The Military Obligations of the English People
1511-1558

By

John Jeremy Goring

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
London
1955
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Abstract of Thesis

This thesis is concerned with the military obligations of the people of England in the period between the re-issue of the Statute of Winchester in 1511 and its repeal in 1558. In its pages an attempt is made to discover what these obligations were and how they were enforced.

The primary purpose of this thesis is to show that the Crown enforced these obligations in two different ways - to establish the hitherto unrecognized fact that there were two distinct military systems in England in the early Tudor period. On the one hand was the "national" system, under which groups of gentlemen (acting on the authority of commissions of array) prepared men for the wars in the shires, hundreds, and parishes of the kingdom. On the other hand was the "quasi-feudal" system, under which individual gentlemen (acting on the authority of signet letters) prepared men for the wars from the ranks of their own tenants, servants, and other dependants.

An examination of the workings of these two systems occupies the first two parts of this thesis. The third part is devoted to matters which concern both systems and matters which concern neither.

The two systems existed side by side throughout the reigns
of the first four Tudors, often overlapping and sometimes clashing. By the end of Mary's reign, however, the quasi-feudal system had been almost completely superseded by the national one, and from this time forth the armies of the Crown were to be composed almost exclusively of the men of the local militias.
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INTRODUCTION

The title of this thesis has been chosen faute de mieux. Any other title, although it might have the advantage of being more concise and less pretentious, would probably fail to indicate either the narrowness or the breadth of the subject with which the thesis attempts to deal.

This study cannot claim, for example, to be a "History of the Early Tudor Army". Apart from the fact that there was at this period no permanent Army (but only a long succession of ephemeral armies), such a title would be very misleading. The reader would expect to be provided with descriptions of the military engagements of these years—of the tactics employed at the battles of Flodden and Pinkie and the strategy used at the sieges of Tournai and Boulogne. As it is, these events are hardly mentioned at all in the pages that follow.

Again, it would be wrong to describe this thesis as a "History of Early Tudor Military Organisation"; for, although it is concerned with some aspects of military organisation, there are many which it does not touch upon. Among these are important administrative matters like the
payment of wages, the purveyance of victuals, and the provision of transport, tentage, and ordnance. The only part of the machinery of military organisation which is treated is that which controlled the recruitment of men.

Nevertheless, this is not a purely administrative study. It attempts to describe not only the process of recruiting men for military service but also the way in which the burden of military service was distributed throughout English society. However, any such title as "Military Recruitment in England" would be an insufficient description of its contents, since these embrace other obligations than that of military service.

Furthermore, as its title indicates, the thesis is concerned only with the military obligations of the people of England and not with those of the people of Scotland or Ireland. Even the military obligations of Welshmen, in so far as the peculiar structure of Welsh society (which at this period, moreover, was undergoing considerable changes) caused them to differ from those of Englishmen, have not received any attention in this work.

Finally, the scope of this study has chronological as well as geographical limitations. Unlike Dr. Noyes's similarly titled work,¹ which covers 400 years of English

history, this thesis deals only with a very short period of time - the years 1511 to 1558. The year 1511 has been chosen as the commencing date because it represents something of a turning-point; but this can only be perceived when the events of that year are set against the background of the later Middle Ages.

Section I. 1327-1485

In the early Middle Ages an Englishman was subject to two kinds of military obligation: he was bound by homage to serve in the feudal host; he was bound by allegiance to serve in the forces of the shire. "The armed force of the nation", wrote Bishop Stubbs of this period, "was divided by the same lines of separation which divided it in matters of land tenure, judicature, council, and finance".¹

Under Edward III, however, the military system of England began to undergo a change, since "feudal service was recognized as becoming obsolete".² Although in 1327 the full and formal feudal levy was called out, the size

---

1. W. Stubbs, Constitutional History, ii, 277.
of the retinues provided by the tenants-in-chief on that occasion far exceeded their strict feudal obligations: "if it was the voice of feudalism which uttered the call to arms in 1327, it was the voice of a dying feudalism". ¹ Moreover, after 1327 the feudal levies appear to have become less and less formal: in 1331, for instance, when certain tenants-in-chief were ordered to join the King with as many horsemen as they could muster, the gratuitous 40 days' service was not performed - all men were paid from the outset. ²

After the outbreak of the Hundred Years' War, indeed, Edward III realised that the feudal organisation of the army was "absolutely useless" for foreign service. ³ Although he continued to order the chief magnates of the realm to supply him with soldiers, he seems to have done so by virtue of his authority as a national king rather than as a feudal lord; and the magnates were bound to obey him by virtue of their allegiance as subjects rather than their homage as tenants-in-chief. The King, moreover, being anxious to utilise "the business-like astuteness of his subjects", ⁴ ensured that

2. Ibid., p.351.
4. Ibid.
the suppliers were well paid for the services of themselves and their men. Accordingly, he caused indentures to be drawn up between himself and the individual magnates, by which they undertook to supply him with certain numbers of men for certain periods of time and for certain sums of money.¹

While most of the important contingents that fought in France in the Hundred Years' War were raised by indentures, the contingents prepared for the defence of the realm were normally raised under the national system of general obligation. Under this system every able-bodied man aged between sixteen and sixty years had to hold himself in readiness to serve when called upon to do so. Under this system also every person of substance was bound to keep quantities of arms and armour in his house in readiness for such service. This latter duty was regulated by the Statute of Winchester of 1285, the relevant provisions of which may be tabulated thus:²

---

1. For the whole question of indentures, see A.E. Prince, "The Indenture System under Edward III" (Historical essays in Honour of James Tait, pp.293-97), and N.B. Lewis, "The Organisation of Indentured Retinues in Fourteenth-century England" (T.R.H.S. ser. IV vol.xxvii pp.29-39).

2. Statutes of the Realm, i, 97-8.
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Although these were the terms of the Statute, they were not always rigidly adhered to; "the amount and character of the weapons and armour to be provided by the holder of lands or chattels of a particular value varied occasionally to a marked degree".\(^1\) In 1334, moreover, when the sheriffs were ordered to make proclamation for the better enforcement of the Winchester provisions, reference was made to two additional classes — those with £40 and those with £20 in lands.\(^2\)

While in theory the militia comprised every able-bodied man in every shire, in practice it was not normal for the whole _posses comitatus_ to be called out at one time. Such a levy "would have been quite unmanageable,

---

1. Prince, "The Army and Navy" (op.cit.) p.356.
would have robbed the land of its cultivators, and left the country undefended except at headquarters". Only a certain quota was levied in each shire "by a process of selection of the strongest and best armed", those responsible for selecting them being local gentry who had been specially authorised to do so by commissions of array under the Great Seal.

The English military system underwent little change in the course of the 15th century: on the eve of the Tudor period the armed forces of the Crown were still divided into two principal groups. On the one hand were the contingents of individual magnates, raised on the authority of letters under the Privy Seal or Privy Signet from the ranks of their own dependants, and often contracted for by indentures between them and the King. On the other hand were the forces of the militia, raised by groups of commissioners on the authority of letters under the Great Seal from the ranks of the ablest men in the shire. As it happens, both these ways of raising men for the wars were employed by Richard III in the latter

2. Prince, "The Army and Navy" (loc.cit.).
part of his reign when he was preparing to defend his kingdom against the threatened attack of the Earl of Richmond: on 8 December 1483 he sent out commissions under the Great Seal to groups of nobles and gentlemen in all English shires ordering them to cause the people to make ready;\textsuperscript{1} and four days after Henry had landed at Milford Haven the King sent out letters under his Privy Signet to individual gentlemen ordering them to provide soldiers for the army that was to be sent against the usurper.\textsuperscript{2} But all was in vain: the rebels were victorious and Henry Tudor ascended the throne of England.

Section II. 1485-1511

The accession of Henry VII brought about no striking change in the military organisation of England. Although his creation of a royal bodyguard of Yeomen Archers introduced a new element of professionalism into military service, he was for the most part content to follow in the footsteps of his predecessors. Henry, like Richard III before him, continued to raise men both by commissions

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textit{C.P.R. 1476-85}, pp.438-92.
\end{enumerate}
of array and by indentures.

The first Tudor called out the militia whenever the peace of the realm was threatened by internal rebellion or foreign invasion. In 1487, for example, at the time of Lincoln's rebellion, he sent out commissions to groups of lords and gentlemen in Norfolk, Suffolk, and Essex ordering them to raise the forces of their shires.¹ Ten years later, when Perkin Warbeck landed in the west, and when there was no time to issue commissions of array, the King ordered Sir Peter Edgecomb, sheriff of Cornwall, to "raise the country": whereupon the latter levied a force numbering, "as tradition saith", some 20,000 men and marched against the enemy.²

In this rebellion, as in that of Michael Joseph and Thomas Flammock earlier in the year, however, the King did not rely mainly upon the national levies but upon the private retinues of individual subjects. At the field of Blackheath, for instance, were divers lords and gentlemen, who, according to the chronicler Hall, had come to the King's aid with "as many men of warre as thei could put in aredines".³ It was of invidual

gentlemen's contingents, too, that Henry VII's overseas expeditionary forces were largely composed: such was the army sent into France in 1492, as the indentures drawn up at the time between king and subjects (many of which still survive) bear witness;¹ such, also, was the army that had been sent into Brittany three years previously.

Professor Mackie and Dr. Noyes, however, have suggested that the men who served in Brittany in 1489 were militiamen raised by virtue of commissions of array.² But the commissions "De Sagittariis pro Relāvamine Partium Britanniae Providendis" issued on 3 December 1488 were not commissions of array. They did not authorise their recipients to cause all men generally to prepare themselves for war but only to cause the lords and gentlemen to prepare their own dependants:

Vobis ... Potestatem & Auctoritatem conjunctim & divisim, Damus & Committimus ad omnes & singulos Comites, Barones, Milites, ac alios Nobiles quoscumque ... coram Vobis Evocandum, Et ad ipsos & eorum quemlibet per se quotum & qualem Numerum Hominum Sagittariorum, defensibiliter arraíatorum, quilibet dictorum Comitum, Baronom, Militum, ac aliorum praedictorum, pro Expeditione Armatae nostrae praedictae, ad nostri Custum & Onera, inveniet diligenter Examinandum, & cum eis & eorum quolibet super Praemissis appunctandum & indentandum.

¹. Ryme, op.cit. v, pt.4, 43-4.
². J.D. Mackie, The earlier Tudors, p.209; Noyes, op.cit. p.43.
The commissioners were then to send the Crown a certificate of the names of the lords and gentlemen, together with the number of archers that each could provide.¹

Among these names must have been that of Sir John Paston, for on 12 March 1489 the Earl of Oxford wrote to him in these words:²

> according to the Kyng our soverayne Lordis commandements late to me addressid, I desire and pray you that ye wolle in all gode\[s\]haste, upon the sighte hereof, prepare youre selfe to be in a redinesse with as many personnes as ye heretofore grauntid to do the Kyng servyce.

The Breton expeditionary force, however, did not consist entirely of English archers: in the retinue of Sir Walter Herbert, for example, were 19 "soldarii equestres vocati demi launces" who had been drawn "a partibus Wallie".³

It is significant that Henry VII made considerable use of levies other than those of the militia both at home

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1. Rymer, op.cit. v, pt.3, 196b. Cf. C.P.R. 1485-94, p.278, where "inveniet" is taken to mean "is bound to find" - thus giving the impression that Henry was attempting to revive the formal feudal array.

2. J. Gairdner, Paston Letters, iii, 353.

and abroad at a time when "everything tended to compel resort to the national militia as the principal military force of England".\(^1\) From the political point of view he would probably have preferred to rely solely on the militia: it was safer to restrict the levying of soldiers to groups of nobles and gentlemen specially commissioned for the purpose, than to permit individual magnates to raise men from the ranks of their own dependants - a procedure which savoured too much of the anarchy of the Wars of the Roses. And this fear of anarchy led the King not only to prohibit the keeping of retainers in time of peace,\(^2\) but also to impose strict limits on the numbers levied in time of war: in 1497, for example, Sir Gilbert Talbot was ordered to raise 120 soldiers "and no moo".\(^3\)

Nevertheless, privately raised contingents, dangerous though their existence may have been, were too valuable to be dispensed with. In the first place, they could be employed anywhere, while the mobility of the shire levies was hampered by certain restrictions. A statute of Edward III's reign laid down that no man was to be

\(^1\) J.W. Fortescue, *History of the British Army*, i, 110.
\(^2\) *Statutes of the Realm*, ii, 658-60.
\(^3\) H. Ellis, *Original Letters*, i, 32-3.
compelled to go out of his shire in the King's service "but where necessity requireth".\textsuperscript{1} By ancient custom, moreover, it was held that the militia must on no account be made to serve outside the realm.\textsuperscript{2}

Again, from the administrative point of view, it was often more convenient to raise men in other ways. The machinery of the militia, especially if the handling of it was left to the sheriffs (as it was when there was no time to issue commissions of array) was clumsy and inefficient, and a better force could be assembled in a shorter time by ordering the leading magnates to levy their dependants. As Henry VIII was to realise in 1511, the Crown could be more "speedely and sufficiently provyded" with soldiers by ordering individual lords and gentlemen to recruit their tenants and servants than "by ... meanys of mustres".\textsuperscript{3}

Section III. 1511 and after

In 1511 the possibility of war with France became a probability, and military matters were much in the thoughts

\begin{itemize}
\item[1.] Statutes of the Realm, i, 255.
\item[2.] C.G. Cruikshank, Elizabeth's Army, pp.6-7.
\item[3.] H.M.C. Middleton, p.126.
\end{itemize}
of the young man who had lately ascended the English throne. Henry in fact despatched two small expeditionary forces overseas that year to aid the enemies of France: in May a "crue" under Lord Darcy was sent to assist Ferdinand of Aragon in his way against the Moors; and in July another force under Sir Edward Poyning was sent to assist Margaret of Savoy in her dispute with the Duke of Gelders.¹

But it is as a year of military preparations that 1511 is significant. It was at this time that Henry VIII inaugurated that "revival of the militia system" for which one historian has wrongly given the credit to his father.² Henry VII indeed, although he made considerable use of the militia, appears to have made no attempt to revive the system of general obligation upon which it was based: he took no steps to enforce the military provisions of the Statute of Winchester. Henry VIII, on the other hand, was determined that these provisions should not remain a dead letter, and on 5 July 1511 ordered the sheriffs to make proclamation:³

3. P.R.O. C6 /615 m.7d (L.P. i, g.833(11)). This appears to have been the first time that the Statute had been re-issued since Richard II's reign (Noyes, op. cit. p.27).
that every man have in his house armour for
kepyng of the peace accordyng to his havyour
and substaunce, as they have been and shal be
ordred by the commyssioners a ter the olde
assise.

The "commyssioners" here referred to were doubtless those
nobles and gentlemen who, a fortnight previously, had
been ordered to cause all men to be armed "juxta formam &
effectum Statutorum & Ordinationum ante haec tempora inde
editorum & provisorum".1

It is impossible to over-emphasize the importance
of the latter clause: it does not seem to have appeared
in any commission of the previous reign, and its insertion
in the commissions of 1511 marked the beginning of a new
era in the history of the English militia. Henry VII
had generally ordered the commissioners of array merely
to cause the people to be armed "juxta gradus et facultates
suas"2 - and this had been sufficient in a period when
a commission of array was little more than a means of
obtaining armed men in time of war. After 1511, however,
a commission of array (the wording of which invariably
contained the "statutory" clause) became an instrument
for enforcing the military obligations of the English

2. See, e.g., P.R.O. C66/566 m.6(8)d; C66/577 m.14(12)d; C66 578 m.8(14)d.
people in peace and war.¹

In 1511 Henry also took steps to reorganise the other half of the military system. On 8 September, not long after the above-mentioned commissions had been issued, he sent out letters under his Privy Signet to certain lords and gentlemen ordering them to prepare as many men as possible for the wars and to certify his secretary of their number by the first day of November.² But the letters contained this important proviso:

forseeing alweyes that ye nether prepayre ne take any personnes for the warre but oonly suche as bee your awne tenauntes or inhabitauntes within any office that ye have of oure graunt or of the graunt of any other person or personnes or commynaltie, not being tenauntes or officers to any other person or personnes havyng semblable commaundment.

The imposition of such a restriction is highly significant. Previously, it seems, a man had levied his soldiers wheresoever he wished: he would not necessarily recruit his retinue from the ranks of his own tenants.³ Now, however, the importance of the tenurial bond, which in the later Middle Ages "had been superseded ... by the personal contract between master and man," was re-emphasised.

1. For commissions of array, see Appendix V.
4. K. B. McFarlane, "Bastard Feudalism" (E.I.H.R. xx) p.161
The year 1511 thus witnessed the emergence of a military system which differed somewhat from the indenture system of the 14th and 15th centuries. This new system may, for want of a better term, be described as "quasi-feudal"; for it was a system under which the Crown sent out writs of military summons to the principal landowners, and the principal landowners answered the call by taking steps to enforce the military obligations of their tenants.

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In the following chapters the national and quasi-feudal systems of military service receive separate treatment. This, however, is not to say that there was at this period any theoretical distinction between allegiance and homage, but that there was a practical distinction between that part of the machinery of military organisation which was set in motion by commissions under the Great Seal and that part which was set in motion by letters under the Privy Signet. The distinction may be best understood if tabulated thus:

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1. The indenture system in fact seems to have come to an end in 1512; the indentures drawn up on 30 April (H.M.C. Middleton, p.128; J. Smyth, The Lives of the Berkeleys, ii, 196) were probably the last ever made.
PART ONE

NATIONAL SYSTEM
CHAPTER I

The Enforcement of Military Obligations

In theory the England of the early Tudors was a nation in arms: every able-bodied man was a potential soldier; every parish church was an armoury; and every village green was a training-ground for archers. At the firing of a beacon or at the beating of a drum there could quickly be assembled an enormous array of well-equipped and well-trained bowmen and billmen, who would be capable of beating back any invasion or of overcoming any rebellion. Since, however, many Englishmen failed to fulfil their military obligations, there was often a great divorce between theory and practice.

It is the purpose of this chapter to examine both the extent of this divorce and the steps that the Crown took to heal it. And, in order to do this, the military obligations have been divided into three sections: (i) the possession of military equipment; (ii) the practice of military exercises; and (iii) the performance of military services.
Section I. The Possession of Military Equipment

The possession of military equipment was regulated by the ancient Statute of Winchester, the relevant provisions of which have been tabulated above.\(^1\) The provisions of this Statute "remained the basic embodiment of the military obligation, subject of course to varying interpretations, until its formal repeal in the reign of Philip and Mary".\(^2\)

The military obligations of the English people, however, were collective as well as individual: each parish had to have its own set of arms and armour. This "parish harness" was not mentioned in the Statute of Winchester, but it dates back at least to the reign of Edward II. Throughout the later Middle Ages, it seems, "every parish was bound to keep ready for use a certain amount of armour, and a man or men, if necessity arose, properly trained to the use of this armour".\(^3\)

But although the military obligations of Englishmen were clearly defined, they were not always properly fulfilled. In 1522, for example, the certificates of the

\(^1\) See above, p. 6.
\(^2\) Noyes, op. cit. p. 27.
\(^3\) J. C. Cox, Churchwardens' Accounts, p. 326.
"Domesday" commissioners reveal a widespread failure to comply with the provisions of the Statute of Winchester.\(^1\) From these returns, where the wealth of every man and the quantity of his arms and armour are recorded side by side, it is possible to discover how faithfully the English people were adhering to the letter of the law. Although at Coventry everyone appears to have possessed harness according to his substance,\(^2\) the story was generally very different from this. From the Rutland returns, for instance, one learns that, of the 36 residents in the East hundred who possessed 20 marks or more in goods, 17 had no harness at all, while six had incomplete sets of harness: thus only about one-third of the population of this district were fulfilling their obligations. Moreover, among the law-breakers were men like Henry Bokyngham of Little Casterton who had £60 and no harness, and Henry Thistilton of Great Casterton who had £50 and a sallet.\(^3\) An even worse example of negligence comes from the Buckinghamshire return, from which it appears that John Collingbourne of Aylesbury, whose goods were valued at no less than £300, had no harness whatsoever.\(^4\)

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1. For the Survey of 1522, see Appendix I.
2. This fact emerges from a careful analysis of the Coventry return (Cov.C.R.O. A 96).
As with individual obligations, so with collective obligations, there was clearly a wide divorce between theory and practice at this time. In 1522 few English parishes appear to have had communal armour: in the hundred of Shrivenham (Berkshire) it as found only at Longcot and Shrivenham;¹ in the hundred of Wrandle (Rutland), only at Seaton and North Luffenham;² and in the three hundreds of Aylesbury (Buckinghamshire), only at Ellesborough.³

This failure on the part of the people to fulfil their military obligations was a constant source of concern to the Crown. In 1511, for instance, the King declared himself to be somewhat ill at ease:

Quia ... omnes f rme Homines, Pacis temporibus Otio & Quietii indulgentes, Arma & Instrumenta bellica negligentia & erugine consumi sinant, adeo ut Rebus bellicis dissuerti ad Bella gerenda, cum postea contigerint, propter Defectum Armorum, improvidi & imparati saepenumero inveniantur.

It was therefore ordained that the statutory provisions which defined these obligations were to be rigorously

enforced.\textsuperscript{1}

The principal instrument of enforcement was the commission of musters.\textsuperscript{2} Whenever the Crown became concerned about the condition of the militia, as it did in 1511 and in many subsequent years, it gave orders for "general musters" to be taken throughout the realm. This meant that the Lord Chancellor would be instructed to "directe furthe into all Shyres Commissions under the Brode Seale".\textsuperscript{3} As well as being sent to the representatives of the shires, commissions were also sent to the mayors of certain privileged cities and towns.\textsuperscript{4}

Those named in the shire commissions were invariably men of magisterial standing: if they were not J.P.s they were at any rate leading members of the local gentry. It would be quite accurate to say that the majority of those named in all the commissions of musters issued at this period were men who were already serving on the commissions of the peace. This coincidence between the two kinds of commission became more marked as the years passed, partly no doubt because the number of J.P.s was on the increase.

\textsuperscript{1} Rymer, \textit{op. cit.} vi, pt.1, 21a.
\textsuperscript{2} See Appendix V.
\textsuperscript{3} \textit{A.P.C. 1542-7}, p.313 (1546).
\textsuperscript{4} See below, p.193.
By 1539 it was apparently customary for the membership of the commissions of musters and the commissions of the peace to overlap almost completely. The case of Wiltshire in that year provides an illustration of this. With three exceptions, all those named in the muster commission were J.P.s of that shire at the time of their appointment; of the three outsiders, two were soon to become J.P.s, while the third (Sir John Bridges) was the immediate past sheriff of the shire. On the other hand, it so happened that 17 of those on the commission of the peace were not appointed to take musters. Of these, 14 (the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Privy Seal, two dukes, one marquess, two earls, four barons, two judges, and one King's Serjeant) appear to have been merely nominal members of the Bench; two others were probably exempted from military duties because they were ecclesiastics; and the remaining one (Henry Pole) was in prison.

1. L.P. xiii, pt.1, g.384(65); xiv, pt.1, 652 M24.
2. L.P. xiv, pt.1, g.1354(27).
4. It was not usual for ecclesiastics to serve on muster commissions, although the Abbots of Waltham and St. Osyth did so in 1535 (Westm. Abb. MS. 3254).
5. G. E. C. The Complete Peerage, ix (1936), 96-7. He was the son of Henry, Lord Montague, who had also been a J.P. for Wilts. until his death in December 1538.
A similar picture emerges in the two other shires where the composition of the 1539 muster commission is known: in Staffordshire only one commissioner was not a J.P. of that shire, while one of the three effective J.P.s who were not commissioners there served as such in the neighbouring county of Hereford; and in Herefordshire all the commissioners were J.P.s, while two of the four effective J.P.s who were not commissioners in that shire served as such in Staffordshire.¹

So far as is known, therefore, the commissioners appointed to make preparations for war in 1539 were on the whole the very same men who were already responsible for the maintenance of peace in the same shires. In that year, indeed, John Marshall, an inhabitant of the Nottinghamshire village of South Carlton, was evidently unable to distinguish between these two functions of the gentry of his shire: in a letter to Cromwell he referred to the activities of "the Justes of the pease here at our laste musters".²

By 1557, however, it must have been quite impossible

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1. L.P. xiii, pt.1, g.384(18); g.1519(10); xiv, pt.1, 652 W9 an M18. Lord Ferrers was a J.P. and a commissioner in both shires; John Vernon and Thomas Holt were J.P.s in both shires and commissioners in Staffs. only.

for anyone to make any distinction between a commissioner of musters and a commissioner of the peace: in this year the Lord Chancellor directed muster commissions only to the "Justices of Peace and Shireffes" in every county.\(^1\) Furthermore, in those years when Lieutenants were appointed to oversee the organisation of the militia, no commissions of musters at all were issued. The only recipients of military commissions were the Lords Lieutenants, under whose supervision the J.P.s mustered the forces of the shires in the course of their normal administrative duties.\(^2\) The justices of the peace were fast becoming in theory what they had long been in practice — the men who kept the country in readiness for war.

On receiving a commission of musters those named therein assembled in some convenient place to discuss ways and means of executing it. It is probable that not all the commissioners would be able to attend this meeting; at the meeting of those for the West Riding of Yorkshire held at Leeds on 17 December 1534 less than half appear to have been present.\(^3\) However, on this as on other occasions, the absence of a number of commissioners did

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2. See below, p. 312.
not deter the rest from proceeding to the "division" or "severance" of the shire. It seems, though, that on some occasions not all the commissioners were given a district to look after: in 1539, for instance, seven of the twenty Herefordshire commissioners were apparently allowed to escape service in this way, perhaps because they were otherwise engaged.¹

The commissioners usually worked in groups of two or three. Sometimes the size of these groups was laid down in the original instructions, as in those sent to the gentlemen commissioned to take musters in 1557:²

Damus etiam vobis in mandatis quod, pro meliori expeditione & executione Praemissorum, vos, per tres & tres vel per duos & duos vestrum, in singulis Locis Comitatus praedicti separabitis & dividetis vosmetip/sos, prout vobis melius pro Habitatione et Commodity Ligeorum & Subditorum nostrorum videbitur expedire.

Each group of two or three commissioners would be responsible for one or more hundreds or wapentakes according to size.

The speed with which the commissioners would proceed to take the musters of their division depended upon the urgency of the situation. On one occasion, when the Scots

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² Rymer, op. cit. vi, pt.4, 52a.
were planning to invade England, the commissioners were ordered to complete their musters and return their certificates within fifteen days of the receipt of their commissions.\textsuperscript{1} Again, in 1548, when news came through that a French army was to be sent to Scotland, those responsible for mustering the forces of the shires were instructed to finish their task in twenty days.\textsuperscript{2} However, in those years when there was no great urgency the commissioners were allowed more time: in 1535 it was seven weeks;\textsuperscript{3} in 1539, nine weeks;\textsuperscript{4} in 1557, seven weeks;\textsuperscript{5} and in 1542 they were given no definite dead-line, but were merely ordered to return their certificates "cum omnia diligencia et celeritate".\textsuperscript{6}

Once the commissioners knew which part of the shire they had to muster and how long they had to do it in, they would be able to set in motion the ancient machinery of local military administration. Their first move was to give instructions to the constables to assemble the inhabitants.

\textsuperscript{1} P.R.O. SP 12/30/9 p.3. (Temp. Ed. VI).
\textsuperscript{2} G.B.R.O. Loseley MS. 1330/1 /1.
\textsuperscript{3} Westm. Abb. MS.3254.
\textsuperscript{4} Collections for a History of Staffordshire (Wm. Salt. Soc.), n.s. iv, 216.
\textsuperscript{5} Rymer, loc. cit.
\textsuperscript{6} B.M. Titus B 1 f.58 (L.P. xvii, 711).
of their townships at certain places and at certain times. The places were generally easily accessible assembly-points like Muster Hill in the hundred of Newport (Shropshire), Muster Oak in the hundred of Codsheath (Kent), and Muster Green in the hundred of Buttinghill (Sussex). The times of assembly were probably determined by such considerations as the personal convenience of the commissioners and the urgency of the military situation.

When the people had assembled at the appointed places, the commissioners proceeded to inspect their arms and armour. Although in 1547 this task was apparently delegated to the constables, who were ordered to "take the perfect view of every private man's furniture" and to certify the commissioners accordingly,¹ this was probably not a normal practice. Roger Ascham makes it quite clear that the commissioners actually inspected men's military equipment and, moreover, that they were not easy to please.² The men, indeed, may have come to the muster wearing their armour, as did John Courfyld of Stanton Lacy (Shropshire) who on one occasion was reported to have been "seyn in harn sse Complete with Jak and Salett".³

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1. P.R.O. SP 10/1 ff.115b-116a.
2. W. A. Wright, English orks of oger sch m, p.95.
3. P.R.O. E 101/62/3 m.2d.
It was the task of the muster commissioners, however, not only to inquire into the quantity and quality of the equipment that each man possessed, but also to require him who did not possess any (and who yet was bound by law to do so) to obtain some without delay. For this purpose they assessed (or caused to be assessed) the wealth of each inhabitant; and, on the basis of this assessment, they ordered each to acquire the arms and armour that he was obliged to possess "according to the effect of diverse Statutes yf or enactyd".1

The principal statute here referred to, of course, was that of Winchester. It was on the basis of the scale of charges contained in the provisions of this Act that a gentleman like Sir William Ayscugh of Stallingborough (Lincolnshire) was in 1539 "Chayrged with horse and harnes for hymeselfe and xij of hys howsholde servaundes",2 and that ordinary yeomen like the inhabitants of the hundreds of Cleley and Towcester (Northamptonshir) were ordered "to fynde harnys accordyng to ther substaunce".3 The Winchester provisions also lay behind the activities of

1. P.R.O. E 101/2/8 m.5d.
2. P.R.O. SP 1/145 f.34a (L.P. xiv, pt.1, 652 M12/2).
the Nottinghamshire commissioners of 1539, who were said to have "charged every man after his haveour to provyde hernes and wepon".¹

The Oxfordshire commissioners of the same year left behind them a detailed record of their activities, which shows them implementing the military regulations of 1285 to the very letter. In their return the "haveour" or substance of every inhabitant is recorded, together with the equipment that he had been ordered to provide. Two typical entries are these from Stanton St. John:²

Kellam Rede, gentyllman, in londes - x li. / a fotman furnysshed with hernes, byll, sword, and dagger.

Edward ffrenche, in goodes - xx ii markes / a fotman furnysshed with hernes, byll, sword, and dagger.

There are few cases of anyone of less substance than £10 in lands or 20 marks in goods being required to provide arms and armour.

This document, unfortunately, appears to be unique. However, in one or two other muster returns there are stray references to men's haviours: in the Gloucestershire

2. P.R.O. E 36/28 f.21b.
return of 1535, for example, it is recorded that the constable of Wickham "hathe sworren that no Inhabitaunt ther ys of the substance of xx markes in goodes and cattelles",¹ and that Richard Warner of Westington (who had "xx markes" written by his name) had been "commandyd to harnes for a man";² and in the Staffordshire return of the same year Richard Coton of Hamstall Ridware was described as a gentleman who "mey dispend xx ti markes, Et in goodes xx li."³ In these returns the commissioners were recording information, which, though essential to them in the process of calculating the amount of each man's obligation, was not required by the Crown: they were, one might say, showing arithmetical "working" that was not asked for by the examiners.

Normally, however, the muster returns only provide information about the quantity and quality of equipment available (or soon to be available) in every shire. In order to test the exactitude with which the commissioners enforced the provisions of the Statute of Winchester, recourse must therefore be had to the returns of the subsidy commissioners (who in fact were probably the same men in a

1. P.R.O. E 101/58/25 m.5.
2. Ibid. m.1.
different guise). A comparison of the Gloucestershire muster returns of 34 Henry VIII with the subsidy returns for the same shire for the following year is quite revealing. In the hundred of Berkeley, for example, about two-thirds of those individuals who were charged with the provision of harness were recorded as possessing 20 marks or more in goods, and about two-thirds of those individuals who were recorded as possessing 20 marks or more in goods were charged with the provision of harness.¹ These figures do suggest that the muster commissioners of 1542 were attempting to distribute the burden of military preparedness in accordance with the principles and practices of the previous two and a half centuries.

In their attempts to enforce the Winchester provisions the commissioners seem on occasion to have met with a lack of co-operation on the part of certain individual. In 1535, for example, th Gloucestershire commissioners were apparently obliged to threaten men with penalties for non-compliance with their instructions. This, at any rate, must be the explanation of these two entries under Chipping Camden:²

Williamus blower sub pena xl s.
Robertus helmes sub pena x s.

¹ P.R.O. E 101/60/7; E 179/114/235, 240.
² P.R.O. E 101/58/25 m.1.
Similarly, at Kettering in 1539 one Richard Alderman was "assygned to ffynd a archer on horssebacke and a other horsse pena xx s." 1

Richard Alderman and the other men named above were all persons of substance who could well afford to purchase the requisite equipment. On the other hand, those who were too poor to provide harness were sometimes grouped together and assessed collectively for this purpose. In 1535, for example, Thomas Harrys, John Broughton, John Roche, and William Bagg of Condicote (Gloucestershire) were recorded as being jointly "Commaundyd and agreeable to harnes ij paire Almon revettes, ij paire of splynttes, ij sallettes, and ij gorgettes". 2 In the same way, four years later eleven men of Stanton St. John (Oxfordshire), whose combined wealth totalled 26 marks, were ordered to equip an archer with arms and armour. 3

In addition, as has been seen, there were the collective obligations of the parish, township, or tithing, which it was also the duty of the muster commissioners to enforce. In 1535 the Bedfordshire commissioners reported

1. P.R.O. E 101/59/19 m.1d (L.P. xiv, pt.1, 652 M14/9).
2. P.R.O. E 101/58/25 m.5.
that they had "Comaundyd every Township to have harnes accordyng to the statut uppon payn of every towneshyp xl s., and that by ester next Comyng";¹ while, in Hertfordshir, every township was required to prepare harness "as yt hathe bene afore tyme accustomyd to make yt" by the same date and penalty.²

Although the commission of musters was the principal instrument for the enforcement of military obligations, it was not the only one. The possession of bows and arrows, for example, prescribed by the Acts of the Maintenance of Archers,³ was regulated not only by the muster commissions but also by the manorial courts. In the first Archery act, indeed, it is expressly laid down that the "Stuardes of Frauncheses, Letes, and Laudays" were to assist in the enforcement of this obligation and were to collect fines for disobedience.⁴

An illustration of this method of enforcement is provided by the proceedings of the manorial court of Methley (Yorkshire). On 20 April 1532, for instance, each male inhabitant was enjoined to prepare one bow and two

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1. P.R.O. E 101/58/15 m.1.
2. P.R.O. E 101/549/14 f.12b.
3. 3 Hen. VIII c.3, 6 Hen. VIII c.2, 33 H n. VIII c.9.
arrows and to show them at the butts by the parish church
between Nones and Vespers on Ascension Day: the penalty
for non-compliance was fourpence.¹ Again, on 11 May
in the following year all male inhabitants of military age
were ordered to muster before the bailiff with their
bows and arrows on such a day as the latter should
stipulate: on this occasion the fine was fixed at
twelvepence.² The same kind of ordinance is found at
Wimbledon (Surrey): on 18 May 1553 every male inhabitant
was ordered to have in his possession a bow and arrows
"juxta formam ordinacionis statuti" under a penalty of
3s. 4d.³ It is clear from these cases that the motives
of manorial lords were pecuniary as well as patriotic.

It is doubtful, nevertheless, whether the manorial
courts and muster commissions did succeed in forcing the
people to fulfil their military obligations. Contemporaries,
too, were doubtful about this. Hall's statement that the
musters taken throughout the realm in 1523 "caused every
man of honesty to bye harnes and weapon"⁴ seems to imply

¹. H. S. Darbyshire and G. D. Lumb, The History of Methley
(Thoresby Soc. xxxv), p.200.
². Ibid. p.201.
³. Extracts from the Court Rolls of the Manor of
Wimbledon, p.98.
that there were many dishonest men who remained unperturbed and unequipped. Again, in 1539 it as generally felt in Nottinghamshire that many of those who had been ordered to provide harness would not bother to do so, and that consequently the work of the muster commissioners would "proffet but menely onles they hadde ... proclamatyons made to muster agayne, and every man to bryng ffurthe and shew affore the ... Justyces ther ... [requisite] abelementes".1

That the commissioners were not always unsuccessful in their efforts to enforce military obligations can be seen from the following entries in the muster returns of Newcastl -unde -Lyme for 1535 and 1539:2

(1535) This towne to fynd iiiij able men in harneyes - ij archers on fote and ij billmen.

(1539) The Inhabitauntes of new Castell afforsed have hernes, weypons, and artillary for iiiij men to do the kynges grace serves; that is to sey, for ij bowmen and for ij bilmen.

That the commissioners could, on the other hand, have no success at all is indicated by these two entries in the

2. 1535 - P.R.O. E 101/58/30 m.10.
   1539 - P.R.O. SP 2/S f.101a (L.P. xiv, pt.1, 652 M20/1).
muster returns of North Poorton (Dorset) for 1539 and 1542: 1

(1539) The Tethyng to provyde a harnys.
(1542) the tething muste provide a hole harnis.

The more forceful language employed by the commissioners on the latter occasion seems to indicate their impatience at this failure to comply with their instructions. A similar failure, moreover, was recorded at all the other parishes in the hundred of Redhove that were listed in the returns of 1542.

After 1542, however, there appears to have been an improvement in the situation: more and more parishes are found fulfilling their obligations. It was in 1542, significantly enough, that the churchwardens of Chagford (Devon) made their first recorded payment for military equipment; the sum of 33s. 4d. was paid "pro le harnyse mandatu" (i.e. demanded by the commissioners). 2 It is perhaps significant, too, that in the period 1542-6 payments in connection with parochial harness appear in the

churchwardens' accounts of Snettisham (Norfolk),\(^1\) Stratton (Cornwall),\(^2\) Cratfield (Suffolk),\(^3\) and Shipdham (Norfolk).\(^4\)

Thus it is not surprising that the muster returns of 1548 show that some parishes which had previously neglected their obligations were now fulfilling them: now, apparently, only one township in the three hundreds of Aylesbury lacked harness.\(^5\)

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The Winchester regulations which bound every man having lands to the value of 15 or goods to the value of 40 marks to keep a horse in readiness for war had probably (owing to the high price of horses) been a dead letter for many years when it was repealed in 1542 on the passing of the War Horses Act. The provisions of this Statute may be tabulated in the following way:

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1. N.P.L. MS.11357 f.113a.
2. E. Peacock, "On the Churchwardens' Accounts of ... Stratton" (Archaeologia, xlvi), p.218.
4. B.M. Add. MS. 23008 f.113a, sqq.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Annual Income</th>
<th>Number of Horses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Duke or Archbishop</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marquess or Earl</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bishop</td>
<td>£1000</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>do.</td>
<td>1000m.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>do.</td>
<td>500m.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viscount or Baron</td>
<td>1000m.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>do.</td>
<td>500m.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commoner</td>
<td>500m.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>do.</td>
<td>£100</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, those who were unfortunate enough to have wives who wore silk gowns or precious ornaments had to keep a horse, no matter what their income.¹

The provisions of this Act were enforced in the same way as those of the Statute of Winchester. Thus the muster commissioners who were sent round the shires in the spring of 1547 were instructed to ensure that all those who were bound by law to keep horses had the same in readiness, together with able men to serve on them as demi-lances.² These commissioners, however, appear to have extended the scope of the statutory provisions. In the "boke of horses" that was compiled from their returns.

¹ Statutes of the Realm, iii, 830-2.
² P.R.O. SP 10/1 f.116.
appear the names of men with less than £100 in lands: for instance, two Sussex gentlemen (Nicholas Pelham and Thomas Darell), each of whom had only £80 in lands, were both charged with the provision of a light horseman.  

In the following year, moreover, the class of suppliers was extended further still: among the spiritual men who were ordered to provide horsemen were comparatively minor ecclesiastics like deans and archdeacons.  

The middle years of the century thus witnessed the division of the militia into two distinct groups - the cavalry (furnished by the upper classes, temporal and spiritual) and the infantry (furnished by the rest). This division, which received written confirmation in the Militia Act of 1558, was to become a characteristic feature of the militia system of the later years of the century.

Section II. The Practice of Military Exercises

It was the duty of every Englishman of military age not only to equip, but also to train himself for ar. The Archery Act of 1512 ordained that every able-bodied man aged between sixteen and sixty was to have bows and arrows.

1. P.R.O. SP 15/1 f.157a.
2. P.R.O. SP 10/5 ff.55-56.
in his house and to "use hymself in shotyng". Holy days were considered to be particularly appropriate for such martial exercises, and butts were to be erected in every city, town, and village.¹

It would be interesting to know how many parishes did in fact maintain common butts at this time. In the 1540s, at all events, the villagers of Bishopsteignton (Devon) claimed that they had "tyme owt of mynd of man" kept "a payre of buttes stonding upon ... Chapell grene" for "the mayntenaunce and practyse of the feate of Artyllary".² But it is well-nigh impossible to say whether or not this was an exceptional case, since information about butts never seems to have found its way into the returns of the muster commissioners.

This was so because the enforcement of the obligation to maintain butts was the task, not of the commissioners, but of the manorial courts.³ At Bishopsteignton, it seems to have been the steward of the manor who instructed the people there to rebuild their butts when these were broken down by a local trouble-maker.⁴ Again, the evidence of

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1. Statutes of the ealm, iii, 25-6.
2. P.R.O. C 1/1101 f.23.
3. Cf. above, p. 35.
4. P.R.O. C 1/1101 f.23.
court-rolls reveals that the erection of butts was a matter for manorial edicts at Burnley and Chatterton (Lancashire)\textsuperscript{1} and at Ingatestone and Walden (Essex).\textsuperscript{2}

The inhabitants of Walden, significantly enough, received their orders to erect butts immediately after the passing of the second Archery Act. The passing of the first and third Acts, be it noted, appears to have had similar results in other places. In the year of the passing of the first Act the inhabitants of Shipdham spent 2s. 2d. on bread and ale "at the altering of the Butts", and in the year following the passing of the third Act they paid twelvepence "for making the Butts".\textsuperscript{3}

Payments in connection with the erection of butts in the period immediately after the passing of the 1542 Act are also found in the records of Barnstaple,\textsuperscript{4} Leicester,\textsuperscript{5} and North Elmham.\textsuperscript{6}

The records of North Elmham show that the erection of butts could be an expensive business. Those made in

\begin{flushleft}
1. W. Farrer, Court Rolls of the Honor of Clitheroe, ii, 64; iii, 291.
2. E.R.O. D/DP MS. Cal. of Rolls 1 & 2 Ph. & M.; D/DEy MS. Cal. of Rolls 7 Hen. VIII.
3. B.M. Add. MS. 23008 ff.89b, 110b.
5. M. Bateson, Records of the Borough of Leicester, iii, 49.
\end{flushleft}
1548, for instance, (which apparently replaced those made five years earlier) involved the inhabitants in an expenditure of nearly ten shillings: the "gravyng of the flaggs" and the digging of the ditches cost 5s. 8d., and the transportation of 17 loads of stone cost 4s. 3d.\(^1\)

Little wonder, therefore, that when one Robert Bruett cast down the butts which the people of Bishopsteignton had erected in their village there were bitter complaints to the Lord Chancellor.\(^2\)

These Devonshire villagers, it has been noted, claimed that they had long maintained butts for the "practyse" of archery. Whether they had in fact practised in them regularly throughout the same period is another matter. Nevertheless, in the case of another English village, that of Methley, there is definite evidence that the inhabitants did make good use of their butts. Two entries in the records of the manor there show that the people did practise shooting: on 5 March 1529 one William Winterburn as ordered to refrain from breaking the arrows of those shooting at the common butts;\(^3\) and on 9 March 1542 the same man, whose house adjoined the butts and who had

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2. P.R.O. C 1/1101 ff.23-5.

apparently been disturbed by trespassers in search of lost arrows, was obliged to permit all men of military age to practise archery.¹

It is doubtful, however, if many men were as law-abiding as the men of Methley. The general complaint at this period was that "archerie ... is right litell used"² and that "learnyng to shoote is lytle regarded in England".³ Men were apparently wont to keep within the law by keeping weapons in their houses, while neglecting to become proficient in their use; they were thus, as Ascham pointed out soon after the passing of the third Archery Act, allowing themselves "to playe with the Kynges Actes".⁴ The truth then seems to have been that, while muster commissions and manorial courts could force men to acquire arms and armour in readiness for war, they could not force them to acquire that military skill without which no war could ever be won.

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¹ Darbyshire and Lumb, op. cit. p.205.
² Statutes of the Realm, iii, 25.
³ Wright, op. cit. p.60.
⁴ Ibid. p.62.
Section III. The Performance of Military Services

While statute law bound all able-bodied men to keep themselves well-equipped and well-trained for war, the common law of the land bound them to hold themselves in readiness at all times to serve in the defence of the country. Their allegiance to the Sovereign obliged "all and singler his Subjectes, of every Astate, Degree, and Condition betwixt the Ages of Sextey and Sextene"\(^1\) to serve in the ranks of the militia.

When the Crown decided to call out the militia, it normally sent out instructions under the Privy Signet to those gentlemen who had previously been commissioned to take musters in the shires.\(^2\) These commissioners, it has been seen, were empowered to view military equipment and to enforce the statutes that regulated its possession. But, in addition, they were empowered to inspect and "try" all men of military age - to find out who were "able of personage to Serve the kynges grace in his warres".\(^3\)

Furthermore, they were to ensure that all men billed as "able" remained in readiness to serve in the armed forces of the Crown "quando necesse fuerit".\(^4\) The levying of

1. Rymer, op. cit. vi, pt.1, 205a.
3. P.R.O. E 101/58/17 m.11.
men for the wars thus constituted the logical completion of the muster commissioners' task.

The way in which they went about this task was well described by the defendant in a Star Chamber case which arose out of the actions of the Oxfordshire commissioners employed in levying men for the defence of the South Coast in 1545. On that occasion, it was stated,

there were Lettres adressyd ffrome the kynges highnes most honorable Counsell to the Commyssioners of and ffor the mustres ... ffor to Levy the holl fforce and power of the ... Countye of Oxford to convey theym with all possible spede to Portesmowth ffor the repulse of enymyes than entending to envade in those partyes; by reason wherof, ... Sir John [Brome], being one of the Commyssioners appoyntyd ffor the said Mustres and being Allottyd by Comen divysion with other gentylmen to certen hundredes, Assemblyd byfor them the fforce and power of the said hundredes to hym and other Allottyd.

Whereupon the ablest men were chosen to be soldiers and duly set forward towards Portsmouth.¹

More details about the procedure are provided by another Star Chamber case of the following year. This contains a description of the way in which militiamen were levied in Devonshire in March 1546 for service at Boulogne. The commissioner appointed to the hundred of

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¹ P.R.O. Sta. Cha. 2/2 f.162.
Halberton was Roger Blewett, and his first move was to make contact with the bailiff of the hundred, Christopher Sampford, and to order him to cause the male inhabitants to assemble at certain places and on certain days. Accordingly, the people mustered before the King's commissioner, who, with the assistance of the bailiff and the two constables of the hundred (William Coliford and William Euchyn), proceeded to select the required number of soldiers.\(^1\) Here the temporary officer of the shire is seen working in close co-operation with the permanent officers of the hundred, and another link in the chain of authority is established.

Below the officers of the hundred came the officers of the parish. The task of the parish constables was a twofold one: in the first place, they had to cause the inhabitants of their parish to assemble at the place and time appointed for the muster;\(^2\) in the second place, once the soldiers had been selected by the commissioners, they had to see that they were properly equipped with harness and clothing.\(^3\) As the churchwardens' accounts of the period testify, the

1. P.R.O. Sta. Cha. 2/12 ff.78-82.
2. See, e.g., P.R.O. E 101/549/19.
3. See below, Part III, Ch. II.
parish constable, the last link in the chain of which the muster commissioner was the first, was a person of great importance in the "national" military organisation of the kingdom.¹

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In the middle years of the century the muster commissioner's place as the first link in the chain of authority began to be taken by the Lord Lieutenant, whose task it as to supervise the mustering and levying of the forces of the shire.² In 1545 the southern part of England was divided into three districts, over each of which was placed a Lord Lieutenant to whom (as the King explicitly stated in a circular letter of that year) the shire authorities were subordinate:³

we have devided the powers of the Shires on this side Trente into three partes and have appointed to every of the said partes one Lieuetsaunte, at whose Comaundement the whole power of all the shires sorted unto him must be levied and marche forwarde and doe in all things as he shall appointe.

In the next reign Lieutenants were appointed fairly frequently: Northumberland "contemplated making the

2. For a detailed study of the question, see G. Scott Thomson, The Lords Lieutenants in the Sixteenth Century.
3. P.R.O. SP 12/90/9 p. 4.
Lieutenancy a permanent part of the administrative system of England. Under Mary, however, "Lieutenants were only commissioned at irregular intervals during times of pressing necessity".\(^1\) One such time was the period following the rebellion of Sir Thomas Wyatt in 1554. It was then, for instance, that the Lord Treasurer (the Marquess of Winchester) and his son (the Lord St. John) were jointly appointed to the Lieutenancy of Hampshire and the Isle of Wight with "power to levie all the subjectes inhabiting within any the places aforesaid, and then to arme, muster, and put in aredynes and ... to leade them as well against ennemies as rebelles".\(^2\)

Although their powers were clearly defined in this way, some of the Lieutenants commissioned in 1554 appear to have had their authority questioned by their subordinates. The citizens of Norwich, for example, were somewhat dubious about the Duke of Norfolk's right to order musters to be taken there; but, after some deliberation, the Mayor decided that "the commaundemente of the dukes grace" was a sufficient "warrant in this behauf".\(^3\) The doubts

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2. P.R.O. SP 15/7 f.20a.
of the people of Rutland, however, were not so easily resolved, as can be seen from the following letter which the Earl of Huntingdon wrote to the J.P.s of that shire in June:—

considering I have alreadie showed unto sum of you my commission for the lieutenantship of your shire and others withall, I do not a little marvell what movethe you to be so earnest to see the same. methinketh you and all men might well Judge I am not so unadvised to take uppon me in that behalfe withoute a sufficient warrant. And besides that, I suppose you have receyved lettres bothe from the Queenes majeste and the Lordes of the Privie counsell testifieng unto you of my commission. which thinges notwithstanding, I have to satisfye all partes: yt maye be sent you, the same [is] to be publisshed among you, though yt be more than nedes.

The Lords Lieutenants themselves, moreover, seem at times to have been in doubt about their authority. This was certainly the case with Sir Henry Jerningham, who was made Lord Lieutenant of Kent early in 1558 after his predecessor (Sir Thomas Cheyne) had told the queen that the post should be given to "a man of greater credite, strength, and yonger yeres then I am".2 At the end of March Jerningham informed the Council that he had "conceyved a doubte" as to the limits of his authority: he

1. B.M. Eg. 2986 f.15.
2. P.R.O. SP 11/12 f.95a.
was not sure, for instance, how he stood in relation to the Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports. Nor, it seems, was he quite sure of his position vis-à-vis the sheriff of Kent, whom, in a letter of 4 April, he described as "the Quenes ordynarye lyeutenaunte of the shyre". By this date, however, the office of sheriff was not of great military importance: he could not be thought of as a rival claimant to the Lord Lieutenant's place as the principal local representative of the Crown.

2. P.R.O. SP 15/8 f.167b.
CHAPTER II

The Incidence of Military Service

Although all the able-bodied male inhabitants of all English shires were obliged to hold themselves in readiness to serve in the forces of their shires, not all such men would actually be called upon to do so at any one time. In the first place, it often happened that only certain shires would be required to supply soldiers; and, in the second place, it almost always happened that only a certain proportion of the available manpower of a shire would be conscripted. How in fact the burden of military service was distributed (i) among the shires and (ii) among the inhabitants of the shires, it is the purpose of this chapter to discover.

Section I. Regional Incidence of Military Service

When the Crown decided to call out the militia, the factors which determined from which shires the men would be drawn were very largely geographical. As a Venetian Ambassador, in his report on the customs of the English,
put it: "if they make war on the French, the northern counties do not stir; if opposed to the Scots, the southern provinces are not mustered."1 By "northern counties" he meant those shires that lay (largely or entirely) north of the Trent, viz. Cumberland, Northumberland, Westmorland, Lancashire, Yorkshire, Durham, Cheshire, Derbyshire, and Nottinghamshire. And true it is that the forces of these shires were reserved for service against the Scots: the men recruited in Lancashire for service against the French in March 15462 were perhaps the only north country militiamen to march south in the period under discussion.

It is also true that the forces of the shires that lay south of the Trent were not normally recruited for service against the Scots. Nevertheless, there were exceptions to this rule: in 1513 men are said to have been levied in Berkshire when Queen Katherine "was ... raising a great power to goe against the faithlesse King of Scots";3 and in 1558 300 Lincolnshire men were among those "appointed to goo to Barwicke" to defend the place against the Scots.4

2. L.P. xxi, pt.1, p.41.
4. P.R.O. SP 15/8 ff.130-1.
This division of England into two military provinces (corresponding roughly to the two ecclesiastical provinces of Canterbury and York) is apparent from the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shire</th>
<th>1545</th>
<th>1558</th>
<th>Shire</th>
<th>1545</th>
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<th>Shire</th>
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<td>Beds.</td>
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<td>Hants.</td>
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<td>Oxon.</td>
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<td>Berks.</td>
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<td>Herefs.</td>
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<td>Rut.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bucks.</td>
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<td>Herts.</td>
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<td>Salop.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chesh.</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>Kent</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>Staffs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Corn.</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>Lancs.</td>
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<td>Cumb.</td>
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<td>Leics.</td>
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<td>Surrey</td>
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<tr>
<td>Derby</td>
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<td>Lincs.</td>
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<td>Sussex</td>
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<tr>
<td>Devon</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>Middx.</td>
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<td>Warw.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dorset</td>
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<td>Norf.</td>
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<td>W'land</td>
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<tr>
<td>Durham</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>N'hants</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>Wilts.</td>
<td>x</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essex</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>N'land</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>Worcs.</td>
<td>x</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glos.</td>
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<td>Notts.</td>
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<td>x</td>
<td>Yorks.</td>
<td>x</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Within these two great divisions the incidence of military conscription among the shires also depended to a certain extent upon geographical factors. As another

1. In this table, an entry in the "F" column indicates that the shire's forces were reserved for service against the French, and one in the "S" column indicates service against the Scots. Information comes from L.P. xx, pt. 1, 1078 and P.R.O. SP 11/12 f. 23.
Venetian Ambassador pointed out, it was customary to recruit men only from those districts that were "nearest the scene of action". Thus the men sent to Boulogne in September 1544 were levied only in Kent, Middlesex, Surrey, Essex, Hertfordshire, Norfolk, Sussex, and Buckinghamshire; originally, men were also to be drawn from four other counties, but it was decided at the last moment not to levy men in them because they were too "farre of" and "it wold have been long or those men could have com hither".

In 1545, when reinforcements were needed at Boulogne, the Council decided not to raise men in those shires that lay within Lord Russell's commission (viz. Dorset, Devon, Somerset, Cornwall, and Gloucestershire) because "the same shuld be so farre from here and they shuld come so Later". Again, of the numerous shires which had been ordered to prepare men for the defence of Calais in January 1558, only those which were "nere adjoyning" Dover (viz. Essex, Middlesex, Hertfordshire, Buckinghamshire, Suffolk, Sussex, Kent, Berkshire, and

4. P.R.O. SP 11/12 f.23.
Surrey) were finally to receive instructions to set forth soldiers.¹ On the other hand, when in March 1546 the need for soldiers was less urgent and time was more plentiful, men were levied for service at Boulogne in shires that were far distant from Dover, the port of embarkation: some came from Staffordshire, a "marginal" county lying partly to the north and partly to the south of the Trent, and others from Devon and Cornwall.²

Geographical factors also lay behind the practice of restricting the recruitment of men for overseas service to inland shires whenever there was a danger of foreign invasion: the men of the coastal shires were reserved for home defence and thus escaped military service altogether. In August 1545 the reinforcements sent to Boulogne were levied only in Bedfordshire, Cambridgeshire, Hertfordshire, Huntingdonshire, Leicestershire, Norfolk, and Northamptonshire - all of which, with the single exception of Norfolk (which was doubtless thought to be too far northerly to be in danger of French attack), were inland shires.³ Again,

when men were once more sent to Boulogne in the following March, the only shires in the southern province from which men were not drawn were those that lay on the coast between the Wash and the Solent: that this was a deliberate policy is evident from the fact that the names of many coastal shires, which had originally been listed as recruiting-grounds, were later crossed out.¹

Nevertheless, in the critical month of January 1558 the Crown, putting aside all such precautionary considerations, ordered troops to be levied in all the shires of southern England quite indiscriminately: Calais, the Jewel of the Realm, was in danger, and the question of coastal defence had to give place to the more important question of relief for the besieged garrison. The men of Suffolk, Essex, Kent, and Sussex were marched hastily to Dover, leaving their shores unguarded.² It is clear, however, that this abandonment of traditional policy had unfortunate results: the inhabitants of Sussex were obliged to make an "earnest request" to their Lord Lieutenant "that there be no more men takin from hense neyther for lande nor sea, butt thatt they maye be levyed

¹. P.R.O. SP 1/213 ff.110-14 (L.P. xx, pt.1,91).
². P.R.O. SP 11/12 f.28a.
wheare no daunger is of invasion". 1

Geography was thus a very important factor in determining which shires would be called upon to send men to the wars. It explains why it was that only the men of the nine northernmost shires of England were normally employed in the wars against Scotland; that only the men of Lancashire, Cheshire, Gloucestershire, Somerset, and Devon were normally recruited for service in Ireland; 2 and that only the men of the southern province were normally levied for armies in France.

Geography, however, cannot explain everything. It cannot explain, for example, why it was that the men of Shropshire were recruited for service against the Scots on several occasions, but never (so far as is known) for service against the French. Why, for instance, were the men of this shire reserved for northern service in the year 1546, when those of Staffordshire (which, if anything, was nearer to the Scottish Border than was Shropshire) were recruited for service at Boulogne? 3

Clearly, the determining factor was not geographical in this case. On the contrary, it was a purely personal one:

1. P.R.O. SP 11/13 f.11a.
the most powerful man in Shropshire was the Earl of Shrewsbury, who was also (in his capacity of member, and later President, of the Council in the North)\(^1\) largely responsible for the defence of the northern province against the Scots. Indeed, throughout the period under discussion the association of successive Earls of Shrewsbury with the military organisation of the north led to the virtual incorporation of Shropshire in the northern province.

Once the Crown had decided from which shires it would recruit its soldiers, it had to decide how many of them each should supply. The number of men that any county could supply was ultimately dependent upon the number of its able-bodied inhabitants of military age; and this could be ascertained by the Government from the returns of the muster commissioners. When in July 1557, for example, the Crown decided to raise men in the southern shires for the defence of the country against the French, use was probably made of the certificates of musters that had been sent in by the commissioners of every shire in the previous spring. Nevertheless, it would seem that, on this occasion at any rate, the Crown did not

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take the commissioners' numbers very seriously: Berkshire and Huntingdonshire, for instance, were ordered to supply more men than they actually possessed according to their certificates.¹

But if the muster certificates were inaccurate, as at times they must have been, how else could the Crown officials have estimated the human resources of the shires? Perhaps they could have examined the returns of earlier years, and, by a process of comparison, have arrived at a more reliable assessment. If they had done this in 1557, for example, they would have been able to detect the inaccuracy of the numbers certified by both Berkshire and Huntingdonshire; they would have discovered that in 1545 the former shire was recorded as possessing more than six times, and the latter exactly three times, the number certified twelve years later.²

Nevertheless, it seems certain that the Crown's tendency was always to overestimate the strength of the shire forces. From the rough draft of the list of counties that were to be ordered to raise men for the

1. P.R.O. SP 11/11 ff.36-7, 64b.

defence of the town of Calais in January 1558, it is clear that the numbers finally allotted to thirteen of them were smaller than those originally allotted to them.\(^1\) On some occasions, moreover, the Crown appears to have imposed upon some shires burdens that were too great for them to bear. Did the authorities realise how small some of the shires really were?

In the reign of Mary the Rutland J.P.s were severely rebuked on two separate occasions on account of the smallness of the number of men that they were able to provide. In April 1554 the Earl of Huntingdon, the Queen's Lieutenant, informed them that the "certificat of the force of your shere ... ys suche that, yf I shuld delyver the same accordingly, ther shuld no doubte a great lacke be found in you for your certifyeng of so small a force of harnessed men within your said shere".\(^2\) Again, in August 1557 the Lords of the Council wrote to the same justices to tell them that they had received their reply to the Queen's demand for a certain number of men and that "thiere Lordships cannot but marvaill at the slender aunswer they have made in a matter of suche weight and importance"; they were therefore to "provide for the furniture of men appointed by the Quenes Majesties said

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1. P.R.O. SP 11/12 f.27a.
2. B.M. Eg.2986 f.12.
lettres without any further delaye, whereunto her Heighnes trusteth and maketh her speciall accounte of the said nombres.¹ The number that Rutland was called upon to provide on this occasion was no less than 300, the magnitude of which can only be appreciated when it is understood that this was also the number demanded of the much larger county of Huntingdon, and that shires of the size of Warwickshire and Wiltshire were only called upon to provide 500.² Nevertheless, the men of Rutland seem, in the end, to have convinced the Government of the smallness of their shire: in January 1558 they were ordered to supply no more than 100 men — one-half the number required from Huntingdonshire, and one-tenth the number required from Warwickshire or Wiltshire.³

Rutland, however, was not the only county that had difficulty in supplying its required number of men at this period. In June 1558 the Northamptonshire J.P.s wrote to the Marquess of Winchester, Lord Lieutenant of several Midland shires, to tell him that they were unable to accomplish his demand for 1000 soldiers. There was, they said, no shortage of men: "personages and boddies we

2. P.R.O. SP 11/11 ff.64-5.
3. P.R.O. SP 11/12 f.246.
confesse to have in nombre"; but there was a shortage of the kind of men who would make good soldiers. Many men were "stopinge and crockyd", and consequently "unmete to doo any servis in warres". The commissioners then proceeded to explain why there was this shortage of potential warriors. There was, they suggested, "one greate cause that the Manred of ower Contrye nor the choyse therof ys nothinge souche as your Lordshippe or others might suppose it to be". This was that the young male inhabitants tended to seek opportunities outside a shire in which agriculture was almost the only industry. The county of Northampton, wrote the justices, "standithe nigh the harte and mydell of the realme, fare of all sydes the Sease" and "the Common people therof, alltogether followinge the plough, lyve for the moste parte by tillage": in the shire there were "ffewe artyffycers or ... any that travell or have any trade ne occupyenge of any wares or merchaundys whereby yonge and Lustye men shulde, by that meanes, the rather [be] brought uppe in the same shyre".1 This being so, they were only able to provide 570 men, with an additional contingent of "vijc moo indyfferent hable men", most of whom had no harness.2

1. B.M. Add. MS. 25079 f.8a.
2. Ibid. f.8b.
Another cause of the shortage of potential militiamen in the shires of England in the 1550s was the fact that the sweating sickness, which had raged throughout England in 1551, had carried off many men of military age; for "this mortality fell chiefly or rather on men, and those also of the best age, as between 30 and 40 yeeres". 1 The apparent reduction in the number of able men in the shires between 1545 and 1557, which the muster returns indicate, has already been noted; 2 perhaps death by sickness had something to do with this. On one occasion in Edward VI's reign, indeed, the Crown ordered new musters to be taken throughout England because, in the period that had elapsed since the previous musters, "ther hath reigned great sickness, wherby great numbers of our people be deceived". 3 Again, in 1558, when the J.P.s of Derbyshire were ordered to raise 1500 footmen, they replied that they could only raise 100: part of the reason was that sickness had carried off many able men. 4

There was, however, another reason for the Derbyshire justices' statement that their "pore lyttle Countie was

2. See above, p.61.
3. B.M. Eg. 2790 f.37a.
never lesse able to furnishe any great nombre". This was the acute shortage of harness, which was partly due to the fact that much of it had been lost in the campaign of the previous year. There seems, indeed, to have always been a universal shortage of this equipment. In 1522, for example, there were fewer than 100 harnesses in Oxfordshire (a shire with an able-bodied male population of over 2000); while in the hundred of Farnham (Surrey) there was only one harness to every 30 able men. Again, in 1557 the 3628 able men in Hertfordshire had only 427 harnesses between them: this may help to account for the fact that in August of that year the shire was only required to set forth 400 men. The number of men that a shire could send to the wars was thus determined not only by the number of able men resident in the shire, but also by the quantity of armour that was available there for the soldiers' equipment.

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2. B.M. Royal 41 B X (L.P. iv, 972/1).
5. Ibid. f.64b.
It occasionally happened that, when men were to be raised from a certain shire to serve in the militia, they would only be drawn from certain hundreds. The reason for this might be geographical. In 1545, for instance, men were recruited in only nine Kentish hundreds for service in the Isle of Sheppey: naturally, these were the hundreds that lay in the immediate vicinity of the island.\(^1\) In the same way, when in 1558 the Lord Lieutenant of Sussex prepared men for the defence of Portsmouth, he selected them only from those hundreds which were situated in the "west ende of this shyer".\(^2\)

The Sussex militia had been called out in previous years for the defence of the Isles of Portsmouth and Wight. In 1545, for example, the men of the hundreds of Dumpford, Westbourne, and Easebourne were assembled for this purpose when the French effected a landing in this region.\(^3\) Why was it that these three were the only hundreds in the shire which sent men to repel the invaders? It was not merely that these hundreds formed part of the Rape of Chichester, the westernmost division of the county; for

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1. L.P. xx, pt.2, 263.
2. P.R.O. SP 11/13 f.11b.
so also did the hundreds of Bosham, Manhood, Aldwick, Box, and Stockbridge (and these were rather nearer the scene of action than were the other three). It was because the hundreds of Dumpford, Westbourne, and Easebourne lay in close proximity to the Isle of Wight, and yet were not (like the other hundreds in the same Rape) within a stone's throw of the sea, that they were called upon to send their men against the French. And so it came about that the inhabitants of these more northerly hundreds saw active service in 1545, while their southern neighbours, who lived in the danger area, were able to remain in their homes with their eyes fixed on the beacons which in fact were never fired.

On those occasions when men were recruited in every hundred of a shire, it was customary for the shire authorities to allocate to each a definite proportion of the total number required. This proportion often seems to have been a constant factor, even though the total number required changed from year to year. An illustration of this is provided by the county of Lancaster in the 1550s. When in 1553 the shire was ordered to supply 2000 men, the burden was distributed among the hundreds in this way: Darby 430, Salford 350, Leyland 170, Amounderness 300, Blackburn 400, and Lonsdale 350.\(^1\) Again, when three

years later the shire was ordered to supply 200 men, the number was divided up among the hundreds in a very similar way: Darby £42, Salford 36, Leyland 17, Amounderness 30, Blackburn 39, and Lonsdale 36.¹

The proportion that any one hundred or other division would be called upon to supply would generally depend upon the proportion of the shire's population that resided there. This seems to have been the case in the county of Surrey, where in 1544 men were recruited for service at Boulogne: on this occasion the hundred of Tandridge, where the total number of able-bodied men was stated four years later to be 246, supplied the same sized contingent as did the two hundreds of Kingston and Elmbridge, where the potential soldiers numbered 237.² Again, when in 1547 men were recruited in Yorkshire for service on the Borders, the large wapentake of Strafford in the West Riding provided more than seven times the number provided by the tiny wapentake of Stone Cross in the same Riding.³

The size of the population of a hundred or wapentake, nevertheless, was not the only factor which determined how

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2. For numbers levied in 1544, see O. Manning and W. Bray, The History and Antiquities of Surrey, iii, 664. For numbers mustered in 1548, see P.R.O. SP 10/3 ff.107a, 111a.

many men it would be called upon to send to the wars. It sometimes happened that the whole manred of a hundred was not available for service in the militia, because some of its residents had been called up for service in the quasi-feudal forces. In 1557, for example, the Lords of the Council were informed that certain Essex hundreds were not able to furnish the numbers allotted to them "by reason that diverse private personnes, having lettres to muster and put in aredines thiere tenantes and others within thier rules and offices, have alredie mustered many within the said Hundredes". The J.P.s of that shire were therefore ordered "to supplie the nombres that they want oute of the Hundredes allotted to them where they saie there are more men than are appointed to be levied in those Hundredes". 1

1. A.P.C. 1556-8, p.162.

The distribution of the burden of military service among the people of England thus depended to a certain extent upon geographical factors. A man's place of residence was of considerable significance in determining whether or not he would be called upon to serve in the militia on a particular occasion. If men were required to serve against the Scots, an inhabitant of Sussex could be fairly certain that he would not be conscripted; and
the same could be said of a Yorkshireman's being called upon to defend the Isle of Wight, and of a Suffolk resident's being recruited for the Irish wars.

Section II. Individual Incidence of Military Service

Within any particular shire the only men who would normally be called up for service in the militia were those who possessed the basic qualifications for such service. Although in 1557 Sir John Salisbury is reported to have appointed many inhabitants of North Wales to serve in the army "not respectinge either theire Aige or other impotencye", it was a general rule that soldiers had to be of military age and physically fit.

Men were liable for military service at this period if they were over sixteen and under sixty years of age. Since it rarely happened, however, that the ages of militiamen were recorded on paper, it is difficult to say whether this regulation was always observed. Certainly, of the 56 inhabitants of Glamorganshire who were appointed to serve in 1557 (and who later obtained their discharge), four are known to have passed their sixtieth year; the

majority of these men, nevertheless, were in their 20s and 30s, and the average age was in the region of 35 years.¹

It was only natural that the younger men should be recruited in preference to the more elderly, since the former were likely to be physically fitter: the nine "younge men of Selby" who were described as "impotent" in a Yorkshire muster return of 1535 were probably not typical of the youth of England.² Be this as it may, the existence of unfit men of military age led the Crown to be ever insistent that only those men should be conscripted who were "able" or "mete to serve in the warres" or "arma portare valentes". These formal phrases, however, were capable of the widest possible connotation; and on some occasions more explicit instructions were issued. In January 1558 those responsible for levying men in the southern shires were ordered to "have spetiall regarde that ... the said nombers be taken of the mostë-apte and hable men".³ Again, in March of the same year the Earl of Westmorland instructed the Derbyshire J.P.s to select only "the most lustye, tallest, and servyceable personages..."

2. P.R.O. E 101/549/5 f.1b. It was not usual for unfit men to be listed in muster returns.
3. P.R.O. SP 11/12 f.18b.
and most metest to assault and defende thenemy".¹

In those days, when a man's call-up was not preceded by a medical examination, it was only natural that a man who was anxious to escape military service should emphasise his physical infirmities. Shakespeare's Peter Bulcalf, when required to serve in the militia, said to the commissioner - "O Lord Sir! I am a diseased man". The recruiting officer, however, refused to believe him, and he was compelled to serve.² Likewise, to the muster held at Halberton (Devon) in 1546 one John Barnfield apparently came with a similar excuse: he pleaded disability on account of "An Ache which ... he hadd yn one of hys thighes". But Roger Blewett, the King's commissioner, "wold not credit hym"; and the unfortunate man was only able to obtain a licence to tarry at home through the good offices of the bailiff of the hundred, "who ... knew his seid greff".³

Provided, therefore, that a man was neither too old nor too young and, at the same time, was firm in mind and body, his chances of being called upon to fulfil his military obligations by service in the militia were

3. P.R.O. Sta. Cha. 2/12 f.79.
theoretically as good or as bad as those of any other Englishman of similar physical condition and similar geographical situation. In practice, however, this was not so: all kinds of factors interfered with the smooth working of a theoretical system of universal military service. The first of these factors was that of social status: there was indeed one law for the gentry and another for the rest. This being so, from this point onwards, the question must be discussed in relation to two distinct classes of society.

(a) Gentry

Although the rôle of a common soldier was beneath the dignity of a gentleman, and although he would probably never be called upon to play such a rôle by the commissioners (who were sometimes his colleagues, often his friends, and almost always his peers), he was not therefore certain to escape military service. He might well be appointed to serve as a captain or petty-captain in his local militia. These ranks, indeed, could only be held by gentlemen. It was always specifically stated that such officers were to be "gentlemen of haviour",¹ "gentelmen of inheritaunce, or their heires apparaunt",² and so forth.

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1. P.R.O. SP 11/12 f.25b.
2. P.R.O. SP 11/11 f.75a.
That the captain had to be a man with a "stake" in the country that he was called upon to defend is seen from an examination of two sets of royal instructions of the year 1557, in which the words "being inheriters" (absent from the original drafts) have been inserted after the word "capitaines"; this was a qualification for leadership specific mention of which was too important to be omitted.

In addition, the captains had to be men who were capable of doing good service in war. Invariably they were required to be "experte" or "discreete and skilfull". Sometimes the emphasis was laid on practical knowledge of the arts of war: on one occasion in 1558 it was stated that the leaders had to be "gentlemen of ... experience". In practice, too, it seems to have been the tried soldiers who were selected for service. In 1546, for example, the one captain of the Dorset militia was Bartholomew Hussey, who had lately seen much fighting while serving as Grand Master of Rhodes, and who was listed as "Husey, late of the Rodes". In the same year, also, one of the

1. P.R.O. SP 15/8 ff.84a, 86b.
2. P.R.O. SP 11/12 f.18b.
4. P.R.O. SP 11/12 f.92b.
three Devon captains was that veteran warrior Sir Richard Grenville,\(^1\) who had formerly held the office of High Marshal of Calais, "a military position of considerable importance".\(^2\)

Among those qualified to be captains the likelihood of any one man's being called upon to serve depended upon the forces of supply and demand. If a particular shire, which possessed a large number of potential captains, was required to provide only a small number of such men, the chances of any one man's being conscripted would be small, and \textit{vice versa}. Thus, in 1546, when both Dorset and Rutland were required to provide one captain, the chances were smaller in the former case than in the latter.\(^3\)

While supply would remain fairly constant in most cases, demand would tend to vary from year to year: while the number of potential captains would not vary greatly, the number of captains required did vary considerably. This variation was due partly to variations in the numbers to be provided: a potential captain resident in Cambridgeshire was more likely to be called upon to serve in the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{L.P. xxi, pt.1, p.42.}
  \item \textit{L.P. xxi, pt.1, p.42.}
\end{itemize}
county militia in August 1545, when 400 men were levied there, than in the following March, when only half that number were levied. But the variation was also due to variations in the proportion of captains to men: other things being equal, a potential captain was more likely to be called upon to serve in 1544, when there was to be one captain to every 100 men, than in 1558, when there was to be one captain to every 200 or 250 men.

(b) Others

The likelihood of an ordinary Englishman's being conscripted for military service depended almost entirely on the judgment of the commissioners appointed to levy men in his district. These officers might or might not be fair and honest in their choice: the chances are that they would not all (to borrow a phrase from the 14th century) be "gentz mervelouses de arraier".

If the commissioners were public-spirited men, they would naturally choose those men who were most likely to

1. L.P. xx, pt. 1, 1078.
4. P.R.O. SP 11/12 f. 25b.
make good soldiers. Where possible, it was desirable that the men should be skilled in the use of weapons. This, of course, was imperative in the case of handgunners, but even at the end of the period they constituted only a minute fraction of the soldiery. It was also necessary in the case of archers. Sir Thomas Wyatt, in his scheme for the reform of the militia, suggested that the commissioners should always test the skill of the archers before admitting them as soldiers: they must "see all suche as shoote with there longe bowes, shoote before them one after another".

In the second place, it seems that a conscientious commissioner would, where possible, recruit soldiers from the ranks of unmarried men. In the muster rolls of this period bachelors were sometimes specially designated as such, as though particularly suited for military service. Moreover, when in 1548 men were being recruited for service on the Borders, it was specifically stated that they were to be levied from "suiche as be unmaried". The reason for this preference for bachelor warriors may have been that

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1. See Appendix II.
2. B.M. Loan 15, Wyatt 23 f.6b.
3. E.g. "Thomas Morsse sengelman" (P.R.O. E 101/59/10 ms 3).
4. I.C.R. iv, 182.
put forward by Wyatt. He maintained that married men made poor soldiers because they will, when they have a while endured the contynuall travaille and perill that is to be suffered in an army, call righte lightly to remembrance the differrence of sleepinge under an hedge and in a bedd which there wyves weare wont to make; Insomuche that they have wished themselves to be at home in there smoky houses. and because suche holowe folke cannot well keepes there owne counsaille, they faile not to be the occasion that many another growe to be of the same opynion; whereupon there failetethe not to followe as well daungerous perill to the Army as dyshonour and muche forlorne cost to the prync.

Thirdly, since it was part of the Crown's policy to conscript men who were thought to be "idle", the commissioners would probably try to recruit as many men as possible from the ranks of the unemployed. In October 1549 the commissioners were ordered to "have speciall respect to take suche as be idle persons and will not labour". In July 1558 the word "idle" was used to describe all non-agricultural workers: men were to be levied in Northamptonshire from the ranks of "artificers and ydlle persons - and not of mowers, reapers, husbandmen, and suchlike, by whose labours and travell the common wealth of this realme ys encreased". This, however, was an

1. B.M. Loan 15, Wyatt 23 f. 3b.
2. P.R.O. SP 10/9 f.87a.
exceptional occasion: only a small number of men were needed (to serve as pioneers), and it was almost harvest-time. Normally, soldiers would be recruited mainly from the ranks of the small farmers no matter how much they were needed in the fields: in 1546 men had been sent to Boulogne and had been kept there despite the fact that "they wold fayne be at their houses for making of their hey and harvest".1 The Government would probably have been glad to have levied soldiers only from the ranks of non-agricultural workers, but there would never have been enough of the latter to go round.

Closely related to the Government's policy of conscripting idlers was its policy of conscripting trouble-makers. The outstanding example of this was the forcible despatch to the Scottish Border in 1545 of a London Alderman, Richard Reed, who had refused to pay a benevolence towards the cost of the war.2 After Kett's Rebellion the practice became a universal one: in October 1549, when men were levied to serve at Boulogne, the commissioners were ordered "specially to pike out those that wer grettest doers and ringleaders in the late sedition and commotion",3 or (as they

1. P.R.O. SP 1/220 f.199a (L.P. xxi, pt.1, 1122).
3. P.R.O. SP 10/9 f.87a.
were elsewhere described) "those that were busiest in
the rebellion". The same kind of thing may have happened
in 1554, after the defeat of Wyatt's Rebellion: in February
of that year, at any rate, Lord Gray wrote to the Queen
telling her that reinforcements were needed for the garrison
of Guisnes, and "desyring to have some soldyars, parte of
siche as were condemned to be hanged".

It would seem therefore that, if the commissioners
really had the interests of the country at heart, and if
they really carried out what was explicit and implicit
in the Crown's instructions, the men that they would be
most likely to conscript were those unruly, unmarried, and
unemployed men who were both able in body and skilled in
the arts of war. But, as such men were few and far between,
the average soldier was probably very different from this.

It has been assumed up to this point that the
commissioners appointed to levy soldiers were always just
and honest men. This, however, was not the case: while
most of them were probably disinterested public servants
who executed their commissions faithfully and well, there
were some who were not above receiving bribes and showing
favouritism.

1. P.R.O. SP 10/9 f.88.
2. J. G. Nichols, Chronicle of Queen Jane (Cam. Soc. 1st
There were several occasions when commissioners were accused of accepting bribes from those who wished to "buy their peace" and escape war service. In the spring of 1546, for instance, when men were being recruited in Devonshire for service at Boulogne, one Robert Daly of Halberton, described as a man "of good substaunce", was one of several who paid money to the King's commissioner for a licence to tarry at home.¹ Again, in Wales in 1557 there was said to have been widespread bribery of this kind: many of "the freeholders and weallthye men" of the counties of Anglesea, Carnarvon, Denbigh, Flint, and Merioneth, having been appointed to serve in the army by Sir John Salisbury, paid "divers greate Somes of moneye" to him for their discharge;² while, in Glamorganshire, 52 of the inhabitants selected for military service paid sums varying from 3s. 4d. to 33s. 4d. to William Herbert in order to avoid it.³ If the wealthier inhabitants of the shires were generally able to purchase exemption from military service, as they were in these particular cases, then it is possible that the burden of such service was borne to an unfairly large extent by poor men.⁴

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¹ P.R.O. Sta. Cha. 2/12 f.79.  
² P.R.O. Sta. Cha. 4/3/19 f.2.  
⁴ Cf. below, p. 157.
As well as sparing wealthy men, the commissioners also had a tendency to spare their own tenants, many of whom would live within the limits of their "divisions". Sometimes, of course, they had every justification for so doing; it might happen that they needed their dependants for service in their own quasi-feudal retinues. On other occasions this kind of favouritism appears to have had no legal or moral sanction. William Harford of Crayford, one of the Kent commissioners in 1545, was accused of levying "dyvers symple and weke persones ... levyng dyvers and many of his tenuantes and of their servauntes (beyng apt, able, and strong men for the warres) at home, not onely at that tyme [1545] but lykewise at dyvers other tymys when men were set forth to serve the kynges majestie in his warres". Three years later this kind of practice was expressly forbidden by the Crown: since there had been complaints that, in recruiting shire forces, "suche as hath ben commissioners for that purpose have spared their owne tenuantes and the tenuantes of their frendes to tary at home", the commissioners were instructed to have henceforward "an indiferent eye to the appointment and allotment of your nombres". If this sort of practice was a common one, it

1. See below, P.278.  
2. P.R.O. Sta. Cha. 2/33/52 f.12.  
3. P.R.O. SP 15/3 f.56a.
follows that the tenants of the less important gentlemen (who were not on the commission) were likely to bear a disproportionate share of the burden of military service.

In attempting to discover, therefore, who were the men who served in the national levies of this period, all the above factors must be taken into consideration. But even when one has said that an unmarried man was more likely to be conscripted than a married man, that a poor man was more likely to be conscripted than a rich man, and that an ill-behaved idler was more likely to be conscripted than a hard-working husbandman, one has not said a great deal. In the long run, the chances of a man's being called up for service in the militia would be governed by another factor - the proportion of the total number of able men resident in that particular district that was recruited.
PART TWO

QUASI-FEUDAL SYSTEM
CHAPTER I

The Organisation of the Forces

Section I. Military Preparedness

When the Crown wished to make an inquiry into the military preparedness of the English people, it normally ordered both "general" and "special" musters to be taken throughout the realm. By means of the former, it has been seen, the Crown attempted to ascertain the strength of the militia in every shire; by means of the latter it attempted to ascertain the "power" of every gentleman of standing in the land.

The purpose of these special inquiries was fully explained in the preamble to the letters for special musters sent out in 1539.¹

advertised what hable men our servauntes and other gentlemen in every place maye make unto us upon any warning to them geven.

And so it came about that these "lettres ... for the special ayde and nombre every gentilman woll certifie to have of hymself ever in aredynes" were, as Cromwell informed the King, sent out "Incontinent at the arryvaill of the certificates of the general munsters".¹

The letters for special musters were not, like those for general musters, passed under the Great Seal, but under the Privy Signet. The form of these letters, though varying slightly from year to year, remained substantially the same throughout the period under discussion. There is, for example, little difference between that sent to Sir Henry Willoughby in 1511² and that sent to Nicholas Pelham in 1543.³ In each case the addressee was ordered to muster his tenants, servants, and others under his rule and authority, find out how many of them were able in body, and certify the Crown accordingly.

The recipient of such a letter would probably have no difficulty in ascertaining which of his household servants were potential soldiers: he would in fact know

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the answer to that question before it was even asked.

With his tenants and others under his rule, however, it was another matter: they might dwell at the other end of the county or even in another part of the kingdom. When, for instance, Otho Gilbert, dwelling near Dartmouth in Devonshire, was called upon to muster his dependants in the spring of 1543, he was evidently obliged to travel the 90 miles that lay between his home and the Wiltshire village of Semley, where some of his tenants lived.¹ Muster ing tenants might involve other difficulties, as poor blind Sir Richard Brereton discovered to his cost that year: having travelled from his home at Shocklach (Cheshire) to his manor of Worsley (Lancashire), he found to his horror that his son had already mustered his tenants there and was in open rebellion against him.²

Once they had completed the musters, the gentry drew up their certificates and sent them to whomsoever had been deputed to receive them. Normally, this was the King's Secretary, but, in the case of those living in the northern shires, they were sometimes sent to the King's Lieutenant there: in 1512 and 1522 to the Earl of Shrewsbury,³ and in

1. P.R.O. SP 1/177 f.167 (L.P. xviii, pt.1, 480).
1543 to the Duke of Suffolk.\textsuperscript{1} The only certificates which appear to survive today are those returned by seven Devonshire gentlemen in pursuance of the King's letters dated 31 March 1543.\textsuperscript{2}

On receiving these certificates, the authorities normally caused the information contained therein to be copied into a large book, where it would be easily accessible if and when the time for mobilisation came. In the book compiled from the returns sent in in April and May 1543 the names of the gentry are grouped in shires, so that anyone who might have the task of organising an army could distribute the burden of finding men evenly throughout the country.

Such a book, provided that its information was kept up to date, would be invaluable to any Government: it would give a clear picture of the size and distribution of the manred that lay at the disposal of the gentry. Some of the information recorded in the army book of 1543, however, was out of date even at the time of its compilation. The list of Devon gentry, for instance, included the name of John Gilbert, even though his son had pointed out in his

\begin{enumerate}
\item \texttt{L.P. xviii; pt.1, 53.}
\item \texttt{P.R.O. SP 1/177 f.167 (L.P. xviii, pt.1, 480); SP 1/178 f.65 sqq. (L.P. xviii, pt.1, 579); SP 1/244 f.129 (L.P. Add. 1589).}
\end{enumerate}
certificate that "no man in the Countey of Devonschere ys known by the name of John Gylberd, but only ... John Gylberd deceased".\footnote{P.R.O. SP 1/177 f.167 (L.P. xviii, pt.1, 480).}

Apart from certifying the Crown of the number of their able-bodied dependants, the gentry were also explicitly or implicitly required to ensure that these men were prepared to serve in the armed forces of the Crown whenever occasion arose. Beyond this, however, there was not usually any real attempt to organise the quasi-feudal forces as potential fighting units.

On one occasion, nevertheless, the Crown does appear to have taken steps to create a reserve army of quasi-feudal contingents. On 25 August 1518 letters were sent out under the Privy Signet to certain gentlemen in whose "fidelitie and true mynd towards us" the King had an "assured trust and confidence", informing them that, although the country was at peace, it was necessary "to provide and forsee remedies against warre when the same shall fortune". This being so, it was "thought right, expedient, and necessarie to depute and assigne a good nombre of hable captans ... and to licence the same ... to retaigne a good and competent nombre of our subgiettes,
and the same to [be] put in aredynesse, conveniently horsed and harnessed, to doo unto us service ... whansoever and as often as we shall require and commaunde thaym soo to doo, without daungier or penaltie of any statutes or ordenaunces heretofore made against retaynours in that behalf". The gentlemen to whom these letters were sent were ordered to inform the King's Secretary by All Hallows' Day of the number of able men, horsed and harnessed, that they could provide, whereupon they would be given licences to retain that number. 1

The licences which were eventually issued described in great detail the methods by which the retainers were to be recruited and organised. 2 The recipient of the licence (hereinafter referred to as the licensee) was to levy his men from three main classes of people: his own tenants, those living on lands which were within his rule or office, and any other men who were willing to serve and who were not the dependants of another licensee.

The recruits were to be equipped with uniform and armour. The King informed the licensees that each man was to receive "a Jaquet of our colours with our cognisaunce and yours", together with a complete set of almain harness. In this apparel the men were to muster once or twice a

2. P.R.O. E 101/59/5 (L.P. x, 1072). For the dating of this MS., see Appendix IV.
year before their captain or his deputy, who would proceed to "vieu and revieu" them. Nevertheless, the company was not required to undergo any training: perhaps it was thought that the recent Act for the Maintenance of Archers had ensured that all able-bodied men would practise regularly in the butts.

While little is known about this scheme beyond the fact of its proposed implementation, a great deal is known about a not altogether dissimilar system of armed retinues which came into being some thirty years later. On 26 February 1551 the Privy Council debated

whether it were convenient [that] the Kinges Majestie shulde have a nombre of men-of-armes in ordynarie, as well for the suertie of his Majesties parson as for the staie of the unqueit subjectes, and for other services in all eventes; which aftre long disputacion was thought and concluded upon as a thing very necessarie.

The men-at-arms were to be raised by certain magnates from the ranks of their own dependants, they were to be paid quarterly, and they were to be mustered periodically before the King. One such muster, held in Hyde Park on 7 December 1551, was mentioned by Edward himself in the pages of his Journal:

2. J. G. Nichols, Literary Remains of King Edward VI, ii, 375.
I saw the musters of the new band [of] men of armes, 100 of my lord treasaurours, 100 of Northumberland, 100 Northampton, 50 Huntington, 50 Rutland, 120 of Penbroke, 50 Darcy, 50 Cobham, 100 sir Thomas Cheiney...

Later, in describing the scene to Barnaby FitzPatrick, the King remarked that such an assembly of horsemen had never been seen before.¹

Some months afterwards, on 16 May 1552, another great muster of the "gendarmery" was held in Greenwich Park: on this occasion, according to one eye-witness, the men had "ther cottes in broderie of yche lords colers" - a clear indication of the quasi-feudal character of these contingents.² And although it was ordained at this time that similar musters were to be taken at three-monthly intervals,³ there is no record of any further assemblies of horsemen; in October, indeed, it was decided to break up the bands for the sake of economy.⁴

The farsightedness which the Crown appears to have displayed in 1518 and 1551, when it took steps to ensure that it would be well supplied with squadrons of cavalry in the event of war, is matched by that of certain private

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4. Ibid. p.579.
individuals who, on their own initiative, took steps to ensure that they would be well supplied with men and equipment for their retinues in the event of war. The way in which they did this was to cause military clauses to be inserted in the indentures by which they leased their lands. These clauses generally bound the tenants to serve (in person or by deputy) in any contingents which their lords should send to the King's wars and to provide equipment for this purpose.

All the known military leases dating from the period under discussion are listed in the following table:\(^1\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Lease</th>
<th>No. of Leases</th>
<th>Name of Lessor</th>
<th>Location of lands</th>
<th>To be provided</th>
<th>Term</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17/11/18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Thos. Hesketh</td>
<td>Lancs.</td>
<td>1 1 Life</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/1/23</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Rd. Leftwich</td>
<td>Chesh.</td>
<td>1 1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/3/26</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Wm., lord Sandys</td>
<td>N'hants.</td>
<td>3 3 40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/6/29</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Rd. Catesby</td>
<td>Warw.</td>
<td>1 1 20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24/9/38</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sir Nic. Strelley</td>
<td>Yorks.</td>
<td>1 1 21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14/3/39</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>do.</td>
<td>do.</td>
<td>1 1 21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/3/41</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>do.</td>
<td>do.</td>
<td>1 1 30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/9/42</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Archbp. Cranmer</td>
<td>Salop.</td>
<td>1 1 40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/10/45</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Jn. Danyell</td>
<td>Lancs.</td>
<td>1 1 Life</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20/12/47</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Hy. Babyngton</td>
<td>Leics.</td>
<td>4 20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31/12/48</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Thos. Babyngton</td>
<td>Derby</td>
<td>1 1 21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/5/50</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ralph Egerton</td>
<td>Staffs.</td>
<td>1 1 21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/6/50</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>do.</td>
<td>Chesh.</td>
<td>1 1 21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30/11/50</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>do.</td>
<td>Staffs.</td>
<td>1 1 Life</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/4/53</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sir Nic. Strelley</td>
<td>Yorks.</td>
<td>1 1 26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19/10/55</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>do.</td>
<td>do.</td>
<td>1 1 21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) Cat. Anc. Deeds, A 13134, 13470; C 7221, 7227, 7433, 7491, 7578-80, 7613, 7642, 7672-3, 7679, 7684, 7687,
These leases, it will be seen, do not include any from the four northernmost shires of England. The reason for this is not that no military clauses have been found in north country leases, but that instances of them are too numerous to mention; it is common knowledge that in the Border counties the performance of military services was one of the recognised conditions of land-holding.¹

This tenurial obligation was well described by one Alayn Buntyng of Casterbirdge (Cumberland), who maintained that, according to "the Costome of the Countree called Tenaut right", the tenant "Shal [be] [at] all tymes redy sufficiently apayreld and arrayed boith in hors and harnes mete ffor the warre whensoever the lord or lorde doo call apon theyme to doo the kynges servyce eyenst his enmyes the Scottes".² In view of this, the imposition of such obligations on tenants in other shires may perhaps be looked upon as an extension southwards of the custom of Tenant Right.

The list of leases tabulated above, though not an exhaustive one, does seem to indicate that, the further south one travelled, the less was the likelihood of

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² P.R.O. C 1/727 f.12.
finding tenurial obligations defined in this way. Indeed, in all the leases that were enrolled in the county of Devon in pursuance of the Statute of 27 Henry VIII, there does not appear to have been one military clause. This may be a reflection of the fact that, the further away a man's place of residence was from the turbulent Scottish Border, the smaller were the chances of his being called upon to recruit his tenants for the wars.

The table of military leases is interesting from a chronological as well as a geographical point of view. It may not be merely coincidental that 1526, the year in which the Northamptonshire manors of Steane and Hinton were leased to one Fulk Barker on condition that he was "to fynde to ... lord Sandes thre Able men in harnes and to paye foure poinde to horse them with to serve the kyng in warre", was also the year in which Lord Sandys was appointed Captain of Guisnes. The significance of this appointment, when viewed from this angle, is that it carried with it the occasional duty of raising troops for the garrison: in March 1528, for example, Sandys was ordered to levy as many horsemen as he could from the ranks

2. P.R.O. 6 1/392 f.6.
3. D.N.B.
of his tenants and others; and on this occasion he, who six months before had informed Wolsey that he could not levy "past x able men besides my howshold servauntes",\(^1\) was able to report that he could provide 60 horsemen.\(^2\)

Is it not possible that this improvement was due to the fact that in the meantime Sandys, mindful of his increased military obligations, had taken steps to enforce those of his tenants?

While in 1526 the prospect of military service was such a remote one for most Englishmen that considerations of military preparedness would not have affected their relations with their tenants, the case was very different ten years later. The raising of an army in 1536 obliged many gentlemen, perhaps for the first time, to call upon their tenants to serve the King in their retinues, and some may have experienced difficulties in this connection.\(^3\)

Thus it is not surprising to discover that the vast majority of the military leases listed above were drawn up in the two decades after the Pilgrimage of Grace - a period in which Crown and people became increasingly aware of the necessity for military preparedness.

1. P.R.O. SP 1/24 f.130a (L.P. iii, 2238). In L.P. the number of men is wrongly given as 20.
2. L.P. iv, 4058.
In September 1542, it has been recorded, Archbishop Cranmer leased the Shropshire manor of Stoke St. Milborough to John Sandford on condition that the latter "in every ... tyme of warre ... shall fynde or sett forthe to or for the saide Archebusshop ... one suffycyent and able man and an horse or geldyng with A payer of Almayn Reyvettes, A bowe, A sheff of Arrowes, Sworde, and daggar at thonly propre costes and charges of the saide John".¹ The presence of this clause may be partly explained by the fact that, at the time when this indenture was drawn up, military matters were very much in the Archbishop's thoughts; only a few weeks previously he had been ordered to prepare men for service against the Scots. On this occasion, moreover, it seems that he had been unable to raise his required number on his own lands, for he had been obliged to ask the Dean and Chapter of Canterbury to help him with men.²

When, however, there was little prospect of war, it would seem that the ordinary English landowner, who was not, like Lord Sandys, the holder of an important military post, was not very mindful of the need for military preparedness. Except when the Crown became

1. C.C.L. Reg. U f.60.
2. Ibid. f.7a.
concerned about the strength of the quasi-feudal forces and ordered special musters to be taken, it is probable that most landowners were content to forget about the important part that they had to play in the military organisation of the kingdom.

Be this as it may, there must have been many gentlemen who, though apathetic about military preparedness, were yet the possessors of considerable quantities of military equipment. These private arsenals might be merely collections of arms and armour that had been left over from some previous campaign. Such, for example, was the miscellaneous assortment of implements that was evidently scattered through the house of John Trevelyan at Whalesborough (Cornwall) in March 1544: sallets, jacks, and splints in the "grene chamber"; bows in the "chamber for spynnyng"; and arrows in the "grett chamber".¹

Some private collections of arms and armour, however, were kept in well-ordered armouries. It was in such a room that Thomas Cromwell kept the "store of harneys and wepons" which so greatly impressed the French Ambassador in February 1539. This armoury, as Cromwell was not unnaturally eager to point out to the envoy of a potentially hostile power, was not unique: indeed, it was matched

by "other particular armaryes of the lordes and gentilmen
of this Royaulme".¹ Some lords and gentlemen even
employed paid officials to look after their armouries:
the Earl of Rutland, for instance, in this same year
(1539) was paying 7s. 6d. a quarter to his "Armerer",
Nichlas Bentley;² while Sir Henry Willoughby (in the
1520s) and Sir William Petre (in the 1550s) each kept an
armourer in his household at a quarterly fee of 6s. 8d.³

From the foregoing it will be seen that the quasi-
feudal "system" of military preparedness, if such it
may be called, was a very haphazard affair. The system,
indeed, was universal only in those years when the Crown
took steps to see that it was so, and permanent only in
those regions where an individual landowner chose to
maintain it. Thus it is perhaps only by a stretch of the
imagination that a section on "Military Preparedness" can
be thought to deserve a place in a chapter on "The
Organisation of the Forces".

¹ Merriman, op. cit. ii, 177.
² R.M.C. Rutland, iv, p.299.
³ N.U.L. Middleton MSS. Aact. of John Lewissey f.30a (1523).
E.R.O. D/DP Z 14/1 f.4 (1553-4).
Section II. Military Service

The first stage in the mobilisation of an army was the compilation of a book containing the names of all those who were to supply the men, together with the number that each was to send. Although, in the case of armies against the Scots, this task might be deputed to the King's Lieutenant in the North, it generally fell on the King's chief adviser.

In 1521, for example, when the King decided to send an expeditionary force to aid the Emperor against the French, he asked Wolsey to make the necessary arrangements. The latter immediately set to work, and was soon able to report that he had "divisid a boke conteynyng the nombre of six thousand archiers with their capitayns and the names of the persons by whome the said archers shal be prepared and put in Redynes". Fortunately, this book is still in existence, and an examination of its contents provides one with information about the early stages of the process of mobilisation.

The book is divided into five main sections. The first contains the names of those chosen to be captains

1. State Papers, Henry VIII, i, 23.
2. P.R.O. SP 1/22 f.276 (L.P. iii, 1453).
and the number of archers that each was to provide. The second and longest section contains the names, by counties, of all other individuals who were to "make" men, but who were not to serve in person; here again, the number that each was to send was recorded. The third and fourth are lists of boroughs and ecclesiastics, and the numbers that they had to provide. The last part of the book contains another list of the men appointed to be captains, this time with the number that each was to command.¹

Once a book of this kind had been compiled, the Crown was in a position to send out letters to those named therein, ordering them to prepare their allotted numbers by a certain day. Sometimes, too, the addressees were instructed to ascertain the King in writing of their "conformable mynde herin" by a definite date (as in 1514);² though of course such a clause was omitted on those occasions when there was need for hasty mobilisation (as in 1536), or when the Crown had already ascertained the strength of the quasi-feudal forces by means of special musters, (as in 1544).

When the letters had been dated, addressed, and stamped

2. P.R.O. E 101/56/10 ff.54, 81, 93, 106 (L.P. i, p.1518).
with the King's sign-manual, they were handed to messengers or pursuivants for delivery. These men do not always seem to have been as efficient in the execution of their duties as they ought to have been: there are several cases of letters taking an inordinately long time to reach their destinations, with the result that the whole machinery of military organisation was thrown out of gear. One William Jentyllman "pryceyvaunte alias messynger" did not deliver a letter dated 15 December 1513 to its addressee, Sir Miles Bush of Hougham (Lincolnshire), until the 26th of the following month; this left the latter only five days in which to prepare 25 men and certify the Crown accordingly.¹ That this letter was unduly late in arriving is indicated by the fact that the Mayor of Gloucester received his letter of the same date on New Year's Eve.²

The late arrival of a letter sent to the Archbishop of Canterbury in 1522 had more serious consequences than this. This letter, dated 9 April, ordered the Archbishop to set forward 50 men by the end of the month; but, as it did not arrive until the evening of the 22nd, there was nothing that he could do but write to Wolsey to tell

2. Ibid. f. 116 (L.P. i, pp. 1518-9).
him that he was "right sory" not to be able to accomplish
the King's request "bi reason of the late recevyng of
those letters, and for Lakke of tyme sufficient". There
seems, however, to have been no good reason for this
delay: Otford, the Archbishop's residence, is only about
25 miles as the crow flies from Richmond, where the letter
was despatched; and, as the Primate pointed out, many
men in his district had received their letters long
before.1

Perhaps it was the inefficiency of messengers which
led the Crown, in the 1530s and later, to cause such
letters to be delivered to their destinations by the
sheriffs. In 1542 and 1544, for instance, the sheriff
of Essex received batches of signet letters for delivery
to the gentry of his shire.2 Again, in 1557 "the
Shirieffes of all suche shires wherein any force is
appointed to be levied" were sent "the lettres addressed
from her Majestie to the gentlemen ... appointed to levye
force and attende upon her", and were ordered to cause
them "to be delyvered with speade".3 The sheriffs,
indeed, appear to have found this rather a burdensome task:

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1. P.R.O. SP 1/24 f.93 (L.P. iii, 2192).
2. L.P. xvii, p.482; xix, pt.1, 440.
in 1536, at the time of the Pilgrimage of Grace, for example, the sheriff of Sussex reported that he was so weary "with rydyng to serve the kyng in delyveryng his graces letters" that he could scarcely sit on a horse.\textsuperscript{1}

But though the task was an onerous one, it was not a very honourable one: the sheriff, who was still the official commander of the shire militia, had a very insignificant part to play in the quasi-feudal military organisation of the country. He was, one might say, merely the "telegraph boy" of the Tudor Monarchy.

Although it was the normal practice for the gentry of southern England to receive their instructions direct from the Crown, this was not the case with the gentry of the north parts. They were instructed and authorised to raise men by letters under the Privy Signet, it is true, but these letters were not addressed to them by the King's Secretary; they were sent out by the King's Lieutenant in the North Parts, or, after its creation in 1537, by the King's Council in the North. While the Lieutenants, it seems, were usually sent blank forms of Signet Letters, which they filled up and sent out to the gentlemen residing within the limits of their commission,\textsuperscript{2}

\textsuperscript{1} P.R.O. SP 1/108 f.57 (L.P. xi, 707).

\textsuperscript{2} See e.g., letter to the Earl of Shrewsbury in 1522 (L.P. iii, 2412).
the Council in the North possessed its own replica of the King's Signet.¹

The recipients of the royal demands for men would normally be required to have their contingents ready by a certain date, the proximity of which would of course be determined by the urgency of the situation. In October 1536, at the time of the Lincolnshire Rebellion, there was only a margin of nine days between the date of despatch of the King's letters and the date appointed for the assembling of the army at Ampthill:² this meant that the gentlemen had to act very quickly, but it appears that "the gentylmen for the moste parte ..., notwithstandyng ther shorte tyme, used ther ernest endeavour in sutche harty wise" that they were able to do as they were bidden.³ In December 1533, on the other hand, when the Government was in a position to make leisurely plans for the raising of an army, letters were sent out to the gentry about three months before the projected formation of the same army.⁴

In Edward VI's reign, whenever men were required for

1. Reid, op. cit., p.149.
2. L.P. xi, 579, 637.
4. P.R.O. E 101/56/10 ff.54, 81, etc. (L.P. i, p.1518).
service against the Scots, it seems that there was an attempt to keep a definite margin of about 40 days between the date of the despatch of a summons and the date of the assembly of an army. The letters dated 14 July 1547 stipulated that the men had to reach Newcastle by 24 August;¹ and those dated 30 June 1549 ordained that the men had to be on the Borders by 10 August.² Moreover, when in 1547 the Duke of Somerset wrote to the Earl of Shrewsbury ordering him to be at Newcastle 26 days after the despatch of the letter, he apologised because "the space and tyme to you geven is so short".³

The speed with which a gentleman could raise and equip a contingent for the war would depend largely on the greatness of the distance between him and the tenants, servants, and other dependants from whom he would recruit his soldiers. In some cases the distance was very great indeed. On 8 May 1522, for example, when Sir William Sandys, then at Calais, received a signet letter dated 3 May ordering him to raise 200 men from his dependants and send them to Dover by the 25th of the month, he was

¹. B.M. Harl. 6986 f.17; Add. MS. 33137 f.7.
². P.R.O. SP 15/3 f.105.
obliged to point out to Wolsey that this would involve "greate tract of tyme" in view of the fact that he was in France and that "thesse CC men must be levied in Ingland".

Most of the recipients of such letters, however, were probably nearer home at the time of their receipt. In April 1522, for instance, Archbishop Warham was just sitting down to supper in his manor-house at Otford when the long overdue letters arrived to upset his composure; but even though he was at home he was still a long way from his nearest available tenants at Charing and Canterbury. This, indeed, must often have been the case with those landlords whose estates lay scattered throughout several shires. How long did it take the Duke of Buckingham, for example, to levy the contingent of 550 soldiers which served in the Middleward of the Royal Army against France in 1513, and which had been drawn from eighteen different counties? How much more fortunate was the Earl of Wiltshire, who in 1514 was able

1. P.R.O. SP 1/24 f.130 (L.P. iii, 2238).
2. Ibid. f.93 (L.P. iii, 2192).
3. P.R.O. E 101/56/25 ff. 87-90. 550 was the number of those who returned home in the autumn: the number originally sent was probably larger.
to recruit a retinue nearly twice as large in three counties.\(^1\)

Great noblemen such as these would naturally have had plenty of agents upon whom could be placed much of the administrative burden of mobilisation. In 1542 the Earl of Shrewsbury was able to leave much of the work of raising men for service against the Scots to his "right heartily beloved frende John Scudamore esquier", who was his "officer" in several of his lordships. Even a comparatively small landlord like Sir Adrian Fortescue seems to have delegated his duties to his bailiff, John Heywood, when in 1523 he was called upon to recruit a contingent for the wars.\(^3\) Again, 21 years later, when another great army was prepared for service against the French, George Cornwall appears to have used his "trusty servant" Richard Capull in a similar rôle.\(^4\)

\(^1\) P.R.O. SP 1/230 f.116 (L.P. i, 2727). These men in fact were never sent, because the proposed "army by land" of 1514 did not materialise.

\(^2\) B.M. Add. MS. 11042 f.93 (L.P. xvii, 794).

\(^3\) L.P. iii, 3148.

\(^4\) P.R.O. SP 1/138 f.24 (L.P. xix, pt.1, 608).
Having selected his men and having provided them with arms, armour, and uniform, the final task of the supplier was to ensure that his men reached the place appointed for the muster of the army by the appointed day. And then, unless he himself had been ordered to serve in person as captain or petty-captain, his responsibilities were at an end. His contingent was absorbed into the ranks of the royal army and became part of a military organisation which lies outside the scope of the present study.

1. For the provision of equipment, see Part Three, Chapter II.
CHAPTER II

The Suppliers of Soldiers

It was seen in the last chapter that, whenever the Crown wished to raise an army on a quasi-feudal basis, it sent out letters to certain men ordering them to prepare soldiers for the wars. It is the purpose of the present chapter to discover who these men were and why they were chosen, how many soldiers they provided and upon what occasions.

The first factor which determined whether or not a man would receive an order to prepare soldiers was geographical. Generally speaking, the likelihood of a man's being called upon to supply soldiers for a particular army was directly dependent upon the proximity of his dwelling-place to the assembly-point of that army. This was particularly so on those occasions when the Crown had to raise men in a great hurry. In July 1549, for example, when the King's person was thought to be in danger, the lords and gentlemen of only seven shires (viz. Berkshire, Buckinghamshire, Essex, Hertfordshire, Middlesex, Surrey, and Sussex) were called upon to send
In 1544, on the other hand, when lengthy preparations culminated in the despatch of an army into France, residents of all shires south of the Trent except Cornwall were ordered to supply soldiers.\(^2\)

The relative unimportance of the geographical factor in the distribution of the burden of supplying soldiers to the army in 1544, however, was due not only to the fact that there was plenty of time for mobilisation, but also to the fact that the total number of men required was a large one. In order to avoid depriving a small area of its able-bodied male population, the Crown cast its recruiting net as wide as possible. In 1543, on the other hand, when a small army had been raised for service in Flanders, the only men called upon to contribute soldiers to that part of it which embarked at Dover were those dwelling in Hampshire, Hertfordshire, Kent, Middlesex, Oxfordshire, Surrey, and Sussex; while the soldiers who embarked at Maldon were drawn only from the counties of Essex, Suffolk, and Cambridge.\(^3\)

When the Crown had decided into which parts of the

1. P.R.O. SP 10/8 ff.2-5.
3. L.P. xviii, pt.1, 832.
country its demands for men should be sent, it then had to decide to whom these demands should be addressed. It had to draw up a list of all those who were "of power and substance to make men". In this list would appear the names of all sorts and conditions of men - of great noblemen and small squires, of peace-loving bishops and war-loving knights, of worldly merchants and pious monks. But, in order to clarify the picture, this heterogeneous "powerful" class has been sub-divided into two groups.

Section I. The Gentry

A "powerful" man was one who had tenants on his lands and servants in his household. Theoretically all such men, and only such men, would receive letters for special musters whenever the Crown sent them out; but, as the Crown's knowledge of such matters was never perfect, it might send letters to some who were not "powerful", while omitting to send them to some who were.

Who then were the men whom the Crown deemed "of power to make men"? Who were the actual recipients of letters

1. This phrase occurs in the instructions given to Surrey in 1522 (P.R.O. SP 49/1 f.140b - L.P. iii, 2412).

2. See above, p.85.
for special musters? In 1539, according to Cromwell, "every gentilman" in the realm was sent one; but how Cromwell defined a "gentilman" it is impossible to say, since the names of those called upon that year do not survive. Nevertheless, the names of those to whom letters for special musters were sent four years later do survive, and from an examination of them it is possible to discover who were (or who were thought to be) the "powerful" men in England at that time.

In 1543 there were, for instance, 44 knights, esquires, and gentlemen of the county of Buckingham among those in receipt of letters for special musters. What led those in authority to believe that these 44 men were the (only) "powerful" men in Buckinghamshire? Was the Crown so familiar with the social structure of that shire that it knew automatically who were and who were not able to "make" men? The answer to the latter question must be in the negative; for while the name of a big landowner who was also a knight and a J.P. would be well-known in Court circles, that of a small landowner without office or title would not be well-known outside the limits

1. Merriman, op. cit. ii, 197.
2. For a complete list of their names, together with other information, see Appendix III.
of his own immediate neighbourhood. It would be very difficult for the organiser of an army to overlook Sir Robert Dormer or Sir Ralph Verney, but it would be very easy for him to overlook John Rufford of Edlesborough or Thomas Woodford of Burnham.

The Crown, indeed, must have had some source of information other than the memory or imagination of its principal advisers. It may have obtained details about local gentry from the sheriff or the custos rotulorum of the shire. It may have gathered information about landed wealth from the returns of subsidy commissioners, despite the inaccuracy of the assessments. It may have extracted the names of gentlemen with household servants from the certificates of the commissioners of general musters, which were almost invariably taken immediately before the taking of special musters. But although the Crown may have made use of all these sources, it seems that it relied to a large extent on mere guesswork: how else can one account for the fact that a letter was sent to one man who had been dead for two years, and to another who (so it transpired) had neither lands nor offices.

1. See above, p. 85.
2. There is evidence that, in all, letters were sent to 13 dead men and 3 other non-existent men this year (L.P. xix, pt.1 273).
The Crown's list of names may be criticized not only because it contains the names of men who were not able to prepare soldiers, but also because it excludes those of men who were well able to do so. Among the Buckinghamshire gentry not written to in 1543 were four of the 23 resident J.P.s of the shire, including George Bulstrode, lord of the manors of Chalvey and Berkin-in-Horton, who was a man of considerable landed wealth.\footnote{His lands in all England were assessed at £60 in 1522 (Bod. e 187 f. 112b).} Bulstrode, indeed, was a much bigger landowner than many of those deemed "powerful" in 1543, eleven of whom apparently owned no lands at all in the county. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that, of these eleven, three were lessees of royal manors (who might thereby have the leading of considerable numbers of the King's tenants) and one had lands just over the border in Berkshire.

Apart from these eleven, there were seven men in the list of 1543 whose lands were apparently only worth £20 or less per annum. This fact is of some significance when it is realised that a man like John Hampden of Dunton, whose lands were worth more than £30 per annum, should have escaped a summons. This oversight, however, may have been due to his being confused with his namesake cousin.
of Great Hampden, whose name does appear on the list.

Not all those who had been ordered to prepare soldiers, on this as on other occasions, were eventually ordered to send a contingent to the wars. Of the 44 Buckinghamshire gentry to whom letters for special musters were sent in 1543, only thirteen were called upon to contribute soldiers to the great army that crossed to France in the following year - two of them providing men to serve in the Battle, and the rest to serve in the Rearguard.¹

How were these unlucky thirteen selected? Two, Sir Edmund Peckham and Richard Greenway, were automatically chosen because, as officers of the Royal Household, they were bound to accompany the King with a retinue of men whenever he went to war in person. The remaining eleven, however, cannot be so readily categorized: all possible explanations of their selection seem to be invalid. It might be thought, for example, that they were the wealthiest men in the shire; but, although the list includes the name of Sir Robert Dormer, it also includes that of Richard Willoughby of Stoke Goldington, while

¹ L.P. xix, pt.1, 275-6. In addition, Ralph and Nicholas Giffard, whose names were not in the 1543 list, were ordered to supply men.
excluding that of Sir Ralph Verney. Thus one can only conclude that there is no real explanation of the Crown's choice: perhaps it was a question of drawing lots.

In coastal shires, however, there was a factor which may have influenced the Crown's choice of suppliers: this was the proximity of a gentleman's property to the sea. It may be of some significance that in 1544 neither Otho Gilbert, who had referred in his certificate to "hys mancon places adjoynyng Torre baye",¹ nor Richard Coffin, who had described himself as "dwellyng at Portelynche ... within halffe a quarter of a mile to the see" and who had stated that all his able-bodied tenants and servants lived within a mile of the sea,² was called upon to send men to the wars. Their claim to exemption (for such in effect it was) was no new one: thirty years previously another Devonshire gentleman, Robert Cary, had asked to be discharged of the duty of finding a number of men so that he could keep them at home in readiness to defend the coast.³

When the Crown had decided who should be called upon to send men to the wars, it had to decide how many each

1. P.R.O. SP 1/177 f.167 (L.P. xviii, pt.1, 480).
2. P.R.O. SP 1/244 f.129 (L.P. Add. 1589).
3. L.P. Add. 115.
should send. In 1544 this decision was not a difficult one to make: the special musters of the previous year had provided the Crown with details of the "power" of almost every gentleman of standing in the country. The Crown knew, for example, that it could call upon Sir Edmund Peckham to provide anything up to twelve dozen men (he eventually provided 111) and upon Richard Willoughby to provide no more than two (which was the number that he eventually did provide). Likewise, in 1523, when the King's Lieutenant in the North Parts was raising an army for service against the Scots, he had no difficulty in allotting numbers to the gentry, because special musters had been taken in the previous year. To Adam Hulton, for example, he sent a signet letter ordering him to "have redy ... the nombre of xlij personnes", this being the number which he had certified that he could "make". Again, in 1521, when Wolsey had to draw up a list of those "meate to make men" together with the numbers that they could provide, he could make use of the certificates returned in pursuance of the letters for special musters that he had

2. L.R.O. DDHu 53/11.
sent out three years before.¹

Although in these years the Crown could obtain
information about the numerical strength of the quasi-feudal
forces from the returns of recently taken special musters,
there were other years when it had to raise men without
any such source of information. In 1528, for instance,
when Lord Sandys (acting on behalf of the Crown) sent out
signet letters to various men ordering them to supply
soldiers for the wars, he had no definite knowledge of the
number of soldiers that each was able to provide, and had
to rely merely on his "simple estimacon".² This, too,
was what other organisers of armies had to rely upon in
other years when definite information was lacking. In 1536
it was probably Cromwell's "simple estimacon" which
determined the number that each gentleman should send
against the rebels, since there was no time for the taking
of special musters. On this occasion, it seems, Cromwell
under-estimated the strength of many gentlemen, for, as
the Earl of Surrey informed his father, they had "dobleled"
or "trebled" the numbers that they had been appointed to
supply.³

1. See above, pp. 89-90.
2. P.R.O. SP 1/47 f.240b (L.P. iv, 4199).
When the Crown had no information about the resources of those ordered to supply men, however, it was more likely to over-estimate than to under-estimate the number that each should provide. In 1514, for instance, the Earl of Surrey (the father of the above-mentioned Earl) informed Sir John Daunce that "wher'as Sir Stephen Bull was written to by the kinges grace for L men ..., he hath certyfied ... that he can make but XXV";¹ and Sir Wistan Browne, who had been "apoynted in the boke to fynd C men", had "ben before the lordes off the consell, who be content that he shall fynde but L".² Again, in 1542 a Kentish gentleman named Waller, who had been ordered to provide more men than he could make, was instructed to "write to the hole counsail [to tell them] what he can furnishes" in order that they might discharge him of part of his number.³

In these cases it is of course possible that the recipients of royal demands were deliberately under-estimating the numbers that they could provide. This possibility must also be borne in mind when one considers the numbers certified in the special muster returns of 1543: it is, for example, extraordinary that a big landowner like Thomas Giffard of

2. Ibid. f.69 (L.P. i, p.1518).
3. B.M. Harl. 283 f.166 (L.P. xvii, 641).
Twyford should only have been able to provide five men.\(^1\)
just as their eagerness to minimise their contributions of
money to the State led the English people to under-estimate
the value of their lands and goods, so too their eagerness
to minimise their contributions of men to the State led
them to under-estimate the number of their able-bodied
dependants. This state of affairs seems to have been
fully appreciated by the Duke of Norfolk, who told Wolsey
in 1525 that many of those who were to be ordered to provide
numbers of men "woll make excuse that they bee not Able to
fynde so many".\(^2\) It was at this time, moreover, that Sir
William Heron, a Northumberland knight, stated that he could
only provide sixteen men for the wars, "which nombre",
wrote William Franklin and others to Wolsey, "we thinke
verrey smale considering his power and auctorite, And
[we thinke] that he might serve your grace moche better
yf he wold extend his will to his power."\(^3\)

It was probably in order to deal with this problem
that, on some occasion in Henry VIII's reign, the Government
planned to distribute the burden of supplying soldiers among

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1. See Appendix III.
2. P.R.O. SP 1/34 f.162 (L.P. iv, 1292).
the gentry strictly in accordance with their wealth. The
scale of charges which was devised at that time is still
in existence, thanks to the diligence of Sir Robert Cotton.¹
Cotton himself, in his draft history of the English Army,
when writing about the raising of forces under Henry VIII,
says: "A proporcion I have at that time drawne (whether
acted or not uncerteine) for an Army Royall to attend Henry
8 into Fraunce, in which, on all subjectes from 4000 li.
Land or ffees to 20 li. in goodes, a proporcion is sett to
finde for the Kings service proportions of men".² It is
possible that this scheme dates from the year 1539, when
Cromwell's memoranda included a reference to "A devise for
defence of the realme in tyme of envasion, and for every
man to contribute according to his behavior".³ Moreover,
it was in this year that John Marshall, on receiving an
order to prepare four soldiers, wrote to Cromwell in these
words: "my lawrde, the kynges graces Consell ys mysinformyd
of me, for my londes ys but ffourty markes a yere Clere,
and other men that maye dyspend thryse my londes fynd no mo
than I dow".⁴

¹ B.M. Otho E XI f.20 sqq. For details, see Appendix VI.
² B.M. Julius C IV f.24a (printed with alterations in
F. Grose, Military Antiquities, i, 74).
³ P.R.O. E36/143 p.129 (L.P.xiv, pt.1, 655).
⁴ P.R.O. SP 1/150 f.187b (L.P. xiv, pt.1, 839).
Just as there were variations in the number of soldiers that different men would be required to supply in any given year, so also were there variations in the number of soldiers that any given man would be required to supply in different years. These variations can best be illustrated by the following tables, the first of which contains the names of all those who are known to have sent certain numbers of men to the wars in each of the years 1512 and 1513:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Supplier</th>
<th>1512 No.</th>
<th>1513 No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sir George Forster</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir William Rede</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir William Filol</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Adrian Fortescue</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Richard Fowler</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William FitzWilliam</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

How does one account for the fact that Fortescue's and Rede's numbers were so greatly increased in the second year, while those of the other four remained fixed? Had the Crown acquired new knowledge in the meantime? It is impossible to say.

The second table lists the names of all those who are

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1. P.R.O. SP 1/2 ff. 112-3 (L.P. i, 1176/1); L.P. i, 1176/3; P.R.O. E 101/61/31 f.43.
known to have been called upon to supply certain numbers in 1521 and 1523: 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Supplier</th>
<th>County of Residence</th>
<th>1521 No.</th>
<th>1523 No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sir John Clerk</td>
<td>Bucks.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Robert Lee</td>
<td>Bucks.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Andrew Windsor</td>
<td>Berks.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Richard Weston</td>
<td>Berks.</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Edmund Tame</td>
<td>Glos.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir John Vere</td>
<td>Essex</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Giles Strangeways</td>
<td>Dorset</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Henry Marny</td>
<td>Essex</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Roger Wentworth</td>
<td>Essex</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir William Essex</td>
<td>Berks.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the total number of soldiers required in 1523 was greater than that required in 1521, it is only natural that the numbers that individuals were called upon to provide should be larger in the later year. But, if this is so, why did the numbers allotted to Clerk and Lee remain constant? In order to attempt to answer this question, it is necessary to look closely at the period that intervened between the mobilisation of 1521 and the mobilisation of 1523.

The year 1522 witnessed the making of an inquiry into

the financial and military resources of the kingdom, of
which inquiry a few of the returns survive. Of the five
counties named in the above table, there are complete returns
for Buckinghamshire and incomplete returns for Berkshire
(but none at all for Dorset and Essex, and only unavailable
ones for Gloucestershire). These returns were supposed to
contain a great deal of information that would be very
useful to anyone who had to organise an army: in them
was to be recorded not only the "ability" or otherwise of
every man, but also (where applicable) the name of the
person from whom he held his land or by whom he was employed.
But although this information is found in the Berkshire
return, it is absent from the Buckinghamshire one; which
means that the Crown in 1523 had some idea of the numbers
of able men who were under the leading of the gentry of
Berkshire, but no idea at all of the numbers at the disposal
of the gentry of the neighbouring county of Buckingham.
Wolsey, while he was ignorant of the number of able men
holding land from Sir John Clerk or Sir Robert Lee, was
aware that Sir William Essex, for example, had seven able
tenants at Lambourn, four at Benham Valence, four at Church
Speen, four at Enborne, and one at West Woodhay. Thus

1. For details of the inquiry, see Appendix I.
2. P.R.O. E 315/464 ff.33-4, 91b, 94, 96b, 97b.
he could safely double the number that Essex had been called upon to provide in 1521, although he could not do the same in the case of Clerk or Lee. And in the same category as Essex would probably come Weston (under whose rule were 97 able tenants of the Queen at Newbury),\(^1\) Windsor, Strangeways, Tame, and the three knights of Essex (the returns for which shire were almost certainly as full as those for Berkshire).\(^2\) Is it not possible, therefore, that the reason for the increased size of the contingents recruited in 1523 was the acquisition of new information about the numbers of potential soldiers that certain individuals had on their lands?

While the number that a gentleman was ordered to supply generally tended to increase (perhaps because the Crown's knowledge of his resources tended to increase) with each successive campaign, the opposite sometimes happened. For instance, when a man was called upon to supply soldiers in two consecutive years, the number that was demanded of him in the second year would sometimes be smaller than that demanded in the first. The case of Sir William Essex again provides an illustration: in 1543 he sent 50 footmen to

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2. See the Essex commissioners' instructions, below, p. 289.
Flanders; but in the following year he was ordered to contribute only 20 footmen to the army against France. The Crown may have thought it inequitable to make a heavy demand upon a man two years running, especially if his contingent had sustained casualties.

The Crown, moreover, seems on some occasions to have deliberately refrained from making any demand whatsoever on one man in two successive years. Of the ten Berkshire gentlemen called upon to send soldiers to the wars in 1543, only three (of whom Sir William Essex was one) were called upon again in the following year: the seven who escaped a second summons were replaced by seven other gentlemen. Be this as it may, the fact that nine men (Sirs Wistan Browne, John Cutte, William Filol, Adrian Fortescue, George Forster, James Hubber, William Rede, and Thomas Wyndham - and John Fortescue) are all known to have sent soldiers to the French wars in the three years 1512, 1513, and 1514 indicates that the Crown was quite capable of making frequent demands upon one group of gentlemen.

1. L.P. xviii, pt.1, 832; xix, pt.1, 274.
2. Cf. below, p.131.
   1513: L.P. i, 1176/3; P.R.O. E 101/56/29 f.11b.
   1514: L.P. i, pp.1518-9; B.M. Otho E XI f.44; P.R.O. E 101/61/31 ff.22, 45, 61.
Thus it happened that, in the course of his lifetime, one man might be ordered to provide soldiers on many occasions. Sir Adrian Fortescue, for example, whose habit it was to preserve all the signet letters that he received, is known to have been instructed to despatch contingents to the army on nine separate occasions in the course of 25 years: in 1512, 1513, 1514, 1521, 1522, 1524, 1525, 1528, and 1536. But whether or not this record is an exceptional one it is impossible to say. What is certain is that it was the country gentlemen of England, of whom Fortescue was in many ways a typical example, who had to bear the main burden of providing soldiers for the wars of the early Tudors.

Section II. The Lords Temporal and Spiritual

While the country gentry was the class which bore the main burden of providing soldiers for the wars, the greatest individual burdens were borne by the temporal lords. In return for the privilege of peerage, it was the duty of the lords to provide the Crown with large contingents of soldiers.

1. L.P. i, 1176/1; P.R.O. E 101/61/31 f.43; B.M. Otho E XI ff.41-50; L.P. iv, 4127; xi, 637.
whenever these were required. In the eyes of the sovereign, it has been said, "the great military virtue of the peerage" was its "ability to recruit soldiers".1

Every campaign therefore saw the lords busily engaged in recruiting soldiers. In 1543, for example, two out of three peers received letters for special musters against the French,2 while many others doubtless received similar letters for special musters against the Scots. In 1536, moreover, when the king was raising forces for service against the rebels, it seems that every peer in the realm was called upon to supply men.3

The number of soldiers that a peer was called upon to provide naturally tended to be larger than that required from an ordinary gentleman: while the latter's contingent would often be counted in tens, that of the former would often be counted in hundreds. Thus in 1512 nine peers (aided by three sons of peers) contributed more men to the Guienne expeditionary force than did 66 knights, squires,


2. This is revealed by a comparison between the list of peers at the end of Miss Miller's thesis and that in L.P. xix, pt.1, 273.

3. This is revealed by a comparison between Miss Miller's list and that in L.P. xi, 580/5.
and gentlemen put together. ¹ This, however, is perhaps an exceptional case: a more typical example comes from the year 1523, when the total number of soldiers provided by temporal peers amounted to a little over half the number provided by lesser men.²

The spiritual peers, too, bore their share of the burden of supplying soldiers for the wars. In 1536 18 out of a total of 21 English and Welsh bishops were listed among those ordered to send men to serve against the rebels,³ while 23 out of a total of 27 received letters for special musters seven years later.⁴ Sometimes, however, when the size of the army to be raised was small and/or the time available for its assembly was short, only those bishops whose sees were nearest the assembly-point of the army would be called upon to supply soldiers: in 1549, for example, only the Archbishop of York and the Bishop of Durham were required to send troops to the Scottish Border,⁵ and only the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Bishops of London and Chichester were required to send troops to the

¹ P.R.O. SP 1/2 ff.112-3 (L.P. i, 1176/1).
² P.R.O. SP 1/28 ff. 193-210 (L.P. iii, 3288).
³ L.P. xi, 580/5.
⁴ L.P. xix, pt.1, 273.
⁵ P.R.O. SP 15/3 f.105.
aid of the King at Windsor.\textsuperscript{1}

The number of soldiers that any given bishop was required to supply would generally depend upon the size of his see and the size of the army to be raised. To the small "army by sea" of 1513 the Bishops of Lincoln and Hereford contributed 50 and 20 men respectively;\textsuperscript{2} while the contingents which the same bishops were ordered to send to the much larger army against the rebels in 1536 numbered 300 and 100.\textsuperscript{3} Sometimes, however, other factors come in to alter the picture. To the "army by sea" of 1513 the Bishops of London and Chester contributed 25 and 51 men respectively;\textsuperscript{5} but to the "army by sea" of the following year (which was of similar size), while the Bishop of London again contributed 25, his brother of Chester only contributed 30.\textsuperscript{6} This unexpected reduction may have been due to the fact that only 44 of the 51 men sent to the wars in 1513 came back alive\textsuperscript{6} - a fact which might have led the bishop to petition the Crown to permit him to despatch a smaller number in the following year. It

\begin{itemize}
\item[1.\quad] P.R.O. SP 10/8 ff.2-4.
\item[2.\quad] L.P. i, 1176/3.
\item[3.\quad] L.P. x1, 580/5.
\item[4.\quad] L.P. i, 1176/3.
\item[5.\quad] P.R.O. E 101/56/10 f.59 (L.P. i, p.1514); E 101/61/31 f.49.
\item[6.\quad] P.R.O. E 101/56/29 f.13a.
\end{itemize}
is noteworthy that the Archbishop of Canterbury's contingent was reduced from 100 to 60 in the same period, perhaps for the same reason.\footnote{1}

As the leading ecclesiastical magnate in England, the Archbishop of Canterbury was often called upon to furnish contingents for the wars. In the course of Henry VIII's reign Warham and Cranmer were summoned no less than eight times: in 1513, 1514, 1522, 1523, 1536, 1542, 1543, and 1544.\footnote{2} Primacy among the bishops in spiritual affairs seems to have carried with it primacy in such a secular matter as the provision of soldiers for the King's armies; but while the one was a cherished privilege, the other was a burdensome duty.

The bishops' duty of providing the Crown with soldiers had always been shared by the heads of certain religious houses that were important enough to receive a direct summons for this purpose from the Crown.\footnote{3} The heads of 50 such houses had received military summonses in the period 1244-1385;\footnote{4} and, of these 50, 16 were to receive

\footnote{1. There are no demobilisation figures for his 1513 contingent, as there are for the Bishop of Chester's.}
\footnote{2. \textit{L.P. i}, 1176/3 and p.1518; \textit{iv}, App.87; \textit{iii}, 3288; \textit{xi}, 580/5; \textit{C.C.L. Reg. U} f.7a; \textit{L.P.xviii}, pt.1, 832; \textit{xix}, pt.1, 274.}
\footnote{3. The manred of a small monastery was normally at the disposal of the high steward. See below, p. 164.}
\footnote{4. H. M. Chew, \textit{English Ecclesiastical Tenants in Chief}, p.76n.}
summons in the course of Henry VIII's reign. The largest number ever to be called upon at one time in this period was, so far as is known, 21: that was in 1521, when Wolsey sent out signet letters to 14 abbots and 7 priors, ordering them to raise men for service in Flanders. And, as this list of monks is the only complete one of its kind that survives, it deserves a careful analysis.

All the 14 abbots were of Parliamentary status, and were clearly ecclesiastics of considerable standing. But they were not the only religious who enjoyed this status: there were 14 other Parliamentary abbots who received no military summons in 1521, although they had all contributed men to mediaeval armies. Why then were half the Parliamentary abbots written to, while half were not? Obviously, geographical factors had something to do with the Crown's decision: it explains, for example, why the Abbots of St. Mary's (York) and St. Benet's (Hulme) were not summoned. Nevertheless, it does not explain why the Abbots of Colchester and Waltham were not summoned, when the Abbots of Evesham and Tewkesbury were.

1. For a complete list of the abbots and priors summoned in Henry VIII's reign, see Appendix VII.
2. This list is in B.M. Otho E XI f.38b.
4. Ibid. and Chew, loc. cit.
The reasons underlying the selection of the seven priors is also obscure. The only Parliamentary prior (the Prior of Coventry), who, incidentally, had sent men to the wars in the Middle Ages, was not included in the list. More surprising still is the omission of the Prior of Christchurch (Canterbury), which at this time was "one of the most important and largest houses in the country, ranking with abbeys such as Glastonbury, St. Albans, and Bury St. Edmunds", and which lay conveniently near the proposed port of embarkation of the army – Dover. Why was this priory not selected when comparatively insignificant and less conveniently situated houses like Merton and Lanthony were? Again, there appears to be no rational explanation: Wolsey, to whom had been entrusted the task of selecting those who were "meate to make men", was free to choose whomsoever he liked.

It is possible that on this occasion the Cardinal's decision was affected by a passing whim. At the time when he was engaged upon the task of selecting the suppliers of soldiers for the army to be sent to the aid of Charles V, Wolsey was travelling towards Dover on the first stage of his journey to Bruges for his famous meeting with the

2. For the evidence on which the following account is based, see Appendix VIII.
same Charles. On 31 July he travelled from Sittingbourne to Dover, stopping at Canterbury to write a letter to the King; and on the following day, while waiting for his ship at Dover, he wrote once more to the King to say that he had drawn up a list of those who were to supply the men. Is it merely a coincidence that this list did not contain the name of the Prior of Christchurch, with whom Wolsey had probably been dining on the previous day at the very time when he was turning over in his mind which abbots and priors should be burdened with the Crown's demands for men? Would it be rash to suggest that the Cardinal's stay at Canterbury had anything to do with the otherwise inexplicable omission of the prior's name from the army list of 1521? It may well be that considerations of this kind sometimes weighed more heavily than the more obvious ones of geographical location and so forth in the minds of those responsible for the organisation of early Tudor armies.

In 1536, however, the Prior of Christchurch enjoyed no such exemption: he was one of 16 religious who, ironically enough, are known to have received direct summonses from the Crown to send troops to fight against those staunch friends of the monasteries, the Pilgrims of Grace.¹ This, of course, was the last occasion on which

1. See Appendix VII.
the abbots and priors were called upon to furnish the King with soldiers, for the rebels were defeated and the monasteries were dissolved.

By 1544, when the King was once more raising a large army, all the abbeys and priories had gone: only the "late Abbot of St. Albans" and the "late prior of Marten" (who presumably still had a number of dependants) were called upon to raise men. These two ex-monks, together with the heads of the Colleges of South Malling and Sudbury and the Masters of the Hospitals of St. Katherine's and the Savoy, who were also called upon that year, were the sole survivors of an era in which monastic houses had played an important part in the military organisation of England.¹

Some of the "power" formerly belonging to the monasteries now belonged to the bishops of new sees like Gloucester and Peterborough, both of whom received letters for special musters in 1543.² Some of it, on the other hand, had hardly changed hands at all: the Deans and Chapters of Canterbury and Winchester who were ordered to send men to France in 1544, were not very different from the Priors and Monks of Christchurch and St. Swithin's who had been ordered to send men against the rebels less

¹. *L.P.* xix, pt.1, 274.
than eight years before.\textsuperscript{1} A great deal of it, however, had passed by grant or lease of monastic lands out of the hands of ecclesiastics and into those of the country gentlemen, from the ranks of whose dependants, now more than ever before, the Crown expected to draw the great bulk of its soldiery.

\textsuperscript{1} L.P. xi, 580; xix, pt.1, 274.
CHAPTER III

The Soldiers

In order to analyse the composition of an army raised under the quasi-feudal system, it is necessary to divide the soldiery into two distinct groups. The first group consists of captains and petty-captains; and the second group, which is about fifty times as large as the first one, consists of common soldiers. Between these two groups there was an unbridgeable gulf.

Section I. The Captains and Petty-Captains

The captains were normally drawn from the ranks of the suppliers of soldiers.\(^1\) Thus, when the Crown sent out signet letters to individual gentlemen ordering them to supply soldiers, it always ordered a proportion of them to serve in person. "Our pleasure and commandement ... is that you shall ... putt yourself in redynes with horse, harneys, and other apparaill and convenient habilimentes

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\(^1\) For an analysis of this class, see above, pp.112-17.
for the warre to wayte upon us", wrote Henry VIII to Sir William Fielding when ordering him to provide a contingent of soldiers for the army that he himself was planning to lead against the rebels in 1536.1 And similar instructions were always being sent out in time of war and internal rebellion to those whom the Crown thought fit to serve as captains in its armies.

The reservoir from which captains could be drawn was not a large one: the suppliers of soldiers constituted a small class, and not all of them could be called upon to serve in person. As the King himself realised, some of the gentlemen whom he ordered to serve in 1536 would probably be so "gretely diseased" that they would be unfit for military service.2 Sickness, indeed, was often put forward as an excuse for the non-performance of such services. In the year 1545 this was the excuse offered by three of those ordered to lead contingents against the Scots - by John Tempest,3 by William Plompton,4 and by Sir Edward Aston. The last-named informed Shrewsbury at the end of April that he had been "syns the begynnynge off lente

1. P.R.O. SP 1/109 f.259 (L.P. xi, 906/1).
2. P.R.O. SP 1/107 f.5 (L.P. xi, 579).
4. Ibid. 824.
sore dyseased with syckenes".  

The weight of official business was also put forward as a reason for a gentleman's inability to serve in the war. In 1545 Sir Thomas Venables pleaded that he could not serve against the Scots on account of his office of sheriff.  

In 1557 the Privy Council interceded with Shrewsbury to 'forbeare the servyce abrode in the warres" of Sir John Chaworth, because he was both sheriff and general receiver of Nottinghamshire. Yet another northern office-holder who asked to be exempted from military service was Sir Henry Clifford, who in 1523 pointed out that he was "charged with the kynges sherroweke of this countie of yorke". He had, however, a more personal reason for wishing to stay at home on that occasion: "his beddfellow bredeth child, wherby ... it shuld put hr in Jepardy of hir Liff".

In theory only the most suitable gentlemen were selected to serve as captains. In practice, however, as Thomas Audley pointed out in his "Booke of Orders for the Warre" which he wrote "att the Comand of Kinge Henry the viij"

2. L.P. xx, pt.1, 579.
4. P.R.O. SP 1/233 f.231a (L.P. Add.373).
this did not always happen. "captens be chosen in England by favor and not by worthynes": hence, the cause of the inefficiency of the English soldier was that "his capten is as ignorant as he, and was made a capten ere ever he was a soldiour".\footnote{B.M. Harl. 309 f.8.} Be this as it may, the captains that Henry appointed to serve in the intended expedition to Flanders in 1521 do seem to have been chosen for their "worthiness": three out of four are known to have fought in the previous French war, where a number of them were knighted for their good service.\footnote{The captains' names are found in B.M. Otho E XI ff.34a, 39b.}

Foremost among these captains was Sir William Sandys, soon to be created Baron Sandys of the Vyne. Wolsey, indeed, thought so highly of his military qualities that he had wanted the King to make him Grand Captain and Commander-in-Chief of the army, but Henry said that no-one below an earl could hold such an important rank.\footnote{L.P. iii, 1454.} Sandys was one of the most distinguished soldiers of his day: he served as Treasurer of the expeditionary force sent to Guienne in 1512, as a captain in the Middleward of the army against France in 1513, as Marshal of the army that Suffolk led against the French in 1523, and as Captain of
Günes from 1526 onwards.¹

Sandys, however, was too eminent a man to be considered a typical captain of this period. A better example of a gentleman-soldier of Henry VIII's reign is found in the person of an Oxfordshire knight, Sir Adrian Fortescue, who fortunately left behind him some record of his services. In 1513 he was present at the sieges of Thérouanne and Tournai: "I and l souldyures ware with the kynges grace at the getting of turwysyn and turney, v monethes."² In the following year he served in the "crew" that was sent across to Calais under Lord Abergavenny: "I and l souldyoure ware at Cales ... under the [lord] burgany, iij9 monethes."³ In 1522 he again served against the French: "I and xxx souldyoures ware on see and londes ... under the erle of surrey, lord admyrall, from the vj day of June to the xxvij day of octobre, xxj wekes."⁴ Thus, in the course of ten years, Fortescue had spent more than twelve months in the King's service. Nevertheless, he was always eager to serve: in 1536 he evidently wrote to Cromwell complainin

¹. D.N.B.
². B.M. Otho E XI f. 44a.
³. Ibid., f. 50b.
⁴. Ibid., f. 42a.
that he had not received a summons to serve against the rebels.¹ This was the last campaign in which he could have served: three years later the loyal old soldier was sent to the block by an ungrateful sovereign on account, it is said, of his kinship with Anne Boleyn.²

One other record of service, covering exactly the same period, is extant: it is contained in a petition made to Henry VIII round about the year 1540 by Sir Edward Willoughby of Woodland (Dorset) and later of Wollaton (Nottinghamshire). Here he relates how, "at all tymes passed sythens that he was of thage of xxj tô yeres untoo this day, by the space of xxix tô yeres", he "from tyme to tyme hath done unto your Grace sutche service as haith bene in his power". He had served in person in "Hey Spayne" in 1511, in Guienne in 1512, in the North in 1513 (being taken prisoner by the Scots at Flodden), in France in 1522, and finally against the rebels in 1536. On the last occasion he had led 100 men "owt of Dorsettshire too Dankester, wiche is viij xx miles".³

In leading 100 men to the wars, Sir Edward Willoughby,

1. L.P. xi, 637.
2. D.N.B.
like all captains on all occasions, would have been assisted by a second-in-command or "petty-captain". Such an officer often seems to have been the friend or kinsman of the captain. In 1542, for example, being ordered to lead a contingent of men against the Scots, Roger Brereton appointed his "very nere freud and kynnesman", Thomas Brereton, "to be his petye capten of his seid men and company". That it was not unusual for a captain to appoint a relative as his petty-captain seems to be clear from an examination of the list of officers serving in the Vanguard of the army against France in 1513: Sir Thomas Blount and Meredith ap Mathew both appointed their sons; Sir John Draycott, Sir John Leak, Sir John Zouche of Codnor, Arthur Eyre, and William Chetwyn all appointed their brothers; while Sir William Pierpoint, Sir John Mainwaring of Ightfield, Sir Thomas Cockin, Sir William Gresley, William Chorlton, and Ralph Leach all appointed men with the same surnames as themselves, who were probably their near kinsmen.

But even if there were no ties of blood between captain and petty-captain, there were always ties of class: both officers were invariably gentlemen. Indeed, it was their gentility which separated the officers from the other members of the company, and which gave to them that ascendancy.

2. L.P. 1, 2392.
over the common soldiers upon which the good discipline of an army always depended.

Section II. The Common Soldiers

When the Crown sent out signet letters to individuals ordering them to prepare soldiers, it almost always gave some indication of the class or classes of men from which the soldiers should be drawn. In May 1523, for example, the suppliers were informed that their soldiers were "to bee takene of youre tennautes or other being within any youre Rule or auctoritie". In some years, however, the Crown was more careful to enumerate all the classes from which men should be recruited: in July 1549, for instance, Sir Anthony Kingston was ordered to levy men from "your own ffryndes, favorers, servaunte, Tenauntea, and others within your offices and Rules".

But although the wording of signet letters varied from year to year, the Crown's conception of the nature of a man's "power" remained the same. An individual who was called upon to supply soldiers could recruit them from four principaclasses of men: his household servants, his tenants, the

1. B.M. Otbo E XI f. 43a.
2. P.R.O. SP 46/2 f.21.
tenants of other men under his stewardship, and his friends.

(a) Household Servants

Most of those called upon to supply soldiers for the wars kept servants in their households, some of whom would probably be suitable for military service. From the returns of the general musters of 1539, for example, it appears that Sir Hugh Paulet had 35 able-bodied household servants around him at Hinton St. George (Somerset), that Sir William Gascoigne had 28 at Gawthorpe (West Riding of Yorkshire), and that William Wroughton had 13 at Bishopstoke (North Wiltshire).\(^1\) Again, from the returns of the special musters taken four years later it appears that Sir Robert Dormer of Buckinghamshire, Sir Thomas Dennis of Devonshire, and Sir Richard Catesby of Warwickshire each had 20 able household servants.\(^2\)

The possession of able-bodied servants enabled some recipients of royal demands for men, particularly noblemen, "to supply a fair number of men from their households alone".\(^3\) Sir William Waldegrave, for instance, could have recruited all but one of the 24 men that he sent to the wars

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3. Miller, op.cit., p.177.
in 1523 from the ranks of his household servants; for an examination of the Suffolk "Domesday" return of the previous year reveals that he had 24 servants (all but one of whom were able) in his household at Bures. ¹

Nevertheless, it does not follow that, in recruiting a contingent of soldiers, a man would recruit his household servants first, even though they would be his nearest available source of manpower. In fact, unless he were serving in person, he might be reluctant to part with any of his servants until all other sources of manpower had been exhausted; a house denuded of its able-bodied male staff would be an uncomfortable place to live in. On the other hand, it has to be borne in mind that a man's household servants were generally the most trustworthy of his dependants; at the time of the Pilgrimage of Grace, the gentry of Yorkshire, having no faith in the loyalty of their tenants either to the King or to themselves, were obliged to recruit their contingents only from the ranks of their servants. ²

(b) Tenants

In the normal way, the greater part of a man's power was drawn from the ranks of his tenants. It was among the

¹ P.R.O. SP 1/28 f. 201b (L.P. iii, 3288); I.P.L. MS. 942.64 f. 60 (H.M.C. Ancaster, p. 491). The Crown may have ordered him to send 24 men because of this entry in the return of 1522. Cf. above, p. 125.

² L.P. xi, 692.
people who held land from him – by lease, by copy of court-roll, or by neither – that a lord expected to raise the bulk of any contingent of soldiers that he sent to serve in the King's wars. Thus it is generally true to say that the extent of a man's "power" was roughly proportional to the extent of his lands.

There was, of course, no fixed proportion between the size of an estate and the number of tenants dwelling there. The following table, in which are listed the values of four of the Abbot of Abingdon's Berkshire manors and the numbers of tenants residing on them in 1522 provides an illustration of this:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Manor</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>No. of Tenants</th>
<th>No. of Able Tenant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farnborough</td>
<td>£18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Ginge</td>
<td>£18 11s.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Lockinge</td>
<td>£29</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welford</td>
<td>£48 9s.</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table indicates not only that the number of tenants bore little relation to the area of the estate, but also that the number of able-bodied tenants bore little relation to the total number of tenants. This was, in effect, what Nicholas Ashford was saying when in 1543 he explained

that he was only able to certify ten able men because "manye of his tenauntes bene wydowes, aged men, as alalso syngle in habylyte".\(^1\)

All able-bodied male tenants were bound to serve the King in their lords' retinues whenever the latter were called upon to lead or send soldiers to the wars. By his allegiance every man was obliged to perform military service in the King's army; by the terms of his tenure, if no longer by homage,\(^2\) every tenant was obliged to perform this service under the leading of his lord.

This tenurial obligation, even in the case of a leaseholder, was not normally a written one, though occasionally a clause relating to the performance of military services was included in an indenture.\(^3\) The argument put forward on behalf of two men of Potlock (Derbyshire), that "byt was notte there dutye" to perform military services since the deeds by which they held their lands made no mention of such services, was not a valid one.\(^4\) The manred of his tenants was a customary perquisite of every manorial lord.

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1. P.R.O. SP 1/178 f.67 (L.P. xviii, pt.1, 579/2).

2. As late as 1552 Henry, Duke of Suffolk was making his tenants do homage for lands held by military service (Indentures in Devon R.O. 123/17, 20, 21).

3. See above, p.93.

4. P.R.O. C 1/1053 f.49.
that was so universally recognised that it was hardly ever
mentioned. It was, however, mentioned on those rare
occasions when a tenant refused to serve in his lord's
retinue.

One such refusal to serve, indeed, elicited from one
man (perhaps a lawyer) a minor treatise on tenurial military
obligations. In a petition to the Lord Chancellor made
on behalf of one John Port of Etwall (Derbyshire) in 1544
it is stated that:

by auncient and laudable Custum contynned syns
and afor tyme of mynd (as well in the Countre
and shire where your said Cratour dwellith,
as also by and throught out the hole Realme
of England) hyt hath bryn used that, whencesoever
and as often as any of the kynges faithfull
and obedient subjectes hath had in commanment
by the kynges highnes or his graces lieutenaunt
(by reyson of there lettres to them adressid)
to prepare of his servauntes, femours, and
tenaunte any nombre of men to serve the kynges
said majestie in his gracis warres, that then
and thereupon the kynges said subjectes (to
whom such comanment hath at any seyson be
gyvyn) have usyd to reise such nombre of men
amongest there said servauntes, femors, and
tenautes.

The refusal to perform military service which led to
this action in Chancery was one of eight similar incidents
of which there is record. These have been listed in the
following table:

1. E 1/1053 f.48.
2. L.P. xiv, pt.1, 968, 1071; P.R.O. C 1/1047 f.62;
C 1/1053 ff. 48-9; C 1/1100 f.26; P.R.O. Sta.Cha.
2/26/287; Collections for a Hist. of Staffs. (Wm.
Salt Soc. 1910), pp.71-2; Stewart-Brown, op.cit.,
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Lord</th>
<th>Manor</th>
<th>Shire</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of Tenants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sir Jn. Newton</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1539</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Wm. Turville</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1539</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ed. Pye</td>
<td>Meriden et al.</td>
<td>Warw.</td>
<td>1542</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jn. Port</td>
<td>Potlock</td>
<td>Derby</td>
<td>1542,'4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nic. Bradbury</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>Derby</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thos. Nowell</td>
<td>Ackleton</td>
<td>Salop.</td>
<td>1542</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Wm. Sneyd</td>
<td>Keele</td>
<td>Staffs.</td>
<td>1549</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thos. Brereton</td>
<td>Wettenhall</td>
<td>Chesh.</td>
<td>1542</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The reasons for these refusals to serve are of some interest. In two cases the tenants denied that the man who had attempted to recruit them for the wars was their rightful lord. In the case of Pye the defendants, who had recently come into the possession of certain deeds, "openly dyeclaymed and denied to be Tenauntes". In the case of Port the defendants stated that they had never "agreyd ... to take the sayd Complaynaunt for there lorde", and that they were the tenants of another man.²

In the case of Nowell, however, those refusing to serve did not deny that he was their rightful lord, but they did deny that he had any right to compel them to serve.

1. P.R.O. C 1/1047 f.62.
2. P.R.O. C 1/1053 f.49.
in the wars. The tenants of the manor of Ackleton, it was claimed, did not hold their lands "by knyghtes service ne by any suche service ... for whiche they ought to go wythe them [i.e., the lords of the manor] in the warres ne wythe any other but only the kynges highnes and suche persons to whom his grace wyll appoynte them". In thus denying the right of a lord to recruit his tenants for the wars, the men of Ackleton were in effect denying the existence of that tenurial obligation upon which the whole quasi-feudal military system was based.

Of less significance were the objections put forward by the two tenants who refused to be conscripted in 1539. Newton's tenant objected to serving in an "army by sea": "he wolde goo to see at no mannes request, but at lands ... he wolde not refuse the kynges demande". Turville's tenant, however, was more adamant: in no circumstances would he serve under Turville, though willing "to be redy at any tyme undre the retinue of oney other the kynges subjectes".

1. P.R.O. Sta Cha. 2/26#287 f.3.
2. See below, pp. 278-9.
4. P.R.O. SP 1/152 f.29 (L.P. xiv, pt.1, 1071).
Bad relations between landlord and tenant, however, were probably the exception rather than the rule: certainly, some of the cases cited above were exceptional ones. Both Edward Pye and Thomas Nowell were dealing with men who were probably not well known to them; they were tenants of manors that had only come to them at marriage. Moreover, Nowell was a non-resident landlord: the manor of Ackleton was more than 20 miles distant from his home at Pelsall in Staffordshire.

The distance between a manor and the dwelling-place of its lord was often a factor in determining whether or not its tenants were called upon to serve in the wars. As a general rule, the incidence of service was lowest among tenants dwelling on distant manors, since it was normally more convenient for a landlord to recruit those near at hand. As will be seen later, a Staffordshire landowner could run into difficulties if he tried to recruit men in Surrey.¹ Thus, year after year, a man might levy troops in the immediate vicinity of his own house, in this way allowing his tenants in more remote regions to escape military service. Both in 1513 and 1514 Lord Stourton, for example, appears to have raised all his soldiers in the vicinity of his mansion house at Stourton (Wiltshire).²

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1. See below, p.161.
Again, in 1554, when Lord Berkeley was ordered to send 500 men to the Queen's aid, he caused them all to be "drawn out of the parts about Yate and Berkeley".¹

Nevertheless, there are many examples of men recruiting distant tenants for the wars. In 1513 Sir William Sandys of the Vyne, while levying most of his men on his Hampshire manors, levied a few men on his Northamptonshire manors of Steane and Hinton.² Again, in 1544 Thomas Cawarden of Blechingley recruited men as far north as Utlicote and Loxley - his newly-acquired manors in Warwickshire.³

Noblemen, moreover, had always been accustomed to recruit men over a wide area: the greatness of their estates (which were often scattered throughout several counties) enabled them to do this; the greatness of the numbers demanded of them compelled them to do it. In 1512, for instance, Lord Thomas Howard levied his soldiers in the vicinities of Horsham, Norwich, Ipswich, York, and Tavistock;⁴ while in 1513 Lord Abergavenny levied his in the vicinities of Bury St. Edmunds, Colchester, Lewes, Ipswich, Walsingham, and Birling.⁵ In the latter year,

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¹ Smyth, op.cit., ii, 280.
² P.R.O. E 101/56/25 f.61. For these manors, see above, p.75.
³ G.B.R.O. Loseley MS. 26 f.1a. For these manors, see L.P. xvii, g.220 (88).
⁴ P.R.O. E 101/56/5 p.27.
⁵ P.R.O. E 101/56/25 f.41.
furthermore, Lord Hastings is known to have raised troops in seven shires, and the Duke of Buckingham in not less than eighteen shires.

The incidence of military service among a man's tenants was determined by other factors than that of geography, many of which are identical to those factors mentioned in connection with the recruitment of militiamen. Theoretically, at any rate, a man's soldiers were selected on account of their military capabilities. In 1536 Sir William Molyneux, for example, was ordered to select only "the most able and piked men that you can make and shall thinke the most potent and able to doo us manly .. service", but whether or not he complied with these requirements it is impossible to say.

It is certain, indeed, that some gentlemen, when they came to select men for military service, found that many of their tenants were not suitable for this purpose. In 1523 Sir Adrian Fortescue was informed by his agent, John Heywood, that few of the tenants of one of his manors were meet to serve, but that he would be able to find "pretyar men" on

1. L.P. i, g. 1804 (28).
2. See above, p. 107.
3. See above, Part I, Chapter II, Section II.
4. L.R.O. DDM 17/75.
his estate at Henley. 1 On another occasion James Gifford was informed that the men that his brother was planning to recruit at Pyworthy were of such poor quality that "the more parte of them woll not be alowed when they shall be mustred", and that he would therefore be advised to "loke well uppon the tenaunttes of Stokeham and Yalmeton where be as tall and actyff men as any within devon". 2

The likelihood of a tenant's being recruited for the wars, however, may have depended less upon his ability to do good service than upon his ability to, purchase his discharge. It is possible that, as with the militia, so with the quasi-feudal forces, the poor bore a bigger share of the burden of military service than did the men of substance. The seven men of Monks Eleigh (Suffolk) who were away serving in the army when the "Domesday" commissioners visited that village in 1522 were all described as men of no substance. 3 Again, many of the tenants of the manor of Margaretting (Essex) whom Sir William Petre recruited at the time of Wyatt's rebellion were apparently "of the poorest sorte". 4

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1. P.R.O. SP 1/28 f.68a (L.P. iii, 3148).
2. P.R.O. SP 1/140 f.66a (L.P. xiii, pt.2, 1016/3).
3. I.P.L. MS 942.64 f.112. These men were probably tenant of Christchurch Priory, serving in the retinue of the steward there. See below, p. 163.
4. E.R.O. D/DP Z 14/1 f.7.
There were probably a number of ways in which wealthier tenants could escape service in their lords' retinues. One way was to find substitutes. That this was permissible is clear from the wording of the military clauses that are found in some leases: the tenant was not normally required to serve in person - he could furnish another in his stead.¹ Moreover, it seems that many of the tenants who are known to have refused to perform military services at this period had the option of finding substitutes. Indeed, the two tenants who caused John Port so much trouble in 1542 and 1544 had not been ordered to serve in person: they had merely been "requirid and warnyd to furnishe upp ij able men".² They were wealthy husbandmen, and they may have had servants or labourers whom they could send in their places.

Furthermore, the wealthier tenants were probably able in some cases to bribe their landlords to allow them to escape service, just as the wealthier inhabitants of a parish were able to bribe the King's commissioners.³ In 1523, when Sir Adrian Fortescue was planning to recruit some of his tenants for the wars, he was told that a number of the:

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1. See above, p. 93.
2. P.R.O. C 1/1053 f.48.
3. See above, p. 82.
"wil be glad to by ther peace to byde at home".  

Little is known about the men that Fortescue eventually recruited in 1523 (if indeed he did recruit any). However, it so happens that a list of the men that he recruited for service against the rebels in 1536 is extant; and about a few of these men it is possible to find information in a contemporary rental of Fortescue's manor of Watcombe (Oxfordshire). The names of these men, together with their particulars, have been set down in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Holding</th>
<th>Rent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rd. Andrews</td>
<td>Freeholder</td>
<td>1 tenement</td>
<td>2s. 0d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rd. Browne</td>
<td>Tenant-at-will</td>
<td>1 cottage, ½ acre 5s. 0d.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rt. Buckland</td>
<td>do.</td>
<td>1 tenement,</td>
<td>13s. 8d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 warren</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jn. Rawlinson</td>
<td>do.</td>
<td>1 tenement, 1 toft, 5 acres</td>
<td>25s. 2d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laur. Westfield</td>
<td>do.</td>
<td>1 cottage, 1½ acre</td>
<td>5s½ 6d.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another member of the contingent was Richard Ford.

1. P.R.O. E 1428 f.68a (L.P. 111, 3148).
2. L.P. xiv, 1580-6, f.13.
3. P.R.O. E 315/491 ff.22-7 (27 Hen. VIII); ibid., ff. 28-35 (29 Hen. VIII). The information in both rentals is identical.
He was probably the same Richard Ford who was bailiff of the manors of Sotwell Stonor and Sotwell St. John in 1532,\(^1\) and who five years later was referred to thus:\(^2\)

\[
\text{Sotewell. Richard fford hath the manour place and the demayne londes in ferme for iiiijr yeres.}
\]

In addition to Ford, three other Sotwell men, Thomas Barrett, John Heron, and John Prentice, who almost certainly correspond to the three customary tenants of these names listed in a rental of 1523,\(^3\) appear to have served under Fortescue in 1536.

Here then are nine of the many thousands of tenants who, in the year 1536, were conscripted by their lords to fight against the Pilgrims of Grace. Whether or not they are typical examples of the soldiers who made up the quasi-feudal contingents of early Tudor England one cannot tell; only a few retinue lists survive, and the chances of being able to compare these with manorial rentals are very small. But these nine men - the freeholder, the leaseholder (a member of the rising class of demesne farmers), and the seven customary tenants - are perhaps a representative selection of the English soldiery in an age when the majority of soldiers

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1. P.R.O. E. 315/491 f. 8a.
2. P.R.O. SP 1/152 f.147a (L.P. xiv, pt.1, 1244/5).
were the tenants of the gentry, and the majority of the held their land according to the custom of the manor.\(^1\)

(c) **Stewardship-Tenants**

A man's "power" comprised not only his own tenants, but also the tenants of other men that had come under his authority by virtue of stewardship. This class of dependants was often specifically referred to in the signet letters which ordered and authorised a man to raise troops. In October 1549, for example, Sir Henry Seymour was instructed to levy as many men as possible "by vertue of anie ... authoritie, Stewardship, office or libertye, whatsoever it be".\(^2\) Generally, however, the word "stewardship" was not in fact used; a more typical wording was that employed in a letter sent to Sir Henry Willoughby in the year 1511, in which he was informed that he could levy the "inhabitauntes within any office that ye have of oure graunt or of the graunt of any other person or personnes or commynaltie, not being tenauntes or officers to any other person or personnes havying semblable commaundment".\(^3\)

The proviso at the end of this clause was inserted in order to obviate disputes over manred. Such also was

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2. P.R.O. SP 10/9 f.4.
the purpose of the order issued by the Crown in 1539 to the effect that "none shold reteyn men to serve the kyng in othere offices, Romes, and lordshyppes" - an order that was, in Sir Richard Rich's opinion, "very requysytt for awydyng of debate and stryveff". The order, however, did not avoid a "debate" between Sir Edward Aston and Sir Matthew Browne over the manred of the lordship of Ashtead (Surrey). In the spring of 1539 Sir Edward ordered some of his tenants there to prepare themselves to serve in a contingent of soldiers that he was sending to the wars, only to find that the same tenants had already received a similar summons from Sir Matthew. Accordingly, Aston wrote to Cromwell requesting him "that I may have my owne teynauntes to do servyce unto the kynges hyghtnes with me, as in tymes past they have downe".

Now it is highly probable that Browne was in fact steward of the manor of Ashtead, and that, as a consequence, he numbered the tenants there among the "others within his offices, rules, and authorities" who were an essential part of his "power". If this was so, he had either forgotten that the tenants of other men who had also been called upon

2. P.R.O. SP 1/151 f.190 (L.P. xiv, pt.1, 938).
to supply soldiers must not be meddled with, or he had not known that Aston had been thus called upon.

Although there is no definite evidence that Browne was steward of Ashtead, it does seem highly unlikely that the tenants there would have obeyed his orders were he not Aston's officer. Moreover, as Ashtead was a long way from Aston's principal residence at Tixall (Staffordshire), it is probable that he would have found it necessary to appoint a local gentleman like Sir Matthew Browne of Betchworth as his steward there. Such a practice was not uncommon, as the returns of the survey of 1522 indicate. Sir Andrew Windsor, for instance, was Sir Henry Marney's steward at Buckingham;\(^1\) while Marney was Sir Edward Nevill's steward at Nayland (Suffolk).\(^2\) And since in the following year (1523) all three knights were called upon to lead contingents against the French,\(^3\) it would have been quite possible for them to have become embroiled in disputes over manred. Ten years later, indeed, there were the seeds of such a dispute in the North between the Earl of Derby and Sir Robert Bellingham, steward of the Earl's tenants "nere unto ffurnes"; for Bellingham received a letter direct from

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1. Bod. e 187 f.1a.
2. H.M.C. Ancaster, p.487.
the Lord Warden of the West Marches ordering him to be in readiness to resist the Scots with all the horsemen that he could muster.¹

While there was some risk of disputes over manred between the lords and stewards of lay manors, there was no risk at all of such disputes between the lords and stewards of most monastic manors, since only a very small proportion of religious houses ever received direct demands for men from the Crown.² And even in the case of a large monastery like the Priory of Christchurch (Canterbury), which often sent men to the wars, such disputes would probably have occurred only on manors like Hollingbourne and Chartham which were near enough to Canterbury to be used for the recruitment of men.³ In 1522, when the Priory sent 50 soldiers to France,⁴ the tenants of outlying manors like Halton (Buckinghamshire) and Monks Eleigh (Suffolk) were probably not called upon to serve in this contingent, but were at the disposal of John Cheyney and Humphrey Wingfield, the stewards of the respective manors.⁵

1. T. N. Toller, Derby Correspondence, (Chetham Soc. n.s. xix), p.123.
2. See above, pp.132-3.
3. It was from these manors that the Priory recruited men in 1536 (J. B. Sheppard, Literae Cantuarienses, iii, 348-50). I owe this reference to Mr. L. W. Ives.
4. B.M. Add. MS. 28035 (L.P. iv, App. 87).
5. Bod. e 187 f.39a; H.M.C. Ancaster, p.496.
The stewardship of a monastery (or of part of a monastery's lands) did in fact constitute a very rich source of manpower. The "lytull offyce of the hye stewarteschype of owre monastery" which the Abbot of Winchcombe gave to Cromwell in March 1538 (in a last-minute attempt to win his good favour) was only worth £5 a year; "howbehyt", said the Abbot, "ther ys a pratty manredde belonggyng to hyt wereby yow shall have at yowre commawndment too or thre hundrythe men to serve the kyng". 1 Again, the stewardship of Godstow Nunnery, which the Abbess offered to Cromwell at the same time, provided the holder with 40s. and 20 or 30 men. 2 Both offices had been held by Walter Welsh, who had recently died, and who (probably on account of his stewardships) had been called upon to provide the large number of 200 men in 1536. 3

Another notable holder of monastic stewardships was the Earl of Derby. As he pointed out to the Earl of Northumberland in 1533, he was steward for life of all lands belonging to the Abbey of Furness by virtue of a patent "made under the Convente Seale of the same Monastery": Northumberland therefore had no right to call out the

1. P.R.O. SP 1/130 f.45 (L.P. xiii, pt.1, 505).
2. L.P. xiii, pt.1, 441.
3. L.P. xi, 580.
tenants on the Abbey's estates in Borrowdale. In the same year also, when he was raising a small force to defend the Isle of Man against the Scots, Derby, as high steward of the Abbey of Whalley, called upon the head of that house to levy 20 of his tenants for this purpose. A third religious house, the Priory of Burscough, also came under the rule of the Stanleys; and in 1536, when some were evidently of the opinion that the steward of the monastery (Sir James Stanley, the Earl of Derby's uncle) had no right to its manred, the Earl wrote a long letter to Sir William Fitzwilliam informing him that his uncle's stewardship "appereth by wryting under the Convent Seale", and that his ancestors (who had founded the Priory) had always had the leading of its tenants.

A third great proprietor of monastic offices was Sir William Compton, high steward of "Cistetter, Walsbury, and many other Religious places". On the latter's death in 1528, Lord Sandys wrote to Wolsey asking him to order the heads of these houses to grant their stewardships to him; for, he said, by the acquisition of these offices he would be

3. Ibid., p. 122.
"the mor able to do the better service unto the kinges highnes".  

The Crown, it seems, was well aware that the stewardship of a religious house placed a considerable number of potential soldiers at the disposal of its holder. This is clearly indicated by the letter that Henry VIII wrote to the Prior of Carlisle in 1537 informing him that, in order that the Deputy Warden of the West Marches "may have the men of that countrey in a more redynes to serve us at all tymes when nede shall be or Requyer, It were veray expedient that he shuld have the Office of Stuardship of that your priory".  

By 1537, however, the monasteries were doomed to extinction, and the monastic steward was soon to lose his distinctive place in the military organisation of the kingdom. When special musters were taken in 1543, only one man, it seems, could still raise men from his old monastic office: Sir Thomas Wriothesley, formerly high steward of the Abbey of Hyde near Winchester, informed the King that he was able to raise ten archers on "the lands of Hide not sold". This, nevertheless, gives one only half

1. P.R.O. SP 1/49 f.55 (L.P. iv, 4450).
2. P.R.O. SF 1/241 f.78 (L.P. Add. 1c29).
the picture: some of the manors formerly belonging to this monastery had in fact been granted to Wriothesley at the Dissolution, the tenants of which manors were probably included in the 100 other men that he had described as his own tenants and servants. Similarly, some of the 500 able men certified by Sir Thomas Dennis in the same year were probably tenants of the large manor of Littleham and Exmouth, of which he had formerly been steward for the Abbot of Sherborne, and which had passed to him by purchase in 1540: thus the monastic "power" which he had enjoyed before the Dissolution remained with him after that event.2 This, however, was not a frequent occurrence: in Devonshire, if not elsewhere, it was not usual for a man to acquire lands belonging to a monastery of which he had been steward.3

Most monastic land, of course, passed in the first instance into the hands of the Crown, and its manred into the hands of the Crown's stewards. Thus in 1543 John Ridgway was able to report that he could raise 34 able men

from "his office of Stuard of the late Monastery of Torre", Ridgway's "power", like that of any other steward of Crown lands, was greatly increased by his tenure of this office.

After the Dissolution, it seems, the Crown became more than ever aware of the military potential that lay at the disposal of the stewards of its lands. In the "Articles for the ordering of the Manrede", which were probably drawn up in 1539, it was laid down that the King was to have "A booke of all suche offices and Romes as be of his graces gift within this his Realme of Englande by the whiche any men may be made, with the names of the officers of the said Romes and offices - And the nombre of all suche able persones as may be made within the same offices". The purpose of such a book was to enable the King to "ordre the said Manrede to his graces moost suerty and to the good succession of this his said Realme", and the rest of this document is taken up with the regulations to this end.

Though it is not known whether such a book ever materialised, the very fact that its compilation was ever contemplated is an indication of the Crown's appreciation of the military importance of the steward's office. A further indication

is that, when a man was granted the stewardship of Crown lands, specific mention of the manred was sometimes made in the grant. In 1544, when Sir Richard Southwell was given the office of chief steward of the Nottinghamshire lordships of Mansfield Woodhouse, Clipston, and Linby, and of the Derbyshire lordship of Horsley, it was explicitly stated that he was to have the leading of the King's tenants there.\(^1\) Again, in 1557 Sir John Parrot's patent as chief steward of the lordship of Carew (Pembrokeshire) entitled him to "le manred" of the inhabitants there.\(^2\) Moreover, the absence of such a clause from many grants of stewardship is merely an indication that the governance of the tenants in time of war was universally recognised to be an essential feature of the office.

It was because of its military perquisites that the office of stewardship of Crown lands was often given to the captain or constable of a castle. A letter from Gregory Cohyers to Sir John Bulmer dating from the year 1537 provides an illustration of this:\(^3\)

towchyng the stewerdschyp off Whytby, it is gyffyn all Redy by the kyng, and that can master

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1. L.P. xix, pt.1, g.812 (18).
3. P.R.O. SP 1/115 f.120b (L.P. xii, pt.1, 271).
Boynton schew you; ffor he harde yong Sir Raffe Evers tell the same to Sir George Conyers, And sayd that the kyng and his counsell had takyn dyrectyon that whosoever ware constabyll off Skarborow castell schold be stewerd off Whytby strand.

Similarly, the constable of Sandal Castle seems generally to have also held the office of steward of the lordship of Wakefield.¹

The office of King's steward of Wakefield in Henry VIII's reign gave its holder "the ledyng and setting forthe of many of the kynges subjecttes in the tyme of warres agaynst Scotlande." In the case of Sir Richard Tempest, steward there until his death in 1537, the exercise of these military functions appears to have provided plenty of opportunities for bribery and corruption; on one occasion he was accused of allowing the King's tenants to purchase exemption from military service.² Nevertheless, in 1558 the Privy Council upheld the claim of his kinsman, Sir John Tempest, to the manred of Wakefield by virtue of his ancestral office of steward of the lordship.³

Another important stewardship in the West Riding of

1. L.P. xvii, g.714 (13, 14); xviii, pt.1, g.981 (111).
Yorkshire was that of the honour of Tickhill and Conisbrough. This was held jointly by Sir Henry Wyatt and Sir Arthur Darcy until the former's death in 1536. Wyatt, however, had apparently delegated his share to Sir Bryan Hastings; for, soon after his death, the latter wrote to Suffolk complaining that "my strength which I shold have aydyd the kyng withall is taken fro me by the meanes of sir Arthur Darcye; for I was stuard of thonour of Tyckull and Conesborow under sir Henry Wyat".¹ Two years later this particular office again became the object of a pleading letter: Sir John Hercy wrote to Cromwell requesting him to cause it to be granted to him "off purpas that I may be more abyll to serve the kynges grace when I shal be Caulyd". In the same letter, incidentally, Hercy also congratulated Cromwell on his recent appointment as Justice of the Forests North of Trent, because, concluded this redoubtable warrior (who tended to think of all offices in terms of the soldiers that they would yield) "in Shyrrwode you ought off Ryght to have many men yff yt be wel lokyd on".²

This last sentence seems to suggest that the number of soldiers that an office would yield depended to a

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1. P.R.O. SP 1/111 f.39 (L.P. xi, 1026).
certain extent upon the diligence of its holder in seeking out the able men and preparing them for military service. Corroboration of this is found in a letter of Sir Piers Dutton, who, by the King's express command, had the "execution" of the stewardship of Halton (Cheshire) under Sir Edward Nevill. In rendering an account of his stewardship to Henry VIII in 1535, Dutton stated that he had brought the office into "better Ordre then hyt was affore I medled therwith" and had "prepared moo men in aredynes within the same Office... then hath byn accustomed afforetyme".¹

That the stewardship of a royal manor placed a considerable number of men at the disposal of its holder is clear from the returns of the survey of 1522. Everard Digby, for example, who was steward of eleven such manors in the county of Rutland, had 62 able tenants of the King under his leading.² Again, Sir Richard Weston, who was steward of the Queen's large manor of Newbury, had under his rule there no less than 97 able-bodied men.³ It was from the neighbourhood of Newbury, too, that 22 years later

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2. P.R.O. E 36/54 ff.4b, 9a, 15a, 17b, 18a, 20b, 25a, 26, 28b, 32a.
3. See above, p. 126.
Thomas Cawarden, steward of the royal manors of Donnington, Church Speen, and Enborne, was to raise 150 footmen.¹

While the most valuable stewardships were those of royal (and, up to the time of the Dissolution, monastic) manors, there were other miscellaneous stewardships which placed considerable numbers of men under the leading of their holders. The stewardships of boroughs, which will be discussed later, come into this category.² So also, it seems, do the stewardships of universities.

Thomas Howard, third Duke of Norfolk, for instance, who was High Steward of Cambridge from 1540 onwards, required that university to provide him with men in 1542 and 1544. In the former year 14 colleges contributed money towards "the settinge forthe of x soldyardes wythe the duke of northefolke, our stuarde, into skotlande".³ And in 1543 the Duke wrote to the university authorities informing them that, because the King had ordered him to prepare as many men as he could "as well of myne owne landes as of syche offyces as I have at thys presente under hys Majestie", they were to advertise him in writing of the number of able men that they could raise.⁴ Accordingly,

² See below, p.189.
³ C.C.C.C. MS. 106, p.582.
⁴ Ibid. p.581.
in the following year, ten soldiers were equipped at the colleges' charge and set forth to serve in the Vanguard of the Army against France.¹

(d) Friends

In addition to his servants, tenants, and others under his rule, the recipient of a signet letter was also empowered to recruit his friends, provided that they were willing to serve. In 1525 Sir Adrian Fortescue was informed that he could levy his appointed number of men for the wars from any of his "frendes or lovers that of thair good myndes woll passe to the same".² Again, in 1557 Sir Rice Mansfield was ordered to be prepared to serve with all his dependants and "with suche yor frendes also as shal be willing to go with youe".³

This seems generally to have meant in practice that a man could and would levy his friends' tenants and servants. In 1523, when Sir Edward Guldeford was ordered to levy 500 men for service in France under Suffolk, he asked his agent, one Copuldyke, to "speke with Thomas Aldy

². E XI f.LI.5a.
³. P.R.O. C 66/908 m.18d (C.P.R. 1555-7, p.315). It is not clear why this letter was passed under the Great Seal instead of the Privy Signet.
and my cousyn Crayford and other my frendes to appoint me the tallest men that be in that parties". Guldeford also suggested that, if Copuldyke spoke to Lady Ringley, "I am sure I shall have her tenaunte and the best that she can do". Again, in 1542, when Roger Brereton was ordered to prepare himself and "all suche power and company as he colde or myght make of hymself and his frendes for able and convenient men for his graces warres", his "very nere frend and kynnesman", Thomas Brereton, placed his whole "power" at the said Roger's disposal.2

A request to a friend for military assistance was not normally of the nature of a command, even if the one whose aid was sought was of inferior social status. When Thomas Grey, third Marquess of Dorset, sent a letter under his signet to his friend Sir John Trevelyan asking him to provide him with a number of soldiers, the tone of the letter was mild and almost apologetic:3

his grace hath apoyented me to go with hym to serve hym with suche nombre of goode men as I can gete in this ... viage. Wherfore I heretely pray you to do so moche for me as pourvey me of iii or fore goode archers, or mo, suche as ye thyinke be goode and sufficient men.

1. B.M. Eg. 2093 f.57b.
Friendship, however, was probably the weakest of all the various bonds that linked the supplier of soldiers to the men that he supplied. A man could not command a friend or a friend's tenants to follow him in war, even though he had a royal warrant in his pocket. With his servants, his tenants, and the tenants of others under his stewardship, on the other hand, it was a very different matter: with them his word was law. The strong bonds that already bound servant to master and tenant to lord became very strong indeed when reinforced by the power and authority of the Tudor Crown.
PART THREE

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
CHAPTER I

The Military Obligations of the Boroughs

Section I. The Nature of the Obligation

When in May 1522 the city of London was ordered to send 100 men to serve in the King's wars, the Court of Aldermen decided "that Mr. Recorder, with the Counsell of this Citie, shall goo to my lorde Cardynalles grace and shewe to hym that article of oure grete Chartre ... concernyng that the Citzens shall nott be compellyd to goo or sende into the kynges warre owte of this Citie, etc., besechyng his grace that the same may take effecte and stand in force".¹

Again, in the following year, when the city was once more ordered to supply 100 men, the Cardinal was informed that "yt ys expressly agenst the liberties of the Citie".²

This claim, if it had been upheld, might have had serious repercussions; for the Crown relied on the cities

¹. L.C.R.O. Rep. 4 f.152. This may refer to a grant of 1321 re military service (see M. Weinbaum, British Borough Charters, p.75).
². Ibid. f.168a.
and towns of England to provide it with a fair proportion of its soldiers. The claim, however, was not upheld; the Crown could point to numerous occasions during the previous two centuries when London and other cities and towns had sent soldiers to the royal armies.

Throughout the later Middle Ages, indeed, the English boroughs had borne their share of the burden of supplying men for the King's wars. Whenever a large army was to be raised, it seems, writs were sent out to all the principal towns and cities of the realm ordering them to contribute soldiers to it. In 1336, for example, Edward III commanded the mayors and bailiffs of some 48 boroughs to furnish contingents for the war against Scotland: between them they were to supply more than 2000 men, London being burdened with as many as 300, and Dunstable, Ware, and Guildford with as few as six.\(^1\) Again, exactly 100 years later (in 1436) Henry VI sent out letters under his Privy Seal to a number of municipalities asking them to "sende as many persones defensables and habiles for the werre as yn any wyse ye goodly may" to serve in the defence of Calais: whereupon the citizens of Salisbury duly granted a dozen men.\(^2\) It would seem, therefore, that throughout

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2. H.M.C. Various Collections, iv, 198-200.
the 14th and 15th centuries the boroughs recognised their obligation to give military aid to the Crown whenever it needed it.

The accession of the Tudors saw no change in the position of the boroughs. Henry VII, who seems to have regarded the English townsmen as his most loyal subjects, made frequent demands upon them for soldiers: Ipswich, for example, was called upon to supply men on at least seven occasions in the course of his reign.¹ And when, towards the end of his life, Henry began to organise what seems to have been a small reserve army, Coventry, Colchester, and Ipswich were all requested to prepare contingents.²

During the next three reigns the boroughs continued to play an important part in the military organisation of the country. Some of them, it is true, seem to have been called upon less frequently than in previous reigns, perhaps on account of declining wealth: only once in the town records of Ipswich for the reign of Henry VIII, for instance,

is mention made of soldiers. However, in the first half of the 16th century, as in previous periods, most of the important campaigns saw contingents of townsmen marching off to join the armed forces of the Crown. Ten boroughs—Boston, Canterbury, Coventry, Exeter, Gloucester, Grantham, Oxford, Salisbury, Stamford, and Worcester—are known to have sent men to join the "army by sea" levied in 1514. Seven boroughs—Colchester, Dover, London, Norwich, Nottingham, Oxford, and Reading—are known to have raised troops to serve in the "army by land" which crossed to France thirty years later.

What were the factors which determined which boroughs sent men to the wars on any particular occasion? Clearly, one important factor was that of geography: soldiers would not normally be demanded from those cities and towns which were far removed from the assembly-point of the army.

Although in 1542 men were recruited in boroughs as far south

as Norwich and Reading for service on the Scottish Borders, this was not a normal practice. A more typical example of the recruitment of municipal levies comes from the year 1528, when Lord Sandys, Captain of Guianes, collected a small force at Guildford: on that occasion all the nine towns to which letters were sent were situated within 100 miles of the place of assembly.

Geography, nevertheless, was not the only factor: the size of a borough also had much to do with determining whether or not it would receive a military summons. On some occasions only the larger boroughs would receive them. In 1521, for example, when Wolsey was asked to draw up a list of those individuals and corporate bodies which he considered "meate to make men" for service in Flanders, he included in his list the names of six cities and four towns. Wolsey’s upper ten boroughs were the following (in this order): London, Coventry, Exeter, Winchester, Norwich, Salisbury, Bristol, Worcester, Colchester, and Ipswich. He chose these because, in his estimation, they

1. N.C.R.O. Assembly Proceedings I f.200; Guilding, op. cit. i, 180 sqq.
2. L.F. iv, 4199.
were the largest and wealthiest boroughs south of the Trent - the "good townes", as Sir Robert Cotton was later to describe them.¹

There were, of course, other "good townes" in England beside the ten selected by Wolsey. There was, for instance, the city of York, but it was excluded for geographical reasons: it was so far from the southern ports that it could not conveniently be called upon to send men to serve in Flanders, and it was so near to the northern Border that its forces were always reserved for service in that region.² But, apart from York, there were about thirty other boroughs which are known to have been ordered to furnish soldiers on various occasions during the period under discussion - some receiving direct summonses from the Crown, and others receiving indirect royal summonses via some intermediate authority.³

The latter boroughs probably bore a heavier military burden than others of similar size and comparable geographical position; for they would almost certainly be required to supply men whenever their officer received

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1. Grose, op. cit. 74.


3. See below, p. 189.
a royal summons. Thus the fact that the Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports was a magnate from whom the Crown would be likely to demand a contingent of soldiers on every occasion when troops were levied in the south of England meant that the town of Dover, for example, would receive frequent demands for men: Dover, indeed, received at least six such demands in the period 1522-44.\(^1\)

On the whole, however, the municipalities which were called upon most frequently were the large cities: London set forth four separate contingents in the course of the two years 1544 and 1545;\(^2\) York furnished at least that number of contingents in the two years 1548 and 1549;\(^3\) Coventry provided men on three occasions during the first French war of Henry VIII's reign;\(^4\) while Norwich was called upon to supply soldiers on at least seven occasions in the period under discussion.\(^5\)

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1. The six occasions were: 1522 (B.M. Add. MS. 29618 f.54b); 1523 (Eg. 2093 ff.56-7); 1536 (Add. MS. 29618 f.305b); 1539 (Ibid. f.315b); 1543 (Ibid. f.358a); 1544 (Ibid. f.362a).
3. Y.C.R. iv, 177 sqq.; v, 10 sqq.
4. I.e. in 1512 (Cov.C.R.O. A 79 p.25), in 1513 (L.P. i, 1175/3), and in 1514 (A 79 p.26).
5. I.e. 1513 (P.R.O. E 101/56/29 f.2b), 1521 (B.M. Otho E XI f.38), 1536 (N.C.R.O. Ass. Pro. I f.181a), 1542 (Norf. Arch. i, 32-6), 1544 (Ibid. 36-8), 1545 (N.C.R.O. Chamberlains' Accts. II ff.172-3), and 1558 (Ibid. III ff.130-4).
Not only were the larger boroughs requested to send men to the wars more frequently than others; they were also requested to send larger contingents. In 1513, for instance, Coventry provided more men than did Salisbury, Exeter, and Oxford between them.¹ In 1521 Norwich was ordered to send a contingent equal to the combined contingents of two other East Anglian boroughs, Colchester and Ipswich.² In 1557 London furnished 25 times the number furnished by either Reading or Gloucester.³

While the relative sizes of the contingents depended upon the relative sizes of the boroughs that provided them, the actual number provided by any given borough at any given time depended ultimately upon the size of the army to be raised. Thus the numbers supplied by a particular borough varied considerably from year to year, as is seen from the case of the city of London in the 1540s. To the small army sent to the aid of the Emperor in 1543 the Londoners contributed 100 men;⁴ to the large army sent into France in 1544 they despatched 500;⁵ and for the

1. Coventry 100, Salisbury 30, Oxford 20 (L.P. i, 1176/3); Exeter 0 (E.C.R.O. Act Bk. I f.38b).
3. London 1000 (L.C.R.O. Jor. 17 f.50b); Reading 40 (Guilding, op. cit. i, 252); Gloucester 40 (H.M.C. 12th Rep. App. ix, p.453).
great "levée en masse" that was ordered for the defence of the kingdom in 1545 they set forth no less than 1500.¹

Since the number of men that the Crown demanded from a borough was determined more by the need of the Crown for men than by the ability of the boroughs to provide them, it sometimes happened that the latter found themselves unduly overburdened. On several occasions in the middle years of the century, when there was almost continuous warfare between the English and the Scots, the citizens of York complained about the great numbers of men that they had to supply: the city's burden, they maintained, was bigger than it had been in days gone by, "whan it was a greate better inhabited and farre more wealthie than it is nowe".²

Complaints of this kind, indeed, were often to be heard. In 1542 the citizens of Coventry sent two men to London to obtain "the discharge of the furnysshyng of xl men to be mad redie".³ Three years later the citizens of London, who had been ordered to send 2000 men to Portsmouth, were obliged to inform the Lord Chancellor that 1500 "was as meny as they coulde convenently sett fourth, onelesse

1. C. Wriothesley, A Chronicle of England, i (Cam.Soc. 2nd ser. xi), 158.
they sholde leve the Cytie desolate of men.\textsuperscript{1} In 1548 it was reported that so many men had been levied in the borough of Southwark that, if any more were levied there, the foreign residents would outnumber the English residents by two to one.\textsuperscript{2}

Nevertheless, a comparison between the numbers provided by corporate bodies and the numbers provided by individuals reveals that the former were often let off relatively lightly. To the "army by sea" of 1514, for instance, the cities of Exeter and Salisbury each contributed the same number as did an ordinary country gentleman like John Chichester of Devonshire or William Bonham of Wiltshire.\textsuperscript{3} Again, to the expeditionary force of 1521 the corporations of Norwich and Colchester were each required to send the same sized contingents as were Sir William Paston of Norfolk and Sir William Browne of Essex respectively.\textsuperscript{4} Such comparisons as these merely provide a further indication that, in the military administration of the early Tudor period, equity was frequently not an important consideration.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1} L.C.R.O. Rep. 11 f.189b.
\item \textsuperscript{2} P.R.O. SP 10/3 f.114b.
\item \textsuperscript{3} P.R.O. E 101/56/10 ff.86, 98, 100, 113 (L.P.i, p.1518).
\item \textsuperscript{4} B.M. Otho E XI ff.34, 38; N.C.R.O. Ass.Pro. I f.130.
\end{itemize}
Section II. The Enforcement of the Obligation: External Administration

The English borough, for most of the period under discussion at all events, was an integral part of both the quasi-feudal and the national military systems. Because it had a corporate personality, the Crown could call upon it to supply soldiers just as though it were a private individual. Because it was a geographical division of the kingdom, the Crown would recruit militiamen within its boundaries just as though it were a shire or a hundred or a tithing. This being so, the external administration of its military forces is best discussed under two separate heads.

(a) Quasi-Feudal System

Under the quasi-feudal system the royal demands for men reached the borough in one of two ways. In the first place, there was the direct demand - the signet letter sent straight from the royal palace to the mayoral parlour. For most of the period under review this was the normal method of ordering one of the larger boroughs to place its "power" at the Crown's disposal. It was in this way, for example, that the ten "good townes" were called upon to send contingents to the aid of the Emperor in
The mayors of the larger corporations were placed on an equal footing with temporal and spiritual magnates in this respect: they were all the "trusty and well-beloved" subjects of the sovereign, and were addressed and treated as such.

In the case of the smaller boroughs, however, the requests for men did not always come direct from the sovereign: like the tenants of the gentry, they received their orders at second hand. Many boroughs, as has already been noted, were subject to the overlordship of a high steward or other officer, who, when called upon by the Crown to supply men from all his "rooms and offices", would pass on some of the burden to them. There is some evidence, in fact, that the Government at this period was anxious to ensure that these "pocket boroughs" did not escape their military obligations: in 1539 it was laid down that the King would henceforth have a "booke of all Romes and offices that ... any Cities or Townes have or gyve, by the whiche any men may be made by the officer of the same". Such a book would have enabled the King to know to which corporations letters could be sent direct

1. See reference to these letters in Wolsey's letter of 1 August (P.R.O. S.P. 1/22 f.276 - L.P. iii 145).
and which ones could be summoned indirectly via their stewards.

This book, if it was ever compiled, unfortunately does not appear to survive. Nevertheless, one good example of municipal stewardship can be found. At Leicester, throughout the period under discussion, the stewardship was in the hereditary possession of the family of Hastings, Barons Hastings and Earls of Huntingdon. In 1510 Lord Hastings's right to the manred of the burgesses was confirmed by the King's letters; while in 1553 the townsmen were reminded that no man was to be retained "except only with us to do us service when required in the retinue of our stewardship there". That the Hastings exercised their rights in this matter is seen from the events of the year 1549, when the Earl of Huntingdon received a royal order to levy 300 men from his "frendes, favorers, tenauntes, and servantes": since the mayor and corporation of Leicester were his "very frendes", he ordered them to provide him with as many men as possible.

While the claims of the Hastings family to the manred

1. M. Bateson, Records of Leicester, iii, 1.
2. Ibid. 73.
3. Ibid. 58.
of Leicester appear to have been maintained successfully, the opposite appears to have been the case with those of the Clifford family to the manred of York. When Lord Clifford put forward his claim in 1513, the citizens replied that they could not find any foundation for it, even though they had "maid serche as well by olde registres as by examinacon of aged folks". In 1542, however, they appear to have admitted the claim made by his son, the Earl of Cumberland; although two years later they seem to have forgotten all about it, since the Earl was obliged to send them a stern letter reminding them that he had the "governaunce of the inhabitaunts within the Citie". Again, despite the fact that Cumberland's claim was once more admitted in 1545, the citizens were able to inform him in 1557 that they had searched "the old regystars and books of this Citie" and had found therein no evidence to support his pretensions. The claims of the Cliffords were nevertheless bound to

1. Y.C.R. iii, 40-1.
2. Ibid. iv, 79-80.
3. Ibid. 101.
4. Ibid. 123.
5. Ibid. v, 154.
be ignored, for York was a great city that would always receive direct summonses from the King or from the Council in the North. It was precisely because the citizens received orders for men both from the Government and from the Earl that they were forced to ignore those of the latter. As they themselves pointed out to him in 1545, they could only admit his claim if, in return, he could "fynde the meanes that the kings lettres may so be dyrectyd to us for our dyscharge" from the obligation of meeting the direct demands of the Government. ¹ Even so, it is hard to imagine York in the "pocket" of any magnate, however powerful: what the Earls of Huntingdon could do at Leicester, the Earls of Cumberland could never hope to do at York.

While many of the smaller boroughs received indirect royal summonses from the hands of their stewards, those boroughs which belonged to the Liberty of the Cinque Ports received theirs from the hands of their Lord Warden. Sometimes, it would seem, the royal demands reached them even more indirectly; for there was an intermediary between the Warden and the towns. In June 1523, for instance, when the Lord Warden (Sir Edward Guldeford) received a royal demand for 500 men, he promptly wrote off

¹ Y.C.R. iv, 123.
to his deputy (one Copuldyke) to tell him to send out "lettres of attendance" to every town within his jurisdiction. The latter then despatched letters under the Warden's seal to "all and singuler Mayers, Baylyffes, Jurates, and Combarons of the ... fyve portes" ordering them to prepare men for the wars. This rather cumbersome procedure seems to have caused considerable delay: a fortnight elapsed between the despatch of the letters under the King's signet and the arrival at their destination of those under the seal of the Lord Warden.¹

(b) National System

The part played by a borough in the organisation of the militia varied according to its size. The largest boroughs, in the first half of the 16th century at any rate, were independent of the shire administration and enjoyed the privilege of mustering and levying their own men. Thus, whenever musters were to be taken throughout the land, most of the larger boroughs were sent separate commissions, in which their mayors and other officials were always named.

For only one year does there survive a complete list of those boroughs which had been sent separate commissions

¹. B.M. Eg. 2093 ff.56-7.
of musters. This was the year 1523, when a total of 30 cities and towns are recorded as having received them.\(^1\)

What was it that distinguished these 30 from the rest of the 150 odd English boroughs then in existence?\(^2\) In the first place, 15 of them were to be distinguished by the fact that they were "county boroughs", and were therefore separated from the shires in which they lay.\(^3\) Two others, though not of county status, enjoyed the privilege of a separate commission of the peace, which would probably have entitled them to the further privilege of a separate commission of musters.\(^4\) With regard to the remaining thirteen, it is difficult to point to any distinguishing feature which would explain their receipt of separate commissions. True, five of them had been officially incorporated by Royal Charter, but then so had 17 other boroughs which had not received commissions.\(^5\) It would

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1. P.R.O. C 82/528/1 (L.P. iii, 2875/1).
2. This estimate was arrived at from an examination of the tables in Weinbaum, op. cit.
3. These were Bristol, Canterbury, Carlisle, Chester, Coventry, Exeter, Gloucester, Hull, Lincoln, Newcastle-on-Tyne, Norwich, Nottingham, Southampton, York, and London. (See Weinbaum, op. cit.).
4. These were Oxford and Cambridge. (See C.P.R. 1494-1509. pp.632-3, 655).
5. The five incorporated boroughs were Colchester, Ipswich, Northampton, Rochester, and Scarborough. (see Weinbaum, op. cit.) The remaining eight were Bath, Derby, Leicester, Salisbury, Shrewsbury, Westminster, Winchester, and Worcester.
seem therefore that these 30 boroughs had been picked out not on account of any legal status, but simply because they were known to be among the largest and wealthiest communities in the land. Thus it could happen that an unincorporated town like Shrewsbury was included in the list, while an incorporated city like Chichester was excluded: the significant facts were that the former was a prosperous trading centre, and that the latter belonged to "the category of small and unimportant communities". Nevertheless, it is symptomatic of the flexibility of the system that, when in 1534 the next musters were taken, the city of Chichester did receive a separate commission.

The cherished municipal privilege at this time, however, does not seem to have been the possession of a separate commission, but simply that of "corporate junction". For in practice it made little difference whether or not a corporation received a separate commission: what did matter was that, whenever musters were taken in their town, the mayor and other municipal officials had the right of being "joined in the commission".

2. L.P. vii, 1468.
Hereford was a borough which apparently enjoyed this privilege; for when Sir James Baskerville and Richard Warmecombe (the shire commissioners appointed to the task at the "division") came to take musters there in 1539, they were joined in their duties by the mayor of the city. Another borough which appears to have had this privilege was Plymouth: in 1542 their mayor is recorded as having ridden to Plympton to oppose the evil designs of the shire commissioners, who "wold have had this towne to have mustered there before theym agaynstoure auntient custom".

This custom, however, does not appear to have been very ancient: Plymouth was not included in the list of about fifty boroughs which in 1336 were declared to be outside the jurisdiction of the shire authorities. Nevertheless, the custom may have grown up in the intervening two centuries, and the townsmen may indeed have been defending their proper liberties. Similar attempts to encroach upon customary rights probably led the townsmen of King's Lynn and Lichfield, both of which were "villae exceptae" in the early years of Edward III's reign, to have the privilege of "corporate junction" recorded in their

2. R. N. Worth, Plymouth Municipal Records, p.112.
respective charters of 1547 and 1553.¹

The smaller boroughs, on the other hand, were definitely denied this privilege. In 1546 the Lords of the Council informed the mayor and brethren of Portsmouth that they could not be joined in the commission of musters as the mayors and brethren of other boroughs were.² It was the lot of the lesser boroughs to be merged in the shires in which they lay; in 1539, for instance, the inhabitants of the Wiltshire boroughs of Calne, Malmesbury, and Marlborough mustered before the same commissioners as did the inhabitants of any village in that part of the county.³

The day was not far off, however, when even the large privileged boroughs would be obliged to fight for the retention of their independence from the shire. At Northampton the clash came as early as 1545, when the townsmen were ordered to prepare soldiers by the commissioners for the county; the latter seem to have been victorious, but the townsmen, "because they be a liberty of themself", saved their faces by refusing to let their

1. C.P.R. 1547-8, p.101; 1553-4, p.52.
men march to London with the shire levies.¹ In the following year even the great city of Coventry was threatened with the loss of its independence: the citizens had to remind the Warwickshire commissioners that their mayor had to be included in any commission of musters within the city.² Again, in 1554 the Lords of the Council were constrained to order the Wiltshire commissioners to permit the mayor and aldermen of Salisbury to take the musters of the inhabitants of their city.³

The independence of the larger municipalities from the shires in which they lay appears to have received confirmation in the Militia Act of 1558. Here the practice of "corporate junction" was authorised in "every City, Bourghe, and Towne Corporate, wherein there bee Justices of the Peace".⁴ This meant that many corporations would be able to continue to avoid that subordination to the shire commissioners which they feared so greatly.

But it did not mean that they would be able to avoid subordination to the new local authorities - the Lords Lieutenants. As early as 1554 the citizens of Norwich

¹ P.R.O. SP 1/208 f.47a (L.P. xx, pt.2, 425).
² Cov. C.R.O. A 79 p.56.
³ A.P.C. 1554-6, p.8.
⁴ Statutes of the Realm, iv, 320.
received a great surprise when the Lord Lieutenant of
Norfolk and Suffolk ordered them to send him details of
their military strength: they marvelled that "there came
noo Commission to this Cittie, being a Countye of itself,
whereby the musters of hable men might be taken".¹
Nevertheless, by 1558 the subordination of the municipal
corporations to the Lieutenants was a fait accompli: in
January of that year those appointed to levy men were
expressly ordered not to spare "any Cytye or town though
the same be a Countye of itself".² Thus even the greatest
cities in the land found themselves deprived of that
direct contact with the Crown which they felt to be the
main guarantee of their liberties.

Section III. The Enforcement of the Obligation: Internal
Administration

"Each town," wrote Bishop Stubbs, "has its history,
and makes its independent contribution to Municipal
History as a whole".³ This means that any attempt to

1. N.C.R.O. Ass. Pro. II f.3b.
2. P.R.O. SP 11/12 f.18a.
3. O. Ogle, Royal Letters Addressed to Oxford (Oxford,
describe the internal military organisation of the English borough is bound to be complicated by the fact that there were wide local variations in this organisation. Thus the following description of municipal administration, which is based on an analysis of only a few boroughs, must not be thought to be of universal application, although it is probably typical of most of the larger cities and towns. For convenience, this subject may be discussed under two separate heads: (a) the organisation of watches for home defence; and (b) the organisation of military contingents for offensive warfare.

(a) Watches

A regular institution of the majority of English boroughs was the watch—a periodic review of the military forces of the town, normally associated with some religious festival. At London and Coventry the watch was bi-annual, taking place on St. Peter's Eve and St. John's Eve; at Faversham it took place on Lammas Eve; at Salisbury, on St. Osmund's Night; and at Exeter, on Midsummer Eve.

3. S.C.R.O. Leger B II ff.246a, 254a, etc.
These watches were generally kept with unfailing regularity, unless circumstances compelled their cancellation. A common cause of cancellation seems to have been the plague: in 1528 the London watches were put down on account of this, whereupon the city Armourers, who had a vested interest in the matter, "made great suite to the Kyng and declared their great hynderaunce".¹

The burden of these ceremonial summer manoeuvres seems to have often been borne by the crafts, occupations, or companies existing in the boroughs. At Exeter in 1549 the corporations of Tailors, Weavers, Tuckers, Shoemakers, Bakers, and Brewers were each ordered to provide ten harnessed men for the watch.² At Salisbury in 1534 it was ordained that "every occupacion do there best ... to bryng forthe as many harnes men as they conveyently maye to thonour of this citie".³ At Coventry throughout the period it was usual for each of the larger craft guilds to send a certain number of men in armour to each of the summer watches: normally the Dyers and Butchers each provided six men, the Smiths and Drapers four men, and the Cappers and Carpenters two men.⁴

¹. Hall, op. cit. p.750.
². E.C.R.O. Act Bk. II f.103b.
Apart from these formal watches, which were part of the yearly routine of English municipal life, there were special watches in times of national emergency. At London in 1549, for instance, watches were kept on two separate occasions: firstly, from 3 July to 10 September, on account of the rebellions in Norfolk and the West; and secondly, from 7 October to the 17th of the same, on account of the Somerset Conspiracy. On each of these occasions there were both daily and nightly watches: the former were maintained by the city companies, and the latter by the wards. Again, at the time of the second insurrection of the Duke of Suffolk in 1554 the civic defence forces of Coventry were on duty for seven days and eight nights.

(b) Military Contingents

The burden of furnishing men for the royal armies was distributed in different ways in different boroughs; and

1. Wriothesley, op. cit. ii (Cam. Soc. 2nd ser. xx), 15, 23.
2. Ibid. 25, 28.
3. For a specimen of a mayoral letter to the warden of a company re the provision of harnessed men for a daily watch, see L.C.R.O. Jor. 16 f. 33 a.
within one borough it was sometimes distributed in different ways in different years. Generalisation, therefore, is extremely difficult: all that can be done is to describe the various methods of distribution, and indicate on which occasions certain boroughs are known to have used them.

In the first place, it was common for the whole burden of equipping soldiers to be borne by the craft-guilds. This was the normal practice at London: the Lord Mayor merely passed on the royal demands to the wardens of the companies.1 The numbers allotted to the various companies varied according to their size and wealth. The Mercers always seem to have headed the list: in 1544 and 1557 they provided 36 out of a total of 500;2 in May 1545, eight out of 100;3 and in 1558, 72 out of 1000.4 Similarly, the Brown Bakers generally supplied the smallest proportion, if they supplied any at all: in 1544 they provided one man out of 500; in May 1545, none at all. Whether or not this was an equitable distribution it is hard to say; at any rate, the city authorities seem to have intended it to have been. In December 1557, for example, the wardens

1. See, e.g. L.C.R.O. Jor. 17 f. 53.
2. L.C.R.O. Rep. 11 f.72a; 13 ff.525-6, 582b.
4. L.C.R.O. Jor. 17 f.53b.
of one company (who may have complained that they were being overburdened) were informed that "there fellowship shall be as gentlyly usyde and intreatyd accordyng to theire hablyty and power whennever the Companyes and fellowshippes of this Cyty shall hereafter be generally chardayd with settynge furth of any Souldyours".¹

In provincial boroughs, too, the crafts had to bear their share of the military burden. At Ludlow every occupation was obliged to keep men and equipment in readiness for war: the Weavers, for instance, were on one occasion recorded as having ready "iiij men able in harnes, with iiij Jakkes, a payre of almayn Ryvettes, iiiij payre of Splentes, iiiij Salettes, iiiij gorgettes, ij bowes, and to bylles, to serve the kyng on fote".² The Salisbury guilds were under a similar obligation: in 1512 it was decided that their obligation should be rigorously enforced, and the stewards of the guilds were reminded that "bifore this tyme dyvers Craftes of this Citie hath been charged to fynde certayn men sufficiently harneyed to do the Kyng oure soverayn Lord services of warre".³

². P.R.O. E 101/62/3 m.1.
Such, too, was the case at Coventry, where in 1542 the craft-guilds furnished 58 out of the 80 horsemen which the city sent to the army in the North, the Mercers and Drapers heading the list with six men each, and the Carpenters and Painters bringing up the rear with one.¹

The craftsmen, nevertheless, were not the only citizens of Coventry who furnished men on that occasion. Five out of the 80 were furnished by the "fforence" or suburbs of the city. "And the residue of the said iiiij men", it is recorded, "were furnysshed partelie at th. charges of suche Citizense as be not associat to eny feliship or Craft in the Citie and bere no charges with the same; and the rest of the costes and charges therin was paid and borne owt of th Tresorie or comen box of the said Citie".²

Even in those boroughs where the military contingents were frequently supplied by the craft-guilds, it sometimes happened that the soldiers were furnished in other ways. The charges of the 1500 men set forth by the city of London in July 1545 were borne by the inhabitants of every ward.³ The 40 men prepared by the city of Salisbury in

2. Ibid. p.5.
1522 were equipped at the cost of those possessing goods to the value of £10 or more.¹

In many boroughs, moreover, the burden of furnishing soldiers seems to have been borne by the inhabitants qua residents, and not qua guild-members. This seems to have been the case at Southampton, Exeter, and Reading among others. At the first-named town in 1513 each member of the contingent sent to the wars was "ferneshid" by a prominent resident: the 20 furnishers included the mayor, two ex-mayors, the sheriff, four ex-sheriffs, the broker, and the senior and junior bailiffs.² At Exeter, in the same year, contributions towards the cost of soldiers' equipment were levied from the inhabitants of the four quarters of the city, some men paying as much as 26s. 8d. and others as little as 4d.³ At Reading in 1542 the burden of furnishing the municipal troop of cavalry fell upon the wealthiest inhabitants, individually or in groups of two, three, four, five, or six.⁴

⁴. Guilding, op. cit. i, 180-3.
While it was customary for the wealthiest inhabitants to bear the cost of their town's military forces, it was probably the lot of the poorest inhabitants to bear the actual burden of military service. Municipal society seems to have been divided into two groups: those who fought and those who paid. There was, for example, no coincidence between the list drawn up in 1558 of "all the wealthy and substantial persons in York and Ainsty" and the lists of those who served in the city contingents in 1557 and 1558. As the Lord Mayor pointed out on a later occasion, it was against the city's custom to send the wealthier citizens to the wars, since they were relied upon to provide the money for taxes and military assessments.

The selection of men for the wars was sometimes the task of those responsible for furnishing them with equipment. At London, when the city companies were called upon to provide equipment for soldiers, they were also ordered to provide the men, presumably from the ranks of their own members or their servants. Generally, however,

the tasks of supplying materials and selecting men did not go together. The work of selection often devolved upon the officials of the wards: at Norwich in 1544, for instance, every alderman was ordered to seek out the ablest men in his ward and certify their names to the mayor.¹ At York, on the other hand, where there were no wards, the work devolved upon the constables: in 1542 these officers were ordered to cause all able men of military age "personally to appere before ther wardens in ther parish churches furthwith to theent that the sayd maister wardens with the consent of the constables and parishinners may elect and appoynt ther men".²

The selection of soldiers, in boroughs as elsewhere, was no easy task. As the Lord Mayor of London pointed out to the wardens of the city companies in 1557, the men selected had to be "good, sadd, apte and hable men".³ Similar qualifications were specified in the following January, but the wardens were negligent; and the Queen was obliged to write a strong letter to the Lord Mayor telling him that in future the city’s soldiers were to be

¹ Norf. Arch. i, 36-7 (where the year is wrongly given as 1553); N.C.R.O. Ass. Pro. I f.207a.
² Y.C.R. iv, 81.
³ L.C.R.O. Jor. 17 f.50a.
"aptar personages and better chosen".¹

The citizens of Norwich always seem to have been especially careful in the choice of their soldiers. Whenever they were required to supply a certain number of men, they took the precaution of levying a larger number; then, having mustered and inspected those provisionally selected, they proceeded to weed out the less suitable recruits. Thus, in 1544, when required to send 40 men to the army against France, they levied 60 men, "wherof xxᵗ¹ of the worste ... wer shiftid oute and discharged".² In the following year they cut down their contingent from 54 to 40;³ and in 1558 only half of the 60 "prested" were eventually set forth.⁴

On some occasions it was necessary for the borough to choose a captain for its contingent. York, for example, was often required to do so, and the task of commanding the civic forces usually fell to the city macebearer.⁵ The London contingents, on the other hand, generally served

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1. L.C.R.O. Jor. 17 f.54.
3. Ibid. f.192b.
4. Ibid. III f.130a.
5. Y.C.R. iii, 89; iv, 81, 132, 179, etc.
under captains appointed by higher authority: the 600 men whom the city sent against Sir Thomas Wyatt in 1554 (and who were later to change sides so dramatically) were led by captains appointed by the Queen's Council, not by the city.1

Once the men had been prepared for the wars, it only remained for their fellow-citizens to bid them farewell. The departure of municipal contingents seems always to have been an occasion for beer-drinking. The accounts of borough chamberlains are full of references to payments like that made at Nottingham in 1544 to "Grene wyffe" for "ale that was dronke at the Towne Hawle when Mayster Mayre veuyd the sodyoures at the Chapell Bar".2

After these final refreshments, the soldiers would march out of the town on the first stage of their journey to the assembly-point of the army or the port of embarkation. What happened to the men after the gates of their town had closed behind them lies outside the scope of this study. Nevertheless, the march of the men of Norwich to Ipswich in January 1558 (the events of which can be

2. Stevenson, op. cit. p.386.
reconstructed from the accounts of the city chamberlain)\(^1\)
may provide a fitting narrative with which to bring this chapter to a close.

After a civic breakfast, the soldiers, 30 in number, marched out of Norwich under the command of their two conductors, John Blome and Robert Collard. On reaching the village of Long Stratton, some nine miles on, the platoon halted for a meal of bread and ale, after which they went on to Dickleburgh. Here they stopped for the night, footsore and weary no doubt after their fifteen mile march in newly-issued boots. Lodgings at Dickleburgh, however, seem to have proved unsatisfactory, for "the soldegears refused to paye" their whole price. Next morning the men continued their journey along the old Roman road to the south, stopping at Brockford for a snack before completing the 25 miles to Ipswich. It must have been late in the evening when the soldiers marched into the town to the sound of an eightpenny drum specially purchased for the occasion.

The Norwich men remained at Ipswich for two or three days, awaiting further instructions. But these, when they came, merely informed the soldiers that they were

\(^1\) N.C.R.O. Chamberlains' Accts. III ff.130-4.
not needed after all, and that they were to return to their homes. 27 of the 30 men did so, but the other three, perhaps because they were unwilling to face the 40 mile walk home, "went ther waye with all thinges that thei were sett forthe withall" and were not seen again. It had in truth been a fruitless enterprise: it had involved the men of Norwich in a march of over 80 miles; and it had involved the city chamberlain in an expenditure of at least £25. Nevertheless, such happenings were probably all too frequent: a similar story could perhaps be told about the contingents sent off to the wars by many boroughs (or, for that matter, by many shires or by many individuals) in those days of indecisive policy, bad communications, and inefficient methods of recruitment.
CHAPTER II

Financial Aspects of Military Obligation

The fulfilment of their military obligations necessarily involved the people of England in considerable expense. The complete harness which many were compelled to possess according to the provisions of the Statute of Winchester, or even the bow and arrows which many more were compelled to possess according to those of the Archery Laws, could not be obtained for nothing. Nor indeed could the other military equipment which soldiers had to have when they were set forth to serve the King in war.

Every soldier, whether conscripted by commissioners to serve in the militia or by a private individual to serve in his retinue, had to be properly equipped. He had to be "fencibly arrayed" - to be protected against the blows of the enemy by a complete set of armour. In practice this meant that he had to be given a sallet for his head, a gorget for his throat, a jack or coat of fence for his body, and a pair of splints for his arms.

Some of these items were very expensive. While a sallet could be obtained for 30 pence (the price paid by the
churchwardens of Cratfield in 1546),\(^1\) and a gorget for a mere sixpence (the price paid by the churchwardens of Ashburton in 1558),\(^2\) a pair of "almain rivetts", by which collective name the rest of the harness was generally known, could cost a considerable sum of money. Though in July 1523 Sir Henry Willoughby had been able to obtain a second-hand pair for the modest price of 4s. 4d.,\(^3\) a new pair normally cost much more than this. In November 1521 the citizens of Exeter decided to purchase ten pairs of almain rivetts "yff they may be hade for x s. a peyr";\(^4\) which suggests that they were concerned lest the prospect of war with France might put up the price of this equipment. This in fact was exactly what did happen: in August 1522 Wolsey informed some of the aldermen of London (in which city most of the German armour was marketed) that the King was displeased because the price of harness had been greatly enhanced.\(^5\) The same thing happened at the time of

\(1\). Holland, op. cit. p.71.


\(3\). N.U.L. Middleton MSS. Acct. of John Levissey (1523) f. 29a.

\(4\). E.C.R.O. Act Bk. I f.93a.

the next French war: while in 1542 the chamberlain of Norwich had been able to buy almain rivetts at 7s. 6d. a pair,\textsuperscript{1} in the spring of 1544 the receiver of Barnstaple had to pay 13s. 4d.\textsuperscript{2} Little wonder, therefore, that in August of that year the Crown ordained that no pair of almain rivetts was to be sold at more than 9s. 6d.\textsuperscript{3}

That there were additional items of expenditure in connection with the purchase of armour is evident from this extract from the accounts of Sir Thomas Lovell for the year 1523:\textsuperscript{4}

Item paid for the carriage of \textit{viii} salettes and \textit{iiiij} peyer of splentes from London to Holywell, bought of John Barnard in Seynt Laurance Lane, ironmonger, with xij d. paid for a dry fatt to put the harness in, xix d.

Since the distance from the City to Holywell was only a few miles, it can be imagined that those who had to send to London for armour from distant parts of the country would have to pay quite considerable sums of money on its carriage.

\textsuperscript{1} N.C.R.O. Chamberlains' Accts. I f.93a.

\textsuperscript{2} J. R. Chanter and T. Wainwright, \textit{Reprint of the Barnstaple Records}, ii, 106, 200. They are referred to as "almetry fyttts".

\textsuperscript{3} L.P. xix, pt.2, 102.

\textsuperscript{4} H.M.C. Rutland, iv, 264.
The soldiers also had to be provided with weapons. Every archer had to have a bow and a sheaf of arrows: the former might cost as much as 3s. 4d. (the price paid by the chamberlain of Dover in 1543)\(^1\) or as little as 1s. 8d. (that paid by the chamberlain of Canterbury in 1558);\(^2\) the latter might cost as much as 3s. (the price paid by the churchwardens of Shipdham in 1545)\(^3\) or as little as 1s. 4d. (that paid by Sir Henry Willoughby in 1522).\(^4\) Similarly, every billman had to have a bill, the cost of which was generally in the region of 15d. (the price paid by the chamberlain of Norwich in 1544)\(^5\) or 16d. (that paid by the churchwardens of Woodbury in 1546).\(^6\) Moreover, it was usual for every soldier, whether bowman or billman, to be issued with a sword and a dagger: the former might cost as much as 3s. 4d. (the price paid by Sir William

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3. B.M. Add. MS. 23008 f.112b; 23009 f.29b.
Petre in 1554)\(^1\) or as little as 2s. 2d. (that paid by the churchwardens of Snettisham in 1544);\(^2\) the latter might cost as much as 1s. 1d. (the price paid by the chamberlain of Maldon in 1544)\(^3\) or as little as fourpence (that paid by the receiver of Exeter in 1513).\(^4\)

The equipment of mounted soldiers, with which the gentry were often charged in the later years of this period, naturally involved additional expenditure. Horse-armour could not be obtained cheaply: in 1547 a complete harness for a demi-ounce could be obtained from Sir Richard Gresham for the sum of 40s.\(^5\) Some idea of the trouble and expense involved in equipping a horseman can be obtained from a letter which Sir Walter Devereux wrote to the Earl of Shrewsbury on one occasion. "Where I am appointed to fynde ij Dymilaunces", he wrote, "if you wolde be soe good Lord unto me as to take xx markes of me and to fynd them, I wold thinke ye did miche for me".\(^6\)

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1. E.R.O. D/DP Z 14/1 f.6.
5. P.R.O. SP 10/1 f.117b.
An essential part of a soldier's equipment was his coat or jacket, which was normally the only item of wearing apparel in an army that was really "uniform", and the only one for which the Crown made an allowance of money. The cost of such a garment would depend largely upon the price of the cloth from which it was made. The price of white kersey, which was normally the cloth used, rose steadily throughout the period: in 1523, for example, the citizens of Oxford paid 6d., 6½d., and 7d. a yard; \(^1\) while in 1558 the parishioners of nearby Marston paid 2s. \(^2\) The amount of cloth used in the making of one coat was in the region of three yards. \(^3\)

That the making of soldiers' coats involved a number of miscellaneous items of expenditure is apparent from the following extract from the accounts of John Hall, receiver to Sir Richard Gresham at Fountains Abbey (Yorkshire), for the year 1543: \(^4\)

White kersey for my Mr. is men that shulde have gone to the Borders.

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1. Turner, op. cit. pp.43-44.
Item, bought at Rippon, the xxvth day of Auguste, vxxxiij yerdes white cloth, v li. xiiij s. iiiij d.; and geven to him that brought the same to Brymbem, ij d.; and for a taylor of Rippon and his men is. deners, at Brymbem, vj d. - v li. xv s.; and for my expenses when I bought the clothe, viij d.; and for two yerdes reade clothe, ij s. viij d.; and to a taylor for mayking fouretie cotes, vj s. viij d.; and for him and his servauntes commons whan the cotes were in maykings, iiiij s.; and for whit threde x d., and for blakke threde ij d. vj li. x s.

Since, however, the King made an allowance of four shillings for every coat, this expenditure of £6 10s. would have been offset by the receipt of £8: Gresham would thus have made a profit of 30s. on the transaction.

A supplier of men, nevertheless, could not make a profit if he provided his men with other clothing besides their coats. But this was what the boroughs and parishes, at any rate, frequently did do: their soldiers were often equipped with hats, doublets, and boots. The payment of ten shillings "to John Hatmaker for xvij hattes" by the receiver of Exeter in 1514,1 of 2s. 3d. for "thre yerds of whyte ffustyan for a Dubbellet" by the churchwardens of Woodbury in 1546,2 and of 3s. 4d. "for boottes for the soldyer" by the churchwardens of Snettisham in 15443 are

2. Brushfield, loc. cit.
not exceptional ones. What was perhaps a little unusual was the expenditure of 20d. by the chamberlain of Maldon on five "nyght Cappes" for the town soldiers who were set forth in September 1544.¹

The clothing of the soldiers who had crossed to France to join the army earlier that year had been exceptionally costly; for, on this particular occasion as on no other during the period, their suppliers had been ordered to provide them not only with uniform coats but also with uniform hats and hose. Thus the citizens of Norwich had to spend £12 on hose and 26s. 8d. on hats for the 40 men that they sent to this army.² The Crown, nevertheless, made no extra allowance this year.

The equipment of soldiers for the wars was thus an expensive procedure: the provision of armour, weapons, and jacket for one footman must always have left his supplier at least one mark the poorer, if, like William Gonson in 1542, he had no "Bows, aroos, Bylles, or barnes" in his possession and was therefore "compellyd to Bye" the same.³ How did the supplier raise the money?

¹ E.R.O. D/B 3/3/238.
³ P.R.O. SP 1/172 f. 76 (L.P. xvii, 605).
If he were a local official like the mayor of a borough or the constable of a parish, he would probably levy an aid from the wealthier members of the community. How this was done in a borough has already been noted. In a parish it is not so easy to see, owing to the paucity of parish records. What is certain, however, is that in June 1545, when militiamen were being prepared to serve in the defence of the realm, the Crown ordained that there was to be "a common purse in every village, parishes, and township sufficient to furnish the poor men in their voyage." But such a common fund was already in existence in most, if not all, parishes: this was the money in the Church Box. That this was in fact used for military purposes in 1544 is clear from the fact that in that year the churchwardens of Bramley (Hampshire) paid 13s. 4d. "of the church money for fyndynge sowdiers at Porchmoth." The "church money" came from many sources, but doubtless most of it came originally from the pockets of the parishioners.

2. P.R.O. SP 12/90/9 p. 5.
4. Cf. ibid, pp. xvi-xxi.
On some occasions, moreover, a separate aid was levied from the whole shire towards the cost of militia-men's equipment. This evidently happened in Cornwall in March 1546, when men were prepared for service at Boulogne by John Reskymer and other shire-commissioners. However, since 200 of the 300 originally demanded were later countermanded, the people who had contributed towards the expenses of the soldiers not unnaturally wanted to have their money returned. On 8 April Hugh Trevanyon told Reskymer that everyone was noticing "how myche the Pepyll dothe mormur that Restytucyon ys not made of thos Sommes of monye that you and your deputes dyd Receve ffor the ffurnytur' of your nomber of CC men". He therefore desired him to make repayment at the next General Sessions.¹

Where the supplier was an individual lord or gentleman, part of the financial burden appears sometimes to have been passed on to his tenants. In June 1544, when he equipped 30 men for service in the Vanguard of the Army against France,² the Dean of Westminster levied an aid "ad Armaturam" from his tenants at Deerhurst, Todenham,

2. See L.P. xix, pt. 1, 274.
Morton Castle, and elsewhere.\(^1\) Again, on another occasion in Henry VIII's reign, Lord Montague seems to have raised sums totalling over £5 as a "Gyft toward the hernys" of his soldiers from certain of his tenants.\(^2\) Furthermore, a Warwickshire landowner, Thomas Braysbridge, even went so far as to insert a clause concerning such a tenurial obligation in the indenture by which he leased lands in Kingsbury to one Thomas Ensoure. In this indenture it was laid down that, whenever Braysbridge was called upon to supply men for the King's wars, Ensoure "shuld paye ... towards the ffurnysshheyn and settyng forthe of one harnyst man to serve the kynges majestye the somme of xx s."\(^3\) In most cases, however, the landlord who inserted a military clause in a lease bound his tenant not to pay money but actually to provide harness.\(^4\)

Other landlords seem to have resorted to the expedient of raising loans from their tenants. In January 1554, at the time of Wyatt's Rebellion, the Queen wrote to Lord

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2. P.R.O. SP 1/140 f.66b (L.P. xiii, pt. 2, 1016/3).
4. See above, p 93.
Berkeley ordering him to send 500 men to London with the greatest possible speed. Whereupon:¹

This lord, to his great charges, redely prepareth, armeth and appareleth that number ... ; for help whereto hee obtained a lone of money from his tenants - from fourty shillings to Twenty pound a pcece - and gave bills of repayment, in like resemblance as kings by their privy seales borrow of their subjects.

Lord Berkeley must have been brought to the verge of bankruptcy on this occasion: he even had to pawn his mother's and his ancestors' plate, "much of which was never redeemed".² A similar fate befell Sir George Blount when he was "Appointed to serve the kines Majesty in his Warres beyonde the Sea". In order to obtain "some store of money for his redy furnyture and provision of horses and other things necessary and meete for the same, [he] bargayned and solde unto one John Leveson Esquier for the some of one hundred and Three Score poundes to hym by the said John paide the Manour of Worley in the Countie of Staffordshire".³ But neither Berkeley nor Blount suffered as much as did poor Christopher Ascugh, who thus described his plight to Cromwell in 1537:⁴

¹ Smyth, loc. cit.
² Ibid. All this was in vain because the men were turned back after they had marched half way to London.
³ P.R.O. C 1/1195 f.34.
⁴ P.R.O. SP 1/127 f.188a (L.P. xii, pt.2, 1322).
my lord, I saraffed the kyng with xxiiij men and 

hors and harncys and awll thyng that belongyt to 

thyem bocht at londdon and at holl, and with my 

lord off norffowk In the norht, without an

wayggys In awll thys tyem or anny alowans; 

wech cost me awll that effver I have.

Some men, however, were more farsighted and less 
patriotic than Christopher Ascugh: they attempted to
escape financial ruin by requesting that the number of
men that they had been appointed to supply might be
reduced. Charles Moreton, for example, when ordered on
one occasion to prepare ten soldiers for the wars, informed
the Earl of Shrewsbury that he was unable to prepare so
many:¹

for, sir, the truthe ys I have nether offece
nor rowme were I may make any part towards
the furnessyng of a man; and also, sir, in
gud fathe I have but bare xx li. landes, off
the wyche I have never a man able to do nothyng
towards the same, for thay be but pore cotageres
... besechyng your gud lordshype to conceder
my smale pour and also my grete charge off
chyldeyrn, and [that] I am in grete dettes to
the Kynges majestie.

By the time this letter was written, however, the
quasi-feudal system of military recruitment was in its
last years of life and the financial burden that the

gentry had borne so long was soon to be greatly lightened. Under the reorganised national system, a gentleman's obligation was strictly limited to his means. The new system was a more equitable one than the old one: the cost of equipping soldiers was fairly distributed throughout all classes of society.
CHAPTER III

Regular Soldiers

It has been seen that the great majority of the men who served in the armies of the early Tudor Period were not professional soldiers: in the normal way, a soldier was merely a man who had been obliged (sometimes against his will) to serve in an army. Nevertheless, there were some "regular" soldiers in the royal service at this period, and these fall into five main groups.

Section I. The Yeomen of the Guard

Henry VII's creation of a Corps of Yeomen Archers soon after his accession has been mentioned by most chroniclers. Hall states that:

person, whome he named Yomen of his garde, which president men thought that he learned of the Frenche kyng when he was in Fraunce: For men remembre not any kyng of England before that tyme whiche used such a furniture of daily souldyouses.

According to Polydore Vergil, there were originally about 200 Yeomen in the Guard; but this was probably only a very rough estimate. In Henry VIII's reign, at any rate, the strength of the Corps varied considerably at various times: in 1509 there were about 200 Yeomen; in 1513 there were no less than 600; in 1528 there were over 300; in 1541 there were less than 250; and in 1545 there were only about 125. The peak number, it will be noticed, was reached at the height of the first French war, after which time the King appears always to have been anxious to cut down the strength of the Corps. In 1526, for instance, when "it was considered that the greate nomber of the yomen of the gard were very chargeable", 64 of them were put on half-pay and ordered to come to

2. R. Hennell, The History of ... the Yeomen of the Guard, pp.55-7.
5. L.P. xvi, p.188.
6. L.P. xx, pt.2, App.2. There were other Yeomen at Boulogne.
Court only when sent for.¹

That these "Yeomen Extraordinary", as they came to be called, were occasionally sent for is clear from the following entry in the King's Book of Payments:²

"Item, for the wages of xxviiij yomen of the gard, beinge no dayly wayters, but sent for by the kinges commandement to geve their attendance at the Comynes commynge into this Realme - from the xth day of Decembre anno xxxix° unto the xixth day of this moneth of January eodem anno - and then sent home agayne... liiiij li. iiiij £."

There are two other occasions when the Yeomen Extraordinary are known to have given attendance upon the Sovereign; in 1546 81 came to Court at the time of the visit of the Admiral of France;³ and in 1553 an unknown number helped to guard the person of the Queen during the critical months of July and August.⁴

The Yeomen of the Guard, indeed, were first and foremost a royal bodyguard. Their main task was to protect the person of the Sovereign wherever he (or she) went. Thus, while they spent most of their time in the vicinity of London, the Yeomen sometimes went further

¹ Hall, op. cit. p.707.
² B.M. Arundel 97 f.111b (L.P. xvii, p.180).
³ L.P. xxi, pt.1, 1424, 1516.
⁴ A.P.C. 1552-4, p.342.
afield: for instance, they went to France with the King in 1500, 1513, 1520, and 1544.¹

Nevertheless, detachments of Guardsmen were occasionally employed on military duties other than those of a Sovereign's escort. Some were employed as garrison troops:² in March 1515 314 Yeomen were serving in the garrison of Tournay;² in December 1544 185 were serving in that of Boulogne;³ while in September 1550 the Privy Council discussed the possibility of sending 100 to Guisnes.⁴ The Crown was also prepared to employ the Yeomen in more active roles: in 1521 it was decided that as many Guardsmen "as may be spared" should serve in the expeditionary force that was to be sent to the aid of the Emperor⁵; while in 1554 Sir Henry Jerningham, Captain of the Guard, and some 200 Yeomen served under Norfolk in the early stages of the campaign against Sir Thomas Wyatt and the Kentish rebels.⁶ Again, on one or two occasions individual Yeomen saw service as officers in the Royal Navy: in 1545 a Guardsman by the name of Lekyer met his

¹ Hennell, op. cit. pp. 47, 65, 72, 85.
⁴ A.P.C. 1550-2, p. 126.
⁵ B. M. Otho E XI f. 39.
death while serving in command of one of His Majesty's Ships; and in 1557 a list of naval captains included the name of "Turner of the gard".

If the Yeomen were fit to fill responsible posts such as these, they must have been men of parts. However, as their name implies, they were not men of gentle birth: most were probably men who, like Roger Haccheman, had "neither learning nor great language". Many, moreover, may have had a better command of the Welsh language than the English: to the original Guard the first Tudor had appointed a considerable number of his Welsh followers; and it is significant that among those names of Yeomen that have found their way into the Letters and Papers of Henry VIII there is a fair sprinkling of Powells, Vaughans, and Griffiths.

1. L. P.XX, pt. 2, 3.
2. P.R.O. SP 11/11 f. 79a.
3. L. P. ii, 701.
5. I have made a list of all Yeomen mentioned in L.P.
Section II. The Gentlemen of the Guard.

It is often stated that, soon after his accession, Henry VIII strengthened his bodyguard by the addition of a Corps of Gentlemen, who at first were known as "King's Spears" and later as "Gentlemen Pensioners", and who survive today as the "Gentlemen-at-Arms".¹ This, however, is an erroneous view: the Corps created at the beginning of Henry VIII's reign was disbanded within a few years of its creation; and the Corps which survives today dates only from 1539. The two organisations must therefore be treated under two separate heads.

(a) The King's Spears (c. 1510 - c. 1515).

In the first year of Henry VIII's reign, according to the chronicler Hall, "the kyng ordeneid fiftie Gentle menne to bee speres, every of theim to have an Archer, a Dimilaunce, and a Custrell, and every sperre to have three greate Horses, to bee attendaunt on his persone, of the which bende the Erle of Essex was Lieuentenaunt and sir Jhon Pechie Capitain".²

The Spears make their first appearance in the King's Books of Payments in March 1510, when 23 of them received

1. This is the view expressed in S. Pegge, Curialia, pt. 2 pp. 1-4; H. Brackenbury, The History of ... the Honourable Corps of Gentlemen-at-Arms, pp. 35-36; and J. D. Mackie, op. cit. p. 269. A. R. Myers, in his England in the Late Middle Ages (1952), p. 200, even goes so far as to say that the Gentlemen-at-Arms were founded by Henry VII.
an instalment of their wages. And in later years many more names make their appearance. The names are invariably those of men of good birth: among them are the scions of the noble houses of Howard and Grey, and the representatives of substantial county families like the Courtenays and the Guildefords. The appointment of such men was strictly in accordance with the original Regulations, where it was stated that the Spears were "to be chosen of gentlemen that be commen and extracte of noble blood".

The Regulations also state that the Spears "shall make their abode in such places as the King's Grace shall appoint them ... wheder it be in places nigh his person or elsewhere". Thus in 1513 the King required some (like Sir Edward Don and Sir Edward Cobham) to serve "nigh his person" in the Battle of the "army by land" against France, and others (like Sir Wistan Browne and Sir Arthur Plantaganet) to serve "elsewhere" in the "army by sea". As well as being a bodyguard, the Spears constituted what has been described as a

2. These Regulations have been printed in Grose, op. cit. i, 109-12.
"nursery for officers" and as a "pool of reliable captains".

As the war against France drew to a close, the King realised that the Spears' "apparell and charges were so greate" that they could not be maintained in time of peace. The first signs that the King was thinking of disbanding the Corps when the war was over are found in a letter that he wrote on 5 May 1513 to Sir John Daunce, Treasurer of the Middleward of the Army against France, in which he stated that the wages of the Spears attendant upon his person "shal not be any lenger payed for a season by thandes of our servaunt John Heron, Treasurer of our Chamber, but only of our warre mohey". Accordingly, throughout the rest of that year and part of the next, Daunce was paying wages to various gentlemen out of "warre money", the last known payment being that made to Sir William Farr, "oon of our Speres", in the autumn of 1514. Some of the Spears, however, continued to be paid by the Treasurer of the Chamber until this time.

3. Hall, loc. cit.
4. B. M. Stowe 146·f.57 (L.P. i, 1843).
5. B. M. Add. Ch. 16578. For some earlier warrants, see L.P. i, 1990, 2100, 2356.
The Spears, indeed, appear to have received their last payments in 1514: the end of the Corps probably followed closely upon the end of the war. Though the payments of two years' wages in advance to individual Spears like Lords Leonard and John Grey in September 1514 meant that they were officially in the King's employment until the autumn of 1516, these isolated payments probably represented "gratuities" rather than salaries.¹ The last two Spears to be found earning their 3s. 4d. a day in the King's service were Sir Anthony Ughtred and Sir Richard Jerningham, who in March 1515 were both receiving these wages in addition to their salaries as officers in the garrison of Tournay.²

Hall's statement that the Corps "endured but a while"³ has not passed unchallenged. Samuel Pegge, asserting that he cared little for "the evidence of chroniclers, historians, and compilers" described this chronicler's statement as "absolutely fallacious".⁴ His attack was followed up by Major Brackenbury, a member of the Corps.

¹. L.P. ii, pt. 2, p. 1465.
³. Hall, loc. cit.
of Gentlemen-at-Arms, who maintained that "Hall ... errs in saying that the band was after a time dissolved. There is direct evidence of a continuous existence from 1509 to 1526, and presumptive evidence which covers the period between the latter date and 1539."¹

This "direct evidence" deserves close examination.

The first item is the record of payments made to the Earl of Essex as Captain of the King's Spears in 1513 and 1520; but the sums that the Earl was paid in those years have nothing to do with his Captain's wages, of which there is no mention after 1513.² The second item is an engraving which depicts the embarkation of Henry VIII at Dover in 1520;³ but there is no reason at all to suppose that the armed gentlemen there portrayed are members of a royal Corps of Spears, since there is no mention of such a body in the list of the King's attendants at the Field of the Cloth of Gold.⁴

Brackenbury's third piece of evidence is more formidable: it is the Eltham Household Ordinance of

1. Brackenbury, op. cit. p. 35.
2. The 1515 entry is in P.R.O. E 36/215 f.202a (L.P. ii, pt. 2, p. 1469); and the 1520 entry is in E 36/216 f. 89b (L.P. iii, pt. 2, p. 1540). The last record of a payment to Essex as Captain is in E 36/215 f.129b (L.P. ii, pt. 2, p. 1461.)
3. This well-known engraving is reproduced in Brackenbury, op. cit. facing p. 46.
4. L.P. iii, 703-4.
1526, in which is found a list of 50 Pensioners. This list, indeed, would provide convincing proof of the truth of his argument if it really did date from 1526. But, although the list was included in the edition of the Ordinance printed by the Society of Antiquaries in 1790,¹ this was done without any good reason; in fact it "must be as late as 1544."² A similar error, moreover, led to the inclusion of another list of Pensioners in the Appendix to the Eltham Ordinance printed in the Letters and Papers of Henry VIII:³ this list, which includes the names of Sir Osburn Ichyngham (who was not knighted until 1529)⁴ and Peter Carew (who was not born until 1514),⁵ clearly dates from 1539.⁶ Thus, the continuous existence of the King's Spears throughout the period 1519-39, for which the principal evidence was found in the Ordinance of

2. L.P. iv, pt. 1, p. 865n.
5. D.N.B.
1526, is no more than a legend which arose largely because most copies of that Ordinance "include a good many additions from ordinances of later periods".¹

(b) The Gentlemen Pensioners (1539 onwards).

The Corps of Gentlemen Pensioners was finally established in the last days of 1539, although the Crown had been contemplating the establishment of such a Corps for the past three years.² "In the moneth of December", wrote Stow in his account of the year 1539, "were appointed to waite on the K. person 50 Gentlemen called Pentioners or Speares, like as they were in the first yeere of the King".³

The new Corps, indeed, did bear a strong likeness to the one that had been established 30 years before. Its 50 members were under the command of a Captain and a Lieutenant; they were armed with the spears that distinguished them from the Yeomen Archers of the other Guard; and they were all men of good birth and breeding. Their wages, however, were lower than those

¹. A. P. Newton, "Tudor Reforms in the Royal Household" (Tudor Studies) p. 237.
³. Stow, op. cit. p. 577b.
enjoyed by the old Spears, and they were paid to them in a different way: while their predecessors had been paid individually by the Treasurer of the Chamber or a Treasurer of Wars, the new Pensioners received their wages from their own clerk of the cheque.¹

The new royal bodyguard, with its own pay clerk, its own harbinger, and its own standard-bearer, was thus much more of a unit than the old one had been. And it was as a unit that it served in France in 1544.² That the Corps also constituted a "pool" of officers is clear from the evidence of its members' activities in the following year: in 1545 the Pensioners were employed in different ways in many different regions. Edward Vaughan was captain of the all-important town and garrison of Portsmouth, with Edward Grimston acting as his deputy.³ Nicholas Arnold was captain of the forces assembled in the Isle of Sheppey.⁴ John Portynary as captain of a company of pioneers employed in building coastal defences in the Isle of Wight.⁵ Henry Markham,

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1. See Grose, op. cit. i, 113.
4. Ibid. 221.
5. L.P. xx, pt.1, 1329.
William Fulwood, and Richard Knyvett were serving under Hertford on the Borders.\(^1\) Clement Paston, Peter Carew, and Gawen Carew held commands in the Navy.\(^2\) Sir Ralph Fane, the Lieutenant of the Corps, was acting as a commissioner of musters in Germany.\(^3\)

Section III. Garrison Troops.

While the Yeomen and Gentlemen of the King's Guard (together with a small garrison of Yeomen and Gunners in the Tower) constituted the only permanent central force, there were other permanent military forces in the provinces. These were the garrisons of the various castles and fortresses that lay scattered throughout the kingdom, the most important of which were situated on the Scottish Border and along the South Coast.

(a) Border Garrisons

Though in time of war the Border strongholds were garrisoned by large numbers of troops, in time of peace

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the military establishment of this region was not large: outside Berwick and Carlisle, the normal garrison consisted merely of the constable or deputy and his household servants.¹

The constable of a Border castle was a gentleman specially appointed to have the keeping of it by a patent under the Great Seal. Typical of his class was Thomas Cary, Sewer of the King's Chamber, who on 3 December 1537 was given a patent as constable of Prudhoe Castle in Northumberland.² Two days after this grant an indenture was drawn up between him and the King, in which it was stipulated that "the said Thomas with his howeshold and famylye shall every yere for the moost part of the same be contynually resident, permanent, inhabiting, and dwelling within the said castell of Prado during his liefe, if he shall so long kepe the forenamed office of custody of the same". If he ever had occasion to leave the castle for a time, he was to leave behind him "oon substancyall personage to be his lieutenaunt".³ Thomas Cary (or his deputy) and his able-bodied household

¹. Cf. L.P. xiii, pt.1, 60.
². L.P. xii, pt.2, g.1311 (7).
³. P.R.O. SP 1/1c7 f.10 (L.P.xii, pt.2, 1174).
servants, of whom there appear to have been eight in 1538, thus constitute the whole permanent garrison of this northern fortress. In times of emergency, however, the constable had the power to 'call the tenauntes of the lordshipp of Fredo and the neyghbours aboute into the saide Castell for the defence of the same'.

An important fortified place like Berwick, on the other hand, had a permanent garrison of considerable size. In the castle alone there were normally forty soldiers (included in which number were the constable, 2 porters, 3 watchmen, one priest, and one cook) and ten gunners: this, at any rate, was the number of men that Sir Cuthbert Radcliffe, formerly constable of Alnwick, was appointed to have under him when he was promoted to the captaincy of the castle in 1544. In the following year, however, Simon Sage, one of the gunners there, gave a very unfavourable account of the state of affairs in the castle:

2. P.R.O. SP 1/127 f.10b (L.P. xii, pt.2, 1174).
3. P.R.O. E 351/3470 m.1d.
4. L.P.xix, pt.1, g.141 (51).
ffurst, ther is in the said castell x gounners in wages; and ther is bott foure that can shoite, whoos names followith - Richerd Bellinggham, lyell haggerston, Symond sase, and Thomas Best.

Item, when the Capitayn is froo home, the Rewle is lefte to his sonne, who is constable of the castell ... (a verye wilfull yong man and nott all of the wyssyst), and not past xviiij persens with hym; and, when the Capitayne is at home, ther is nott past xxxti persons duly ther residente.

In addition to the garrison of the castle, there was in the town of Berwick a "crew" of 50 gunners. Though this was a permanent corps of men, its membership was constantly changing: of the 50 who belonged to it in the quarter ending 15 November 1519, for example, only 37 continued to do so in the quarter ending 16 May 1520. This probably meant that every quarter new men had to be recruited to fill the places vacated by those who had grown tired of the military life.

Some indication of the kind of man who would be recruited to serve in the garrison of Berwick and of the way in which he would be recruited is provided by a letter which Lord Darcy, Captain there, sent to William Langton, Treasurer there, in May 1514:

1. P.R.O. SP 1/19 f.104 (L.P. iii, 511); SP 1/20 f.49b (L.P. iii, 813).
2. P.R.O. E 101/57/6 f.15.
I send unto you now Percyvall Wortelay, a bastard son of my Cousin sir Thomas Wortelaies, to be put in th Crew ther at vj d. by the day. I wolde ye did advyse and loke upon hym to cause hym to be thrifty... I wolde be glad to her he shulde do well, and specially nowe under me, for my Cousin his faders sake ... I pray yow kep hym abowt yourself - hourely, unthrifty, and dronken ye shall fynd hym.

If Gunner Worteley was typical of his class, one is not surprised to learn that there was sometimes a little friction between the inhabitants and garrison of Berwick.

(b) Coastal Garrisons

In the early part of Henry VIII's reign, the coasts of southern England were ill-protected against invasion. Admittedly, there were a few castles at various points along the shores of the English Channel: ever since Edward IV's time the townsmen of Dartmouth, for instance, had maintained a "stronge and mightie fortresse or bulwarke of lyme and stone" for the defence of their port and its hinterland,¹ and other and stronger castles were to be found during the period at Dover, Southampton, and elsewhere on the South Coast.

It was not until the 1530s, however, that the Crown became fully aware of the need for an efficient system of

¹ E.C.R.O. DD 61375.
coastal fortifications, and this awareness led to the erection of a considerable number of castles and bulwarks along the coasts of Suffolk, Essex, Kent, Sussex, Hampshire, and Dorset. Each of these new fortresses was manned by a small garrison of trained men: by the end of 1540 there were more than 170 soldiers and gunners in the 26 castles and bulwarks on the coast between Gravesend and Portland.¹

By the beginning of Edward VI's reign there were also seven blockhouses on the coast of Essex. Those at Mersea and St. Osyth were each manned by a captain, a lieutenant, a porter, two soldiers, and three gunners; each of the three at Harwich had the same garrison, with the addition of one gunner; while those at "Langer Point" and "Langer Rood" each had an extra three gunners. This made a total of 7 captains (at 16d. a day), 7 lieutenants (at 12d.), 7 porters (at 8d.), 14 soldiers (at 6d.), and 0 gunners (at 6d.).² In the autumn of 1552, however, these blockhouses (together with those on the coast of Suffolk) were thought to be no longer necessary, and their garrisons were discharged.³

¹ L.P. XVI, 372.
² P.R.O. SP 10/1 ff.82-3.
³ A.P.C. 1552-4, pp.130, 139-40; P.R.O. SP 10/15 f.15.
Nevertheless, many of the coastal garrisons in other shires remained in being after this date. In 1557 the garrison of Hurst Castle (Hampshire) consisted of a captain, a lieutenant, a master gunner, and three soldiers, while those of the Kentish bulwarks of Milton and Gravesend each consisted of a captain, two soldiers, and five gunners. ¹

By 1557 the garrison of one important Henrician castle on the South Coast appears to have ceased to exist. This was the Sussex castle of Camber near Winchilsea, of which in July 1544 Philip Chute had been appointed captain by patent under the Great Seal — with a retinue of 8 soldiers and 6 gunners. ² Ten years later the same Philip was still in command of the fortress and its garrison of one sub-captain, one janitor, one sub-janitor, one soldier, and 17 gunners. ³ In 1557, however, it was reported that both captain and crew were "not payed bycause the patent is not renued", ⁴ and in the following year it was said that the castle was "in sore decaye". ⁵

¹ P.R.O. SP 11/11 ff.150b, 152a, 154b.
² L.P. xix, pt.1, g.1035 (142).
³ P.R.O. SP 11/11 f.154a.
⁴ Ibid., f.155b.
⁵ P.R.O. SP 11/13 f.11b.
Camber Castle, moreover, was the subject of an Order in Council in 1558: all able-bodied men dwelling in the two hundreds that adjoined it were to be put in readiness to enter the fort if and when need should arise.¹ There was, however, nothing unusual about this Order: militiamen were often recruited for "castle-ward" even where the castle had a regular garrison. In 1557 it was decided that a number of those able-bodied men who lived in the vicinity of Portland Castle should stand in readiness at all times "to be placed and putte into our saide Castle for the defence and safetie of the same", since "the Captayne and his own force is no sufficient garde for the sayd Castell".²

The garrison of Portland, which Leland had described in the late 1530s as "a right strong and magnificent castel",³ consisted at this date of a master gunner and five soldiers under the command of John Lewston, armiger.⁴ Lewston was in many ways a typical castle commander: like William Blechenden, captain of Walmer (Kent),⁵ Richard Uvedale, captain of Yarmouth (Isle of Wight),⁶ and Thomas Arundell, captain of St. Mawes

¹. A.P.C. 1556-8, p. 258.
². P.R.O. SP 11/10 ff. 74-5.
³. L. T. Smith, The Itinerary of John Leland, i. 251.
⁵. Ibid, f. 154b.
he was a member of a local landed family. These gentlemen-captains, however, who probably owed their appointments to local influence rather than to any military prowess that they might possess, were not always suitable men for the job. Arundell's predecessor at St. Mawes, Thomas Treffry, for instance, had been much too old for the captaincy of the castle - which he clearly regarded as a sinecure. At the beginning of Mary's reign he described himself as "a man drawn in yeres as lx or above" and asked the Queen that he might be allowed "to spende the residue of his tyme in the said Roome and Offyce and not to be forced nowe in his olde daies to chaunge his habitacon or dwellinge". Nevertheless, he lost his job, but not (as one would expect after such a clear statement of his unsuitability for it) on account of his age, but of his religion.

Captains of coastal fortresses, however, were not drawn entirely from the ranks of the local gentry: a number were men without local connections who, at the time of their appointment, were already paid servants of the Crown. In 1541, for example, three of those in

1. A. L. Rowse, Tudor Cornwall, p. 385. The first captain of Pendennis Castle across the haven was John Killigrew, whose family owned the land upon which it was built (Ibid. p. 247).

2. P.R.O. Req. 2/25/190.

command of Kentish strongholds appear to have been
Serjeants-at-Arms: Richard Keys, captain of Sandgate
Castle, Folkestone; Thomas Vaughan, captain of the bulwark
under Dover Castle; and John Yardley, captain of Higham
bulwark.¹ Richard Keys, it may be noted in passing,
was succeeded at Sandgate by one Thomas Keys, who may
have been his son, and who in 1556 was given an annuity
of £40 in consideration of his 10 years' service as
captain there.²

Section IV. Foreign Mercenaries.

The employment of foreign mercenaries in English
armies was a customary practice of the later Middle
Ages: Edward III, for example, had used them in the
first major campaign of his reign.³ So, too, the first
major campaign of Henry VIII's reign (the Guienne expedi-
tion of 1512)⁴ and most of his subsequent campaigns
against the French saw foreign mercenaries serving side
by side with English troops in the armed forces of the
Crown.⁵

1. L.P. xvi, 456. Cf. L.P. i, g. 2861 (30); ii, 1338;
xii, pt. 2, g. 1311 (19).
2. C.P.R. 1555-7, p. 73.
5. See, e.g., L.P. i, 1918, 1934, 1939, 2050; xix, pt. 1,
245-7, 279-82, 419-21.
At the end of Henry VIII's reign mercenaries were even employed against the Scots. In the spring of 1545 a contingent of Spanish troops under Peter de Gamboa arrived at Newcastle; and these were soon followed by contingents of Italian and German troops. In addition to these, the Council planned to bring over a band of Spanish soldiers from Calais - for service in the defence of Essex and Kent. The use of foreign mercenaries in the defence of the Northern Border and the South Coast represented a new departure: although mercenaries had often been used to supplement expeditionary forces, this was the first time that they had been used to supplement the militia.

In the reigns of Edward and Mary the Government tended to rely more and more on foreign troops. The eventful year 1549, for example, saw Italians and Spaniards fighting Scots on the Border, and Germans fighting Englishmen in Devonshire and Norfolk. Indeed, it seems to have been the Germans, "hitherto never employed to suppress an insurrection at home", who turned the tide in the Crown's favour at that critical time. The rebellious peasants were no match for the "almaynes", who, as Thomas Audley...
had told Henry VIII, "be accompted among all nacions the flower of the world for good orders of footemen". ¹

Section V. Other Volunteers.

Sir Thomas Wyatt the Younger, in the proposals for military reform that he laid before the Privy Council in Edward VI's reign, had suggested that the only men who should be recruited for military service were those who were "joyefull and desierous to serve there prynce as men of warr". ² But, in spite of a Venetian Ambassador's statement that there were in England between 20 and 25,000 "huomeni da fattione" who were always willing to serve as soldiers, ³ it is doubtful whether an army of volunteers could ever have been raised in England. Englishmen, unlike Germans, were never very "joyful" at the prospect of military service.

Occasionally, however, the Crown did attempt to recruit volunteers for its armies. The attempt appears to have been successful during the second French war of Henry VIII's reign: in 1524 there was a band of about 200 such soldiers "called the krekers or aventurers"

1. B. M. Harl. 309 f.6a.
2. B. M. Loan, Wyatt 23 f.3b. See Appendix II.
serving at Guisnes.\footnote{Hall, op. cit. p. 686.} Again, in 1545 one John of Calais was licensed by the King to recruit "Soldiers Adventurers" at the sign of the Gun in Billingsgate, London;\footnote{L. P. xx, pt. 1, 504.} but with what success it is not known.

Raising soldiers by the beating of drums appears to have been a favourite expedient of the Duke of Northumberland. On one occasion in 1551, for instance, when troops were needed for service in Ireland, the Government sought to raise men in this way in London, but only 200 footmen answered the call.\footnote{Cal. S. P. Span. x, p. 291.} In July 1553, however, the beating of the drum in the City yielded an ampler harvest: the Duke was able to get together 1000 horsemen and 3000 footmen for his enterprise against Queen Mary, but, so the Spanish Ambassadors assured that lady's future husband, few of these volunteers were loyal to their leader's cause.\footnote{Cal. S. P. Span. xi, p. 103.}
CHAPTER IV

Narrative Account of the Years 1513 and 1544

In the period under discussion the two most eventful years from the military point of view were 1513 and 1544. There is, moreover, a striking similarity between the events of these two years: both years saw the King himself in France at the head of a large army, the English triumphant over the Scots, and the calling out of the national militia to act as a reinforcement in the face of an enemy offensive. In this chapter an attempt has been made to relate these events to the system of military organisation that has been discussed in previous chapters.

Section I. 1513

After the military failures of the previous year, the early part of 1513 saw England very much on the defensive. On 28 January the sheriffs of all southern coastal shires were ordered to make proclamation that all men of military
... prepare themselves to resist a French invasion, and a fortnight later commissions as principal captains against this threatened attack were issued to several southern magnates. The militia, however, was not in fact called out, because the threatened invasion of the King of France did not materialise.

By the beginning of February, indeed, the King of England was himself preparing to go over to the offensive: before the end of January, even, he had caused letters to be addressed to various individuals ordering them to prepare soldiers for an "army by sea". Among those who received such a demand were Sir Henry Vernon and the mayor of Coventry, each of whom was to send 100 men to Greenwich by 8 March, and to certify the King of his ability to do so by 15 February. It was on this day, moreover, that the mayors of Norwich, Exeter, and Southampton (each of whom had presumably received a similar letter to that sent to the mayor of Coventry) mustered their contingents of soldiers before sending them off to join the army.

1. L.P. i, g. 1602 (38).
2. Ibid. g.1662 (27).
By 15 February, it seems, the Fleet, under the command of Sir Edward Howard the Lord Admiral, had already arrived in the Thames.\(^1\) Before long, too, the soldiers would have begun to arrive at Greenwich. These men had come from all parts of the kingdom: from nearby places like Brentwood, Enfield, St. Albans;\(^2\) and from distant ones like Lostwithiel, Oswestry, and Cardiff.\(^3\) Among them were the dependants of great monasteries like the Abbeys of Gloucester, Peterborough, and Westminster;\(^4\) the retainers of great magnates like the Earl of Oxford, Lord Ferrers, and the Countess of Devon;\(^5\) and the inhabitants of the greatest city in the kingdom - London.\(^6\)

At Greenwich the soldiers, more than 3500 in number, were divided up into groups of 100 or more and put on board the various vessels that were lying waiting in the Thames. The 100 men supplied by Sir Thomas Wyndham, for example, were quite naturally allotted to the **John Hopton** of which Sir Thomas himself was captain. To this ship were also allotted 50 of the 200 men sent by the Earl of Oxford - the residue being accommodated on the **Nicholas Reede**. Again, on the **Gabriell Royall**

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1. L.P. i, 1628/2.
2. P.R.O. E 101/56/29 ff. 6a, 8a, 11b.
4. L.P. i, 1176/3.
were placed the 100 men provided by the Bishop of Exeter and the 50 men provided by Lord Stourton.¹

All necessary preparations having been made, the Fleet put to sea on 19 March and sailed along the South Coast to Plymouth. There it remained for some days before setting sail once again: this time the destination was the hostile harbour of Brest. After a small encounter with the French on 25 April, in which the Lord Admiral lost his life, the "army by sea" returned to Plymouth in a very dispirited condition. The soldiers were particularly troublesome: some went on shore and created disturbances; others even attempted to desert; and it took the new Admiral, Lord Thomas Howard, a long time to restore order.²

Early in May, however, plans were afoot to employ these soldiers in an expedition into Brittany. On the 10th of this month the King informed the mayor of Coventry that he was "entending to have a secret enterprize of our Ennemyes" and that, with this in view, he had appointed Sir Charles Brandon (soon to be created Viscount Lisle) as "Chef Captayne" of an army to be assembled at Southampton

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¹ Bpont, op. cit. pp.80-5.
² Ibid. pp.xxxiv-xl.
on the 18th. This force, it seems, was to consist of the soldiers then at Plymouth and a number of newly-levied troops (who had originally been appointed to Dover for service in the "army by land"), of which 50 men to be sent by the city of Coventry were to be a part. But this intended expedition evidently came to nought, and the newly-levied troops were absorbed in the "army by land", which, from the middle of May onwards, was being transported from Dover to Calais.

For this army preparations had been in progress for some months. On 22 and 23 February letters were sent to Sir David Owen and Lord FitzWalter ordering each to prepare 100 soldiers and to send to London for coat and conduct money before April. On the 13th of the latter month some of the suppliers were sent further instructions: Lord Hastings was informed that his men were to pass over in the Vanguard; Sir Adrian and John Fortescue were informed that theirs were to pass over in the Middleward.

It was not until the second half of May, however, that the Vanguard (under the Earl of Shrewsbury) and the

2. Ibid.; L.P. 1, 1869. Cf. L.P. 1, 1858, 1874. The Coventry men were to serve under Sir Edward Belknap.
3. L.P. 1, 1640, g.1662 (50).
4. Ibid. g.1804 (28-9).
Rearguard (under Lord Herbert) crossed to Calais - to be followed at the end of June by the Middleward or Battle (with the King himself at its head). This army numbered some 25,000 men, who had been drawn from an even wider area than those in the "army by sea". Many horsemen came from the North of England: there were demi-lances from Kendal and Pickering, and mounted archers from York and Newcastle-on-Tyne.¹ Footmen, too, had come from places many miles from Dover: there were Yorkshiremen from Wakefield and Wilstrop, and Welshmen from Holyhead and Haverfordwest.² Some footmen, on the other hand, like the men from Penshurst and High Halden, were more fortunate in that they had only a very short distance to travel.³ Most fortunate of all in this respect were the seven men of Dover conscripted to serve in the retinue of the Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports: they merely had to march the few hundred yards that lay between Town Hall and harbour.⁴

Among those who came to join the Middleward of this great army were the dependants of some of the most important

1. P.R.O. E 101/56/25 ff.7b, 37, 44b, 47.
2. Ibid. ff.1, 2, 50, 71b.
3. Ibid. ff.41b, 89b.
4. B.M. Eg. 2092 f.92.
people in the kingdom. From Groby (Leicestershire) and Stoke-upon-Tern (Shropshire) came those of the mighty Marquess of Dorset;\(^1\) from Blechingley (Surrey) and Maxstoke (Warwickshire) came those of the over-mighty Duke of Buckingham;\(^2\) and from Ipswich and the Isle of Axholme came those of one who was soon to become mightier than either of these — the King's Almoner, Thomas Wolsey.\(^3\)

The majority of those who were seen marching through the Kentish countryside in the last days of June, nevertheless, were the dependants of less eminent personages. Such were the tenants of John de Vere's Northamptonshire manors of Lamport, Thorpe Malsor, Marston Trussel, and Easton Maudit, and of Sir Thomas Tyrell's Cambridgeshire manors of Shepreth and Meldreth. Such, too, were the men levied in Buckinghamshire on Sir Andrew Windsor's manor of Horton and on John Cheyney's manor of Chesham Bois.\(^4\)

On reaching Dover the men were mustered before the King's commissioners, whose task it was to inspect them and to divide them up into tactical units of 100 men.

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2. Ibid. ff.87-90.
Those soldiers, however, who were already grouped in "centuries", like the contingents of Sir John Seymour, Sir Edward Hungerford, and Sir Ralph Egerton (each of which was a hundred strong), were not meddled with. They fought in the field as tactical units under the command of their own suppliers, each of whom held the rank and drew the pay of one of His Majesty's captains.

While the quasi-feudal levies comprised the great bulk of the soldiery in the Army against France of 1513, they did not comprise the whole of it. Also serving the King that year were "vi C archers of his garde, al in white gabberdines & cappes", the gunners of the Ordnance under the Master, Sir Richard Carew, and several thousand mercenaries from Flanders and High Almain. In addition to the soldiery, of course, there were large numbers of non-combatant personnel: as Hall pointed out, there were over 11,000 men in the Battle, "but of good fightynge men ther were not full ix M".

When the King decided to cross to France, "he and his counsaill forgat not the olde Prankes of the Scottes which is ever to invade England when the kyng is out".

2. L.P. i, 2053.
3. Ibid.
5. Ibid. p.555.
Thus, before leaving England, Henry gave orders to the Earl of Surrey to repair to the North Parts to organise the defence of the kingdom. Surrey did as he was bidden, and towards the end of July he sent out letters for special musters to all the lords and gentlemen of the northern shires. Upon receipt of their certificates, he ordered them to bring or send their certified numbers to Newcastle by 1 September: accordingly, a large army assembled in the path of the advancing Scots.\(^1\)

Apart from the men of the garrison of Berwick serving under Sir Ralph Evers, Deputy there,\(^2\) this again was an army of non-professional warriors. Among the 20,000 men that assembled at Newcastle were Sir John Stanley with the Bishop of Ely's servants, Lionel Percy with the tenants of the Abbot of Whitby, and Richard Cholmely with the King's tenants of Hatfield and certain townsmen of Hull.\(^3\) But before joining battle with the Scots, this army was reinforced by the arrival of over one thousand men from the Fleet, who had landed at Newcastle under the command of the Lord Admiral, Thomas Howard, and 15 captains.\(^4\) These reinforcements were

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2. L.P. i, 2651.
4. L.P. i, 2652.
to prove invaluable on the field of Flodden on 8 September.

At the time of this battle, moreover, further reinforcements were apparently on their way northward under the command of the Queen Regent. These, it is said, were militiamen from Berkshire, Wiltshire, and other southern counties - some 10,000 in number - whom Katherine had assembled at Stony Stratford. And, according to one rather unreliable account, among the Berkshire contingent was the celebrated Jack of Newbury with a hundred servants. These forces, however, had not travelled far along the road to the north when news came of the great victory that Surrey had won over the Scots: the army duly disbanded and the soldiers returned to their homes.¹

Demobilisation was now the order of the day. Soon after Flodden Surrey dismissed the greater part of his forces: back to their ships went his son's followers after only 16 days on shore;² and back to their homes went the quasi-feudal levies from the northern shires. Before the end of the month the greater part of the army by sea was also demobilised. The "dispatchyng and brekyng up" of this army took place on 26 September.³ Not all the soldiers, however, returned to their homes: in spite of

¹ Deloney, op.cit., pp.42-6.
² L.P. i, 2652.
³ P.R.O. E 101/56/29 f.1a.
its inactivity, it seems, the army had suffered casualties. It was reported that, in the course of one skirmish, "Syr Wystan Bro[wne had] 3 men slayne",¹ this may account for the fact that, of the 64 men that he had originally supplied,² only 61 returned to Sir Wistan's home at Langenhoe (Essex) in September.³ Similarly, only 42 of the 50 men supplied by Lord Stourton returned to Mere and Sourton,⁴ and only 28 of the 30 men supplied by the mayor of Exeter returned to their native city.⁵ There is evidence, too, that casualties were sustained by the Middleward of the Army against France, which was disbanded at the end of October. Of the "centuries" provided by Sir Maurice Berkeley and Sir William Sandys, for example, only 89 and 88 men respectively appear to have returned to their homes.⁶ The fact that a considerable number

1. Spont, op.cit., p. 156.
2. L.P. i, 1176/3.
4. L.P. i, 1176/3; P.R.O. E 101/56/29 f. 38b; P.R.O. E 101/56/29 f. 2b.
6. L.P. i, 2053/1; P.R.O. E 101/56/25 ff. 61, 64b.
of soldiers did not return to their homes that autumn, however, had nothing to do with casualties: these men had been detained in France to serve in the garrison of the newly-captured town of Tournay.¹

Section II. 1544

In 1543 the Crown, foreseeing the possibility of war against France and Scotland, had ordered special musters to be taken throughout the realm.² Accordingly, the lords and gentlemen of England had returned their certificates—those in the southern shires to the King and Council at London, and those in the northern shires to the Duke of Suffolk, the King's Lieutenant in the North Parts. Thus, when in the following year it was decided to raise armies to fight the French and the Scots, the Crown was already in possession of much valuable information about the "power" of the leading inhabitants of every shire in the land.

Preparations for the war against Scotland were commenced early in 1544: before the end of January the King was making

1. See, e.g., L.P. 1, 2480/23.
plans for an invasion of that country in March. But it was not until 25 February that the letters under the Privy Signet were sent out to the northern suppliers ordering them to send soldiers to Newcastle by the last day of March. By the latter date, indeed, almost all the soldiers had reached Newcastle. The great majority of these men were from the northern province, like those sent from Tollaton (Nottinghamshire) by Sir Hugh Willoughby, from Atherton (Lancashire) by Sir John Atherton, and from Kirkby Hoorside (Yorkshire) by George Stafford. Strangely enough, however, two contingents are known to have come from the south of the kingdom: Lord Stourton sent one from Stourton (Wiltshire); and Sir Anthony Hungerford sent another from Shefford (Berkshire). Most of the soldiers were probably the tenants of their suppliers, like the men of Potlock (Derbyshire) whom John Port appointed to serve in the contingent of 50 soldiers that he sent "to attend upon the Erle of hertford, the kinges lieutenaut, into Scotland". Others were probably King's tenants sent to the war by the

1. L.P. xix, pt.1, 71.
2. Y.C.R. iv, 102.
4. Ibid., 532.
stewards of royal honors and manors: in this category must have come many of the Cheshire men provided by Sir Piers Dutton, Steward of Halton under Sir Edward Nevill, and many of the Wakefield men supplied by John Temp/est, the King's steward there.¹

The soldiers had to remain on Tyneside for a whole month, much to the annoyance of their commander, Hertford. The Fleet that was to transport them to Scotland did not arrive in the Tyne until 21 April, and it was not able to set sail again until 1 May. On the 4th, however, the whole army disembarked near Leith and the war against the Scots began in earnest. On the 8th Hertford was joined by Lord Evers (Lord Warden of the East Marches) and Sir Ralph Evers (Lord Warden of the Middle Marches), who brought with them 4000 horsemen that they had levied within their offices.²

By 18 May the army was back in England, and on the following day the bulk of the soldiers were dismissed. Back to Bolton in Wensleydale (Yorkshire) went Lord Scrope's men, and back to Halsall (Lancashire) went Henry Halsall's.³ But others were less fortunate. On 15 May the Council had informed Hertford that he must keep back 3900 of his men

2. Ibid. 366, 451, 463, 483.
3. Ibid., 532.
and send them by ship straight to Calais for service in the Army against France. 1 Hertford had replied that this was impossible since most of his men were in need of rest and fresh equipment, but he had promised to send a smaller number. 2 Thus it came about that a number of men saw service that year in two separate campaigns: in the spring expedition against Scotland and in the summer expedition against France.

By the end of May, indeed, preparations were in full swing for the expedition against France. On the 25th a signet letter was sent to the Dean and Chapter of Wells ordering them to send 40 soldiers to Dover by 12 June. 3 And on the same day the Lord Mayor, the Recorder, and the Sheriffs of the city of London were due to appear before the King's Council "for the answering of their Commandement for the finding of Souldeours to the kynges warres". 4 Five days later, too, the council of the city of Oxford was discussing "the setting forward of certen persons to the Kyngs majestyes warres wyth the Dukes grace of Suffolk". 5

1. L.P. xix, pt.1, 508.
2. Ibid. 531.
3. H.M.C. Wells, ii, 257.
The vast majority of the soldiers in this army, however, were supplied, not by ecclesiastical or municipal corporations, but by individual lords and gentlemen. As the latter had been ordered to take special musters in the previous year, the Crown knew exactly how many each could provide. Thus, to the Vanguard of the Army the Crown was able to order magnates like the Lords Mountjoy and Wentworth each to supply the number of 140 footmen, and small squires like John Berney of Reepham (Norfolk) and John Pointz of South Ockendon (Essex) each to supply four.

The whole army numbered over 30,000 men, who had been drawn from a wide area. From the North came Sir Peter Mewtas with 500 hackbutters who had lately done good service in Scotland, and ten footmen of the Dean and Chapter of Chester. From the West came Lord Ferrers and his son Sir Richard Devereux with "a great number of Welshmen", and soldiers supplied by both the Bishop and the Dean of Exeter. From the East came townsfolk from

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1. See above, p. 113.
2. L.P. xix, pt.1, 274.
3. Ibid. 472, 634,652.
4. Ibid. p.159.
Ipswich and Lynn,\textsuperscript{1} and the men set forth by the University of Cambridge.\textsuperscript{2} From the South came the contingents of the Archbishop and Archdeacon of Canterbury,\textsuperscript{3} and King's tenants from Blechingley and Nonsuch.\textsuperscript{4}

By 11 June the soldiers of all three wards - the Van under Norfolk, the Battle under Suffolk, and the Rear under Russell - had begun to cross to Calais. Most embarked at Dover, but some embarked at Rye, Harwich, and Ipswich.\textsuperscript{5} It was to the last-named port, for example, that the 40 soldiers of the city of Norwich were sent. And, although the city authorities had sent a man to Buckenham "to appoynt with Sir Edmond Knyvet knyght what daye the Sowgers shuld settefforward", they apparently got to Ipswich too early; they were kept waiting about there for a day and a half "beffore the Capiteyn wold receyve them".\textsuperscript{6}

In spite of such delays, however, by 5 July all those appointed to serve had crossed to Calais, with the exception of a few from Harwich and those in attendance upon the King. The King himself eventually crossed over

\textsuperscript{1} L.P. xix, pt.1, p.158.
\textsuperscript{2} See above, p. 175.
\textsuperscript{3} L.P. xix, pt.1, p.159.
\textsuperscript{4} G.B.R.O. Loseley MS. 26 f.1a.
\textsuperscript{5} L.P. xix, pt.1, 672.
\textsuperscript{6} N.C.R.O. Chamberlains' Accts. I f.161b.
to Calais on the 14th, by which time Norfolk and Russell with the Fore and Rear Wards were preparing to lay siege to Boulogne.\(^1\)

In England, meanwhile, the King's commissioners were mustering the forces of the shires and ordering all men of military age to be prepared to serve in the defence of the country at an hour's warning.\(^2\) On 23 July the Council with the King informed the Council with the Queen (who was acting as Regent in her husband's absence as her predecessor had done in 1513) that 4000 of the militiamen prepared by the commissioners were to be held in readiness for despatch to Boulogne as reinforcements.\(^3\) Nevertheless, it was not until 8 September, six days before the capture of Boulogne, that the King ordered the soldiers to be sent across.\(^4\) The men were to be levied in 12 different shires, and were to take ship at the nearest convenient port: 600 men from Essex, for instance, were to embark at Harwich on the 20th.\(^5\) Among the latter were five

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1. L.P. xi, pt.1, 848; Hall, op. cit., p.861.
2. Ibid. 890.
3. Ibid. 979.
5. Ibid. 253/3.
townsmen of Maldon who had been well equipped for the purpose by their borough: they had been issued with doublets, hose, and hats; and the sum of threepence had been expended on the "nottyng of the Sogeors hedes".¹

Again, 500 Norfolk men were due to take ship at Lynn, Ipswich, or Yarmouth on the 24th.² Among these were two men of Shipdham and two of North Elmham, each of whom had been supplied with a pair of boots at the parochial expense,³ and one man of Snettisham to whom the churchwardens there gave eight shillings for his "exspenses to ypyswych".⁴

The militiamen, however, had no sooner reached their ports of embarkation than they were ordered to march home again.⁵ But, on the 25th, in view of a sudden French threat to Estaples, new orders were sent out for the despatch of 4000 men across the Channel. These were provided by the same shires which had previously set forth soldiers, with the exception of four which were thought to be too far off.⁶ The Essex commissioners were

¹ E.R.O. D/B 3/3/238.
² L.P. xix, pt.2, 253/3.
³ B.K. Add. MS. 23008 f.112a; 23009 f.29a; Legge, op. cit. p.33.
⁴ N.P.L. MS 11357 f.117a.
⁵ L.P. xix, pt.2, 452.
⁶ Ibid. 292.
again ordered to send men to Harwich, and the chamberlain of Maldon recorded the payment of four shillings "to the Sogeors at ther next goyng forthe this yere".¹

By 4 October the 4000 men that had so often been demanded and countermanded were beginning to arrive at Boulogne.² These reinforcements, however, proved insufficient in view of a vigorous counter-attack by the French, and on the 10th the shire commissioners were ordered to prepare further levies.³ The Surrey commissioners, for instance, were instructed to raise 400 men of whom 80 were to be archers and the rest billmen. Accordingly, on 16 October they met together to allot a proportion of this number to each hundred and borough in the county: 20 men were to be raised in the borough of Southwark and 16 in that of Guildford; 36 were to be raised in the hundred of Woking and 20 in that of Effingham.⁴ But there is no record of any militiamen being sent to France at this time.

By this time, indeed, the military situation had taken a turn for the better, and the bulk of the army was

². L.P. xix, pt.2, 347.
³. Ibid. 397.
⁴. Manning and Bray, loc. cit.
preparing to return to England. On the 14th the King had ordered the Council at Calais to send over all the soldiers abiding there (save for 2000 of the best men who were to go to Boulogne) whenever they thought it expedient to do so.¹ Thus, by the end of the month, the only men of the Army against France left in the fever-ridden town were a few who were too sick to move and the 2000 who were waiting to go to Boulogne.²

The 2000 eventually left Calais and went to Boulogne, where they became part of a garrison of some 5000 soldiers that was to remain there throughout the winter.³ Thus, at the end of the year 1544 a considerable number of conscripts were still on active service: the capture of Boulogne may have brought honour and glory to the King, but it brought nothing but hardship and unhappiness to several thousands of his subjects who (evidently much against their wills) had been compelled to remain in his service after the campaigning season was over.⁴

¹ L.P. xix, pt.2, 436.
² Ibid. 505.
³ Ibid. 799.
⁴ For the unwillingness of the 2000 to serve at Boulogne, see L.P. xix, pt.2, 489.
CONCLUSION

One of the principal purposes of this thesis has been to establish the fact that there were two distinct ways of enforcing the military obligations of the English people in the period 1511-1558 - by the national system and by the quasi-feudal system. For there has been a tendency to overlook the existence of the latter system altogether: the most recent writer on the subject of English military organisation, for instance, declares that "the taking of musters of the total male population was the basis upon which the whole of the Tudor military system was founded".\(^1\) In other words, there has been a tendency to date back the Elizabethan military establishment to the beginning of the century - to allow the picturesque figures of Falstaff and Shallow to dominate a hundred years of English history.

An example of this kind of confusion is to be found in Dr. Noyes's account of the measures taken by the Crown to combat the Pilgrimage of Grace in 1536. Clearly, he thought that the principal instrument of recruitment

\(^1\) Longbone, \textit{op. cit.} p. 64.
on this occasion was the commission of array: "at the
time of the Pilgrimage of Grace", he wrote, "resort
was made to the muster of array for military purposes". ¹
Nevertheless, he does mention the fact (but only in a
footnote) that "armies to crush internal risings were
also raised by letters under the Privy Seal to landed
gentry ordering them and their followers to come to the
aid of the crown". ²

Now it is conceivable that Dr. Noyes derived his
erroneous view that the militia was called out in 1536
from a reference in the Letters and Papers of Henry VIII
to a "circular letter thanking the person addressed for
his obedience to the summons of the commissioners of
musters on the breaking out of the rebellion in Lincoln-
shire". ³ This certainly gives the impression that troops
were levied by shire commissioners, but an examination
of the original document reveals that the editor of
Letters and Papers (who doubtless had the Elizabethan
military system in mind) had interpreted its contents
very freely. The commissioners in this case were not

¹. Noyes, op. cit. p. 49.
². Ibid., p. 49n. The letters, in fact, were not sent
out under the Privy Seal but under the Privy Signet.
³. L. P. xi, 821.
shire authorities, but merely men "appointed for the takyng of the mustres of suche persons as ... made theyr repayre unto Ampthyll" (i.e. "muster masters" whose task it was to inspect and order the assembled companies); moreover, they had given no summons to any man.¹

The same kind of mistake occurs in the Catalogue of the Harleian Manuscripts in the British Museum. On 10 February 1543 a signet letter was sent to one George Booth ordering him to certify the Duke of Suffolk of all the able men under his rule.² In the Catalogue, however, the letter is described thus: "Copie of K. Henry VIIIts Commission ... to George Boothe Esq; authorising him to muster all the able men in Cheshire".³ Clearly, the compiler was under the impression that Booth was a J. P. or a commissioner of array who had been charged with organising the county militia - a Cheshire version of Justice Shallow in fact.

The confusion between the national and the quasi-feudal military systems that exists in the minds of some modern writers was absent from the minds of contemporary

¹. P.R.O. E 36/121 f. 69a.
observers. Giovanni Michiel, Venetian Ambassador in London, saw that a distinction had to be made between the forces of the shires on the one hand and those of private individuals ("quelli dei Signori, e particolari baroni") on the other.\(^1\) Michiel was writing in May 1557. Later that year the distinction between the two systems of recruitment, which the Ambassador was drawing, was to become very much in evidence when the Crown attempted to raise men under both systems at once. As a result, the two systems came into conflict; for although, by its letters of 31 July, the Crown had specifically ordered them not to do so,\(^2\) the commissioners of at least one shire attempted to raise men within the rules of a gentleman who had been sent an individual letter of summons. On 25 August the Privy Council was obliged to write "to the Justices of Peaxe in the countie of Hertford to forbeare the mustering and levieng of eny tenantes within the rules and offices of Sir John Mordant, knight, for that he is otherwise

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2. *P.R.O. SP 11/11* f.75a.
presently appointed to serve with them himself".\textsuperscript{1}

The J.P.s of the neighbouring county of Essex (of whom Mordant was one) also ran into difficulties, because "diverse private personnes" had received "lettres to muster and put in aredines thiere tenantes and others within thier rules and offices".\textsuperscript{2}

A few years previously a similar clash had occurred in Rutland and had occasioned the following letter from Gregory Cromwell to one of the muster commissioners for that county:\textsuperscript{3}

\begin{quote}
fforasmouche as I ame advertised that ye have by vertue of Commissione taken a tenaunte of myne named Thomas Barkeby of Langhame to serve the kinges majestie \ldots\ I, not knowings when it shall please the kinge to call uppon me, wolde gladly be as well in arredynes to serve his grace with suche of my owne tenauntes as hathe heretofore served his highnes for me \ldots\ This shal be therfore moste hertily to desire you the rather at this my requeste to leave hym at home.
\end{quote}

In these clashes between the national and the quasi-feudal systems it appears to have been the latter which prevailed against the former. Although, round about the year 1544, some lawyer seems to have tried to maintain that the manor was but "a parcell and membre of the ... parisshe" and that its tenants ought to

\textsuperscript{1} A.P.C. 1556-8, p. 160.
\textsuperscript{2} See above, p. 70.
\textsuperscript{3} B. M. Eg. 2986 f. 7.
"appere and muster afore the kynges Comissioners"
rather than the lord of the manor,\(^1\) it seems to have
been generally recognised that the lord took precedence
over the commissioner. The Militia Act of 1558, more-
over, made it clear that the tenurial obligation came
before the local:\(^2\)

\[
\text{this Acte ... shall not extende to take awaye or dischardge any Tenaunt or Fermour of his Service or Covenant towards his Lorde, for the finding of Horse, Armour, or Weapon, or for doing of Service by himself or any other, whiche by the Tenure of his Lande or Ferme he is bownde to doo at the tyme of making of this Acte.}
\]

By 1558, however, such a proviso had little meaning,
for the quasi-feudal system was almost dead. Ever
since 1544 the Crown had been gradually abandoning it
in favour of the national system. The militia had
become the principal fighting force in the realm, not so
much because the Crown had become strong enough to dis-
regard the old custom that the shire levies must never
be sent overseas, as because the national military
system had become efficient. The frequent issue of
commissions of musters in the years after 1535 had
caused the gentry to become skilled in the working of the

\(^1\) P.R.O. Sta. Cha. 2/26/287 f.2. Statement made in defence of tenants of Ackleton manor (Shropshire) who refused to serve under their lord in war. See above, p.152.

\(^2\) Statutes of the Realm, iv, 318.
machinery of the militia and the people to become more conscientious in the fulfilment of their military obligations; and the practice of appointing Lieutenants in the provinces had led to the emergence of a really effective local authority. In the long run, indeed, it was perhaps inevitable that the quasi-feudal system should be replaced by the national: that a system under which men were levied in divers places by individual gentlemen should give place to one under which men were levied within given limits by gentlemen specially commissioned for the purpose; and that a highly centralised system whereby the Crown made direct contact with an enormous number of suppliers should give place to a decentralised one whereby the Crown made direct contact with only a small number of local officials.

The national system, however, did not supersede the quasi-feudal merely because it was more desirable from an administrative point of view: it was also more desirable from a political point of view. The national system was not only more efficient than the quasi-feudal: it was also less dangerous to the State. The rulers of England had not forgotten the anarchy of the Wars of the Roses, when the maintenance of armed retinues by private individuals had served to undermine
the whole basis of public authority. A similar situation, indeed, developed in the troubled autumn of 1536, when the Pilgrims defied the King in Lincolnshire. It was then that Sir John Thimbleby of Bourne (to name but one of the gentry who sided with the rebels) "Assembled all his teneant, frendes, and servauntes together under the colour to do the kinges service" and marched off to join the King's enemies.¹ This was as clear a case of illegal maintenance as one could wish to find.

At the time of the Pilgrimage of Grace, moreover, there was a strong desire on the part of the King's loyal subjects to avoid being accused of such a practice. On 6 October 1536, for example, the Earl of Huntingdon wrote to Henry VIII as follows:²

I shall humble beseche your hightnes that, if it please the same to commaunde me to Reas any of your Subjectes, that I may have your graces Auctorite so to do - to thentent that neither I nor thay that shall goo with me incurr the daunger of your Lawes, which is to hevy for Anny of us to bere.

The laws in question were the Statutes against Unlawful Retainers of Henry VII's reign, exemption

¹. P.R.O. SP 1/107 f. 147b (L.P. xi, 658)
². P.R.O. SP 1/106 f. 282 (L.P. xi, 560).
from the provisions of which was always given at the end of a signet letter. In August 1521, for instance, those required to supply men for the King's wars were informed that: ¹

theseourelettresshallbe[ə]sufficientsufficientwarrantanddischargeuntoyouforyourindepntieinthereteignyng, levyeng, and preparing of the said nombre - as though ample auctoritie were geven unto you for that p[urp]oseunderourgreate seals. Any act, statute, or ordenaunce made to the contrary notwithstanding.

In spite of every precaution, nevertheless, it was clearly undesirable, in so far as the security of the State was concerned, to allow individuals to keep retinues of armed men even in time of war. There was always the danger that a gentleman would see in an order to arm his dependants a glorious opportunity to revenge himself on an unfriendly neighbour. It was this kind of local rivalry which the Duke of Norfolk had in mind in 1536, when he informed the King that "sombe desirous to have a greter company more for glory than for necessity".²

How much preferable was a system of military recruitment under which the national necessity was the only consideration and national glory the only goal.

¹. B.M. Otho E XI f.41a.
². P.R.O. SP 1/108 f.230b (L.P. xi, 800).
The successful implementation of both the quasi-feudal and the national systems, nevertheless, depended upon the loyalty and willingness of the same men. Neither system could work without the co-operation of the gentry from whose ranks were drawn the recruiting officers and the captains, and of the lower classes of society from whose ranks were drawn the common soldiers of the Crown. But the loyalty and willingness of these men always depended upon whether or not they thought the cause in which they were called upon to fight to be a just one.

In times of war with France or Scotland the Crown could generally count upon the patriotism of its subjects. In 1539, for example, when the prospect of war with France loomed large, Cromwell informed the King that he perceived a "good Inclination, disposition, and towardnes of good will in all your graces people", and Lord Ferrers informed the President of the Council in Wales that he had never seen men more willing to serve the King.

In times of internal rebellion, on the other hand, the Crown could not always rely upon the loyalty of its subjects. This was particularly apparent at the time

1. Merriman, op. cit. ii, 197.
of the Pilgrimage of Grace: many of the Lincolnshire gentlemen to whom the King had addressed his signet letters went over to the insurgents;¹ some of the men serving under Norfolk were of the opinion that the rebels' quarrel was "gode and godly";² and "every third man in Shrewsbury's force was with the Pilgrims at heart".³ Again, it may have been sympathy with the rebels which led Robert Hardyng, one of the tenants of the Prior of Christchurch (Canterbury), to withdraw himself from the contingent of 60 soldiers which his lord had prepared for service in the King's army.⁴ Similarly, it may have been sympathy with the King's enemies which lay behind the actions of Edward Brétt and other of Sir William Sneyd's tenants at Keele (Staffordshire), who in 1549 refused to serve in their lord's retinue against the Norfolk rebels and who "arraied in manner of war" to resist his attempts to conscript them.⁵

It was on occasions such as these, when the fate of the kingdom was determined by the loyalty or disloyalty of the gentlemen and yeomen of England, that the Crown

1. L.P. xi, 587, 590.
3. Ibid. 257.
4. At the muster held on 13 October, "Robert Hardyng comparuit et recessit postea" (Sheppard, op. cit. iii, 349).
must have been most painfully aware of its lack of a standing army. According to one authority, indeed, it was in the period that followed immediately upon the suppression of the Pilgrimage of Grace that Cromwell drew up "a draft proposal for the creation of a standing army".\(^1\) This view, however, has been challenged by another authority, who states that "there is no sign at all that a standing army was ever contemplated".\(^2\) And although the phrases "standing army" and "standing forces" have been used to describe the armed retinues of 1551-2,\(^3\) it is probably safe to say that at no time was the formation of a large regular army ever seriously envisaged. Throughout the period under discussion the security of the kingdom depended upon "irregular" levies of unprofessional soldiers. And the Crown, in many ways, was content that this should be so, for it realised that an "irregular" military organisation (in spite of its many unsatisfactory features) had one great advantage over a "regular" one: it placed no permanent strain upon the financial resources of the country. The importance of this consideration, indeed,

was to be as great in the years that followed the death of Queen Mary as it had been in the years that preceded it.

The year 1558 has not been chosen as the closing date of this thesis because it saw the death of Mary, though her death did bring to the throne a younger and more vigorous woman who was to do much to reform the military organisation of the kingdom. Nor has it been chosen because it witnessed the fall of Calais, though the loss of this continental bridgehead did mark the end of that long series of French campaigns for which the English military system had been specially adapted. It has been chosen because it saw the replacement of the ancient Statute of Winchester by a new "Acte for the having of Horse, Armour, and Weapon". ¹

The Militia Act of 1558 caused "an upheaval in the military"² and brought about "the most important change that had occurred for two centuries in the military system of the country."³ The basic military obligations of the English people were brought up to date: the

1. Statutes of the Realm, iv, 316.
3. Fortescue, op. cit. 125.
mediaeval provisions which had previously defined them were abolished and modern ones put in their place. Moreover, this reorganisation of the national military system meant that the quasi-feudal system, which had been falling more and more into disuse, would henceforth cease to exist. The old dualism was ended, and the subsequent history of the Tudor army is the history of the Tudor militia.
APPENDIX I

The Survey of 1522

The chronicler Stow relates that, between Easter and Michaelmas in the year 1522, there was made "a generall proscription of all the Realme of England", the importance of which led one historian to describe it as "such a survey as was formerly taken in the reign of William the Conqueror".

This Tudor "Domesday" survey took the form of an inquiry into the military and financial resources of the country - a determined attempt on the part of the Crown to bridge the great gulf of uncertainty that lay between it and the human and material resources of its kingdom. The commissioners appointed for this purpose were ordered to return certificates containing the names of all men resident in the district allotted to them, together with the quantity and quality of their arms and armour and the names of those "whom they belong unto". In addition,

the returns were to contain the following information: 1

who is Lord of every towne or hamlet ... and who bee Stewards. Item, who be parsons of the same townes, and what the benefices be worth by yeere. Also who be owners of every parcell of land within anytowne, hamlet, parish, or village ...with the yeerely value of every mans land within the same townes, hamlets, parishes, and villages. And of every stocke and stocks of Cattell, or other things that he occupied upon any ferme within the said townes, hamlets, and parishes, and who be owners of them. Also what aliens or strangers dwell in any towne, hamlet, or parish ... and where they were borne, and under whose dominion. Item, what occupation, mystery, or substance they be of. Item, the value and substance of every person being of 16 yeeres and above ... as well spirituall as temporall. Also what pensions goeth out of any lands there to any religious or spirituall men.

The answers to these questions would have provided the Crown with a very valuable description of the kingdom.

But it so happened that many of the questions were often left unanswered: among the surviving returns, 2 indeed, only those of Berkshire, Rutland, and Coventry contain all the requisite information. The other returns, while giving the names of the able men, generally fail, for example, to designate "whom they belong unto" — an absolutely vital piece of information in view of the

1. Instructions sent to the bailiff and chief constable of the half hundred of Waltham by the Essex commissioners. (Stow, loc. cit.)

2. For a list of these, see Note D below.
overwhelmingly quasi-feudal basis of military organisation at the time.¹

Owing to this shortcoming, the Survey of 1522 (in so far as it was a military survey) was effective only as an inquiry into the condition of the militia — as an attempt to find out how many able men and how much harness there were in the shires, hundreds, and parishes of England. In this, at any rate, the attempt was successful, for from the returns the Government was able to compile a table showing the strength and distribution of the nation's military resources.² It was also able to discover the extent to which the people of England were fulfilling their military obligations.³

As an attempt to give administrative unity to the English military system, the Survey of 1522 appears to be unique. Never before or afterwards did a Tudor Government endeavour to combine "general" and "special" musters in one all-encompassing investigation.⁴ On no other occasion in the period under discussion did the Crown attempt to acquire so much military information.

1. For the use that the Crown probably made of those returns which were complete in this respect, see above, p. 125.
2. B.M. Royal 14 B X (L.P. iv, 972).
4. See above, pp. 35-6.
at one time.

But the information that the Crown attempted to acquire in 1522 had a fiscal as well as a military value. In this respect, too, the Survey appears to be unique: three features serve to distinguish it from the fiscal inquiries of other years. In the first place, it was concerned with all men, nobles and commoners, clerics and laymen: it was indeed, as the chamberlain of the city of Canterbury said, an "enquiry of every mannye value". In the second place, it was concerned with all kinds of wealth (in lands, fees, wages, pensions, and goods), and, if a person possessed wealth in more than one form, this was recorded in the certificate. In the third place, it was concerned, not with the total value of a man's possessions throughout the kingdom, but with the value of the possessions that he had in every place: thus Sir Andrew Windsor's name appears more than twenty times in the Buckinghamshire return alone.

Perhaps the most distinctive feature of the fiscal inquiry of 1522, however, was its thoroughness. Dietz describes it as "a careful assessment of men's wealth".

2. Bod. e 187 passim.
The commissioners, indeed, were ordered to be very careful to ensure that their valuations were accurate, as the additional instructions sent to them in the summer indicate. Whereas up till then (i.e. the summer of 1522) "the very truth ... hath bene concealed", they were now to take steps to see that "the hole and entire extent and value of the ... londes and goodes" was ascertained. Those suspected of trying to conceal their wealth were to be assessed according to the estimation of their neighbours. Moreover, in order to encourage veracity, the people were to be made to think that the purpose of the assessment was purely military - that the Government was only trying to enforce the provisions of the Statute of Winchester.¹

The fiscal information, it has been said, was thus "obtained by subterfuge".²

Many of the "Domesday" valuations give the impression of being very exact: some were even reckoned in pence and halfpence (in contrast to the subsidy valuations of later years, which were always reckoned in pounds). The annual values of the Abbot of St. Albans¹ lands in Winslow and Little Horwood (Buckinghamshire), for example, were


assessed at £25 18s. 11½d. and £12 13s. 5½d. respectively; while the fees received by the Marquess of Dorset for his stewardship of the royal manor of Feckenham (Worcestershire) were said to amount to £14 16s. 10½d. Furthermore, when a comparison is made between some of the "Domesday" land valuations and the figures recorded in the rentals of the same lands, the accuracy of the former is seen to be not only apparent but real. In the rentals of 6 and 8 Henry VIII the values of Lord Montague's lands at Ellesborough and Ledmenham (Buckinghamshire) are recorded as being £18 8s. and £27 19s. respectively; in the returns of 14 Henry VIII the values of the same lands are stated to be £18 19s. 1½d. and £28.

It may perhaps also be taken as an indication of their accuracy that the 1522 valuations are generally higher than those recorded in the Inquisitions Post Mortem and in subsidy rolls. It so happened that a number of men whose names are found in the "Domesday" returns died soon after the survey was made, and it is noteworthy that in each case the land values recorded in

1. Bod. e 187 ff.89a, 94b.
2. P.R.O. E 36/35 f.28b.
3. P.R.O. SC 12/5/71; 12/21/17 m.2.
4. Bod. e 187 ff.29a, 155a.
the I.P.M. are considerably lower than those in the returns. A similar result is obtained when a comparison is made between the goods valuations in the returns of 1522 and in the (subsidy) returns of 1524: the earlier assessment had been too rigorous, perhaps too accurate, and, when Wolsey had attempted to raise an Anticipation on its basis, he seems to have met with some opposition. Thus the new assessment made in 1524 was more lenient, and perhaps less accurate: most men's values are found to have been reduced, in some cases by more than 50%.

It has been suggested that the valuations of 1522 were inflated - that the English people, fervently patriotic and blissfully ignorant of the fiscal purpose of the survey, were content to make themselves appear more wealthy than they really were. But this does not seem toring true: Englishmen could not have been so credulous and so unsuspecting in a matter that concerned their pockets. It is highly unlikely that their patriotism "led them ... to exaggerate the extent of their estate"; certainly there is no suggestion of patriotism

1. See Note B below.
3. See note C below.
in Hall's account of the survey, which, he says, was made "not without grudging of the people, and marveilyng why thei should be sworne for their owne goodes". ¹ It is far more likely that a rigorous assessment (with careful precautions against concealment) had in fact come nearer than usual, and perhaps nearer than was liked, to providing the Crown with what the author of the survey described as "the verrey knowlegge of the verrey value of all the substaunce and goodes" of its subjects.²

This rigorous assessment provided the Crown with a very valuable instrument of extortion, which it was not slow to use. Even before the "Domesday" books had been returned into the Star Chamber, loans were being levied on the basis of this assessment from all those whose wealth amounted to £20 or more.³ In 1523 the assessment was used again: in the spring a second loan was levied from all those possessing less than £20 and more than £5;⁴

¹ Hall, op. cit. p.630.
² L.C.R.O. Rep. 5 f.317b. This was Wolsey's own description of the re-assessment of August 1522 as given to the citizens of London.
³ The loan books were in fact returned at the same time as the survey books (see L.P.iii, 3683, 3687). Some of these loan books are preserved in the P.R.O., e.g., E 179/103/116 (wrongly dated 15 Hen. VIII).
⁴ Hall, op. cit. p.652. Some of these loan books are preserved in the P.R.O., e.g., E 36/19.
while in the autumn an Anticipation of the subsidy granted by the April Parliament was raised from "every man that was worth xl. 1." But the Crown was obliged to abandon this assessment, and the subsidies of 1524 and 1525 were levied on the basis of a new and less rigorous valuation.

Note A. The Chronology of the Survey

Stow, it has been observed, relates that the survey was made "between Easter and Michaelmas", i.e. between 20 April and 29 September; but the earlier date is clearly inaccurate, since the instructions issued by the Essex commissioners (which Stow himself prints) are dated 27 March. Hall, moreover, states explicitly that the musters commenced in March, while the earliest surviving instructions (which were not the first to be sent) are dated the 11th of that month. Since no copy of the original commission appears to survive, it must be

2. See above, p. 289.
4. H.M.C. Middleton, pp. 512-3 (dated 1513? by editor). The letters of 11 March contained instructions about the assessment of men's values - which had been omitted from the original letters.
concluded that the first steps were taken round about the first week of March.

Stow also seems to be in error when he states that the survey was finished by the end of September: the Buckinghamshire commissioners, at any rate, did not send in their returns until quite late in November, and theirs was not the last to be received into the Star Chamber. The outer chronological limits of the "generall prosc.ription" must therefore be placed in March and November.

Originally, it seems, the commissioners were to have finished their task by Easter. On 23 March Henry VIII wrote to Charles V telling him that he had thought it convenient to have the survey made at "this tyme of lent"; while on 10 April Shrewsbury wrote to Wolsey to say that he and the other commissioners for the county of Derby hoped to "make parfye" their books "in the latter ende of ester weke".

1. Bod. e 187 frontispiece.
2. L.P. iii, 3683.
3. B.M. Galba B VI f.162b (L.P. iii, 2128). This letter is undated, but it is evidently the letter of 23 March referred to in L.P.iii, 2143.
4. P.R.O. SP 1/24 f.85 (L.P.iii, 2164).
Why then did the making of the survey drag on into the autumn? Perhaps it was because the inquiry took longer to complete than had been anticipated. Shrewsbury hinted as much in his letter to Wolsey: "ffor as y-t, becaus of the shortenes of tyme, I and my ... ffellowes have not made all thinges parfite". As a result, it would seem, the commissioners were unable to finish their task by Easter.

Now after Easter there were many other things for them to do, which may have persuaded the Crown to declare a moratorium until later in the year. At the end of Easter week itself the Emperor arrived at Dover, where he was met by many English noblemen and gentlemen, of whom nearly all would have been "Domesday" commissioners. Henry, be it noted, had asked Charles to delay his arrival for as long as possible because the English gentry were commissioned to survey the realm, fffrom theexecucion of whiche our commission, if we schuld now call thaym ... (if accordyng to your and our honour we schuld mete and

1. P.R.O. SP 1/24 f.85 (L.P., iii, 2164).
2. See letter to Fortescue (L.P., iii, 2159).
3. B.M. Galba B VI f.162 (L.P., iii, 2128).
receyve you at your arrival into this our Reame) the same schuld greatly redound to the hinderaunce and empecheiment of our affeyrys ... besides the losse of all the labour that hathe been hythirto employed for that purpose.

The Emperor, nevertheless, did arrive early, and this may well have caused that "hinderaunce and empecheiment" of the commissioners' work which Henry had been so anxious to prevent. Henceforward, moreover, a fair proportion of the commissioners were to find themselves in the active military employment of the Crown - in the North, in France, and on the sea. Among those who saw service on the sea was Sir Adrian Fortescue, who would almost certainly have been one of the commissioners for the county of Oxford, and who endorsed the King's letter ordering him to prepare for the Emperor's arrival with these words:

Memorandum, after the preparation herefor I was commandyd to go to the see under my lord admyrall, wher we wer and on lond xxj wekes.

Fortescue was thus away from home until the autumn, as were doubtless many of those who, in the spring, had been commissioned to survey the kingdom.

1. B.M. Vesp. C I f.299 (L.P. iii 215g).
### Note B. Comparison between "Domesday" and I.P.M. land valuations

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<th>Name</th>
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<th>I.P.M. Val.</th>
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<td>Jn. Harrington</td>
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<td>£17 6s. 8d.</td>
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<td>Exton, Rut.</td>
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<td>6s.</td>
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<td>do.</td>
<td>Whitewell, Rut.</td>
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<td>£3</td>
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### Note C. Comparison between goods valuations of 1522 and 1524.

#### (i) Wraysbury, Bucks.

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<th>Name</th>
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1. P.R.O. refer nos:-
   Hulse: C142/43/20 (1/11/25) - E 315/464 ff.17a, 70;
   Harrington: ----/41/11 (16/10/24)------- f.10b.
   Flower: ----/40/23 (7/11/23) -------- ff.7b, 10b.

2. These contain the names of all goods owners listed in both years; there are other names which appear only in one year.


4. P.R.O.E 36/54 ff.28-9 and E 179/165/110 m.4.
Note D. List of Surviving Returns

(1) In the P.R.O.

Berkshire (Hundreds of Shrivenham, Lambourn, Ganfield, Farrington, Kentbury, and Eagle) E 315/464.

Cornwall (Hundreds of West, Trigg, and Kerrier) E 315/77.


" (Hundred of S. Erpingham) E 101/61/3.
" (Hundred of Holt) E 315/466 ff.28-61 (described in Norf. Arch. xxii, 45-58; 1926).

Rutland (Whole shire bar Oakham) E 36/55 (T/S in E 36/54).

Worcestershire (Hundreds of Halfshire & Oswaldstow) E 36/35-6.

(ii) Elsewhere

Buckinghamshire (Whole shire) T/S in Bod. e 187.¹

Coventry (City) Cov. C.R.O. A 96.

Exeter (City) E.C.R.O. Bk. 156A.

Suffolk (Hundred of Babergh)² Grimsthorpe Castle (H.M.C. Ancester, pp. 485-500). T/S in I.P.L. MS. 942.64.

Surrey (Abstract of shire returns) G.B.R.O. Loseley MSS.

(iii) Inaccessible

Gloucestershire. Berkeley Castle (No Admittance).³

1. This return was found for me by Mr. A.H. Smith, to whom I am greatly indebted.

2. I am indebted to Dr. W.G. Hoskins for telling me about the T/S in I.P.L.

APPENDIX II

Sir Thomas Wyatt the Younger and his Scheme for the Reform of the English militia

(i) George Wyatt's Account of his Father's Scheme.¹

In the daise of King Edward the 6 of happie memory, he beinge yet younge and a slender prop unto Religion (then also greene and newly planted in this Ile), the trobles risinge on many parts which threatened to subvert it even in the first and tender groweth therof, the studie of many of the Kings best divoted and disposed Subjectes was to devise of sum convenient provition whereby he might set himself free not to rest at the pleasure of the vaine and uncertaine multitude for orderinge his goverment, either touching Religion or the Civil state - as upon knowledge of their owen power and by the preserwations of evel instruments they easily might be led to presume.

Wherfore, my father and divers of good sort (for it concerned the nobilhitie and Gentlemen many waise), consideringe hereupon, conceavid that the most suer and proper remedie for this headstronge mischife would be to strengthen the Kings part with a pow r of the choise of his most able and trusty Subjectes, which might be upon a very short warninge in areddines (wel armed and ordered against al suddin attemptes either at home or abrode), and whereby he might not doubt to use without danger his other subjectes armed and trained (though with sum cautions) against any mightie prince that shuld make invation upon this realme.

**********

This thinge ... was movid and propounded to the Lord ProtectoPs grace then beinge and to divers others of their Honours of the privie Counsell then unto the King, and was with greate likinge approved and alowed of, but not concluded upon - either for the newnes of the thinge, or for that it was not at that season thought so convenient to have the subjectes armed (whereof the greater numbers were evel affected to the Religion then professed), or for that (sum divition then beinge amongst thos that bore the sway) sum hindered that that others liked of.

¹ B.M. Loan 15, Wyatt MSS. no.17 t.l. ee Agnes Conway, "The yatt MSS. in the Possession of the earl of Romney" (B.I.H.R.i, 75; 1925).
(ii) The Scheme as Submitted to the Council.\(^1\)

In the preamble there are vague references to a Protector who cannot defend the King because the nation is unarmed: "and if ye defend not, so lesse youe your name". England is in dire need of an army: "so loose noe tyma - for gods sake bringe in this armie whilst we maye have it".

After presenting his argument that the Government need have nothing to fear from a nation of well-armed and well-equipped people, Wyatt goes on to give detailed directions as to the ways in which men were to be chosen, armed, and trained for war.\(^2\) The safety of the realm was to be in the hands of a completely reconstituted militia, consisting entirely of volunteer soldiers. It was in this conception of voluntary military service and in the insistence upon the necessity for a properly organised system of military training (a thing unknown in the pre-Elizabethan era) that the great originality of the scheme appears to have lain.

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1. Ibid. no.\(^3\). See Conway, loc.cit.
2. For some details of the scheme, see above, pp. 78–9.
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fras. Pigott</td>
<td>Stratton (Bed.)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robt. Pigott</td>
<td>Beachampton.1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thos. Pigott</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leon. Rede</td>
<td>Boarstall</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>68+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ed. Restwold</td>
<td>Chalfont St.G.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>68+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jn. Rufford</td>
<td>Edlesborough</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jn. Sandes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humph. Tyrell</td>
<td>Thornton</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>77</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Ralph Verney</td>
<td>Stoke Goldington</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rd. Willoughby</td>
<td>Burnham</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notes on Buckinghamshire Gentry

Column 1. These are the names of those gentlemen to whom letters for special musters were sent on 31 March 1543. The names are listed in the document hereafter referred to as the 1544 Army Book. Thos. Luatt has not been identified; he may have been Thos. Lowe.

Column 2. These are the places where the gentlemen are believed to have resided in 1543. In some cases the location of a man's seat has not been discovered: Edmund Ashfield, for example, probably lived at Stantonbury, but, as this fact is not certain, it has not been recorded.

Column 3. A cross indicates that the man had a seat on the commission of the peace of 31 October 1542.

Column 4. These are the numbers of able-bodied dependants of the gentry as recorded in the certificates of special musters returned in pursuance of the letters of 31 March. These were copied into the 1544 Army Book. Where no number has been entered, it must be assumed that the individual had no able dependants (as in the case of John More who certified that he possessed "no lands or offices") or that

1. P.R.O. SP 1/184 ff.125a-126b. (L.P. xix, pt.1, 273). Toucher Bold's name was later crossed out.
3. L.P. xvii, g.1012 (67).
he failed to return a certificate (as in the case of Jerome Hampden who had died in 1541).

**Column 5.** These are the values (in pounds) of lands in Buckinghamshire which the individual is known to have owned at the time when the special musters were taken. A blank indicates that the individual concerned is not known to have owned an appreciable amount of land in the shire. A question-mark indicates that he is known to have owned an appreciable amount of land, though its value is not ascertainable. A plus sign indicates that he is known to have owned additional lands of unknown value. The values have been ascertained from the 1522 Survey returns (in which the value of every man's holding in every parish is recorded), used in conjunction with the manorial descents described in *V.C.H. Bucks.*

**Column 6.** A cross indicates that the man in question is known to have owned considerable property outside Buckinghamshire.

**Column 7.** A cross indicates that the man in question is known to have been a lessee of Crown lands in Buckinghamshire.

**Column 8.** A cross indicates that the man in question held an office of profit under the Crown: Sir John Baldwin

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1. See Appendix I.
was Chief Justice of Common Pleas; Henry Bradshaw was Solicitor General; John Croke was one of the Six Clerks; Sir John Daunce was one of the General Surveyors; George Giffard was one of the Particular Receivers of the Court of Augmentations; Richard Greenway was a Gentleman Usher; and Sir Edmund Peckham was Cofferer of the Household.

Column 9. A cross indicates that the man in question was called upon to send men to the wars in 1544.¹

¹ L.P. xix, pt.1, 275-6.
Appendix IV. The Armed Retinues of 1518

All that is known about the creation of a system of armed retinues in the reign of Henry VIII comes from two documents— the preliminary notice sent to Sir Henry Willoughby and now preserved in the Middleton MSS., and the draft licence preserved in the records of the Exchequer. The former was assigned to the year 1518 by the Historical Manuscripts Commission's editor, and the latter to the year 1536 by the editor of the Letters and Papers of Henry VIII. The truth, however, seems to be that both documents belong to the year 1518.

That the letter to Sir Henry Willoughby dates from this year is indicated by the following facts:

(i) The preamble states that "by our grete studie, labour and policie, we have peax and amitie with all outwarde princes". This may refer to the favourable diplomatic position in which Wolsey found himself in the summer of 1518.

(ii) The preamble refers also to the Crown's intention to license a number of private retinues "by our lettres of placard auctorised by act of parliament last holden at our paloys of Westminster". This may refer to the clause

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1. See above, pp. 89-91.
2. Now in N.U.L.
3. P.R.C. E 101/59/5.
5. L.P. x, 1072.
in the Act of Apparel passed by the Parliament of 1515, where it is laid down that "every ... lycence by the Kynges placard [i.e. to wear any illegal apparel] ... shal be as good and effectuall in the lawe ... as though ytt were under the Kynges grete seale".¹ The Crown would thus be applying this clause to the Acts against Unlawful Retainers.

That the draft licence belongs to the same year is indicated by a sentence in its preamble, which states that:

"ther is a mutuel bonde betwixt us and divers other might mighty Princes, our frendes, alies and confederates, wherby, for the mayntenaunce of thestates of us and thaym and our and thairesubgiettes, every of us is bounde to assist and defende thother in caas we or they bee invaded by any other."

This seems to refer to the Treaty of Universal Peace signed on 2 October 1518, which made provision for mutual aid in case of attack.²

It is therefore possible to draw up the following chronological table for the second half of 1518:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Arrival of Campeggio to plead for united crusade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Despatch of letters to Willoughby and others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept.</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Arrival of French Ambassadors to discuss Tournay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Signature of Treaty of Universal Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Certificates of Willoughby and others due</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov.</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Despatch of licences.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹. Statutes of the Realm, iii, 181.
². L.P. ii, 4469.
Appendix V  Commissions of Array

A commission of array was any commission under the Great Seal which authorised one or more men to prepare the inhabitants of a certain region to serve in the King's wars. Such commissions empowered their recipients:¹

ad omnes & singulos Hominès . . Arraiandum & Triandum, ac armari & muniri Faciendum ... et ad Monstrum sive Monstrationem eorundem diligenter Faciendum & Supervidendum, ita quod iídem Hominès ..., sic Arraíati & Muniti, prompti sint & parati ad Deserviendum Nobis quotiens & quando necesse fuerit.

These words constituted the sine quâ non of a commission of array.

The rest of the wording of a commission of array varied according to the purpose for which it was issued. If the purpose was the enforcement of the military provisions of the Statue of Winchester, the commission contained a clause which authorised the recipients to cause the people to equip themselves with arms and armour "juxta formam et effectum Statutorum & Ordinationum ante haec tempora inde editorum & provisorum".² Such a clause was the characteristic feature of the "muster commissions" referred to in

¹. Rymer, op.cit., vi, pt.1, 21a.
². Ibid.
the text of this thesis; they were issued on 20 June 1511, 1 18 February 1523, 2 6 October 1534, 3 and at more frequent intervals thereafter.

While these commissions were invariably addressed to groups of gentlemen, other commissions of array (without the "statutory" clause, but with other additional clauses) were addressed to individual noblemen and gentlemen. These "commissions of Lieutenancy", originally issued only for the North Parts, were eventually to be issued for all parts of the kingdom. 4

For practical purposes, then, commissions of array in the period 1511-58 may be divided into "commissions of musters" and "commissions of Lieutenancy", the difference between which may best be understood by reference to the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Commission</th>
<th>Recipients</th>
<th>Extent</th>
<th>Purposes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Muster&quot;</td>
<td>Many men</td>
<td>One shire</td>
<td>1. Inquiry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Lieutenancy&quot;</td>
<td>One or more men</td>
<td>one or more shires</td>
<td>General supervision of militia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. L.P. iii, 2875.
3. L.P. vii, 1468.
From the middle years of the century, however, the commissions of Lieutenancy began to supersede the commission of musters: it became increasingly the rule for the work of mustering and levying men for the wars to be done by the J.P.s qua J.P.s (and not qua muster commissioners) under the general direction of the Lords Lieutenants and their Deputies.¹

## APPENDIX VI

### Sir Robert Cotton's Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value (£) of Lands or Fees</th>
<th>Number of Horsemen</th>
<th>Number of Footmen</th>
<th>Total Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(4000)</td>
<td>??</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>???</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3500</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3000)</td>
<td>??</td>
<td>??</td>
<td>??</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2500</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1900)</td>
<td>??</td>
<td>??</td>
<td>??</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1800</td>
<td>??</td>
<td>??</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1700</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>(40)</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1600)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>(64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1400</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>(61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1300)</td>
<td>??</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>??</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1200</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>??</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1100</td>
<td>??</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>??</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1000)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>??</td>
<td>??</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>900</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>800</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(700)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>(12)</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>600</td>
<td>9*</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(400)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>??</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(100)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(40)</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--OR--1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Value of Goods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>do.</th>
<th>do.</th>
<th>do.</th>
<th>do.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>200+</td>
<td>One able man for every 40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>160</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(120)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(1 -- OR --1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* sic

### APPENDIX VII

Table showing soldiers supplied by monks in the reign of Henry VIII

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monastery</th>
<th>Head</th>
<th>H.L.</th>
<th>Med.</th>
<th>13</th>
<th>14</th>
<th>21</th>
<th>22</th>
<th>23</th>
<th>36</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abingdon</td>
<td>Abbot</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battle</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bermondsey</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;16 retd.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bury</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chertsey</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cirencester</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crowland</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evesham</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glastonbury</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gloucester</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
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<td>25</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hyde</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peterborough</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reading</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<td>20</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Albans</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Augustine's</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stratford</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>20</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>No</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td>Winchcomb</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baye</td>
<td>Prior</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>50</td>
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<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Canterbury</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
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<td>No</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ely</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
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<td>Lanthony</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
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<td>No</td>
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**Abbreviations:**
- H.L. = Member of House of Lords.
- Med. = Supplier of soldiers to mediaeval armies.

**Sources:**
1513 L.P. i, 1176/3; P.R.O. E 101/56/29 f.2b.
1514 L.P. i, pp.1517-9.
1521 B.M. Otho II f.38b.
1522 B.M. Add. MS. 28035 (L.P. iv, App.87).
1523 P.R.O. SP 1/28 f.202a (L.P. iii, 3288).
1536 L.P. xi, 580, App.8; L.P. Add.1105.
APPENDIX VIII

Wolsey's Journey to Dover, July 1521.1

The evidence for the supposition that Wolsey dined at Canterbury with the Prior of Christchurch on 31 July 1521 is as follows:

(i) In the steward's account of expenses on the journey there is no record of any payment for dinner on that day. Here is the complete list of meals paid for:2

- Monday, 29 July. Supper at Dartford.
- Wednesday, 31 July. Breakfast at Sittingbourne. Supper at Dover.

This suggests that Wolsey and his party enjoyed hospitality at some point on the road between Sittingbourne and Dover.

(ii) Wolsey evidently stopped long enough at Canterbury to write the letter to the King referred to in his letter dated Dover, 1 August.3

(iii) In 1527 Wolsey was entertained at Christchurch by the same Thomas Goldwell who had been Prior in 1521.4

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1. See above, p. 134-5.
2. B.M. Harl. 620 f.50a.
N.B. In the main, this bibliography has been restricted to MSS. and works cited.

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C  1 Chancery - Proceedings, Early.
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C  82 - Warrants for the Great Seal, Series II.
C 142 - Inquisitions Post Mortem, Series II.

E  36 Exchequer - Treasury of Receipt, Miscellaneous Books.
E 101 - King's Remembrancer, Accounts Various.
E 179 - King's Remembrancer, Subsidy Rolls, etc.
E 315 - Augmentation Office, Miscellaneous Books.
E 351 - Lord Treasurer's Remembrancer, Accounts Declared.

Req. 2 Court of Requests - Proceedings.

SC 11 Special Collections - Rentals and Surveys, Rolls.
SC 12 - Rentals and Surveys, Portfolios.

Sta. Cha. 2 Court of Star Chamber - Proceedings, Henry VIII.
Sta. Cha. 4 - Proceedings, Mary.
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SP 12 - Domestic, Elizabeth.

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- Otho E XI: Papers Relating to Levies, etc.
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GLOSSARY

Almain-rivets : light armour, made flexible by overlapping plates sliding on rivets. First used in Germany.

Bil., : a weapon, generally consisting of a concave blade on a long wooden handle.

Conduct-money : money paid for soldiers' travelling expenses from dwelling-places to assembly-point of army (and back again). The rate for a footman was normally 3d. a mile.

Cusrel : an attendant on a knight.

Demi-lance : a light horseman armed with a lance with a short shaft.

Gorget : a piece of armour for the throat.

Hacibut : a portable fire-arm.

Harbinger : a purveyor of lodgings.

Harness : body-armour (generally consisting of jack, splints, gorget, and sallet).

Hauberker : a long military tunic, usually of ring or chain mail.

Haviour : substance.

Helm : a helmet.

Jack : a coat of fence.

Manred : the men whom a lord can call upon in time of war.
Sallet : a light globular headpiece or "tim-hat".

Splints : pieces of armour used for protecting the arms at the elbows.