A STUDY OF THE PAPER WAR
RELATING TO THE CAREER OF THE
1st DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH,
1710-1712

by
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ABSTRACT

The thesis deals with the party journalism of the years 1710-1712 as it concerned Marlborough, relating it to its political context and discussing the techniques of controversy employed.

The introduction outlines Marlborough's popular status during the earlier years of Anne's reign, the uneasiness aroused by his family's monopoly of royal favour, the growing discontent with the war, despite his repeated victories, and Marlborough's personal reactions to such criticism.

The first three chapters concern the issues arising from the ministerial changes and General Election of 1710, measures which many pamphleteers justified by censuring Marlborough's abuse of royal favour and conduct as general and plenipotentiary. The important contribution of Marlborough's principal apologist, Francis Hare, to this latter controversy is discussed in detail. Chapter III demonstrates that journalistic pressure was also a determining factor in Marlborough's retention of his command under the new ministry.

Chapters IV to VI trace the efforts of Marlborough's journalistic supporters during his last campaign to make his continuing military success the spearhead of their opposition to the ministry's secret peace negotiations, a procedure more favoured by the Duchess of Marlborough than by the Duke, and culminating at the end of 1711 in major ministerial press attacks on the latter and finally in his
dismissal on charges of financial malpractice.

The last two chapters describe the controversies of the year following Marlborough's dismissal, including the journalists' unscrupulous exploitation of the peculation charges, and the numerous publications purporting to expose plots of Marlborough's devising against the Queen and ministry. The difficulties facing his defenders and the effect of this massive and damaging press campaign on the Duke himself are also examined.

An epilogue deals briefly with journalistic reactions to Marlborough's period of self-exile on the Continent from December 1712 until August 1714.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes and Abbreviations.</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction.</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>The Favourite-Minister.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>General and Plenipotentiary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>The Question of the Command.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>&quot;Things are not the same&quot;: the Opening of the Campaign of 1711.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>Bouchain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>The Peace Debate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII</td>
<td>&quot;The Result of Fourteen curious Eyes.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII</td>
<td>&quot;Plot upon Plot.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epilogue.</td>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography.</td>
<td>407</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The photograph facing p.375 is taken from the frontispiece of a pamphlet of 1712, entitled, The Triumph of Envy, or the Vision of Shilock the Jew.
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the Public Record Office; the Library of University College London; the University of Nottingham Library; the Library of the Victoria and Albert Museum.

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NOTES AND ABBREVIATIONS

Dating

The English calendar at the period covered by this thesis was eleven days behind the Continental. For letters written, and events happening in England, Old Style dates only have been given, while for letters written from the Continent, the alternative date has been added (e.g., 11/22 June 1710).

Some letters, pamphlets, and newspapers written or published between 1 January and 25 March of a given year bear the date of the previous year, according to the Old Style practice of beginning the new year on 25 March. In such cases, the actual date according to modern usage has been added (e.g., 10 January 1712/3). Such additions have not been enclosed in square brackets.

In cases where the exact publication date of a pamphlet can be ascertained with reasonable accuracy (e.g., from advertisements in newspapers), this has been given, usually after the first citing of the work in the notes, and followed by the source of information. All newspaper advertisements cited in this connection refer to pamphlets published "this day" except where otherwise stated.

Citing of Printed Works

In both the notes and the bibliography, titles have been cited with their original spelling, but capitalization and punctuation have been regularized. The place of publication is specified only where it is not London, and all references are to the first edition of the work, except where otherwise indicated. As a rule, short titles only have been given in the notes, fuller titles being reserved for the bibliography.

In addition, the following abbreviations and short forms have been used in the notes for frequently cited references:

Add. MSS Additional MSS
B.M. British Library, Reference Division, Departments of Printed Books and Manuscripts (at the British Museum).
Churchill


Coxe

William Coxe, Memoirs of the Duke of Marlborough, with His Original Correspondence, revised by John Wade. 1847-1848. 3 vols.

Dispatches


Heinsius Corr.


H.J.

Historical Journal

H.L.Q.

Huntington Library Quarterly

H.M.C.

Historical Manuscripts Commission. Reports in the notes are cited with this abbreviation, followed by the name of the owner of the manuscripts (e.g., H.M.C. Hare MSS); fuller details are given in the bibliography.

J.S.A.H.R.

Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research

Moore, Checklist


Morgan, Bibliography

William Thomas and Chloe Siner Morgan, A Bibliography of British History 1700-1715. Bloomington, 1934-1942. 5 vols.

Oldmixon, Maynwaring

[John Oldmixon], The Life and Posthumous Works of Arthur Maynwaring, Esq. 1715.

Political State


Private Corr.

Private Correspondence of Sarah, Duchess of Marlborough. 2nd edn., 1838. 2 vols.

P.R.O. S.P.

Public Record Office, State Papers.

R.O.

Record Office.

s.sh.

Single sheet publication, printed on one side or both sides.

Swift, Prose Works

INTRODUCTION

At the beginning of 1713, John Vanbrugh complained, in a letter which got him into a good deal of trouble, of "the continual plague, and bitter persecution" which the Duke of Marlborough had "most barbarously been followed with, for two years past"; later explaining that he referred to the "pamphlets, newspapers, and stories, which daily galled him." \(^1\) Marlborough's most systematic apologist, Francis Hare, noted a little more accurately at the end of 1710, that this material had begun to appear in quantity about six months before. \(^2\)

While no biography of Marlborough is without some reference to this press campaign, the subject has never been studied in detail. Michael Foot's account, The Pen and the Sword (1957), concentrates largely on Swift's contribution which, though important, was in volume only a fraction of the whole; and since Swift wrote little against the Duke after his dismissal at the end of 1711, Mr. Foot also concludes at this point, though the controversy itself continued fiercely throughout the following year. In general, much less has been heard of Marlborough's journalistic defenders than of his attackers; yet the productions of the former were not only of importance in their own right, but frequently determined the timing and content of hostile publications.

The present study is concerned with the mass of propaganda, both hostile and favourable to Marlborough, published between 1710 and the end of 1712 -- some two hundred and fifty pamphlets, broadsides,
and periodicals in all. The controversy was not of course rigidly confined within these time-limits. Marlborough was no stranger to press attack before the fall of the Whig ministry in 1710, and his departure into self-imposed exile on the Continent two and a half years later did not put an abrupt end to it. Nevertheless, as the comments of Vanbrugh and Hare suggest, it was during this period that the pamphlet war was at its height and, on the Tory side, most closely co-ordinated with the policy of Oxford's ministry towards Marlborough. This propaganda is important historically because of the influence it can be shown to have had on the career of one of the greatest figures of Queen Anne's reign, and consequently on the political and international events in which he was involved; and since this was also one of the major press campaigns of a period remarkable for the volume and ferocity of its "paper wars," the tracing of its successive stages provides a framework in which the journalists and their techniques can be studied closely in action.

Vanbrugh's term, "persecution," is a challenging one and, if applied indiscriminately to all hostile publications, misleading. It has been pointed out that Whig expressions of indignation at Marlborough's treatment are as suspect as Tory abuse; that Marlborough's military successes had made him "a political power in the Whig opposition," and the use of the press to discredit him, after "the accustomed manner of the day," was therefore "an essential step in achieving the Tory peace."³ It is certainly true that the Tory attacks on Marlborough were politically
motivated; many of his defenders were to acknowledge this quite freely. It is also true that professional and personal disparagement in the press was an occupational hazard from which few of the public figures of Queen Anne's reign were completely exempt. Yet Marlborough's treatment was exceptional even by the standards of the day, and there were times, especially after his dismissal, when the outrage of his supporters was not without foundation. Those who favoured the ministry's policies, but remained sufficiently unbiassed to question the strict truth of many of the press attacks on its greatest opponent, might have salved their consciences with something resembling Arbuthnot's definition of the political lie "Detractory or Defamatory": that "which takes from a Great Man the Reputation that justly belongs to him, for fear he should use it to the Detriment of the Publick." But to Marlborough's sympathizers, who believed that the measures he opposed were pernicious, this would naturally have seemed no justification at all.

Nevertheless, it must be said in fairness to Swift and his associates, that the initiative did not always lie with Marlborough's detractors. At times, most notably during the campaign of 1711, he suffered as much from the activities of his own supporters, who made his name and reputation the spearhead of their opposition to the ministry, as from the unprovoked hostility of Tory persecutors. In fact, the motives of the pamphleteers of both sides, and the reasons for the success or failure of their propaganda, can only be fully understood if the controversy is followed step by step, in relation to the political
conflicts which gave rise to it. However, in view of the quantity of material involved, and the many existing studies of Marlborough's career and of the reign as a whole, I have chosen in this thesis to discuss these contemporary issues as they arise from an examination of the propaganda itself, and as they bear directly on an understanding of it, rather than to examine each individual publication in the context of a detailed and strictly chronological narrative of events.

Although Marlborough's worst ordeal began with the downfall of the Whig ministry in 1710, many of the weaknesses which the Tory journalists then proceeded to exploit had been inherent in his position for some years. It has been suggested that one reason for Marlborough's sensitivity to press attack after the advent of Swift was his inability to adjust to the role of satiric victim after the "cascades of eulogy" to which he had so long been accustomed. But although the volume of panegyric was very large, it had never entirely precluded detraction. In fact, one historian has gone to the opposite extreme and concluded, from the determined Tory belittlement of Marlborough's greatest achievements, that he had been "one of the most unpopular men in England" even at the height of his success. G.M. Trevelyan accepts, in a modified form, this inability to command widespread popularity, explaining Tory hostility and Whig indifference in terms of a failure to give undivided allegiance to either party. He suggests also that a baffling reticence and a certain want of personal magnetism in Marlborough made it easy for
his political opponents to destroy his hold on the affections of the common people.

Political allegiances were certainly at the root of the problem. In 1711, a more impartial writer commented disgustedly,

It has sometimes turn'd my very Bowels within me, and made me even sick to see the nauseous Effects of weighing Men in Party-Scale; to see Bearded Men with grave Faces, putting in the Trifles of their Side against Actions of unparallel'd Importance, and Golden Solidity on the other; and declaring the over Ballance in Favour of the former ... to hear their fulsome Encomiums of worthless Wretches, their shameless Invectives againg [sic] glaring Merit, their vain and inconsistent Determinations concerning the very same Persons and Actions. With what different and contrary Measure have they on each Side taken the Height of the D-- of M--, according as fresher Discoveries ... have brought either Side accounts of his being more or less theirs ... 8

The fact was that Marlborough, finding himself fundamentally at odds with the Tories on questions of strategy, had been compelled to rely increasingly on the Whigs for political support, thereby alienating their opponents still further; yet his reluctance to commit himself whole-heartedly to the Whig cause and the Junto's pretensions to power at times engendered, not merely indifference, but a hostility as bitter as the Tories'.

After the disappointing campaign of 1705, for example, a controversial pamphlet accused Marlborough of deliberately neglecting the opportunity for a decisive victory and casting the blame on the Allies, in the hope that he would be given a more absolute command and so be enabled to sell his country into a dishonourable peace with France. Failing this, it was suggested, he would prolong the war to reimburse
himself for the lost opportunities for gain. Tory malice could not have contrived a more ingenious indictment, yet the pamphlet was the work of a well-known Whig propagandist, possibly influenced by prominent Whig patrons, who feared that Marlborough was leaning towards the high Tories.\(^9\) It is also notable that between the years 1704 and 1708, the party organ whose criticism most persistently galled Marlborough and his staff was the arch-Whig Observator.\(^{10}\) During the winter of 1707/8, when the Junto was bringing pressure to bear on the ministers for admission to the Cabinet, successive issues of the journal accused Marlborough of engrossing royal favour, prolonging the war to enrich himself, misapplying the public money, and in all respects laying the foundations of a Cromwellian dictatorship; it was even hinted that he would be called to account officially for these crimes.\(^{11}\)

This selection of criticism suggests weaknesses in Marlborough's circumstances and character more serious than a simple lack of personal magnetism. In particular, the privileged position to which he had succeeded when Queen Anne came to the throne was an open invitation to detraction. In 1704, Defoe had noted that "the Nation is Particularly Jealous of Favourites," and had cited several examples of the breed, who all Incur'd the Displeasure of the people by One Crime, Persueing Their Private Intrest, Enriching and Aggrandizeing themselves and Familyes, and Raiseing Vast Estates Out of the Spoils of the Publick, and by Their Princes favour heaping up Honors and Titles to Themselves from Mean Originalls.\(^{12}\)

The traditional stigma was fixed on Marlborough and his wife in every detail before the Queen had been twelve months on the throne. Rewards
bestowed on him after his campaign drew an almost incoherent tirade from the aged John Evelyn:

After: th[e] excesse of honors conferred by the Queene on the E. of Marborow, to make him a knight of the Garter, & Duke for the successe of but one Campagne, [that] he should desire 5000 pounds a yeare out of the Post-office to be settled on him was by the parliament thought a bold & unadvised request, who had besides his owne considerable Estate, above 30000 pounds per Ann in places & Employments, with 50000 at Interest: His Wife also (whose originall & his every body knew, & by what merit become such favorite, for his sister was a Miss to K. James the 2d when Duke of York, his Father but a cleark of the Green-Cloth, ingrossing all that stirred & was profitable at Court ... ) Thus suddainly rising was taken notice of & displeased those who had him til now in great esteeme ...

And others, as well as Evelyn, remarked on Marlborough's desertion of James II at the Revolution, as a particularly flagrant example of his abuse of the royal favour to which he owed his advancement. 13

The prejudice against the Marlboroughs ("King John" and "Queen Zarah") as all-engrossing royal favourites was common to both Whig and Tory, and recognized as the one thing capable of drawing down on the Duke "the Envy of the People of England" despite his spectacular success as Captain-General. 14 Misgiving increased when an estate, with the promise of a palace at royal expense, was bestowed on him after the Blenheim campaign. "Great is the man, and great have been his actions," an observer commented, "but all these favours create enemies. The Duchess, however, and the Lord Treasurer being linked together, and favourites of the Queen, nothing stands in their way, though it be never so much regretted." 15

A related source of uneasiness was Marlborough's prevailing moral frailty. What his admirers might interpret as frugality or
acquisitiveness, was to his enemies the sin of avarice or covetousness, condemned by Christian moralist and philosopher alike, guaranteed to engage the "Mortall Aversion" of the populace, and supposedly quite incompatible with a truly heroic nature. This foible undoubtedly made serious inroads on Marlborough's prestige. A foreign visitor to the capital in the summer of 1710 was shocked to witness a frenzied exhibition of popular antagonisms to the Duke, occasioned only by a ballad concerning his miserly habits. Such recognition of the failing was the more dangerous because of the inferences which could plausibly be drawn from it concerning his conduct in public life. "His sordid avarice is the root of all evil," Harley wrote in 1708, of what he conceived to be Marlborough's neglect of a favourable opportunity to conclude the war.

Whether or not Marlborough's enemies could raise sufficient resentment against him on these counts to destroy the prestige of his years of success, depended to a great degree upon the progress of the war. In retrospect, Francis Hare considered that "all the Complaints we have heard of the Management of the War" dated from the winter of 1707/8. There had of course been discontent at the disappointing campaigns of 1703 and 1705, expressed in "barbarous lampoons" which caused Marlborough some concern, but the victories of Blenheim and Ramillies were sufficient to vindicate his policy and place him, temporarily, "above all detracting tongues." When he advised the rejection of French peace overtures in 1706, it was with the conviction
that one more successful campaign would secure all the terms the Allies could desire; when, therefore, the next campaign proved to be the most unsuccessful of the whole war, recrimination was inevitable. The Tory doctrine of the futility of concentrating the Allied forces under Marlborough's command in Flanders, as a means of securing the entire Spanish monarchy for the Austrian candidate, began to make new converts, and at least two pamphlets threatened a parliamentary enquiry into the lost opportunity for peace. 21

By this time, the suspicion that Marlborough was prolonging the war in his own interests "had raised such an odium against him ... among the people, that many foresaw it would end in his ruin." 22 It was an ominous sign that his third victory at Oudenarde in 1708 failed to silence criticism as effectively as its predecessors. As economic hardship began to bite, it was becoming apparent that only victory which secured peace, but not victory alone, however glorious in itself, could do so completely. The country gentlemen, who bore the burden of the land-tax and had thought Blenheim "more for their 4s. in a pound than ever yet they saw," now declared that "they had rather be quiet have there Depts [sic] paid and enjoy there Trade then be at the expence of Victorys which they have no prospect of getting any thing by"; and Marlborough was personally blamed for not making the most of his success. 23 A sermon preached by Francis Hare before the House of Commons the following winter is an eloquent testimony to the prevalence of this criticism. 24

Had the peace negotiations of 1709 ended as well as they
seemed at first to promise, Marlborough's reputation would have been safe; but when Louis XIV refused to comply with the measures that would have guaranteed the cession of the entire Spanish monarchy to the Austrian candidate, there were insinuations in England that Marlborough was glad of the resulting rupture of the negotiations, and even that he had pressed impossible terms upon France as a pretext for continuing the war. Insinuation became a clamour when the promised invasion of France gave place to the long-drawn siege of Tournai, and after the inconsequential and costly battle of Malplaquet in September there was "a perfect chorus" of "Grumblers." Reactions ranged from suspicion that the casualty figures were being deliberately suppressed, to criticism of Marlborough's tactics and the sour comment of the Jacobite, Thomas Hearne, that the usual thanksgiving ceremonies were a governmental ruse to conceal the prolongation of the war for Marlborough's benefit. The first six months of the following year being occupied with further deadlocked peace negotiations and siege warfare, Henry Watkins, a member of Marlborough's staff, wrote in July that peace was essential, if only because "'tis now the blackest Character Envy gives Our best deserving Patriots that they continue the War for their own advantage." Yet although the Tory disposition to find fault with Marlborough was mounting, it could manifest itself publicly, only in what the Observator called "a treacherous and clandestine Manner" while the Whig ministry was in power. Verses embodying recent criticism of the war had to be circulated in manuscript, and a clash between Defoe and the news-writer, John Dyer, well illustrates the reluctance of Tory journalists
to reproduce verbal detraction in its most outspoken form. According to Defoe, Dyer's account of Malplaquet had included "this happy Parenthesis, VICTORY, as Marlborough calls it." Dyer's words actually were, "this great Success (as ye D. of Marlb. o calls it)." Defoe's misquotation had made the sneer unmistakable and given the impression that, by omitting Marlborough's full title, Dyer had added an insolent familiarity to his disparagement of the victory. Dyer had of course intended disparagement, or at least to encourage it in his readers. Hearne, for example, unhesitatingly translated the passage into unequivocal criticism. Nevertheless, it had been so framed that, if challenged, Dyer could claim it was entitled to be taken at its innocent face-value. Accordingly, he referred his readers back to the newsletter in question, as proof that he had not used the "unmannerly phrase" attributed to him, and then adroitly turned the tables on Defoe with a fine show of indignation, by accusing him of "a designe to wound the reputation of that great Man thro: my Sides." 

The winter of 1707/8 witnessed an event of great political importance in the enforced resignation of Robert Harley as Secretary of State, after what Marlborough and Godolphin believed to be an attempt to overthrow their administration. The Queen bitterly resented being forced, by Marlborough's threat of resignation, to part with her new favourite; and although there may be some doubt about Harley's guilt initially, there can be none about his feelings toward Marlborough and Godolphin afterwards. In a series of draft pamphlets written in
retirement between 1708 and early 1710, while his plans for ridding the Queen of her now Whig-dominated ministry matured, Harley accused Marlborough of every crime later to be laid to his charge by the Tory pamphleteers; of engrossing the Queen's favour and usurping royal authority, of embezzling the public money, of passing over promising opportunities for peace, and neglecting the navy and the war in Spain in favour of protracted and futile offensives in Flanders. These tirades, however, never saw the light in printed form.

Henry St John, having resigned with Harley, was also living in retirement on his country estate; and though still professing his former admiration for Marlborough's military talents, he was beginning to take up the cause of the war-weary gentry, with complaints that the landed interest was being ruined by the war, that success was no compensation for financial hardship, and that too much care was being taken of Allied interests at England's expense. But, as in Harley's case, these criticisms did not find their fullest expression in print until a Tory ministry had come to power and was faced with the task of making peace.

In 1709, there were only occasional hints of what was to come. When, in January, a great stir was caused within Parliament and without by the publication of an allegorical attack on the Marlboroughs and the Godolphin administration, entitled An Account of a Dream at Harwich, most readers considered that the honours for authorship lay between Harley and St John. St John, at least, may have had some knowledge
of the most daring attack on the Whig administration at this period, Mrs. Manley's *Secret Memoirs and Manners of Several Persons of Quality of Both Sexes from the New Atalantis*, published in two volumes in May and October 1709. It is also possible that Mrs. Manley had some contact with Harley's associate at Court, the Queen's new female favourite, Abigail Masham. Sarah's suspicion that the latter had assisted the authoress financially is substantiated by internal evidence, and Mrs. Manley was certainly well-informed about Abigail Masham's part in Harley's intrigues. One phrase of description, "she speaks more correct than others Write" (II, p. 148), also implies some personal contact between the two women.

In two recent studies of Mrs. Manley's satiric technique, a symbolic relationship has been suggested between her lurid accounts of the sexual intrigues of the Whig personalities, with their pitiless preying upon female innocence, and the evils of a Whig administration -- in Tory eyes, "an amoral masculine world of ruthless economic individualism and irreligious Realpolitick." The character of Marlborough ("Count Fortunatus"), one study argues, was her most concentrated embodiment of these destructive forces. Yet perhaps not all her contemporary readers would have been conscious of this parallel between the private microcosm and the public macrocosm. One Oxford reader, in fact, was bemused and rather disappointed by her preoccupation with the former in a work which he had assumed to have great political significance:

I have read but little of the *New Atalantis*, & am able to interpret nothing after the History of *Ct. Fortunatus*. The
design seem's to be rather to lay open men's private, than public, Characters, & to discover their Secret Love-Intrigues, than their more dark designs in Policy & State. I wish You wou'd favour me with the key to it ... 40

Readers in possession of the key would of course have been able to extract more enjoyment from the book, but one need not assume a symbolic significance to account for the effectiveness of the scandalous revelations as a means of embarrassing those in power. Although Mrs. Manley later claimed in self-defence that "she did but take up old Stories that all the World had long since reported," she was known to be "a retainer of the Court and especially of the lewd part of it," and consequently "admitted into the secret intrigues of it." Her versions even of well-known scandals therefore had a special news value in their own right for the less well-informed. A case in point was her account of John Churchill's youthful affair with the Duchess of Cleveland. Its existence had never been a secret, but Mrs. Manley, having later become a confidante of the Duchess, was in a position to record its most intimate and discreditable details. 42

If readers had seen 'Fortunatus' as the embodiment of any destructive force in the state, it was more likely to have been that of the corrupt court-favourite, with whom Mrs. Manley repeatedly and explicitly identified him, than that of the amoral Whig statesman as such. If even the bemused Oxford reader, whose comments have just been quoted, was able to comprehend those portions of the work which concerned Marlborough, it was because they drew upon well-established
prejudices against him. It has already been noticed how resentfully private critics dwelt upon his conformity to the type of the corrupt favourite in his rise to power from humble origins, his profiting by his sister's position as the Duke of York's mistress, his desertion of the King at the Revolution after so many favours bestowed, and the monopoly of royal favour which he, his wife, and Godolphin held after the Queen's accession. Mrs. Manley later declared that these were the grounds on which she too thought him "a just and flaming Subject for Satire," and they were certainly the basis of her attack on him in the New Atlantis. Aware that "the People, who with no indulgent Eyes, examine into the actions of Favourites, had always rather Rail then Applaud; and hate that Grandeur they cannot share in" (II, p. 146), she must have realised that this was the safest and surest means of discrediting him, at a time when peace threatened to disarm critics of his management of the war.

It is as the titled royal favourite that he is introduced, in terms similar to those used by Evelyn: "rais'd by the concurrent Favour of two Monarchs, his own, and his Sisters Charms, from a meer Gentleman to that Dignity"; it is also noted that his wife is the "She-favourite" of the Queen, and "all will be manag'd in the new Reign by their Advice" (I, p. 21). It was proverbially said of the breed of corrupt favourites, that they rose to their high stations by "base and shameful" means; they might, for example, owe their first advancement "to the Beauty of their Face, or the interest of a Strumpet." Mrs. Manley's
account of Marlborough's rise illustrated his exact conformity to this pattern; for she describes how the attraction which his youthful good-looks had held for the King's most promiscuous mistress led to his first promotions at Court and in the army, and how he took advantage of her infatuation to further his ambitions, afterwards ridding himself of her by a mean trick and disowning all obligations. The narrative then centres on his relations with the Duke of York, with emphasis on the part which the "prostitution" of his sister had played in his preferment, and on his desertion at the Revolution of the King who had saved his life in a ship-wreck and to whose favour he owed all his fortune. Yet however shameful this behaviour, "he has rose by it, and will in a moment ... touch the tallest Dignities of the Empire" (I, pp.21-43). This last episode is reworked in the second volume, where it is said to have been the prime cause of the King's decision to abandon his cause; for "the Ingratitude of Favourites and Friends, whom we have particularly oblig'd, is, to most, the sensiblest of all Disappointments or Evils" (II, pp.134-142).

The affair described in the second volume between Godolphin and the Duchess of Marlborough, with the Duke complaisant for political reasons, is the most distasteful construction that could be put upon the clique of favourites surrounding the throne, which had already caused some misgiving; and when Harley and Abigail Masham are introduced, it is specifically as characters worthy of royal favour, in contrast to their corrupt predecessors (II, pp.144-149).
The *New Atalantis* was hailed by Lady Mary Wortley Montagu as a relief from "heavy panegyric" and "false characters, so daubed with flattery, that they are the severest kind of lampoons ... like that vile paper the Tatler." It is certainly true that Mrs. Manley had questioned some eulogistic commonplaces about Marlborough's rise to power. Some months before in the *Tatler*, Steele had commented:

> it is, methinks, a pleasing Reflection, to consider the Disputations of Providence in the Fortune of this Illustrious Man, who, in the Space of Forty Years, has pass'd through all the Gradations of Human Life, 'till he has ascended to the Character of a Prince ... But such Elevations are the Natural Consequences of an exact Prudence, a calm Courage, a well-govern'd Temper, a patient Ambition, and an affable Behaviour. These Arts, as they are the Steps to his Greatness, so they are the Pillars of it now it is rais'd.

In the same year, Ned Ward also recalled the time when the great general was "no more than Mr Churchill, an Ensign in the Guards," and while condemning the hierarchy of the army as a whole, he acknowledged that Marlborough owed "his Grandeur to little but the Greatness of his Sense and Courage." Mrs. Manley had suggested some far less creditable factors in Marlborough's advancement, but she could not ignore the reputation he had acquired for patience, courage, and even temper. In fact, her initial character-sketch differs from Steele's, only in the subacid flavour she imparts to "that coolness of Temper, that allay of Fire, that passive Moderation, ever uppermost, and to which he has ow'd his greatest Success." She explains, however, that these good qualities were not innate; even his courage was not "inborn to him, but acquir'd," simply another manifestation of the self-control to which all his
"appearances of Virtue" were attributable, and which had so long concealed his deep-rooted avarice and ambition (I, pp. 26-27).

Mrs. Manley's statement that the New Atalantis had pointed the way for future critics of Marlborough and the Whig leaders was proved accurate; and considering that the tract was the most sustained attack on these ministers in print while they were still in full power and well able to punish those who deviated too sharply from eulogy, it was with some justice that she later claimed credit "for having, with hazzard to my self, first circulated their vices and open'd the ey's of the Crow'd, who were dazzled by the shine of power into awe and Reverence of their persons."^47

Marlborough's personal reaction to press attack and to replies in kind was to be of some importance in determining his relations with the new ministry after 1710, and his responses to earlier material of the same sort throw some light on his later attitude.

With his strong sense of personal dignity and of the importance of his European mission, and his habitual distaste for party warfare, Marlborough could not be expected to take kindly to partisan fault-finding, printed or verbal. "I have had the good luck to deserve better from all Englishmen, than to be suspected of not being in the true interest of my country," he wrote at the height of his success. ^48 The denial of this merit, which was implicit or explicit in almost every criticism of his conduct, galled him inexpressibly. On one occasion, his reaction was
so violent that Godolphin ventured to remonstrate with him. "I think what you say is reasonable," Marlborough wrote back, unappeased, "but as I act to the best of my understanding, with zeal for the queen and my country, I cannot hinder being vexed at such usage." At another time, having threatened the author and printer of the persistently critical *Observator* with physical violence, he expressed the hope that this would "be approved on by all honest Englishmen, since I serve my Queen and country with all my heart."50

There was, however, more to these reactions than wounded self-esteem. A later pamphleteer was correct in remarking that Marlborough had always valued "the good Opinion of his Native Country," the more so because it was a means of protection against the hostility to which he was subject from both parties. "[I] shall certainly not care what any party thinks of me," he wrote in 1704, "being resolved to recommend myself to the people of England, by being to the best of my understanding, in the true interest of my country"; and again the following year, "I have no other ambition but that of serving well her majesty, and being thought what I am, a good Englishman."52 His fear of those who threatened to strip him of this modest, but all-important title was not groundless. It was later to be demonstrated that propaganda which could do so convincing, would go far to leave him at the mercy of his political enemies.

Marlborough also feared the effect of plausible detraction for the practical reason that the maintenance of his prestige at home,
abroad, and in the army was necessary for the efficient discharge of his official responsibilities. "I cou'd suffer every thing for Her [the Queen's] sake, but cant think it for Her Service, that I shou'd unjustly be blam'd," he wrote in 1705, of a deliberate omission from the official account of a controversial incident in the London Gazette, which amounted to a reflection on his professional judgment and threatened his effective command of the Allied army.\textsuperscript{53}

His freedom of action in the field could likewise be seriously hampered by the knowledge of his enemies' readiness to find fault with his conduct. Fear of these fault-finders haunted him throughout his campaigns, increasing as his political position grew weaker and the criticism which greeted his last two victories taught him what to expect in the event of failure or defeat. Soon after the ministerial changes of 1710, he wrote to the Secretary of State, requesting the Queen's authority to undertake a particular operation, because "it is grown too much in fashion to canvas and reflect on what I do without any consideration of the service." To Godolphin, he had already confessed that, "as every thing is now, I dare attempt nothing, but what I am almost sure must succeed," for "should I not have success, I should find but too many ready to blame me."\textsuperscript{54}

The methods Marlborough had used before this time to combat party propaganda varied according to the nature of the offence. In cases of particular provocation or controversy, he had recourse to the law, recommending the official suppression of James Drake's notorious
Memorial of the Church of England, and demanding "justice" under the continual goading of the Observator; and though he favoured a remittance of punishment for William Stephens, the author of a highly critical pamphlet, he admitted that he would have been "very uneasy if the law had not found him guilty." But as a general means of discouraging less important offenders, he preferred to rely on his own matchless powers of self-control. Resignedly noting the publication of "another scurrilous pamphlet" in 1705, he advised Sarah that "the best way of putting an end to that villany is not to appear concerned." This conviction was the basis of his habitual "official" reaction to criticism. Though he had complained bitterly in private of partisan fault-finders during the campaign of 1708, his formal response was one of the loftiest unconcern.

His reluctance to encourage replies in kind was another manifestation of this studied indifference to critics, reinforced in the hour of success by the confidence that, "as long as God blesses us with success their writing can have little weight." It is understandable that in 1706, Marlborough should have believed his victories themselves to be the most effective answer to his critics. Defoe's support of his cause in the Review drew from him the categorical statement, "I do not love to see my name in print, for I am persuaded that an honest man must be justified by his own actions, and not by the pen of a writer, though he be a zealous friend."

In practice, however, Marlborough was far from blind to the value of suitable printed publicity for his actions. If they were to
be his justification, it was necessary that they be properly represented to the public. He was observed to be "no ways inclinable to give Encouragement to Panegyrics upon himself," and specimens such as William Pitt's *Two Campaigns in One Panegyrical Essay*, written to ingratiate himself with the ministry, warranted this indifference. 60 Nevertheless, it was not unknown for more reputable eulogists to receive substantial cash benefits from the general, and he not only sanctioned, but supervised an account of the Blenheim campaign, in which accuracy went hand in hand with praise. 61 He also kept a strict watch over the official bulletins of the army's movements, which were prepared by his staff for publication in the *London Gazette*, and was "no ways pleas'd" when they were tampered with by the gazetteer without his permission. 62 The unprecedented explosion of temper which followed the damaging omission from one of these bulletins in 1705 revealed how essential he considered this official publicity for the maintenance of his reputation. It was probably to prevent a repetition of this outburst, that Godolphin warned Harley, a great believer in retaining journalists in the government service, that a pamphlet which he commissioned for Marlborough's benefit a few months later should be submitted for the general's approval before it went to press. 63

The political propaganda of this period must be read with the reservation that "it is almost impossible to assess how far it reflected and how far it formed opinion." 64 The press attacks on
Marlborough from both sides before 1710 were manifestations of political pressure and party hostility, but it would be a mistake to take them, in their own right, as indications of his fundamental unpopularity. Before the end of his first campaign, he was observed to be "the great darling of y° People, and (as he goes on) is like to be every day more soe." Although, year by year, he became increasingly vulnerable to party criticism, especially on the grounds of his supposed abuse of royal favour and mismanagement of the war, this prestige remained astonishingly durable. In the Tory stronghold of Oxford, amid reports of the carnage of Malplaquet, he was still found to have "Reputation enough" and to be considered "a very Extraordinary man." Even Mrs. Manley admitted him to be "shining in a thousand Virtues that obscur'd his Vices." The more systematic campaign of detraction which was set on foot once his political opponents were restored to power was basically a tribute to this prestige. Had Marlborough really been as unpopular as is sometimes claimed, his reputation and achievements would have been neither an asset to the Whig opposition, nor a serious obstacle to the ministry's policies, and there would have been no need to set the pamphleteers to work to discredit him.
NOTES TO THE INTRODUCTION


2. The Management of the War, in Four Letters to a Tory-Member (1711), p. 4.


4. [John Arbuthnot], Proposals for Printing a Very Curious Discourse... Intitled... a Treatise of the Art of Political Lying (1712), p. 11.


8. Conyers Place, The Arbitration, or the Tory and Whig Reconcil'd [1711], p. 13.


10. Marlborough to Sarah, 19/30 July 1704, Blenheim MSS E2; Hare to Francis Godolphin, 27 May/7 June 1706, B. M. Add. MSS 28052, f. 114; Marlborough to Harley, 30 September/1 October 1706, H. M. C. Bath MSS, I, p. 105-106; Adam Cardonnel to George Tilson, 8/19 October 1708, P. R. O. S. P. (Foreign) 87/4.

11. Observator, VI, Nos. 67 (18-21 October 1707), 84 (17-20 December 1707), 95 (24-28 January 1708), 97 (31 January-4 February 1708), and 99 (7-11 February 1708).


15. Robert Raworth to Thomas Pitt, 7 February 1706/7, H.M.C. Fortescue MSS, I, p.28.


19. Management of the War, p.4.


23. News-letter of 19 August 1704, H.M.C. Portland MSS, IV, p.110; Thomas Erle to James Crags, 8 October 1708, Churchill College, Cambridge, Erle/Drax MSS 2/12, f.20 (draft); Supplement to Burnet's


27. To Horace Walpole, 9/20 July 1710, B.M. Add. MSS 38500, f.349v.

28. Observator, VIII, No.63 (3-7 September 1709).

29. "The Thanksgiving for 1708," Bodleian MSS Eng. Poet. e. 87, f.28; see also Tusmore Papers, ed. L.G. Wickham Legg, Oxfordshire Record Series, XX (Oxford, 1939), pp.33-34; and Remarks and Collections of Thomas Hearne, II, p.352. The verses were eventually printed in Whig and Tory, or Wit on Both Sides (1712), Pt.IV, p.41; this collection, according to the Preface, contained "many Things which have been handed about privately in Manuscript."


32. Dyer's Newsletter of 4 October 1709, B.M. Portland Loan MSS 29/320.


34. B.M. Portland Loan MSS 29/10/1, 20, 22, and 25, esp. the long draft entitled "Plaine English," dated 24 August 1708.
35. To the Earl of Orrery, 9 July and 1 September 1709, Bodleian MSS
Eng. Misc. e 180, ff.3-4 and 7; to James Brydges, 26
June and 8 September 1709, "Letters of Henry St John to
James Brydges," eds. Godfrey Davies and Marion Tinling,
161 and 164. See also H.T. Dickinson, Bolingbroke (1970),
pp.68-70.

36. Peter Wentworth to Lord Raby, 25 January 1709, The Wentworth
Hare to Watkins, 28 January 1708/9, B.M. Add. MSS 33225,
f.17; Edward Harley to Abigail Harley, 30 January 1708/9,
H.M.C. Portland MSS, IV, pp.517-518. Edward Harley's
amusement at attempts to determine authorship suggests
that his father may well have been involved.

37. Mrs. Manley's association with St John had begun in 1705, when
she became the mistress of the Tory printer, John Barber;
see Dolores D.C. Duff, "Materials toward a Biography of Mary
Delariviere Manley" (Indiana University Ph.D. diss., 1965),
pp.369-371. For the publication dates of the New Atalantis
see Gwendolyn B. Needham "Mary de la Riviere Manley, Tory
references to both volumes of the New Atalantis are to the
facsimile reprint in the first volume of The Novels of Mary
Delariviere Manley; this edition has both the editor's and
the original pagination; all references in the notes and
text are to the latter.

38. Needham questions the connection with Abigail Masham (H.L.O., XII,
pp.265-266), but Mrs. Manley herself paid tribute to
Mrs. Masham's patronage of "Letters" (New Atalantis, II,
p.147), and it is worth noticing that a pamphlet of the
previous year had accused the latter of encouraging press
attacks on the Churchills (The Rival Dutchess, p.13).

pp.133-136, 152, and 155; see also Ronald Paulson,
Satire and the Novel in Eighteenth Century England (New

40. Palmer to Yorke, 18 November 1709, B.M. Add. MSS 35584, f.120.

41. The Adventures of Rivella (1714), p.110, reprinted in facsimile
in the second volume of The Novels of Mary Delariviere
Manley; Ralph Bridges to Sir William Trumbull, 11 November

43. Adventures of Rivella, p.33.

44. The Character of an Ill-Court-Favourite (1708), pp.7 and 23; this pamphlet was first published in 1681, supposedly as a translation from the French.


46. Tatler, No.5 (19-21 April 1709); Mars Stript of His Armour (1709), p.3.


50. To Harley /11 October 1706, H.M.C. Bath MSS, I, pp.105-106.

51. P.H., An Impartial View of the Two Late Parliaments (1711), p.67.


53. To Sarah, 29 August/9 September 1705, Blenheim MSS E3. For a full account of this incident, see Churchill, II, pp.984-985.


56. To Sarah, 27 August/7 September 1705, Coxe, I, p.372.

57. To Godolphin, 15/26 July 1708, Coxe, II, p.273; to Travers, 22 July/2 August 1708, and to Brydges, 24 January/4 February 1709, Dispatches, IV, pp.142 and 427.

58. To Harley, 27 June/8 July 1706, H.M.C. Bath MSS, I, p.82.


62. Cardonnel to Tilson, 9/20 June and 8/19 November 1708, 7/18 July, 25 July/5 August, and 1/12 August 1709, P.R.O. S.P. (Foreign), 87/4.


65. Edmund Gibson to Arthur Charlett, 8 October 1702, Bodleian Ballard MSS 6, f.81.


Chapter I

THE FAVOURITE-MINISTER

Several historians have drawn attention to the relative scarcity of comment on the past conduct of the war from pamphleteers who wrote in justification of the ministerial changes and the General Election of 1710. Given the outspoken Tory complaints on this subject for some years past, and the radical revision of Whig war and peace policies which the new ministers instituted once firmly in office, the initial, almost Whiggish assurances from their journalistic supporters, of a vigorous war effort and a safe and honourable peace, are at first sight somewhat surprising. The explanation, however, lies in the very precarious position in which the ministry found itself on coming to power. The Whig financiers of the City and the Allies abroad were already alarmed at the domestic upheaval, and to have fostered the impression that peace at any price was the aim of the new administration would have made its chances of survival very remote.

Nevertheless, what the Tory propagandists prudently forbore to say, their opponents said for them, this being the most promising means of staving off defeat. "The Main Objection against the Present Changes," Abel Boyer noted,
is, That as all Seasons are not proper for Physick, so all Times are not fit for Purging the Body Politick; and that the War having been Successfully carry'd on by the late Ministry, it had been Prudence not to shift Hands before a Peace was concluded.
Some prominent supporters of the new ministry were also prepared to admit that "it falls out indeed at an unhappy Conjuncture with respect to our Affairs both at home and abroad, that there should be any Occasion for an alteration of the Ministry." There was, therefore, in spite of the Queen's undoubted right to change her ministers whenever she chose, a real need to justify the decision to do so, at so apparently unseasonable a juncture.

Harley's pamphleteers were unanimous in their solution to this problem. Retaining the medical analogy of "Physick" and "the Body Politick," Boyer observed that "in Cases of Necessity" drastic remedies might be administered at any time. A colleague expanded the point by arguing that the changes arose from an inevitable necessity of giving some speedy cheque to the formidable Power of a few Men, who have given Indications too evident to be slighted, that they have entered into Confederacies, and taken Resolutions to govern both Queen and Nation according to their own pleasure.

And when Sir Thomas Double, Charles Davenant's caricature of incarnate Whiggism, complained of the untimeliness of the ministerial revolution, his companion reported that it might perhaps have been delayed, "if your Behaviour had been such as was in any degree compatible with the very Existence of Regal Government." 6

These seeds fell on fertile ground. James Brydges considered that Harley's overthrow of the prestigious administration of Marlborough and Godolphin had only been possible because "Several concurring circumstances tended by degrees to imprint an opinion in the body of
the Gentlemen & People, that there was an intention of altering in
time the constitution in Church & State." Marlborough had been
abroad at the time of the Sacheverell trial, certainly one of the
"circumstances" which had raised this alarm against the Whig ministry.
However, the Tory pamphleteers had little difficulty in involving him
in the general condemnation of his colleagues on other grounds. In
fact, he and his family were repeatedly singled out for special attention.
The ordeal was long-lasting. Propaganda on this subject began to
appear in quantity after the dismissal of Marlborough's son-in-law,
Sunderland, in June 1710, and as late as February the following year,
Swift was devoting space in the Examiner to answering "that baffled
Question, Why was the late Ministry changed?"

For many pamphleteers an appeal to the traditional prejudice
against royal favourites, which Mrs. Manley had already directed towards
the Marlboroughs, was the most obvious means of substantiating the claim
that an immediate ministerial change had been essential for the preserva-
tion of the Queen's authority and the national liberties. In fact,
since Marlborough was related to two members of the old ministry by
marriage, and his wife, daughters, and sons-in-law held Court offices,
the entire political upheaval could be justified as the necessary
extirpation of a dangerous family monopoly of government and royal favour.
In answer to those who demanded the reasons for the ministerial revolution,
Defoe put two rhetorical questions: "Whether the exorbitant Ambition
of a Family ... is not a sufficient Reason?" and

Whether the People of England are not strangely alter'd, who are particularly remark'd in the World, for their being Jealous of the too Great Growth of Favorites; That they should now desire to promote what they have always apprehended was dangerous to their Liberties?  

In the past, as Defoe had informed Harley, this jealousy had been aroused by the aggrandizement of the low-born favourite and his family with titles, honours, and estates at public expense. The abuse now lavished on the Marlborough family by Defoe's colleagues was calculated to arouse every aspect of this traditional prejudice. "The Pride, Insolence and Profuseness of Upstarts intolerable," one such tirade ran, "One Family rais'd above all the Rest with as many Places (not long ago) as would honourably maintain Twenty others of as much Modesty and more Gratitude." Boyer also argued that

the People cannot behold, without a just Resentment, Two, Three, or more Persons exalted high above all the rest, who abuse the Prince's Favours; whose Ambition is not satisfied with any Honours, and whose Avarice is not satiated with Multiplicity of Profitable Places, nor with Repeated Gifts and Grants ... who, in return to his Kindness and Munificence, put continual Slights and Affronts upon him, and keep him in an Inglorious Dependance on their Wills, in the Disposal of All. 'Tis such a sort of Favourites and Ministers that the People Hate, and Exclaim against; and whom Men of Birth and Superior Merits endeavour to get Remov'd.  

The half-finished palace at Woodstock and the newly completed Marlborough House at St. James's became for these pamphleteers symbols of the enrichment of a single family at public expense, and of the prince's subordination to his own creatures. Boyer's account combined the suggestion that these "Insulting Palaces"
were a personal affront to the Queen, with a backward glance at the
sinister medieval figure of the over-mighty subject and the stronghold
from which he could defy regal authority. Another pamphleteer wanted
to know "Whether ever such Princely Edifices were built, and Fortunes
rais'd by the Servants of a Crown in so short a Time, and in the Midst
of War." According to one estimate, the cost of Blenheim amounted to
"upwards of Three Hundred Thousand Pounds."11

As might be expected, Mrs. Manley made a substantial contribution
to this propaganda, developing at length a point of similarity between
the Marlboroughs and the pernicious favourites of history which had not
hitherto been touched on. With a thin veil of allegory, she reviewed their
relations with the Queen during previous reigns, claiming, amongst
other things, that they had encouraged her to gamble heavily with cards
and dice, in the expectation that all debts would be paid when she
succeeded to the throne, and to indulge in lavish banquets, so that
she would have neither the time nor the inclination for affairs of
state, which would then be left in their hands.12 These details were
clearly intended to recall the excesses of extravagance and sensual
indulgence into which designing favourites were traditionally supposed
to lead weak monarchs for their own ends; and since Anne's gambling
debts in her minority were heavy, and her addiction to the pleasures
of the table throughout her life a subject for ridicule, there was
a grain of truth in the account just sufficient to sustain this
identification of the Marlboroughs with such "Advocates of
Voluptuousness, the Pest of a Realm, and the Evil Genii of Kings."13
It was Swift who put the finishing touches to this topic. Discussing the ministerial changes in the *Examiner*, he used a particular historical parallel to show, not only that the family was worthy of dismissal by traditional standards, but that they did not even have that excuse for their existence which their worst predecessors, Edward II's notorious minions, could claim, namely "that the Prince is pleased and happy, although his Subjects be aggrieved." For Swift could by this time rely on the fact that the Queen's disillusionment with her former favourites was public knowledge. He then argued that Marlborough's "monstrous Alliance" with the "Republican" Whigs, which had made the changes imperative, had been a direct result of the Tory Commons' refusal to grant in perpetuity the annual sum which the Queen had requested in 1702, for the support of his Dukedom. Marlborough thus appeared as the kind of unscrupulous minister whose political allegiances were determined, not by the interests of his country, but by his insatiable appetite for the rewards of royal favour.¹⁴

The advantage of whipping up this prejudice against the Marlborough family as corrupt and dangerous royal favourites, was that, once aroused, it constituted in itself a powerful reason for the decision not to delay the ministerial changes. For it was the proverbial fate of such favourites to fall victim to the rage of their fellow-subjects, and Harley may actually have used this alarming prospect of sedition to strengthen the Queen's resolution. Among his manuscript jottings is the reminder that

\begin{quote}
when favourites grow mischievous or dangerous or unsupportable to the Prince or the people: if the Prince does not take the
\end{quote}
true way of laying them aside: the People do it themselves which is attended with much disorder and confusion ... 15

Boyer, at this time supporting Harley's schemes, may have received hints from him on this subject, for he too justified the Queen's action by pointing out that,

to see Ambitious Upstarts engross all Favours, and invade all Offices and Employments, has been the occasion of many popular Seditions; which wise Monarchs have either prevented, or appeas'd by a just and seasonable Sacrifice. 16

This appeal to a prejudice to support the claim that the Queen's authority had been under serious threat from Marlborough and his colleagues, was greatly strengthened by an appeal to recent events. In answer to indignant protests from the Whigs that there had been no design against the established constitution, Swift crushingly retorted, "I beg their Pardon if I have discovered a Secret; but who could imagine they ever intended it should be One, after those Overt-Acts with which they thought fit to conclude their Farce?" 17

The ability to appeal to fact was of great value to Marlborough's critics at this delicate stage of his relations with the new ministry, since it gave their criticism, not only plausibility, but an air of impartiality and restraint. One pamphleteer, referring specifically to Marlborough, apologized for having discussed matters which may touch some great Men whom I yet honour in my heart, but all the respect I was able to show on such an occasion, was to forbear their Names; the Facts I have mentioned are known to be true, 'tis therefore their own Actions that reflect the Censure, not the Relation ... 18
There was of course no genuine desire to spare Marlborough's reputation, once this claim to forbearance had been established; as Swift remarked, "barely to relate the Facts, at least, while they are fresh in Memory, will as much reflect upon the Persons concerned, as if we told their Names at length." 

In this relation of the facts there was a similar specious appearance of impartiality. To allow them to speak for themselves, "make their own uncommented Impressions," as one pamphleteer put it, seemed the essence of fairness. Yet the episodes in question happened to be such, that a bare presentation of the facts without comment or interpretation was precisely the technique likely to do most damage to Marlborough.

He had long suspected that Harley's associate, Abigail Masham, had been instrumental in undermining his position at Court, and matters had come to a head in January 1710, when the Queen waived the claims of Marlborough's candidate for a regiment fallen vacant at the death of the Earl of Essex, in favour of those of Abigail Masham's brother, John Hill. Marlborough, unable to persuade her to change her resolution, retired from Court in anger, determined that she should have to choose between retaining his services or those of her bedchamber-woman. Meanwhile, Sunderland, with his approval, attempted to arrange a parliamentary address recommending Abigail Masham's dismissal from Court. Alarmed and affronted, the Queen cast about her for political support, at the same time making such concessions to Marlborough that, as his more cautious colleagues urged, he could not decently maintain the stand he had taken.
But the damage had already been done. The dispute between Marlborough and the Queen was public knowledge, and when the pamphleteers came to justify the ministerial changes a few months later, it was a trump card. Few pamphlets were without some reference to the "unsufferable Insolence" to which the Queen had been subjected by Marlborough and his colleagues on this occasion; they had attempted "to take that Privilege from Her, which the Meanest of Her Subjects enjoy, and Slavery was to pursue Her even into Her Bed-Chamber"; under their administration, she could "not Dispose of any Commission, Civil or Military, nor have a Woman to Pin up her Gown, but with their good Leave"; they "thought it hard to let the Queen bestow a Regiment in the Army, where Merit, and her Majesty's Judgment, directed"; under a Tory ministry there would be no dispute about her "giving a Regiment to whom she pleased"; and so on.

Although no one could deny that these incidents had taken place, or even that Marlborough's behaviour had been imprudent in its lack of deference to the Queen, it is what is left unsaid in these accounts that produces the desired effect. While the political insignificance of Abigail Masham, as the Queen's bedchamber-woman, is stressed, her involvement in Harley's intrigues is not mentioned at all, though this was the real reason for Marlborough's determination to have her removed. Similarly, his clash with the Queen was not over her "giving a Regiment to whom she pleased," but over her giving it to a known political enemy (none of the accounts mention Hill's identity), on the advice of his political enemies and against all he could say to dissuade her. The
issue at stake, as Marlborough saw it, was therefore nothing less than the maintenance of his effective authority in the faction-ridden army, which depended upon his being recognized as the sole source of preferment. 23

This propaganda took advantage of the dilemma in which the original incident had placed Marlborough. If he had submitted to Hill's appointment, his command of the army would have been weakened; on the other hand, as Sarah noted, if he "should not comply or should show any reluctance in complying, this would furnish an excellent pretence for grievous complaints and outcries that the Queen was but a cipher and could do nothing." 24 This is exactly what happened. In these over-simplified accounts of the crisis there seemed no other explanation for Marlborough's conduct than a desire, in the first instance, to impose his will on the Queen in the most trivial aspects of her private life, and in the second, to set his command of the army above her authority; both apparently indications enough that "some speedy cheque" had to be given to his overweening presumption.

A particularly popular method of justifying the ministerial changes was to recount these and other incidents in more detail and with cumulative effect, as the "secret history" of the political upheaval. This term was used to describe accounts, genuine or more often invented, of the seamier, behind-the-scenes aspects of Court and government affairs. Hare, for instance, could refer quite accurately to Sarah's knowledge of "the inside and secret history" of post-Revolution politics, but Swift was later to disparage comprehensively those "who pretend to write
Anecdotes, or secret History," and "repeat the Discourse between a Prince and chief Minister, where no Witness was by." Yet however unreliable the medium might be as history, in 1710 it undoubtedly proved a very effective form of political propaganda. Since the narrator was presenting details and scenes outside public knowledge, there could be little check on his veracity; and, as Hare observed in exasperation, the very name "secret history" "immediately forbids all asking of Questions; for were the proofs to be produc'd, where would be the Secret?" In fact, the willing suspension of disbelief which such propaganda induced was the despair of those who had the task of counteracting its influence. Another pamphleteer lamented that the Secret Histories, the Atalantis's, the Faults on Both Sides, &c. have been able to Villify the most Worthy Persons; and yet not one of these Authors hath ever produc'd the least Proof of what he says ... for every scandalous Story is taken upon Trust, and as readily believ'd as if the Quality of Lying were not in Nature. Of the tracts referred to in this passage, three were particularly damaging to Marlborough: the pre-Election tract, Faults on Both Sides, The Secret History of Arlus and Odolphus, and the second volume of Mrs. Manley's Memoirs of Europe towards the Close of the Eighth Century, later to be reissued with the first volume as a sequel to the New Atalantis. Faults on Both Sides was a very influential work, which enjoyed "a prodigious Run" and impressed "many well-meaning People." It was a more reputable example of secret history than the others, because the author, believed to be one Simon Clement, had encouraged the rumour that he was writing to Harley's instructions; "I have seen the Man who has seen the Queen," he asserted, when challenged about his confident
The pamphlet was soon dubbed "Mr H..ly's Book," and historians have confirmed that the sentiments do correspond closely with his, and have even suggested that it was written to his dictation. 30

The attribution to Clement was certainly accurate, and it seems also that he was the author in his own right; "perhaps you may not think it for my disadvantage to let y° Secret[St. John] know who writ y° faults on both sides," he wrote to a friend the following year. However, his letters to Harley reveal a close association between them of some years standing, 31 so that there is every reason to suspect the minister's influence in the composition of the tract, even if he did not actually dictate it.

Ostensibly a critical survey of the history of both parties, the pamphlet was a contribution to Harley's ideal of an administration free from the extremists of either side. The real objects of the attack, however, were the party leaders who, in manipulating the rank and file for their own ends, were said to threaten both the rights of the monarch and the liberties of the people. Moderate men of both parties were urged to unite to put an end to this evil. It was in this context that Marlborough's recent conduct came under criticism, and more was revealed about the crisis of the previous winter. Discussing the political alliance between the ministers and the Junto, Clement observed,

"surely Men will think themselves Great, Strong, and Powerful, when the Parliament, Army, Navy, and Treasury of a Kingdom are at their Devotion; and we had reason to think so, when a
certain very great Man, whose general Behaviour had always been remarkably soft, easy, courteous and cool to all, could now presume to dispute the disposal of a single Regiment in the Army with his Sovereign, and to such a degree of animosity, as to depart from her presence in disgust, without returning till the good Queen (may I say) submitted and yielded the Point to him. (p.35)

Again, there is no reference to the real issue at stake in this dispute between Marlborough and the Queen, and although Clement eschews the exclamatory and outraged tones of the majority of his colleagues, his choice of words constantly guides the reader to a highly unfavourable view of Marlborough's conduct. The references to the Queen, the regal and formal "Sovereign" and the affectionate and respectful "good Queen," draw attention to the Duke's disregard for all these qualities, though together they comprehend the proper relationship between monarch and subject in all its possible forms; the jarring incongruity of the terms "animosity" and "disgust" in such a context is sufficient reflection on the impropriety of Marlborough's behaviour without explicit comment, and the diffident parenthesis, "may I say," is at once an apology for, and a careful pointer to, the reversal of proper roles implied in the use of the words "submit" and "yield" to describe the attitude of a sovereign to a subject. Above all, the incident, as it is here described, demonstrates the truth of Mrs. Manley's view, that Marlborough's celebrated amenity of temper, to which he had hitherto owed his "Appearances of Virtue," was in reality only a mask for ambitious designs as yet unfathomable.

The significance of this crisis, as the moment when these designs had at last been brought into the open, was confirmed when the
This, though one would hardly guess it from the unemphatic tone, was the first mention in print of what was to become a standard item of Tory propaganda. Clement's restraint was genuine. The occasion referred to was no less than Marlborough's third attempt to induce the Queen to grant his commission as Captain-General for life; and this after discouragements from his own supporters, of which Harley was well-informed, and persistent opposition from the Queen herself. Most historians are content to absolve Marlborough from the worst implications of the request, and interpret it simply as an ill-considered expedient for relieving himself of the pressures of party politics, which threatened his effective action abroad. Yet his contemporaries, some of whom had personal recollections of Cromwell's regime, could not be expected to take so lenient a view. "Was not Grandinsula made the most miserable of Islands by such a Concession? the Memory of those Bloody and Tyrannical Days are too fresh in our Minds to be deluded into a like Error so soon," one otherwise friendly pamphleteer wrote when he learnt of the scheme. Inevitably the effect was to confirm the insinuations of hostile journalists such as the Observator, who, even without this clue, had already suggested a parallel between the Captain-General and the Lord Protector. Clement's failure to do more than hint in passing at these alarming implications of Marlborough's action is therefore somewhat surprising.
He could, however, count upon most of his readers' drawing the appropriate conclusions for themselves, and it is likely that he was simply using the authority which his connection with Harley gave him to make the basic facts of Marlborough's request available to less well-informed colleagues for elaboration as the occasion should offer. This in itself would have been a sufficient embarrassment to the Duke, for once the request had proved unsuccessful, he certainly would not have wished it to become public knowledge. News that the episode had begun to be exploited by the party pamphleteers reached him while he was still abroad, and the comments of two of his supporters on this subject suggest that both they and their patron regarded Clement's revelation, for all its restraint, as one of the most damaging products of the press campaign of this period. 34

Other pamphleteers certainly had no hesitation in enlarging on the topic once they had been given their cue. Abel Boyer's Essay towards the History of the Last Ministry and Parliament, for example, was modelled on Clement's doctrine of Harleyite "moderation," and once the circulation of the original pamphlet began to diminish, it became "the Piece on wch the Party would value themselves"; there was apparently no inkling in Whig circles that it was the work of one of their own number, drawn to Harley's cause, partly at least, by the lure of the post of gazetteer. 35 In fact, the pamphlet seemed intended to demonstrate Boyer's complete severance of sympathy with the old ministry; the implications of the request for the Captain-Generalcy, barely hinted at by Clement,
were not only stated in the most explicit and alarmist terms in the Essay, but by typographical means, made almost to leap from the page:

the Junto had form'd the Towers Project, of Getting a GENERAL for LIFE: who might, in Time, have gain'd an absolute Authority, as that of a Roman perpetual DICTATOR; or of a British PROTECTOR: and so have Govern'd Arbitrarily both QUEEN and NATION. (p. 47)

That the ambitions of Marlborough and the Junto had reached this pitch was of course the final clinching argument for an immediate change of the ministry.

These same topics were included in The Secret History of Arlus and Odolphus (i.e. Harley and Godolphin), a pamphlet dedicated on the title-page "to those Good People of GRANDINSULA, who have not yet done wond'ring, why that PRINCESS would Change so Notable a Ministry."

The central feature of its attack on Marlborough ("Fortunatus") was, however, an account of his audience with the Queen in the winter of 1707/8, which had led to Harley's resignation as Secretary of State.

Historically, the pamphleteer's version of this episode agrees with those of well-informed contemporaries in many respects; most notably in such details as the Queen's readiness to accept Godolphin's resignation rather than part with Harley, the few days' grace she allowed him to reconsider his decision, her personal distress at being forced to dispense with Harley's services when she had been made aware of the chaos that would follow Marlborough's resignation, and the hint that if she had not been subject to such pressures, she would have retained Harley in preference even to Marlborough. These details must have
been supplied by someone intimately acquainted with the affair, and
the probability is that it was Harley himself. Hare, in fact, believed
Harley to be the author.36

The name, Fortunatus, was obviously a borrowing from the
New Atalantis, and the fictional techniques of secret history which
Swift had condemned are used in the scene between the Queen and Marlborough
to develop the interpretation of the latter's character which Mrs. Manley
and Clement had put forward; his outwardly suave and affable demeanour
is shown to be the mask of a nature basically devious and incalculable.
Although personal mannerisms are exaggerated to the point of ridicule,
the general impression of subtle duplicity, concealed by professions
of cordiality and sincerity, is remarkably similar to that which hostile
contemporaries, including the Queen herself at a later date, have left
on record of their personal contacts with Marlborough.37

Clement, however, concentrated on the one incident in which
political pressures really had caused Marlborough to abandon his
habitually deferential attitude to the Queen. This one lapse might
perhaps be excused by his apologists, and a plausible objection to all
Tory complaints about the insolent and overbearing behaviour of
Marlborough and Godolphin to the Queen was that

they were both as gentle in their Manners and Behaviour,
had as much Command of Temper as any Men; were bred up
in Courts, and could not want so much Politeness as not
to preserve the ordinary Forms of approaching and speaking
to their Sovereign: The Insolence complained of could
not certainly be of that Sort ... 38

The account of Marlborough's audience with the Queen in the Secret
History, however, purported to demonstrate how he had maintained his "tyranny" over her in past years, without abandoning his celebrated courtier manner.

Fortunatus first informs the Empress that he is under such pressure from his colleagues to procure Arlus's dismissal, that failure would mean his own resignation; "then he farther begg'd leave, (not alas! as an Argument for her Compliance) but as he thought himself bound in Duty, to lay before her the Consequences of his so unavoidable, tho' unwilling Resignation" (p.24). This, however, is the preamble to a barely veiled threat of the chaos he is able to bring upon her affairs at home and abroad if she does not comply with him, a presumption which is made the more discreditable by the obsequious and patently insincere terms in which it is introduced.

The Empress acknowledges, as she must, that Fortunatus' prediction of the disastrous consequences of his resignation is accurate, but continues,

My Lord, I think I am safe, because, I find, I am in your Power; But I had rather now, methinks, relieve upon the Friend, than the Minister; Be then sincerely all the First, and help me in this Hardship! Suppose your self in my Dilemma, and tell me truly how you'd answer what you have now so warmly press'd me to Consider. (p.25)

The Queen was prone to treat her chief ministers as personal friends and her regard for Marlborough lingered even after his wife had forfeited her affection, so that it is on the basis of historical fact that the pamphleteer contrives the damaging contrast between the simplicity, sincerity, and pathos of the Empress's appeal to the friendship of her
minister, the unconscious irony of her implicit confidence in him, and his obvious insincerity, elaborately-couched threats, and calculating use of this trust. In such a context the Empress's artless admission that she is in his power has an ominous significance.

To make it quite plain that Fortunatus is untouched by this appeal, the omniscient narrator can slip in a direct pointer to his dissimulation -- "seeming touch'd with her Concern"; and it is interesting to note also, that the accompanying insight into his thoughts ("Happy in the Art of Pleasing, even with a Refusal ... [he] resolv'd at least to mingle Pity with his Sentence") gives a wholly repellent twist to what was otherwise a proverbial tribute to Marlborough's personal magnetism, his ability to "refuse more gracefully than other people could grant." The implication is that when such charm of manner becomes the tool of an unscrupulous nature, it is more dangerous and discreditable than overt insolence and browbeating. This is made quite apparent when Fortunatus draws upon all the florid and hypocritical involutions of Court rhetoric at his command to disguise his inexorable insistence on his own will.

... since your Peace requires it -- Preserve the Injur'd Arius in your Favour, and let me run the pleasing Risque of my Obedience -- Thus, Madam, when Honour'd with the Name of Friend, I must comply, and might at worst deserve your Pardon for betraying you: But then there is a waking Conscience in severer Honour, that will be heard, that is not to be soft'ned by the tend'rest Sighs of Nature, that chides me for this weak Submission, and bids my Virtue arm in your Defence -- Madam, 'tis with the utmost Pain I mention it -- but -- forgive the Harshness of the Word -- You must abandon Arius, or those that only can Support you -- (pp.25-26)
The clash between Marlborough and the Queen had, in fact, been more plain-spoken on both sides than it is here represented. The Queen at first obstinately refused to part with Harley, in spite of all Marlborough could say, and it was only in the face of cabinet and parliamentary pressures that she finally gave way. It is clear, however, why the pamphleteer chose to emphasise her submissiveness, rather than her strength of will on this occasion, for her reduction to the position of humble petitioner to her all-powerful minister presents the same disturbing spectacle of a reversal of the proper roles of sovereign and subject, as Clement had already hinted at, and this was the most powerful argument in favour of the ministerial changes.

A hostile critic of the *Secret History* referred contemptuously to the author's efforts to "scrue himself into Arlus's Favour," and a similar purpose is discernible in the second volume of Mrs. Manley's *Memoirs of Europe*. When, in May, she had sent a copy of the first volume for Harley's perusal, as an earnest of future services as propagandist, he was sufficiently interested to make himself a key for the identification of the more obscure characters. But although the condemnation of the Marlboroughs as corrupt favourites would certainly have pleased him, the portrait of the Duke ("Stauracius") was not in all respects adapted to his present purposes; for Mrs. Manley had been so preoccupied with the general's twin moral failings of covetousness and ingratitude, that she was content to minimize the dangers of his ambition, which, she explained, "wou'd have had no Bounds, had not his Avarice confin'd it" (I, p.253).
Perhaps she was informed, or realized for herself, that for the justification of Harley's schemes it had become necessary to represent Marlborough's ambition as a serious danger to the Crown, for in her second volume she abandoned her condemnation of his vices on purely moral grounds, and concentrated instead on the ambitious excesses to which they had led him. There was no further mention of the "moderating" effect of avarice, and his ingratitude was now not merely "abominable" morally, but positively treasonable: ignoring his obligations to a prince whose favour had raised him from nothing, Stauracius made "Caesar's Goodness of Temper his Engine wherewith to batter down, not only the Constitution, but even Augustus himself" (II, p.25).

To illustrate this process, Mrs. Manley concentrated, as other Harleyite pamphleteers had done, on Marlborough's disputes with the Queen during the previous winter. The conventions of secret history allowed her to pretend access to the most secret councils and motives of statesmen and monarchs, and with this licence she made two additions of her own to these episodes which increased the enormity of Marlborough's offence and made it of a piece with her accounts of his earlier career. The first was the revelation that his display of temper over Hill's appointment to the Essex regiment had been entirely counterfeit, and was in fact a pre-arranged device to display his devotion to the Junto's interests and so win their support of his request for the Captain-Generality for life:

At another time perhaps Stauracius wou'd not have so highly resented it; he had no mighty Crash of Passion in his Composition, he did not care to be warm'd, it must be a very great Occasion that rais'd his Phlegm, tho' he cou'd personate sometimes ...
However, to serve the present purpose, he "fell into all the Indecency both of Manners and Expression that was requir'd" (II, pp. 280-282). If this explanation of the incident were accepted, his apologists would not be able to excuse it as a momentary loss of self-control, arising from a genuine concern at attempts to undermine his authority in the army.

Mrs. Manley also reconciled Marlborough's confrontation with the Queen on this occasion with her earlier accounts of his relations with royal benefactors, particularly those in the New Atalantis; for she made it clear that the significance of the episode lay not only in the threat which the favourite's ambition had posed to the Crown, but in the ingratitude of the brutal display of counterfeit anger which had set his scheme in motion: "to repay him so ungratefully for all his Bounties! his Love, his Tenderness! this was an Arrow in the Heart of the afflicted Monarch!" (II, p. 283). Evidently she wished the incident to be considered, not in isolation, or even as the product of Marlborough's recent political alliance with the Whigs, but as the last in the long series of betrayals of affection and trust which had marked his rise in royal favour from the earliest stages.

There can be no doubt of the effectiveness of this propaganda. Of Marlborough's stand over the disposal of the Essex regiment, Francis Hare wrote later in the year, "no one thing, I fear, has been made a greater handle to mischief"; and some time later another defender also recalled that it had "been magnified as a great Crime in him, perhaps to Her M[ajest]y but especially among the People; and I fear it has had
its Effect." At the end of 1712, Thomas Burnet, surveying all the Tory attacks on Marlborough, agreed that this episode, and Harley's enforced resignation in 1708 had been plausibly represented as "the two most exceptionable Parts of the Dukes Life." Yet at the time no Whig pamphleteer presented an adequate defence of Marlborough's conduct on these occasions, and few broached the subject at all. Even Hare, who was to single out the criticism of Marlborough's military achievements in the Secret History for special attention, completely ignored the rest of its contents.

The fact was that no pamphleteer would dare to defend a minister who had carried any dispute with the Queen, however legitimate in itself, to a point where she became personally distressed or resentful; and the Tory propagandists had taken great care to stress this aspect of Marlborough's confrontations with her. Clement pointed out that at the time of greatest pressure from Marlborough and his colleagues, the Queen had been recently widowed, "and having lost the Support of her dear Consort, the anxiety of her mind was become so great that she was even overwhelm'd with grief." The really discreditable feature of Marlborough's conduct, as it was represented in the Secret History, was his insistence on his own will in spite of the personal distress it caused the Queen; and Mrs. Manley's variation on this theme was to dwell on the tears of anguish which Stauracius' pretended brutality of manner had wrung from his prince. The Queen's rank, sex, and popularity as a monarch made an absolutely chivalrous and deferential behaviour incumbent on all her ministers, and the slightest deviation from this standard on Marlborough's
part would have remained indefensible, even if he were cleared of
the worst suspicions of treasonable intent.

His apologists could not even argue that the Tory accusations
of insolence, presumption, and disrespect were exaggerated, for the Queen
was known to have been deeply affronted by Marlborough's past conduct,
and particularly by the threatened parliamentary action against Abigail
Masham. In fact, this resentment was offered as one of the principal
reasons for the ministerial changes, and accepted as such by the most
well-informed. Therefore, as a later commentator on this kind of
propaganda observed,

her Majesty permitting it to be once openly and directly
asserted, no Answer could possibly be made to it, no
Justification could be offered; for to what End could any
one dare to plead that her Majesty was not used with
Insolence, if she, the only Judge and Witness in that Case,
would affirm she was? 46

These were not the only deterrents to Marlborough's potential
apologists. Some who were prepared to defend his conduct in other
spheres, actually shared the censorious view which the Tory pamphleteers
had taken of his recent behaviour to the Queen. Hare, for example,
thought the dispute over the Essex regiment ill-advised, if not in itself,
at least in the advantage it had given to his opponents; for "it will
always seem hard a prince should not now and then dispose of a regiment,
when her general has the disposal of so many." 47 Another pamphleteer,
although slightly more sympathetic, unflatteringly attributed any
impropriety in Marlborough's conduct to "the infirmities of his Age," and was not prepared to defend the attempt to oust Abigail Masham at all,
maintaining that her influence had never been proved pernicious and
that the Queen should have perfect freedom in the choice of her personal
servants. Moreover, the attempts of Marlborough and his Duchess to
disclaim all responsibility for this scheme, once they discovered how
greatly it had estranged the Queen, had alienated many of their Whig
supporters, and by the time of the ministerial changes the subject was
such a sore one on all counts that the silence of the majority of the
pamphleteers is scarcely surprising.

Silence was also the only possible reaction to the revelation
of Marlborough's attempts to secure the Captain-Generalcy for life.
His own colleagues had opposed him at the time, and the only friendly
pamphleteer who mentioned the subject at all, denied outright that
Marlborough had made any such request, on the unconsciously ironical
grounds that he was far too prudent to do anything so "repugnant to
the Genius of the Nation." 

In fact, the emphasis which Harleyite pamphleteers placed on
the exorbitant ambition of the Marlboroughs, as the true cause of the
ministerial change, had been designed to unite both Whigs and Tories
in condemnation of the family. Defoe was able to remind Whig protestors
that in the past they had been "as warm against, and as dissatisfy'd
with" this abuse of royal favour as their opponents, and an astute
supporter of Harley's had recommended that the Whigs as a party be
encouraged to attribute their disgrace solely to those "whose vanity
and avarice of usurping so much rendered them insupportable and their
discharge necessary.". By this means, he believed, the family would be deprived of supporters to "blazon their actions" and condemn those who had advised the change. 51

In any case, the mere fact that Marlborough and his colleagues were now known to have forfeited royal favour, was itself a sufficient deterrent to all but their most zealous defenders. "With the generality of Writers," Mrs. Manley wrote, "'tis confess'd, the Emperor's Smiles creates [sic] (as his Frowns destroy) Desert"; and in a moment of ironic self-examination Swift confirmed the truth of this maxim for himself and many others. 52 The defection of Defoe and Boyer to Harley's cause once he was in power illustrates the lure of Court favour for journalists with no commitment to extreme Whiggism and no overriding loyalty to the old ministers. Moreover, since Harley and his colleagues were the Queen's personal choice, any pamphleteer who attempted to defend the Whig leaders at their expense could expect to find himself accused, like his patrons, of insulting the Queen's intelligence and questioning her prerogative; 53 and if the offence were particularly blatant, there was always the danger of official prosecution.

This thought was in Sarah's mind as she reviewed one of the few really solid attacks on the new administration, for the benefit of the Queen's doctor, Sir David Hamilton. The pamphlet, The Impartial Secret History of Arlus, Fortunatus, and Odolphus, argued that Tory attacks on Marlborough's exorbitant ambition were libels inspired by the resentment of Harley and his associates at his repeated victories
over the French, since these threatened the success of their schemes for bringing in the Pretender. It was, Sarah claimed, 

a plain true story told of the present and past time, under hard & disagreeable names, to read, but one understands it as well as if they were call'd by their own names, & I suppose it was done in that manner to make it more easy to be printed.

In fact the theme was so provocative that, having copied out large portions of the pamphlet with annotations, she was anxious lest the document go astray; "being writ in my hand it might do me a prejudice." Her protestations that she did not know the author were belied by her understanding of the finest points of his allegory and by her concern to shield him from the "people in power." His identity, however, remains a secret, though some suspicion must fall on Arthur Maynwaring, who was at this time engaged in editing the Medley under her auspices, and who had collaborated with her in the past in the writing of a pamphlet in which the subject of Tory crypto-Jacobitism was very prominent. Even if the Impartial Secret History was not his work, it certainly embodied his sentiments; earlier in the year he had argued that when the Tories came to power, they could be expected to "make their first Attack upon that Family, which had destroy'd the Hopes of the Pretender."

It was natural that the arch-Whig Duchess, long convinced of the Jacobite commitment of the Tory leaders and outraged at the press attacks on her husband, should have regarded this pamphlet as a definitive answer to his critics; but it is doubtful if this opinion would have been shared in less prejudiced circles. Marlborough himself was not absolutely
convinced at this time of the reality of Harley's designs on the Protestant Succession. Nor did this explanation of Tory hostility account for the fact that many of the pamphlet attacks, however malicious and exaggerated, were based upon recent episodes in Marlborough's relations with the Queen, some of which, as even his own supporters admitted, were open to serious misinterpretation.
NOTES TO CHAPTER I


5. [Simon Clement], Faults on Both Sides (1710), p.35; see also Examiner, No.18 (7 December 1710), in Swift, Prose Works, III, p.33.

6. Essay towards the History of the Last Ministry, p.10; [Clement], Faults on Both Sides, p.36; Sir Thomas Double at Court, p.6.


8. No.29 (22 February 1710/1), in Swift, Prose Works, III, p.95.

9. Counter Queries (n.p., [1710]), p.1 (s.sh. numbered on both sides). Moore, Checklist, p.83, Item 200, has suggested that this piece was published early in 1711; in content, however, it rather belongs to late 1710.

10. The Gun-Smiths' Queries (n.p., 1710), p.2 (s.sh. numbered on both sides); Essay towards the History of the Last Ministry, p.3.
11. Essay towards the History of the Last Ministry, pp. 2 and 46; Gun-Smiths' Queries, p. 2; To the Whig's Nineteen Queries, a Fair and Full Answer by an Honest Torie (1710), p. 8.

12. Memoirs of Europe towards the Close of the Eighth Century (1710), I, pp. 181-190 (advertised, Daily Courant, No. 2672, 17 May 1710, "just publish'd"). This and all subsequent references to the Memoirs are to the facsimile edition in the second volume of The Novels of Mary Delariviere Manley, ed. Patricia Koster (Gainesville, Florida, 1971); as in the case of the New Atalantis, references are to the facsimile pagination, not to that added by the editor.


18. Clement, Faults on Both Sides, p. 54.


28. Oldmixon, Maynwaring, p.171; Faults in the Fault-Finder (1710), p.3. In the ensuing discussions of Faults on Both Sides, page references are included parenthetically in the text.

29. A Vindication of "Faults on Both Sides" (1710), p.33. Several contemporary attributions to Clement are cited by Ransome, "The Press ...", Cambridge Historical Journal, VI, pp. 214-215 n.33. Although Faults on Both Sides was not specifically titled secret history, a critic noted Clement's claims to "Secret History and great knowledge in Matters that he won't speak" (Supplement to "Faults in the Fault-Finder", p.28).


31. To William Penn, 4/15 April 1711, B.M. Portland Loan MSS 29/45W/2. For Clement's letters to Harley from 1707 to 1713, see B.M. Portland Loan MSS 29/45W/2, 3, and 4.


34. For the reaction of Marlborough and his supporters to this propaganda, see [Francis Hare], The Conduct of the Duke of Marlborough during the Present War (1712), p. 279; and [Arthur Maynwaring, et al.], The Lives of the Two Illustrious Generals (1713), p. 149. Rumours about Marlborough's request had been circulating among the well-informed since January 1710; see Wentworth to Raby, 24 January 1710, The Wentworth Papers 1705-1739, ed. J.J. Cartwright (1883), p. 103. But a comment in the Political State, I (January 1710/1), p. 66, suggests that for most people Clement had made the first authoritative revelation.

35. Kennett to Blackwell, 2 November 1710, B.M. Lansdowne MSS 1013, f. 138v; in this letter Kennett mentions the rumour that the Essay had been written by "a H. Ch. Divine in concert with a Commissioner." For Boyer's solicitation of the gazetteership, see his letters to Harley of 15 August 1710 (B.M. Portland Loan MSS 29/127/4) and 17 October 1710 (H.M.C. Portland MSS, IV, p. 615). Boyer's periodical publications, such as the Political State, are often Whiggish in sympathy, but he had had some association with Harley in the past (see, in particular, his letter of 11 September 1704, B.M. Portland Loan MSS 29/127/4), and claimed in his letter of 15 August 1710 that he had never given the "least occasion of Offence to either Party" by his publications.

36. Cf. the Secret History, pp. 23-26 with the accounts of G.S. Holmes and W.A. Speck, "The Fall of Harley in 1708 Reconsidered," English Historical Review, LXXX (1965), pp. 694-696; Edward Harley's "Memoirs of the Harley Family," H.M.C. Portland MSS, V, p. 647; and Sir John Cropley to the Earl of Shaftesbury, 7 February 1707/8, P.R.O. MSS 30/24/21, f. 12. For Hare's attribution, see the Management of the War, p. 36. A further attribution to Colley Cibber is mentioned in The Cambridge Bibliography of English Literature, ed. F.W. Bateson (1940), II, p. 556, but the bitter attack on the Duchess of Marlborough in the Secret History, pp. 20-23 is at variance with the lifelong admiration Cibber professed for her; see Richard Hindry Barker, Mr. Cibber of...
Drury Lane (New York, 1939), pp. 84-85. The Secret History was first advertised in the Post Boy, No. 2416 (4-7 November 1710); page references in the subsequent discussion of it are given parenthetically in the text.


38. The Grand Accuser the Greatest of All Criminals (1735), Pt. I, p. 18.


40. Holmes and Speck, "The Fall of Harley . . .," English Historical Review, LXXIX, pp. 695-697.


42. The Novels of Mary Delariviere Manley, I, pp. xvi-xvii. The publication of the second volume of Memoirs of Europe was advertised in the Examiner, No. 18 (16-23 November 1710); in the ensuing discussion of the work, volume and page numbers are given parenthetically in the text.

43. Hare to Sarah, 1 December 1710, Private Corr., II, p. 45; J.F., A Letter from a Curate of Suffolk to a High-Church Member concerning the D. of M. and Mr. Walpole (1712), pp. 23-24; [Thomas Burnet], A Certain Information of a Certain Discourse (2nd edn., 1712), pp. 45-46.

44. Faults on Both Sides, p. 35.

45. [Clement], Vindication of the "Faults on Both Sides", p. 35; [Boyter], Letter from a Foreign Minister, pp. 8-9; Sarah to the Queen, 7 June 1710, Blenheim MSS G1-7; Brydges to Drummond, 24 August 1710, "Letters on Godolphin's Dismissal," H.L.C., III, p. 237; The Private Diary of William, First Earl Cowper, ed. E.C. Hawtrey, for the Roxburghe Club (Eton, 1833), p. 51.

47. To Sarah, 1 December 1710, Private Corr., II, p. 45.


49. Snyder, "The Duke of Marlborough's Request ...," J.S.A.H.R., XLIV, p. 81; Sarah to the Queen, 7 June 1710, Blenheim MSS G1-7.


51. [Clément], Faults on Both Sides, pp. 36 and 55; [Boyer], Essay towards the History of the Last Ministry, p. 40; [Defoe], Counter Queries, p. 1; Robert Monkton to Harley, 23 August 1710, H.M.C. Portland MSS, IV, p. 574.


53. See, e.g., [Defoe], Counter Queries, p. 1; Examiner, No. 18 (7 December 1710), in Swift, Prose Works, III, p. 33.


57. Hare to Sarah, 1 December 1710, Private Corr., II, p. 40.
Chapter II

GENERAL AND PLENIPOTENTIARY

Yet, preoccupied as the Tory pamphleteers were with the domestic crisis, they could not shelve the question of the war completely. Whig pamphlets, the most influential of which were The French King's Thanks to the Tories of Great Britain and A Letter from Monsieur Pett[ecu]m to Monsieur B[u]ly's, still insisted that an opportunity for peace had been lost, and the French heartened by the ministerial changes. According to Dyer, the Tories laughed at such suggestions, but the attention that was devoted to these two pamphlets in the first issues of the Examiner suggests that they were regarded as dangerous.¹

Hare anticipated that, finding themselves blamed for the lost chance of peace, the new ministers would "lay the fault of its not being made somewhere else, to skreen themselves from being thought the true cause of it."² This is exactly what they and their journalists did. Charles Davenant's incorrigibly self-damning Whig spokesman cited four Whig pamphlets, among them the two just mentioned, and expressed the hope that they had

prepar'd the People, by way of anticipation, to lay upon the new Ministry, the interruption of the Peace, and the decay of Credit; which, to speak plain Truth, have been the result of former Errors, and no more than was to be expected from our Conduct ...\n
St John's Letter to the Examiner put forward the same doctrine.³ Once the General Election had produced its massive Tory victory, and the
ministry settled in earnest to the task of making peace, there was more need than ever to substantiate this claim. After some initial optimism, reflected in the Tory journalists’ almost Whiggish assurances about the future of the war, it became evident that the Whig ideal of "no peace without Spain" would have to be relinquished. "We have nothing to save us but a peace," Swift wrote in January 1711, "and I am sure we cannot have such a one as we hoped, and then the Whigs will bawl what they would have done had they continued in power." In the Examiner he accordingly prepared to argue that the difficulties which the Whigs would hasten to blame on the new ministry were "the necessary Consequence of former Counsels." 4

It was clear that if blame were to be diverted, and the ministerial revolution justified in these terms, some criticism of Marlborough’s past conduct of the war and the peace negotiations would be involved. The accusation that he had prolonged the war was by this time of several years’ standing and increased in plausibility with every campaign; "'tis natural for People when they grow weary of a War, to give into any Surmizes of this kind, be they never so ill grounded," Hare admitted. 5 In the circumstances, the first hints of the Tory pamphleteers on this subject were surprisingly tentative, keeping to the safe ground of unchallengeable platitudes concerning the frailty of human nature in general and of Marlborough’s nature in particular. "I do not say that his G[ra]ce desires to prolong the War, for I should think he has got enough," one journalist commented, "yet I hear that the
Contributions are very sweet and inviting ... I have nothing to say against this great Man, but I tell you that Grandeur and Riches make Men often forget themselves, that Ambition is Blind, and Avaritia est radix Omnium malorum"; and another pamphleteer, having also declined to accuse Marlborough directly, continued:

it is possible such as are Gainers by the Continuance of the War, may not be so heartily dispos'd to finish it, as we could Wish ... It's natural for all Persons to lean towards their own Interest, and to prefer the bettering their own Private Circumstances before those of the Publick ... [and] it is not certain but many Thousands per Annum may have an Influence upon the most Heroical Minds ...

As yet, however, there were only hints, from St John and his two aptest pupils, Swift and Mrs. Manley, of the theory of a massive league of vested interests between Marlborough, the Whig monied men, and the Allies, into which these charges of self-interest were later to be elaborated.

Since Marlborough was both Captain-General and senior English plenipotentiary, the charge of prolonging the war could be substantiated by criticism either of his strategy in the field, or of his conduct at the conference table. But although the former was for the time the more popular topic, one very obvious objection had first to be answered: namely, if Marlborough had been bent on protracting the war, "what cou'd engage him to be so sincere in his many signal Victories o'er our Enemies?" His critics found their answer in a revival of the long-standing Tory grievance that, although the restoration of the entire Spanish monarchy to the Austrian candidate was the principal unrealized
war-aim, the Whig ministry had consistently subordinated operations in Spain to Marlborough's theatre in Flanders, where, it was argued, France was so heavily defended by frontier fortresses that even repeated victories and successful sieges could not put a decisive end to the war. By 1710, as both Maynwaring and Hare acknowledged, this had become the most plausible criticism of Marlborough's conduct of the war. As Addison had written in the *Tatler* when peace was thought sure, "the Command of General in Flanders hath been ever look'd upon as a Provision for Life"; and to the civilian it would seem self-evident that the country fought for should be the principal theatre of operations.

Moreover, this theory seemed to offer an explanation for the bewildering fact that Marlborough's successes, spectacular as they were, had not yet secured a peace. Indeed, the very extent of this success, by a startling paradox, could be made to support the contention that his strategy was basically misguided; for how, Swift demanded, could peace have been lost after so many victories, but by "the extreamest Degree of Folly and Corruption?" It is not surprising, therefore, that almost every hostile pamphleteer who broached the subject, adopted this explanation of the protraction of the war.

The question of Marlborough's misconduct as plenipotentiary was a more delicate matter. Since the Whigs accounted for the repeated failure of the negotiations by insisting that the French had never treated sincerely for peace, blame could be transferred to Marlborough only if it were argued that the terms demanded had been impossible for the
This suggestion had long been current by word of mouth, but the ministerial journalists could not reproduce it without contradicting their own assurances that the new administration would be as zealous as the old in procuring a safe and honourable peace. For the time, therefore, Marlborough's critics could do little more than arouse suspicion and resentment in the most general terms, with the hint that more would be revealed at a later date.

Mrs. Manley and Charles Davenant both dwelt upon the economic hardships resulting from Marlborough's failure as peacemaker, for which the glory of his victories was said to be no compensation. An anonymous pamphleteer, who may have been Harley himself, queried rhetorically,

WHETHER the Country Fellow was not in the right, who said, He could not expect a Peace, while the General was the Plenipotentiary, any more than he could hope for the end of his Law-Suit, whilst a Norfolk Attorney was the Arbitrator of his Difference? 14

Replying to a Whig pamphleteer who had mentioned a design to blame the English plenipotentiaries for the failure of the peace negotiations, the Examiner blandly reproved him for arousing a suspicion which, "when once awaken'd, may not easily be laid asleep again." 15 Even St John dared not at first go beyond these tentative insinuations; he passed over the Whig assertion that "our Plenipotentiaries did all that possibly could be done to obtain a Safe and Honourable Peace," but "not because it is True, for the contrary shall one Time or other be made out to the World, when the True State of our present Condition will be set in a clearer Light." 16 It was not until November that Mrs. Manley was permitted to make the first overt reference in print to the "harsh and
unreasonable Terms of Peace" demanded by Marlborough during the negotiations of 1709, and Swift did not broach the subject in the Examiner until January of the following year. Yet it seems that these scattered hints did their work, for by the end of 1710, Hare decided that a detailed defence of Marlborough's conduct as plenipotentiary had become essential, "there being no Point that People are so uneasy at, or so much in the dark about, and consequently in which they can be so easily impos'd on." It was with the publication of The Secret History of Arlus and Odolphus in November 1710, that this desultory propaganda was given its most coherent expression, providing what was probably the immediate provocation for Hare's definitive vindication of his patron. The usual cautiously stated maxims concerning the temptations facing an avaricious general were now delivered sharply and directly, and without apology ("are we to treat that Vice in every other Man with Suspicion, Ill Wishes, and Contempt, and think it not only Pardonable, but Worthy of the Highest Trust in him?"); while the passage discussing the errors in Marlborough's strategy, which contained a mocking echo of Addison's comment in the Tatler, was low-keyed and good-humoured in its irony, its power coming from the implicit assumption that the case was so self-evident as to need no overstatement:

the War, we find, has made a shift some Years to out-live our Hopes of it, which 'tis possible we may in some Measure owe to his prudent Conduct, laying the Cause of the War in one Country, and the Seat of it in another, where our Conquests have got us more Honour, than Profit ... The Command of an Army in the Country where our Enemy has been able to lose so many Battles, has been always look'd on as Provision for Life even of the most Victorious Generals. Let them be never so Successful they are
sure not to fight themselves out of their Posts, unless they are too Rash in exposing their Persons: There's a Barrier of stubborn Towns will find Work enough for the Wisest of 'em ... (pp. 10-11)

In such a context, even the outrageous insinuation about Marlborough's personal cowardice, slipped in almost as an afterthought, and simply as a matter of logic, could be swallowed without straining.

The pamphleteer then took the opportunity to give the carping which had followed the battle of Malplaquet its first detailed and unequivocal expression in print, his air of casual familiarity with the circumstances of the action establishing his right to be heard on a subject which might otherwise have been considered outside the sphere of the party writer:

Was the last Years Bloody Battle so well Concerted, as it might have been? Was it so absolutely Necessary to stay two Days within Sight of the Enemy, for a few Troops that never Engag'd when they came, and give 'em so much Time to throw up such unequal Fortresses before we Attack'd them? (p. 12)

Nor did this writer show any hesitation in broaching the delicate subject of Marlborough's conduct as peacemaker, though his subject was not the controversial and highly publicized conferences of 1709 and 1710, but the overtures made by the French after the battle of Ramillies in 1706. The theory that a satisfactory peace might have been obtained on this occasion was a favourite one of Harley himself, and if resentment against Marlborough could be expected to increase in proportion to the number of years of unnecessary war to which he was believed to have committed his country, it was clearly more profitable for his enemies to date his obstruction of the peace from 1706, rather than 1709 or 1710.
According to the secret historian, Harley, as Secretary of State, had received "from a Minister of our chief Allies such full Conditions of Peace propos'd to them from our Grand Enemy, as would have wholly answer'd the End of our War," but Marlborough and Godolphin, bent on prolonging hostilities, had refused to consider them, and had forced their colleague's resignation, when he attempted to lay the matter before the Queen (pp. 13-14). In fact this wording was ambiguous; it implied that Louis XIV had, in 1706, been prepared to restore the entire Spanish monarchy to the Austrian candidate. This was not the case, though the intention to deceive those who had not been well-informed about the terms offered was obvious. On the other hand, those in possession of the facts were at liberty to take the passage as an indirect argument that English interests would be perfectly well served without insistence on this aim. It thus became a conveniently oblique means of introducing a proposition which might soon have to be argued openly, and which was bound to meet with vociferous opposition from the Whigs.

Before Hare published his four letters "to a Tory-Member," soon to be known under the general title, The Management of the War, there had been no satisfactory reply to these criticisms of Marlborough's conduct as general and plenipotentiary. One Whig pamphleteer had declined to enter the debate on the inadequate grounds that the critics had not produced "one colourable Argument" in support of their case, and others
resorted to the standard theory that frustrated Jacobitism accounted for Tory belittlement of the victories. Only Addison in the shortlived Whig-Examiner and Lord Cowper in his Letter to Isaac Bickerstaff, dealt briefly, but intelligently, with the objections to Marlborough's Flanders warfare, and Hare was to incorporate their arguments into his own complete vindication. In fact it was he, and not Steele in the person of Isaac Bickerstaff, who took to heart Cowper's injunction to compose a more detailed defence of the conduct of the war and the peace negotiations than had hitherto appeared.

Hare certainly had more points in his favour than any other candidate, for a journalistic task which demanded discretion, intelligence, and a good deal of specialized knowledge. His formidable powers of intellect commanded the respect of friends and enemies throughout his life. A professional rival had magnanimously declared him to be "as fit a man for the station of Chaplain General [to the army] as any One in England: an honest, brave man and a good Scholar"; and even his bitterest Tory critic conceded, "none will deny him to be a Person of Learning and Intelligence."

By the end of 1710, in his capacity as Marlborough's personal chaplain, Hare had had nearly seven years' experience of observing and reporting the army's engagements and had so satisfied Marlborough's exacting standards that he was entrusted with the task of preparing the official account of the Blenheim campaign for publication. In fact, as his private news-letters reveal, he had an interest in, and an understanding of, military matters
that were unusual in a civilian, and especially in one who was also a scholar and a clergyman. 26

These occupations meant that Hare was a respectable apologist, as well as an intelligent one, a matter of importance to a patron who was so sensitive to the productions of the party hacks. Hare undoubtedly hoped for preferment in the church as a reward for his journalistic and other services. In fact, one of his critics sneered at The Management of the War, as having been written solely to "grasp at a Miter," and claimed that "he is more mercenary who writes for a considerable Preferment, than the other who does it only for a few Guineas." 27 A bishopric was certainly not beyond Hare's expectations, and, but for his Cambridge degree, the bishopric of Oxford would have been his four years before. As it was, he had had to be content with a chaplaincy at Chelsea Royal Hospital and a prebend at St. Paul's, procured for him by Marlborough and Godolphin, and he later dated his claims to the bishopric of Worcester from the year in which The Management of the War was published. 28

Yet personal ambition cannot have been his sole motive for writing it. Association with those who were under royal displeasure was not the high road to promotion, as Hare discovered in November 1710, when, as Marlborough's chaplain, he was ostentatiously passed over for an appointment to Convocation. 29 But at the beginning of the year he had written to Henry Watkins, "'tis my principle, you know, not to desert, or leave his Grace till he leaves me," and to this principle he adhered even when the "good End" he then anticipated became very remote; he could therefore claim
quite truthfully in retrospect, "I endeavoured to serve my Lord Marlborough & his friends at a time when I could not be supposed to act, either out of Flattery, or for any private views." His indignation at the party criticism which dogged his patron was genuine, and his impulse to defend him must have arisen as much from this, as from any remoter consideration.

Hare's personal loyalty to Marlborough at this period transcended his commitment to either party. "I can't understand being for this or that party, but I can understand being for this or that man, this or that thing," he wrote revealingly while The Management of the War was in the process of composition. In fact, his attitude to the parties was largely determined by their respective attitudes to his patron. It is significant that he found many of the doctrines of Faults on Both Sides congenial, and his sympathies clearly lay with ministers such as Marlborough and Godolphin, who were naturally moderate politically and therefore subject to pressure from the extremists of both parties.

Although he was in accord with the Whig war policy of a complete reduction of the exorbitant power of France, and although Oldmixon was later to write of his "Zeal in those Days for Revolution Principles," Hare's greatest indignation in the long, sensible, and intelligent letters he wrote to the Duchess of Marlborough in 1710, was reserved for the power-hungry Junto and the obstructions they had put in Marlborough's way; "your Grace is very generous to excuse, as you do, the usage your Whig friends, as you are pleased to call them, have shewn to Lord Marlborough,"
he observed with daring coolness at one point.\textsuperscript{35} Professionally he leaned towards the Tories; "if the men of the Tory Ministry have their faults, they don't so directly strike at religion, nor set themselves to run down those who profession it is."\textsuperscript{36} These opinions were sufficiently well-known among Hare's Whig friends to be the subject of some teasing.\textsuperscript{37} Yet there was no doubt where his sympathies lay when a difference arose between Marlborough and the Tories. His letters to his Tory colleague, Watkins, contain scathing references to the latter's "old friends" and their malicious detraction of the Duke, and when the ministerial reshuffle which brought the party to power threatened Marlborough's position, Hare was careful to assure Horace Walpole, a former pupil with Whig allegiances, that he was "heartily sorry for the changes both on account of the Public, & for the part my friends suffer in it."\textsuperscript{38}

The four "letters" or sections of The Management of the War were originally published separately between 4 January and 24 February 1711.\textsuperscript{39} The first two ran to a fourth and a third edition respectively, excluding the final collected form, no mean feat at a time when "whatever appear'd on the Whig Side, was thrown away without any Examination tho' ever so well writ."\textsuperscript{40} Indications of the pamphlets' enduring popularity and influence are plentiful. Boyer, who had no reason, in view of Hare's severe censure of a work of his own, to give him more praise than his due, states that they were "receiv'd with general Approbation," and there are casual references in both Whig and Tory writings to the "four letters" and the "four famous
Letters" long after their publication. They were also in common use by Whig pamphleteers as source material, and were recalled by historians of both parties later in the century as the definitive vindication of the war and peace policies of Marlborough and the Whig ministry. But perhaps the most striking tribute to their importance is the attention paid to them by Swift, who made a point of ignoring the majority of opposition pamphlets as beneath his notice; he not only devoted space to discussing them in two issues of the Examiner, but conceded that they were "worth Examining" in detail.

The attribution to Hare was made almost at once, and since in the text of the pamphlets, he had made some attempt to discourage the assumption that the author had been an eyewitness of the events he described, there may be some truth in the derisive comment of a critic:

I understand, he is so fond of his Productions, finding them inscrib'd the Second and Third Editions, That what at first he recommended as a Secret to the Publisher, he takes all Occasions to reveal himself, that is, to own and declare himself the Author of those admir'd Letters.

Certainly there was some discreet leakage of information in friendly circles. "If you have not Seen the Mannagem\textsuperscript{t}: of the Warr in 4 parts writt by an Acquaintance of yours," a London correspondent of Horace Walpole's wrote, "Let me know and I will Send them by a Safe hand."

However, another pamphlet, probably the work of Oldmixon, who had seen The Management of the War through the press, denied that Hare had ever claimed authorship, and suggested that the person responsible may have been "a Layman, and a Member too; and I have heard more than one guess'd at."
This was almost certainly a reference to Maynwaring, M.P. for West Looe, who had actually revised Hare's work for publication. Yet these attempts to confuse the issue were unsuccessful. Oldmixon was ridiculed for giving himself "a sort of learned Air, / For Manapemnts of War, compos'd by H--re," and "the Confessor to the Army, who knows so much of the Management of the War" continued to be the butt of the Tory pamphleteers.

The fact was that a semi-official acknowledgement of authorship had both advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, given Hare's connection with Marlborough, it would add to the respect with which the pamphlets were read; on the other, it could and did lay Hare open to the charge of writing for preferment and of meddling in matters unbecoming his cloth; nor was it desirable for Marlborough's name to be too closely associated with any criticism of the Queen's new administration. An admiring commentator on the pamphlets was very conscious of this dilemma, and declined to discuss the various conjectures about their authorship, for "it requires something more to discover a Man, who, without doubt, had some sufficient Reasons to forbear exposing his Name in Print"; but he continued,

I can nevertheless I assure you, that if we guess right, his Person, his Character, and the Opportunity he had of being rightly inform'd, ought to give us a Confidence, that the Facts he mentions, and which the Public has not been acquainted with, are Authentick, and to prepossess us in Favour of his Reasoning.

Others stressed this authority which Hare's position on Marlborough's staff gave him, and it was inevitable that he should also be generally assumed "to have receiv'd Hints and Instructions from his Patron."
The extent of Marlborough's involvement is, however, not easy to determine. The distaste he had evinced for printed apologies in 1706 was rooted in the natural assumption that a victorious general needed no such justification, but with the criticism that followed Oudenarde and Malplaquet, this view became increasingly untenable, and by 1710 there could be no doubt that his prestige would suffer considerably, if the press attacks of his political opponents went completely unanswered. This press campaign was, as Maynwaring later put it, the "unforeseen Foe" which Marlborough would have to contend with henceforth; and the fact that his reputation was being systematically assailed by journalists protected and encouraged by his ministerial colleagues, meant that he was singularly vulnerable. St John, who as one of the Secretaries of State, controlled the official methods of suppressing propaganda offensive to those in power, was himself a hostile pamphleteer and a patron of pamphleteers; Marlborough could not have recourse to the law for protection, as in the past. Replies in kind were therefore the only means of combating the evil, and Marlborough was prepared to acknowledge this, though he was soon to be made aware that even this procedure had its dangers. Nevertheless, when there was a question of enlisting Steele as a possible defender the following year, Sarah, to whom the initial application had been made, found her husband quite agreeable to the transaction in principle, provided that its financial basis was not made public. It is unlikely, therefore, that he would have had any objections to Hare's similar efforts. It is, in any case, difficult to believe that Hare would have
ventured into print on such a subject without Marlborough's sanction. One recalls Godolphin's warning to Harley that a pamphlet which he had commissioned for Marlborough's benefit should have the general's approval before printing. There is also the following letter from the Duke to his wife of 26 April/7 May 1711:

I have forgott if I did formerly give you an account of a Chaplain that desir'd to Print a relation of the present Warr, he was direct'd to lett you have a Copie, which I desire you wou'd beg the favour of 52 to peruse, for if they are not well perform'd, the printing of them shou'd be delay'd; but I think we can't do better then to leave that to the Judgement of 52.

The letter is deliberately cryptic, at a time when Marlborough knew that his correspondence was liable to be opened by the ministry's agents; but "52" was occasionally used as a cipher for the Duchess herself (the wording to suggest that they were two different people may be a device to conceal this), and the chaplain referred to was almost certainly Hare, who was still in London at the time. The impersonal reference probably indicates that Marlborough had no cipher for his name. The projected work may have been either The Management of the War (assuming that Marlborough did not know of its publication), or Hare's longer tract, The Conduct of the Duke of Marlborough during the Present War, which appeared the following January. But the point which the letter does establish positively is that, while Marlborough expected his clients to apply to him for permission to publish accounts of his conduct, he preferred to leave the closer supervision to his wife and her circle. The transaction involving Steele also suggests that this was the usual arrangement.
From a practical point of view, it is also unlikely that Marlborough had any direct influence on the composition of *The Management of the War*, since he had remained abroad for several weeks after Hare had returned to London at the end of 1710, and it was during this period that the bulk of the pamphlets must have been written; and after his own home-coming, Marlborough was in such a "continual hurry and concern," that he can have had little time to devote to such matters. But this is not to minimize his indirect influence on the pamphlets which, as will be seen, is apparent throughout. After seven years' close association, Hare would have been sufficiently well-informed about Marlborough's views on any subject likely to have a bearing on his task, not to need specific "Hints and Instructions" for the occasion.

Sarah's influence on Hare can be more fully documented. Her decision to begin a lengthy correspondence with him on the affairs of the day, and to supply him with copies of her own manuscript accounts of recent events, at a time when he was of possible use as a pamphleteer, suggests that she was consciously sounding and guiding his opinions; and in fact, several passages from Hare's letters to her were transferred almost word for word into *The Management of the War*. There is also the possibility that he received payment from her for his services. In a letter written just before the first of the pamphlets went to press, Hare gave her "a thousand thanks for the goodness you have shewn in the kind present you have been pleased to send me," and some years later, complaining of the
lack of recognition of his services in Whig circles, he added, "I say
not this to reproach your Grace, whom I have always found more ready
to do favours, than I have been to ask them."59 One need not assume
that the present referred to was money, though it may have been, but it
is reasonable to suppose that it had some connection with his current
journalistic activities. If it seems strange that Hare did not
mention the pamphlets he was engaged on in his letters to her, it may simply
have been that, like most opposition journalists, he was reluctant to commit
any evidence of his involvement in the press campaign to paper.

Hare methodically devoted two of his four letters to considering
the criticism of Marlborough's conduct as general, and two to his part in
the peace negotiations; and in the former he naturally devoted most space
to the charge that Marlborough had neglected the vital Spanish theatre
in favour of a series of futile offensives in Flanders. He was aware the
plausibility of this theory for many people, so that, while privately
dismissing it as "nonsensical cant,"60 he was careful to make his
printed rebuttal closely argued and equally plausible. His first contention
was that the climate and geography of Spain, and its distance from England,
made it unsuitable as the main theatre of war, and that Marlborough's
strategy which had given it only a secondary importance was therefore
quite sound: "if that Kingdom be ever recover'd, it must be by proper
Applications to France" (pp. 10-19). This was certainly a doctrine learnt
from Marlborough, who had been confirmed in it by Allied failures in Spain.
"If you could order itt so as that wee might have success in Flanders," he had written to Heinsius, "I should hope to gaine Spain by France."  

Hare's account of the difficulties of mounting full-scale campaigns in Spain was undoubtedly accurate. St John himself admitted, "we feel by experience, how insupportable an expence it is to carry on a regular war with great armies in Spain," but added, "still we think, that the expence which we have been at, well applied, would have been effectual."  

It was this charge of "shameful Mismanagements in Spain" which Swift accused Hare of ignoring, and once it had been confirmed by the House of Lords, in order "to give the Duke of Marlborough a side-wind Mortification," Hare's opponents could use the official verdict to demolish his case without further argument.  

In tackling the second part of this major criticism, that having failed to give priority to the Spanish theatre, Marlborough had occupied himself solely with siege warfare on France's most heavily defended frontier, Hare was on stronger ground. Yet his task was seriously complicated by his awareness of the need for constant discretion and forbearance in discussing the shortcomings of the Allies, as he considered these had hampered the execution of the Duke's strategy. Marlborough himself had repeatedly complained of having to minimize his difficulties on this score in public, for fear of fostering bad relations which would impede the progress of the war still further. Hare had noted with approval his patron's refusal to "suffer Justice to be done him by the least Word, that might be prejudicial to the Publick, or indeed to any body else," and he now took this discretion...
as his model. Having noted in general terms that the Duke's hands had "been often ty'd, when he was impatient to be doing something brave and Enterprizing," he added dutifully,

but I had rather leave his Grace without Defence, than pretend to do him Justice, by entering into things he thinks fit to make a Secret of; the End of the War will be time enough for that. (p.31)

One is reminded of Marlborough's characteristic observation to a Dutch official over some dispute between the armies of the two nations: "let us wink at all this, and when we have a peace it will be then time to come to a discussion."67

Yet this self-imposed forbearance was constantly at odds with Hare's personal loyalty to his patron. His reaction to an episode of severe strain for Anglo-Dutch relations during the campaign of 1705 throws some light on his later dilemma. On this occasion, Marlborough had been bitterly frustrated by the refusal of the Dutch generals to agree to what promised to be a decisive battle, but had restrained his public protests somewhat, for fear of the damage they would do to Allied relations. 68 Hare, though sharing Marlborough's resentment to the full, had also drawn a careful distinction between those with a legitimate grievance against the Dutch and those whose complaints amounted only to deliberate trouble-making. Among the latter, he included the high Tories, who "want us to quarrel with our allies in order to an ill peace," and so "are always rather before hand with those whom a just concern for our late disappointments makes uneasy at that over caution of theirs which has in great measure been the cause of them"; violent recriminations against the Dutch, even from Marlborough's supporters, were
therefore not to be encouraged. Yet at the same time, Hare was concerned at the cost of this reticence to Marlborough's reputation, for unless the whole truth were told, "our good people of England it is likely will lay the fault on him who has done his utmost to prevent it."  

These same problems existed in a heightened form in 1710. To have defended Marlborough by reviving old grievances against the Dutch would have inflamed Tory prejudices which propagandists such as St John were already beginning to foster in order to promote dissatisfaction with the war. Nevertheless, on occasion some of Marlborough's bolder strategies had been hampered, and his army confined to Flanders against his better judgment, by Dutch circumspection, and Hare clearly felt that he could not ignore these points altogether at a time when the suspicion that the Duke was personally responsible for the prolongation of the war was gaining such currency.

Hare's solution to this difficulty was to deal with the controversial episodes as briefly and unrancorously as possible, pointing out that responsibility for many failures and disappointments did not lie with Marlborough, but refraining from direct condemnation of the Allies. He made, for instance, only a passing reference to the incident of 1705 and the success which might have followed "had every body been as forward as his Grace on that Occasion" (p.27). When this is compared with Hare's private fulminations against "that beast Slangenberg" (the obstructionist Dutch general), and scathing comments on "Dutch understanding" in military matters, his self-restraint is very evident. He exercised a similar forbearance on the subject of the Dutch Deputies, Marlborough's civilian
field advisors. Exasperated references in his private letters to "fear and an ill-placed parsimony ... never failing qualities of those genius's that haunt a general in these countries, I mean Dutch Deputies," were so far toned down in print as to imply that the function of these officials was not necessarily a detrimental one:

one may be sure, by all one has ever heard of Deputies, that they are something like Socrates's Genius, which never put him upon doing any thing; its whole Business was to check him, when he seem'd too forward. (p. 31)

But on the larger strategic issues, Hare did find it impossible at some points to avoid laying responsibility for successive campaigns spent in Flanders specifically on the Dutch. He could readily cite the Blenheim campaign as proof that Marlborough had not confined himself to siege warfare in Flanders when there was a chance of acting decisively elsewhere; but to account for the failure to repeat the experiment, he pointed out that the Duke was not able to take the army to Italy in 1706, because "the Dutch thought they should be too much expos'd by his Absence," and that the following year, Marlborough was not

for sitting still; but the States were so frightned with the Battle of Almanza, and the Invasion of Germany, that they would not let him stir. Thus the Duke could neither carry the War out of Flanders, nor act with Vigour in it ... (pp. 27-28)

These statements are accurate enough as they stand; yet as simplifications they do something less than justice to the Dutch. In private, Hare freely acknowledged that "the smallness of their country and the danger they have once been in of being over-run" made this obstinate caution in Flanders understandable. This is the argument put forward in defence of Dutch policy in a recent study, and Hare might
have included it without weakening his defence of Marlborough. Evidently his first loyalties were to his patron, and although he was prepared to exercise forbearance towards the Allies, he did not feel the need to go out of his way to defend them. This was a task reserved for the future.

It can be seen that Hare did not represent the Flanders theatre as the ideal place in which to wage the war. Marlborough himself considered the Moselle valley "the most sensible part in which we might do the most hurt to France," and in 1705 had formed a project to invade France from this direction. Hare, in a passage which bears the obvious impress of Marlborough's opinion, could therefore remind the Duke's critics that he had made an initial attempt "to penetrate France on that which is confessedly the weakest Side," and that it was not for want of his efforts that the plan had come to nothing (p.22).

In 1705, in fact, Hare himself had shared the belief that no "effectual impression" could be made on France from the Flanders theatre. It was Marlborough's later success there which caused him to modify this opinion, and by 1710 this personal experience enabled Hare, not only to argue that Marlborough's overall strategy was sound, but to pay tribute to the ability which had overcome difficulties at first believed insuperable even by his admirers (pp.29-30).

Perhaps Hare's arguments on this whole question would not have convinced those to whom any land warfare on a large scale was anathema, but they must have seemed impressive to those, otherwise well-disposed towards Marlborough, who were beginning to find Tory criticism increasingly plausible, and who were not sufficiently well-informed to discover its
weak points for themselves. As one discerning admirer put it, Hare's pamphlets were

very Useful for acquainting such as are ignorant of it, with the State of the Case, for reclaiming of well-meaning Persons, who have been wrongfully prepossess'd, and for confounding of such Politicks as have their Dependance on Affection and Partiality. 78

Having disposed of this standard item of Tory criticism, Hare then turned somewhat surprisingly to the separate charge that Marlborough had prolonged the war; surprisingly, because in most cases this accusation and the criticism of the general's strategic priorities had been one and the same thing, and having dealt with the latter, Hare could reasonably claim to have refuted the former. His most systematic critic therefore complained that under "the specious Pretence of shewing, That the War has not been prolong'd," Hare was simply composing a eulogy of his patron's achievements. 79 Hare's purpose, however, was somewhat more subtle. The ultimate aim of recalling the details of Marlborough's successes was to make the most obvious point of all in his defence, a point so obvious that it could be taken for granted and overlooked even by his own supporters:

In one Sense, indeed, I am willing to allow he has prolong'd the War, that without him must have ended long ago in an ill Peace; which he has hinder'd our coming to so soon as some seem to wish we had ...  (p.32)

This was an argument which was to remain unanswerable until the ingenuity of Swift and St John devised the theme of The Conduct of the Allies nearly twelve months later.
There still remained the accusation that Marlborough had wilfully
cast away the chance of a good peace when it was offered at the conference
table as a result of his successes; and this was a matter which taxed
Hare's discretion to the uttermost.

At first reading, the third and fourth letters "to a Tory-Member;"
dealing with the negotiations of 1709 and 1710 respectively, appear to
concern Marlborough scarcely at all. His individual role is seldom
mentioned, and Hare is occupied with vindicating Allied peace policy at
its most uncompromising, and with establishing French chicanery as the
reason for the failure of the treaty. This would, of course, be a
vindication of Marlborough also, were it not that at one point in 1709,
of which Hare makes no explicit mention, the Duke was privately in
disagreement with his colleagues as to the best means of securing their
ambitious aims.

The point on which the repeated deadlock of the negotiations
centred publicly was the thirty-seventh article of the preliminaries.
As a condition of peace, the Allies insisted that the French king induce
his grandson to surrender the entire Spanish monarchy to the Austrian
candidate within a stipulated period of time, while Louis XIV declared
himself unable to do so, and unwilling to compel his grandson to comply by
force of arms. Historians have pointed out that Marlborough had earlier
professed himself in favour of leaving some part of the Spanish monarchy
to Philip of Anjou, and that he later made secret pleas for some
modification of the expedients designed to secure Spain for the Allies.
At one point his proposal was that they accept French guarantees of
withdrawal of support from Philip and, following a separate peace with France, mount a full-scale campaign for the conquest of Spain, which he claimed would be successful within six months. Sir Winston Churchill considers these opinions proof of Marlborough's sincere desire for peace; others, while giving him credit for realism and good intentions, point out that he was showing wisdom after the event, and never attempted to press his policy publicly. 80

It is uncertain how well acquainted Hare was with his patron's views on this subject, but it is difficult to believe him wholly ignorant of them. They were known, or suspected, by those who did not have his close contact with the general. 81 But if Hare was in the secret, there were a number of reasons why he should not have anticipated Marlborough's modern apologists and revealed it in order to absolve him personally from the charge of obstructing the peace; why he should instead have emphasized the complete harmony between the Duke and his colleagues, both English and foreign.

In the first place, Hare seems genuinely to have disagreed with Marlborough, whether knowingly or not, about the desirability of making any peace with France which would leave Spain to be conquered afterwards, for he argued that the Allies would never be brought to co-operate and that France would have an opportunity to repair her damaged finances while England was still at war. 82 And since these opinions seem also to have prevailed in England, it was unlikely that even if Hare had revealed his patron's private views, they would have been accepted as proof of a genuine desire for peace. The Duke himself had refrained from making them public.
at the time, because he discovered that to make a peace exclusive of Spain would be thought "a continuation of the war, and a giving time to France to recover."83

Yet although Hare made no explicit mention of this matter, there are certain passages in his pamphlet which suggest an awareness that the unanimity he assumed among the English and Allied plenipotentiaries was more apparent than real, and which certainly show an understanding of the reasons which induced Marlborough to keep to the letter of his official instructions in public, whatever his private opinions might have been. In particular, Hare stressed the penalties that awaited any representative of the British government abroad who disregarded orders framed in accordance with parliamentary declarations of policy. In these terms, Marlborough certainly was bound to uphold the policy of "no peace without Spain."

Therefore, Hare argued,

if to insist on the 37th Article was a Fault, the D. of M. is not to be blam'd for it: Because, if he did insist, 'twas what he was oblig'd to; he had no Authority to do otherwise. All the World knows, that both Houses of Parliament did the Beginning of that Year (1709) address the Queen, That no Peace should be made with France, without an entire Restitution of the Spanish Monarchy ... If therefore the 37th Article was insisted on, the D. is not to be blam'd; he did but his Duty, and could not justifie his doing otherwise; which if he had, would as certainly have been a High Crime and Misdemeanour, as his not doing it is now made a Matter of Complaint against him. (p.56)

This is the point put forward in extenuation of Marlborough's conduct in one of the most recent studies of these negotiations,84 and there is no doubt that Hare was also reproducing his patron's sentiments. While complaining privately that the orders sent to the plenipotentiaries from England were "full of obstructions," Marlborough
repeatedly stressed in his letters to Townshend and Heinsius that he was obliged to act strictly in accordance with these instructions in all matters of importance. It is interesting to note, however, that Hare's use of the phrase "if he did insist," suggests an awareness that the Duke had perhaps been privately unwilling to do so.

Another passage, cast in the same carefully guarded language, hints at the subtler pressures which determined both Marlborough's conduct at the peace negotiations, and Hare's later delicate handling of the subject in print:

If a Minister advises Peace, be sure he is well paid for it; if he advises against it, 'tis to perpetuate the War; if to facilitate a Treaty, he is willing to give up some Part of the Spanish Monarchy, he shall be accus'd of betraying us to France. If according to his Instructions he insists upon the whole, 'tis plain he aims at nothing by such Terms, but to render all Treaties impossible. If he acts neither one or other of these Parts by himself, but in Conjunction with the rest of the Allies, and is rather willing to hear their Opinions than forward to give his own; and is so far from assuming to himself a Part that may particularly distinguish him, that he does not so much lead the rest, as he is led by them; yet a Fault must be found where there is none, and that must be all laid on him; which, were it a Fault, he has perhaps the least Share in ... Thus the D. of M. is with them a Dutch-Man, an Imperialist, a French Man or anything else but what he ever was, and ever will be in spite of all their Provocations, a True Englishman ... (pp.55-56)

In the last sentence there is the echo of Marlborough's own words which one often finds in Hare's writing; the Duke's sensitivity to the accusation that he was not "a good Englishman" has already been noticed. But the passage is chiefly remarkable because it suggests that Hare was trying to absolve his patron individually from the charge of pressing unrealistic terms on France, without actually committing himself to a definite account of what had happened, since this would simply
have stimulated the fault-finding mood of the Tory propagandists. Hare was probably right in assuming, for instance, that if he had dwelt upon Marlborough's efforts "to facilitate a Treaty," the hostile pamphleteers would have dropped the accusation of insisting on impossible terms, and claimed instead that the Duke had been bribed to betray his country to France. How ready they were to arouse this suspicion, even without prompting, was demonstrated by Mrs. Manley's insinuation that Louis XIV had not been able to buy Marlborough only because, with a treasury depleted by the long war, "he cou'd not come up to his Price." 86

Hare's decision to defend Marlborough's conduct as plenipotentiary by appealing to his official instructions also took advantage of the difficulties which the new ministry and its propagandists faced in arguing openly against the old ideal of "no peace without Spain." It was only after the death of the Emperor in April 1711 that Swift ventured to challenge the repeated parliamentary sanction of this policy, 87 and until this was convincingly done, Marlborough could not be publicly blamed for adhering to it.

But even with this major problem solved, the peace negotiations were not an easy subject for Hare to deal with. Personal experience enabled him to write intelligently and authoritatively about military matters, but when he came to discuss international diplomacy, the fact that his identity was known was not an unqualified advantage; "we have never heard that he was employ'd as Plenipotentiary, to be so thoroughly acquainted with all the Steps taken in that Affair," a Tory critic acidly remarked, "and if he has hapned to say Grace to some of those Ministers, it will hardly be
believ'd they should lay themselves so open to him over their Meat." 88

At first sight, this would seem to be fair comment. Although Hare had been at The Hague during the negotiations of 1709, and had taken a keen interest in their progress then and afterwards, they were conducted in some secrecy, and Hare explicitly stated at the time that he had not always been "in the secret." 89 He could not therefore claim to be writing consistently from first-hand knowledge. In fact he made no secret of his considerable reliance on accounts of the conferences already printed in "the News Papers and Monthly Accounts"; it was to these sources that he referred his readers for verification of his statements at one point (p. 5), and at another he quoted a document from the Mercure Historique et Politique (pp. 8-9). 90 Evidently he was sufficiently aware of his own want of authority not to expect his arguments to be taken on trust where there was some readily accessible means of corroboration.

His most extensive use of such material was not, however, specifically acknowledged in the text. When the conferences at Gertruydenberg were finally broken off in July 1710, the French plenipotentiaries issued a manifesto, justifying their conduct and complaining of the treatment they had met with from the Allies. Both the English and the Dutch governments were indignant at what they considered an attempt to rally the war-weary elements of both nations against them, and the States-General drew up a long, detailed "Resolution" in reply. 91 Marlborough's reaction to it is worth noticing; "I think [it] must convince everybody that is not resolved to be blind, that the King of France did never sincerly resolve the evacuation of Spain and the West
Indies," he wrote to Heinsius, and went on to advise that the document "be well translated and printed at Londen, for I can't but hope that our people are yett so honest as to go on cherfully with the warr til we force France to be reasonable and honest." 92 In fact, even as he wrote, translations of the Resolution were appearing in the London newspapers. 93

Marlborough's comments are of interest, both as evidence of his growing realization of the value of printed propaganda, and because Hare made considerable use of the Resolution as source material for his account of the Gertruydenberg negotiations. 94 At one point he praised the "Plainness and Sincerity" and the "solid Reasoning" with which it had exposed French deceit (pp. 85-86), and it was particularly valuable for his purposes because it had Marlborough's approval and was also a detailed expression of the official Dutch attitude on a very controversial and complex subject. By adhering closely to it, Hare could therefore avoid the conflict of views which had bedevilled his discussion of military matters.

Yet for all his reliance on accessible sources, Hare did give the impression of being better informed about the peace negotiations than even the most conscientious reader of "the News Papers and Monthly Accounts" could be expected to be, and some of his comments do imply that he had had access to privileged, if not secret, information. "Considering the Secrecy, with which Things of this Nature are, and ought to be transacted," he remarked at the close of his third letter, "I flatter my self, you will be content to find I know so much of them, rather than wonder I can't tell you more" (p. 65); elsewhere he stated
that his account was compiled "from what I have observ'd my self in the
Progress of this Affair, and the most exact Information I could get
from others" (p.54).

In spite of taunts at Hare's status as chaplain, there was good
reason for his readers to take these hints seriously. A reputation for
gravity and strictness acquired during his years as tutor at King's
College, Cambridge, had not prevented his retaining lasting friendships
with several of his former students, and by 1710, these young men and their
influential family connections held an impressive array of public offices.
Robert Walpole had been Secretary-at-War, while his brother, Horace, was
secretary to the British Embassy at The Hague during the negotiations
of 1709 and 1710. Hare also had a friendship dating from childhood with
Lord Townshend, Marlborough's fellow plenipotentiary and later the
Walpoles' brother-in-law. Townshend and the younger Walpole, with
whom Hare was on terms of equality, could have supplied him with ample
information about the peace conferences, even if Marlborough proved
unforthcoming with his chaplain.

There is also some evidence that Hare had a similar assistance
from Godolphin, whose son, Francis, had been another of his students.
The two young men, as Hare's letters reveal, had remained close friends,
and it has already been noticed that the Lord Treasurer had several times
interested himself in Hare's promotion. The elder Godolphin certainly
viewed the press attacks of his political opponents with contempt, but he nevertheless approved of Maynwaring's efforts to defend his
financial administration in print, and was even prepared to supply him
with the necessary confidential material for a further pamphlet.\textsuperscript{99} It is quite likely, therefore, that he would have been willing to extend the same privilege to Hare.

The evidence for this collaboration lies in the similarity between some of the opinions expressed in Godolphin's letters to Marlborough concerning the negotiations of 1709 and 1710, and Hare's discussion of the same subjects in print. On the difficulty of securing Allied support for a conquest of Spain, for example, Hare's opinions are far closer to Godolphin's than to Marlborough's, and there are some striking correspondences in matters of detail. Godolphin argued that even if the French officially withdrew support from Philip of Anjou, they could still assist him underhand with men and money,\textsuperscript{100} a suggestion which Hare also makes (p. 58). The surrender of some towns in Spain which the Allies had proposed as security for this point had been refused by the French, and Godolphin considered that by withdrawing their garrisons from these towns, they had "willfully put it out of their power" to adopt this expedient. He then proposed as an alternative, the surrender of Perpignan, Pamplona, and Bayonne, "all three of them inletts to Spain by Several ways, & therefore in my humble opinion, the properest Security the Allys can have next to towns w th in Spain it self," and one which the French could not pretend was out of their power to give.\textsuperscript{101} In discussing this subject, Hare stresses all these points in very similar terms (pp. 68-70). Finally, Godolphin claimed that the French troops withdrawn from the Spanish towns had been kept in Spain in order to assist Philip's cause;\textsuperscript{102} and again
this accusation is to be found in Hare's account (p. 69). These points are scarcely conclusive evidence of Godolphin's influence on Hare, but together with the family connection, they do suggest a possibility of collaboration.

Yet in spite of Hare's claims to privileged information, it is probable that the third and fourth letters, which did not run beyond the second edition, made fewer converts than the first two. Although his uncompromisingly "official" attitude to the whole subject of the peace treating might frustrate Marlborough's Tory critics for a short time, it could not hope to dispose of their insinuations once and for all. In particular, the vehement emphasis on French insincerity as the sole cause of the breakdown of the negotiations was bound to seem unsatisfactory to many readers. According to one contemporary historian, this claim had largely lost its power to persuade by the summer of 1710. 103

Hare's acknowledged connection with Marlborough made his defensive stance a lesser disadvantage than it might otherwise have been. When he pointed out that critics of the Duke's tactics and strategy "were neither at the Consultations of our Generals themselves, nor pretend to any Correspondence with those that were" (pp. 38-39), and that the majority of party writers "seldom know any thing of Affairs abroad themselves; much less are they fit Masters to teach others, how to judge about them" (p. 24), he evidently intended a silent comparison with his own superior claims to such knowledge, in spite of his token attempts elsewhere to
suggest that he had not been an eyewitness of the events he described.

He also set himself apart from the standard breed of "answerers" by his attitude to his opponents' publications. He did not, for instance, make the tactical error of confining his attention to any single pamphlet. "You won't expect I should consider each of these Papers by themselves," he wrote to the "correspondent" who was supposed to have requested a reply to several popular Tory prints, "that would be giving too much trouble to one, who, I know, is too good a Judge to think them of so much Consequence (p.1). Instead, his first step was to extract the most representative criticism of his patron contained in these pamphlets and summarize it under four headings (p.3); in the process, hints and innuendoes were reduced to direct accusation and each accusation given in its bluntest form. This businesslike and unflinching approach to his opponents proclaimed Hare's confidence in the strength of his case, and also made it clear that he was about to present an independent, methodical, and definitive reply to the whole body of Tory accusation against Marlborough. He then proceeded to subject each of the four points to a rigorous and lengthy examination.

An ostentatious reliance on solid argument and exposition, and what Hare called "plain naked Truth and Fact" (p.8), was at once acknowledged as the most notable feature of the four letters. It was, of course, one of the most confidence-inspiring techniques open to the pamphleteer. "The Author grounds all his Arguments on Facts, which have lately happened before our Eyes," an admiring reader noted,

and the Consequences he deduces are no way forc'd, or remote. I am therefore perswaded, that whosoever reads them with Attention, and
This was not the only tribute to the "great Plausibility and force of Argument" with which Hare made out his case. Swift, however, was more critical. He conceded the plausibility, but claimed that it was a cover for "much Artifice, and Abundance of Misrepresentation, as well as direct Falshoods in Point of Fact"; on further consideration, he could not deny Hare some measure of truth in his vindication of Marlborough's generalship, and his chief complaint was that this defence of what had always been "unquestionable" was laboured to the exclusion of such matters as "the wrong Steps in the Treaty of Peace."

Even a friendly reader was prepared to endorse this criticism to a certain extent; "if I may here presume in some sort to blame the Apologist of so good a Cause, it is needless to refute, to argue, to prove, when the Actions themselves speak so loudly." Marlborough himself had, of course, been the first to make this claim; but Hare's preliminary survey of his opponents' arguments had demonstrated how unrealistic it had become, and how disingenuous was Swift's assertion that the Duke's professional ability had never been seriously called in question. In the circumstances, therefore, these criticisms were the highest tributes Hare could have received. He had constructed the necessary vindication with such constant reference to the facts of Marlborough's past conduct, that once the case was set out logically, it had the air of self-evidence of which the Duke himself had been confident, and the task itself seemed almost superfluous.

But the charges of artifice and misrepresentation in Hare's account...
of the peace negotiations had, as has already been suggested, a greater foundation; and in this case, his apparent reliance on fact assisted in the process of concealment, for he kept up a smoke-screen of superficial detail in such matters as the dates, times, and subject-matter of the various conferences, in which there was an ostentatious display of accuracy. Since few would have been sufficiently well-informed to question even these statements, much less pinpoint a more significant error, the account could pass as impressively, even oppressively, weighted with fact. Hare's most dogged critic admitted defeat when faced with the task of examining it in detail, dismissing it as a "Narrative, either of True, or Suppositious Facts, which I cannot pretend to be so intelligent in those Affairs as to disprove." 108

Yet there was always the danger that this procedure would give the pamphlets a length and complexity which the average reader would not tolerate. Hare was certainly conscious of running this risk (his text is punctuated with apologies for undue prolixity and preoccupation with detail), but he remained doggedly resolved not to let it deter him from dealing with each point as thoroughly as possible. That the pamphlets even so make easy reading is attributable largely to the manner in which the arguments are presented.

The device of casting a pamphlet in the form of an open letter to a friend was, of course, a very common one, indicative of a "willingness to 'get together' with the reader, and a corresponding unwillingness to write impersonally, or make ex cathedra statements," which had become characteristic of the prose writers of the period. 109 In Hare's case,
it enabled the refutation of Tory criticisms to be conducted without undue formality and dogmatism; and the fact that the "correspondent" with whom he was on such familiar and cordial terms was himself "a Tory-Member" made the important point that Marlborough's vindication would be acceptable to intelligent and honest readers of either party.

The form must, in any case, have seemed a natural one to a pamphleteer who in private life was such a prolific writer of informal news-letters. In fact, it was the unlaboured style of these letters that he transferred almost unaltered into print. The forms of familiar speech, "'tis," "can't," "you'll," etc., are used throughout, and the phrasing is often colloquial to the point of raciness; "nothing but Experience could have convinc'd People, that Spain might not have been had for going for," Hare remarked at one point, when explaining the decision to carry the war into the Peninsula (p. 17). The resulting informality, fluency, and liveliness of the prose make it an ideal vehicle for its weight of factual evidence and exposition, and they also communicate the confidence and enthusiasm of a writer completely at home with his subject. As a contemporary reader put it, Hare handles the vindication "with such Sprightliness, and such Energy of Stile, as expresses a mighty Zeal." 110

Although Hare began with a conventional apology for "the many Marks of Haste and Negligence" in his pamphlets (p. 1), the informality of presentation was almost certainly calculated. He had had little taste for formal eulogy at any time; "I hope our Poets will try in their way to do justice to such a Theme," he had written after the battle of Ramillies, "but if their verses prove no better than the prose congratulations I have
seen, one might be content to be without them"; of some compositions
of his own on the same subject, he remarked, "they had that advantage by
being writ in haste, that they were ye more natural; wch is all so great
a subject wants."\(^{111}\)

It was, in any case, becoming undesirable for Marlborough’s
supporters to "do justice" to his military achievements by means of
conventional panegyric, since all such material was seized on by hostile
pamphleteers as evidence of a deliberate Whig attempt to eclipse the
Queen’s prestige and authority.\(^{112}\) In November 1710, a eulogistic
reference to the Duke’s victories in a Latin sermon preached before
Convocation by the Dean of Peterborough was sufficient to attract the
unfavourable attention of the most widely read of the Tory news-writers,
and when Kennett protested at a Tory "translation" of the Sermon which
dubbed Marlborough a second Protector, it was retorted that the "Encomium"
bestowed on the general had been greater than the tribute paid to the
Queen herself, "a Practice that is grown into Request with the Party
ever since the Dissolution of the Last Parliament."\(^{113}\) Even Hare’s
studied moderation in this respect could not protect him from the charge
of encouraging Marlborough’s overweening ambition with his praise.\(^{114}\)

A positive advantage of Hare’s careful avoidance of literary
affectation in the presentation of his case was that it enabled him
to discredit his opponents’ more elaborate techniques of "Romance" and
"Declamation" by comparison, by associating them with the need for
misrepresentation; "for plain Truths need no Disguise," he commented
in his opening paragraph, "Fiction and Ornament are of no Advantage, but
when they serve a Cause, that can't bear to be seen in its true Light" (p.1).
By this reckoning, Hare's soberer methods of procedure amounted to a pledge of good faith to his readers.

Hare's greatest shortcoming as a pamphleteer was his apparent inability to transmute his indignation at Marlborough's treatment into anything more subtle than undistinguished invective, the least effective of satiric techniques. He himself was aware that his congenital hot temper in argument might prove a disadvantage: "if resentment can give life to a discourse you won't think this wants any," he wrote to Francis Godolphin, of an unpublished reply to an earlier pamphlet critical of Marlborough, "all the danger is, I'm afraid you'll think there is too much." But these misgivings did not prevent him from giving considerable rein to a similar "resentment" in The Management of the War. The following passage is fairly representative:

I shall shew you the vile Ingratitude and Impudence of these Men, in such a Manner, as will, I hope, abundantly convince you, the most implacable Malice could have invented nothing more stupidly ridiculous, than to accuse him of prolonging the War, who has more Reason than any Body to wish a good End to it ... (p.30)

Terms such as "unjust and villainous," "black Villany and Malice," "senseless and ridiculous," "the Folly and Malice of this most profligate Libeller," were applied to the Tory pamphleteers and their productions with such wearisome regularity, that even Hare's greatest admirer felt the need to beg indulgence for "what may be found something Hot in his Answers and Recriminations." Meanwhile, his opponents, unable to fault him in more serious matters, had seized gladly on this weakness. From Swift came a reprimand for "foul" and ungentlemanly language,
unbecoming their common profession, and another critic, snatching the opportunity for ridicule, recommended that the pamphlets be inscribed "In Usum Bellingsgate, for the Information of Porters, Carmen, Watermen, Oyster-Women, Orange-Women, &c." 118

But there was perhaps one aspect of this "Bellingsgate" for which Hare was not entirely responsible. Many years afterwards, Oldmixon stated that Maynwaring's revision of Hare's pamphlets had been so thorough "that they might, indeed, have well past for his own." 119 The evidence of close collaboration between Marlborough's supporters is interesting, but in this instance it cannot be accepted without some reservation. Throughout the period of the composition and publication of The Management of the War Maynwaring had in fact been very ill, so ill that he was not even equal to his share of labour on the Medley; 120 it is unlikely, therefore, that he would have undertaken a revision of Hare's lengthy and closely argued tract, as systematic as that described by Oldmixon. In any case, a comparison of The Management of the War with Hare's private letters in style and in the similarities of content already noted can leave little doubt that it was predominantly and characteristically his own work.

There are, however, certain isolated passages in which Maynwaring's influence may be discerned. "Jacobite seems to be no juster a character of a Tory, as to the body of them, than Republican is of a Whig," Hare had written to Sarah in 1710, "'tis the dirt each side throw at one another, and that in such plenty as some will stick." 121 It was Maynwaring, a more zealous Whig than Hare, who revelled in such mud-slinging, and in the past had been involved in the writing of pamphlets to raise "a cry upon the
Jacobites," and "to prove that Tories are Frenchmen, and must never rise again." Such allusions occurred with sufficient frequency in The Management of the War to attract the attention of a Tory critic, and in view of Hare's professed distaste for this name-calling, it is reasonable to conjecture that Maynwaring had been largely responsible for them.

A few days before the publication of Hare's fourth letter "to a Tory-Member," Defoe, who at this period attacked or defended Marlborough with equal facility, issued his Short Narrative of the Life and Actions of His Grace John, D. of Marlborough. It had been written, Defoe claimed, for "the common People only; to vindicate the Innocent, and to undeceive a good part of the Nation, who have not had an Opportunity to be better Informed" (pp.9-10); although without the political influence of Hare's "Tory-Member," this section of the population had some power to determine Marlborough's fate, for "cunning Envy is often very strong, and when once its Devices are effectually spread in the Mouths of the Multitude, will produce a Blast able to blow down the most lofty Cedar" (p.21).

The pamphlet, in the course of its biographical narrative, dealt with a number of major topics of detraction, but perhaps most interesting were Defoe's comments on the charge that Marlborough had prolonged the war. Lacking the authority which Hare's connection with the Duke had given him, Defoe made up the deficiency by adopting the persona of "an Old Officer in the Army." A vindication of Marlborough's generalship came very aptly from a professional soldier, supposedly irritated by Tory
coffee-house practitioners of "the Art Military" (p.26), for, as Swift
remarked, "I know not any Sort of Men so apt as Soldiers are, to
reprimand those who presume to interfere in what relates to their
Trade." To have entered upon detailed accounts of strategic
priorities and international diplomacy would have left Defoe's chosen
readers little the wiser, but "an Old Officer" could be expected to have
plentiful experience of campaigning conditions, and this was all that
was necessary for Defoe's purposes. For the rest, he employed the
kind of simple logic, combined with emotional appeal, which would impress
the most uninformed. If the common people had had experience of life in
the army, Defoe argued,

they would be perswaded, that a State of War, to those who
are engag'd in it, must needs be a state of Labour and Misery;
and that a great General, I mean such a one as the Duke of
Marlborough, weak in his Constitution, and well stricken in
Years, would not undergo those eating Cares, which must be
continually at his Heart; the Toils and Hardships which he must
endure, and the often Sorrows which must Prick his Heart for
ugly Accidents, if he has the least Spark of humane Commiseration,
I say, he would not engage himself in such a Life, if not for
the sake of his Queen and Country, and his Honour. (pp.41-42)

This was a very different picture of Marlborough from that
usually presented in the press, a more appealing and human figure than
the victorious demigod of past panegyric, or the master strategist of
Hare's vindication; and the passage is particularly interesting because
of its similarity in substance to the Duke's private letters of
the previous two years, in which he had referred repeatedly to his
advancing age and wish for retirement, and lamented the heavy mortality
at Malplaquet and the havoc wrought in camp and countryside by famine
and epidemics of sickness.
It is perhaps surprising that Hare, who was in a better position than Defoe to be acquainted with Marlborough's feelings in this respect, did not include such arguments in his own vindication. Yet Hare, a civilian, whose interest in military and diplomatic affairs was primarily intellectual, does not seem fully to have shared the fellow-feeling which the Duke, as a professional soldier, had for his men. He would, in any case, probably have considered it beneath his dignity to adapt his complex arguments to the capacities of Defoe's chosen readership; "the multitude don't use to think," was a characteristic complaint of his. Defoe, however, possessed pre-eminently "the popular writer's gift for simplification, for bringing an abstract issue down to concrete terms that appeal to the ordinary reader," and his view of Marlborough's situation, both perceptive and plausible, added a new dimension to the defences published by the Duke's supporters at this period.
NOTES TO CHAPTER II

1. Dyer's News-Letter of 29 July 1710, B.M. Portland Loan MSS 29/321; Examiner, Nos. 1 (3 August 1710), 2 (3-10 August 1710), and 3 (10-17 August 1710). The French King's Thanks is now attributed to Benjamin Hoadly, but according to Dyer, it was thought at the time to be the work of "a Man of Quality." The likeliest candidates for the authorship of the Letter are Maynwaring and Robert Walpole; see Henry L. Snyder, "Daniel Defoe, Arthur Maynwaring, Robert Walpole, and Abel Boyer: Some Considerations of Authorship," H.L.Q., XXXIII (1969-1970), pp.151-153.


5. The Management of the War, in Four Letters to a Tory-Member (1711), p.30.

6. To the Whig's Nineteen Queries, a Fair and Full Answer by an Honest Tory (1710), p.9; Reasons for a Total Change of a Certain Ministry and the Dissolution of the Parliament [1710], pp.6-7. The last pamphlet was probably that recommended by Dyer as having been "written by an eminent lawyer to prove ye expediency and Conveniency of frequent new Parliaments and Changes of ye publick Ministry" (News-Letter of 29 August 1710, B.M. Portland Loan MSS 29/321).

7. Letter to the Examiner, in Swift, Prose Works, III, Appendix A, pp.222-224; Examiner, No.13 (2 November 1710), in Swift, Prose Works, III, pp.4-8; Memoirs of Europe towards the Close of the Eighth Century (1710), II, p.28-30. This last work, in particular, with its hint that the Dutch had made it worth Marlborough's while to ignore their defaulting in the matter of treaty obligations, came very close to the theme of Swift's Conduct of the Allies of the following year.
8. The Secret History of Arlus and Odolphus (1710), p.11.


10. No.18 (19-21 May 1709).


14. Queries for Queries (n.p., [1710]), s.sh.; this piece was an answer to a Whig sheet, simply entitled Queries (n.p., [1710]), which was probably the work of Maynwaring (see p.174, n.5 below). In the latter publication, the Queen was accused of breaking a promise made after the dismissal of Sunderland, that there would be no more ministerial changes; for this reason, it was brought to her notice by Sir David Hamilton, who maintained that Harley should answer the charge. Within the month, Hamilton was able to show the Queen Queries for Queries (Hamilton's Diary, 16 August and 8 September 1710, Herts R.O. Panshanger MSS D/EP F207, ff.15-16). Queries for Queries was certainly widely circulated by Harley's family (see William Stratford to Edward Harley, 2 September 1710, H.M.C. Portland MSS, VII, p.16; and Ann Clavering to Sir James Clavering, 2 September 1710, The Correspondence of Sir James Clavering, ed. H.T. Dickinson, Publications of the Surtees Society, CLXXVIII [Gateshead, 1967], p.94). There are several drafts of rhetorical queries in Harley's handwriting among his papers, and in one, dated 31 March 1708, the Jacobite sympathies of Sarah's sister, the Duchess of Tyrconnel, and the similarity of temperament between the Earl of Sunderland and his mother-in-law are commented on (B.M. Portland Loan MSS 29/10/25); the fact that these two subjects recur in Queries for Queries suggests the possibility that Harley himself was the author.

15. No.3 (10-17 August 1710).


18. Management of the War, p. 42.

19. Hare paid more attention to this, than to any other single Tory pamphlet in the Management of the War (see, pp. 1-2, 4, 7, 36, 55, and 96). Page references to the Secret History in the following discussion are given parenthetically in the text.


24. Noyes to the Archbishop of York, 2/13 July 1704, "Letters of Samuel Noyes, Chaplain of the Royal Scots, 1703-4," ed. S.H.F. Johnston, J.S.A.H.R., XXXVII (1959), p. 133; An Examination of "The Management of the War" in a Letter to My Lord *** (1711), p. 6 (advertised, Examiner, No. 30, 15-22 February 1710/1). Samuel Noyes had been a candidate for the Chaplain-Generalcy, but in 1704 the appointment was bestowed on Hare, who had been tutor to Marlborough's son, the Marquis of Blandford, before the latter's death at Cambridge in 1703. For Hare's achievements as an undergraduate, fellow, and tutor at King's College, Cambridge, see the biographical account in the College library by Hare's contemporary, Anthony Allen, "Skeleton Collegii Regalis," IV, p. 1823.


26. Hare was a prolific writer of letters describing the actions of the campaigns. Four series survive:

(i) to his cousin, George Naylor, 1704-1711, H.M.C. Hare MSS, pp. 200-234.

(iii) to George Tilson, under-secretary at the office of the Secretary of State for the North, 1708-1709, P.R.O. S.P. (Foreign), 87/4, passim.

(iv) a long series describing the campaign of 1705, to an unnamed correspondent; the originals of these in Hare's handwriting at Blenheim Palace were not available for detailed study during my visit; all subsequent references are therefore to the transcripts made for Archdeacon Coxe, B.M. Add. MSS 9114, ff.128-221.

27. Examination of "The Management of the War", pp.6 and 39.

28. For Godolphin's unsuccessful attempt to procure the bishopric of Oxford for Hare, see the former’s letters to Marlborough of 24 and 28 June 1706, Blenheim MSS A1-36. For the other preferments, see Allen, "Skeleton Collegii Regalis," IV, p.1824; C.G.T. Dean, The Royal Hospital Chelsea (1950), p.73; Marlborough to the Bishop of London, 7 February 1707, Dispatches, III, p.311; and Godolphin to Harley, 20 June 1707, H.M.C. Bath MSS, I, p.176. For Hare's claims to the bishopric of Worcester, see his letter to Sarah of 29 August 1717, Private Corr., II, pp.100-101.


30. Hare to Watkins, 24 February 1710, B.M. Add. MSS 33225, f.23; Hare to ?, 8 January 1721/2, B.M. Add. MSS 34518, f.67v (transcript).

31. See, for example, his letters to Francis Godolphin, 29 July/9 August 1706, B.M. Add. MSS 28057, f.309; and to Watkins, 14 December 1708, B.M. Add. MSS 33225, f.13v.


34. Letter of [November? 1705], B.M. Add. MSS 9114, f.211v; John Oldmixon, The History of England during the Reigns of King William and Queen Mary, Queen Anne, King George I (1735), p.466.
38. To Watkins, 28 January 1708/9 and 15 March 1708/9, B.M. Add. MSS 33225, ff.17 and 19; to Walpole, 5/16 October 1710, B.M. Add. MSS 38501, f.149v.
39. The original titles of the four "letters" are given in the bibliography; the first was advertised in the Daily Courant, No.2870 (4 January 1711), and the last in the Post-Man, No.1978 (22-24 February 1711).
40. Oldmixon, History of England, p.477. There appear to have been four editions of the first part, three of the second, and two each of the third and fourth. There was also a French translation published at The Hague, noted in Morgan, Bibliography, II, p.226, Item N273; as in previous chapters, all my references are to the collected edition, The Management of the War in Four Letters to a Tory-Member (1711), and in this chapter, page references are given parenthetically in the text.
41. Political State, I (March 1711), p.211 (on pp.218-219, Boyer also draws attention to Hare's criticism of his own pamphlet, A Letter from a Foreign Minister, in The Management of the War, p.2); John Bridges to Trumbull, 30 November 1711, Berks R.O. Trumbull MSS LIV; [John Leneve?], The Lives and Characters of the Most Illustrious Persons ... Who Died in the Year 1712 (1714), p.404.
42. Among the publications in which excerpts from the Management of the War were quoted or closely paraphrased are:
   (i) The History of the Treaty of Utrecht (1712), e.g., pp.15-29,46-49, and 57.
   (ii) The Protestant Post-Boys of March 1712; cf., for example, the review of Marlborough's campaigns in No.79 (1-4 March 1712) with Management of the War, p.32, and comments on the battle of Malplaquet in No.89 (25-27 March 1712) with Management of the War, p.36.
   (iii) [Arthur Maynwaring, et al.], The Lives of the Two Illustrious Generals (1713); for details, see

(iv) Oldmixon, History of England, pp.421 and 424-425; Oldmixon here acknowledges his debt to Hare, for his account of the peace negotiations of 1709, under the title of the "Bp. of C[hichester]", the preferment Hare held from 1731 until his death in 1740.

For the later references to the Management of the War, see Nicholas Tindal, The History of England by Mr. Rapin de Thoyras, Continued from the Revolution to the Accession of King George II (1744-1747), IV, p.299; and Thomas Somerville, The History of Great Britain during the Reign of Queen Anne (1793), p.634.

43. Nos.23 (11 January 1710/1), and 28 (15 February 1710/1), in Swift, Prose Works, III, p.62 and 87-88. See also pp.163-166 below.

44. Examination of "The Management of the War", p.6. By March 1711, according to Boyer, Hare was generally recognized as the author of the Management of the War (Political State, I, p.211); but Hare's own comments in the pamphlet, "we that live at home" (p.10), "by all one has heard of Deputies" (p.31), etc., imply that the author had not been an eyewitness of the events he described.

45. James Taylor to Walpole, 27 February 1710/1, B.M. Add. MSS 38501, f.275.

46. An Answer to the "Examination of 'The Management of the War'" Written by the Medley's Footman (1711), pp.6 and 8 (advertised Daily Courant, No.2929, 10 March 1711). The connection with the Medley, and the author's knowledge of Maynwaring's share in the Management of the War suggest Oldmixon as a possible author of this pamphlet; for the latter's account of his own and Maynwaring's assistance to Hare, see his Memoirs of the Press ... from 1710 to 1740 (1742), p.20. The author of An Examination of the Third and Fourth Letters to a Tory Member ... in a Second Letter to My Lord *** (1711), p.40 (advertised, Examiner, No.33, 8-17 March 1710/1), also conjectured that the Answer must have been the work of one of the Medley's editors.

47. [William Pittis], Aesop at the Bell-Tavern in Westminster (1711), p.6 (italics reversed in the quotation); [William Oldisworth], Reasons for Restoring the Whigs (1711), p.5. For the attribution of the first of these pamphlets, normally treated as anonymous, see Theodore F.M. Newton, "William Pittis and Queen Anne Journalism," Modern Philology, XXXIII (1935-1936), pp.292-293.


50. Lives of the Two Illustrious Generals, p.149.

51. For the Secretary of State's powers in this respect, see Mark A. Thomson, The Secretaries of State 1681-1782 (Oxford, 1932), p.114; and Laurence Hanson, Government and the Press 1695-1763 (1936), pp.62-64.

52. Sarah to James Craggs, 17 August [1711], B. M. Stowe MSS 751, f.11; for a fuller account of this transaction, see p. 213 below.

53. Blenheim MSS E5.

54. "240" was the usual cipher for Sarah's name in the correspondence of her family circle, but in a letter from Godolphin to Marlborough of 18 October 1706 and Marlborough's reply of 29 October / 9 November 1706, "52" appears to stand for the Duchess (Blenheim MSS A1-37). In a letter to Sarah of 4/15 May 1711, Blenheim MSS E5, Marlborough makes it clear that Hare had not left England to join the army at the time he had written to her about the supervision of the pamphlet.

55. Hare had been given leave by Marlborough to return to England as soon as the army had retired to winter-quarters, and arrived in London in mid-November 1710 (Hare to Sarah, 18 November 1710, Blenheim MSS E38). Marlborough remained at The Hague for several weeks after this and did not return to England until the end of December. It is clear from the space Hare devoted to answering the Secret History of Arlis and Odolpheus which was published on 7 November, that he cannot have begun serious work on the Management of the War until after that time. In fact the dates at the head of the four "letters," 23 November 1710, 30 November 1710, 22 December 1710, and 10 January 1710/1 are probably accurate guides to the dates of composition, and only the last of these is after Marlborough's home-coming.

56. Marlborough to Townshend, 12 January 1711, Dispatches, V, p.252. For some account of Marlborough's situation at this time, see pp.142-158 below.
57. It is clear from Hare's first letter (13/24 July 1710, Private Corr., I, pp.359-360) that Sarah had chosen to begin the correspondence, and in his letter of 1 December 1710 Hare acknowledged receipt of some "papers" which the Duchess had sent him (Private Corr., II, p.60). Some draft fragments of Sarah's letters to Hare survive among her papers at Blenheim MSS G1-4 and G1-8.

58. Cf. the accusation that the ministers would try to find a scapegoat for the lost chance of peace, and the comments on their relations with Marlborough in Hare's letter of 19 / 30 October 1710, Private Corr., I, pp.404 and 405-406, with the similar passages in the Management of the War, pp.43 and 96; and cf. Hare's condemnation of the Pretender in his letter dated "Friday Night" [24 November 1710: wrongly assigned to December by the editor], Private Corr., II, pp.22-23, with a similar account in the Management of the War, p.99.


60. To Sarah, [24 November 1710], Private Corr., II, p.11.


62. To Drummond, 20 December 1710, Bolingbroke Corr., I, p.44.

63. Examiner, No.28 (15 February 1710/1), in Swift Prose Works, III, pp. 87- 88.

64. For the Lord's debate and its implied criticism of Marlborough's strategy, see Abel Boyer, The History of the Life and Reign of Queen Anne (1722), pp.485-486. Its findings were quoted against Hare in the Examination of "The Management of the War", pp.18-20.


70. To Naylor, 13/24 August 1705, H. M. C. Hare MSS, p. 206.

71. To Naylor, 9/20 August 1705, H. M. C. Hare MSS, p. 205; to Francis Godolphin, 13/24 August 1705, Catalogue of the Collection ... Formed ... by Alfred Morrison, II, p. 239.

72. To Naylor, 29 August/9 September 1706, H. M. C. Hare MSS, pp. 214-215.


74. Letter of [November? 1705], B. M. Add. MSS 9114, f. 211.


77. Letter of 2/13 May 1705, B. M. Add. MSS 9114, f. 130v.


81. See, in particular, Lieut-Col. J. Cranstoun to Robert Cunningham, 14/25 July 1709 (wrongly dated 1708 by the editor), H. M. C. Portland MSS, IV, pp. 497.

82. To Naylor, 11/22 August 1709 and 15/26 June 1710, H. M. C. Hare MSS, pp. 227-228 and 231.

83. To Godolphin, 15/26 August 1709, Private Corr., II, p. 357.

84. Thomson, "Louis XIV ...," B. I. H. R., XXXIV, p. 34.
85. To Godolphin, 23 August / 3 September 1709, Private Corr., II, p.362; to Townshend, 2 / 13 August 1709 and 22 August / 2 September 1709, B.M. Add. MSS 41178, ff.51v and 61v; to Heinsius, 30 July / 10 August 1709, Heinsius Corr., p.453.

86. Memoirs of Europe, II., p.33.


88. Examination of the Third and Fourth Letters, p.8.

89. To Naylor, 11 / 22 August 1709, H.M.C. Hare MSS, p.228; for Hare's interest in the negotiations at The Hague, see his letters to Naylor of May and June 1709, H.M.C. Hare MSS, pp.222-224.

90. The Mercure was a periodical published monthly at The Hague, and appearing in translation in London under the title, The Present State of Europe, or the Historical and Political Monthly Mercury (Morgan, Bibliography, III, p.311, Item V262); the issues of 1709 and 1710 contained a good deal of factual detail about the peace negotiations which must have been a useful source of reference for Hare when he came to compile his account.

91. The original French texts of the Manifesto and the Resolution are printed in H.M.C. House of Lords MSS, New Series, IX, pp.327-329 and 331-340; on p.264 is the letter from Boyle to Townshend of 18 July 1710, which gives the official English attitude to the Manifesto.


93. E.g., in the Post-Boy, No.2371 (22-25 July 1710), and the Daily Courant, No.2730 (24 July 1710).

94. The influence of the Resolution is most apparent in Hare's criticism of the project to join the French and Allied forces in order to drive Philip of Anjou out of Spain (p.83), in his explanation of the Allies' refusal to accept a French subsidy for the same purpose (p.85), and in his account of the breaking off of the conference (p.89). In the second of these examples, for instance, the Resolution (Post Boy's translation) claimed that the Allies had declined the French offer of a subsidy "because that suppos'd a separate Peace with France, and the Continuance
of a War separately against Spain, to which the Allies could not consent for the Reasons alleged in the first Conference; requiring at the same Time a plain Declaration of the Intentions of France upon the Point of evacuating Spain and the Indies, in favour of King Charles, conformably to the Preliminaries, before which the Allies could not explain themselves upon the Proposition of a Partition."
The second paragraph on p.85 of the Management of the War reproduces this passage almost word for word.


96. There are two letters from Hare to Robert Walpole ("dear Bob") of 8 August 1700 and 16 November 1700 in Cambridge University Library, Houghton (Cholmondeley) MSS, Correspondence 72 and 78; for Hare's friendship with Walpole in later years, see Horn, "Marlborough's First Biographer ...", H.I.Q., XX, p.162. It is clear from Hare's letter to Horace Walpole of 5 / 16 October 1710, B.M. Add. MSS 38501, f.149, that they were on similar terms of friendship; and in a letter of 29 August 1717 Hare wrote to Sarah of "the friendship I have the honour to have had from a child with Lord Townshend" (Private Corr., II, p.101).

97. In a letter to Marlborough of 3 September 1714, Blenheim MSS E38, Hare commented that it was twenty years since he had had "the honour to be Tutor to Ld Godolphin" (by this time Francis Godolphin had succeeded to his father's Earldom).

98. Both Oldmixon (Maynwaring, p.158) and Marlborough (to Godolphin, 30 October / 10 November 1710, Blenheim MSS B1-9) mention this characteristic, and Sarah refrained at one point from discussing the contents of the Examiner with Godolphin because "I know [it] will make you peevish that one looks into it" (undated letter of 1712, B.M. Add. MSS 28057, f.385).

99. Godolphin to Cowper, 25 July 1711, Herts R.O. Panshanger MSS D/EP F54, f.160. In this letter Godolphin requests documents relating to the charter of the town of Bewdley for a pamphlet being prepared by "a friend of ours"; at the time both Godolphin and Maynwaring were staying with Sarah at St. Albans (see Maynwaring to Lord Coningsby, 7 July 1711, B.M. Add. MSS 57861, f.164.), and the pamphlet, A State of the Bewdley Case (n.p., 1711: advertised Observator, X, No.93, 17-21 November 1711) is attributed to Maynwaring on Oldmixon's authority (Maynwaring, pp.314-323).
100. To Marlborough, 6 June 1709, Blenheim MSS B1-22.


102. To Marlborough, 17 September 1709, Blenheim MSS B1-22.


111. To Francis Godolphin, 13/24 June 1706, B. M. Add. MSS 28057, f. 252.


118. Examiner, No. 28 (15 February 1710/1), in Swift, Prose Works, III, p. 88; Examination of the Third and Fourth Letters, p. 7.


120. Maynwaring to Coningsby, 21 November 1710 and 13 March 1710/1, B.M. Add. MSS 5761, ff. 156-158; Oldmixon, Maynwaring, pp. 192-193.


122. Maynwaring to Sarah, 3 April 1708 and November 1709, Private Corr., I, pp. 117 and 277.


124. Published on 20 February 1711 (Moore, Checklist, p. 83, Item 99); in the ensuing discussion, page references are given parenthetically in the text.


127. A single impersonal reference in Hare's letters to "the poor creatures in the trenches" (to Naylor, 16/27 June 1709, H.M.C. Hare MSS, p. 225) contrasts with Marlborough's constant preoccupation with the hardships of his "poor men."

128. To Naylor, 19/30 July 1705, H.M.C. Hare MSS, p. 203.

Chapter III

THE QUESTION OF THE COMMAND

On the one hand, the accession of Marlborough's enemies to power, and his involvement in the campaign of denigration which had preceded and justified the dismissal of his colleagues, suggested the possibility of his own dismissal or resignation. On the other, his unquestionable ability to command success in the field made it advisable for the new ministers to retain his services, if they wished also to retain the confidence of the nation and the Allies in the future conduct of the war; yet it was evident that he could not be continued in office on the same footing as before. The problem of Marlborough's continued command of the army received much attention from the party pamphleteers from mid-1710 until early the following year, and some points the pressures they brought to bear were a determining factor in the solution that was eventually reached.

For the new administration to have dispensed with Marlborough's services while the campaign was still in progress would have been a disastrous step, and after the defeats in Spain at the end of the year, which destroyed initial hopes of a speedy peace, Marlborough's Flanders theatre was recognized as the only place in which the war could now be won. Since the Allies, particularly the Dutch, also interceded powerfully on Marlborough's behalf, both Harley and St John preferred
to represent the decision not to part with him as a gesture of indulgence to them. Yet the unpalatable fact was that even without these pressures, he could not have been disposed of simply as another political opponent. The barrage of plausible criticism of his conduct at home and abroad was slow to destroy the prestige of years of success, and in September Peter Wentworth learnt that

the Duke of M—— will be continued until he lays down himself, for the merit of his service is more Glaring to the eyes of the World, then the private piques that he may justly have given occasion to be taken at him. 3

Harley accordingly made overtures of accommodation before the campaign was over, and the Queen herself repeatedly declared that "there was no thought of putting him out." 4

Nevertheless, rumours that "a Commission has been drawing for a New General" had been circulating since the previous April, and by mid-year it was the contention of the most influential Whig propaganda that Marlborough would be dismissed and the country fall "an immediate Sacrifice of France." 5 These rumours that the new ministry intended to pay off old scores at the expense of the national interest were to some extent a Whig device for shaking national confidence in their opponents from the outset; the subject was such an effective one for this purpose that a Tory journalist condemned discussion of it as "tending to create Jealousies and Divisions amongst Her Majesties Subjects, and to excite them to Sedition and Rebellion." 6

However, it was Tory, rather than Whig propaganda which gave these reports their credibility and absolved Marlborough's supporters from
the charge of sheer mischief-making; for only one ministerial pamphlet, and that intended in part for distribution abroad, explicitly referred to the Queen's promise to the Allies not to remove Marlborough from his command, and even this need not have been considered binding beyond the end of the campaign then in progress. Otherwise there was a real discrepancy between the official attitude and the greater part of printed discussion of the subject. Sarah was puzzled. "Some times I think by the discourse of him, that they think it of too much consequence & danger to put him out after such success's," she wrote to Hare, "but they print millions of lyes in case it happens to quiet those that would not like it." It was not simply that Marlborough had not been spared by propagandists justifying the ministerial changes; many of them appeared to regard his dismissal as a serious possibility, some indirectly prepared for it, and one or two openly argued in favour of it.

A Tory answer to a Whig ballad which foretold Marlborough's dismissal pointed out that he was as subject as any servant of the Crown to removal at the Queen's pleasure, whatever his success or popularity, and an "Honest Torie," replying to another such prediction, made the more venomous retort that,

if his [quote] could not longer serve but upon his own [condition], it may be near time for the Queen to use her prerogative; for I hope she can change him at her pleasure, as well as any other of her Servants ...

The issue was further complicated by the rumour that when the envoy of the new ministry, Earl Rivers, departed for Hanover to ensure the Protestant
heir of the good intentions of his colleagues, he had instructions to offer the command of the army to the Elector. There were, in fact, three variations of this news item: one stated outright that Marlborough was to be removed and the Elector put in his place; the second, that the offer was a safeguard against Marlborough's voluntary resignation; and the third, that the Elector was simply being invited to assume the nominal command of Generalissimo, which would not affect Marlborough's control of the army in the field. The last proposal could be approved of even by the Whig Observator. 10

However, the conflicting reports so increased the uncertainty about Marlborough's tenure of office that the Tory Post Boy was soon maintaining that they were "altogether groundless." 11 Marlborough himself had already seen them for what they principally were, contributions to Harley's Election propaganda, to be seized on by his pamphleteers as indisputable proof of his good intentions towards the Protestant succession, upon which the Whigs delighted in casting doubts. 12 Even so, Marlborough's secretary warned Whig journalists to be wary of scotching the rumours too hastily, "for I am persuaded the Party would be glad to send him [Rivers] those Instricitions still if they could prevail." 13

One Tory pamphleteer did press all the charges brought against Marlborough to their logical conclusion, arguing that the mere suspicion of treasonable designs made him unfit to retain his command. With considerable, though somewhat misapplied ingenuity he then used the strongest arguments in favour of keeping the general in office to bolster the case for his
removal, by pointing out that continued success under a single commander, and the popular acclaim it brought him, might swell him "into such an Imposthume of Greatness" as would make him a danger to the Crown. Even more ineptly, he cited with approval the French policy of making frequent changes in the supreme command, ignoring the obvious fact that it had resulted in nothing more desirable than nine years' consistent defeat for the French troops. More to the point, however, was the reminder that, while Marlborough had strong motives for continuing the war, the Elector of Hanover had a vested interest in procuring a speedy and secure peace, as the means by which his succession was to be guaranteed by other members of the Alliance. 14

But the more realistic of the pamphleteers who seemed to favour Marlborough's dismissal concentrated on undermining the belief that his presence at the head of the army was a prerequisite of success, realizing that for most people the prestige of consistent victory would be an argument against his removal, not in favour of it. Defoe wanted to know whether the Duke had "any hereditary Title to the Command of the Army of Britain," and whether "God's Blessing upon her Majesty's Arms, to which all our Successes are owing, is a Peculiar to the Queen, to the Protestant Interest of Europe, or to the Person of the General?" The "Honest Torie" was "sure that we have the best Officers and Army in the World, who by God's Blessing cannot fail of continued good success, tho' the General should be Changed" and suggested one of Marlborough's Tory rivals, General Webb, or the Elector of Hanover, as possible successors. 15
It was Mrs. Manley who embarked most enthusiastically on the task of demonstrating to "those who esteem Stauracius so necessary;" that he could claim no personal credit for the Allied victories; for she argued that he owed them to sheer good luck, to the fact that Fate had made him the instrument of Louis XIV's downfall, and above all to the training which his veteran troops had received under the late King's command. Finally, realizing that the personal element could not be eliminated altogether, she described how, before a battle, the general had resort to "soperiferous Drugs, Fumigations, and certain Necromantick Rites," by which he "gains a foresight of the Event, and is instructed in the manner of overcoming." This last point, in so far as it was intended to be taken seriously, is chiefly valuable as an illustration of the difficulty of discounting Marlborough's innate ability completely, without recourse to the wildest fiction. Nor was it hard for his supporters to dispose of the contention that good fortune alone was responsible for his consistent success. But the reminder that his victories were in a great measure attributable to the bravery and skill of his officers and troops had, of course, a real validity. Marlborough himself had repeatedly acknowledged this, and Bolingbroke years afterwards recalled having heard him say, before his first battle had been won, that he could predict the ultimate success of the Allied cause from the quality of the veteran troops whose command he had inherited from William III.

Yet there was a limit to the appeal of such logic at a time of widespread uneasiness about the future of the war. Whatever part
Marlborough's personal ability might have played in past successes, the plain fact was that success had become identified with his command, and in practice Mrs. Manley's arguments did not convince even those who would most have liked to believe them. Swift was a better judge of the consideration which should be given to the almost superstitious national confidence in the Captain-General, because he was to some extent under its spell himself. Although he made a passing reference in the Examiner to the credit that was due to the whole army for the victories, he privately acknowledged the fallacy of arguing from this that Marlborough's services were dispensable; for he realized that the invincibility of the soldiers, in which Mrs. Manley and others had expressed such confidence, was itself a product of collective faith in their commander, and as such, another argument against his dismissal, rather than in favour of it. 19

Meanwhile, of course, these onslaughts on the notion of Marlborough's personal indispensability had not gone unchallenged by his supporters. One of them pointed out that after all the Duke's success, "he must be a bold Man indeed, that will pretend to succeed him, with Expectation ev'n of bare Approbation." 20 It added weight to this argument, that, of all the pretenders to the command, there was not one whose military record bore comparison with Marlborough's, and who did not have additional temperamental shortcomings disqualifying him from the post. Only the dangers of indulging in overt criticism of the new ministry and its adherents prevented the exploitation of these points, and this problem was ingeniously solved
in a pamphlet entitled *The New Scheme*.

It consisted simply of a series of tributes to members of the Whig ministry, followed in each case by the name of a possible or actual successor who was notorious for possessing the contrary abilities or temperament; the reader was then ironically invited to make a choice in favour of the Tory candidate. This was a particularly effective means of ridiculing the pretensions of Marlborough's would-be successors. The Duke, for example, was noted for his unfailing affability and patience; the reader was accordingly invited to compare these qualities with the corresponding character traits of the Duke of Argyll. The latter was an able and ambitious general and one of Marlborough's most hostile rivals, but his arrogance and ungovernable temper were a source of discomfort even to his admirers. When tribute was paid to Marlborough's modesty about his great achievements, General Webb's name was appended. Webb had won a brilliant minor victory during the campaign of 1708, for which at the time Marlborough had inadvertently failed to give him due credit, but he was said to have tired even his Tory sympathizers by his boasting of this single exploit. ²¹

The virtue of this technique was, that since not one word of actual criticism was involved, opponents could not complain without admitting in effect that the implied unfavourable comparisons were valid. The irritable confusion which this aroused can be judged from references to the pamphlet in the Tory press. Sir Thomas Double was made to refer to it complacently as "One of the most Impudent of all my Performances"
and to boast that "it has cost me above a Hundred Pound to disperse it about the Town, and round the Country," Boyer was outraged at the "Scandalous Paper" and "the Malicious Aspersions" it cast on the new ministers, while another pamphleteer sought to neutralize the irony with the lame assertion that "it is a very Honest Paper simply as it is wrote," though applied to the passages relating to Marlborough, this would only have added to the laughter.\(^{22}\)

Maynwaring was personally convinced at this time that Harley was in favour of Marlborough's dismissal, and he was evidently determined that if this opinion prevailed, the minister would be accountable to public opinion for the consequences. In the Medley, through the medium of a speech of Cicero against Caesar, he urged the Tories to put aside personal vendettas against the general at least until the war was over, since nothing but an irresponsible vindictiveness could justify his premature recall.\(^{23}\)

Ominous hints from the Tory press of financial enquiries and impeachments which might lie in store for Marlborough met the same response. When the French foreign minister argued that Marlborough could not be dismissed, because he had not been charged with any "capital fault," he was reckoning without the press, and when Swift imprudently ventured to make the same point in order to refute the claim that Marlborough was being ungratefully treated, the Observator was very quick to take him up on it.\(^{24}\) For not only Swift, but several of his journalistic colleagues, had hinted at corruption in Marlborough's
handling of the public money, and recommended that he be called to account officially. He had also been accused of treasonable designs, and it was Swift who recommended publicly that his request for the Captain-Generalcy for life should be entered on record as "highly Criminal." However, the Whig response to these threats was simply a reminder of the overriding need to retain Marlborough's services. The Observator, for example, pointed out that the Romans had deferred Scipio's impeachment until "after he had gloriously finish'd the War they had employ'd him in," and the benefits of Marlborough's victories were set against his alleged crimes, with the implication that his enemies could never justify taking official action against him.

The Queen and her ministers were of course aware of the strength of the Whig case. Marlborough did have irreconcilable enemies among the Tories who would have gladly seen him disgraced and impeached, whatever the consequences, and some of the pamphlets which recommend this course of action may be attributable to them. But how is one to account for the similar contributions from ministerial pamphleteers, such as Swift, Mrs. Manley, and Defoe, who elsewhere admitted the desirability of keeping Marlborough in office?

One possible explanation is that, however undesirable Marlborough's dismissal might be in principle, there were certain circumstances in which it would have been unavoidable. To Dutch pleas for an assurance that the general would be allowed to retain his command for one more campaign, a ministerial spokesman would say no more than that "it might
depend pretty much on his Grace's own behaviour to the Queen and her ministry."

If Marlborough had returned to join with his Whig colleagues in an attempted overthrow of the new administration, his dismissal would have been as necessary as it actually became in similar circumstances twelve months later. Both Harley and St John regarded this, or pretended to regard it, as an increasingly serious possibility, despite information from a go-between that the general was "terribly mortified, and ... will submitt to your termes if you will make them supportable." Indeed they may have felt that this last stipulation argued too great a readiness on Marlborough's part to make his own conditions for the partnership. They certainly succeeded in communicating their worst fears to the Queen, who at one point was prepared to contemplate his removal, should he refuse to "go into her Measures." 28

Consequently it fell to the ministerial pamphleteers to prepare for this eventuality, and, as Sarah noted, "quiet those that would not like it." Hence the hint of the "Honest Torie" that Marlborough's dismissal might become necessary if he would agree to serve only on his own conditions; hence the fact that Clement's promises to the Duke on Harley's behalf of "a large measure of Respect and Good-will" were conditioned by the hope that he would be "reform'd by some seasonable reproof, and be preserv'd from falling into any such extream as might cancel the merit of his past Services"; 29 hence the efforts to scotch the notion of Marlborough's absolute indispensability as general, and the hints in preparation for the parliamentary enquiries which would have
been necessary to justify the event if it had proved unavoidable.

The very existence of this propaganda was actually a safeguard against the crisis which the ministers seemed to fear, for once it had been advertised that they intended to deal summarily with any opposition from Marlborough, those who were most in favour of his continuance considered that he should take care not to "give his Enemies, a handle or pretence to lay him aside, which many suppose they would be glad to do." 30

More than one Whig journalist, however, concluded that the real purpose of these preparations for Marlborough's return was to raise a hostile mob against him. A sufficiently violent reaction might convince the Queen and the ministry that it was possible, and even necessary, to dispense with his services, whether his future conduct seemed to warrant it or not. A vague accusation of this kind, coming from the opposition, must be viewed with suspicion. The instances in which it is particularized are not impressive. A Whig commentator on Swift's famous contrasting bills of Roman gratitude and British ingratitude in the *Examiner* melodramatically claimed that,

> the Design of that Paper, at this Juncture, and in this Scarcity of Money, cou'd be no other, than to direct the Mob to fire his Houses, and to plunder his Family; as if his over-proportion'd Rewards had burden'd the Subject, brought the Nation into so great a Debt, and occasion'd the present Calamity. 31

The mob was an alarming and unpredictable force in politics, but the *Examiner* was not primarily designed for such an audience; and since
lists of Marlborough's incomes had been circulated repeatedly in the past without precipitating arson and riot, Swift may fairly be absolved from seditious intent on this occasion.

Nevertheless, while no one item of propaganda can be said to have been written in order to arouse active popular hostility against the general, the press campaign as a whole might well have had this effect. A single ballad concerning his avarice had driven the audience of The Recruiting Officer to a frenzy of resentment earlier in the year, and the hostile pamphleteers were scarcely taking pains to avoid a repetition of this incident on a larger scale. Boyer implied that it was just, and even laudable, for the people to "Hate, and Exclaim against" the corrupt favourites to whom Marlborough and his family had been likened; Swift also mentioned the "universal Hatred" due to any general or minister who did not show "the most entire Submission and Respect" to the Queen, and remarked that,

if Paulus Aemelius, or Scipio himself, had presumed to move the Senate to continue their Commissions for Life, they certainly would have fallen a Sacrifice to the Jealousy of the People. 

When, therefore, Swift claimed that Marlborough could not be said to have been ungratefully treated, because he had never been subjected to popular hostility, there was some justice in the Observer's retort that "it will not be owing to the Examiner if he be not hooted at and insulted in the Streets by the ungrateful Mob whenever he comes home."

In the event, Marlborough's reception was so favourable, that his
only problem was how to prevent his enemies using it to substantiate their claims that his prestige was a danger to the Crown; for his progress from the coast and entry into London were marked by demonstrations of popular acclaim. Sarah, as an eyewitness, recalled that,

there was at most of the doors in the street very Substantial well lookt people, that shew'd great affection to the duke of Marl:... which shew'd that notwithstanding all the lyes the new ministry had spread by printing, & all manner of waits, it had not had so thorow an effect to hurt the duke of Marl: as they wisht. 35

This was a reasonable conclusion. Though the incident may not have been proof that Marlborough was permanently invulnerable to such propaganda, it seems that for many people, it was one thing to ridicule a great man's foibles, and another to be reconciled to losing his services at a critical period. For once the Observer had the last word:

>> the Examiner may perceive, to the great Mortification of himself and his Faction, that the Scale of General Favour, and the Dispositions of the Kingdom, are not at their Disposal; and that they have spit their Venom against his Grace to no purpose. 36

Although Marlborough had gained an unexpected advantage, the question of his continuing command of the army was by no means settled. With dismissal now out of the question, his resignation remained the foremost factor in an unpredictable situation. Ever since the dismissal of Sunderland in June, rumours had been fostered in the Whig press and by
word of mouth, that the general would feel bound to resign in sympathy with his colleagues, despite assurances which Marlborough himself gave to the contrary.\footnote{37} These reports were disruptive of Harley's plans, especially while the campaign was in progress. It was less than three years since the episode narrated in *The Secret History of Arlus and Odolphus*, when Marlborough's threat of resignation had wrecked his schemes for a reconstructed ministry. Some means had to be found of combating the Whig propaganda; of reassuring those who were genuinely alarmed at the possibility of Marlborough's resignation, of discouraging such threats for the future, and finally of ensuring that if the Duke should ever put them into practice, he, and not the instigators of the ministerial changes, would be held responsible for the consequences. The form of propaganda adopted for this purpose was so effective, that it eventually transformed Marlborough's indispensability into a means of ensuring his complete submission to the new administration.

The principle was simple. Marlborough's initial declaration that he would not bring chaos on Allied affairs by resigning was said to have been received with relief even by the Tories, "who never desired he should lay down." Maynwaring also found "most People" of the opinion that the Duke "shoud serve, & do it as cheerfully as is possible under his circumstances."\footnote{38} But if this realization of the need for Marlborough's services meant that his dismissal would be regarded as an irresponsible act, what would be the public reaction if he should voluntarily abandon his
post or even threaten to do so, on party or personal grounds?

Discussions of the subject in the ministerial press therefore took their cue from a letter written by the Queen to Godolphin, when Sunderland's dismissal had been represented as sufficient to justify Marlborough's resignation:

If he and you should do so wrong a thing, at any time, especially at this critical juncture, as to desert my service, what confusion would happen would be at your doors, and you alone would be answerable and nobody else. 39

The first two numbers of the Examiner hinted at this theme in the mildest terms. The editor expressed his disbelief in the rumours of resignation and his confidence that Marlborough was "guided by a nobler Principle than that the little Interests of any Party." His main attack was on the Whig journalists who were calling the Duke's sense of duty in question for their own factious purposes. 40 Yet even these flattering and reassuring comments made it clear what weapon was being held in reserve if Marlborough's actions should ever confirm the truth of these reports.

A much clearer indication of the underlying purpose of this propaganda came with the publication of a pamphlet entitled, Reasons Why the Duke of Marlborough Cannot Lay down His Commands, Deduced from the Principles of Loyalty, Gratitude, Honour, and Interest, &c. 41 These reminders of the obligations Marlborough was under not to desert the service of the Queen and countrymen who had so bountifully rewarded him, would have been reassuring to those who believed his resignation or disgrace imminent. At the same time, they indicated the standards he would be accused of
violating if he should resign, and at times the threat explicit in the Queen's letter was very close to the surface. It was pointed out, for example, that such a resignation would tend
to the Encouragement of those Powers his Sovereign is engag'd in War with, which merits a more Odious Name than I can think of, while I have the Image of his Grace's Heroick Actions in my Mind. (p. 2)

The finishing touch was a direct quotation from a formal reply which the Duke had made the year before on receiving parliamentary thanks for his services, to the effect that he would think no pains too great on his part to secure a safe and honourable peace. The pamphleteer called this a Testimony that will rise in Witness against Him, shall He at any Time act Counter to His Promises, by the Resignation you are talking of, before He has brought about those desirable Ends which He has so long contended for ... it would be Criminal in the Greatest Man breathing to degenerate into such an Inglorious State of Life, as a Retreat from his Country's Service, when the last finishing Stroke was only wanting to be put to all His Labours ... (pp. 5-6)

There could scarcely have been a clearer indication of the recrimination which Marlborough might expect if he resigned. Yet there was no reply to these arguments, since they ostensibly appealed to his virtue and honour, and were in essence those which his own supporters had used to prevent his dismissal. Such propaganda placed Marlborough in a position which exactly suited the ministry's purpose. If he should now resign, they had prepared the public to condemn him; if, realizing this, he accepted the logic of his position, he would be disarmed of the one effective method of resisting whatever curtailments of his power they would devise.
Even so, the Whigs continued to spread the rumour of Marlborough's resignation before the beginning of the next campaign, either out of a genuine belief that he could never establish a satisfactory relationship with his political enemies, or because such reports continued to be an embarrassment to Harley and his colleagues. But such considerations did not influence Marlborough himself. The threat of being taxed with disobedience and ingratitude to the Queen, and made the scapegoat for every future misfortune impressed him deeply. Sarah testifies that "avoiding this snare" was one of the principal reasons for his reluctance to surrender his commands whatever the provocation given him. Her further comments on this subject reveal how conscious Marlborough and his circle had become by this time of the pressures brought to bear by the party journalists. If he were to resign, Sarah was convinced that he would be proclaimed a public enemy by the ministers, and that their pamphleteers would then distribute propaganda "all over the countries" claiming that he had "quitted his Queen's and his country's service, merely because he could not govern in the Cabinet as well as in the field."

In fact, the treatment which Marlborough now received led her to conclude that, having prepared such a reception for his resignation, the ministers intended to force him to it as a substitute for his dismissal. She was not alone in reaching this conclusion, but before it can be endorsed, the ministry's point of view must also be considered. Faced with a majority wish that Marlborough remain at the head of the army, they knew that he was nevertheless a formidable political opponent, whom
they could not safely continue in office without substantial reductions of his power in both civil and military spheres. Since measures for this purpose were necessarily undertaken at the same time as the official accommodation was being negotiated, they would naturally appear to Marlborough and his sympathizers as deliberate hindrances to it. The dividing line between policy and provocation was, and remains, very indistinct. The pamphleteers were employed at each stage to justify the ministry's measures and to forestall Marlborough's right to object to them; yet to him this was simply adding insult to injury. A study of the publications involved does tip the scale in favour of this interpretation. The pamphleteers had a case for some of the ministry's methods of dealing with Marlborough, but the manner in which they presented it seldom suggests a genuine desire to make the terms of his continuing service "supportable."

This unconciliatory tone was set by Swift in the famous Examiner of 23 November 1710. As the time of the hoped-for adjustment of Marlborough's relations with his new colleagues drew near, Whig journalists began, not unnaturally, to complain of the past and present hostility of the ministerial press towards him. Parallels were drawn with generals of classical history who had been plagued by ungrateful scribblers; and on the insulting assumption that considerations of common decency and gratitude would not influence the ministers in their treatment of Marlborough, Maynwaring argued that they should at least take care not to precipitate his resignation by insults and ill-usage while it was still
in their own interests to retain his services. 46

These complaints attracted the attention of the chief ministerial spokesman, but instead of palliating the offence, he set out to make it worse. Dismissing the principal grievance with the breath-taking assertion that "in the highest Ferment of Things, we heard few or no Reflections upon this great Commander," he altered the Whig protests in paraphrase, so that they appeared, not as legitimate complaints about a handful of pamphleteers and their patrons, but as an arrogant and indiscriminate clamour against the "Ingratitude of the whole Kingdom to the Duke of Marlborough," for which there was no discernible cause but the dismissal of two of his relations from the Cabinet. By this device Swift evidently hoped to deprive Marlborough of the sympathy of those who had previously been most ready to condemn his graceless treatment, since they would be most conscious of the injustice of this general accusation of ingratitude. Moreover, nothing destroys a genuine impulse of gratitude more rapidly and completely than constant reminders of the obligation and unfounded reproaches of failing to acknowledge it; and it was child's play for Swift to add to this sense of injury and alienation by demonstrating, with his lists of rewards bestowed, that the nation as a whole had been very far from ungrateful to the general. In fact, the classical parallel suggested that he had been considerably over-rewarded. For good measure Swift then included insinuations of war-profiteering and cheating against both the Duke and Duchess.
It was easy to enjoy the ingenuity and wit of this piece, which the delighted printer dubbed "the Laurel Crown" (the twopenny item in the bill of Roman gratitude), and forget its significance for the victim at the moment it was published. At a time when most people hoped that Marlborough and the new ministers would make a responsible attempt to put aside their differences in the national interest, Swift's response to Whig complaints in effect advertised that his patrons, for their part, were prepared to make no concessions to Marlborough's feelings. Yet if Marlborough had felt driven to resign, Swift's initial argument that the general had no right to object to his civilian colleagues' dismissal, could readily have been transformed into the cry that he had quitted only "because he could not govern in the Cabinet as well as in the field." Sarah, who considered the officially inspired press campaign against Marlborough to be in itself sufficient provocation for his resignation, was understandably outraged at the inconsistency of this latest contribution with the majority desire for his continuance in office.

Among the more concrete issues which might radically influence Marlborough's decision to stay or go was the dismissal of Sarah herself. The Queen was determined that it should not be deferred beyond the end of the campaign, and it was probably only for fear of precipitating the Duke's resignation that it had been delayed so long. Apart from the personal feelings which might lead him to this step, there were the international repercussions of his wife's dismissal to be considered; "his concern was least ye noise of it abroad shoud lessen him, as if he was not so
much in ye Q[ueen]'s favour." 50

The press had an obvious part to play in solving the problem created by the Queen's obstinacy on the one hand, and Marlborough's sensitivity on the other. The campaign against the Duchess, a study in itself, was far less restrained than that against her husband, and since the imprudent behaviour which had destroyed her friendship with the Queen was common knowledge, there was no lack of material. As justification of her dismissal in itself these productions were quite superfluous. Even Whigs who admired Marlborough acknowledged that his wife had lost the Queen's favour deservedly. 51 The aim was rather to disarm the Duke's objections to the event, and prevent him from using it as a legitimate pretext for his own resignation. St John had ended his abusive attack on the Duchess with the assurance that "the Royal Hand is already reach'd out to Chain up the Plague" and Boyer forestalled Marlborough's right to claim this as a grievance, by arguing that

no Military Services, or other Merits, can give a Man a just Title to Screen any, no not his nearest Relations, who forget themselves so far as to Insult their Royal Mistress, and Bountiful Benefactress. 52

From the ministry's point of view, these tactics were an unqualified success. "They soon indeed found their account very much among the people (wch was the point they had to gain) in this way of proceeding," Sarah admitted, "and therefore they took all occasions of printing all the rude and scandalous things that were possible against me." 53 The result was that when Marlborough found the Queen immovably
resolved on her dismissal, many felt it would be wrong for him to resign on this account. As Sarah herself realized, it would have given the Tory pamphleteers the excuse to claim that he had sacrificed his country's interest simply because his wife could not "be permitted to use the Queen disrespectfully." 

Yet this method of forcing Marlborough's acquiescence in his wife's disgrace only intensified the greatest personal ordeal he faced on his return. For him there could be no distinction between a libellous attack on her and one on himself: "When with Reproaches they the Wife defame, /'Tis at the Husband's honour that they aim," a verse dialogue, supposedly between the Duke and Duchess, argued. Another ballad vainly urged some mitigation of Sarah's treatment, out of consideration for the Duke. It is not surprising, therefore, to find Sarah claiming that the ministerial pamphleteers published "lyes" about her, "knowing that will add to the uneasiness which they give the duke of Marlborough in all other things, their main poynt being to remove him from the Queen, & not to let him serve any more."

With Marlborough's home-coming imminent, another matter which called for similar treatment in the press was the cashiering of three of his best officers, for drinking toasts to the "confusion" and "damnation" of the new administration and pledging themselves to "stand by" their general. The ministry was concerned in its own interests to reduce Marlborough's absolute influence in military affairs, and the behaviour of the three officers afforded reasonable excuse to begin the process.
Yet it was necessary to tread warily, since Marlborough might consider
that his inability to protect his most zealous supporters would so weaken
his effective authority in the army, as to leave him with no alternative
but resignation. Anticipating his objections, the Queen explained that
the cashiering of the three "was not done with ye least disrespect to ye
Duke; but because they had made it their Business to reflect upon her,
& her administration" and should therefore be made an example to others. 58
The subject was then handed over to Swift for discussion in the Examiner.

This publicity was in itself bound to increase Marlborough's
resentment at the blow to his authority; but Swift used the whole incident,
in the first place to demonstrate that the ministers' determination to keep
"the Military Power [i.e. Marlborough] in absolute Subjection to the Civil
[i.e. themselves]," was legitimate and even essential policy, and in the
second, to make sure that the Duke could not resign without appearing to
condone the worst implications of his officers' unwary remarks. For while
Swift was careful to keep to the letter -- though scarcely the spirit --
of the Queen's declaration that no reflection on Marlborough had been
intended, he also had her authority for claiming that the officers'
offence was a personal insult to herself, as well as to her administration:

I have heard it mentioned as a common Practice last Autumn,
somewhere or other, to drink Damnation and Confusion (and this
with Circumstances very aggravating and horrid) to the New
Ministry, and to those who had any Hand in turning out the Old;
that is to say, to those Persons whom her Majesty has thought
fit to employ in her greatest Affairs; with something more than
a Glance against the Queen herself. And if it be true, that
these Orgies were attended with certain doubtful Words, of
standing by their General, who without question abhorred them:
Let any man consider the Consequence of such Dispositions, if they should happen to spread ... If Men of such Principles were able to propagate them in a Camp, and were sure of a General for Life, who had any Tincture of Ambition, we might soon bid farewell to Ministries and Parliaments, whether new or old. 59

Since the earlier part of this same issue had been occupied with a discussion of the dangerous implications of Marlborough's request for his Captain-Generalcy for life, this concluding thrust was obviously intended to heighten suspicion and alarm against him. Yet by paying lip-service to the view that Marlborough "without Question abhorred" the treasonable activities of his supporters, Swift had made sure, even while maintaining his own admirably impartial stance, that the Duke could not now resign, protest, or make any public gesture suggesting sympathy with his officers' predicament, without convicting himself by his own actions of disrespect to the Queen and sinister designs against the established constitution. Again there were the conflicting pressures, tempting him to resign and yet making it impossible for him to do so with honour, which so complicated Marlborough's position during this winter.

Yet had matters rested there, it would have been difficult for Marlborough to claim deliberate and outright provocation; his own supporters had after all committed the original offence. But when the episode became involved with yet another humiliating expedient for reducing his power and prestige, it could reasonably be said that the bounds of policy had been passed.

The question of whether Marlborough should as usual receive the
formal thanks of one or other of the Houses for Parliament for the achievements of the campaign was in the hands of his political opponents. There was a hostile Tory majority in the Commons, and although the Whigs had more strength in the Lords, an unsuccessful attempt to move the vote there had already convinced them that they were not strong enough to force the issue without risking a humiliating defeat. Finally, when Marlborough returned, the Queen herself informed him "that no motion should be made in the house of lords as usual to thank him for his services because her ministers would oppose that." 60

The omission appeared significant to those who looked for some sign that the new ministers really intended to establish a cordial working relationship with the general for the coming campaign, and there were complaints from a Whig pamphleteer. 61 Yet the decision, though a deliberately humiliating one, had been justified in the course of the Lords' debate on the grounds that the unspectacular siege warfare of the previous campaign had brought peace no nearer. 62 The ceremony had been omitted in the past for similar reasons, 63 so that, had the matter rested there, it could not have been called a studied insult. It was the immediate publication of a pamphlet entitled, Reasons Why a Certain Great G[eneral] Has Not Yet Receiv'd the Thanks of Either of the Two Houses of P[arliamen]t, which cast doubt on the real motives for the action. 64

Ostensibly a vindication of the official decision, it dealt only perfunctorily with/least exceptional reason for it — the lack of progress during the campaign (pp.5-6). Instead, drawing on recent Tory propaganda,
it suggested that Marlborough was being refused the usual tribute in recognition of the measures he was alleged to have taken to prolong the war and obstruct the peace for his own enrichment. Parallels from classical history were used as the thinnest of evasions of direct accusation; so thin, that the device was rather a mockery of the victim than a serious attempt to provide protection for the pamphleteer and true historical precedent for Marlborough's treatment:

The Records of past times among ... the Romans, tell us of Generals that for the sake of supporting their own Honour in one Part of the World, are said to have been the Cause of losing that of their Country in all others; Of Consuls, that out of a Regard to themselves and the Perquisites of War, were accus'd of having rejected the Conditions of Peace, tho' never so Advantagious to those they fought for; and prefer'd the loss of Legions before Towns, to the Acquisition of Victories in open Fields; of Embassadors, that have postpon'd a certain Benefit to an uncertain Expectation; and tho' it cannot be said any one of the foregoing stations have been made use of by any British Subject to any one of the forgoing purposes, I presume it may without Offence be affirm'd, That the Persons so Offending, had no Decrees in their Favour from the Roman Senate. (pp. 14-15)

Another reason for the omission of the usual ceremony, it was suggested, was the suspicion under which the conduct of the three cashiered officers had placed Marlborough. To the objection that a general could not justly be blamed for the indiscretions of his subordinates, it was retorted that Marlborough could not complain of ungrateful treatment, because he had not officially been held responsible for the incident and had been amply rewarded by Parliament in the past (p. 10-11). Even while screening himself behind the Queen's declaration that she had intended no reflection on Marlborough in disgracing his three supporters, the
anonymous pamphleteer had contrived to flout it more blatantly than Swift; and the unashamed suggestion that the refusal of the address of thanks was actually a form of punishment for suspected offences for which there was no higher authority than hostile propaganda, gave the whole affair the aspect of deliberate provocation and party malice. It is understandable that the official decision, together with the publication of this "invidious and scurrilous" pamphlet, "encreas'd the Apprehension of many, that his Grace would gratify his private Disgust, and lay down his Commission." 65

There are indications, in fact, that in their readiness to impose humiliating conditions on Marlborough's tenure of office, in the confidence that he could not resign without drawing the condemnation of his countrymen down on his own head, the ministry and its supporters had somewhat overreached themselves. During the winter, Marlborough ignored press attacks altogether and confined his remonstrances on other matters to his private conclaves with the ministers. Whig versifiers drew attention to his studied indifference to party libels, as an attitude few more dignified and becoming than his wife's combativeness, 66 and on this occasion it did him good service. Whether his motive was a genuine sense of duty, or simply a sense of self-preservation, the outward patience and submissiveness he consistently displayed made the ministry's treatment of him seem more and more like deliberate persecution.
Defoe was later to pay tribute to Harley for having shew'd the Hero, who we thought would have quitted the Service in Disgust, that his own Interest, his Countries Advantage & his Mistresses Glory, might still be in his Power, if he knew how to Practise what his Duty to them all Call'd for, (viz.) to Submit to the Reason and the Commands of his Soveraign. 67

In the sense that Marlborough had continued at his post, partly at least, out of fear of being condemned by the ministerial pamphleteers for disobedience to the Queen and neglect of his country's interests if he did not, Defoe was probably quite right in giving some credit to Harley's ingenuity for the decision. But the contrary pressures which had been exerted did not escape notice. Not even Swift was privately convinced that the credit for Marlborough's remaining in office really lay with Harley and his colleagues. In fact, he became increasingly apprehensive that if the general did resign, not only would they lose his necessary services, but the ministry, and not Marlborough, would be held responsible for the consequences. As soon as the Duke had declared his readiness to work with his new colleagues if at all possible, Swift remarked, "I really think they will not do well in too much mortifying that man, although indeed it is his own fault"; and a few days later, hearing Whig rumours that Marlborough would resign, he was prepared to criticize the ministers for pressing the Duke too hard, and letting "personal quarrels mingle too much with their proceedings." 68

Marlborough himself was aware that his hold on public sympathy was one of his few remaining assets, and when, on the eve of his departure for the Continent, he asked Sir David Hamilton what people were saying of
his conduct to the Queen and nation since his return, he must have been gratified to learn that "some gave him as Great or greater Character, for yt Victory over himself under Provocations, yn for all his other Victories." 69

Yet the ministers were well aware that, for all Marlborough’s outward submissiveness, he was still their enemy, and not the less so for the treatment to which they had subjected him; "the exterior is a little mended", St John wrote, "but at heart, the same sentiments remain, and these heightened and inflamed by what he calls provocations." 70 It must have strengthened these misgivings that his continued command of the army, even though necessary for the ministry’s stability, was also the most effective method for Marlborough himself "to maintain his Credit Abroad, and to retrieve his Interest at Home." 71 The hopes of the Whig opposition were pinned on this process. In a verse dialogue in which Sarah figures, lamenting the ill-fortune that has fallen on her family, Court acquaintance reminds her,

Your noble Lord his old Command still bears,
And who can tell if Fortune but declares,
What one Lucky Blow may give to your Affairs.

Sarah admits, "That Thought indeed does keep my Hopes alive", but fears that the Duke’s enemies, who have already tried in vain to destroy his reputation by means of the press, will attempt to prevent any future addition to his prestige by the same means. 72

This is exactly what they were planning to do. Swift’s famous
letter to "Crassus," published less than three weeks after the first official announcement that Marlborough was to retain his command for the following campaign, was to Steele a plain declaration that the Duke was still regarded as an adversary, and a "very formidable" one. 73

It was because the contents of the *Examiner* could so readily be taken as an index of the ministry's sentiments, and by association, even those of the Queen herself, that it was such an effective medium for guarding against any revival of Marlborough's prestige. For as long as the ministerial journal still continued its hostility to him, no one could suppose, whatever the outward appearances, that Marlborough was really trusted by his new colleagues or in full favour with the Queen. When considering how to deal with Marlborough should circumstances forbid his immediate dismissal, Harley had suggested that, "[if] the Prince could not presently withdraw the Effects of his favor, yet he could Easily divert it" by "Publicly & avowedly" bestowing it on another. 74 Clearly Harley had himself in mind, and the policy had been translated into practice by the ministerial revolution and the accompanying propaganda which had contrasted his own rise to royal favour with Marlborough's deserved loss of it.

Mrs. Manley had already hinted that an official decision to retain Marlborough in command of the army would not mean that he was fully restored to royal favour. Past offences had been such as could be neither forgotten nor forgiven: "Stauracius, 'tis true, is yet at
at the Head of the Thracian Legions, but with that Esteem which his Contempt of Caesar has justly drawn upon him."75 Once Marlborough's re-employment had been officially settled, Swift's renewed assault in the Examiner was confirmation of this point. The advantage of these tactics for the ministry was considerable. Marlborough personally attached a great deal of importance to the public knowledge that he was high in the Queen's favour and in the confidence of his own government, maintaining that it was this, and not his official status, which gave him his influence abroad and at the head of the army. Stripped of these assets, he felt demoralized and vulnerable, less able to do justice to his responsibilities, and less ready to make enemies of the ministers by open opposition. 76

A more straightforward effect of this press attack was the damage it could do to his remaining popularity at home, which the coming campaign might otherwise consolidate. The letter to Crassus, rivalling "the Laurel Crown" as the most widely read of the Examiners, was singled out by a relatively impartial critic as Swift's "Master-piece." 77 Even as an isolated piece of propaganda, it could be expected not only to whet the hostility of Marlborough's Tory enemies, but to deprive him of some of the public sympathy he had gained during the winter.

Swift's problem was how to achieve these objectives while under the temporary restraints which now lay on all the Duke's detractors; for the official acknowledgement that his services were indispensable to the new ministry, and the fact that he had been sent to command again
in Flanders in spite of earlier Tory objections to this strategy, meant that direct belittlement of his professional ability, especially from a ministerial spokesman, would be neither prudent nor convincing. On this issue, in fact, Swift had already created difficulties for himself. Several weeks before, in recognition of the influence of The Management of the War, he had committed himself publicly to answering the first two parts in detail. A third section had now appeared, and still Swift did not redeem his promise. Indeed, it had become obvious that he could not do so. Even if he had felt confident of his ability to rout a well-informed adversary on his chosen ground, this could not have been done without the radical criticism of Marlborough's professional conduct which present circumstances forbade. Swift therefore seized upon the abusive postscript to Hare's third letter as an excuse for paying no further attention to the whole.78

Hare's complaint was that Marlborough had been referred to in the fourth issue of the Examiner (for which Swift was not responsible), as "an ambitious Cataline at the Head of a Mercenary Army." He was not the only reader to accept this interpretation of the phrase, and it was probably correct. Nevertheless, the insult had been so obliquely framed that it could easily be disclaimed and Whig journalists who quoted it out of context were certainly more concerned with berating the Examiner than with vindicating Marlborough. In fact, there was probably some justice in a Tory pamphleteer's remark that, but for this publicity, most readers
would have passed the jibe over unnoticed. On the other hand, Swift's outrage at Hare's "gross perverting of an innocent Expression" was also in excess of its object, and seems to have been largely simulated to free himself from the promise which it was no longer convenient to keep.

One modern editor, however, has suggested attributing the two anonymous Examinations of The Management of the War to Swift, on the basis of his retracted promise to answer Hare's pamphlet "in a discourse by itself." The titles do indicate that the anonymous author wished the connection to be made; given the Examiner's reputation, this would have been an obvious means of promoting sales. It is just possible, though in view of the low quality of the two pamphlets, unlikely, that he was undertaking the task with Swift's sanction. But contemporaries were never deceived into supposing Swift the author in his own right. One of them did at first connect the Examination of the Management of the War with Swift's promise of a separate answer to Hare, but concluded almost at once,

'tis such a mean, low Performance, that after reading it twice over, which I believe is more than any body else will do, I can't discern in it the least shadow of an Argument: and I must do my Friend the Examiner the Justice to clear him from having any hand in it.

Meanwhile, the Whig journalists were not prepared to let Swift's omission pass unchallenged. To both the Observator and the Medley it was a demonstration that the Examiner had met his match in Hare, and it was conjectured that Swift's patrons must have instructed him not to undertake the task he had promised, for fear he should "expose himself,
as they knew he wou'd do, if he ventur'd upon it."\textsuperscript{82}

Some reply from Swift was clearly necessary, both to save face and to undo some of the effect of Hare's influential pamphlets by more devious means. Since Marlborough's military achievements were temporarily sacred, his prevailing temperamental weakness made an excellent substitute; "excessive Avarice in a General, is, I think, the greatest Defect he can be liable to, next to those of Courage and Conduct," Swift argued when challenged, "and may be attended with the most ruinous Consequences."\textsuperscript{83}

The subject was also an ideal one for the sheer destruction of popular prestige. Defoe had already remarked that avarice in a statesman was bound to arouse the "Mortall Aversion" of the populace, and Swift had also singled out this quality in Marlborough as one which would "extremely damp the Peoples Favour, as well as the Love of the Soldiers."\textsuperscript{84}

But Swift had still to tread warily if he was to avoid the obstacles that hedged about any press attack on the general, and he first took care to disarm critics with an apparently magnanimous tribute to Marlborough's virtues and achievements, including his courage and success in the field. His next step was an anecdote purporting to illustrate the ridiculous and undignified personal frugalities which Marlborough practised in the midst of his wealth and grandeur. This was certainly no reflection on his professional ability, but it was precisely the kind of ridicule which had driven the audience of \textit{The Recruiting Officer} to a frenzy of jeers and catcalls, in spite of a consciousness of Marlborough's military merit. It also presented a facet of the general's character
which was ludicrously difficult to reconcile with that of the national hero whom some of Swift's readers may have hailed in the streets a few weeks before.

The transition to more serious matters was made with studied indirection:

When your Adversaries reflect how far you are gone in this Vice, they are tempted to talk as if we owed our Successes, not to your Courage or Conduct, but to those Veteran Troops you command; who are able to conquer under any General, with so many brave and experienced Officers to lead them.

Here Swift almost certainly had in mind the passages from Mrs. Hanley's Memoirs of Europe, in which she had compared Marlborough, in his excessive avarice, to Crassus, and argued that his victories were largely owing to the bravery and skill of his officers and troops.85 But even while giving her theories the maximum of publicity, Swift was careful to maintain his own impartial stance by reporting them as hearsay; though his failure to disagree with them, even from this detached standpoint, implied that the criticism was valid, or at least that Marlborough had only himself to blame if his adversaries could thus cast plausible doubts on his ability. By this means, Swift had contrived to belittle Marlborough's courage and military talents in spite of his initial tribute to them.

The device of hearsay was unobtrusively abandoned as Swift went on to retail accusations that Marlborough had starved his soldiers rather than forfeit profits from safeguards and contributions in occupied territory, that he had confined his conquests to Flanders where the gains were greatest, rather than press forward with an invasion of France, and that he had broken off the treaty of peace rather than end these
opportunities for enriching himself. In renewing this last accusation, Swift had simply ignored Hare's carefully argued rebuttals ("your Friends offer nothing material in your Defence"), and returned to the well-worn, but effective device of aphoristic comment on the evils of avarice in public life ("all agree, there is nothing so pernicious, which the Extremes of Avarice may not be able to inspire"). 86

Unable to destroy the total impact of Swift's attack, the Whig pamphleteers used Marlborough's newly confirmed status to make some telling criticisms of the author. Defoe dwelt upon the folly and danger of destroying the army's confidence in its general while the war was still in progress; Maynwaring, so moved by this fresh outrage from the Examiner that he rose from a sick-bed to compose a reply, taunted Swift with stupidity in failing to realize that the Queen's renewed declaration of confidence in Marlborough had superseded earlier instructions to denigrate him at all costs; and the Observator argued with some point that Swift's insinuations amounted to a reflection on the Queen and ministry, since, by his account, they had re-employed as Captain-General a man whose moral shortcomings made him "unworthy the Command of a single Company." 87

The most decisive complaint, however, came from Marlborough himself. Earlier in the year, the Observator had remarked, "'tis well for the Examiner, that he seems to be below the Duke's Resentment," 88 but this apparent indifference was simply a part of Marlborough's prudent policy of ignoring all provocations until he was more certain of his
ground. He may have expected that once he was reinstated in his command, this goading would cease. When it did not, he appealed to St John to redress the grievance. The Secretary of State's patronage of the journal was too well-known for him to risk a rupture of his official relations with the Duke by ignoring the complaint. In fact he had good reason for confirming Marlborough's suspicions that he could restrain the *Examiner* at will, since this implied that he could also revoke his instructions should there be occasion for it.\(^89\) This hint was not lost on Marlborough, and it was not the last time this bargaining-counter was to be used between them.

Ministerial propagandists who accepted the need for Marlborough to retain his command also aimed to guard against the possibility that his continuing foothold in power would eventually become the means of restoring a Whig ministry. The ministerial changes, which had severed the official connection between Marlborough and his former colleagues, had been the first step in curtailing his power, and the pamphleteers had taken care to emphasize this in order to justify retaining the services of a man who had repeatedly been accused of treasonable designs. Writing of the "exorbitant Power" of Marlborough and Godolphin, Boyer had explained that the design was "to remove the one, and by that means restrain the Authority of the other.\(^90\) Marlborough would thus, in Swift's patronizing phrase, be "taken out of ill Hands, and put into better," and it would be quite safe to continue him in office.\(^90\) It is interesting to note also that most of the references to his attempt to secure the Captain-Generalcy
for life, attribute the original design quite erroneously, but quite deliberately, to the Junto, with the implication that in this instance Marlborough had allowed himself to be manipulated, possibly against his better judgment, by his "Republican" colleagues.91

There still remained the fear that the fragile bond between Marlborough and Godolphin and their Whig associates would be cemented by their common adversity, and by the knowledge of the Whigs that the Duke was their last link with ministerial power. The pamphleteers accordingly continued their efforts to foster distrust between them and so prevent them from joining forces in the future to oppose the ministry. Two publications taunted them with having "privately offer'd to sell one another" in the course of the ministerial changes,92 and the fact that Marlborough had continued at his post after his colleagues had been dismissed, provided an excellent opportunity for combining assurances about the restraints imposed on his overweening ambition, with insinuations that he had deserted the Whig cause. One of the meaner refinements of this propaganda was that, if the Duke has resigned in sympathy with his colleagues, he would have been taxed with putting party loyalties before the good of his country; whereas, having taken the contrary decision, he was now as readily condemned for sacrificing former attachments in the interests of self-preservation.

It took Mrs. Manley's ingenuity and the resources of secret history to present this conflicting case to best advantage.
She first represented "Hezminius" (Harley) reassuring the Emperor that Stauracius would not be any longer formidable, when once Aemilius [Godolphin] was displac'd ... The lawless Power of the Conspirators once reduc'd, it was not to be doubted but he wou'd content himself with being the second Person of the Empire, without any longer aiming to become the first ...

With the facility of secret history, she then provided an insight into Aemilius' own reflections on the same subject, and so was able, without inconsistency, to launch into the bitterest denunciation of the general for his apparent switch of loyalties:

On Lord Stauracius, always Faithless and Ingrateful! there was no dependence to be had; so well he knew the Native Falsity in him, that to secure himself, that General wou'd not hesitate at betraying what was dearest to him! ... nor shou'd he be the least surpriz'd to find Stauracius making early Offers of Peace and Service to Lucifer himself, were he once in Power! in publick disavowing and condemning those very Actions, which he had in private not only approved, but advanced! there was nothing but such a defection remaining to make the Father of the Empire more contemptible than he was, or to the last degree despised ... 93

This interpretation of Marlborough's decision was not only very much in keeping with Mrs. Manley's past readings of his character, but also had a particular relevance to his present situation. Although his determination not to resign was approved of "by those Whigs thats his real friends," Sarah warned him that some would be suspicious of his readiness to act in concert with Harley. 94 In fact, Marlborough was of necessity playing something of a double game; in Tory circles, much as Mrs. Manley had represented, "lamenting his former wrong steps in joining with the Whigs," when only a few weeks before he had assured them of his unshakable loyalty. 95 There was always the danger that, with the encouragement of
such propaganda as Mrs. Manley's, both sides would come to regard him as a timeserver, a type traditionally as much despised by those who temporarily accept his allegiance, as by those whom he has betrayed.

The most provocative summing up of Marlborough's situation during this winter, from the ministerial standpoint, came from the author of The Secret History of Arlus and Odolphus. Having claimed the nation's confidence in an administration which had secured Marlborough's incomparable fighting abilities, he made it clear that the general's days of meddling in civil affairs and obstructing the diplomacy of Europe for his own ends were over; and there was also the hint, for the benefit of the displaced Whigs, that in acquiescing in this settlement, Marlborough had cut his losses and deserted them:

we have not yet heard that Fortunatus himself has thought them so absolutely Necessary to his Support, as to be frightened out of his Post by their Removal; so far from it, that he acquiesces in the Will and Pleasure of his Sovereign, and is contented by being a little eas'd in Disposing our Affairs at Home, to use his greater Leisure in minding his sufficient Business Abroad, and I don't question from his past Successes, that he will yet frighten our Enemies into an Honourable Peace, if during the next Treaty, he keeps at the Head of his Hundred Thousand Plenipotentiaries. 96

It was these lines which stung Francis Hare into publishing his own classic analysis of Marlborough's relations with the Tory ministry. The long passage which forms the conclusion of his fourth letter "to a Tory-Member" was fairly characterized by a contemporary as "an exceeding Remarkable bold and no less Prophetick Expostulation and Reflexion," and has been several times reprinted, though usually without acknowledgement of its source. 97
Few of the tactics used by the ministers and their pamphleteers to ensure Marlborough's submission to them, had escaped Hare's notice.

On the question of the general's resignation, he commented,

they know not how to let him leave his Command, or continue in it: If he had left it, then with loud Mouths they would have thrown the Odium upon him, which they dare not take upon themselves, and all the Effects of their own ill Management would have been laid upon him, as if his quitting had been the sole Cause of them: and we shou'd have heard nothing but Invective and Complaint of his Ingratitude to his Queen and Country, after such ample Acknowledgments as they have made of his Services. (p.98)

Hare was also minutely acquainted with the simultaneous pressures on Marlborough to resign, in the shape of the measures taken to reduce his power and prestige at home and abroad:

Things are not the same, any more than the Usage he meets with: When he is uneasy in his Thoughts, underminded in the Favour of his Sovereign, and vilely misrepresented to the People; when his want of Interest at Home makes it impossible for the Allies to depend on the Hopes he gives them; when he is without Authority in the Army, where 'tis made criminal to espouse his Interest, and to fly in his Face is the surest Means to Advancement ... (p.96)

To those who are unaware of the private feelings concealed by the façade of the working relationship just established between Marlborough and the ministry, this outpouring of the Duke's grievances would have been a revelation; and the wisdom of publishing it was so questionable, that Hare must have had strong motives for abandoning his habitual discretion. The first was clearly sheer indignation at Marlborough's treatment, with a corresponding determination to prevent the ministers from claiming any credit for his decision to remain in office. But Hare was also aware of
the effect which a consciousness of lack of support at home could have on Marlborough's freedom of action in the field. In fact he was convinced that, having compelled Marlborough to remain at his post even while depriving him of the necessary authority to act decisively, the ministers and their propagandists would then hold him responsible for any lack of success. Having predicted that Marlborough would achieve little in the coming campaign, Hare therefore attempted to forestall this criticism with a reminder of the disadvantages under which the general's "profess'd Enemies" in the ministry had placed him:

For with what comfort can he continue in a Command under a Notion of doing his Country Service, when all possibility of serving well is taken from him? When nothing is left him that can make a General be obey'd or lov'd? What Encouragement can he have to venture upon any great Enterprize, when he is sure ill Success will be made a Crime, and good Success from him they had rather be without? (pp. 97 and 98)

Finally, Hare was also very much concerned at attempts to encourage the Whigs to resent Marlborough's continuance in office as a betrayal of their interests. The revelation that the Duke still regarded the ministers as his "profess'd Enemies" was obviously intended to scotch this view, as was the important concluding assurance that he would never join with his new colleagues to promote a peace which fell short of the Whig ideal:

He has gain'd too much Honour by the War, and espous'd too far the true Interest of his Country, to promote an ill Peace, or make way for it by an ill War; and if nothing else can please these Gentlemen, he will never purchase their Favour, and Applause, at the Expence of his own Glory and the Nation's Safety; to say nothing of the common Cause, which nothing will prevail with him to betray. (p. 99)
It is not surprising that these passages should have attracted interest. Hare's indignation, for once not allowed to dissipate itself in unedifying abuse of his opponents, carried conviction. As usual, he was assumed to be writing from first-hand knowledge, and for the first time he actively encouraged this assumption with his casual insights into Marlborough's state of mind ("he is uneasy in his Thoughts..."), and his confident statements of his patron's future political allegiances. In fact, there was a strong implication at certain points that the manifesto of grievances had actually been written to Marlborough's dictation, and this, in contrast to Hare's impersonal "journal" of the Gertruydenberg negotiations, was calculated to convey to the reader the compelling sense of intimacy with the motives of those in the highest government circles, which was the hallmark of genuine secret history.

It was certainly true that every sentiment which Hare attributed to Marlborough in these passages, fear of the condemnation which would have followed his resignation, concern at the press attacks and at the effects of his loss of the Queen's favour, and resentment at the attempts to undermine his authority in the army, can be paralleled in the Duke's private letters and conversation; and like Hare, he anticipated an unspectacular campaign and was sure that his enemies would blame him for it.99 Yet it would be a mistake to suppose that Hare was writing to his patron's instructions on these matters. The genesis of this
conclusion to The Management of the War is to be found in a letter which Hare wrote to the Duchess of Marlborough in October 1710; clearly it represents his own thoughts and observations. In any case, however accurate a picture these passages presented of Marlborough's private sentiments, it is unlikely that he would have approved of their publication in what was virtually a declaration of war against the ministers on his behalf. At the time, he was doing his utmost to convince St John that his devotion to Tory interests was genuine, and he would scarcely have considered it in his own interests to advertise to the world at large at the beginning of the campaign, that his relationship with his new colleagues was one of mutual hostility.

If Hare had had any encouragement to publish these passages, it is more likely to have come from the Duchess of Marlborough, to whom he had first communicated his thoughts on this subject. She too was becoming increasingly concerned at the ministers' attempts to drive a wedge between her husband and the Whigs; "I believe what they wish most is that hee should act with them till hee has lost every friend hee has," she had written to Hare. She would therefore have considered a blunt and public declaration of Marlborough's real feelings towards them to be in his best interests. Hare must have known this and was probably encouraged by it. This conflict of opinion between Marlborough, his wife, and his most zealous apologists was to recur several times, with important consequences, in the course of the coming campaign.
NOTES TO CHAPTER III


3. To Raby, 26 September 1710, B.M. Add. MSS 31143, f. 568.


5. Kennett to Blackwell, 22 April 1710, B.M. Lansdowne MSS 1013, f. 144v; Tatler, No. 187 (17-20 June 1710); A Letter from Monsieur Pett[ecu]m to Monsieur B[uly]s (1710), s.s.h.; Queries (n.p., [1710]), s.s.h. This last sheet was possibly the work of Arthur Maynwaring; Queries for Queries (see p. 117, n. 14 above), in answering it, punned in a foot-note on the words "Author" and "Arthur," and Oldmixon later recalled that this pun had been used by one of the ministry's journalists to identify a work of Maynwaring's, though by a lapse of memory he connected the incident with the Medley (Maynwaring, p. 341). In content, Queries could well be Maynwaring's work. In particular, its description of the Duchess of Shrewsbury as a Papist and an "Italian Courtezan" recalls some comments in a private letter from Maynwaring to Sarah of October 1710 (Private Corr., I, p. 392). Apart from Queries for Queries, the sheet inspired Defoe's Counter Queries (n.p., [1710]), and the pamphlet entitled, To the Whig's Nineteen Queries, a Fair and Full Answer by an Honest Torie (1710).


8. Undated fragment, [July-October 1710], Blenheim MSS G1-4.

9. The Age of Wonders (n.p., 1710), s.sh. (attributed to Defoe in Moore, Checklist, p.70, Item 169); Wonders upon Wonders, in Answer to "The Age of Wonders" (n.p., 1710), s.sh.; To the Whigs' Nineteen Queries, p.9.


11. No.2398 (23-26 September 1710).

12. Marlborough to Robethon, 20 September/1 October 1710, B.M. Stowe MSS 223, f.385; [Defoe], Counter Queries, p.2; [Davenant], Sir Thomas Double at Court (1710), p.49.

13. Cardonnel to Horace Walpole, 21 September/2 October 1710, B.M. Add. MSS 38501, f.120v.


15. [Defoe], Counter Queries, p.2; To the Whigs' Nineteen Queries, p.9.


17. [Daniel Defoe], A Short Narrative of the Life and Actions of His Grace John, D. of Marlborough (1711), p.26; Medley, No.8 (20 November 1710), in The Medleys for the Year 1711 (1712), pp.92-93 (all references to the Medleys of 1710-1711, except that by Steele, cited p.180, n.73 below, are to this edition, and in future a page number only will be given, following the number and date of the issue).


21. I know of no copy of the original pamphlet, but the text is printed in full in an answer to it, entitled "The New Scheme" Consider'd (1710); the passages relating to Marlborough are on p. 7. For the characters of Argyll and Webb, see G. M. Trevelyan, *England under Queen Anne: the Peace and the Protestant Succession* (1934), pp. 113-114; Robert Parker and Comte de Mérode-Westerloo; the Marlborough Wars, ed. David Chandler (1966), pp. 79-80. The New Scheme was possibly the work of Maynwaring and one of his circle; one of the rhetorical questions in *Queries* (see p. 174, n. 5 above) "Whether the Comparison that is now writing of these new Counsellors with the late Ministers will not be a most instructive Piece of History?"


26. IX, No. 93 (2-6 December 1710).

27. Drummond to Harley, 27 October / 7 November 1710, reporting a conversation between Lord Rivers and the Dutch heads of State, H.M.C. Portland MSS, IV, p. 618-619.

29. **Faults on Both Sides** (1710), pp. 54-55.

30. Maynwaring to Coningsby, 21 November 1710, B.M. Add. MSS 57861, f. 156.


32. For the audience of Swift's propaganda, including the Examiner, see Richard I. Cook, Jonathan Swift as Tory Pamphleteer (Seattle and London, 1967), pp. 19-30. Irvin Ehrenpreis, in Swift: the Man, His Works, and the Age (1962-), II, p. 528, has suggested that Swift invented the device of the lists of incomes for use against Marlborough; in fact, there had been at least three versions of it in manuscript and in print between 1704 and 1709; see Ralph James, The Other Side of the Question (1742), pp. 378-379; Remarks and Collections of Thomas Hearne, ed. C. E. Doble, et al. (Oxford, 1885-1921), I, p. 162; Raby to Cadogan, 5/16 February 1709, B.M. Add. MSS 22196, f. 182; Daniel Defoe, The Conduct of Parties (n.p., 1712), p. 19.

33. Essay towards the History of the Last Ministry, p. 3; Examiner, Nos. 16 (23 November 1710), and 20 (21 December 1710), in Swift, Prose Works, III, pp. 20 and 42.

34. Examiner, No. 16 (23 November 1710), in Swift, Prose Works, III, p. 19; Observator, IX, No. 94 (6-9 December 1710).

35. Narrative of the Duchess, Blenheim MSS G1-8; for confirmation of her account, see L'Hermitage to the States-General, 29 December 1710, B.M. Add. MSS 17677EE, f. 19; and John Bridges to Trumbull, 1 January 1710/1, Berks R.O. Trumbull MSS LIV.


37. Letter from Monsieur Pett[eau]m to Monsieur B[u]ly, s.s.h.; Stratford to Edward Harley, 8 July 1710, H.M.C. Portland MSS, VII, p. 2. For Marlborough's decision not to resign, see his letter to Sarah of 22 June/3 July 1710, Coxe, III, pp. 92-93.

38. Sir John Percival to Archdeacon Percival, 10 November 1710, B.M. Add. MSS 47026, f. 37v; Maynwaring to Coningsby, 21 November 1710, B.M. Add. MSS 57861, f. 156.

40. Nos.1 (3 August 1710), and 2 (3-10 August 1710).

41. The pamphlet, cast in the form of a letter, is dated 10 August 1710; it was probably published a few days after this. In the following discussion of its contents, page references are given parenthetically in the text.

42. Taylor to Watkins, 11 August 1710, B.M. Add. MSS 33273, f.67; Wodrow, Analecta, I, p.292; [David Jones], A Compleat History of Europe ... for the Year 1711 (1711), p.122.


44. Narrative of the Duchess, Blenheim MSS G1-8; Memoirs of Sarah, Duchess of Marlborough, ed. William King (1930), p.188.


46. Observator, IX, No.84 (1-4 November 1710); Medley, Nos.6 (6 November 1710), and 8 (20 November 1710), pp.64 and 90-91.

47. Examiner, No.16 (23 November 1710), in Swift, Prose Works, III, pp.19-23; for evidence that even Tories had been ready to tax the new ministers with ingratitude towards Marlborough, see Monkton to Harley, 23 August 1710, H.M.C. Portland MSS, IV, p.574.

48. Examiner, No.50 (5-12 July 1711); by this time Mrs. Manley was editor of the journal (see p.189 below), and she is here discussing the most popular of the earlier numbers.

49. Narrative of the Duchess, sent to Lady Hardwicke, B.M. Add. MSS 35853, f.28v; Sarah to Hamilton, 28 December 1710, Blenheim MSS G1-8; to "Mr. Jennens," 4 December 1710, Letters of Sarah, Duchess of Marlborough ... at Madresfield Court (1875), p.19. Cook, in his study, Jonathan Swift as Tory Pamphleteer, pp.103-104, assumes that this number of the Examiner was written after Marlborough's dismissal, in order to justify it; this, of course, is a basic error of chronology, and it distorts his reading of the significance of the piece in its historical context.
50. Hamilton's Diary, 8 January 1711, Herts R.O. Panshanger MSS D/EP F207, f.26. For the events leading up to Sarah's loss of her Court offices, see David Green, Queen Anne (1970), pp.235-239. Cardonnel, in a letter to Watkins of 5 January 1710/1, B.M. Add. MSS 42176, f.313, also mentions the likelihood that Marlborough would resign if his wife were dismissed.


55. Bellisarius, a Great Commander, and Zariana, His Lady: a Dialogue, (1710), p.7; Age of Wonders, s.sh.


57. For this policy and the practical steps taken towards it, see I.F. Burton, "'The Committee of Council at the War-Office': an Experiment in Cabinet Government under Anne," H.J., IV (1961), pp.78-82.


60. Narrative of the Duchess, Blenheim MSS G1-8; for the unsuccessful attempt to move the vote of thanks, see St John to Drummond, 28 November 1710, Bolingbroke Corr., I, pp.29-30.

61. Political State, I (February 1710/1), p.201; Speech of the Lord
Haversham's Ghost, pp.2-3.


63. E.g., after the campaign of 1707; see [Francis Hare], The Conduct of the Duke of Marlborough during the Present War (1712), pp.131-132.

64. The pamphlet is dated 1710, and must have been written after the Examiner of 21 December 1710, to which it refers. In the following discussion, page references are given parenthetically in the text.

65. Political State, I (February 1710/1), p.201.

66. Bellisarius, a Great Commander, pp.8-9 and 13-15; He's Wellcome Home, or a Dialogue between John and Sarah (1711), s.sh.

67. A Spectator's Address to the Whigs, on the Occasion of the Stabbing Mr. Harley (n.p., 1711), p.10 (published 17 March 1711, Moore, Checklist, p.84, Item 203).

68. Letters of 31 December 1710 and 7 January 1710/1, Journal to Stella, I, pp.145 and 159.


70. To Drummond, 23 January 1711, Bolingbroke Corr., I, p.81.


72. The Court Visit to a Great Lady at Her Country Seat (1710/1), s.sh.

73. Medley, No.23 (26 February-5 March 1711), in Tracts and Pamphlets by Richard Steele, ed. Rae Blanchard (Baltimore, 1944), p.65.

74. Paper in Harley's handwriting, dated 10 April 1710, B.M. Portland Loan MSS 29/10/20. John Gay, in his Present State of Wit (1711), p.9, makes it clear that the Examiner's connection with the ministry was well known and a major reason for its ascendancy over its rivals.


76. See, Marlborough to the Queen, 26 September/7 October 1707, H.M.C. Morrison MSS, pp.469-470; Hamilton's Diary, 30 December 1710, Herts R.O. Panshanger MSS D/EP F207, f.24; Marlborough to Sarah, 5/16 April 1711, Coxe, III, pp.194-195.
77. Examiner, No. 50 (5-12 July 1711); Gay, Present State of Wit, p. 8.

78. Examiner, Nos. 23 (11 January 1710/1), and 28 (15 February 1710/1), in Swift, Prose Works, III, pp. 63 and 88.

79. The Management of the War, in Four Letters to a Tory-Member (1711), p. 65, referring to Examiner, No. 4 (24 August 1710). This interpretation of the phrase was also accepted by Taylor in a letter to Horace Walpole of 9 February 1711, B.M. Add. MSS 38501, f. 257, and by Maynwaring in the Medley, No. 34 (21 May 1711), p. 380; for the Tory comment on such publicity, see An Examination of the Third and Fourth Letters to a Tory Member ... in a Second Letter to My Lord *** (1711), p. 29. The fact that Swift later referred to Marlborough's contingents of hired foreign troops as "Mercenary" in his History of the Four Last Years of the Queen (Prose Works, VII, pp. 65-66), suggests that the application of the Examiner's jibe to Marlborough really was intended.

80. The Prose Works of Jonathan Swift, ed. Temple Scott (1897-1908), IX, p. 184 and n. The two Examinations were, of course, the Examination of "The Management of the War" in a Letter to My Lord *** (1711), and its sequel, cited in the preceding note.

81. [John Oldmixon?], An Answer to the "Examination of 'The Management of the War'" Written by the Medley's Footman (1711), p. 4.

82. Observator, X, No. 10 (19 February 1711); Medley, No. 19 (5 February 1710/1), pp. 224-225.


85. II, pp. 31-34 and 288.

86. The letter to Crassus is in Examiner, No. 27 (8 February 1710/1), in Swift, Prose Works, III, pp. 83-85; the letter itself is printed largely in italics, which have been reversed in my quotations from it.

87. [Defoe], Short Narrative, p. 44; Medley, No. 20 (12 February 1710/1), p. 231 (for the circumstances under which this issue was written, see Oldmixon, Maynwaring, pp. 192-193); Observator, X, No. 41 (19-23 May 1711).

88. X, No. 10 (31 January-3 February 1711).

89. Marlborough's letter does not survive, but its substance is
clear from St John's replies of 13 and 20 March 1710/1, 
Bolingbroke Corr., I, pp. 98 and 115, in which he refers to 
the Duke's protest about the Examiner, and assures him that 
"the proper hint" has been given to the editor. It has been 
suggested in Ehrenpreis, Swift, II, p. 527, that Marlborough's 
complaint referred to the Examiner of 23 November 1710; the 
dates of the letters, however, make it more likely that the 
later issue was the one concerned.

90. Letter from a Foreign Minister, pp. 6-7; Examiner, No. 28 (15 
February 1710/1), in Swift, Prose Works, III, p. 87.

91. E.g., [Clement], Faults on Both Sides, p. 35; [Boyer], Essay 
towards the History of the Last Ministry, p. 47; Secret 
History of Arlus and Odolphus, pp. 30-31; Examiner, No. 20 

92. Queries for Queries, s.s.h.; Secret History of Arlus and Odolphus, p. 34.


94. Wentworth to Raby, 10 November 1710, Wentworth Papers, p. 157; 
Marlborough to Sarah, 23 September/4 October 1710, Coxe, III, p. 142.

95. Letter of 31 December 1710, describing an interview between 
Marlborough and St John, Journal to Stella, I, p. 145; 
Sarah to Godolphin, 17 October 1710, Coxe, III, p. 144.

96. Pp. 36-37; the phrase, "his Hundred Thousand Plenipotentiaries" 
was a mocking echo of Marlborough's own description of his 
troops, quoted in the Tatler, No. 1 (12 April 1709).

97. Management of the War, pp. 96-99 (page references to specific 
quotations are given in the text). The description of the 
passage is that of Anthony Allen, "Skeleton Collegii Regalis," 
IV, p. 1826. For examples of complete or partial reprints, see 
Political State, I (March 1711), pp. 211-218; Thomas Lediard, 
The Life of John, Duke of Marlborough (1736), III, pp. 114-115; 
Nicholas Tindal, The History of England by Mr. Rapin de Thoyras 
Continued from the Revolution to the Accession of King George II 
(1744-1747), IV, p. 208; Churchill, II, pp. 829-830.

98. See Boyer's comments in Political State, I (March 1711), pp. 210-211.


102. Undated fragment, [July-October 1710], Blenheim MSS G1-8.
Chapter IV

"THINGS ARE NOT THE SAME": THE OPENING OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1711

In order to demonstrate that Swift was not the reckless and indiscriminate libeller he is sometimes represented, his latest biographer has asserted that the attacks on Marlborough in the Examiner, while the journal was under Swift's editorship, were only three in number, the last being the letter to Crassus. Mr. Foot agrees that after this issue, "apart from an occasional stab at the Duchess, the paper had refrained from any provocation directed clearly at the Duke."\(^1\) It will be seen that Marlborough and his supporters disagreed with these conclusions, and not without cause. Certainly it is not true to say that the letter to Crassus was the last manifestation of Swift's hostility to the Duke in the Examiner. The issue of 22 February, for example, had contained the condemnation of Marlborough and his family as corrupt royal favourites which has already been noticed.\(^2\) A few days after this, however, St John received the Duke's complaint of the earlier number and passed "the proper hint" on to Swift. For several weeks it had the desired effect. He was in any case amply supplied with subjects of more immediate interest, among them the assassination attempt against Harley, and William Benson's influential Letter to Sir J[acob] B[anks], which seems to have marked a revival of interest in Whig propaganda.\(^3\) For some time after his departure for The Hague at the end of February, Marlborough was out of the public eye. The question of most immediate importance, his continued command of the army, had been settled; the campaign did not promise to be
a spectacular one, and his premature desertion of the London political
arena was taken as a gesture of conciliation, amounting to weakness, by
both friends and enemies. 4

When Marlborough's name did begin to reappear in the party
press, it was not always in a context to which he himself could have taken
exception. Despite Tory enthusiasm for carrying on the war in Spain at
the expense of that in Flanders, the ministry was careful not to neglect
Marlborough's theatre of operations. He was given adequate financial
backing, which he in turn gratefully acknowledged. All Hare's complaints
of lack of moral support could not therefore prevent the Harleyite
pamphleteers from making a merit of this preferential treatment, and
offering it as proof that the ministry had made no irresponsible surrender
to Tory prejudice, nor allowed the war effort to suffer for the sake of
victimizing Marlborough. 5

It was not long, however, before the Examiner began to renew
hostilities. As pamphlets of the previous year had demonstrated, the
absence of any direct allusion to Marlborough by name was no proof of a
genuine desire to spare his reputation. Reference to policies and events
in which he had been involved, or to qualities which had repeatedly been
the subject of more outspoken satire, were by this time more than sufficient
guides to the identity of the victim. Swift himself admitted that
"Reflections upon any particular Person" were seldom necessary:

If I display the Effects of Avarice and Ambition, of Bribery and
Corruption, of gross Immorality and Irreligion; those who are
the least conversant in Things, will easily know where to apply
them. 6
This device of indirect reference now became a favourite method of stabbing at Marlborough.

At the end of March, Swift made the passing remark that the verbal tribute paid to Harley by the Queen and Parliament after the attempt on his life was

more acceptable to a Person of Mr. Harley's generous Nature, than the most bountiful Grant that was ever yet made to a Subject ... although neither Avarice nor Ambition would be able to comprehend its Worth. 7

The stressed phrases made the jibe at Marlborough's more substantial rewards almost audible. Three weeks later, Swift returned to the subject of the ministerial revolution, to display once more the necessity of the Queen's ridding herself of her arrogant favourites, or "Ephori," the latter one of Harley's favourite terms for the ministry of Marlborough and Godolphin; 8 it is worth remembering that all Swift's criticisms of the previous "corrupt Administration" were reflections on Marlborough, since he and Godolphin had been the Queen's political managers for eight years past. The same issue contained an insulting reference to the Duchess of Marlborough, and this was closely followed by a discourse on that "most useful Science" of "defrauding the Publick," in which both the Duke and Duchess were included by indirect allusion. 9 A little later came a pointed reference to "insatiable Avarice" as one of the characteristic "sordid Vices" of those, "who by the Appearance of Merit, or Favour of Fortune, have risen to great Stations, from an obscure Birth." 10 The mention of low birth, avarice, and the favour of fortune made the application to Marlborough
(Fortunatus) unmistakable. Mrs. Manley had described his rise to power in precisely these terms.

Admittedly these were pinpricks compared with what was past and what was to come, but they were nevertheless a constant reminder of the latent antagonism between Marlborough and the Examiner's patrons, which at any time might flare up into something worse. In the last week in April and after, this is what happened. Swift's first step was to condemn the parliamentary authority which had been bestowed upon the principle of "no peace without Spain," as a device to preserve the old ministry in power, and "to gratify the unmeasurable Appetites of a few Leaders, Civil and Military," by the indefinite prolongation of the war. Any reader would realize that Marlborough was included in this censure, and the whole argument was of far-reaching significance, as a contribution towards the wholesale condemnation of the war in The Conduct of the Allies. If it were accepted, Hare's defence of Marlborough's conduct as plenipotentiary, which had been grounded upon this parliamentary sanction, would have no validity. The Whigs, realizing the importance of this form of propaganda, were convinced that St John was personally responsible for it.  

Towards the end of May came the most direct attack on Marlborough since the letter to Crassus, a discussion of the exorbitant and unjustifiable expense of Blenheim — "a Subject's Palace," as Swift meaningfully described it — worked with purposeful ingenuity into an apparently harmless account of the ministry's plans for building new churches.  

Even more ominous, as a further precursor of The Conduct of the Allies, was a comment in the
next issue on the alliance which Marlborough and Godolphin ("certain
great Persons, who had been all their Lives in the Altitude of Tory-
Profession") were compelled to make with the Whigs, because the Tories
began to be resty, and would not allow Monopolies of Power
and Favour; nor consent to carry on the War entirely at
the Expence of this Nation, that they might have Pensions
from Abroad ... 13

If the Examiner was assured of a wide circulation, its connection
with the ministry meant that its editors had always to observe some
forbearance towards Marlborough. An anonymous pamphleteer, however, did
not lie under such restraints, and a popular tract, entitled Oliver's
Pocket Looking-Glass, so libellous that it had to be sold "sous le manteau,"
took full advantage of this fact. The publicity it received in the
advertising columns of the Examiner and the Post-Boy not only confirmed
that these ministerial organs were basically hostile to Marlborough, but
worked so much in its favour that a fortnight after the first announcement,
another edition was advertised, "many Thousands of the former Editions
having been sold in a little time." 14

This popularity was an ominous indication of the public appetite for
such material, and may have resulted in part from the author's heavy debt
to the New Atlantis. Like Mrs. Manley, he dwelt upon Marlborough's rise
to power from humble origins, the part which his sister, as the Duke of
York's mistress, had played in his advancement, his affair with the Duchess
of Cleveland and subsequent ingratitude to her, and his desertion of
James II at the Revolution. The narrative was undistinguished, largely
a vehicle for the wearisomely vituperative commentary on Marlborough's "unparalell'd Crimes." Its most interesting and topical feature was an appeal in the last pages to a particular section of the Duke's enemies, his professional rivals and malcontent subordinates.

The pamphleteer had certainly been well primed with the most promising topics for this purpose. Marlborough's promotion to high rank of his "Irish favourites," Cadogan, Meredith, and Maccartney, had been much resented by their Tory rivals, one of whom, General Webb, had raised the subject in Parliament earlier in the year. These "Sclavonian" supporters of the Duke were accordingly singled out for attack in this pamphlet, on the assumption that Marlborough was using them to build up a faction in the army, "that the Interest of his Party might not want the Support of a Military Assistance upon Occasion" (p. 70). One of his professional critics had made this same accusation in a private letter to Harley the year before.

It may not be coincidence that General Webb's personal grievance against Marlborough, dating from the battle of Wynendael in 1708, was also aired at some length by this pamphleteer, together with detailed criticism, on tactical grounds, of other controversial actions during the campaigns of 1705 and 1709. On these occasions, it was argued, Marlborough had shown himself incompetent in generalship, insufficiently concerned for the lives of his men, and unjust to subordinates, in denying them their rightful share of credit for victory. (pp. 51-61). Such propaganda was certainly indicative of the Tory disposition to foster faction and indiscipline in
the army, of which Marlborough and his supporters had complained, and it may be that the pamphlet was intended, among other things, for circulation within the army itself, to undermine confidence in the Duke's leadership.

As soon as its popularity became apparent, the inevitable "answer" was published. Its paragraph-by-paragraph dissection of the Tory pamphleteer's errors and prejudices was intelligent and conscientious, far more so, in fact, than his "incoherent Rhapsody of Scandal and Detraction" deserved. Yet one is struck by the futility of the task. An answer depending so closely upon an opponent's text could only have been meaningful to those who had been sufficiently attracted by the original to read it with attention, and they would have been the least likely to trouble themselves with criticisms which destroyed the basis of their enjoyment. In this respect, the two tracts were a classic illustration of Hare's maxim that "answers to Libells are seldom libells enough themselves, to give the readers much pleasure"; and while the journals of the following year contained advertisements for yet further editions of the first pamphlet, nothing more was heard of the answer.

In the second week of June, Swift surrendered the Examiner to Mrs. Manley, a change which did not in itself bode well for Marlborough. Under her editorship, the columns of the journal were liberally sprinkled with references to the "Lawless Junto" and their "Arbitrary Cap[tai]n General"; to "insignificant Pages ... hoisted above the Knowledge of themselves," who embezzled the public money and presumed "to give Laws even to their Sovereign"; and to "the Commanding Basha and Cofferer" whose overbearing...
behaviour had once deprived the Queen of her most faithful servant.\textsuperscript{19}

It is not surprising, therefore, that by mid-year Marlborough's supporters were anxiously watching for some sign of the early demise of the journal, writing to inform him that envy was "putting all her engines in motion" against him once more, and complaining to the ministers on his behalf of "the Examiner's severity on the Duke."\textsuperscript{20}

The ministers, however, had reasons enough for not having consistently enforced the policy of forbearance which had followed Marlborough's initial complaint. St John's suspicions about the sincerity of his professions of goodwill to the ministry may well have been confirmed by the closing passages of The Management of the War, and there were also disquieting reports that Marlborough was reconsolidating his power abroad.\textsuperscript{21} But the most immediate and obvious excuse for the persistent hostility of the Examiner was the equally persistent provocation from the Whig press; and on this issue centred the differences of opinion between Marlborough and his wife which were to be a determining factor in his relations with the ministry for the rest of the campaign.

Left to himself, and in spite of the private resentments so graphically described by Hare, Marlborough would have maintained outwardly cordial and conciliatory relations with the ministers, at least for the duration of the campaign. A major practical reason for this was the obvious fact that he could not hope to do justice to the responsibilities of his command without an adequate working relationship with his colleagues;
and on the success of the campaign depended not only his reputation, but his ability to contribute to a good peace or to oppose a bad one.

An even more powerful motive was fear of the weapons they could use against him if he should show any signs of open opposition. The most immediately threatening of these was the press; "Whilst I am in the service I am in their power, especially by the villainous way of printing, which stabs me to the heart," he wrote to Sarah, and therefore, " whilst I serve I must endeavour not to displease." Marlborough's sensitivity to press attack, more acute during this last year of his command than ever before, has generally been condemned by historians. At best, it is represented as a regrettable infirmity of mind; at worst, as an arrogant incapacity to brook a word of criticism; and at all times as a major handicap in the political battles in which he was involved. His attitude is sometimes unfavourably compared with that of Harley, who read libels against himself "by way of Amusement with a most unaffected Indifference."  

If, as the Examiner once remarked, the ability to remain calm and unintimidated under a sustained and undeserved campaign of detraction from the press was "the Perfection of Heroick Vertue" in a statesman, Marlborough must be acknowledged to have fallen far short of this ideal. He himself envied Godolphin's "good temper and Judgment" in despising the attacks of the ministerial propagandists; yet, as Haynwar ing pointed out, Godolphin lived to regret this attitude, and Marlborough's contrary reaction was not an unrealistic response to the situation in
which he found himself in 1711.

In the first place, one must remember the pressures to which he had been systematically subjected by means of printed propaganda during the previous winter, in particular, the attempts to discredit him whether he decided to resign or to remain in office, and the curtailments of his power and prestige to which he had been obliged to submit as a result. By these means, far in excess of the kind of incidental detraction which any public figure might expect, he had been made to feel something of the power of the press as a weapon skilfully wielded by political opponents, and it is small wonder that he had come to fear and detest it as never before; and for the future he might well be concerned at the influence which a journalist of Swift's calibre could exercise over public opinion in general, and over the Tory majority in the Commons in particular.

It should also be acknowledged that the ostentatious indifference to printed criticism for which Harley has been admired was more appropriate to his circumstances than to Marlborough's... In 1711, the former was in full power and royal favour, with all the means of controlling the output of the party presses which this position gave him at his command. Marlborough's situation was correspondingly vulnerable. His prestige had already suffered from his loss of the Queen's favour and from the propaganda accompanying the ministerial changes, and any future opposition would make him liable to further press attack at the instigation of his own Cabinet colleagues, against whom few of the usual means of protection and retaliation could be used with safety or effect. Moreover, Harley was
not called upon to command an army, while a ministerial journal advertised to friends and enemies, and to his own subordinates, that he did not have the confidence of his government. As Swift's attacks multiplied, the Observator commented on the damage they could do to Marlborough's authority in the army and the corresponding boost this would give to French morale; for "they can't take it for an Argument that those People wish our General to be duly supported or successful abroad, when they libel him so boldly at home." 26

Finally, it may be noted that Marlborough's sensitivity to officially inspired detraction was not a purely personal matter. He had always believed that his own standing and reputation could not be damaged without hazarding the success of the European cause which he led, and he was now more than ever conscious that, in undermining his position by means of the press, the ministers would not simply be carrying on a personal vendetta, but laying the way open for an insecure peace. "'Tis not therefore the Person of the Duke of M— I am concern'd for," Hare had written on this subject,

but for the Connexion which the Fate for this poor Nation, of our Allies, of all Europe has with his. 'Tis the Prospect of an ill Peace after so glorious and successful a War, and the dismal Train of Consequences which such a Peace will bring with it: 'tis this disturbs me; and 'tis indeed this, and only this, disturbs him ... 27

With such issues at stake, Marlborough had been anxious that his wife should not jeopardize his relations with the ministers, or provoke the Examiner out of the silence which had followed his first complaint to St John, even by hostile references to them in private letters which were
subject to their inspection. 28 It soon became clear that this prohibition was even more applicable to the public hostility of the Whig press. As Hare had already pointed out, when Sarah complained of Swift's attacks on the Duke during the winter, "they, who suffer the Medley, may well enough pretend, they cant hinder the Examiner." 29 He was no doubt referring to the fact that the Whig journal had been started under her auspices, with her chief political confidant as one of its editors. Although its avowed purpose was to combat the Examiner, it was far from being a consistently defensive publication. Maynwaring's ridicule and criticism of Harley in particular, enraged Swift as much as it delighted Sarah, and the minister himself was said to have been sufficiently aroused from his habitual indifference to such matters to contemplate taking official action against the journal. Mrs. Manley also claimed that "the Heads of the late Faction," two of whom were related to Marlborough by marriage, circulated large numbers of the Medley and the Observator free, "to corrupt the Minds of weak People, who are at distance from the Metropolis." 30

Therefore, when Craggs protested early in July of "the libels that came out," Harley could quite reasonably reply that Marlborough "must not mind them, that he himself was called rogue every day in print, and knew the man that did it [a reference to Maynwaring] ... yet he should live fairly with him." Watkins, making the same complaint, was more bluntly reminded that "the 'Medley' and 'Observator' were patronized and promoted by the Duke's nearest relations," with the implication that
Marlborough could expect no better treatment from the *Examiner* while this state of affairs continued.\(^{31}\) It is possible that Hare, as well as Maynwaring, was suspected to contributing to the *Medley*. Although the suspicion was unfounded (Hare is not mentioned in Oldmixon's detailed account of the journal's composition),\(^{32}\) it was not an unnatural deduction from the approving references each made publicly to the work of the other; and since Hare's connection with Marlborough was even closer than Maynwaring's, this would have hardened the ministers' hearts even more against the Duke.

It is clear that Marlborough disapproved of the anti-ministerial activities of the *Medley* as much as he disapproved of the invective in his wife's letters, and for the same reasons. When he was told of the unsympathetic responses to his complaints of the ministerial press, Watkins reported,

> he utterly denies his giving any manner of encouragement to the "Medley," and when I spoke last to him on that subject I almost put him into a passion, and he concluded my argument with saying: "I wish the devil had the 'Medley' and the 'Examiner' together."\(^{33}\)

Sarah's attitude, however, was diametrically opposed to her husband's on all these points. Aware that his commitment to Whiggism had never been strong, and yet that his support would be necessary for the success of any Whig scheme to topple the new administration, and suspecting at the same time that Harley hoped to persuade Marlborough not to "Joyn against him in any difficultys that/happily arise in the winter," she took the most suspicious view of the Duke's readiness to
conciliate the ministers:

I hope in god my lord Marlborough will leave a better character then to help support such villains for a little mony which hee does not want, & which would stain all the glory hee has seemd to bee very fond of ... 

Her prayer was that he would not "bee used by them, but waite for the first opertunity to joyn with those that will bring these wretchs to Justice." Nor did she consider the threat of the ministerial press reason enough to truckle to its patrons. Two years later, when the Examiner had done its worst, her defiance was still unquenchable:

I had rather they should write so as long as the world endures, then only to say that common thing my self that I am an humble servant to any of these ministers who deserve to bee hang'd ... 34

It was characteristic that her only response to Marlborough's plea to moderate the tone of her letters should have been to redouble her abuse of Harley, in the hope that the correspondence would be brought to his attention.35 Still less would she have been prepared to curb Maynwaring's activities, and the Medley's editors, whose task was to keep up Whig morale, had already made it clear that the Examiner and his patrons could expect no deference from them while the Tory journal continued.36

Nor was the Medley the only publication of these months to exacerbate Marlborough's relations with the ministers, and reflect Sarah's hope that he would join in Whig schemes to bring them "to Justice."

When the preamble to the patent for Harley's Earldom of Oxford and Mortimer was published at the end of May, it was found to give as one reason for the promotion, his efforts to prevent "the further Plundering the Nation," a clear reference to the alleged peculations of the old ministers.37 Yet the zeal of the Tory Commons to bring them
to justice for this "Plundering" had proceeded no further than the passing of votes and the publication of a Representation, claiming, amongst other things, that delays in passing accounts for thirty-five millions of the public money had been a device for concealing the massive embezzlements of the Godolphin administration. The Whig pamphleteers therefore used these documents to discredit both Harley and his Tory backbenchers, and to set them at loggerheads with each other; for the latter, banded together as the October Club, were already resentful of the ministers' failure to impeach their predecessors for the corruptions of which Tory Election propaganda had held them guilty.³⁸

A small pamphlet, entitled *A Roman Story*,³⁹ recalled the fate of "Manlius" (Oxford), who had brought about a ministerial revolution by accusing the previous office-holders of corruption, and had then alienated his own supporters by his inability to substantiate the accusations. Meanwhile,

> the Senators, who were thus innocently slander'd, took the Matter very heinously, and met frequently together, to think of Methods to chastise the Author of these Slanders, and to clear up their Innocence to the People. Howbeit, they thought it not proper to stir in the Matter till the return of the Dictator [Marlborough] from the War …

They therefore instructed their "Officers" (the party pamphleteers) to make continual demands for official proof of their crimes, in order to convince the people of their own innocence and of the injustice of their accusers (p.9). Finally, the Dictator, having returned from his campaign, brought Manlius to trial and eventually to execution, for falsely accusing his opponents of "plundering" their country.
Maynwaring was very much in favour of this form of propaganda. The new ministers, he wrote to Sarah,

did not want to be put in mind to punish the late ministers if they could. But since there is nothing against them & it is impossible to punish them, as it certainly is, I think it very right that the Publick shou'd know all this, & how shamefully they have been abus'd: And this must certainly hurt the new Ministers as well as do the old ones Justice. 40

It is possible that he was the author of the Roman Story. In reply to a friend's enquiries about his journalistic "performances," Maynwaring admitted, "Something of that Kind there has been often, & in several Shapes," implying that his activities were not confined solely to the Medley; and he added, with a glance at the patronage suspected by the ministers, "I think All Men shoud do what they can; & those that are oblig'd, return it in such manner as they are capable."41 Certainly Sarah was not the only member of Marlborough's family to appreciate and encourage Maynwaring's efforts to defend the old ministers and discredit the new. In a letter written while both were Sarah's guests at St. Albans, Godolphin referred approvingly to "some collections" Maynwaring had prepared for the press "in order to sett the late representation of the H: of C: in a truer light," and undertook to supply him with the necessary documents to continue the work.42 The "collections" involving detailed statistical evidence can now be assigned to Maynwaring with certainty,43 and he may well have added the historical allegory to his other publications in this cause.

A little later, there appeared a classic example of the "Officers'" propaganda referred to in this pamphlet, a longer tract mockingly entitled
The Re-representation, or a Modest Search after the Great Plunderers of the Nation. It criticized both the patent and the Representation at length, and claimed that those who published such accusations when they were unable to prove them officially deserved severe punishment themselves. It drew attention to similar threats and allegations of the previous year against Marlborough and Godolphin, suggesting that their escape where there had been so much will to punish was proof of their innocence (pp. 67-70). The promise of impeachment, it argued, had been a ministerial device to hoodwink the Tories, and it was finally predicted that these false accusations would prove the means of restoring the old ministry to the Queen's favour (pp. 86-88).

The authorities could not overlook such blatant criticisms of parliamentary proceedings, presented without even the nominal protection of historical allegory; and since the most provocative passages of the pamphlet had been reprinted in the forty-first Medley, the Whig journal was also involved in the censure. This in itself would have given the ministers sufficient cause to suspect that such propaganda was being produced at the instigation, or at least with the full approval, of Marlborough's family.

That they did so, and believed Sarah in particular to be the directress of all propagandist schemes for bringing down the ministry, is strongly suggested by Mrs. Manley's allegory in the fifty-first Examiner. It described the visit of "Fulvia" to "the House of Pride" (Blenheim), where the goddess instructs her and her associates in the best means to
turned against him (as pamphlets such as the Re-representation aimed to do), and all his policies for the public good misrepresented to the people:

Neither new Seas explor'd, nor Countries discovered and subdued; the heavy Debts of the Empire discharged, Credit restored, Peace brought home to their Dwelling, Trade secure and flourishing, shall overcome those Suspicions and bad Impressions we will make upon the People. 46

Mrs. Manley evidently had reliable resources of information about the activities of the Duchess's circle. Within a few weeks, Maynwarung was to publish his popular ballad, An Excellent New Song, Called Credit Restored, satirizing Oxford's South Sea scheme and other efforts to bolster the public credit. This, Sarah recalled, had been a great favourite with the Whig conclaves at St. Albans, where it must have been composed, and it was later to be suppressed officially. 47 Maynwarung was also soon to be deeply involved in the production of propaganda to discredit the ministry's peace policies.

Since Oxford was among the many who credited the popular myth that Sarah could "turne and govern her Husband as she pleased," 48 the knowledge that she was bent upon ousting the new ministers, together with the hint that Marlborough was expected to join with the Whigs on his return for the same purpose, provided reason enough to treat him as a political enemy, despite his earlier professions of co-operation. In fact, given Sarah's very decided views on this subject, it is possible that such a rupture of the Duke's apparently cordial relations with his new colleagues was one of the aims of this Whig propaganda. The suspicion and antagonism it fostered were calculated to destroy any confidence there might be between
them and so leave Marlborough no alternative but to join with the Whigs. Watkins, who believed that the Duke's salvation lay in resisting such pressures, commented,

as for "Medleys, Observators," etc., what corner soever they come from, 'tis certain my Lord Duke has some near relations who are far from being his friends, and ... they have their ends if they can keep him from joining heartily with the present Ministry ... " 49

Yet this procedure had its dangers. One result was the revival of a form of pressure from the ministry which Marlborough particularly dreaded. It has already been noticed that both he and Hare feared attempts to blame him for an inactive campaign, and in April St John had answered Marlborough's initial professions of goodwill with the assurance that he would not be held responsible for any lack of success; 50 but the Duke's worst fears were realized after a meeting between Craggs and Oxford early in July. The Treasurer, though professing his readiness to co-operate with Marlborough, had refused to curb the hostility of the ministerial press while the provocations of the Whig journalists continued, and despite Craggs' reminders of the general's want of credit with the army and other disadvantages, he also made it clear that some action was expected in the field; "there must be either Success or Blame," Maynwaring now realized. 51

The point was then made publicly in Mrs. Manley's allegorical attack on the Duchess of Marlborough in the Examiner; for at the House of Pride, Fulvia is advised that for the success of her intrigues against Agrippa, "Antony's Zeal must languish," so that want of the usual success in the field will add to the embarrassments of the new
administration. It was a renewed warning that the ministers' indulgence to Marlborough was conditional on his good behaviour, and that if he should join in Whig schemes of opposition, their propagandists could take advantage of the apparently insuperable difficulties in the field to spread the notion that he had deliberately put the interests of his wife's faction before his country's good.

There was one other weapon in the ministry's hands, more dangerous than any form of printed propaganda. Sarah shared the view of Maynwaring and other Whig journalists, that Marlborough and his former Whig colleagues could never be convicted officially of the financial malpractice they had been charged with in the press; she would therefore see no danger in mocking this propaganda and proclaiming her husband's future opposition to the ministers publicly. "As to what you have hinted some times of Ld. Marl:8 being in their power," she wrote to Craggs,

I hope there is no ground for that apprehention, first because I think hee talkd as if hee had beenvery carefull to manage the Publick mony, & cautious not to sign any thing that might hurt him self, & next because I think if these wicked infamous sett of men could have ruind my lord Marlborough they would have don it long agoe, not only to have Justifyd them selves to the world, but to put it out of his power for ever to revenge the wounds they have given him, which I hope hee will never forget ... 52

But this was a serious error of over-confidence. The failure to call Marlborough to account officially after the accusations of the previous year was not, as Sarah and her circle assumed, evidence that the new ministers realized the emptiness of their threats, but simply that such action had been deferred, should it prove necessary at all, until his military services were no longer indispensible. In January, St John had threatened enquiries into financial irregularities if at any time
he should refuse to co-operate with them, and Defoe's mocking comment that the October Club's clamours for the impeachment of Marlborough and Godolphin had been "put off with a Commission to State and Take the Publick Accounts" was particularly premature; it was this body which came forward a few months later with the evidence that provided the immediate excuse for Marlborough's dismissal.

Since 1708, at least, Harley had had in mind a deduction from the pay of the foreign troops hired by England, as an issue on which Marlborough might be called to account by Parliament, and this was to be one of the principal items of the Commissioners' indictment. Marlborough himself had been informed in May that they had begun to investigate this matter, and whatever he told Sarah of his caution in handling the public money, this must have contributed to his unwillingness to give offence to the ministers. A Harleyite pamphlet of the previous winter, which had glanced at the Duke's alleged appropriation of "the sweet Article of Secret Service," provided another ominous clue to their intentions; this matter was also to be taken up by the Commissioners. The threat of Marlborough's future opposition provided good reason to hasten and encourage these proceedings.

Meanwhile, Whig attempts to discredit them served as a further excuse to keep up the Examiner's hostility. Swift soothed the goaded and frustrated Tory backbenchers with the reminder that satire had traditionally been a means of punishing those whom the law could not touch. Defoe, however, stripped this pose of some of its dignity
by describing a meeting of the October Club, at which "a wiser Member ... than the rest," accepting the need to defer the impeachments of Marlborough and Godolphin, proposed that the Examiner and his colleagues "should be employ'd to open upon them, and to rail and throw Dirt at them, that the hatred of the People might not cool and abate."58

The Examiner was finally suspended on 26 July, and because of the frequent complaints about it on Marlborough's behalf, it has been assumed that the action was taken in recognition of his sensitivity to its criticism.59

It is virtually certain, however, that even without these pressures, the journal would have ceased production at about this time. In fact, Mrs. Manley proclaimed publicly that she had intended to take her farewell a little earlier, but had delayed in order to include the allegorical attack on the Duke and Duchess in the penultimate issue. This was scarcely indicative of an overriding deference to Marlborough. She also made it clear that the suspension was only temporary, "till the Meeting of the Parliament."60 Evidently one motive was the close of the current session.

Another may well have been a decline in the journal's sales and reputation. Swift later revealed that he had hoped to put the many enemies it had made him off the scent by the change of editorship,61 and it is at this point, perhaps, that the influence of Marlborough's disapproval may be discerned; for the Examiner's attacks on him had
drawn threats of legal action from the *Observator*, which was believed
to be sponsored by the general's family and might be supposed to reflect
his intentions.\(^{62}\) The change of style was as obvious to the journal's
readers as Swift had intended it should be, and though Mrs. Manley's
contributions were not as utterly contemptible as they have been
represented,\(^{63}\) they certainly suffered by comparison with Swift's. The
*Medley* taunted its rival with diminishing prestige, and one of Maynwaring's
acquaintances told him,

> he had seen Dr Atterbury lately, who own'd that the Advertisement
> in the *Medley* about the Act of Indemnity, had quite sunk the
> *Examiner*, & that he never cou'd recover it.

Atterbury was of course not the editor, as Maynwaring seems to have
assumed, but he had probably retained an interest in the fortunes of the
journal to which he had once contributed,\(^{64}\) and the comment may well
represent the truth.

But though there were reasons enough, apart from Marlborough's
complaints, for the suspension of the *Examiner*, it had become convenient,
and even necessary, for Oxford and St John to persuade him privately that
the action had been taken at his instigation. Their attempts to keep a
check on his authority and prestige and to intimidate him into submission
by means of the press, appeared, if anything, to have been rather too
successful. Towards the end of May, Lord Raby was prevailed upon by
the Allied leaders to plead that "it would not be amiss whilst he was
at the head of the Army he should be a little encourag'd, for his dejection
was such, it had an effect on the whole army"; and Raby added his own
recommendation that the general should not be "too much mortify'd." In June, Marlborough began to add his own weight to Raby's appeal. To a colleague who had access to the Queen, he wrote,

"I do meet with so many mortifications, that if my own honour, or the Queen's Service cou'd permit of it, I wou'd not serve any longer ... for if I consider'd only my self, the best thing I cou'd do, shou'd be to retier and be quiet, for I am sensible that the dayly Vexations I meet with, dose not only break my spirit, but also my Constitution."

By July he was talking more seriously of resignation unless some mitigation of these "Vexations" and some signs of renewed confidence and support were forthcoming from the Queen and her ministers. If he were given satisfaction on these points, he promised "to live with Lord Oxford, as he had done with Lord Godolphin"; if not, he feared the worst consequences for the Allied cause under his leadership. To add to these considerations came a renewed plea from Watkins for the suspension of the Examiner, which had now become the Duke's "greatest grievance." Of the charge of encouraging the Whig journalists' hostility to the ministry, Watkins reported, "I do very stedfastly believe he himself is innocent," and "'tis not just he should suffer for their faults." Another supporter argued that "he is above being governed by the little piques [which] may be in his family, in things which so highly concern the Queen's service and the welfare of his country."

The ministers therefore had much to gain by representing the final demise of the already moribund Examiner as an act of compliance to Marlborough. While their secret peace negotiations matured, they could
not afford to make his continued command of the army as impracticable as he claimed it had become, and since the hostility of the journal had advertised the lack of governmental support of which he complained, its suspension could be regarded as visible evidence of their improved relations. The fact that he had been taught its measure as a means of dealing with any future opposition from him or his supporters meant that its silence would also be understood as a guarantee of his good behaviour. In fact, now that Marlborough himself seemed ready to disclaim sympathy with Whig schemes of revenge, the ministers might well feel it imprudent to drive him unnecessarily into opposition by keeping up a source of dissension which the Whigs themselves were anxious to foster.

Brigadier Richard Sutton, like Watkins, genuinely believed that a truce between the Medley and the Examiner would free both sides from the mischief-making of their propagandists and allow them the chance of a mutually profitable working relationship. The ministers certainly encouraged this opinion. Having been sent to London with news of the first success of the campaign, Sutton wrote back to Marlborough's headquarters, after a brief interview with St John, "I think I may assure you of hearing of no more Examiners, by which I hope the Medley will cease, and I pray (as well as I can) [that] may heale all differences." A few weeks later, Oxford repeated to Craggs, who duly informed Marlborough, "that 55 [St John?] had made the examiner quit his Scribling because he understood it was disagreeable to 78 [Marlborough]."
The first successful operation of the campaign, the passing of the supposedly impassable French lines, was apparently one with which the most hostile critic could find no fault. It was brilliantly executed, bloodless, the result of much careful planning on Marlborough's part in which few others could claim any share, and it opened the way for decisive action which had before seemed impossible. It also appeared to dispose once and for all of Mrs. Manley's recent insinuations, proving "very seasonable to raise the spirits of those, who his Graces Enemies had raised great apprehensions in, of seeing nothing done this year." Yet within a few days it had become one of the most controversial actions of his career.

In the first place, the initial London rumours of action in Flanders reported, not the bloodless crossing of the lines, but a complete victory on the scale of Blenheim, with the capture of innumerable trophies and prisoners, among the latter the French general, Villars, himself. These reports had such currency and occasioned such rejoicing that when the first accurate account of the affair was circulated in a soberly worded broadside published "by Authority," it was received with a sense of anticlimax and disappointment.

Wildly inaccurate reporting of military operations was no novelty at this period, but at a time when Marlborough's political opponents might be supposed to fear a sudden revival of his prestige, this instance appeared suspiciously convenient. The most elaborate version of the
rumour in the London newspapers was that of the British Mercury. In
the issue of 27-30 July, it was reported that Marlborough had sent over
an account of the victory by Major General Evans,

who arriv'd here Yesterday with a Letter to the Queen's Majesty,
in which, as we are very credibly inform'd, his Grace had only
Time to say, That her Majesty's Army had gain'd a complete Victory;
and that Marshal Villars was THEN WITH HIS GRACE; referring for
the Particulars to the Major General aforesaid: Which Particulars
(according to our best Information) are, That besides Marshal Villars,
his Grace has taken 16000 Prisoners, and amongst them 22 Battalions
entire: That the Enemy's Left Wing, and all their Horse, are
entirely ruin'd, 160 Cannon, 120 Colours, 58 Standards, and all their
Baggage taken, and the Army in Pursuit of the rest. 74

This bears all the signs of a malicious invention, designed to spread the
temporary notion that a second Blenheim had been won. The plethora of
exact detail, and in particular, the similarity of the paraphrased dispatch
to the famous pencilled note which had brought the first news of the earlier
victory, are highly suspicious. 75 It is unlikely, however, that the
editor of the British Mercury, at this time a Huguenot journalist named
Alexander Justice, would have been knowingly a party to a hoax of this
kind. The paper was intended only for private circulation, and the
proprietors forbad successive editors to engage in any political controversy,
on pain of instant dismissal. 76

Moreover, the next issue contained what appears to be a genuinely
discomfited apology for the blunder, giving the wide currency of the
rumours as an excuse. Though a perfectly innocent, but rather unconvincing
explanation was offered for their existence, there was a passing reference
to the theory that they had been spread by "some Persons in View of a
particular Interest." Boyer was more specific in his accusations. He.
claimed that the Tory propagandists, having been disappointed in their insinuations that the whole campaign would be spent in inaction, had devised the "Strategem" of the phantom battle "to pall the Publick Joy, and depress his Grace's spreading Reputation." This does seem to be the most likely explanation of the phenomenon.

What made this "Stratagem" particularly damaging to Marlborough was the fact that he had actually passed up an opportunity for battle after passing the lines, which even the proverbially cautious Dutch Deputies had considered favourable. Though he offered sound strategic reasons for his decision, it is now generally agreed that he was also influenced by fear of the capital which his political enemies would make of a defeat, or even of an indecisive victory. Craggs' hint to Oxford a few weeks before, that Marlborough was reluctant to undertake any risky operation because of the fault that had been found with the battle of Malplaquet, suggests that this may well have been the case. The general's position was singularly difficult. It had been made clear that he could expect to be blamed if the army remained completely inactive; yet any action short of an almost bloodless victory would have made him liable to even more serious criticism; and having avoided the greater risk by deciding upon the siege of Bouchain, he now faced the charge of frittering away the campaign in indecisive action. The fact that his dispute with the Dutch Deputies had become public knowledge in every European capital increased this danger. Remonstrating privately with the Deputy Goslinga, who had been loudest in his criticism, Marlborough explained that,
The confidential remark throws a good deal of light on Marlborough's relations with the ministers at this time. For all their readiness to comply with his demands, and for all his own eagerness to "preserve and improve" their confidence, he remained convinced that if they were given the slightest advantage over him, they would use it to destroy him. He advised another foreign colleague that since the ministers were in full power, it would be wise to maintain good relations with them, and he evidently believed that this conciliatory attitude, which would give them no cause to fear his opposition and no excuse to employ their destructive tactics openly, remained the best means of safeguarding himself.

Since Marlborough had so little confidence in the genuine goodwill of his colleagues, it must have been in a mood of challenge that he wrote to St John, requesting that a statement of his reasons for not giving battle after passing the lines be published in the London Gazette, so that criticism of the decision "might not make any false impression on people's minds." The Duke had always attached considerable importance to this form of publicity, and while still a member of the ministry, he was evidently not prepared to relinquish his right to it without a struggle. The maintenance of his reputation among his own countrymen was one of his few remaining protections against the hostility of political opponents. The ministers, however, maintained the pattern set by the suspension of
the Examiner. Although St John assured the Duke that "no impression was received here like what your Grace seems to apprehend," the vindication was at once inserted almost word for word in the Gazette, in an anonymous paragraph under the Brussels heading.

In the final issue of the Medley, however, written while Maynwaring was a guest at St. Albans, the first success of the campaign was used to revive the Whig war-cry of "no peace without Spain," and it may have been this which prompted a paragraph in the Post-Boy, ostensibly from The Hague and taking notice of the fact that Marlborough had been forced to justify his conduct after the passing of the lines,

because the Publick, who sometimes pretend to judge of Things they do not understand, call'd the Passing of the Scheld before Bouchain was invested, a manifest Blunder.

In spite of the carefully oblique framing of this criticism, the Observator was at once up in arms, proclaiming almost triumphantly that the Post Boy had "taken up the Examiner's Province ... to revile the Duke of Marlborough." Maynwaring was no doubt expressing the feelings of the general's family circle when he called the passage "such a Reflection upon his Conduct, as I think the rogue that writes it shoud be hang'd for." Yet the ministers were prepared to palliate this offence also. When Craggs complained to Oxford in person of the "Impudent paragraph," the Treasurer professed that "he had not so much as heard of [it], but would enquire into it."

Meanwhile, Marlborough was doing what he could to keep his own supporters from breaking this uneasy truce. In one of the Spectator's rare incursions on to controversial ground, Steele had made the passing of
the lines the occasion for a graceful, but rather cryptic tribute to Marlborough, which included the comment that his riches and power had no value for him "but as accompanied with the Affection of his Prince," and that such a man would be "Glorious without Possibility of receiving Disgrace."⁹⁰ It was at this time also that Craggs applied to Sarah on Steele's behalf for the post of Marlborough's salaried apologist. The Spectator's eulogy was perhaps an earnest of future services.

Marlborough's enthusiasm for the offer was qualified. "I find," Sarah told Craggs,

hee is willing to give him any thing that I shall desire when hee comes over, but hee says hee would not doe it now, nor bee named, & if I ghesse right at his meaning I believe it is better hee should not, because what ever Mr Stele writes in doing him Justice it will not have so good an air if tis thought that hee is paid for it ... ⁹¹

Marlborough's distaste for mercenary apologetics was probably real enough, but it is likely that his stipulation was chiefly designed to prevent further provocation being given the ministers in print on his behalf, at least while the campaign was in progress.

Craggs had apparently understood his meaning. Much was made in the Whig press of the malicious glee with which some Tories received pessimistic or critical reports of the siege of Bouchain. Indeed, it was said that Marlborough's military advisors had tried to dissuade him from an operation which presented so many difficulties, on the grounds that failure would give his enemies the chance to destroy his reputation, or to revive Mrs. Manley's insinuation that he was determined to create problems for the ministry by acting with less than his usual zeal.⁹²
When all obstacles had been overcome, therefore, Craggs received a letter from Cadogan, demonstrating that the capture of the town had been "attended by all the Circumstances my Lord Dukes Friends could wish for his Glory and Reputation." This was relatively harmless, but the letter continued,

I am sure you are not unacquainted with the difficulties most People foresaw in this Enterprise, and I believe it was sufficiently made known in England; by some who intended my Lord Duke no service, tho as things have turned their representations must add a Lustre to the undertaking ... 93

The impersonal tone of the letter suggests that it was written with a view to publication, and in that case the underlined passage could have been taken as a taunt at the misguided ill will of the ministry and its propagandists. It is interesting to note that when Craggs had the document printed anonymously in the Daily Courant this allusion was omitted. 94 He must have been aware that Marlborough had no wish to be defended in the press in any way that would revive these old antagonisms.
NOTES TO CHAPTER IV.


2. See p. 43 above.

3. Benson's pamphlet was advertised as "Lately Publish'd" in the Daily Courant, No.2911 (17 February 1711); it was attacked by Swift in the Examiner, No.30 (1 March 1710/1), in Prose Works, III, p.100. For its great popularity, see John Oldmixon, The History of England during the Reigns of King William and Queen Mary, Queen Anne, and King George I (1735), p.477.


5. For the Tory enthusiasm for the Spanish war, see Mungo Graham to the Duke of Montrose, 2 January 1711, The Divided Society, eds. Geoffrey Holmes and W.A. Speck (1967), pp.92-94; for Marlborough's acknowledgement of the ministry's support, see Maynwaring to Coningsby, 13 March 1710/1, B.M. Add. MSS 57681, f.158; and Marlborough to Oxford, 28 May / 8 June 1711, H.M.C. Bath MSS, I, p.204. For the pamphleteer's comments, see [Daniel Defoe], Eleven Opinions about Mr. H[arley] (1711), pp.70-71 (published 14 May 1711, Moore, Checklist, pp.84-85, Item 206); and [Richard Martyn], A Modest Presentation of the Past and Present State of Great Britain (1711), p.9; the authorship of this last pamphlet is discussed by Henry L. Snyder in "The Reports of a Press Spy for Robert Harley: New Bibliographical Data for the Reign of Queen Anne," The Library, Fifth Series, XXII (1967), p.329.


7. No.34 (29 March 1711), in Swift, Prose Works, III, p.120.


14. For the sale of this pamphlet, see La Clef du Cabinet des Princes de l'Europe, Tome XY (1711), p. 138; for the advertisements, see Examiner, Nos. 42 (10-17 May 1711) and 44 (24-31 May 1711); there had also been an advance notice of publication in the Post-Boy, No. 2489 (24-26 April 1711). Page references to quotations from the pamphlet have been incorporated parenthetically into the text.


18. Hare to Watkins, 28 January 1708/9, B.M. Add. MSS 33225, f. 17; a second and third edition of the pamphlet were advertised in the Evening Post, No. 382 (19-22 January 1712), "Tomorrow will be publish'd"; and the Post-Boy, No. 2627 (11-13 March 1712), "on Saturday will be publish'd."

19. Nos. 47 (14-21 June 1711), 48 (21-28 June 1711), and 49 (28 June-5 July 1711). For the change of editorship, see pp. 204-205 below.

21. Raby to St John, 24 April/5 May 1711, B.M. Add. MSS 22205, f.47v.


26. X, Nos. 41 (19-23 May 1711), and 44 (30 May-2 June 1711).

27. The Management of the War, in Four Letters to a Tory-Member (1711), pp.97-98.


29. Letter of 1 December 1710, Blenheim MSS E38; this passage was omitted from the printed version of this letter in Private Corr., II, pp.24-58.

30. For Sarah's delight at the ridicule of Harley as the "sausage-maker" turned statesman, in the Medley, No.9 (27 November 1710), pp.106-109, see her letter to "Mr. Jennens" of 4 December 1710, Letters of Sarah, Duchess of Marlborough ... at Madresfield Court (1875), p.22. For Swift's reaction to the attack on Harley in the Medley, No.32 (7 May 1711), see Examiner, No.41 (17 May 1711), in Prose Works, III, pp.54-56. Oldmixon mentions Harley's attempted action against the Medley in Memoirs of the Press ... from 1710 to 1740 (1742), p.11; for Mrs. Manley's statements about the journal's distribution, see Examiner, No.46 (7-14 June 1711).

32. Matthew Prior included Hare among the Medley's editors in his *History of His Own Time* (1740), p. 338, and it is likely that the same assumption was current in the ministerial circles in which Prior moved. For Oldmixon's account of the Medley's composition, see Maynwaring, pp. 169-202.

33. To Drummond, 15/26 July 1711, H.M.C. Portland MSS, V, p. 50.

34. To Craggs, 20 July [1711], 28 July 1711, and 2/13 June [1713], B.M. Stowe MSS 751, ff. 6, 7v-8, and 50.

35. In a letter of 13/24 May 1711 (Coxe, III, p. 180), Marlborough again requested her to avoid criticism of the ministers in her letters, but in a letter to Craggs of 20 July [1711], Sarah revealed that she had disregarded these instructions, in the hope that Oxford would read her letters (B.M. Stowe MSS 751, f. 5).

36. According to Oldmixon, the purpose of the Medley was to keep up "a Spirit in the Whigs" (Memoirs of the Press, p. 12), and in the Medley, No. 34 (21 May 1711), p. 379, Maynwaring remarked that when the Examiner ceased to attack the old ministers, he would "have no more occasion to complain of the Author of the Medley."

37. *Reasons Which Induc'd Her Majesty to Create the Right Honourable Robert Harley, Esq., a Peer of Great Britain* (1711), p. 7 (advertised, Examiner, No. 44 (24-31 May 1711)).

38. The Commons' findings were published as *The Humble Representation of the House of Commons to the Queen*, in Votes of the House of Commons, in the Third Parliament of Great Britain ... Beginning the Twenty Fifth of November in the Ninth Year of the Reign of Queen Anne, Ann Dom. 1710, No. 147, pp. 329-332, esp. p. 331. The Representation was presented to the Queen on 4 June 1711. For the October Club, its votes concerning the thirty-five millions, and its grievances against the ministry, see H.T. Dickinson, "The October Club," *H.L.Q.*, XXXIII (1969-1970), pp. 158-163.

39. This pamphlet is dated 1711 and was advertised without specific date in *A Pair of Spectacles for Oliver's Looking-Glass Maker*, which appeared on 28 June 1711. Page references are given in the text.

40. Undated fragment, [July-August 1711], Blenheim MSS E25.

41. To Coningsby, 5 June 1711, B.M. Add. MSS 57681, f. 163.
42. To Cowper, 25 July 1711, Panshanger MSS D/EP F54, f. 160, Maynwaring and Godolphin were at St. Albans from July to August 1711; see Maynwaring to Coningsby, 7 July 1711 and 15 August 1711, B.M. Add. MSS 57861, ff. 164 and 168.


44. This pamphlet has been attributed to Defoe (e.g. in *The Cambridge Bibliography of English Literature*, ed. F.W. Bateson [1940], II, p. 501), but it is not included in Moore's Checklist. An excerpt from it was printed in the *Medley*, No. 41 (9 July 1711), pp. 439-441; it had probably been published a few days before this. Page references are given in the text.

45. The official censure of the Re-representation was printed in the *Post Boy*, No. 2561 (9-11 October 1711); it had originally taken place at the Oxford Assizes on 13 July 1711. See also *The History and Defence of the Last Parliament* (1713), p. 107.

46. No. 51 (12-19 July 1711).

47. Sarah to Craggs, 26 May/6 June 1713, B.M. Stowe MSS 751, f. 58v. Since this ballad (attributed in Oldmixon, *Maynwaring*, pp. 334-338) contains a reference to the final issue of the *Examiner*, No. 52 (19-26 July 1711), it must have been composed after that time, during Maynwaring's stay at St. Albans. For the later suppression of the ballad, see *Political State*, II (November 1711), p. 390.

48. "Excerpta" from classical history in Harley's handwriting, clearly chosen for their relevance to contemporary situations and people (Marlborough and his wife figuring as Belisarius and Antonia, favourites of the Emperor Justinian), B.M. Portland Loan MSS 29/10/21.
49. To Drummond, 21 June / 2 July 1711, H.M.C. Portland MSS, V, p.192.


51. Maynwaring to Coningsby, 7 July 1711, B.M. Add. MSS 57861, f.164; Maynwaring seems here to be giving a more detailed version of the interview between Harley and Craggs which he had described to Sarah in the letter cited p.217 n.31 above.


60. Examiner, No.51 (12-19 July 1711).

62. Observator, X, Nos. 13 (10-14 February 1711), and 41 (19-23 May 1711).

63. E.g., by Morgan, Bibliography, III, p.255, Item V81.

64. Maynwaring to Sarah, [July-August 1711], Blenheim MSS E25; for Atterbury's share in the Examiner, see Swift, Prose Works, III, p.xvii. For comments on the journal's deterioration, see Medley, No.40 (2 July 1711), pp.425-426.

65. To St John, 18/29 May 1711, B.M. Add. MSS 22205, f.115.


67. Lord Stair to the Earl of Marchmont, 10 December 1736, describing an interview between himself and Marlborough in July 1711, A Selection from the Papers of the Earls of Marchmont ... Illustrative of Events from 1685 to 1750, ed. G.H. Rose (1831), II, pp.77-78.

68. To Drummond, 15/26 July 1711 and 21 June/ 2 July 1711, H.M.C. Portland MSS, V, pp.50 and 192.

69. Stair to the Earl of Mar, 12/23 July 1711, H.M.C. Portland MSS, V, p.43.


72. L'Hermitage to the States-General, 31 July 1711, B.M.Add. MSS 17677EEE, f.277v; Taylor to Watkins, 10 August 1711, B.M. Add. MSS 38852, f.126; Political State, II (August 1711), pp.158-159. The official broadside account of the passing of the lines is headed "Whitehall," and dated 28 July 1711.

73. See Addison's mockery of the news-writers in the Tatler, No.18 (19-21 May 1711).

74. No.211 (27-30 July 1711).

75. For the text of this, see Churchill, I, p.863.

77. *British Mercury*, No. 212 (30 July-1 August 1711); *Political State*, II (August 1711), p. 158.


79. Maynwaring to Coningsby, 7 July 1711, B.M. Add. MSS 57861, f. 164.


81. Marlborough to Drummond, 2/13 August 1711, H.M.C. Drummond Moray MSS, p. 141; see also Marlborough to Oxford, 15/26 July 1711, H.M.C. Bath MSS, I, p. 205. Foot, *The Pen and the Sword*, pp. 230, 232 and 238, suggests that Marlborough had been largely taken in by the ministers' gestures of goodwill; Goslinga's account, cited in the previous note, is evidence that this was not so.


85. No. 45 (6 August 1711), pp. 474-475; for the information that Maynwaring was at St. Albans when this issue was composed see Oldmixon, *Maynwaring*, p. 202.

86. No. 2536 (12-14 August 1711).

87. X, No. 66. (15-18 August 1711).

88. To Coningsby, 15 August 1711, B.M. Add. MSS 57681, f. 168v.


91. Letter of 17 August [1711], B.M. Stowe MSS 751, f. 11. There is no reference to Steele in Marlborough’s letters to his wife of this period; the message to which Sarah referred must therefore have been a verbal one, possibly carried by Dr. Samuel Garth, who had been involved in the setting up of the Medley, and who had just returned from a visit to Marlborough’s camp, bearing letters and verbal messages between the Duke, his wife, Godolphin and Craggs; see Oldmixon, Memoirs of the Press, p. 9; Watkins to Drummond, 19/30 July 1711, H.M.G. Portland MSS, V, pp. 56-57; and Marlborough to Godolphin, 19/30 July 1711, Coxe, III, p. 224.


94. No. 3097 (15 September 1711).