert was the brother of Blanche and, as a first cousin of Philip III of France, may well have seen Edmund's marriage as an unwelcome intrusion into the family and its territorial prospects. He reputedly objected to it at the time on the grounds of the known enmity of the King of England towards the King of France (Powicke, p. 239). Thus, d'Artois' chance to lead a French army against Edmund in Guienne may have represented to him a personal crusade and the opportunity to settle old scores and grievances.
campaign had been an almost exact replica of their predecessors. The difference was that the gains had been less substantial than those of the first expeditionary force, the failures more serious. The second part of Edward's tripartite plan had been implemented, but with no territorial gains to show for it. A considerable second effort, of which so much had been expected, had been to little effect. The French hold on Guienne was as firm as ever, the prospect of ducal recovery as remote. All now depended on the third and final stage of the strategy, the arrival of the King- duke himself at the head of a third expeditionary force; and he was still not in a position to launch it. Until he was, his troops in Guienne must consolidate their bases in the south of the duchy to ensure their survival, and as a prelude to any future attempt on the north when Edward should be able to launch it.

On Edmund's death, Henry de Lacy became capitaneus. The term capitaneus was first associated with the style of lieutenant in the war years, and as military command was normally part of the lieutenant's functions it must be understood as an emergency title, meaning commander-in-chief in time of war. It clearly conferred additional status or fuller emergency powers.

The new capitaneus inherited an enterprise which was in any sense a failure. The nadir of ducal fortunes had been reached. Lacy was capitaneus of an army which was demoralised, disintegrating for lack of pay, and in a precarious position. Its continued existence was threatened by a newly raised French army, before which it had withdrawn ignominiously. Temporary asylum could be found in the south, for d'Artois had to dispose of the remnants of ducal arms in the north before he could commit his troops with impunity to a major campaign elsewhere; but in early June 1296 it must have seemed only a matter of time before the day of reckoning.

After the failure of ducal commanders to re-establish their predominance in the northern theatre of war, after the loss of reputation by John of
Brittany at Podensac and Rions, after the loss of face at Bordeaux and St-Macaire, there began a new operational phase in the ducal struggle for Guienne. The conflict assumed a different character; from the ducal standpoint it became a war of attrition instead of grandiose strategy as hitherto. It was a phase which coincided with the advent of Lacy's command; and if probably the automatic consequence of military necessity, also reflected the outlook of a new leadership - much more realistic than the Quixotic one of Edmund.

The war of attrition had more modest military objectives. Firstly, the ducal objective now became essentially a holding-operation, defensive, established on the reserve operational base and alternative capital, Bayonne. The ducal army had at last a secure command post and was no longer pursuing a fluid campaign in the north against an established enemy. In the south the roles were reversed. It was King Philip's forces which, though militarily stronger, would have to maintain long supply lines to field armies and were faced with demolishing enemy citadels. In future, ducal attacks would be solidly grounded. The second ducal military objective, after holding existing citadels, was to tie down enemy contingents. This Lacy's troops could do from secure forts by raiding, and by attacking weak points of the enemy. The only prerequisite for both objectives was the maintenance of ducal bastions in men, armaments and supplies. This was in itself, however, a demanding undertaking; but, if achieved, it would ensure success for the less ambitious military aims of the new capitaneus.

The plain fact was that his army needed re-constituting before any significant forward thrust was again possible; and this possibility was at present remote pending the arrival of the King- duke himself with a larger force to offset the French military superiority. Meanwhile, Lacy began to concentrate on the routine but essential work of reorganisation in readiness for a limited offensive.
Like the first expeditionary force a year before, his army was out on a military limb. The remoteness of the Gascon command from the King-duce in Scotland or England must be considered if the degree of that isolation is to be appreciated. Miss Lodge has estimated that the voyage from Bordeaux to London took ten days. Trabut-Cussac, however, estimates that the sea-journey from Plymouth to Bordeaux took 'about two weeks, providing the winds were favourable and the sea quite calm', but 'in fact this journey was full of delays'. It would therefore be reasonable to expect the crossing to take nearer three weeks from or to Bayonne, especially having regard to the conditions of wind and wave in the Channel and Bay of Biscay. As already observed, the men of Gascony had not apparently received by 22 November 1295 a letter of the King-duke dated 20 October, in which he announced the appointment of Edmund as lieutenant. Similarly, Edward later wrote on 17 February 1297 from St. Albans to Lacy, as lieutenant, and St.-John, as seneschal of Gascony, regarding a safe-conduct for merchants of Spain and Portugal — a letter which shows that the King-duke was as yet unaware of St.-John's capture at Bellegarde about 2 February. If Edward were in

Scotland or the north of England communication would take much longer. The eventual Anglo-French truce of 9 October 1297 was not proclaimed in London until 20 October; if Lacy was notified of it from Westminster rather than from Guent, the duchy may still have been actively warring until mid-or late-November. So, the factor of distance was a handicap and could even be dangerous.

The tenuous nature of sea-communications with England must also be noted. Both sides were quick to appreciate the role of sea-power as a military factor. The Anglo-Gascon victory at St-Matthieu in May 1293 and a further English naval victory over the French on 19 July the following year had early secured ducal sea-lanes and command of the Channel. Apart from the ability it gave to troopships and transports to come and go in safety, it had enabled the first expeditionary force to penetrate into the heart of the duchy via its waterways; and it had enabled St-John to employ naval resources decisively in the siege and capture of Bayonne. Thereupon, the King-duke was able to create a specifically Gascon command over local waters; this naval supervision falling, as noted, to Barran de Sescars. It also relieved the existing admiral of the English fleets, William de Leyburne, of an onerous responsibility. The demands of war in ducal waters could be more practically and quickly met from Bayonne than Portsmouth. That Sescar's authority extended to Gascon, not merely Bayonnais waters, is clear from his later claim for backpay as admiral of the Bayonne fleet serving also Bourg and Blaye. The Gascon range of Sescar's command is corroborated by the change of custos at Bayonne in August 1295; for the new garrison commander or castellan, Garzia-Arnaldi, was better fitted as 'vicecomes maritime' than mayor Pascal de Vielle to oversee coastal

1. BEMONT, cxlvi; Annales de Wigornia, p. 517.
2. See BEMONT, cxlviii; RANSAY, p. 415.
defence at Bayonne. The latter was of great importance. The fall of Bayonne to St-John had been due to a naval initiative, and the risk of an enemy naval force emulating his achievement while Sescars and the Bayonne fleet were absent could not be overlooked. By August 1295 the military situation in the north had considerably worsened through Charles of Valois' campaign and Sescar's support of Bourg and Blaye, and thus his absence from Bayonnais waters was essential. Even with naval support, the town of Bourg was to be subjected by d'Artois in 1296 to a siege and naval blockade which came near to achieving its surrender, as will be seen.

The French naval blockade of Bourg is explainable by the renaissance of naval power and activity during the previous year. About 1 August 1295 a French fleet sacked Dover, despoiling its priory and killing a monk. Later in the month, on the 29th, Yarmouth vessels are represented as repulsing a French attack on Winchelsey; and an attempted landing at Hythe in the same period is recounted, where a French galley was taken. The Dunstable annals indicate the generalised nature of French operations by an inclusive reference to 'other attacks'. English sensitivity is perceived in Edward's mandate of 28 September to John Butecurte, admiral of the Yarmouth and east coast fleets, and to the bailiffs of Yarmouth, that men of Holland, Zeeland and Frisland be permitted, as per royal permission, to fish unmolested near Yarmouth; a permission which had obviously been ignored.

1. 16 August (C.P.R., 1292-1301, p.142).
3. COTTON, p.295.
4. Ibid., p.296; TRIVET, p.338/RISHANGER, p.150; Flores Historiarum, p.94.
6. Foedera, p.826.
The serious view taken in England of French naval strength is seen in a letter from Edward to the Cinque ports on 13 August, in which he ordered their fleet to beware of French ambuscades following the 'Dover affair'.

Great importance was obviously attached to French sea-power, which from Lacy's point of view could prove decisive in undermining his retention of Guienne, if the enemy won control of the Channel. English and Gascon inability to guarantee safe sea-lanes would increase the precarious situation of his army. Although French activity in the Channel lessened in 1296, there always remained the possibility of the duchy being isolated. At best, a continuing Channel-war, even piracy, was a constant hazard to ducal communications and supply lines. If King Edward sought to apply commercial pressures on the Continent by trade sanctions and a physical blockade, there was also disruption of Gascon commerce by retaliatory French action and continued private buccaneering. The effect on Anglo-Gascon trade and communications can be deduced from the Chronicon Brevius, where it is recorded that in 1296 a lack of wine and wax almost made it impossible to celebrate Mass.

In respect of the duchy itself, the question arises as to the extent to which ducal forces actually were beleaguered, which has so far been assumed. It is clear from earlier consideration of the areas of French occupation, that King Philip's troops controlled nearly all the duchy, except for ducal enclaves at Bayonne, St-Sever, Bourg and Blaye. Recent ducal gains along the Garonne were currently being erased by the comte d'Artois, and the northern limit of effective ducal influence was St-Sever. Dax was firmly in French hands, and so too was Pontonx to its

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1. C.P.R., 1292-1301, p. 139.
2. Edward forbade trade with the Continent except for Brabant, whose duke was his son-in-law (Annales de Dunstaplia, p. 398).
4. Supra, ff. 44-5.
north, as is clear from the plea of its dispossessed abbot, which was heard by the King-Duke at Plympton after Easter 1297.¹ Labouheyre, near Mimizan in Landes, remained an English outpost, however, which shows how the ducal and French areas of occupation inter-penetrated.² To the south-east, Béarn was pro-French.

The effectiveness of French control in Guienne is problematical. D'Artois was engaged in confirming his hold on the Gironde into early May 1296; from 21 May to 11 September he was building up his troops at Mont-de-Marsan; and he was at Nérac, near Agen, on 5 December.³ He apparently remained in the north during the winter, for he left his siege of La Réole to intercept the enemy at Bellegarde about 2 February, as will be seen, ⁴ but was back at La Réole on 12 March. If the reference to an investment of La Réole is correct, it sheds further valuable light on the extent or effectiveness of French control; for La Réole, like Labouheyre, must have been another ducal outpost in what has been assumed to have been a French occupied area. La Réole had been annexed to the French Crown in 1295;⁵ it must subsequently have reverted to its duke or been reoccupied by his army in 1296.

From the itineraries ⁶ of ducal commanders in this period, several phases of ducal initiative emerge, all characterised by the presence or absence of the French general. While d'Artois was in the north of the duchy in the summer of 1296, Lacy was able to launch a determined attack on Dax.

With the French concentration at Mont-de-Marsan, he withdrew again to

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¹ The 'Plympton Pleas' (BEMONT, Appendice I, No.15).
² Labouheyre is on record as in need of relief about 8 April 1297 (E101 12/26).
³ BEMONT, cliii, n.4; Chartes d'Agen, pp.165-8.
⁴ Anciennes Chroniques de Flandre, p.356. His return is shown by Bémont (BEMONT, cliii, n.4; Bibl. nat. lat.9131. No.7).
⁵ C47 24/2/38. The town is said to have opened its gates spontaneously to the first expeditionary force (BALASQUE & DULAUERENS, p.535).
⁶ See my Appendix II.
Bayonne. When d'Artois moved away northwards, his foe seized the chance to raid deeply as far as Le Toulousain.\(^1\) While d'Artois was besieging La Résol in mid-winter, Lacy, with great caution, advanced a relief column towards Bellegarde and St-Quiterie. The ambush sustained sent his force back into its retreat at Bayonne in considerable disorder, for it had been waylaid in 'ducal' territory. The sudden perambulation by the capitaneus in the summer and autumn of 1297 coincided with the French re-deployment in Flanders and d'Artéis' transfer there.\(^2\) Lacy took advantage to tour the towns and citadels in the area of Gascony still subject to his jurisdiction. Even here his hold was precarious and was jeopardised by French infiltrations; the letters of obligation which he issued in July were tested 'BEFORE Castel Sarrazin',\(^3\) which suggests that this fort was a French enclave. Dax and Mont-de-Marsin clearly were. D'Artois move to Flanders obviously permitted a greater degree of movement than hitherto; witness John of Brittany's visit to such relatively distant towns as Sorde and St-Sever late in the year. French domination was effective, then, so long as there was a superior French army in the field. It is increasingly apparent from the siege-warfare that both sides remorselessly pursued that outright victory was impossible without the complete subjugation of all enemy citadels. This was the significance of the handing-over to the French in 1294 of Bordeaux and six major fortresses. The French army had thereby an initial

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1. John de St-John's presence at Bellegarde on 6 November suggests that he led this destructive raid and that he broke his return journey at Bellegarde. Bonds issued by Lacy at this time (e.g., E101 155/4/5) show that he was at Bayonne.

2. V.infra,s.99.

advantage. Ducal forces faced from the outset an uphill task; siege demands so considerable that they could never really hope to regain the duchy except through a protracted process of systematically reducing French-held citadels one by one. The chances of doing so were repeatedly frustrated by additional French incursions of numerically superior forces, which were able to dominate the territory between citadels, so preventing ducal recovery of lost forts or even reducing the number re-won. The saving grace for ducal strategy was French inability to keep a dominant army in the field permanently, or raise one decisively overwhelming. Thus, the citadels were the key to success. Whenever the French army withdrew, and as military attention turned to Flanders, the 'beleaguered' re-emerged to take the offensive. French territorial domination did not extend into subjugation.

Even at the height of the war ducal messengers and military personnel were able to slip through the French net. For example, a bond issued by Lacy at Bayonne on 23 March 1298 to a Lord Peter de Roquetaillade, knight, for £78 sterling as compensation for loss of war-horses, refers to his service 'cum equis et armis IN DIVERSIS PARTIBUS Ducatus Aquitanniae'; and in the Gascon rolls he is referred to as a member of the Bourg garrison and also received army pay in the war from Nicholas Baret, the paymaster at Bourg and Blaye. As troops were paid off at their centres of service, it seems that Peter de Roquetaillade served latterly at Bayonne, which suggests that ducal troops were not incarcerated in their citadels. Similarly, a letter of the King-duke to Lacy in August 1297 refers to a complaint from the men of Blaye at the departure to Bayonne, with financial records, of Humphrey de Clare, who was originally paymaster at Bourg and Blaye prior to Baret.  

1. E101 154/13/5.
2. R.G., 4262 (9 December 1296) & R.G., 4966/15 (during Baret's tenure; from 7 May 1297). He was in the Bourg garrison, too, on 19 December 1296 (Archives hist Gironde, XIII, 386).
That communications were hazardous but not severed is further exemplified by the continued submission of and Edward’s response to constitutional business in the duchy. Two entries in the Gascon rolls support this.¹ They record a petition to the King by the bastide of Bellegarde through two burgesses for renewal of tax-exemptions, now expired. King Edward wrote to Lacy, as lieutenant, to inspect the royal letters held by the bastide, so as to permit continuance of current practice according to liberties there shown; and he wrote to the citizens and jurats of Bellegarde informing them that he had favourably received their letters and messengers, who had his reply and would acquaint them with it BY WORD OF MOUTH. If dislocated, the administrative machinery of the duchy was still functioning. These entries indicate not only a considerable freedom of movement in the duchy by the King-duke’s officers and subjects, but also the expectation of it—and this in the midst of war. When previously writing to Edmund in the duchy, the King-duke had assumed his lieutenant could confer with papal and English envoys, whom Edward had authorised to arrange a cease-fire.²

Nevertheless, the prerequisite for the continued functioning of ducal jurisdiction was the maintenance of citadels against a persistent French pressure aimed at a complete ducal collapse.³ D’Artois was sitting on their supply lines so that by early 1297 several of them were almost out of food or in extreme need of necessary supplies quickly; they were appealing to Lacy at Bayonne for help, if they were not to capitulate through starvation.⁴ Their plight was even worse later in the year, after

¹. R.G., 4439 & 4440 (4 January 1297).
³. English awareness of this is apparent in the Dunstable annals under the year 1295, where the purpose of the second expeditionary force is stated to be, to bring aid to the loyal people and castles of the duchy (Annales de Dunstaplia, p. 397).
Lacy's relief column had failed to get through. Repeatedly, reference is made to them, 'quos sunt en mult povre estat'. That such citadels as St-Sever, St-Quiterie and Bellegarde, explicitly named, should be in such peril was a serious matter for Edward's capitaneus.

King Philip's appointment of d'Artois to the Flemish command was a timely relief for the ducal cause in Guienne. If he had continued his southern blockade much longer, the surrender of ducal citadels might have followed quite quickly; with dramatic consequences for the Anglo-French struggle for Aquitaine. Although individuals there might come and go, the French general was applying a very effective stranglehold to ducal prospects. The coming of Edward himself to the rescue was a priority. Until then, Lacy adhered to the twin features of his strategy, limited attack and maintenance of ducal forts - primarily the latter, for they were both bastions of defence and centres from which to dominate the localities.

Trabut-Cussac has appreciated the essential importance of the bastides as local centres of ducal jurisdiction and expanding interest and influence. This appreciation is particularly relevant in respect of the ducal citadels in the Gascon war. They were more than military bases. They were the key to military success, but also to the establishment or disestablishment of French or ducal authority as a whole. Both sides were acutely conscious of this. Thus, Philip IV had annexed to the French

1. Notably in bonds (E101) given for money and/or supplies for their relief: e.g., 155/5/13 (30 March), 153/15/11 (1 April), 152/9/39 (3 April - BEMON, clx, m.2 on clxi impref. ref.), 153/15/5 & E101 12/26 which names also Labouheyre (8 April), 154/8/6 (17 April - BEMON, clx, m.2 on clxii impref. precisely) and 155/7/20 (17 April). N.B., Bundles 154/8 and 155/8 are duplications.

Crown both Bordeaux and La Réole to confirm them as centres of French jurisdiction and influence. When Edmund ceded the duchy in March 1294, the constable of France who received it for King Philip was quick to appoint seneschals of Gascony and the Agenais. Their authority would be only formal if the French did not also physically control the towns, the centres of administration and jurisdiction. Thus, de Néel had also quickly established himself in Bordeaux and had appointed a pro-French or puppet mayor. King Philip and his officials were also adept at dangling liberties as bait to attract civic allegiance. On 24 March 1295, for example, Philip confirmed at Paris privileges which had been granted by Charles of Valois to the ancient town of St-Émilion and considerably enjoined his seneschals to restore others to the community. On 25 August 1296, only ten days after arriving to raise Lacy's siege, Robert d'Artois granted to the citizens of Dax exemption from tolls on land and sea in transporting their merchandise throughout all Aquitaine and the kingdom of France, in recognition of their loyalty to King Philip and their resistance to a long and arduous ducal siege. Much more intriguing was his attempt to wean Bayonne itself, the rock of ducal resistance, away from its established fealty. Record of it survives in a letter patent dated 16 October 1296. It purports to be issued at Bayonne and is addressed to the supposed mayor of the city, a certain Brunet de St-Pé. In it, d'Artois as lieutenant of the king of France in the duchy of Guienne and in the senechaussées of Gascony, grants to the inhabitants of Bayonne exemption from all taxes and tolls in Guienne and the whole realm of France in recognition of their exceptional loyalty and hardships and bravery under siege and their refusal to surrender to the English. If not a charade, the letter was a most devious
piece of propaganda, cleverly designed to exploit possible subversive elements within the town, or play on civic apprehensions or war-weariness. After d'Artois' victorious advance south to the Adour, the soldiers of the King- duke were penned in their reserve sanctuaries. Now was the time to invite desertions. D'Artois' letter represents a blatant attempt to do so.

Once won ever, it was a different story, and Gascon loyalists of the King-duke knew it. Then towns which had displayed such loyalty were rendered incapable of again being a base for ducal resistance, by having their fortifications demolished. This occurred at Rions and somewhat at St-Sever. Libourne was another loyal ducal town whose walls were destroyed during French occupation.

Cônt. from f. 70


8. Pascal de Vielle, appointed mayor by King Edward 1 March 1295 is still so named on 25 November 1296 (R.G., 4404), on 23 March 1298 (ElO1 153/13/12) and even on 1 June 1301 (R.G., 4548).

1. TRIVET, p. 336/RISHANGER, p. 149; 'Carolus autem, versis villa et castro Risuncii, ... properat obsidere.' Guisborough (p. 247) mentions the demolition of only the town. Nangis (p. 289) in contrast, maintains that Charles fortified Rions before going on to besiege St-Sever. Trivet's account finds support in a note in BEMONT (cxlviii, n. 6 on cxlix) which mentions a plan of the medieval fortifications of Rions in the Archives historiques du département de la Gironde, XXXIX, implying that the defences were dismantled at some time; Les Guides Bleus (Poitou/Guyenne) reinforces this, referring to the survival of a great part of the ramparts of Rions of the FOURTEENTH century, 'avec le belle Porte du Lhyan (1304)', which suggests post-war reconstruction. (© Librairie Hachette, Paris, 1964).

The earl of Lincoln has been criticised because, after succeeding as capitaneus, he delayed a full six weeks before taking the offensive. This is to overlook the situation of the troops that he commanded. Frustration and failure, desertion, retreat and loss of a popular commander as Edmund was, must all have produced a demoralised force. Moreover, possibilities of recruitment were small as Edmund had exhausted the military coffers. It would take time to raise both mercenaries and the money with which to hire them; and they were unlikely to be forthcoming until encouraged by some evidence of military credibility. An outstanding feature of Lacy's lieutenancy was to be his remarkable ability to raise troops, money and supplies; but he had to prove his leadership first.

In contrast to his later levies, there is on record, prior to his assault on Dax, the hiring of only one soldier, namely, Sir Montasivus de Noaillan, who received £40 sterling 'pro nobis, octavo socio, cum armis' — he was presumably a feudal tenant of the King-duke who had completed his obligatory feudal service and was continuing on mercenary pay. In the difficult circumstances in which he found himself, the earl was nevertheless trying to re-build, re-equip, re-train and re-fortify his army, just as any other general would prior to an offensive; and this is confirmed by the chronicles, which record that he set out to besiege Dax about the feast of John the Baptist (24 June) after having, to some extent, recreated the ducal army. The funeral arrangements for Edmund

1. e.g., RAMSAY, p. 422.
2. RAMSAY, p. 421: Trivet, Rishanger, Guisborough.
4. GUISBOROUGH, p. 262/KNIGHTON, p. 362: 'Cum aliquantuisper recreasset/ regulasset exercitum.'
must also have been a time-consuming and necessary first duty. 1 His
body was apparently embalmed, then lay at the House of the Friars minor
at Bayonne, until shipped to England about six months later. The Opus
Chronicon provides a further explanation of Lacy's delayed campaign,
in its reference to a period of inclement weather which delayed the
shipment of Edmund's body for six months. 2 Bad weather would also hold
back the Dax expedition. About the turn of the century, a change in the
weather cycle seems to have been occurring, as chronicles bear out and
as historians are coming to understand. 3

Lacy's reorganisation and war-preparations in mid-1296 were facilitated,
as noted, by d'Artois' involvement in the north of the duchy. There French
pressure was on Bourg. If Bourg and then Blaye could be taken, the last
ducal footholds on the Gironde would have gone and the chance for
renewed campaigning there destroyed. French efforts could be concentrated
on finally subjugating the south. From the ducal point of view, it was
therefore vital that the twin towns survive. Chroniclers recount the
determined French efforts to take Bourg in the summer of 1296 and the

1. TRIVET, p. 358; Opus Chronicorum, pp. 58-9/RISHANGER, p. 154; Annales de
Dunstaplia, p. 402; Chronica de Melita, p. 265; GUISBOROUGH, p. 262/KNIGHTON,
p. 362.

2. Opus Chronicorum, p. 59: 'quousque serenas auras paulo clementior
hyms inveheret.'

GUISBOROUGH, p. 252/KNIGHTON, p. 350: in 1294 many poor in England died
from a great famine, grain prices being greatly inflated (16/- or even
20/- Qtr.); Chronicon Brevis, p. 306, likewise. Eulogium Historiarum,
p. 159: 1294, scarcity of food. TRIVET, p. 332/RISHANGER, p. 143: in 1294
a dearth of grain caused the deaths of many poor from diarrhoea.
Annales de Dunstaplia, p. 391: 1294, dearth of corn through bad weather
and late harvest and in 1295 dearth. Chronica de Melita, p. 260: 1295,
famine and plague in England. For modern comment, see D. Waley, Later
equally determined and successful resistance of the garrison. The siege was conducted by the lord de Sulliac, whom d'Artois sent against the town, and who succeeded in forcing it to seek the usual truce so as to send messengers for succour, namely, supplies — in this instance to Blaye. The 'intrepid' Sir Simon de Montague sailed a supply ship through the middle of the blockade, thereby saving Bourg from capitulation, breaking the siege and preserving the twin outposts on the Gironde for the ducal cause.

A parallel ducal victory is recorded about the same time in the southern theatre, where the French apparently conducted an unsuccessful siege of Bellegarde under the leadership of the comte d'Ei and the prévôt of Toulouse. The former was badly wounded when leading a small troop into the town, deceptively unopposed; his companions were put to the sword in the ambush. The prévôt met his end beneath a load of rocks which fell on him from the ramparts when, in a moment of elation, he jumped a trench and with his sword jubilantly, but alas misguided, slashed the cable of the beam on which the rocks were loaded. He and his war-horse were buried; the rest of the French 'took to flight'.

The important events of the summer in the south were the siege of Dax undertaken by Lacy himself and the later raid into the Toulousain. On Guisborough's chronology the siege lasted from about 24 June to 12 August. It was very vigorously pressed, almost daily assaults for seven weeks, and the scale of the effort is reflected in the financial

1. TRIVET, p. 341/RISHANGER, p. 155.
2. BEMONT, ciii, n. 1.
3. The Flores Historiarum (p. 289) declares that Lacy drove off d'Artois from Bourg, an embellishment that the C.P. includes (p. 684).
5. GUISBOROUGH, p. 262/KNIGHTON, p. 362.
account for the war submitted by the royal clerks John Sandal's and
Thomas Cambridge in 1314.¹ The besiegers consumed £95.5s.6d worth of
wheat, 381 razed measures in all, supplied by the commune of Gosse alone.
The account also reveals that Lacy used workmen in pressing the siege
by land and river in addition to men-at-arms of Bayonne. The abandoning
of the siege is mostly to be attributed to the French military build-up
at Mont-de-Marsan,² but Trivet ascribes it to shortage of food,³ and this
may have been a major factor; for in times of famine or scarcity the
normal difficulties of sustaining a siege would be greatly magnified.
Charles of Valois had met the same problem in besieging St-Sever in 1295.⁴

The raid to the Toulousain in the late summer or autumn of 1296 Bémont
has termed 'fruitless'.⁵ The criticism again overlooks the state of
morale of ducal troops at that time. There was a great need to record at
least some success in this bleak year. Lacy had probably hoped to restore
the spirits of his troops by his vigorous attack on Dax. After Edmund's
passing, action had been called for. As, yet again, the army had been balked
of success at Dax too, it was vital from Lacy's point of view to offset
any prevalent creeping frustration. A demoralised army can only lose
battles. Seen in this light, the expedition to the Toulousain was no mere
ostentatious raid, but a necessary stimulant, to leave the ducal troops
at the end of the year with some sweet taste of success. As a morale-
booster the Toulousain raid must be counted an encouraging success. In

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¹ BÉMONT, cliii, n. 3; Pipe Roll 8 Edward II (160) m. 41.
² GUISBOROUGH, p. 262/KNIGHTON, p. 362; DUGDALE, p. 104; RAMSAY, p. 422; BÉMONT, cliii.
³ TRIVET, p. 341/RISHANGER, p. 154.
⁴ TRIVET, p. 336/RISHANGER, p. 149: 'Carolus .. S. Severum .. properat obsidere; quam in magnum Gallicorum dispendium, qui ibidem fame mortis bantur et peste, tenuit .. Hugo ..'
⁵ BÉMONT, lxx.
their foray the ducal forces burnt towns and villages and returned to winter-quarters laden with booty.¹ Coming so late in the year, the raid could not be offset by French retaliation, and its boldness must have been a tonic for Lacy's soldiers before the onset of the depressing winter season. Besides which, the booty accruing must have provided the material inducement for mercenary recruitment. Above all perhaps, it was an insurance against any potential myth or mystique of French invincibility.

By the late autumn of 1296 the Gascon situation had, if anything, improved. The campaign of the comte d'Artois had for the moment reached its realisable limits. Although Lacy's soldiers had been beaten back to their southern citadels, they still survived as a military force; if d'Artois had won the military laurels, he still had a worthy enemy to contend with. The very fact that Lacy's holding-operation had so far succeeded, that there was still a definite ducal military and jurisdictional presence in Guienne - defeated but defiant - meant that victory and the possession of the duchy still evaded King Philip's grasp. A military stalemate was beginning to emerge. On the other hand, a French war in Flanders was already looming and would be a heavy additional and distracting commitment for King Philip.

¹ GUISBOROUGH, p. 262/KNIGHTON, p. 362.
CHAPTER III

LACY'S WAR - 1297

The most dramatic event of Lacy’s captaincy was the Bellegarde episode. It resulted from his necessary pursuit of one of the twin features of his strategy, namely, the maintenance of ducal citadels on which continued military effectiveness depended. Lacy’s supply column, which was escorted by the bulk of his field army and which d’Arteis ambushed, was set to relieve the ducal fortress of Bellegarde, which, like St-Quiterie and St-Sever, was sorely in need of supplies. The chronicles tell of a major ducal reverse, although with some disparity of detail as between English and French versions. The encounter occurred in late January or early February 1297. In answer to a plea for aid from the citizens of Bellegarde, Lacy aimed to provision the bastide – possibly others also – by Candlemas (2 February). Most English chroniclers, like Trivet, date the battle 30 January; significantly, for clerics, the very day on which King Edward outlawed his clergy for their stand, in accord with Clerici Laicos, against his taxation of the Church.

2. This account is based predominantly on Trivet (the ‘court’ chronicler of Edward II’s reign who had contemporary knowledge and access to official sources), Guisborough (who despite his geographical remoteness had participant-informants on the Gascon war) and, on the French side, Guiart (whom Bemont observes to be ‘abondant et circonstancié’ and who wrote his work in 1306, earlier than Trivet, as his own introduction shows) and the Anciennes Chroniques de Flandre (near contemporary). On English plagiarisms c/f supra, f. 21, n. 1 & 2. In addition, LANGTOFT and the Chronica de Welsa are like versions. The Chronographia Regum Francorum is a fifteenth-century work which greatly follows the Anciennes Chroniques de Flandre. For modern general accounts see BEMONT and RAMSAY.
The locale of the encounter was between Bonnut and Bellegarde.\(^1\) The exact site has been a matter of uncertainty. Guiart places it 'near Bonnuz(sic)' and four leagues from Tartas. The editors of the *Anciennes Chroniques de Flandre* believe Bellegarde to be the modern Bonnegarde and, mistakenly, identify St-Quiterie as St-Sever. This prompted the editor of the *Chronographia Regum Francorum* to maintain that 'Tout cela est douteux ou inexact.' Bémont, in his introduction to the Gascon rolls is careful to be imprecise: 'il (John de St-John) fut pris dans une bataille livrée aux Français près de Bonnut', and 'il (Lacy) fut surpris près de Bonnut', and again, 'le désastre de Bonnut'.\(^2\)

D'Artois is reputed to have been in the north besieging La Rèole when his spies brought news of ducal intentions, whereupon he hastened south to Orthez on the border of Béarn. He seems to have anticipated exactly the ducal line of march, for he established garrisons of 150 men-at-arms on either side of it at Tilh and Estibeaux, as observation posts.\(^3\) The garrison at Tilh was under the castellan 'de Berghes' with lord Jacque de Leire. At Estibeaux d'Artois installed 'messire Rogier de Maulion et messire Anthoine de Crequi.'\(^4\) The reliability of French intelligence was duly borne out by the arrival of a messenger from de Leire, who reported to d'Artois the enemy approach on Tilh.\(^5\) This quite precise plotting of Lacy's route places the engagement to the south of Amou; and d'Artois' return to Orthez after the battle to celebrate his victory supports

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1. The modern Bonnegarde.
2. BEMONT, lxii, lxx and lxxi.
3. Tilh is about six miles from Orthez and about three from Estibeaux.
5. The observation post had a three-mile view.
More exactly, Trivet places it about three miles from Bellegarde and the *Anciennes Chroniques de Flandre* about one league, which approximate. Topographical description is a further aid to the siting of the battle, for Lacy's vanguard was ambushed as it emerged from a wood on the final approach to Bellegarde. The eighteenth-century map of France by Cassini clearly shows this wood in a low-lying depression, into which the column would have to descend and from which it would have to re-ascend once through the wood to reach the level approach to the Luy du Béarn river and the bastide of Bellegarde on the other side. It was an ideal situation for an ambush. The fairly steep rise from the valley prior to the final approach to Bellegarde would explain the alternative description of an ambush as the vanguard of the column emerged from a narrow pass. Finally, an extra aid to siting the battle is the chronicle reference to the drowning in flight of Sir James de Beauchamp, and of Lord Alan de Tuycham, his son and their squires. The Carte de Cassini shows a tributary of the Luy du Béarn river flowing between the wood and Bonnut, which is the exact direction in which the fugitives would ride with the French in pursuit, as is described. Although only a small river, it would have been greatly swollen at that time of

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1. *Anciennes Chroniques de Flandre*, p. 357. There was a strong castle there, built only in 1242 by the vicomte de Béarn, Gaston VII, and chief seat of his House for over two centuries, where d'Artois could lock up his prisoners and celebrate.

2. Guisborough sites the battle as 'only some three short leagues from Bellegarde' (p. 263) but agrees that it was beyond a wood from which the vanguard emerged that the encounter occurred.

3. TRIVET, p. 354. Guisborough informs that it was a medium-size wood and the description accords with the Cassini map.


5. LANGTOFT, p. 281; *Chronica de Melza*, p. 265; & BÉMONTO, clxv.

6. LANGTOFT, p. 283; *Chronica de Melza*, p. 265; COTTON, p. 319.
year by heavy rains, in view of the normally wet weather in southwestern France in winter, and remembering the additionally inclement weather in western Europe at the end of the thirteenth century. Indeed, the wood beyond which Lacy's force was ambushed, and the entire basin in which it lay, is bounded almost entirely by rivers: the Luy du Béarn to the east, the above-mentioned tributary which joins it below Bellegarde after flowing along the west and north sides of the basin from its source to the south-west, and a second tributary of the Luy du Béarn joining it above Bellegarde, and whose course takes it adjacent to the source of the first tributary and then along the southern side of the battle area. If Beauchamp and his fellows missed their way to Bonnec, their automatic path of flight, they may well have perished in the second tributary.

The earl of Lincoln's men were caught out because they were pushing on, late in the day, eager to reach Bellegarde before nightfall. Perhaps they took a chance at the last stages of the journey and with their destination all-but in sight, throwing caution to the winds. Yet, the earl took what normal precaution he could before entering the obscurity of the wood, the last apparent obstacle between him and his goal. For, on reaching the wood, Lacy defensively divided his troops into two or three divisions, advancing by squadrons with consignments of corn and other supplies being conveyed in between them. Trivet maintains that St-John led the vanguard and Lacy commanded the rest of the column. Guisborough records a tripartite division; and this gains support from Guiart, who declares that in battle, and so by implication before it, the three divisions were commanded by John of Brittany, St-John and Lacy, in that order. So it seems that the earl did not approach Bellegarde without caution. The disaster may, however, have been due to faulty reconnaissance or military intelligence, or even deliberate betrayal; for it has been asserted that the expedition's scout, after reconnoitre, misinformed his
to the effect

superscience{that only a small French force opposed their entry to the bastide. On the strength of which, they decided to proceed and, it may be inferred, were led into a trap.

The waiting French army was arrayed in three or four divisions. Guisborough's description of four French divisions presumably corresponds to the French record of three, one being subdivided into two squadrons or wings. They were disposed in three 'lines', according to Guiart, the first under Thibaut de Cheppoix, the French commander who had successfully resisted Edmund's siege of St-Macaire. The second line was commanded by the comte de Foix with the comte de Perigord, 'Maubuisson Oudart', and his brother 'Milepois'. The third line, under d'Artois, was divided between the comte 'de Sanceurre' and the comte de Boulogne. The Anciennes Chroniques de Flandre names Comte Gaston de Foix as commander of the first line and Cheppoix, marshal for the day, commander of the third line; while the middle line was under d'Artois himself, but subdivided into two wings led by the comte de Boulogne and the comte de 'Sansoirre'. As vexillifer, Sir Pons de 'Nuilly' bore the marshal's standard; Sir 'Walepays' and Sir Sanson de Maulion the two standards of Robert d'Artois.

The comte de Foix had joined d'Artois only that same morning 'with a fine company', and according to Guiart had been at Tartas with the comte de Boulogne, about twenty kilometres to the north-east of St-Sever, when Lacy set out from Bayonne — an indication of how quickly d'Artois gathered his forces.

1. LANGTOFT, p.281/Chronica de Melza, p.265 (perhaps an attempt to excuse the 'English' defeat).

2. The editors of the Anciennes Chroniques de Flandre, correct this to Sanson de Cingormes and further associate Sir Pons de 'Nuilly' (Mouilli) with Cheppoix in command of the third division, submitting that the marshal's banneret was Sir Vallepays, who carried one of the standards of d'Artois.

3. Anciennes Chroniques de Flandre, p.357.
Predictably, English accounts are briefer than the French. Apart from variations in detail they generally agree in presenting a simple picture of the French ambush of the ducal advance column as it emerged from the wood or defile. St-John engaged the enemy, which turned out to be the entire French army, not the anticipated few contingents, and Lacy retreated so that 'a few were overwhelmed by many'.

If Lacy deserted his seneschal - probably an over-simplified version of events - his supreme responsibility as capitaneus must not be forgotten. It can be argued that he dared not risk the total destruction of his force, the sole ducal field army; that his first responsibility was not to St-John, but to the King- duke and his cause; that he must not, out of loyalty to a comrade in arms, jeopardise the very existence of ducal sovereignty or its survival by recklessly committing his only army.

1. TRIVET, p. 354. According to Langtoft, also the Chronica de Walsa, John de St-John went into action at once; overthrowing the first enemy division by his unexpected assault, then proceeding to attack the next. If so, the reader is to accept that the vanguard, confronted totally unexpectedly by an overwhelming enemy force, was able to throw the psychological shock of the surprise encounter to worst at least the first division or squadron waylaying it. On the other hand, St-John was not caught entirely off-guard, but probably anticipated some enemy opposition, though of a size he was equipped to deal with. The surprise lay in the ambush and in finding the 'whole French army' waiting. That he attacked it rather than fled or retired fits his martial temperament. Also, he would be conscious of the heavy obligation which lay on him to engage the enemy and frustrate their ambush, so as to allow ducal troops following up to deploy or, if retreat were a foregone conclusion, to retreat while he and his vanguard 'held the bridge'. In the latter event, his deliberate self-sacrifice was sound military sense.
It is significant that Lacy has come out of the affair quite well in Chronicle accounts. Nowhere is he charged with deserting St-John. Instead, he is called 'comes strenuous'; and even those chronicles which extol the bravery of St-John voice no criticism of the earl's retreat. Langtoft writes that he retired 'by advice' and with the agreement of the rearguard; the Chronica de Melas that, on reaching the pass, he did not dare advance further against such a large French army. The French chronicles record his having put up a stiff fight.

Guisborough provides more detail, giving some indication of the mêlée which would be expected on the ducal side. His account corresponds to French versions and shows why Lacy was not castigated by the chroniclers, and why his reputation needs no defence. It is clear that the earl did not, in fact, turn tail and leave the valiant St-John to his fate. According to Guisborough, the vanguard met two French divisions—perhaps two squadrons of a subdivided division—and was thrown back in confusion on the second ducal division behind it. The third, following up, was similarly taken by surprise or overtaken by the train of events, so that the whole force was routed.

Miss Lubimenko has deduced, apparently from Guiart's description of the three-part command of John of Brittany, St-John and Lacy respectively, that the advanced-guard was led by the former. Brittany's panic under attack and his flight were similar, as Miss Lubimenko remarks, to the

1. GUISBOROUGH, p. 263/KNIGHTON, p. 364.
2. I. Lubimenko, Jean de Bretagne, Comte de Richmond (1266-1334), doctoral thesis of the University of Paris, Lille, 1908 (hereinafter LUBIMENKO), p. 22. This would reconcile the divergent accounts of Trivet and Guisborough, the former's first of two divisions thus being taken to be an advance-guard of an associated main body of troops. Since Brittany and St-John had been commanders of the first expeditionary force, it would be a natural arrangement. Also, as St-John was seneschal but Brittany no longer lieutenant, it would be proper that St-John command the main company.
way that he and his garrison lost their heads and fled from Rions in 1295 and supports such a reading. For John of Brittany was of poor military metal; he was ‘parmi les premiers fuyards.’ There is general approval in the chronicles of the parts played by Lacy and St-John, but Brittany is passed over in silence.

The French chroniclers describe the battle as a military set-piece; and they naturally dwell more fully on the details of the French victory and also more graphically. According to them, when the ducal vanguard was waylaid or, more likely, came face to face with the enemy, it had time to wheel to its left.¹ Indeed, all Lacy’s troops in turn set their backs to the wood, deploying in three ranks. Trivet’s description confirms the French assertion that the fight took place beyond the wood in open country: ‘... de S. Joanne, suaque acies, transita silva, cum egresseretur IN CAMPI PLANITIEM, obviam habuit comitem Attribatensem (d’Artois), qui sum praestolabatur cum magno exercitu.’² Similarly, Guisborough writes, ‘Egressa audent acies prima a silva occurrit eis in plena planicie comes de Artoys ...’³

As a set-piece, the battle seems to have been in two parts. The first began with the French attack on Lacy’s front rank, which had taken up position between the wood and a narrow pass so that the first attacking squadron under the comte de Foix could not advance right up to it.⁴ It was overrun and routed when de Foix personally led the attack with the battle-cry ‘Monjoie,’ animating his troops to cast fear aside and put the opposing Gascon troops to flight.⁵ They, fleeing, seem to have involved the men-at-arms of the second line in the débâcle, so that it also succumbed to the French onslaught.

1. ‘towards Sinodine’ (Anciennes Chroniques de Flandre, p. 357).
2. TRIVET, p. 354.
3. GUISBOROUGH, p. 263.
4. Anciennes Chroniques de Flandre, p. 357.
5. The author of the Chronographia Regum Francorum attributes this initiative to d’Artois (p. 352).
From the French chronicle accounts is discernible next a distinct second phase of the battle. The earl of Lincoln rallied his troops—about six hundred, writes Guiart—and counter-attacked, initially very effectively, catching the French general unprepared.¹ D'Artois found himself with a reserve squadron of only about one hundred men-at-arms, the rest of his men being in pursuit of the enemy.² So is explained the statement of the French chroniclers that the third line commanded by Lacy put up a fierce fight before finally being worsted. The battle was bitter, the outcome uncertain for a good half-hour. Clearly, there was much more to it than just a successful French ambush and a general ducal flight with the exception of an heroic John de St-John. Of the three ducal commanders, two stood and fought; one, John of Brittany, precipitately fled the field with a number of his company, before Lacy's counter-attack, when the battle seemed to be going badly.³

Nevertheless, the eventual outcome was beyond dispute. The earl of Lincoln's forces were finally put to flight, took to the fields or woods for refuge, and, but for nightfall, might have suffered complete annihilation. The pursuit went on for some two hours into the night, during which time both sides lost their bearings and most of the earl's men were able to escape before moonrise. As the chase lasted about two hours,⁴ and the second engagement for about half an hour,⁵ Guiart's assessment of three hours duration for the whole action would be quite accurate. Bellegarde was obviously a major confrontation.

Some observations must be made. Firstly, that the comte d'Artois could establish his headquarters at Orthés; that he had two good fortresses, as is stated,⁶ in Estibeaux and Tilh; that Lacy's column advanced in

¹ Bémont associates Brittany with Lacy in this effort; Lubimenko, St-John.
² LUBIMENKO, p. 23, n. 6: Guiart, 13623–35.
³ Ibid., n. 4: Guiart, 13573–80.
⁴ Anciennes Chroniques de Flandre, p. 357.
⁵ GUIART, 13675–6.
⁶ Anciennes Chroniques de Flandre, p. 356.
expectation of an enemy presence in the vicinity; all this shows that the earl was embarked on a hazardous and bold venture, penetrating country which between citadels was enemy-dominated. Secondly, the Gascon infantry units were more of a liability than an asset in the action, not only breaking under attack, but also causing the downfall of supporting men-at-arms. Henry de Lacy seems to have been faced with trying to salvage some efficient fighting force out of the ruins of a Gascon rout. If the more detailed French account of Bellegarde is accepted, by which John of Brittany led the foremost ducal corps, then this adverse judgement of the Gascon soldiers may, however, be harsh. It should be tempered with the mitigating recognition of Brittany's inadequate leadership and his cowardice in the early stages of the battle. Past Gascon experience of his tendency to panic under attack, plus his lack of courage in the present action, probably engendered a lack of courage in the ranks.

The sudden unexpected encounter at Bellegarde caught the earl's troops completely off-guard and made the result of the fight a near foregone conclusion. In those latter days of traditional feudal warfare, the element of surprise was usually near decisive. The advantage and outcome lay almost entirely with the ambusher. Thus, defeat stared Lacy's men in the face from the very outset. To rally troops so shocked by such an unexpected meeting, especially if they were unprofessional troops, as many of the Gascon auxiliaries probably were, was a virtual impossibility. The French army was ready for battle, drawn up in four divisions for the attack. In contrast, the ducal forces were totally unprepared for such a contest; probably hungry and weary at the very end of a long and

1. GUISBOROUGH, p. 262: 'Et erant omnes armati et bene muniti quia suspicabantur hostes in proximo, non tamen de certo sciebant.'
gruelling march in mid-winter over heavy terrain; perhaps relaxing their vigilance as they had nearly reached the security of their destination at last, especially after a reassuring reconnaissance-report; and in the event, without adequate time or opportunity to adopt a battle formation, take evasive action, or prepare mentally or tactically for a rested and ready foe. Lacy's troops may even have been caught advancing in extended file. It is greatly to Lacy's credit that, after such early confusion, he was able to rally his troops and attempt a stand.

The inadequacies of the methods of war on both sides are apparent in the details of the battle. Ferdinand Lot has commented on the undue emphasis on cavalry in the feudal armies of western Europe in this age.¹ One result was the relative ineffectiveness of infantry; and this is seen in the poor performance of the Gascon foot. Another example is the vainglorious indiscipline of the cavalry itself as exhibited by the French pursuit of the enemy from the field. The French general was left in a vulnerable situation, exposed to the sharp counter-attack of Lacy, who succeeded in re-forming his troops.

The question of ducal tactics at Bellegarde, over which Henry de Lacy has been criticised by Oman,² is hardly relevant in view of the unexpected circumstances in which the ducal commanders found themselves. After praising the virtues of the new English military technique of combining cavalry and foot-archers acquired during Edward I's Welsh wars, Oman cites Bellegarde to show that the war in Guienne lacked that technique. Although Lacy's contingents understandably demonstrated continental military ideas, Oman writes 'it is curious to find that their English leaders seem to have taught them nothing.' He draws on Hemingburgh

to substantiate his case, describing how the English cavalry came up, successively forcing their way out of the forest to engage the enemy, but that the infantry 'hung back in the wood without advancing, and did no good whatsoever.' This was so, writes Oman, although the knights were in great need of infantry, 'qui projectos armatos hostium spoliarent vel interimerent' — which last clause, he declares, shows the very modest part that Lacy expected his foot-soldiery to play.

This is a misinterpretation of the passage through taking it out of context; for this clause does not appear in the description of the battle itself. It occurs AFTER Guisborough has concluded his description and is trying to minimise ducal losses by stating that St-John and certain others were captured, but that only a few 'perished by the sword', the rest escaping under cover of night. It seems quite clear that the implication in Guisborough's mention of the infantry, who stayed in the wood and were therefore of little help to the men-at-arms, is that therefore they, too, suffered few casualties. The French chronicles show that they had not begun the fight stationed in the woods with a view to preying on the unhorsed enemy, as Oman says, but had taken refuge there after the French attack. The 'English leaders' were not therefore necessarily ignorant of the reputedly new English military technique of combined horse and foot. Moreover, Oman overlooks that Lacy himself was an active participant in those very Welsh wars where the English, according to Morris, began to learn the new tactics; and that John Giffard, who is credited with devising them, was a relative of Lacy by marriage. It is quite inconceivable that the earl of Lincoln should

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1. OMAN, p. 71; Hemingburgh, I, p. 74.
3. This same John Giffard in 1295 surrendered Podeinac to the French, without adequate safeguards for his Gascon colleagues, some fifty of whom were hung. He had married Matilda de Clifford, mother of Lacy's first wife (OMAN, p. 111; CL, p. 104).
be ignorant of this military development in view of his relationship with Giffard. Rather, failure to use the new technique must be attributed to lack of time and opportunity at Bellegarde.\(^1\)

Bémont's judgement on Lacy's performance at Bellegarde is that he was a better administrator than general.\(^2\) This is a little harsh. His usually quite successful leadership and participation in the Welsh wars, where he earned his military spurs, cannot be ignored. Admittedly, this was the second ambush of his military career, for his tenants of Denbigh had worsted him there in November 1294 on the outbreak of the Welsh rising; but on both occasions he was pushing ahead boldly, in the midst of obvious dangers, because of the extremity of the situation; and on both occasions he was apparently at a considerable numerical disadvantage. Few commanders must not on occasion have taken a risk which proved to be miscalculated. Not all paid the penalty so fully as Henry de Lacy.

At Bellegarde he took due precaution before finally committing his column to the fateful final approach to the beleaguered bastide. Faulty intelligence or even deliberate betrayal, not ineptitude, on this occasion led the earl and his men into an ambush. But not only was Lacy, an experienced campaigner, deceived; so too was his redoubtable colleague and seneschal, John de St-John — the commander who emerges from the Gascon war better than any other ducal commander.

St-John was by far the most serious loss to Lacy at Bellegarde; his military right hand. With him were captured other English lords and knights whose loss was serious, notably, Sir William de Mortimer 'the younger'. Expectedly, there is a considerable difference in the estimates

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1. Doubt has recently been cast on the prevalence or proper adoption of the new technique in Edward I's reign, anyway; Prestwich argues that there is little evidence of the joint use of archers and cavalry in this period in any campaign of the reign (M.C. Prestwich, Edward I's Wars and their Financing, 1294-1307, unpublished doctoral thesis, Christ Church, Oxford, 1968 (hereinafter Prestwich (thesis), ff. 116-119).

2. Bémont, ixxi.
of the captured between French and English accounts, the former being
greatly exaggerated. The English chroniclers generally agree on numbers
and names and are thus probably more reliable. The Anciennes Chroniques
de Flandre names St-John, Mortimer and 'up to sixty English gentlemen';
in addition, fleeing Gascons are recorded among them 'le visconte de
Mirenpois' (Maurepas)¹ and other knights.² Nangis writes of 'quamplures',
including St-John and both Gascon and English nobles.³ Guiart declares,

'Pris est Jehan de Saint-Jehan,
Et celui de Berno Jehan,
Mesire Adan de Houstlestoune,
Noiers, Le Pui, Muse, Chandouné,
Et d'autres merveilleuse tire,
Desquiez que ne sai les noms dire,'⁴

A composite and more exact list from English sources comprises St-John,
William de Mortimer, William de Suleya, John de Ross, Adam de Huddleston,
John de La Garde, Reginald de Nowers, Thomas de Mose, William de Pontone,
Henry de Schadowrche, Gerard de Leseyn and William de Birmingham. With
the exception of Le Pui and perhaps Chandouné, Guiart's list thus
 corresponds. The average English chronicler estimate of captured is about
a dozen lords and their attendant squires. Trivet writes of St-John and
ten knights and some squires; the Flores Historiarum of St-John and twelve
knights.⁵

According to the English chroniclers, only a very few of the English
nobility were killed; Philip of Watersdon being specifically named. Alan

¹ Chronographia Regum Francorum; viccomes de Malo Repastu.
² Anciennes Chroniques de Flandre, p. 357.
³ NANGIS, p. 295.
⁴ GUIART, 13685–13690. The Chronographia Regum Francorum claims nearly
100 English nobles (p. 52).
⁵ TRIVET, p. 354; Flores Historiarum, p. 100. LANGTOFT, p. 283 / Chronica
de Melve, p. 265; St-John, 11 knights and 18 gentlemen 'of their
esquire.'
di 'Tuycham', his son and their squires, and also Sir James de Beauchamp, were 'shamefully' drowned in flight. The claims of French chroniclers are more ambitious. Whereas Nangis is content to aver that many English met their end, the Anciennes Chroniques de Flandre maintains that there were as many dead English left on the field as fled, namely, either 3,700 or 700, according to different MSS of the chronicle. Guisborough's statement that the great majority escaped in the night is more convincing, especially when taken in conjunction with the actual names of the knights as recorded by that reliable chronicler Bartholomew Cotton.

The captives were duly interned in various French prisons. Trivet describes how they were conveyed to Paris by d'Artois 'in pompam triumphi'; the Flores Historiarum how the French applauded St-John's capture 'prout quondam Phylistini de Sampsons'; he was imprisoned first at Corbeil for ninety days, then at Paris. The Eulogium Historiarum, remarking on King Edward's 'great sorrow' at the capture of his knights, records under the year 1297 that he paid a large ransom for their

1. LANGTOFT, p.283 / Chronica de Melsea, p.265; COTTON, p.319.
2. NANGIS, p.295; Anciennes Chroniques de Flandre, p.357. As earlier on the same page the chronicle gives the numbers of 'English' troops at Bellegarde as 800 men-at-arms and 600 foot, even the lower estimate is impossibly high. The Chronographia Regum Francorum, p.53 reproduces the figure of 700 English slain. Even the claim of 100 English lords killed is clearly very exaggerated (Les Grandes Chroniques de France, 10 vols, Paris, Librairie Ancienne Honoré Champion, 1920-53, VIII (Philippe le Bel), 1934 (hereinafter Les Grandes Chroniques), p.168).
3. GUISOBOUGH, p.263; COTTON, p.319.
4. NANGIS, p.296.
5. TRIVET, p.354.
release, whereupon they returned home.\(^1\) As prisoners of war were probably not released before the autumn armistice of Vyve-St-Bavon on 9 October, it is unlikely that repatriation occurred before the end of the year.\(^2\)

The loss of the supply train at Bellegarde, as an addition to the already desperate plight of the citadel-outposts, was very serious from the ducal standpoint. The chroniclers are almost unanimous in stating that the column lost all its victuals, supplies, baggage, equipment as well as arms;\(^3\) the whole convoy, as Guiart declares. Guisborough, however, provides a quite detailed alternative account, which has been overlooked or ignored by modern commentators. The details appear in his sequel to the events of the day. About three hundred men who had fled the field, he writes, made the bastide of Bellegarde but were refused entry by its citizens, who already knew of the disaster and denounced them for 'so senselessly' deserting their fellows and the 'brave earl'.\(^4\) The fugitives went on the same night to St-Sever, four leagues away, where they were received. The citizens of Bellegarde did, however, admit some other fugitives from the battle, and on the strength of their information sallied forth at

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2. The chronicles record that St-John was exchanged for John Baliol, who was not released until 18 July 1299 (BEMONT, liii; Flores Historiarum, III, p. 290; D.N.B., XVII, p. 636; after the treaty of L'Aumône in the summer of 1299; and W.E. Flaherty, *The Annals of England*, Oxford/London, Parker, 1876, pp. 173, n. 6, and 174). Yet, St-John is said to have participated with Lacy and John of Brittany in the Falkirk campaign of 1298, in which case the exchange of prisoners was very prompt (MORRIS, p. 291; "John de St-John, lately returned from Gascony.")
4. *GUISBOROUGH*, p. 263.
dawn to the battlefield and salvaged much 'booty' and corn, which they carried off. In view of the future continued 'poor estate' of Bellegarde like other citadels, the account must be treated with caution; but it is quite feasible that some supplies were saved from the French, enough perhaps to prolong the bastide's survival.

The bitter outcome of the day's events from the ducal viewpoint was relieved in some bright moments when comrades who had lost one another in the night were re-united. The comte d'Artois celebrated his victory at Orthez, then in the morning sent his troops out to search for survivors or remaining enemy resistance, but there was also rejoicing on the ducal side when, at about the third hour of the morning the earl of Lincoln, after wandering lost during the night, re-entered Peyrehorade to the jubilant welcome at his safe return of some of his dejected troops, who had feared the worst as he was missing. This sequel, like the more detailed chronicle accounts of the battle, does not give credibility to any suggestion of his prompt withdrawal without battle, leaving St-John to his fate. Rather it suggests the capitaneus had fought till dark and finally become separated from the main body of his force in the confusion of and flight from battle. Nevertheless, he returned to the safe walls of Bayonne discomfited and without the irreparable John de St-John; the remainder of his dispersed troops gradually re-joining him there, trickling in during the course of the next month or so.

1. Anciennes Chroniques de Flandre, p.357.
2. GUISBOROUGH, p.263.
3. Ibid, pp.263-4s 'Congregati sunt ad eum in sequenti quadragesima omnes dispersi sui et profugi.' Or does Guisborough mean throughout the following Lent, i.e. from 3 March?
It was some weeks before the King-duke received the bad news. His letter of 17 February to Lacy and St-John jointly shows that he was still unaware of the Bellegarde disaster. Once informed, Edward acted with his customary alacrity and animation, exhorting his Gascon subjects to maintain the fight. This was the third spell of crisis in the defence of the duchy when, as a result of French success, Edward was reduced to encouragement, promises and obsequious expressions of gratitude until he could personally take a promised hand in the war.

Examples of exhortation are his letters to his Gascon subjects and troops of 11 April and 3, 7, and 23 May 1297. In the first, he writes from Plympton in Devon to his English and Gascon troops at Blaye, acknowledges their great burdens and sufferings and his indebtedness to them, for which his thanks, and asks especially that they continue the struggle; although, because of the pressures of great business, he has not as yet been able to hold parliament at London since his return from Scotland and so arrange for money to be sent to them — presumably their army pay — he promises that they will have further sufficient corn-supplies and money by the feast of St. John. This letter seems to have crossed a direct approach from the town; for on 30 March it is recorded in a letter from the citizens of Blaye to Walter of Coventry and Lichfield, lord treasurer of England, that Elias Aycredi, rector of the church of St. Saviour of Blaye, Elias of Petragoricum (Périgueux), domicellus, and Bernard Grassi had been appointed by them as their general and special proctors and attorneys to receive payment of debts from the King or his treasurer, and to deal with all matters pertaining.

1. Foedera, p. 860; T.R., 447; v. supra, f. 61.
2. R.G., 4368, 4377, 4490, 4491, 4492; Foedera, p. 864.
3. Presumably St. John the Baptist, 24 June; the feast of St. John the apostle and evangelist being 27 December.
They were also to inform the King-duke of the plight of their town and its environs. Whereas the King-duke's letter was an exhortation to his troops, that from the burgesses of Blaye represents claims from Gascon creditors for military loans, as well as being an appeal for relief. It illustrates that civil as well as military fibre in the duchy needed strengthening.

This correspondence is echoed in similar communications with Bourg. A like letter to the troops there, also of 11 April, repeated the message and encouragement sent to Blaye. Bourg was, of course, the more isolated and hard-pressed citadel, being farther up the Gironde estuary. Supplies might be landed at Blaye, but not necessarily at Bourg if it were under attack. Edward's letter of 11 April follows quite quickly on another to Bourg of 9 December 1296, which shows vividly the predicament of this far outpost. In it, Edward urges Richard Fitz-John, captain of Bourg, the mayor, jurats and other worthies to maintain their resistance to the enemy. He acknowledges receipt of their letter for help; knows their past faithfulness and zeal in his cause; how many dangers, deprivations and attacks that they have withstood under French siege; and he will not fail to meet their needs. He promises both reinforcements and immediate supplies of food, with much more abundant supply to come in the next fleet. Edward also strove to keep the local loyalists happy by promising to deal with the claims of creditors for loans to his troops at Bourg in due course. The creditors, it may be noted, were not slow to take him up on his offer. By 30 July they and their fellows in Blaye had representatives in London requesting the payment of outstanding debts. In his

1. These letters to Bourg and Blaye bear the same entry number in the Gascon rolls (4368).
2. R.G., 4262.
3. C.P.R., 1292-1301, p. 301.
letter of December, Edward also guaranteed full compensation to the
citizens for war-damages, expenses and dangers incurred at sea. Bourg was
a tight corner to be in, and the enemy made repeated efforts to win it.
Possibly, the King-duke's letter of December was an overdue reply to one
written prior to the relief of Bourg by Simon de Montague in August
1296; but equally, the single supply ship which he sailed through the
French blockade could not have replenished the stores of the town
indefinitely.

Edward's letter of 3 May from Plympton was addressed to all his subjects,
English and Gascon in Guienne. It expressed appreciation of their
continued loyalty under hardship, and promised despatch in due course of
what fruitful aid could be managed. His letters of 7 and 23 May were
specifically to his garrisons and subjects at the citadels of Bayonne,
Bourg and Blaye. Yet again, he made it clear that he knew well of the
extremities in which they found themselves, and extended his heart-felt
gratitude for their loyal and zealous support; he was sending presently
what help he could, and promised much more in the future, so far as he
was able.

To reinforce ducal defences and resources, Edward did send some more
'felons', however. These impressed criminals may well have been part of
a force mentioned in Edward's letter of 9 December, and already intended
for despatch about the feast of the Purification, 2 February, but as
usual behind schedule. A few felons, however, could not significantly
affect the military imbalance in Guienne after the reversal and losses
of Bellegarde. Nor is there any evidence of their large-scale recruitment
as in the summer of 1294— perhaps the jails were now empty! A military

1. C/f. supra, f. 74.
2. BÉMONTECLIV, n. 2 C.P.R., 1292-1301, pp. 242. The latter entry (15 April)
is, however, of the demobilisation of a 'felon'.
3. Bémont cites in evidence the enrolled pardons for manslaughter in
the Patent rolls of only two 'felons', William de Borham and Thomas
de Percy, subject to their going to Gascony in the next fleet (7 March).
expedition of some substance was needed after Bellegarde and to that end Edward harangued his barons at Salisbury in early March 1297 and sought to oblige them to take ship for Gascony. Puny measures were inappropriate at a time of such emergency; nor were they in character for a monarch and soldier as energetic as Edward Plantagenet, especially now that he had successfully dealt with the Welsh and the Scots. If Henry de Lacy was to do more than merely hold Bayonne and its hinterland, he needed a transfusion of experienced and professional soldiers. Thus the King-duc's urgent though unsuccessful attempt to transfer to his duchy a major fighting force, which would include the pre-eminent figures of Roger Bigod and Humphrey de Bohun, the earl marshal and constable of England. Money and supplies were forthcoming, if usually with difficulty, but troops were not. The English baronage, as it made clear at Salisbury, felt under no obligation at all to go to Guienne in support of Lacy, which was now proposed, while the King went to Flanders. They would embark for Gascony, but only under the royal banner. The records of the proposed but abortive royal expedition of 1294 show that the English magnates were not in principle opposed to serving in Gascony to help the King-duc regain his duchy, even though they had not been party to its cession. By the original plan, Edward was to lead his troops to the duchy in person; and, in accordance with the general baronial support of that plan, Humphrey de Bohun, constable of England, who now, in 1297, refused to go there without the King-duc, was, in 1294, a member of the royal expedition. This change of attitude emphasised how the English

3. C.P.R., 1292-1301, p. 84 (16 August 1294): a licence for Humphrey de Bohun, earl of Hereford and Essex, 'who is going to Gascony in the King's service'. Admittedly, he was not at the Salisbury parliament, but his later solidarity with the earl marshal and his fellow magnates justifies ascribing to him the opinions expressed at Salisbury.
baronage felt under no feudal obligation to fight in their lord's continental war except under his leadership. Despite this serious lack of reinforcement, Lacy succeeded in stabilising the situation in Guienne regardless of the reversal at Bellegarde, and by so doing made possible Edward's Flemish expedition.¹ His holding-operation was finally a success. If it had not been, if ducal resistance had seemed in danger of collapse, Edward would not have been able to embark for Sluys instead of Bayonne. Yet, the transfer of the Anglo-French confrontation to Flanders finally eliminated the chance of regaining the duchy quickly, which the King-duke's arrival at the head of a large military force would certainly have afforded. His barons had never refused to go to Guienne with him, only without him; and the probable size of such an army may be gauged from his original estimate for his Flemish expedition or his later one to Scotland, which Powicke has described: 'an impressive galaxy of English, Irish, and Scottish earls and barons marshalled in a flexible host of some two thousand cavalry comprising the flower of the knights and squires or men-at-arms (armigeri) who had lands in their shires of the annual value of £20 and more', and 'The great army raised for service in the Scottish campaign which culminated in the battle of Falkirk'.² Such a brilliant company could have achieved wonders in Guienne.


² POWICKE, pp. 678-9.
Edward was obviously very conscious of this and of his moral obligations to his troops and subjects in Guienne. He was perhaps also apprehensive of their reactions to his final failure to come to their relief after all; for they had been waiting loyally and patiently for him for a long time. His tender conscience is evident in letters that he wrote to Guienne at the time of his embarkation for Flanders on 21 August. In one, he wrote to his Gascon barons and knights excusing his failure to join them because he was going to Flanders instead; and he promised money and supplies. More important is the second letter, to his English barons, knights and other gentlemen in the duchy, requesting them not to return home — their inferred termination date for military service being the feast of St. Michael, 29 September — unless demobilised by Lacy. If their should adhere strictly to their duration of service, the King-duke’s cause would founder; therefore, he was counting heavily on their continued selfless loyalty.

Meanwhile, as already noted, once the restricting presence of d’Artois was removed, the earl of Lincoln and his men began again to assert themselves. D’Artois left Guienne to join Philip IV at the siege of Lille, the investment of which began about 23 June; he was given command of the French armies in Flanders, capturing the town of Furnas (Veurne) on 20 August. He is variously said to have been succeeded in the Gascon command by Sir Robert Brunel lord of Saint Venant, Orry l’Allemand, or Guichard de Marcia c senechal of Toulouse. At once, Lacy’s troops inflicted a punitive raid ‘versus partes Thelesanias’ in the summer of 1297. Accounts of this may be a chronicle duplication of the raid of 1296; but as Guisborough’s version of the later raid is more detailed, the possibility of two such excursions in consecutive years cannot at all be ruled out. The fact that John de St-John was at Bellegarde in the

1. R.G., 4392; Foedera, p. 875.  
2. R.G., 4391; Foedera, p. 876; T.R., 335.  
3. Anciennes Chroniques de Flandre, p. 361; MONLEZUN, p. 72.
autumn of 1296 and could have led the first raid, and that the usually reliable Trivet describes the raid of 1297, reinforces the likelihood. According to Trivet and Guisborough, the marauders of 1297 not only burnt towns and villages as in 1296, 'ravaging with fire and sword up to the feast of St. Michael', but also raised the 'seige' of St. Katherine's which was being conducted by the men of Toulouse. 'St. Katherine's' is an obvious chronicle version of St-Quitere, one of the ducal citadels that Lacy was trying to supply when ambushed at Bellegarde. It was one of the furthest ducal outposts; and its relief in 1297 from an enemy siege, which would have been a natural sequel to the French frustration of Lacy's effort to provision it, makes military sense. This theory is supported by a letter patent of 28 August 1297, written at St-Quitere by Amauri de La Zouche, in which he acknowledges the receipt from Thomas Cambridge, ducal paymaster, of £143.0s.15d, as a loan from dues of the King, by Lacy and Hugh de Vere on Lacy's behalf, for the sustenance of Sir Robert Fitz-Neal 'e de moy e de nostre compagnie' on Gascon service, for the period up to 30 September 1297. The ducal strike-force returned afterwards 'with much booty' to winter at Bayonne. The foray of 1297 would have been a natural repetition of that of the previous year. After the disaster of Bellegarde, an expedition into the territory of the south would be an excellent piece of military psychology, as well as a predictable counterpart to the effort of the King-duc in Flanders. It would mark a ducal revival after d'Artois' departure and signal recovery from and revenge for the defeat at Bellegarde. There can be little doubt that Lacy's troops must have smarted for vengeance after that episode. On the personal level, Lacy could demonstrate to the ranks that ducal success was not confined to the initiative of St-John alone and therefore a vanished prospect.

1. E101 155/2/2.
2. TRIVET, p.362; GUISOBRUGH, p.264.
Edward's finance ministers reckoned 24 March 1298 as 'armistice day' for accounting purposes.\(^1\) The military computation related, naturally, to the cessation of fighting. It is expressed in a letter of Hugh de Vere, John de St-John's eldest second-in-command in the south of the duchy; it is dated London 1 April 1300 and refers to his Gascon service 'during the whole' of the war in Guienne and to his being commanded to join Edward in Flanders at the end of the war in the twenty-sixth year of the King's reign (1297-8).\(^2\) In other words, since Edward returned to England in the first fortnight of March 1298, Hugh de Vere as a soldier and a member of the Gascon 'high command' took the end of the war to be the autumn truce of 1297, presumably 9 October. Lacy, however, did not rely on the trustworthiness of the enemy. The truce of 9 October made between Edward I and Philip IV in Flanders included a halt in operations in Gascony until Epiphany, 6 January 1298; and it was renewed periodically until the final peace of May 1303; but Lacy and John of Brittany continued raising war-loans, for war was also renewable on the expiry of the truce. The earl may have known of the truce about mid-November,\(^3\) but his actual preparations for the demobilisation of troops did not begin before March 1298, that is, just prior to his own departure.

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1. Pipe Roll 8 Edward II (160) m.41 as quoted by Bémont (BÉMONTR, clxvii, n.1): 'per sufferenciam guerre solempnum inter dictos regem E patrem et regem Francie concordatam.' This final account of the French war rendered to the exchequer by John Sandale and Thomas Cambridge in the financial year 1314-15 dates the start of the war from 11 November 1294, namely, from their initial payments of the expenses of the first expeditionary force, although 29 September is the beginning of their receipt of monies from the exchequer and wardrobe.

2. E101 155/2/3 (Bémont incomplete references: BÉMONTR, clxi, n.1).

from the duchy. For example, on 8 March 1298 Lacy issued a certificate of loyal service in the Gascon war to John Galyot, on the testimony of the ducal clerk Thomas de Grantbridge. On 9 March, Simon de Montague, marshal of the Blaye garrison, gave a similar certificate to John, son of Richard Burnel of Langley, for loyal service since the arrival of Edmund in the duchy. He issued a similar one, undated, to a certain William Fox of Dodington. Both had served in the Blaye garrison and were now returning to England. On 13 March, Lacy also testified, at the request of lord Reginald of Montague, to the Gascon service of a John de Fenwick.

The viability of the garrisons was of course maintained, demobilised captains being succeeded by new appointees. An example was Lacy's appointment on 20 March of William-Raymond de Gensac as 'captain and Castellan' of Blaye in succession to Sir Ralph Basset. That the 1. He and his troops seem to have transferred to England about Easter, 6 April (GUISBOROUGH, p. 264; C.P., p. 684; BEMONT, lxxi). The Worcester annals record the English return from Gascony before an entry of 24 May (p. 536). The troops were urgently needed for the Scottish war for which Edward had summoned the feudal host on 14 March. A Gascon corps was probably already on its way (POWICKE, p. 688). Yet, the military summons of 10 April did not include Lacy's name.

2. C47 2/13/3 (unpublished). Galyot was a felon pardoned 16 May 1299, on Lacy's testimony of war service in Gascony, for breaking prison at 'Bomyne' (C.P.R., 1292-1301, p. 416).


4. Ibid., 2/13/6 ( " ).

5. Ibid., 2/13/5 ( " ). He was a felon pardoned at Canterbury 26 May 1299, for robberies etc., and his abjuration of the realm for same, on Lacy's testimony to his Gascon war record (C.P.R., 1292-1301, p. 420).

6. SC1 48/57 (as quoted BEMONT, lxxiv n. 3, where Bémont erroneously dates it 1297 for 1297/8). The appointment lasted until terminated by the King-duke four years later (R.G., 4559:13 July 1301).
appointment was in succession to Basset is evident from reference to Basset about this time as having been captain of the garrison at Blaye, whereas a number of earlier bonds attest to his captaincy of the fort during the war and certainly as late as 7 May 1297.¹ This latter mention concerns the appointment of Nicholas Baret and John of Gloucester as finance officers of the garrison; and there were a considerable number of recognizances subsequently issued by Basset and Baret jointly. William de Gensac was appointed with a comitiva of 15 cavaliers armés et 40 sergents à pied aux gages du roi, which indicates that things were being kept on a war-footing.

The release of prisoners of war proceeded simultaneously though rather more lengthily. John de St-John may have been one of the first English captives to be freed, for the king-duke was personally concerned for him. In July 1297 St-John's son had received apud Saltum the sum of 50 marks from Thomas Cambridge to send to his father for his prison expenses.² The payment was made on Lacy's orders. Two documents of late May 1298 suggest that St-John may then have been on the point of repatriation. The first reference is an entry in 'le Journal de Trésor de Philippe de Bel', namely, wages to Johannes Baatel, 'serviens armorum' for guarding John de St-John, knight, 'in castelloto Parisius', ...XII p. (Parisian pounds).³ The second document is a bond of the abbot of the monastery

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1. E101 154/10/31 of 31 March 1298 (a memorandum to the king-duke from Nicholas Baret concerning monies outstanding to a certain Richard de Eyton, viz. £65.4s.6d st. for wages paid to troops of the Blaye garrison) and R.G., 4381 of 7 May 1297, where he is addressed as captain of the garrison.

2. E101 152/14/9, as quoted in BEMONT, clxv, being his son's letter patent of Bayonne 24 September 1297, acknowledging receipt of the payment.

3. Bibl. nat. lat. 9783 fol. 70 r (as quoted by H. Moranville, editor of the Chronographia Regum Francorum, p. 52, n. 3).
of St. Peter, Gloucester, for payment to merchants of the companies of
the Frescobaldi, Cerchi, Neri, Spini and Mozzi of Florence and the
Ammanati of Pistoia and the Buonsignori of Siena of 300 marks, borrowed
for the ransom of John de St. John, 'a prisoner of war'. Other captives
probably had to wait a little longer for ransom. In the Patent rolls,
there is a notification (Stanwix 24 September 1298) to the effect that
John de Cretinges, lately taken prisoner in the King's service in
Gasceny, is alive and well in a prison of the King of France. He had
been captured at Rions by Charles of Valois in April 1295 and interned
at Paris, but, as an entry on the Close rolls shows, had been thought dead
until that date. Similarly, reference is made to the French imprison-
ment of Hugh of Audeley after capture in Gasceny, and to the Frescobaldi
having put up bail of £2,000 of Tours, at royal request, for his release.
The King- duke's continuing concern is evident for his knights, English
or Gascon, and is seen again in an entry in the Patent rolls on 31
December of the same year, with royal indebtedness to merchants of Lucca
to the sum of £1,300 of Paris for the prison expenses of Oger Mote,

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1. C47 13/1/17. Prisoners of war bore heavy expenses themselves. D.N.B., XVII, p. 636: 'His (St. John's) captivity involved him in heavy debts, and on 3 November 1299 he was forced to pledge four of his manors for sixteen years to the merchants of the society of the Buonsignori of Siena (C.P.R., 1292-1301, p. 482).'
2. C.P.R., 1292-1301, pp. 361-2.
3. TRIVET, p. 336; GUISBOROUGH, p. 247; C.C.R., 1296-1302, p. 175; 24 September 1298.
4. C.C.R., 1296-1302, p. 239; 2 April 1299; C.P.R., 1292-1301, p. 429; 1 August 1299.
5. C.P.R., 1292-1301, p. 449. This entry is vacated for a second, C.P.R., 1292-1301, p. 450, where the name John Ballard is substituted for Oger Mote.
Final comment on the campaigning in Guienne must be that the opposing forces, French and ducal, were too evenly balanced, though with French troops clearly having the military edge, for a decisive outcome. Ducal inadequacies must in great part be attributed to the severe handicaps imposed by the rival demands, distractions and commitments in Wales, Scotland and Flanders, which drained off resources which were desperately needed in, and would otherwise have been available for, the Gascon war. The seriousness of these distractions makes Langtoft's bitter criticism that Edward sacrificed Guienne quite unrealistic. Despite the deleterious effect of other theatres of war on the duchy, Henry de Lacy gradually managed to stabilise the conflict there. Although d'Artois did increase the momentum of the struggle for a time, and although he won the major single engagement of the war at Bellegarde, on the whole his campaign was restricted to the north of the duchy. Lacy brought a steadiness to the affairs of Guienne lacking since 1293 and reduced d'Artois to a war of attrition and economic blockade. After d'Artois' relief of Dax the war moved inexorably into stalemate.

The indicator of military activity was always the level of citadel-warfare, which comprised a series of sieges. This military form was traditional since the days of Henry of Anjou and his son King Richard. The English commanders automatically accepted the citadel as the backbone of defence and the springboard for attack; thus the care with which ducal generals established English rather than less experienced Gascons as castellans or garrison commanders in the fortified towns. They were usually tried soldiers. For example, Hugh de Vere, whom St-John had appointed governor of St-Sever on its capture in April 1295, was a man of substance who had participated in Edmund's treaty negotiations

1. He may still have been in command at St-Sever in August 1297, judging by the payment he made for Lacy to Amauri de La Zouche at St-Qiterie (supra, f.100).
in 1294 with the French queens and had been a witness of King Philip's promise to observe the marriage treaty.\(^1\) In 22 Edward I he led his own troop of 10 men-at-arms to Guienne;\(^2\) on 8 December 1295 Lacy, as newly appointed lieutenant, was ordered to consult particularly with him and St-John over compensations in the duchy for war-damage;\(^3\) and de Vere is also referred to as a co-guarantor with Lacy of the promised restoration to Geoffrey Rudel, lord of Blaye, of its 'vills and castle'.\(^4\) Even though he had had to surrender St-Sever to Charles of Valois, his defence had been so stout that he returned as its governor in re-occupying it about 21 July 1295.

John Giffard was to surrender Podensac ignominiously in March 1295, but his original appointment as its governor in 1294 followed a distinguished military career in Wales. The affair at Podensac which besmirched his record has been exaggerated by the chroniclers, for Edward later made him a member of the Prince of Wales' council of regency in 1297, which was not an appointment for a man in disgrace. Bourg and Blaye were two of the most vital appointments and also went to English soldiers. Accounts differ over who became governor when Bourg fell to the first expeditionary force in November 1294, but it was not a Gascon. According to the Worcester annals, Sir Elias de Hauville was appointed;\(^5\) Guisborough names Richard de Boyce.\(^6\) The soldier whose name figures most prominently is Richard Fitz-John; and as he was a member of Edmund's expedition, he may have succeeded Hauville or Boyce. He was captain of the

\(^1\) TRIVET, p.329; COTTON, p.232.
\(^2\) C47 2/10/3.
\(^3\) R.G.,4223; SC1 13/10.
\(^4\) R.G.,4133.
\(^5\) Annales de Wigornia, p.519. He led to Guienne a troop of 10 men-at-arms (C47 2/10/3).
\(^6\) p.244.
\(^7\) On 18 October 1295 he was about to set out for Gascony in the king's service (C.P.R., 1292-1301, p.155).
Bourg garrison by 9 December 1296, for on that date the King- duke wrote to him as such and to the mayor, jurats and troops of Bourg regarding the 'strait' in which they found themselves. 1 He was 'deceased' by August 1297, 2 and was succeeded by Roger La Ware, who was captain of the garrison during 26 Edward I. 3 La Ware had been in the south with Lacy prior to his appointment, as is evidenced by a letter of Edward dated 2 March 1297, which orders the honouring of bonds sealed jointly by Lacy and La Ware. 4 By 9 June 1298 he had of course been demobilised, being then referred to as ex-captain of Bourg. 5

The picture at Blaye is much the same. Here the two commanders were Roger de Mortimer, and later, Ralph Basset. Mortimer was installed on the initial ducal occupation in November 1294. 6 He led a troop of 12 men-at-arms to Guienne in 22 Edward I, 7 and may have had with him at Blaye another English stalwart, Simon de Montague, who was marshal of Blaye in 1298 and had earlier broken the French blockade of Bourg. Ralph Basset

1. R.G., 4262. Further references are made to him as captain of Bourg on 20 & 27 March 1297, firstly in a letter to chancellor John Langton in England requesting protections for men serving at Bourg (SC1 26/184); secondly in a letter of indebtedness to the treasurer Walter Langton (E101 154/10/39); also, 7 May 1297 in a royal letter on the appointment of Nicholas Barret and John of Gloucester as finance officers for Bourg and Blaye (R.G., 4380); and at other unspecified dates during the war a.r. 25 Edward I (E101 154/5/48 and R.G., 4932/33 & 34), these being joint letters of obligation with Barret.

2. On 5 August 1297 there is mention of his death on Gascon service (C.C.R., 1296-1302, p. 120).

3. i.e. from at least 20 November 1297 (C.C.R., 1296-1302, p. 350, entry under 30 April 1300).


5. R.G., 4908.

6. GUISBOROUGH, p. 244.

7. C47 2/10/3.
was a member of Edmund's expedition, like Fitz-John. Although he was
captain of Blaye in 1297 (May), 1 a letter from Edward dated 2 March 1297,
referred to above, mentions bonds jointly sealed also by Lacy and Basset,
which suggests that he also was earlier in the south of the duchy with
the earl, and that his appointment to Blaye was fairly recent. These
ducal citadels of St-Sever, Bourg and Blaye were then, firmly under
English command during the war. To them must be added, of course, Bayonne,
which was successively the military head-quarters of John de St-John
and Henry de Lacy.

Citadel warfare presented both besieger and besieged with innumerable
problems and difficulties, which sometimes proved insuperable. The two
English expeditionary forces each lacked the siege-engines to take
Bordeaux and had to by-pass the city for want of a popular reversion
as at Bourg and Blaye. Apart from the purely military problems of siege
or defence, logistical factors were often decisive. Although the statist-
ics of medieval chroniclers are notoriously suspect, the Worcester annals'
estimate that Charles of Valois lost 600 men-at-arms and 1500 foot in
nine weeks from disease and battle, while besieging St-Sever, does at
least indicate the hazards involved. For the defenders, if the enemy
maintained their encirclement, starvation soon became a decisive matter;
for in the duchy, food supplies were too limited to allow sufficiently
large stocks to be stored for a protracted resistance – the need to
ship grain from England in large quantities has already been noted. St-
Sever is a case in point. The formidable defence against Charles of
Valois by Hugh de Vere was ended for lack of victuals after a mere
nine or thirteen weeks. The effectiveness of war by starvation was
counter-balanced, however, by the time factor; a conquest of Guienne by
a lengthy series of sieges was in the long-term self-defeating for the
aggressor, who had to maintain sources and lines of supply. Thus, as noted,
shortage of food was a factor causing Lacy's abandonment of the siege

of Dax after about seven weeks in the summer of 1296. Similarly, the truce preceding Hugh de Vere's surrender of St-Sever was partly due to the besiegers' lack of food; most of the chroniclers ascribe the great French losses to famine and disease more than disease and battle. To maintain a besieging army in victuals put a strain on the local countryside which overstrained the Gascon economy. The staple of the duchy's economy being so predominantly its viticulture, it was dependent on England for basic foodstuffs such as grain, dairy-produce, and even fish. Moreover, these were years of grain shortage, as has been observed, and grain export from England was sometimes forbidden. The problems of feeding and equipping his armies in Guienne called for great efforts by King Edward, and these were matched in the duchy by Lacy and St-John in maintaining their citadels.

Finally, some mention may be made of the chivalric niceties and conventions of citadel warfare. By the terms of war, a besieged garrison was granted the right to a respite from siege while seeking relief from another fort. If this were not forthcoming within a stipulated period, the defenders laid down their arms or were to withdraw and hand over their defences. The terms of such surrender varied with the degree of extremity to which the garrison had been reduced; but the chivalric practice at least had the effect of saving unnecessary bloodshed, effort and loss of life. Instances of these conventions of war are numerous in the Gascon campaigns. For example, in October and November 1294 the French troops at Bourg and then Blaye had three days' grace for unforthcoming help from Raoul de Nesle, constable of France, at Bordeaux, before their promised capitulation. When St-John took Bayonne at the turn of 1294

1. TRIVET, pp. 336-7 on St-Sever, and p. 341 on Dax.
3. Ibid., 149.
4. Annales de Wigornia, p. 519; GUISBOROUGH.
the French garrison was allowed to withdraw leaving its castellan, Jordan Bertram as hostage. Similarly, the French garrison at St-Sever retired under truce following the rebellion of its citizens. Hugh de Vere in turn accepted at St-Sever a fifteen-day truce to seek aid from Bayonne and was then permitted a safe withdrawal of two days' march, which included military and personal baggage. Edmund gave the town of St-Macaire a three-day respite to require aid, unsuccessfully, of Bordeaux - although the garrison withdrew to the castle and continued its resistance until relieved by d'Artois. Also, there was the truce granted to Bourg by the lord de Sulliac, during which the defenders sent a plea to Blaye, which for once was rewarded with success in the relief of the town by Simon de Montague. The code of honourable warfare was observed in all phases of the Gascon conflict.

If the accepted mode of fighting was by traditional dictat of siege succeeding siege, the period of Lacy's command as capitaneus, however, saw the inauguration - perhaps his brainchild - of a new and devastating technique, the cavalry raid. The two forays deep into the Toulousain by Lacy's troops foreshadowed the more adventurous and far-ranging chevauchées of the Hundred Years War by Edward I's grandson and

1. GUISBOROUGH, p.245/KNIGHTON, pp.341-2. TRIVET, pp.334-5/RISHANGER, p.147 refer to St-John's imprisonment of the Lord of Aspremont and others in addition to the capture of two French galleys; but see EMMONT, cxlvii, n.8, where Aspremont appears as the royal governor and Sir Bertrand Jourdain de L'Isle as royalist (French) mayor - a mis-reading of 'Hemingburgh'?

2. GUISBOROUGH, p.245/KNIGHTON, p.342.


4. C/f. supra, f.49.

5. Ibid., 74.
great grandsons. In this regard Lacy broke new ground, introduced some new military thinking, which was to have momentous consequences in the next century. The Toulousain strikes were the first military emancipation in Western Europe from the smaller restrictive shell of the siege complex, which had epitomised the feudal age from which Europe was now beginning to emerge.

A sound, if unexceptional soldier, the earl of Lincoln was an excellent military organiser and a good capitaneus. A final assessment of the quality of his leadership must depend, however, on an analysis of the military resources available to him, which largely determined the fulfilment or otherwise of his potential. This is the task now to be undertaken.
CHAPTER IV

DUCAL MILITARY RESOURCES (a) ENGLISH.

During the entire period of his Gascon command as capitaneus the earl of Lincoln was severely restricted in fighting the war by inadequate military manpower. To understand the limitations imposed on his strategy calls for an examination of his English and Gascon troop-resources, the military loyalties of Gascony itself, the disposition of 'support' areas of recruitment, and of factors detrimental to a successful prosecution of the war in the duchy.

The one battle of the Gascon war was Bellegarde. The scale on which it was fought is to be gauged at first sight only by averaging the figures quoted by the chroniclers on the ducal side approximately 800 men-at-arms and rather less than 6,000 foot seem to have opposed a French force of over 900 men-at-arms and about 700 foot. To what extent these figures are reliable is a matter of conjecture; but a study of English recruitment and Gascon resources may provide a better idea of the size of ducal involvement at Bellegarde.

Estimates of English military resources available to Henry de Lacy appear at first sight to be essentially something of a guessing game. Béron has described the nature of the problem and classified it as unanswerable: 'Les Hôtes gascons ne permettent pas d'obtenir même une base de calcul approximatif; .... le nombre de lettres individuelles de protection et d'atteurnent dépasse le chiffre de 960; mais il y a dans ce nombre des clercs, appartenant au clergé régulier et séculier, qui ne pouvaient pas être des combattants, et beaucoup d'autres gens dont les

1. Ducal forces - GUIART, 13340-13356; nearly 1,000 men-at-arms and 7,000 foot; Anciennes Chroniques de Flandre, p. 357; 800 men-at-arms and 600 foot; GUISBOROUGH, p. 262; 600 men-at-arms and 10,000 foot.
French forces - GUIART, 13420 & 13422; 600 men-at-arms and 700 foot; Anciennes Chroniques de Flandre, p. 357; 700 men-at-arms and 700 foot 'with lances and arbalrestes'; GUISBOROUGH, p. 263; 1500 men-at-arms; 
(Continued
noms seuls nous sont maintenant connus et dont nous ne saurions dire la conditions sociales. Enfin nous ignorons absolument le chiffre des combattants fournis par chaque comté. Quant aux 'félon', leur nombre, on l'a vu, ne s'élève pas beaucoup au-dessus de 300 et, si l'on peut en trouver quelques autres égarés sur le rôle des lettres patentes ou ailleurs, la masse n'en saurait être notablement accrus. Force nous est donc d'avouer sur ce point notre ignorance, en ajoutant cette considération, plus décourageante encore, que, pour les évaluations de ce genre, le témoignage des chroniqueurs est en général sans autorités.\(^1\)

Bémont's pessimism seems to be borne out by the impossibility of calculating the size of ducal forces from the exchequer records. Total troop expenditures in the Gascon war do survive in the financial account of John Sandale and Thomas Cambridge, which was presented to the barons of the exchequer in 1314-15,\(^2\) and summaries of the Pipe Roll totals have been quoted by Bémont and reproduced in their turn by Powicke and Lot.\(^3\) Indeed, Bémont himself has also very usefully listed\(^4\) from the

Continued from f.112)

TRIVET, p.354: a 'great army'. Les Grandes Chroniques describe an equal contest between 700 men-at-arms and 5,000 foot on each side; Nangis estimates that 1,000 ducal men-at-arms fought 500 French; Langtoft and the Chronica de Melus inflate the numbers of French men-at-arms to 1,500 and 15,000 respectively. N.B. the relatively few French infantry.

1. BEMONT, cxxxix. Ferdinand Lot agrees with Bémont's conclusion in his own military survey (LOT, p.249).
2. Pipe Roll 8 Edward II (160) m.41 as quoted by Bémont; and E101 353/21.
3. BEMONT, clxvii - clxix; POWICKE, p.650; LOT, p.249, n.4. For a classification of payments see BEMONT, cxi, n.3.
4. BEMONT, cxi & n.
Pipe Roll the rates of military pay for the campaigns:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>English</th>
<th></th>
<th>Gascon</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>bannerets</td>
<td>4/- sterl. per day</td>
<td>bannerets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>knights</td>
<td>2/-</td>
<td></td>
<td>knights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>troopers</td>
<td>1/-</td>
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<td>troopers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Distinctions of rank and service have been outlined usefully by Morris.¹

The military designation 'banneret' described a knight who led a body of men-at-arms or homines ad armas, - 'a generic term for all heavy cavalry, knights included'. The chronicle term was often armati. As distinct from the banneret, the undistinguished knight was classified as the miles simplex in the Pipe Roll. Troopers are there called scutifer and serviens ad arma. Elsewhere troopers, 'the horsemen next to the knights, the rank and file of the heavy cavalry', are referred to as armigeri or valetti. The term scutifer - sometimes a young man of good birth acting as a squire prior to eventual knighthood² - appears more commonly in the pay rolls and refers especially to mercenary troops. The term serviens ad arma was applied to troopers of the same class who served in feudal retinues as distinct from paid corps. An armiger meant sometimes 'young esquires of good birth', sometimes just a trooper.² The name valetus appears in horse inventories to describe the same young gentlemen. A simple distinction between mounted and foot soldiers, pedites, was made by the use of the terms serviens ad arma and serviens respectively. In the Pipe Roll under consideration the three categories are applied equally and without distinction to English and Gascons alike.

For infantry, the Pipe Roll lays down wages of 4d st. per day for a

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1. MORRIS, pp. 50-51, 71.
2. A young Gascon gentleman of this standing was a domicellus.
commander of 20 English foot archers (a vintenarius), 2d st. per day for an unranked English archer (a sagittarius), and 1/- chip. per day for foot soldiers of Gascony, Spain, Aragon, Catalonia and elsewhere who bore crossbow, lance, dart or other weaponry.

In the light of total pay expenditures and known rates of pay - 5 chipotenses being specified in the Pipe Roll to equal 1 sterling - is it possible, then, to calculate the approximate size of ducal forces engaged in the war?

On closer examination, however, the exchequer records are inadequate because the classifications are not sufficiently specific or precise for conclusions of any value to be drawn. The itemized account of military expenditure is from 11 November 1294, when Sandale and Cambridge began paying the wages of English mercenaries in the Gascon war, to 24 March 1298, 'quo die dicta guerra fines cepit'. Apart from wages to non-combatants, the following totals are presented:

- To wages of English knights and troopers - £37,851 16s 7½d st.,
- " " Gascon " " - £137,595 2s 9d st.,
- " " infantry (unspecified) - £17,928 1s 9d st.

From this it is clear that the infantry total is a composite one, including English, Gascon and Iberian soldiers, that the numbers of English foot in this combined total must have been quite small, and that the English expeditionary forces must have been predominantly equestrian.¹ Foot soldiers tended to be recruited in Gascony. It will be recalled that, when English garrisons were established in the citadels, the infantry of the garrisons were local soldiers.² The débâcle at Rions in 1295 when John of Brittany precipitately attempted a withdrawal down-river reinforces this impression, English men-at-arms in the affair being juxtaposed in chronicle accounts with Gascon foot.³

1. Particular mention is made of the landing of the expeditions' horses at Rions in 1294 and at Castillon in 1296 (GUISOBRUGH, p.245/KNIGHTON, p.341; Rhodes, op. cit., 232; Flores Historiarum, iii, p.285).
2. The English captains of Bourg and Blaye were established in 1294 'cum populo terrae multo' (GUISOBRUGH, p.244/KNIGHTON, p.341). (Continued)
Thus, although pay-rates and wage-totals are known, it is apparent that no calculation can be made of English infantry numbers. Nevertheless, Bémont's unqualified pessimism over the possibility of estimating English troop numbers as a whole is unjustified; for his disqualification does not apply to the most important of the ducal forces, the English men-at-arms. Calculations are possible for English cavalry, because they are accounted separately from the Gascon. By analysis of the surviving records, especially the Gascon rolls, a compilation can be produced of English men-at-arms, who comprised the fighting core of ducal forces in Guienne. From the same sources it is also possible to compare the numbers of English men-at-arms available for the Gascon war, as first planned in 1294 and as later scaled down in 1295-6.

The task, then, is to reconstruct the English cavalry resources available to Henry de Lacy as capite in 1296-8 by a compilation of the two expeditionary forces, less their losses in war and repatriations.

The Gascon rolls furnish copious details of English men-at-arms destined in 1294 for the war in Guienne. These are found under six groupings: writs of military summons (211 entries), letters of protection (541 entries), letters of attorney (225 entries), letters in respect of debts (367 entries), letters in respect of pleas (51 entries) and letters concerning the release of 'felons' (310 entries). In addition, general as distinct from individual writs of military summons for those holding in capite of the King are enrolled under R.G., 3448-9 and the later postponement under 3682.

Continued from f.115):
1. BÉMONTE (cxxxix): 'On y (the Gascon rolls) a transcrit deux listes de personnes évidemment nobles, convoquées à l'armée par lettres individuelles: l'une est de 120 noms, l'autre de 139 et la plupart des noms de la première se retrouvent dans la seconde.' This is incorrect. Sixty-one names of the first list (3416-23) are of nobles summoned to the Great Council at Westminster in June 1294 (3421-2); entries 3420 & 3423 are letters on other matters. Only 59 entries (3416-19) are military writs.
2. Numbers here match Bémont's (c/f. supra, f.113).
It is reasonable to assume that the great majority of those whose names appear under the above six headings did tranship; and indeed, there is considerable corroborating evidence from other sources, including the chronicles, of the names of men-at-arms who 'were serving' or 'had served' in the duchy. A particular mine of information in this regard are the lists in the Gascon rolls of those in the duchy on the King's service, who were on that account to receive quittance of the tenth, eleventh or twelfth granted by the laity of England to the King in the November of 1294, 1295 and 1296. Other entries in the Patent and Close rolls etc. further substantiate records of Gascon service. It is by the combined use of all these rolls, of the chronicles, and also of chancery and exchequer records that the task of reconstructing the size of Lacy's force of men-at-arms is here undertaken. It will be done firstly, by establishing how many were listed as going to Gascony to serve in the King-duce's war; and secondly, by ascertaining how many are on record as actually having done so.

The most comprehensive heading and thus the best basis for calculating the numbers of those going to Gascony in 1294 is the second-mentioned, namely, letters of protection. They provide the names of 939 individuals bound for Guienne; and even after deductions for duplicate entries (80), clerics and non-combatants (28) and seamen (64), the final total of 767 individual military protections is still the fullest record. The names of those 767 individuals are also found to recur in the other categories - letters of attorney, letters in respect of debts, letters in respect of pleas. Protections provide not only the fullest information on the numbers of troops going to Guienne, but are also more reliable than writs of military summons; for soldiers may have been summoned to muster, but it is another matter whether they answered the call.

Letters of protection seem normally to have been issued prospectively, on the advance notice and request of troop-leaders (bannerets), who
already in this period were raising companies on the indenture system. Protections gave a normal legal immunity for the period of active service. Bémont has already considered the elements of protection with the clause *volumus*, which is the appropriate form here. It is best seen in the Gascon rolls in entry 2711, a protection for James de La Plancher: 'Volumus quod idem Jacobus interim sit quietus de omnibus placitis et querelas, exceptis placitis de dote, unde nichil habet et quare impedet, et assisis move disseisine et ultime presentacionis.' A letter of protection was, then, essentially a normal legal cover-note.

Morris has summarised the current prevailing system of protections as follows: 'not every soldier had a protection, and .... the clerk who drew up the roll of the year did not necessarily enter the names of all those who actually had them. ... When we can make a comparison with the extant cavalry pay-roll of 1295, or with the inventories of horses in 1298, it is seen that usually about one-third, occasionally a much smaller proportion, occasionally as many as two-thirds or three-quarters of the men-at-arms of some retinue, had protections. But in the particular instance of the campaign of 1294 I believe that some retinues are entered in full, those of the Earls of Lancaster and Warwick in particular, for the figures correspond very well in their cases to the undoubted numbers of their retinues in other wars..... I suggest that the clerk of the roll entered at various dates the names of all the followers who then and there were in their leader's retinue with the king, and the reason why the list is so full, being much more exhaustive than those

2. BEMONT, xvi.
3. Bémont has the same quotation from letters of protection to barons of the port of Sandwich (R.G., 2691).
4. MORRIS, pp. 245-6.
of the rolls of most wars, is that the retinues were already in arms for Gascony.¹

Morris is writing of the Welsh campaigns, but his last sentence describes exactly the situation of the troops at Portsmouth in 1294, in the presence and under the direction of Edward and his clerks, from June to September. The retinues were mustered, in arms, and could physically be counted and enrolled on the spot. The letters of protection were issued at Portsmouth or in its vicinity and in some cases tested per ipsum regem. The second force retinues of 1295–6 were probably in the same situation; probably still in arms after campaigning in Wales. Certainly, they would have been fully known to the royal clerks by now; and so the full retinues of the impending second expedition would again have been entered by the clerk of the roll.

Thus, it may be taken that the protection lists of 1294–6 of troops going to Guienne record the great majority of the men-at-arms, apart from late-arrivals; and the task of reconstructing the size of the two expeditionary forces, largely on the basis of letters of protection, is a practical proposition.

Many who were granted letters of protection in 1294 for Gascon service did not in fact take ship there after all, because of the Welsh rising. These were troops in the companies of Edmund and Lacy who comprised the second stage of the invasion force. However, the balance of the Gascon protections listed, which fall in the period 10 July–20 October and 8 June–10 July 1294, may still be drawn on to discover the membership of the first expeditionary force which went to Guienne as planned in that first year of the war.

¹ My italics.
THE FIRST EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

Entries relating to troops in the first expeditionary force led by John of Brittany and John de St-John in 1294 are as follows:


From protections-lists and from a separate, unpublished document which corroborates and supplements them, the two major companies of the first expeditionary force can be established as follows:

1. **C47 2/10/3.** This is purely a list of bannerets which is entitled 'Isti subscripti profecturi sunt primo passuagio cum domino Johanne de Sancti Johanne'. From this document, it is apparent that a number of bannerets whose names appear in the 1294 lists of protections, but are not there identified as members of the companies of Brittany and St-John, can be so identified in this list. The document names chiefly bannerets; but by reference to the Gascon rolls where the names of men-at-arms accompanying them are listed, it is possible to re-discover further troops of soldiers destined for the duchy with Brittany and St-John.

2. In the lists of troops which are compiled throughout this chapter, bannerets are classified under the letter A, their secondary and subsidiary bannerets or troop-leaders under B, C and, if necessary, D in turn. The names of troopers follow their appropriate bannerets or, if not identifiable as troop-members, are listed as individuals. Where letters of protection were granted, this indicated by the entry number from the Gascon rolls.
with John of Brittany (R.G., 2714)

A: Guy Ferrer (2790/2808/2925) and 2272 Philip le Spicer of Oxford.

Hugh of Audley (2867/2910) and 2305 William of Hosedwell.

Robert of Halloughton (2866) and 2232 Adam of St. Albans, 2910 John of Swinnerton.

Robert of Pinkney (2817/2849) and 2256/2817 Robert the marshal, 2258/2817

William Passlow (valet of Robert de Pinkney);

B: John Heron (2810) and 2300 William le Waleys.

A: William Latimer (2843/4289) and 2304 Henry de Mauley, 2343 Geoffrey de Capellis of Haverhill, 2378/2890 Roger Basset of Drayton, 2379 John of Somersham, 2844/2917 Thomas Latimer of Westwarden, 2908/2916 Henry of Legbourne 2, 2840/2909 Ralph Fitz-William 3, 2918 John Raleigh 4, 2926 Thomas of Steeton, 2919 John of Twenge;

B: Marmaduke of Twenge (2346/3876) and 2348 John of Westbeck, 2349 Raoul de La More, 2350 Robert the constable.

1. It will be noted that men-at-arms are alternatively stated to be going to Gascony either 'with' or 'in the company of' a commander. This distinction made in the Gascon rolls has no significance. Entry 2512 seems to indicate that comitiva might be considered a larger military unit than the troop; soldiers going 'with' another 'in the company of', for example, Edmund; or, if 'with' Edmund, as members of his personal retinue. But the size of a comitiva is unclear. In entry 4266, for example, four soldiers are named as 'in comitiva ... Roberti Tybotot'. Again, Philip Chauncy went to Gascony 'with' William de Ross (4351, quittance); whereas, Alexander Cheverel went 'in comitiva... Johannis de Mongue'. Records on Ross and de Moun (c/f. ff. 122, 137, 145, 152) suggest that the latter was the more eminent banneret. Yet, the indiscriminate or loose use of the two terms in, for example, entries 4341 & 4347, where Roger Bardolf is said to have gone to Gascony 'with' Hugh Bardolf, but stayed there 'in comitiva Hugonis', shows there is no essential distinction between the two terms and no significance in their use. The term comitiva could be merely a feudal usage referring to comital or baronial quotas, as discussed by Morris, but in a period of increasing resort to paid levies, anachronistic.
Individuals:
2253 Geoffrey of Staines, 2254 William the marshal of Stanstead, 2255
Richard of Poslingworth, 2513 Henry Peverel, 2826 Robert of Crepping,
2767/2910 Thomas of Burwell and 2866 John of Enfield.

(Additionally, two clerics: 2815/2862 John of Granges, parson, of Swaffham;
2815/2861 Peter Gerrer, parson, of Malteby.

one non-combatant: 2257/2852 Richard the chamberlain).

The total number of men-at-arms here listed as accompanying John of
Brittany to Gascony is thus 34, including 2 marshals and 1 constable. 1

with John de St-John (R.G., 2875)

A: Hugh de Vere (2796/2868) and 2797/2869 Simon of Sherstead, 2869: William
Bauns, William of Dething, Hugh of Patemere, John Carbonel, William of
Birchey, William of Lindsey, Thomas Aucher (Archer?), Guy of Shenfield;
B: Gilbert de Peche (2904) and 2263 Hugh Randolf, 2358 John of Gestingthorp,
2359 John of Willoughby, 2360 Thomas of Lee, 2905 John of Mollington.
A: John of Pulburn (2720/2921) and 2733: Andrew of Fulburn, Robert of
Sherborne.
B: John Husé 2 (2874) and 2881 John of Upton.
A: John Rivers (2248/2748/2901) and 2900 Richard de Ringwood of Reading,
2902 Simon de Creye.
John de Moun (2855/4297) and 2328 Roger of Arundel, 2890 William Basset
of Drayton.

Continued from f.121:
2. Recorded later in the year as in the troop of John Wake in the
company of Edmund (2500).
3. Ibid. 4. Likewise, but with Roger de Mowbray (2512)
1. REMONT, cxxiv: 'Je compte... à la suite de Jean de Bretagne, 17
personnes, dont 1 prêtre.'
2. Husé was subsidiary troop-leader to John de Seymour, not John of
Fulburn (see infra, f.129).
A: Roger de Mortimer (2886) and 2324 William Cook of London, 2339/2887
Robert of Turbeville, 2344 John Toop, 2887; John Caen, Raoul Liulf, Roger
d'Evreux, Thomas of Eton, Richard Labank, Hugh Goddard, John de Mortimer,
Walter of Robertabridge, Henry de Mortimer.
Thomas de Turbeville (7259 sic) and 2286 Hugh of Pembbridge, 2352
Gilbert of Clayhanger, 2828 Vincent of Gloucester, 2288 six Welshmen.
B: John de La Mare 2 (2717/2895) and 2891 Thomas of Lithington, 2892
William Gubinn, 2910 Roger Savage.
A: Robert Achard (2371).
John Tregoz (2713) and 2302 Roger Payne, 2303 Gilbert of Stubbington,
2870; William of Harptree, Thomas of Gurney, Hugh of Gurney, 2889 Laurence
of Hamilton;
B: Miles Pichard (2829/2854) and 2871 Gilbert of Ashendon.
A: Alan de La Zouche (2792) and 2316 William of Diseworth, 2317 Peter de
Northborough of Segrave, 2318 John Masce, 2323 Henry Bosse, 2788 Amauri
de La Zouche, 2822/2866 Robert Fitz-Neal.
Amer of St. Edmunds (2712) and 2321 Thomas of St. Edmunds, 2926 Thomas
of Foscot.
Raoul de Gorges (2722) and 2534 (attorney) / 2726 William de Lisle, 2723
Gilbert d'Amery.
John of Sudeley (2716) and 2363 William Russell of Winchecombe, 2715
John Peche, 2719 John Neel, 2866; William of Sudeley, Robert of Wandsworth,
William of Hamburg and William of Sloutre (Slough?).
Hugh d'Odingseleg (2718) and 2330 William Maskerel.
Richard of Wells (2864).
John of Straitling (3449/110 military summons).

1. The traitor of 1295 who was captured by the French at Rions and
was released by King Philip to spy for him on return to England.
2. He was a subsidiary troop - leader of Hugh de Vere, not of Turbeville
(see infra, f. 113).  
3. Marshal of John of Brittany's forces at Rions and captured there in
1295.
As James de La Planche (2711) and 2212/2758 Eustace d'Avesnes, 2298 John Nel of Tepsham, 2322 Richard of Chadwell.

John Lestrange (2781) and 2224 John le Vek of Ipswich, 2782 Humphrey de Beauchamp, 2225 Thomas Fitz–Robert of Cockington, 2896 John of Knockin, Snr., 2897 Madoc of Crutocce, 2898 John of Knockin, 2899 William of Eton, 2866 Robert Body;

B: Fulk Lestrange (2299/2746) and 2794 Thomas Godfrey.

As Henry of Bottingham (2749/2882).


Gilbert of Bridgesheale (2791) and 2230 John Gascelyn.

Stephan Fitz–Walter (2750).

Arnold of Montignac (2879).

Philip of Watersdon (2872).

Robert Giffard (3449/120 military summons).


William de Cantilupe (2761) and 2233 William of Hamme, 2762 John of Hamme, 2763 William of Waldingfield, Robert of Hildercole.

John of Engayne (2825; going to Gascony with Henry de Lacy, Earl).

1. James de La Planche, and thus presumably his troop, did not go to Guienne in 1294. He was in Edmund’s company in 1295–6 (R.G., 4178 of June 1296).
As Roger de Leyburn (2913) and 2910 Nicholas of Legbourne (Leyburn?), 2914 John of Longville.

Raoul de Toci (2222/2721) and 2219 Peter le Brun, John Ace, 2333 Thomas son of William l'Espicer of Oxford, 2832 Maurice of Stobhill, 2833 Robert of Leicester, 2890 John de Montaut;

James of Keating (2890) and 2243 Richard Keating, 2297 Robert Talbot, 2320 William Burnel, 2327 Geoffrey Makepace, 2930 Adam of Keating, Nicholas of Keating, William Fitz-Geoffrey of Keating, Peter of Staunton.

Geoffrey of Wells (2863).

Thomas of Maidenhead (2284).

Robert Tiptoft (2770) and 2217 Thomas Breton, 2771 Roger of Thornton, 2866 Nichols le Vel, 2880 Walter of Orwell, 2912 Reginald of Basing, 2776 Simon of Cuckfield, 2773 John de Moigne, 2779 Baldwin de Maners.

The Earl of Cornwall.

John Lovel the bastard, of Snotescomb (2289/2858) and 2301 Philip Fitz-Philip d'Estneye.

Bartholomew of Badlesmere (2214) and 2252 Robert Fitz-Jordan of Kendall.

William de Creye (2747/2903)

Thomas of Havering (2287).

Individuals:


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1. William of Draycot did not go to Gascony in 1294. Under entry 3915/5 he is listed as about to go there with Roger de Montaut on 19 October 1295.
de la Coudre, Raoul Fitz-Michael, Albert Fulbert, Raoul Westhouse, John of Basing, John son of John de St-John, Thomas Paynel, Thomas of Chaucombe, Nicholas Gentil, 2906 John Le Roux of Lambton, 2922 Richard Piers, 2923 Walter of Dee, 2928 Adam of Kersey;

Valets: 2493 John of London; Peter Bluet, John of Geycon; 2760 Grimbaud Pauncefot and companion; Robert of Crepping, James of St. Guy, Able de Mouns, Henry de Bevillard;

Others: James of Germany, Raoul d'Escuns (?).

(Additionally, eight clerics: 2208/2353/2907 Robert Peus parson, of Bokeland, Rivers; 2354 Henry of Selbourne, chaplain; Raoul de Ho (Hooe?), vicar of Wymering; 2242 Geoffrey Dolyn of Totton, clerk with John de Moun; 2887 Richard Dun, chaplain with Roger de Mortimer; 2823 Henry of Llancarvan, clerk with Fulk L'Estrange, 2221 Henry of Walworth, parson of St. George, Southwark, with Adam de Cretting; 2236 Raoul, vicar of East Greenwich, with Adam de Cretting.

seven non-combatants: 2210 Henry the barber of Hereford;

2869 John le Ginour (the engineer) with Hugh de Vere; 2245 Simon the baker, with Adam de Cretting; 2292 Henry le Paneter (pantler/steward) of Newton, with Adam de Cretting; 2325/2365 Robert of the chamber, with Roger de Leyburn; 2887 Richard Paneter, with Roger de Mortimer; and 2890 John the tailor, with Raoul de Toeni)

The total number of men-at-arms here listed as accompanying John de St-John to Guienne is thus 212, including one marshal, but excluding James de La Planche and his troop and William Draycot who did not go.

1. Robert Peus appears again (4379, 20 May 1297), when John de St-John was already a prisoner of war, being granted protection as clerk of John son of St-John, 'qui in obsequium regis per preceptum regis ad eundem Johannem (the son) prefecturus est ad partes Vasconie'. He had presumably returned to England after St-John's capture, or had not gone with him in 1294 after all.

2. BEMONT, cxxxiv: 'Je compte .... à la suite de Jean de Saint-John, 50 personnes, don't 1 chapeleain, 1 clerç, 1 prêtre. There are in fact 60 listed in the Gascen rolls excluding clerics & non-combatants.
Together with the 34 men-at-arms who accompanied John of Brittany, which were first listed, this gives a total of 250. However, 12 of those listed with John de St-John are not on record as receiving letters of protection and, in the present absence of other corroborating evidence, cannot therefore be included as definite members of the first expeditionary force. By subtracting these 12, a total of 238 men-at-arms is arrived at, as accompanying John of Brittany and John de St-John to Guienne with the first force in 1294. The chronicles, it will be recalled, recorded variously 500 men-at-arms (armatos) and 7,000 men-at-arms (loricati). 1

It is a matter of no small interest to know if the 238 men-at-arms listed above did actually cross to the duchy. The records of quite a number of them confirm that they did. These records are next set down here 2, firstly the bannerets, secondly the troopers.

Bannerets.

William Latimer - 9/10 October 1294 sailed for Guienne (GUISBOROUGH, p. 244); 15 September 1295 in Gascony (R.G., 3960); December 1295 second-in-command (?) to John of Brittany at Rions (GUISBOROUGH, pp. 245-6); 14 April 1296 at Langon with Edmund of Lancaster, Lacy, Brittany and St-John (C47 25/1/18); 26 December 1296 in Gascony (C.C.R., p. 7); 20 January 1297 in Gascony (ibid., p. 8) and OF THE FIRST EXPEDITIONARY FORCE (R.G., 4278/4292 vacated/4289).

1. GUISBOROUGH, p. 244; Annales de Wigornia, p. 519.
2. The Calendars of Patent and Close rolls are for the years 1292-1301 and 1296-1302, unless otherwise indicated; quittance numbers are from the Gascon rolls.
Raoul de Gorges – 9/10 October 1294 sailed for Guienne (BEMONT, xlvi; Knighton, I, p.344; Hemingburgh, II, p.50); 5 March 1295 marshal at Rions (GUISBOROUGH, p.246); 6/7 April 1295 captured at Rions (ibid., p.247; TRIVET, p.336; C.C.R., p.103); 28 December 1296 'in Gascony' (C.C.R., p.7); 4 February 1297 OF THE FIRST EXPEDITIONARY FORCE in Gascony; quittance (4329); 9 May 1297 'deceased' (C.C.R., p.28); 14 May 1308 ref. to past Gascon service (C.C.R., 1307-13, p.34).

Robert Tiptoft – 9/10 October 1294 sailed for Guienne (Eulogium Historiarum, p.158; TRIVET, p.331); March/April 1295 at Rions (TRIVET, p.336); 26 April 1295 at Blaye (El01 152/8/1); 21 November 1295 in Gascony; quittance (4210); 15 January 1296 in Gascony (R.G., 4138); 22, 26, 28 December 1296 in Gascony (C.C.R., pp.6-7); 30 December 1296 in Gascony (R.G., 4266, 4309-12); 14 January 1297 in Gascony (R.G., 4282); 6 February 1297 in Gascony; remission of debts (R.G., 4447); 1 March 1297 party to a marriage contract at Bayonne (C.P.R., p.346).

Raoul de Toeni – 9/10 October 1294 sailed for Guienne (Eulogium Historiarum, p.158); April 1295 captured at Rions (TRIVET, p.336; GUISBOROUGH, p.247).

Adam de Creting – 9/10 October 1294 sailed for Guienne (Eulogium Historiarum, p.158); 7 April 1295 killed at Rions (TRIVET, p.336); ref. to his death in Gascony (C.C.R., 1302-7, p.264); 7 April 1296 ref. to his presence before Bordeaux with the first expeditionary force (C47 2/13/1).

Guy Ferre – 26 December 1296 in Gascony (C.C.R., p.7); 26 Edward I at Bourg (C.C.R., p.350, under 30 April 1300).

Hugh of Audeley – 28 January 1297 in Gascony; quittance (4307); 29 January 1297 in Gascony (C.C.R., p.8); 2 April/1 August 1299 ref. to his capture and imprisonment in France (C.C.R., p.239; C.P.R., p.429).
Robert of Halloughton - 21 November 1295 in Gascony: quittance (4206); 8 February 1297 ditto (4343); 10 March 1298 past Gascon service (E101 154/15/3); 4 April 1305 ditto (R.G., 4919/21).

Thomas of Havering - 13 March 1298 bond at Bayonne for Gascon service (E101 154/15/13).

Philip of Watersdon - 25 February 1297 OF THE FIRST EXPEDITIONARY FORCE in Gascony: quittance (4355); January 1297 killed at Bellegarde (COTTON, p. 319).

Hugh de Vere - 7 April 1295 governor St-Sever (TRIVET, p. 336; GUISBOROUGH, p. 245); April–July 1295 at St-Sever (TRIVET, p. 336; GUISBOROUGH, pp. 247–8); 21 November 1295 in Gascony: quittance (4210); 18 January 1296 ditto (4227); 26 December 1296 in Gascony (C.C.R., p. 6); 10 January 1297 in Gascony: quittance (4270); 14 January 1297 in Gascony (R.G., 4276); 22 July 1297 in Gascony (C.C.R., p. 47); 24 July 1297 in Gascony (R.G., 4495); 1 April 1300 past Gascon service 'during the entire war' (E101 155/2/3).

Gilbert de Pecche - 8 October 1295 in Gascony (R.G., 3968); 22 June 1296 in Gascony (E101 155/1/18); 17 January 1297 in Gascony (C.C.R., p. 8); 22 January 1297 OF THE FIRST EXPEDITIONARY FORCE in Gascony: quittance (4300).

John of Fulburn - 6 April 1295 captured at Rions (GUIBOROUGH, p. 247); 21 November 1295 in Gascony: quittance (4210); 26 December 1296 in Gascony (C.C.R., p. 7); 1 January 1297 in Gascony: quittance (4268/4277).

John Husé - 18 January 1296 in Gascony: quittance (4227); 29 January 1297 with John de Seymour in Gascony (C.C.R., p. 8) and OF THE FIRST EXPEDITIONARY FORCE: quittance (4318 vacated); 2 February 1297 in Gascony: quittance (4320); 4 February 1297 in Gascony (C.C.R., p. 83).

John Rivers - 8 February 1297 OF THE FIRST EXPEDITIONARY FORCE in Gascony: quittance (4342); 14 March 1298 bond at Bayonne (E101 155/2/4); 1 April 1300 past Gascon service (C.P.R., p. 506); 14 February 1301 ditto (ibid., p. 571).
John de Moun - 28 December 1296 in Gascony (C.C.R., p.7); 18 January 1297/13 April 1297 in Gascony in the company of St-John's quittance (4279/4279); 24 March and 18 April 1297 in Gascony (C.C.R., pp.22 and 98); 28 August 1297 in Gascony (R.G., 4390, attorney); 22 September 1297 account for Gascon service (BEMONT, clvii, n.1: E101 6/21/m.11); 10 June 1304 past Gascon service (C.P.R., 1301-7, p.231).

Roger de Mortimer - late November 1294 at St-Macaire with the first expeditionary force (C47 25/1/19); late 1294 captain of Blaye garrison (Annales de Wigornia, p.519); 25 August 1295 in Gascony quittance (3955); ditto (4321); 14 February 1301 past Gascon service (C.P.R., p.571).

Thomas de Turbeville - 6 April 1295 captured at Rions (GUISBOROUGH, p.247). John de La Mare - 2 January 1297 in Gascony (C.C.R., p.8); 22 January 1297 OF THE FIRST EXPEDITIONARY FORCE in Gascony quittance (4299).

John Tregoz - 20 March 1296 HAD BEEN in Gascon service (returned?); quittance (4211); 27 May 1303 past Gascon service (C.P.R., 1301-7, p.145).

Alan de La Zouche - 15 September 1295 in Gascony quittance (3961); 28 March 1296 before Bordeaux (TRIVET, p.341); 28 August 1297 in Gascony (at St-Quiterie?) and in service until at least the end of September 1297 (E101 155/2/2).

Aymer of St.Edmunds - late November 1294 at St-Macaire (?) (C47 25/1/19); April 1295 captured at Rions (TRIVET, p.336; GUISBOROUGH, p.247); 26 January 1297 OF THE FIRST EXPEDITIONARY FORCE in Gascony quittance (4303); 8 February 1297 ditto (4350).

John of Sudley - November 1294 before Bordeaux with the first expeditionary force (Annales de Wigornia, p.519); 15 April 1297 OF THE FIRST EXPEDITIONARY FORCE in Gascony quittance (4361); 18 April 1297 in Gascony (R.G., 4369); 5 April 1305 past Gascon service (E101 155/2/5).

1. A claim in 26 Edward I by the town of St-Macaire to John of Cambridge for compensation for damages and provisioning when the first expeditionary force took the town.
Hugh d'Odingseles - 15 September 1295 in Gascony:quittance (3959);
8 February 1297 ditto (4333); 13 March 1298 bond at Bayonne (E101 154/11/7; BEMONT, clxii, n.2); 6 May 1307 past Gascon service (C.C.R., 1302-7, p. 499); 23 October 1321 ditto (C.C.R., 1318-23, p. 405).

John of Straitling - 1305 past Gascon service (Memoranda de Parlamento, 1305, p. 88).¹

John Lestrange - 21 November 1295 in Gascony:quittance (4210); 3 January 1297 in Gascony (C.C.R., p. 8) and quittance (4267); 11 March 1298 pay arrears at Bayonne (E101 153/7/11).

Henry of Bottringham/Bodrugan - April 1295 captured at Rions (GUISHBOROUGH, p. 247; Boyding).

Elias de Hauville - November 1294 captain of Bourg garrison (Annales de Wigornia, p. 519);² 29 September 1304 past Gascon service (C.P.R., 1301-7, p. 260).

Gilbert of Brideshale - 9 December 1296 in Bourg garrison (R.G., 4262 and Archives hist. Gironde, XIII, 386); 24 October 1297 OF THE FIRST EXPEDITIONARY FORCE in Gascony:quittance (4503).

Stephan Fitz-Walter - summer 1295 died in the siege of St-Sever (Annales de Wigornia, p. 525).

Arnold of Montignac - 4 January 1297 in Gascony (C.C.R., p. 8); 8 February 1297 in Gascony:quittance (4336); 13 March 1298 paid at Bayonne (E101 153/7/12).

William de/le Cantilupe - 10 January 1297 in Gascony:quittance (4275).

Roger de Leyburn - April 1295 captured at Rions (TRIVET, p. 336; GUISHBOROUGH, p. 247).

Geoffrey of Wells - 8 September 1295 in Gascony:respite debts (R.G., 3962-3).

¹ Memoranda de Parlamento, 1305, ed. F.W. Maitland, Rolls Series, 1893.
² C/f. supra, f. 106.
Thomas of Maidenhead - 4 January 1297 in Gascony (C.C.R., p.8); 22 January 1297 OF THE FIRST EXPEDITIONARY FORCE in Gascony; quittance (4298); 4 April 1305 past Gascon service (R.G., 4919/12).

John Lovel of Snetescombe - 28 January 1297 in Gascony; quittance (4313).

John Heron - 8 February 1297 OF THE FIRST EXPEDITIONARY FORCE in Gascony; quittance (4353).

Marmaduke Twenge - 21 November 1295 in Gascony; quittance (4210).

Troopers.

(with John of Brittany):

John of Enfield - 18 March 1298 bond at Bayonne (E101 154/14/18); 3 April 1305 past Gascon service (R.G., 4906).

(with John de St—John):

Peter de Champagne - 18 January 1296 in Gascony; quittance (4227); Richard of Burhunt - ditto; 2 February 1297 in Gascony; quittance (4320); John du Boyce - 21 February 1297 bond at Bayonne (E101 155/11/8); John de Roches - 14 January 1297 in Gascony; quittance (4285); January 1297 captured at Bellegarde (COTTON, p. 319; Ross);

William of Petton - captured at Bellegarde (ibid., s Pontone);

John son of John de St—John - July 1297 at Saut (E101 152/14/9); 24 September 1297 at Bayonne (E101 152/14/9; 153/7/9; 155/2/6);

Thomas of Chaucombe - 18 January 1296 in Gascony; quittance (4227);

John of London - 9 December 1296 at Bourg (R.G., 4262); 17 March 1299 past Gascon service (C.P.R., p. 398); 4 April 1305 past service in the Bourg garrison (R.G., 4919/13);

Grimbaud Pauncefot - 1 March 1297 in Gascony; quittance (4359); 1 April 1297 in Gascony; respite of debts (R.G., 4367).

(with Hugh de Vere):

Simon of Sherstead - 14 January 1297 OF THE FIRST EXPEDITIONARY FORCE in Gascony; quittance (4276);
Roger Savage\(^1\) — ditto;

William Baum — 18 January 1296 in Gascony:quittance(4227); 26 December 1296 in Gascony(C.C.R., p.6); 8 February 1297 in Gascony:quittance(4334);

William of Dething/Detting — 24 July 1297 OF THE FIRST EXPEDITIONARY FORCE in Gascony:respite of debts(R.G., 4495);

John Carbonel — 18 January 1296 in Gascony:quittance(4227); 26 December 1296 in Gascony(C.C.R., p.6); 8 February 1297 in Gascony:quittance(4334).

(with Gilbert de Peche);

John of Mollington — 8 October 1295 in Gascony:respite of debts(R.G., 3968); 11/22 March 1298 paid at Bayonne(E101 153/7/11 and 153/7/13).

(with Robert Tiptoft);

Reginald Basing — by 3 February 1297 captive in a French prison(C.P.R., pp.231-2);

Roger of Thornton and Simon of Cuckfield — 21 November 1295 in Gascony:quittance(4210); 28 December 1296 in Gascony(C.C.R., pp.7-8); 30 December 1296 OF THE FIRST EXPEDITIONARY FORCE in Gascony:quittances(4266, 4311, 4312);

John de-le Moigne and Baldwin de Maners — 21 November 1295 in Gascony:quittance(4205); 28 December 1296 in Gascony(C.C.R., p.7); 30 December 1296 OF THE FIRST EXPEDITIONARY FORCE in Gascony:quittances(4266, 4311, 4312);

(with Alan de La Zouche);

Amauri de La Zouche — 28 August 1297 at St-Quiterie. Gascon service until at least 30 September 1297(E101 155/2/2);

Robert Fitz-Neal — 10 January 1297 in Gascony(C.C.R., p.8) OF THE FIRST EXPEDITIONARY FORCE: quittance(4274); 8 February 1297 in Gascony:quittance (4352); in Gascony at least until 30 September 1297(E101 155/2/2).

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1. Roger Savage is listed in C47 2/10/3 as with John de La Mare, who must therefore have been a subsidiary troop-leader with Hugh de Vere.
(with Adam de Creting):
John de Creting, son/heir of Adam - April 1295 captured at Rions (TRIVET, p.336; GUISBOROUGH, p.247); 24 September 1298 ref. to his French captivity (C.P.R., pp.361–2; C.C.R., p.175);
John Andrew - 8 February 1297 OF THE FIRST EXPEDITIONARY FORCE in Gascony; quitance (4335);
Robert of Cuckfield - April 1295 captured at Rions (GUISBOROUGH, p.247);
18 January 1297 OF THE FIRST EXPEDITIONARY FORCE in Gascony; quitance (4293).
(with John Tregos):
Thomas Gurney - 21 November 1296 in Gascony; quitance (4210).
(with Aymer of St. Edmunds):
his brother (Thomas?) - April 1295 captured at Rions (TRIVET, p.336).
(with John Lovel the bastard, of Snotescombe):
Philip Fitz-Philip d'Estneye - 29 January 1297 OF THE FIRST EXPEDITIONARY FORCE in Gascony; quitance (4314).
(with William Latimer):
Geoffrey de Capellis of Haverhill - 26 December 1296 in Gascony (C.C.R., p.7); 4 February 1297 ditto; quitance (4331).
(with John of Sudeley):
William of Sudeley - January 1297 captured at Bellegarde (COTTON, p.319).

The above individual records reveal that, of the 38 bannerets¹ and 8 subsidiary bannerets accounted as going to Guienne in the first expeditionary force, no less than 32 and six respectively, and thus by implication their troopers also, are on record as having served. To these must be added a further banneret, John of Straitling, previously excluded because not in receipt of letters of protection, but on record here.

¹ i.e. excluding James de La Planche who did not go in 1294, and also the Earl of Cornwall, Robert Giffard & John of Straitling who did not receive letters of protection (c/f supra, f.127).
As regards the troopers, 31 of the originally listed 192 are on record as having gone to Guienne on active service.

The addition of the name of John of Straitling to the list of serving bannerets (bringing it to a total of 33 plus 6 secondary bannerets) shows that individual service-records disclose additional members of the first expeditionary force not previously included, both bannerets and troopers; further additions are next listed:

Bannerets.

As Hugh Bardolf (2734) - 9/10 October 1294 sailed for Guienne (Eulogium Historiarum, p. 158); April 1295 captured at Rions (R.G., p. 495, n. 5); 29 November 1295 in Gascony (C.C.R., p. 465); 14 January 1297 'in Gascony' (C.C.R., p. 81); 20/29 January 1297 OF THE FIRST EXPEDITIONARY FORCE in Gascony: quittance (4288/4316); 8 May 1297 'lately' captured in Gascony (C.C.R., p. 103); 20/24 June 1297 in Gascony: quittance (4280 vacated/4281); 14 July 1297 in Gascony: letter of attorney (R.G., 4387); and 30 March 1299 past Gascony service (C.C.R., p. 239).

B: Walter de Mounsey (2261) - 24 June 1297 OF THE FIRST EXPEDITIONARY FORCE in Gascony: quittance (4362).

As John de Mandeville (2910) - April 1295 captured at Rions (GUISBOROUGH, p. 247); 28 December 1296 in Gascony (C.C.R., p. 7); 4 February 1297 OF THE FIRST EXPEDITIONARY FORCE in Gascony: quittance (4329).

Simon de Montague (2372) - 25 August 1295 OF THE FIRST EXPEDITIONARY FORCE in Gascony: quittance (3953, 4344); 28 December 1296 in Gascony (C.C.R., p. 7); 17 January 1297 in Gascony (C.C.R., p. 8); 29 January 1297 OF THE FIRST EXPEDITIONARY FORCE in Gascony: quittance (4319, 4324).

William de Say (2239/2367/2376) - 14 September 1295 in Gascony (R.G., 3956).
Eustace del Hatch (2429) - 21 November 1295 in Gascony: quittance (4209);
30 December 1296 in Gascony (C.C.R., p. 8); 4 February 1297 of the First Expeditionary Force in Gascony: quittance (4326/4327); 25 February 1301 past Gascon service (C.C.R., p. 432).

William of Rye (2293) - 9/19 December 1296 of the Bourg garrison (R.G., 4262; Archives hist. Gironde, XIII, 385); 24 January 1297 in Gascony: quittance (4301); 14 March 1297 of the First Expeditionary Force in Gascony: quittance (4358); 4 April 1305 past Gascon service (R.G., 4919/1).

Richard de Boyce (2827) - November? 1294 captain of the Bourg garrison (GUISBOROUGH, p. 244); 15 September 1295 in Gascony: quittance (3958); 11 March 1297 ditto (4356); 15 April 1297 ditto (4360); 15 May 1297 in Gascony (C.C.R., p. 104).

John Giffard (-) - March/April 1295 captain of Podensac garrison (GUISBOROUGH, p. 246).


Hugh of Brompton - 16 January 1296 in Gascony: protection (4138);
Henry de (E)Elyn (Elwin?) - 26 December 1296 in Gascony (C.C.R., p. 7); 4 February 1297 in Gascony: quittance (4325); 6 September 1297 in Gascony: respite of debts (R.G., 4502); 4 April 1305 past Gascon service (R.G., 4919/8);

Ralph Paunkel - 28 December 1296 in Gascony (C.C.R., p. 7).

(with John de Thorp) 2866: George de Thorp, John of Briseworth.

1. As both Richard de Boyce and John Giffard (next entry) were captains of garrisons they are here included as bannerets, although neither is anywhere specified as such; it is inconceivable that they would not be.

(with John de Moun):
Alexander Cheverel (2813) - 28 December 1296 in Gascony (C.C.R., p.7); 25 February 1297 OF THE FIRST EXPEDITIONARY FORCE in Gascony's quittance (4354).

(with Hugh de Vere):
Alan of Twitham (2736) - 14 January 1297 OF THE FIRST EXPEDITIONARY FORCE in Gascony's quittance (4276); January 1297 killed at Bellegarde (COTTON, p. 319);
William de Fleg - 26 December 1296 in Gascony (C.C.R., p.6); 8 February 1297 in Gascony's quittance (4334).

(with Hugh Bardolf):
Alan Novel (2260) - 7 December 1296 in Gascony (C.C.R., p.5);
John of Tilney (2739) - 29 January 1297 OF THE FIRST EXPEDITIONARY FORCE in Gascony's quittance (4317);
John of Reppe (2742) - 24 June 1297 OF THE FIRST EXPEDITIONARY FORCE in Gascony's quittance (4363);
Roger Bardolf - 8 February 1297 in Gascony's quittances (4341/4347);
John, his brother - ditto (4341/4346);
2377 William Peytevyn or Robert of Bodingfield, 2380 Hamon of Berstead, 2381 Bartholomew Malemeyns, 2735 William of Gurney.

(with Walter de Mouncey): 2396 Thomas of Shelwood.

(with John de Mandeville): 2910 Geoffrey de Mandeville.

(with Simon de Montague):
Richard of Poltimore (2856) - 8 February 1297 OF THE FIRST EXPEDITIONARY FORCE in Gascony's quittance (4344);
2857 Richard of Raleigh, 2859 John Paviot.

(with William de Say):
Alexander de Cheyne (2367/2376) - 14 September 1295 in Gascony with William de Say's quittance (3956/3957);
2376: Henry de Coleville, Giles Fitz-Eustace of Barenton, John de Lafforde, John de Say.
(with Eustace del Hatch):

Nicholas Trumenel(2430) - 4 February 1297 OF THE FIRST EXPEDITIONARY FORCE in Gascony with del Hatch: quittance(4327);


(with William of Rye):

William de Mortimer(2259/2294/2775) - 20 January 1297 in Gascony (C.C.R., p.8); ditto OF THE FIRST EXPEDITIONARY FORCE: quittance(4287);


(with John of Brittany):

William of Batsford(2231) - 10 January 1297 OF THE FIRST EXPEDITIONARY FORCE in Gascony: quittance(4273).

(with Adam de Creting):

Robert Haumont - 7 April 1296 certificate of service at Langon for service in the Blaye garrison with the first expeditionary force(C47 2/13/1);

Thomas of Pannington - ditto;

Simon le Roux - ditto.

(with Raoul de Gorges):

John de Gorges - 28 December 1296 in Gascony(C.C.R., p.7); 4 February 1297 in Gascony: quittance(4330).

Individual Troopers.

Robert of Tivetshale (2765) - 7 May 1299 past Gascon service(C.P.R., p.465).

Matthew of Grimstead (2727) - 23 January 1300 ditto(C.P.R., p.489).

James de Creting - April 1295 captured at Rions(GUISBOROUGH, p.247).

Walter Giffard - April 1295 either deserted or was captured at Rions (TRIVET, p.336; GUISBOROUGH, p.247).

Robert de Montaut - 23 August 1302 ref. to apparent service with first expeditionary force(C.P.R., p.90); 4 April 1305 past Gascon service(R.G., 49/11).

1. It is assumed Tivetshale & Grimstead went to Gascony in 1294, as they had letters of protection then, but not in 1295/6.
Laurence of Savoy - 9/10 October 1294 sailed to Guienne (LANGTOFT, p. 214).

(Additionally, three non-combatants: 2364 Robert the tailor of Merston, with Simon de Montague; 2430 Henry of the Parlour and Geoffrey the tailor, both with Eustace del Hatch).

The additional list of bannerets and troopers compiled from individual service records has shown a further 9 bannerets, 2 secondary bannerets, and 49 troopers, which comprise totals of 48 bannerets, 10 secondary bannerets, and 241 troopers in all in the first expeditionary force which went to Guienne in 1294. Including the two commanders, John of Brittany and John de St-John, this produces a final inclusive total of 301 English 'men-at-arms'.

It is interesting to notice that four of the bannerets and their troops, namely, Hugh Bardolf, William de Say, Eustace del Hatch and William of Rye were not originally associated with the companies of John of Brittany and John de St-John, as their protections entries show, but with those of Edmund or Henry de Lacy. In September and July 1294, Eustace del Hatch and William of Rye were designated as about to tranship to Gascony 'in comitiva Edmundi' and 'cum Henrico de Lacy, comite Lincolnie' respectively. Hugh Bardolf and William de Say were both listed in June and July 1294 respectively, as about to set sail for Gascony 'cum Edmundo', but are also predominantly featured in protection entries as going 'in comitiva Henrici de Lacy, comite Lincolnie'. In the event, all four bannerets and their troops went to Guienne with the first expedition. It thus becomes apparent that quite a number of men-at-arms of the 'second stage' of the King-duke's total anticipated army transhipped with the

1. N.B. the alternate service commitment, on f. 137 supra, of William Peytevyn & Robert of Bodingfield; only one is included therefore in the total of troopers.
'first stage'. Thus, the three-part expedition, announced in July 1294 by the King-duke to his Gascon subjects \(^1\) and hitherto accepted as a reality by historians \(^2\), was a strategic theory which did not become a reality in practice. When it came to the practicalities of muster and embarkation, the situation must have quite fluid.

Nor is this to be ascribed to the Welsh insurrection; as an attempt on King Edward's part to despatch as many troops as possible to Guienne with John of Brittany and John de St-John, in the knowledge that the proposed second and third stages of his expedition must inevitably be withheld from Guienne and diverted instead for the time being to Wales. For, it will be recalled, \(^3\) the first expeditionary force sailed before the news of the Welsh rising broke.

The possibility that these additional companies of troops were a later reinforcement is also to be discounted. The only body of troops sent to the duchy by Edward between the embarkation of the first and second expeditionary forces was a contingent of 13,000 infantry under John de Butecurte in July 1295 and a further 10,000 foot and some 200 horses in late August. \(^4\) There is no record anywhere of men-at-arms embarking for Guienne between the dates of the two expeditions.

The picture that emerges of Portsmouth in the autumn of 1294 is, then, of a military hive of activity presided over by Edward, who was straining every nerve to ship to his duchy as many troops as he could, as quickly as possible, and without undue adherence to his tripartite plan if practice proved able to outrun theory.

This, of course, agrees fully with his original plan of leading in person.

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2. e.g. POWICKE, p. 649.
a single expedition. If, instead of crossing to his beloved duchy with the first of his troops, he had to remain at Portsmouth to organise an enterprise so massive as to require his personal supervision, he could nevertheless despatch as many troops as were ready as soon as they were ready, so that he himself might follow the more speedily.

In the lists of men-at-arms accompanying Brittany and St-John to Guienne, the clerks of the Gascon rolls are generally flexible or imprecise in their literary format or rubric, so that no great significance should be attached to their use or non-use of phraseology in enrolling letters of protection, quitances and so forth. It is interesting to note, however, that of the 106 named as having service records, no less than 36 are designated as members of THE FIRST EXPEDITIONARY FORCE; and a further 38 were, by their records, self-evidently members of that expedition. In other words, 74 of the 106 are known for a fact to have seen Gascon service from the outset, not as a matter of conjecture, assumption or deduction. The fact that they comprise a representative cross-section of 51 of the 60 companies, including those of John of Brittany and John de St-John, which were designated to go to Guienne, is a convincing demonstration that the companies scheduled to take ship with Brittany and St-John in the autumn of 1294 did in fact do so.

It has proved possible to reconstruct a first expeditionary force of an estimated 301 men-at-arms (including the two leaders in this general classification). It remains to undertake the same exercise in regard to the second force led by Edmund and Henry de Lacy in 1296, in order to ascertain the approximate number of English men-at-arms available to Lacy in his prosecution of the Gascon war in 1296-8,
Entries in the Gascon rolls pertaining to the second English expeditionary force fall under broadly the same headings as for the first: letters of protection (103 entries), letters of attorney (106 entries), letters in respect of debts (71 entries), letters in respect of pleas (10 entries), felons, and quittances. Details of the entries are as follows:

- **Letters in Respect of Pleas**: R.G., 4049-4055, 4218-4220.
- **Felons**: R.G., 3952.
- **Quittances**: R.G., 4203-4, 4207-8, 4266-4364 (with those of the first expeditionary force), 4366-7, 4383-4.

Although, in contrast to the 1294 records, the entry enrolments of letters of attorney for members of the second force actually exceed the number of protections entries, the two totals are nearly the same; and entries of protections are in many cases composite ones, whereas attorney entries are individual. So, the most comprehensive category of members of the second expeditionary force, as for the first, is that of protections. For this reason and for the sake of consistency, letters of protection once again form the basis for reconstructing the membership of Edmund and Lacy's force. They provide the names of 234 individual soldiers, clerics and non-combatants bound for the duchy at the turn of 1295, although 12 military entries are duplicated. They fall into the period 4 October 1295 to 23 January 1296, supplemented by interspersed entries of 18 June and 16 September 1295, 17 February to 30 June 1296 (sparse) and late entries of 10 September 1296, 6 and 16 December 1296, 3 January 1297, and 26 April, 7 and 21 May, 15 June and 14 July 1297. They comprise the following expeditionary forces:
with Henry de Lacy, Earl of Lincoln (R.G., 3893)

**Individuals:**


The total number of men-at-arms here listed as accompanying Henry de Lacy to Guienne is 32.

with Edmund, Earl of Lancaster (R.G., 3912)

A: Roger La Warre (3896/4261) and 3925/3929 Thomas of Banbury, 3926

Godfrey of Andover, 3927 Nicholas of Stow, 3928 Roger de Taney, 3929:

John de Clairvaux, Roger Russell, William of Staunton, William of Exeter, Peter de Ryfend.


B: Reginald de Nodariis (Nowera) (3902).

1. In 1294 listed with Roger de Mowbray’s troop (2398).
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
As William of York (3898) and 3932: John de La Hame (de Hames), Richard of Bath, John of Wellington.

Henry de Grey (3909) and 3911: Robert de Vaux, William of Arundel, Ingleram Russell, Stephen le Keu, William of Ritton, John Walton, William of Johnby. 1

By Thomas de Meuse (3911) and 3911/4101 Warren Walton. 2

William Granson (3913) and 3911 William le Long. 3

As William Fitz—William Latimer (3913) and 3930 Stephen Hovel.

Richard Fitz—John (3913) and 3913: Simon of Seyton, Edmund of Ellesworth, William of Badenho, Richard of Seyton, Peter of Cokeshou, John Dean, John of Seyton, Gerald Salveyen, Philip Verney, 4384: Bartholomew Weden, Elias Walton.

Edmund d'Eincourt (3913) and 3913: William d'Eincourt, John d'Eincourt.

John de Lisle (3916) and 3917 John de Seles, 4177: William Helmerton, Raoul le Tort.

Raoul de St. Mauro (Seymour) (3937) and 3938 William Cockerel, 3939 John del Willows? (sic: Wylwes).

William Fitz—Roger de Mortimer (4083) and 4083: Nicholas of Bath, Robert Waifer, Robert of Sapie (Sheppey?), Nicholas of Leadington, John of Sapie, Philip de Chandos, Elias of Walesnede, 4139 Robert Michel.

Robert de Vere (4096) and 4097: Robert de Lacy, John Ducksworth, Geoffrey of Sarum.

Philip de Kyme (4141) and 4141: Robert of Barkworth, Simon of Legbourne (Leyburn?), Geoffrey Maucovenant.

Ralph Basset of Drayton (4143) and 4144: Hugh of Cuilly, Thomas of Avenhale, John Ashbrook, Robert Sheldon.

William Martin (4153) and 4154: Thomas Raleigh, 4155: James Okesston, Giles Fissacre, Raoul Beapul, Walter le Keu, William Storlock.

1. Listed as 'with' Henry de Lacy, earl of Lincoln.
2. Listed as 'with' Henry de Grey, but also with secondary banneret de Meuse.
3. " " " " " " " " " " " " Granson.
As Peter de Malo Lacu (Mauley) (3935) and 3936 Robert de Mauley.

William de Ross of Hamelack (Hemsley) (4083/4263).

James de La Planche (4178). ¹

Individually:


¹ As he is recorded as a banneret in 1294 (c.f. supra, f. 124), it is here assumed that he was in 1295/6.

² Not to be confused with the clerk of the same name two lines infra.
six non-combatants: 3900 Roger the pantler, with Reginald de Nowers; 3911 Thomas the chamberlain, with Henry de Grey; 3917 Hugh the chamberlain, with John de Lisle; 3940 Raoul the butler, with Edmund; 4097 Robert the chamberlain, with Edmund; 4146 Thomas the butler, with Edmund).

The total number of men-at-arms here listed as accompanying Edmund to Guienne is 153, including 1 marshal.

Other members of the secondary expeditionary force who received letters of protection, but are not listed specifically with either Edmund or Henry de Lacy are as follows:

As Roger de Montaut (3914) and 3915: Thomas Flatting, William d'Aubrey, John Cromwell, John Bracebridge, William Draycot, John of Cardiff, Roger Tiere, John of Sindlesham, John Astley, William Fiennes, Giles de Mont pinson, Adam Place, Gilbert de Burgh, Roger Bilney, 3915/4142 (vacated) William Morley.

Robert Fitz-Roger (4084) and 4085 John Clavering.

Individuals:

3891 Robert of Englefield, valettus of Richard de Boyce, 2
3907 William de Vescy, 4180 William Fitz-William de Montravel, 4181 John de La Zouche, 3
4370 Hugh of Brompton, valettus of Robert Tiptoft, 4
(3887 Eustace del Hatch and 4182 Alan de La Zouche). 5

(Additionally, Edmund Everard, socius of Richard de Boyce (4378);
one cleric: Edmund Dineton, parson of Calthorpe (4372);
one non-combatant: William the tailor of Newton, with Roger de Montaut (3915).

1. In 1294 listed with Lacy.
2. Already in Gascony (Boyce) with the first expeditionary force.
3. In 1294 listed with Edmund.
4. Already in Gascony (Tiptoft) with the first expeditionary force.
5. Both already in Gascony with the first expeditionary force.
These 23 additional names of men-at-arms of the second expeditionary force, added to the 32 and 153 accompanying Lacy and Edmund respectively, give a provisional total of 208 individual military protections.

As in the case of the first expeditionary force, it is interesting to discover how many of them actually served in the duchy. By reference to individual service records it is again possible to compile a list of names of bannerets and troopers who did:

**Bannerets.**

**Roger La Warre** - 6 December 1296 in Gascony: renewed protection (R.G., 4261); 14 January 1297 in Gascony: quittance (4283); 2 March 1297 in Gascony (SC 12/174); 3, 5, 6 and 10 April 1305 referred to as captain of Bourg garrison in the war (R.G., 4908 vacated/4910(1)/4912/4925(6)/4898(2)/4932/4919(17) ); 2 April 1299 past Gascon service (C.C.R., p. 240); 30 April 1300 in Gascony as captain Bourg in 26 Edward I (1297–8) (ibid., p. 350).

**Robert Fitz-Walter** - 14 April 1296 at Langon with Edmund (C47 25/1/18); 26 December 1296 on Gascony service (C.C.R., p. 6); 10 January 1297 in Gascony: quittance (4271); 8 February 1297 in Gascony (R.G., 4332/4345); 5 August 1297 in Gascony: respite of debts (R.G., 4498).

**Reginald de Nowers** - 26 December 1296 with Robert Fitz-Walter in Gascony (C.C.R., p. 7); January 1297 captured at Bellegarde (COTTON, p. 319; GUIART, 13688; BEMONT, clxv); 8 February 1297 with Robert Fitz-Walter in Gascony: quittance (4332).

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1. Records for the second expeditionary force also include Fryde's account of 14 barons pressed into Gascon service under royal threat of distraint for debt (PRESTWICH (thesis), f. 63; Book of Prests, ed. Fryde, p. xlviii). The episode is here taken as sufficient evidence that dissident magnates did in fact go to Guienne.

2. The same abbreviation is followed as for the records of members of the first expeditionary force (c/f. supra, f. 127, n. 2).
Henry de Grey - a pressed member of the expedition (Prestwich/Fryde);
10 January 1297 in Gascony (R.G., 4269); 26 January 1297 in Gascony;
quittance (4302); 1 July 1297 in Gascony (R.G., 4454); 23 July 1297 on
Gascon service (C.C.R., p.118); 21 September 1297 paid at Bayonne (E101
153/7/10).
Thomas de\waste\sise - 4 January 1297 in Gascony (C.C.R., p.8); 10/20 January
1297 in Gascony; quittances (4269/4291); 28 January 1297 in Gascony (R.G.,
4308); late January 1297 captured at Bellegarde (COTTON, p.319; GUIART,
13688).
William Granson - 17 January 1297 in Gascony (C.C.R., p.8) and quittance
(4290); 13 November 1297 at Bayonne (E101 153/8/5); 15 March 1298 in
Gascony; respite of debts (R.G., 4504); 24 March 1298 paid at Bayonne
(E101 153/7/15); 6 May 1315 ref. to past Gascon service (C.C.R., 1313-18,
p.177).
Richard Fitz--John - 9 December 1296 captain at Bourg (R.G., 4262;
Archives hist. Gironde, XIII, p.385); 25 Edward I (1296-7) at Bourg (E101
154/5/48); 28 January 1297 in Gascony; quittance (4306); 1 February 1297
captain Bourg; garrison (E161/25/28); 8 February 1297 in Gascony (R.G., 4337/
8/9); 2 March 1297 in Gascony; SC1 12/174); 20 March 1297 at Bourg (SC1 26/
184); 27 March 1297 at Bourg (E101 154/10/39); 7 May 1297 captain Bourg
garrison (R.G., 4380); 15 June 1297 in Gascony (R.G., 4383/4384); 24 July
1297 in Gascony; quittance (4497); 5 August 1297 / 31 January and 8
November 1298 ref. to his death on active service by 26 September 1297
(C.C.R., pp. 120, 185 and 229); captain Bourg garrison during war (R.G.,
4932/33 & 34).
Edmund d'Eincourt - 11 March 1297 in Gascony; quittance (4357).
John de Lisle - 29 January 1297 in Gascony (C.C.R., p.8) and quittance
(4315).
William Fitz-Roger de Mortimer - pressed member of expedition (Prestwich/Fryde); late January 1296 in second expeditionary force (Anciennes Chroniques de Flandre, p.355); January 1297 captured at Bellegarde (TRIVET, p.354; Les Grandes Chroniques, p.168; Anciennes Chroniques de Flandre, p.357); 12 February 1297 his Gascon service A/C finalised at Bayonne (E101 153/7/7).

Philip de Kyne - pressed member of expedition (Prestwich/Fryde); 10 June 1296 in Gascony (SC1 27/66); 4 February 1297 in Gascony: quittance (4322); 14 July 1297 in Gascony: attorney (R.G., 4388); 29 May 1319 ref. past Gascon service (C.C.R., 1318-23, p.76).

Ralph Basset - 1 February 1297 captain Blaye garrison (El61/25/28); 2 March 1297 in Gascony (SC1 12/174); 7 May 1297 captain Blaye garrison (R.G., 4381); 23/31 March 1299, 4/5/6 April 1305, and 6 June 1306 ref. to him as captain of Blaye garrison in war (E101 154/10/30 & 31; R.G., 4898/1, 4898/3, 4910/2, 4913/1, 4919/18, 4924, 4925/1 & 2, 4931; C.P.R., p.439).

William Martin - pressed member of expedition (Prestwich/Fryde); 5 October 1296 returning to England from Gascony (SC1 27/64).

Peter de Maulay - pressed member of expedition (Prestwich/Fryde); 9/19 December 1296 in Bourg garrison (R.G., 4262; Archives hist. Gironde, XIII, 386); 14/28 January 1297 in Gascony: quittances (4284/4305); 16 December 1297 paid at Bayonne (E101 154/6/5); 12 August 1301/1301 past Gascon service (C.P.R., p.605; C.C.R., p.464).

William de Ross of Hemsley - 16 December 1296 in Gascony: protection (4263); 18/28 January 1297 in Gascony: quittances (4296/4304); 28 January 1297 in Gascony (C.C.R., p.8); 1 March 1297 party to marriage contract at Bayonne (C.P.R., p.346); 4 April 1305 past Gascon service of self and company (R.G., 4919/7).

1. The phrase 'qui cum primis transfretantibus transfretavit' in quittance 4284 is clearly a clerical error, as he was about to set out in the company of Edmund on 8 November 1295 (3935).
Roger de Montaut - pressed member of the expedition (Prestwich/Fryde).

Robert Fitz-Roger - pressed member of expedition (Prestwich/Fryde).

Richard Fitz-Alan - ditto.

John de Montfort - ditto; acknowledgement in 1305 of outstanding pay for self and company and outstanding compensation due for loss of horses in past Gascon war-service (R.G., 4919/9).

Hugo Pointz - pressed member of expedition (Prestwich/Fryde).

Troopers.

(with Henry de Lacy):

Edmund Bacon - 7 June 1296/7 on Gascon service (SC1 18/188); 4 July 1297 in Gascony; attorney (R.G., 4386); 5 July 1297 in Gascony (C.P.R., p.289).

Adam of Huddleston - late January 1297 captured at Bellegarde (GUIART, 13687).

James Neville - 14 January 1297 in Gascony; quittance (4286).

Richard of Sutton - pressed member of expedition (Prestwich/Fryde);
4 February 1297 in Gascony; quittance (4328); 24 March/July 1297 in Gascony; repite of debts (R.G., 4366/4496).

William Bollesdon - 18 August 1297 in Gascony; repite of pleas (R.G., 4501); 23 March 1298 bond at Bayonne (E101 153/1/39).

(with Edmund):

William of Birmingham - late January 1297 captured at Bellegarde (TRIVET, p.354; COTTON, p.319); 8 February 1297 in Gascony; quittance (4349); 21 September 1297 his Gascon A/W finalised at Bayonne through his brother, Thomas (E101 153/7/8).

Henry of Glastonbury - 3/10 January 1297 in Gascony; protection and quittance (4264 & 4272).

Nicholas Seymour - 17/20 January 1297 in Gascon service (C.C.R., p.8).

Laurence Seymour - 29 January 1297 in Gascon service (ibid.); 23 March 1297 'deceased' (E101 154/1/5).

1. Earl of Arundel.
Philip of Sherborne - 8 February 1297 in Gascony quittance (4340).

Robert de Cantilupe - 9 December 1296 member of Bourg garrison (R.G., 4262; Archives hist. Gironde, XIII, 386); 4 April 1305 past Gascon service (R.G., 4919/2).

Benedict Flitwick - 3 April 1305 ref. to his outstanding backpay and compensation for loss of horses on Gascon service (R.G., 4905).

(with Robert Fitz-Walter);

Robert de La Warde - 22 May 1296 bond from Edmund at Bayonne for loan E101 153/7/1; 26 December 1296 in Gascony (C.C.R., p. 7); 8 February 1297 in Gascony quittance (4332).

William Walton - 26 December 1296 in Gascony (C.C.R., p. 7); 8 February 1297 in Gascony quittances (4332/4345).

William Hanningfield - 26 December 1296 in Gascony (C.C.R., p. 7);
8 February 1297 in Gascony quittance (4332).

Richard Punchardon - ditto.

Thomas Fillol - ditto.

Walter le Vilour/Wylur - ditto.

Richard Farnham - ditto.

William Burton/Bozon - ditto.

William Bagot and William (sic) le Parker - 26 December 1296 indemnity from royal corn levy in England because in Gascony (C.C.R., 1296-1302, p. 7); 8 February 1297 in Gascony quittance (4332).

William Frances and Thomas Derays - 8 February 1297 in Gascony quittance (4332).

(with Thomas de Meuse);

Warren Walton - 28 January 1297 in Gascony quittance (4308).

(with William Granson);

William le Long - 17 January 1297 in Gascony (C.C.R., p. 8); 18 January 1297 in Gascony quittance (4294).

Peter de Cusance - 17 January 1297 in Gascony (C.C.R., p. 8); 18 January 1297 in Gascony quittance (4295).
(with Richard Fitz-John):
Simon of Seyton - 8 February 1297 in Gascony; quittance (4337).
Richard of Seyton - ditto (4339).
John of Seyton - ditto (4338).
Bartholomew of Wedon and Elias of Walton, valetti - 20 March 1297 in Bourg (SCL 26/184); 15 June 1297 in Gascony; protections (4384).

(with Peter de Mauley):
Robert de Mauley - 28 March 1296 captured at Bordeaux with his brother John (TRIVET, p. 341; GUISBOROUGH, p. 261); 28 January 1297 in Gascony; quittance (4305); 4 April 1305, 5 June 1312, 28 October 1312 past Gascon service/capture at Bordeaux (R.G., 4919/11; C.P.R., 1307-13, pp. 463-4; C.C.R., 1307-13, p. 486).

(with Roger de Montaut):
John Cromwell - 18 April 1311 ref. to past Gascon service (C.P.R., 1307-13, p. 339).

(with William de Ross):
Philip Chauncy - 8 February 1297 in Gascony; quittance (4351); 24 July 1297 in Gascony; respite of debts (R.G., 4494).

Individual Troopers.
William de Vescy - pressed member of expedition (Prestwich/Fryde); a member of the second expeditionary force (LANGTOFT, p. 231); late 1296 returned to England (GUISBOROUGH, p. 262).
Walter of Huntercombe - pressed member of expedition (Prestwich/Fryde).
Edmund Mortimer - ditto.

To these may be added the names of eight other troopers, who were destined for Gascony in 1295/6 and may be assumed to have gone there, although they cannot be shown for certain to have done so:
William of Rochester - going to Gascony 12 August 1295 (C.P.R., p. 141). 1

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1. Pardon enrolled that date for robberies, receiving a felon and other trespasses - i.e. a 'felon'. But assumed to be a man-at-arms as listed in 1294 to accompany William le Vavassour to Gascony (R.G., 2424).
Robert of Hertford - 15 November 1295 (Cowick, nr. Exeter) Lacy requested his quittance of tenth as going with him to Gascony (SC1 27/43).

John Difford, John Bolton, Robert Hoderoede, Alan Stockeld all ditto. ¹

Andrew of Hengham - 10 December 1295 going to Gascony with Lacy (C.P.R., p.169).

William de Pount - 25 December 1295 Lacy notified Langton of his attorneys (SC1 27/52).

(Additionally, three clerics: ² Master Arnold Lupe of Tilh - 10 May 1296 protection as going to Gascony (C.P.R., p.189); 6 February 1297 in Gascony (C.C.R., p.85; R.G., 4265); 30 October 1304 past Gascon service (C.C.R., 1302-7, p.185).

Sir Raoul of Hogenton, parson of St. Michael's, Long Stratton and chaplain to Richard Fitz-John - 20 March 1297 in Gascony, from where Fitz-John requests renewal of his protection (SC1 26/184); 15 June 1297 in Gascony; letter of protection (R.G., 4383).

Master William le Keu, knight - 15 November 1295 (Cowick, nr. Exeter) Lacy requested his quittance of tenth as going with him to Gascony (SC1 27/43).³

The above individual records reveal that, of the 19 bannerets and 3 secondary bannerets accounted here as going with Edmund and Lacy to Guienne in the second expeditionary force, no less than 14 and 3

¹ Hertford and these four were duly granted the said quittance, as members of Lacy's company, 21 November 1295 (4204).

² Lupe and le Keu may well have been combatant clerics. The former's final record entry concerns backpay and compensation for loss of horses for his company and himself.

³ Le Keu received the quittance like his colleagues in Lacy's company (c/f. n.1 supra).
respectively, and thus by implication their troops also are on record as having served. To these must be added 3 others, Richard Fitz-Alan the earl of Arundel, John de Montfort and Hugo Pointz whose service records have been included here. Their inclusion brings the total of bannerets in the second expeditionary force to 25.

As regards the troopers, 30 of the 186 originally listed above, are here recorded as having done Gascon service. To these must be added 16 others, namely William Bagot, Walter le Parker, William Frances and Thomas Derays of Hemenhale, Peter de Cusance, Philip Chauncy, Walter of Huntercombe and Edmund Mortimer and the eight members of Lacy's company: William of Rochester, Robert of Hertford, John Difford, John Bolton, Robert Holderode, Alan Stockeld, Andrew of Hengham and William de Pount. Their inclusion produces a total of 202 troopers in the second expeditionary force. A late reinforcement to the army in Gascon was John Neal of Dorset, who was recorded on 18 April 1297 as setting out for the duchy to join John of Sudeley, who had gone there with the first expeditionary force. Neal apart, the combined totals of 25 bannerets and 202 troopers of the second expeditionary force gives, with the inclusion of Edmund and Lacy, a final figure of 229 members in it who went to Guienne in January 1296, as English 'men-at-arms'.

1. i.e. the total of 208 (c/f, supra, f.147) less 22 bannerets first listed on ff.143-7.
2. V. supra, f.151.
3. Ibid.
4. V. supra, f.152.
5. Ibid., ff.152-3.
7. C/f. supra, f.123.
The names of various other serving men-at-arms appear in contemporary records, but as they do not feature in the protection lists it is not possible to establish with which expeditionary force they took ship. Yet, their names must be set down as members of the army available to Henry de Lacy in Gascony. Details are as follows:

John de La Warde - late January 1297 captured at Bellegarde (COTTON, p.319).

Henry Schadewrche (Chadwick?) - ditto.

Gerald de Leseyn - ditto.

James de Beauchamp - killed at Bellegarde (LANGTOFT, p.283; Chronica de Melsa, p.265).

Simon de Hooe - 8 September 1296 in Gascony bond at Bayonne regarding backpay and compensation for loss of horses in Gascon war service (E101 154/14/5).

Reginald de Montague - 13 March 1298 in Gascony; letter patent at Bayonne of Henry de Lacy, lieutenant, declaring Montague's denial (assumed to be at Bayonne) that he gave surety in England for John Fenwick, felon, but bearing witness now to the latter's Gascon service to this time (C47 2/13/5).

William of Loughborough (?) - 14 January 1300 past Gascon service (C.P.R., p.485).

William Erizeworth - 15 February 1300 past Gascon service (C.P.R., p.545).

Matthew of Cornwall and company - circa 1305 past Gascon service (LETTRES, I, p.439).

Richard the marshal - 16 October 1305 past Gascon service (C.C.R., 1327-30, p.198; C.P.R., 1301-7, p.388).

Martin Martinets of Hurteby and company - 6 April 1305 past Gascon service (R.G., 4928/13); 26 July 1308 ditto (C.C.R., 1313-18); 12 April 1314 ditto (ibid.).

John of Brockley - permanent hospitalisation through maiming in the King's service in Gascony (28 December 1310, 17 July 1311 and 1 December 1311; C.C.R., 1307-13, pp.339, 434 and 444).
John Squirel - 8 December 1312 past Gascon service (C.P.R., 1307-13, p. 516).
John Raetel - 2 February 1297 on Gascon service: quittance (4320).
Simon de Kyme - 4 February 1297 ditto (4323).
Guy Ferre, Jnr. - 8 February 1297 ditto (4348).
Thomas of Birmingham - 21 September 1297 at Bayonne (E101 153/7/8).
Geoffrey of Havehaut (Havant?) - 23 March 1298 bond at Bayonne for recompense of one rouncy and other debts (E101 153/11/14).
Alan of Wallingford, scutifer - 3 April 1305 outstanding backpay and compensation for loss of horses on Gascon service (R.G., 4906/2).
William Bard, scutifer - 4 April 1305 past Gascon service (R.G., 4919/3).
John Polgreyn, scutifer - ditto (R.G., 4919/6).
Nicholas de Laszeles, scutifer - ditto (R.G., 4919/17).
As in the case of the first expeditionary force, chronicle accounts of the size of the expedition led by Edmund and Lacy vary. French chroniclers write of 'a great company of knights and men-at-arms'⁴ and a force of 'more than 80,000 troops'.² English estimates are more conservative. Guisborough lists 26 bannerets and 700 men-at-arms, 'cum plebe multa' accompanying Edmund and Lacy.³ Langtoft similarly refers to 26 bannerets;⁴ and the Worcester annals record 25 barons, 1,000 horses and 10,000 foot as following the earls to Guienne.⁵ However, although the impression given by contemporary accounts is of a second expeditionary force of much more splendid proportions than the first, it becomes apparent on examination, that there was in fact a great reduction in the scale of the second force in 1295 as compared with its original mobilisation the previous year. This can be seen by comparing the size of the companies of men-at-arms in the actual 1295/6 expeditionary force just considered, with that projected for 1294. The final reconstruction exercise, for this comparison, is therefore of the intended second-stage expedition in the autumn of 1294, which is compiled as were the previous exercises from current lists of protections in the Gascon rolls. The membership of the companies of the projected second expeditionary force is as follows:⁶

2. GUIART, 13137-8.  
3. GUISBOROUGH, p. 260.  
4. LANGTOFT, p. 231.  
5. Annales de Wigornia, p. 525.  
6. The numerical range of entries in the Gascon rolls are as on f. 120 supra, members of the first force and projected second force being enrolled together. This applies with regard to other categories of entry as well as protections.
with Henry de Lacy, Earl of Lincoln (2831)

As Hugh Bardolf (2734) and 2260 Alan Nove, 2377 William Peytevyn, Robert Bodingfield, 2380 Amon of Berstead, 2381 Bartholomew Malemeyna, 2735 William Gurney.

As Walter de Muncy (2261) and 2396 Thomas of Shefwood.

As William de Say (2239/2367/2376) and 2367/2376 Alexander de Cheyney, 2376 Henry de Coleville, Giles Fitz-Eustace of Barenton, John de Lafforde, John de Say.

William of Rye (2293) and 2259/2294/2775 William de Wottoner, 2295 John of Goldburg, 2296 John of Beaumont, 2347 Peter Knapton

John de Montfort (2793) and 2267 William de Montfort, 2403/2815 John d'Early, 2443 John le Sar.

Walter of Maidstone (2251) and 2391 Thomas Aghemond of Shefford.

Edmund of Hengrave (2449/2825) and 2448 John of Walkfare, William of Hengrave.

Robert of Hertford (2357) and 2356 Hugh Willington.

William le Vavassour (2825) and 2424 William of Rochester.

Individuals:


1. In entry 2734 designated as with Edmund, but elsewhere with Lacy.
2. In entry 2239 " " " " " " " " " ""
Ashby de La Zouche, Robert Stopham, Robert Stermesworth, John Tadcaster, Marmaduke de La More, Bernard of Villa Burgundy, Richard Wrotworth, Robert Witley

The total number of men-at-arms here listed with Henry de Lacy is 81.¹

with Edmund of Lancaster

As: Roger de Montaut/Mohaut (2846) and 2473; William Morley, John of Cardiff, John Astley, Giles (his brother), Bartholomew Morley, William Person, William d'Aubrey, John Cromwell, John Croft, of Dylew, 2479; Roger de Beauchamp, John Sindlesham, John Mauncer, John de Beauchamp, 2481 Robert son of John Gidding of Buxhall, 2485/2841 John Bracebridge, 2519 William Gyle of Newington (?), 2521 Thomas Fatting, 2853 William Calwe of Thornhaugh.

B: Robert de Clifford (-) and 2262/2847 Alan Horton.²

C: Robert Tillol (2235) and 2512: Henry du Boyce, John du Boyce.


¹ BEMONP, 'je compte ... à la suite de Henri de Lacy, comte de Lincoln, 91 personnes ...
² He is listed in separate entries with both Roger de Montaut and Robert de Clifford.
³ Henry of Legbourne & Raoul Fitz-William are both listed members of William Latimer's company with the first expeditionary force (supra, f.121).

John Tany (2433) and 2482: Robert Pipert, Thomas Fihide, John Marisco.

Robert de Mowbray (2397/2511) and 2398: Miles Stapleton, Thomas Coleville, Alexander Orre, Roger Carlton, William Crake (Craig?), John Stapleton, John Blaby, Walter son of Thomas Burnham, 2512 Robert Landsley.

Eustace del Hatch (2429) and 2430: Nicholas Trumenel, William Hardshill, Bertin Bacon, William Ramshill, John Solowas, Gilbert Hardshill, 2496 David the blond.


Nicholas Crioll/Kiriol (2283) and 2281/2476 Roger Hagham, 2282 Robert Fiveous.


John de Vescy (2818) and 2488 Roger Bilney.

B: Robert de La Warde(2464) and 2461 Reginald de La Warde, 2462 Hugh de Cuilly, 2523 Giles Burton.

As Edmund d'Eincourt(2421) and 2422 John d'Eincourt, John Rotherfield, William d'Eincourt, William Fitz-William of Emley, Thomas Fairfax, John Wirtney, Simon Legbourne (Leyburn?), Alexander Casterton.

Richard de St-Valery(2400) and 2401 Henry de St-Valery, William Heron, Walter Favelor, 2402 William de Rosceles, 2492 Richard de La More.


John Fitz-Reginald(2440) and 2355 John Fitz-Reginald, Jnr., 2441 Richard Fubliccott, Adam le Despenser, 2442 Adam Shortcombe, Philip le Parker.

B: John d'Ewyas(2444/2517) and 2445 Nicholas Blundel.

As: Fulk son of Fulk Fitz-Warren(2502/2860/2878) and 2290 Philip son of Ade Feteplace, 2454/2503 Dreu de Barentin, 2503 Raoul of Stoke, John Lenham, 2509 Raoul Dunn.

William Granson(2384/2830) and 2467 Richard Harley, 2468 Geoffrey Kinsdale, 2516 Peter de Cusance.

Robert d'Arcy(2271) and 2265 Thomas Swinford, 2269 John Swinford.

(William Fitz-Warren) and 2496 Roger Bran, John Boyd.

Warin de Lisle(2264) and 2270 Nicholas of Chartres.

Nicholas Audeley(2249) and 2420 John Drengton, 2250/2420 Edmund Wastneys, 2250 William de Mere, John Erreby, Philip Neville, John Devereux, Roger Bourguillon, Robert Meynill, John of Brompton.

Robert de Scales(2417) and 2416 Matthew Osgodby, 2418 William d'Alenzun. (Thomas Chaworth) and valettis: 2407/8 Robert Bulmer and William Bulmer.

Robert Luterel(2520).

Nicholas Branch(2505) and 2507 Jordan Dungiers, Richard Trowe.

John Pichard(2226/2439) and 2526 Henry Middleton.
Simon de Provincia (2246) and 2247 Simon Basset of Sapcot, Ralph Basset, Richard Curzon, Thomas Basset, Richard Basset, Robert Basset, Roger Draycot, Howel Amedock, 2247/2809 John of Sibton.

John of Ingham (2404) and 2405 Nicholas de Valers, 2406 John le Gros, John Cove, Richard of Hunstanstead, James de Valers.

Henry d'Ortrai (Hawtrey) (2457) and 2458 John Eastcot, Michael Eastcot, Henry Eastcot, John Watchese, Thomas Attwell, William Attyste, Walter of Putney.

Individuals.


(Additionally, seven clerics: 2825 Laurence Clifford, chaplain with Henry de Lacy; 2476 William Berkley, chaplain with Robert Fitz-Robert de Vere; 2470 William of Southminster, vicar of Steeple with Robert Fitz-Walter; 2412 Brother Simon of St. Botolph's, 'custos domus hospitalis' of St. John of Jerusalem in England, of Down Ampney; 2452 Andrew le Forcer, parson of Buckland in the Moor; 2389 Walter of Reading, custos of the hospital of St. Katherine 'extra Turrim Londonie'; 2393 (another?) Walter of Reading, parson of the church of Raunds;

twelve non-combatants: 2825 William the tailor; 12430 Henry del Parlour of Coventry, Geoffrey the tailor, both with Eustace del Hatch; 2476 John the tailor, with Robert Fitz-Robert de Vere; 2480 William the butler, with Nicholas de Menil; 2441 John the chamberlain, with John Fitz-Reginald; 2865 William the butler of Warrington; 2250 William the locksmith, with Nicholas Audeley; 2525 Robert the chamberlain, with Robert Luterel; 2410 John the butler of Bertham; 2435 Roger the pantler; 2830 Robert the tailor).

The total number of men-at-arms here listed with Edmund of Lancaster is 336.\(^2\)

This reconstruction of the intended second expeditionary force in 1294, which shows 81 men-at-arms with Henry de Lacy and 336 with Edmund, gives a total of 417 men-at-arms accompanying the two earls to Guienne in the autumn of that year.

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1. Listed with Henry de Lacy, earl of Lincoln.
2. BEMONT, cxxiv: 'À la suite d'Edmond de Lancastre ... je compte 278 personnes, parmi lesquelles, 3 prêtres, l'marescallus', l 'magister'...
By the same methods of reconstruction, however, it has already been shown that the actual number of men-at-arms who accompanied Edmund and Lacy in 1296 was only 227 - a very far cry from French chronicle claims. In terms of statistics, the second stage expeditionary force of 1296 thus shows, in comparison with its intended size in 1294, a reduction in dimensions of nearly one half, from an original 417 to an eventual 227. This is a significant revelation of the degree to which the Guienne operation was scaled down in the period of the Welsh and Scottish wars of 1294-1296. The planned English involvement in Guienne was reduced by over 45.5%.

Even more illuminating is a comparison of troop-figures for men-at-arms of the two expeditionary forces of 1294 and 1296. The force led by John of Brittany and John de St-John had been augmented in August 1294 by some 'second-stage' troops who were mustered at Portsmouth and ready to embark. That augmentation was a consequence of the King-duke's zealous prosecution of his Gascon expedition, out of his extreme impatience to land his army in the duchy as soon as possible, for a swift campaign of re-occupation. In contrast to the happily augmented

1. Supra, f.154.

2. Ibid., ff.139-140. In addition to Bardolf, Say, Hatch and Rye and their troops, four others, namely, John Giffard (f.136), Henry of Legbourne and Raoul Fitz-William (f.159 & n.), and John du Boyce (ff.132 & 159) were all 'second-stage' men who accompanied Brittany and St-John to Guienne. Conversely, James de La Planche and William Draycot seem to have taken ship with the second force, rather than the first as originally intended (w. supra, ff.126, 145 & 146).
force of Brittany and St-John, the second-stage expedition of 1296 was not only greatly reduced from its original projection, but it is now established, through the statistical calculation made here, that it was actually smaller in numbers than the first expeditionary force: a computed 227 to 299. In other words, it was only three-quarters the size of the first force. The discrepancy in size is even more marked in the numbers of bannerets of each force: 58 with Brittany and St-John, only 25 with Edmund and Lacy.

Chronicle accounts of the two forces give the impression that the second was a much more splendid affair. Most pass over the first expeditionary force altogether, or make only perfunctory references; but there are a few comparisons. The Worcester annals, for example, declare that 700 men-at-arms and 4,000 foot accompanied Brittany and St-John; and that 25 barons, 1,000 barded (coopertiis) horses and 10,000 foot accompanied Edmund and Lacy. Walter of Guisborough gives a comparison of 500 men-at-arms with 20,000 foot in the first expedition, as against 26 bannerets, 700 men-at-arms and 'cum plebe multa' in the second. Two contrasting quotations from the Chronica de Melsa illustrate the chroniclers' impressions of the relative importance of the two expeditions:

'rex Edwardus praemisit magnates quosdam, Johannem de Bretaygne, Johannem de Sancto Johanne, Robertum de Tibtoft et alios, in Vasconiam ...'  

1. V. supra, ff. 154 & 139.
2. Ibid.
3. Annales de Wicgornia, p. 519.
4. Ibid., p. 525.
5. GUISBOROUGH, p. 244.
6. Ibid., p. 260.
7. Chronica de Melsa, p. 258.
and

'Rex Angliae Edwardus ..... magnates et milites, videlicet Edmundum fratem suum, Henricum de Lacy, comitem Lincolniae, Willelum de Vescy, et alios plures de optimis terrae, ad Vasconiam iterum fecerat transmare.'

Clearly, the second expedition was considered to be a much bigger undertaking. Was it not, after all, led by the King's own brother and the most eminent of the King's earls? It is to be expected, then, that the military spotlight should be focused by the chroniclers on this 'major' expedition to the duchy. Edmund and Lacy took ship for Guienne, it was written, 'cum exercitu valido';

'The earl of Lincoln, with all his household,
Sir Edmund, the king's brother, of noble spirit,
Sir William de Vesci, a prudent and wise knight,
Barons and vavasors of noble descent,
Knights and serjeants with their kindred,
People on foot without number from moor and bush,
And Welshmen who know how to fight by use,
Are gone into Gascony and entered on the sea,
With twenty six baronets of the best scutage
Which was in England ....'.

The opinion was unanimous. The two earls embarked with a 'grant nombre de bons chevaliers et escuiers'; 'cum armatorum multitudine copiosa';

Edmund, Lacy, Mortimer 'et quamplures alios barones regni sui in maxima militum armatorumque comitiva'. Not surprisingly, modern historians

1. Ibid., p.260.
3. LANGTOFT, p.231.
5. Annales de Dunstaplia, p.397.
seem to have accepted contemporary opinion without serious question.\(^1\)

It must have been inconceivable to contemporary writers that the forces
mustered to accompany the earls of Lancaster and Lincoln to Guienne
should be a smaller assemblage than that of John of Brittany. But in
fact, not only was the much vaunted second expeditionary force reduced
to almost half the size of its original projection in 1294, but, as
shown, it was also only three-quarters of the size of the first
expedition. Moreover, it must be remembered that the first force had
initially been envisaged by the King-duke as the first of three
progressively larger embarkations— or so his letter of 1 July 1294 to
his Gascon subjects would seem to imply.\(^2\) Morris quotes a force of 822
men-at-arms comprising Edward's Flemish expedition,\(^3\) which is considered
by historians to be a small or even token force. Yet the second force
sent to Guienne mustered only 227— puny indeed. The conclusion must be

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1. e.g. Rhodes, op. cit., 232: 'John de St. John ... had been sent with a
small force in the autumn of 1294 ... ', an implicit comparison with
Edmund's supposedly much larger one later.

2. R.G., 2934; Poedera, p. 805. An idea of Edward's intentions may be had,
regarding the respective sizes of the first and second expeditionary
forces, from his own words in the letter: 'ad vos mittimus carum
nepotem et fidelem nostrum, Johannem de Britannia, cum quibusdam aliis
nobilibus de nostris concilio atque regno, Mittemus etiam ad vos in
proximo, Deo propito, Edmundum fratem nostrum carissimum, et dilectum
et fidelem nostrum Henricum de Lacy, comitem Lincolniae, cum pluribus
aliis nobilibus et proceribus dicti regni.'

3. MORRIS, p. 277.
that, the English men-at-arms at Lacy's disposal for fighting the
Gascon war in 1296-7 fell drastically short of what Edward himself had
considered requisite for a successful campaign which he had intended to
lead in person in 1294. Not only was the second expeditionary force but
a pale shadow of its original self, but 'stage three' was still-born.

Some additional comments need to be made on Lacy's English cavalry
resources. Firstly, there is the problem of the prevailing period of
military service of English troops in the Gascon war. For length of
service would be a factor in the fluctuating size of Lacy's military
potential. By simple addition of the earlier calculated numbers of the
two expeditionary forces and the additional troops not identifiable as
members of a particular expedition, the maximum number of English
men-at-arms available to the earl of Lincoln would have been
approximately 560 (299 plus 227 plus circa 34). If, however, troops were
periodically or regularly demobilised and repatriated on termination of
service, this maximum figure of fighting men available to Henry de Lacy
as capitanus at any one time could be considerably reduced. In addition,
troop losses in action, by defection, repatriate casualties or invalids,
and possibly by transfer to the Flemish theatre of war in 1297 must all
be considered in attempting to arrive at an estimate of Lacy's troop-
resources.

At the outset it is important to recall that the military service of
English troops in Guienne was paid rather than feudal. A forty-day
feudal service could not possibly meet the needs of the Gascon war.
Certainly, King Edward's initial response in 1294 to the sequestration

1. V. supra, ff. 155-6.
2. Only 23 names are listed on ff. 155-6 supra, but as two, namely,
Matthew of Cornwall and Martin Martinetz on f. 155 were bannerets,
an addition of approximately a dozen has been allowed for their
companies and the grand total rounded off for convenience at 560.
of his duchy had been to raise an English army by feudal summons; and again in October 1295, when the second expeditionary force was being mobilised. Also, £40 per annum landholders, liable to knighthood, were ordered to be ready to serve in the duchy for seven weeks - in effect, the customary feudal forty days. Such initial measures were perhaps in line with the thinking behind Edward's letter of 12 August 1297 to the community of England, where he advocated a short but decisive campaign to settle the French war; 1 but the delays and time-taking procedures, which preceded the departure of each of the expeditionary forces, made forty-day service anachronistic in the context of a continental war. The two expeditions were made up of paid troops, any feudal period of their service having expired by the time of their departure. As Prestwich has observed, the majority of cavalry were organised in retinues raised by formal agreements and indentures, and the Crown 'took advantage of the system of retinues in making contracts with military leaders for service'. 2 The earls of Lancaster and Lincoln both served in Guienne under contract. Thus, the King-duke's English forces mustered for the Gascon war may be presumed to have rendered an initial forty-day feudal service, and on its expiry continued serving on a mercenary basis. 3 To this end, both English and Gascon troops received royal loans with which to equip

1. Foedera, p. 872: 'Kar meuz vaut de mettre fyn en la busoynge au plus tost qe hom purra, qe de languyr ensi longement', words that refer not merely to the Flemish business but the whole war and the recovery of Guienne.
2. Prestwich (thesis), ff. 80, 110. He writes of the reign as a whole.
3. On the writs of 1294 for the Gascon expedition, Morris suggests (pp. 76-7) that they were feudal in form, but 'it may be supposed that the recipients (i.e. bannerets) understood that they were to enroll horsemen for paid service; in fact they were commissions of array disguised in feudal language'.

themselves and their retinues for campaigning in the duchy. Yet even contracts of paid service have expiry dates; and it was presumably to such that Edward referred on 21 August 1297 when he wrote to his English barons in Guienne prior to his own departure for Flanders, asking them not to return to England without Lacy's permission, their limit for service being the feast of St. Michael (29 September). It must be discovered, then, whether there was in fact a periodic or regular termination of English military service in Guienne during the Gascon war, whether it is possible to establish any accepted duration of service there.

English troops were repatriated from the duchy, but not at periodic intervals. Repatriation is specifically recorded at one particular moment in the war, namely, at the end of 1296 subsequent to Lacy's prolonged investment of Dax in the summer and his Toulousain foray in the autumn. Several unpublished documents, taken in combination, provide corroborating details:

October 1296 - Lacy issued a demobilisation certificate to Thomas de La Panetria, vintenarius (commander of twenty foot). The year of issue is confirmed from a separate document, a list of names of 85 infantry, archers and crossbow-men, including 7 vintenarii, Thomas de La Panetria, Robert Hondeyn, Amadas of St. Stephens, John of Laughton (?), Robert of Ireland, Roger Pentney, Augustine de Noreis, and possibly several others unspecified, such as Geoffrey de Lande who was stated to be returning from Gascony in December 1296 and had 'outstanding expenses'.

5 October 1296 - Lacy wrote to John Langton, chancellor, requesting protections for infantry returning to England with Sir William Martin.

1. 'Fourteen magnates, headed by ..Edmund of Lancaster, were granted, on 10 October (1295) a liberate writ of £1,983.6s.8d (PRESTWICH (thesis), f.38; Liberate Rolls, C. 62/71). For Gascon examples see E101 152/8/...
11 October 1296 - like for Robert de La Yernite(?) and his troop of twenty infantry returning to England.1

October 1296(?) - like for Augustine de Noreis, vintenarius and his troop of infantry returning to England.2

c. October 1296 - like for John of Laughton(? Luton?) and his troop of 20 infantry returning to England.3

C. October 1296 - like for Robert Hondyn/Houden, vintenarius of crossbow-men, and his troop returning to England.4

C. October 1296 - like for Robert of Ireland, vintenarius and his troop of infantry returning to England.5

C. October 1296 - like for Geoffrey de Lande, vintenarius and his troop of infantry returning to England.6

C. October 1296 - like for Roger Pentney, vintenarius and his troop of infantry returning to England.7

Continued from r.ioj)

2. R.G., 4391; Foedera, p. 876. There is no definite indication of the nature of this deadline or of what determined it.

3. C47 2/13/2. The reason for the issue is that Panetria was a 'felon'.

4. C47 2/16/21. These infantry are clearly one of the two companies of repatriated troops, 85 & 132 men respectively, who, writes Prestwich, 'came to Edward to protest that they had not been paid the wages they were due' (PRESTWICH (thesis), ff. 191-2; B.M. Add. MSS. 8835, ff. 52, 54; and again, M. Prestwich, War, Politics and Finance under Edward I, London: Faber and Faber, 1972 (hereinafter: PRESTWICH), p. 166.

5. Scl 27/64.

1. Scl 27/65.

2. Scl 27/67. The dating is in fact verifiable by reference to C47 2/16/21, considered supra, n. 4.


4. Scl 27/70. Ditto reference dating. Another document (Scl 27/70a), originally sewn to 27/70, is a schedule of names of 15 crossbow-men with Robert Hondyn.

5. Scl 27/69. Ditto reference dating. Another document (Scl 27/69a), originally sewn to 27/69, is a schedule of names of 18 men with Robert of Ireland.


7. Scl 27/72. Ditto reference dating. Another document (Scl 27/73), originally sewn to 27/72, is a schedule of names of 17 men with Roger Pentney.
A chronicle reference is made to this demobilisation by Walter of Guisborough, who declares that many wounded, sick and infirm English foot were demobilised and returned to England with William de Vescy, himself ill, with others, late in 1296. There are a few isolated references to the demobilisation of individuals during the war. For example, in the Patent rolls a pardon dated 15 April 1297 and on Lacy's testimony for a 'demobilled' felon, Robert of Tonnecombe, for loyal Gascon service; and again, on 8 September 1296, a letter of obligation from Henry de Lacy for Simon de Hoce, scutifer, are both instances of individual terminations of service. The second was for outstanding backpay and for compensation for loss of horses 'du temps, que il est demorez en vostre (Edward's) service es parties de Gascoigne', the implication being that his term of duty was now concluded. Such examples during the course of the war of 'past service' of English men-at-arms are, however, rare; and they provide only scanty evidence of 'English' demobilisations in the period of actual conflict in the duchy. Indeed, the repatriations of late 1296 were, with the two exceptions of Sir William de Vescy, who was sick, and Sir William Martin, entirely of time-expired or incapacitated infantry, not men-at-arms. This impression is supported by an examination of references to men-at-arms serving or having served in Guienne. Treating the two

1. GUISOBOURGH, p. 262; BEMONTE, clvi; RAMSAY, p. 422.
2. C.P.R., 1292-1301, p. 246.
3. E101 154/14/5.
4. Some of the returning infantry were felons, who may have been on a strictly limited service-obligation in return for anticipated pardon. One of them was the vintenarius Roger Pentney (supra, f. 171), who, with two other 'felons' John Semot, of Pentney's troop, and William le Fevre, received a royal pardon in England for completed Gascon service (C.P.R., 1292-1301, p. 224).
5. V. supra, ff. 127-139, and 147-153.
expeditionary forces in turn, the following picture emerges:

**First Expeditionary Force**

(Number of men-at-arms with Gascon service-records - 130\(^1\))

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number who served until capture or death</th>
<th>20</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; desertion</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; through the entire war</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; recorded as serving until mid/late 1295</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; late 1295</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; early 1296</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; mid - 1296</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; late 1296</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; early 1297</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; mid - 1297</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; late 1297</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Presumed serving until circa June 1295? - 1\(^2\)

| " " " " December 1295? | 1\(^3\). |

Total - 97.

**Second Expeditionary Force**

(Number of men-at-arms with Gascon service-records - 66\(^4\))

| " who served until capture or death | 7 |
| " " " " the end of the war | 3 |
| " recorded as serving until late 1296 | 5 |
| " " " " early 1297 | 26 |
| " " " " mid-1297 | 9 |
| " " " " late 1297 | 2 |

Total - 52

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1. V. supra, ff. 134, 135, 139.
2. John Giffard, who seems to have been repatriated after the Podensac 
   débâcle, v. supra, f. 88, n. 3.
3. John Tregoz, who seems to have returned to England by 20 March 1296 
   when a quittance to him records 'qui fuit in obsequio nostro (Continued
These tables do not include those troops named as serving in Gascony but not identifiable as members of a particular expeditionary force, as their length of service cannot be calculated, and therefore they can not be incorporated in either of the tables.

Taken in conjunction with the absence of evidence of any appreciable repatriation of men-at-arms from Guienne from either expeditionary force once they had been committed to war-service there, the impression gained from the above tables is that prior to mid-1297 the bulk of English men-at-arms in the duchy remained in service and were not subject to any schedule of repatriation. For, of the 110 men-at-arms of the first force with service-records who had not died in Guienne or been captured, some 56 (about 51%) were still on active service until about mid-1297. As to the second expeditionary force, of the 59 men-at-arms with service-records who were not dead or captured, some 40 (about 67%) are actually recorded as still on active service in the duchy in the first part of 1297.

After the early months of 1297 an argument for continuing service is at first sight untenable, because of the reduced figures in each table of those men-at-arms recorded as still on active service in Guienne by mid-1297. It must be asked whether this considerable reduction in numbers does not reflect a withdrawal of fighting men from Gascony by

1. V. supra, ff. 155-6.
2. i.e. 10 plus 32 plus 7 plus 7.
3. i.e. 3 plus 26 plus 9 plus 2.
King Edward for his Flemish expedition. Indeed, Bémont has suggested just that.  

Certainly, the King made use of Gascon ships in his crossing to Flanders. There is evidence of this in his letter of 8 September 1297 from Guent to his clerk Elias de Segre. Edward's instruction to Segre to deliver 22 tuns of wine, 40 quarters of wheat and 30, or if possible 40 bacons to the masters of nine ships of Bayonne at 'Swayne' (Sluys) for distribution between them and their men, only about ten days after the King and his troops had disembarked at Sluys, seems evidence that he had drawn on Gascon shipping to transport his army from Winchelsey. To use Gascon transports was one thing; to have drawn English troops from his duchy for his Flemish campaign, however, would have been a very different matter. It needs careful consideration.

An obvious source for examination are the horse valuations undertaken and recorded in August/September 1297 for the Flemish expedition. Morris has considered these in some detail through exchequer documents and gives details of the contingents proceeding to Flanders in 1297: 822 cavalry comprising 127 bannerets and knights, 475 troopers of their retinues and 220 'unattached lances'. He names the bannerets of the most important retinues, 19 in all. Of these 19 names, two feature in the Gascon lists examined in this chapter: James de La Planche and John d'Engayne. James de La Planche had been scheduled to cross to Guienne with John de St-John in 1294, but there is no record of his troop or himself having done so; and as he again received letters of protection

1. BÉMONT, clvi, n.1: 'D'Autres furent rappelés, pour la guerre de Flandre. Exemple, Hughes de Ver ...' He unjustifiably quotes a letter of de Vere (E101 155/2/3) as evidence.

2. E101 155/13/1.

3. To avoid the supplies falling into the hands of the approaching French forces.

for Gascon service with Edmund in June 1296, it has been presumed that he was a member of the second expeditionary force. John d'Engayne was listed in 1294 with both Lacy and St-John as bound for Gascony and has been included as a member of the first expedition. There is no record, however, of his Gascon service. Another list of 'Flemish' horse-valuations for 1297 is extant in the Exchequer Accounts (Various). Among the 123 names appearing there, are 10 included on Gascon lists: Lord Hugo Pointz, Walter Mace/Masce soldarius (mercenary), Lord Humphrey de Beauchamp knight, John Jocelyn valettus, Lord Alexander Cheverel, Lord Nicholas Seymour knight, Robert de La Strode valettus, Lord Simon Roges knight, Lord Reginald of St. Martin and Lord Henry of Glastonbury. They must all be presumed to have shipped to Guienne as intended, although only three of them—Alexander Cheverel, Nicholas Seymour and Henry of Glastonbury—are recorded as serving in Guienne. Be that as it may, they are all on this 'Flemish' horse valuation.

It is established, then, that some few men-at-arms who may be supposed to have served in Guienne were also members of King Edward's Flemish contingents in August 1297. Further, since three of them are recorded as

1. V.supra, ff. 124 & 145.
2. V.supra, f. 124.
4. Including margins.
5. V.supra as follows: ff. 150, 145, 124, 124, 137, 145, 145, 143, 145 and 145. On 25 December 1295 Lacy had granted Simon Roges a certificate of attorney and requested of Langton letters of protection and attorney for him (SC1 27/52).
6. Cheverel and Seymour are named on E101 6/19 m. 1; Glastonbury on m. 2. Richard de Boyce, valettus is named against the month of September, also on membrane 2, but this mere valettus can not have been the Richard de Boyce, captain of Bourg garrison, who was still in Gascony on 15 May 1297 (supra, f. 136).
still serving in the duchy in January/February of that year, a number of troops in Guienne were actually withdrawn for service in Flanders. Yet these seem to have been an exception to the rule; for there is no reference to any withdrawal of men-at-arms from Guienne in either chronicle or diplomatic sources, and the great majority must therefore be assumed to have remained in the duchy. Indeed, the ten named in the 'Flemish' horse valuation may not all have crossed to Guienne - only three have Gascon service records - or, if they did, they may have returned individually for a variety of reasons.

The preponderance of figures or numbers in the service lists of the two tables above, up to early 1297, can be best explained as due to the enrolment of the third and final series of quittances. These enrolments in the Gascon rolls were in early 1297; the last and belated quittance enrolled being for John Reppa on 24 June 1297. In the absence of any definite evidence of a general transfer of troops from Gascony to Flanders in mid-1297, it may be asserted that, if the enrolment of the third series of quittances had been delayed until late in the year, those English men-at-arms shown to be on active service in Guienne in January and February would instead have been so recorded in late 1297. This, not troop movement to Flanders, probably explains the subsequent diminution of references to men-at-arms in Guienne after early 1297.

Supporting this view is the absence, too, of any finalisation of military accounts in Guienne for departing troops; whereas there are instances of this in regard to deceased or captured military personnel; and if such finalisation of military accounts took the form of the issue by Lacy or

1. The third grant from the laity to King Edward was in November 1296.
2. V. supra, f. 137.
3. e.g. William Fitz-Roger de Mortimer, captured at Bellegarde (V. supra, f. 149).
his paymasters John Sandale and Thomas Cambridge of a letter of obligation, as was the case when the earl was closing his financial books in March 1298 prior to his departure for England, it is significant that there was no such general issue of bonds in 1297. There is only one block of obligations that were issued in the first eleven months of the year, namely, a group of thirty-five, plus one duplicate, on 18 June at Bayonne; and there is not a single military one among them.\(^1\) They are, without exception, letters of obligation to Bayonnais merchants for bread and other merchandise.

A further argument against the transfer of English men-at-arms from Guienne to Flanders is the immense practical difficulties involved in the shipment of a cavalry force of any size; not just the troops, but in particular their horses. The magnitude of the task had required the personal attention of King Edward himself at Portsmouth in the summer of 1294 for over three months. The scale of the operation would make some reference to it or ordnance record of it an impossible omission from contemporary sources. Further, as has been seen,\(^2\) the King had instead been shipping horses to Guienne as reinforcement, not withdrawing them.

This is the clinching argument against Bémont's suggestion of the transfer of men-at-arms from the Gascon to the Flemish theatre of war—the least technical and yet the most obvious. Such theoretical military withdrawals are overtly contradicted by King Edward's self-evident attempts to maintain ducal resistance in Guienne. After Bellegarde, he not only despatched and promised to despatch still more supplies and monies to his forces there; he also exhorted his English barons in Guienne

\(^1\) E101/152/9/10 & 13; 152/10/7, 13 & 15; 153/1/1 & 6; 153/2/15; 153/5/3; 153/13/8, 10, 13, 15, 17, 21 & 25; 153/14/15; 153/15/3, 9, 12 & 17; 154/3/13; 154/8/20 (duplicate 155/8/20); 155/5/1, 8, 17 & 18; 155/6/1 & 4; 155/7/17; 155/13/4, 5, 10, 18 & 20.

\(^2\) V. supra, f. 140.
to continue in service there;\textsuperscript{1} and even attempted to dragoon his
barons and earls in England to take ship for the duchy without him in
support of the earl of Lincoln - an attempt which brought his kingdom
to the verge of civil war. Both the King's words and deeds belie the
proposition of deliberate troop-withdrawals from his duchy.
Individual service records - additional to those already presented earlier
in this chapter - reinforce the impression of continuing Gascon service
by those who had crossed to Guienne. Firstly, there is the letter of
Hugh de Vere dated April 1300,\textsuperscript{2} which Bémont advanced as evidence of
a transfer of troops from Gascony to Flanders. In it, de Vere states that
he had served in Guienne 'throughout the whole war' and had transferred
to Edward in Flanders 'at the end of the Gascon war'. By no stretch of
the imagination can this be taken to mean before the Anglo-French
truce of November 1297, which finally brought hostilities to a halt. It
would seem self-evident that his transfer was because of his pre-war
diplomatic experience in Anglo-French negotiations over Guienne,\textsuperscript{3}
in conjunction with his first-hand knowledge, from the very outset of the
fighting, of the situation in the duchy of Aquitaine. Both would be
assets to King Edward in the current truce negotiations in Flanders.

A number of certificates of military service issued in the course of the
war may also be cited as evidence of a lack of any time-limit on Gascon
service. For example, on 7 April 1296 Edmund issued at Langon a certif-
icate of service for Robert Haumont of Wilts, Thomas Pannington of
Dorset and Simon le Roux of Dorset to the effect that they had come to
Guienne as members of the first expeditionary force and had served to
date in the Blaye garrison.\textsuperscript{4} He requested for them 'chartres de pais',

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{1} V. supra, ff. 99 & 170.
\textsuperscript{2} E101 155/2/3: 1 April.
\textsuperscript{3} V. supra, ff. 105-6.
\textsuperscript{4} C47 2/13/1.
\end{flushleft}
(letters of protection), as those which they had received when leaving England had been lost in the advance on Bordeaux in the first expedition. So, these three soldiers of the first expeditionary force had served through the opening campaign and were continuing to serve in the second one.

Another example of continuing service is seen in a letter of Lacy, dated Bayonne 7 June (1297), in which he writes to King Edward regarding the grant of the manor of Ewelme, Oxfordshire, by John Bacon royal clerk, to his brother Edmund Bacon. Lacy refers to Edmund's having come to the duchy with John de St-John and his still serving there in the company of St-John Jnr.; the implication is that Edmund had served the father until his capture at Bellegarde and had then transferred to service with the son. In the Patent rolls under 5 July 1297, the royal judgement is duly recorded - the grant of a licence for John Bacon, king's clerk, to enfeoff Edmund Bacon his brother, now in Gascony on the King's service, of his manor of Ewelme, county Oxford.

Lacy's military subordinates also issued testimonials or certificates of service, on the strength of their military commands, to men under their authority. Two such certificates of Simon de Montague, marshal of the Blaye garrison, have survived. One, dated 9 March 1298, is in favour of a John Fitz-Richard Burnel of Langley for loyal service in the Blaye garrison from the time of Edmund of Lancaster's arrival there until the departure of the garrison, which may be presumed to be March 1298. Another, of the same format, though undated, testifies to the loyal service with de Montague in the Blaye garrison of William Fox of Dodington, up to the time of the marshal's own departure for England. Lacy was himself issuing similar service certificates at Bayonne. One of 8 March 1298 confirms the loyal Gascon service to that date of John Galyot; Galyot

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1. The originals were lost by Adam de Creting, killed at Rione 95.
2. SC1 18/188. Date deduced from St-John's capture in January 1297, Lacy's return to England in c. March 1298 and the Patent rolls entry. (Continued f. 181.)
was a 'felon', who on 16 May 1299 duly received pardon for breaking prison at Bromyne, on Lacy's testimony of his Gascon war-service. So too, it emerges, were William Fox and John Fitz-Richard Burnel. The former is named in the Gascon rolls among the 310 freed felons in 1294 for service in Guienne; the latter duly received a pardon (for manslaughter) on Montague's testimony of Gascon service. A fourth 'felon', John Fenwick, received a certificate of loyal service from Lacy at Bayonne on 13 March 1298. He had come to Guienne and remained in service there to that date. He received his pardon (for robberies etc.), through Lacy's certificate, on 26 May 1299. In each case, the certificated service was to the very end of hostilities, whether the individual entered into it with the first or the second expeditionary force. So, although there were a few instances of 'felons' returning to England before the end of fighting in the duchy, possibly because of infirmity or incapacity, others soldiered on.

The conclusion of this investigation into length of service by English troops in the Gascon war is that, although some small numbers of infantry, possibly casualties, and a few invalid men-at-arms were repatriated from Guienne about the end of 1296, there was no regular or periodic demobilisation of troops, and certainly not of English men-at-arms - the core of the ducal army. Even the needs of the Flemish expedition do not seem seriously to have cut into Lacy's available

Continued from f. 180)

3. C.P.R., 1292-1301, p. 289.

1. C.P.R., 1292-1301, p. 416.
2. R.G., 3103 dated 30 July 1294.
3. C.P.R., 1292-1301, p. 405 under Westminster 5 April 1299.
5. C.P.R., 1292-1301, p. 420.
6. V. supra, f. 172, n. 4.
English troop-resources. As a general rule, the prevailing period of military service in the duchy was from muster to the end of hostilities, which in practical terms meant demobilisation after repatriation about March 1298. Such devotion to the ducal cause in Guienne was a tribute to both the King-duc and to his capitaneus, Henry de Lacy.

To conclude this exercise in establishing the size of the English cavalry forces available in Guienne to Henry de Lacy, it can be maintained that, on the basis of calculations in this chapter - to be treated of course with an element of caution because of the unknown completeness or incompleteness of medieval records - the size of Henry de Lacy's total force of English men-at-arms in Guienne was no more than 560 at most, 1 less captured, killed, incapacitated and some small proportion of repatriations. Making a deduction of 81 for such reduction of English cavalry strength prior to Lacy's taking command in June 1296 2 gives a final total of 479 English men-at-arms available to him for fighting the war in Guienne.

In itself, being otherwise uncorroborated, the calculations and estimates advanced in reaching the above conclusions and figures are completely hypothetical. Happily, they can be corroborated. It is possible to test the hypothesis by reference to an entirely separate source of evidence: the financial total for the wages of English men-at-arms in Gascony as set down by the King-duc's paymasters John Sandale and Thomas Cambridge in their final account for the war submitted to the barons of the exchequer in 1314-15.

If there is validity in the estimates worked out in this chapter, if there is validity in the argument that English military service in the

1. i.e. 299 members of the first force plus 227 of the second plus c. 34 others; c/f. supra, f. 168.
2. The details of the figure 81 are set out in the calculations on f. 183 et seq. under troop losses, short term service etc.
duchy of Aquitaine tended to be for the duration of hostilities, that is, until 24 March 1298,\(^1\) then a further estimate can be made of the total wage-bill of the English men-at-arms. If that calculation, based on known wage-rates, individual periods of service, and troop numbers of the expeditionary forces already reconstructed in this chapter, should approximate to the final wage figure of the two paymasters, then, contrary to Bémont's contention that a deduction of English troop numbers is impossible, the impossible — at least in regard to cavalry numbers — will have been achieved. For if the final figure is reasonably near to the final figure in the paymasters' accounts, it will demonstrate that the reconstruction in this chapter of the size of the contingents of English men-at-arms in the ducal armies of the Gascon war has been a meaningful and worthwhile exercise. The estimates propounded here will be established as substantially correct; and although the question of infantry numbers remains to be resolved, the size of the really significant element of the ducal forces, its core — the English men-at-arms — will have been ascertained. The dimensions of this predominant element in Henry de Lacy's army, the mainspring of his military mechanism, will no longer be hypothetical. His actual military capability and his limitations can for the first time be properly appreciated. That exercise is now undertaken here. The following tables provide an estimate of the wage-bill of English men-at-arms who served in the Gascon war, based on troop-numbers, length of military service and wage-rates as calculated and argued and stated earlier in this chapter.

**First Expeditionary Force**

(maximum service-period: 11 November 1294–24 March 1298, i.e. 1230 days).\(^2\)

Bannerets: 58.\(^3\)

---

1. V. supra, f. 115.
2. Ibid.
3. V. supra, ff. 139, 165.
Knights and Troopers: 241¹ (ratios 6 troopers to 1 knight).²

Composition

Bannerets: 58

Less losses: Rions 6 April 1295 - 9

(captured: Raoul de Gorges, Raoul de Toeni, John of Fulburn, Thomas Turbeville, Aymer of St. Edmunds, Henry Botingham/Bodrugan/Boydin, Roger de Leyburn, John de Mandeville; killed: Adam de Creting).

St-Sever 31 May 1295 - 1

(Stephen Fitz-Walter, who died during the thirteen-week siege April–July, say circa 31 May).

Bellegarde 30 January 1297 - 5

(captured: John de St-John, John de Roches, William Petton, Hugh of Audeley?; killed: Philip Matersdon).

Less short services: 3

(John Tregoz to circa 31 December 1295?; John Giffard to circa 30 June 1295?; John Engayne to circa 31 December 1295?).

Knights: 34 (one seventh of 241 - combined total with Troopers).

Less losses: Rions 6 April 1295 - c.12 (according to chronicles,³ although only 6 actually named:


1. V.supra, f.139 for a combined total as 'troopers' in contradistinction to bannerets.

2. Morris, writing of the Welsh campaigns of 1277 and 1282, states (p.55): 'In paid corps as those of 1294–5 to Gascony [as] two or three, even as many as five, troopers appear with each knight'. As 1294–5 was a time of emergency so exceptional as to cause the engagement of 'felons' for Gascony, 6 troopers per knight seems a legitimate ratio.

(Continued on f.185
Bordeaux c.25 March 1296 - 2 (vexillifers)\(^1\)

Bellegarde 30 January 1297 - 3

(captured: William of Sudeley; killed: Alan of Twitham and son).

**less short service**: 2

(Humphrey de Beauchamp to circa 31 December 1295?; Alexander Cheverel to circa 31 March 1297?).

**Troopers**: 207 (combined total with Knights of 241 less 34 Knights).

**less losses**: Rions 6 April 1295 - 33 ('squires')\(^2\)

Bellegarde 30 January 1297 - c.12?\(^3\)

**less short service**: c.24

(187 to circa 31 December 1295; 6? to circa March 1297).\(^4\)

Continued from f.184)

3. TRIVET, p.336: a total of 21 'knights' (i.e. including bannerets) were lost at Rions.

1. TRIVET, p.341.

2. Ibid., p.336.

3. Calculated according to the proportion of troopers (33) to knights (21) lost at Rions, i.e. a ratio of approximately 3:2. Admittedly, trooper losses at Bellegarde are unspecified, but this comparison with losses at Rions is the only available one in the Gascon war.

4. The short service figure of troopers is also an unknown quantity. The procedure adopted has been to multiply the banneret and knight figures by 6, as per the applied ratio of 6 troopers to each 'knight'. John Giffard, who is assumed to be a lone repatriation after his 'disgrace' at Podensac in March 1295, is not included in the calculation. John Jocelyn (ff.124 & 176) is the only named and presumed 'short-service' trooper.
Bannerets @ 4/- per day

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Days</th>
<th>Rate</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>1230</td>
<td>4/-</td>
<td>£9840 0s 0d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>4/-</td>
<td>264 12s 0d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>4/-</td>
<td>40 8s 0d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>813</td>
<td>4/-</td>
<td>813 0s 0d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>4/-</td>
<td>166 8s 0d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>4/-</td>
<td>46 8s 0d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>£11,170 16s 0d</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Knights @ 2/- per day

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Days</th>
<th>Rate</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>1230</td>
<td>2/-</td>
<td>£1845 0s 0d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>2/-</td>
<td>176 8s 0d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>2/-</td>
<td>100 4s 0d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>813</td>
<td>2/-</td>
<td>243 18s 0d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>2/-</td>
<td>41 12s 0d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>872</td>
<td>2/-</td>
<td>87 4s 0d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>£2,494 6s 0d</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Troopers @ 1/- per day

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Days</th>
<th>Rate</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>207</td>
<td>1230</td>
<td>1/-</td>
<td>£8487 0s 0d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>1/-</td>
<td>242 11s 0d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>813</td>
<td>1/-</td>
<td>487 16s 0d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>1/-</td>
<td>373 4s 0d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>872</td>
<td>1/-</td>
<td>261 12s 0d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>£9,852 3s 0d</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. According to wage-rates laid down in the Pipe Roll (c/f. supra, f. 114).
First Expeditionary Force Financial Total -

Bannerets  £11,170 16s 0d
Knights    2,494  6s 0d
Troopers   9,852  3s 0d

£23,517  5s 0d

Second Expeditionary Force
(maximum service—period: circa 25 January 1296 to 24 March 1298: 790 days).
Bannerets: 25.1
Knights and Troopers: 202.2

Composition

Bannerets: 25

less losses: Bellgarde 30 January 1297 - 3
(captured: William Fitz-Roger de Mortimer, Reginald de Nowers, Thomas Meuse).

less short service: 3
(Richard Fitz-John who died mid-1297; William Martin to circa December 1296; Hugo Pointz to ditto?).

Knights: 29 (one seventh of 202 - combined total with Troopers).

less losses: Bordeaux c.25 March 1296 - 2
(captured: Robert and John de Mauley).

Bellgarde 30 January 1297 - 2
(captured: William of Birmingham and Adam Huddleston).

less short service: 5
(William Vesey to circa December 1296; Simon Roges ditto; Reginald of St. Martin ditto; Nicholas Seymour to circa 31 March 1297; Henry of Glastonbury ditto).

1. V. supra, ff. 154 & 155.
2. V. supra, f. 154. Ratio of Troopers to Knights is taken again as 6:1.
Troopers: 173 (combined total with Knights of 202 less 29 Knights).

less losses: Bellegarde 30 January 1297 - c.8 1

less short service: c.42 2

(30? to circa 31 December 1296; 12? to circa 31 March 1297).

Computation

Bannerets 6/- per day

25 less 6(losses/short service) = 19

\[ 19 \times 790 \text{ days} \times 6/- = £3,002 \text{ os od} \]
\[ 3 \times 372 \times 6/- = 223 \text{ 4s od} \]
\[ 1 \times 527 \times 6/- = 105 \text{ 8s od} \]
\[ 2 \times 342 \times 6/- = 136 \text{ 16s od} \]

\[ £3,467 \text{ 8s od} \]

Knights 2/- per day

29 less 9(losses/short service) = 20

\[ 20 \times 790 \text{ days} \times 2/- = £1,580 \text{ os od} \]
\[ 2 \times 61 \times 2/- = 12 \text{ 4s od} \]
\[ 2 \times 372 \times 2/- = 74 \text{ 8s od} \]
\[ 3 \times 342 \times 2/- = 102 \text{ 12s od} \]
\[ 2 \times 432 \times 2/- = 86 \text{ 8s od} \]

\[ £1,855 \text{ 12s od} \]

---

1. Calculated as for Troopers of the first force (v.supra, f.185, n.3).
2. Ibid. (v.supra, f.185, n.4). It is assumed that troops of deceased knights such as Richard Fitz-John would transfer as mercenaries to other companies and remain on active service. Presumed 'short service' Troopers: Walter Mace, soldarius (mercenary) to circa the end of 1296; Robert de La Strode, valettus ditto.
Troopers @ 1/- per day

173 less 50? (losses/short service) = 123.

\[
\begin{align*}
123 & \times 790 \text{ days} \times 1/- = £4,858 10s od \\
8 & \times 372 \times = = 148 16s od \\
30 & \times 342 \times = = 513 os od \\
12 & \times 432 \times = = 259 4s od \\
\hline
\end{align*}
\]

\[£5,779 10s od\]

Second Expeditionary Force Financial Total -

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bannerets</td>
<td>£3,467 8s od</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knights</td>
<td>1,855 12s od</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troopers</td>
<td>5,779 10s od</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>£11,102 10s od</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A third and final calculation remains to be made for firstly, 4 knights named in the chronicles as lost at Bellegarde,¹ namely, John de La Warde, Henry Chadwick(?), Gerald de Leseyn and James de Beauchamp; secondly, an extra 19 men-at-arms, two apparently bannerets with their own troops, who, like the first four, are not specified as members of either expeditionary force, but were members of Lacy's army.²

Additional Men-at-Arms³

\[
\begin{align*}
4 & \times 592\frac{1}{2} \text{ days} \times = = £ 59 5s od \\
1 & \text{banneret (1st force?)} \times 1230 \text{ days} \times 4/- = 246 os od \\
1 & \text{banneret (2nd force?)} \times 790 \text{ days} \times 4/- = 158 os od \\
\text{Simon de Hooe, 'esquier'} & \times 668 \text{ days} \times 1/- = 33 8s od \\
\text{Reginald de Montague (1st force?)} & \times 1230 \text{ days} \times 2/- = 123 os od \\
\hline
\end{align*}
\]

1. V. supra, f. 155.  
2. Ibid., ff. 155-6.  
3. In view of indeterminable service periods and ratios of Knights and Troopers, calculations are made by averaging where necessary.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Days</th>
<th>Rate</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>John Rastel, Simon de Kyme, Guy Ferre Jnr., (second force as only 1297 quittance?)</td>
<td>790</td>
<td>2/-</td>
<td>£237 0s 0d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas of Birmingham and Geoffrey of Havant (?) (2nd force as no earlier reference?)</td>
<td>790</td>
<td>2/-</td>
<td>158 0s 0d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Knights (?) of 'past service' (say, 3 each force)</td>
<td>1230</td>
<td>2/-</td>
<td>369 0s 0d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Neal (late arrival)</td>
<td>662</td>
<td>2/-</td>
<td>66 4s 0d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Troopers (scutifers) (say, 2 each force)</td>
<td>1230</td>
<td>1/-</td>
<td>123 0s 0d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troopers of 2 bannerets (supra) (say, 24 Troopers? each force)</td>
<td>1230</td>
<td>1/-</td>
<td>738 0s 0d</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Grand Financial Total (based on reconstructed troop numbers):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First Expeditionary Force</td>
<td>£23,517 5s 0d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td>11,102 10s 0d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional men-at-arms</td>
<td>2,481 4s 0d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>£37,100 19 od</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It will be recalled that the final account of John Sandale and Thomas Cambridge submitted in 1314-15 contains, as the final total for the wages of the English men-at-arms, the sum of £37,051 16s 7½d — a discrepancy of £49 2s 4½d.

1. Receipt of a quittance suggests they were probably Knights, not mere Troopers.
2. His receipt of letters of attorney suggests the same classification.
3. V. supra, f. 115.
The approximation of the two figures, the treasury-account figure and the reconstructed estimate, vindicates fully the arguments and assumptions advanced in this chapter. It also confirms the general opinion of historians as to the excellence of King Edward's organisation of the clerical records of his administration, so well exemplified in the Gascon rolls, on which such great reliance has been placed in the above calculations.

It is thus now possible to treat as reliable the statistical reconstruction, undertaken in this chapter, of the size of the King-duke's main military force in the duchy in the Gascon war, his English men-at-arms. The numbers of English cavalry troops under Henry de Lacy's command as capitaneus, when he succeeded Edmund of Lancaster in that capacity in June 1296, were a mere 480 at most.¹ This small force falls well below chronicle estimates of its size, as would be expected. More important, it illustrates the paucity of Henry de Lacy's chief military resources in holding the duchy of Aquitaine, or what still remained outside French control, for the King-duke.

Obviously, these man-power inadequacies in English recruitment threw a great burden in continuing the war against King Philip's troops in Guienne, on the duchy itself. Gascon military resources in the ducal cause must also, therefore, be considered, to obtain any balanced assessment of the situation and of Henry de Lacy's military potential and record.

¹. V. supra, f. 182. N.B., the leaders of the two expeditionary forces, John of Brittany, John de St-John, Edmund and Lacy, are not included in this total, nor therefore in the financial total.
DUCA.L MILITARY RESOURCES: (b) GASCON

Military survival in the Gascon war depended for the earl of Lincoln and his troops on the retention of remaining ducal citadels - the fortified towns. A consideration of Henry de Lacy's Gascon military resources and of his Gascon support may suitably begin, therefore, with a study of urban reliability.

On the outbreak of war, the King-ducę sent letters of recruitment in June 1294 not only to individual Gascon magnates, but also to the citizens of Gascon towns. Letters for aid were addressed to Bordeaux, Regula (La Rèole), Lectoure and Bayonne; also to the civic officers of many towns: Bordeaux, Bayonne, Basas, Dax, St-Sever, La Rèole, Bourg sur Mer, Libourne, St-Macaire, St-Émilion, Marmande, Lectoure, Condom, Monclar-d'Agenais, Agen, Meilhan, Port St-Marie, Penne-d'Agenais, Tournon-d'Agenais, Monflanquin and Puymirol. The weight of ecclesiastical approval in the duchy was sought in letters to the archbishop of Auch and the bishops of Basas, Agen, Dax, Bayonne, Oloron, Aire, Lescar, Lectoure, the abbots of St-Maurin and Clairac, and the prior of Mas-d'Agenais. Edward also appealed for aid to his subjects in rural areas, for example, the inhabitants of Labour, Mauléon (Marsan), Mezin, the Aspe valley, the Ossau valley, Oloron, Morlan (Morlaas), Orthes and Sauveterre-de-Béarn. 1

Many Gascon towns and their environs were already under French jurisdiction. 2 Six ducal citadels and Bordeaux had been made over to the constable of France, Raoul de Nesle, in March 1294. 3 It will be noted that, despite that, Edward approached four of them, Tournon, Puymirol, Penne and Monflanquin, for support the following June — an indication of the King-ducę's confidence in the loyalty of his Gascon subjects.

1. For these letters requesting support see R.G., 3382-3394, 3395-6 and Foedera, pp. 806-7.
2. C/f. supra, ff. 44-45, Appendix I and map of occupation.
3. C/f. supra, f. 44.
Bearing in mind the pressures of French occupation, the King-duke's anticipation of Gascon support, and the importance of the Gascon towns to ducal commanders as reservoirs of local infantry contingents (in particular for garrisoning purposes), it is important to discover how many towns in Guienne, or what proportion of them, did prove loyal to their lord to the extent of supporting his expeditionary forces and contributing positively to the campaigns of his generals.

For over forty years King Edward had been fostering Gascon loyalty and the benefit of that policy was seen in the Gascon war, not only among the nobility of Guienne, but in the Gascon communities. Although Bordeaux, Bayonne, Bourg and Blaye had all remained loyal to King Henry III in the Gascon revolt of 1252-3 against Simon de Montfort's administration, other towns had not been so dependable, notably La Réole, which had remained a centre of resistance to the very end. The story was very different in 1294, when 'Blaye, Saint-Macaire, La Réole et les autres châteaux des environs ouvrirent spontanément leurs portes' to the first expeditionary force.

Bayonne, Bourg, Blaye and St-Sever were self-evidently ducal strongholds in the Gascon war. The strength of Bayonnais loyalty was evident from the end of 1294 when John de St-John invested the city. Despite a strong

1. C/f. supra, f.115 and n.
5. BALASQUE & DULAURENS, p.535.
French-Basque garrison,¹ the citizens not only opened their gates to the ducal forces, but also played so major a part in forcing the garrison to withdraw to the castle, that later historians claimed that the city was re-taken for the King-duke not by St-John, but by the mayor, Pascal de Vielle, and the men of Bayonne.² Bayonnais loyalty was most vividly expressed in the civic request to King Edward to unite the city to the English Crown; it was highly respected in the King-duke's grant of privileges and his regular mode of address to the community - 'to his faithful and loyal men'.³

Edward used that mode of address in his letters to other citadels as well, such as Bourg and Blaye, both to civil and military personnel. The loyalty of the citizens at Bourg and Blaye had been in evidence since their capitulation in 1294 to the first expeditionary force out of pro-ducal feeling. In contrast, the French siege of Bourg in mid-1296 did not bring a like capitulation, which indicates that the citizen body was inclined to the ducal cause.⁴ The strong ducal garrisons which were established in the twin towns in 1294, must have been sizeable, for a letter of Earl Edmund on 25 May 1296, only eighteen months later, refers to backpay owed to the two garrisons totalling £7,391 9s 8d st. up to 15 March 1296.⁵

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¹ BALASQUE & DULARENS, p. 531.
² Ibid., pp. 533-534. Cf. also, Annales de Wigornia, p. 520; TRIVET, p. 334/ RISHANGER, p. 147; NANGIS, p. 286 & n. 2.
³ Cf. supra, ff. 50-51, 51-53 and e.g. R.G., 4490 of 7 May 1297.
⁴ RAMSAY, p. 415.
⁵ Cf. supra, ff. 73-74.
⁶ REMONT, cliv, n. 3: E101 6/1 & 6/2.
The citizens of St-Sever were also loyal to their lord. The French had found it necessary to compel obedience in the city when they first occupied it in 1294, as is shown by a chronicler’s reference to hostages being taken and sent to Toulouse for internment.\(^1\) Gascon loyalty at St-Sever was evident on St-John’s recapture of the city early in 1295, when the citizens came over to him and precipitated the withdrawal of the French garrison. Later, in the spring and summer of 1295, the ducal garrison under Hugh de Vere was able to withstand a bitter siege by the army of Charles of Valois for about three months and, when forced to come to terms, to extract a guarantee of immunity from reprisal for the citizens of St-Sever and their properties.\(^2\) St-Sever’s loyalty to the King-duke was re-emphasised by the easy and uneventful re-occupation of late July 1295 by Hugh de Vere, immediately after Charles of Valois and his army had left.\(^3\)

St-Sever persisted in ducal loyalty during Henry de Lacy’s captaincy, being one of a number of ducal citadels periodically described as ‘en mult povre estat’ for want of supplies, and therefore in danger of falling to the enemy. Four towns were thus specifically named: St-Sever, Bellegarde, St-Quiterie and Labouheyre; although there is reference also to ‘other places’.\(^4\) One of these was presumably ‘Sodoye’ which is mentioned as one of the outposts that Lacy was seeking to provision when his supply-train was ambushed at Bellegarde.\(^5\)

\(^1\) TRIVET, p.337/RISHANGER, p.149.
\(^3\) TRIVET,p.336/RISHANGER,p.150; GUISOBRUGH,pp.245, 248; NANGIS,p.289.
\(^4\) C/f.supra,f.77 & n. For detailed references (1297): E101 155/5/13(30 March); 153/15/11(1 April); 152/9/39(3 April – BEMONT,clxi:part ref.); E101 12/26 & 153/15/5(8 April); 154/8/6 & 155/7/20(17 April). On Labouheyre, c/f.supra,f.65.
\(^5\) Anciennes Chroniques de Flandre, p.356.
recounts that the bastide of Bellegarde had successfully withstood a French siege in the summer of 1296.\(^1\) The continued resistance of starving ducal citadels in 1297, despite the French destruction of the desperately awaited relief-column at Bellegarde, re-affirms the strength of Gascon loyalty to the King-duke and his capitaneus. The citizens of Bellegarde, at the time of that bitter reversal, gave vent to their loyalist feelings by refusing to harbour fugitives from the battle, whom, they considered, deserters of the earl of Lincoln in his hour of need.\(^2\) St-Quiterie (Katherine's) was actively resisting a siege until relieved in the autumn of 1297.\(^3\) Further evidence of Gascon steadfastness in the face of deprivation is illustrated by a letter in the Gascon rolls dated 9 December 1296, in which King Edward states that he has charged William of Toulouse, merchant, with the supply of the town of Bourg in response to its letter of distress.\(^4\) The 'delivery' was of 1,000 qtrs of wheat, 300 qtrs of oats, 200 qtrs of beans, 300 bacons and 10,000 fish 'et amplius'.

Loyalist Gascon towns are discernible by their normal co-operation with ducal forces. Thus, Bonnut, which Lacy made his last stop en route for Bellegarde with his supply column, must on that account be held loyal; as also Peyrehorade which was Lacy's previous halt, and where ducal troops met-up after the Bellegarde ambush. Nearby Lana, in the diocese of Aire, was also loyal; for a letter of obligation from Lacy, written at Peyrehorade 11 September 1297, mentions some small provisions (bread and apples?) that

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2. *GUISBOROUGH*, p. 263; and *supra*, f. 92.
4. R.G., 4262. The same merchant made war-time loans to Bourg and Blaye of £233 14s 4d st. and £100 6s 8d st. for the payment of mercenaries in the two garrisons (R.G., 4932/33 & 4913/1).
had been purchased from its inhabitants. Another Lacy bond, of 23 March
1298, reveals the loyalty of the inhabitants of the community of the
whole of the King's territory of Labourd', to the south of Bayonne, a
number of whom were owed a total of £97 st. backpay for military
service for the King-duke. St-Sever's loyalty is on record in a letter
patent of 24 February 1297 from Lacy to Walter Langton, bishop of
Coventry and Lichfield and lord treasurer of England, states his
obligation of £97 5s 8d st. to the burgesses of St-Sever for backpay
and recompense for horses lost on ducal service. The military record
of St-Quiterie is reflected in a Patent roll entry of 4 April 1317
concerning a debt of £213 15s 11d to the burgesses of the town for
backpay and re-stocking of horses.

Gascon loyalty had been very evident, too, in the north of the duchy in
the local welcome extended to the two English expeditionary forces on
their arrival. Castillon, in the Medoc, had received the first force
'jubilantly' and was the town chosen for landing the horse of the
second force. The adjacent fort of Lesparre had also welcomed Earl
Edmund and his army. The loyalty to the King-duke of Libourne, on the
Dordogne, is clear from the destruction of its fortifications during
French occupation. Macau, about ten miles to the north of Bordeaux,
received the first expeditionary force at once it is said, and higher
up the Garonne the complex of Virelade, Rions and Podensac was a
particularly friendly area. The ducal adhesion of the men of Podensac

2. Ibid., 154/9/1.
3. C.P.R., 1313-1317, pp. 636, 640, 673.
4. GUISBOROUGH, p. 244; Rhodes, op. cit., 232; Flores Historiarum, iii, 285.
7. RAMSAY, p. 415.
was reflected in the French hanging fifty of them in retribution,\(^1\) after the English garrison-commander, John Giffard, had surrendered the town to the constable of France on the arrival of Charles of Valois' army in early 1295. Despite the subsequent débâcle at Rions, from which citadel - until then his military headquarters - John of Brittany withdrew precipitately and in disorder, apparently having deserted his Gascon allies,\(^2\) the men of Rions remained true to the cause of their King-duc. This is apparent from an entry in the Gascon rolls dated 25 August 1299, which refers to a grant by the King-duc of £1,000 chipotenses per annum to his dispossessed men of Rions, who did war-service for him in the garrisons of Bourg and Blaye, whither John of Brittany retreated, and also in the garrison of Bayonne.\(^3\)

A similar picture of Gascon loyalty emerges at other citadels further up the Garonne at Langon, St-Macaire and La Röle, all of which evinced support for the forces of their lord, the King-duc. Langon, about fifteen miles up-river from Bordeaux, received Earl Edmund in late March or early April 1296; the citizens of St-Macaire gave over the city to him despite the presence of a stubborn French garrison, which retired to the castle of the town and continued a stout and successful resistance under Thibaut de Cheppoy, who was later a prominent French squadron leader at the battle of Bellegarde; La Röle,\(^4\) was resisting a French siege as late as January 1297 and possibly again, after Robert d'Artois' return from Bellegarde.\(^5\) This is significant, that La Röle, which had been the

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1. GUISOBOROUGH, p. 246. According to BEMONT (cxlvi(iii) the victims were sixty of the leading burgesses.
2. TRIVET, p. 336/RISHANGER, p. 149; GUISOBOROUGH, pp. 246-7; Annales de Wigornia, p. 525.
3. R.G., 4532. Libra chipotenses were coin of Bigorre and about one fifth of sterling in value (Pipe Roll 8 Edward II (160). as quoted BEMONT, cxxi, n. 1).
5. RAMSAY, p. 422; Rhodes, op. cit., 233.
final centre of revolt in the insurrection of 1252-3, was in 1297 still
solidly for Edward; and this, notwithstanding the French retention of
hostages taken on the occupation of the duchy almost three years earlier. ¹

In addition to the outpost of Labouheyre, ² several other towns in
Landes were loyal, namely, Labrit, Rochefort/Roquefort, Pontonx, Beyries near
Amou, Sault and Hagetmau. All except Sault were centres of troop-raising
in 1294-5 by John de St-John. ³ During the war, Lacy made Arnold Gaveston
custos of the town and castle of Sault, with a small garrison of forty
men-at-arms (presumably Gascon) and fifty foot, and also of Rochefort, with
five men-at-arms and fifty foot, ⁴ so both must have been ducal citadels.
The fidelity of Pontonx, on the Adour, is underlined by the French
destruction of the priory there and the persecution of its prior, Arnold,
for his allegiance to the King-duke. ⁵

A very simple test of the loyalty to Edward of his Gascon towns was their
willingness to advance loans for financing the war against the French,
and to accept both delay in repayment and the need to receive it at
the English exchequer. There are instances of groups of representatives

¹. Arnold de Pis, for example, had been arrested 'with others of La
Réole' and was still in a French prison in late 1296 (R.G., 4414 of
25 November 1296). The Des Pis were one of the principal families of
La Réole (Bémont, 'Simon de Montfort, comte de Leicester, son
gouvernement en Gasconie 1248-1253', La Revue historique, IV, 252).
². C/f. supra, f.65.
³. E101 152/8/48-54; 152/8/55-67 & 69 (BÉMON, clix part ref.); and
BÉMON, clix, 152/14/.
⁴. C47 24/2/23.
⁵. R.G., 4517, 4529/260, 4985/180, Appendice I, No.15; and C.C.R., 1302-7,
p.436.
engaged in this exercise as proctors. For example, on 30 March 1297 a letter from the burgesses of Blaye to Walter Langton, lord treasurer of England, refers to their appointment of Elias Aycard, Elias of Périgueux and Bernard Grassi as their proctors and attorneys, empowered to receive payment of debts and to settle all matters pertaining. A greater example is an entry of 30 July 1297 in the Patent rolls, which records how the bishops of London and Ely were appointed to see that the men of the towns of St-Sever, Oleron, St-John de Sordes, Sauveterre, Bourg, St-Quiterie, BORDEAUX(!) and Blaye, WHO WERE PRESENT IN LONDON, and who had respited the King's debts to them until Michaelmas (29 September), should be paid after that date. Repeated reference is made throughout the Patent rolls to loans advanced for the financing of the ducal cause by loyalist towns, including Bourg, Blaye, St-Sever, St-Quiterie, Bellegarde, Sordes, Labatud, Peyrehorade, Pouillon, Uyre, Labouheyre, Saunt, and also strikingly from merchants of Bordeaux (presumably exiles), and Oloron, Sauveterre, Morlans (Mauleon) and Orthez, all four in Béarn. Bémont has stressed that Bayonne was, among the towns, Edward's chief Gascon banker, one single loan from the city totalling £2,000. There were loans, however, from a great variety of towns in Guiennes.

1. E30, Diplomatic Document 1207; c/f also supra, f. 95.
2. C.P.R., 1292-1301, p. 301.
4. BEMONT, clx. There are frequent references to this large civic loan in individual bonds (£101 bundles 152-155).
5. Unless otherwise indicated figures are in sterling.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bellegarde</td>
<td>76/-, 20 marks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blaye</td>
<td>£292 16s 3d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bourg</td>
<td>£750, £440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cassaner (Castanet?/Cendos?)</td>
<td>£12.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gosse</td>
<td>£6 18s 6d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labatud</td>
<td>£20, £15 14s 5d, £148 11s 5d, £6.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missen (Mezin?)</td>
<td>66/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sorde</td>
<td>£1,246 10s 10d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St-Panthaleone (sic)</td>
<td>£13 8s 10d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St-Quiterie</td>
<td>£768 0s 6d, £4 3s 3d, £8 14s 6d, £11 8s 6d, £160, £2,072 0s 8d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St-Sever</td>
<td>£160, £2,072 0s 8d.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Loans to the ducal cause came also from rural areas and the country vicinities of towns. A bond issued by Lacy at Bayonne, 5 May 1297, acknowledges a debt of £90 to men of the land of Marenset, the coastal area of Landes. Similarly, on 20 March 1298, in finalising his

1. E101 154/5/5; BEMONT, clxiv, n.1; E101 154/14/ .
3. C.P.R., 1301-7, p. 18; BEMONT, clxivii, n.
12. E101 153/1/35 (BEMONT, clxxiii, n. 3, part ref.) Their attorney for repayment at the English exchequer was John de Cosson, citizen of Bayonne.
records at Bayonne before returning to England, Lacy acknowledged a loan of £30 9s 10d from, among others, inhabitants of Hagetmau, St-Cricq, Miramont, 'Sarelos', Mugron, Poyaler (Pujal), 'et aliorum locorum de partibus Sancti Severi'. Also on 20 March 1298, Lacy issued a bond to the inhabitants of 'parts near' St-John de Luz for 103/4 st. Ecclesiastical houses also rallied to the ducal cause. Lacy borrowed £102 3s 3d. st. from the 'venerable chapter' of Bayonne, £10 8s od st. from the Prior of Bayonne, £4 st. from the Friars minor of the convent of Bayonne; while Nicholas Baret, paymaster at Bourg and Blaye, borrowed £17 8s od st. from the abbot of the monastery of St. Saviours, Blaye and from its convent for the Blaye garrison; and monks of the House at St-Quiterie were contributors to a civic loan of 44/- st. The jurats and community 'of the town of the House of St-Quiterie' had established proctors charged with a financial contribution to the ducal cause as early as 29 January 1295; and there is reference, too, to a loan to Lacy, as lieutenant, from 'des religieuses du Mas d'Aire'.

In considering the loyalty to King Edward of his Gascon towns, the case of the city of Bordeaux, his ducal capital, is paramount. At first sight, the attitude of Bordeaux during the Gascon war is a mystery. There was no manifest display of ducal loyalty in the capital on the approach of either of the two expeditionary forces. Indeed, chronicles depict citizens of Bordeaux as dissembling by offering collaboration to Earl Edmund in 1296, but instead participating in the French sally from the city against his army encamped a few miles away at Bègles. The reason for their apparent inconstancy is not hard to find. When Raoul de Neale,

1. E101 154/5/22.
3. E101 153/14/11 (BEMONT, clxii, n.2, part ref.); 152/12/59; 152/15/2; R.G., 4965; 154/5/62 (supra, n.201, n.10).
4. Both refs. BEMONT, clxiv, n.1.
constable of France, established French power in Bordeaux in March 1294, he did so on a basis of intimidation. Not only were his officers and troops placed in the city, but 153 hostages were taken and marched off into captivity. 1 Eight of them were sent to Marmande, ninety-one to Toulouse, and fifty-four to Carcassone. 2 Thus, as has been observed, the principal burgesses loyal to the King- duke had been removed.

Evidence confirming that the city of Bordeaux was held captive came when, about 21 April 1296, five leading burgesses secretly offered to surrender the capital to Earl Edmund. 4 They were hanged by the French on their return to the city for their 'treachery'. The reaction of the occupying power was further demonstrated in Robert d'Artois' subsequent despatch to Carcassonne of an additional twelve hostages. 5 Citizen unrest in Bordeaux continued, however, and it is recorded that on 21 November 1297 the 'commune of Bordeaux' wrote to the King of France about the hostages at Toulouse, who were 'reduced to a state of misery beyond description' and threatened to 'abandon' the French cause if the needs of the hostages were not met. 6 This implicit threat of revolt was probably not as bold as it reads; the citizens must by then have known all too well of the Anglo-French truce entered into in early

1. *Livre des Coutumes*, ed. H. Barckhausen, Bordeaux, Archives municipales de Bordeaux, 1890 (hereinafter: *Livre des Coutumes*), p. 407, No. xli, where the hostages are named. Barckhausen gives the total as 152; it appears in *BEMONT*, cxxviii, n. 8, on cxxix, erroneously as 182.
2. Barckhausen, 53 to Carcassone.
October at Vyve—St—Bavon, Flanders; their threat was thus not extreme. Yet the civic unease continued to fester; in mid—January 1303 the citizens finally threw off the French yoke in a successful rising, expelling King Philip's officers. 1 Henry de Lacy, earl of Lincoln, who had just been invested by Philip IV with the duchy of Aquitaine at Paris on King Edward's behalf, was obliged with his diplomatic colleagues, Amadeus of Savoy and Otto de Granson, to receive back the administration of Guienne from King Philip's officers at St—Emilion instead of Bordeaux, as the capital was 'inaccessible aux Francais'. The successful insurrection of 1303 was probably an impatient anticipation of the impending re—establishment of ducal jurisdiction and its seat of administration. It demonstrates, however, that but for French troops, Bordeaux would have exhibited the same devoted loyalty to its King—duke in 1294—1298 as did free cities and towns throughout Guienne. The rigours of French occupation, wherever its heavy hand was applied, were a spur to such ducal loyalty. 2

In contrast, the few areas of French affiliation in the duchy can be noted quite briefly. The sole major town which has so far been omitted from this consideration of civic loyalty to the King—duke is Dax. This city cannot with certainty be classified as reliable to the ducal cause. The evidence is conflicting. It shows both Anglophobe and anti—ducal tendencies; yet also, like Bordeaux, a potential loyalty suppressed by the presence of French arms. Anti—ducal tendencies at Dax first appear in respect of a charter of 1278, by which Edward pardoned the citizens for 'disobedience' to him and restored their communal rights and privileges. 3 During the Gascon war, Dax remained solidly in French hands like Bordeaux, despite its proximity to the main ducal enclaves in the south of the duchy; and in December 1295, King Philip ratified a

1. TRABUT—CUSSAC, p.111.
French senesclual confirmation of King Edward's charter of 1278—an act which may be interpreted as either approval of, or invitation to loyalty to the French Crown. In the summer of 1296, Dax stubbornly resisted for a couple of months the daily assaults of ducal forces directed in person by Edward's capitaneus. It has been stated that the French defence of Dax was 'vigoureusement soutenus par les habitants'. This opinion is found on examination to be a perversion of an earlier account—also secondary—which declared that 'Les habitants soutenus par Roger Bernard [de Foix] et par Guy de Clermont, maréchal de France, opposèrent une ... vigueuruse résistance'. Apparently in recognition of its adherence to the French cause, Robert d'Artois granted a privileged exemption from tolls to the city on 25 August 1296, immediately after his relief of Dax. Whether this was an example of propaganda and political bribery is unclear. The loyalty of Dax must therefore remain an open question. Sufficient it to observe, no records survive of the city of Dax or its merchants advancing loans to Henry de Lacy for the ducal cause, as even Bordeaux did. Dax does not appear on any list of names of Gascon towns doing so. Although no argument from the negative can be conclusive, the complete absence of any reference to civic loans from Dax seems significant.

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2. BAILASQUE & DULAUdRENS, p. 554.
3. MONLEZUM, p. 70. This account is itself based on an earlier one which it notes: Dom. Vaisssette IV. Marcs, liv. 8, cap. 28.
4. C/f. supra, f. 70.
5. V. supra, ff. 200-201.
It is in connection with the defence of Dax against Henry de Lacy that the most important names arise of anti-ducal nobility; lords whose territories must also be seen as areas unsympathetic to the King-Duke. The most prominent of these nobles was Roger-Bernard, comte de Foix and vicomte de Béarn, who fought from the outset on the French side. ¹ The King-duke must have been conscious of the fragility of his relations with the comte de Foix, and the consequent impediment to military success in the south of his duchy that the region of Béarn presented, especially in view of its anti-ducal tradition; for on 9 July 1294 he authorised his lieutenant and seneschal of Gascony, John of Brittany and John de St-John, to treat with Roger-Bernard. ² In April and June 1295, because of his services in the war for the French cause, Roger-Bernard was granted in turn by Raoul de Nesle, constable of France, and by Charles of Valois, jurisdiction of 'les divers sénéchaux de Carcassonne' and extensive 'ducal' rights. ³ He mediated the truce between Charles of Valois and Hugh de Vere at St-Sever, which ended its siege in the summer of 1295; and, presumably in reward and recognition, was named by Charles and Raoul de Nesle at Mont de Marsan about the end of July, 'recteur gouverneur et commandant dans les diocèses d'Auch, d'Aire, de Dax et de Bayonne'. ⁴ He had fought through the entire war to date, had distinguished himself at the siege of St-Sever, was to do so again at Bellegarde under Robert d'Artois, ⁵ and meantime received the jurisdiction of the places and castles 'de Castelnau-Rivière-Basse, de Maubourguet, de Roquefort et de Viella' and 'le Mas d'Aire, et la Bastide de Ste-Gemme'. ⁶

¹ MONLEZUN, p.68; BAIASQUE & DULAMBRENS, p.542.
² C/f.infra, f.221, n.2.
³ MONLEZUN, p.68; Dom Vaissette, IV.
⁴ MONLEZUN, p.68.
⁵ C/f.supra, ff.81 & 84.
⁶ MONLEZUN, p.68; Dom Vaissette, IV.
The July appointment referred to made an exception of 'les terres du comte d'Armagnac' as the latter was also apparently a French ally; or perhaps the exception was another attempt at military diplomacy, for d'Armagnac's position is unclear. In October 1293 he had received at Agen the sum of £500 st. from John de St-John, then lieutenant of the duchy, as part of St-John's exercise of putting the duchy on a war-footing. In January 1294 d'Armagnac received £200 money of Bordeaux from the seneschal of Gascony as a wage-payment (i.e., por son fee). On the other hand, by 19 October 1295 the King-duke was urging him with others to remain loyal to his cause. Although many loyal Gascon lords received the same exhortation, the literal affinity in the document of d'Armagnac and the comte de Foix, suggests that the former may have been wavering in his loyalty at that time of ducal extremity. Other pro-French lords who fought against ducal forces at Bayonne or Dax were Sir Jordan Bertram lord of Asprement, Bernard de Durfort, Jordan de Lisle, Dieudit de Montlaur, Raymond de Villeneuve, Sicard de Lordat, Pierre-Raymond de Rabastens, Otho de Montaut, Izarn de La Graulet and Arnold-Raymond comte de Tartas, domicellus. Among knights named in an account of the trésor du Louvre destined for six-months military service with the French army in Guienne was another, 'le comte de Perigord'. Bérenger de Thesan (near Béziers) also served on the French side.

1. E101 152/6/44. One of a series of obligations in the same file concerning the equipping of ducal troops in preparation for possible war with France.
2. C/f. infra, f. 296.
3. MONLEZUN, p. 69: Foedera.
4. GUISBOROUGH, p. 245; TRIVET, pp. 334-5; BAIASQUE & DULAUENS, p. 534; MONLEZUN, pp. 68-70.
5. LOT, p. 248.
The regional influence of these lords is problematical with the exception of the comte de Foix. His power is evident in a Gascon plea to King Edward from Bernard d'Ortes, which recounts that he and twelve companions had been exiled by the comte from his whole land of Béarn for fighting against Charles of Valois at the siege of St-Sever.¹ Some negative evidence of the comte's influence is the non-service in the ducal cause of Sir Assieu Navailles, whose House was closely associated with the court of the vicomtes de Béarn, and the comtes of Foix and Bigorre, and who failed to answer the King-duke's 'summons' to military service in defence of Aquitaine of 12 July 1294.² Count Roger-Bernard's local authority is seen, too, in the animosity of the 'townsfolk' of Béarn, who in early 1295 refused passage to John de St-John and so foiled further recovery of the south by way of Béarn.³ Although, according to Ramsay,⁴ the vicomtess Constance de Béarn was friendly towards the ducal commanders, entries in the Patent rolls indicate the reverse; for King Edward seized her castle and honor of 'Tykhill' and her manors of 'Whetely, Gryngeley and Frodesham' in England on the grounds of her adhesion to the French.⁵ In addition to Béarn, it has been noted that, by their receipt of Gascon hostages and prisoners of war, Toulouse and Carcassonne beyond were inclined to the French cause. The provost of Toulouse was killed in 1296 besieging the ducal bastide of Bellegarde.⁶

¹. BEMONT, Appendice I (Plympton Pleas), No. 16.
². OGILVY, I, pp. 418, 421; Poedera, p. 806; R.G., 3382.
³. Annales de Wigornia, p. 520.
⁴. RAMSAY, p. 415.
⁵. C.P.R., 1292-1301, p. 433; C.P.R., 1301-7, p. 290.
⁷. C/f. supra, f. 74.
These few exceptions apart, the previous general impression is here confirmed by detailed examination, them, that Gascon towns and also rural areas tended to display a solid loyalty to their King-duke. Otherwise, anti-ducal tendencies were mainly met only in the region of Béarn and to the south-east. The possible solitary civic exception was the city of Dax.  

1. It cannot be overlooked that the city and vicinity of Dax had their share of dispossessed Gascon loyalists. See Appendix I.
The positive loyalty and responsiveness to the ducal cause of the Gascon nobility and their retainers are incontrovertible from an analysis of contemporary records – the traditional individual feudal military obligations to the King-duc set down in the seigneurial recognitions of 1273-4; a list of 'important persons' in the duchy, that is, those pre-eminently liable for military service, which was sent from Guienne to Edward in England, presumably at his request, late in 1293 or early in 1294; Edward's letters of request to his Gascon subjects for aid in the military recovery of Aquitaine; Gascon horse-valuations (1296-7?); Gascon troop-payments by the King-duc's military paymasters in Guienne and the extant military expenses of Gascons in the years 1294-8; 'displaced persons' (Gascon loyalists) named in the Pympton pleas after Easter 1297, in Edward's letters to Henry de Lacy, lieutenant, and in lists of 'dispossessed' in the Gascon rolls and elsewhere; and finally, individual and general letters of exhortation and encouragement from the King-duc to his men in Guienne, together with evidence from chronicle and secondary sources.

1. An exhaustive compilation of Gascon loyalists, mainly mercenary troops, has been made in a separate appendix, which is too extensive to include in this thesis. The brief consideration here is confined of necessity to analytical conclusions drawn from that appendix.


6. e.g., E101 Bundles 152-155 (about 900 letters of obligation mainly unpublished); R.O. (e.g., 4928); C.P.R., 1292-1301, p. 482.

7. Bémont, Appendice I, clxxxiii-clxcv; R.O., 4223-4485; and e.g., R.O., 4529, 4531, 4985; C47 26/6, 26/7, 35/16 (unpublished).

8. R.O. (e.g., 4250-3, 4262); SCL 18/189; C.P.R., 1292-1301, p. 142; MONLEZUN, p. 69.
The return on 'important persons' in Guienne must have been made before March 1294 at which time ducal officials listed in it were superseded by French ones. As regards the letters of request for military service sent out by Edward to Gascon loyalists and civic authorities in July 1294, it would be incorrect to term these 'writs of military summons', as it is evident from the Recognitiones Feudorum that Edward's military rights vis-à-vis his Gascon subjects were very tenuous; the feudal relationship delicate. Hence his concentration over the years 1 on creating a firm bond of loyalty between his subjects and himself. It was a necessity in regard to military defence of the duchy in particular.

Analysis shows that some 1415 Gascon loyalists can be identified from extant records. A breakdown of this figure reveals the following numbers and categories: ducal officials 21; ex-officials 11; counts 4; viscounts 7; viscountesses 1; count/viscount 1; countess/viscountess 1; lords 87; ladies 10; lord/knights 55; lord/domicelli 13; knights 49; domicelli ('little lords' or junior) 212; scutifers/esquires 45; socii 7; serviens 3; serviens ad arma regis 2; serviens ad arma 1; serviens pedes 14; pedes 3; balisterii 3; miscellaneous: 2 carpenters, 1 smith, 1 trencher (and company), 1 rope-maker, 1 pelterer and 1 surgeon; clerks 20 (including one 'royal' clerk/canon); clergy: the bishop of Basas, the bishop's chapter, the abbot of St-Sever, the lay-abbot of Casteignos (domicellus), the prior of the Blessed Mary of Mimizan, the prior of Pontonx, a hospital prior, a (lord) presbyter/chaplain, the dean of St-Seurin, a canon, a chaplain, a priest, a sacristan, and the almoner of Bourg.

Twelve of the ducal officials were castellans (constables): of Bordeaux, Monflanquin, Tournon, Bourg, La Réole, Sauveterre, 2 St-Macaire, Lectoure,

1. C/f. supra, ff. 11-18 et passim.
2. Two castellanes of Sauveterre are named in C47 25/1/17: Iscarn de Valens (Valens) and Sir Bertrand de Bodenac.
3. V. infra, f. 214.
Lalinde and Pontonx(?), plus 1 castellan de marine (de Saintonge?) and 1 ex-castellan of St-Puy, the first three of these citadels having already been surrendered, of course, in March 1294 to French officials. The seneschal of the Agenais, at that time made hostage, the seneschal of Périgord and Limousin, his deputy seneschal, the lieutenant of the seneschal of Gascony and ex-seneschal of Landes and 'del Freres', the lieutenant of the seneschal of Périgord, the ex-senechals of Gascony and Saintonge are all listed; as also, 1 bailiff, 5 ex-bailiffs, 1 ex-bailiff/provost, 1 ex-provost, the capitale (chief judge) of Buch and the capitale of Latresne. The mayors of Bordeaux and Bayonne and the ex-mayor of Bayonne, Peter-Arnold de Vielle, are also named. It was the son of the latter (a popular or influential civic figure?), Pascal de Vielle, who was to play a leading part in the subsequent recovery of Bayonne by John de St-John, and himself be made mayor of the city — a revealing insight into local Gascon politics.

When the service-records of these ducal officials and ex-officials are examined, it is significant and illuminating that of the 21 officials, 20 were listed as liable for military service — the sole exception being the capitale of Buch — only five duly received letters calling on them to aid in the recovery of the duchy, and only one of these apparently answered the call and did services the mayor of Bayonne. 1

The explanation is self-evident. It confirms by detailed examination the general impression of historians on the situation: the officials in question had been surrendered as hostages in March 1294 and interned by the French. The individual records of the seneschal of the Agenais, the seneschal of Périgord and Limousin, the constable of Bordeaux, the castellan of Tournon and the castellan of Lalinde confirm this to be definitely so in their cases. The two seneschals and the castellan of Lalinde later served the King-duke in the war, however, and thus must

1. This is concluded because he was later listed as ‘dispossessed’; but that is not in itself conclusive that he did serve.
have ransomed themselves. A total of six ducal officials did services: the captal of Buch, the castellan of Bourg, the castellan of Lalinde, the seneschal of the Agenais, the seneschal of Perigord and Limousin and, it seems, the mayor of Bayonne. It is most significant militarily that only two of the dozen castellans listed were in fact able to serve.

The service-record of ex-officials of the duchy supports the impression of a general imprisonment of current ducal officers at the start of the war. Altogether, 8 ex-officials are named as eligible for service; 1 received letters of request; 4 actually served. The captal of Latresne is a case on his own. He is recorded\(^1\) as being seneschal of Périgord and Limousin after Elias de Caupenne, who had been interned. As there is no record of his ducal service, this may imply that he became a French appointee.

Some of the clergy, it may be noted, saw active service, as, for example, Peter Bavelis, chaplain of the Isle of Oleron, and brother Peter de Lamothe, prior of Mimizan. In addition to feudal loyalists, the names of individual civic loyalists are recorded, namely, 35 burgesses or citizens. A large proportion of these were from St-Sever as well as from Bayonne.

One king and one queen also figure in the lists under consideration: King Pedro III of Aragon, to whom Edward sent a letter requesting aid in the recovery of Guienne; and Guillaume of Moncade, Queen of Aragon, in her capacity as daughter of Gaston VII, Vicomte de Béarn.

This introduces the peripheral question of mercenaries from Iberia. Twenty are specifically named, being recruited from over a wide area—Spain; six soldiers (noble, civic, foot); Portugal; a banneret; Catalonia; two lord/knights, one knight/domicellus, one knight; Catalonia/Aragon; one knight; Aragon; one knight, three domicelli, two serviens pedes and lastly,

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\(^1\) C47 25/1/17
Pascal Valentini, the Adalid, who was himself able to provide or offer several hundred foot, as will be seen; Navarre: one socius. It is not possible to gauge the numbers of mercenaries available from the Iberian hinterland, as there is little evidence of the size of individual troops, indeed, this is the handicap in producing estimates of Gascon mercenaries also; but clearly, Spain and Portugal could be a useful extra recruiting ground for the English capitaneus. The proportion of Iberian mercenaries among Gascon is so small, however, that no great importance can be attached to their numbers as a military factor. The total figure for infantry expenditure in the Gascon war on English, Gascon and Iberian soldiers was only about £18,000, so the Iberian element must have been quite small; and there is no separate financial record for Iberian cavalry.

Returning to the general picture which a compilation of Gascon loyalists presents, a comparison of theory and fact is instructive. For example, some 211 names of vassals are found in the Recognitiones Feudorum as liable for military service; 32 actually served in the Gascon war twenty years later. In feudal terms, the military support for which Edward could look was meagre, for a glance at terms and conditions of service in the Recognitiones Feudorum shows that most services were for parts of a knight or for a few 'socii' or a combined service by several vassals. The King-duke had therefore to rely on raising mercenaries. The eventual numbers of troops who served were far in excess of the vassals duty-bound to do so, and this indicates that they were overwhelmingly mercenaries, an indication borne out by the many letters of obligation issued in Guienne by Henry de Lacy, John of Brittany and John de St-John for military pay. This is further supported by a comparison of the numbers of combatant feudal loyalists who were sent letters of request.

for aid, namely 157, and the number recorded as having served in the
ducal cause, namely 1142. This larger figure is based on the reasonable
assumption that men listed as 'dispossessed', even without any record
of actual service in, for example, the pay records, were dispossessed
because of their active allegiance.

It is of course impossible to suggest any acceptable estimate of the
numbers of Gascon troops engaged in the Gascon war on the ducal side.
There is no indication of length of service, or indeed of the size of
individual troops; there is no recorded distinction between cavalry
and foot. Many of the letters of obligation for army pay refer only to
previous or 'past' service, without any indication of whether it was
periodic or continuous or partial. Payments were made to individual
soldiers, but also to soldiers for themselves and their companions,
without stipulation as to numbers, rank or service-period. Only general
conclusions can therefore be drawn.

The treasury accounts reveal that approximately four times the amount
of money was paid out to Gascon knights and troopers in comparison to
English. Admittedly, this Gascon category hid an unknown number of foot
whom Gascon lords tended to include in their companies;¹ but allowing
for this and for the discrepancy between English and Gascon pay-rates,
for the maintenance of token Gascon garrisons till 1299, and even for
payments to displaced persons,² the broad impression is of a considerably
larger number of Gascon than English soldiers in the ducal armies.

Certainly, accounts of the battle of Bellegarde are uncomplimentary of
Gascon participation, which would not be surprising in 'part-time' troops
or in view of John of Brittany's unfortunate examples to them,³ but the
general loyalty of Gascon towns which has been established, and the use

1. PRESTWICH (thesis), ff. 112-113.
2. POWICKE, p. 650, n. 2.
of local infantry troops for garrisoning — there is considerable
obligation to castle guard in the Recognitiones Feudorum — underlines
the valuable contribution that Gascon contingents must have made to
the corner-stone of Lacy's strategy, the general holding-operation based
on citadel warfare. The universality of Gascon loyalty to the King-duke,
with the notable exception of Béarn — although individual mercenaries
in the ducal forces were drawn even from there — is seen in the areas
of recruitment. Gascon troops enlisted from all regions; from Périgord
and the Bordelais in the north to Béarn in the south; and this is further
attested by the geographical examination of loyalist 'dispossessed' in
an earlier chapter. 1

At the end of chapter three in this thesis, a final assessment of Henry
de Lacy as a military leader and capitaneus was postponed pending
consideration of the military resources available to him. The examination
of his English, Gascon and Iberian troop-resources and of the military
loyalties of Guienne, which have both been carried out in this chapter,
now make a final judgement possible.

It is evident that the hard-core of the earl's military potential was
his English force of men-at-arms, and that this was quite modest by con-
temporary military standards; in comparison, for example, with the numbers
of troops committed by King Edward in Scotland or first intended by
him for committal to Guienne and later Flanders. It is evident that a
great fund of loyalty to Lacy as Edward's capitaneus existed in Guienne,
but that, although of pleasing dimensions from the ducal point of view,
it was of insufficient weight and calibre to enable the earl to conduct
more than a defensive war; a war designed to hold what had not already

been lost, and if the opportunity arose to add to the territories and jurisdictions remaining to the King-duke in Guienne. Henry de Lacy lacked the practical military means to do more, however, and it is concluded that in his circumstances he did very well with what slender resources were available to him. Nor does he seem to have lost many troops in action, even at Bellegarde. On that episode, chronicle figures, especially French, are obviously highly inflated; for the numbers of troops available to Lacy, after making due allowance for those committed to garrisoning citadels — some of which were the object of his relief expedition anyway — can only have been quite small.

In the absence of military reinforcement from England, Henry de Lacy can be held to have acquitted himself with credit, though not distinction, as capitaneus of the King's men in the duchy of Aquitaine. It remains to consider his role as lieutenant of the duchy.
CHAPTER V

LIEUTENANT OF AQUITAINE.

The evolution of ducal administration during the second half of the thirteenth century was dictated by the consequences of the Treaty of Paris of 1259. Ducal administration grew in experience and scope by the pressure of circumstances — the increasing need to meet French legal and territorial encroachment. In this evolution it is necessary to distinguish, however, between the administration and the government of the duchy. For whatever the administrative developments, government and the policy-making which was part and parcel of it remained the undoubted prerogative of the King-ducx. The seneschal of Gascony was by the last decade of the thirteenth century the chief administrative officer of the duchy; the constable of Bordeaux was its chief financial officer, his appointment and direction being reserved to the king-ducx himself. Both officers visited England quite often — the constable the more frequently — so as to keep ducal administration in tune with the main theme of English governmental thinking. Thus, King Edward was himself the very real ruler in this period of the duchy of Aquitaine and the mainspring of his government, the constable of Bordeaux being his financial puppet and the seneschal of Gascony merely head of ducal administration based at Bordeaux — in modern parlance, head of the civil service.

The earlier tendency for the seneschal of Gascony to be considered the first officer in the duchy received a set-back in the years 1248 to 1259 with the appointment, as a matter of urgency, of royal lieutenants, namely, Simon de Montfort and later Prince Edward, who had a 'royal'

1. For a general background to this consideration of ducal administration see: POWICKE, King Henry III; LODGE; TRABUT-CUSSAC; TRABUT-CUSSAC, L'Administration Anglaise en Gascogne, Histoire des institutions francaises au moyen âge, ed. F. Lot et R. Fawtier, 3 vols., (Continued
authority and capability to settle internal disaffection which had gone beyond senescalian control. Lieutenants of the duchy of Aquitaine were great lords, who came to the duchy with full ducal powers and authority. Their appointments were exceptional, the product of times of great difficulty or emergency in the duchy's affairs—hence their high rank and authority. Theoretically, it was as the king- duke himself that a lieutenant took office in Guienne to take governmental action; and after Edward had systematised ducal administration in 1289, he had at once delegated his powers to Maurice de Craon as lieutenant, before returning to England, for the full implementation of his ordinances of Condom and Condat.

In the opinion of Trabut-Cussac, 'Avec Maurice de Craon .. apparaît un nouveau type de lieutenant.' His appointment represented a new rationale on the part of the King- duke. In particular, instead of his Gascon subjects being faced with the heavy costs of travelling to England to seek justice of him, 'Le nouveau lieutenant rendra justice sur place au nom du roi. Le but avoué de cette nomination est donc de rapprocher la justice royale des justiciables, de laisser en Gascogne un responsable suprême, disposant des pouvoirs nécessaires pour jouer le rôle que le roi venait de tenir lui-même, de 1286 à 1289, avec l'aide de son entourage.' It was an attempt to short-circuit appeals to the


1. Quotations in this paragraph are from TRABUT-CUSSAC, p.221.
Parlement de Paris by making available to Edward's Gascon subjects 'recours à un pouvoir supérieur d'origine anglaise ..... cette nouvelle conception du rôle du lieutenant comporte un élément de stabilité inconnu auparavant'.\(^1\) The King-duke's appointment of de Craon BEFORE leaving for England is seen therefore as highly significant.

The powers conferred on de Craon, asserts Trabut-Cussac, made him a kind of viceroy, authorised to dismiss officers previously appointed even by Edward himself, to reduce civic privileges even if similarly derived, to conclude 'accords d'arbitrage' that he considered useful and to take financial decisions in agreement with the constable of Bordeaux that he considered appropriate. In the matter of ducal appointments, our attention is drawn by Trabut-Cussac to a change of formula, from 'quamdiu nobis placuerit' to 'quamdiu nobis VEL TENENTI LOCUM NOSTRUM placuerit'.

The war-time appointment of John of Brittany to the office of lieutenant brought an extension of the title. Edward sent him to Guienne 'ad tenendum locum nostrum ... ET UT SIT VESTER CAPITANEUS'.\(^2\) The King-duke requested his Gascon subjects to obey Brittany in all things 'sicut nobis'. No powers were specifically stated in Brittany's appointment although, curiously, they were in the accompanying appointment of John de St-John as seneschal of Gascony: 'Cui quidem Johanni damus tenore presencium potestatem ponendi et amovendi subsesenescallos, caste lanos, majores et omnes alios ballivos et ministros, secundum quod sibi videbitur faciendum'.\(^3\)

Edmund of Lancaster's terms of appointment as lieutenant on 20 October 1295 were comprehensive and were published in suitably expressive terminology. They included specific definition that was lacking in John

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1. This recent opinion is quoted at some length because of its novelty and significance.
2. R.C., 2932; Foedera, p. 805. For the significance c/f. supra, f. 59, n.
3. R.C., 2933; Foedera, ibid.
of Brittany's, but had partly appeared in St–John's as seneschal in July 1294. Moreover, the phraseology of Edmund's appointment was more formalised, the format more developed. As Henry de Lacy succeeded to these powers on Edmund's death, a full statement of them is included here:

'nos facimus, ordinamus, constituimus et ponimus, tenore presencium, ... Edmundum, comitem Lancastrie, locum nostrum tenentem et capitaneum gentis nostre in ducatu nostro Aquitannie et terra nostra Agenesii et omnibus aliis terris nostris Vasconie, dantes eodem liberam et generalem potestatem omnium bonorum nostrorum parcium earundem, ac eiam speciale mandatum pacem et concordiam, amicicias et confederationes cum quibuscumque regibus vel principibus, aut aliis proceribus et magnatibus, personis ecclesiasticis vel secularibus, quocumque nomine censeantur, et cum communitatibus quibuscumque nostro nomine iunguntur, et nos et heredes nostros in quibuscumqueconfederationibus, amiciciis et contractibus, sub quibuscumque condicionibus, juramentis, modis et penis obligandi, mutuum contrahendi, civitates, castra, burgos, villas, terras et possessiones impignorandi, illos qui de fidelitate nostrae in partibus illis recesserunt et profugas seu bannitos ad pacem nostram et gratiam admittendi. Concedimus insuper ... potestatem speciales locum nostrum tenentes et capiteaneos a nobis alias in eisdem terris constitutos, ac eiam senescallos et subsenescallos, castellanos, majores et omnes alios ballivos et ministros, per nos et illos quocumque locorum parcium

1. Bémont writes that Edmund's and thus Lacy's title and powers were as granted to John of Brittany in July 1294. This seems to be an assumption. No details of Brittany's authority are outlined in his letter of appointment (R.G., 2932; Poëdéra, p. 805). C/f. BÉMONT, lix.

2. Brittany had no such general diplomatic warrant. He received separately from his appointment only plenas ... potestatem tractandi, et ordinandi super confederationes etc. between Edward and other princes (Poëdéra, p. 806), or authorisations for particular diplomatic initiatives, as with the comte de Poix or the king of Castile (ibid., p. 806).
This statement of Edmund's terms of appointment as lieutenant makes it clear that his powers, subsequently transferred to Henry de Lacy in December 1295 before duly devolving on him in Guienne in June 1296, were unlimited. In contrast to senescal's supreme administrative competence, the raison-d'être of the lieutenant of the duchy of Aquitaine was his supreme governmental authority as the very personification of the King- duke himself. He could remove or replace already constituted officers of any rank from previous lieutenants and capitaneos downwards; revoke all previously granted potestates; audit either personally or by deputy the accounts of all royal finance officials, either as to monies spent or levied or received; and enter into or conclude any diplomatic undertaking that he saw fit on behalf of the King- duke and his future heirs.

So much for constitutional theory; to what extent did it accord with political practice? It must be examined how far the lieutenant's de facto power corresponded to his de jure authority; what were in reality the extent and limits of his jurisdiction; whether they were unlimited; or

whether the King-duke on occasions over-rode, intervened, interfered; and if so, on which occasions. If, even in 'normal' times, an attempt was being made to put theory into practice, did this continue in time of war; or is Trabut-Cussac correct in writing that the war and the interminable negotiations which followed the fighting 'abolirent pendant pres de dix ans toute administration normale du duché d'Aquitaine par les Anglais'? 1

Answers to these questions will be elicited in the course of this chapter by direct reference to the lieutenancy of the earl of Lincoln, with supporting evidence from the government of his war-time predecessors John of Brittany and Edmund of Lancaster. The evidence is drawn mainly from the Gascon rolls; numerous letters of the King-duke to his lieutenants; his judgments on Gascon pleas — notably at Plympton after Easter 1297; and from his various letters to his subjects and troops in the duchy. The material will be considered under eight headings: ducal administration, pleas and responses, appointments, civic matters, property matters, ecclesiastical considerations, foreign affairs and French administration in Guienne.

Ducal Administration.

The most striking feature of ducal administration in the war years is the practice of direct inter-communication or inter-correspondence between Edward and his Gascon subjects, apparently in complete disregard of the intervening authority of the lieutenant of Aquitaine, who was in theory the ducal personification. At the outset it is necessary to distinguish between individual and general communications. The latter usually took the form of letters patent from the King-duke. For example, there was the letter of 21 August 1297, which Edward wrote at Winchelsey before sailing for Flanders, and in which he made his excuses for going there instead of Guienne as previously promised. This letter 2 is

2. R. G., 4392; Foedera, p. 875.
addressed directly to his barons, knights ' a a toutz les autres hommes de Gascoigne demorantz en nostre service es celez parties', but not through the lieutenant; indeed, the lieutenant is not an addressee. It is important because the letter includes not merely an affirmation of existing policy but the announcement to his Gascon subjects of a new one—a departure from his original announcement to them in July 1294 of his intended crossing to Guienne.

Similarly, Edward had written the previous May from Plympton in Devon\(^1\) to all his subjects, both English and Gascon, in Gascony, in appreciation of their loyalty, in understanding of their hardships, and promising to send what aid he could in due course; again this general letter bore no reference to the lieutenant. In contrast, his letter of 17 November 1296, in which he ordered that Blanche, Queen of Navarre and widow of Edmund, be accorded free and safe passage, aid and advice to assist her journey with her household and entourage to come to England, this letter was addressed 'au conte de Nioile/Lincoln\(^7\) e a totes nos autres bones gentz, Engloys et Gascouns, demorrantz en la mesmes duchëe'.\(^2\) In this instance the supporting action of the lieutenant was needed to facilitate Blanche's journey; therefore his inclusion. Otherwise, this letter would also have been a general letter patent with no specific reference to Henry de Lacy as lieutenant. Such general letters were essentially public communications from the King-duke to his subjects en masse; it would have seemed neither necessary nor desirable, in view of the personal nature of kingship in that period, to transmit such public statements by pronouncement of the lieutenant. Indeed, in matters of government policy the lieutenant was in practice as much a subject as anyone else—witness Edward's letter patent of 21 November 1296 in which

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2. R.G., 4202.
the lieutenant was included with all other ducal subjects in the order to obey the plenipotentiaries who had been appointed to negotiate a peace with France.¹

As well as general communications, however, the king-duke often wrote to particular groups or interests in the duchy directly rather than through the lieutenant as might seem more appropriate. On 9 December 1296, for example,² Edward wrote to Richard Fitz-John commander of the Bourg garrison, the mayor, jurats, citizens and garrison of Bourg, exhorting their steadfastness. Thirteen knights or men at arms are addressed by name in addition to Fitz-John. On 11 April 1297 he wrote similarly to 'totes ses bones gentz Engleis e Gascouns' at Blaye and again to those at Bourg, acknowledging their great burdens and so forth.³ Royal letters went direct to the communities and garrisons at Bayonne, Bourg and Blaye on 7 and 23 May 1297,⁴ and to Bourg and Blaye without reference to Lacy announcing the royal establishment of Nicholas Baret as principal receiver/treasurer and John of Gloucester as his controller (surveyor) of receipts and payments in the twin towns.⁵ Lastly, there is Edward's letter of 21 August 1297 addressed directly to his English troops in Gascony ('es barons e as chivaliers e a tutz les autres gentils hommes d'Engleterre, demorants en nostre service es parties de Gascoigne'), asking them not to discontinue serving him there without Lacy's permission.⁶ Edward's direct appeal to his English forces over the head of his capitaneus could only serve, however unintentionally, to weaken psychologically Lacy's supreme military authority; for if Edward's reference of his troops to their capitaneus for permission to discharge

2. R.G., 4262 (9 December); Archives hist. Gironde, XIII, pp. 385–6 (19 December) c/f. supra, f. 95.
3. C/f. supra, ff. 94-95.
4. Ibid.
5. R.G., 4380, 4381 (7 May 1297).
themselves might seem support for his command, the motivation was obviously personal, appealing for loyalty to Edward, not Lacy. Such were the natural ways and outlook of a medieval autocratic prince. It may be argued that Edward's direct correspondence with his military outposts at Bourg and Blaye was the consequence of their strategic isolation. This is not so; it was a matter of ducal convenience and authority. For, the command-post and seat of Gascon administration did have effective oversight of Bourg and Blaye.¹

It may be argued that Edward's direct communications were responses to appeals from his subjects which as their lord he was bound to acknowledge. Answers could equally well have been sent through his lieutenant, however, if somewhat more tardily. Moreover, Edward's responses must have encouraged such circumventing of the lieutenant. The King- duke's letter of 9 December 1296 to the Bourg garrison and community states that it is in reply to their letter, presented by their messenger John of London. Edward's letter of 11 April 1297 carries an implied reference to a message from Bourg and Blaye, and indeed the citizens of Blaye had addressed just such a communication to him on 30 March.² The tenor of Edward's letter of 7 May 1297 to Bayonne also suggests that it is a reply to a Bayonnaise appeal. Here, surely, there can have been no justification of distance or isolation for writing directly to the community which was the seat of his lieutenant's jurisdiction and military headquarters, if the King- duke had any conscious notion of official propriety in supporting his duly constituted authority. Clearly, he had no such notion; clearly, the niceties of constitutional theory were no hindrance to royal practice. In effect, Edward's actions in corresponding directly with his Gascon subjects or troops tended to undermine the official theoretical status of the lieutenant, whom he had ostensibly established to handle the very matters in which the

¹ C/f. supra, f. 67 & infra, f. 231-233.
² C/f. supra, f. 94.
King-duke was involving himself.

There were precedents for Edward's actions during the lieutenancies of John of Brittany and Edmund. The King-duke, such was his devotion to his duchy, could not desist from interference or intervention in its affairs. On 19 October 1295 he sent a letter to his duchy announcing directly to his Gascon lords, nineteen by name, rather than through his lieutenant John of Brittany, the impending expedition of Edmund and Lacy.¹

Nine instances of particular, as opposed to general, correspondence are extant. For example, in appointing Peter Aylesford and Thomas Cambridge as paymaster and controller in Guienne on 13 July 1294, Edward included in their letters of appointment a directive which it was the prerogative of the lieutenant to issue, namely, not to make payments without the sanction of Robert Tiptoft, 'cui super hoc nostram exposuimus voluntatem'.² On 23 February 1295, the King-duke wrote directly to the seamen of Bayonne in appreciation of their loyal services — instrumental in the capture of the city — and also notified them directly, rather than through John of Brittany, of the appointment of Barran de Sescar as their admiral.³ On 19 October 1295, the day before Edmund's appointment as lieutenant, Edward wrote to the mayor, jurats and 'worthies' of Bourg about monies sent towards their defence and concerning compensation for war-damage, a communication that might well have been left to the new lieutenant, especially as Edward alluded in it to having commended their interests to Edmund.⁴ On 11 February 1296, when Edmund was crossing to Guienne, the King-duke similarly informed his English and Gascon men of Blaye of consignments of wheat and money.⁵

¹. John of Brittany was lieutenant until Edmund's letter of appointment as lieutenant of 20 October (R.G., 3944).
². R.G., 2938. Brittany had been lieutenant of Aquitaine since 1 July, but was still at Portsmouth with Edward and his wishes.
³. C/f. supra, i. 93.
⁴. R.G., 4058.
⁵. Archives hist. Gironde, XII, 115.
An outstanding example of direct correspondence between Edward and his Gascon subjects were his letters of 18 May 1296 to five individual nobles. The King-duke's letters were in answer to letters from them. Their direct approach to him is understandable, for their concern was with the prompter payment of ducal debts; payments which must be made at the exchequer in England. This system is consistently evident in letters of obligation issued by Lacy for debts incurred on Edward's behalf in the duchy. Yet, Edward's response to the approach could as well have been relayed through his lieutenant, if the King-duke were at all conscious of a need or obligation to act through his personal representative in Guienne as theory dictated.

After the cessation of active hostilities there was still no reversion to any earlier 'normal' practice of ruling Guienne through the ducal lieutenant. On 0.15 April 1299, for instance, Edward wrote direct to the communities of Bourg, Blaye, St-Quiterie, St-Sever, Saut, Sorde and Bellegarde on the subject of war-debts and concerning supplies of corn. He also wrote about the same time to bannerets, knights and/or gentlemen of Bayonne, St-Sever, Bellegarde, Saut, St-Quiterie and their neighbourhoods regarding outstanding pay and subsistence, and to others at Bourg and Blaye. Such letters were examples of Edward's continuance of his traditional policy of affiliating Gascon loyalties directly to his own person.

A side-effect of this policy was his invasion of his lieutenants' authority over secondary and junior officials by Edward's direct

1. C/f. supra, f.52.
2. E101 Bundles 152-155.
5. R.G., 4513.
dealings with them. Only three examples of this survive from the period of Lacy's lieutenancy, but they illustrate the tendency. The first is a letter of 12 December 1295 from Edward to Barran de Sescars, admiral of the Bayonne fleet, informing him of Lacy's appointment and the impending departure of the second expeditionary force under his leadership.1 If it were inappropriate for Lacy himself to send this news, it could have been sent to the armed forces, with its mandate to obedience, through their commander in Guienne, John of Brittany. The two other examples from the time of Lacy's regime are also military, both drawn from ducal letters of 7 May 1297. They were addressed to the captains of the Bourg and Blaye garrisons, informing them of Edward's appointment of Nicholas Baret and John of Gloucester as finance officers. The King-duke specifies that Baret and Gloucester should act jointly and orders that 'ipsos Nicholaum et Johannem ad officia illa admittatis in forma predicta'.2 During John of Brittany's lieutenancy Edward had written to Pascal de Vielle, mayor and custos of Bayonne, promising him money and supplies for the city.3 He might the better have been informed through the lieutenant, even if the promise were in response to an appeal for such aid, perhaps from Vielle himself.

A last and earlier example of the King-duke dealing directly with junior and secondary officials is a report by the seneschal of Saintonge to Edward on piracy.4 This report by Rostand de Soler, dated 5 July 1293, seems to have been at Edward's instance. It shows that already before the outbreak of war, the King-duke was in personal communication with a regional seneschal, instead of through the seneschal of Gascony, John Havering, his superior.

1. R.G., 4334. Admittedly, in time of war the need for quick communication with military commanders tends to circumvent protocol.
2. R.G., 4380, 4381.
3. LETTRES, I, p. 422.
4. 047 31/5 (duplicate 27/15).
There was also a tendency on Edward's part to over-ride the authority of his war-time lieutenants in their capacity as capitanei. On 14 August 1295, for example, in a letter to Pope Boniface VIII, in answer to his effort to act as mediator between France and England, Edward mentioned the proxy power which he had given to the cardinal-legates of the pope over his armed forces in Guienne. On the same date he commanded the Gascon 'navy', as well as the English, to observe the expected truce when made. On the following 24 April there is a like reference to the power of the legates to order a cease-fire in the duchy in the event of a truce with Philip IV. Edmund and his fellows in Guienne were to obey accordingly.

Edward also personally arranged financial matters and it is well to recognise that after the French arrest of Robert de Laysset, constable of Bordeaux, in early 1294, the financial organisation was necessarily provisional. Peter Aylesford and Thomas Cambridge were appointed by Edward to the operation of fiscal procedures from 13 July 1294, but under the specified authority of Robert Tiptoft as 'director of finance'. His supervisory role suggests that the King-duke was at first attempting to continue the peace-time financial system with Tiptoft as a proxy-constable. If so, the experiment was short lived; for supervision of financial payments became the lieutenant's prerogative from the time of Edmund's appointment. The system had already collapsed with the subdivision of the first expeditionary force, when John de St-John marched south at the end of 1294; for, Aylesford and Cambridge went with him and made payments to troops on his orders as seneschal, whereas Tiptoft remained at Rions with the lieutenant, John of Brittany. Tiptoft's supervision of his treasury subordinates thus became essentially remote or theoretical.

3. *p.837*.
4. *POWICKE*, p.649; *BEMONT*, cxxvi.
5. e.g., on 28 December 1294 at Hagetmau to Arnold-William, comes Andon (E101/152/8/49).
The constable's functions devolved in practice onto the war-time paymasters. Two examples are found in the actions of Thomas Cambridge. On 19 December 1294 he issued a letter of obligation to Sansaner de Podenx, domicellus, for £46 8s od in money of Morlaas (Béarn), it being backpay for garrison duty at the fort of Mauléon (a.r. 22)¹ according to a letter of Robert de Laysset, constable of Bordeaux.² So, Cambridge underwrote an I.O.U. of his more eminent predecessor. On 11 October 1295, Cambridge again acted for the interned constable when, on the instructions of John of Brittany, lieutenant, he repaid to Otto de Cauneneuve £40 sterling for a loan of £200 burdeleys (money of Bordeaux) which Robert de Laysset had been committed to repaying.³

The ducal paymasters themselves had subsidiary agents to conduct their business throughout the duchy; most notably, their subsidiary paymaster at Bourg and Blaye. It is quite certain that, despite appointment by the King- duke himself, finance officers at Bourg and Blaye were under the authority of, first, Aylesford and Cambridge, and on Aylesford's death, of Sandale and Cambridge. On 15 March 1296 an indenture, a chirographed schedule, was made at Blaye between Sandale and Humphrey de Clare, the ducal clerk responsible for wage-payments in the garrisons of Bourg and Blaye; by it, Sandale—on Edmund's order as lieutenant—paid Clare £7,391 9s 8d sterling as backpay of divers bannerets, knights, squires, infantry and others in the said garrisons, and for portage and carriage of wheat and flour, for tonnage and lodemanage (pilotage), for damnage (storage?) and ferrying of wheat; also, £120 sterling for divers advances made by Clare previously to bannerets, knights and squires in the two

¹. 1293-4.
². E101 152/6/9.
³. E101 152/6/7 (Bémont error: 152/7/ ).
The payment is later referred to by Edmund in a letter patent dated Bayonne 25 May 1296. On 8 June 1298 the subsidiary finance officer at Bourg/Blaye is in evidence again, when the subsidiary account of Nicholas Baret, Clare's successor, was finalised at Bourg by John Sandale following the termination of hostilities; the sum total in monies, credits and by goods and divers victuals was, after deductions, £1,442 18s 2d sterling. On the same date Baret, presumably before the settlement with Sandale, had terminated his military-expenses account with Thomas Cambridge for (after deductions) £163 17s 10d sterling. An example of a lesser finance-agency appears under 24 December 1294. At Hagetmau on that date Bascule de Lescuto, miles, received £50st. 'pro me, decimo equite', from Bernard de Lescuto, monk of Reule Silvestrens, acting for Peter Aylesford and Thomas Cambridge.

Henry de Lacy's control as lieutenant of secondary financial agencies is exemplified in a payment of £80 wages to Guy Ferre, who was on the king's service in Gascony, in 26 Edward I (1297-8). The payment was made by Roger de La Ware, then captain of the Bourg garrison and on the orders of Lacy. The incident is an example of the care continually taken, because of past financial corruption, to keep a firm rein on paymasters in Guienne. It has been noted how Aylesford and Cambridge were subject to the supervision of Robert Tiptoft; and how Baret and Gloucester were to act jointly, so as to keep a check on each other as their letter of appointment actually states in the same way, the terms of appointment of Sandale and Cambridge as a partnership laid down that they should make

1. E101 6/2/4 (Bémont erroneously dates it 1297. This is clear from the document of 25 May 1296: c/f n.2).
2. E101 6/2/3; BÉMONT, cliv, n.3; E101 6/1/ .
3. E101 6/2/1; BÉMONT, clv, n. continued from cliv n.3; 6/2/ .
5. E101 152/8/53; BÉMONT, clix, n; 152/8/ .
payments together and only on the authority of Henry de Lacy, as lieutenant. The payment at Bourg by Roger de La Ware on Lacy's mandate was an extension of the supervisory practices pertaining at Bayonne to the financial sub-department at Bourg/Blaye.

The issue of letters of obligation to creditors or troops was always on the instruction of a supervisory authority, usually on the spot. Thus, Sandale, Cambridge, Aylesford, Bare and Gloucester appended their seals in conjunction with those of Lacy, Brittany, St-John or the local garrison commander, such as Richard Fitz-John or Ralph Basset. This practice may also have been partly due to demand from the creditor for a higher authorisation than a clerk's for payment at the English exchequer. Edward, for his part, directed the treasurer and barons of the exchequer to honour bonds sealed by Lacy, Brittany, St-John, Basset and other English commanders. This double authorisation and check was as much in the interests of the creditor as the debtor.

Only one example of a diplomatic exercise by the lieutenant and his officers is evident in this period, but it is a useful one, for it shows the King-duke working through his lieutenant for once. On 17 February 1297, Edward, as yet ignorant of the Bellegarde defeat, wrote to Lacy and St-John as lieutenant and seneschal about safe-conducts for trading for merchants of Spain and Portugal. The letter arose from a request by Guy, count of Flanders, for such safe-conducts, in return for which he promised to ask the kings of Spain and Portugal to grant to English merchants the same privilege. Lacy and St-John were to pass this information to the community of Bayonne and discover if the safe-conducts for English merchants were forthcoming from the said kings. If they were, Lacy and St-John should obtain them in the same form.

1. R.G., 4374; C.P.R., 1292-1301, p. 247.
2. E.g., SC1 12/174 re John of Brittany.
as Edward was granting them to their merchants, a transcript of which he was sending to Lacy and St. John for their guidance.  

One of the most delicate problems for Lacy to handle as lieutenant was that of compensation-claims for war-damage. Most Gascon claims were submitted directly to Edward, but Lacy was involved in their investigation and in considering policy. The problem was put to him on his first appointment as lieutenant in December 1295, when on the eighth of the month Edward issued a directive to Lacy to consider with his council what action should be taken over those suffering loss from enemy action in the duchy. He was to consult particularly with John de St. John and Hugh de Vere. They should consider the suitable level of provision and support desirable for those in need, the requisite and available amount of money, how many of the needy were men-at-arms or other mercenaries, for how long indigent and so forth; then they were fully to inform Edward of their recommendations.

Consideration of the needs of dispossessed was only one aspect of the lieutenant's routine administration in the war. A major responsibility was for monies and supplies sent to Guienne from England and set against the account of the military paymasters. Several letters patent of Edmund dated 26 May 1296 illustrate this. He acknowledged the receipt of £740 12s 0d st. of the 'King's' monies; of flour, oats (fodder) and beans to the value of £283 14s 0d st; of 101 qtrs of corn received at Portsmouth in his name, some of which had been lost by enemy action in transit and for which he therefore asked to be credited in account with Sandale. Again, on 31 May Edmund acknowledged the receipt from Sandale

1. Foederæ, p. 860 (and in error p. 797 under 1294); T.R., 447.
2. SC1 13/101; R.G., 4223 (originally to Edmund).
3. E101 153/7/3.
4. E101 153/7/5.
5. E101 153/7/6.
of £157 8s od of the King's monies, paid on Edmund's orders into his wardrobe. Sandals seems to have been in England still, engaged in shipping money and supplies to Guienne, so that Edmund seems to have been fulfilling Sandals's future function in the duchy. There is no evidence of similar letters of acknowledgement from Henry de Lacy as lieutenant; it was normally the job of treasury clerks in Guienne. For example, on 1 February 1297 Nicholas Baret acknowledged to the treasurer and barons of the exchequer in England his purchase for Bourg and Blaye from Laurence Gillis, merchant of Sandwich, of 139 qtrs 2 bus of wheat @ 18/- qtr, and 8 qtrs beans @ 15/- ² Yet the ultimate responsibility remained the lieutenant's or his local commander's, as the last sentence of Baret's letter shows: for which lords Ralph Basset and Richard Fitz-John, captains of the said towns, 'promiserunt et obligaverunt etc.'

Routine military administration in war-time Guienne included questions of protection and attorney, pay and military expenses and service certificates. For example, on 10 June 1296 Lacy wrote from Bayonne to John Langton, chancellor, requesting the renewal of letters of attorney for Philip de Lis, who was serving in Guienne. ³ On 20 March 1297 Richard Fitz-John, Lacy's garrison commander at Bourg, wrote to Langton for protections for members of his garrison. ⁴ Letters of obligation to individual soldiers exist by the dozen in the files of the Exchequer, King's Remembrancer (Accounts Various) at the Public Record Office. ⁵ One typical example is a bond issued by Lacy at Bayonne to Simon de Hooe, Esq., to the sum of £23 12s 8d st. for outstanding backpay and for

3. SC1 27/66.
4. SC1 26/184.
compensation for loss of horses during his service period. The issue of demobilisation or service certificates to troops was another duty of military commanders from Lacy downwards. The recipients were normally 'felons', who required them to obtain their promised pardon of King Edward in England. More exceptional was Lacy's payment to John de St-John Jnr. of 50 marks in sterling towards his father's prison expenses.

An aspect of a lieutenant's work as personal representative of the King-duke were grants. Records survive of two made by Henry de Lacy. The first was to Master Peter-Arnold de Vic, king's clerk, in recompense for expenses in the ducal cause. He was granted permission to 'let his place, bailiwick and land of Le Bone ... for four years ... on condition that the king shall be quit of his salary of sixty pounds of Bordeaux for that period'. The second was also to a royal clerk. For service in Aquitaine, Bernard de St-Cricq was granted the ducal orchard and its lands 'with the land under the castle of Bonegarde called the king's place, to hold during pleasure', in other words, temporarily.

A greater variety of grants occurred in the other lieutenancies of the war. Several are commercial. On 7 June 1295 John of Brittany granted at Bayonne letters of marque for five years to Bernard d'Angresse, citizen-merchant of Bayonne, against men of Portugal, notably Lisbon. Letters of marque gave the right to seize the merchandise of a named person or persons in retaliation and as compensation for their previous appropriation of goods to the same value. Bernard d'Angresse had produced facts and figures to substantiate his claim for letters of marque, and

1. E101 154/14/5.
2. C/f. supra, f. 181.
3. Payment was made to him at Saut by Thomas Cambridge (E101 152/14/9).
4. C.P.R., 1292-1301, pp. 357 & 365.
5. BALASQUE & DULAURENS, pp. 543-4: Foedera.
on these being corroborated by "l'échevinage de Bayonne" John of Brittany had granted his request. A second commercial grant is mentioned in a safe-conduct granted at Westminster on 12 August 1295 to John Fracinaut, merchant-burgess of Bordeaux, shipping wines from Bayonne and returning there with other goods. He had come to England on the grant to him of a trading licence by John of Brittany and John de St-John as lieutenant and seneschal. The grant of such trading licences was by no means the prerogative of the officers in Guienne alone. The King-duke ignored their jurisdiction at will. For example, on 28 March 1295 he informed Brittany, St-John and their officers that he had given Bernard of Bayonne a licence to buy a hundred tuns of wine in Guienne for sale in England, which they should observe.

A letter of 22 May 1296 from Edward to Edmund provides another example of a trading licence and letters of marque. At first sight it suggests that theory had become practice. In response to a request from John de Vignac for a special licence to carry passengers, the matter is referred to the lieutenant to grant only if acceptable to the citizens of Bayonne and not prejudicial to either their or ducal interests. Vignac's request for the renewal of a letter of marque against the men of Spain and Portugal is also referred to Edmund to grant only if there be no prospect of the re-establishment of 'peace' with the Spanish and Portuguese.

Fuller consideration of these grants reveals less freedom of action for the lieutenant than first appears. For both requests of John de Vignac were to be dealt with by Edmund along lines laid down already by Edward. Neither are referred to the lieutenant merely with an instruction to

1. C.P.R., 1292-1301, p. 139.
2. R.G., 3886.
'settle'. The letters granted by John of Brittany, which have been considered, were an example of his initiative; but it is found on closer investigation that they were subject to the King's confirmation some four months later. So were the two grants by Henry de Lacy to royal clerks. They were confirmed by Edward on 18 July and 14 October 1298, apparently about four months after Lacy's grant in one case. The wording of the first, to Peter-Arnold de Vic, implies that the grant was made about Easter (6 April) 1298; it seems reasonable to suppose that both grants were made during Lacy's final settlement of his business as lieutenant immediately prior to his return to England about Easter 1298.

The requirement of later royal confirmation is illustrated in an example par excellence under an entry in the Gascon rolls of 28 April 1298. There Edward confirms a grant made by John of Brittany, lieutenant, and subsequently confirmed by Edmund, lieutenant, to Master William Amanieu of Bourg. The grant was of the priory of St. Andrew in the castellania of Bourg. Furthermore, Edward's confirmation is in reply to a letter of the current lieutenant of the duchy, Guy Ferre. So, three lieutenants had had this grant referred to them by the grantee, one of them having actually confirmed the initial grant of his predecessor, yet still the action required royal confirmation. Whether the grantees or the king-duke were responsible for the requirement is unclear; but if King Edward had felt or desired that his lieutenants' authority be deemed sufficient without his own added confirmation, he did not indicate this to grantees.

To do so would in Gascon eyes be a rebuff and so undermine loyalty. The only possible conclusion is that the procedure was in accord with his wishes and his sense of ducal prerogative. The fact that only one of

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1. R.G., 3892; LETTRES, I, p. 418; both on 3 October 1295.
2. C.P.R., 1292-1301, pp. 357 & 365.
4. He was lieutenant by 28 April 1298 & until 3 December 1299.
the seven grants considered here is not recorded as duly confirmed by Edward supports this conclusion.

Akin to the granting of licences was recommendation to the government in England for their award. An example of such function of the lieutenancy is implicit in a letter dated Westminster, 22 October 1297, which was tested in the King's absence in Flanders by 'Edardo, filio regis'. Prince Edward addressed 'all his bailiffs and loyal subjects' in the duchy, referred to the welcome services rendered by Péter-Petri (Perez) and his brother Andrew, citizen-merchants of Burgos in Spain, and granted them safe residence and trading throughout royal territories. It is quite clear that this award was on recommendation or request from the duchy; for the services to the King-duke and his Gascon subjects which are referred to in the letter, are as apprised by the letters patent of Henry de Lacy (lieutenant), John of Brittany, and the mayor and community of Bayonne. The letter, however, is yet another example of direct communication and directive to local officers and others, in disregard of the lieutenancy. For the addressees are ordered to observe the grant and not to hinder the merchants in their enjoyment of it. There is no record of any similar mandate or information on the subject to Henry de Lacy as lieutenant.

An interesting example of the lieutenant acting in a feudal capacity for the King-duke occurred on 1 March 1297. On that date at Bayonne a marriage-contract was sealed between Robert Tiptoft and William Ross for the son of the former to marry the daughter of the latter. The agreement was 'sealed in the presence of 'monsieur' Henry de Lacy, earl of Lincoln, the King's lieutenant in the duchy of Guienne'. Lacy was here acting, as lieutenant, for the King-duke. But his jurisdiction was held to be inadequate. The contract had to be confirmed by Edward in person,

1. R.G., 4395.
2. C.P.R., 1292-1301, p. 346.
namely at St. Albans 25 April 1298.

Although the King- duke and his government in England disregarded at will the theoretical authority of the lieutenant of Aquitaine, an alien prince at least adopted the constitutionally correct procedures — those outside an organisation often tend to show more respect for its official requirements than those within it. In the Ancient Correspondence files of the Public Record Office is a letter from the bailiffs, echevins and consuls of Antwerp to Henry de Lacy, lieutenant of the King of England, on behalf of a certain William Drake, burgess of Antwerp, from whom Lacy's 'men' had seized, in mistake for his being a Fleming, fifteen tuns of wine which he had purchased at La Rochelle. In pursuance of this claim for restitution were subsequent supporting letters from Duke John II of Lorraine, Brabant and Limberg and from his wife, the duchess Margaret, daughter of King Edward, dated Brussels 6 January 1298. The wine had been seized from a Flemish ship at St. Matthieu, presumably in a Gascon raid. This official approach to Lacy as lieutenant must not, however, obscure its personal aspect. The affectionate terms in which both John and Margaret wrote remind the researcher that Lacy had led the embassy to the court of Brabant which in 1278 arranged their betrothal, and that later, in July 1290, he had attended their wedding in London. The official approach on this one occasion is insufficient to discount the general conclusion that emerges from a study of war-time administration in the duchy, that the lieutenant of Aquitaine's theoretical powers were not matched by a corresponding regard for them by the King- duke and his officers in England. It is evident in all areas of jurisdiction.

To end this consideration of general ducal administration in this period, supporting reference may be made to the lieutenants' dispensation of pardons; although the two surviving examples are from the regimes of

1. SC1 29/172.
2. SC1 29/203 & 30/158.
3. Feodera, p. 551; C.P., p. 682; COTTON, p. 177; with a retinue of 36 knights.
John of Brittany and Edmund. On 26 August 1295 the former remitted at Bayonne, at the instance of Amanieu d'Albret, Peter de Tontoulon and Barran de Sescars, a banishment on Arnold de Monlongues, domicellus. This pardon reversed an earlier senescalian judgement; for it was granted 'whether this banishment or judgement of banishment was pronounced by the Seneschal of Gascony, or the provost or any other bailiff'.

It is an example of the lieutenant's jurisdiction over-riding all other civil or judicial authority in the duchy; but the pardon and the implied reversal of a ruling of junior officers by John of Brittany were themselves subject, like other matters, to ducal confirmation; on 18 August 1299 by King Edward at Chertsey.

The second example of a pardon arises in a petition to Edward by Raymond de Laporte, begging the King-duc to confirm Edmund's release of him from banishment from Bordeaux 'on false charges'. Edward did so. His confirmation was implemented in a letter to John de Havering, seneschal of Gascony, ordering him to act in accordance with the letters of remission and quittance held by Laporte from Edmund.

King Edward's personal intervention in general ducal administration was continuous and unlimited. His confirmation of so many of his lieutenants' acts argues that such confirmation was considered necessary, perhaps out of regard for Gascon susceptibilities; also, that ducal approval was not automatic— that ducal confirmation could be denied and so a lieutenant's actions retrospectively disowned by the King-duc. Although full ducal authority had in theory been delegated to the lieutenant of Aquitaine on his appointment, in practice government was still Edward's. A study of Gascon pleas reinforces this impression.

1. C.P.R., 1292-1301, p. 432.
3. R.S., 4819: 30 March 1305. There was then no lieutenant in office.
Pleas and Responses

Far and away the greatest number of Gascon pleas in this period arose directly from the exigencies of war. Quite a number of Edward's Gascon subjects were dispossessed of their lands and possessions by the officers of the King of France because of their loyalty to his vassal the King-duke; and, being rendered destitute, they turned in their extremity to their immediate lord for the means to subsist. Hence the number of pleas to Edward for maintenance.

Twelve such appeals are extant in the Gascon rolls. Lord Amanieu d'Albret and Pierre-Amanieu, capital of Buch, informed the King-duke that they were destitute, unable to support their wives and households and had not received wages from Edward. They asked that he grant them some lands by which to maintain their wives and dependents. 

Claims were made by three valetti, Gombald de Bourg, William de Montpezat and William-Sancho de Pommiers for support for themselves, their wives and households because of the many damages and losses that they had sustained in the King-duke's cause; and they declared that their wages were insufficient.

Peter de Gavarret, domicellus, submitted a like claim and additionally for recompense of the many payments that he had had to make. 

Doat de Pis, son of the late Doat de Pis, recounted the many damages and losses they had both suffered in Edward's cause and begged the means to support himself, his mother, sister and household as his wages were inadequate.

John de La Caussade and his brother William sought some employment or means of support because of their many damages and losses in over two years' ducal service. 

A different kind of case is represented by the plea of Master Raymond de Pis, clerk, for suitable

1. R.G., 4419.
2. R.G., 4400, 4408, 4409.
5. R.G., 4396.
provision for many of his colleagues, relatives and friends either captured, arrested or made completely destitute by King Philip's men, and who in consequence lacked any means of maintenance.¹ Similar cases of total destitution because of the war occur in the pleas of Sir Raymond de Campagne, knight and previous seneschal of the Agenais, and Sir Bertrand de Panissau, knight and previous castellan of Lalande(?), who begged maintenance for the duration of the war for themselves, their wives and households.²

Finally, there are four cases involving clerics, which Edward considered at Plympton in May 1297. James de Cruce, capellanus, applied for a commensurate allowance to compensate for his loss of income when ejected by the French from his living as a canon of the church of Dax.³ Arnold, prior of Pontonx, submitted⁴ that because the church and buildings of Pontonx had been razed to the ground and he had lost the rents of his priory there; and because his rents from his priory of Calesun, of Lusignan, and in La Réole had been granted away by the King of France, the King-duke should make suitable provision for his needs as he lacked the means to maintain himself or pay his debts. Another plea came from the brothers P. Calculi and Raymond de Burgo of the Friars minor, who sought a letter requiring the lieutenant to provide for their needs.⁵ Fourthly, Brother Peter de Pisu humbly begged the King-duke of his mercy to provide, for the duration of the war, the necessaries of life for himself and his companion, so that they might not be reduced to begging; as he had been deprived for some time of all lay aid and help from friends, so that he had nowhere else to turn.⁶

1. R.G., 4417.
4. Plympton Plea, No. 15.
5. Plympton Plea, No. 17.
In response to the pleas of Amanieu d'Albret and the capit of Buch, Edward wrote to Lacy that, wishing to show them special favour because of their praiseworthy service, he was ordering him to consult diligently with his appropriate English and Gascon counsellors, acquire some demesne land acceptable to the plaintiffs, and divide it between them; the lands to be held during royal pleasure, that is temporarily, and assigned to each in accordance with custom and as seemed best.

Concerning the claims of the three men-at-arms, of Doat de Pis and of Peter de Gavarret, Edward ordered Lacy to take diligent counsel with such English and Gascon advisers as he felt he should, investigating and fully discovering the services rendered and the damages and losses sustained, and then fully to inform the King-duc; as also on the condition and deservedness of themselves, their wives and households and their sizes, and forward their conclusions and advice regarding compensation or provision for them. Edward's response to the plea of de Gavarret also included additional consideration of his claimed expenses.

On the plea of the La Caussade brothers, Lacy was to take diligent counsel with such English and Gascon advisers as he felt expedient, fully investigate the details, and consider, with due regard to their condition and merit, whether their request would be convenient to grant. Otherwise, he was fully to inform Edward on the outcome of his deliberations with recommendations. The plea of Master Baymond de Pis drew the response that Lacy take counsel, fully investigate the details, then inform the King-duc on the rank, number and condition of those involved, and on their damages, losses, as well as the manner and cause of them and all the relevant details of their situation, rendering to Edward counsel as to appropriate provision or recom pense.

Turning to the case of Raymond de Campagne, here the King-duc made it clear that he intended to deal especially generously with him because
of his praiseworthy past record of ducal service, and because he had been interned in a French prison on Edward's account. Therefore, Lacy was ordered, after taking appropriate counsel, to grant available lands or income to Raymond for the maintenance of himself, his wife and his household until Edward should ordain otherwise. His mandate concerning Bertrand de Panissau was similar.

On the plea from canon Crucex, the lieutenant was instructed that, if the facts seemed correct, he should grant to him the appropriate income as provided to other canons of his church still in ducal service — unless there be any prohibiting reason of which the King-duke was unaware. Prior Arnold was informed by Edward that provision would be made for him if he came to England. The plea of Brother Peter de Pis evoked the same answer; that of the two Friars minor brought none — or at least none is recorded. The responsiones of pleas 15 and 20 are instructive. Both contain a significant statement of policy by Edward: 'for the king is not making provision in Gascony for anyone else apart from his troops'.

The Gascon pleas for maintenance which feature in the lieutenancy of Edmund survive in their final stages, with little difference of treatment. Edward's letters on them to Edmund are dated 15 November 1295. He orders Edmund to make fit provision of wages and maintenance at an early date to Sir Montasive de Noaillan as became his rank and needs. Free return—passage to Guienne was to be granted to Noaillan's messenger and proctor Elias de Monte Pavon. Edmund was similarly ordered to give ship to and grant suitable subsistence or wages, after consulting 'cum fidelibus nostris de Anglia et Vasconie', to Boniface of Rions, scutifer, who had suffered grievously on the King-duke's account, if he were still in service and loyal. The lieutenant was to provide also, as far as he

1. R.G., 4061.
2. R.G., 4066.
was able, for Bernard Faur, clerk and canon of Bazas, who had been expelled by the King- duke's enemies and had suffered other grievous hurts. This Edmund was also to do for other loyal clerics, all after consultation with his English and Gascon counsellors. 1 Edmund was also ordered by his brother to give return passage to Guienne and, after due consultation with his English and Gascon counsellors, to make suitable provision, in the event of their continuing in ducal service, for Arnold—William de Gensac, 3 John of Farro, 4 Peter de Baum and John Fremaud citizens of Bordeaux, Peter de Maignan, 5 William-Raymond Colomb of Bourg, 6 and Port de Bozo 7, all of whom had suffered grievously on Edward's account. Finally on the subject of maintenance, Edmund was to make suitable provision in wages or maintenance, according to their needs, for the lord of Rions (William-Séquin d'Escoussans) and Master Bernard Ferrator of Rions because of the grievous hurts that they had suffered on the King- duke's account and for their loyal service. 8

One composite plea has survived and is noteworthy. It was submitted by the town of Rions and is referred to in Edward's directive to his brother to make suitable provision, after taking due English and Gascon counsel, for the loyal men, their wives and households of Rions, who had greatly suffered because of Edward's interests. 9

1. R.G., 4069.
2. Obviously in Guienne. These directives were conveyed to him while still in England of course.
5. R.G., 4072 (a composite entry). Baum is printed as Buan.
7. R.G., 4076.
The pleas for maintenance in the lieutenancies of Edmund and Lacy are of a pattern. Their only difference is with regard to stage of settlement. Those of Edmund’s regime which have been considered had already been submitted to the King-duc, presumably during the lieutenancy of John of Brittany. Edmund was thus only concerned with the resultant action. Those of Lacy’s regime were in many instances for fuller investigation or substantiation. Whatever stage of the legal process had been reached, however, three features are clear. Firstly, either in the matter of investigation and report, or in the execution of royal directives, Edward repeatedly emphasised the need and desirability for consultation with local noble and official opinion in Guienne, that is, with both English and Gascon advisers. Secondly, it is clear that pleas were not referred to the lieutenant for judgement. Edward himself either had taken the appropriate decision on the pleas submitted to him, or would do so on receipt from his lieutenant of the information and local counsel that he required. Like government, judgement was his. Thirdly, in the granting of pleas or maintenance the King-duc was single-minded. Regard was to be had to whether the plaintiff was an active participant in the continuing struggle on the ducal side. Supporters of his cause received priority of consideration. Those no longer active would presumably have to wait. The war effort, and all that contributed to it, took precedence.

The major observation to be made is significant; there is no evidence of any war-time lieutenant referring pleas to the King-duc. It must therefore be taken that Gascon pleas were being submitted directly to him by his subjects – some journeying in person to England to seek justice, some sending proctors. This runs entirely counter to Trabut-Cussac’s projection of a lieutenant making justice available in the duchy as a remedy to the costly practice of recourse to the King-duc in England – although Trabut-Cussac has pointedly maintained that the ‘normal’
peace-time system did not operate in time of war. In contrast to what Trabut-Cussac has represented as the role of Maurice de Craon, lieutenant, his war-time successors certainly only acted in the matter of pleas as intermediaries for effecting royal judgements or inquisitions; and one of these was the King-duke's own royal brother, and the two others leading earls— all far more eminent in status than Maurice de Craon.

The greatest number of Gascon pleas to Edward which arose directly from the exigencies of war were claims for outstanding military wages or expenses, or for compensation for financial or economic loss. Six cases can be cited over backpay and thirty-nine over military expenses or compensation during Lacy's lieutenancy. Three of the wage pleas are of the same simple format, namely, those of Doat de Pis, William de Montpezat, and Gombald de Bourg requesting that the King-duke pay their arrears of army pay.¹ The other three are a little fuller. Sir Miles de Noailan requests the pay owing to him for three men-at-arms 'per quod sibi quandam pecuniam super vadiis suis de prestito fecimus liberari, prout in quodam rotulo quem dilectus clericus nostri Johannes de Drokenesford, custos garderobe nostre, mittit dilectis clericis nostris Thome de Cantabruga et Johanni de Sandale, pecuniam nostram apud Baionem ministerantibus, plenus continetur'.² A like plea was entered by Barran de Sescars³ for wages owed to him 'pro quinque hominibus armatis et triginta sagittariis'. Another claim by Sescars was for his wages as admiral and captain of the Bayonne fleet.⁴

¹ R.G., 4401, 4406, 4407.
² R.G., 4470.
³ R.G., 4471.
The King-duke's responses to these pleas were of a pattern. To the requests for army pay by Doat de Pis, William de Montpezat and Gombald de Bourg he answered that, after due consultation with his finance ministers, Lacy should settle with Doat de Pis according to his discretion and deal justly and fairly with the other two. The same directive was sent to Lacy over the pleas of Miles de Noaillan and Barran de Sescars over the payment of their mercenaries — to settle justly after examination with his treasury clerks. On Sescar's claim for naval wages, Lacy was to investigate it fully with Thomas Cambridge, establish the date and duration of his appointment and service, discover whether he had previously received wages in that time, then report his findings to Edward.

Turning to pleas for military expenses, three are for the loss of horses on active service. ¹ William de Montpezat, domicellus, and Gombald de Bourg, valettus, begged, so Edward informed Lacy, that 'equorum quos in nostro servicio perdidit restauracionem fieri faceremus'. Pierre-Amanieu, captal of Buch, detailed his actual equestrian losses and begged that 'de septem equis per Rogerum de Mortuo Mari / Mortimer/ apud Blaviam appreciatis, quos in servicio nostro Edward/'s/ perdidit, allocacionem fieri faceremus'.

One plea was for payment to William-Sancho de Pommiers for his purchase of horses and arms for the ducal cause; repayment having been promised by Earl Edmund but not made. ² Another, from John Alegre, was for repayment of the costs of equipping himself in horses and arms and for repayment also of his ransom of 16 guineas after his capture by the French. ³ Barran de Sescars features again in a claim to be recompensed:

¹. R.G., 4406, 4407, 4418.
². R.G., 4473; Plympton Plea No. 3(part).
³. R.G., 4399.
for his necessary expenditure of 100 marks in excess of his wages. His expenses seem to have been incurred in purchasing food or supplies. A more considerable claim, for providing victuals and supplies to the garrison of Blaye, was submitted by the lord of Blaye, Geoffrey Rudel. Then there was the plea of Doat de Pis for money to pay his creditors for his costs in raising mercenaries at the promised reimbursement by ducal officers of 100/- per armed man.

A variety of pleas to Edward are retrospectively mentioned in the Plympton Pleas as distinct from the Gascon rolls. William de Fluvian, variously referred to elsewhere as both 'domicellus' and 'miles Cathalonia', had requested £25 'de Jakeys' of Edward for the equipping of himself and his men-at-arms, who were in ducal service. Similar pleas came from Sancho-Petri and Quannes Marren, men-at-arms of the king of Aragon, and Peter-Jacobi, man-at-arms of 'lord' William de Fluvian, that as they had been in Edward's service a long time and had entered it at their own expense, he should now grant them some increment to enable them to serve him the better henceforth. Bernard d'Ortes, of the company of Bernard de Cazenove domicellus, asked that, as he and his men had not been paid from the feast of St. Michael 'usque ad hodiernum diem', they be granted an allocation of corn. Lastly, there was the petition of Miles de Noailian, that the King should be pleased to pay Philip de Beauvais, surgeon, for attending Bernard-Amanieu his nephew, who had been wounded that year, as Miles himself lacked the means to pay him.

1. R.G., 4477; Plympton Plea, No. 11 (part).
2. R.G., 4224.
7. " " No. 16.
8. " " No. 18.
Montasive de Noaillan was the author of the one plea for military expenses that survives from the lieutenancy of Edmund. Edward's letter on it to Edmund is unusually precise in its mandate. He orders Edmund to pay to Noaillan £14 st. for a horse which he had lost on Gascon service. It is to be assumed that the sum was the exact amount claimed and that the claimant had proof of its worth in a previous horse-valuation such as submitted by Pierre-Amanieu, capitl of Buch.

In response to claims for military expenses in the lieutenancy of Henry de Lacy, Edward ordered him to investigate with his treasury clerks the claims of William de Montpezat and Gombald de Bourg and to settle them justly and fairly. He should ascertain the facts of the plea of Pierre-Amanieu, capitl of Buch, and if they were as stated make him the due allowance. On William-Sancho de Pommier's claim for recompense for his purchase of horse and arms for the King-duke's cause, Lacy was to take appropriate counsel, diligently investigate to discover all the facts, and speedily report the result to Edward. Over John Alegre's claim for costs of equipping and the repayment of his ransom, the directive to Lacy was much the same; take appropriate advice, fully investigate and ascertain the facts, then fully inform Edward, advising also on the nature and extent of the action recommended. The King-duke's judgement on Sescar's extra expenditure was the same as over his wages, namely, Lacy should discover whether the admiral had already received any payment and report back. Lacy was also ordered to investigate fully Geoffrey of Rudel's claim over supplying the Blaye garrison and speedily inform the King-duke on the details, so that the claimant might have no cause for complaint over delay in receiving justice. Rudel's value in the maintenance of Blaye was self-evident. The lieutenant was given a free

1. R.G., 4061(part).
hand with regard to the plea of Doat de Pis on meeting his costs in hiring troops - Lacy should take appropriate counsel, diligently investigate, and do as he considered best. If, however, he was for some reason unable to deal with the matter, he should fully acquaint Edward with the facts of the case and tender advice on the nature and method of action he recommended.

William de Fluvian's claim for the costs of equipping himself and his men-at-arms was denied, and he was told to desist from his persistent claims. His persistence and Edward's implacability are seen in another plea considered at Plympton, which had been addressed to Edward by James Aleruck, prefaced with the request 'qe, si luy plest, seyt remembrant de fet de sir William de Fluvian', to which the King-duke replied that he did not intend to increase his wages. There were similar claims, as noted, for pay increases from Sancho-Petri, Quannes Warren and Pierre-Jacobi, all of which were denied.

The point to be noted is that all these unsuccessful claimants were Iberian mercenaries whom Edward felt no obligation to equip, in contrast to his own Gascon subjects, many of whom received payments in 1294 for arms and equipment. To some extent, the same applied to Bernard d'Orthes and his Spanish troopers. Rather than meet his request for an allocation of corn in the absence of wages, Edward ordered him to submit details, so that he could instead settle, at least in part, the wage-bill owed.

Lastly, Miles de Noaillan's plea for payment of a surgeon, brought forth the order that the seneschal and lord J. de Bar should speak to the surgeon on the matter.

Gascon pleas to Edward concerning compensation for financial or commercial loss are more of a pattern. Eighteen refer to merchandise lost at La Rochelle by enemy action or confiscation.¹ The claimants and sums involved were as follows: Laurence Dorog and Peter–John de Vic, citizens of Bayonne, £1,002 10s od turonensium nigrorum (black money of Tours)²; Auger de Morlaas, citizen of Bayonne, £580 t.n.; Arnold de Vic alone, £94 10s od t.n.; Bartholomew d’Avesse and his son Bernard, citizens of Bayonne, £1,745 12s od t.n.; William–Arnold de Fayet, citizen of Bayonne, £189 10s od t.n.; Arnold d’Auribat, citizen of Bayonne, £130 t.n.; Arnold–Raymond d’Auribat and William–Arnold d’Auribat, citizens of Bayonne, £1,800 t.n.; William–Arnold d’Auribat, citizen of Bayonne, £650 t.n.; Peter–Arnold Bonisit and Gerald Duhieu, citizens of Bayonne, £1,240 6s od t.n.; John de Perioun, citizen of Bayonne, £139 t.n.; Peter de Gisted, citizen of Bayonne, £304 t.n.; Dominic de Castet, citizen of Bayonne, £1,030 t.n.; Joanna de Maa, wife of John de Camou, £380 t.n.; William–Arnold de Beguioe, citizen of Bayonne, £166 t.n.; John de Villa, citizen of Bayonne, £328 13s od t.n.; Peter–Arnaldî de Villa, citizen of Bayonne, £5,305 4s od t.n.; and Peter Camped, citizen of Bayonne, £6,139 t.n.

Another similar plea came from Peregrin de Villa, citizen of Bayonne, for his merchant John of Orthez, concerning goods lost at Bordeaux to the value of 6,000/- morlanorum (money of Morlaix)³; also, from Peregrin

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¹ R.G., 4441–6, 4456–63, 4465, 4467 (duplicate); Fosdera, p. 860; C.P.R., 1292–1301, p. 234.
² According to the patent rolls entry (supra, n. 1) 'the sterling being reckoned equal to four black coins of Tours'.
³ R.G., 4464. Approximately 2½ coin of Morlaix (Morlaas, Béarn) were reckoned to be equivalent to 1 sterling about this time, but there was great instability of exchange rates (vide T.N. Bisson, 'Coinages and royal monetary policy in Languedoc during the reign of St. Louis', Speculum, XXXII (1957), pp. 443–469). For example, on 26 December 1296 on letters of obligation from Guienne, 107/- morlanorum are counted as 42/10 sterling (ratio, 2½:1); on only 19 March 1297, £23 15s 4d morlanorum were made equivalent to £9 19s 6d sterling – approximate ratio 2½:1 (£101 154/5/49 & 53).
de Larum, citizen of Bayonne, for goods worth £394 t.n. plundered by the French at the Isle of Oloron. All these pleas appear in letters of the King-duc to his lieutenant in Guienne on 12 February 1297. Apart from these claims over 'despoiled' merchandise, there are registered also, on 6 December 1295 and 7 March 1297 in royal letters to Lacy, a claim by John de Sistre of Bayonne for compensation for the loss on active service by enemy action before Lormont of his ship, the 'Holy Spirit' of Bayonne; and a claim by Pascal Valentini for recompense for successive losses of money at sea in a ship of Peter d'Artiguelongue, citizen of Bayonne, and in another, 'La Maury'. A completely different kind of claim on the King-duc is registered in the Plympton Pleas from the Franciscan brothers P. Calculi and Raymond de Bourg. They had recounted how, 'on the night when the lord John de Butecurte and themselves were wounded', they lost their breviary by which to say their office. The brothers therefore begged of Edward some small 'emolument' (i.e. alms), wherewith to buy another. The action taken by Edward on these military and commercial pleas from Guienne was twofold: either the lieutenant should examine the case and settle it; or, he should investigate fully, report back, and in one case also advise. The pleas referred to Lacy for him to settle, were to do with matters best and most easily dealt with in the duchy, where the lieutenant and his officers had the relevant records to hand and, with immediate knowledge of the local situation, were best fitted to handle them. These pleas were simple claims for pay arrears of individuals or their troops, reparations for loss of horses, and in one case for reimbursement of the costs of recruiting mercenaries according to a previously promised rate of repayment by Edmund. As such, all these cases

1. R.G., 4466.
3. Plympton Plea, No. 17 (part).
were part and parcel of the routine financing of the war by ducal officers appointed for that purpose in the duchy, and for which they received periodic payments from the treasury in England. There was no advantage or need for Edward to interfere in such orthodox matters of local administration—no principle was involved, no vital interest at stake.

Edward did pronounce, however, on pleas which did not fall into this routine category. Barran de Sescar's claims for outstanding pay and expenses beyond his official salary as Bayonnais 'admiral and captain', for example, were for investigation by the lieutenant and report to the King-duc, and so for the latter's ultimate decision or action. For Sescar had been a royal appointee, although, in the event, on John of Brittany's warrant. Similarly, Edward's directive to Lacy to investigate and report on William-Sancho de Pommier's claim for remuneration for his purchase of horses and arms—even though with Edmund's agreement—was because he had acted as a ducal agent, dealing with others on Edward's account, committing him to military expenditure, not merely serving in his army. Pommier was a royal agent and therefore a special case. The plea of John Alegre for equipment and ransom costs was also a special case. Here was a Gascon loyalist, dispossessed because of his fidelity to Edward, who would be entitled to expect his equippage costs to be met, as so many of his fellow Gascons had been in 1294. His loyalty and captivity would arouse Edward's esteem, so that he would naturally wish to examine the ransom-claim personally, by reference to Alegre's service record. Hence, Edward's order to Lacy to investigate, report and advise. Edward also had a personal interest in the claim for surgical expenses, because the medical attention had been at Edward's direction; payment was morally his responsibility and could not be delegated to the local Gascon administration.

1. For examples of these payments see E101 152/8/ On his dispossession see C47 26/6; R.G., 4529/187.
As regards the denied pleas, these consistently reflect a royal policy of disowning responsibility for the private costs or needs of Iberian mercenaries, and Edward personally made that policy clear, rather than leave the outcome to the judgement of his officers in Guienne. Finally, the point must again be made that, as in regard to pleas for maintenance, there is no evidence of pleas being referred to the lieutenant; they went direct to the King-duc in England, and not to him through his officers in the duchy or by sanction of the lieutenant. Compensation pleas, it may be noted, all received the same treatment; the lieutenant was instructed to examine the case and report the findings. Edward's policy on them, once he had the facts, was enunciated in his letter of 6 December 1295 to Lacy referring to the claim of John de Sistre over the loss of his ship, the 'Holy Spirit'; 'Nos .. intendentes ad eundem Johannem ET OMNES ALIOS occasione servicii nostri damna passos propter presentem guerram congruo tempore specialem habere respectum'. That policy is evidenced in three cases which are found in their final stages in the Patent rolls, where the claims of John de Vielle, Peter-Arnold de Vielle and Peter Camped, citizens of Bordeaux, are met in full after local investigation — the first's 'by an inquisition made, at the king's command, by John de Britannia, John de Sancto Johanne and Amaneus de Lebreto, knts'; the third by inquisition of St-John and d'Albret; and the second, it must be assumed, similarly. The only exception in treatment was the part-plea from the two Franciscan brothers for money for a breviary. This was a special, personal, clerical plea on which Edward gave an immediate direction; the matter was referred for settlement to John of Drokenesford, clerk.

1. Plympton Plea No.24 reveals that William de Fluvian also claimed costs for loss of horses.
The treatment of pleas for compensation in the lieutenancy of Edmund is identical to that of Lacy's regime, illustrating a continuation of ducal policy and methods. Those concerning lost ships and goods were subject to Edmund's investigation and report; but where a special case arose, it called forth Edward's personal consideration and decision. An example was the plea of Bernard de Longa, citizen of Bayonne and master of the 'St. Nicholas', who asserted that his ship was lost on a return voyage from England, after carrying wine there on the appropriation of the vessel by Itier Bochard d'Angoulême, then constable of Bordeaux; and he complained that he was being pressed by his creditors. Edmund was instructed to prohibit his undue or unjust harassment by them. Presumably, reading between the lines, compensation for the loss of his ship would meanwhile be investigated as in other cases. In contrast, on the claim of Sir Montasie de Noaillan for £14 st. for a lost horse, Edmund was ordered to make an early payment. The King-duke must himself have made the decision rather than refer it to his lieutenant, because de Noaillan was, again, a special case: a Gascon who had been 'dispossessed' by the French. 

Several miscellaneous pleas must be considered before turning from military to civil claims. A couple concern military appointments. Pascal Valentini requested the rank and pay of a banneret. Bernard de Lagleire, who had been expelled from his lands by King Philip's officers and so made totally destitute, begged to be made general serjeant of the King-ducé's men-at-arms. One of the items in the plea of Barran de Sescars

1. R.G., 4077, 4079, 4080.
2. R.G., 4078.
3. C47 26/6, 35/16/32; R.G., 4529/34, 4985/23.
4. R.G., 4478; Plympton Plea, No. 8.
5. R.G., 4484; Plympton Plea, No. 10.
was over his future position and pay as admiral/captain of the Bayonne fleet.\(^1\) Two pleas are concerned with military contingents. One is from Arnold Gaveston requesting that, if any of his usual military companions have been attached by Lacy or other royal officers to garrison duty or defence of other places or ducal forts, they should be restored to him by Lacy, so that he might honourably serve the king-duke.\(^2\) The other plea was submitted by Pascal Valentini under two items\(^3\): firstly, to be allowed to maintain a larger number of men-at-arms than at present, whom John de St-John had told him would be required if the war lasted, and so he was offering some two or three hundred armed infantry; secondly, to be permitted to supply replacements for those of his troops already killed by the enemy or future casualties and at customary rates of pay.

A plea submitted by Master Raymond de Pis, clerk, was rather different. He sought the release of French prisoners-of-war in exchange for his brother William de Pis, Doat son of William, Peter de Mirail, Arnold de Pis de Turnon, Raymond de Migayn and Arnold de Lamothe, burgesses of La Rèole, who had been captured or arrested and had been in French custody for a long time.\(^4\)

Eight miscellaneous military pleas come to light solely through the collection of Plympton Pleas.\(^5\) Arnold Gaveston protests his devotion to Edward's honour and interests and his wish to serve him usefully; and he asks that the king-duke make some fitting financial provision, as he sees best, for horses for him, out of his customary beneficence. The

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1. R.G., 4477; Plympton Plea, No.11(part).
2. R.G., 4476; Plympton Plea, No.1(part).
3. R.G., 4479; Plympton Plea, No.2(part) & 8(part).
5. Plympton Pleas Nos.1(item 2), 1(item 6), 2(item 2), 18(items 2 & 3), 23, 25 & 27.
The upshot of this plea is found in a letter from Edward, dated Plympton 28 April 1297, to Diego Lopez, lord of Biscay, asking him to permit Gaveston to buy horses and transport them to Gascoeny unmolested; and in a similar letter from Edward on the same date to Henry, young son of King Henry III of Castile and Léon, to the same effect. As another item, Arnold reminded the king-duke how Edward had taken him with a single knight into his household; how he had lain for three years in a French prison after being surrendered as a ducal hostage by John de St-John, then lieutenant of the duchy; and that he had therefore been prevented from attending Edward's court. He asked that Edward pay him his wages as a household knight due for the feast of Easter last, plus arrears for the period of his imprisonment. Pascal Valentini submitted that he maintained a large company and therefore had much heavier expenses than a single knight with a small retinue. He accordingly asked that Edward grant him some bounty, as he should see fit. Sir Miles de Noaillan begged to be made a household knight, and also that Edward grant to Arnold-Sancho, a Basque, a situation as a trooper in his household. John Porket (of Aragon) and Sancho, and also James de Alerick, asked Edward, as he had made knights of them, also to grant them the means to maintain themselves in his service. Finally, Berengar Senercois, a Catallan, squire of Sir James de Alerick, begged a serjeanty in the Agenais.

As would be expected, Edward's answers to these various pleas were individual. The king-duke inclined to be especially gracious to Pascal Valentini because, as he put it, of his praiseworthy service to the ducal cause and the large squadron that he maintained. Therefore, he granted him the rank of banneret for as long as he should continue in ducal

1. R.G., 4468 & 4469.
2. Gaveston was a household knight in the late 1280's and again in 1301 (PRESTWICH, pp. 45-46).
service and the same wages as a Gascon banneret. The significant fact is that Valentini - called Ladalil de Arragonia\(^1\) - was a Spanish mercenary to whom the king-duke was granting privileges normally reserved for his own subjects. This explains why Edward dealt personally with the plea, rather than pass it to his capitaneus in Guienne. It would normally be considered a routine matter of military administration. An exception was made of this plea - an exception to Edward's declared policy towards other Iberian mercenaries of no concessions beyond their purely mercenary status - only because of Valentini's eminence.

Bernard de Lagleire's plea brought a directive to Lacy to take him into ducal service and award him the serjeanty that he sought or some other suitable office. Barran de Sescar's appointment as naval commander was confirmed by Edward, but with the reservation that his continued command rested with Lacy, who was to judge what was best in the ducal interest. To Gavaston's plea for restoration of his contingent, this, being a local military matter, was referred to Lacy to consider in council, investigating the situation of those concerned and the duties to which they had been assigned, and then to settle as seemed honourable and in the ducal interest. Valentini's offer to provide more troops, also being a local matter for the judgement of the capitaneus, was similarly left to Lacy to consider in council on its merits, and also do as he believed to be consonant with ducal honour and advantage. The matter of exchange of prisoners-of-war was again referred to Edward's capitaneus. Lacy was to effect the liberation of French prisoners-of-war of such status and condition as he saw fit, but only after ducal hostages and prisoners had been released by the enemy. King Edward no longer trusted the faith of the French.

To Gavaston's plea for a monetary allowance for the purchase of horses, Edward replied that he would do what he could when apprised of the

\(^1\) Strictly, Pascual of Valencia, the Adalid (PRESTWICH, p. 46, n. 3).
number of horses that Arnold had bought. As regards his household pay, Gavaston would receive his wages when he came to England. Valentini's request for a gratuity seems to have brought no response — as already remarked, Edward was disinclined to grant bonuses to Iberian mercenaries. The King-duke granted Miles de Noaillan's request to be made a household knight; but he would promise nothing for Noaillan's squire, Arnold-Sancho the Basque, until he had seen him in England. To the pleas of the Spanish mercenaries Porket, Sancho and Alerick and his fellows, Edward answered that they had their pay for serving him and, according as they continued to do so, they would be rewarded. Berengar Senercois' request for a serjeanty in the Agenais was denied as Edward did not then possess the area; but when he again did, he would consider the request and make Senercois some grant according to his service.

It is apparent that Edward referred to his capitaneus military pleas which were strictly for his decision as the best judge of them. All others, if they contained an extra-military element such as policy towards Iberian mercenaries, or transactions with the enemy, or personal appeals to the King-duke from dispossessed loyalists, evoked a decision or directive from Edward himself. In effect, all but simple administrative decisions, civil or military, were referred to and taken by the King-duke. In particular, any plea in any way involving the personal relationship of subject and ducal lord, and therefore likely to affect Gascon loyalties to the King-duke which he had been cultivating over the previous forty years, received Edward's personal attention. He was supremely conscious of an empathy with his Gascon subjects.

There was one obvious exception to the scope of an otherwise general royal oversight: internal matters within the administration of the duchy. Edward referred these to his lieutenant. Three instances of this are found in internal appointments to the ducal administration — as distinct from appointments to headships of it. Three clerks, Bernard de
Garssi, Bartholomew de Mans and Bertrand de Lesgor individually petitioned the King-duke for appointment as public notaries in Guienne.¹ In each case Edward referred the plea to Lacy as lieutenant, to consult with his English and Gascon counsellors, ascertain the facts, and act as he saw fit, according to the petitioner's merit and suitability and the public interest. This delegation occurred despite the applicants' submission of their many 'injuries' due to the war. Here, then, the junior nature of the appointments, and Edward's regard for his lieutenant's authority over his internal administration, took priority over the personal relationship of prince and subject.

A good example of Edward dealing with higher appointments in the duchy personally— and also of ensuing difficulties because of his remoteness from the events that he was ordering— appears in a plea² which, out of embarrassment, he referred to Edmund as lieutenant in November 1295. In a moment of abstraction, carelessness or haste Edward had appointed Garsias Arnaldi, 'vicecomes Maritime', as commander of the castle of Bayonne, even though he had already made Pascal de Vielle, mayor of Bayonne, its custos.³ Edward had appointed de Vielle on 1 March 1295 and Arnaldi the following 16 August. The result was a plea from Arnaldi. Presumably, de Vielle was refusing to relinquish his post. Whether Pascal de Vielle also submitted a plea to Edward is unrecorded, but a royal mandate to Edmund⁴ to give free passage to Arnold de Gos, messenger and proctor 'nostri vicecomitis', to return to Gascony shows that Arnaldi certainly had. No wonder that in his letter to Edmund on 15 November Edward told him to resolve the matter as he saw best, after investigation and counsel from his English and Gascon advisers. For the rival claimants to the office of castellan at Bayonne both held Edward's letters of appointment!

1. R.G., 4405, 4421, 4422.  
2. R.G., 4068 (15 November 1295).  
4. R.G., 4065 (15 November 1295).
The Plympton Pleas illustrate other requests for appointment. Arnold Gaveston, writing on behalf of his kinsmen and friends, requested that Edward command the earl of Lincoln kindly to receive them into ducal service, providing for them according to their suitability and status, and as it had been usual to provide for others. Bernard d'Ortes, a mercenary of Raymond-Bernardi de Cazeneuve, stated that he and twelve companions had been expelled by the comte de Foix from his land of Béarn for fighting against Charles of Valois at the siege of St-Sever and were now exiles. Wherefore, he besought the King-duke to grant him the office of verderer (forest officer) at Pulcra Garda for the same dues as a farmer there paid for his lands. Bertrand de Panissau, knight, asked that, as he had two sons who were clerks, namely Grimoard and Armaund, and for whom no living had as yet been provided, the King-duke should kindly grant the scrivenership of the provost's office of St-Fide in the diocese of the Agenais to one of them for life, and for the price for which Edward had received it when he was possessed of the duchy of Aquitaine and with the land of the Agenais. Fourthly, there was the petition of Bernard de Cauvet, clerk to the lord Raymond de Campagne. He had served his lord in a French prison for a long time, he claimed, and had lost what possessions he had in Guienne by enemy action and at the hands of King Philip's officers. He begged the King-duke to grant him the office of bailiff's notary in the bastide of Vianne for the time being. Gaveston's plea was granted and Edward informed Lacy accordingly. To Bernard d'Ortes Edward replied that he lacked the requisite information to be able to make the grant. His response to Bertrand de Panissau was that when the Agenais was again his, he would provide for one or other of his sons what he could, if it were possible honourably and legally to dispossess its present incumbent, and with that Bertrand must be content.

1. Nos. 1 (item 4); 16 (item 1); 19 & 22. C/f.R.G., 4476.
Edward's answers at Plympton to these pleas were quite in line with his attitude on the three clerical petitions for appointment as notaries. If the appointment was to be in the internal Gascon administration, it was referred to the lieutenant at its head; but pleas for feudal offices were reserved for Edward's personal decision. The king-duc deaql, however, with Bernard de Cauvet's claim for a post in Gascon administration because it was impossible to grant. Rather than waste his lieutenant's time with it, Edward answered Cauvet to the effect that when the Agenais was again his, he would do what he honourably could, if it were possible without hurt to the existing grantee.

A few feudal pleas have survived and inevitably had Edward's personal attention. On 7/8 December 1295, for example, Edward wrote to Henry de Lacy as lieutenant regarding the claim by Geoffrey Rudel, lord of Blaye, over an outstanding dowry of £55 in rents owed to him by Sir John de La Lande of Monte Andronis (Montardon?) and his wife Fina, for their daughter Isabella. Edward was instructed to render justice speedily to Rudel; but it was not a matter for his judgement. Edward had already examined the case and adjudged Rudel's claim to be just. He was thus instructing his lieutenant to implement Rudel's claim; for, in his letter to Lacy, Edward indicated that the facts were as Rudel claimed by the phrase 'prout in instrumento super eodem contractu confecto plenus continetur'. Another feudal plea came from Raymond de Sordes, citizen of Bayonne, who claimed that he had been improperly obliged to renounce certain liberties of the town of Bayonne by order of its mayor and jurats. He asked for a reversal of that injurious, enforced revocation. Lacy was instructed to inquire into the cause of the renunciation and discover whether it was voluntary or imposed, then fully inform Edward.

1. R.G., 4222 - a repetition of an original directive of 15 November 1295 to Edmund, then lieutenant (R.G., 4081; Sic 13/102).
2. R.G., 4403.
The mayor, Pascal de Vielle, and his officials may well have represented a particular civic faction at Bayonne – a quite normal feature of Gascon public life – for this was not the only case at this time of local conflict between private and public interest, as two royal letters of 15 November 1295 to Edmund show. The first concerned a plea from William de Saubagnac, citizen of Bayonne, about a certain weir (nassa) which he held of the King-duke by annual rent and about some houses of his, built by ducal licence, on all of which he was in dispute with the mayor and twelve jurats of Bayonne. The second letter referred to a plea from Arnold – William de Gensac, asserting that the mayor and twelve jurats of the city of Bayonne had wrongly destroyed a weir or fishery (nassam seu piscariam) which he held by annual rent of the King-duke.

Although two different weirs were involved, the first 'in aqua vocata L'Adore', the second 'in flumine vocato le Nyver', both claims were substantially over the same matters: destruction or anticipated destruction by the local civic authority. Edmund was ordered to hear the petitions – in the first case 'sympathetically' – and do 'quod justum fuerit et consonum racioni'. As both plaintiffs could base their cases on ducal licence, what was right and fair could only mean what was in their favour. There was little room, if any, for discretion on the part of the lieutenant; and there is no intimation in either letter that Edward intended he should be allowed any.

Three more feudal pleas remain to be considered. The first was a petition

1. R.G., 4062. Entry 4067 of the same date instructs Edmund to give free return passage to Gascony to Bertrand Swat, messenger and proctor of William de Saubagnac; it again illustrates the Gascon practice of direct recourse for justice to Edward in England instead of his lieutenant in Guienne.

2. R.G., 4070. Gensac had personally come to England to seek justice, as appears from his request for passage home.
by Arnold Gaveston, claiming the wrongful possession by the lord of Lescume of his castles of Louvigny, Montgaillard, St-Loubouer and Hagetmau during and since Arnold's internment in a French prison at the order of Edward or his officials\(^1\) - which makes it clear that he was one of the hostages handed over to the French in March 1294 for an expected forty days. Arnold sought remedy for himself and his heirs. The events preceding the misappropriation were outlined separately in item 1 of this Plympton plea. According to Gaveston, the King-duke had possessed the lands of the said castles, which had belonged to Arnold's late wife, Clerimonde, from the 4th of February 1287. Each year Edward had received from them a revenue of £50 capotentium (chipotensium?). Arnold asked that, when the time was opportune, Edward should receive the accounts of his officers, which showed the revenue that they had received from the aforesaid castles and lands, in the presence of the executors of the will of the said Lady. Arnold asked that, when the King-duke had learned how fully satisfaction had been made for the debts owed to him by Arnold and his late wife, the land and castles should be restored to the executors of the will, so that the blessed alms and other donations, which the Lady had requested in her will, might be provided, and her soul might thereby be freed from danger and the executors be able to do her wishes. Edward himself took the necessary decision. He ordered Lacy, as lieutenant, to take suitable local counsel and re-establish the castles and lands and their possessions as on the day when Arnold was made hostage; unless, with the consent of the parties, he be able to arrange things better and more safely for the duration of the war.

Another petition was from Bernard de Luposse, citizen of Bayonne, who alleged that the custom of a farm of the land of Marenson, which he had received before the war from Auger de Mauleon, and also certain other

\(^1\) R.C., 4472 and Plympton Plea No.1(item 3).
possessions of his, had been wrongfully and unjustly appropriated by the said Auger. Bernard appealed to Edward for suitable remedy, as the land of Marensin had since fallen to ducal jurisdiction, but the King-duke’s officials had refused to restore the custom to Bernard. Edward responded by ordering his lieutenant to take appropriate counsel, hear the arguments and, having regard to the conditions of the times, render to Bernard full justice, in accord with local practice. In this case, Edward might seem to be referring a final decision to Lacy as the man on the spot, who was thus most informed. But the command to give Bernard full justice — although ‘full justice’ was a legal term employed for expediting a case — implies a sympathy for the appellant which would not be lost on his lieutenant. As the officers who had retained the custom were obedient to Lacy’s authority, it was proper that in such an internal administrative matter the action should be taken on the instruction of the head of that administration. Definite guidelines for that action were, however, prescribed by Edward.

Thirdly, there was the plea of James de Cruce, chaplain, for the restoration of rents which had normally been paid to him annually through the Abbot of St-Sever, up until the time when the abbot’s property was appropriated by ducal officers, who had since retained it and made no payment to him. Lacy was directed to take counsel, and if the chaplain’s claim was proven in his presence, then he should reassign the said payments to Cruce, unless there be any impediment to doing so, which was not apparent to Edward.

It is clear from studying these feudal pleas that, when Edward did not himself give judgement, he requested information from his lieutenant with a view to doing so; or else he referred the case to the lieutenant to make the pronouncement according to recommendations or instructions already specified by Edward. If the King-duke left the final judgement

1. R.O., 4480; Plympton Plea No.7.
2. R.O., 4485; " No.9(part).
to his lieutenant, it was for lack of absolute certainty on Edward's part, for want of local Gascon information; but the nature of the eventual decision was anticipated as far as possible.

As in other kinds of cases, a plea submitted to the King-duke was answered by him and if possible settled by him. Also, as in other cases, Gascons put their pleas directly to their lord, sometimes journeying to England to do so in person, rather than submit them through any intermediary royal officer, even the lieutenant of Aquitaine.

Some miscellaneous civil pleas call for comment. Peter-John de Bic, citizen of Bayonne, appealed to Edward for justice against his fellow-citizen Peter-Arnold d'Ortes over a sum of money owed but refused by the latter.⁠¹ In a letter of 12 September 1296 Edward directed Lacy to render justice to de Bic speedily. Edward's reference to de Bic as 'dilectus nobis' is sufficient indication of Edward's inclinations in the matter. A similar preference is evident in the case of John de Monges, citizen of Bayonne, versus Auger-Roberti his fellow-citizen.⁠² In a letter of 12 August 1297, Edward directed 'quod super omnibus petitionibus et querelis per Johannem ... contra Augerium...' Lacy should give John full justice. The differences at issue between the two citizens may have been considerable and complex, requiring therefore a local judgement. Lacy was to call the two parties before him and have regard in his decision for the prevailing situation in the duchy; but Edward's letter contains an implicit pre-judgement.

A very good example of the way in which Edward's Gascon subjects continued to appeal from local decisions over the head of Gascon officials to the King-duke himself is the plea of Brother Bernard de Pis regarding an 'unjust' sentence passed by the prior of La Rôole on Bernard Faur, clerk,⁠³ though admittedly this can be construed as a clerical appeal, in

¹. R.G., 4260.
². R.G., 4500.
³. R.G., 4416.
the absence of ecclesiastical support, to the civil protector of clerics. It seems that Faur had been excluded from his living for wounding a clerk of the prior. The king-duke was requested to revoke the ban. Edward's letter of 25 November 1296 to both Lacy and John de St.-John orders them to investigate the reasons for the exclusion, and if they found the judgement to have been improper or unjust, either to revoke or amend it as seemed just and right.

Two other civil pleas give added insight into local faction or interest at Bayonne. On 25 November 1296 Edward wrote to Lacy concerning the plea of ' dilectus nobis' William-Arnold d'Oeregave against Pascal de Vielle, mayor of Bayonne, and others of his circle or friendship, complaining that they had unjustly inflicted on him many outrages, injuries and hurts.

Lacy was commanded to do as discretion dictated to be expedient, taking into account the nature of the persons and transgressions, and giving due thought to the state and condition of things in the present time of war. So, a tricky local situation was conveniently delegated by Edward to his lieutenant. Another local conflict was aired in a letter from Edward to Lacy of the same date, namely over the plea of Dominic Arbeus, who asserted that he had been maliciously and unjustly banished from Bayonne. He requested that the king-duke remit the ban. Lacy was ordered to summon to his presence those involved, hear the arguments, examine the evidence, and settle as he saw fit and just. Both these cases indicate a delicate local situation in which Edward felt it desirable to involve his lieutenant, who was conversant with the intricacies, to resolve the problem. The paramount need to maintain Bayonnais loyalty in the war against the King of France meant that the mayor, Pascal de Vielle, so instrumental in the ducal reoccupation of Bayonne, must be handled.

2. R.G.,4404.
with due regard, and in view of the double appointment of Garsias Arnaldi as castellan, possibly with kid gloves. Moreover, the mayor and community of Bayonne had only very recently acquired civic rights of which they would be very jealous, and which must be allowed for in any legal judgement. ¹

Into the last but one of the Plympton Pleas² was poured the pathos of a contemporary human story: Sibyl, 'poor lady of Gascony with four sons and daughters', asked of the King- duke that in his goodness he enable them to cross the sea in one of his ships touching at Bayonne, as they were unable to make the life that they came there to seek - 'peti(sic) pro Deo'. Edward's response was to the point: let her go to the keeper of the wardrobe and he would provide her with passage and food.

To conclude this examination of Gascon pleas a few in the financial and judicial area must be noted. A letter³ of Edward dated 2 August 1297 records the approach to him of the community of Blaye, which complained that Humphrey de Clare, previously a financial clerk for Edward at Blaye, had removed to Bayonne with the town's financial records, 'in quibus continabantur plurima credita hominum predictorum de dicta villa'. The men of Blaye claimed that they could in consequence get no satisfaction over their accounts.⁴ Lacy was ordered to render an authenticated copy of the accounts or have the original returned to Blaye. Also, after taking appropriate counsel, he should dispense full justice speedily to the men of Blaye over pleas against the lord of Blaye and mercenaries of the garrison, but having regard to the current situation, in due form according to accepted custom, and as he knew to be right and proper. This

1. Edward had granted the mayor and court of Bayonne freedom from intervention in their affairs by ducal officers - although appellate jurisdiction was excepted - only six months previously, on 14 May. C/f. supra, f. 52.
2. No. 28.
was an appeal against the military; and Edward appropriately referred it to his capitaneus. He did so, however, not so much out of regard for Lacy's military authority in Guienne - repeated references have been made in this study to Edward dealing directly with his troops in the duchy - as for practical reasons; the need for local military-civil relations to be handled on the spot by the man able to control them.

Another type of financial plea arose from Gascon recourse for justice to Edward in England. Three appeals for costs arise in the Plympton Pleas. 1 Arnold Elias, proctor for William-Sancho de Pommiers, begged payment of his expenses. He had come to England to recover the wages owed to Pommiers, had been kept waiting a long time, and because of tardy payment had run up a bill of £15 sterling towards which the King's officers in London had paid only 30/-.. Vital de Seguin, who had come to England for wages owed to himself and Doat de Pis, had incurred the same costs and received the same unsatisfactory payment. Both claimants cite the same period of expense, 'from the feast of St. Michael to the present time', and the same costs, which suggests that either they had travelled together from Guienne, or they had privately agreed costs. The friars P. Calculi and Raymond de Bourg also claimed expenses incurred in coming to England, and they were prepared to bring witnesses in support.

Edward replied to Arnold Elias that coming to England for backpay did not warrant additional payment; 2 Vital de Seguin was told that John of Brokeneasford, clerk, had testified that he had been paid what he ought to have for his expenses. Both responsiones seem designed to discourage personal lobbying for military wages. Claimants should rather take their turn at the Gascon treasury to which the King-duke sent what funds he could, and which held what monies Henry de Lacy raised locally. No specific

1. In Pleas 3, 6 & 17.
2. Strictly: 'responsum est quod nichil fiat sibi, quia venit pro vadiis.'
reply seems to have been made to the two friars beyond a promise to provide for their needs if they remained in England.

Two Gascon pleas referred to Edward in this period were judicial. One was from a Gerald Seigner, burgess of Lectoure, who solicited the release of a certain Adam of Kendale, lying in the King's prison at Newgate charged, as was said, with the killing of William of Monmouth in self-defence. The grounds for the plea were Kendale's proven and trusted reliability in the war, his frequent service to Seigner, and the latter's willingness to stand surety for him. Edward's reply was that he would look into the matter and see what could be done at the proper time. The second plea was a clerical one. The two friars Calculi and Bourg complained of an order in the provincial chapter of the see of Aquitaine that they be imprisoned indefinitely; they asserted that the general chapter had confirmed the order to curry favour with King Philip. The friars begged the King-duke to write to Lord Matthew Rubeus, in whose care the order had been lodged, to ask that the decree and order and its confirmation be revoked and that Rubeus inform the Franciscan minister for Aquitaine. Perhaps because, so the friars declared, they had come 'ex mandato domini Edmundi, bone memorie', Edward ordered that letters of request (de rogatu) be sent to the cardinal (Matthew Rubeus Ursinus) and to the Franciscan minister of Aquitaine.

The only possible conclusion to be drawn from the evidence of the Gascon pleas to Edward which have been examined here is that he personally gave judgement on whatever was referred to him by his subjects of the duchy, unless it involved the internal workings of his lieutenant's own administration. Further, in the complete absence of any evidence to the contrary, it must be repeated that his Gascon subjects were intent on a direct recourse to him for justice, regardless of who was in theory available in Guienne. There was no substitute for the King-duke.

1. Plympton pleas Nos. 12 and 17(part).
Ducal Appointments

The King-duke reserved to himself important appointments in the duchy of Aquitaine. Indeed, before the war, as is seen in a communication of 30 May 1290 to his lieutenant, he involved himself in the deposition and replacement of officials within the lieutenant's own administration, actually ordering Maurice de Craon to institute an enquiry into the workings of his 'civil service' through the seneschal of Gascony and the constable of Bordeaux, and to make necessary replacements, even of ducal appointees. The justification for this exceptional intrusion into the internal administration of the duchy, when a lieutenant was in office there, was ministerial corruption and inefficiency — naturally a matter of great concern to Edward.

Examples of his appointment of leading officials in the early years of the war have already been mentioned, but may be reviewed here as a whole. Firstly, there was the appointment on 13 July 1294 of Peter Aylesford as paymaster of troops in Guienne and of Thomas Cambridge as his contrarotulator (controller), both under the supervision of Robert Tiptoft as director of finances. About a year later, on Aylesford's death, a financial partnership was established of John Sandale as controller of receipts and payments and Thomas Cambridge as principal receiver and keeper. Payments were to be made at Bayonne and only on the authority of Henry de Lacy as lieutenant — a royal recognition of the earl's considerable financial and administrative acumen. A similar subsidiary

1. LETTRES, p. 378; TRABUT-GUSSÀS, p. 179 and n.
2. There is some confusion in the records on the dating of these appointments. Under 3 May 1297 (R. G., 4374) it is recorded that Cambridge had gone to Guienne with the first expeditionary force and Sandale with the second. An entry of the same date in the Calendar of the Patent rolls (p. 247) states that Cambridge was being sent to Gascony with the first fleet and that Sandale was to go later in the company of Edmund. The document (C66/117) from which the Calendar is compiled is dated 3 May but carries no year, although the roll is headed a.r. 25 (m. 24), i.e. 1297. It seems to be a later enrolment, for Sandale was in the duchy by 15 March 1296 (c/f. supra, f. 231). Further, on 28 April 1297 a royal memo at Plympton refers to (Continued
financial partnership of Nicholas Baret and John of Gloucester, as receiver/treasurer and controller of receipts and payments at Bourg and Blaye, was established in May 1297.¹

On 1 March 1295 Edward appointed Pascal de Vielle mayor of Bayonne and custos of its castle, and at the same time made Barran de Sescars 'admiral and captain of all the shore, ships and seamen of Bayonne'.² In a letter from Edward to Lacy dated 6 May 1297 it is stated that Sescar, in claiming for expenses and salary, declared that his command had been assigned by John of Brittany, then lieutenant, but the fact that Edward had himself informed the seamen of Bayonne of Sescar's appointment as early as 23 February⁴ shows that it was a royal appointment and that Brittany acted only as Edward's agent. The appointment of Vielle is a good example of Edward's traditional direction and control of regional administration. It also shows his initiative in senior military appointments in the duchy in war-time, and is emphasised by his later unfortunate double appointment of Garsias-Arnaldi to the same post of custos of Bayonne.⁵

Certainly, the lieutenant did make appointments. A plea considered in a letter of 15 November 1295 from King Edward to Edmund, lieutenant, reveals that John de St-John, when lieutenant, had made Master Bernard Ferrator of Rions a notary in the Court of Gascony. Edward now instructed his brother, after due consultation with his English and Gascon advisers, to confirm the appointment and grant Ferrator's request for outstanding

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Continued from f.273)

Sandale as Edward's controller of receipts and payments in Gascony and to Cambridge as his receiver (EL61 25/7). On Lacy's administrative abilities c.f. Baldwin, op.cit., who describes his resemblance to King Edward in his capacity for organisation.

2. C/f. supra, f.53.
5. " " f.262.
salary. As the post was in the lieutenant's own administration the King-
duke referred the matter to him; but as the plea had been submitted to
the King-duke in the first place he considered it and made his
recommendation to the lieutenant. There were similar royal mandates to
Edmund and Lacy the following year. On 20 May 1296, Edward wrote concern-
ing Master Peter de Vau, who had a mind to serve in the Gascon adminis-
tration under Edmund. The latter was directed to grant him the office
of bailiff or some other suitable post at the first opportunity,
whichever seemed most suitable after consulting his advisers. On 25
November 1296 Edward wrote to Lacy exhorting him to treat Master
Raymond de Pis, his brothers, relatives and friends with great regard
because of his services, and to include his brother, Master Bonet, in his
councils and business as expedient. Again, as the Gascon administration
was the lieutenant's own preserve, the details of implementation were
left to him; but Edward's mandate pre-determined the outcome. The influence
of the King-duke is evident, too, in a military command which Lacy granted
to Arnold Gavaston, presumably in response to Edward's letters. The
Gascon received the captaincy of the town and castle of 'Saut' and of
the castle of 'Roucheford'. Arnold de Gavaston was the subject also
of a recommendation parallel to the case of Raymond de Pis, which has
just been considered. In a letter of 6 May 1297, Edward ordered Lacy to
receive Gavaston's kinsmen and friends into service as seemed appropr-
iate. A final military appointment by the lieutenant is on record in
March 1298, when he was demobilising his English forces and making over
key citadels to Gascon commandants. On 20 March 1298, Lacy appointed

1. R.G., 4255.
2. R.G., 4415.
3. C/f. supra, ff. 258, 266 and Edward's letter to Lacy (R.G., 4476) on
Gaveston's desire for a military establishment so as to serve Edward.
5. R.G., 4476; c/f. supra, f. 263.
William-Raymond de Gensac to the command of the Blaye garrison.\(^1\) An interesting footnote to this appointment is found in a royal letter of 13 July 1301 to Gensac, 'constable of Blaye', when he was directed to relinquish the fort to Barran de Sescars and the royal clerks Peter-Arnold de Vic and Raymond de Piss; he AND HIS HEIRS IN PERPETUITY were relieved of responsibility for the fort.\(^2\) It is an illuminating comment on how a command in the duchy could come to be considered by Edward's Gascon subjects in personal terms as a feudal property; and probably it accounts to some extent for the King-duke's continual personal part in the making of Gascon appointments at all levels.

**Civic Matters**

An entirely different area of ducal affairs was Edward's relationship with Gascon towns. Sufficient documentation survives to provide at least a useful impression of the nature of that connection. A chronological treatment is adopted here to illustrate trends throughout the period, and for comparison of conditions and relationships in time of peace and war. Peace-time evidence exists on the King-duke's relations with no less than six towns in Guienne. In 1273, some fifteen years before the outbreak of Anglo-French hostilities, there is a reference to Edward restoring communal rights to Dax.\(^3\) The grant was effectively 'une charte de pardon' to the inhabitants for their disobedience. Edward restored their traditional rights, privileges and customs, promising to continue to observe them fully. The nature of the 'disobedience' for which the civic privileges had been withdrawn is unfortunately not mentioned.

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1. SC1 48/57 & supra, f. 102.
2. R.G., 4559.
On 22 July 1287, during Edward's last visit to his duchy, a ducal commission at Oloron made a grant of judicial rights to the town of St-Émilion, which the King-duke confirmed at Condat on 27 May 1289, immediately before returning to England. ¹ Shortly before doing so, on 16 April 1289 Edward issued an ordinance concerning a levy of £100 bordelais (money of Bordeaux) on St-Émilion.²

About 1290 three towns submitted petitions to the King-duke: Libourne, Castel-Sacrat (the bastide Castelsagrat) and Sainte-Foyen Agenois (St-Foy, Agenais).³ The Libourne petition requested the grant of three fairs a year, some help in the repair of the town's fortifications and the right to enjoy franchises available to other inhabitants of the Dordogne basin. The inhabitants of Castel-Sacrat petitioned for the same privileges as other towns of Quercy concerning dues on wines from newly planted vines.⁴ The commune of St-Foy begged a custos to maintain its rights. Edward referred the plea to the seneschal of Gascony to implement.⁵ On 20 May 1293, Edward ratified a grant of John de Havering, seneschal of Gascony, to the bastide of Réamont.⁶ The grant, 'examinata per seneschallum Vasconie et thesaurarium Ageniensem', was of liberties and customs previously promised to the burgesses and citizens of the bastide by John de Candeure, treasurer of the Agenais at the time of its construction.

¹. Archives hist. Gironde, XXXII, 195/8. The members of the commission included the bishop of Bath and Wells, Henry de Lacy earl of Lincoln, the Lord John of Chester, Otto de Granson and John de Grilly then seneschal of Gascony.
³. LETTRES, pp. 382, 387 & 388.
⁴. The seneschal of Gascony and the constable of Bordeaux were ordered by Edward to deal jointly with the petition.
⁵. 'Qu' il y mette tiele homme en cal lieu que soit profitable pur le roi è pur eaux.' So, Edward took the decision, not his seneschal.
⁶. LETTRES, p. 403. Réamont was in the Agenais.
Edward's relations with the towns of Guienne during the Gascon war have already been examined, and call for only brief allusion here. There was his grant of civic privileges to Bayonne on 24 February 1295 and 14 May 1296 in response to the community's request; his grant on 1 March 1295 to the smiths of Bayonne; Edward's restoration of the right of mayoralty to Bayonne; and his 'reunification' of Bayonne indissolubly to the English Crown. It has also been remarked how, in the midst of war, the bastide of Bellegarde petitioned the King- duke for the renewal of expired tax exemptions and how he directed his lieutenant to inspect the previous ducal letters patent granted to the town with a view to permitting the continuance of past privileges. Lastly, there was Edward's simultaneous letter to the jurats and 'good men' (a legal term) of Bellegarde, referring to their letters received through their messengers and fellow-burgesses, Raymond-Arnold deu Gua and Peter-Bayardi, which he declared he had received favourably, and to which they would receive his reply verbally; he would have them and their interests much more in mind than he often had in times past.

The details of the various petitions and Edward's responses, and of the relationship generally of the King- duke and his Gascon townsmen are undeniably sparse. Yet, the range of matters raised and dealt with—feudal liberties, customs, franchise, communal and judicial rights, civic and economic privileges, taxation, repayment of loans, urban defence, public office—shows that the relationship was personal and close, and that no other agent or official intervened to lessen in any way its immediacy.

3. C/f. supra, f. 53.
4. C/f. supra, f. 54.
5. C/f. supra, ff. 50-51.
6. C/f. supra, f. 68.
7. Ibid.
Property Matters

Ducal correspondence with regard to property also exhibits the paramount importance for Edward and his Gascon subjects of their personal relationship as lord and vassals. The grant, for instance, of a Gascon fee to William de Montravel and heirs on 16 May 1290 was made by the King-duke at Westminster in England, not by his lieutenant Maurice de Craon on his behalf in Guienne. 1 A letter patent of 6 December 1295 mentions promises and covenants entered into by John of Brittany, lieutenant, with Geoffrey Rudel, lord of Blaye, which were later attested by Edmund as lieutenant and also by Amanieu d'Albret and Hugh de Vere, knights, and also subsequently by Henry de Lacy as lieutenant, undertaking to restore to Rudel after the war the town and castle of Blaye. 2 Notwithstanding the weighty assurances of three successive lieutenants of the duchy of Aquitaine and two of their leading nobles, one English, one Gascon, the commitment still had to be confirmed officially by the King-duke himself. There was Edward's directive to his lieutenants, Edmund and Lacy successively, to meet Rudel's claim for outstanding rents due to him as part of his wife's dower, in feudal terms a property. 3 The King-duke's letter of 25 November 1296 to Henry de Lacy, lieutenant, may also be cited again, 4 on the assignment of ducal lands for the maintenance of Gascon lords Amanieu d'Albret and Pierre-Amanieu, capital of Buch. Lacy was to arrange the matter with the advice of his English and Gascon counsellors, but their conference was on detail and method; the royal directive was to make the necessary provision; and the lands granted were 'tenendas pro nostre libito voluntatis'.

2. R.G., 4133 after an earlier ducal letter patent of 16 November 1295 to the same effect (R.G., 3946).
4. C/f. supra, ff. 242, 244.
A similar case is covered by a letter from Edward to Lacy of 13 March 1297, according to which Barran de Sescars laid claim to the house or castle of Aspermund. Edward, being ignorant of the details of the matter and of Lacy's possible previous action, referred the case to him to settle; but Edward directed that the property should be granted to Sescars if not already promised to another. He also stipulated that it should be a temporary grant: 'quamdiu nobis placuerit'.

On 24 March 1297, Henry de Lacy as lieutenant appointed John Rosselli, knight, to custody 'during the king's pleasure' of two properties, 'De Doazito' and 'De Brassenco Podic', together with their appurtenances and rents, for the maintenance of his wife and household. The grant was duly ratified by Edward at Canterbury on 15 June 1302.

As a final example of Edward's personal ordering of property matters in the duchy a royal letter to Lacy of 21 August 1297 may be cited, in which the King-duke corrected a judgement of his lieutenant regarding the property and jurisdictional rights of Loup Burgoih of Bordeaux. The letter was addressed to Lacy and to other past lieutenants and referred to the rightful holdings, dues, jurisdictions and rights of Loup, as assigned to him by the late Gaston de Bearn, and of which Lacy had held him to be disseised. The royal recognition was an acknowledgement of faithful service. Lacy was commanded to restore the said properties and rights to Loup and henceforth to maintain his possession of them 'juxta tenorem litterarum nostrarum sibi'.

1. R.G., 4365. The lord of Aspermund had been captured at Bayonne by John de St-John. Had he perhaps died in captivity?
2. SC1 18/190 (a transcript at Devises on 11 April 1298 of the original) and C.P.R., 1301-1307, p. 41. On the matter of time-lag between grant and confirmation c/f infra f. 292.
4. A letter of obligation of 3 November 1295 shows that he was hired as a mercenary at Bayonne with ten troopers, receiving a sum of £50 st. (£101 152/8/17; REMONT, clviii incomplete reference).
From the above examples it is clear that all judgements and directions by Edward on matters of property in his duchy were to him unquestionably a ducal prerogative. For he either made the necessary grant or decision himself, commanded what should be done, or confirmed or amended the previous action of his ducal officers. Matters of feudal tenure were not for delegation.

**Ecclesiastical**

Ecclesiastical considerations were no exception to the general rule of Edward's personal oversight of ducal affairs. The wellbeing of his clerical subjects was of major concern to him. Five examples of this princely concern may be mentioned. The first is found in a letter of the King-duke to the seneschal of Gascony and the constable of Bordeaux dated 26 July 1290, and concerns the Friars preachers of Bayonne. They were to make the Friars, who had lost their church ornaments and books in a fire, a grant of £200 bordelais. In June 1293, Edward wrote on a private matter to his archbishop at Bordeaux, Henry of Geneva. This practice of either direct communication with church dignitaries or mandate on ecclesiastical matters to his civil officers in Guienne was continued during the war. For example, on 26 November 1296 King Edward wrote to the provincial prior of the Dominicans in Aquitaine, commending to him the Dominican brothers Peter de Pis and Amanieu de Blezin his companion, asking the prior to attend to their well-being, hear sympathetically their requests, and repay ducal favour so far as he possibly could. Two days later, three entries are recorded in the Gascon rolls relating to the wellbeing and interests of the Friars minor at Bayonne. Edward wrote separately on the matter to John of Brittany (not now as lieutenant, but as his dear nephew), to John de St-John,

2. SCI 60/117.
and also to the mayor and jurats of Bayonne, requiring them all to defend, support and promote the material condition of the Friars, especially in regard to any molestation they might have suffered at the hands of the French. The personal nature of the approach by King Edward is emphasized by the absence of any similar communication to the lieutenant of the duchy, Henry de Lacy, resident at Bayonne.

On 7 May of the following year, Edward also wrote to the provincial minister of the Friars minor of Aquitaine, commending to him two friars of his order in Aquitaine, the Brothers Peter Calculi and Raymond de Bourg, in exactly the same terms as he had earlier used in commending the two Dominican friars to their provincial prior.¹ This letter was one of the two letters 'de rogatu' sent by Edward in response to the pleas of the two friars, which he answered at Plympton.² In conclusion, there was the grant of a priory to Master William-Amanieu of Bourg.³ The King-duke's ratification of 28 April 1298 stipulated that the priory and its appurtenances be a temporary grant, held that is at ducal pleasure, thus preserving his personal interest in the property. It emphasized, as in civil matters, that his ducal prerogative was to be maintained in the duchy in the sphere of Church affairs also.

Foreign Affairs

The field of diplomacy was of course pre-eminently the preserve of the King-duke. A brief chronological outline serves as a reminder of that fact.

As early as July 1293 Edward ratified a treaty between Bayonne and Castile, gave authority to John de Havering, seneschal of Gascony, and to Master Raymond de Ferraria, dean of St-Severin at Bordeaux, to extend

¹ R.G., 4488.
² Plympton Plea, No. 17; c/f. supra, f. 272.
³ C/f. supra, f. 238.
the truce arrangements with Sancius, King of Castile, ordered his officials and subjects of Aquitaine to desist from reprisals against the men of Castile, granted Havering and Ferraria power to pursue similar truces and settlements with Portugal, and wrote personally to Sancius asking his co-operation in implementing the truce, and to King Denis of Portugal also over mercantile disputes. In other words, the King-duc’s officers were to act in the settlement of local outbreaks of piracy, but as his agents, not on their own initiative, and Edward involved himself in the negotiations. Early in 1294 Edward’s autocracy in deciding independently the very possession of the duchy was illustrated in his surrender of it to King Philip without any reference whatsoever to his Gascon subjects. It showed how he regarded foreign affairs as the automatic preserve of the King-duc.  

Edward’s continued single control of the external relations of his duchy continued in the early war-years and was underlined in July 1294 when he granted a special authority — not automatic — to his lieutenant and seneschal to construct alliances with princes or nobles on the periphery of Guienne in, for example, Castile or Béarn. Edward’s personal direction of his duchy’s foreign relations was further demonstrated by his appointment on 12 August 1294 of Stephen de Penchester, constable of Dover castle and warden of the Cinque Ports, to investigate a complaint of Bayonnais merchants that they had been robbed in Portugal by seamen of Spain.

In the midst of war, on 14 August 1295, Edward wrote to Pope Boniface VIII, without any prior consultation with the men of Gascony, agreeing to a truce till All Saints, and giving the cardinal-legates, Berald de Got of Albano and Simon de Belloloco of Palestrina, proxy power to order his armed forces to cease fighting, subject to a like response by the King.

1. C.P.R., 1292-1301, p. 34; G47 29/3/5.
2. C/f. supra, f. 221, n. 2.
of France. 1 The King-duke was deeply involved in truce negotiations on
the duchy's behalf in London in August 1295; again at Berwick in April
1296, when he again gave power to the papal legates to order a cease-
fire in the event of a successful embassy to France, and directed Edmund,
his lieutenant in Guienne and his fellows to obey the legates
accordingly; and in May 1296, when he appointed English plenipotentiaries
to act with the papal nuncios and repeated his command to his
lieutenant and associates in the duchy to obey the diplomats in his
place. 2

All this shows scant regard by Edward for the theoretical powers of
his lieutenant in matters of diplomacy, as stipulated in the terms of
appointment of Edmund and Lacy. 3 Certainly, Edward had learned from his
unilateral renunciation of his duchy in 1294. This is clear from his
apology for his act to his Gascon subjects in July the same year, 4 and
from his mandate of 14 May 1296 to Edmund to consult with his English
and Gascon advisers to obtain their opinions before the settlement-
negotiations were concluded. 5 But this gesture was a formality. It was
accompanied by information on the arrangements already made for the
prospective truce, and by a further order to obey the legatine authority.
At no time was there any prior Gascon consultation. The lieutenant and
the duchy were presented with a fait-accompli.

There was of course nothing unusual in this. To the King-duke's mind,
foreign affairs were essentially a royal prerogative. Nor would he have
expected otherwise. The evidence fully supports that contention, as
would be expected. The extent to which Edward personally controlled
these events was again underlined by his agreement, in the negotiations

2. Foedera, pp. 824, 837, 838.
4. R.G., 2934; Foedera, p. 805; c/f. supra, f. 31 & n.
of January 1298 in Flanders, to appoint in Gascony 'swearers' to the truce.¹ Their appointment, it seems, would be by the King- duke himself, not by his officials in the duchy. As in all other aspects of government, foreign affairs were the prerogative of the King- duke.

The French Administration in Guienne

Side by side with ducal administration during the years of the Gascon war was the attempt by King Philip's officers to represent a rival administration in the duchy. It began with a series of French appointments and continued to be expressed in the grants or enactments of successive French commanders. These acts have mostly been mentioned in earlier chapters of this thesis, but may usefully be collated here, and with further examples.

Raoul de Nesle, constable of France, began his administration of Guienne on taking it over from John de St-John, the King- ducal's lieutenant, by installing Jean de Burlac as seneschal of Guyenne (sic) and Jean de Manhalières as seneschal of the Agenais.² The effective end of de Nesle's jurisdiction was marked by his appointment on 29 April 1295 of Roger- Bernard, comte de Foix, to jurisdiction over 'les divers sénéchaux de Carcassonne' as recognition of his services to date in the war.³ In the intervening year de Nesle had effectively established King Philip's authority at Bordeaux, the seat of government in the duchy, which French troops occupied in March 1294. King Philip annexed the capital to the French Crown in August of the same year.⁴ In 1295 Philip IV also annexed La Réole.⁵ The constable of France had made a show of representing the realities of his lord's rule, and this was continued by Charles of Valois.

1. BEMONT, clxv, n.31, carton J632 des Archives nationales.
2. BEMONT, cxxxviii, n.8; Livre des Coutumes, p.463, No.50.
3. MONLEZUN, p.68.
4. C47 27/3/7 (mutilated).
5. C47 24/2/38; Paris, a.r.9 (sic).
Charles of Valois, brother of King Philip and commander of the French army in Guienne in 1295, granted to the comte de Foix on 30 June 1295 all rights in the duchy over the places and castles of Castelnau-Rivière-Basse, Maubourget, Rochefort and Vielle, reserving sovereignty only to the French Crown. In July 1295, Charles and Raoul de Nesle made yet a third grant to their ally of Béarn, 'le Mas d'Aire et la Bastide de Ste-Gemme (Geaune)'. They also named him 'recteur gouverneur et commandant dans les diocèses d'Auch, d'Aire, de Dax et de Bayonne, excepté dans les terres du comte d'Armagnac'. He was given command of 50 men-at-arms and 'de mille sergents à pied aux gages du roi'. In December 1295 a royal charter issued by King Philip at Paris ratified the confirmation on 5 November 1294 by John de Burlac, French seneschal of Gascony, of King Edward's charter of pardon of 1278 to the citizens of Dax, whereby he had restored their communal rights. On 24 March 1296 (?) King Philip also confirmed privileges granted to the town of St-Émilion by Charles of Valois and enjoined his seneschals and other officers to restore to the town all other rights unjustly forfeited. The privileges included 'le droit de commune et de mairie dont elle louissait autrefois'. A later petition of the town to Edward reveals that shortly before the French occupation, the mayor of St-Émilion having died, the seneschal of Gascony had himself taken possession of the mayoralty and it had been rendered up to King Philip's officers in that situation. Charles' grant and Philip's ratification of it seem to have been totally ineffective, however, for in 1303 (?) St-Émilion was still demanding of Edward the restoration of its rightful mayoralty.

1. MONLEZUN, p. 68.
2. C/f.supra, f. 206.
3. MONLEZUN, p. 68.
6. Archives hist. Gironde, I, p. 174; 1303 (?).
Robert of Artois in his turn continued to implement French rule in Guienne. In 1296 his heavy taxation brought protests from the comtes de Foix, Armagnac and Astarac. Monlezun has described the affair as follows: 'Pour subvenir aux frais de cette nouvelle expédition, le nouveau général [Robert d'Artois] fit divers emprunts aux principales villes de la province et assigna leur remboursement sur les revenus du grenier à sel de Carcassonne. Il imposa de plus un subside de six sols par feu, mais à la place de six sols le comte d'Artois exigea qu'on lui envoyât un homme armé. Le comte de Foix protesta contre cette taxe à laquelle on voulut se soumettre. Les comtes d'Armagnac et d'Astarac durent l'imiter, car par une ordonnance du 2 août 1278, Philippe-le-Bel défendit d'étendre la nouvelle taille aux possessions de ces trois seigneurs.'

Also in 1296, d'Artois is recorded to have taken a dozen additional hostages from Bordeaux, a sure indication that he was having to maintain in the duchy a policy of repression to hold it down; they were sent south to Carcassonne.

During his tenure of office as French lieutenant of Guienne, the comte d'Artois made two charter-grants, designed to give credibility to the constitutional status of his lieutenancy. On 25 August 1296 he granted to the citizens of Dax exemption from tolls on land and sea in moving their merchandise throughout all Aquitaine and the kingdom of France - this in recognition of their loyalty to King Philip and their resistance to a long and arduous ducal siege prior to his arrival, which Henry de Lacy had maintained during the summer months of 1296. Robert d'Artois' charter was confirmed by King Philip at Corbeil in February 1302. More ambitious was d'Artois' artifice in granting an almost identical charter on 16 October 1296 to Bayonne.

1. MONLEZUN, pp. 69-70.
2. Livre des Coutumes, p. 413, No. 42.
4. COMPAGNIE, p. 22; E. Ducére, Histoire Militaire de Bayonne et des Pyrénées (Continued
When Robert d'Artois left Guienne for Flanders in mid-1297, the French administration in the duchy passed into lesser hands, but with no perceptible change of character. D'Artois invested Guichard de Marciac (Massac?), seneschal of Toulouse, with Aquitaine, and Marciac was named 'governor and captain of Aquitaine and Gascony'. On 20 March 1298, King Philip ordered the French seneschal of Gascony to ensure a fair apportionment of taxes on St-Émilion. French tax-levies must again have been causing local discontent and had presumably resulted in appeals to the French king. It is interesting to see that the relations of King Philip with his officers in Guienne were no different from the King-duc's to his. For here is an instance of direct communication between prince and subordinate official, rather than through the designated head of the administration in Guienne, at this time Guichard de Marciac.

Reference has already been made to the severity of French rule in Guienne. Four examples may be cited. In about 1303 the commune of Libourne petitioned the King-duc over the destruction of its walls during the French occupation and begged the appointment of a provost who would see to their rebuilding. The reason for this latter request was that the existing provost-deputies were enemies of the King-duc during the war. Some French officials, it seems, had survived in office from the time of French occupation. The second example is from the same period and is an extension of the first. It was another petition from Libourne which included a request for a grant of fairs to defray the costs of war and of more ducal money towards the cost of reconstructing Libourne's fortifications. Balasque and Dulaurens also provide useful

Continued from f. 287)
Occidentales, p. 67 and Histoire de La Marine Militaire de Bayonne, 2e partie, p. 44 (both MSS); and MONLEZUN, p. 66 n. (16 November).
1. MONLEZUN, p. 72; end of June 1297.
3. C/i. supra, f. 204.
5. Ibid., p. 173.
instances of the rigours for the duchy of French occupation. One was
the pillaging and plundering which occurred in Bayonne before the
ducal re-occupation.¹ The Basque mercenaries of the lord of Aspremont,
'suisis d'une foule de routiers avides de pillage, s'abattirent sur la
ville et s'y installèrent comme en pays conquis'; and later a seaman
of Bayonne asserted that the French officers there had reduced to ruins
his house in the rue du Bornau, thus costing him more than £100 st.
The confused state of the duchy of Aquitaine, in the years of
negotiation which followed the armistice, has been recorded by a letter²
claiming expenses submitted by Arnold Gaveston, where he declares that
French officials in Guienne maintained that the duchy was to remain in
the possession of the King of France, until King Edward appeared before
the Parlement de Paris. Those barons and knights of the duchy who had
not served in the cause of the King-duke, however, were excepted from
that general ruling and permitted to retain or recover their holdings.
From this brief outline of French administration in the duchy in the
war-years, it is evident that to King Philip's men the French occupation
and jurisdiction in Guienne were no mere theoretical pretence.

¹ BAILASQUE & DULAUENS, pp. 531-2.
² C47 24/2/23.
It remains to answer the questions posed earlier in this chapter on the extent to which the theory of ducal administration in Guienne corresponded to political realities and practice.¹ Trabut-Cussac has suggested that in the years immediately preceding the outbreak of the Gascon war, the lieutenant of the duchy of Aquitaine already possessed full ducal powers and authority and was in effect the epitome of the King-duke himself; that Edward had deliberately created a viceroy to assume full responsibility for the duchy and so relieve the King-duke of the continual embarrassment he was liable to as a prince who was both a royal equal and a ducal subordinate of the King of France; that the presence of a lieutenant in Guienne would obviate the need for its subjects to appeal for justice to the King-duke in England, so involving him in litigation that often was ultimately appealed to the Parlement de Paris for a definitive settlement.

Whether such theories on the 'normal' peace-time government and administration of the duchy are tenable or not, it must nevertheless be concluded from the evidence considered in this chapter, that the picture in time of war was totally different. Constitutional theory did not accord with political practice. The de facto power of the lieutenant was but a pale imitation of his de jure authority. Indeed, in practice the power of the lieutenant was no different from that of the seneschal of Gascony except in regard to his financial authority; he was just a more weighty and more eminent personage. The theoretical political and governmental advantages of his appointment in terms of ducal administration were offset by the King-duke himself, who continually ignored or broke the constitutional rules that he had prescribed for his Gascon administration. The rules were for others.²

Thus, there were indeed limits to the lieutenant's jurisdiction; the will

2. Even his peace-time military authority had once been the seneschal's.
of the King-duke. Edward did in practice as he saw fit as regards the
business of his duchy. He intervened and interfered at will, overrode
or reversed decisions if necessary. He took decisions on all aspects of
ducal government, issuing directives on the settling of business, if for
some reason he referred it to his representatives instead of giving an
immediate decision himself; and, except in the sphere of his lieutenant's
own internal administration, he never hesitated to issue the necessary
orders. Edward dealt directly and corresponded directly with any subject
or officer in Guienne, if he wished. Almost without exception he
received and responded to submissions from his subjects or officers in
Guienne; and by so doing he encouraged them to persist in their recourse
to him in England, rather than to his representatives, supposedly
appointed for that purpose, in the duchy. Chaplais has noted the
continual Gascon demand for the authentification of grants in the
duchy by the official application of the Great Seal of England. 1
All grants made in the duchy by Edward's officers were subject to his
personal confirmation in England. John of Brittany's grant as lieutenant
of letters of marque on 7 June 1295 was confirmed about four months
later; 2 Lacy's two grants to clerics about Easter 1298 were confirmed
by Edward about four and six months later; 3 the grant of a priory
which involved the actions of three lieutenants, John of Brittany, Edmund
and Guy Ferre, was confirmed in April 1298; 4 a marriage contract in
Bayonne on 1 March 1297 was ratified by the King the following April; 5
pardons of banishments by Brittany and Edmund in Gascony were approved
in 1299 and, on request in 1303, in 1305; 6 John of Brittany's promise to-

1. P. Chaplais, 'The chancery of Guienne, 1289-1453', in Studies to Sir
2. C/f. supra, f. 238.
3. C/f. supra, ff. 236, 238. N.B. the personal element: they were Rotal clerks.
5. C/f. supra, f. 239.
Geoffrey Rudel to restore the possession of Blaye to him after the war was confirmed on 6 December 1295;¹ and Lacy's property grants to John Rosselli on 24 March 1297 were ratified by the King on 15 June 1302.² Pre-war grants to Oloron and Réamont it has also been noted were duly confirmed in periods of 22 months and 10 months.³ The length of time between the original grant and the subsequent confirmation varied, presumably according to the requisite processes of royal bureaucracy, but in the end confirmation is nearly always recorded.

King Edward's active concern with the business of his duchy was fairly continuous during the war-years. The business consisted of letters of information, exhortation, appointment, commands to troops, arrangements on diplomatic matters and mandates arising, answers to and directives on Gascon pleas, policy instructions, grants of privileges (individual and civic), grants of trading licences and safe-conducts and letters of marque, and confirmations of grants and actions of ducal officers. Edward is on record as dealing with one or other or several of these types of business on behalf of his duchy from June to September of 1294; in February, March, August, October, November and December 1295; in February, April, May, November and December 1296; in January, February, April, May and August 1297; and still in July and October 1298. The notable absence of Gascon activity in this sequence is of course for the period of his absence in Flanders from September 1297 and on his immediate return from that absence. Otherwise, it may be observed that even the Welsh and Scottish risings of 1294 and 1295 did not prevent his dealing with Gascon affairs. Nor did he respond to approaches from his Gascon subjects by delegating the settlement of their pleas to subordinates, but as has been seen he personally settled them or initiated the necessary action through his lieutenants and their officers. In some

¹ C/f. supra, f.279.
² C/f. supra, f.280.
³ C/f. supra, f.277.
cases he took direct action himself within the duchy, as when he wrote to the heads of the mendicant orders in Aquitaine.\(^1\)

Edward's judgement of Gascon pleas fell into three main periods: late November/early December 1295, late November/early December 1296, and April/May 1297 at Plympton in Devon. But there were other occasions when he made response, such as in February and March 1297, and even in August 1297 before embarking for Flanders, a period when he was in major political and constitutional conflict with his English baronage. He was seldom too busy to attend to the business of his duchy.

The tendency of Edward's Gascon subjects to look to their lord in England for decisions and judgements rather than to his local officers, even the lieutenant of the duchy, was due to Edward's status. He was first a king, only secondly a duke. Although he was duke of Aquitaine, even to Gascons his pre-eminence was his kingship.

This fact is reflected in their mode of address and reference to him. Throughout this thesis Edward has often been referred to, for convenience, as 'King-ducex'; but in fact, his style in letters to and from his duchy was neither 'duke' nor 'King-ducex', but 'King'. His Gascon subjects automatically inclined to his highest title. His royal style dignified and magnified his ducal standing, and, by attachment, his Gascon subjects' also; they could claim to be the subjects of a king.

Just a few examples suffice to illustrate this - there are hundreds in contemporary documents. Among the duties of the constable of Bordeaux listed in Edward's great administrative ordinance issued at Condom in 1289 was the receipt of monies 'ad dominum REGEM in Ducatu Aquitanie'.\(^2\)

In the same document, 'Ordinatum est [by Edward] quod Seneschallus Vasconie' make, ordain..., sub-seneschals and other officers 'in negociis REGIS'. In response to a plea from the commune of St-Foy in c.1290,

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Edward referred it to the seneschal to appoint as governor at St-Foy 'tient homme en cel lieu qe soit profitable pur le ROI...'.¹ So, even Edward referred to himself in a Gascon context as 'king'. Again, in the marriage contract sealed at Bayonne on 1 March 1297 between Robert Tiptoft and William de Ross on behalf of their children, it was 'sealed in the presence of 'monsieur' Henry de Lacy, earl of Lincoln, the KING'S lieutenant in the duchy of Guyene'.² So too in pleas to Edward, letters of recognizance by Gascon nobles or mercenaries for debts,³ or in letters of obligation issued by Lacy, John of Brittany or other royal officers in the duchy,⁴ the reference is always to 'the king'.

This consistent mode of address emphasises the fact that Edward's royal, not ducal status, coloured and conditioned the relationship of the 'King-duke' and his duchy. For to both Edward and his Gascon subjects, he was much more than a duke. The duchy of Aquitaine was essentially of a different political standing from every other territorial fief of the kingdom of France — its lord was a king. As such, the lord of the duchy of Aquitaine could be considered, by sleight of mind, the equal of King Philip. It was an attractive concept for Edward's Gascon subjects, men who were independent, proud and jealous of their near autonomy, in an era when the jurisdictional tentacles of the French monarchy were, with increasing persistence, entwining the bodies politic of the still semi-independent fiefs of the French Crown.

With the restoration of the duchy of Aquitaine to Edward in 1303, the ducal seat of administration was re-established at Bordeaux by Henry de Lacy and Otto de Granson.⁵ Trabut-Cussac's suggestion is that it

¹ C/f. supra, f.277.
² C.P.R., 1292-1301, p.346; c/f. supra, ff.239-240.
³ E.g., E101 152/8/.
⁴ E101 Bundles 152 — 155.
⁵ For details see TRABUT—CUSSAC, pp.113-116.
signified a return to 'normal' ducal administration. It may be so. Yet, not only had the war-years not approximated to the theory which is held to apply to the 'normal' rule, but is by no means certain that 'normal' ducal administration was properly functioning in the years immediately preceding the outbreak of hostilities. Without entering here into a controversy of the nature of pre-war ducal administration by the lieutenant of Aquitaine, perhaps just a few facets or actions may be noted which don't fit Trabut-Cussac's theory.  

Mention has already been made of King Edward's intervention in May 1290 in the workings of the internal ducal administration of Maurice Craon, lieutenant, who according to Trabut-Cussac was a new kind of lieutenant, an officer of the proportions of a viceroy. There is also some doubt as to whether constitutional theory was working in practice at lower levels in the administration of Guienne. For example, on 26 June 1291 Edward issued a mandate to the seneschal, judges, mayor and treasurer of the Agenais to open up a road between the bastide of Viane and Nérac. It may be that the separate ordinances of Condat and Condom permit the view that the Agenais was a separate jurisdictional entity from the rest of the duchy; but as the lieutenant had authority over both, this was a pre-war example of Edward communicating directly with the junior officers or secondary officers in his ducal lands, in disregard of his lieutenant's theoretical authority.

Again, on 12 April 1292, Edward wrote to the seneschal of the Agenais directing him to observe the traditional liberties and rights enjoyed by the 'consuls' and commune of St-Foy as originally bestowed by Count Alphonse of Poitiers and the illustrious king of France.

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1. As this thesis studies the years of active war in the duchy a fuller excursion outside those limits is beyond the scope of this work.
2. C/f. supra, f. 273. Craon was lieutenant till February 1293.
A glance at the Gascon rolls reveals these are by no means solitary instances of the King making direct contact with particular regions of Guienne on local matters. Edward's direct communication has been noted with the Seneschal of Saintonge regarding Norman piracy in the pre-war period. It reinforces the suspicion that Edward, not Maurice de Craon, was running the duchy.

A letter of 11 October 1295 from John of Brittany, lieutenant, to John de St-John, seneschal, reveals that at the request of Sir John Havering, when seneschal before the war, Sir Otto de Cazeneuze had paid to Sir Bernard, 'counte de Ermygnak' (Armagnac) £200 de bordeles 'por son fee'. Havering had then ordered Master Robert de Leyset, constable of Bordeaux, to repay the said sum to Sir Otto. By the explicit terms of the Ordinance of Condom the seneschal of Gascony was forbidden to involve himself in any way in the financial affairs of the duchy; nor was the constable of Bordeaux to be subject to his jurisdiction in that sphere. Constitutional theory was already in disregard, then, in 1293, that is, within four years of Edward's ordinances.

According to Trabut-Cussac, 'Les pouvoirs du lieutenant étaient ceux du roi lui-même. Ils n'étaient limités que par les termes de sa commission et par les directives générales reçues du roi avant son départ'. That is the theory, and the letters of appointment of Edmund and Lacy lend themselves to its attractiveness. In the years 1294-8, however, the facts were altogether different - so different, that it must be questioned whether the theory had ever possessed reality even before the hostilities which are supposed to have subverted it.

2. E101 152/6/7 (HÉMONT cxlii, n.s. 152/7/1).
3. TRABUT-CUSSAC, p. 218.
Ironically, Trabut-Cussac's claim of viceroyal powers for the lieutenant has greater relevance in the years 1294-1298 to his military function as capitaneus than to his civil function as lieutenant. This was because of his greater freedom of action as a general in the field, and it is well illustrated in the person of Henry de Lacy.

As capitaneus of the King's men in Gascony in the years 1296-1298, Henry de Lacy, third earl of Lincoln, had proved his mettle despite the paucity of his military resources. He had stabilised the conflict, frustrated the attempt of Philip IV to annex the duchy of Aquitaine to the kingdom of France, and so had ensured the duchy's continued, separate existence as a Plantagenet fief. This was his great contribution to King Edward's cause.

One of the major handicaps in assessing the scope of Lacy's independence of action is the complete absence of evidence on intelligence communications between the capitaneus and his king, which must have been either verbal or expendable and therefore have not survived. This deficiency does not, however, hide the active nature of Edward's methods in ducal government. Crises of war did nothing to encourage the adherence to government by the rules of the ordinances of Condom and Condat. To Edward, government was, as has been shown, essentially personal and immediate; and especially so in times of emergency.

For these reasons, Henry de Lacy's contribution as lieutenant of the duchy was more modest than his achievements as capitaneus. For, when he returned to England about Easter 1298, laying down the lieutenancy in which he had acquitted himself so ably, it was as the loyal servant of a king who, throughout the entire war, had kept his finger on the pulse of Gascon politics, government and justice - who had never for a moment ceased to be his own lieutenant of the duchy of Aquitaine.
Appendix I: French-occupied areas of Guienne

circa January 1296.¹

Gironde – Médoc

Lesparre.

vicinity of Lesparre: Sarnac, Laraze, Boyantran, Biars (commune of Begadan), Maurin, La Seuve, Sigogna, Breuil (commune of Begadan), Andron nr. Vensac, Le Mont, Grezinhac nr. Blagnan, Castillon, Lussac nr. Castillon.

Pauillac.

vicinity of Pauillac: Laffite (commune of Pauillac), Bayzac, Le Breuil (commune of Cissac), Calon (commune of St-Éstèphe), Ayran nr. St-Éstèphe, Ségur (castle in commune of St-Éstèphe), Rignac, Branne (nr. St-Éstèphe), Cazaux.

vicinity of St-Laurents: commune of Sémignan.

vicinity of Castelnaus: Carren, Arsac, Bouqueyran, Bevelhan nr. Arsac, Margaux (Macau?).

vicinity of Blanquefort: Le Pian (Doupyano), St-Aon, castle of Puyastruc.

Gironde – Bordelais

Bordeaux.


¹. Compiled from the areas of 'Dispossessed Gascons' as shown in C47 26/6, 26/7, 35/16; R.G., 4528-32, 4984-5; R.G., Appendice I.
Blaye.

vicinity of Blayes: Boisset, Séguin (commune of Cezac), La Cave, Mazerolles, Asnieres, Fonte Augart, Marsan nr. St-Savin.

Bourg.

vicinity of Bourgs: Villeneuve, Combs, St-Andresio (St-André-de Cubzac?).

Blanquefort.

vicinity of Blanquefort: Mataplana, the house of Louc, La Houringue.

Podensac.


Rions.

Libourne.

vicinity of Libourne: Curton nr. Branne, St-Cybard nr. Lussac, Corbin nr. St-Émilion, St-Germain-de-Fuch nr. Branne, Lescours, Lavagnac, St-Émilion, Coutras, St-Quentin-de-Baron nr. Branne.

Podensac.


(Buch)

Sales nr. Bélin, Mons nr. Belin, Artiguemale nr. La Teste-de-Buch.

Gironde - Bazadais


Langon.

vicinity of Langons: castle of Fargues (commune of Langon), Sescars nr. St-Macaire, Roquetaillade, Semens nr. St-Macaire, St-Martin-de-Sescas nr. St-Macaire, St-Loubergt, St-Macaire.

La Rèole.

Gironde - Born
Sis nr. Mimizan, Escouasse (Escource?).

Dordogne - Perigord
vicinity of Perigueux: La Cassagne nr. Terrasson.
vicinity of Sarlat?: Panissau nr. Montignac, Brenac (Beyna?).
Champagnac.

Lot-et-Garonne - Bazadais
vicinity of Nérac: Sos nr. Mézin, Lestage.
Ruffiac nr. Bouglon, Lussac-de-La-Casa nr. Bouglon?.

Lot-et-Garonne - Agenais
vicinity of Agen: Lusignan nr. Port St-Marie, Monpezat nr. Prayssas, Pis?, Beauville.
vicinity of Marmande: Le Mas d'Agenais nr. Bouglon.
Balenx nr. Cancon?

Landes


Dax.


Gers

Lannox nr. Riscle nr. Mirande.

Basques-Pyrénées - Béarn


vicinity of Pau: Giscous commune of Lons nr. Lescars, Andoins nr. Morlaas.

(Haute-Garonne - Languedoc

Montguiscard nr. Toulouse). ¹

¹. N.B., not in Guienne. An instance it seems of French confiscation of lands of a ducal ally.
### Appendix II

**Itineraries of ducal commanders outside the precincts of Bayonne during the lieutenancy of Henry de Lacy 1296-8**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1296</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June/August</td>
<td>Lacy before Dax</td>
<td>Chronicles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 July</td>
<td>John of Brittany before Dax</td>
<td>E101 154/7/54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 November</td>
<td>John de St-John at Bellegarde</td>
<td>&quot; 152/8/14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1297</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 January</td>
<td>Lacy, St-John &amp; Brittany at Peyrehorade</td>
<td>E101 153/15/10 &amp; 155/7/8; Chronicles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Lacy, St-John &amp; Brittany at Bonnut and Bellegarde</td>
<td>Chronicles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Lacy at Peyrehorade</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 June</td>
<td>Lacy at Pontonx</td>
<td>E101 154/6/19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 July</td>
<td>Lacy at Saut(Sort?)</td>
<td>&quot; 154/4/7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; 153/2/20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17-20 July</td>
<td>Lacy before Castel Sarrazin</td>
<td>&quot; 153/1/11 &amp; 155/4/12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 August</td>
<td>Lacy at Peyrehorade</td>
<td>&quot; 155/6/15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Lacy at St-Sever&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>&quot; 152/8/9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Lacy at Peyrehorade</td>
<td>SC1 18/189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 September</td>
<td>Lacy at St-Quiterie</td>
<td>E101 152/8/7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-30</td>
<td>Lacy at Peyrehorade</td>
<td>&quot; 154/1/3,10 &amp; 21; 153/1/25; 152/9/25; 155/12/8;153/6/6.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 October</td>
<td>John of Brittany at Sorde</td>
<td>E101 154/5/52 &amp; 55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 November</td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; 154/5/54.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. BEMONT,clviii : dated 1296. The document date is not clear and it fits 1297. If accepted as 1296, this would mean that Lacy advanced north-east to St-Sever after abandoning the siege of Dax because of Robert d'Artois' military build-up at Mont-de-Marsan; i.e., that he marched **TOWARDS** the enemy, whereas the chronicles recount his withdrawal south to Bayonne.
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MAPS.


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MAP I

(The lower coloured line represents final occupation)

- French occupied
- Ducal occupied
- Uncertain occupation