



Structural Change in Industrial Output: China 1995-2010.

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Structural Change in Industrial Output: China 1995-2010

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to learn about some patterns of sectoral and industrial structural change of the Chinese economy over the 1995-2010 period. To such a purpose, we set up a quantitative methodology via input-output modelling, which allows us to decompose gross output into some key demand sources or contributions. It can be shown that the trajectory of the main structural patterns over the period were both not smooth and pretty unbalanced and that they generally responded to both domestic policy and international shocks. Export demand and heavy industry appeared to be the main engines of the economy, which showed massive increases in their share of output, at the expense of domestic demand, services and agriculture. Despite the high growth rates over this period, the Chinese economy seemed to be in need of rebalancing. There is however some indication towards the end of our period that the economy was starting to go that way.

Key Words: China, industrial structural change, input-output decomposition, trajectories over 1995-2010.

JEL Classification: L16, O4, B4, E2

1. Introduction

This paper is both a continuation of our quantitative study of structural change in China and a complement to our previous paper (Albala-Bertrand 2013). The latter focused on the structural change of important indicators such as capital productivity, capital intensity, participation rate and total factor productivity for China and its main regions, at an aggregate level. The present paper focuses on structural change at an inter-industrial level. For the purpose, we use a quantitative approach by means of a decomposition of the input-output model⁽¹⁾. This model mostly relies on fix coefficients, so its use for forecasting beyond three-to-five years may make it insufficient in any case, let alone in a country undergoing extremely rapid economic and social changes. But this is not an issue for our purpose, as we use the model to assess what happened in the recent past, rather than to forecast the state of the economy in the future. To such an aim, we

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3 feed the model with the available input-output statistics with a view to assess the evolution of the
4 industrial structure of China between 1995 and 2010, which is then significantly more than a
5 mere accounting exercise. This is the period of the most momentous policy thrusts, and it is just
6 about bounded by two international shocks, the Southeast Asian crisis of 1997 and the world
7 crisis that started in 2007/8.
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17 There are many studies of structural change in China at different economic levels for similar
18 periods. A good deal of them concentrates on exports (e.g. He and Zhang 2010, Amiti and
19 Freund 2010, Feentra and Wei 2010), others do on employment (e.g. Cai and Wang 2010, Evans
20 and Stavetieg 2009), and others on industrial productivity and change (e.g. Zheng, Wang and Shi
21 2008, Yueh 2011). A few have also used input-output analysis with its focus on inter-industrial
22 relationships, such as Ichimura and Wang (2003), engaging in interregional analysis for a given
23 years; Pan, Yang and Lin (2012) focusing on technological spillovers for three given years; Pei,
24 Dietzenbacher et al. (2011) concentrating on an import growth decomposition over 1997-2005;
25 Yang, Dietzenbacher et al. (2015) dealing with vertical specialization; and there are others that
26 focus on the environment, energy and the like. The difference with them is that ours, first, use a
27 different kind of decomposition that allows to differentiate consistently from various sources of
28 output demand; second, we use tables for each year of our period (1995-2010), composed of 33
29 industries, and we show the structural change trajectory of demand sources, economic sectors
30 and main industries over this period⁽¹⁾.
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53 Our main conclusions are that the main structural trajectories and patterns over the period were
54 both not smooth and pretty unbalanced and that they generally responded to both domestic policy
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3 and international shocks. Export demand and heavy industry appear to be the main engines of the
4 economy, which show massive increases in their share of output, at the expense of domestic
5 demand, services and agriculture, which then show significant decreases in their share of output.
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10 So despite the high growth rates over the period, the Chinese economy seemed to be in need of
11 rebalancing. There is however some indication that the economy was starting to rebalance by the
12 end of our period.
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20 The paper is structured as follows. We start by unravelling our methodology (2.), we then present
21 our analysis and results for China in both an aggregate (3.1.) and a disaggregated fashion (3.2.)
22 with the help of some useful charts, and then we show the structural evolution over the period by
23 means of graph trajectories of economic sectors and their main sources of demand (3.3.). We
24 finally present our main conclusions (4.).
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34 2. Methodology

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39 We analyze structural change by means of an empirical decomposition of input-output tables.
40 This tradition started with Chenery (1960) and was later refined by several authors (e.g. Dervis *et*
41 *al.*, 1982; Kubo *et al.*, 1986; Sakurai, 1990). The decomposition method used in this paper
42 follows more closely Wyckoff and Sakurai (1992) and Albala-Bertrand (1999, 2006). This
43 method of analyzing structural change, while exploiting most of the advantages of the input-
44 output model, avoids most of its limitations (Bulmer-Thomas 1982; Ciaschini 1988), especially
45 the standard shortcomings of forecasting on fixed coefficients for countries undergoing
46 momentous economic and social changes, as we confine the analysis to yearly snapshots within
47 our focus period (1995-2010).
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6 The overall structural change over a period can be decomposed into the demand sources
7 contributing to such a change, both for the whole industrial complex and for each constituent
8 industry. To be noticed, these sources are not be taken as explaining structural change in terms of
9 causality, but only in terms of *ex-post* concomitance. Therefore, these are useful empirical
10 foundations for explanatory sectoral and structural analyses, which is beyond the scope of this
11 paper.
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22 For presentational clarity, we split the method to assess structural change between the text and
23 our appendix. So first, we describe the way we use the general input-output framework in the
24 text and then we use the appendix to present the derivation leading to the decompositions of both
25 output change and output share changes.
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34 2.1 *The General Input-Output Framework*

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39 Input-output tables or matrices are statistical tools that account for all the market transactions
40 that any industry has in an economy, i.e. intermediate transactions with all classified industries
41 and with its demand for final output. This accounts for the total gross output (i.e. intermediate
42 and final) of an economy, disaggregated into industries and/or regions. It also account, at the
43 level of each industry, for the cost of primary inputs or value added. So at the level of
44 intermediate transactions, this gives rise to a symmetrical double-entry table or matrix that
45 contains the same classified industries in both columns (intermediate demands) and rows
46 (intermediate supplies). In addition, it provides another matrix for the final output supplies of all
47 classified industries, and another for primary inputs. Let's then assume that we have available
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input-output matrices for a given economy for at least two years, i.e. a base year “0” and a comparison year “1.” This would include the following matrices: an $n \times n$ matrix W of intermediate demands for the domestic and imported inputs of all the n classified industries; an $n \times m$ matrix F of output for domestic final demands from the same industries, including both domestic and imported commodities; an $n \times 1$ vector E of exports from the same industries; an $n \times n$ matrix M^W of intermediate import usage of all industries; and an $n \times m$ matrix M^F of imports of final goods and services. Hence, the $n \times 1$ domestic gross output vector X of the n industries will be given by:

$$X = Wi + Fi + E - M^W i - M^F i \quad (\text{domestic gross output})^{(2)} \quad (1)$$

Where i is an $n \times 1$ unity vector.

So let a_{ij} represent the input from the i^{th} industry that is required by the j^{th} industry to produce one unit of its output at a given moment, which in terms of standard technical coefficients is:

$a_{ij} = W_{ij} / X_j$ This therefore generates an $n \times n$ matrix A of coefficients, or rearranging:

$$AX = Wi \quad (2)$$

Substituting (2) into (1):

$$X = AX + Fi + E - M^W i - M^F i \quad (3)$$

We then calculate the proportion of imported inputs in total inputs (m^W) and imported final goods/services in total final goods/services (m^F), which at the level of each cell would be $m^W_{ij} = M^W_{ij} / W_{ij}$ and $m^F_{ij} = M^F_{ij} / F_{ij}$, respectively. So $M^W = m^W * W$ and $M^F = m^F * F$. Then, we have:

$$Mi = M^W i + M^F i = m^W * Wi + m^F * Fi = m^W * AX + m^F * Fi \quad (4)$$

The asterisk (*) and the stroke (“/”) indicate that the multiplication and the division are standard scalar rather than a matrix multiplication and division, respectively⁽³⁾. Then substituting (4) into

(3) and factoring:

$$X = ([i] - m^W) * AX + ([i] - m^F) * Fi + E \quad (5)$$

Where $[i]$ is an $n \times n$ unity matrix, i.e. a matrix with a number 1 in each of its cells.

Let's make $U^W = ([i] - m^W)$ and $U^F = ([i] - m^F)$. Notice that these two matrices provide the ratios of domestic-to-total intermediate demands and domestic-to-total final demands, respectively. They can be interpreted as indicators of import substitution. Then equation (5) becomes:

$$X = U^W * AX + U^F * Fi + E \quad (6)$$

Therefore, solving for X , we obtain the input-output model:

$$X = (I - U^W * A)^{-1} (U^F * Fi + E) \quad (7)$$

Where " I " is the identity matrix. Let's also drop the unity vector " i ", which post multiplies F , as we will be working with the totals only, i.e. F becomes an $n \times 1$ vector, so M^F does too. Notice that the first term on the right-hand side is the Leontief inverse for domestic intermediates only, and represents coefficients or weights, while the second term contains final domestic output for domestic and foreign demands, and represents volumes. In order to use less notation, let

$B = (I - U^W * A)^{-1}$ and $G = (U^F * F + E)$. Then the input-output model becomes:

$$X = BG \quad (8)$$

From here two decomposition can be produced: one for gross output growth rate and one for output share changes (see Appendix for derivations). Each of the five terms below, in terms of variation or growth rate (i.e. absolute growth (ΔX) or its growth rate ($X^{-1} \Delta X$)) represents the demand contribution to the gross output of the economy, and has the following meanings:

- (i) $B_0 U_0^F * \Delta F$ contribution of final domestic demand expansion (FDE);
- (ii) $B_0 \Delta E$ contribution of export demand expansion (EDE);
- (iii) $B_0 \Delta U^F * F_1$ contribution of import substitution of final goods/services (ISF)⁽⁴⁾;

- (iv) $B_0 \Delta U^w * W_i$ contribution of import substitution of intermediate inputs (*ISW*);
 (v) $B_0 U_0^w * \Delta AX_1$ contribution of changes in input-output coefficients (*IOC*)⁽⁵⁾.

In turn, the decomposition for gross output share changes has an analogous meaning to the above, but refers to the absolute value of the share change (δX) and the relative share change in percentage points ($\delta X/X_{t1}$). As shown in the appendix, the last three terms are exactly the same as above, while (i) and (ii) now become $B_0 \hat{U}_0^F * \delta F$ and $B_0 \delta E$, respectively. To recall, these demand contributions should not be taken as explaining structural change in terms of causality, but in terms of concomitance, as these are the result of complex interactions of domestic policies and endogenous dynamics, and world trends and shocks. These factors are beyond the scope of this paper, but our analysis of contributions may serve as a basis for such a type of aims.

2.2 Application to China

For the purpose, we produce both a 33-industry disaggregation and some relevant subgroupings. The analysis focuses on the 1995-2010 period. The source data comes from both the World Input-Output Database (WIOD) and the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS). WIOD input-output tables were available in dollar terms for current (1995-2011) and previous year (1996-2009) basic prices⁽⁶⁾. The latter tables were used to derive implicit price indexes to deflate the current-price series, at an industrial level. Additional prices for 2010 and 2011 were obtained from the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS). The latter has only produced tables for four given years with 23 comparable industries (1997, 2000, 2005 and 2010), which were used as a general check. But we prefer WIOD tables as they seem to be more consistent, with a full

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3 public documentation of the methodology used (see WIOD). Given our purpose, we transformed
4 the tables into constant Yuan prices of 1995. In addition, to secure further consistency and
5 stability, we calculated a 3-year moving average of the tables for all the period. Not having
6 available a 1994 table for a 3-year average for 1995, we decided to keep the 1995 table as a
7 single year, as this is the base year for the constant series. So our series go from 1995 to 2010⁽⁷⁾.
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18 3. Analysis of Results

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22 The analysis below is divided into three parts. Firstly, we analyzed the change between 1995 and
23 2010 for aggregations of primary, secondary and tertiary sectors. Secondly, we disaggregate such
24 sectors into some key constituent industries to show how they evolved and contributed to the
25 aggregation. And thirdly, we look at the trajectory of changes of these sectors, and some of their
26 main industries, year after year from 1995 to 2010 (see note 6).
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36 3.1 Aggregate Analysis

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41 Table No.1 is divided into two panels: the left panel shows the change in the shares ($\delta X/X_{2010}$) of
42 gross output (X), while the right panel shows the growth rates ($\Delta X/X_{1995}$) of gross output (X) for
43 the 33 disaggregated industries, and for grouped ones into customary sectors, between 1995 and
44 2010. The share-change panel is expressed in percentage points (pp), while the growth-rate panel
45 is expressed in percentage (%).
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54 Table No.1
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4 The first column in the shares panel presents the share changes in gross output, expressed in
5 percentage points of 2010. The following five columns: *FDE*, *EDE*, *ISF*, *ISW*, and *IOC*, are the
6 demand sources or contributions to such share changes, expressed in percentage points (pp), so
7 that for each industry the addition of the contributions add up to its share change. In turn, the first
8 column in the growth panel presents the growth rates of gross output, expressed in percentage
9 ($\Delta X/X_{1995}$). The five demand contributions are however expressed in percentage points so that
10 their addition amounts to the growth rate in question. The meaning of each of these five terms is
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25 The final two column in the shares panel expresses the share of each sector in gross output in the
26 initial year (S_{1995}) and final year (S_{2010}), respectively. In addition, the bottom section regroup the
27 industries in the standard categories of primary, secondary and tertiary sectors, with its main
28 constituent industries. Finally, the bottom row presents the column sums (shares panel) or the
29 column weighted averages (growth panel). Let us then start with the whole economy and then
30 concentrate on the three economic sectors.
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42 The sum total of the first column of the shares panel has to add to zero, indicating that some
43 industries grew faster than average, producing a positive share change, while others grew slower
44 than average, exhibiting a negative share change. For the whole economy, only the contribution
45 of final domestic demand (*FDE*) was negative, amounting to a massive contraction of 20
46 percentage points over the period. All the other contributions are positive, especially that due to
47 foreign demand expansion (*EDE*) and also to the increase in mutual input demands of the
48 economy, producing a positive change in input-output coefficients (*IOC*). Imported input and
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3 final output substitutions (*ISW* and *ISF*) also played a positive, but secondary role. The growth
4 panel, bottom line, shows that the final domestic demand is the larger contributor to the total
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6 panel, bottom line, shows that the final domestic demand is the larger contributor to the total
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8 growth of gross output over the period⁽⁸⁾, but it lost 20 percentage points (pp) in its share of gross
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10 output, while the foreign demand contribution increased its share by 8 percentage points. This is
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12 because the growth rate of the former has systematically been below the economy average
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14 growth rate of 385%, while the latter has systematically been above it, namely 272% and 568%,
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16 respectively (not shown in the table). This simply confirms that the economy has moved strongly
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18 towards exports and investment (530%) at the expense of domestic consumption, which grew by
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20 only 200% (not shown in the table). Notice however that the growth rate over the period was
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22 very high, and the growth rates for each of our industries were positive, so share losses should
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24 not be interpreted as losses in the growth of absolute values, but only in relative terms.
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32 *3.2 Disaggregated Analysis*

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37 The aggregate results above can be disaggregated into the standard main sectors of the economy
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39 and some key industries within them. The bottom blocks of both panels of Table No.1 show this
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41 for primary, secondary (including construction) and tertiary sectors. The last column of the
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43 shares panel shows the shares at the end of the period. It shows that the secondary sector share
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45 grew from 60pp to 75pp, and notably heavy industry more than double its share, from 14pp in
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47 1995 to a massive 32pp in 2010. Except for “Post and telecommunications” (No. 26) and a few
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49 members of light industry, all the other industries lost share presence in gross output. Chart 1
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51 below gives a synoptic view of the share change over the period for this categorization.
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8 The secondary sector increased massively its share in gross output at the expense of especially
9 the primary sector, but also the tertiary one. This hides the very fact that the secondary sector
10 increase was mostly due to heavy industry (17.6pp) at the expense of light, medium and
11 construction industries. And as shown in Table No.1, within heavy industry, the increase was
12 especially due to “Electrical and optical equipment” (No.14) and “Transport equipment”
13 (No.15), increasing their share by 11.1pp and 3.3pp, respectively.
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24 In turn, the fall in the primary sector share is mostly due to the non-mining primary sector
25 (No.1), which fell by 8.6pp, while Mining and quarry fell by 1.6pp. As regards the tertiary
26 sector, the main fall in share was due especially to domestic wholesale trade and financial
27 intermediation (Nos.19, and 27), with a slight positive direction by especially Post and
28 telecommunications (No.26). Chart 2 helps us visualize the five demand contributions to the
29 sectoral share changes above.
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40 Chart 2
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45 The contribution of domestic demand (*FDE*) fell in all sectors, while that of export demand
46 expansion (*EDE*) strongly increased in the secondary sector and to a minor degree in the tertiary
47 one. The other positive contribution is that to direct input-output coefficients (*IOC*) from the
48 secondary sector, meaning that this sector pull on the whole economy has significantly increased.
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50 This sector also shows an increase in import substitution of especially intermediate inputs (*ISW*)
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3 and to a much lesser extent of final goods (*ISF*), which means that a higher proportion of
4 intermediates inputs is produced domestically.
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10 Table No.1 shows that all the above contributions to the secondary sector are mostly from heavy
11 industry, notably those to foreign demand (*EDE*) and input intermediation coefficients (*IOC*).
12 The latter is especially marked from the same heavy industries mentioned above, but also from
13 No.13 Machinery. Medium industry shows positive contributions to especially export demand
14 and import substitution, but negative ones to domestic demand and input-output coefficients.
15 Light industry, in turn, shows also positive contributions to both types of import substitution,
16 (especially from No. 4 “Textiles”), and input-output coefficients (particularly from No.3 “Food
17 beverages and tobacco”). This is an indication of higher domestic reliance, and probably higher
18 technical sophistication, in these areas. The opposite happens in the primary sector, where all
19 contributions are negative or null, except for a slim positive contribution to imported input
20 substitution from the non-mining primary sector (No.1). The tertiary sector is more mixed, as
21 foreign demand and both items of import substitution show positive contributions, especially
22 from domestic trade and financial activities.
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43 The growth panel (bottom block) shows the story in growth terms. The secondary sector shows
44 an unweighted growth rate of 508%, well above the total average of the weighted growth rate of
45 385%, while the other sectors were well below such an average, especially the primary sector.
46 The heavy industry within the secondary sector grew (unweighted) by a massive 985% over the
47 period, especially on account of No.14 Electrical and optical equipment. For all sectors, the main
48 contributors to their growth rates are domestic and foreign demands (*FDE* and *EDE*), the latter
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3 especially strong for heavy industry, which also shows an important growth in both input
4 substitution (ISW) and input intermediation (*IOC*), mostly in the said industry No.14, but also in
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6 No.15 Transport equipment. The tertiary sector shows also gains in both items of import
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8 substitution.
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12 13 14 15 3.3 *Structural Evolution over the Period* 16

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19 In this section, we show how the results above built up over the 16-year period, by graphically
20 presenting the changes above in terms of periods made of two consecutive years, from 1995-96
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22 to 2010-11 (see note 9), and showing that main policy reforms and world shock can help explain
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24 such evolution. But first a fast look at the trajectory of growth rates of gross output. Graphs 1
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26 shows the growth rate trajectory of the economy and its main sectors, presenting a clear
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28 slowdown over 1996- 2000 for the three sectors, an acceleration over the 2000-2006, especially
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30 on the back of the secondary sector, then a fast slowdown over 2006-2009 for all sectors and a
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32 recovery afterwards for especially the secondary and tertiary sectors. This changes in the patterns
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34 of growth rates have clear effects in the patterns of structural change via the changes in the
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36 shares of sectors and industries in total gross output over the full period, as is shown in the next
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38 two subsections.
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48 Graph 1
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57 (i) *Sectors and subsectors makeup*
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Graph 2 below presents the evolution of the share change of the three economic sectors. The secondary sector gained share all over the period (curve over the 0.0 axis), while the primary one did the opposite (curve under the 0.0 axis), and the tertiary sector was for the most part losing representation. For example, in the period 1998-99, both secondary and tertiary sectors gain share at the expense of the primary sector, while in 2005-06 the secondary sector gains share at the expense of the other two sectors⁽⁹⁾. The curve trajectories are however not smooth, showing important changes in certain periods, especially for the secondary sector, which shows increasing share gains in gross output from 1998 to 2007, notably between 2000-01 and 2006-07, reaching a peak in 2005-06. From this peak onwards there is a fast descent in the strength of percentage point gains, but is still on the positive side, so it keeps gaining share but at a slower pace. In turn, the tertiary sector is mostly on the negative side, almost mirroring the secondary one, except for the period 1997-2000 and from 2009.

Graph 2
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Lastly, the primary sector is all along on the negative side, showing its biggest losses of share over the period 2000-07. These patterns can be better informed by presenting the trajectory of the sub-sectoral components of each of the main sectors so as to show their impact on the sectoral patterns of Graph 2⁽¹⁰⁾. Graph 3 shows the secondary sector disaggregated into light, medium, heavy and construction industries.

Graph 3
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3 The thick curve (with a glow) is again the secondary sector as in Graph 2, while the other curves
4 are its main sub-sectoral components. The most striking point here is that almost all of the
5 secondary sector pattern is due to the trajectory of heavy industry, while the heavy industry
6 pattern itself is mostly explained by the “Electrical and optical equipment” industry (No.14),
7 which follows a similar trajectory, picking in 2004-05 (not shown in graph). At a more unstable
8 and less salient levels, transport equipment (No. 15), utilities (No. 17) and non-electrical
9 machinery (No. 13) also contribute to this pattern (not shown in graph). Graph 4 shows the same
10 for the tertiary sector, which is disaggregated into domestic trade, transport, finance and social
11 sectors. The fall in tertiary sector share in gross output, especially between 2001 and 2008, seems
12 to be mostly due to falls in domestic trade and finance, and at a slower level social sectors.
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28 Graph 4
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33 On the other hand, most of the positive share changes of the tertiary sector seem to be due to
34 transport services, especially up to 2000-01 and from 2008-09. Notice, however, that a curve
35 trajectory close to the 0.0 line means a pretty high growth rate, just about the (unweighted)
36 average of the economy⁽¹¹⁾.
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43 (ii) *Demand Contributions* 44 45 46

47 Graph 5 presents the trajectory followed by the five demand contributions over the period. The
48 top contribution to the total share change is due to export demand expansion (*EDE*), notably
49 between 2000 and 2006, mostly at the expense of domestic demand expansion (*FDE*). The latter
50 shows a systematic negative contribution to its share change until 2007-08, when start regaining
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3 ground at the expense of *EDE*, reverting some of the lost ground, but at decreasing rates, as it
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5 seems that by 2011 the two curves go in opposite directions again.
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10 Graph 5
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14 As regards the other three contributions, there is some slow and unstable contribution from
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16 import substitution of final goods (*ISF*) and a more significant imported input substitution (*ISW*)
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18 between 2005 and 2010. The contribution of input-output coefficients (*IOC*), indicating strength
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20 of mutual demands for domestic output, appears mostly positive, but at low percentage point
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29 Lastly, Graph 6 is a collection of five subgraphs that show the sectoral share change trajectory of
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31 each of the five demand contributions *FDE* (final demand), *EDE* (foreign demand), *ISF* (final
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33 import substitution), *ISW* (imported input substitution) and *IOC* (domestic input-output
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35 intermediation) for the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy.
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41 Graph 6
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47 The primary and tertiary sectors show a similar trajectory for each of the five contribution,
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49 except for *ISF*, and these are near but mostly under the 0.0 percentage point (pp) change,
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51 especially for the primary sector. This tallies with the total pp change for these two sectors over
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53 the full period, as shown in Table No. 1 (i.e. the primary sector lost 10.3pp while the tertiary one
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3 4.9pp). For *ISF*, the latter appears as first losing pp ground (up to 2001-02) and then regaining it
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5 (mostly from 2002-03 onwards).
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11 The Secondary sector however shows a more variable pattern, being mostly and strongly on the
12 positive side. Domestic demand (*FDE*) and external demand (*EDE*) appear to show an about
13 mirror pattern (i.e. as *EDE* increases, *FDE* falls and vice versa). This simply means that most of
14 the positive share change in the secondary sector has been due to *EDE* mostly at the expense of
15 *FDE*, and vice versa after 2007-08, when *EDE* has its deepest fall. For *ISW*, this sector shows a
16 positive contribution between 2005 and 2010, peaking in 2007-08. In turn, *IOC* shows a positive
17 pattern all along except for the period 2009-11. Finally, *ISF* shows a similar trajectory for both
18 secondary and tertiary sectors, being negative between 1998 and 2003 and positive between 2003
19 and 2011, with a dive in 2008-09. This tallies with the massive gain by the secondary sector in
20 the share of gross output over the full period (i.e. 15.2pp). Given that most of the inflection
21 points happen after 2006-07, then this also shows that the international crisis and policies therein
22 had an important impact on the China economy, as further detailed below.
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43 3.4 Phases, World Shocks and Policies

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47 The patterns of Table No.1, charts and graphs above respond mostly to domestic policy,
48 domestic dynamics and world conditions. Table No.2 shows the main phases and features of the
49 structural change which can generally be visualized by means of our graphs above. So this table
50 also acts as a guide to our graphs.
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8 The 1997 East Asian crisis put a slowdown to exports gains and, among other explanations,
9 sluggish rural income growth and widespread industrial inefficiency that impinged on significant
10 falls in the total factor productivity of the economy (Albala-Bertrand 2013, Yueh 2013, Zhen,
11 Bigsten and Hu 2009). At the time, some reforms were introduced to face the crisis, adopting
12 policies to stimulate domestic demand, especially via construction and services development.
13 These came on top of important reforms introduced over the period 1994-96 that aimed at both a
14 nation-wide liberalization of capital inflows to attract foreign direct investment and a massive
15 push towards privatization to develop private domestic business (Prasad and Wei 2005).
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28 Between 1997 and 2001, there were further reforms especially via a law that let the markets to
29 set or guide prices with outside intervention by the government. In addition, in 2001 China
30 became a member of the WTO, which forced a policy of eliminating direct price controls and
31 export subsidies to agricultural products (Yueh 2010, 2013; Zhang and Tan 2007, OECD 2002).
32 All these plus other associated reforms, like open market agreements with the US and Southeast
33 Asian countries, created the strong platform on which capital intensity and total factor
34 productivity contributed to the very high growth rates of the economy, especially between 2001
35 and 2007 (Albala-Bertrand 2013). This especially relied upon heavy industry and exports (Yueh
36 2010, 2011; Lardy 2006), as also reflected in Graph 3 and Graph 5 above. By 2007, China
37 officially acknowledged that its economic growth was “unsteady, unbalanced, uncoordinated and
38 unsustainable” (Wen Jiabao-Annual Meeting of China’s legislature, 2007), which is what our
39 Table No.1, charts and graphs reflect. To be sure, this reality check did not just referred to the
40 situation between domestic and foreign demand, and between the secondary and the other
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3 economic sectors, but also about regional disparities, income inequalities, and market and
4 product fragmentation, among others problems (Goodman and Parker 2014, Yueh 2010, Zhang
5 and Tan 2007, World Bank 2005, Fu 2004, Chow and Li 2002).
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12 This official admission coincided with the onset of the international financial crisis (or Great
13 Recession). This brought new policies to counteract it, especially via a massive stimulus package
14 for agriculture, construction and services, with a special focus on housing and rural
15 infrastructure, education and health, environment and disaster reconstruction, industry and
16 transportation, tax cuts and finance, and so on (Wong 2011). This is well reflected in Graph 5
17 and the Graph 6 collection, as there appeared to have been a strong, but short lived, structural
18 change reversal, especially from 2007, between final domestic demand expansion (*FDE*) and
19 external demand expansion (*EDE*). This is also reflected in an important domestic substitution of
20 previously imported intermediaries (*ISW*) and in an increasing domestic input intermediation
21 (*IOC*). In terms of sectoral share change, as shown in Graph 2, the tertiary sector starts to reduce
22 its losses and achieves gains after 2008, with a recovery of domestic retail and transport (see
23 Graph 3), while the primary sector keeps losing share representation, but at lower levels.
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43 So, over the period 1995-2011, world and regional international crises, counter and strategic
44 policy packages, and the overall structural change of economy and society, can be generally
45 illustrated with the help of the above analysis, which can complement and serve as the basis for
46 other approaches and aims (e.g. He and Zhang 2010, Cai and Wang 2010, Zheng, Wang and Shi
47 2008).
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4. Conclusions

The aim of this paper was to learn about some patterns of sectoral and industrial structural change of the Chinese economy over the 1995-2010 period. To such purpose we set up a quantitative methodology via input-output modelling, which allowed us to decompose gross output into its main demand sources or contributions. Noting that the national output growth rates were around 10% over the period, and that on the whole these rates were positive for all sectors and industries, the main observations about structural change are as follows.

- (i) Between 1995 and 2010, there was a significant structural change in favour of the secondary sector, and especially its heavy industry. This sector increased its share in gross output by over 15pp (pp: percentage points), from 60% to 75%. Two thirds of this change was done at the expense of the primary sector (notably its non-mining industries), which lost over 10pp share in output, and one third at the expense of services (notably domestic trade and financial intermediation).
- (ii) The main demand sources that contributed positively to the changes above were export expansion EDE (representing 8pp) and increases in domestic input intermediation IOC (7pp), and at a secondary level import substitution of both final goods ISF and industrial inputs ISW (1pp and 3pp, respectively). In turn, the main negative contribution comes from domestic demand, which lost 20pp share over the

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3 period. The latter loses come from all sectors, except for some industrial components
4 of heavy industry (machinery, electrical, optical and transport equipment) and also
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6 post and telecommunications of the tertiary sector.
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12 (iii) The above structural change, however, was not linear. The secondary sector, mostly
13 pulled by its heavy industry, has most of its massive share gain over 2001 and 2007.
14 That is between just after the 1997 East Asian crisis together with the liberalization of
15 capital flows plus (guided) market prices, among other opening trade policies, and
16 just before the Great Recession and some policies to rebalance the economy. It is not
17 until 2009 that the tertiary sector appears to regain slightly some of its lost share in
18 output, while the primary sector keeps losing representation, but at lower levels.
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31 (iv) As regards demand contributions, export demand expansion (EDE) and domestic
32 demand expansion (EFE) show an almost mirror trajectory, while the former has a
33 massive share gain the latter shows a massive share loss. From around 2007, for the
34 first time the share change of export demand becomes negative and falls below that of
35 domestic demand, the latter even exhibiting a positive share gain from around 2008
36 for the very first time in the observed period. But it seems that by 2011, the two
37 contributions start to revert again. To be also noticed, there is a significant increase
38 in the share of final and input imported substitution from 2005. This, together with
39 the general increase of domestic intermediate input-output trade (IOC), may be an
40 indication of an economy that moves to a more endogenously sustainable one, which
41 is part of the necessary rebalancing of the Chinese economy.
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6 As shown in the text, all these patterns and trajectories can be generally shown to respond to both
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8 international shocks and main domestic policy decisions. Whether the Chinese economy will
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10 properly rebalance, as the need for it has been acknowledged by the government, will mostly
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12 depend on policies that can sustain a stable growth in which domestic demand, especially
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14 consumption, becomes the main contributor to it. The recent decrease in growth rates puts
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16 additional pressures and difficulties to achieve such a rebalancing. But there are recent
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18 indications that consumption is taking a greater role in the dynamics of China's economic growth
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22 (World Bank 2015, 2014; *The Economist* 12/09/2015).
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4. Notes

(1) A regional disaggregation of inter-sectoral relationships would have been useful, but there are no systematic regional input-output tables for China. To further clarify, as is well known, input-output analysis is a demand rather than supply type of analysis, so apart from the technology related to the combination of intermediates used by each sector/industry, which is specified in the matrices of direct coefficients, there is no focus on embodied or disembodied technology, as in supply studies (see Albala-Bertrand 2013). Neither are there input-output tables that directly include the import content of exports at sectoral/industrial level, so in our paper this is treated by means of imported input substitution of the whole economy, which does not allow to distinguish between intermediate imports used for domestic demand (consumption and investment) and those for export demand. Given the highly globalized fragmentation of some industrial structures, the import content of exports and their supply chains, which relates to vertical specialization and derived value chains, are important research efforts, which have so far shown only relative successes. Given the insufficiency of direct information from the standard tables, this issue has been tried indirectly either via the use of some strong assumptions (e.g. Hummels et al. 2001), which produce some significant biases, or by means of complementary data that comes from custom and tax rules peculiar to China alone (Yang, Dietzenbacher et al. 2015), which also require some convenient assumptions on these data, so the results may not be devoid enough of biases. This is not what our paper is about, but the research attention paid to this issue is an important endeavour, which will surely see more robust results in due course.

(2) Notice that gross output includes both intermediate and final output, so from the viewpoint of GDP it would be double counting, as GDP already contains all the value-added additions to final output from all the intermediate inputs required for its production. But from the

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4 viewpoint of each industry (or firm), it represents the actual productive effort to supply both
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6 intermediate inputs to other industries (or firms) and goods/services for final demands. So what
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8 the input-output model does is to show the total productive effort that, directly and indirectly, all
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10 sectors of the economy have to undergo to satisfy the production of one unit of final output of a
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12 particular sector or industry. This represents one unit of value added for the economy, which
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14 would be distributed among all the many participating sectors, as they have to pay their
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16 productive factors for the effort to satisfy that unit of final demand. This productive effort would
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18 normally be significantly more than one unit of final output, and can be derived from the input-
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20 output multipliers associated with the Leontief inverse. The decomposition that we use here
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22 derives from the full input-output model and cannot be possibly produced by focusing on final
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24 output alone. To do so would ignore the actual inter-industrial effort required to secure such one
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26 unit of final output. And this is the very basic advantage of approaching the economy via input-
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28 output analysis (see for example Bulmer-Thomas 1982, Eurostat 2008).
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35 (3) In previous studies, imports were treated as if each industrial import was to be used by all
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37 industries in the same proportion, as normally only the total input usage, at the level of each
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39 industry, was available, i.e. the composition of imported inputs in the output of each industry
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41 was not known. But given that we have the full import tables for China, we use the full table in
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43 our calculations, which is why we have to use scalar multiplication for the purpose. In other
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45 words, $m^W * W$ means that each cell of W is multiplied by the same cell of m^W . So M^W is the
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47 matrix of imported inputs.
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52 (4) Terms (iii) and (iv) are positive when there is an increase in import substitution over the
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54 period i.e. an increase in the proportion of domestic inputs in total inputs and domestic final
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3 output in total final output, respectively. This represents a variation in demand exclusively due to
4 variations in import substitution.
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9 (5) This represents the change in demand over the period, exclusively due to the Leontief
10 weighted variation of *direct* (domestic) input-output coefficients of the system. If this term is
11 positive for a particular industry, then this means that more of the output of this industry is used
12 as input for the production of other industries than in the base year. That is, it represents an
13 increase in the *direct* domestic contribution of this industry towards the system. Hence, it
14 represents a version of *direct* backward domestic linkages (demand) from the rest of the
15 economy to this industry, or alternatively a version of the *direct* forward domestic linkage
16 (supply) of this industry towards the rest of the economy over the period (Hirschman, 1977).
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28 (6) As the OECD defines it: “the basic price is the amount receivable by the producer from
29 the purchaser for a unit of a good or service produced as output minus any tax payable, and plus
30 any subsidy receivable, on that unit as a consequence of its production or sale. It excludes any
31 transport charges invoiced separately by the producer as well as suppliers’ retail and wholesale
32 margins”. This is considered a better measure of industrial efforts than market (final) prices.
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40 (7) We also add the change over the period 2010-2011. The latter is only used for
41 illustration, but not as a 3-year average, as we have no data for 2012.
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45 (8) Given the input-output model in equation (7), the total final demand (domestic and
46 foreign) has to be the larger contributor to gross output, but not necessarily in growth or
47 percentage points variation terms. The absolute change decomposition allows us to assess the
48 size of such contributions plus the contributions from the other three factors over the period.
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(9) Recall that for each period, the percentage point sum of the three curves has to add to zero. And also that percentage points on the positive side implies that the sector is growing faster than the average growth of the economy (as measured by gross output), while the opposite is the case with negative percentage points. So we will not clutter this analysis with graphs about growth rates, as we are focusing on structural (share) changes.

(10) The primary sector is mostly “Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing” (No.1), as “Mining and quarrying” (No.2) plays a very secondary role. So the trajectory is just about the one in Graph 2, which is why we don’t present an individual graph for this sector alone. Also notice that for each given period, the percentage point sum of the subsectors has to add up to the value of their sector.

(11) For example post and telecommunications (No. 26), which is part of “Transport plus”, grew over the 15 year period by a massive 1036%, as shown in Table No. 1. But given that it started at very low share level, it looks less impressive in terms of the weighted average of the economy. “Education”, and “Health & social work” (Nos. 32 and 33), part of “Social Sectors”, show also an impressive (unweighted) growth rates (327% and 402%, respectively), but given their low shares to start with, they don’t seem to have made share improvements in total gross output, if anything the opposite. This is similar for industries of the other sectors, especially those of the primary one, which lost a significant share of the economy, but grew at positive but low rates all along, except for the period 2006-08, when it fell by around 3.5% (only industry No.1: non mining primary sector).

(12) The decomposition of the RHS first-term of equation (12) is as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 B_0\Delta G &= B_0\{[U_1^F * F_1 + E_1] - [U_0^F * F_0 + E_0]\} = B_0\{U_1^F * F_1 - U_0^F * F_0 + E_1 - E_0\} = \\
 &B_0[U_1^F * F_1 - U_0^F * F_1 + U_0^F * \Delta F + \Delta E] = \\
 &B_0[\Delta U^F * F_1 + U_0^F * \Delta F + \Delta E]
 \end{aligned}$$

(13) The decomposition of the RHS second-term of equation (13) is as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta B_0 G_1 &= [B_0 B_0^{-1} B_1 - B_0 B_1^{-1} B_1] G_1 = B_0 [B_0^{-1} - B_1^{-1}] B_1 G_1 = B_0 [B_0^{-1} - B_1^{-1}] X_1 = \\ & B_0 \{ [I - U_0^W * A_0] - [I - U_1^W * A_1] \} X_1 = B_0 \{ U_1^W * A_1 - (U_0^W * A_1 - U_0^W * A_0) - U_0^W * A_0 \} X_1 = \\ & B_0 \{ \Delta U^W * A_1 + U_0^W * \Delta A \} X_1 = B_0 [\Delta U^W * A_1 X_1 + U_0^W * \Delta A X_1] = \\ & B_0 [\Delta U^W * W_1 i + U_0^W * \Delta A X_1] \end{aligned}$$

(14) The Paasche calculation would have led to the following result for equation (21):

$$\delta X = B_1 U_1^F * \delta F + B_1 \delta E + B_1 \Delta U^F * (1 + g_a) F_0 + B_1 \Delta U^W * (1 + g_a) W_0 i + B_1 U_1^W * \Delta A (1 + g_a) X_0$$

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Appendix

A. Decomposition of Output Change

The decomposition of gross output change, i.e. absolute growth and the growth rate, between two periods amounts to calculating the first difference of equation (8). That is:

$$\Delta X = \Delta(BG) = B_0\Delta G + \Delta BG_0 + \Delta B\Delta G \quad (9)$$

Either the first or the second term on the right-hand side can absorb the third term. If the second term absorbs the third, then the calculation will be weighted by the initial year of the structural B matrix and the final year of the volume G matrix, and *vice versa* if the third term is absorbed by the first term. This is similar to Laspeyres and Paasche index weightings, respectively, i.e.

$$\Delta X = B_0\Delta G + \Delta BG_1 \quad (\text{Laspeyres weighting}) \quad (10)$$

$$\Delta X = B_1\Delta G + \Delta BG_0 \quad (\text{Paasche weighting}) \quad (11)$$

The numerical results from the two alternative weightings are not normally equivalent and can be very different if the third term is large. To correct this index number problem, several methods have been devised, such as re-weighting the terms, creating an appropriate divisia index, etc. However, a simpler method that distributes the third term proportionally into the other two terms is by taking the simple arithmetical average of the Laspeyres and Paasche results. This appears to produce a good approximation, as analyzed by Dietzenbacher and Los (1998). This method has also been used by Chenery and Syrquin (1986) and Wyckoff and Sakurai (1992). We also use it here for all our actual calculations. However, the derivation of the formula for either alternative is analogous, so for presentational purpose only we use the Laspeyres weighting, i.e. letting the

third term be absorbed by the second term. The two terms on the right-hand side of equation (10) can be decomposed as:

$$B_0 \Delta G = B_0 (U_0^F * \Delta F + \Delta E + U_0^F * F_1) \quad (12)$$

and

$$\Delta B G_1 = B_0 (\Delta U^W * W_1 i + U_0^W * \Delta A X_1) \quad (13)$$

Therefore, the total decomposition for the absolute growth or variation in gross output will be:

$$\Delta X = B_0 U_0^F * \Delta F + B_0 \Delta E + B_0 \Delta U^F * F_1 + B_0 \Delta U^W * W_1 i + B_0 U_0^W * \Delta A X_1 \quad (14)$$

The decomposition for the gross output growth rate can be obtained by dividing equation (14) by X_0 . Each of the five terms on the right-hand side of (14), in variation or growth rate terms, represents the direct and indirect contribution to the gross output of the economy.

B. Decomposition of Output Share Changes

The share change for the i^{th} industry is simply the difference between the gross output share of the terminal year (S_{i1}) minus that of the base year (S_{i0}):

$$\Delta S_i = S_{i1} - S_{i0} = X_{i1} / X_{t1} - X_{i0} / X_{t0} \quad (15)$$

Where $i: 1, \dots, n$ (n industries) and subscript t denotes "total". Let us first define the following:

$$X_{i1} = X_{i0} (1 + g_i) \text{ and } X_{t1} = X_{t0} (1 + g_a) \quad (16)$$

Where g_i and g_a denote the gross output growth rate for the i^{th} industry and the economy's average gross output growth rate, respectively. Replacing X_{t0} with $X_{t1} / (1 + g_a)$ in (15) and manipulating yields:

$$\Delta S_i = [X_{i1} - (1 + g_a) X_{i0}] / X_{t1} \quad (17)$$

Or to carry less notation, let $\delta X_i = [X_{i1} - (1 + g_a) X_{i0}]$, then:

$$\Delta S_i = \delta X_i / X_{t1} \quad (18)$$

The numerator, δX_i , contains the difference between the actual value of X_i in the terminal year and the value of X_i that would have occurred had it grown at the economy's average growth rate (g_a) over the period. Therefore, the equation represents the deviation of each industry's gross output from balanced growth, normalized by the actual value of the gross output in the terminal year. This allows us to derive the decomposition formula in a closely analogous way to (10) above. In matrix form, the case of Laspeyres weighting yields:

$$\delta X = B_0 \delta G + \Delta B G_1 \quad (19)$$

While the Paasche weighting leads to:

$$\delta X = B_1 \delta G + \Delta B G_0 (1 + g_a) \quad (20)$$

Notice that only the volumes of the base year appear multiplied by the coefficient $(1 + g_a)$, in the latter weighting. As before, given that the derivation of the formula is analogous for both cases, for presentational purpose only, we use the Laspeyres derivation below. Therefore, applying the same solving procedure as before we obtain⁽¹⁴⁾:

$$\delta X = B_0 \hat{U}_0^F * \delta F + B_0 \delta E + B_0 \Delta \hat{U}_0^F * F_1 + B_0 \Delta \hat{U}_0^W * W_1 i + B_0 \hat{U}_0^W * \Delta A X_1 \quad (21)$$

Notice that the last three terms on the right-hand side are the same as in equation (14) above. Dividing equation (21) by X_{t1} we are back to equation (18), but in matrix form. The meaning is analogous to equation (14), but refers to the absolute value of the share change (δX) and the relative share change in percentage points ($\delta X / X_{t1}$), rather than the absolute growth (ΔX) and its growth rate ($X^{-1} \Delta X$).

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FIGURES: TABLES (2), CHARTS (2) AND GRAPHS (6)

Table No.1: Share Changes (percentage points) and Growth Rates (%): 1995-2010

NACE	1995-2010 No INDUSTRY	SHARE δ 1995-2010							GROWTH RATE Δ 1995-2010						
		$\delta X/TX_{2010}$	FDE	EDE	ISF	ISW	IOC	S ₁₉₉₅	S ₂₀₁₀	$\Delta X/X_{1995}$	FDE	EDE	ISF	ISW	IOC
AIB	1 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing	-8.6	-6.5	-0.6	0.0	0.1	-1.6	12.5	3.9	51	62	21	0	3	-36
C	2 Mining and quarrying	-1.6	-0.5	0.0	0.0	-0.4	-0.7	3.1	1.5	130	159	77	3	-31	-79
15116	3 Food, beverages and tobacco	-0.9	-2.7	-0.4	0.0	0.1	2.1	6.4	5.5	317	202	36	-1	4	75
17118	4 Textiles and textile products	-0.5	-1.3	-1.0	0.1	0.8	0.9	5.8	5.3	345	113	155	4	39	34
19	5 Leather, leather and footwear	-0.4	-0.3	-0.3	0.0	0.1	0.1	1.4	1.0	261	119	105	4	23	11
20	6 Wood and of wood and cork	0.4	-0.2	-0.1	0.0	0.2	0.5	1.1	1.5	578	282	111	2	57	127
2122	7 Pulp, paper, paper, printing and publishing	0.1	-0.6	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.5	1.9	2.0	416	218	111	1	34	53
23	8 Coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel	-0.5	-0.3	0.1	0.0	0.0	-0.3	1.7	1.2	241	190	102	3	6	-60
24	9 Chemicals and chemical	-0.4	-1.3	0.4	-0.1	0.4	0.1	4.5	4.1	339	176	143	-2	27	-5
25	10 Rubber and plastics	0.6	-0.4	0.3	0.0	0.2	0.5	2.3	2.8	507	218	224	4	24	38
26	11 Other non-metallic mineral	-1.3	-0.8	0.1	0.0	0.0	-0.7	4.4	3.1	239	231	56	3	2	-52
27128	12 Basic metals and fabricated metal	1.1	-0.7	1.1	0.2	0.5	-0.1	8.1	9.2	450	266	172	9	24	-21
29	13 Machinery nec	2.6	0.1	1.0	0.4	-0.1	1.1	4.0	6.6	693	390	201	32	-6	75
30133	14 Electrical and optical equipment	11.1	0.6	5.2	0.3	0.9	4.1	5.0	16.1	1460	414	725	17	68	235
34135	15 Transport equipment	3.3	1.1	0.8	0.0	0.0	1.4	2.6	6.0	995	617	219	4	10	145
36137	16 Manufacturing nec; recycling	0.1	-0.1	0.3	0.0	-0.1	0.0	0.7	0.8	472	155	354	-10	-23	-3
E	17 Electricity, gas and water supply	0.5	-0.5	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.8	1.9	2.4	514	277	122	4	9	102
F	18 Construction	-0.6	-0.6	0.0	0.1	0.0	-0.1	8.1	7.5	350	347	3	2	0	-2
51	19 Wholesale trade and commission trade, ex motor vehicles	-1.8	-0.8	0.5	0.0	0.1	-1.6	5.2	3.4	216	209	95	3	8	-98
52	20 Retail trade, ex motor vehicles; repair of household goods	-0.4	-0.2	0.1	0.0	0.0	-0.3	1.1	0.7	216	208	95	3	10	-100
H	21 Hotels and restaurants	-0.4	-0.6	-0.1	0.0	0.1	0.2	1.8	1.5	288	203	46	4	16	18
60	22 Inland transport	-0.8	-0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.3	2.4	1.6	225	190	78	3	2	-47
61	23 Water transport	0.4	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.3	0.6	1147	370	410	4	17	346
62	24 Air transport	-0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.3	284	141	166	-1	-20	-3
63	25 Other Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; travel agencies	-0.1	-0.2	-0.2	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.7	0.7	337	208	33	4	44	48
64	26 Post and telecommunications	0.7	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.5	1.2	1036	707	129	10	10	179
J	27 Financial intermediation	-1.1	-0.5	0.2	0.0	0.1	-0.9	3.1	2.0	210	205	83	4	11	-93
70	28 Real estate activities	-0.8	-0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.4	2.0	1.1	177	206	31	2	4	-66
71174	29 Renting of m&eq and other business activities	0.0	-0.7	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.5	1.8	1.9	395	205	117	0	-3	77
L	30 Public admin and defence; compulsory social security	-0.5	-0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.9	1.4	264	258	1	3	2	0
M	31 Education	-0.2	-0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	1.3	1.2	327	302	7	0	-1	19
N	32 Health and social work	0.0	-0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	1.0	1.0	402	359	9	1	5	27
O	33 Other community, social and personal services	0.0	-0.2	-0.1	0.0	0.0	0.4	1.1	1.1	390	260	37	1	8	85
I	PRIMARY SECTOR (1,2)	-10.3	-7.0	-0.6	0.0	-0.4	-2.3	15.6	5.4	66	81	33	1	-4	-45
II	SECONDARY SECTOR (3-18)	15.2	-7.8	7.7	1.0	3.1	11.1	59.9	75.1	508	273	168	6	19	42
	Light Industry (3-7)	-1.2	-5.1	-1.7	0.1	1.4	4.1	16.5	15.3	350	171	97	2	25	56
	Medium Industry (8-12)	-0.6	-3.4	2.1	0.2	1.0	-0.5	21.0	20.4	371	228	141	4	19	-21
	Heavy Industry (13-17)	17.6	1.3	7.4	0.7	0.7	7.4	14.2	31.8	985	415	386	16	24	144
	Construction (18)	-0.6	-0.6	0.0	0.1	0.0	-0.1	8.1	7.5	350	347	3	2	0	-2
III	TERTIARY SECTOR (19-33)	-4.9	-4.8	0.8	0.2	0.3	-1.4	24.4	19.5	288	234	70	3	7	-25
	Domestic Trade (19-21)	-2.6	-1.5	0.5	0.1	0.2	-1.8	8.1	5.5	232	207	84	3	10	-72
	Transport plus (22-25, 26)	0.2	-0.5	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.5	4.2	4.4	406	265	103	4	9	25
	Finance plus (27-29)	-1.9	-1.7	0.4	0.0	0.1	-0.8	6.9	5.0	250	206	77	2	6	-41
	Social sectors (30-33)	-0.6	-1.1	-0.1	0.0	0.0	0.6	5.2	4.6	331	288	11	1	3	28
	Average/Total	0	-20	8	1	3	7	100.0	100.0	385	233	123	4	13	12

BP: basic prices (10 million Yuans)

NACE: European Classification of Economic Activities (French acronym)

 $\delta X/TX_{2010}$: rate of industry deviation from average growth (normalized by total gross output of final year 2010) (%) $\Delta X/X_{1995}$: rate of growth of gross output (%)

FDE: contribution of domestic demand expansion to either rate

EDE: contribution of export demand expansion to either rate



ISF: contribution of import substitution of final goods either rate (negative sign [-] means import penetration)

ISW: contribution of import substitution of intermediate goods to either rate (negative sign [-] means import penetration)

IOC: contribution of changes in direct input-output coefficients to either rate


Note: all contributions in percentage points

S₁₉₉₅: sectoral share in total gross output in the initial year 1995 (%)S₂₀₁₀: sectoral share in total gross output in the final year 2010 (%)




dX/TX1: total share change, composed of the following contributions → **FDE**: domestic demand, **EDE**: export demand, **ISF**: import substitution of final goods, **ISW**: import substitution of intermediate goods and **IOC**: input-output coefficients. The sum of these contributions is equal to the total share change.


Graph 1: Growth Trajectory of Economy over 1995-2011




Graph 2: Sectoral Change over 1995-2011



Graph 3: Secondary Sector and its Main Subsectors over 1995-2011




Graph 4: Tertiary Sector and its Main Subsectors over 1995-2011



Trade


Graph 5: Trajectory of Contributions over 1995-2010



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Graph 6: Sectoral Share Change According to Demand Contribution over 1995-2011



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Foreign Trade S

Table No.2: Phases, Shocks, Policies, and Graphs Visualization

PERIOD	WORLD	POLICIES	ECONOMIC EFFECT	SECTOR	Graph
1994-1996	"normal"	liberalization, privatization	lagged	to take hold	2
1997-2001	1997 Asian crisis	domestic stimulus freeing of prices WTO membership Trade agreements	slowdown	all sectors	2,5,6
2001-2006	"normal"	deepening reform policies	strong acceleration	secondary	2, 3, 5
2006-2007	onset world recession	recognition of huge imbalances	significant deceleration	all sectors	2, 3, 5
2007-2009	world recession	massive domestic stimulus	bottoming out	sectoral reversal	2, 5, 6
2009-2011	world recession	massive domestic stimulus	recovery	back reversal?	2, 5, 6

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3 Title: Structural Change in Industrial Output: China 1995-2010
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