A PHILOSOPHICAL COMMENTARY ON CICERO,
ACADEMICA PRIORA II, 1-62

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by

ASRAFF ALLEEMUDDER

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ABSTRACT

In confining this Commentary to the first 62 sections of the Lucullus my intention has been to make a special study of Antiochus' case against the Academic sceptics. Although this is the only full-length counter-argument against Academic scepticism which we possess (despite the many works written by both sides in a controversy spanning more than two centuries), due attention has not been paid to it. Scholars have tended to use Cicero's work as a source-book for Antiochus' general philosophical views or to confine their attention to the sceptic case. Even if consideration has been given to the dogmatic case as well (as by Stough, Greek Scepticism), there has been a certain bias in favour of the Academic sceptics. This is possibly due to the fact that the scepticism of the Academy has in itself a strong appeal and that it has the final word in Cicero's work. But I do not think that Lucullus' arguments, whatever their shortcomings, are weaker by comparison.

The Lucullus is not only an extremely important philosophical text, it is also one of the most difficult. Reid's Commentary is very valuable but his interest was more literary and general than strictly philosophical. My own Commentary is concerned solely with the philosophical content of the dialogue and takes account of relevant work on Hellenistic philosophy since Reid's edition appeared at the end of the last century. I have tried to place the arguments and philosophical issues in their ancient context, either by means of plausible inferences where direct evidence is lacking or by reference to classical texts. I am aware that the problem of knowledge is still an issue to-day and I have made use of some modern works on the subject in elucidating particular arguments, but, in general, I have limited references to modern philosophy to a minimum in order not to impede understanding of Cicero's text and not to widen excessively the scope of the Commentary. The text used is that of Flasberg (Teubner, Leipzig, 1922).
TO MY WIFE AND CHILDREN
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ABBREVIATIONS

I have in general used the standard abbreviations for classical texts, source books and journals. When referring to works of Cicero, I have not given the name of the author, except to avoid ambiguity. In referring to the Academica Priora, I have given the section numbers only. For the Academica Posteriora, I have used either Ac.I or I.

Other abbreviations regularly used include the following:

Bailey, Greek Atomists
Brochard
Dillon
Hirzel, Untersuch.
Long, H.Ph.
Plasberg
Problema
Reid
Robin
Stough

C. Bailey, The Greek Atomists and Epicurus
V. Brochard, Les Sceptiques press
J. Dillon, The Middle Platonists
R. Hirzel, Untersuchungen zu Ciceros philosophischen Schriften
A.A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy
O. Plasberg, Teubner text of the Academica
A.A. Long (editor), Problems in Stoicism
J.S. Reid's edition of the Academica
L. Robin, Pyrrhon et le scepticisme press
C. Stough, Greek Skepticism
INTRODUCTION

A. Cicero's Lucullus

The Lucullus, otherwise called Academica Prima II by some editors, is the sequel to another dialogue, the Catulus, now lost. Both constituted a single work and were intended to be an exposition in dialogue form of the controversy between Academic scepticism and Greek philosophical dogmatism, the chief exponent of which in Cicero's time was Antiochus of Ascalon. One of Cicero's aims was to champion and popularise the New Academic case, so that although the work included the case of Antiochus ('Antiochia', Att.XIII, 12,3; 19,5), Cicero was more inclined to see it as a treatise which as a whole concerned the Academic philosophy ('haec Academica', Att.XIII, 19,5). There is perhaps nothing surprising in this since Antiochus also claimed to be an Academic, but Cicero refuses to see him as such, at least in the dialogue. It is clear that he considered his work as a whole to be a defence of the Academic sceptical philosophy (cf. Ac.II,7), and both the later title of the work and his description of it in his letters and elsewhere already show his bias for the New Academic case and against Antiochus.

We do not, of course, know whether Cicero would have actually entitled the first version of his work the Academica, or Academici libri, as he later called his revised and official version. Most of his references are to the later version, but since he himself uses the titles 'Catulus' and 'Lucullus'

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1 Cf. 'Ακαδημικὴ συναγωγή, Att.XIII, 12,3; 16,1.
2 E.g. 12 'Antiochum contra Academicos (disserentem)'; 137 'plane Stoicus'; 143 'a Chrysippo pedem nusquam'.
3 E.g. Tusc.II,4 'pro Academia autem quae dicenda essent satis accurate in Academicis quattuor libris explicata arbitramur.'
4 Hence the commonly accepted titles, Academica Prima and Posteriors. The phrase 'in Academicis' (Tim.1; Off.II,6; cf. 'de Academicez', Att.XIII, 13,1) suggests the use of the neuter plural as a title (Reid p.37). Flasberg, on the other hand, understands 'in Academicis' as a masculine with 'libris' omitted, and takes the neuter plural 'Academica' to refer to subject-matter only (Proef.X). He moreover confines the title 'Academici libri' to the second version.
in his earliest explicit reference to the first version (Att. XIII, 32, 3, written on the 29th May 45 B.C. from his villa at Tusculum),¹ it is possible that these would have been his official titles for that early version. If so, Cicero may have been planning a sort of trilogy with the three dialogues (Hortensius, Catulus, Lucullus), having the same characters (Hortensius, Catulus, Lucullus and Cicero) and taking place at the villas of Lucullus, Catulus and Hortensius respectively.² Although Cicero himself clearly regarded the second as the authentic version, the first was also published; Quintilian (III, 6, 64) refers to it as the Catulus and Lucullus. Plutarch (Luc., 42, 3) refers by name to the Lucullus.

We also know that, before starting on his second version, Cicero had been dissatisfied with the 'prohoimia' of his early version and had added new ones (Att. XIII, 32, 3). The present proem of the Lucullus is most likely the amended version. But despite this modification Cicero was still not satisfied. From his letter to Atticus of the 28th June written from Arpinum (Att. XIII, 16, 1) we learn that, prior to his decision to recast the work and, at Atticus' suggestion, make Varro the mouthpiece of Antiochus, he had already transferred the discussion of the first version to Cato and Brutus. This, it seems, he did on reaching Arpinum around the 21st June.³ Despite some hesitation as to whether he had made the right decision about Varro, the new version was completed before the end of June (Att. XIII, 14, 1; 18, 1).

¹In Att. XII, 44, 4, written on 13th May from Astura, where he had retreated after the death of Tullia, he mentions the completion of 'duo magna omnia'. This has been taken to refer to the two volumes of the first version of the Academica, or, less probably, to these with either the Hortensius or the Do Finibus (Reid, p. 30–31; Flasberg, Fræj. VII–VIII). M. Ruch, In préambules dans les œuvres philosophiques de Cicerón, has a whole chapter on the circumstances surrounding the composition of the Academica. It is uncertain when Cicero started work on the first version.


³The date is from Att. XIII, 10, 3 when he was planning to leave Tusculum.
Cicero continued to have doubts and still hesitated to send the book to Varro (Att. XIII, 22, 1, 4th July; XIII, 23, 3, 8th July). We find him even contemplating giving the part of Varro to Brutus (Att. XIII, 25, 3). But there was to be no third version and by the 20th or 21st of July the work had already been sent to Varro (Att. XIII, 44, 2).

Cicero's main reason for being dissatisfied with the first version was that the subject-matter did not fit the characters. He had come to feel that to represent Catulus, Lucullus and Hortensius taking part in a philosophical discussion of this nature would be most implausible and improper because of their ἀποστολή in such subjects (Att. XIII, 16, 1; cf. XIII, 12, 3). The subtlety of the arguments was such that they could not even have dreamed about them (XIII, 19, 5). Atticus' suggestion of Varro was seized on as a 'godsend' (Att. XIII, 19, 5), since voicing Antiochus' case could suit no one better (XIII, 16, 1).

The other literary faults of the first version can also be guessed from the fact that Cicero considered his second version to be 'splendidiora, breuiora, meliora' (XIII, 13, 1). He obviously was much more pleased with it and boasted that the Greeks themselves had nothing like it in this particular field of literature. The two volumes of the first version were divided into four (of which part of the first and some fragments remain), and though the amount of material was cut down, Cicero considered the four books to be 'grandiores' (Att. XIII, 13, 1).¹

On the other hand, the author's doubts about choosing Varro as a character and dedicating the work to him are fully understandable. It meant abandoning his earlier principle of avoiding envy by portraying no living person other than himself in his dialogues (Att. XIII, 19, 3-4). As a scholar, not a man of affairs, Varro could not typify Cicero's ideal of a philosopher-

¹'Grandiores' has nothing to do with length here (contra Heid, p. 35).
statesman.\(^1\) There were other reasons of a more personal nature. Varro had not yet honoured his promise to dedicate to Cicero a work of his own (Att. XIII, 12,3), and Cicero was not entirely convinced that he wished to receive the dedication (XIII, 14,1). Moreover, both Cicero and Atticus seem to have been nervous of possible criticism from Varro (XIII, 25,3; cf. Roid p.34-5). In spite of his confidence in the merits of his work, Cicero could visualise Varro complaining 'moas pars is in iis libris copiosius defensas esse quam sum' (ibid.). Though Cicero strongly denies that this is so,\(^2\) it remains true that the case for the sceptical Academy has the last word in the dialogue, and that Varro might therefore have had grounds for feeling displeased with the way the case of Antiochus had been presented.

D. Philosophical Background

1. The sceptical Academy before Philo

Academic scepticism started with Arcesilas (316/5 - 241/0 B.C.).\(^3\) There was later a controversy as to whether scepticism was something new in the Academy or not (cf. 13 ff.). But though the issue was discussed with much partiality, it is virtually certain that it was due to Arcesilas that the Academic philosophy became characteristically one of doubt, propounding the basic sceptical thesis that nothing can be known.

Arcesilas directed his sceptical attacks chiefly against the Stoic theory of the cataloptic impression and their theory of assent. An impression (φαντασία) is, according to the Stoics, an image that arises in the leading part (ἡγεμόνιχόν) of the soul, and must necessarily arise if a perceptual

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\(^1\)See p.67 of this thesis.

\(^2\)Cf. Att. XIII, 19,5 'eseque partes ut non sim consecutus ut superior mea causa uideatur' et seq.

\(^3\)He became head of the Academy some time before Zeno's death c. 260 B.C. (Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics p.37 n.1).
act is to take place.\(^1\) It is said to be 'catalectic' (καταληπτική)\(^2\)
when it is an exact copy of the external object and is unmistakably taken to
have come from that object. The Stoics therefore claimed that assent
(συγκατάθεσις) to a catalectic impression results in κατάληψις, percep-
tion or grasp of the image and its source. This perceptual event is
itself said to be intermediate between knowledge (defined as 'secure and firm
grasp that cannot be altered by argument') and opinion (defined as 'weak and
false assent').\(^3\) Both the wise man and the fool can experience κατάληψις,
but the grasp is opinion if the percipient is a fool and knowledge if he is
a wise man.\(^4\) Arcesilas argued that in this case the existence of κατάληψις as
an intermediate or common experience is purely verbal.\(^5\) He also argued that
assent is given to a judgement and not to an impression, so that if κατάληψις is
defined as assent to a catalectic impression it is non-existent.\(^6\) Further,
it is non-existent because the catalectic impression is non-existent. There
are no perceptual experiences which enable us to have an indubitably true
grasp of facts or of the external world. If the wise man were to assent, he
would be assenting to mere opinion; he will therefore, in all cases, withhold
assent.\(^7\)

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\(^1\) Sextus A.M.VII, 236/SVF I, 58; 288 ff./SVF II, 56.

\(^2\) For the meaning of the term see Sandbach in Problemes, p.10 and The Stoics
p.89. For the definition, Ac.II, 18, Sextus A.M.VII, 248.

\(^3\) Sextus A.M.VII, 151 (SVF II, 90).

\(^4\) A.M.VII, 153.

\(^5\) Sextus, ibid. Rist, Stoic Philosophy p.140, gives the mistaken impression
that Arcesilas argued that, if κατάληψις can occur in the wise man and the
fool, then the difference between knowledge and opinion is merely verbal.

\(^6\) Sandbach, Problemes p.12-13, has attempted a defence of the Stoic position
by arguing that the impression carries with it certain information about
its source and that it is to this information that assent is given. The
Stoics would probably not have denied that the act of assent is made to
a judgement about the impression. Arcesilas' objection could be regarded as
purely contentious in this respect.

\(^7\) Sextus A.M.VII, 157; Ac.II, 59, 66 ff., 77 ff.
We are told that Arcesilas refused to grant the one epistemic claim of Socrates, that he knew that nothing can be known. It is probably because he aimed at consistency as a sceptic and argued against the views of others without putting forward any of his own (Fin. II, 2) that what we know of his philosophy is very scanty and consists almost exclusively of sceptical polemic against Stoicism. In face of the argument that scepticism renders action impossible, he proposed, as a substitute for truth and knowledge, the 'reasonable' (εὐλογον) as a standard for action (Sextus A. II VII, 158). He agreed with the Stoics that the end for man is happiness and that this is attained by wisdom (φρόνησις), which consists in the performance of right actions (χαρωπώματα). But he dealt a blow to Stoic ethics by contending that a right action is one that admits of a reasonable defence (σκέπος πρακτικὸς εὐλογον ἐξει τὴν ἀξιολογίαν), a description a Stoic would give not of a perfectly moral action but of a befitting action (χαίρον), which is within the capacity even of the fool. By so doing he undermines the Stoic distinction between the wise man and the fool and strips the wise man of his characteristic perfection based on absolute knowledge.

The next head of the sceptical Academy who is of interest to us is Carneades, fourth in line from Arcesilas (167). No new development seems to have occurred in the interval, but academic scepticism may at that time have had a wide appeal, to judge by the number of names cited. It was

1 Ac. I, 45. Socrates, however, did not say that nothing can be known, but that he knew nothing.


3 214/3 or 219/8 - 129/8 (see p. 100 of this thesis). He must have been head of the Academy before 156/5 when he accompanied the Stoic Diogenes of Babylonia and the Peripatetic Critolaus on the famous embassy to Rome (137; Plut. Cat. Maii, 22).

4 Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics p. 535 n. 3; Drochard, pp. 121-122.
with Carneades that Academic scepticism reached its zenith. He widened its scope and brought it to completion (16), particularly by his doctrine of probability. But a word of caution must be introduced here. Part of the evidence about Carneades (notably that of Sextus) has been influenced by the biased interpretations of Metrodorus and Philo. It would be wrong to assume that his theory of probability incorporated a doctrine of assent, for whether Carneades in fact held that the wise man will sometimes assent was still a controversial issue in Cicero's day. Moreover, there is no ground for thinking that a concept of 'qualified' as opposed to 'absolute' assent existed at all in the sceptical philosophy of the Academy.

We are told that Carneades directed his attacks against all previous philosophers, though again the Stoics were his principal opponents. Like Arcesilas, he refused to grant the existence of the cataleptic impression because our perceptual experiences do not necessarily correspond to the external world and any impression that appears true might always be false.

1Metrodorus and Philo maintained that Carneades actually held that the wise man might form an opinion (i.e. assent to what is false or not indubitably known), whereas Clitomachus maintained that Carneades had merely advanced the view in argument (78; cf. 59, 67, 104, 112, 140). Cicero says that he believes Clitomachus (78), but the other view may have been put forward in the Catulus (cf. 143). Sextus' account of Carneades' theory of probability implies that assent is given to a probable impression (A.M.VII, 172, 188; cf. P.H.I, 220). Numenius, fr. 26, 107-9 (Des Places) also states that Carneades differed from Arcesilas on the question of ἐποχή, maintaining that it was impossible for a man to withhold assent about everything. Modern scholars have been inclined to see the doctrine of probability as a modification of Carneades' position on assent (Brochard, p.135; Robin, p.99; Stough, pp.58, 63 and 65). For further discussion, see p. 310 ff. of this thesis.

2See previous note.

3The concept seems to be the invention of Reid; see his notes on 104, pp.299-300; cf. p.209 n.19, p.254 n.6, p.348 n.2. He is followed by Stough, pp.58 and 67, and other recent writers. None of the ancient sources quoted by Stough lends any support to the distinction. Cf. pp.197-198 below.

4Sextus A.M.VII, 159; Cic. Tusc. V, 63; N.D. II, 162.
But he may have adduced more arguments and examples to illustrate perceptual error, and to have made a more scientific attack on the Stoic criterion. His approach was both more methodical and more positive than that of Arcesilas. Rejecting the cataleptic impression or our own perceptual faculties as criteria of truth, Carneades analysed the percipient-impression-object relation and discarded the possibility of determining the precise relation of the impression with the object in any act of perception. When we experience an impression, we can never be certain of its truth; but an impression, he pointed out, can appear to us as true or as false, so that our acceptance or rejection of it is based on a probable judgement, not on absolute certainty. As opposed to the Stoic criterion, the probable impression is said to have 'sufficient breadth', meaning that different degrees of probability can be accepted according to circumstances. Hence Sextus regards Carneades as having abandoned the true sceptical position, in so far as he assigns more weight to some impressions than to others. Further, in contrast to the eλογον of Arcesilas, Carneades' πιθανόν was by Cicero's time taken to be not only a rule for action but also applicable to theoretical and intellectual activities.

179 ff.; Sextus A.M.VII, 401 ff.
240 ff., where the reference may be to Carneades in particular. Sextus A.M.VII, 159 ff., cf. Fin.V, 16 ff.
3Sextus A.M.VII, 166 ff.
4πλάτος πιθανόν A.M.VII, 173.
5This Sextus regards as inconsistent with εποχή (P.H.I, 230, 232). Brochard p. 100, following Hirzel, argues that Arcesilas may have rejected the concept of the πιθανόν because, according to the Stoic definition, it leads to assent (D.L.VII, 75/SP II, 201). Numenius fr. 25, 70-71 (Des Places) states that he did away with the true, the false and the probable (πιθανόν). It is in any case clear that the ελογον of Arcesilas is concerned with the justification of action, not with the credibility of impressions.
6volunt enim ... probable aliud esse et quasi ubi similis, eaque uti regula et in agenda uita et in quaerendo ac disserendo' (32).
Carneades carried his attacks into other areas of Stoic thought, arguing against the existence of gods, divine providence and divination, as well as their strict system of causality and determinism. In many cases he turned their own premisses against them. Cicero implies that it was in the same polemical spirit that he put forward his view of the *sumnum bonum* as the enjoyment of the primary advantage of nature. He would often debate on both sides of a question, his most famous *tour de force* of this nature being the occasion when (in Rome in 156/5) he discoursed on two successive days for and against justice (Lactant. *Inst.* 5.14.3-5/Rey. III, 9).

We can infer from Clitomachus’ use of his work in a ‘consolatio’ that he discussed the question of the wise man’s ‘apathy’ (*Tusc.* III, 54), and he is said to have disagreed with the Stoics and most other people in maintaining that sorrow is merely deepened not alleviated by the reflection that suffering is the common lot of humanity (ibid. 59).

Although Carneades brought Academic scepticism to its highest level, his philosophical position was not unassailable. Otherwise the controversy would not have continued and Lucullus would not be voicing the objections that are raised in the first part of Cicero’s dialogue. But whatever criticisms might be brought against him, there is one that would not *prima facie* be justified, namely that he was an inconsistent sceptic because certain positive assertions are attributed to him. These are put forward

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2. N.D. I, 4; III, 65 ff.; III, 79 ff.
4. Fat. 31-2.
7. E.G. *there is something in our power* (*Fat.* 31). This was in fact a Stoic tenet, though Carneades uses it refute their determinism (Long, pp. 103-4).
in a context of debate and need not represent his own opinion. But it should not be forgotten that assertions can legitimately be made within the framework of a probability theory, which do not at all clash with the rejection of dogmatism.

The headship of Clitomachus is relevant for us because of the question whether the Academy immediately after Carneades began a gradual move towards dogmatism, and whether the immediate disciples of Carneades had anything to do with the developments under Philo that were to lead to the collapse of the sceptical Academy. Clitomachus was the literary exponent of Carneades, as Lacydes had been of Arcesilas; he was noted for his industry and the volume of his writings (93; D.L.IV,67). Philo is said to have studied under him for many years (17), and Cicero frequently refers to his opinion (78, 108 ff., 108, 139). There is nothing to suggest that he was less of a sceptic than Carneades.

It seems to have been characteristic of the school at this time to attack rhetoric and the professional teachers of the subject. In this connection Sextus (A.M.II,20) specifically mentions Clitomachus and Charmadas; the latter is said by Cicero to have maintained that true eloquence is impossible without philosophy (De Or.I,84). Charmadas, who was noted for his remarkable memory, was also associated with the Academy.

1In 139 Cicero says that Carneades used to defend Calliphon's view of the summum bonum as a combination of virtue and pleasure so vehemently that he was thought to hold it himself. It is in this context, he tells us, that Clitomachus used to say that he never knew what Carneades' own views were.

2For his dates see Brochard, p.186 n.5. According to the Index Herc. cols. 24 and 30, Clitomachus was third in succession to Carneades, who was succeeded during his lifetime by another Carneades, followed by Crates of Tarsus, who presided for two years.

3Diogenes' statement (IV,67) that he also studied in the Peripatetic and Stoic schools need not indicate any leaning towards dogmatism. Brochard, p.186-7, assumes that this refers to his early years; Zeller, e.g. p.564, that he studied the doctrines of other schools in order to refute them.

4De Or.II,360; Tusc.I,59; Pliny, N.H.VII,89.
of Philo (Sextus P.H.I,220), possibly because of a common interest in rhetorical teaching (De Or.III,110 with Wilkin's note). This interest certainly does not imply, as Ritter suggests, the end of Carneades' doctrine of probability. Cicero's statement (De Or.I,84) that Carneades followed the 'mos patrius' of the Academy in arguing against the opinions of others without revealing his own, is sufficient proof that he did not abandon the sceptical standpoint of Carneades.

Another disciple of Carneades, Metrodorus of Stratonicus, is of especial interest owing to the statement ascribed to him by the Index Herculanensis, that everyone had misinterpreted Carneades, who had not in fact believed that nothing could be known. We must presumably add, 'but only in the Stoic sense'. This was the position of Philo, which he also attributed to the Academy before him. Philo may have been influenced by Metrodorus, but the evidence here is not entirely consistent, since according to Cicero the elder Catulus had accused Philo of plain lying, and Antiochus, when he read Philo's book in Alexandria, had indignantly asked his friend Hermolitus whether such views had ever been put forward either by Philo or any other Academic, and received a negative answer (11, 18). Elsewhere the view ascribed to Metrodorus and Philo (67, 78) is that Carneades held that, though nothing can be known, the wise man can assent and therefore hold opinions; this interpretation of Carneades was also accepted by the elder Catulus (140).

1Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics p.564 n.4.
2Index Herc, col. 261 ὅς ἐφι καρνεάδου παρακηκχοντας πάντας, οὐ γὰρ ἀκατάληπτα νεομίκεναι πάντα.
3St. Augustine (Ac.III,18,41) represents Metrodorus as the first to admit that the Academics did not sincerely believe that nothing can be known, but had found it necessary to use this as a weapon against the Stoics ('qui primus dicitur esse confessus non decreto placuisse Academicis nihil posse comprehendi sed necessario contra Stoicos huius modi eos arma sumpisses'). In 16 Lucullus says that Metrodorus was thought to be well acquainted with the doctrines of Carneades, and in De Or.I,45 he is mentioned as a diligent pupil.
4See, however, pp.57-8 of this Introduction.
We may conclude that, even if Philo's philosophical standpoint owed something to Metrodorus, the latter's views were exceptional and that under Clitomachus the Academy in general remained as sceptical as it had been under Carneades. I shall argue lower down\(^1\) that Philo himself did not make any concession to dogmatism and that his position has been greatly misunderstood. It was in Philo's interest to emphasise the positive and constructive side of Carneades' teaching and to claim continuity in the Academic tradition. But if the New Academy had all along been gradually moving in the direction of dogmatism, as Brochard thinks,\(^2\) there would have been less rather than more justification for Antiochus' defection and 'revival' of the Old. The move to dogmatism, when it came, was not gradual but sudden.

2. Opposition to the sceptical Academy

One of the most puzzling things about the origin of scepticism in the Academy is the fact that there does not seem to have been any opposition to it in the Academy itself. It took nearly two centuries for a member of the Academy (i.e. Antiochus) to object to it. If, as is generally thought, the Academy of Arcesilas marked a break in the philosophical tradition of the school, it would not be surprising if he had propounded his scepticism only after becoming head (i.e. after Crates' death, 268/264 B.C.). Yet, according to Plutarch (\textit{Adv. Col. 1121E}), Epicurus was jealous of Arcesilas' reputation, and Epicurus died in 270 B.C. Are we then to think that Arcesilas' philosophical position was approved by Polemo and Crates, his immediate predecessors, or even by Crantor, from whom his admiration for

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\(^1\) See p. 35 of this thesis.

\(^2\) Brochard p.189: 'L'histoire de la nouvelle Académie montre d'ailleurs une marche plus ou moins lente, mais ininterrompue, vers le dogmatisme.'
Plato's works was perhaps derived? Varro, reporting the views of Antiochus, speaks of these philosophers as among those who 'carefully guarded what they had received from their predecessors' (Ac. 1, 34), and there is nothing to indicate that they had any leanings towards scepticism. Nevertheless, no opposition to Arcesilas from within the Academy itself is recorded; on the contrary, we even hear of a certain Socratides resigning in his favour (D.L. IV, 32). It was only in Antiochus' time that a controversy arose as to whether Arcesilas had led the school away from the original tradition or not.

There was, on the other hand, much external opposition to the sceptical Academy, coming not only from the dogmatic schools but also from contemporary sceptics. Arcesilas no less than the dogmatists came under attack from Timon, the disciple of Pyrrho (c. 365-275 B.C.), who had been the first to bring scepticism in its most extreme, but perhaps most consistent, form on to the Greek philosophical scene. Arcesilas and the later Academics were unwilling to admit the influence of Pyrrhonism and preferred to trace their lineage to earlier and more notable philosophers. Cicero himself never mentions the scepticism of Pyrrho, and it was this policy of silence that may have whetted the curiosity of later generations as to the connection between the two schools. It would have been virtually impossible for Arcesilas, as an Academic, to voice openly any association with Pyrrhonism. But unlike the early Pyrrhonist, Arcesilas was a brilliant dialectician.

1 D.L. IV, 32. Cranor was the author of the first commentary on Plato's Timaeus (Proclus in Tim. 244; Zeller, Plato and the Older Academy p. 590 n. 24). Like Polemo, he appears to have been more interested in ethics than in dialectic or epistemology (Zeller, p. 617 ff.).

2 Fr. 31 and 32 (Diols); D.L. IV, 33.

3 Collius N.A. XI, 5, 6; 'aeulas autem quaestio et a multit scriptoribus Graecis tractata, un quid et quantum Pyrrhonie et Academicii philosophos intersit'. Plutarch wrote a work on this subject, now lost (Catalogue of Lamprias, 64).

4 Hence the Stoic Aristo refers to Arcesilas in a parody of a line of Horace (11, 6, 181) as 'Plato in front, Pyrrho behind, Diodorus in the middle' (i.e. the Megarian Diodorus Cronus, D.L. IV, 33).
a fact which may explain why Academic scepticism appears to have been more popular than Pyrrhonism and at that time to have dominated the philosophical scene. It was perhaps through envy at this turn of events that Timon and others accused Arcoreslas of being a friend of the mob.\(^1\) Timon may also have thought that, because of its contentious nature, Academic scepticism still retained some affinity with dogmatism.\(^2\)

According to Cicero (70), all the other philosophical schools were united in their opposition to Academic scepticism. Yet there is no record of any objection raised by contemporary Peripatetics against the scepticism of the Academy as such.\(^3\) One reason may be that the Academics themselves were not particularly concerned with the Peripatetics in their attacks on perception.\(^4\) The novelty of Stoicism, on the other hand, made that philosophy a more conspicuous target. Furthermore, the contemporary Peripatetics may not have been very much interested in epistemology. Cato accuses them of 'ignoratio dialecticae' in Fin. III, 41.\(^5\) On two occasions (Ac. II, 112-13 and Fin. V, 76) Cicero claims that he has no quarrel with the Peripatetics and contrasts their moderation with the extremism of the Stoics. He argues (112) that a Peripatetic would grant him that no percept is incorrigible

\(^1\) Φιλοχολος, D.L. IV, 41-2.

\(^2\) This thought may underlie the remark which, according to D.L. IX, 114, he addressed to Arcoreslas as the latter was passing through the Knaves-market: 'Why do you come here, where we free men come?' On the association of scepticism with freedom, see secs. 8-9.

\(^3\) One of the severest critics of Arcoreslas was the Peripatetic Hieronymus (D.L. IV, 41). But what he was condemning was the apparently immoral life of Arcoreslas and his pursuit of pleasure.

\(^4\) Arcoreslas had, after all, been a pupil of Theophrastus (D.L. IV, 29-30). That the Peripatetics had a formative influence on his scepticism (a view put forward by A. Weische, Cicero und die neue Akademie, pp. 71, 78) is very unlikely. Long (H. Ph. p. 88 n. 3) finds the argument of Weische 'not compelling'.

\(^5\) Antiochus himself reverted to the doctrine of the older Peripatetics in ethical matters (Fin. V, 14).
and consequently that it is possible for the wise man to opin.\textsuperscript{1} Since the Peripatetics believed in the indubitability of knowledge no less than the Stoics, Cicero's assumption is to a great extent unjustified. But he could safely use the argument, not only because the Peripatetic position was much less explicit than the Stoic on these two issues,\textsuperscript{2} but also perhaps because of a general lack of interest on the part of contemporary Peripatetics in the controversy with scepticism.

In the case of the Epicureans, there is some evidence of objections raised against scepticism, although it is not always made explicit that the attacks are being directed at the Academics. The Epicurean Colotes included Arocellas in his polemic against various philosophers whose doctrines he considered inconsistent with ordinary life (Plut.\textit{Adv. Col.},1120C). Lucretius' refutation of scepticism in IV 469 ff. is taken by \textit{Bacon} to echo Epicurus' attack on Arceillas.\textsuperscript{3} Torquatus' argument in \textit{Fin.} I,64 against those who say that nothing can be perceived no doubt refers to the Academic sceptics. But Epicurean opposition was only very superficial, and they in their turn were not attacked as extensively and in the same critical and analytical way as were the Stoics. Epicurus' claim that all impressions are true inspired contempt rather than an elaborated response. It is dismissed off-hand by Cicero (80) and even by Lucullus (19), who, besides, does not think that the Epicurean attempt to overcome the problem of perceptual error made the case easier for dogmatism (45).

\textsuperscript{1}This argument probably comes from \textit{Ib.}, who had every reason to seek support for his modified theory of perception and knowledge from other quarters and to see a close link between his Academy and the Peripatos. \textit{Heid}, p.307 n.24, wrongly attributes the argument to Carneades.

\textsuperscript{2}Cicero notes in 113 that Zeno was the first to insist that perception must be incorrigible and that the wise man never opines.

\textsuperscript{3}\textit{Us.} p.348,14; cf. Plut.\textit{Adv. Col}.1121E-F. Bailey in his commentary on the passage (\textit{Il.} 1.1237 ff.) suggests that Lucretius is reproducing Epicurus' argument against the followers of Democritus, particularly Metrodorus of Chios. But at the beginning of the passage Lucretius virtually repeats the argument of Metrodorus (\textit{Ac.} 11.73) that we do not know whether we know or not.
The Stoics were bitterly opposed to the Academics (cf. Plut. Comm. Not. 1059A), naturally, since they were the chief targets of attack. Numenius paints a vivid picture of the clash between Arcesilas and Zeno in which the latter, being worsted in the encounter, attempted to divert his opponent by starting a polemic against Plato. ¹ Another Stoic whose opposition to Arcesilas is explicitly attested is Aristo of Chios (Di. IV, 33; VII, 162-3). Numenius' statement that after Arcesilas there was a long truce until Carneades renewed the fight cannot be entirely true.² In particular, it does not take account of Chrysippus, the third head of the school (died c. 205) and the most remarkable of the opponents of the Academy. Plutarch states that it was claimed that he was sent by divine providence in the interval between Arcesilas and Carneades, so that by his writing against the former he built a barricade against the cleverness of the latter and bequeathed to sense-perception many aids, as it were, against siege (Comm. Not. 1059B-C/ SVF II, 33). He was praised by a disciple as 'a cutter of Academic knots' (Plut. Sto. Ren. 1033E/SVF II, 3b). Whether through sympathy at first with the scepticism of the Academy³ or because he thought that he could thus fight scepticism more effectively,⁴ he displayed a profound interest in perceptual error and raised sceptical issues to such an extent that his

²Fr. 27, 4-5, (Des Places). This seems to be an inference from the fact that it was Carneades who really brought the controversy to a head. H.M. Jatrick's claim (The Greek Sceptics, p. 139) that 'the strife with the Stoa ceased until it was renewed by Carneades' and that there was 'a gradually developing friendship with the Stoa' is without foundation.
³According to Sotion (Di. VII, 163-4), Chrysippus was associated with Arcesilas and Lacydes in the Academy and this was why he argued at one time against and at another in support of experience. Bréhier, Chrysippe, p. 11, rejects this story.
supporters boasted that the arguments of all the Academics put together were not worth comparing with those Chrysippus wrote against the senses (Plut. Sto. Rep. 1036C/SVF II, 109), and that Carneades was merely repeating his arguments (1036B/SVF II, 32). Cicero, on the other hand, claims that he was unable to solve the problems he raised and that the Stoics themselves complained that he had provided Carneades with the necessary weapons to fight dogmatism. But there is little doubt that he considerably strengthened the Stoic position, and his argument that assent is necessarily implied in action and impulse continued to plague the Academy to the end. After Chrysippus the only Stoic opponent about whom we have direct evidence is Antipater, who, however, did not prove himself a match for Carneades. There is no mention that Panaetius or Posidonius opposed the Academic sceptics, and in fact Cicero seems to be under the impression that Panaetius had approved of Academic doubt, at least in the matter of dreams and oracles.

To meet Academic criticisms the Stoics were undoubtedly compelled to bring forward new arguments and even to modify their position from time to time. According to Sextus (A. M. VII, 253-60; cf. 424-5), later Stoics (ol νεώτεροι) posited that the cataleptic impression is the criterion not unconditionally but only when there is no obstacle, and that in such a case it virtually forces assent. Scholars have found it difficult to

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3See Commentary on 17, p. 103 of this thesis.

4107; cf. N. D. II, 118; Div. I, 6-7; II, 88.

5Long, H. Ph. p. 128; Hamlyn, Sensation and Perception, p. 36. The obstacle in question is either a factor in the external circumstances, such as Admetus' belief that Alcestis was dead, or in the perceptual conditions (A. M. VII, 258; cf. 425).
determine who these 'younger' Stoics were.\(^1\) The whole passage in Sextus has, however, so many echoes in the \textit{Lucullus}\(^2\) that it seems certain that Antiochus shared their view. I shall argue later\(^3\) that the interpretation of the theory in terms of strictly irresistible impressions is not necessarily correct, particularly since Antiochus himself upheld the freedom of the will and of the act of assent (37-39), and that despite the proviso about obstacles the cataleptic impression remained the criterion of truth. For the present, I should like to record my disagreement with Rist's view (\textit{Stoic Philosophy}, p.144) that the theory goes as far back as Sphacrus, but that the orthodox Zenonian view persisted alongside it. In \textit{A.M.VII},424 Sextus does say that 'some' (\textit{τινες}) have held such a view, but the contrast in 253 is between the 'older' and the 'younger' Stoics, which suggests that once the theory had been put forward it became accepted doctrine in the Stoa as a whole. There is a striking parallel between this modified Stoic theory and the Carneadean stipulation about absence of obstacles and the need of proper perceptual conditions in the determination of probability.\(^4\) It is most likely, therefore, that this Stoic theory was put forward only after Carneades had propounded his doctrine of probability.\(^5\)

\(^1\)Polhenz at first (in his \textit{Zeno und Chrysipp}) identified Chrysippus as one of them, but later (in \textit{Die Stoa}) modified his view and thought that they were later than Chrysippus. Sandbach (\textit{Problems} p.14-15) suggests Antipater or his contemporaries. A similar view was held by Schmekel, who also included Panaetius (\textit{Die Philosophie der mittleren Stoa}, p. 352 ). Long, in his review of Stough's \textit{Greek Skepticism} (\textit{Philosophy}, 1970), puts them 'probably after Carneades' time'.

\(^2\)As noted by Hirzel (\textit{Unternuch.III}, pp.514-17). \textit{Ac.II},19,31,32,37,38,46.

\(^3\)See p. 201 of this thesis.

\(^4\)Sextus \textit{A.M.VII},176-189. The concept of 'concurrence' (\textit{συνδρομή}) is important in both theories (cf. \textit{A.M.VII},424 with 179 and 182), and so is that of \textit{κατελή} (cf. \textit{A.M.VII} 254,256,258 with 178,180,181,185). For the absence of obstacles, compare 19 and 46 with 59, 104 and 108.

3. **Philo and Antiochus: Crisis in the Academy**

When Philo took over the Academy at the death of Clitomachus, the general philosophical atmosphere was still greatly opposed to scepticism, while the Academics on their side did not desist from the fight with other schools, particularly on the issue of perception and knowledge. Two events later occurred which completely changed the course of the history of the Academy. Antiochus, who had studied under Philo for a long time and zealously supported his doctrines, both orally and in writing, turned dogmatist and proclaimed the possibility of knowledge in the very sense which he had as a sceptic denied (69-71), while Philo himself advanced certain new interpretations of the sceptical Academic philosophy, which were considered (particularly by Antiochus himself, 11-12), to be quite revolutionary. According to Cicero, Antiochus was furiously angry on hearing of these innovations, and this has led some scholars to think that his defection was the direct result of them. My view is that the sequence of events was the reverse and that it was to a large extent Antiochus' defection that provoked Philo into advancing his new doctrines.

(i) **Antiochus' new position**

Antiochus gave up scepticism for a dogmatic eclecticism. According to him the Academy before Arcesilaus and the Peripatetics belonged to the same Platonic tradition and system of philosophy, while Stoicism was only a verbal modification of it. He therefore gathered together a medley of...

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1. The exact date is unknown. *De Cr.* I,45 implies that Clitomachus was still alive in 110 B.C. If the dates given by Brechard (p.189-90) are worked out correctly, Philo could have succeeded any time between 110 and 104 B.C.


3. Also maintained by A. Schmockel, *Die Philosophie der mittleren Stoa*, p.385.

4. *Lc.* I,17-10,22,33; *Fin.* IV 3 ff.; *V.* 7 ff.; *Lec.* I,30; *De Cr.* III,67.

5. *Lc.* I,37; *Fin.* III,5; IV,72-3; *Lec.* I,55; *L.D.I.* 16.
doctrines belonging to the other schools into a system of his own which, he claimed, represented the true Old Academic system abandoned by Arcesilaus. His opponents accused him of being nothing but a Stoic and an Academic only in name, while the Stoics themselves resented his failure to recognise the uniqueness of their doctrines. Antiochus was not unaware of the differences, for example, between the Stoa and the Peripatos. But for him both schools were part of a common dogmatic tradition derived from Plato, and by highlighting the agreements he perhaps hoped to counter the sceptical thesis that disagreements among philosophers establish the impossibility of knowledge. His eclectic position thus enabled him to oppose scepticism on a wider front, and at the same time to avoid moving practically into the Stoic camp.

The fundamental difference between the sceptical Academy and the Old Academy of Antiochus is that, like the Stoics, Antiochus held that the wise man can infallibly distinguish the true from the false. His concern with knowledge influenced not only his view of philosophy but also perhaps his ethics. The problem of knowledge became for him one of the two most important issues in philosophy (29), while physics retained a very insignificant place in his system. His entirely empirical theory of perception was necessary to his view of the ethical end as a life in complete agreement with nature (Fin. V, 16 ff.) and as consisting in the

1 69; 132; Plut. Cio. 4, 1; Sextus En.H.I, 235; Aug. Ac. III, 41; C.D. 19, 3.
2 N.B.I, 16; Fin. III, 41; Ac. II, 119.
3 Ac. I, 39-41; Fin. IV, 3 ff.
4 This claim is considered to be historically unreliable; see Long, H.Th. p. 224 ff.; Dillon, p. 55. The amalgamation of philosophical systems can only have been prompted by his desire to oppose scepticism, though this is a point which is generally overlooked.
6 His views on physics are to be found principally in Ac. I, 24 ff. For a more detailed account of his general philosophical views, see Dillon, pp. 62-106.
development of man's whole being and the realisation of his entire potential (ibid. 26 ff.). The best guides to the moral life are our earliest impulses and these continue to be significant right up to and after moral maturity (ibid. 41 ff.). Here Antiochus diverged from the Stoics who, after basing the development of moral awareness on the primary impulses of nature, discard these at a later stage and postulate that bodily and external advantages no longer matter, as compared with virtue. In so doing, Antiochus argues, they take into account only one aspect of man, as though he were a disembodied mind. Since natural advantages matter, however insignificantly, and form part of the sumnum bonum, he regarded the enjoyment of healthy perceptual faculties and their proper functioning and use as part of man's moral activity (Fin. V, 36 ff.). It is natural for man to strive after knowledge, since he has been endowed not only with a profound and instinctive desire to know, but also with the necessary faculties to attain such knowledge (ibid. 48-9).

In defending dogmatism, Antiochus relied principally on the Stoic theory of perception and knowledge. He re-emphasised the doctrine of the catalectic impression (17 ff.) and stressed that such an impression could be differentiated from others owing to a characteristic mark (33 ff.) and clearness (45, 51). This prompts Cicero to ask ironically 'quis enim iste dies inluxerit quaeo qui illi ostenderit eam quam multos annos esse negitauiisset veri et falsi notam' (69), and Plutarch to suggest that he abandoned the standpoint of Carneades because he was influenced by ἐνάπλησις and the senses (Plut. Cic. 4, 1).

1 Fin. IV is a criticism of the Stoic position from Antiochus' point of view. H.A.K. Hunt, The Humanism of Cicero, examines in detail Antiochus' objections to Stoic ethics on the ground that it was inconsistent with their empiricism.
(ii) Philo's innovations

Philo's main innovation undoubtedly consisted of the statement that the Academy had all along been denying the possibility of knowledge only in the Stoic sense and consequently that the Academic could make knowledge claims. In addition he supported the view that Carnocrates had given up the doctrine of έποχη (i.e. that Carnocrates held that the wise man does exercise his assent and therefore opines), which means that he himself gave it up (as stated by Numenius, fr.28, 6-7, Des Places). Both views, it will be noticed, were also attributed to Metrodorus (see above, p. 18), who is explicitly associated with Philo in sec. 76 with regard to the second claim.

These two theses, (1) that knowledge is impossible only in the Stoic sense, and (2) that the wise man assents and therefore opines, are, I believe, complementary to one another and part of the same philosophical position. To understand the connection it must be borne in mind that, for an Academic, it follows that 'if the wise man assents, he opines' only because knowledge in the strict sense is held to be impossible. Thus the wise man in assenting to a highly probable experience can claim knowledge in the Philonian sense, but at the same time, since it is recognised that such knowledge is not based on incorrigible perceptions, it has to be allowed that, in assenting, he would be opining. In accepting the Carneadean thesis, Philo was equating knowledge (in his sense) with opinion (in the Stoic sense), and so erasing the usual Greek dichotomy between knowledge and opinion. Whether he would have retained the distinction outside the context of the controversy with the Stoics and within his own epistemological scheme, and if so, where he would have drawn the line between them, is debatable.

1 Sextus P.H.I,235; Ag.II,10; 146; cf. 112; Fin.V,76.
2 78; also 59,67,112 and 148.
There is no suggestion in the Academica that the second of these two theses (i.e. that the wise man assents and opines) was considered innovatory. We may, however, deduce from 59 that Antiochus was not too sure of the historical point that Carneades really did take this view; from this in turn we may deduce that it was not the official view of the Academy prior to his defection and that Philo gave up the doctrine of $\epsilon\lambda\alpha\nu\kappa\nu\eta$ only later (a fact confirmed by Numenius, fr. 28, 6-7, Des Places).

The elder Catulus is said to have rebuked Philo for misinterpreting the tradition of the sceptical Academy (12, 10). Yet he appears to have maintained that the doctrine that the wise man assents and opines was genuinely Carneadean (146). There is a discrepancy here for which Cicero himself may be responsible while putting together this whole story about the elder Catulus (see below, p. 57 ff.). It could not be denied, however, that Carneades had actually maintained this in argument; what was doubtful was whether he really meant it (78). On the other hand, the claim that the sceptical Academy had not rejected the possibility of knowledge was a much more dubious one. It cannot, of course, be true that Antiochus and Heraclitus (11) had never previously heard of such a claim, for Metrodorus had been making it. This is another discrepancy probably deriving from Cicero himself. But apart from Cicero's evidence, the only sense in which Philo's move could have been considered revolutionary is that he was raising some moot points in the Academy to the level of official doctrine.

Lastly Philo maintained, both in his books and in his lectures at Rome, which Cicero heard (Ac. I, 13; Brut. 306), that the Academy had all along followed the same tradition and that those who distinguished between two Academies were wrong. The books referred to are probably those in which Philo made known his innovations (11-12). The impression we receive is that this contention formed part of Philo's new position and that it was meant to settle the question whether the Academy had remained faithful to the teaching of Plato.
(iii) The relation between Antiochus' defection and Philo's innovations

If Antiochus' defection was in fact brought about by the innovations of Philo, we would expect Cicero to have exploited the dramatic significance of the event by stating or at least hinting that this was the case, either in 11-12, where Lucullus narrates how Antiochus first came to know of Philo's new doctrines at Alexandria, or in 69-71, where Cicero speculates on the motive of Antiochus' defection. Yet in the first passage he represents Antiochus as already arguing against the Academic position even before the two books of Philo came into his hands, while in the second (particularly 69) he seems to imply that the break occurred before the two men left Athens at the beginning of the First Mithridatic War (88 B.C.). Again in Ac. I, 13, when Varro questions Cicero about his supposed desertion of the Old Academy for the New and Cicero refers to Philo's contention that those who think that there are two Academies are mistaken, Varro replies, 'Est ut dicis, sed ignorare te non arbitror quae contra ea Philonis Antiochus scripsit'. It is quite possible, as Dillon argues (p. 51), that Antiochus first made his position clear on this point in his Soseus. But Philo was obviously arguing against a view held previously to his own ('erroremque eorum qui ita putarunt coarguit'), and there is nothing to prevent the plural 'eorum' from including a reference to Antiochus.

Dillon argues that Antiochus deserted the sceptical Academy because he was dissatisfied with Philo's innovations and thought that they made the sceptical position less consistent (p. 53). It is true that Antiochus did consider Philo's new standpoint to be inconsistent (18), but this was not because he believed that Philo's earlier position was a more tenable one. If the dispute were about the consistency of the sceptical position, we would have expected him to defend either Philo's original doctrine or a different modification of it. As it was, Antiochus passed on into the dogmatic camp by repudiating every aspect of the Academic sceptical philosophy and adopting the dogmatic epistemology of the Stoics, so that,
judged from his own original standpoint, he went considerably further than Philo had dared to go. It is furthermore unlikely that he would, as a sceptic, have found Philo's emphasis on the unity of the Academic tradition particularly objectionable or that this was one of the factors that caused him to break away from Philo. On the other hand, Philo's insistence on unity is wholly understandable as an answer to Antiochus. Dillon's conjecture that Philo was replying to 'inquiries made by the Roman hearers of his lectures as to how far his teaching in fact accorded with the doctrine of Plato' (p. 55) is most implausible. Philo's concern on this score suggests a prior controversy, possibly within the Academy itself, as to whether scepticism was or was not alien to the Platonic tradition.

I would therefore suggest that Antiochus became dissatisfied with not scepticism and thus estranged from Philo long before the First Mithridatic war. At the start of the war Philo and some other prominent Athenians fled to Rome. Their arrival there could not have been much later than the end of 88 B.C. since Sulla began his siege of Athens in the spring of 87. Since Antiochus first heard of Philo's new views in Alexandria, it is reasonable to infer that they were expounded only after Philo had left Athens and perhaps immediately after arriving at Rome, which, besides, offered him a change of scene and a new audience. There is no direct

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1Cicero states that he attacked the sceptical views he had earlier defended 'in senectute' (69). The date of Antiochus' birth is a matter of conjecture (Erochard p. 209 n. 3). If he was born c. 130 B.C. he would have been about 43 at the time of the meeting at Alexandria. Cicero may be exaggerating, or he may be thinking of some later date such as the publication of the Sosias, or of the lectures he heard at Athens in 79 B.C.

2See Reid p. 60; J. van Ootegehem, Lucius Lecinina Lucillus, p. 22.

3It would not then be extraordinary (as Reid suggests, p. 60) that the elder Catulus, who died shortly after Philo's arrival, should have known of those innovations or that Philo's two books should have reached Alexandria as early as the summer of 87. Reid's assertion (p. 59) that 'at the time when Cicero first heard his lectures, he almost certainly taught nothing but the doctrine of Carneades' is unsubstantiated and in fact refuted by Ac. I, 13. His other suggestion that Philo may have reserved his 'reactionary doctrines' for private conversations and his written works is purely fanciful.
evidence that Antiochus went with Philo to Rome and met Lucullus there. If
the break between the two had occurred before they left Athens, this would
be sufficient reason why Antiochus did not accompany Philo to Rome and why
it was in Alexandria that he first heard of Philo's innovations.

(iv) The reasons for Antiochus' defection, and Philo's reaction to it

Cicero's suggestion (69-71) that Antiochus' defection was due to a
sudden recognition of a mark of truth or even to a desire for glory in
polemical (see Dillon, p. 53). Antiochus was certainly influenced by Stoicism,
though it is unlikely that he had the Stoic Mnesarchus as teacher or that
the latter played a major part in his conversion. Cicero also attributes
Antiochus' action to the general opposition of the other schools to the
skepticism of the Academy (70).
The Academy had, moreover, acquired a

1 See, however, Dillon p. 53-4; Long, H.F., p. 223. De Vogel (Greek Philosophy
III p. 276, 119f) relies on Plut. Luc. 42, 3, a passage which it is hard to
take at its face value. Cicero nowhere mentions Antiochus' presence at Rome.
Had Antiochus accompanied Philo to Rome, we should have had to seek a
plausible reason why he should have left Rome with Lucullus rather than
stayed with Philo, and there is none. Lucullus must have left Rome either
before or shortly after Philo's arrival there, if he was already in the East
at the beginning of Sulla's siege of Athens. If Antiochus had met Lucullus
in Rome, we should have to assume that they became acquainted in a very short
space of time. Besides, if Antiochus had been in Rome, he would have heard
of Philo's innovations there and not in Alexandria. If we suppose that Philo
did not at first make known his new views at Rome, this conflicts with their
being criticised by the elder Catulus, and still further shortens the time
interval in which Philo's books were composed and taken to Alexandria.

2 A claim made by Numenius (fr. 28, 13, Des Places) and St. Augustine
(Lc. III, 41), and possibly based on a misinterpretation of this passage (69).
It is accepted by M.M. Patrick, The Greek Sceptics, p. 193, Brochard, p. 210,
Zeller, Outlines, p. 253, Long, H.F., p. 223. Dillon (p. 53) is doubtful but
allows that Antiochus may have attended Mnesarchus' lectures before his break
with Philo.

3 As believed by R.E. Witt, Albinus, p. 22.

4 It is very unlikely that these opponents were by now giving up the struggle,
as St. Augustine states. He believed that the skepticism of the Academy was
merely a weapon to fight Hellenistic sensationalism and to conceal Plato's
spiritual message (Lc. III, 37-45). He therefore interpreted Philo's new
doctrines as the beginning of an attempt to shed this disguise and reveal
Plato's message: '...Philonis auditor, hominis, quantum arbitror, circum-
spectissimae, qui iam veluti aperire ceditibus hostibus portas cooperat et
ad Platonis auctoritatem Academiam logique revocare...' (Lc. III, 41). It was
thus easy for him to infer that the enemy were retreatting.
reputation for sophistry and its sceptical philosophy may no longer have been popular (Polybius XII, 260 ff.), especially as it was at variance with the ideal of wisdom cherished by the other schools.

Scepticism cannot by its very nature offer unlimited scope for further initiative, contributions and development. The negative nature of such a philosophy would gradually have become apparent when it no longer had personalities like Arcesilaus and Carneades to expound it. There was, besides, the vexed question of what the actual views of Carneades had been on certain vital issues. It is possible that Philo had been feeling for some time that his sceptical position was a somewhat uneasy one, and this feeling may have communicated itself to Antiochus. Account must also be taken of the many objections to scepticism raised by Lucullus in the first part of Cicero's dialogue, which reflect considerations that must have influenced Antiochus.

Philo was no doubt affected by the same general pressures as Antiochus. But what finally prompted him to modify his position was, I believe, Antiochus' own description. By falling back onMetrodorus' interpretation of Carneades and renouncing ἐξορθή Philo may have thought that he was not taking too drastic and revolutionary a step, though it seemed so to Antiochus. Still, he was advancing a doctrine that he had not publicly endorsed before, and it remains a mystery how he related his new position to his former teachings. Most likely he remained silent about his previous position, especially as Rome offered him the chance of a new audience.

1The passage is biased according to Zeller (Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics p. 565 n.1). Cicero's deep concern to dissociate Academia sceptica from sophistry (Ac.I, 44; II, 7-9; 67) does, however, seem to support the evidence of Polybius. On the other hand, Cicero tells us (De Cr. I, 45) that the school was flourishing ('Academia florentes') around 110 B.C. But the reference there is to its rhetorical teaching, not its sceptical philosophy.

2Ibid; also 44. But Antiochus had become hostile to Philo and may therefore have exaggerated his uneasiness.

3Lucullus gives as the reason for his innovations his inability to withstand criticism of the 'portinacia' of the Academy (10).

4Schreckel, p. 397, thinks that Philo did not believe that he had changed his ground.
It was perhaps Philo's intention to undermine Antiochus' motives for deserting by giving a more positive outlook and a more consistent foundation to the scepticism of the Academy. His innovations were also intended to be polemical in so far as they were in every way opposed to and contradictory of the Stoic doctrines. But though it was clearly Philo's aim not to impair the sceptical basis of the Academic philosophy or make any concessions to Stoic dogmatism, he has been interpreted as moving away from scepticism and towards dogmatism. ¹ This is perhaps partly due to his more positive attitude and also his interest in questions of practical morality² and rhetoric.³ We ought possibly to make a difference between being positive and being dogmatic. If, as we are accustomed to think, dogmatism and scepticism are mutually exclusive concepts, perhaps neither term can properly be used to describe Philo's position.

4. The end of the sceptical Academy

Cicero tells us that Antiochus attacked Philo's innovations in a book entitled the Sosus (12).⁴ Though he also says that, while Philo lived, the Academy did not lack a champion (17), Philo probably did not write a reply to the Sosus.⁵ He may have died in Rome soon after propounding his new

¹E.g. Numerius, fr. 28, 6 ff., (Des Places); Reid, p. 59; Robin, p. 133; A.H. Armstrong, Introduction to Ancient Philosophy, p. 146; R.E. Witt, Albinus, p. 21. Both Stough (p. 8) and Hirt (Stoic Philosophy, p. 150-51) speak of the 'Stoicism' of Philo.

²Stob. Eel. II p. 39, 24 (W); Brochard, p. 205.

³De Or. III, 110; Tusc. I, 9.

⁴Named after a Stoic philosopher, also from Ascalon, possibly himself a deserter from the sceptical Academy. Reid, p. 184 n. 9; Dillon, p. 52. R.E. Witt (Albinus, p. 25) thinks that the book was written at Alexandria, but there is no evidence for this.

⁵Cicero in his reply to Lucullus (64-148) does not seem to be relying at all on any work of Philo which could have constituted Philo's answer to the Sosus. It has been thought that Aug. Ac. III, 41 ('sed hic arreptis iterum illis armis et Philo ...stitat, donec moreretur') implies that Philo answered back. See Brochard, p. 191, esp. n. 7. But St. Augustine is probably merely echoing Cicero's 'Philone autem uiuo patrocinium Acadamine non defuit' (17).
doctrines. And with his death the sceptical Academy came to an end. We know of no philosopher who continued to support Academic scepticism or who defended Philo's innovations after the latter's death.

Antiochus appears to have been the undisputed head of the Academy in 79 B.C. when Cicero heard him at Athens. The Academy itself was deserted at the time and he was teaching his so-called Old Academic philosophy in the gymnasium known as the Ptolemaeum (Fin. V, 1). But this does not seem to have been a handicap to him. Several prominent Romans attended his lectures and espoused his philosophy, the two best known being Brutus and Varro.

5. On the use of certain terminology in this Commentary

The word 'sceptic' is derived from Greek σκέπτεσθαι ('examine' or 'consider'). A σκέπτηκός, therefore, is one who 'examines', or (as defined by Sextus P.H. I, 3) one who goes on seeking for the truth. The word is commonly found in later writers, though we do not know when exactly it acquired a technical sense. Stough (p. 3) thinks that Timon may have used it of Arcesilas (fr. 55, Diels), but her claim that 'subsequently, the term came to be applied with increasing frequency to both Pyrrhonists and Academics' is not supported by the evidence. Polybius, for example, does not use it of the Academics (XII, 26 C, 1 ff.). Sextus (P.H. I, 3, etc.) sharply distinguishes Sceptics and Academics. The term 'Academic sceptic' is thus, strictly

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1. He is thought to have died at latest before 79 B.C., when Cicero heard Antiochus' lectures at Athens. According to Tusc. V, 107, Philo never returned to his birthplace Larissa. Brochard (p. 221) wrongly uses this as evidence that he never returned from Rome to Greece. It is, however, probable that he died at Rome.

2. Except in so far as it was championed by Cicero; See pp. 51 ff. below.

3. Heraclitus of Tyre is represented by Cicero as defending the Academic position against Antiochus (11-12), but it is not clear whether he continued to support Philo. Brochard (p. 222) thinks that Eudorus of Alexandria must have been a disciple of Philo; Dillon, however, treats him as a follower of Antiochus (p. 115). There is also the view that the sceptic Aenesidemus broke away from Philo through dissatisfaction with his new 'doctrines' and 'Stoic' position (Photius Bibl. cod. 212, 170a 14 Bekker); see Stough, p. 9; Brochard, p. 246. Rist (The Heracliteanism of Aenesidemus, Phoenix 24 (1970) pp. 75-6, even speculates that the break occurred at Alexandria. Too much, I believe, is read into the evidence.
speaking, a misnomer. This may explain why Cicero, who is aware of the concept (7-9), does not suggest any Latin translation for it, though the Greek word may have been in use.¹

The term δογματικός, on the other hand, was certainly in use by the third century B.C.,² and was employed by later writers to mean the opposite of σκέπτικος. This is because δόγμα implies judgement to which assent is given, but the sceptic by nature repudiates judgement and assent. He is an ἐρεκτικός (from ἐχειν), i.e. one who withholds assent. Cicero uses the periphrasis 'qui se scire arbitrantur' (8) and coins 'opiniosissimus' (143) to convey the concept of a dogmatist.

For Antiochus the conflict was not between the sceptical Academy and the dogmatic Academy, but between the New Academy and the Old. The terms 'New' and 'Old' may have come into use as a result of the controversy between himself and Philo, Antiochus himself perhaps being responsible for the distinction. Cicero, like Philo, refuses to allow that the Academy from Arceislas/different from that of Plato, though we find him deciding to keep the distinction between 'Old' and 'New' in Ac. I, 46 (and he keeps it elsewhere also, e.g. Leg. I, 38-9), presumably for the sake of convenience, and also perhaps because of a tacit recognition that the Academy of Arceislas did mark a change of direction of the school. In the Lucullus, however, he refuses to allow that Antiochus himself is properly an Academic (70, 132, 137, 143), and even Antiochus' spokesman Lucullus is made to refer to his opponents as 'the Academics' (12), as though Antiochus did not contest the title for himself. Elsewhere (Fin. V, 7; Brut. 315) Antiochus is associated

¹It was Aulus Gellius (N.A. XI, 5, 1-3) who was later to propose the Latin equivalent 'quaesitores et consideratores' to describe the Pyrrhonist.
²It was applied to a school of medicine opposed by the 'Empiricists' (Stough, P.11; C.E.R. Lloyd, Greek Science after Aristotle, p.89).
with the Old Academy. Finally, one may note that it became fashionable to label the various phases of development in the Academy after Plato. Plato's was the First or Old Academy, Arcesilas' the Second or Middle, Carneades' and Clitomachus' the Third or New, Philo's and Charmades' the Fourth and Antiochus' the Fifth. ¹ But the distinction that is relevant here is that between the Old and the New Academy. And for Antiochus the New Academy starts with Arcesilas.

C. The nature and general purpose of Cicero's dialogue

It appears to have been Cicero's intention to use the quarrel between Philo and Antiochus as a starting-point for both the Lucullus and the Catulus. ² And since that quarrel partly concerned the history of the Academy, the author was enabled to embrace within a single work a general view of the controversy between the Academic sceptics and the Stoics. But while the Catulus may have had as its main theme a contrast between the historical viewpoints of Philo and Antiochus, the Lucullus was intended to be much more argumentative and to deal with the conflict of philosophical views proper.

Cicero has accordingly tried in the Lucullus to give a generalised treatment of the arguments for and against the sceptical Academy from Arcesilas to Philo. Lucullus deploys his arguments against the principal Academics and against the school as a whole, incorporating here and there portions of the critique that concern only particular philosophers. In his reply Cicero similarly defends, for the most part at least, an ideal and impersonal Academic, who displays a combination of the most positive and salient features of the school from Arcesilas to Philo.

¹Sextus E.H.I,220-21; Galen H.Ph.3 (Diels Dox. p.599 ff.); Numenius, fr.26, 103-4 (Des Places); D.L.1V,28.
²See section F of this Introduction, p.62 below.
The confusion and discrepancies resulting from this line of approach are obvious. For example, Lucullus sets out to report a conversation which allegedly took place immediately after Philo's innovations became known to Antiochus in Alexandria, yet at the end of his preliminary speech he decides to pass over the polemic against Philo and deal with Arcesilas and Carneades (12). The historical argument which follows (13 ff.) would concern Arcesilas and Philo more than Carneades. Lucullus does nevertheless come back to Philo and his innovations in 18, while his argument from 19 ff. would concern all the Academics, including Philo. The arguments against ἐποχή (37-39) are, on the other hand, irrelevant to Philo's latest position. In 32 a position which is presumably that of Arcesilas is brushed aside as hopeless, and no more mention is made of him until 59, although the discussion of ἐποχή in 37-39 would concern him most closely, and some of the arguments about sense-deception (47 ff.) would undoubtedly have been put forward by him. Again, in Cicero's reply, no clear distinction is made between Clitomachus' interpretation of the Carneadean doctrine of probability and Philo's new standpoint (98-110, 111-113). In general Cicero supports the view that the wise man does not assent and opine (67, 78, 108), yet in 112-113 he argues for the reasonableness of supposing that the wise man sometimes opines. In 146 he appears to accept the new Philonian concept of knowledge ('scientia'), without taking into account that it is incompatible with ἐποχή.

It is natural to think that in the Soccus Antiochus rebutted every claim Philo had made in his two books and included a statement of his own view of the development of the Academic philosophy in opposition to that of Philo. We should not, therefore, assume (with Reid, p. 51 n. 2) that the

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1 The reason for dismissing Arcesilas in 32 is that Lucullus is there preparing the ground for his criticism of the πεπανοῦ. No mention is made of the εὐλογοῦ. A number of Arcesilas' arguments are not examined at all (see p. 11 ff. above), just as Lucullus does not exhaustively analyse and refute all the Academic arguments about sense-deception. He dismisses, for instance, those concerned with illusion (19).
Sosus, being 'polemical rather than expository', did not contain an outline of the history of philosophy similar to that given by Varro in Ac. I, 15 ff. Reid also believes that the Sosus 'covered exactly the same ground as the discussions which Lucullus professes to report' (p. 52). He infers that since the conversation at Alexandria is said to have lasted several days, the Sosus was divided into several books, only one of them concerned with Philo, which Cicero passed over in writing his work. This assumption ignores the obvious fact that Cicero's account of the conversation is designed to make Lucullus' knowledge of Antiochus' case against the Academics dramatically plausible and to enlarge the scope of the debate in his own dialogue. Unless we have definite grounds for thinking otherwise, it is more probable that the Sosus, which we are told Antiochus wrote 'contra suum doctorem' (12), was directed mainly against Philo. It would not have been hard for Cicero to adapt and extend Antiochus' polemic since all the Academics from Arcesilas to Philo had rejected the cataleptic impression on generally the same grounds. Cicero may have modified what he was borrowing from the Sosus or relied on other works of Antiochus or even on his own recollection of Antiochus' lectures. It need not, moreover, be inferred from his concluding remark in Att. XII, 52, 3 that his philosophical works are merely word for word translations of Greek originals. 3 In Fin. I, 6 he claims to be not so much translating his Greek sources as preserving their thought, while applying to it his own judgement and following his own order of composition. In Off. I, 6

1 Sextus. A. M. VII, 201, refers to another work of Antiochus, the Canonica, which Dillon (p. 60) regards as Cicero's chief source for the Lucullus. See however Brochard, p. 211.

2 'Ἀκόγραφα sunt, minore labore siunt; verba tantum adfero quibus abundo.' This was written on 21 May 45 B.C., so that the reference could be to the first version of the Academica.

3 See A. E. Douglas, Cicero, ed. T. A. Dorey, pp. 138-9. Douglas thinks that much of the discussion in the Academica Priora is 'unoriginal', but that Cicero may have been considerably freer elsewhere.
where he makes a similar claim, he explicitly states that this is his usual practice.¹

Since Cicero differed from Philo on the question of ἐποξήθι, it is hard to think that the two books, which marked off the discussion in Alexandria, were Cicero's main source for his reply to Lucullus. He may, however, have used these books together with others written earlier by Philo, or by Antiochus himself prior to his defection (69). It is clear that he used Clitomachus (98 ff.; 102 ff.; Reid, p. 52-3). But again, we must assume some degree of independence and personal initiative on Cicero's part. Sections 66-78, for instance, look very much like the author's own attempt at a preliminary discussion that would match Lucullus' introduction (13-18). Philo would not, perhaps, have defended Arcesilas with the argument that he was merely trying to safeguard wisdom by his doctrine of ἐποξήθι (66-69, 76-78). The argument in 68 is faulty in that the necessity of ἐποξήθι does not follow from the assumptions posited; Cicero here seems to be trying to compromise between the traditional view of ἐποξήθι and Philo's new position. In 72-76 he gives a very one-sided account of the Presocratics and Plato that would not fit well with Philo's interpretation of the history of the Academic philosophy. The supposed conversation between Arcesilas and Zeno on the question of the cataleptic impression (77) could easily have been Cicero's invention.² I would therefore disagree with Reid's opinion that sections 66-78 'in all probability' come from Philo's two books. His view (pp. 52-3) that Cicero's account of the disagreements among philosophers is derived from Clitomachus is also open to objection. While this may be true

¹Off. I, 6; 'sequemur igitur hoc quidem tempore et hab in quaestione potissimum Stoicos non ut interpretes sed, ut solius, e fontibus eorum iudicio arbitrioque nostro, quantum quoque modo uidemus, hauriemus.'

²The conversation hardly illustrates Arcesilas' desire to discover the truth, as Cicero claims (76 and). Moreover, Zeno's repli are evasive, so that the interchange is unnecessarily prolonged.
of some sections, especially those on physics (116 ff.), it need not be true of all. The pattern of the argument in the sections on ethics (129-141) is determined primarily by Cicero's wish to set up a contrast between the ethical views of Antiochus and those of the Stoics and to look forward to a more exhaustive treatment of the subject in the ethical works that were to follow the *Academica*. In view of his considerable interest in ethics, it is possible that Cicero relied largely on his own knowledge in these sections. Again, the sections on logic (142 ff.) are so elementary that it is unnecessary to assume that Cicero is translating some Greek original.

Almost all Cicero's philosophical works, excluding the *De Re Publica* and the *De Legibus*, were composed during the years 46-44 B.C. Writing provided a means of consoling himself for his domestic misfortunes, and for his enforced retreat from public affairs. His main aim, he tells us, was to make good come out of evil by using his leisure for the benefit of his fellow countrymen. Philosophical works written in Latin by an expert in the language such as himself would fill a long-felt gap in the Roman cultural heritage and make the Roman people independent of, or at least less dependent on, the Greeks.

Cicero tells us in *N.D.* I,9 that his intention was, from the outset, to cover the whole philosophical field in his writings. It can be inferred from the *Academica* and the *De Finibus* that a programme of subjects or problems to be treated was already in his mind by the time he was composing these works. As I said earlier, his survey of ethical disagreements in the

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1Sextus A.M. IX,1; Diels, Dox. p.119 ff.
2He himself notes the shortness of the time, *N.D.* I,6; *Off.* III,4.
3Ac. I,11; *N.D.* I,9; *Tusc.* V,5.
4Div. II,1; *Off.* II,2-4; III,1-4; *N.D.* I,6-7.
5*Off.* II,4. A.E. Douglas (Cicero, ed. Dorey, p.136) notes that Cicero wants us 'to see primarily in his philosophical writings a continuation by other means, as it were, of his political and public career'. For Cicero's reasons for writing philosophy, see Ac. I,3-14; *N.D.* I,6-9; *Fin.* I,1-12; *Off.* II,2-6; III,1-4; Div. II,1-7; *Tusc.* I,1-7; IV,6.
Lucullus (129 ff.) has been framed, in both presentation and content, by his own ethical sympathies and interests and constitutes a sort of argument in miniature of his major ethical works. The last two sections (147-8), which refer to the prospect of further discussions in the speakers' country houses at Tusculum, seem to look forward to a series of works on ethics and natural philosophy. Torquatus in Fin. I, 26 ('de physicis alias') also appears to hint at Cicero's intention of composing works on natural philosophy.

Cicero's plan perhaps went even further back than the Academica, to the time when he was composing the Orator and possibly the Hortensius. The presence of the same characters in both the Hortensius and the Academica suggests that these two works, at any rate, formed part of a single design. Both were intended as introductory to the author's philosophical corpus.

Since Cicero probably agreed with Antiochus that the problem of knowledge was one of the two most important issues in philosophy (29), and since logic in general was normally treated as a propaedeutic to the other branches of philosophy, it is possible that the Academica was conceived, both logically and chronologically, in accordance with the accepted divisions of philosophy and their relative importance. Secondly, Cicero's plan, particularly in view of its wide range and didactic purpose, required coherence and a proper philosophical method. These are provided by the Academic philosophy and

1 See H.A.K. Hunt, The Humanism of Cicero, pp. 19-20. Hunt also believes that the sections on physics raise issues which are of particular interest to Cicero and are examined in his works on natural philosophy.

2 This subject has been treated by M.F.A. Sullivan in: The Plan of Cicero's Philosophical Corpus, Fordham University Dissertation, 18 (1951). This is an unpublished thesis, and I have not been able to see it.

3 See Or. 148. The Hortensius may have been begun as early as 46 and completed a few months after Tullia's death and Cicero's retreat to Astura in February 45. See Reid, pp. 29-31; M. Ruch, L'Hortensius de Ciceró, histoire et reconstitution, pp. 35-36.

4 Ruch, op. cit. p. 36.

5 Hunt, on the other hand, sees the Hortensius as the introduction to a series of works that started with the Academica.
the author's own adherence to it. On several occasions Cicero states that his critics still do not understand his philosophical position and that this has been made clear in his *Academica* (N.D.I, 6; 11-12; Off.II, 7-8). This philosophical position is especially important in relation to what he was trying to achieve. It enables him to range over the whole philosophical field, provides him with a method of philosophizing that is 'least arrogant, most consistent and refined',\(^1\) allows him to shun dogmatism,\(^2\) to engage in argument with an open mind and to follow what is probable, without placing restrictions on the individual judgement.\(^3\) In short, the Academic philosophy, particularly with its doctrine of probability, suits Cicero's purpose. The *Academica*, therefore, explains the basis of this philosophy and not only gives the author's final word on the problem of knowledge but also provides the necessary understanding of his method of procedure in the works to follow and the epistemic basis of the arguments there.\(^4\) In these works, one system is pitted against another and the doctrines that are most probable (to the author) are pointed out. The method which began as a purely negative dialectic thus acquires a positive purpose, and is justified by Cicero on the ground that only in this way can we elicit what is true or at least probable.\(^5\)

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\(^1\) *Div.* II, 1 'genus philosophandi minime arrogans maximeque et constans et elegans'.

\(^2\) *Off.* II, 8 'affirmandi arrogantiam uitantem fugere tementem'.

\(^3\) *Ac.* II, 8-9; *Tusc.* II, 5; *Off.* II, 8; N.D.I, 10-12; *Div.* XI, 150.

\(^4\) Hunt (loc. cit.) sees the principal aim of Cicero's philosophical works as the exposition and examination of Antiochus' views. He accordingly sees the *Academica* as merely an examination of Antiochus' theory of perception, in opposition to that of the Academy, which would pave the way to the De Finibus, where the significance of that theory for Antiochus' ethics becomes apparent. A.E. Douglas (Cicero ed. Dorsey, p.145) points out that Hunt's view involves 'stigmatizing large parts of the works as "irrelevant"', and that 'it is easier to believe that Cicero's main purpose was somewhat wider.'

\(^5\) *Ac.* II, 7; *Off.* II, 8; *Tusc.* II, 9; N.D.I, 11.
The type of dialogue form that Cicero adopts suits his general purpose and method of exposition. Action and details of dramatic background are kept to a minimum. In the *Lucullus*, two of the four characters are for the most part silent. After the preem and introductory conversation, Lucullus, as Antiochus' spokesman, delivers a virtually continuous and uninterrupted speech, which is opposed by that of Cicero, again long and uninterrupted. Of the two protagonists, Cicero is clearly the principal character in the sense that the roles of the other three are subordinate to that of the author and subservient to his dramatic intention and his own philosophical position. In this, as we learn from one of his letters to Atticus, he was following the example of Aristotle, who in his dialogues used to assign to himself the chief speaking part. The Aristotelian character of Cicero's dialogues is perhaps further illustrated by the use of opposing speeches. How far the philosophical works which were used as sources, including the works of Philo and Antiochus, may have influenced the form as well as the content of the *Academica*, is, of course, impossible to judge.

1 In *Fin. II*, 1-3 Cicero criticises the use of long speeches and states his own preference for the Socratic method of question and answer. Normally, however, he follows the practice of the later Academy in using the continuous speech.

2 Att. XIII, 19, 4 'sermo ita inducitur ceterorum ut penes ipsum sit principatus'. The reference is specifically to the *De Finibus* and the second edition of the *Academica*. Earlier in the same letter Cicero objects to Atticus' suggestion that Cotta should reply to Varro on the ground that he himself would then not have a speaking part. This is acceptable, he says, only when the characters are 'antiqui', as in many of the dialogues of Heraclides Ponticus and in his own *De Re Publica* and *De Oratore*. Elsewhere (*Fam. I*, 9, 23) the *De Oratore* is said to be written 'Aristotelico more'. Reid (p. 29) considers this to be an inconsistency; A.S. Wilkins in his edition of the *De Crat. Orator* (p. 4) suggests that in *Fam. I*, 9, 23 Cicero is thinking of the substance rather than the form of the dialogue. The 'nos Aristotelius' can clearly have different connotations according to the context (cf. *Or. III*, 80). K. Ruch, *Le résumé des oeuvres philosophiques de Cicéron*, p. 40. See also following note.

3 In *Fin. V*, 10 the rhetorical and philosophical exercise of arguing on both sides of a question is said to have originated with Aristotle. In *De Cr.III*, 80 the speaker who can argue 'Aristotelico more' on both sides of every topic is said to be the perfect orator. (Wilkin's note ad loc. is misleading; Cicero is clearly ascribing the practice of arguing on both sides to Aristotle). In *Tusc. II*, 9 the practice is attributed to both the Peripatetics and the Academy; Cicero says it has always appealed to him both as a means of discovering what is probable and as a rhetorical exercise. Cicero's dialogues are evidently intended to reflect this method, though he does not specifically say that Aristotle used it in his own dialogues.
D. Cicero as an Academic

As a New Academic (to use Antiochus' terminology), Cicero is in a class of his own. He is keenly aware of the notoriety of the school for its entirely negative philosophy, and for such perverse qualities as 'pertinacia', 'calumnia' and 'studium uincendi/certandi' (Ac.I, 44; II, 65). He vigorously exculpates both Arcesilas and himself from any such dishonourable motives and proclaims his own and his school's concern for the truth (7; 65-66; 76 ff.). A contrast is thus set up in his works between the New Academic's impartial but assiduous love of truth and members of the other contemporary schools who will contentiously and arbitrarily cling to a position or doctrine they have taken up. In general, the New Academic emerges from Cicero's works as the most positive and constructive type of philosopher possible, as opposed to the other philosophical groups.

Like Carneades who defended different views at different times (Div. I, 62), Cicero cherished above all the freedom—to which adherence to the Academic school entitled him—of moving from one position to another, of not being tied down to any particular system, and of being able to examine and defend a view on its own merits independently of authority. He is convinced that, as an Academic, he can roam freely over the whole philosophical field and choose what is to him most probable. This is characteristic of Cicero alone. Philo had already started to exploit the possibility of a more positive approach, the natural culmination of which would have been a fully developed system of philosophical doctrines based on knowledge, except that this knowledge would have fallen short of absolute certainty. This development takes place in Cicero's works but not in the way we would have expected.

1 In Tusc. I, 17 he admits that he cannot go further than the probable. But in Ac. II, 66 he argues that love of truth is implied in the satisfaction felt on discovering the probable.

2 E.g. Tusc. IV, 7; V, 83.
Here we have a disconcerting type of eclecticism, with views borrowed from the very opponents of Academic scepticism, which previous Academics would not publicly have dared to espouse even as merely probable. Cicero is prepared to disagree even with Carneades (Fin. II, 38). In N.D. I, 17 he dissociates himself from the New Academic Cotta, and at the end finds the case of the Stoic Balbus to be nearer to the truth.

It appears at first sight that Cicero's interpretation of the doctrine of probability would lead to an extreme form of subjectivism, whereby every man is the best judge for himself of the probability of any proposition. In Tusc. V, 33, for example, we find him claiming that he lives from day to day and that he says whatever strikes his mind as probable and so he alone is free. Elsewhere (Ac. II, 134; Off. III, 33) he represents himself as unable to decide between two alternatives and as adopting first one then the other. But, on a closer look, it becomes clear that Cicero's freedom to range from one view to another is restricted (by himself) within well-defined limits. What he is not sure about is whether the moral end is 'honestum' alone (the Stoic view) or whether it is 'honestum' together with the primary natural advantages (the Academico-Peripatetic view of Antiochus). These are the only views which safeguard virtue (Ac. II, 134) and nothing else, apart from those, seems probable (Off. III, 33).

Cicero's Academicism too is eclectic. Despite his claim in Fam. IX, 8, 1 that in the Academica he has taken for himself the part of Philo, he is not really Philo's spokesman. For example, he does not support Philo's view that Carneades had actually held the doctrine that the wise man assents and opines, but prefers to think with Clitomachus that Carneades had merely advanced the view in argument (78). He does, of course, argue that it is reasonable to

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1 This is on the question of the ethical end, which Carneades defined as 'frui principiis naturalibus' (Fin. II, 35). In Ac. II, 131 Cicero recognizes that the definition was put forward merely in opposition to the Stoics.

2 'nihi sumpsi Philonis (sc. partos). It should be noted, however, that the reference is to the second edition of the Academica.
think that the wise man may opinio (112-13), and at the end of the Lucullus (148) he adopts a tolerant attitude towards this view. But his final word does appear to be that assent should be done away with.\(^1\) Thus Cicero upholds the Clitomachean view that probability does not involve assent (104), as well as the original Academic view, which coincides with the Stoic, that assent to what is not known, and therefore opinion, is incompatible with wisdom (59; 66-68). Yet he is attracted by and backs up Philo’s bid for a new definition of knowledge (112; 146; Fin.V, 76), and admits that there can be perception of the true, provided that such perception is not taken to be incorrigible. Thus he apparently fails to realise that the doctrine of ἐποχή is rendered obsolete within the context of Philo’s new definition of knowledge.

There are other inconsistencies in Cicero’s position. At the beginning of his reply to Lucullus, despite his usual rejection of assent, he quite unnecessarily claims to be an ‘opinator’, in contrast to the wise man.\(^2\) Such a contrast would have been more appropriate in a Stoic context, in which the ordinary person’s assent to opinion is the only alternative to the knowledge of the wise man. Cicero could, as an Academic, have represented himself as a follower of probability, in which case the contrast between himself and the wise man would have been less marked. It is one thing to admit to the occasional lapse (‘nec tamen ego sum qui nihil unquam salui adprobem, qui numquam adsentiar, qui nihil opiner...’); it is quite another to claim that this is the characteristic feature of his thought (‘magnus quidem sum opinator’), and that he steers, as it were, a roving course by Helice, not by the Pole star. It is possible, therefore, that Cicero has become confused between the Philonian and Clitomachean views of opinion and probability.

\(^{1}\) 148. ‘Tollendum’ has a double meaning in that it can refer to weighing anchor or to abolishing assent. Cicero takes it in the latter sense.

\(^{2}\) 66. In this passage it is a question of assenting to what is not known, and so of weak assent, not of ‘qualified’ assent, a concept which is foreign to this controversy, as has already been said (p. 14 above).
Again, Cicero does not make a decisive choice between the Stoic concept of wisdom ('sapientia') as primarily the possession of knowledge and the Academic view of it as essentially avoidance of rashness and error. In 66-67 he attempts to establish common ground in the fact that neither Zeno nor Arcesilas would allow that the wise man opines. But what he appears to overlook in that passage is that for the Stoics and Antiochus the 'firmitas' of the wise man springs from the possession of indubitable and incorrigible knowledge, not merely from the fact that he does not opine. Elsewhere he defines wisdom in more traditional terms, which are nearer to the Stoic concept. In Ac. II, 112-113, however, he is sympathetic to a view of the wise man whose judgement is not infallible and whose knowledge is not absolute.

The lack of coherence in Cicero's position might be taken to suggest that it was, for him, a relatively recent one, and that he had not been from the first a committed adherent of the sceptical Academy. As an orator he was disposed to see both sides of a question and to be satisfied with the probable, but this alone would have been hardly sufficient to draw him to scepticism. Scepticism may have had 'points of contact' with rhetoric, but apart from the method of arguing on both sides he nowhere makes a connection between them or states that he espoused Academic scepticism because of his professional calling. There is, of course, his own claim in the Orator (12) that he owed his eloquence to the Academy rather than the rhetorical workshops, and in the De Fato (3) he points out that there is a close link between the orator and the philosophy of which he is an adherent. The Academy of

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1 As 'rerum diuinurum et humanarum scientia', Off. I, 153; II, 5.

2 This is put forward as the Peripatetic and Old Academic view, but is also in agreement with that of Philo.

3 E. Rawson, Cicero: A Portrait, p. 236.

4 E. Havet ('Pourquoi Cicéron a professé la philosophie académique', Séances et travaux de l'Académie des sciences politiques et morales, 121 (1884), pp. 660-671) argued that Cicero saw philosophy purely as an auxiliary to oratory and, secondly, that he merely followed the fashion in his choice of philosophical opinions. Both views are plainly false and are contested by P. Boyancé ('Les méthodes de l'histoire littéraire, Cicéron et son ouvrage philosophique', RRL 14 (1936), p. 290 n. 1 and p. 257).
Philo was well known for its rhetorical teaching, but what Cicero has in mind in both passages is not scepticism as such but the general training in argument and mental subtlety which the orator derives from the Academic philosophy, from Plato onwards.

Cicero appears to have been by temperament averse to dogmatism. Sometimes he strikes us as having been uncertain in his decisions and actions, for instance at the beginning of the Civil War, though the difficulty of the choice with which he was then faced provides ample excuse for what has often been criticized as vacillation. His comment on his own indecision with regard to his choice of characters for the Academica (‘O Academiam uolatiram et sui similem, modo huc modo illuc’, Att.XIII,25,3) arises naturally from the fact that the work in question is about Academic scepticism; there is no implication that Cicero considers himself by nature a sceptic, far less that he has always been an Academic sceptic. Had this been so, one might have expected to come across some comment in his earliest letters.

In the De Legibus (I,37-39), Cicero anticipates the approval of the Old Academic, Peripatetic and Stoic schools for his attempt to establish firm foundations for cities, and he begs the New Academy of Arcesilas and Carneades to be silent, and not play havoc with the discussion. He does not speak as if he were himself an adherent of this school. Though Atticus points out (36) that his friend does not usually follow the authority of others, the De Legibus as a whole is dogmatic in both tone and content. A possible explanation is

1Even in his earliest work, the De Inuentiono (II,10), he declares that he will not make statements that are too positive, for fear of giving assent to anything rashly and dogmatically - a principle he intends to follow in all his life.

2K. Carcopino, Cicero and the Secrets of his Correspondence, I p.233, represents Cicero as a sceptic who aspired to certainty in politics, and calls him, somewhat obscurely, a 'doctrinaire without a doctrine'.

3We find Cicero professing to put into practice the method of arguing 'in utramque partem' as early as December 60 B.C. (Att.II,3,3). But the method is described as being Socratic.
that at the time of writing this treatise Cicero had not yet come forward openly as a champion of the sceptical Academy. ¹

Twice in Ac. I (13 and 43) Cicero is said to be deserting the Old Academy for the New. Reid (p. 15) rightly rejects the suggestion that Cicero had for a time abandoned the views he learnt from Philo. His explanation, based on Varro's use of the word 'tractari' (I, 13), is that Cicero is referring to a change in his literary sources. This is plausible; I believe, however, that the author's main purpose here is to distinguish the camps of the opposing protagonists in the dialogue. For Varro, Antiochus' mouthpiece, there are two Academies, so that Cicero in supporting the New has seceded from the Old (I, 43). Cicero jokingly points out that Antiochus has done just the opposite in returning to the Old from the New (I, 13). But for Cicero, who is looking at things from Philo's point of view, there is only one Academy that stretches from Plato to Philo himself, so that there is no question of a change of allegiance. Nevertheless, it is significant that, to both Varro and Lucullus, Cicero's support for the sceptical Academy appears as something recent ('quae nunc prope dimissa revocatur', II, 11). ²

Cicero himself implicitly admits a shift of interest (I, 13), though the ambiguity of the term 'Old' Academy enables him to do so without declaring any former allegiance to Antiochus. What is new, therefore, is not his support for the Academy, but his defence of its scepticism from Arcesilas to Philo.

¹It is very unlikely that the De Lecibus was written after the Academica, as has been argued by H. R. A. Robinson ('The Date of Cicero's De Lecibus', TAPA, 1943, pp. 109-112, and 1946, pp. 321-2) and M. Ruch ('La question du De Lecibus', LEC 1949, pp. 3-21). The argument of A. Goedemeyer (Die Geschichte des griechischen Skeptizismus, 1905, pp. 143-144) that when he wrote the De Republica and the De Lecibus, Cicero had temporarily defected from the New Academy to the Old Academy, can hardly be supported.

²Although in the dramatic context 'nunc' refers to the conversation then taking place, this does not imply that Cicero's support for the sceptical Academy goes back to the dramatic date of the dialogue (between 63 and 60 B.C., see Reid, p. 41). Cicero is alluding to the composition of the Academica itself and his own programme of philosophical writing.
If, before the *Academica*, Cicero made any claim of following a particular system, that system was probably Academic in the broadest sense. He was greatly attracted by Plato and Socrates, compared to whom all the philosophers who disagreed with them had a plebeian appearance. He often claims that the method he is following is Socratic. Although it was from Philo he learnt to see the history of the Academy as a unity, it is possible that Antiochus, whom Cicero heard in Athens in 79 B.C., may have had some part in directing his interest towards its early tradition.

I would therefore conclude that Cicero declared himself in support of the New Academy for the first time in his *Academica*. In *N.D.* I,6 he refers to critics who were surprised at this unexpected defence ('patrocinium necopinatum') of an obsolete and long abandoned system of philosophy. Hence in the *Lucullus* he defends the New Academic philosophy as such (7-9), but in later dialogues (*N.D.* I,6; 11-12; *Off.* II,7-9) he feels the need to defend his own adherence to it. This adherence, as set out in the *Lucullus*, was not the result of long cherished sceptical convictions. Rather, Cicero was feeling his way towards an epistemological solution that would be in keeping both with the traditions of the Academy and with his own literary purpose. He was not a professional philosopher as Philo and Antiochus were, and there had previously been no need to align himself definitely on this

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1 *Tusc.* I,55; cf. *Off.* I,2. In *Att.* IV,16,3, writing in 54 B.C. about his own *De Republica*, he refers to Plato as 'deus illo nostro'. In 64 B.C. Quintus Cicero speaks of his brother as 'homo Platonicus' (*Comment. Fat.* 46).

2 *Tusc.* I,8; V,11; *N.D.* I,11; *Att.* II,3,3.

3 Cf. *Lucullus* 'prope dimissa' (11). It may be added that in none of the letters relating to the composition of the *Academica* does Cicero indicate a previous interest in scepticism. In *Fam.* IX,8,1, where he informs Varro that he has assigned him the part of Antiochus 'qua a te probari intellectisse mihi videbar', he makes no corresponding statement about his own attitude to Philo. In *Att.* XIII,19,3, when he rejects Atticus' suggestion to include Cotta in the discussion, he does so not on the ground that he wishes to defend his own philosophical convictions, but for the purely literary reason that, since he is following the model of Aristotle, he cannot himself remain silent except in a dialogue set in a more remote past.
issue. Any lack of coherence in his position is probably due to his attempt to act as spokesman for the sceptical Academy as a whole, and perhaps to a residual uncertainty in his own mind on the question of assent and Philo's new definition of knowledge. He is of course careful to describe the system he supports as the Academic not the New Academic philosophy (7), though he accepts the appellation 'New' as given to it by others (Ap. I, 46).

Since Cicero accepts in the Academica the thesis that nothing can be perceived or known, he is in principle adopting a philosophical position whereby, according to his opponents, he can neither act nor advance any view whatsoever. Now, though not previously to the Academica, the question of consistency arises between his past cognitive claims (made, for instance, when exposing the Catilinarian conspiracy) and his present sceptical standpoint (62-63). In Off. II, 7-8 he refers to critics who, despite the Academica, still do not understand how an Academic sceptic can discuss any topic, as Cicero has been doing in his books, and ask whether he thinks he is being consistent. Those critics no doubt saw, as anyone would today, a certain discrepancy between some aspects of Cicero's life and works and his rejection of the possibility of knowledge. For instance, one meets the normal use of cognitive language, dogmatic expressions or even positive assertions in his writings. Some of his works (e.g. De Republica, De Legibus, De Oratore, De Officiis, De Fato) are anything but sceptical in tone. His apparent dogmatism is perhaps most conspicuous in his statements on matters of religion and morality. Cicero, in short, appears to be an inconsistent sceptic.

1 In spite of his sceptical attitude in the De Divinatione, Cicero stresses the value of religious beliefs and observances in the most positive manner in the De Legibus. One explanation (see R.J. Goar, Cicero and the State Religion (1972) p. 45) is that Cicero adapts his assertions to the matter in hand; thus he upholds divination in the De Legibus for fear of undermining the religious framework of the state. On the other hand, M.P. de Fourny ('Les fondements de la religion de Cicéron', LEC 22 (1954), pp. 241-253, 366-378) insists on the seriousness with which Cicero viewed Roman religious cults and holds that he kept philosophy and religion strictly apart, the basis of the latter being nos maiorum.

2 E.g. he positively asserts the supremacy of virtue (Tusc. IV. 34; V. 67, 147 ff.) and that it cannot be divorced from the moral and (Off. I. 5). Virtue, like vice, is not a mere matter of opinion (Leg. I. 44 ff.). Standards of conduct are fixed
It would, perhaps, be fair to judge Cicero's consistency only on the basis of the works that followed the Academica. Even so, the problem is not entirely eliminated. One might defend him by pointing out that he does here and there insert phrases or expressions to qualify his statements as non-dogmatic. He cannot be expected to have worked out an entirely new cognitive vocabulary. Much of his work is a record of views held by other philosophical schools and he certainly had no reason to change the original technical language into a new sceptical terminology. Again, one might argue that any sceptic is bound to lapse occasionally into the dogmatic style or even that it is harder to be a good Academic sceptic than it is to be a member of any of the various dogmatic schools.

But this kind of defence tells only half the story. When Cicero first came forward in his Academica as a supporter of the sceptical thesis that nothing can be known, he was perfectly aware that he would have to relate his past actions and assertions to his present Academic position. And if he puts into Lucullus' mouth the accusation of inconsistency between his claim to have brought to light the Catilinarian conspiracy and his support for the sceptical doctrines of the Academy (62-63), the implication is that he was fairly confident that there was no inconsistency at all. Cicero does not directly answer this criticism in the Lucullus, perhaps because he hoped that his position would become clear once he had stated the

and depend on nature (Off.I,6). In Off.III,33 young Cicero is asked to assume, like a mathematical axiom, that only what is 'honestum' is worthy of pursuit for its own sake, or failing this, that it is more worthy of pursuit for its own sake than anything else. See N.Y. Henry, The Relation of Dogmatism and Scepticism in the Philosophical Treatises of Cicero, Diss. N.Y., 1929.

1 E.g. 'ut mihi quidem uidetur', 'ut opinor'; cf. 'nihil ut adfirmem' (Div. II,6); 'falli igitur possimus' (Fin.I,15).


3 See C.B. Schmitt, Cicero Sceticism, p.88 n.33.
case for scepticism in his reply (64-148). But elsewhere (Off. II, 8; N. D. I, 12) he does indicate why there is no discrepancy between his actions and expression of views and his adherence to the sceptical Academy. The Academic sceptic is not someone who is always in a state of doubt, for he follows probability, and while denying that true impressions can be infallibly distinguished from false, he nevertheless finds that many are sufficiently clear to serve as a guide to the conduct of the wise man. In effect, Cicero is saying that we should not see him as a total sceptic.¹ M.Y. Henry was therefore right to meet the charge of inconsistency by arguing that even in the theoretical sphere Cicero's "whole trend of thinking is affirmative, not negative" and that "his spirit is that of a believer, not a sceptic".² There is, however, one aspect of the matter to which she does not give attention and on which Cicero himself does not elaborate in replying to his critics, namely that, as a disciple of Philo, he can make normal cognitive claims, with the proviso that these claims do not satisfy the epistemological requirements stipulated by the Stoics. It is clear that Cicero approved of Philo's new definition of knowledge (which he tends to equate with the Peripatetic, 112-113, Fin. V, 76), though he does not exploit that definition to the full when explaining his own position.³

¹ M.M. Patrick, The Greek Sceptics, p. 194.
² M.Y. Henry, The Relation of Dornatism and Scepticism in the Philosophical Treatises of Cicero, p. 5.
³ E.g. N. D. I, 12: "non enim sumus ii quibus nihil uerum esse uideatur, sed ii qui omnibus ueris falsa quaedam adiuncta esse dicamus tanta similitudine ut in iis nulla insit certa indicandi et adscendi nota. ex quo exstitit illud, multa esse probabilia, quae quamquam non perciportur, tamen, quia eiusmod quendam haberent insignem et inlustrom, iis sapientis uita regeretur". There is an echo of Philo's new view here.
E. The other interlocutors and their philosophical significance

Apart from Cicero himself, the persons in the dialogue are L. Licinius Lucullus (c. 110-57 B.C.), Q. Lutatius Catulus (died 60 B.C.) and Q. Hortensius Hortalus (114-50 B.C.). Catulus and Hortensius played a relatively more important part in the lost Catulus. In the Lucullus their roles are confined to very brief remarks at the beginning and end of each speech by the two protagonists, and even these remarks are determined, not by any philosophical convictions they may or may not have had in real life, but by the dramatic needs of the dialogue and the author's own literary and philosophical aims. We may assume that his portrayal of them, both here and in the Catulus, was no more historically accurate than his portrayal of Lucullus. 1 In his letters Cicero nowhere distinguishes between these three characters in point of suitability (or rather unsuitability) for the parts assigned to them. All three were now dead, 2 all three were 'nobiles', but not 'philologus'; 3 they lacked not so much the general culture as the training and experience which would have enabled them to take part in an epistemological discussion. 4

There were possibly two factors in Lucullus' life which determined Cicero's choice of him. He had been a generous patron of the arts, and he had had Antiochus in his company for a time during his military missions in the East. Plutarch's picture of him (Luc. 42) as a strong supporter of the Old Academy of Antiochus against the followers of Philo, of whom Cicero was one, is obviously based on the Lucullus itself. But if Lucullus' interest in philosophy had been more than superficial, 5 Cicero could hardly have

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2 For Cicero's decision not to include living persons in his dialogues, see Att. XIII, 19, 3.
3 Att. XIII, 12, 3; cf. 13, 1.
4 Att. XIII, 16, 1; cf. 19, 5.
assigned him the task of merely repeating from memory the arguments of Antiochus which he is alleged to have heard at Alexandria. On the other hand, it is hard to see why Cicero should have become dissatisfied with his choice, unless his account of Lucullus' presence at the discussions in Alexandria were purely fictitious.

Catulus is principally the mouthpiece of his father, who, according to Cicero, had been acquainted with the Carneadean philosophy (148), and had condemned Philo's interpretations of the Academy before him as mere lies (12 and 18). The elder Catulus is thus used to back up the view that Philo had deviated from the teachings of his predecessors. If we accept what Cicero says about him as historically true, we have to assume that he heard Philo in Rome, although we need not also assume that he had read Philo's two books. It is possible, however, that the elder Catulus' condemnation of Philo is another of Cicero's fictions.

When at the end of the Lucullus (148) the younger Catulus is asked his final opinion, he remarks that he is falling back upon the view of his father, which his father said was that of Carneades, namely that nothing can be perceived (i.e. there is no cataleptic impression), but that the wise man will assent to something not perceived, and therefore opine. This view constitutes a repudiation of the doctrine of ἐξοχή and is very similar

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1 'quae heri Catulus commemoravit a patre suo dicta Philoni'. Reid (p.42) argues unconvincingly that there is nothing to indicate that the elder Catulus had either heard Philo or read his two books. Plasberg (Præf.XII) assumes that he did both.

2 'revoluitur' is here used in the sense of 'have recourse to' (cf. De Or.II,130). It does not imply that Catulus had at any time changed his opinion. In 10 'revoluitur' is used in a different sense, 'is led back to'.

3 It is therefore impossible to accept 'conprobans' as it stands in the text (p.102,19). The required sense is given by 'quae ... non probans' (Hadvig) or 'improbans' (Davies). Reid's acceptance of 'conprobans' (followed, but without conviction, by Rackham) rests on a misunderstanding of Clitomachus' explanation of ἐξοχή in 104, from which he wrongly infer that an Academic can withhold assent in theory and give assent in practice.
to that of Philo. Philo himself had attributed it to Carneades (70). It is strange, therefore, that the elder Catulus should have adopted a view so close to Philo's position,¹ and yet be said to have condemned his innovations as mere lies (12 and 18). He cannot have been a follower of Clitomachus, as Reid states (p. 42),² and doubt is bound to arise whether the historical Catulus was really committed at all to the philosophy of Carneades.³ If not, the inconsistency of the view attributed to him at the end of the Jucullum may merely be due to Cicero's wish to conclude the dialogue by contrasting two different Academic standpoints concerning ἐνοχή.

Since the death of the elder Catulus must have occurred soon after Philo's arrival in Rome, the improbability that he should have criticised Philo's new doctrines, and that Cicero should have known about it, is very great. In the dialogue, this is concealed by the dramatic form, since it is plausible enough that the son should have known his father's views. But when we examine the time factor, and ask how Cicero came by his information, whether from father or son or some other source, the difficulty becomes apparent. The same does not apply to Cicero's account of the conversations in Alexandria, since he may have read about them in the Sonus. But whether fact or fiction, the criticisms of Philo made by the elder Catulus must have provided Cicero with a starting-point for discussion in the Catuln, just as Antiochus' reactions to Philo's two books did so in the Jucullum.

¹See the section on Philo's innovations, p. 29 ff. of this Introduction.

²Since Clitomachus had denied (78) that Carneades actually held the view here attributed to him by Catulus' father.

³He emerges from Cicero's works (for references see Reid p. 41) as a man of exceptionally upright character and wide culture, with strong leanings towards philosophy (De Or., I, 154 ff.). But apart from the Academica, he is nowhere particularly associated with the sceptical Academy. For his life, character, and death in 87 by order of Marius, see Wilkins' introduction to his edition of the De Oratore, pp. 24-5.
In real life Hortensius, in spite of his distinction as an orator, appears to have had little or no interest in philosophy. The development of his role in the *Academica* is presumably continuous with the *Hortensius*, where, after first delivering a speech attacking philosophy, he was brought to acknowledge the cogency of Cicero's arguments in reply. That Hortensius did experience a change of heart in the dialogue which bore his name is proved beyond reasonable doubt by Lucullus' appeal to Cicero at the end of his speech (61): 'tune, cum tantis laudibus philosophiam extuleris Hortensi-umque nostrum dissentientem commoueris ...'. Otherwise, the fiction of his interest in philosophy could hardly have been sustained to the extent of making him an interlocutor in the present dialogue. It is made clear, however, that his participation in the discussion has not the same depth and seriousness as that of the other two. In 10 he claims to have made only the more obvious points in his speech on the previous day, so that the whole case against Academic scepticism has been virtually reserved for Lucullus. In 63, having shown his admiration for Lucullus' arguments throughout, he expects Cicero to be immediately convinced by them, though Cicero says that he could not be sure whether he was serious or joking. At the end of the dialogue, when asked his opinion, he answers with a joke ('tollendum!'), through the ambiguity of which the author is able to impose his own final verdict on the reader. Hortensius is thus represented as one who can appreciate the subtlety and force of argument (63) without being committed too seriously to a single point of view. The ambiguity of his attitude seems to be a necessary part of his dramatic characterization.

1Reid p. 44. The general opinion is contested by M. Ruch (*Hortensius et Cicéron*, p. 26), who thinks that Hortensius must have acquired some knowledge of philosophy in the course of his training as an orator and that his exceptional memory would have enabled him to retain this. In the *Brutus*, however, in which Cicero pays tribute to the memory of Hortensius (1 ff., 317 ff.), no philosophical interest is mentioned.

2Lactant. *Inst.* I, 3, 16; *Tusc.* II, 4; *Fin.* I, 2; Ruch, op. cit. pp. 87-95 and 102-115.

3This was the view of Krieche, which Reid rejects out of hand (p. 44). See Ruch, op. cit. p. 169, who, however, wrongly infers from what Reid says that he thought the reference in 61 was to the *Catilina*. 
F. The lost Catulus

Any evidence we have for the form and content of the Catulus is far too meagre to justify the elaborate reconstruction attempted by Reid (p. 39 ff.), and followed in its main outline by Flasberg and Rackham. Apart from the surviving portion of the first book of the second edition (the so-called Academica Posteriora), a few inferences can be drawn from the Lucullus itself and from Cicero’s letters. The scene of the dialogue was Catulus’ villa (9), probably the one at Cumae (80), where the four friends had met on the previous day. From Catulus’ opening remarks in the Lucullus (10) we learn that in the previous day’s discussion the whole subject had been almost fully covered (exactly what the subject was is not defined), except for Lucullus’ promise to report the arguments of Antiochus. Hortensius refers to his own speech, clearly on the same side as Lucullus, since he describes it as merely a preliminary handling of the case, which he might have done better to leave entirely to Lucullus. In 28 he is said to have demanded that the Academic sceptics should admit that the wise man knows at least the one thing, that nothing can be known, and Lucullus goes on to attribute the same argument to Antipater. It may be observed that in the intermediate version where Cicero rewrote the dialogue for Cato and Brutus (Att. XIII, 16, 1), the part of Hortensius was probably assigned to Cato. It could be argued, therefore, that Hortensius was not defending dogmatism merely from the point of view of Antiochus, but in a more general way. Reid conjectures that Hortensius gave an outline of the history of philosophy corresponding to Varro’s in I, 15 ff., but that he also advanced a polemical argument, which has disappeared in the second edition because Varro had to speak first, not second. He assumes that Catulus, Hortensius and Cicero spoke in that order.

In 79 Cicero tells Lucullus that, when he himself spoke on the previous day, he ‘went out of his way’ to say a great deal against the validity of the senses (‘non necessario loco contra sensus tam multa dixeram’), with the express purpose of forestalling any stock arguments which Lucullus might use
in this connection. We may infer that in some part of his speech Cicero was attacking the dogmatic position, which Hortensius had defended, and at the same time anticipating the attack on the sceptical position which Lucullus was later to make. Hence Lucullus remarks in 10 that his case has been weakened by the previous day's conversation, though he still believes in its truth. In 12 his reference to Philo 'minus enim acer est adversarius is qui ista quae sunt heri defensae negat Academicus omnino cicerone', shows that the case for the sceptical Academy before Philo was defended in a fairly orthodox way by one at least of the speakers on the previous day.

A doubt arises, however, over the place occupied by Catulus himself in the dialogue. From the fact that it was named after him and that a 'laudatio' was later added (Att. XIII, 32, 3), it may be inferred that he played a leading role. But Cicero also spoke, and it is not clear how far, if at all, their points of view would have been differentiated. In 63 he indicates that he is on the same side as Cicero. We know that he mentioned his father's criticism of Philo's innovations (12, 18), which makes it probable that his speech was mainly a historical exposition of the doctrines of the New Academy along orthodox lines.¹ In the course of his exposition he might well have maintained what Philo alleged no Academic had ever said (12), namely that knowledge is impossible. But Cicero too would have defended this position, and Lucullus is rather vague here so that we cannot be sure if the reference 'quae sunt heri defensa' is to Catulus in particular. Reid further argues...

¹In Reid's reconstruction (p. 43), the main part of Catulus' speech was devoted to defending Arcesilaus and Carneades against the dogmatists, though more emphasis was placed on the Carneadean doctrine of probability and the positive side of Academic teaching than on the destructive criticism. In support of this he asks us to compare 'ista quae sunt heri defensae' with the words 'ad Arcesilam Carneademque veniamus' (12; Reid p. 43 n. 2). Similarly Hortensius' demand mentioned in 28 is arbitrarily taken as aimed at Catulus' defence of Arcesilas. The positiveness of Catulus' speech is inferred from his remark at the end of the Lucullus (148), that he would fall back on his father's views, etc. Plasberg too thinks that Catulus defended this view in his speech in the Catulus (Praef. XII). But as I have argued in Section E of this Introduction, Philo himself attributed this view to Carneades, and Catulus cannot therefore have defended it against Philo.
(p. 216 n. 9) that Lucullus' remark in 32 about the emphasis placed on probability by the Academics ('et hoc quidem uel maximo uos animaduertebam moueri') refers to Catulus' speech. But here too there is no reason to suppose that 'uos' applies more to Catulus than to Cicero.

It is possible, therefore, that in the Catulus the points of view of Catulus and Cicero may have been sufficiently close to enable Cicero to merge the part of Catulus with his own in the second edition. If the historical survey was divided in the earlier as in the later version, Hortensius' account of the Old Academy and related schools would have preceded and not followed Catulus' exposition of the doctrines of the New Academy. Cicero might then have expressed some judgment on those accounts, though the main part of his speech could have been an attack on dogmatism, including arguments against the validity of the senses (42, 79; cf. Plasberg, pp. 20-21).

An alternative, however, which I should like to propose for consideration is that the clash between Antiochus and Philo provided the starting-point, as in the second edition, for two opposed accounts of the history of the Academy, one from the point of view of Antiochus, the other from the point of view of Philo. For this purpose only two main speakers were needed. If Hortensius

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1 It seems to be on this ground that Reid (p. 43) assumes that Catulus defended the πιθανόν against Philo's innovations and showed that a satisfactory basis for knowledge had already been attained by it.

2 The contrary has often been assumed, e.g. by Plasberg, Praef. XII: "Pro Philone dixit Cicero ipse." Reid, on the other hand, disagrees with the view of Krische and Enstram that Cicero answered Catulus' arguments point by point, and maintains that Cicero never defends Philo's innovations anywhere (p. 46). It is true that Cicero does not, in the surviving part of either version of the Academica, openly pronounce a personal verdict on Philo's new doctrines. But he does accept two of Philo's principal claims, (i) that there has always been one Academy (I, 13 and 46), and (ii) that there is perception and knowledge, though not in the sense stipulated by the Stoics (111-113; Fin. V, 76). But he nowhere attributes this view to Philo's predecessors in the sceptical Academy, so that on this point, perhaps, he is in agreement with Catulus. Reid is surely wrong, however, in arguing that it can be inferred from 12 that Philo's views were dismissed by all the disputants, including Cicero, or that when Cicero states in Fam. IX, 8 that he is taking the part of Philo, he is referring to the 'general New Academic doctrines' taught by Philo prior to his innovations. Though Cicero's position in the Academica is not exactly that of Philo, his view of the unity of the Academy, if nothing else, would justify his claim to be supporting him, and like Philo, he has undertaken the 'patrocinium' of the school (17), including its rejection of the doctrine of the cataleptic impression.
outlined the earlier period from the point of view of Antiochus, we may suppose that Cicero, who accepted Philo's view of the unity of the Academy, was the speaker who justified the existence of the sceptical Academy as part of the tradition received from Plato and other philosophers before him (cf. 13). On this hypothesis there is no place for a major speech from Catulus, whose part in the dialogue would have been to open the discussion with a reference to Philo's innovations and his father's reactions to them.

Cicero's own account of the view of the principal Academic sceptics would, of course, have been unaffected by Philo's interpretations of them.¹ There would thus be no difficulty in taking 'ista quae sunt heri defensa' (12) as a reference to Cicero's own speech, which must also have included his attack on the senses 'non necessario loco' (79, cf. 42). But though Lucullus feels (10) that his case has been shaken by the argument in the Catulus, Cicero's attack on dogmatism can only have been superficial, so that a more critical examination of the case on each side was left for the Lucullus. Some polemical material may also have formed part of the speech of Hortensius, unless his point mentioned in 28 was not made during his speech but as a concluding remark, similar to the final opinion of Catulus in 148.

Whether the role here assigned to Catulus would have been deemed of sufficient weight to justify Cicero in naming the dialogue after him and prefacing it with a 'laudatio', is a matter of individual judgement. Cicero evidently found it easy to dispense with his part, for both in the intermediate version, where the parts of Hortensius and Lucullus were assigned to Cato and Brutus, and in the second edition, in which Varro takes them over, there is no speaker other than himself on the side of the sceptical Academy. Since both those revisions were carried out very quickly (Att. XIII, 13, 1; 16, 1), it is perhaps cn-sicr to believe that there were only two main speakers in the Catulus. Its structure would thus correspond both to the Lucullus and to what is left of the second edition of the Academica.

¹Since, in any case, they repudiated the doctrine of the cataleptic impression, Philo's view would be nothing more than a particular interpretation of the original Academic position.
The Proem

Cicero himself tells us that in prefacing each book of a major philosophical dialogue with a separate introduction1 he is following the example of Aristotle: *Att.* IV, 16, 5 'quoniam in singulis libris utor prohoimio2 ut Aristoteles in his quos έξωτερικοῦ κουκατ'. It is possible, therefore, that he is also following Aristotle in the style and manner of these introductions, written in propria persona,3 and used (generally speaking) to explain his own literary and philosophical aims, to set the scene and to introduce the dramatia personae.4

1 He does not always do so, e.g. *Fin.* III, N.D. II and III.

2 In Greek the word is used as a technical term for the opening section of a speech (Lat. exordium, cf. Arist. Rhet. III, 1414b; Quintilian IV, 1, 2), but also has the more general meaning of prelude or introduction. The use of the Latin prohoimion to mean the author's introduction to a literary work seems to have begun with Cicero; cf. *Att.* XVI, 6, 4, where he speaks of a 'volumen prohoimiorum' from which he was in the habit of making a selection. By mistake, he had sent Atticus a copy of a work 'On Glory' with an introduction already used for the third book of the *Academica* (second edition). This introduction, which must in the second edition have stood in the place of the present one, cannot have been so carefully related to the contents of the work.

3 In Plato's dialogues there is sometimes an introductory conversation prefacing the dialogue proper, as in the *Theaetetus*, but Plato himself never appears in his own person. That the philosophical dialogue after Plato normally had a non-dramatic opening can perhaps be inferred from Proclus' criticism of the proems of Theophratus and Heraclides Ponticus as 'out of keeping with what follows' ( ἀλόγως τῶν ἐξομένων, Procl. In Parm. IV p. 54 Cousin; Rose, Arist. frag. p. 23). Cicero may also have used Heraclides as a model for his proems, although Heraclides' dialogues were more often set in the remote past and he did not, therefore, take a speaking part in the rest of the work (*Att.* XIII, 19, 4, *O.F.* II, 5, 1). Cicero's proems are, however, never wholly independent of the rest of the dialogue.

4 For a full study of the introductions to Cicero's philosophical works, see M. Ruch, *Le mythambule dans les œuvres philosophiques de Cicéron*. 

COMMENTS

...
There is no exact parallel to the Ciceronian proemium in other forms of Latin literature. As explaining the author's aims and commending his subject, it bears some resemblance to the historian's preface; as a 'captatio benevolentiae', to the opening of a speech; as a non-dramatic preface to a dramatic work, and as an answer to critics, to a prologue of Terence. The closest formal parallel is to Varro's prefaces in the three books of the Res Rusticae, each of which contains, along with other introductory material, the setting of the scene for the dialogue which follows. Varro's treatment, however, both of the introductory matter and of the dramatic element, is comparatively simple; he is under no necessity to apologise for his subject or to explain his own position with regard to authorship, and he has no problem with his characters. For Cicero, in addition to the need to explain and defend, the dramatic requirements of the dialogue may to a greater or less extent affect the whole content of the proem. This particular mixture of authenticity and fiction, in the proem as well as in the dialogue proper, depends mainly on his choice of characters and is peculiar to Cicero.

Lucullus, the philosopher-statesman

1-4 (p.26,1 - p.28,14) magnum ingenium .... de quibus audisbat.

Summary. 2 (1) Lucullus' intellectual gifts and liberal culture did not win him the forensic distinction he merited because, during the time when he might have won such distinction, he was absent from Rome. In early life he and his brother displayed filial piety by bringing a charge against their father's prosecutor. Following his quaestorship, he was for many years in charge of the province of Asia, where he distinguished himself. He was appointed aedile in his absence, then praetor before the legal age; after this he went to Africa and returned to hold the consulship, during which he showed remarkable diligence and his ability was universally recognised. Sent by the senate against Mithridates, he exceeded not only everyone's expectations of him but also

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1 The page references are to O. Plaanberg's Teubner edition (1922).

2 In these 'summaries', I have occasionally translated rather than merely summarised, to avoid omitting points that require comment.
the glory of his predecessors. (2) This was all the more surprising since he had had no previous military experience. He arrived in Asia a ready-made general simply by conversing with the experts and reading military history during the journey. His memory for facts rivalled that of Hortensius for words, and recalls the similar gift of Themistocles. The greatest of the Greeks, except that, unlike Themistocles, Lucullus developed his natural powers by training. (3) He accordingly became so brilliant and versatile a commander that Mithridates, the greatest king since Alexander, admitted that he found him a greater general than any he had read about. His wisdom and justice were such that even to-day the province of Asia preserves his institutions. All these qualities unfortunately escaped the notice of the senate and the forum owing to his absence abroad. Worse, on his return the slander of his enemies delayed his triumph by three years, and it was I myself who, as consul, practically led his chariot into the city. I will not mention his help and advice during this crucial period, since it would mean talking about myself.

(4) In contrast to these much publicised aspects of his life, which are known to many, I share with only a few some more intimate details. Lucullus was more devoted to literature in general and philosophy in particular than those who did not know him were aware of. He pursued this interest not only in youth but also for several years as quaestor and even when actively engaged in the conduct of the war against Mithridates. During this period he kept Antiochus, who had the greatest reputation among philosophers, by his side, and his memory being such as described, he was easily able to learn through repetition what he could have remembered if he had heard it only once. He moreover took great delight in reading the books which Antiochus talked about.

The proem of the Lucullus, as it now stands, is an amended version:

Att. XIII, 32,3 'Catulum et Lucullum, ut opinor, antea (misi). His libris nova proboimia sunt addita, quibus eorum uterque laudatur'. His letters (Att. XIII, 12, 16, 19, 5) show that Cicero became dissatisfied with his original choice of characters for the Academica because of their lack of the

1For attempts at demarcating the new from what may be left of the original proem of the Lucullus, see M. Kuch, op. cit. p.264 ff.
necessary expertise in philosophy. The present proem, with its laudatio of Lucullus, represents, therefore, an intermediate stage (or one of several intermediate stages), before Cicero decided to rewrite the work transferring the parts of Hortensius, Catulus and Lucullus to Varro. In so doing, he was forced to go back on an earlier decision not to include living persons other than himself as speakers in the dialogues (Att.XIII,19,3 'sic enim constitueram, neminem includere in dialogos eorum qui uiuerent').

In selecting his speakers, Cicero seems to have been torn between the demands of dramatic propriety, which forbade the use of persons whose lack of familiarity with the subject was well known, and his wish to commend philosophy to his readers by depicting distinguished Romans discussing philosophical problems and combining this interest with their conduct of public affairs. For this purpose the dead were clearly more suitable than the living, as giving more scope for idealisation and for any fictional element which the dramatic treatment might require.¹ Thus the laudatio assumes to a certain extent the character of a laudatio funebris, in which a man's public achievements and virtues could be praised without an undue regard for strict historical accuracy.² In Cicero's account of Lucullus' public career there are obvious distortions and exaggerations, the chief being the statement that Lucullus was 'rei militaria rudis' when he took over command of the Mithridatic War. Since he had served under Sulla in the Social War and as proquaestor in Asia this was far from being the truth.³ Cicero's motive in misrepresenting the facts seems to be the wish to ascribe Lucullus' success as a general entirely to his remarkable memory, a factor...

¹See Introduction pp. 56 ff. Cicero also mentions, in connection with his choice of characters for the De Republica, a wish to avoid giving offence by encroaching on the contemporary scene: O.F.III,5,2 'ne in nostra tempora incurrens offenderem quempiam'. Cf. Att.XII,12,2.


³J. van Ooteghem, Lucius Licinius Lucullus, p.61.
which he stresses again in 4 when speaking of Lucullus' association with
Antiochus. Lucullus' success was not, in any case, as great as Cicero makes
out; he became unpopular with his troops and Pompey was eventually sent out
to replace him. Moreover, Cicero's assumption that he would have made his
mark at home if he had not been abroad so long is hardly consistent with the
fact that, when he did finally return, he held aloof from public affairs and
devoted himself to a life of refined luxury.

The laudatio of Lucullus should not, however, be judged as a historical
record. It is a brilliant piece of dramatic characterization, designed to
disguise the inadequacies of the real Lucullus for the role assigned to him
in the dialogue, and to create from him what is virtually an ideal character,
in which practical achievement and theoretical interest are combined to the
highest degree. It was not enough, therefore, to magnify the intellectual
gifts of Lucullus; Cicero had also to raise his practical abilities to the
level of near-perfection. 1 The creation of such an ideal, here represented
by Lucullus, is part of Cicero's plan to justify the pursuit of philosophy
to the practically-minded Roman. 2

His method is to look for those aspects of Lucullus' career which
simply required a shift of emphasis to transform his life into the perfect
combination of philosophy and statesmanship. He dwells much on what 'might
have been' Lucullus' impact on the political scene at Rome, if his qualities
had not been put to such good use elsewhere. In assessing his ability as a
commander, he appeals to the judgment, not of the senate or any competent
Roman, but of Mithridates, who found him a greater general than 'any he had
read about'. Thus part of the ideal rests on inference and part on a personal
opinion not admitting confirmation. Lastly, in 4 he differentiates between

1 It follows, in the context of the argument in 6, that if Lucullus had
distinguished himself so highly in practical affairs, no one could reasonably
object to his spending his leisure time in cultural pursuits. His memory
had been of service to the state as well as to philosophy.
2 It also, of course, looks back to the De Republica and Cicero's attempt to
transfer the Platonic ideal to the Roman scene.
the well-known facts of Lucullus' public life ('ex-\text{\textasciitilde}rma\textquoteleft\textquoteleft) and the inside information ('interiora\textquoteleft\textquoteleft) which he shares with only a few, namely Lucullus' devotion to philosophy and long association with Antiochus. By introducing fiction in the guise of what is less well known, he gives it verisimilitude without flying too openly in the face of fact.

For the real Lucullus' lack of philosophical equipment for the task assigned to him in the dialogue, we have the evidence of Cicero himself.\footnote{Att.XIII,12,3; 16,1; 19.5. Plutarch's picture of Lucullus as an ardent philosopher seems to be based mainly on the first edition of the Academica, which he mentions (Luc. 42).}

In lieu of the necessary expertise, Cicero offers us Lucullus' remarkable memory,\footnote{Probably a dramatic device. The deliberate memorizing of reported subject matter also plays a part in dialogue, cf. Am.3; Plat.Symn. 172 a ff.} and by admitting that repetition also played a part, he makes the tour de force seem plausible and well within the capacity of Lucullus.

A defence of Greek literature and philosophy

5-7 (p.28,15 - p.29,16) ac uereor interdum ....mortuis inuidoro.

Summary. (5) I sometimes fear that in trying to increase the fame of such men I may be diminishing it. For many dislike Greek literature and still more philosophy; the rest, even if they have no other objection, consider the discussion of such topics unsuitable for leading public figures. In my opinion, however, the fact that Cato learnt Greek literature in his old age\footnote{The tradition that the elder Cato was a 'late learner' in the field of Greek studies is certainly much exaggerated; see N. Tetronalos, \textit{Roman Attitudes to the Greeks} (Athene, 1974), pp.166 ff. R.E. Jansen ('Cicero's Accuracy Of Characterization in his Dialogues', AJP, 1939, p.310-12) argues that the portrait of Cato in the 
De Senectute as an enthusiast for Greek literature and philosophy is inaccurate. See A.E. Astin, \textit{Cato the Censor} (1976), p.157 ff.} and that Africanus took Panainius with him on his famous embassy\footnote{For the dating of this embassy and Scipio's friendship with Panainius, see A.E. Astin, \textit{Scipio Aemilianus} (Oxford 1567), p.127.} sufficiently supports the case for Greek literature and philosophy.
(6) It remains for me to reply to those who think conversations of this kind unbecoming to persons of dignity. But are we to expect them to meet in silence or talk about frivolities? If I was right in my praise of philosophy in a certain book of mine, surely it is a subject worthy of the most eminent persons, provided that we whom the Roman people has elevated to this rank do not allow our private interests to interfere with our public duties. But if when I had public work to do I devoted myself to the service of my fellow citizens and wrote nothing that was not concerned with my public life, who will blame me if, in the absence of such preoccupations, I try to keep my wits sharp and at the same time to benefit as many people as possible? As to the fame of such men, I consider that I am increasing it not diminishing it by publicising their less widely known claims to distinction. (7) There are those who say that the characters in my books did not in fact possess the knowledge attributed to them; these critics seem to me to be jealous of the dead as well as of the living.

From the praise of Lucullus, Cicero passes on to a defence of his own literary methods and activities. He starts by mentioning two sets of critics: (1) those who dislike Greek literature and philosophy; (2) those who think philosophical discussions unsuitable for men of rank and position. The first are briefly disposed of by the examples of the older Cato and the younger Scipio, which are sufficient to justify the study of Greek literature and philosophy respectively. The second criticism is more serious because it concerns Cicero’s own works and the literary methods employed in them. In his reply Cicero maintains an ambiguity, which seems to be deliberate,

1Reid (p.176 n.4) accuses Cicero of carelessness in using the expression 'restat ut' at the beginning of 6, on the ground that Cicero has not yet come to the end of his argument and that 'restat' is used again in 7 ('restat unum genus reprehensorum'). M. Ruch repeats this criticism (op.cit., p.265), which rests, however, on a confusion. The phrase 'restat ut' though it is sometimes used to state the conclusion of an argument (as in N.D.II,44 'restat igitur ut motus astrorum sit voluntarius'), can also indicate merely a transition to a fresh subject, not necessarily the final one (as here and in N.D.II,45 'restat ut qualis eorum natura sit consideramus').

2I.e. the N.c.tensius, mentioned also in Fin.I,2 and Tusc.II,4 as Cicero's answer to those who disapproved of philosophy as such, not any particular system of philosophy. Cf. Tusc.III,6; Div.II,1.
between conversations in real life and those portrayed in his dialogues, and
between his own role as an author and that of his leading characters (of whom
he is, of course, himself one). What is common to both Cicero and his
characters is that they are men of high position in the state using their
'otium' in a fitting manner: the sentence 'etnam in quodam libro ....
detrahamus' (6) applies, accordingly, to all concerned. In the next sentence,
however, still in the first person plural, Cicero states his own personal
position: if while he had a part to play he never neglected his public duty,
and committed to writing only his public speeches,¹ who would grudge him, in
his enforced 'otium', an occupation useful to himself and others? In the
next sentence ('gloriem uero ... adiungimus') he is again speaking as an
author about the (real or fictional) philosophical interests of his characters.
This leads him to mention a third set of critics, who object that his
characters did not in fact possess the 'scientia' needed for the discussions
in which they are represented as taking part. Although Cicero dismisses the
objection briefly, as due to jealousy of the dead, it must have weighed with
him sufficiently for him to write out the parts of Hortensius, Catulus and
Lucullus in the second edition.

In giving the claims of public life priority over philosophy, Cicero
is conforming both to Roman feeling on the matter and to his own opinion of
the paramount importance of service to the state.² Thus in the opening
chapters of the De Republica he rebukes certain philosophers for their
deliberate abstention from public affairs and argues that, since virtue

¹This interpretation of 'ne litteram quidem ullam fucimus nisi foroscsm' is
supported by Off. II, 3 'prim= enim, ut stante ro publica facere solsbamus, in
agendo plus quam in scribendo operae ponere mus, deinde ipsa scriptis non ea
quae nunc, sed actiones nostras mandaremus, ut scepse fecimus, cum a=em roo
publica, in qua omnis mea cura, cogitatio, opera poni solobat, nulla esset
omnia, illae scilicet litterae conticuerunt forenses et senatoriae.' In
Div. II, 3 he tells us that only the De Republica was written before his
retirement from public life (completed in 51 B.C., Att. V, 12, 2; Fam. VIII, 1, 4).
²Cf. Rep. I, 8, where he argues that the individual should expect for his private
use only just so much of his own mental powers and efforts as was left over
from service to the state.
depends on practice, it is more perfectly realised in the work of government than in the mere talk of the philosophers (Rep.I,2). This somewhat extreme position is modified later, when he points out that the greatest philosophers, though not actively engaged in political life, have contributed much to it by their inquiries and writings (Rep.I,12). Thus he sometimes argues that his own philosophical writings, far from being responsible for any neglect of the public interest, are now his only means of contributing to it.¹ During the period of his active public life, however, he spent only his spare time on philosophy, and this time, he tells us, was spent in reading and not in writing (Off.II,4).

In answering the third set of critics (7 'aunt etiam qui negent...'), Cicero does not step outside the dramatic convention to which he has conformed throughout the proem, of treating the fictional element in his character portrait as if it were historical. Hence he is unable simply to reply: 'The idealisation of character is an accepted feature, from Plato onwards, of the literary genre in which I am writing.' The attribution of the criticism to jealousy is not a very satisfactory answer,² and seems here to be Cicero's way of shelving a problem which continued to trouble him. The objection may have been first raised in relation to some previously published dialogue (the De Republica or the Hortensius), or, since the present proem is a later addition, Cicero could be answering criticism arising from the private circulation of some copies of his original version of the Academica; or he could be anticipating criticism. The somewhat perfunctory treatment, and the suggestion that such critics are hostile or malicious, perhaps suggests repetition of a point made in a previous dialogue.³

¹ Div.II,1; N.D.I,7; Tusc.I,5; Off.II,5; Ac.I,11.
³ Arusianus Messius, a grammarian of the 4th century, quotes from Cicero's Hortensius: 'qui hodie bellum cum mortuo gerunt' (Keil Cr.I. VII. p.458). See M.Kuch, L'Hortensius d' Cicéron, pp.64-66. The quotation is referred to as well known by Trebellius Pollio (V.G.20,1).
Summary. There remains a class of critics who disapprove of the Academic philosophy. But who approves any system except his own? Since we argue our views against others, we must allow them to disagree with us. Yet our case is easily stated: we wish to discover the truth without contention, and we search for it with unflagging zeal. All knowledge is hard to come by, owing to the obscurity of things themselves and the weakness of our powers of judgement, so that with good reason ancient thinkers doubted that they could reach their goal; yet they did not give up the search nor shall we tire of it. Our debates have no other aim than by arguing on both sides to bring out the truth or what comes nearest to it. (8) The only difference between ourselves and those who think they know is that they do not doubt the truth of what they maintain, whereas we consider many things probable, which we can follow but not positively affirm. We make free use of our faculty of judgement and are under no necessity to maintain a position that has been laid down for us. Others are caught and tied down before they are of an age to judge for themselves; influenced by some friend or captivated by the first speech they listen to, they form judgements on matters about which they know nothing, and cling to whatever system they have drifted up against, like a rock in a storm. (9) They claim to have faith in one whom they judge wise, but even granting that it was in their power to make such a judgement, they could not have done so on a single hearing and without learning the opinions of other schools. But most people prefer to be in error and to fight hard for the doctrine they have fallen in love with, rather than to search without obstinacy for the most consistent position.

Cicero here uses the proem not, as in N.D.I,11-12 and Off.II,7-8, to explain his own position as an adherent of the New Academic philosophy, but rather to defend that philosophy as such. I have suggested in the Introduction (p.52) that this difference of emphasis may be due to the fact that Cicero is now coming forward for the first time in support of the sceptical Academy.

The main basis of his defence in the present passage is the distinction he makes between those who would be called, in modern terms, sceptics and

1 Accepting Reid's 'contra omnes dicere' in line 21.
dogmatists. Cicero sees the former as keen and indefatigable seekers after truth, whose minds are free and uncommitted, whereas their opponents, having no doubts about what they maintain, are content to defend their position tenaciously on lines prescribed by authority. The theme of freedom is important in Cicero's works\(^2\) and becomes for him a means of projecting the positive side of the sceptical Academy and of countering the charge that scepticism would, if adopted, plunge us in total darkness and chain us down to immobility (61; cf. N.D.I,6). Cicero here brings out as sharply as possible the contrast between the freedom of individual judgement allowed the Academic sceptic and the restrictions placed on others by their dependence on authority. Reid points out that complete trust in 'one whom they judge to have been a wise man' is particularly characteristic of the Epicureans.\(^3\) Cicero must, however, intend his remarks to apply to any dogmatic school (cf. N.D.I,10, where the Pythagorean 'ipse dixit' is criticised). The saying, that it takes a wise man to judge a wise man, is attributed to Epicurus.\(^4\) A longer version of Cicero's argument occurs in Lucian, Hermotimus, 14 ff.

The claim that the purpose of the Academic 'disputatio' is to bring out the truth, or what comes nearest to it, by arguing on both side of a question, is distinctive of Cicero, and perhaps of the Academy in its later days.\(^5\) It can hardly have had this purpose in the Academy of Arcesilas, if

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\(^1\) See Introduction, pp.36-37.

\(^2\) 265; 137; Off.III,20; Div.II,150; Tusc.IV,7; V.93; H.D.I,10. Introduction, p.46. Scepticism may have been associated with freedom from the beginning (Introduction p.21 ...2). Renaissance writers were later to uphold the same opposition (Schmitt, Cicero Scenticus, p.24 ff.). However, Cicero does not always reject authority (Div.I,6; Log.I,36; Tusc.I,49).

\(^3\) Reid p.179 n.24; cf. N.D.I,72; II,73.

\(^4\) Act.IV,9,19/Us.225. Cf. Plin.Fr.I,10,4 'ut erim de victore sculptore fictore nisi artifex iudicarn, ita nisi sapiens non potent orriscore sapientem.\(^1\)

\(^5\) Cf. 60; Eor.III,3.
indeed Arcesilas did use this method, as Diogenes Laertius states (IV,20). 1
Usually Cicero makes a clear distinction between the 'mos patrius Academiae'
of opposing all views without stating one's own 2 and the practice of arguing
on both sides of a question, which originated with Aristotle and was taken
over by his school and by the Academy. 3 Cicero always associates Arcesilas,
and sometimes Carneades, with the former method, which began with Socrates. 4
In N.D.I,11, however, the two methods seem to be confused, and the task of
the New Academic is said, as in Ac.II,60, to be that of arguing for and
against all philosophical views. There is a similar confusion in Off.II,8,
where Cicero states that the purpose of arguing against all views is to
elicit the probable by comparing the case 'ex utraque parte'. It seems likely,
however, that as practised in the Academy of Arcesilas and Carneades, the
only outcome of either method would have been suspension of judgement. 5

1Plutarch, Sto.Rep.1037B (SVF II,129) quotes from Chrysippus 'Use of Reason'
a statement, which seems to be aimed at Arcesilas, that reason should be used
'for the discovery of truth and its cognates, not for the opposite of this,
though many do so.' Plutarch supposes that 'those who suspend judgement'
are the target of attack and proceeds to defend them as follows: 'they argue on
both sides without having knowledge of either, thinking that if anything is
knowable, only so, or mainly so, would truth allow itself to be known'. This
defence, which seems to owe something to Cicero, does not necessarily prove
that Arcesilas used this method, although Plutarch, like Diogenes, may have
thought that he did so. Nor does it prove that, if he used the method, he
did so for the reason given.

2De Or.I,43; N.D.I,11; Fin.II,2. Cf. 7 'contra omnes dicere' (Reid).

3Tusc.II,9; Fin.V,10; De Or.III,80. See Introduction, p.45 n.3.

4N.D.I,11; Fin.II,2; cf. Fin.V,10; De Or.III,80. But in Att.II,3,3 the practice
of arguing on both sides is said to be Socratic. We know from his speeches
for and against justice, delivered in Rome in 155 B.C., that Carneades also
employed this method, though whether from the motive which Cicero alleges it
would be hard to say.

5Cicero is nevertheless anxious to maintain that Arcesilas too had a serious
purpose and wished to discover the truth (76). Hence in 77 he pictures him
conversing with Zeno in what seems intended to be an imitation of the Socratic
manner. See von Armin, RE s.v. Arkcesilas (Long H.III, p.91 n.1). Long (p.69)
describes Arcesilas' philosophical method as 'the Socratic procedure updated
to take account of the state of philosophy in the third century B.C.', and
illustrates it from his criticism of the cataleptic impression in Sextus A.N.
VII,150-71 and the passage of Cicero referred to above.
It may seem that Cicero has been led into an inconsistency through his desire to present the New Academic philosophy as entirely positive in its approach and outlook. The search for truth presupposes that truth is, in theory at least, attainable, however difficult this may be in practice. But the New Academic, though he does not deny that truth exists, denies that it can be known or recognised with certainty. Are we to suppose that, in spite of this, he still goes on searching for the truth in the same sense as anyone else? As St. Augustine will later argue (Ac.I,2,5; 4,10), doubt is surely a 'desperatio uori', and there is nothing pleasant or laudable in a life spent in an unsuccessful search for truth. On the other hand, it could be argued, as Cicero does in 65-66, that the New Academic is motivated by a genuine desire for the truth, since he welcomes the probable as the nearest approximation to it. In principle, there is no end to search except discovery: what differentiates the sceptic from the dogmatist is that the latter's claim to 'know' and to have formulated this knowledge in a system implies that he has already found the truth, whereas the sceptic is still searching. Whether the true or the probable is the ultimate goal of his search is therefore immaterial. In 111 Cicero argues, like Philo, that we perceive the true and...

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1 In I,44 the view that there are obstacles to knowledge is attributed, not without reason, to the early philosophers and used to justify Arcesilas' sceptical attack on Stoicism. See below, p.91.

2 If nothing can be known, the best course would be to avoid desiring the truth (Aug. Ac.I,3,9), or to give up the search, like Hermotimus in Lucian's dialogue. If the Sixteen sceptic leaves the issue of knowledge open (P.H.I, 1 ff.), it is perhaps from a realisation that a dogmatic 'nothing can be known' is incompatible with a philosophy of search. On the Academic desire for truth and how this differentiates him from the Pyrrhonian sceptic, see M. Concho, Pyrrhon ou l'apparence, pp.107-8.

3 It is a corollary of this that he should wish to avoid the false. Cicero deduces from this the necessity of έποχή (60).

4 26; Fin.I,3.

5 For the sceptic, this claim involves 'arrogantia' (Off.II,8); cf. Div.II,1: 'quod genus philosophandi minimo arrogans maximeque et contemptus et elegans arbitramur, quattuor Academicia libris ostendimus'. Similarly Montaigne (Peresais II,12) considered the Pyrrhonian sceptics to be 'le plus sage parti des philosophes'. Cf. Sextus P.H.II,11; A.M.VII,314.
the false, though not with certainty. Elsewhere he says that the Academic sceptic cannot advance further than probability and the appearance of truth. In the present passage he does not commit himself to either alternative, or raise the question whether the New Academic can make knowledge claims, perhaps in order to make the contrast between the sceptic and the dogmatist as clear as possible.  

Cicero is here defending a philosophy which in its last days had become increasingly unpopular and which, since Philo's death, had lacked a representative, though in _N.D._, II he refuses to allow that his case has already gone by default, on the ground that doctrines do not die with their human exponents. Thus his preliminary defence, addressed to Roman readers, is designed to remove prejudice (cf. 64 ff.) and to indicate broad differences. In stressing the importance for the New Academic of the discovery of truth, he is rebutting the charge of 'contentio', or argument for argument's sake, and 'pertinacia', wilful obstinacy, a charge which he turns against his opponents, who stubbornly defend their preconceived notions instead of keeping an open mind. He brings this charge indirectly, by criticising not the schools as such but their effect on immature and inexperienced adherents, and by concluding that most people prefer to be in error rather than give up their cherished opinions.

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1 _Tusc._ II, 5; cf. 17. In _Off._ II, 8 the purpose of the 'disputatio' is simply to elicit the probable. This is perhaps sufficient to refute M. Y. Henry (_The Relation of Dogmatism and Scepticism in the Philosophical Treatises of Cicero_, p. 29-30), who compares Cicero with W. James (_Pragmatism_, p. 207-8) and contends that he 'looks toward some ideal world where the truth to which man can only approximate shall now be verified and known'.

2 Cf. 3 'nós probabilia multa habemus, quae sequi facile, adfirmare uix possimus'. Reid p. 178 n. 14 translates 'sequi' as 'act upon'. There seems no reason to confine the word to this meaning. In _Off._ II, 7-9, where Cicero sets out his position in greater detail, there is clearly a reference to thought as well as to action.

3 These charges, if left unanswered, would convict the New Academic of a total disregard for truth. Cf. _De Or._, I, 47, where the Greeks are said to be as a nation 'contentiones cupidiorem quam veritatis'. For 'pertinacia' see Reid p. 156 n. 10; Varro, _L.L._, V, 2. The Academic who is chiefly attacked on this score in Arnaeulan (14-16; cf. _Fin._, V, 94 for Pino's opinion of him as 'in disserendo pertinacia'); Cicero defends him in _An._, I, 44 and II, 76-77.
Dramatic setting

9 (p. 30, 27 – p. 31, 12) quibus de rebus .... consederimus.

Summary. I have often inquired into and discussed these subjects at length, including one occasion at Hortensius' villa at Baulli, when Catulus, Lucullus and I had gone there on the day after we had been at Catulus' villa. We were there early since Lucullus intended to go by sea to his country seat at Naples and I to mine at Pompoi, if there was a wind. After a short conversation in the garden walk, we sat down.

The scene is now set and the characters are introduced; the passage forms a transition between the proem and the dialogue proper, and links the two books of the Academica by supposing the discussions to have taken place on two consecutive days. A similar stage setting, usually brief, occurs in most of Cicero's dialogues; in the Academica Posteriora, where there is no formal proem, it is the only introduction to the dialogue. Unlike those of Plato, which are varied and often highly elaborated, Cicero's settings are simple; the characters are brought on with the minimum of explanation and comment, as a small group of friends already known to one another and probably to the reader.

As in a number of Cicero's dialogues, the scene is set outside Rome, though not at one of Cicero's own villas, as is often the case. It was to his country houses that Cicero usually retreated to meditate and study, and here that he carried on philosophical discussions with his friends and neighbours. During the unhappy period in which his philosophical works

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1 For a brief comparison between the opening passages of Cicero and Plato, see A. E. Douglas in Cicero, ed. T. A. Dorey, p. 140.

2 Of the dialogues we have, the Academica (Pioron and Posteriora) and De Finibus III-IV are set in the country houses of Cicero's friends. Cicero's villa at Tunculum is the scene of the De Divinatione and the Tunculan Disputations; his place at Cumae of De Finibus I-II; at Puteoli, of the De Fato. The De Ieripibus, which (like Plato's Laws) opens as a dramatic dialogue, is set in the countryside near Arpinum; this information is conveyed in the course of the conversation.

3 Top. I; Fin. III, 7; Att. II, 6, 1.

were composed, his time was spent, he tells us, in wandering from one country house to another (Off. III, 1). Thus for various reasons philosophy became linked in the author's life with his stay in the countryside, and the villa or garden setting assumed a certain 'intellectual' role.¹

The country villa, ensuring privacy and retreat from the multitude, symbolises both the aristocratic nature of Roman culture and the seclusion needed for philosophical pursuits. Further, it serves to demarcate the 'otium' of men of affairs from their public obligations. The fact that the discussions take place away from Rome, or if at Rome, during a public holiday,² emphasises that, for a Roman, philosophy is a leisure pursuit and in no way interferes with public business. Moreover, the characters do not meet expressly to discuss philosophy, but always for some other purpose, social or recreational. In Tusc. I, 7 Cicero takes advantage of the fact that he has friends staying with him; in Brut. 10, Brutus just drops by with Atticus, as he often did; in Fin. I, 14 Cicero's friends have come to call on him; in Fin. III, 7 Cicero has gone to the young Lucullus' villa to borrow a book and happens to find Cato in the library. So here, Cicero and Lucullus are waiting for a wind to take them to their country estates; it is a fortunate coincidence that, by the time the wind rises, the conversation has come to a natural end.

A short preliminary conversation is mentioned ('cum igitur paucæ in xysto locuti essesmus')³ after which the characters sit down. This act of sitting, which is referred to also in other dialogues,⁴ marks the beginning of the main discussion. Other common preliminary features, the greeting and the stroll, are here omitted.⁵

³ Cf. Fin. I, 14 'paucæ primo inter nos de litteris'. Rep. I, 18 'cum essent parpaucæ inter se uno atque altero spatio conlocuti'.
⁴ E.g. Fin. III, 9; Brut. 24; Fat. 4; Div. II, 8; De Or. I, 29, III, 18.
⁵ M. Ruch, Le prélambule dans les œuvres philosophiques de Ciceron, p. 372 ff.
In choosing the villa of Hortensius as the scene of the Lucullus, Cicero may be intending to link it with his first work in the philosophical series, the Hortensius (see Introduction, p. 9 and p. 59). Although Cicero makes it clear in his letters that none of his characters would in real life have been qualified to take part in a technical debate of the kind pictured in the Academica, 1 only Hortensius has been previously represented as actively opposed to philosophy. If the conclusion of the Hortensius was, as seems likely, a modification of this attitude (61), the two subsequent dialogues confirm that conclusion and use it to give credibility to his present role, and with it to Cicero's treatment of the other characters. Cicero's picture of Roman intellectual life may be a fiction, but it is a consistent fiction, and one that gives unity and a degree of verisimilitude to his dramatic characterization. One cannot help feeling that much of his self-criticism on this score was misguided.

Preliminary conversation

10 (p. 31, 3-24) hic Catulus .... animos oreximus.

Summary. Here Catulus remarked, 'Though our inquiry was almost completed yesterday, I am looking forward, Lucullus, to your telling us, as you promised, what you heard from Antiochus.' 'I only wish,' said Hortensius, that I had left the whole subject intact for Lucullus. But perhaps I have; my treatment was only superficial and I look to Lucullus for the finer details.' 'Your expectation,' replied Lucullus, 'does not trouble me, as it would if I cared about making a good impression. The doctrines are not mine, and if they are false I would rather lose my case than win it. However, as the case now stands, though it suffered some setbacks yesterday, I am deeply convinced that it is true. So, to heighten your expectation, I will set the matter out as Antiochus used to, for I am very familiar with his treatment of it.' This beginning captured our attention.

1 It is possible that Cicero is likewise exaggerating his own ability to take part in impromptu debate of this kind, since much of his material must have been taken direct from Greek sources. His reference to the frequency of such debates ('quibus de rebus et alia saepa nobis multa quaeritur et disputata sunt') probably reflects his intended programme of philosophical works rather than occasions in real life; cf. Fam. IX, 9, 1 (to Varro) 'puto forte ut cum legibus mirere nos id locution esse inter nos quod nunquam locuti simus; sed nosti morum dinologorum.'
The purpose of the preliminary conversation is to pave the way in a natural manner to the main subject of the dialogue, and to give it continuity with the previous day's discussion as depicted in the *Catullus*. This is done by a reminder to Lucullus of his promise to give an account of the views of Antiochus. We gather that he has been anticipated, though not to a serious extent, by Hortensius on the previous day. Lucullus' account is to be more searching and exact, owing to his closer acquaintance with Antiochus and his doctrines.

The division of a longer work into separate conversations held on different days is, as compared with the length of some of Plato's dialogues, a gain in realism, but creates a need to reintroduce the subject and provide connections, the artificiality of which is to some extent apparent. Cicero's handling of the opening conversation is successful, partly because it is so succinct, and partly because he draws on his own professional idiom in making Hortensius and Lucullus talk as if they were two advocates supporting the same case. The interest of the listeners is roused chiefly by the assertion (for which the reader has been prepared in the proem, 4) that Lucullus has on numerous occasions paid careful attention to Antiochus' line of argument and will thus be able to reproduce it exactly.

As Cicero points out in his letters, the real Lucullus could not have done such a thing even in his dreams. Cicero does not entirely succeed in overcoming this difficulty, for in his attempt to justify the role he has gone to the opposite extreme and built up a character whose talents and devotion to philosophy would lead us to expect that his participation in the dialogue would be anything but trivial. Yet he makes him the mere mouthpiece of Antiochus' doctrines. The reader has been prepared for this by references to his remarkable memory; even so, it seems that Cicero may have fallen

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badly between two stools in first endowing the historical Lucullus with an intense interest in philosophy, then representing this interest as satisfied by memorisation of another's views.

Although he defends the cause of dogmatism, Cicero shows in Lucullus none of the dogmatist's narrow-minded obstinacy which he criticised in the proem (8-9). Lucullus has admittedly been strongly influenced by Antiochus and believes his case to be 'ueriesima', but he is prepared to give way with a good grace if he should in the end be proved wrong. Cicero thus anticipates the conclusion of the dialogue and his own intention to bring a stronger case on the other side. He does not indeed represent Lucullus as openly admitting defeat (this would have been unfair both to the historical Lucullus and to Antiochus), and Lucullus' last comments are deliberately directed away from this issue (148). Throughout his own reply Cicero treats Lucullus as the representative of Antiochus, often addressing him as if he were a member of a school ('uos', 'uester'), but he sometimes points out to him the consequences of his commitment to a dogmatic position, as if these were not fully realised. So here, by making Lucullus say that the views he will state are not his own and he will not be personally concerned if they are defeated, Cicero avoids representing him as defending too stubbornly a doctrine which in real life he probably did not hold or attributing to him faults which are inherent in the dogmatic position.

1 There is, however, a note of dogmatism in the use of the superlative 'ueriesima', in spite of the admission that his case had been weakened by Cicero's arguments on the previous day.

2 E.g. 119 'tibi hoc repudiaro, illud autem superius sicut caput et famam tuam defendero necesso erit'; 137 'haec tu, Lucullo, si es assensus Antiocho familiaris tuo, tam sunt defendenda quam moenia, mihi autem bona modo tantum quantum uidebitur'.

3 At this stage, moreover, Lucullus has to win the goodwill of his audience and cannot therefore be made to display the faults attributed to the dogmatist in the proem.
Summary. (11) Antiochus was with me in Alexandria when I was there as proqua-reator, and I used to listen to his frequent discussions with his friend Heraclitus, who had preceded him there. Heraclitus had been for a long time a pupil of Clitomachus and Philo and was highly esteemed in that school of philosophy which, after being almost given up, is now being championed again. ¹ Those two books of Philo, mentioned by Catulus yesterday, had then been brought to Alexandria and for the first time reached Antiochus. To my surprise, for he was a very gentle person, he became angry and kept asking Heraclitus if such doctrines had even been professed by Philo or any other member of the Academy. Heraclitus thought not, yet the work appeared to him to be Philo's; besides, my friends Publius and Caius Selius and Tetriclius Rogus had not only heard those doctrines from Philo at Rome but had even copied the two books from Philo's own originals. (12) Then Antiochus voiced a number of objections against Philo, including those mentioned by Catulus yesterday as having been brought by his father, and he even published a book against his former teacher entitled the Scoua. In the ensuing discussion, which occupied several days, Heraclitus argued against Antiochus and Antiochus against the Academics; I paid special attention to Antiochus' case. Also present were Aristus, Antiochus' brother, Aristo and Dio, and we spent much time on this single discussion. But since Philo is a less challenging opponent in that he denies, though falsely, that the doctrines delivered yesterday were ever stated by the Academica, let us pass on to Arcestias and Carneades.

The present passage is usually taken as historically true, ² at least in so far as it explains the circumstances in which Philo's two books reached Antiochus and his reactions to them. The whole episode, however, is so clearly adapted to Cicero's dramatic purpose that it cannot be accepted without question.

¹The New Academy had more or less died with Philo until its cause was taken up by Cicero in the Academica. See pp. 36 and 51 above.
Cicero has already spoken in general terms of Lucullus' opportunities to become acquainted with Antiochus' teaching, once in the proem (4), and again in 10, where Lucullus himself states that he used to listen to Antiochus 'vacuo animo' and 'cadem de re saepius'. Lucullus now goes on to recall a specific occasion at the very outset of their friendship, some 27 years before the dramatic date of the dialogue. In 87 B.C. Lucullus was sent by Sulla to Egypt to collect a fleet (Plut. Inc. 2; App. Mitbr. 33). Philo and other prominent Athenians had fled to Rome at the beginning of the war (Brut. 306), and it is very probable that Antiochus went to Alexandria.1 It is even possible, if we accept Cicero's account of their friendship, that he went in Lucullus' company, or that he met Lucullus there. What is highly unlikely is that a scene such as Cicero describes should have taken place in Lucullus' presence, or that Lucullus would have had time, while carrying out his mission, to attend lengthy philosophical discussions.2
Antiochus may, however, have indicated in the Sonus that he was in Alexandria when he received the two books of Philo, and he may have described his own feelings on reading them, with other circumstantial details.3 Cicero's contribution would then be to make this coincide with Lucullus' mission to Egypt and to assume him a witness to what happened.

Apart from other implausibilities in Lucullus' account of the meeting,4 the suggestion that Antiochus argued against the New Academy in general ('contra Academicos') and did not confine his criticism to Philo's two books, is clearly directed to providing Lucullus with an opportunity to attend to and memorise Antiochus' objections not only against Philo but also against

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1 For reasons against supposing that he first went to Rome with Philo and met Lucullus there, see Introduction p.33 n.1.

2 J. van Oosterhem, Lucius Licinius Lucullus, p.20. According to Plutarch, Luc.2.10, Lucullus did not even take time off to visit Memphis and the other wonders of Egypt.

3 Dillon, p.54. For Cicero's use of the Sonus, see Introduction, p.40.

4 If the doctrines contained in the two books were new even to Heraclitus, how could he have recognised them as genuinely Philon's? Some of Philo's new claims had previously been made by Metrodorus, yet both Antiochus and
the school as a whole. Antiochus is thus represented as arguing from two standpoints: like Catulus' father, he is accusing Philo of misrepresentation, as if in defence of the sceptical Academy; he is also attacking the sceptical Academy, including Philo, which he could only do from his new dogmatic standpoint. We are not told what Heraclitus' attitude was to Philo's new doctrines, but merely that he argued 'contra Antiochum', while Antiochus argued 'contra Academicos'. Furthermore, in spite of the occasion which gave rise to the discussion and Antiochus' anger, which would suggest that Philo was the chief target of his attack, Lucullus dismisses Philo as 'adversarius lenior' and decides to pass on to Arcesilas and Carneades.

It is difficult to judge how deep the fiction goes in this account. But, as it stands, it does not provide evidence that Antiochus was shocked into deserting the sceptical Academy by Philo's innovations. He is pictured as disputing with Heraclitus even before the two books arrived, and though his attack on Philo may have been spontaneous and unpremeditated, in the discussions which followed (if Cicero's account of them is accepted) he cannot have been maintaining a position which was wholly new to him. I have argued in the Introduction (p. 31 ff.) that Antiochus' defection is likely to have preceded, not followed, Philo's innovations. Philo claimed that his predecessors had denied the possibility of knowledge only in the Stoic sense and so had not deviated from the true Academic tradition. For Antiochus, whose position depended on keeping a clear distinction between the Old and New Academies, this was as plainly false as it was for Catulus' father, who perhaps looked at the matter from a more orthodox sceptical viewpoint. The angry reaction of Antiochus, which is not in Cicero's account very clearly motivated, was perhaps due to a feeling that Philo had outmanoeuvred him.

Heraclitus are said to have never heard of them.

1 For Cicero's use of 'Academicus' to refer to the New Academy, see Introduction p. 37. Here by implication Cicero denies the application of the word to Antiochus (cf. 132 'qui appellabatur Academicus, erat quidem, si perpauca mutauisset, germanissimus Stoicus').
Philo's claim that no member of the Academy had denied the possibility of knowledge except in the Stoic sense, is probably true enough. It would be false, however, to infer that any would have wished, like Philo, to affirm the possibility of knowledge in a different, non-Stoic sense. This inference is easily drawn and on it depends Lucullus' formulation of Philo's position ('qui ista quae sunt heri defensa negat Academicos omnino dixisse') as a simple denial that the Academy had ever maintained that knowledge is impossible. Lucullus regards this denial not only as false ('et al aperto mentitur') but also as a weakening of the sceptical position. His dismissal of Philo as 'adversarius lenior' / 'minus acer' shows Cicero's tendency to polarise points of view in the discussion. The attitude of Philo's predecessors, who did not make a distinction between two kinds of knowledge, is both simpler to formulate and more sharply opposed to dogmatism.

Of the other persons said to be present, Antiochus' brother Aristus succeeded him as head of the Academy (Brut. 332; see Reid, p. 7–9). Aristo and Dio were both natives of Alexandria, the former a Peripatetic (D.L. VII, 164) and the latter an Academic (Strabo XVII, 796), whose murder in Rome in 57 B.C. caused a scandal (Pro Caelio 24 and 51). Nothing further is known about Heraclitus or the friends who brought Philo's books from Rome.3

Objections against the Academic attempt to vindicate the sceptical tradition as an ancient one

13–15 (p. 32, 32 – p. 34, 19) quae cum dixisset ... idem fuerit in Socrate.

Summary. (13) After this he began again: 'First, in quoting the old physicists, you seem to me' – he was addressing me in particular – 'to be behaving like revolutionaries who claim to be imitating distinguished men of the past, to whom they attribute popular sympathies. They go

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1 Unless we believe Metrodorus' interpretation of Carneades (Introduction, p. 18).

2 It can probably be inferred from the context that he was a follower of Antiochus (Dillon, pp. 61–63 and 115).

3 Brochard (p. 221) places them among Philo's continued supporters, but this is more conjecture. Heraclitus continued to oppose Antiochus in the discussion; this does not necessarily mean that he supported Philo.
back as far as P. Valerius, consul in the first year after the expulsion of the kings, and others who as consuls passed popular legislation about appeal; then they pass on to the more familiar names, C. Flaminius, who as tribune carried an agrarian law against senatorial opposition a few years before the Second Punic War and was later twice consul; L. Cæcina, Q. Pompeius; even Africanus himself is included in the list. They claim that those two distinguished and learned brothers, P. Crassus and P. Scaevola, supported the legislation of Ti. Cracchus, the one openly and the other secretly. They also add Marius, and in his case at least they do not lie. Pointing to these famous men, they claim to be following their example. (14) In the same way you, wishing to overthrow an established philosophy, cite Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Parmenides, Xenophanes, even Plato and Socrates. But just as Saturninus (to name my own family's chief enemy) had nothing in common with those men of old, so the sophistry of Arcesilas cannot be compared with the restraint of Democritus. But in any case it is not very often that, finding themselves in a difficulty, those early philosophers cry out as if in a frenzy (Empedocles sometimes seems to me to talk like a madman) that everything is hidden, that we can see and discover nothing in its true nature; most of the time they make very emphatic assertions and claim to know more than is justified. (15) But if in grappling with new ideas, like new-born infants, they got into difficulties, has no progress toward knowledge been made since then? Had not important systems of philosophy been set up when Arcesilas became, like Tiberius Gracchus, a rebel against the establishment, hiding behind the authority of those who had denied the possibility of knowledge and perception? We must remove Plato and Socrates from their number, the former because he left behind a completed system, that of the Peripatetics and Academics, who differ only in name not in substance, and from whom the Stoics differ in terminology rather than opinion. Socrates, on the other hand, regularly used to employ the kind of self-deprecation which the Greeks call et' kaiwela, as did Africanus, according to Fannius; this characteristic was not considered a fault in Africanus because he shared it with Socrates.

1 Reid, followed by Rackham, takes 'cum...uelitis' as frequentative, but this is clearly wrong. Roby, Latin Grammar, 1716, which Reid quotes, says that cum and subjunctive in this sense is 'rarely, if ever' found in Cicero. The present subjunctive is especially rare in this construction, even in later authors. Cf. F. C. Woodcock, A New Latin Syntax, p.190; Kühner-Steinmann II, pp.206 ff. Cum here is plainly causal.

2 Again, Reid's note on 'et tamen' is misleading, though Munro's note on Lucr. V,1177, to which he refers, gives the sense correctly as 'putting all previous considerations aside'. Cf. Sen.16.
By indicating a fresh start at this point, Cicero marks the transition from the opening preliminaries of Lucullus' speech, based on the meeting in Alexandria, to the beginning of the argument proper, which is probably adapted from Antiochus' Sosus. Lucullus begins, however, with a political analogy which must have been added by Cicero as part of the Roman setting, to interest and involve his Roman readers. It is introduced as an argumentum ad hominem directed especially at Cicero himself, whom Lucullus regards as a political sympathiser even if a philosophical opponent. The common political background of the participants in the discussion is thus emphasised and Cicero is at the same time singled out as the representative of the New Academy who will later reply to Lucullus' argument.

It is not clear who these 'seditioi clives' are, or whether it was, as Lucullus states, common practice for members of the popular faction to justify their actions by quoting precedents from Roman history. In 14 (as in Cicero's reply in 75) Saturninus is singled out for special mention, but there is a discrepancy here in that his contemporary Marius is included in the list of famous precedents quoted by the 'seditioi', some of whom must therefore be later than Saturninus, perhaps even later than the dramatic date of the dialogue.

1 Introduction p. 40.

2 Plasborg conjectures that Cicero himself used a similar argument when in 65 B.C. he successfully defended the tribune C. Cornelius on a charge of 'maentas', against the united opposition of the optimate party; see M. Ruch, L'Hortensius de Cicéron, p. 84. See also following note.

3 In 75 Cicero makes it clear that Saturninus was one of those who cite famous names ('uideor tibi non ut Saturninus nominare modo illustres, sed ctiam initari nunquam nisi clarum, nisi nobilem?'). In Brut. 224 Cicero says of him that of all the agitators after the Gracchi he appeared to be the most eloquent, but he produced this impression more by the use of flamboyant effect than by any real power of speech or mental endowment. The family feud to which Lucullus refers concerned his uncle, Metellus Numidicus, who tried as censor in 102 B.C. to remove Saturninus from the Senate; he was forced into exile but recalled after Saturninus' death through the efforts of his family (H. H. Scullard, From the Gracchi to Marius, pp. 57, 61–2).

4 Cf. 63 'ut cauerae ne quis improbus tribunus plebis, quorum uides quanta copia semper futura sit...' and 144 'ut seditioi tribuni nolent'. By Cicero's time the tribunate had become a political tool, from which he personally suffered when in 50 Clodius secured his exile.
Lucullus takes a broad look at four centuries of Roman history, citing some of the classic examples of popular legislation, but dwelling mostly on the opposition to the senate in the Gracchan and post-Gracchan period. Of the persons mentioned, Publius Valerius (surnamed Poplicola and reputed consul in 509 B.C.) is a virtually legendary figure; his law on 'provocatio' was, according to tradition, the first passed by the centuriate assembly.\(^1\)

The anonymous consuls may be L. Valerius and M. Horatius, mentioned by Cicero in *Rep.* II, 54 as having passed a law providing that no magistrate not subject to 'provocatio' should be elected (449 B.C.). Moving on to better known times, Lucullus names C. Flaminius, who in 232 B.C. set the precedent for Ti. Gracchus by going to the people with his land-bill,\(^2\) L. Cassius, who as tribune in 137 extended the use of secret ballot to the judicial assemblies of the people,\(^3\) and Q. Pompeius, one of the first pair of plebeian censors in 131. Lucullus indicates surprise that the younger Scipio should be included in the list,\(^4\) probably owing to his support of Laelius' land-bill, which was later dropped. Of the two brothers next mentioned, P. Licinius Crassus took Ti. Gracchus' place on the land commission after the latter's death; P. Mucius Scaevola, as consul in the fatal year (133 B.C.), refused to take illegal action against him when asked to do so by the senate.\(^5\) Lucullus suggests that his support of Gracchan legislation rests on mere suspicion, whereas in the case of Marius there was no doubt of his popular leanings.

\(^1\) *Rep.* II, 53-4; Livy II, 8, 1-2 with Ogilvie's commentary, p. 252. Ogilvie concludes that the law of 509 is a fictional 'doublet' of the Valerian law passed in 300 B.C. (Livy X, 9, 3-6).

\(^2\) H. H. Scullard, *From the Gracchi to Nero*, p. 27. Livy XXI, 53, 2 has an account of his opposition to the senate as consul in 223 and 217.

\(^3\) Thus giving them 'greater freedom from pressure by the nobles' (Scullard, op. cit. p. 24). In *Leg.* VII, 35 he is spoken of as 'dissidentes a bonis atque omnis rumouculos populierì ratione auscupante'.

\(^4\) Cf. 5. For Cicero, Scipio was obviously on the side of the establishment, being the ideal combination of intellectual, military and political qualities.

\(^5\) In *Tusc.* IV, 51 Cicero criticises him as 'faint-hearted' ('lanquentem consul-em'); cf. *De Or.* II, 205.
On the philosophical side, Arceeilaa is singled out by being twice mentioned; no other New Academic (apart from Cicero himself) is referred to by name. That Arceeilas justified his scepticism by attributing it to famous philosophers of the past is also attested by Plutarch (Adv.Col.1121F), who names Socrates, Plato, Parmenides and Heraclitus and, like Cicero, makes it a reproach brought against Arceeilas by his opponents. In I,44 Cicero represents Arceeilas as a genuine follower of those early thinkers (Socrates, Democritus, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, 'omnes paene uortes'), to whom, somewhat surprisingly, he attributes total scepticism ('qui nihil cognoscit, nihil percepi, nihil scire posse dixerunt'). Similarly, in his reply to Lucullus in 72 ff., Cicero maintains that the statements of the Presocratics, Socrates and Plato do in fact support the New Academic position. Whether Arceeilas himself made extravagant claims of this nature is open to question. The exaggeration which assimilates the Socratic 'confession of ignorance' to the New Academic thesis that nothing can be known (cf. 74 'dubitari non possit quin Socrati nihil sit uision sciri posse') is probably Cicero's own, since he points out that Arceeilas did in fact distinguish his own position from that of Socrates. It is unlikely that Arceeilas saw no difference between his own views and those of the Presocratics, although he may have claimed an affinity with them, perhaps in order to dissociate himself from Pyrrho. The scepticism of Pyrrho is nowhere

1As Reid points out (p.157 n.13), Cicero does not specifically name Heraclitus in this connection, although the development of his theory by Cratylus is probably the only instance of pure scepticism in the Presocratic period and had an important influence on Plato (Guthrie, History of Greek Philosophy I, p.450). Sextus, on the other hand, regards Heraclitus as a dogmatist (P.H.I,210 ff.).

2The indiscriminate use of the precedent argument is further illustrated in D.L.IX,71 ff., where even Homer is cited as a sceptic.

3By denying that, like Socrates, he knew his own ignorance; I,45 'itaque Arceeilas negabat esse quicquam quod scire posset, ne illud quidem ipsum, quod Socrates sibi reliquisset'. Cf. 74. It is of course obvious that Socrates' denial of knowledge had nothing to do with his perception of the external world.

4See p.20 above. Lucullus does not mention any of the Megarians, probably because Arceeilas also dissociated himself from this school, although his contemporaries saw the connection (Sextus P.H.I,234; D.L.IV,33; Kemenius, fr.25,15 ff.). Cicero in 75 declines to quote them as precedents.
mentioned by Cicero, from which we may infer either that he was unaware of it,\(^1\) or that it was official New Academic policy to ignore it.\(^2\) The latter seems more probable.

Lucullus argues that the 'sceptical' remarks of the early philosophers were mere emotional outbursts caused by the difficulties they encountered at an early stage of physical inquiry; for the most part they were dogmatic in outlook and professed to know more than in fact they did. While agreeing with the second part of this statement, we must have serious reservations about the first. Lucullus does not deny that the Presocratics actually made such statements ('abstrusa esse omnia, nihil nos sentire, nihil cernere, nihil omnino quale sit posse reperire'),\(^3\) but he claims that these are nullified by their very positive assertions of their own doctrines. It would be more correct to make a distinction between the distrust of the senses displayed in varying degrees by most philosophers of the early period and the confidence they felt in the power of reason to arrive at truth, either independently of the senses or by interpreting their evidence in some special way. For Lucullus to have admitted such a distinction would, however, have been to play into the hands of the sceptics, whose case no doubt rested on the attitude of these early 'physici' to sense-experience, which contrasted significantly with the theories of knowledge they were attacking.\(^4\)

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1. Pyrrho is mentioned by Cicero only once in the Academica, as having denied that the wise man even perceives morally indifferent things (130). This might be taken to be a reference to Pyrrho's ethical scepticism. But Long (H.Ph. p.76 ff.) has argued that Cicero has probably confused Pyrrho's position with Aristotle's rejection of the orthodox Stoic doctrine of indifference.

2. Cf. Brochard, p.97: 'Si Pyrrhon n'eût pas existé, la nouvelle Académie aurait été à peu près ce qu'elle a été.' Robin, p.45 ff., contests this judgement. The influence of Pyrrhonism on Arcesilaus is usually accepted, cf. Stough, p.7; Long, H.Ph. p.68.


4. Cf. Stough, pp.31-33, who deduces Pyrrho's scepticism from distrust of the senses combined with acceptance of the 'empirical axiom' that knowledge has its origin in the data of sense-experience.
Secondly, there is no reason to believe, with Lucullus, that remarks on the limitations of human knowledge were thrown out by the Presocratics in moments of discouragement or extreme excitement, even in the case of Empedocles. That is not to say that Empedocles did not sometimes use the 'prophetic' manner, but this style is clearly more suited to the revelation of truth than to a confession of ignorance. If Cicero knew of any frenzied utterances on the part of this philosopher, despairing of human knowledge, they have not come down to us.

Lucullus contrasts the 'verecundia' of Democritus with the 'calumnia' of Arcesilaus, probably on the ground that the 'scepticism' of the former did not involve him in dialectical debate or an attack on the established system. At an early stage of inquiry, doubt of man's power to attain to knowledge is not inappropriate; at a later stage it becomes 'sedition'. For the mere establishment of the system should remove the doubt whether knowledge is possible. This system was mainly the work of Plato who cannot, therefore, be regarded as a forerunner of scepticism. Even the Socratic profession of ignorance was not seriously meant, but merely a device to compliment those whom he intended to refute, by disparaging himself, a trait which he shared with Scipio Africanus.

1Cf. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy II, p.240, speaking of the combination of pride and humility to be found in Empedocles as well as Heraclitus: 'Pride in possession of certain truth is the mark of the seer who believes himself divinely inspired; consciousness of the fallibility of the human faculties belongs rather to the scientific mind.'

2Unless he is thinking of Empedocles' comments on the cognitive limitations of other people (e.g. fr.11 'Fools, for they have no far-reaching thoughts'). Empedocles' theory of sense-perception might well have led him to a subjectivist view similar to that of Democritus, but apparently did not. Cf. Theophrastus de sensu 7, DK A 06: 'Wherefore one cannot judge the sensations of others, since the sense-channels of some are wider and of others narrower in relation to the perceived object.'


4On the controversy whether Plato was a sceptic or a dogmatist, see G.C.Field, Plato and his Contemporaries, pp.236-7.
Whereas, for the sceptically-minded, disagreement among philosophers may be evidence of the impossibility of knowledge,¹ Lucullus points to the fundamental agreement between three of the main schools after Plato (the Academic, Pyrrhotetic and Stoic) to back up his argument that progress in philosophical investigation has in fact been made, which in turn rests on the possibility of knowledge. Professions of ignorance from early thinkers should, therefore, be understood historically, not used to undermine the efforts of generations of great intellects. Whether the Presocratics are included among those who have contributed positively to the advancement of knowledge is not clear in the context, but Plato and Socrates are put in a different category ('quorum e numero tollendus est et Plato et Socrates') as affording no precedent at all for scepticism.

The belief in progress in art and science, spanning more than the lifetime of the individual, goes back at least to the fifth century B.C.² Aristotle may have extended the concept to philosophy,³ but what is now here is its use to combat scepticism. If knowledge has in fact been attained, a fortiori it is possible. Lucullus does not actually claim this, but he

¹These disagreements are noted as early as the sophist Corrins, for whom they illustrate the power of logos to persuade without truth (Praise of Helen 13, DK II, p. 292). The same is probably implied by the fragment of Timon in which he congratulates Pyrrho on escaping the deceptive persuasion and empty opinions of the philosophers (D.L. IX, 65; Diels Koot. pp. 196-7).

²In his reply to Lucullus, Cicero uses the differences among philosophers to prove the absence of certain knowledge (114 ff.). Edelstein in The Idea of Progress in Classical Antiquity, pp. 165-6, misstates Antiochus' argument by exaggerating the importance of dissension among philosophers for the New Academic position. He calls it 'the argument basic to Scepticism', and represents Antiochus as 'renouncing' it or explaining it historically. It is, on the contrary, the profession of ignorance by early philosophers that Antiochus wishes to explain historically, or in some other way.

³See Dodds, The Ancient Concept of Progress, p. 11. Cf. Xenophanes fr. 10: 'The gods have not revealed everything to men from the beginning, but searching with time they discover what is better.' The idea is particularly explicit in medicine (Hippocrates, nat.med. 2 and 12). Cf. Cicero's joke in Ac. 1.13 'certe enim recentissima quaque sunt recta et emendata maxima'.

³Tusc. III, 69 (Aristotle fr. 53 Rose). Cicero states that Aristotle blamed the old philosophers for thinking that philosophy had been completed by their efforts, but said that, in view of the great progress that had been made in a few years, he saw it would soon be brought to perfection. Cf. Edelstein, op.cit. pp. 126 ff. There is not enough evidence to determine whether Cicero
allows it to be assumed in the rhetorical question 'nihilne tot saeculis, 
summis ingonis, maximis studiis explicatum putemus?' Apart from an initial 
belief in progress such a conclusion would not be particularly plausible, 
and it is more likely that Antiochus argued, not so much that knowledge has 
in fact been attained as an end result, but that progress step by step is 
possible only on the basis of certainty.\(^1\) This would be equally the case 
for the τεχνητής, who relies on empirical observation, and for the philo-
sopher, whose concepts are ultimately derived from it. But whereas the 
scientist or historian also looks forward to progress in the future,\(^2\) 
Antiochus (on the evidence of this passage) looks only to the past and 
appears to regard philosophy as already near to completion by the time of 
Arcesilas. In this we may see the beginning of a tendency to see philosophy 
'not as a matter for free inquiry and argument, but as a revelation of truth 
to be handed on to successive generations' (C.G. Field, speaking of the 
later Platonists in \textit{Plato and his Contemporaries}, p.228).

The interpretation of Socrates given here, which implies that his 
profession of ignorance was a mere façade, is clearly biased. In his reply 
in 74 Cicero goes to the opposite extreme in claiming not only that the 
profession was sincere but that it amounted to an almost total scepticism. 
Varro's account of Antiochus' views in \textit{An.I}, 15 ff., on the other hand, 
seems to give a description of Socrates that is free from distortion and 
historical inaccuracy.\(^3\) In 1,17 Varro points out that the formulation 

\(^{1}\) Cf. the importance of τὸ ἐργοῦ for Thucydides (I,22,4), as for Hippocrates 

\(^{2}\) Dodds, \textit{op.cit.}, pp.16 and 23. There are interesting passages in the Elder 
Pliny and in Seneca expressing faith in the advance-ent of knowledge, past 

\(^{3}\) See Reid's comments (p.264 n.2) on these three passages.
of a philosophical system by the followers of Plato and Aristotle went against the Socratic custom of discussing everything in a doubting manner and avoiding any positive statement. Cicero states in several places that it was Socrates' method of refuting an opponent without giving his own view that was revived by Arcesilas. If Varro is correctly representing Antiochus, it is possible that at times the latter would have been willing to concede the link between Arcesilas and Socrates.

In the dispute between Antiochus and the New Academy the position of Plato himself is much more crucial. The fact that, unlike Socrates, Plato left a system of philosophy that was developed by the schools tends to draw him into the ranks of the dogmatists. On the other hand, it could be argued that the character of many of the Platonic writings is closer to the New Academic position (cf. Ac.I,46 'hanc Academiam nunc... appellant, quae nihil uctus uidetur, siquidem Platonic. ex illa uetero numoramus, cuius in libris nihil affirmatur et in utramque partem multa disscrentur, de omnibus quaestitum, nihil certi dicitur'). In De Or.III,67 Cicero states that Arcesilas found his scepticism in the writings of Plato ('ex variis Platonic. libris sermonibusque Socraticis hoc maxime ad ripuit, nihil esse certi quod aut sensibus aut animo percipi posset'), and in his reply to Lucullus in 74 he argues that Plato would not have set out the Socratic doctrine in so many books if he had not agreed with it. This view of Plato perhaps reflects the standpoint of Philo rather than that of Arcesilas. It may, however, have provoked Antiochus into removing Socrates as well as Plato from the list of 'sceptics' by denying the sincerity of his profession of ignorance.

1De Or.III,67; Fin.II,2; N.D.I,11; cf. Tusc.I,8. See Commentary, p.75.

2For the view that Arcesilas took Socrates as his model rather than Plato, see Long; H.Ph., p.69. Brochard, p.96 n.1, contests this view, as put forward by Hirzel. Arcesilas' contemporaries must have seen him as a follower of Plato, to judge from Aristotle's parody ('Plato in front, Pyrrho behind, Diodorus in the middle'), Zeno's retaliatory attack on Plato (Numenius fr.25, Dea Placae) and Plut. Adv.Col.1121F ff. See Introduction p.23.

3For the Socratic irony, see Guthrie III, p.446; Friedlander, Plato I, p.137 ff.; A. Maury, L'ironie et l'humour chez Cicéron (Leiden 1955), p.15 ff. For irony as a trait common to Socrates and Africanum, cf. Brut.299, De Or.
It is difficult to be sure how closely Cicero is following Antiochus' thought in these sections, owing to the somewhat arbitrary way in which he has generalized the precedent argument, as if every New Academic justified his position in the same way. Although there is little doubt that Arcesilas quoted the Presocratics in support of his scepticism (cf. Ac.I,44), there is no evidence that Carneades did so, and the historical question assumes importance only in the context of the debate between Antiochus and Philo. In this debate the relation of the New Academy with Plato, not with the Presocratics, was the real issue. In claiming that there was one Academy, not two (Ac.I,13), Philo must have stressed those aspects of the Platonic writings which provided a link with Socrates on the one hand and with Arcesilas and Carneades on the other. But Philo had also maintained that no Academic had denied the possibility of knowledge, except in the Stoic sense. There was therefore no need for him to claim that Socrates and Plato had been total sceptics, as Cicero does in his reply to Lucullus in 74, and no need for him to bring the Presocratics into the picture at all, unless he wished to defend Arcesilas and repeat his arguments. Cicero seems to have put together two lines of attack, first, against Philo's arguments for a unified Academy, secondly, against Arcesilas' use of precedent, and so has confused the picture. Thus Plato and Socrates are dissociated from the Presocratics and made a separate case as if in answer to Philo, but a more uncompromising scepticism than that of Philo is assumed on the part of the opponent. Similarly Cicero's reply in 72 ff. is conducted on the assumption that any precursor of the New Academy must be shown to be a total sceptic, although his view of the Platonic writings as supporting the New Academic position is probably that of Philo. Cicero gives the argument as a whole a spurious unity by identifying it with his own philosophical position.

II,270. Cicero elsewhere treats the Socratic irony as a form of jesting; cf. Off.I,108; Brut.292 (where Atticus accuses Cicero of 'irony' in praising the style of the early orators such as Cato), and the discussion of 'urbana disimulatio' in De Or.II,269.

1 Cf. Lucullus' statement at the end of 12 that he will be concerned only with Arcesilas and Carneades, since Philo is 'adversarius tenior'.
It should not, therefore, be assumed (as by Long, II.23, p.223) that
the precedent argument Lucullus is hero attacking is exactly that of Philo,
or that the counter-argument accurately reflects Antiochus' reply to him,
or even that this was the argument that mainly influenced Antiochus to
break from Philo at Alexandria. The break did not occur at Alexandria and
what chiefly annoyed Antiochus was perhaps Philo's denial that Arcesilas
and Carneades had been total sceptics. Although the attack on Arcesilas
and Cicero's reply to it only make sense in the context of the main debate
between Philo and Antiochus, Cicero has, for the purpose of this whole
argument, accepted Antiochus' view of the New Academy as essentially a
total sceptic and rejected Philo's.

Review of the sceptical Academy
16-17 (p.34,20 - p.35,9) sed fuerint illa ictora ... non defuit.

Summary. (16) But even supposing that those old doctrines did not
constitute knowledge, has nothing been gained by inquiries pursued
since Arcesilas disparaged Zeno (as it is thought) on the score that
he merely reproduced the ideas of earlier philosophers with verbal
changes, and wishing to invalidate his definitions tried to cover light
with darkness? Arcesilas' philosophy did not gain much ground at first,
although his intelligence and charm of style won him distinction; only
Lacydes, his immediate successor, kept it going, but it was later
perfected by Carneades, who was fourth from Arcesilas (being a pupil of
Hagesimus, who studied under Evander, Lacydes' disciple). Carneades was
head of the school for a long time (he died at ninety), and had disting-
ished pupils; among them Clitomachus was the most industrious (as his
extensive writings show), though Hanno, Charmadas and Melanthius of
Rhodes had their merits. Metrodorus of Stratonicea was thought to have
known Carneades especially well. (17) Your Philo was a pupil of
Clitomachus for many years, and while he lived the Academy did not
lack a champion.

Lucullus' train of thought is not entirely clear at this point. The
words 'illa ictora' seem to be an echo of 'uetera' in 13 and 14 above, and
to refer to all the philosophers allegedly cited by the New Academics, up to
and including Plato. The meaning would then be equivalent to 'even supposing
that the old philosophers did not attain knowledge'. But 'illa uetera' is also the subject of 'investigata sunt', and as such can hardly include more than the common body of knowledge bequeathed by Plato which is referred to at the end of the preceding section. It must be admitted that Cicero's language here falls short of its usual clarity. An even greater difficulty arises, however, from the use of the progress argument to introduce a historical review of the New Academic philosophers. In the first place, the supposition 'sed fuerint illa uetera si uoltis incognita', if it means that no advance towards knowledge was made before Arcesilas, contradicts the conclusion of the previous section and is unlikely to have been conceded by Antiochus, even for the sake of argument. Secondly, no use is made of the argument, except as a transition; we are not told what the investigations were or who made them; presumably they must be credited not to the New Academics but to their opponents. There is also some inconsistency in representing Arcesilas' criticism of Zeno as purely negative and destructive ('conatus est clarissimis rebus tenebras obducere') and yet as conducive to progress owing to the inquiry it stimulated.

It seems probable, therefore, that Cicero himself rather than Antiochus was responsible both for the historical sketch and for the faulty transition. The result is that Lucullus shows here some appreciation of individual New Academics and of the importance of their criticism. Arcesilas' attack on Zeno is, however, reported unfavourably, as arising from a desire to damage his opponent and undermine his system. Cicero elsewhere emphatically denies this motive (76-7; I, 44). The element of fact which underlies the tradition

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1Hence Bentley's emendation 'ueteribus', which presumably excludes Plato from the earlier part of the sentence while leaving 'illa' to represent, somewhat vaguely, the common body of post-Platonic doctrine. Reid is no doubt right that here 'incognita' is used absolutely (= 'incerta'). For other suggestions for mending the text, none of which carries conviction, see Reid's note ad loc. (p.109 n.21).
of personal conflict between the two men in that the New Academic philosophy of doubt was in the main a reaction against Stoic dogmatism. Antiochus, who identified this dogmatism with Platonic doctrine, condemned Arsesilas' attack on it as mere intransigence. Philo, in defending the link between the earlier and later Academy, had no reason to play down the confrontation with Stoicism. It was therefore left to Cicero to defend Arsesilas against the more frivolous charges brought against him, by stressing the seriousness of his motives and the ancient and honourable character of the sceptical tradition he was following.

Arsesilas' disparagement of Zeno's originality is not particularly damaging, since it agrees with Antiochus' own assessment of Stoicism as a 'correction' of the old Academy (I, 43; cf. 'uorbis magis quam sententiae dissentient', 15). Lack of originality was similarly alleged by Epicurus against Arsesilas (Plut. Adv. Col. 1121F). The charge of attempting to substitute darkness for light was commonly brought against the Academic sceptics (cf. 26, 30, 42, 61; N. D. I, 6). For Arsesilas' arguments against Zeno's definitions, see Introduction pp. 12-13.

In the brief history of the school which follows, Cicero gives what appears at first sight to be little more than a list of names, arranged on the doxographic principle of master-pupil relationship. Within this outline, however, he contrives to suggest a difference of importance between the earlier and the later period. He begins by saying that, in spite of the admiration accorded to Arsesilas for his penetrating intellect and remarkable

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1 According to Numenius (fr. 25, 10ff. /VF I, 11) this dated from the time when they both studied under Polemo; cf. Strabo XIII, 614 (VF I, 10). Zeller (Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics, p. 529 n. 1) objects on the ground that they cannot have been students at the same time (Zeno was older, Ac. I, 35). Tradition suggests that Arsesilas was on better terms with Cleanthes (D.L. VII, 171; Plut. de adul. et am. 11, 55C).

2 These are in any case the sort of accusation which Cicero is at pains to refute in the Academica (see p. 77 above).
charm of speech, Academic scepticism did not at first gain many adherents ('cuius primo non admodum probata ratio'). This statement is not repeated elsewhere and is probably a comparative one, since Arcesilas' own popularity is not in question. Cicero seems to be inferring from the mediocrity of his immediate successors that his scepticism did not at that time attract much of a following. This is confirmed by the next clause, 'proxime a Lacyde solo retenta est' (in contrast with the number and distinction of Carneades' pupils). Since Arcesilas himself wrote nothing, it was solely due to Lacydes' written record that the school survived. Cicero then passes to Carneades, who completed what Arcesilas had begun ('post autem confecta a Carneade'), before reversing direction to fill in the gap with a succession of bare names.

Cicero says little about Carneades, although the pattern of the tricolon ('probata...retenta...confecta') seems designed to focus attention upon him. Valerius Maximus (VIII,7,5) also says that he lived to the age of ninety, but Diogenes Laertius (IV,65) gives his age as eighty-five when he died in 125/6 B.C., as does Lucian (Macrobi.20). If, as Cicero implies, he presided over the school up to his death, the length of his headship would in itself have been remarkable. Probably Cicero considers it unnecessary to say more in so short a summary. Each of Carneades' pupils, however, receives a brief word of praise, giving the impression that here Cicero is chiefly concerned with the vitality of the tradition.

1D.L.IV,37. Plutarch (Adv.Col. 1121E) says that Epicurus was jealous of his reputation, as the most popular philosopher of his time.
2This seems more likely than that Cicero intended to exclude a certain Pythadorus, who was said to have recorded the opinions of Arcesilas in a treatise (Index Hercul.).
3D.L.IV,60 states that Lacydes was succeeded by Telecles and Evander, who presided jointly. Cicero mentions only Evander, probably because he survived his colleague and was the one to hand over the school to Hegesinus.
4He was already head of the school in 155 B.C. when he went to Rome on the famous embassy of philosophers (Plut.Cat.Hal.22). Cicero seems to know nothing of a younger Carneades, who according to the Index Herculaneensis (24,28; 25,36; 30,1) took over the school in 137/6 B.C.
5For praise of Carneades, see Te Gr.III,68 'hinc haec recentior Academia
Clitomachus, a Carthaginian, was the chief literary exponent of Carneades; he is here praised for his industry, which according to D.L. IV, 67 produced more than four hundred books. In 102 Cicero quotes from a work on probability addressed to the satirist Lucilius, and mentions another on the same subject addressed to Lucius Censorinus, who was consul in 149 B.C. In 98 we hear of four books on withholding assent.\(^1\) The next name is concealed by a corruption in the text.\(^2\) Of the two suggestions, Magno is usually favoured as nearer to the MSS, though nothing is known of him apart from a passing reference in Athenaeus 602d and a possible mention in Quintilian II, 17, 15. Aeschines (preferred by Reid) is mentioned with Clitomachus, Charmados and Metrodorus in De Or. I, 45 as a pupil of Carneades and a leading figure in the Academy at the time when Crassus visited Athens after his quaestorship.\(^3\) Cicero speaks of the Academy as 'flourishing' at that time. Charmados, here commended for his eloquence, was especially noted for his memory.\(^4\) Virtually nothing is known of Melanthius of Rhodes, except that D.L. II, 64 speaks of Aeschines as his pupil. Metrodorus of Stratonicea, formerly an Epicurean, is here singled out as having been thought to be well acquainted with ('bene nosse') his master Carneades. For his interpretation of Carneades, which differed in important respects from that of Clitomachus, see Introduction, p. 18.

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\(^1\) In Tusc. III, 54 Cicero also mentions a book sent to his fellow countrymen to console them for the destruction of Carthage (146 B.C.); it contained his written record of an actual speech of Carneades against the thesis that a wise man would feel pain at the capture of his city.

\(^2\) In hoc nonne; the reading in hoc quan is an obvious attempt at correction.

\(^3\) There is a difficulty in chronology here, since Crassus was quaestor in Asia in 110, the year in which Clitomachus is said to have died and Philo to have succeeded him as head of the Academy. Brochard regards the date as uncertain (p. 109 n. 7). Plutarch (Ap. Ceni 13) says that he claimed to be a pupil of Carneades in the latter's old age.

\(^4\) Introduction p. 17 n. 4.
The review ends with Philo. Cicero's tribute, that while Philo lived the Academy did not lack defence, draws attention to the increasing pressures on the school, which after his death brought about the virtual extinction of the New Academic tradition. It is therefore significant that Lucullus passes on in the next sentence to his proposed attack on the New Academics. The unspoken inference is that, for purposes of defence, Cicero has taken up the mantle of Philo.

Should one argue with an Academic sceptic?

17-18 (p. 35, 10 - p. 36, 2) sed quod nos facere ... discernatur putant.

Summary. Some philosophers have thought that our present task of arguing against the Academics should not be undertaken at all, on the ground that it is pointless to carry on discussion with men who accept nothing as true, and they blamed the Stoic Antipater for occupying himself so much with this. There was no need, they said, to define knowledge or perception or (to translate literally) 'grasp', which the Stoics call *καταλήπτις* and those who wished to prove that there is something which can be grasped and perceived were displaying ignorance, since nothing can be clearer than *ενωνέω*, as the Greeks call it (let us translate this by 'perspicuitas' or 'evidentia'; you are not - he said to me in jest - the only one allowed to invent words); no verbal proof, they thought, could be more convincing than what was self-evident, and terms so clear did not need to be defined. Others said that they would not have taken the initiative in defending the self-evident, but that arguments brought against it should be answered, so that no one should be deceived. (18) The majority, however, do not object to the definition even of what is already self-evident; the subject is thought to be suitable for inquiry and the persons fit to engage in philosophical discussion.

Cicero refers to three groups of philosophers opposed to the New Academy ('quidam', 'alii', 'plerique'), the first of which have thought it

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1 The use of 'illi' (p. 35, 18) might be taken to indicate that the subject of 'uocant' is different from that of 'aiebant'. This is not necessarily so, however, since 'illi' may be a way of referring back to the subject of the main clause in what is virtually a parenthesis. The contrast is with 'ulorumus' rather than 'aiebant'.
wrong to argue at all against the sceptical position. None of these groups can be identified with certainty as members of any one school. The reference to κατάληψις suggests that at least some of Antipater's critics were Stoics. The appeal to έναργessor is common to more than one school, though the protest against definition seems more characteristic of Epicureans. Possibly Cicero is presenting a composite picture drawn from various dogmatic sources.

Plutarch tells us that Antipater's attacks on Carneades, vociferous as they were, were made only in his writings; hence he was nicknamed καλαμοβδάς ('noisy with the pen'). Cicero refers in 28 and 109 to his argument that it would be consistent for one who asserted that nothing could be known to assert that this one thing could be known. Like Chrysippus, he maintained that there is neither impulse nor action without assent. Although the main controversy must have continued after Antipater, it is possible that an attitude of non-belligerancy was advocated by some Stoics, especially if, as some writers suggest, they were being worsted in the argument.

But such an attitude would probably have been characteristic of many who recognised the general difficulty of communicating with anyone who takes up an extreme sceptical position. Epictetus, for instance, complains that it is hard to find arguments that will convince a person who resists what is absolutely obvious (Diog. I, 5, 1). Am I to carry on a discussion, he asks, with someone who does not know whether he is awake or dreaming? Such a man is worse than a corpse, for though he has perception, he pretends not to have it (ibid. 6-8). Lucretius, in his refutation of scepticism, utters the

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2Plut. Sto. Rom. 1657a (SVP III, 177). According to Plut. Adv. Col. 1122a-b, the Stoics brandished this argument like the Gorgon's head, but without gaining the victory. For Antipater's dispute with Carneades on the question of the ethical end, see A. A. Long, 'Carneades and the Stoic Teles', Philsocia 12, 1967, pp. 59-90.

3Plut. ibid. (see previous note); also Aug. Ac. III, 41 (Introduction p. 33 n. 4).
same sentiment of despair:

\[ \text{huic igitur contra mittam contendere causam,} \]
\[ \text{qui capite ipsae sua in statuit ut atigia case.} \]

IV, 471-2

The clear implication is that the sceptic is debarred by his perversity from meaningful speech and discussion. 1

The further objection, that the clarity of experience renders argument pointless, is also a common one. 2 It rests on the belief of the dogmatist that one cannot refuse assent to what is plainly evident (38) and that the sceptic is evading the facts. 3 Such evasion has in it an element of wilful intransigence or 'peritia' (9; 18), which Bertrand Russell saw as 'frivolous insincerity'. 4 It also raises a specific point of logic. By refusing to accept the obvious the sceptic virtually forces his opponent into the logical error of trying to prove what is self-evident. The argument 'eoque qui persuadere uellent esse aliquid quod comprehendi et perciipi posset inscinerre facere' is reminiscent of Aristotle's view that failure to distinguish what can and what cannot be demonstrated is a mark of ἀπαθετος. 5

1 For the Epicurean argument, cf. Fin., I, 64. Aristotle voices similar objections against those who deny the principle of contradiction (Met. 1008a 31 ff.; cf. 1063b 7 ff.).

2 Sextus P.M. II, 244 ff.; III, 66; 62; 120.

3 Hence Chrysippus' assertion that those who claim to be following impressions without assent are making meaningless statements (Plut. Sto. Ren. 1057A, SVF III, 177).

4 'Scepticism, while logically impeccable, is psychologically impossible and there is an element of frivolous insincerity in any philosophy which pretends to accept it' (Russell, Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits, p. 9, quoted by A. Naess, Scepticism, p. 37). Plutarch, Adv. Col., 1122E, quotes Epicurean objections similar to those raised by Epictetus II, 20, 28 ff.: 'Why doesn't the sceptic run off to the mountain instead of the bath, or go to the wall, not the door, when he wants to go out?' Cf. Epict., I, 27, 18 ff.; Arist. Met. 1008b 14 ff.; 1063a 20 ff.

5 Met. 1006a 5 ff.
The second group of critics ("alti") are also following Aristotle in their belief that, although a self-evident truth cannot be rendered more certain by proof, one may support it by bringing arguments against those who contest it.¹ Lucullus will later (45-46) adopt the same position as this group and contend that it is necessary to come to the defence of 'perspicuitas' to avoid being deceived by the sceptious arguments of the other side. Epicurus is mentioned in the context (45) as being relatively unsuccessful in his attempt at defending knowledge. The Stoics also believed that opposite arguments should be answered, with the object of destroying their plausibility.² In the attitude of this second group there is already a hint of the view that the Academic sceptic is a sophist and a deceiver ('no qui fallerentur'), which is further developed in 45-46.

Lucullus also mentions a difference of opinion between the first group of philosophers and the majority ("plerique") on the question whether 'clear' terms, such as 'knowledge' and 'perception', need to be defined.³ If definition is regarded as superfluous, it can only be on the ground that the terms in which X is defined should be clearer or better known than X itself. The primary objects of knowledge, and perhaps knowledge itself, would thus be indefinable.⁴ Such a view, with its corollary that verbal statement ('oratio') can add nothing to the clarity of experience, seems nearer to

¹Met.1006a 11 ff. For Aristotle it is a question of establishing the principle of contradiction, for the dogmatist, the proposition that 'there is something which can be grasped and perceived'.

²Plut. Sto. Rep. 1035F ff. (SVF II,127). An opponent's views should be stated with caution, however, as in the law courts, to avoid making them sound convincing. For dialectic as a means of guarding against deception, see Fin.III,72; D.L.VII,46-48.

³Cicero's language throughout implies that definition is of things, not of words. This is not usually accepted by modern logicians; cf. S. Stebbing, A Modern Introduction to Logic, p.426. R. Robinson, Definition, pp.149 ff.

⁴Many modern philosophers hold the view that there are indefinable terms, and that it is logically necessary that this should be so. See R. Robinson, Definition, pp.4-5.
Epicurean theory than to Stoic. A Stoic would not expect a definition to be in simple or familiar terms, or to be 'clear' in the same sense as the original experience. He is thus more likely to be among the majority who do not object to defining cognitive terms and are willing to discuss the subject at a dialectical level.

In Orat.116 (as in Fin.II,3-4) Cicero tells us that in any systematic inquiry or debate the disputants must first of all agree what the subject of discussion is, and this is made clear by a definition. In the controversy between the Academics and the Stoics the definition of the cataleptic impression assumed considerable significance and became the pivot around which the dispute centred. So Lucullus first establishes the need to define even clear terms. Then he proceeds in 18 to state Zeno's definition of the cataleptic impression and the conditions that must be fulfilled if knowledge is to be possible. Section 18 appropriately ends with the remark that the aim of his whole speech (19 ff.) will be to establish the validity of Zeno's definition.

1The grammarian Erotian, who compiled a glossary of Hippocratic terms in the first century A.D., refers to an 'accepted principle' that the less well-known should be explained in terms of the more familiar, and ascribes to Epicurus the view that clarity of meaning is ruined when a familiar term is tricked out with a definition (Us. 258). Cicero says of Epicurus 'tollit definitiones' (Fin.I,22; cf. II,4 ff. and Torquatus' reluctance to define pleasure). In the Letter to Herodotus (30) Epicurus lays down: 'Attention should be paid to the primary meaning of each term and there should be no further need of explanation.' Cf. N.D.III,9-10; Aug.An.1,15.

2In Fin.II,4 this rule is referred to Plato's Phaedrus (237b 7 ff.). Cicero says that Epicurus, while recognising the need for agreement about the point at issue in any discussion, failed to realise the importance of definition in this connection. Cf. R.E. Witt, Albinus, p.35.
In section 17 Cicero uses two Greek terms, κατάληψις and ἐνάργεια. The first of these is undoubtedly Stoic and goes back to Zeno. As Cicero's translation indicates, it denotes the mental 'grasp' of a certain class of impressions, to which Zeno attached the adjective 'cataleptic'. Cicero introduces ἐνάργεια as a characteristic of this kind of experience, which renders unnecessary any verbal persuasion that 'there is something which can be perceived and grasped'. Reid and others have assumed that ἐνάργεια too is a Stoic term going back to Zeno, but there seems to be no evidence for this beyond Cicero's own paraphrase in Αο.Ι,41: 'uisis non omnibus adiungebat fidem sed iis solum quae propriam habenter declarationem earum rerum quae uidorentur'. Sandbach believes that the Stoics took over the word from the Epicureans, by whom it was used to denote 'just that quality of a phantasia which Zeno denoted by the word καταληπτική, that quality which makes a man feel certain of its truth'. He observes that the word is not found in any Stoic writer before Antipater, who uses it in an Epicurean sense (of the clear concept we have of the gods, = πρόληψις). He omits to mention, however, that the word occurs in a remark attributed to Aristo by Diogenes Laertius (VII,162) in the context of the Stoic debate with Arcesilas. It

1 Αο.Ι,40-42; ΙΙ,145 (SVP Ι,66; 68 ff.).
3 In the passages of Quintilian quoted by Reid p.193 n.13 (VI,2,32, VIII,3,61 and IV,2,63) ἐνάργεια is a stylistic term, though the Ciceronian equivalents 'illuetatio' and 'evidentia' may be partly based on the present passage. As stylistic terms, 'evidentia' and 'perspicuitas' are not synonymous (cf. Quint.VIII,3,63).
4 Reid, p.193 n.12; Bevan, Stoics and Scenctics, p.35; Rackham, p.488.
5 On cit. p.32 (cf. Rist, Stoic Philosophy, pp.140-141). Similarly Descartes was later to attribute indubitability to judgments that have a certain clearness and distinctness about them (Selections, R.M. Eaton, p.44 ff.)
6 Flut.Sto. Rep.1051E-F (SVP III Antipater 33). Sandbach points out that the word is not included in voe. Arnim's index (Π,. p.37 n.3).
7 Diogenes relates that, seeing a bull with deformed parts, Aristo remarked that it gave Arcesilas a chance to attack the credibility of the senses (ὅμως, ἐπη, δεδοται ἁρκεσίλων ἐπικέφαλης κατὰ τὴς ἑνάργειας). As in so many cases, ἑνάργεια seems here to be used simply as an equivalent.
is frequent in the writings of Epicurus, where it is used to indicate the clarity of experience and, because for Epicurus all impressions are clear, it is virtually a technical term, applying to sense-impressions and general concepts as well as to the primary meanings of words. The Epicureans did not, however, have a monopoly of the term. It may well have been used by Epicurus' contemporaries, as by later writers, of the evidence of the senses and the clarity of perception, and it is likely that by Cicero's day it was the common property of the schools. It can be inferred from 34 that even the New Academics admitted that some sense-impressions were 'perspicua', without allowing that they were 'percepta' in the strict sense.

The Latin terms which Cicero gives as equivalent to κατάληψις are 'cognitio', 'perception' and 'comprehensio'. In so far as there is a difference of meaning between the three terms, 'cognitio' is possibly being used in the wider sense in which it can also be distinguished from perception. The Stoics made a distinction between perception (the experience of a cataleptic impression) and knowledge, which only the wise man possesses, but as far as

for sense-perception. This passage, like Plutarch's reference (Comm. Nat. 1.103b) to the Stoics as οἱ πρόδικοι τῆς ἐναργείας οὐκοι cannot therefore be taken as endorsing the view that the early Stoics used the word with particular reference to the cataleptic impression. On the other hand, Numenius alleges (fr.26,28-9, Dos Placent) that Lacydes learnt from Arcesilaus that there was nothing clear or sound (ἐναργές ἢ ψεῦτος) in sight or hearing, which might be taken to imply that contemporary Stoics associated ἐναργεία with the cataleptic impression. In Div. II,126 (SVF II,62) Cicero attributes to Chrysippus the argument that impressions received when awake are 'clariora et certiora' than those which appear in sleep; it is possible, though by no means certain, that Chrysippus used ἐναργεία or ἐναργής in this connection. In 87 we are told that Chrysippus had collected every argument 'contra sensus et perspicuitatem', and in 99 that Carneades considered arguments 'contra sensum contra quo perspicuitatem' as relevant to the cataleptic impression. But in the last two passages, 'perspicuitas' is somewhat ambiguous.

1For references see Bailey, Greek Atomists, p.243 n. 1; p.269.

2Sextus A.M.VII,218 attributes to Theophrastus the view that τὸ ἐναργές is a common factor in perception and intuitive knowledge. In Aristotle the word is used chiefly in connection with sense-perception (see Ponitz, Index Aristotelicus, p.249). Cf. Plat.Haedr.250d.

3Sandbach complicates the issue by supposing that the Epicureans meant by ἐναργεία the same quality which Zeno denoted by the term cataleptic. Since Epicurus assigned this quality to all sense-impressions, the nature of a clear impression in the Epicurean sense must obviously be different from that of a cataleptic impression. For the same reason, it is tempting to assume that, if the Stoics used the word, they used it with the same general meaning of the evidence of the senses.
the wise man himself is concerned the distinction does not apply, either in
to knowledge. Any cataleptic experience of the wise man automatically constitutes an item of knowledge. Consequently, in Antiochus' arguments against the New Academy, the cataleptic experience is assumed to be equivalent to knowledge. Hence, though Cicero for the most part uses 'comprehenderc' and 'percipere' (usually both together) and their derivatives to convey the concept of a cataleptic experience, he sometimes uses 'cognoscere' as an equivalent alternative.

Philo's new definition of perception is unsatisfactory

18 (p.36,3-23) Philo autem .... percipi nihil posse concedimus.

Summary. But Philo, unable to resist attacks on the stubbornness of the Academics, put forward certain new theories which are plainly false, for which he was blamed by the elder Catulus, and as Antiochus showed, he involved himself in the very difficulty he wished to avoid. For in denying that there is anything that can be grasped (this is our rendering of ἔκατάλησαν), if he was referring to Zeno's definition of an impression ('uisum' - our conversation yesterday has made this a familiar word for φαντασία) - an impression bearing the imprint and stamp of its source in a way that would not be possible if it were not from that source (and we maintain that Zeno's definition is absolutely correct, for how could anything be grasped in such a way that it is indubitably perceived and known, if it could possibly be false?) - in undermining and doing away with this, Philo does away with the criterion of known and unknown; the consequence is that nothing can be grasped, and Philo unaware is back in the position where he least wishes to be. Thus our

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1 The place and significance of κατάλησαν in the cognitive process can be inferred from Ac.I,40-42 and II,145, which record Zeno's illustration of this process by his famous manual similo. Hist, op.cit. pp.139-40, wrongly argues that the acquisition of knowledge involves a further stage after κατάλησαν. But (contrary to Hist's assumption) there is only one act of assent in any perceptual or cognitive act (37), so that any act of κατάλησαν will result in the possession of knowledge by the wise man. So the texts usually equate ἐκπαθήμα and κατάλησαν if the latter is such that it cannot be undermined by any form of reasoning (SVP I,68).

2 E.g. 23, 31; cf. Fin.III,17; V,76.
whole argument against the Academy will centre on the defence of this definition, which Philo wished to destroy; for if we fail to maintain it, we allow that nothing can be perceived.

Although at the end of 12 Philo was dismissed as 'adversarius lenior' and attention directed to Arcesilas and Carneades, the present section is again concerned almost exclusively with Philo. One reason is that Cicero has been trying to widen the scope of the discussion, which will concern the New Academy as a whole, from Arcesilas to Philo. The apparent contradiction in Philo's new standpoint affords him an opportunity to introduce the Stoic definition of the cataleptic impression and its central importance to the dogmatic case. Once the point at issue between the two camps (i.e. the New Academy in general and Antiochus defending Stoic dogmatism) has been clarified in this way, the main discussion can proceed, with sections 19-60 representing Antiochus' arguments 'contra ἄκαταληπτίκως'.

The definition of the cataleptic impression here ascribed to Zeno is given several times by Sextus as ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ υπάρχοντος καὶ κατ'αυτὸ τὸ υπάρχον ἐνακομεμαγμένη καὶ ἐνακομεμαγμένη ὅπως ὁ ἄν αὐτοῦ ὑπάρχον μὴ υπάρχοντος (Ἀ.Μ. VII, 248, 402, 426; Π.Π. II, 4; cf. Α.Μ. VII, 255, 410). Δ.Π. VII, 50 adds ἐνακομέματα ἐνακομέματα (ἔνακομέματα) I p.10). In 77 Cicero gives a shortened version without the final clause: 'ex eo quo esset, sicut esset, impressum et signatum et effictum'. The cataleptic impression is one that is an exact copy of an existing object, and such that it could not arise except from an existing object. It thus produces 'grasp' both of itself and of its source, and (for the wise man) indubitable knowledge.²

¹For the expression see Att. XIII, 19, 3.
²Sandbach, Problems p.13 ff.
Since a representational theory of perception was accepted by both parties in the dispute, the chief difficulty of this definition clearly lies in the interpretation of the final clause and the exact nature of the guarantee offered. If we examine the various possibilities of perceptual error around which the controversy was made to revolve, two emerge as having received the greatest amount of attention, namely (1) the danger of taking an impression to be caused by an actual external object when no such object is present, and (2) the possibility of mistaking one object, which is present, for another, which is absent. Taking (2) into account, Rist (Stoic Philosophy pp.137-9) argues that ἀπὸ μὴ ὀξικοντός cannot merely mean 'from a non-existent object', but must also mean that the impression could not have come from any other object. He accordingly translates the final clause in the definition as 'of such a kind as could not have come from what is not that existing object'. Although it is clear that such a guarantee is needed, it is equally clear that the Greek words do not, as Rist claims, actually mean this. As the examples in Sextus show, what is common to both types of error is that what is not 'there' is falsely supposed to be 'there', and this, rather than non-existence in an absolute sense, is what is implied by ἀπὸ μὴ ὀξικοντός. It may be noted, however, that Cicero's translation in the present passage ('shaped and moulded from its source as it could not have been from what was not its source') is on the whole nearer to that of Rist. ²

179 ff.; Sextus A.M.VII,244 ff.; 402 ff.

²According to Reid, pp.194-5 n.14, Cicero's version guards only against the second type of error, mistaking one object for another, presumably because it is not specifically stated that the source must be an existing object. It seems to be extremely difficult to find a form of words that would clearly cover both kinds of deception. As Reid points out, Cicero's rendering in 77 ('ex eo quo esset, scire esset, impressum et signatum et effictum') is in some ways nearer to the Greek.
According to Sextus (A.M.VII,252), the Stoics added the last clause to the definition ('such as could not arise from a non-existent object') because the Academicians did not, like the Stoics, think it impossible that an exactly similar but false impression might be found. The implication is that the clause was added under the influence of Academic criticism, though there is no really firm evidence for this. By positing a strict causal relation between external object and impression, the Stoics attempted to show that the cataleptic impression would not appear the way it does unless the object that gave rise to it were real and such as it is represented to be in the impression. Sextus complains that, when asked to define the real object (τὸ ὑπάρχον), they would reply that the real is what excites a cataleptic impression (A.M.VII,426; VIII,89). As he points out, the reasoning is circular, but this does not, as he claims, invalidate the definition. For if, as the Stoics maintain, the existing object can be apprehended only through the cataleptic impression, and if there is an exact correspondence between them, it is obvious that each can be defined only in relation to the other.

Like his predecessors, Philo denied that a cataleptic impression, as defined by the Stoics, existed and could be experienced. The hypothetical form in which Lucullus states this ('si illud esset, sicut Zeno definiret...') merely points to the ambiguity of 'comprehendi', and does not mean that Lucullus is not sure of what Philo intended, as is made clear by 'hoc sum infirmat tollitque' further on. If Cicero actually wrote άχυστάληστον, though the structure of the sentences requires κατάληστον, the reason could be that Philo himself used this word when contesting the Stoic

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1Cf. Stough, p.39 n.3: 'The circularity is obvious, since the cataleptic impression is defined by reference to the very facts whose existence it is alleged to confirm.' For the Stoics the circularity was no doubt deliberate and designed to exclude the possibility of doubt.
definition. According to Sextus (P.H.I.235), Philo maintained that things were
\( \lambda \kappa \alpha \tau \lambda \eta \gamma \zeta \alpha \tau \eta \tau \alpha \) in relation to the Stoic criterion, but
\( \kappa \alpha \tau \alpha \lambda \eta \kappa \tau \alpha \) in their real nature.\(^1\) We may infer from Antiochus' argument in this passage that Philo believed that the New Academic, in spite of his rejection of the
Stoic cataleptic impression, could justifiably make claims of perception or
knowledge, though these would fall short of absolute certainty.\(^2\) According
to Antiochus, such claims are meaningless, since nothing that could conceiv-
ably be false can be regarded as known. Lucullus' question conveys the
dilemma: 'qui enim potest quidquam comprehendi ut plane confidam perceptum
id cognitum esse' - the Stoic demand for certainty - 'quod est tale quale
vel falsum esse possit?' - the proviso attached by Philo to any perceptual
experience. For Philo, acceptance of the Stoic criterion would mean that,
since nothing corresponds to it, nothing can be known; for Antiochus,
rejection of it means that there is no way of distinguishing known from
unknown, so that, again, nothing can be known. Philo's rejection of the
cataleptic impression thus automatically cancels his claim that perception/
knowledge is possible ('ex quo efficitur nihil posse comprehendi'). In
this conclusion the Philonian sense of perception/knowledge is being equated
with the Stoic, for this is the only sense that Antiochus will allow.\(^3\)

\(^1\)On the basis of this statement Rist (Stoic Philor., p.150) makes the
extraordinary suggestion that 'perhaps Philo wanted to argue that "presenta-
tions" give only superficial understanding but that some kind of Aristot-
elian essence can be grasped by other means', and further, that 'Philo was
worried about "things-in-themselves". In 'The Korainiteanism of Ainosidemos'
Phoenix 24 (1970) p.313, he adds that Philo perhaps thought of inference as
a means of understanding \( \tau \alpha \kappa \rho \alpha \gamma \mu \alpha \tau \alpha \) . It is obvious, however, that
the passage in Sextus merely means that Philo thought we could have true experi-
ences of the external world but not by means of the Stoic cataleptic impres-
sion, so that we cannot make absolute knowledge claims. It is very unlikely
that Philo's main innovation was the introduction of the word \( \kappa \alpha \tau \alpha \lambda \eta \kappa \tau \alpha \) into the New Academic vocabulary and it was this that had angered Antiochus
(as suggested by Hirzel, Unternuch. III, p.198; see Brochard, p.199 n.2).

\(^2\)Cf. 111-113, 146; Fin.V,76. Though the argument is about perception,
ultimately it concerns knowledge ('scientia').

\(^3\)Since he believed that there is only one standard type of knowledge,
Antiochus naturally saw Philo's new position as a futile attempt to move
away from scepticism and into the dogmatic camp. For Philo's uneasiness as
a sceptic, see 34 and 111 (Introduction p.34 n.2); Numonius fr.26, 6 ff.
Antiochus' argument that, without the Stoic criterion, knowledge even in the Philonian sense is impossible, points the way back to the more orthodox position according to which the possibility of knowledge stands or falls with the cataleptic impression. The New Academic does not question the existence of external objects or even that there are true impressions of them, but he denies that a true impression can infallibly be distinguished from a false one. Hence the battle was fought over narrow ground and though the point at issue was the possibility of knowledge in general, it was knowledge of the external world that was mostly the focus of attention, and, due to the simplistic interpretation of perception in terms of 'appearance' impressed upon the mind, it was the sense of sight that provided most of the examples. Cicero's choice of 'uisum' as the Latin equivalent of φαντασία reflects this bias, for though 'uideor' like φαντασία can have the more general meaning of 'seem', it is not ordinarily used of any sense-experience other than sight. Cicero obviously intends 'uisum' (and sometimes 'uidei' and 'uisio') to be understood in a general way, as applying to any sense-experience.

A defence of the cognitive faculties and process

19-21 (p.36,24 - p.38,6) ordiamur igitur .... disputari potest.

Summary. (19) To start with the senses, their judgements are clear and certain. Could one ask for anything better than sound and unimpaired senses if one were given a choice by some god? I omit the bent ear and the pigeon's neck, for I do not hold that everything is as it appears to be, leaving this and many other matters to Epicurus. But in my opinion

1Antiochus here endorses the usual Stoic view that the cataleptic impression is the criterion of truth, the definition of which he traces back to Zeno. The argument of Pohlenz that Zeno made κατάληψις the criterion (based on Ac.1,42 and Sextus A.M.VII,152) and that Chrysippus' substitution of the cataleptic impression was a significant change, is refuted by Sandbach, Problemen p.15 ff.; cf. Rist, Stoic Philosophy, p.130-147. Some Stoics spoke of other criteria (D.L.VII,54), while those whom Sextus calls the 'younger' Stoics (A.M.VII,253 ff.) added the proviso that the cataleptic impression is the criterion only when there is no obstacle (Introduction pp.24-25). But as this passage shows, though different aspects of the cognitive process may have been stressed from time to time, the basic criterion always remained the cataleptic impression.

2E.g. 33 'ut enim illa oculis modo absenscantur, sic reliqua uisius...'; Ac.1,40'quae uina sunt et quam accepta sensibus'.

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the senses report most truly, provided that they are normal, healthy and unobstructed, which is why we often make adjustments of light, position and distance in order to obtain a reliable view. Similarly with sound, smell and taste, so that no one could wish for a more accurate judgement than that of each sense in its own field. (20) The power of the senses is especially evident when increased by artistic training. Painters see many things in a picture which we do not, and musical experts can recognise the Antionoe and Andromache at the first note of the flute-player. There is no need to elaborate on taste and smell, which have a certain power of discrimination, though a less perfect one. What of touch, or of that so-called ‘inner touch’ which registers pleasure and pain, and is the sole criterion of truth for the Cyrenaics, because it is a datum of sense? Would not anyone who denies a difference between pleasure and pain be most evidently mad? (21) But what we speak of as perceived by the senses has a certain character, to which correspond those judgements which refer to the sensible character though we grasp them not by the senses but by the mind, for instance ‘that is white, this is sweet, that is tuneful, this scented, this rough’. Next comes ‘that is a horse, that is a dog’. After this follows a chain of wider terms, among them those which comprise, as it were, the complete grasp of the thing: ‘if it is a man, it is a mortal rational animal.’ From this class, concepts are derived, which are indispensable to all our intellectual activities.

Although Lucullus concluded the previous section with the avowed intention of establishing Zeno’s definition of the cataleptic impression, he begins here with a general eulogy of the senses into which the question of the definition enters only indirectly. The possibility of sense-deception is mentioned, probably because the subject had been raised by Cicero in the Catulus, and also because Lucullus seems intent on making it clear right at the beginning that Antiochus sided with the Stoics and differed from the

1 ‘quia sentiatur’. The reading ‘cui adissentur’ has no MSS authority. Madvig’s ‘cui adissentur’ (passive) has the support of the Balliol MS and makes acceptable sense, but the grammar seems unusual for Cicero. The past participle ‘adissent’ is used as a passive in 99, and the active ‘adissentio’ occurs a few times in the letters.

2 Cf. 79, where Cicero complains that Lucullus has made a very inadequate reply to what he himself had said on the previous day. Introduction p. 60 ff.
Epicureans in allowing that not all the data provided by the senses are reliable. His position, therefore, is not only nearer to common sense but also guards against the risk of deception in a way that the Epicurean does not (cf. 45). The main argument is an emphatic assertion that, given healthy sense-organs and favourable perceptual conditions, the senses do enable us to have true perception of external reality. Perception is seen as involving both the senses and the mind and the ascending complexity of the process\(^1\) is reflected in the order of treatment: first, the power of the senses (29-20), and secondly, the mind's involvement in perception and knowledge (21). The first of these topics divides again into two: (a) the potential of the normal sensory organs and faculties, and (b) the definite perceptual advantages that result from artistic training. Lucullus concludes this section with a mention of the Cyrenaic criterion, the feeling of pleasure and pain, which provides him with a transition from pure sensation to recognition of the character of objects, with which he begins the next section (21).

In saying that he will begin with the senses, Lucullus seems to be anticipating the distinction between the senses and the mind which is made in 21.\(^2\) It becomes clear, however, as the argument develops, that the power of the senses ('quanta vis sit in sensibus') is not illustrated in any and every sensory experience nor in what might be called 'bare' sensation, but in complex perceptual situations to which the mind has contributed by checking the conditions under which the senses operate or by training them to greater exactness. It also becomes clear that the judgements ('iudicia') of the senses, which were said at the outset to be clear and certain, are

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\(^1\) On whether perception can properly be regarded as a process, see G. Ryle, *Dilemmas*, p.103 ff.

\(^2\) The distinction is not, of course, intended to be an absolute one, since the mind is involved in sensation at all levels, and is described in 30 as 'fons sensuum' and 'ipsa sensus'. Plato and Aristotle also treated the senses as a critical faculty, though the distinction between *noûς* and *aιδεύς* is sharper. Hamlyn, *Sensation and Perception*, pp.11-12.
not simply about the content or character of a given sensation, but about the nature of real objects. This is shown by the admission that sense-deception is possible (as in the case of the bent oar or the pigeon's neck),¹ which makes it necessary to restrict what was at first taken to be a feature of all sense-experience to what is now spoken of as the 'reliable' view ('dum aspectus ipsae fidem faciat sui iudicii').² In the case of artistic training it is especially evident that the increased efficiency of the senses is not simply a matter of discrimination but of recognition, as in the case of the musician who recognises the first notes of the Antiochus or Andromache.³ To a lesser extent smell and taste involve both these factors, which seem to be combined in what Lucullus calls 'intelligens'.⁴ Only the feeling of pleasure and pain is treated as a bare sensation ('quia sentiatur'), so that in terms of certainty Lucullus has here returned to his original position, that in sense-experience as such is the highest degree of truth.


²For the need to ensure the right perceptual conditions, cf. Sextus A. M. VII, 258; Introduction p. 24-5. Lucullus may be trying to refute the view that, since impressions of the same thing vary according to place, distance, etc., none of them can be regarded as true (P.H. I, 121; cf. A. M. VII, 412 ff.). On the difficulty of establishing what is normal or standard in perception, see H.H. Price, Perception, p. 31 ff., p. 209 ff.

³For the view that the artist sees more in a work of art than the layman, cf. Off. I, 145; D.L. VII, 51 (end); Sextus A. M. VII, 55 ff.; Pliny Ep. I, 10, 4. The Antiocho and Andromache are plays by Pacuvius and Junius respectively. It would appear from what Cicero says that tragedies produced in Rome were preceded by a regular musical 'overture' on the part of the flute-player. Bear, The Roman Stage, pp. 168-9, interprets this passage as a reference not to the plays themselves but to the appearance of the leading characters. He also suggests that Cicero might be referring to an early form of pantomime.

⁴In N.D. II, 146 Cicero mentions arts such as perfumery and cookery which have been invented to appeal to these senses. In allowing that their 'intelligens' is defective as compared with sight and hearing, Lucullus is again adopting a standpoint other than that of more sensation. In contrast to the Epicurean view that all the senses are equally valid (D.L. X, 32), Antiochus may have followed Aristotle in stressing the importance of sight and hearing for our understanding of the world around us (Arict. De Sensu 437a 4). Aristotle regarded smell as the weakest of the senses (ibid. 441a 1); the sense of taste he ranked more highly, as a form of touch (cf. Pliny N.H. X, 191).
The concept of the 'judicio auriun' is in fact highly ambiguous. In Fin.I,64, as used by the Epicurean speaker, the phrase means little more than 'our sensations'. In N.D.II,145-6, where Cicero again uses the example of the arts, this time to illustrate the superiority of human over animal sense-organs, the 'judgement' of the eyes, ears and other senses becomes a capacity to distinguish colours, shapes, sounds, smells, tastes in great variety and detail; aesthetic and even moral qualities are included, but in the context the question of the relation of such judgements to external reality does not arise. In the present context, on the other hand, the validity of sense judgements depends entirely on their reference to external objects, and if they are 'clear and certain', they must be so in the sense of giving reliable information about them. It should be pointed out, however, that in ordinary experience a distinction between these two aspects of sense-perception does not often arise; it is therefore easy for Lucullus to pass from one to the other and, by hedging it round with some obvious limitations, to transfer the subjective certainty of sensation to our awareness of external objects. Once the difference has been brought out, however, the criterion of clarity and certainty can no longer be taken for granted. Cicero is therefore right in criticising Lucullus in 79 for having merely employed a 'communis locus', without having given adequate treatment to the problems involved.

1Cf. Orat.164, where 'judicio auriun' is applied to matters of euphony.

2Cf. the corresponding passage in N.D.II,140, where the senses are called 'interpretes ac nuntii rerum'. The example of painting was used by the later sceptics from the opposite point of view, to illustrate the gap between sense-impression and reality (Sextus P.H.II,75; A.H.VII,350; D.L.X,105; cf. J.P. Dumont, Le scepticisme et le rhéombne, p.125 n.100).

3Lucullus' argument that, given healthy and unimpeded senses, their efficiency could not be improved, has something in common with the teleological argument (developed in 30-31) that the senses and the mind have been adapted by nature or providence to the acquisition of knowledge (cf. N.D.II,145 ff.; Epictetus I,6,3 ff.). Like the Stoics, Antiochus believed that a sound condition of the senses was necessary for this purpose, though he differed from them in holding that the soundness and unimpeded activity of the senses were part of the sumnum bonum (Fin.V,36-37). The argument from the arts, regarded as an extension of the senses ('quasi sensus alteror', 31) can be fitted into the same teleological pattern (cf. N.D.II,145-6). In 60 Cicero also criticises Lucullus' use of the conventional 'dum' (cf. Tung.II,67; Hor.Sat.I,1,15 ff.).
Lucullus maintains that since he does not, like Epicurus, hold that all appearances are true, he has no need to explain the bent oar or the pigeon's neck. These are the cases which Antiochus and the Stoics would consider to be examples of unreliable sensation. In his reply in 79 Cicero points out that the Epicurean view is in fact the more consistent; the veracity of the senses can be upheld only on the assumption that all sensations are true, since if some are false, there is no reason why any should be trusted. Both Epicurus and the Stoics were trying to overcome a difficulty inherent in any representational theory of perception, that of 'bridging the gap' between impression and external object. Either the data of sense possess in some cases a guarantee of truth which the mind infallibly recognizes (the Stoic solution), or it is the task of the mind to judge the data correctly (the Epicurean solution). Epicurus reasoned, perhaps rightly, that since the data of sense are the basic indispensable elements of knowledge and admit of no other verification (P.L. IX, 31-32), all impressions should be regarded as equally valid. This naturally led to the difficulties instanced by Lucullus. Cicero argues (79 ff.) that such cases cannot be merely brushed aside, even by the Stoics.

What Epicurus meant by the 'truth' of sensation has been much debated. It seems unlikely that he meant no more than that there is a real physical contact between the sense-organ and the external object through the ἐνδόσωλον (as interpreted by Rist, Epicurus, pp. 19 ff.). On the other hand, Bailey's view that 'the truth of a sensation can mean nothing else than its correspondence with the object which it represents' seems equally unlikely, if by object is meant the external object or 'thing-in-itself' from which the ἐνδόσωλον are emitted. At the same time, it does not seem possible that

1 Cf. Bailey, Greek Atomists, p. 253-7; Eamlyn, Sensation and Perception, p. 34.
2 Greek Atomists, p. 256. Cf. p. 257: 'For by the truth of a sensation Epicurus meant and could only mean its truth to the external object which it represented.'
Epicurus merely had in mind what in modern terms would be called the indubitability of sense-data. If that were the case, Timagoras would not have needed to deny that he saw two flames and to attribute the error to opinion.

There seems little doubt that for Epicurus sensation is true because, being irrational, it exactly reproduces its object, adding or subtracting nothing, but whether this object can properly be identified with the external object (or some property belonging to the external object) is by no means clear. In Sextus' account (A.M.VII, 207 ff.) there is a certain ambiguity between the external object and the εἴδωλα which suggests that in some cases the εἴδωλα themselves might have been thought of as the object of sense. Alternatively Epicurus may have included modifications of light, position and distance in his notion of the external object. Sextus rightly points out in his account that it is opinion, not sense, that identifies the round and the square tower (A.M.VII, 209), though if, as he suggests, it is an error to suppose that the object close at hand is the same as the object seen at a distance, we are left with no justifiable ground to prefer the opinion that the tower is square.

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1 One must, of course, allow for the possibility that Timagoras' denial does not accurately reflect the position of Epicurus. Part of Epicurus' meaning must have been that we cannot doubt the truth or actuality of the content of any single sensation (D.L.X, 31; Lucr. IV, 478 ff.). Cf. Aristotle's view that error cannot arise with regard to the special sensibles (An. 418a 11 ff.). The Stoics too may have held that all sensations are 'true' in the sense that one is actually experiencing them (see Hict, Stoic Philosophy, pp.135-136). Cf. Lucullus' remark in 19: 'ut nemo sit nostrum qui in sensibus sui cuiusque generis iudicium requirat acritum.'

2 D.L.X, 31; Sextus A.M.VII, 203 ff.; VIII, 9. Hamlyn, Sensation and Perception, p.33, adds the important point that Epicurus thought of sensations as incorrigible because they were caused. This is, of course, quite different from believing that the character of the external object is exactly reproduced in the impression.

3 Cf. Plut. Adv. Col. 1121A ff. (Us. 252). The objection that error might arise through the alteration of the εἴδωλα in transit would thus be irrelevant, since sensation would still be true in the sense defined; any lack of conformity between φαντασία and external object would affect opinion only.

4 In En. Pyth. 91 Epicurus distinguishes the size of the sun and moon 'relatively to us' and 'in itself'; the latter is, of course, a matter of opinion only, though confirmed by sense evidence of terrestrial fires seen at a distance.
Lucullus mentions the Cyrenaic criterion, on the other hand, in support of his own view that clear and valid distinctions can be discerned through the senses. The Cyrenaics held that only the immediate sensory experience (\(\chiλάτη\)) can be known and that things in themselves are unknowable. It may seem strange for Lucullus to appeal to a philosophy that has features in common with scepticism, but the reason is not far to seek; the feeling of pleasure and pain is the most obvious example of a sensation that is basically tactual and valid independently of the recognition of objects. The subjective certainty of the Cyrenaic criterion provides him with a starting-point, from which in the next section (21) he will build up the complex process of perception as a combination of sensation and recognition.

Section 21 begins with a contrast between these two factors in perception. A correspondence is stated between 'hace quo sensibus percipi dicitur' and 'ea quae non sensibus ipsius percipi dicitur sed quodam modo sensibus', for instance, 'illud est album, hoc dulce', etc. In view of what has immediately preceded, it is not unreasonable to suppose that Lucullus has in mind a distinction between the actual sensation of white, sweet, etc., and our awareness of these characters as belonging to an object, which is expressed in a judgement or statement. This is especially plausible in view of Sextus A.M.VII, 344-5, which has a clear affinity with the present passage (Reid postulates a common source), though the argument is different: 'For

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\(^1\)Sextus A.M.VII, 191 ff.

\(^2\)Cf. 76; Sextus P.H.I, 215; Guthrie, III, p.245 ff.

\(^3\)We cannot be mistaken about our own sensations (Sextus A.M.VII, 199). In the same way some modern philosophers have argued that statements which confine themselves to describing personal states of mind (e.g. I have a headache) are immune from doubt; Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge, p.53.

\(^4\)p. 199 n.13. Dillon, p.66. In translating the Cicenonian passage, Dillon accidentally omits the stage 'that is white, this is sweet', etc., and so loses the parallel with Sextus. In translating Sextus, his rendering of \(\tau\o\ το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\ το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\το\tauονια as 'such an object', 'an object of that kind', does not quite convey the sense of the Greek, which is of an object or 'thing' bearing a distinct character as opposed to the indistinct and incoherent sensation.
the faculty which is going to grasp the truth in real objects must not only be moved in a whiteish or sweetish way but must also be brought to have an impression of the characterised thing 'this is white' and 'this is sweet', and similarly with the rest. For it is no longer the task of sense to lay hold on the characterised thing; for sense can only grasp colour and flavour and sound, but 'this is white' or 'this is sweet', being neither colour nor flavour, cannot be presented to sense.'

Sextus is arguing that the senses, being irrational, cannot interpret the impressions they receive and so cannot discover the truth about real objects (he will of course argue later that the mind is equally incapable of doing so). Lucullus' point is a different one, that in any act of perception the character which is 'given' in sensation must be recognised by the mind and assigned to a particular object. These two factors are complementary but inseparable, and both have already been included in what has loosely been referred to as the 'judicium' of the senses. But here, in order to build up a picture of the complex process of perception, Lucullus treats sensation and judgement as two successive stages, the first being the experience of the sensible character, the second the assigning of the character to the object. These roughly correspond to the two stages in Sextus, though they are described differently,¹ and Sextus regards the second as being outside the scope of the senses altogether.²

¹Where Sextus, in order to stress the more receptivity of sensation, speaks of a whiteish or sweetish movement of the senses, Cicero uses 'percipi', as if a minimal act of judgement were already included in the sensation. As Hamlyn points out (Sensation and Perception, p.191), it is in practice extremely difficult to separate these two stages or aspects of the perceptual process and ordinary language is not designed to make the distinction. Cf. Watson, Stoic Theory of Knowledge, p.35: 'Even to look at a thing and say simply 'white' is a contracted statement of "This is white".'

²The arguments in both Sextus and Cicero thus rest on the Antiochean view that sensations as such are not perceptions (A.M.VII,201) and the Stoic assumption that truth and falsity apply to judgements and not to disconnected and unjudged sensations (A.M.VIII,10).
The description 'haec quae sensibus pericipi diciturus' would normally be taken to apply to 'sensible' objects or qualities as such rather than to a stage in our awareness of them. Here it seems to refer to the primary information given in sensation before the addition of mental judgement. The next description, 'ea quae non sensibus ipsis percipit dicuntur sed quodam modo sensibus', covers the relating of this primary information to an object in the form of a statement or judgement. Such judgements are 'not precisely sensible but in a way sensible' because, though grasped by the mind, they have reference to sensible qualities or objects. Like Sextus, Cicero gives examples in which a common term is predicated of a demonstrative. The first group consists of statements which correspond to the simple data of each sense ('that is white, this sweet', etc.). The second group ('that is a horse, that is a dog') contains terms which are definable, but is similarly related to the perceptual situation. The third group, however, consisting of definitions, replaces the direct reference to the perceived object by the conditional, 'if it is a man, it is a mortal rational animal'. This is the normal Stoic formulation of the universal statement.

1 The Greek equivalent would be οὐχ ἀληθείᾳ καταληκτὸν ἀληθείᾳ. Rackham (followed by Dillon, p.66) is wrong in translating 'quodam modo sensibus' as 'by a sort of sensation'. For the form of expression, cf. D.L.VII,61: Ενώθημα δὲ ἀετίας διάνοιας, ούτε τι δὲν οὔτε κοινόν, ὡσεστὶ δὲ τι δὲν καὶ ὡσεστὶ κοινόν, οἶνον γίνεται ἀναλόγως ἵππου καὶ μῆ παρόντος.

2 This third group is spoken of as 'interlinked' ('ērīcēs, maiera necta') possibly because the wider terms used are common to more than one definition. With the definition, Lucullus has passed beyond the scope of the introductory sentence 'atqui qualia sunt .... tali secundur ...' (21).

3 Sextus A.M.XI,8; Watson, Stoic Theory of Knowledge, p.52; Long, H.Lh. p.141.
Although a man or a horse may be recognised from visual appearance, the complete grasp of his nature ('quasi exploitum rerum comprehensio') can be obtained only through the definition. It is therefore from this class ('quo ex genere') that 'notitiae rerum' are said to arise. These are, like sense-impressions, imprinted on the mind ('nobis impressuntur') and there is a continuous progression from sense to the formation of such concepts. Leullus does not, in this passage, distinguish between the different kinds of concept, and Reid may be right that 'quo ex genere' refers not to the third group of statements only but to the whole passage (p.200 n.6). It is, however, implied that 'notitiae' are the culmination of the perceptual process, and that they go further than sense-impressions in revealing the nature of the object. The mention of definition suggests the scientific concept (ἐννοια), which is developed through deliberate mental attention, rather than the προδηλησίζ which is acquired naturally, but both would be equally necessary for the purposes mentioned: understanding, inquiry and discussion ('sine quibus nec intelligi quidquam nec quaeriri disputarii potest'). The two types are not always distinguished and both can be called ἐννοια.

1 In N.D.II,147 the Stoic speaker refers to the ability to reason from premises and frame definitions as the highest form of knowledge. Cf. An.I,32.
2 Cf. the fuller account in 30.
3 Act. Plag.,11,3 (AE II,63); Sandbach, Problema pp.22-37. It is possible that Lucullus inform 'notitiae' from the third group of statements not because they are definitions but because, in his scheme, these alone can be separated from the particular perceptual situation. To say 'that is a horse' implies that I am looking at a horse; to say that a horse is a four-legged irrational animal does not. We need to be able to think and talk about horses without a horse being actually present. Cf. D.L.VII,6 (quoted on the previous page, n.1).
4 For this argument, see 27, p.147 below.
Some consequences of Academic scepticism

22 (p.38,6-31) quod si essent falsae notitiae ... multa percepserit?

Summary: But if concepts were false (for 'notitia' seemed to be your word for ἐπιστήμη) - if these were false or derived from impressions indistinguishable from false ones, how could we use them or see what was coherent or contradictory? Memory would be impossible, yet not only philosophy but daily life and the arts depend upon it. For no one remembers what is false or what he has not firmly grasped with the mind. Every art consists of not one or two but many acts of perception. Take this away and you erase the distinction between the artist and the ordinary person. For it is not by chance that we give this name to the man who has a firm hold on what he has perceived and grasped. Arts may be theoretical or practical. How can the geometrician contemplate in his mind objects that are either unreal or of dubious reality, or the lyre-player complete his tunes and verses (without perception of the real)? The same will apply to the other practical arts; for how can anything be made by art, if the artist's skill is not based on perception?

The idea that concepts cannot be false may strike us as an exaggeration, since it assumes that all concepts are derived from the cataleptic impression by reliable mental processes. The Stoics seem to have made this assumption, at least for all concepts acquired naturally, and presumably for all or most of those developed by the arts and sciences. In 38 Lucullus states that memory, 'notitia rerum' and the arts would all be impossible without assent, and in I,42 Varro gives it as Zeno's view that 'comprehensio facta sensibus' is nature's foundation for all knowledge: 'unde postea notiones rerum in animis praecipiantur, e quibus non principia solum sed latiores quaedam ad rationem inueniendae uine aperiuntur'. It is thus hard to see how error could arise, except by assent to a false impression, or at a later stage by a false inference, either of which the ordinary person would be capable of, though not of course the wise man.

1 'quam' must, as Madvig suggests, refer to 'perceptionem' understood from 'perceptionibus'. Reid is wrong in thinking that the antecedent to 'quam' is 'ara' (p.20, n.18). It is unnecessary to emend to 'quae' (Walker).
Lucullus does not, in this section, argue positively that valid concepts must be based on the cataleptic impression. Instead, he asks us to imagine the consequences, if concepts were either false or based on sense-impressions such as the Academic sceptics supposed them to be, possibly true but indistinguishable from false.¹ (The sceptical position that true impressions are indistinguishable from false is, from this point of view, no improvement on supposing them all to be false). The argument takes the form of a *reduction ad absurdum*, expressed in a series of rhetorical questions.

Lucullus does not explain what he means by a 'false' concept. On the analogy of sense-impressions, a concept might be said to be false when it fails to correspond to any existing object, e.g. the concept of a black horse would be false if there were no black horses. Such a view is obviously too simple, since concepts can legitimately be formed in ways other than by direct acquaintance with the corresponding objects.² A concept might, however, be false if its components were put together in a way that contradicted nature, e.g. that of a Centaur or Chimaera. Others might involve false inference, like that of a stationary earth. But Lucullus is not asking us to imagine what would be the consequences if, in our present conceptual framework, there were to be found a number of 'false' concepts.³ He is asking us to picture that conceptual framework itself as false, in the sense

¹The Academic argument from indistinguishability (*ἀπαριμαιστη*), according to which, for every true impression, a false one might be found exactly like it and indistinguishable in every respect (*κατα τ่อ ἀντα* ἀπαριμαιστη, Sextus A.M. VII, 252), will be discussed later in connection with 40-41.

²D.L. VII, 52-53 (SVF II, 87); Sextus A.M. VIII, 56-60 (SVF II, 69); A.M. IX, 393-5; XI, 250-51. All these modes are, however, ultimately based on direct sense-experience.

³The Latin 'quod si essent falsae notionis' (22) should be taken as 'but if concepts were false', not 'but if there were false concepts'. This is shown by the repetition of the protasis, 'if then these were false ...'.
of not relating at all, or not relating with certainty, to the world around us. Such concepts would lack the other test of truth, that of coherence; they would be useless for thought and communication, and above all for inference ("quo modo nutem quid cuique rei consentaneum esset, quid repugnaret, uideremus?"). No place would be left for memory, since there is no memory of what is false, or not held with a firm grasp in the mind. Thus philosophy, the arts, and even the conduct of everyday life would be rendered impossible.

For Lucullus, coherence is not something imposed by the mind on the indeterminate data of experience; it depends on the mind's ability to grasp the nature of things as it really is, an orderly and interconnected system. If we were in fact unable to distinguish true from false impressions, we should have no idea of what was possible or impossible in nature, we could not perform the most ordinary actions, and we should be unable to think or communicate with one another. The phrase 'quid cuique rei consentaneum esset, quid repugnaret' has thus a wide range of applications, covering logical connection, physical compatibility, the consistency of art and moral conduct. In Ac. I, 19 to judge 'quid consentientia, quid repugnans esset' is one of the tasks of dialectic. In Fin. V, 24 the virtuous life is compared to a practical art like dancing on the ground that its mode of action is 'conveniens consentaneumque'. When this inner consistency is interpreted as 'conveniens naturae uicem', its dependence on the certainty of perception becomes even more apparent (23-25).

2 Cf. the position of Cratylus, who emphasized his belief in the Heraclitean flux by refusing to speak and merely waving his finger (Arist. Met. 1010a 10 ff.).
3 Defined by Posidonius as 'the science of the true and the false and what is neither' (D. L. VII, 62). For its importance to the wise man, see D. L. VII, 47.
5 Chrysippus' formula, νοτι τεμ ποτηρι ὑψιπατοντων κοινωνίας (D. L. VII, 67) is translated by Cicero 'uices uirium adhibentem scientiam curum rerum quae natura sequentur' (Fin. IV, 14).
The argument about memory seems intended to apply to sense-impressions as well as concepts. Lucullus' claim that there is no memory of what is false, or not grasped firmly by the mind, is highly ambiguous. Admittedly we do not normally speak of 'remembering' what is not the case, e.g. we should not say that we remembered that it rained yesterday, unless it did rain yesterday, although we might of course be mistaken in our belief that we remembered. Thus we think of memory as a kind of knowledge ('quid quique meminit quod non animo comprehendit et tenet'). But in another sense it is quite possible to remember what is false, as Cicero points out in his reply (106); Siro, for instance, remembers all the doctrines of Epicurus. It is also possible to remember what you believe to be false, as Polybaenus remembered his geometry after he became an Epicurean. Thus the truth or certainty of sense-impressions could not be proved from the fact that we remember them, and the 'grasp' of memory need not extend beyond sensation to its object. Cicero is right to point this out ('quid memoriae uisa nisi compresita non posseum?'), but Lucullus is also right that if impressions are false or dubious, memory in at least one of its meanings becomes impossible, for we should never be justified in saying that we 'remembered' events or objects, or that so and so is the case. And if sense-impressions are doubtful, why should we assume that the memory image is more reliable? Thus we could not even be sure that we are correctly remembering our own sense-impressions.

The whole argument should be looked at against the background of the Stoic view (which Antiochus probably accepted) that the mind at birth is a 'tabula rasa' and all experience is built up from the data of sense. In this process, memory is essential (Act.Pltre.TV,11,1 ff./SV 11,03).

1 This simply means that we can remember statements or judgements, irrespective of their being true or false. It remains true that we cannot remember what is falsely stated or judged. We cannot, for instance, remember that the sun is the same size as it appears, though we can remember that Epicurus said that this was so. The same distinction would apply to sense-impressions; Pentheus might (if he had lived) have remembered that he saw two suns; he could not have remembered that there were two suns that day.
It is misleading to say, as Reid does in his note on this passage (p.201 n.15), that Lucullus 'has got hold of the Greek notion that ἁλὸς ψεύδεις is identical with ἁλὸς μὴ ὄν', i.e. that he is confusing what is false with what is non-existent. On the Greek side, the equivalence only concerns false judgment and statement and could not apply to memory in the same way, as we do not normally distinguish between true and false memory. Protagoras apparently argued that, since it is impossible to think the thing that is not, all opinions are true. Plato, distinguishing false opinion from thinking the thing that is not, identified the latter with thinking nothing, or not thinking at all. Reid seems to mean that Lucullus is arguing that memory of false concepts and impressions would be tantamount to remembering nothing, and so to not remembering at all. It may well be that Lucullus is exploiting the ambiguity of the phrase 'memoria falsorum' and that the argument is to that extent sophistical. But Cicero's ridicule (106) does nothing to answer the question how in a world in which concepts and sense-impressions were false, or no better than false, there could be memory at all in the accepted sense. For if sense fails to grasp its object, then surely memory must fail to do so. We can speak of false sense-impressions, but a memory which is 'false' is no memory at all. To say that we should simply remember what is presented to us ('quid? meminisce ulna nisi comprensio non possimus?' 106) does not solve this problem, for if what is presented is false, we should not, strictly speaking, remember it, any more than we should remember that two and two make five. And if true is indistinguishable from false, it will never have the degree of certainty that would justify our saying that we have remembered it.

2 Plat. Theaet. 106c ff.
3 This is plausible because both the Stoic definition of the cataleptic impression and academic thesis of ἀπαραλλαξια interpret falsity in terms of what is not 'there' (τὸ μὴ ἐκθάρχον).
If Lucullus were arguing that without the cataleptic impression we could have no memory at all, he would obviously be overstating his case.

The conclusion only appears to follow because the sceptical thesis that true impressions are indistinguishable from false is substituted as a hypothesis for the plain man's acceptance of ordinary experience. By saying that no place would be left for memory ('memoriae quidem certe ... nihil omnio loci relinquitur'), he does not necessarily mean that the mind would have no power to retain impressions,¹ but that it could not build them into any sort of system, since if all impressions were false or dubious the activity we call 'remembering' could not take place. Cicero in his reply points out that we can 'remember' in ways that do not imply the truth or certainty of what is remembered. But he does not answer Lucullus' main argument that without a criterion of any sort coherent experience, including memory experience, would be an impossibility.

Lucullus goes on to argue that art (τέχνη) would be impossible without many acts of mental perception.² What the geometrician 'sees' in his mind both exists and is necessarily true; to say that it could be non-existent or indistinguishable from false would imply either that geometry was invalid or (as Lucullus really intends to show) that the sceptical hypothesis applied to geometry is meaningless. In the same way the art of the citharode involves an exact perception of musical and metrical form.

¹Plato calls memory in this sense ομηρία δειχοσως and distinguishes it from 'recollement' (Phileb. 34a-d). Similarly the Stoics define memory as θεωρημος φαντασιων (Sextus A.H.VII.373). Sextus (ibid.) tells us that one of Chrysippus' criticisms of Cleanthes' interpretation of Zenon's idea of the impression as τύπωσις was that it made the retention of impressions impossible and so abolished memory and art.

²Cf. the Stoic definition of τέχνη as σύντημα εκ καταλήψεων συγγεγομενον προς τι τελος ευχρωστον των εν τω βιω (SUP I,73; II,95-7). Quintilian translates 'artem conscia ex perceptionibus consistentibus et coeordinatis ad fines utilem uti in' (II,17,41) and goes on to distinguish 'artes' as theoretical, practical or productive (II,18,1). Philo of Alexandria divides τέχνη into theoretical and practical, giving geometry and astronomy as examples of the former (SUP III.202). Although Reid argues (p.202 n.4) that Cicero's language supports only a twofold division, a threefold division does seem to underlie Lucullus' thought in this passage.
(scale, pitch, quantity, etc.), on which his skill as a performer depends.\footnote{1}

Lucullus concludes that, in general, the doing or making of anything 'by art' implies exact knowledge (many acts of perception) on the part of the artist.

In what way the geometrician's points, lines and circles 'exist' otherwise than as objects of thought is not raised. In 116 Cicero grants in a derisory way that the primary objects of geometry (points without magnitude, lines without depth, etc.) may be 'vera', but throws doubt on the application of its methods to the physical world and the problems of natural science.

Protagoras was probably the first to attack geometry on the ground that no such objects exist in nature; a straight line, for instance, does not touch a circle at a point (Arist. Met. 998a 2; Heath, Greek Mathematics I, p. 179). Epicurus had rejected geometry as inconsistent with atomism;\footnote{2} his followers, especially Zeno of Sidon, continued the attack,\footnote{3} and it would appear from Cicero's arguments in 116 that the Academic sceptics joined them.\footnote{4} For Antiochus and the Stoics, on the other hand, the study of geometry has considerable importance, both for its logicality and for its presumed relation to the physical structure of the universe.\footnote{5}

\footnote{1}The expression of this sentence ('is qui fidibus utitur ...') is elliptical; the original protasis 'quam (perceptionem) si subtraxeris' must be understood. 'Conficere verus' may perhaps be taken of singing the verses, although it suggests actual composition.

\footnote{2}Us. 229a; Bailey, Greek Atomism, p. 234. Democritus, on the other hand, wrote numerous mathematical works (Heath, Greek Mathematica I, pp. 176 ff.).

\footnote{3}Proclus (on Dua. I, pp. 199.3-200) tells us that whereas the Epicureans usually attacked only the first principles of geometry, Zeno of Sidon argued that, even if the first principles were granted, the conclusions did not follow without the addition of other unproved assumptions (Heath, Greek Mathematica II, pp. 221-2). Posidonius wrote a whole book refuting these criticisms (I. c. 46-7 Edelstein and Kidd; Long, H. Ph. p. 221).

\footnote{4}According to Galen (De optima doctrina I, p. 45, see Prochard p. 132 n. 2), Carneades questioned the certainty of mathematical propositions such as 'two quantities equal to a third are equal to another'. The sceptical attack continues in Sextus (e. g. A. M. III, 18 ff.), and is mentioned by Proclus (I. c.) as part of the campaign against knowledge.

\footnote{5}Cf. Ap. I, 6 'nuestra tu physica nosti, quae cum contingantur ex effectione et ex materia ea quae fingit et format effectio, adhibenda etiam geometria est'. For modifications introduced into the concepts of geometry by the Stoics, see Sabatier, Physica of the Stoics, pp. 86 ff. and 96 ff. For Posidonius' special interest in mathematics, see Heath, II, p. 219 ff.; Long, p. 221.
Geometry is chosen by Lucullus to represent the purely theoretical aspect of τέχνη because it is the most obvious example of an art where probability cannot be substituted for exact knowledge. Similarly music, though a practical skill, has a rigorous theoretical element which is comparable to mathematical science. In his reply (107) Cicero mentions, but without giving examples, arts which on their own admission rely more on 'coniectura' than on 'scientia', and others which simply follow appearance since they are not in possession of the Stoic criterion. The former group might include medicine, piloting a ship, business management, military strategy, the first three of which are cited by Aristotle as matters about which we deliberate, since they concern the variable and general rules do not cover all eventualities (F.N.1112b 1-11). It would seem that here again Lucullus has loaded the scales in favour of the dogmatist, and that in many cases the degree of certainty demanded by the Stoics is not required for a satisfactory technical performance. On the other hand, it is difficult to deny that accurate observation is essential even for those arts which, as Cicero puts it, merely follow appearance.\(^1\) By this he seems to mean any art based on sense-experience, as practised by the ordinary craftsman who has never heard of the cataleptic impression. In 146, however, Cicero turns the tables on the dogmatists by maintaining that an artist like Phidian possesses 'scientia' though not in the Stoic sense. This is something that Lucullus cannot claim, since for the Stoic 'scientia' as opposed to κατάληψις is in the power only of the wise man (145).

\(^1\)Although Cicero seems to attribute importance to 'appearance' in the sphere of the arts and sciences, he does not suggest ways in which the artist and the layman can be distinguished if both merely 'follow appearance'. For the Tyrrenhionist view that art is 'the observation of appearances', see Sextus A.M. V,2.
The argument from ethics

23-25 (p.30,32 - p.40,3) maxime uercro uirtutum .... quod occurrit uideri.

Summary. (23) Above all an understanding of the virtues provides proof that many things can be perceived and grasped. On this sole basis science rests (which we regard as a grasp of things which is firm and unshakable), and likewise wisdom, the art of living, which has its own internal stability. That stability must arise from perception and knowledge. Otherwise, how could the virtuous man resolve to endure any torture rather than betray a duty or trust? No one could value justice and faith so highly, if he had not assented to indubitable truth. (24) But if wisdom does not know whether or not she is wisdom, how will she deserve the name? If there is nothing certain for her to follow, how will she embark on any action or confidently carry it through? If she doubts or is ignorant of the final end, the ultimate standard of all things, how can she be wisdom? Clearly there must be some starting-point for her to follow, and this must be in agreement with nature. For otherwise appetite (our rendering of ὀρφή), which prompts us to act and to pursue what is presented to us, could not be moved. (25) But what moves appetite must first be presented to us and be believed; this cannot happen if what is presented is indistinguishable from false. The mind cannot be moved to desire anything if it is unable to perceive whether the object presented is in agreement with nature or alien to it. Likewise, if the mind is not made aware what its own function is, it will never act or be attracted to any object. If it is ever to act, what comes to it must be presented as true.

In saying that knowledge ('scientia'), like art, is based on many acts of perception and defining it as grasp that is stable and immutable, Lucullus allows the reader to assume that this lasting certainty is wholly due to its dependence on the cataleptic impression. This is the case, of course, only for the wise man, who never makes a mistake or assents to a false impression.

1 Reid (n.203 n.11) is probably right in interpreting 'cognitio' as 'study' or 'theory' rather than 'knowledge'; cf. Fin. V, 58 'consideratio cognitioque serm coaliesntium'.

2 This is Zeno's definition; cf. 145I I,41; Sextus A.H.VII,151: ἐκπίθημιν εἶναι τὴν ἀφορμὴν καὶ ἀεθεασμὸν καὶ ἀμετάδειον ύπὸ λόγον κατάληγεν. D.L.VII,47; Stob.Eel.II p.73,19 (SVP I,66). Lucullus here implicitly rejects Philo's new definition of 'scientia'.

3 'in quibus solius incursae sitim scientiam dicimus' (23). M. Adler (SVP IV,p.25 top right-hand column) interprets 'in quibus' an meaning 'in uirtutibus'; but this is surely impossible; see Reid's note, p.205 n.12.
it is only in the context of the wise man's experience that the relation between the certainty of knowledge and its foundation in acts of grasp and perception can clearly be seen. For the ordinary person 'comprehensio' can at best be translated into opinion (Sextus A.M.VII,152; cf. Ac.I,42).

The same is true of wisdom, 'sapientia' or 'ars uiuendi', i.e. virtue in both its cognitive and practical aspects. Without identifying 'scientia' and 'sapientia', Lucullus sees a close relationship between them. Just as knowledge is stable and immutable, so wisdom has its own inner consistency, which he traces to the same source, acts of indubitable grasp and perception.\(^1\) It follows that virtue or wisdom is, like knowledge, the polar opposite of doubt and scepticism.\(^2\) What Lucullus does not make explicit is that the 'constantia' of moral action, whether displayed in the particular act or in the good life as a whole, does not depend merely on individual acts of perception but on the fixed disposition of the agent, which, for the Stoic at least, results not from training or habituation but from 'scientia'.\(^3\) This disposition, which gives consistency to the emotional nature of the agent\(^4\) as well as to his life, is brought to bear in each individual action, which thus depends on knowledge in a more thoroughgoing way than Lucullus appears to be claiming here, unless we take into account that he is speaking about the 'uir bonus', who already possesses the 'ars uiuendi' and whose acts of perception will automatically be equivalent to knowledge.

\(^1\) Cf. 31,39; Plutarch (Comm.Note.1061E) refers to the Stoic view that the highest of the goods is to be unwavering and steadfast in judgment.

\(^2\) Similarly in I,42 we are told that Zeno 'separated from virtue and wisdom error, rashness, ignorance, opinion and suspicion, in a word everything that was alien to a firm and steady assent'.

\(^3\) Thus, although the arts too are based on grasp and perception, virtue is set apart as comprising 'stability, strength and consistency of the whole life' (Fin.III,50). This seems to be Cicero's way of describing ἀκαίρετας ὁμολογούμενη (D.L.VII,89/SVF III,39); cf. Plut.Virt.Esc.441C (SVF I, 202). Seneca (Ep.31,8) argues that the consistency and even tenor of perfect virtue cannot be attained without 'rerum scientia'.

\(^4\) Hence Cicero uses 'constantia' (in contrast with 'perturbatio') to translate Εὐάλεια, the correct state of the emotions found only in the wise man (Tusc.IV,14/SVF III,438).
The next stage of Lucullus' argument (24) again stresses the need for perception and knowledge if moral activity is to take place, but is expressed in curiously abstract terms. If wisdom herself does not know that she is wisdom, she will not deserve the name; she will have no confidence to act, since there will be nothing certain for her to follow; if she hesitates through ignorance of the ultimate ethical end, how can she be wisdom? It is clear that a beginning must be laid down for her to follow when she initiates action, and this must be in agreement with nature ('naturae accommodatum'), since otherwise impulse ('adpetitio'/'ἀρμή') will not be stimulated. All this presumably means that the wise man must, in the first place, be able to know with certainty what the ultimate end of action is, and in the second place, must be able to receive true and indubitable impressions in which he can recognise this end and respond to it.

In regarding agreement with nature as the starting-point of 'sapientia' and action, Antiochus is on common ground with the Stoics and other contemporary philosophical schools. This is made clear in Fin.V,16-17, where reference is made to an ethical survey of Carneades which, we are told, Antiochus was accustomed to use. Carneades argued that every art sets out from and is concerned with something outside itself; as medicine is the art of health and piloting a ship the art of sailing, so wisdom ('prudentia') is the art of living. All philosophers agree that the subject-matter and aim of wisdom is what is fitted and adapted to nature ('aptum et accommodatum naturae',17) and such as to attract appetition (ἀρμή); they disagree about what it is that,

1 The importance of certainty as to the nummum bonum is stressed by Antiochus' spokesmen Pico in Fin.V,15: without knowledge of the chief good, there is no 'ratio uluendi' and action becomes erratic. Once the chief good is known, one will have discovered a way of life, a conception of all the duties, and a standard of action. Cf. Fin.I,11.

2 Here 'prudentia' (ἀρμή) is assimilated to the productive arts, as often by Aristotle, but without Aristotle's distinction between προδημία καὶ πολυκή (F.H.1140a 25-8; b 6-7). It is doubtful whether Antiochus himself would have ignored the distinction. Contrast the comparison between wisdom and the arts in Fin.III,24, where it is stated that wisdom has no end outside itself and is completely realised in each and every right action.
from the moment of birth, attracts appetition; hence they disagree about the *sumnum bonum* or ultimate end, for in that ultimate end the first allurements of nature ('prima inuitamenta naturae', 17) must be included.

In using the concept of 'agreement with nature', Lucullus is again being deliberately non-specific. Without going into details about the definition of the ethical end, he relies on the general acceptance by the schools of the psychological principle that appetition can only be moved by what is 'naturae accommodatum', and argues that it is therefore self-evident that such must be the starting-point of moral action. 1 The inference is then drawn that the impression which conveys this character to the mind must be capable of being perceived and so distinguishable from false: 'quo modo autem moueri animus ad adpotendum potest si id quod uidetur non perciptitur accommodatum naturae sit alienum?' (25). It is characteristic of the generality of his account that we are not told at what level the perception takes place. At one end of the scale are the 'prima naturae', the response to which, though basically natural, is non-moral, at the other end the fully developed concept of virtue as an absolute good to which man's rational nature is adapted and to which action must be directed if it is to be right in the full sense. In the context of the good man's fortitude it is clearly rightness of the latter kind that must be capable of being perceived and of moving the mind to action.

1 The theory that every living creature from the moment of birth is attracted by what is adapted to its nature and repelled by what is alien to it, is common to Antiochus and the Stoics (*Fin.* IV, 24 ff.; I,16 ff.; cf. Epicurus' view of pleasure and pain, D.I.X,34). It would appear to follow that these are the only motives capable of stimulating action. In *Fin.* IV, 46-7 it is argued that concepts of right and duty by themselves will not supply a motive for action; for this the Stoics, like everyone else, have to return to nature. Cf. the view attributed to the ancient philosophers in *Fin.* IV, 58: 'dicunt appetitionem animi moueri cum aliquid ei secundum naturam esso uideatur'.
In insisting that the steadfastness of the good man in abiding by a moral decision, even in the face of torture, must be based on the certainty of perception and knowledge,¹ Lucullus endorses the old belief which goes back to Socrates, that knowledge is the strongest principle in man, through which he is proof against all contrary influences, including pleasure and pain (Plat. Protag. 362c; Arist. E.N. 1145b 23).² But he is not very specific about what in fact the good man perceives and knows when he makes a moral decision. Does he perceive and know certain moral principles ('leges'), and does his cognitive experience include an appraisal of the particular circumstances and perception of the appropriateness of the action in relation to those principles? The occurrence in the context of moral terms such as 'officium', 'fides' and 'aequitas' suggests that the good man's decision must be at least partly based on what is sometimes called a 'moral intuition'. Lucullus would thus be arguing that moral truths are in many cases as clear and self-evident as our perception of external objects. This self-evidence, coupled with the fact that for Antiochus virtue is still the chief part of the sumnum bonum,³ would ensure, as in Stoicism, a consistency of behaviour and fixity of purpose that are assumed to be lacking in a sceptic.⁴

¹'quacro ... cur haec sibi tam graues leges imposuerit, cum quam ob rem ita oportet nihil haberei comprehensi percepit cogniti constituti' (23). The emphatic repetition of cognitive terms indicates the firmness of the moral decision which rests on this basis of knowledge.

²The view that the wise man is 'happy' even on the rack was held by Stoics, Epicureans and Peripatetics (D.L.X, 118; Fin. III, 42; V, 77 ff., 80 ff.; J.II, 134). The importance attached to goods other than moral worth by Antiochus rendered his position open to objection as that of the Peripatetics. To avoid the difficulty, he seems to have inconsistently upheld the Stoic doctrine of apathy (135).

³Fin. V, 71-72. Since other natural advantages are necessarily rejected by the good man undergoing torture, their contribution to the sumnum bonum has to be disregarded for the purposes of the argument.

⁴Aug. Ac. II, 12 argues that the Academic wise man must of necessity be a 'desextor officiorum omnium'. In Fin. V, 22 Piso criticises the ethical end of Carneades (the enjoyment of the primary advantages of nature) on the ground that it leaves no room for duty, virtue or friendship.
Antiochus disagreed with the Stoics on the question of the nummum bonum because their conception of it involved a complete break with the empirical foundations of their ethical system. While agreeing that virtue is the perfection of man's rational nature, he regarded it as an inconsistency in the Stoic system that the primary advantages of nature (principia or prima naturae) should be man's first objects of appetite and thus provide the starting-point and material for virtue and yet not rank a place beside it as constituents of the nummum bonum (Fin. IV, 26 ff.). The consequences of this disagreement emerge clearly when the account of man's psychological and moral development given by Piso in Fin. V 24 ff. is compared with that of Cato in III, 20 ff. Both accounts start from the primary instincts of nature for self-preservation, but for the Stoic a motive different in kind develops together with the awareness of order and regularity in conduct, whereas for Antiochus progress and maturity depend on self-knowledge and a clearer understanding of what is naturae accommodatum. Agreement with nature thus has for Antiochus a more general significance and his conception of the nummum bonum includes the perfection and satisfaction of man's entire nature, not merely the rational part of it.

It should be noted, however, that though he criticised the Stoics, Antiochus fell into what is, from the Stoic point of view, the greater inconsistency of laying down an ethical end that cannot be completely realised in moral action. On his theory it is not easy to see why the wise man prefers to undergo torture rather than betray a trust, i.e. chooses to respond to the moral stimulus rather than the physiological. If it is the task of wisdom to protect and develop the whole of man's nature and not merely a part of it, as Antiochus claims (Fin. IV, 36 ff.), then either wisdom

1If pressed, Antiochus would have to say that an immoral action would be even more alien to man's nature than physical mutilation or death (cf. Fin. V, 71–2, where it is argued that the contribution of natural advantages to the nummum bonum is minimal compared with virtue). But this is by no means self-evident, if the claims of both body and mind are to be united in the concept of 'agreement with nature'. In 135 Cicero criticises Antiochus for accepting some Stoic doctrines, such as the 'apathy' of the wise man, which his own system does not require.
and virtue are not synonymous or Regulus, who died under torture in the hands of the Carthaginians, failed to perform a part of his duty and Q. Metellus, who died after a successful public career and left none and daughters behind him, was the happier of the two men (Fin.V.82 ff.). Unless virtue as the supreme good has an absolute priority over the primary advantages of nature, it is impossible to justify Regulus' choice, and in wishing to assign it a comparable priority within the concept of 'agreement with nature', Antiochus commits the same fallacy as the hedonist who wishes to regard some pleasures as 'higher' than others. Nor can his claim that there is only one object of appetition, embracing both the primary instincts and the ultimate end of rational conduct, be accepted as a satisfactory basis for moral action.

The account which Lucullus gives, in 25 of the psychology of action is again very general and not exclusively linked with any particular ethical theory. He assumes a type of action that is neither purely instinctive nor fully deliberated, but a straightforward response to a true impression, which reveals the object as either in agreement with or contrary to nature, and so as an object of pursuit or avoidance. If assent is given to an impression of this kind, appetition would automatically follow. Assent is specifically mentioned in these sections only once, in connection with the good man's choice (23), but seems to be implied in the later part of the argument in 25 as a factor linking perception and appetition. We are told that, before appetition or action can take place, the mind must be made aware what its function is ('quid officii sui sit'); this is presumably the function of recognising what is true and in agreement with nature and assenting to it.

Although the subject of these sections is 'sapientia', the argument about appetition does not seem to be confined to the 'sapient'. Lucullus maintains that appetition either requires or implies that the impression is accepted as true, which would not be the case if it were indistinguishable.

\[\text{ei quicquid credi; } 'necesse est id ei uerum quod occurrat uidari' (25).\] It is clear from the use of 'credi' and 'uidari' that Lucullus is not exclusively talking about the 'sapient' or the cataleptic impression. What matters for
from false. This conclusion applies to the experience of the ordinary person and not only to the wise man, although only the wise man would never be mistaken in his acceptance of an impression as both true and agreeing with nature. If, on the other hand, the impression could not be distinguished from false, not only the wise man but also any ordinary person would withhold assent and so, on the Stoic view, be unable to act. In extending the argument to the ordinary person, Lucullus seems to be relying on the unspoken assumption that the plain man's belief that he can distinguish a true from a false impression implies that, in all or most cases, he can in fact do so. The point at issue is not, therefore, whether a given impression can be infallibly recognised as true, but whether appetition and action imply assent, i.e. the acceptance of one's experiences as true. If they do, the ability to act refutes the view that true impressions are indistinguishable from false, and so makes perception possible not only for the wise man but also for the ordinary person.

The argument in 25 differs from that in 39 in being directed against the Academic thesis of ἀναπαραλλαξια, whereas in 39 it is directed against ἐποχή, which is perhaps why Lucullus does not mention assent explicitly in the present passage. It is clearly implied, however, that action depends on appetition which in turn depends upon assent. This was one of the focal points in the controversy between the Stoics and the Academic sceptics. The Stoics, especially Chrysippus and Antipater, strongly maintained that there cannot be impulse or action without assent; their opponents were bound to argue that action is possible without assent, if the wise man, who assents to nothing, is to be deemed capable of action.

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1. The importance of activity is perhaps overstressed in Antiochus' ethics (see Fin. V, 55 ff.).

In stressing the importance of assent, or belief in the truth of one's experience, as a precondition of appetition, which in turn is a precondition of action, Lucullus is on common ground with the Stoics. His outline in 24-5 suggests a temporal sequence, but it need not always be so, which is why are said to be acts of assent. Although there is no suggestion in Piso's account in Fin. V, 24 ff. that appetition changes in character or direction with the attainment of moral maturity, it is clear that it must, at a certain stage in the human development, come under the control of reason. A perception or reasoned judgement that one's act accords with nature would thus be a precondition of moral action. Lucullus' account is too brief and simplistic to give any clue to this development. He seems, at this stage in the argument, to be concerned mainly at the level of sense to render conduct proof against scepticism, and so to ensure the possibility of moral behaviour that is both stable and consistent. This raises the question whether moral action can ever be wholly consistent, in the sense of conforming to a single principle, and whether we could ever perceive or be absolutely certain that an act accords with nature in the required sense. And even if these two points were granted, the ambiguity of the term 'nature', though perhaps less in Antiochus' system than in Stoicism, and the general disagreement as to what it is that accords with nature (Fin. V, 17), here work against Lucullus.

1 Seneca, Ep. 113, 18 (S VF III, 169), places assent between appetition and action; cf. Hist. Stoic Philosophy, p. 40 n. 2. See also section 30 and p. 160 of this Commentary.

2 Stob. Pol. II, p. 88 (S VF III, 177). The two psychological events may not always be clearly distinguished in practice. When the Stoic Sphaerus took the wax pomegranate, his impulse was interpreted by King Ptolemy Philopator as an act of assent (D. L. VII, 177/S VF I, 625; cf. S VF I, 624), i.e. as a judgement that what he saw was a real pomegranate and good to eat. On the other hand, the act of assent could be taken as including in some cases 'an appetitve element'; see Long's account of ὁγμή in H. Ph. p. 176. Long points out (n. 1) that although all impulses are acts of assent, not all acts of assent are impulses.

The academic view of impressions undermines the rational faculty and ultimately philosophy and wisdom.

26-27 (p.40,4 - p.41,4) quid quod, si ista uera sunt ... a falsis interesse.

Summary. (26) Reason, the light of life, is totally destroyed if your case is true. Will you still persist in your perversity? Reason started inquiry, and being strengthened by inquiry has perfected virtue. Search is the desire for knowledge and its end is discovery. But no one discovers what is false or permanently unknowable; when things that have been, as it were, hidden are unveiled, then they are said to have been discovered; thus the beginning of search and its end in perception and grasp are held together, and demonstration (in Greek ἀπόδειξις) is defined as 'reasoning which leads from the perceived to what was not perceived'. (27) But if all impressions were, as the sceptics claim, such that they could be false and no concept could distinguish them, how could we say that anyone had inferred or discovered anything, or what confidence could be placed in logical method? Philosophy, which must proceed by logical reasoning, will be at a loss; and so will wisdom, who can doubt neither herself nor her decrees, called ὀγιατα by philosophers: To betray any such decrees is to commit a crime against truth and morality and usually leads to betrayal of friends and country. Therefore there is no doubt that the judgement of the wise man must not only not be false but must also be fixed and irreversible. But this is impossible on your view that the impressions, on which such judgements are based, are no different from false ones.

A transition is now made to the need for certainty as a basis for all reasoning processes; the sceptical view (Lucullus is still arguing against the Academic thesis of ἀπαραλλαξις) would abolish reason, and with it the perfection of virtue, by ruling out the possibility of inquiry or search for knowledge. The argument is complicated by the linking of 'inquiry' or

1Both the meaning and the text are uncertain. Plaeburg retains MSS 'tenet'; Reid and Rackham accept Bentley's correction 'tenetur'. Von Arnim (SVP II, 103) reads 'facultate teneatur', thus separating 'perciplundi et comprehendi' from 'exitur', which seems too easy. Taken with 'exitur', 'perciplundi' and 'comprehendi' are probably defining genitives. Some MSS (followed by Rackham) omit 'itaque' at the beginning of the next sentence.
'search' as an activity of reason with logical demonstration or deduction, presumably on the ground that both involve the revealing of what was previously hidden (though in fact 'there' to be discovered), and that both are a movement of the mind from a 'beginning' to an 'end' that was somehow contained in it, though not previously apparent. Lucullus argues that the desire for knowledge ('adpetitio cognitionis') only makes sense on the supposition that truth is discoverable. 'Inquiry' and 'discovery' are complementary terms and if truth is to remain permanently hidden the whole concept of rational inquiry is rendered futile and meaningless. The same applies to the logical process by which the mind is led from premise to conclusion; if the premises cannot be grasped and the validity of the inference is in doubt, there can be no certainty in the conclusion. It is obvious, to Lucullus at least, that this would destroy the possibility of rational argument and so spell disaster for philosophy and morality.

Antiochus probably shared the Stoic belief that man is not endowed with reason at birth but that reason develops, at an age given variously as seven or fourteen, on the basis of sense-experience and naturally acquired concepts. The first and most obvious way, therefore, in which reason would be abolished if true impressions were indistinguishable from false, is that it would have no chance to develop. It would be impossible to pass judgment on the data of sense or extend the range of perception to intelligibles, logical connections and rational concepts. In Antiochus' system, as in Stoicism, sensation is the starting-point of experience and reason and sense are not separated but interdependent.

1Compare Lactant. Inst. III,4 (SVF I,54): 'ergo si quovis scribi quidquam potest, ut Socrates docuit, nec opinari oportet, ut Zeno, tota philosophia sublata est.'

2Aet. IV, II, 4 (SVF II,83); cf. SVF I,149. Chrysippus is said to have defined reason as ἐννοιῶν τίνων καὶ προφήτων ἐκοινων (SVF II,041).

3Cf. Lucullus' argument in 22.
But assuming that a rudimentary form of reason could develop, the next step, the strengthening of reason by inquiry, seems equally impossible except on the basis of true and firm perceptions. Since Lucullus does not specify what kind of inquiry he has in mind, his argument can be interpreted only in very general terms. Inquiry is initiated by reason, which in its turn strengthened by inquiry; since moral virtue is perfected by reason, the full development of rationality will naturally culminate in perfect virtue. Thus the abolition of reason is seen by Lucullus mainly as a consequence of the impossibility of inquiry, or search for knowledge, which owing to the link between reason and virtue has a vital bearing on the moral issue as well as the epistemological.

1Cf. Gellius' account, N.A.XII,5,7 'postea per incrementa netatis exorta e seminis suis raticet ...' Seneca Ep.49,11 'docilem natura nos edidit et rationem dedit imperfectam, sed quae perfici posset.'

2It seems natural to take the sentence 'nam quaerendi initium ... quaerendo' as referring to the development of the individual who, through the search for knowledge, attains to rational and moral perfection, not as a statement about human evolution and progress. It is significant that both Cicero in Fin. III,17 and Plotinus in Fin. V.48 use the natural inquisitiveness of children as an illustration of the desirability of knowledge for its own sake.

3'nam quaerendi initium ratio attulit, quae perfectat virtutem, cum easet ipsa ratio confirmata quaerendo' (26). This just falls short of a complete identification of virtue and reason. In Fin.V.38, however, virtue is defined as 'rationis absolutio'; cf. the Stoic definition of virtue as 'ratio perfecta' (Seneca, Ep.76,10 /GFP III,200a). Cf. Cic.Lec.I,22 (GFP III,339) 'quae cum adoleuit atque perfecta est (sc. ratio), nominatur rite sapientia'.

4For the metaphor of light, see Heid, p.225 n.5. Antiochus and the Stoics applied the same metaphor to the senses (Coxetus A.M.VII,162-3,259-60; Aet.IV, 12,1/GFP II,54), in which connection the derivation of φαντασία from φανή was considered significant (Aet. 1.g.; also mentioned by Aristotle, An.429a 3). The application of the metaphor to reason goes back to Aristotle's comparison between light and the active and passive roles of the intellect (An.430a 15), this in turn being suggested by Plato's analogy in Rep.VI,500a ff. between the two sources of light in the visible and intelligible worlds. As used by Lucullus, it has special significance owing to the strong moral overtones; hence his next remark: 'tamenne in ista praevitate pesteabat? The Academic sceptic, in 'destroying' reason, is committing a moral sin.
Inquiry, as conceived by Lucullus, is not simply concerned with the collection of directly observable facts but involves inference from what is directly observable to what is not. This is made explicit in the Stoic definition of search, which probably goes back to Chrysippus: ‘search is an impulse towards apprehension that discovers its object by means of signs; discovery is the conclusion and end of search in the act of apprehension.’ Similarly Sextus (P.H.I,178) states that every object of apprehension is apprehended either of itself or by means of something else, and elsewhere (P.H.II,7) contrasts direct apprehension with apprehension by means of ‘some kind of search and inquiry’. It is clear from Sextus’ argument that the object of inquiry is the ‘non-evident’, and this is confirmed by Lucullus’ analogy between inquiry and logical proof, as a movement from the perception of the evident to the perception of the non-evident. His definition of discovery (‘cum ea quae quasi involuta surrunt aperta sunt, tum inuenta dicuntur’, 26) suggests that he is already identifying inquiry with proof, or at least taking demonstration as the characteristic form of reasoning involved in inquiry.

1Cf. Strom. IV, 14 (SVF II, 102). Lucullus’ description of ‘questio’ as ‘acquetio cognitio’, apart from being less complete, is also less technical and more general in meaning. In view of his previous argument about apposition in 24-5, it is noteworthy that here apposition is directed towards ‘cognitio’ as such. Similarly in Fin. III, 17 acts of cognition and perception are said to be desirable for their own sake, and in Fin.V, 48 ‘cognitionis amor et scientiae’ is spoken of as one of nature’s strongest impulses.

2Sextus (P.H.II, 97 ff.; A.M. VIII, 145 ff.) divides the non-evident into the absolutely non-evident (e.g. whether the number of stars is even or odd), the temporarily non-evident (e.g. the city of Athens to him at the time of writing), and the naturally non-evident (e.g. the existence of invisible pores in the skin or of an infinite void outside the universe). The last two can both be apprehended by signs, though normally search, like proof, would be concerned with the naturally non-evident. For the difference between ‘commemorative’ and ‘indicative’ signs, see Benson Mates, Stoic Logic, p.13-14.

3Cf. Sextus’ terms ἐκκαθαρσιν, ἐκκαλυπτικός (A.M. VIII, 309-310, etc) of demonstrative argument. For demonstrative argument, see Benson Mates, Stoic Logic, p.61-3.
It is clear that the grasp or perception with which inquiry ends ('exitus percipiundi et comprehendendi', 26) must be that of reason and not of the senses, if the analogy with demonstrative proof is to be maintained. After a broad reference to 'omnia uia' (27), which may include impressions of reason as well as those of sense, Lucullus subsequently narrows his consideration to the results of inquiry as such; because he is here concerned with rational inference he leaves aside the problem whether the sceptic can have a 'notio' of the object to inquiry (see p.147 and p.170 below) as well as the question of initial evidence. The evidence provided by sense-experience is clearly indispensable to inquiry, as may be inferred from the definition of logical proof.\(^1\) The conclusion of proof reveals what is not directly perceptible on the basis of perceptible evidence contained in the premises (26). Reason can thus extend the range of the senses without being wholly independent of them.\(^2\)

In claiming that no one discovers what is false, Lucullus may appear to be again putting forward a purely specious argument which relies on the strict meaning of words (as in the argument about memory in 22) rather than on the facts of experience, for it is of course possible to be mistaken in the belief that the results of an inquiry are true. In explaining discovery in terms of perception of the non-evident, Lucullus is placing himself on difficult ground, particularly when inference from impression to external

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\(^1\) An argument which infers the less clearly apprehended by means of the more clearly apprehended (D.L.VII,45) or 'an argument which by means of agreed premises reveals deductively a non-evident conclusion' (Sextus D.II, II,176, A.M.VIII,314). An example given by Sextus is 'If there is motion, there is void; but there is motion, therefore there is void.' Cf. Quint.V, 10,11: 'ratio probationem praestans, qua colligitur aliud per aliud, et quae quod est dubium per id quod dubium non est confirmat.' Lucullus here chooses to give the definition in a form that explicitly requires that the premises be cataleptically perceived ('ratio quae ex rebus perceptis ad id quod non percipiebatur adducit', 26). It will be noted that the Aristotelian conception of demonstration as an argument which deduces the particular from the universal is much more restricted in meaning than the Stoic.

\(^2\) The sceptical argument of Carneades that reason cannot be a criterion apart from the senses (Sextus A.M.VII,165) would consequently be endorsed by Lucullus.
object is itself in question. On the other hand, he does not need to prove that the results of any and every inquiry are necessarily true. It is sufficient to point out, as in his previous arguments, that the consequences of supposing them always to be false or indistinguishable from false—a view which would place the objects of inquiry on a level with the permanently 'incerta'—are unacceptable, since this would make nonsense of the whole idea of inquiry.  

In stressing the need for the kind of sense-impressions that can be distinguished by a concept ('notic'), Lucullus may be thought to be alluding to the part played by the concept in linking the beginning and end of search ('initium quacrendi et exitus percipandi et comprehendendi', 26). Just as search cannot take place without a πρόληψις or preliminary concept of the subject to be investigated, 2 so discovery implies a complete grasp of the same subject, 3 recognised through the πρόληψις which thus functions as a criterion. 4 This is the Stoic answer to the problem first raised in Plato's Μένος, 5 how search for knowledge (ζητησίς) is possible, since either we know or do not know what we are seeking; if we already know, there is no point in search; if we do not, we shall not know what to look for or be able to recognise it when we find it. We know from Sextus that this dilemma in an adapted form was used against the sceptics by both Stoics and Epicureans, especially the latter. 6 Lucullus is not, however, concerned here with this particular problem or with the answer to it. Assuming the possibility of

1From the opposite point of view, Sextus (A. M. VII, 393) argues that, if all impressions are true, there is nothing non-evident, which makes nonsense of inquiry.
2Cf. 21. Sextus A. M. IX, 12 etc. The principle was also accepted by Epicurus: D. L. X, 33; Clem. Strom. II, 4 (V. 255); Sextus A. M. XI, 21; Cic. Div. I, 43.
3Cf. 22. This would be the 'scientific' concept (Act. IV, 11 / SVP II, 83).
4Cf. Sextus A. M. VII, 140. This may have been why Chrysippus in the first book of his work On Reason gave sensation and preconception as the criteria (D. L. VII, 54). See, however, Mat's comments (Stoic Philosophy, pp. 133–4).
5Plat. Μένος 00d 5 ff.; Plut. ap. Olymp. in Plat. Phaed. p. 125, 7 (SVP II, 104).
inquiry he is concerned to affirm the certainty of its results, for otherwise no trust can be put in the validity of the rational process, on which philosophy and morality alone depend. Hence the emphasis is on the end-result rather than the beginning of inquiry, and it is in relation to achieving this result that the sceptical view of sense-impressions is judged unsatisfactory.

According to Lucullus, the Academic view that true impressions are qualitatively indistinguishable from false prevents reason from reaching a firm conclusion and so undermines both philosophy, which can only advance by way of rational argument, and wisdom, which must not lack confidence in herself and her decisions ('decreta'/ δόγματα). Although any philosophical tenet to which assent is given can be a δόγμα, Lucullus seems here to be confining the word to moral principles or judgements. For the wise man, a moral decision is essentially an item of knowledge and the same predicates apply to it ('stabile fixum ratum...quod moneo nulla ratio quaeat', 27). The decisions of wisdom can nevertheless be 'betrayed', it is not very clear by whom ('quorum nulsum sine scolere prodi poterit....quod uito at amicitiarum priditiones et rerum publicarum nanci solent'). We must suppose that the moral law is embodied in principles of action which are binding on all and not only on the wise man, though only the wise man is completely steadfast in his adherence to them. The man in whom reason is imperfectly

1 'fides' = πίστις, defined by the Stoics as κατάληψις (συμφερόμενα τοῦ ἔργαμανόμενον (Stob. Element. II, p. 113, 12 / SVF III, 540; Cf. Arist. Post. 131a 23). Clement's use of πίστις in connection with proof (ἀπόδειξις) (Strom. VIII, 7, 2) is commented on by P. E. Witt (Alinuma pp. 33-34), who traces it to Antiochus and through him to Zeno (Ap. I, 43); πίστις can also mean rhetorical proof and evidence and was differentiated from demonstration by Aristotle (Rhet. 1555a 5 ff.). Cicero's 'firma opinio' (given as a definition of 'fides' in Part. Or. 9) is reminiscent of its ordinary meaning and also of its place on the divided line in Plato's Republic (511e).

2 Lucullus' argument also affects Cicero's claim that the Academic is a 'searcher' (7-8; cf. 32, 127).

3 Cf. I, 20. By evoking the logical process from premise to conclusion, Lucullus' language tends to identify the 'progress' of philosophy with that of deductive argument. Compare 'procedi' with Sextus' use of ποσολγίων (A. M. VIII, 367 etc.).

4 Defined as κατάληψις τις λογική (Clem. Strom. VIII, 5 / SVF II, 121), or assent to a non-evident object of inquiry (Sextus F. Ii, 13, 16). Cf. D. L. III, 51.

5 These, in so far as they conform to the 'ius uti rectique', are directives of reason regarded as a universal law. Cf. Ben. III, 35; Leg. II, 6; Clem. Strom. II (SVF III, 332); Stob. Pall. I, 7, p. 96 and 102 (SVF III, 613 and 614).
developed may fail to make the right decision, or to keep to it, when made. Since any such failure constitutes a breach of the moral law, it may lead to serious crimes such as the betrayal of friendships or states. ¹ Lucullus does not clearly explain why these consequences should follow. Since Antiochus did not, like the Stoics, believe that all sins are equal but held that there are degrees of vice as well as of virtue (Fin. IV, 64 ff.), there seems less reason to suppose that, in his system, even a minor dereliction of duty would involve an absolute violation of the moral law, thus impairing its control over the individual concerned. The main reason why Lucullus is led to see the result of undermining ὀμηματα as 'the betrayal of friendships and states' can only be Antiochus' view that the human and social relationship is the most important concern of morality (hence justice is the leading virtue and every virtue has a certain social relevance), ² so that any action that offends morality is first and foremost seen as one which may have undesirable social and political consequences.

Lucullus concludes that, given these considerations, there can be no doubt that the decisions of the wise man must not only be true but also fixed and immutable. ³ He thus makes the possibility of moral deterioration depend, in the last resort, on the difference between knowledge and opinion, between the incorrigibility of the one and the fallibility of the other. The wise

¹ The notion of 'betrayal', which is repeated throughout the passage, suggests failure to carry out a recognised obligation rather than complete ignorance of what is morally appropriate. Duties to country and friends are among the most obvious of the 'appropriate actions' (καθήκοντα) prescribed by reason (D.L.VII, 105). The Stoics held that the wise man would justifiably give his life for the sake of country and friends (D.L.VII, 150). Cf. Acc. I, 23.

² Fin. V, 65 ff. Antiochus followed the Stoics in stressing the common bond which exists among men and their natural propensity to form friendships and establish communities and states (Fin. III, 53 ff.). But in allowing degrees of virtue and vice he did away with the sharp distinction between καθήκοντα and κατορθοματα and made it possible to judge the moral significance of an action partly by its effect on society. The plural 'rerum publicarum (proditiones)' suggests a Greek political background rather than a Roman.

³ Cf. Fin. II, 28 (Cicero speaking of Epicurus): 'est erim tanti philosophi tamque nobilis audacter sua decreta defendere.'
man will never give up any decision because of the firm cognitive base on which his judgements rest, and he is thus safe from moral sin which is due to weakness and instability (Fin. IV, 77), and ultimately to false assumption or ignorance. But on the Academic view of sense-impressions, distinctions between doubt and confidence, knowledge and ignorance, wisdom and folly break down, with serious implications for morality and human relationships. Since only the certainty of absolute knowledge can safeguard the moral decision, Lucullus contrives to suggest that in undermining the perceptual basis of all δόγματα the Academic sceptics are behaving no better than criminals. This conclusion follows, like the rest, from their refusal to allow the existence of the cataleptic impression.

Attempt to force the Academic into a self-refuting argument

28-29 (p.41,5 - p.42,4) ex hoc illud est natum ... opinor dictum satia.

Summary. (28) This consideration underlies the demand made by Hortensius that your school should admit that the wise man at least perceives that nothing can be perceived. Antipater used to make the same demand, arguing that it was consistent for one who affirmed that nothing can be perceived to say that this at least can be perceived, though not anything else. Carneades, opposing him with greater subtlety, used to point out that such an admission would on the contrary be most inconsistent, for no exception had been made in the statement that nothing can be perceived. (29) Antiochus seemed to grapple with the point more closely by arguing that, since 'nothing can be perceived' was a 'concession' of theirs (you


2 The Stoics held that true friendship can exist only among the wise (Stob. Pol. II p.100,15/STP III,630; D.L.VII,124. On the danger of placing the certainty attached to friendship on the same level as logical certainty, see Bovon, Stoics and Sceptics, p.152.
understand that by this I mean θόγια), the Academics should not have been doubtful about their own 'decision' as they were with regard to other matters, especially since their entire position centred round it; for this was the guiding principle of all (their) philosophy,¹ the factor determining true and false, known and unknown. Since they undertook this type of argument and wished to show which impressions should be accepted and which rejected, they ought at least to have perceived that principle on which every judgment of truth and falsehood depends. For the two most important issues of philosophy are the criterion of truth and the ethical end. Any ignorance or uncertainty in regard to the starting-point of knowledge and the ultimate goal of appetite is alien to wisdom. This, therefore, was the ground on which the Academics should have been required to admit perception of at least their principal thesis. But I think enough has been said about the unstable nature of their theory, if a sceptic can be said to have one.

The intention of all three opponents (Hortensius, Antipater and Antiochus) is the same in that all three want the Academic sceptic to admit that he at least perceives that nothing can be perceived, with the result that he would be trapped into self-refutation.² The difference between Antipater and Antiochus lies in the ground on which they argue that the Academic might be expected to admit this. The statement attributed to Hortensius consists of the bare demand that the admission should be made, and we are left to infer that the underlying reasoning derives from Lucullus' previous argument about the cognitive requirements of any decision of wisdom ('ex hoc illud est natura ...', 28), and is therefore similar to that of Antiochus.

¹This may refer to certainty as to the truth of one's dogmas (cf. 27), if by 'totius philosophiae' Lucullus does not mean only the Academic philosophy. But if, as seems equally likely, he means the Academic philosophy, the reference must be to the 'dogma' that nothing can be perceived.

²See also 109, where 'unitatum at saepe repudiatum' is Cicero's description of this argument.
Antipater may not have been of the same calibre as Carneades in
dialectical argument, but he must surely have known that any such concession
on the part of the Academic sceptic would be self-contradictory and damaging.
He could not have been so naive as to think that a claim that nothing can be
known and an admission that this itself can be known would really be consist-
ent, although his argument was so interpreted by both Carneades and Antiochus
(109). Since we are not given the precise details of his argument, we can
only have recourse to conjecture.

One of the objections that can be raised against Academic scepticism
is that it implicitly assumes the truth of certain basic principles and
conceptualisations, or at least it rests on the tacit acceptance of
the proposition that nothing can be known. Unlike the Sextoan sceptic, who
leaves the possibility of knowledge an open question, the Academic denies
that anything can be known, and in so doing takes up a philosophical position
no less than the dogmatist. Hence Seneca (Ep. 68,44) accuses the Academics
and other sceptics of introducing a new form of knowledge (scientia'), that
of knowing nothing ('nihil scire'), and Sextus differentiates the Academic
from the Pyrrhonian sceptic on the ground that the former positively affirms
that all things are non-apprehensible. But Antipater perhaps thought that

1 Cf. A. Naess, Scepticism, p. 126 and 151. Epictetus II,20,4-5. Similarly
the Pyrrhonists were sometimes accused of 'dogmatising' in their refutations
of the dogmatists (D.L.IX,105; cf. Sextus P.M.I,1 ss.). Clement of Alexan-
dria finds the same difficulty in the notion of ἐξοχή (Strom.VIII,5/YP II, 121). Cf. also Aristotle's argument (Met.1006a 11 ss.) in defence of the
principle of contradiction, that even one who denies it is assuming its truth,
for otherwise he will not be able to make meaningful statements or engage in
argument.

2 Sextus P.M.I,1 ss. Cf. P.M.II,79: the Sextoan sceptic does not assert that
there is no criterion of truth, for this would be a dogmatic statement.

Lacy ('On μαθηματικον and the Anecdotes of Ancient Scepticism', Phronesis 3,
1958, p.67) points out that the Academic claim is no more than the opposite
to the Sismon view that some things can be perceived. Naess (op.cit. pp.4,27
and 56) accepts Sextus' distinction and finds a close resemblance between the
Academic and the modern sceptic, both of whom differ from the Pyrrhonist in
that they take an active part in philosophical discussion (pp.4 and 110).
But did not Sextus do so?
he could not argue along these lines because the Academics (including both Arcesilas and Carneades) had already anticipated the objection by allowing no exception to the statement that nothing can be known so that it applies also to itself. 1 Antipater does not, on the other hand, seem to have used the argument that in this unqualified universal form the statement that nothing can be perceived might be regarded as self-refuting. 2 For if nothing can be known, the skeptic cannot know even this, 3 so that any argument to the contrary would be just as credible as his own claim. This criticism of course ignores the issue of probability, by which Carneades would no doubt have defended his own position (cf. 110).

So what Antipater may have done was to resort to a type of argument commonly used against the later skeptics, 4 which offered the Academic a choice between two alternatives but in a sense required him to choose one of them. Either the Academic knows that nothing can be known, or he does not know. If he does not know, his statement has no foundation and cannot be taken seriously. Consistency therefore requires that he should allow perception at least of his claim that nothing can be known, 5 though if he were to make such an admission, he would be trapped in another inconsistency.

1Ae.I,45 'itaquq Arcesilas negabat case quidquum quod seiri possit, rc illud quidem ipsum, quod Socrates sibi reliquiasset.' Cf. Sextus P.H.I,14, A.M.VIII, 409 ff.; D.L.IX,76. In 401 Sextus uses the famous analogy with the step-ladder that is first used and then overturned, which in also used by Plato (Rep.511b) and Wittgenstein (Tractatus 6.54).

2Cf. the famous paradox of the Cretan liar (96; Diels-Kranz Vora.I p.52). Other examples of self-refuting statements are 'nothing is true' (Arist.Kat.1012a 29 ff., 1060b 7 ff.); 'all dreams are false', if heard in a dream (Clem.Strom. VIII,5/Str.7.121); 'all moral precepts are superfluous' (which is itself a precept). Cf.Sextus P.H.I,14; P.H.II,180; A.M.VII,303 ff.

3Lucrarius IV,469-70. According to Lailey's Commentary (III,p.1238), the argument is aimed particularly at Metrodorus of Chios (Di.JI,73), but, as Do Lacy notes (p. 69 n.3), Metrodorus was in fact expressing the same idea.


5It is unlikely that Antipater was suggesting that the Academic claim be excluded as a member from the class of propositions to which it refers, as Do Lacy (Aq.G. p.70) thinks. If he had, he would in a sense have been anticipating Russell's solution to the paradox of the Liar.
Antiochus seems to have felt that his approach was better because, firstly, he avoids the issue of inconsistency, and secondly, he carries the attack a step further. Arguing that 'nothing can be perceived' is a 'dogma' of the Academics, he stipulates that they should not be doubtful about it ('non debere eos in suo decreto sicut in ceteris rebus fluctuari', 29), not so much because dogmatism by nature excludes the element of doubt as because such an attitude contradicts their claim to be philosophers. Lucullus has already established in the previous section (27) that philosophy and wisdom can rest only on certainty and that the decision of a wise man must be indubitably true. He now represents Antiochus as arguing, on the basis of the above contention ('ex hoc illud est natura...', 28), that unless the Academic admits perception of his one 'dogma', he will be undermining his philosophical credibility and his or rather the Academic wise man's claim to wisdom. Carneades had, in Antiochus' opinion, evaded a logical inconsistency at the expense of weakening the cornerstone of his philosophy.

The question of what constitutes a 'philosophy' probably admits of different answers. The Academics would no doubt have thought of themselves as having as much right to be considered a philosophical school as any of the dogmatists, even if their main contention rested merely on probability. But, for Antiochus, a doctrine must rest on a firm perceptual and cognitive

1Cf. 109, where Cicero summarises the argument thus: 'since there can be no decision of the wise man that is not grouped, perceived and known, anyone who said that this very decision, that nothing can be perceived, was that of the wise man, should admit that it is perceived.' Illesberg's 'qui sapientis esse diceret' makes acceptable sense of this passage, though the text is uncertain.

2Cf. Naecn, Scepticism, pp.28-33, especially p.29, defending Pyrrhonism: 'As to whether scepticism counts as philosophy, if we accept as a necessary condition for anything to be a philosophy that it must contain at least one proposition, or at least one doctrine, claimed to be true or probable, then scepticism is not a philosophy.' Cf. Sextus P.H.I,16-17.

3In 109-10 Cicero dismisses as absurd the idea that the wise man could have only one 'decretum' ('proinde quani sapientis nullum alid decretem habet et sine decreto utam agere posse'). It is not clear whether or not he is still using 'decretum' in Antiochus' sense and in contrast with 'probabilia' in the following sentence. If he is, it might be more consistent to read
base if it is to be the foundation of a philosophical system. At the end of Lucullus raises the question whether the Academic, who approves nothing, can be said to have a 'sententia', just as Clement of Alexandria concludes that the definition of ἀπειροτήτα as 'an adherence to a number of dogmas consistent with one another and with appearances, tending towards the good life' cannot apply to those who withhold judgment about everything. Antiochus is prepared to treat the Academic system as a proper philosophy, but only on condition that its basic principle, that nothing can be perceived, is itself regarded as certain and therefore as providing a criterion of truth and falsehood, knowledge and ignorance. The paradox of this argument is that it ignores the nature of the particular 'criterion' involved, which is in effect a denial of the possibility of a criterion. In a negative way, however, the principle that nothing can be perceived does offer a test of every experience that is either accepted or rejected, i.e. judged true or false on grounds of probability, and if the 'probable presentation' is to be followed (cf. 33 ff.), this itself arises from the basic principle that nothing can be perceived. Antiochus not only sees the claim that nothing can be known as the ultimate basis of every judgement the Academic makes about truth and falsehood, but also ironically represents it as a criterion of perception and knowledge in the same sense as the cataleptic impression, which it denies.

'nee' (with Lambinus) in place of 'et' ('nec sine decreto uitam agere possit'), though there is no MS authority for this change (see Phof p.305 n.31). If 'nee' is read, the sentence could also be interpreted as giving two alternatives which enable the Academic to escape the dilemma presented by Antiochus: the Academic wise man may have 'decreta', though not in the sense defined by Antiochus, or he may not need 'decreta', especially in Antiochus' sense. Cf. Sextus P.H.I,13 ff., where it is explained in what sense of 'dogma' the sceptic philosopher 'may be said 'not to dogmatise'.

1Cic.Ettrn.VIII,5 (WiF II,212,p.37,9 ff.). The first part of the definition is also given by Sextus, who proposes an alternative definition more suitable to the sceptic (P.H.I,16-17). In 99 Cicero does not refrain from speaking of 'tota Caremen sententia'. 
Antiochus maintains that anyone who makes a claim to wisdom must be certain of two things, the starting-point of knowledge and the final ethical end. His insistence on the central importance of the former may reflect the change in his own philosophical position, from support of the sceptical Academy to opposition to it. Combatting scepticism or dogmatism respectively becomes, in the last resort, a question of asserting or denying the existence of a criterion, and this is the widest and most crucial difference that divides philosophers (cf. Sextus A.M.VII, 27-28). By foisting at least one dogmatic principle on the Academic sceptics, Antiochus attempts either to lure or to force them into the opposite camp. But the question of the criterion is also relevant for morality, for to abolish perception is also to abolish certainty as to the ultimate goal of moral action (cf. 23-25), and it is here that uncertainty is most damaging (Fin.V, 15). By bringing in the concept of the chief good and shifting attention to moral wisdom, Antiochus shows that his principal concern is, after all, with moral action. If he persists in refusing to admit the certainty of his own basic principle, the Academic wise man will have neither starting-point nor ultimate standard on which to base his judgements and actions. Hence Lucullus' final accusation of 'inconstantia', connoting both lack of firmness and stability in the Academic system and the moral weakness which is inseparable from it: 'omne peccatum imbecillitatis et inconstantiae est' (Fin.IV, 77).

1 In Div.II, 1 Cicero makes the counter-claim that the Academic philosophy is 'minime adrogans maximoque et constans et elegans'.

2 Cf. Leg.I, 45, where 'perpetua ratio vitae' is identified with virtue and 'inconstantia' with vice. See 23 on the 'constantia' of wisdom and the wise man (p. 134 of the Commentary).
Summary. (30) There follows an argument which, though amply supported, is rather less obvious — for it borrows some material from physics — so that I fear I may be giving greater scope to my opponent, for what would he do about matters that are shrouded in darkness when he is trying to snatch away the light of day? Nonetheless, it could have been argued in detail how artistically nature has constructed every animal, and man in particular: how efficient the senses are, how impressions first affect us and move impulse and we then direct our senses towards perception of objects. For the mind, being the fountain-head of sensations and itself a sense, naturally turns its attention to what affects it. It acts upon some impressions at once, others it stores, giving rise to memory, and the rest it groups by virtue of their similarities, forming concepts, called sometimes ἀνωτά, sometimes πρόληπτις by the Greeks. The addition of reason, demonstrative argument and a myriad of facts culminates in perception of all those things, and, with the gradual perfecting of reason, in wisdom. (31) Therefore, since the human mind is adapted to knowledge of things and coherence of life, it welcomes apprehension above all, and that ἁπτανήτις (which, as I said, we shall translate literally as 'grasp') it loves both for its own sake (for it holds nothing dearer than the light of truth) and also for its usefulness. Thus it employs the senses and, moreover, produces the arts, which are as it were further senses, and invigorates philosophy until it brings about virtue on which the whole of life depends. Therefore those who deny the possibility of knowledge are snatching away all that serves and equips life, or rather, utterly overturning it and robbing the living creature (‘animal’) of the mind that gives it life (‘animal’), so that I am at a loss properly to describe their temerity.

1An ostensible reference to the order of treatment by Antiochus in the discussion at Alexandria (11-12), although Cicero may have been influenced by the arrangements of the arguments in the Forum (Reid p.120 n.14).
2I.e. of the objects revealed to the mind through sense and reason working together as described.
3Here 'iustum' means, not 'that of yours', but 'that, which you know about'.
If it were a self-evident fact that our perceptual and cognitive faculties are designed for and capable of obtaining knowledge, there would be no room for doubt and scepticism. But in resorting to this argument and basing it on the craftsmanlike purposes of nature, Lucullus is not really bringing any significant help to his case, as he himself is fully aware, not only because the argument from teleology as such belonged to physics, and physics, or the science of nature, was generally considered to treat of matters that are mysterious and veiled from direct human observation, but also because this argument and the doctrine of which it is a part, that the world is governed by a divine providence, were strongly contested by the Academic sceptics. If the Academic can elaborately argue against perception of objects which are directly observable, his opposition will certainly increase when it comes to matters that are to a large extent beyond the range of the senses and, arguably, of reason.

Antiochus here accepts the Stoic and Aristotelian view that the works of nature display artistic skill and that nature, like art, is guided by a purpose. But while Aristotle's teleology did not as a rule include the idea of a divine purpose or personify nature as an artist, Antiochus seems to have fully accepted the Stoic view of nature as divine reason, working with forethought and intelligent craftsmanship (τεχνική τέχνης). Since Lucullus' aim

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1Antiochus, however, believed that the secrets of the universe can be unravelled by reason (Fin. V, 56).

287, 119-121; M.P.I, II, 73, III, 65 ff.

3For the accusation that the Academicians 'steal the daylight' and cover with darkness matters that are clear, cf. 16, 26 and 61; M.P.I, 6. See also p.144 n.4 of this commentary.

4Cf. 87, Ap. I, 23-29. Aristotle argued that, since art imitates nature, if art is purposeful, so is nature (Thiv. II, 199a 15 ff. etc.).

is to demonstrate the existence of purpose in the skilful construction of man's perceptual faculties and that this purpose is the attainment of knowledge and ultimately moral perfection, he quickly narrows the discussion from 'animal omne' to man, the most favoured of nature's creations, and in particular to the function of the senses and the mind ('mens'), which is clearly intended to emerge as the most important of the human faculties.

This conforms to the Stoic view of the mind or reason as the commanding part of the soul (ἡγεμονικόν), responsible for every human activity and the seat of all perceptual and cognitive experience.

To illustrate nature's craftsmanship Lucullus points to the efficiency both of the senses and of the mind ('quae usi esset in sensibus', 'naturalis uim habet'), and the way in which our responses develop from the first stirring of sensation right down to the formation of concepts and, finally, the perfection of reason and attainment of moral wisdom. It is obvious, particularly from the point where he mentions memory ('alia quasi recondit'), that Lucullus is not describing any random stages in human experience but a progressive development from mere sensation to full rationality and moral enlightenment. On the other hand, it is not clear whether, from 'quem ad

1 Man is superior to the other animals in the structure both of his body and of his mind (Fin.V, 34 ff.). The Stoics held that man is more or less sharply differentiated from the other animals by the possession of reason (SVF I, 377, II, 725 ff., 654 etc.), a distinction which goes back to Alcmaeon c. 500 B.C. (DK I, p. 215).

2 Cf. Fin.V, 34; 'animumque ita constitutum ut et sensibus instructus sit et habeat praestantiam mentis cui tota hominum natura parent, in qua sit mirabilis quaedam usus rationis et cognitionis et scientiae virtutumque omnium.'

3 Att.IV, 0, 1, cf. 23, 1 (SVF II, 050 and 054); D.L.VII, 159 (SVF II, 037). For the relation of the parts of soul to the ἡγεμονικόν, see SVF II, p. 227 ff. and 235 ff. The image of the fountain-head is also found in Chalcidius in Tim. 220 ('uolit e capite fontis', SVF II, 079, p. 235, 30). Other images are the branches of a tree, the threads of a spider's web (Chalcidius l.c.), and the tentacles of an octopus (Att.IV, 21/SVF II, 036, p. 227, 27).

4 Reid (p. 211 n. 20) correctly observes that the efficiency of the senses formed part of the argument in 20, which is referred to again in 37 ('cum uim qua esse sit in sensibus explicabamus'). But his suggestion that Cicero is being careless overlooks the fact that Lucullus' point is now a different one, namely that the validity of the senses is guaranteed by the part they play in the attainment of nature's ultimate purpose for man. The two arguments have, nevertheless, something in common (see p. 118 n. 3 of this Commentary).
modum' to 'intenderemus', he is tracing successive steps in the human development from the moment of birth (i.e. at first we merely receive impressions, as the result of which we are attracted to certain objects, and it is only later that we consciously attend to perceiving them), or whether he is analysing the combined cognitive and appetitive act as it may occur at a more mature stage. Both logically and temporally, impressions must come first and perception follow afterwards. Similarly appetite can only occur after the experience of impressions. But in placing appetite before perception, Lucullus appears to be contradicting his account or appetite in 24-5, where it was implied that assent and at least a minimal act of perception must precede appetite.¹

One explanation of the inconsistency may lie in the fact that there is often a certain overlap between appetite and assent, to which a schematic outline may fail to do justice. The Stoic view that sensations (sensus, αἰσθητήρες) are themselves acts of assent² cannot offer a solution here, since in that context sensation seems to mean perception and the claim is meant to demonstrate that assent must precede appetite (108), while in the present passage Lucullus appears to be placing assent after appetite. One might (as suggested in the previous paragraph) interpret his statement as a list of human responses, from the moment of birth, in accordance with the temporal sequence in which they occur, or even as a mere list of the principal activities of the mind (the experience of impressions, appetite and perception).³ Alternatively, a minimal act of appetite may be thought of as necessary to direct attention to the objects which are to be perceived, or even to the action or choice of actions which may be performed by the percipient (see pp. 161 and 203 below).

¹See p. 141 above. If 'ut' is understood as referring to the text 'ad res percipiendas intenderemus' (30) is taken as final or consecutive, Lucullus' statement is even more inconsistent with the previous account in 24 because it suggests that impression and appetite are the prerequisites of attention and judgment. But 'ut' is probably being used in the sense of 'quem ad modum' above.

²Cf. 103; SVF I, 72-74.

³Cf. Aet. IV, 21 (SVF II, 636), though here the activities include assent and are listed in the correct order.
Although in describing sensation and appetite Lucullus uses words ('pellerent', 'pulsa') that might suggest that we are at the mercy of impressions, he corrects this by emphasising the active role of the mind in perception ('intenderemus', 'intendit'). The experience of an impression is involuntary, but the act of attention, like the act of assent (implied in 'arripit'), is a necessary condition of perception, and both must depend on the percipient. Why we respond in this way to impressions, or to some impressions, is explained by the fact that the mind, being 'the source of the senses and even itself a sense', is 'moved' by them. It is presumably here that appetite plays a part by guiding the attention of the mind to what has some use or value for the living creature.

In seeing a close affinity between the mind and the senses, Antiochus sides with the Stoics against Plato and Aristotle, who never regarded intellect and sense as a single faculty. Their virtual unification in Stoic theory helps to minimise the possibility of perceptual error and to counter the sceptical argument that, since the intellect has no contact with external objects, it cannot judge of matters that have no relation to it. The view of the mind as itself a sense follows easily from its identification with the ἴδευμονικόν, as the centre of sensory and cognitive awareness, and from the material unity of the whole sensory system. The Stoics expressed this interpenetration of mind and sense in different ways. Sextus represents them as arguing that 'the same thing is both intellect and sense, but in

1 Cf. Watson, Stoic Theory of Knowledge, p. 35. For assent as voluntary, see 37-38; Pat. 42-43; Sextus A.M.VIII, 397.

2 Sextus A.M.VII, 352-3 etc. Cf. Dillon, p. 68: 'If any distinction at all is made between the ἴδευμονικόν and its fivefold instrument, there is room for a Skeptic to drive a wedge.'

3 Act.IV, 21/IVF II, 036. Hence Chrysippus' comparison of the ἴδευμονικόν to a spider who can feel any contact with any of its threads (IVF II, p. 236, 12). The Stoics seem to have been anticipated in their view of the ἴδευμονικόν by Theophrastus' successor, Strato of Lamiaecus (Zeller, Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics II, p. 466-9; C.J. de Vogel, Greek Philosopher II, pp. 256-9). But in Strato's case there seems to have been a total identification of mind with the senses (Sextus A.M.VII, 350).
different respects", just as the same cup is concave inside but convex outside (A.M.VII,307); elsewhere, that there are in principle two faculties but as properties of the whole soul they are combined and coextensive with each other, as honey is throughout both liquid and sweet (ib.359). The intellect is thus able to use the senses as its instrument (ib.354).

Lucullus' account of the mind's active response to impressions ('alia uisa sic arripit ut its statim utatur, alia quasi recedidit....cetera autom similitudinibus construct....') is misleading in that it represents each step as concerned with a different set of impressions - some for immediate use, others to be stored as it were for later reference, while yet others are classified by mutual resemblance. One would, however, assume that any impression, whether 'used' (i.e. acted on) or not, can remain in the memory and also provide material for the classification of particulars. We must conclude, therefore, that these groups of 'uisa' are not intended to be mutually exclusive, and that their differentiation is merely a convenient way of drawing attention to the mental operations involved. Again, though the antithesis between 'used and 'stored' is hardly applicable to impressions, the distinction between the immediacy of a perceptual experience and memory, which arises only when the sensible object is no longer within view, is a valid one. Similarly the grouping of impressions by resemblance represents a further cognitive stage after memory, though sensation and memory are clearly continuous and complementary throughout the process.

1According to Stoic theory, this interpenetration (καταμετατροπή) can take place without loss of identity (Zeller, Stoica. Enirurne und Scientia, p.137).

2Cf. Dillon's exposition of Antiochus' view of the relation between mind and the senses p.67-68). He contrasts it with the 'low' view of the senses taken by Sextus in A.M.VII, 343 ff., although Sextus is there stating a position very similar to that of Antiochus and the Stoics, namely that perceptual judgements involve more than the senses (cf.21). I would suggest that the opposition between Antiochus and Sextus emerges more clearly in A.M.VII,354 ff., where Sextus is arguing against the view that truth is discovered by the mind in conjunction with the senses.

3Act.IV,11 (CYP II,83). On the whole, Lucullus' exposition seems to conform more to principles of style, such as antithesis and tricolon arrangement, than to accuracy of detail in the subject-matter.
Comparable accounts of the development of the general concept from sensation and memory are given by Aristotle at the outset of the *Metaphysics* (980a ff., cf. *An. Post.* 100a 3 ff.) and by Aetius (Plac. IV, 11/SEP II, 83), who is quoting the Stoics. In both these accounts memory is succeeded by experience (ἐξ ἑπιστήμου), which arises from many memories ‘of the same thing’ (Aristotle), or ‘of the same kind’ (Aetius). Aristotle adds that art or science arises when ‘from many reflections of experience one general concept is formed concerning similar cases,’ i.e. experience, as compared with art, is still concerned with the particular. Aetius, on the other hand, passes without comment from experience to concepts, which he divides into those formed ‘in the ways described and without art’ (προολογετεῖς) and those which are acquired ‘through instruction and attention on our part’ (ἐννοοῖ). One may infer that ‘natural’ concepts are still closely linked to experience, but that ‘scientific’ concepts go some way beyond it. Since reason is said to develop from ‘natural’ concepts (Aetius ib.), they clearly belong to an earlier cognitive stage than ‘scientific’ concepts. In Lucullus’ account, the grouping of impressions by similarities (‘cetera autem similidinibus construit’) seems to correspond to the stage referred to by both Aristotle and Aetius as ‘experience’. Although he appears to assign both προολογετεῖς and ἐννοοῖ to this stage, he does not clearly differentiate between them, and the emergence of reason is mentioned only in the following sentence (‘...cum accessit ratio...’). Again, a certain overlap must be allowed for, since the schematic and simplistic nature of his account makes

1Met. 981 a 5 ff. Science is added in *An. Post.* 100a 8.

2According to Boëthius (*Aristotle’s Metaphysics I, p. 116*), experience foreshadows the universal, without being aware of it as universal.

3It is curious that in *Top.* 31 Cicero should give the same description of ‘notio’ (‘notionem appellò quod Graeci tum ἐννοοῖ τὸν προολογετεῖν’), and then proceed to explain it in terms which would apply only to the ‘natural’ concept. Perhaps he is using ἐννοοῖ here as a general and inclusive term, as the Stoics themselves sometimes did (Aetius ib.).
it difficult to assign each type of concept to its appropriate place, or elaborate fully on the ways in which they can be formed. If he selects for mention the grouping of similars, it is perhaps because this comes closest to suggesting the universal, and recognition of the common elements in sensible objects is the simplest and most natural way in which concepts can be formed.

Both Sextus and Diogenes Laertius give a list of the various ways in which concepts can arise otherwise than by direct acquaintance with objects, including similarity (κατ' ὁμοιότητα) and analogy (κατ' ἀναλογίαν). Since these processes are supplementary to the simple conceptualizing of sensible experience, they are unlikely to provide a clue to our present passage. Cicero's phrase, 'cetera (sc. usia) similitudinibus construct', recalls Aetius' description of ἐμπειρία as τὸ τῶν ὁμοιῶν φαντασίων πληθος. The concepts which would first arise are those which figure in section 21, 'white, sweet' etc. and 'dog, horse', not those formed by the 'analogical' processes given in Sextus' list (e.g. 'pygmy', 'centaur', or the notion of Socrates derived from his bust). The plural 'similitudinibus' is perhaps used to allow for different principles of grouping; e.g. a white ball and a white stick are similar in colour, a white ball and a red ball in shape. The word 'construct' ('put together', 'build') suggests a certain complexity of arrangement, which might result in a further classification of sensible objects by species or kinds.

1Sextus A.N.VIII, 50-60, cf. XI, 250; III, 40; D.L.VII, 52-3; cf. Fin.III, 33.

2There is no justification for Reid's view (p. 212 n. 4) that Cicero is here ignoring concepts formed directly from experience and that 'similitudinibus' represents the sum-total of the indirect methods listed by Sextus under the name of 'analogical inference' (A.N.XI, 250). Reid is, moreover, wrong in saying that 'similitudine' in Fin.III, 33 is equivalent to κατ' ἀναλογίαν, for this Cicero translates as 'collatione rationis'. Dillon, p. 53, is perhaps influenced by Reid in giving the Greek equivalent of 'similitudine' as ἀναλογία.

3Cf. ὅταν ἐκ ὁμοιότερων πολλαὶ μνήμαι γέναται, τὸς οὐκ ἔχειν ἐπειδὴ ἐπιστήμη, (Aetius ib.), and Diogenes' description of a προδικής according to Epicurus, as 'a memory c' what has often been presented externally to sense, e.g. "such a thing is man". (D.L. X, 33).
The last part of Lucullus' account, from the emergence of reason to the attainment of wisdom ('cum cun accessit ratio ... ad sapientiam peruenit'), is, like the rest, treated only in brief outline. With reason comes demonstrative argument, and the meaning of 'perceptio' can be widened to include the wealth of knowledge acquired not only directly through the senses but by the logical process. Having earlier accepted the idea of virtue as the perfection of reason (26), Lucullus assumes a straightforward progress from the growth of reason to moral maturity, but except for hints contained in the earlier argument (26-7) and in the next section (31), he is fairly vague about the sort of knowledge and mental activity that is included in this final stage.

Except at the level of sense, Lucullus has not mentioned the function of appetition, but it is clear that it must have been present throughout the cognitive process, directing the mind's response to what is perceived to be in agreement with nature. This is no less true in the final stage, when man becomes aware of the sumnum bonum. In 31 we are told that the mind is attracted to knowledge both for its own sake and for the sake of its utility ('cum ipsam per se amat... tum etiam propter usum'). This applies to the exercise of the senses, to the production of the arts, which are an extension of the senses ('quasi sensus alteros'), and also to the pursuit of philosophy, which above all leads to virtue as a unifying factor in the whole of life.

Thus the arts too are drawn into the cognitive scheme which culminates in the perfection of reason and virtue, as extending the powers of the mind, the exercise of which is, for Antiochus, no negligible part of the sumnum bonum. Even if, for any individual, the practice of the arts may be limited and may seem to have little to do with virtue, for man as a whole it represents an important step in his cognitive development and in the fulfillment of nature's purpose for him as a rational being.

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1 Fil. III, 40 ff.
Antiochus' position in these two sections is entirely that of an empiricist, and there is nothing to suggest that he may, as part of his allegiance to the Old Academy, have attempted to reconcile the Platonic theory of Forms with Stoicism. This view has been put forward principally on the basis of \textit{An. I, 30-33}, where Varro gives an exposition of the Ideal theory and Aristotle is said to have undermined it.\footnote{W. Thaller, \textit{Die Vorberichtigung des Kounlatonismos} (1930), p. 40 ff.; C. Luck, \textit{Der Akademiker Antiochus} (1953), p. 20 ff. See the discussions in Long, \textit{H.I.H.}, pp. 22-228, Dillon, pp. 92 ff., P. Norlen, \textit{Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Mediæval Philosophy}, pp. 53-55; R. E. Witt, \textit{Alb.}, p. 52 and pp. 57-59.}

It is contradicted, however, by the present passage and by Cicero's explicit statement in 142 that in his view of the criterion Antiochus was a Stoic and not a Platonist.\footnote{In support of his view that Antiochus did hold a modified form of Ideal theory, Long argues (p. 228) that 'he seems to have regarded the acquisition of valid concepts as a necessary condition of accurate perception', and that this is un-Stoic. The argument seems to be based on Lucullus' mention of 'perception' at the end of 30, where it follows the acquisition of concepts. Long admits that if Antiochus is describing what the Stoics called 'knowledge', there is no problem. I have assumed that perception is mentioned here because it includes rational inference as well as sense-perception. Long's point is, however, an interesting one, namely that, for the Stoic, the cataleptic impression does not require general concepts as a test of its validity, and that the stress laid by Antiochus on the role of the intellect in his defence of it may be in this respect unorthodox.}

If Antiochus had in fact upheld the theory of Forms we would not have expected Cicero to conceal it, for the very reason that it would have made him much more vulnerable to sceptical attack.

Apart from the \textit{Academica}, there is no direct evidence to link Antiochus with the theory of Forms. The version of it that appears in Cicero's \textit{Orator}\footnote{\textit{Orat.} 8 ff., quoted by Dillon, pp. 93-4.} may or may not have emanated from Antiochus, but the Form is there treated as an ideal pattern and could not have been identified with an ordinary concept.\footnote{The Stoics are said to have identified the Ideas with thoughts in the mind (\textit{Nat. I, 10, 5}, \textit{Stob. Pol. I, p. 136/\textit{H.}, I, 65). In \textit{Nat. I, 57} Cicero describes the Ideas as 'inane ex quibus constantias in animis notiones, quas \textit{evolvet}' usque ad.'} In the \textit{De Legibus}, however, Cicero refers to the 'communis intelligentia' which makes things known to us and determines our moral judgements (\textit{Nat. I, 44-5}). It is possible, therefore, that Antiochus...
may in some way have substituted the universality of human experience for the objective existence of the Forms, and so equated them with the ὄντα τῶν Κόσμων of the Stoics.\textsuperscript{1} To go further and suggest that he identified the Forms with thoughts in the mind of God,\textsuperscript{2} and these in turn with the ὅνομα σχεματικόν of the Stoic universe, is to go considerably further than the evidence.\textsuperscript{3}

The teleological argument which Antiochus uses here in the Academica is not a new one,\textsuperscript{4} but it is debatable whether it can be proved that knowledge is possible on the ground that our perceptual faculties have been adapted for that very purpose. For only by taking for granted that perception occurs can we show that our faculties are adapted to it. On the other hand, the obvious complexity of the perceptual process creates a presumption that it has a purpose and that this purpose is what it appears to be, the perception of external objects. Lucullus does not, like Balbus in \textit{N.D.II,140 ff.}, elaborate fully on the nature and function of each of the sensory organs, but he does assume (like Balbus, and like Piso in \textit{Fin.V,34 ff.}) that the mind has been fitted in the best possible way ('aptissima', 31) for acquiring knowledge and virtue, and that the Academics by their philosophy of doubt are robbing man of the equipment nature has bestowed on him for living and for attaining the goal of life. Hence his strictures on their 'rashness' ('temeritas'), a charge more often brought by the sceptic against the dogmatist.\textsuperscript{5} But whereas the sceptic accuses the dogmatist of rash assent,

\textsuperscript{1}See Dillon, p.94; H.E.Witt, \textit{Albinus}, p.58.

\textsuperscript{2}Cf. Long, \textit{H.Ph.} p.228. The identification is to be found in Seneca \textit{Ep.65,7}.

\textsuperscript{3}If Antiochus had devised such a theory, he would have left the sceptic little room for manoeuvre. By the close relationship established between the physical world and the concepts both in God's mind and in the human mind, external objects would be brought within our grasp, and the uniformity of concepts, no matter who the perceiver, would naturally entail that knowledge is possible. There is no trace of such a view in the \textit{Academica}.

\textsuperscript{4}E.g. Plat. \textit{Tim.46c-47d}; Arist. \textit{An.434a 31, 435b 20-25}.

\textsuperscript{5}Cf.68, 103, \textit{N.D.I,1}; Sextus \textit{Ph.H.1,20 etc.}; Reid, p.255 n.22.
the dogmatist claim: that scepticism and by implication ἐπιστήμη is 'rash'
because it entails unacceptable consequences. It therefore belongs to the
same class of moral sin as 'error', 'leuitas', 'opinatio' and 'ignoratio'
(67; I,42; Fin. III,72).

Lucullus' charge that, by rejecting the cataleptic impression, the
Academic sceptics are depriving the living thing of its life-principle
('animal', 'animus') implies that, like Aristotle, he sees the living thing
(κτής) as differentiated by sensation.¹ In 37 he makes the difference
between the living and the non-living ('animal', 'inanimus') primarily one
of action, which depends on sensation and voluntary assent; those who refuse
assent to their sense-impressions are thus robbed of their 'animus'. It is
clear that the basic meaning of 'animus' in those contexts is the power of
responding actively to sensations which is common to all animals, but that
any loss or diminution of the 'animus' in this sense would take with it the
higher faculties as well, including the possibility of wisdom and virtue and
all that can be developed from the proper exercise of the human 'animus'.

Etymologically, 'animal' is more closely connected with 'anima' than
with 'animus', but the latter is used because of its cognitive associations.²
The Greek ψυχή can be translated by either Latin word, but is not itself
so conveniently related to ζτόν. If the word-play was present in the
original Greek, Antiochus must have used ἐπιψυχή rather than ζτόν, in
contrast with ἐπιψυχή.³ It is possible, however, that the word-play is

¹Arist. An. 434a 31. This was the prevalent view (cf. SVF II,458, 718, 7/4),
also held by Carneades (Sextus A.M.VII,160). Aristotle adds the power of
movement (An. 434a 34).
²See R.B. Onians, Origins of European Thought, pp.160 ff. Seneca En.113,2
also uses 'animus' of the principle whereby we are 'animalia', but the course
of the argument clearly identifies it with the ἰγνωστέων. In M.R.III,36
Cicero uses 'anima' of the air or breath of which the 'animus' consists, and
derives 'animal' from 'animus'.
³Unlike Aristotle, the Stoics seem to have confined ψυχή to animals,
using other terms such as φύσις or ζήτις for plant life (Calen., SVF II,
715; Sextus A.M.IX,91). Hence ζτόν may be contracted directly with ψυχή
(as in Carneades, Sextus A.M.VII,160). In Fin. V,39 Pino speaks of the
growth and life-cycle of plants as similar to that of animals, but implies that
plants do not have the same natural power of perfecting their nature.
Cicero's and that Antiochus' version was nearer to the Stoic argument recorded by Sextus (A.M.VII,260), that by rejecting sense-impressions the sceptic is placing himself on a level with the inanimate (τοις ἀσώματοις).

In 101 Cicero answers the charge by pointing out that the Academic wise man is not a statue of wood or stone; he is moved by his senses and his mind, though he accepts his experiences merely as probable.

Lucullus' other accusation, that the Academic sceptics are destroying human life, was also brought against the Pyrrhonian sceptics (D.L.IX,104). Sextus (A.M.VIII,157) has occasion to deny it, as does Cicero (99). A similar charge was brought by the Epicurean Colotes against numerous philosophers whose doctrines seemed to him to make life impossible (Mut. Adv. Col. 1107E ff.; cf. Lucretius IV,472; 500-506).

**Lucullus introduces the doctrine of probability**

32 (p.43, 7-23) nec vero satis ... quaerendo ac disserendo.

**Summary.** I cannot understand their intention. Sometimes when confronted with our objection that, were their case true, everything would be uncertain, they answer: 'What is that to us? It is not our fault; blame nature for having concealed truth in the depths, as Democritus says.' Others use a more sophisticated approach and even complain that we accuse them of saying that everything is uncertain, attempting to distinguish between what is uncertain and what cannot be perceived. Let us therefore dismiss as hopeless those who say that everything is as uncertain as whether the number of the stars is even or odd and deal with those who make the above distinction. For they maintain (and I noticed that you were very enthusiastic about this) that there is something probable and as it were like the truth, which they use both as a practical and as an intellectual criterion.

Sextus tells us that the dogmatists distinguished three classes of ἀδηλα, the absolutely non-evident, the temporarily non-evident, and the naturally non-evident (P.H.II,97 ff.; A.M.VIII,145 ff.).

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1Cf. Epist. I,5,8 (also referred to on p.103).
2Probably a reference to the previous day's discussion; see Introduction p.62.
3See p. 145 n.2 above.
Lucullus is using 'incerta' (given as a translation of ἀδηλα in 54) in the absolute sense, as his example, whether the number of the stars is even or odd, shows. It is in this sense that the one group of Academics admit that everything is uncertain and the other group deny it. Unless this second group can make good their distinction between 'incertum' and 'quod percipi non possit', Academic scepticism must be seen not merely as erasing the natural distinction between the evident and the non-evident, but also as placing the world of physical objects beyond the range of even indirect perception, and so as resulting in uncertainty in the highest degree.

Although Lucullus reports the argument as if it were part of the contemporary scene, it is probable that the first of these two groups is to be identified with the Academy of Arcesillas, and the second with Carneades and his followers down to and including Philo. According to Numenius, the distinction between ἀδηλα ('incertum') and ἀκατάληκτα ('id quod percipi non possit') goes back to Carneades, who is said to have held that all things were ἀκατάληκτα but not ἀδηλα. In 34 Lucullus refers to an Academic distinction between 'perspicua' and 'percipia', and I shall there argue that this distinction was made by Philo. Since the denial that all things are 'incerta' would be consistent with a belief that some things are 'perspicua', it is possible that Lucullus' second group in 32 is intended to include Philo. Cicero does not, in the argument of the Academica, make a sharp difference between the Carneadean and Philonian viewpoints, and the objections brought by Lucullus against the general theory of probability would apply equally to Philo.

1 A stock example, cf. 110; Sextus P.H.II, 90 and 97; A.H.VII, 243, VIII, 149. In VIII, 137, where a different classification is adopted, the number of the stars is given as an example of the naturally non-evident.


3 In 98-110 and 111-113 the two positions are juxtaposed as if there were no difference between them. Lucullus does the same in 33 and 34.
The reason given by the second group of Academics for objecting to the charge that they make everything uncertain, namely that they hold that there is something probable, is based on an assumption accepted by the Stoics themselves, that the absolutely non-evident is neither probable nor improbable.\footnote[1]{Sextus A.M.VII,243. Cf. 110 'in incertis enim nihil est probable.'} This means that 'probabilia' are not 'incerta' in the sense defined.\footnote[2]{If it is not the case that all things are uncertain, then it should follow that some things are certain. But this is an inference which the Academic sceptic avoids. Cf. Off.II,7: 'nos autem, ut ceteri alia certa, alia incerta esse dicunt, sic ab his dissentientes alia probabilia, contra alia dicimus.'} Lucullus is clearly interested in the doctrine of probability and brushes aside the first group of his opponents in order to prepare the ground for criticizing the second. The reply attributed to his imaginary interlocutors in the first group, who accept that everything is uncertain but throw the blame on nature, is in line with the argument in I,44, where Arcesilas is said to have joined issue with Zeno for the same reason that led the philosophers of old to deny the possibility of knowledge, namely the obscurity that surrounds things, and Democritus is again singled out for his well-known remark that 'truth is in the depths'.\footnote[3]{D.L.IX,72 (DK fr.117). Cf. Sextus A.M.VIII,325; Seneca Epist.VII,1,6.} Arcesilaus' scepticism had been so sweeping in its scope that it precluded even the probable (\πιθανόν)\footnote[4]{Numenius fr.25,70 (Doxologia); Sextus P.H.I,232. Hence the answer given by the first group could easily have been inferred from the argument in Ac.I,44 and the fact that rejection of even the probable entails that everything is uncertain.}.

There can be no doubt that the effect of his philosophy would have been to discourage any interest whatsoever in the objective validity of impressions, and the only function he seems to have intended his \κῦλογον to have was to regulate and justify action.

Lucullus does not himself accept the distinction between what is uncertain and what cannot be perceived. If the Stoics allowed that what is probable (\πιθανόν) is not uncertain, this was because it could be measured
against an objective standard of truth and falsehood. But if nothing can be perceived or if true and false are indistinguishable, then nothing is evident and even the doctrine of probability is undermined (33 ff.), and in spite of their denial the second group of Academicians will be found to occupy a position similar to the first. Although Lucullus does not explicitly draw this conclusion, he allows it to be understood from his criticisms in the next sections, and when in 54 he repeats the charge that his opponents make everything uncertain, the reference is clearly to those who deny that they do so ('quod nolunt'). Lucullus' opening remark in 32, that he is unable to understand his opponents' intention, and part of the following sentence ('si ea quae disputentur uera sint, tum omnia fore incerta') must be taken as applying to the sceptical Academy as a whole, though the subject of 'respondent' would still be the group representing Arcaesilaus and his followers.

1 I would disagree with the view of Brochard (see p.245) that 'illos qui omnia sic incerta dicunt ..... desperates aliquus reliquamus' is a possible reference to Aenesidemus. Lucullus is clearly addressing the Academicians in this section, and, on Brochard's view, Aenesidemus would already have left the Academy. Brochard's suggestion is accepted and expanded by M.Concho (Pyrrhon ou l'apparence, pp.83-84, 120). He argues that Antiochus is here telling the Academicians, particularly Philo, that their rejection of the catalectic impression and their doctrine of ἀπαλλαγή would, despite their wish, lead them to the ἀδηλη πάντα and the extreme nihilism of the followers of Pyrrho and Aenesidemus.

2 It should be noticed that the charge which this group explicitly denies in 32 is not that of making everything uncertain ('omnia axoddore incerta') but that of saying that everything is uncertain ('omnia incerta dicere'), which according to them rests on a misinterpretation of their axiom that nothing can be perceived. Seneca's description 'Academicius omnia incerta dicentem' (Ep.80,6) no doubt rests on a similar misunderstanding. Stroh, p.50, speaks of Lucullus' remark that the Academic criticism renders everything uncertain as 'misdirected', but this is, of course, the point at issue.

3 As if 'intervum' stood in the place of a previous 'alii' to which 'alii autem eloquentius' corresponds.
The use of two words, 'probabile' and 'uori simile', to express the meaning of the Greek πιθανόν ¹ seems to be prompted by a desire to bring to the fore that aspect of the probable on which Lucullus' counter-argument in the following sections will rest. In his analysis of cognitive experience, Carneades had distinguished two relations, one which exists between an impression and its source, the external object, and the other between impression and perceiver.² Since the former cannot be known with complete certainty, the criterion of judgement must be sought in the impression-object relation, that is, in the way impressions affect us or appear to us. The 'apparently true' (ή φανομένη ἀλήθεία) or 'probable' impression (πιθανὴ φαντασία) thus becomes a criterion, Carneades' object being to emphasise the subjective aspect of any cognitive act³ and to destroy the dogmatic illusion that experience can carry with it a guarantee of its own truth.

But Carneades did not lay aside the conceptual framework of the Stoic theory of perception, with its assumption that there is an external world made up of physical objects which affect us through impressions. Although he stressed the subjective or 'phenomenal' aspect of impressions, he did not deny that they have objective or external causes. Consequently the doctrine of probability accepts that judgements and beliefs are about the external world. An impression may be 'probable', or 'seen' true, but actually be false, since it may fail to correspond to external reality.⁴ The impression

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¹ C.F. Hermann suggested that 'uori simile' is a rendering of the Greek κλαδας and that Philo used this word in place of Carneades' πιθανόν. There is no evidence to support this view. See Reid, p.216 n.9, who however suggests that there is no reference at all to Philo in this passage.


³ Cf. Coll. N.A. XI, 5,6 'aed ex omnibus rebus proinde ulna dicunt fieri, quas φαντασιας appellant, non ut rerum ipsarum natura cat, sed ut adiectio animi corporis us cat eorum, ad quos ulna pertinuint.' Collius in speaking of both the Pyrrhonian and the Academic sceptics.

⁴ Sextus A.M. VII, 168 and 174.
is spoken of as 'reporting truly' ( ἀληθευόμενη ),¹ and the testing of impressions is compared to a doctor's examination of symptoms or the interrogation of witnesses.² This inclination to match impressions with external reality exposes the weak point of the Academic system, against which Lucullus will direct his attack.

By assuming that truth is measured in terms of correspondence with external reality, and by recognising that there are degrees of probability which depend not only on perceptual conditions but also on the coherence of the many different impressions that make up a single experience,³ the Carneadean doctrine does not avoid being faced with the problem of the reliability of the individual impression. If the Academic makes judgements about external reality, he will have to concede the possibility of their being some evidence of a more or less objective nature on which to base his inferences. The problem becomes more acute in view of the Academic doctrine of ἀπαράλλαξις. For if true and false impressions look qualitatively alike, the evidence on which one might base judgement about an external object becomes totally ambiguous. It will then make no difference whether my impression is 'uori simile' in the sense of appearing to me to be the truth, or in the sense of being a copy of external reality, as Lucullus will tend to interpret it. In neither case can the inference be drawn from impression to external object.

¹Sextus A.M.VII, 175.
²A.M.VII, 179 and 184; cf. 163 where it is said that impressions may be 'bad messengers'. Stough, p. 26 n. 54, suggests that the medical analogy may have been introduced by Sextus himself.
³A.M.VII, 171, 183. We are told (176 ff.) that Carneades reasoned that impressions do not come singly but hang together like a chain, so that they can be seen as contradicting or confirming one another. He accordingly distinguished between three degrees of probability: (1) the probable as such; (2) the probable and uncontradicted; (3) the probable, uncontradicted and tested, which is the highest degree of probability attainable. Cf. 33 and 36. In Part. Or. 46 Cicero's explanation of probability in terms of concurrence shows Carneadean influence.
In principle, the Academic denies the existence of an absolute criterion,¹ but since he is, according to Cicero, a seeker whose aim is to find out the truth or what resembles truth,² the probable is by implication a criterion of truth, and Lucullus will treat it as such (33 ff.). Sextus regards the Carneadean πιθανόν as a criterion for both judgement and action, which is valid 'for the most part' (A.M.VII,173-5). It is possible that it may in the first place have been put forward, as an improvement on Arcesilaus' εὑρογόνον, to justify beliefs and assertions concerned with action,³ and only later extended to serve as a theoretical principle in search and discussion.⁴ One of its main purposes must always have been to counter the argument from διαφανεία, to which the opponents of the Academy attached considerable importance.⁵ In his outline of the doctrine in 98 ff. Cicero lays almost exclusive stress on its use in motivating action and making ordinary practical judgements. Lucullus, on the other hand, has a vested interest in making explicit the use of the probable 'in quaerendo ac disserendo' (32), because he hopes to show the inconsistency between the Academic aspiration for truth and the undermining of their own criterion by the doctrine of διαφανεία.

¹ According to Sextus A.M.VII,159, Carneades argued that nothing was a criterion 'without qualification' (διάλυμα). Stough, p.50 n.53, points out that Bury's translation 'there is absolutely no criterion of truth' is incorrect.

² 7-9; 60; 65-66; 121-28.

³ This perhaps the conclusion to be drawn from Sextus A.M.VII,166, where it is said that, in spite of Carneades' rejection of the Stoic criterion, he was forced to introduce his own criterion 'for the conduct of life and the attainment of happiness' (cf. P.H.I,231). Arcesilaus' εὑρογόνον, although it provided justification for action, did not apply to perceptual experience as such and so offered no kind of guarantee of the external circumstances surrounding en action. Carneades may have wished to remedy this deficiency.

⁴ Whether Carneades himself took this step has been debated. Cf.C.J.de Vogel, Greek Philosophy III,1116.

⁵ Plut.Sto Rep.1057A/SYP III,177; p.140 of this Commentary.
Summary. (33) What is this criterion of truth and falsity if we have no concept of these since they cannot be distinguished? For possession of a concept presupposes a difference, such as there is between right and wrong. But a man who experiences impressions with features common to both true and false can have no standard or mark of truth whatsoever. It is childish on their part to say that all they object to is the possibility of a true impression being such that a false one could not be qualitatively like it. ¹ Having taken away the only criterion of judgment, they claim that they leave us everything else. It is like removing a man's eyes and saying that he is left with the objects of sight. But just as these can be seen by the eyes only, so everything else is perceived by impressions, but by a mark peculiar to the true only, not common to both true and false. So whether you follow the probable impression or the one which is both probable and unhindered, as Carneades put it, you will have to come back to the sort of impression we are talking about. (34) But if it has anything in common with the false, there will be no criterion, because a special characteristic cannot be indicated by a common feature. But if there is no common feature, I have what I want, for I am cooking something which will appear to me to be true in such a way that it could not likewise appear to be false.

The Academic claim that the percipient cannot recognise a qualitative and therefore generic difference between the true and the false is here seen as a weakness in the Academic position which undermines his own theory of probability. This claim particularly conflicts with the last clause in the Stoic definition of the cataleptic impression, 'such that it could not have come from a non-existent object'.² Some Academics accordingly seem to have openly admitted that they would allow the Stoics the rest of their definition, 

¹The addition of 'uorum' to the text brings out the sense more clearly, though even without it the meaning would have to be the same.

²Sextus A.M.VII, 246 etc.; see pp. 110-112 of this Commentary. In A.M.VII, 252 Sextus states that the Stoics added the last clause to their definition because of the Academic theory of ὧμορραλικαὶα. In 77 Cicero represents Zeno as adding the last clause when asked by Arcesilaus whether his definition would hold even if a true impression were of the same kind as a false one.
and it is to this that Lucullus appears to be referring when he argues that it is absurd for his opponents to say that, although they make this one exception, they concede the rest ('nam dum dicunt hoc se unum tollere ... cetera autem concedere, faciunt puerilitor'). In their attack on the Stoic criterion, the principle of ἀπαραξίας was invoked by every member of the Academic school from Arcesilas to Philo. But there is no evidence that Arcesilas granted the Stoics the validity of the rest of their definition. Sextus, on the other hand, refers (A.M.VII,402) to Carneades and his followers as conceding the definition to the Stoics except for its last clause. But, unless we are prepared to accept Philo's interpretation of Carneades, the concession, if Carneades had made it, is unlikely to have amounted to an admission of the possibility of perception even in a new un-Stoic sense. Lucullus has obviously no interest in elaborating on the meaning of the concession, since any form of cognition would in his view be undermined, whatever may have been meant by it. His objection takes the form of an analogy between impressions and the eyes as means of recognition. As visible objects are recognised by the eyes, so the rest ('reliqua') are recognised by impressions, but only by those bearing the peculiar mark of truth. The same analogy appears in Sextus (A.M.VII,259-60) in a Stoic context but with a clearer reference: the man who allows the existence of rights and sounds but abolishes sight and hearing is behaving no more absurdly than one who admits the existence of external objects but attacks the impressions of sense by which they are grasped.

We may therefore infer that Lucullus is examining the validity of the probable in the light of Academic criticism of the cataleptic impression, and that he believes, like Sextus (A.M.VII,438), that the probable can be objected to on the same ground on which the Academicians had faulted the cataleptic

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1According to 77, Arcesilas was prepared to grant Zeno the correctness of his definition in principle, since true perception would only be possible on the condition stipulated in the last clause. But then every Academic would in principle have agreed to it.
impression, i.e., that the true and the false are indistinguishable. It may of course be objected that the probable cannot be treated as a criterion of truth\(^1\) in the same sense as the cataleptic impression, nor can one expect the same perceptual conditions to underlie both a true perception and a judgement of probability. But in treating the probable in this way, Lucullus seems chiefly concerned with that aspect of the doctrine of probability which assumes that judgement is about the external world. He consequently objects to it on two grounds.

Firstly, if the true and false cannot be distinguished apart, we can have no concept of them, and it is therefore pointless to talk of a criterion. The Academic position entails that we can never see or recognise the truth with certainty, since an experience that could be either true or false cannot carry with it a distinguishing mark ('nota') of truth.\(^2\) Having previously argued (27) that if impressions were of such a nature that they could not be distinguished by a 'notio', we should never be able to trust the results of inquiry, Lucullus now extends this argument and raises the question whether the Academic can have a 'notio', although it is not necessary to confine 'notionem veri et falsi' to the preconception of the object of inquiry.\(^3\) The Academic is again faced with a dilemma: either he must admit that he has a concept of true and false, in which case there is a difference between them, or there is no difference, which would undermine his own criterion.

The Academic may not, of course, see himself in this dilemma. He could point out that there are some impressions that appear to him to be true, even if they cannot be known to be so. But can the Academic consistently differentiate between impressions on the basis of their 'appearance'? To bring out

\(^1\)Lucullus is possibly being sarcastic in treating the probable as a criterion of true and false. It was more usual to speak of a criterion of truth only.

\(^2\)If one never perceives the truth, one cannot know if an impression is even 'veri simile'. Cf. Aug. Ao. II, 7, 16 ff.; Sextus A.M. VII, 359, 385; Plat. Phaedr. 273d.

\(^3\)Cf. the general type of dogmatic (especially Epicurean) argument illustrated in Sextus (A.M. VIII, 337 ff.; P.H. II, 1 ff.), to the effect that the sceptic either has no conceptual frame of reference and so cannot understand, inquire into or discuss a subject, or he has one and thus has no ground to be a sceptic. Cf. Lucr. IV, 459 ff.; Fin. I, 64; p. 155 above.
this second weakness in the Academic position, Lucullus contends that an impression that has features common to the true and the false cannot present a peculiar mark ('nota') of truth. He correctly points out that the same property or 'mark' cannot both be a common character of two things and the distinctive feature of one of them ('quia proprium communi signo\(^1\) notari non potest', 34). This argument seems to have something in common with the Stoic view reported by Sextus (A.M.VII,252) that the cataleptic impression has a special character (\(\ell_{\omega\mu\alpha}\)) which marks it off from all other impressions and would preclude the possibility of a false one being found exactly like it.\(^2\) Lucullus is also reverting against the Academics one of the arguments used by Carneades against the Stoics (Sextus A.M.VII,164), that since there is no true impression of such a kind that it cannot be false, the criterion will consist of an impression that is common to both true and false (\(\epsilon\nu\;\kappaαινη\;\varphiαινασια\;\tauου\;τε\;\alphaληθος\;καλ\;\psiε\betaεια\)). The inference drawn is that, since such an impression is not cataleptic, it will not be the criterion (i.e. in the Stoic sense). It is clear that, according to the same argument, the probable impression will also fail to qualify as a criterion, since, even if true, it will be 'common' in the sense defined.

Since the doctrine of \(\alpha\piαραλλακτικα\) primarily affects perception, it is natural that Lucullus should be seen as arguing for a rehabilitation of the conditions necessary for perception. This does not mean that he is confusing a judgement of probability with true perception. But, according to Lucullus, probability makes sense only if perception is possible. While the Academic doctrine of probability assumes that there are some impressions that do not appear to be both true and false,\(^3\) the claim of \(\alpha\piαραλλακτικα\) can be taken to imply that any impression appears to be both true and false (cf. 40). Hence

\(^1\)The deletion of 'in' (retained by Flasberg) is necessary for the sense.
\(^2\)Raid (p.218 n.7, p.278 n.3) takes 'nota' and 'cignum' to be Latin renderings of \(\sigmaημε\tauου\), although in Stoicism the latter is a technical word which does not seem to be used of the relation between impression and external object.
\(^3\)Cf. Sextus A.M.VII, 173-175.
his argument is conducted in such a way as to bring out the Academic emphasis on subjectivity ('uideatur', 'uideri', 34) and at the same time make a case for the Stoic χατάληψες. For the same reason, he interprets ἀπαραλλαξία in terms of a common property, as though this were, like the mark of truth, a visible characteristic.

The problem raised is in fact the problem of evidence. There is a sense in which the requirements for a judgment of probability must parallel those that determine perception, particularly if what the Academic considers probable are just those impressions which the Stoic would consider cataleptic (105). It is irrelevant that the Academics had in the first place denied the existence of a mark of truth,¹ since their shift of emphasis to the subjective aspect of experience had only transferred the problem to another level, particularly in view of their claim of ἀπαραλλαξία. Given the nature of their polemic against the Stoics, they were not in a position to provide a formal definition of the probable impression and a definite theory of evidence. The doctrine of But concurrence² was perhaps a way of avoiding the issue. The concurrence of impressions does not in itself constitute objective evidence relating to the external world, which in the last resort must derive from the intrinsic nature of at least some individual impressions themselves.³ Hence Lucullus argues that even the 'probable and unhindered' impression would require 'evidence' in his sense as a test of its validity. He thus anticipates the argument in 36 that if any impression that is taken for true may also be false, this would put all impressions on the same level as far as the validity of experience is concerned. It is therefore useless to claim that one impression is more probable than another.⁴

¹ Cf. 04, 101, 103; K. D. I. 12.
² Sextus A. M. VII, 179.
⁴ Cf. Plutarch's argument in Adv. Col. 1121C-7 against the Epicurean view (as he sees it) that some sensations can provide information about the real character of objects but not others. No amount of 'confirmation', he argues, can overcome the initial difficulty that all impressions are equal in respect of 'truth'.

Lucullus objects to the distinction between 'perapicua' and 'percepta'.

34 (p.44,16-21) similur in errore ... perapicume ullum relapigitur.

Summary. They are involved in a similar error when, constrained by the rebuke of truth, they wish to distinguish things evident from things perceived and try to show that something evident exists, stamped as true on the mind and intellect, yet it cannot be perceived and grasped. For how can something be evidently white if what is black appear to be white, or how will those things be said to be evident or stamped accurately when it is uncertain whether the source is real or delusive? Thus neither colour nor body nor truth nor proof nor sense nor anything evident remains.

The separation of 'perapicua' (εναργη) from 'percepta' (καταληπτα) can only remain an 'attempt' ('voulunt', 'conantur') and is from the start doomed to be rejected by Antiochus, for whom, as for the Stoics, there is a total identification of what is evident with what is perceived; no further proof of perception, beyond 'perapiculitas', is possible or required (45, 51; cf. 17). Cicero's way of phrasing the sentence, 'simili in errore...', makes it difficult to follow, since it suggests that the Academicians were yielding to the pressure of truth in committing an error. Lucullus must mean, however, that their acceptance that some things are 'perapicua' is a concession to truth, though their refusal to allow that it follows that the same things are also 'percepta' in an error similar to that pointed out in the previous section as involved in the theory of probability. Hence, if the distinction between 'perapicua' and 'percepta' is intended as a now and better explanation of the difference between 'incertum' and 'id quod perapi non possit' (32), this further Academic attempt to refute the charge that they make everything uncertain is likewise a failure.1

1'Inta' means (as in 31 'istam καταληπτα') 'those we are talking about'.

2The word-play or similarity between the two words 'perapicua' and 'percepta', could not have been represented in the Greek. Cf. 'animal', 'animus', in 31 (pp.168-9 of this Commentary).
While it is virtually certain that Arcesilas did not regard any sense-impressions as \( \varepsilon \varphi \rho \gamma \nu \), there is insufficient evidence to determine whether Carneades did so. Although the word does not occur in Sextus' account of his theory in A.M. VII,166 ff., other terms are used which suggest that distinctness and clarity were an important aspect of the probable impression. The word itself might not have appealed to Carneades, owing to its ambiguity and dogmatic associations, though it is uncertain whether at this time it had become an important technical term in the Stoic system. In Sextus A.M. VII,403, where Carneades is pictured in dispute with the Stoics, some false impressions are said to be no less clear and striking (\( \varepsilon \varphi \rho \gamma \nu \xi \chi \alpha \lambda \pi \lambda \eta \nu \tau \iota \iota \chi \alpha \) than those regarded by the Stoics as cataleptic. These particular words could, of course, have been supplied by Sextus. But if Carneades did, as Sextus (l.c.) states, concede the first part of their definition to the Stoics, the description of the 'perspicuum' as 'uercum illud quidem impressum in animo atque mente' might not be inconsistent with his view of the nature of probability.

It seems probable, however, that the position here described is that of Philo. First, the phrase 'convicto veritatia coacti' recalls other references to Philo's apparent unreasonableness as a sceptic, due both to the force of anti-Academic argument (18, 111) and to the pressure of sense-experience itself. Secondly, the phrase 'uercum illud quidem impressum in animo atque mente' looks forward to 112, where Cicero says that he would

1According to Numenius (fr.26,29, Des Plaen). Lacydon learned from Arcesilas that nothing seen or heard is \( \varepsilon \varphi \rho \gamma \nu \xi \) or \( \upsilon \alpha \varsigma \xi \). Cf. p.108 above.

2Cf. Long, H.Ph. p.97, who however uses 'perspicuitas' in his account of Carneades.

3For the Stoic use of the word \( \varepsilon \varphi \rho \gamma \nu \) ('perspicuitas', 'evidentia'), see pp.107-108 of this Commentary.

4In classification of impressions seems, however, to imply that probable impressions are not 'perspicua' (99).

5Numenius fr.23,13-9 (Des Plaen): ἢ δὲ τῶν παθημάτων αὐτῶν ἀνέστρεφεν \( \varepsilon \varphi \rho \gamma \nu \) \\( \tau \iota \chi \alpha \bar{\alpha} \) πάθος τῆς ψυχῆς.
not disagree with a Peripatetic who held that 'quod impressum caset a uero' can be perceived without adding the qualification 'quo modo imprimi non posset a falso'. The latter passage (112) may reasonably be supposed to represent Philo's view of perception, whereas in the present passage (34) 'percepts' is still being used in the Stoic sense.\(^1\)

As an answer to the charge that the Academics make everything uncertain (32), the claim that there are 'perspicuum' is more effective than the simple assertion that there are 'probabilia' because 'perspicuum' (ἐναργεία) is the direct opposite of 'incertum' (ἀνηλον). Philo was no doubt even more concerned than Carneades to repudiate the charge and to stress the difference between what is uncertain and what cannot (in the Stoic sense) be perceived. But part of his innovatory move seems to have been to turn Carneades' acceptance of the first part of the Stoic definition of the cataleptic impression into a specific claim that the Academics were arguing for a new definition of perception. It was a logical step to point out that there is a certain clarity (ἐναργεία) which attends such perception but does not guarantee its infallibility. As we have seen, one of Carneades' criteria for accepting an impression as probable may have been its distinctness or clarity. According to Cicero (105), it is just those impressions which are taken to be cataleptic by their opponents that the Academics consider as probable. Carneades had also recognised that the probable can sometimes be false (Sextus A.M.VII,174-5), and one of his arguments against the Stoics was that false impressions can be just as evident and striking as true ones (ib. 402 ff.). It would thus have seemed reasonable for Philo to use the word 'evident' (ἐναργεία/ 'perspicuum') to denote, as it were, an upper limit of probability, which would justify a claim of perception on the understanding that what is accepted as true could always be false. These impressions are the same as those which the Stoics regard as cataleptic, and like them have

\(^1\)I.e. Philo would not have denied that τὰ ἐναργη ἄρη καταληπτα, unless he were using the word in the Stoic sense (Sextus P.H.I,255). Incius would naturally use the word in the Stoic sense. Cicero does not use 'percepere' in the Philonian sense in the Academia, except where the context makes the meaning clear, as in 112.
In Philo's terms, there is no divorce between perspicuity and perception. But in Lucullus' terms there is, because Philo still insists that a true impression is indistinguishable from a false one. Apart from this, his view of the 'clear' impression as something 'imprinted as true on the mind and intellect' is essentially Stoic. How much of the rest of Lucullus' description is taken from Philo and how much from the Stoics is hard to decide. For the Stoics, one of the requirements of perception is that the impression should faithfully and accurately reflect its source ('impressa subtilior') so that, as Lucullus argues, it is hard to see how this condition is fulfilled if it is uncertain whether the source is real or illusory. Philo's answer would be that the clarity of the impression itself ensures that the uncertainty is minimal. It remains true that, on a representative theory of perception, it is not really possible to define perspicuity in terms of accurate representation of the object unless the object is real, and there is no reason to think that Philo did so. Thus Philo's definition of 'perspicua' may have differed in this important respect from the Stoics, and it is perhaps Philo who is particularly vulnerable to Lucullus' criticism in 33, that the Academics have substituted for the 'nota' of truth a common 'nota' of the true and the false.

Lucullus exaggerates the inconsistency inherent in Philo's position by giving as an example of 'indistinguishability' the mistaking of black for white. How could anything be 'evidently' white if such a mistake were always theoretically possible? The Academics would hardly have agreed that

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1Hermann and Zeller have inferred from these and similar expressions that Philo supported Plato's Ideal theory. Brochard, p.193 ff., has refuted this; cf. Reid, p.56 and Robin's comments, p.132.

2'Subtilior' = ἀκριβῆς. Reid, p.221 n.3, quotes Sextus §2.1,123.

3Cf. Stob. Pal. I, p.475,6, where the Academics are said to have maintained that the senses are ὑπερέκτησις, because it is possible to receive true impressions through them, but not ἀκριβῆς. Brochard, p.208, seems to be wrong in taking 'impressa subtilior' to be expressing Philo's point of view.

4The intention of Philo himself may, however, have been polemical in that he was allowing the Stoics their theory of perception without granting them their definition of it.
their position entails that one can confuse opposite sensible qualities in normal situations. To support their case, they relied mainly on instances of deception due to similarity between objects (54 ff.; 84 ff.;) and the delusive experience of dreams and madness (68-90; Sextus A.M.VII,403 ff.). It should, moreover, be noted that Lucullus seems to be suggesting that the actual character 'white' might be visually confused with 'black', not merely that it might be wrongly assigned to an external object. It is true that there was an Academic argument that colour, like size, form and motion, is inapprehensible, since one may be acquainted with the variations but not with the actual colour of anything (Sextus A.M.VII,412 ff.). In 105 Cicero advances an argument with similar effect, but he there emphasizes that colours will appear to the Academic wise man as they do to the Stoic, i.e. they will have the same definite, sensible character. In 100 he argues that the Academic would be more inclined to accept that snow is white than Anaxagoras was. To Anaxagoras, who knew that the water which composed it was black, snow did not even appear white. The upshot is that, even if it is possible that snow is, or could appear to be, black, this does not alter the fact that to most people it appears white, and the Academic will form his judgement accordingly.

Lucullus' two questions ('quo enim modo perspicue dixeris .... quo modo ista aut perspicua dicamus...') are perhaps meant to correspond to the two main types of deception which are guarded against in the last clause of the Stoic definition of the cataleptic impression, namely mistaking one thing for another, and mistaking a delusive experience for a true one (p.110 above). Pressed to its logical conclusion, the Academic argument might mean a complete reversal of normal experience, or simply, that it is uncertain whether there is anything 'there' at all. In Lucullus' list of items abolished, colour and

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1 Since in both cases what is 'there' is being confused with what is not 'there', the second question could also be taken as explanatory of the first.

2 Philo's new definition of knowledge is thus beset with the same difficulties that are inherent in Protagoras' position. Cf. Haeeu, Sciptioina, pp.147-8.
body together represent the world of material objects as revealed through the senses, truth and demonstrative argument the faculties of the mind, which cannot operate without a 'nota' of truth, sense and 'perapicuum ullaum' the sense faculties and the clarity of the impressions on which all the rest is based. Thus, for Lucullus, 'perapicuum' without 'perceptum' is not 'perapicuum' at all.

The Academic cannot make a reliable statement or judgment 35-36 (p.44,27 - p.45,25) ex huc illud ... se ipsa defendot.

Summary. (35) Hence it tends to happen to them that, whatever they say, people ask them, 'So you do perceive that?' But they resort to ridicule, for they are not anxious to make it obvious that no one can argue positively about anything without attaching some definite characteristic mark to that state of affairs which each individually favours. What, then, is that probability of yours? If what looks probable at first glance is positively affirmed, what could be more irresponsible? (36) But if they adopt the carefully tested impression, they will still be at a loss since impressions that have no qualitative difference are all equally untrustworthy. Again, since they admit that even after most careful consideration the wise man may encounter something which appears probable but is very far from the truth, they will have no confidence in themselves, even if they come a great part of the way (as they say) towards the truth or approach it as closely as possible. If they are to have confidence, a mark of truth must be known to them, and if this is hidden, what truth will they suppose themselves to have reached? What could be more absurd than their claim that they accept so and so as a sign or proof of a certain thing, whereby they follow it, but what is signified may be either false or non-existent? But enough has been said about perception; if anyone wishes to attack these arguments, truth will easily defend herself without my help.

1The meaning of this sentence is not very clear. 'Coarguo' is to 'convict' or 'show up' as criminal or false; the use of the infinitive is unusual and seems to require that what is shown as false is not the negative but the corresponding positive. Hence here it will mean to establish a point which tells against the Academic case, though the Latin could also mean the opposite, to 'refute' or 'disprove' that no one, etc.
Lucullus continues to treat the supporters of 'probabilia' and 'perapicunl' as one group and therefore allows us to understand that his linguistic counter-argument, though linked to his immediately preceding remarks about Philo's position ('ex hoc illud illis usus usui uenire solet...'), concerns the doctrine of probability in general.

That the question should be raised whether the Academic perceives what he states was inevitable, since it is the common assumption of both layman and philosopher that a statement expresses a judgement that is either true or false.¹ That assumption was certainly made by the Stoics,² who according to Sextus classed impressions as true if true affirmative statements could be made about them, e.g., at the present moment, 'it is day' (A.M.VII,244). It might therefore be supposed that if an Academic makes a positive assertion, he does so because he perceives its truth. But positive assertions of this kind can hardly be expected of the Academic, who holds that nothing can be perceived and whose statements express what he judges to be probable. Nor is it entirely correct to suggest that the Academic would not agree that in making positive assertions we would be assigning a definite mark of truth to whatever is asserted. This would be true of dogmatic statements, but his own statements are not dogmatic. Hence Cicero exhorts Lucullus to confine his statements about nature's artistry to what appears and avoid being positive ('donique uidensur sano, ne adfirmuntur modo', 86; cf.105,146). Nonetheless, the Academic does make statements about the external world, and even if the question ('ergo istuc quidem perapicis?') is somewhat unfair as it stands, it is a way of asking the Academic how he relates his statements with his view that the true and the false are qualitatively alike, for in one respect his

²E.g. 95; Tusc.1,14; D.L.VII,65; Sextus A.M.VIII,12. Dencon Mates, Stoic Logic, p.28.
statements are perceptual statements.\(^1\)

An argument based on the sceptic's use of language might take two forms. He might be required to substantiate his statement, by admitting that he perceives its truth or that of some other statement which confirms it, or else to admit that his statement is false or meaningless.\(^2\) For a significant statement is one which can (theoretically at least) be verified.\(^3\) This seems to be the purport of the original question (\'ergo istud quidem percipio?\') and possibly of the contention which follows, that to make a positive assertion is to assign a mark of truth to what is asserted (e.g. it makes no difference whether one says 'It is day' or 'That it is day is true'). But the way Cicero formulates the contention makes it equally applicable to the second form the argument may take. A statement or assertion has reference to an object or state of affairs which is recognised or assumed to exist independently of any statement made about it.\(^4\) If I make a statement, I am recognising or assuming that a mark of truth (or reality) belongs to that object or state of affairs. This would not be possible if the mark were common to both true or false, i.e. if external 'reality' had an ambiguous character. A sceptic who makes any positive statement without admitting that he has perception is thus self-refuted.

\(^1\)Stough (pp.64-65) argues that the Academicians did not, like the Pyrrhonists, advocate a change in linguistic usage from perceptual statements ('there is a snake in the collar') to sense statements ('there appears to me to be a snake in the collar'). But he overlooks the evidence of the Incoherence. In my view, such a strict distinction falsifies the Academic position, which is midway between that of the dogmatist (who makes perceptual statements) and that of the Pyrrhonist (who makes sense statements). Account must be taken of the special nature of probable statements, which relate both to the subjective side of experience and to the external world.

\(^2\)Cf. Sextus P.H.II,1 ff. A similar type of dilemma may have been used against the 'nihil posse percipi' principle by the Stoic Incipiter (see p.153 above).

\(^3\)It does not of course follow that a form of words that is neither true nor false must be meaningless. But a 'statement' in the required sense is 'an indicative sentence uttered for the purpose of asserting something' (W. and N. Kneale, The Development of Logic, p.50).

\(^4\)Cf. Seneca Ep.117,13, where a clear distinction is drawn between the meaning of a sentence or affirmation, and the object which the affirmation is about. Kneale, Stoic Logic, p.12.
It is clear that these arguments depend partly on the nature of statements as much and partly on the attitude of the person making them. It is in his attitude to his own statements as well as those of others that the sceptic differs from the dogmatist. Thus Carneades, if we are to believe Clitomachus, made assertions which he did not himself believe, merely for the sake of argument (78). In general, the 'mos patrius Academiae', that of arguing against the views of others without putting forward one's own, must stem from the wish to avoid positive statement. The doctrine of ἐκαχή implies that no statement may be put forward as true but only as probable.

It does not, of course, follow that a probable statement may not be true or false; but to say that \( x \) is probable usually means that its truth or falsity has not yet been definitely established. As Cicero points out in 99 ff., most practical judgements are of this kind, including predictions about the future. On the other hand, if there are no circumstances in which it would be possible to determine whether a given statement is true or false, this would seem to create a problem. According to Lucullus, we cannot accept a criterion which offers less than complete certainty; there must be a distinctive mark of truth ('certa atque propria nota') by which in the last resort we can determine it. According to the Academic, there is no such mark, and we have to be satisfied with varying degrees of probability.

1W. and M. Kneale, The Development of Logic, p.55: 'Connected with the fact that a given type of utterance has a certain function is the fact that an utterance not only expresses a proposition but also expresses or evinces an attitude towards the proposition expressed.'

2According to Numenius (fr.27,14 ff., Dea Places), Carneades was never misled by his own eloquence into believing what he himself said, whereas Arcesilaus was, forgetting his general principle that he could perceive nothing. In D.IV,36 it is stated that in conversation Arcesilaus used a natural way of talking, including dogmatic expressions such as 'I say' and 'So and so will not assent to this', and that his pupils imitated him in this as in other things. For Carneades' 'lusiveness' in argument, see Plu.I,62; Num.fr.27,28 ff.

3105, N.D.I,12; cf. Fin.II,43 (end); Off.II,7. The refusal to admit the existence of a 'certa nota' would, to Lucullus, be inconsistent with the Academic denial that everything is uncertain.
By remarking that the Academics meet their critics not with serious argument but with ridicule, Lucullus contrives to suggest that they are as irresponsible as the group relegated to the background in 32, and also that their position is equally indefensible, if only for the reason that any statement they might make in their own defence would tend to confirm their opponents' view. He now goes on to accuse them of frivolity ("quid eo leuius?") if they determine probability by a single glance, or of wasted effort if they give long and careful consideration to the matter. His main point is still the same as in 33, that even the most thorough estimate of probability does not eliminate the need for a qualitative difference between true and false impressions, since without it all impressions are equally untrustworthy.

Having mentioned Carneades' first and second degrees of probability in 33, Lucullus now sets up a contrast between the first and the third, i.e. between the merely 'probable' and the 'probable, unhindered and tested' impression. Carneades had argued (Sextus A.M.VII,184 ff.) that one is satisfied with different degrees of probability in different situations. For example, in matters that are of no great importance or when one is pressed for time, one will accept the impression that is merely probable. To a man hurrying into a dark room a coiled-up rope may look like a snake (P.H.I,227); another, pursued by enemies, will interpret a ditch as an ambush and therefore avoid it (A.M.VII,186). It is to this sort of hurried judgement that Lucullus refers in his stricture on accepting the impression which appears probable 'primo quasi aspectu'. But why object on these grounds? Surely even a Stoic philosopher might be pressed for time, or accept without question a matter of everyday experience, as Sphaerus did when he took the pomegranate. The implication must be that the criterion

1 Perhaps a reference to their treatment of Antipater (cf. 28).
2 Cicero's phrases 'ex circumspectione aliqua et accurata consideratione' and 'cum omnia fecerit diligentissimeque circumspexerit' are clearly intended to suggest an impression that is not merely 'probable and unhindered' but also 'tested' (διεξωθεμένη or περιῳδεμένη, Sextus A.M.VII,181-2).
3 D.L.VII,177, cf. Athen.VIII,354e (SVF 1,624-625).
is applied indiscriminately and in circumstances that do not warrant it. But Lucullus is no better pleased with the carefully considered and tested impression. The first reason given, that if there is no difference between impressions they are all equally untrustworthy, may mean as before (33) that without a qualitative difference between true and false no impression can even be probable, but it also seems to convey that Carneades' method of confirming one impression by the evidence of others is (in Lucullus' view) totally useless, since in respect of credibility they are all alike and even if they confirm one another they will fail to carry conviction. The second reason is that, since even when all possible checking has been done, an impression may appear true and still be false, this makes nonsense of the Academic claim that they have moved a great part of the way towards the truth. They are in fact as far away from it as ever, and this is bound to undermine their confidence in their own criterion. The words used, 'fidei', 'confident', suggest the Greek πίστις, πεποιθεῖται, and emphasise the subjective nature of the Academic criterion (πιθανόν).

That the Academics were familiar with this type of criticism is shown by Sextus (A.M.VII,174-5) who, in the course of explaining the Carneadean theory, admits that a probable impression can be false. But the rare occurrence of the impression which 'imitates' the truth should not, he says, make us distrust the kind which as a general rule reports truly, for in both judgement and action the standard is the general rule. This Aristotelian standpoint (e.g. E.N.1112b) marks the probability theory as in origin designed to meet the practical needs of everyday life rather than the theoretical requirements of the sciences. It is thus totally opposed to the Stoic view which attempts to import scientific exactness into sense-experience. Lucullus makes no concession to the fact (and indeed does not even mention it) that the fully tested yet false impression is thoroughly exceptional. For him, if the possibility of falsity exists at all, the criterion is invalidated, whether it is the 'cataleptic' or the 'probable' impression (cf. Sextus A.M. VII,438).
Lucullus thus refutes the Academic claim that they come as near as possible to the truth with the same argument that the Academicians had used against the cataleptic impression, namely that, if true and false cannot be distinguished, any impression may appear true and yet actually be false. All the proper tests might have been carried out, but in the absence of a known mark of truth the Academic can never feel confidence. Again, Lucullus' language is adapted to the subjective character of the Academic criterion ('quod tandem uerum sibi uidebuntur attingere?'), though the argument itself depends on the fully objective nature of truth.

The key word here is 'fides' (πίστις), which, as we have seen (27), is associated by the Stoics with perception and knowledge.¹ According to Sextus (A. M. VII, 401), the primary division of impressions for both Stoics and Academicians was into trustworthy (πισταλ) and untrustworthy (ἀπιστως), but the Stoics identified the former with 'cataleptic', the Academicians with 'probable' impressions (πιθαναλ).² Thus for Lucullus it would be impossible to represent an impression as trustworthy, or inspiring trust, if it could conceivably be false. The criticism is particularly damaging to the πιθανόν in view of its conceptual relation with πιστος and πίστις. The Academic, on the other hand, is prepared to admit that a 'persuasive' impression can be false, although in general it is the best and indeed the only guide to truth.

Finally, the probable impression is represented by Lucullus as a 'sign' or 'proof' of the thing itself, which the Academic claims to follow in spite of the possibility that the 'thing signifyin' may be false or nonexistent.³ The attribution of this view to the Academicians themselves, as an

¹For the Stoic definition of 'fides'/πίστις, see above, p. 140 n. 1.
²πιστος and πιθανος can be virtually synonyms (cf. Sextus A. M. VII, 242, where the primary Stoic division is given as πιθανος/ἀπιστως). Cf. Aris. rhet. 1356b 29. According to Sextus E. H. I, 229-230, πεπεθεσθαι has various meanings, and while the Lycurgian 'believes' without committing himself, the followers of Carnesades and Caïromachus have a strong leaning towards what is πιθανον.
³I am taking 'caut hae quidem...signum' to refer to a particular impression, indicated by pointing to the thing in question. But there is an ambiguity here; see pp. 193-194.
absurd way of talking, may be a rhetorical fiction. According to the Stoics, a sign (σημεῖον) is something which reveals something else not directly perceptible, either by former observed association with it or because it can be inferred from it. The sign features in proof (ἀδιάκριτος), and proof itself is a kind of sign, since both exhibit the same form, 'if this, then this'. The idea of the 'sign' has a certain analogy to the mark of truth ('insigna ueri', 36) by which the cataleptic impression reveals not only itself but also the material object. If the probable impression is similarly the sign or proof of the material object, it would seem illogical to a Stoic to accept the sign as revealing the object and at the same time to assert that the object ('quod significatur') can be false or non-existent. There seems, however, no reason to suppose that the Academics would have thought of the relation between impression and object in terms of sign and what is signified by it, or that the Stoics normally did so. For the Stoics, it would tend to obscure the difference between direct and indirect perception. If they attributed the view to the Academics, it was perhaps from a belief that the Academic theory did in fact do just this.

On their side, the Academics would undoubtedly have attacked the dogmatic conception of sign, which requires that the sign is necessarily indicative of truth (Sextus A.M.VIII,249) and that proof necessarily results

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2 Sextus P.II,104; A.II,VIII,245, 252.
3 Sextus A.II,VIII,276; P.II,II,96.
5 Cf. 111: 'perceptio factum nullo habes'.
6 An impression would differ from an ordinary sign in its supposed resemblance to the external object. A similar relation might be held to exist between the meaning of a statement and the corresponding reality. But, again, there is nothing to indicate that the Stoics extended their theory of signs to cover the relationship between impression and object. But see Sextus A.M.VII, 365, 367, who uses σημεῖοδοσία and σημεῖωσις of the relation between subjective experience and external object.
in a true conclusion (P.H.II.,143).\textsuperscript{1} Lucullus, who has made his stand on proof quite clear in 27, would naturally object to the Academic view, according to which the conclusion of a logical proof might be false or delusive. The present argument provides him with an opportunity to show by implication how the Academic denial of a mark of truth would affect other areas of cognition where reliable evidence is necessary.\textsuperscript{2} At the same time, in passing from the one to the other, he may be deliberately confusing the theory of sign and proof with that of a mark of truth (cf. 34). On the analogy of the latter, the probable impression is taken to reveal the object directly, but without providing a guarantee that what is revealed is not non-existent or false. On the analogy of the former, perception becomes a form of inference from impression to external object, and if the impression is merely probable the inference may always be false. There may thus be an ambiguity between the strict meaning of 'signum', 'argumentum' and 'id quod significatur' and the ordinary meaning of evidence on which action or judgement is based.\textsuperscript{3}

The final remark of Lucullus is quite in keeping with his general dogmatic position and confidence that truth is on his side. By the use of a forensic image, that truth will defend herself without his advocacy, he suggests, as previously, that Academic scepticism is defeated by experience itself (cf.17,34). The unspoken inference is that the Academic, who denies that he makes everything uncertain, will not be able to prove his case.

\textsuperscript{1}Part of Sextus' attack on proof may go back to Carneade (A.H.VIII.,340 ff.). See C.J.de Vogel, Greek Philosophy III,1114. Sextus (P.H.II.,187; A.H.VIII, 473 ff.) admits that his arguments against proof are only probable. This may imply that the sceptic would accept 'proof' if based on the probable.

\textsuperscript{2}Cf. Plato Phaedo 92d, where Simmias points out the dangers of 'proofs' that rest merely on probabilities, in geometry or any other subject. See C.E.R. Lloyd, Pleromar and Analogy, p.394.

\textsuperscript{3}Reid (p.222 n.6 and 7) suggests σημεῖον ή τεκμήριον as the Greek equivalent of 'signum aut argumentum' and interprets 'id quod significatur' (τὸ σημεῖωτὸν in Sextus) in the sense of the object which gives rise to the impression.
Assent and its importance

37-39 (p.45,26 - p.46,12) his natis cognitis ... adsentitur statim.

Summary. I will now say a few words about assent and approval (which the Greeks call συγκατάδεξις), not that it is not a large subject, but the foundations have already been laid. For in explaining the power of the senses, I made it clear that many things are grasped and perceived, which cannot happen without assent. In the next place, since it is activity which chiefly differentiates the animate from the inanimate (for an inactive animal cannot even be imagined), either the animal must be deprived of sensation or the power of voluntary assent must be restored to us. But those whom they wish neither to have sensation nor to assent are being robbed, as it were, of the mind itself; for like a scale under the pressure of weights, the mind must yield to what is evident, and just as an animal must pursue what is suited to its nature (what the Greeks call οἶκετον), so the mind cannot fail to approve what is evident. And yet, if the position I have been arguing is true, any talk about assent is superfluous, for he who perceives anything assents at once.

According to the Stoic account given in Sextus, an act of perception has two stages or aspects. The first is the purely passive reception of an impression, which is involuntary in that the way we are affected does not depend on us but on what is represented in the impression. The second is the act of assent, which is voluntary and corresponds to a judgement on the part of the mind by which the impression is accepted as true. In principle, the act of perception would, without assent, be incomplete and virtually not take place. 'Grasp' (καταλήψις) is consequently defined as assent to a cataleptic impression, and the effective use of the senses is held to

1Reading 'at' with Reid; Flasberg restores the original MSS reading 'et'. Cf. Leumann-Hofmann-Szantyr, Lateinische Grammatik II, p.494.
2A.M.VIII,397; cf. Ρατ.43 (Chryseippus); Ar.1,40 and II,145 (Zeno).
3In practice, it would be impossible to divide any act of perception into two distinct stages. But a situation could be imagined in which, from some such cause as inattention or shock, the mind might fail to complete an act of perception. A deliberate refusal to complete it might also be possible in certain cases. 
4Sextus A.H.VII,151; VIII,397 etc. Sandbach, Problems, p.13, finds Zeno's manual simile misleading, since it suggests that assent and grasp are two successive stages (145, cf. 1,41). But in a sense they are, since καταλήψις is the result of the act of assent.
involve assent. Lucullus takes it for granted, therefore, that having shown (as he claims) that many things can be perceived, he has already laid the foundations of the doctrine of assent.

The Academic sceptics before Philo repudiated assent as a corollary of their position that nothing can be perceived. Accepting the Stoic view that the wise man will assent to nothing that is false or unknown, they accepted the consequences for themselves that the wise man will assent to nothing (67–68). The ordinary person might, of course, assent and hold an opinion (66), and there seems to have been some question whether Carneades thought that the wise man might also do so (59, 67, 78). But the general Academic view, as Cicero represents it, is that the wise man will totally suspend assent, and that action and judgements of probability do not involve assent.

The Academics are able to by-pass assent and avoid the consequences which the Stoics said would follow because the latter confined the meaning of assent to a particular type of judgement, namely one which implies the positive acceptance of something as true. In assenting to an impression, we either take for granted or positively affirm that it does actually correspond to the reality behind it. This exclusive interest in perception and in the type of judgement which ratifies it prevented the Stoics (and Lucullus here) from pressing the point that any judgement, especially a judgement of probability, could be taken as an act of assent and thus as refuting εποχή.  

100 'dicunt enim Stoici sensus ipsae ad sensum esse'. Cf. Aet. IV, 10, 2 (SVP II, 72); Stob. Pol. I, p. 349, 23 (SVP II, 74).

2 Although in his previous argument Lucullus has mentioned assent only once (at the end of 25), it is obviously assumed throughout, especially in 25 (see p. 159 above). The phrase 'cuius uum quae esset in sensibus explicabamus' echoes similar phrases in 30 ('quae uum esset in sensibus') and 20 ('quanta uis sit in sensibus'). Lucullus is probably referring to the argument in 19 ff. (see p. 159 n. 4 above).

3 Clement (Strom. II p. 498/ SVP II, 992) is probably wrong in representing any opinion or judgement as an act of assent. Elsewhere (II p. 923/ SVP II, 121) he argues against the Pyrrhonists that any assumption would be a breach of εποχή, but the argument rests on the belief that what is assumed is tacitly taken to be true.
For the Stoic wishes his opponent to admit that he assents in order that he should admit that he perceives. Even if the Academic were to admit that he assents to a probable impression, this would, on the Stoic view, constitute no more than a weak or false act of assent.\(^1\) A Stoic would not expect him to give his assent to what seems to him merely probable.\(^2\)

So long as the Stoics themselves did not allow the wise man to assent to what is merely probable, there was no need for the Academics to admit that they did so. To the objection that action is impossible without assent, they replied that they followed probability. Cicero always treats assent and following probability as alternatives,\(^3\) and there is no indication in his argument that Lucullus took any other view. We must therefore reject the opinion of Reid, which has been widely accepted, that the Academics made a distinction between 'absolute' and 'qualified' assent, and that they proposed to withhold the one kind of assent in theory but give the other kind in practice (cf. Introduction p.14). This view rests basically on a misinterpretation of 104 (for which see n.3 below) and on 146, where relying on a

\(^1\)SVF III,172. Cf. Fin.III,18: 'a falsa autem adsensione magis nos alienatam esse quam a ceteris rebus, quae sint contra naturam, arbitrantur.'

\(^2\)The Stoic definition of the πιθανόν given in D.L.VII,75 (SVF II,201) as 'a proposition attracting us to assent' does not really tell us whether in judging something to be probable we are assenting (weakly). The same is true of the definition of the έλεγον as 'a proposition that has more chances of being true' (D.L.VII,76/SVF II,201), although here we have the evidence of Sphaerus' claim that he had given his assent to the proposition that 'it is reasonable (εξέλειγον) that these are pomegranates' (D.L.VII, 177; Athen.VIII,354e / SVF I,624-5). But Arsesillas also intended the έλεγον to refer to an action that simply accords with reason. It is likely that both Arsesillas and Carneades took advantage of the equivocal nature of these words to introduce criteria which, while providing motivation for action, made it possible for them to claim that they were not exercising assent.

\(^3\)In 104, where Cicero is explaining Clitomachus' views, the two forms of εξοχή are (1) the wise man's refusal to assent to anything, and (2) his refusal to give an answer for the purpose of approval or disapproval, so that he neither denies nor affirms anything. The wise man withholds assent in both cases, but with regard to the second he follows probability and replies yes or no accordingly. Although the passage is not entirely clear, it cannot be inferred from it that under (2) the wise man gives a 'qualified' assent (Reid p.300 n.1), especially in view of 'dum sine adsensu' below.
corrupt text Reid supposes Catulus to be saying that he approves of universal ἐποξὴ while agreeing with his father, and, according to his father, with Carneades) that the wise man will assent and opine, provided that he realises at the same time that nothing can be perceived. The only reasonable interpretation of this passage is that the principle that nothing can be perceived is no longer hold to justify ἐποξὴ, and that assent is to be given on the basis of a probable judgement. But this assent will be simply assent, it will not be 'qualified' assent. According to Stoic ideas it will be 'weak' assent because of the possibility that what is assented to might be false. But assent does not become 'qualified' simply because there is a proviso attached to it. Cicero makes this clear in 66, where he denies that the wise man will ever assent, but admits that he himself often does so, in spite of his conviction that nothing can be perceived. The two senses of assent are obviously the same. To hold that nothing can be perceived is not the same, therefore, as to withhold assent, though ἐποξὴ may or even should be the consequence of it (cf. 59).

Lucullus does not differentiate between the two words 'adsercio' and 'adprobatio', but offers both as the Latin equivalent of συγκατάδεσσις. In what follows, either word, or the corresponding verb, is used to express assent. In I, 41 Cicero joins 'acceptum' to 'approbatum', whether as a synonym or as a repetition of 'quasi accepta sensibus' in I, 40 is not entirely clear. If assent is given, recognition and classification of the object can be assumed in the act of assent, but it is perhaps a weakness of the theory that an analysis of perception which divides it into a passive and an active component, the latter being identified with assent, leaves no way

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1This involves changing 'comprobans' to 'non probans' or 'improbans' (see Introduction p. 57 n. 3).
2When Cicero needs a word without this implication he normally uses 'probare', e.g. 78 'quod a Carneade dicitur probatum'.
3Reid, p. 152 n. 1, argues that 'acceptum' in I, 41 is used in a different sense from 'quasi accepta sensibus' in 40 and virtually as a synonym of 'approbatum'.
in which the mind can acknowledge the impression and react to it if assent is withheld. It is therefore possible that in I,40-41 Cicero is using 'quasi accepta sensibus' and 'acceptum' in an attempt to distinguish various degrees of acceptance in a perceptual act. But 'assent' (συγκαταθέσεις) is a technical term referring to a single and specific mental act, i.e. acceptance that the impression is true (see p.109 n.1 above).

Lucullus goes on to repeat the charge made earlier in 30 (see pp.167-168 above), and argues that his opponents by refusing assent are eliminating the difference between the living and the non-living ('animal', 'inanimum'). This difference he sees as one of activity,¹ which depends on sensation and, at least in the higher creatures,² on voluntary assent. The Academic is thus presented with the uncompromising dilemma that either assent must be restored³ or the living creature be deprived of sense, for without assent man would lose not only the power of action but also the effective use of his senses, and so be unable to fulfil his basic functions as a living being. He would, in effect, be robbed of his 'animus', and Lucullus keeps before us the dual picture of the human 'animus', yielding to clear impressions, and the living thing ('animal') pursuing what is suited to its nature. In this analogy, only the assent given to impressions is illustrated, but Lucullus goes on to argue that all mental and moral activity - in a word, all action - follows from it.

¹Cf. Antiochus' view that all living things, including man, are naturally inclined to constant activity (Fin.V,55 ff.), and that man's moral excellence is bound up with this natural activity (ibid. 53).

²The phrase 'in nostra potentate' shows that Lucullus is thinking of assent primarily in human terms. It was in fact Stoic doctrine that all living creatures have the power of assent (SVF II,991; Long, E.M. p.173).

Alexander of Aphrodisias distinguishes between rational and irrational assent, attributing the latter kind to the Stoics (SVF II,980, 981, 983).

³As suggested in the Introduction (n.39 above), the argument here is anachronistic in that Thilo had already 'restored' assent, though not in the sense of accepting one's experience as indubitably true. In this respect, Lucullus' argument is still very relevant.
In these sections Lucullus has not himself the task of proving that to assent to nothing is to deny the proper and natural functions of the mind and at the same time that it is psychologically impossible. This might prima facie seem inconsistent with his original description of assent as 'in our power' (ca quae est in nostra potestate sita...addensio', 37).¹ For if it is in our power to assent it should also be in our power not to assent, but for Lucullus this does not seem to follow. The conception of freedom that is implied here and in Cicero's account of Chrysippus' theories in the De Fato (41 ff.) is unusual in that the problem is seen as arising with the perceptual antecedents of action rather than with action itself. Basically the contention is that, although assent cannot take place without the impression, it is not necessitated by it.² On the other hand, we are not free to give or refuse assent as we please, irrespective of the nature of the impression. Assent is 'in our power' because it is our own act and depends on ourselves and our nature, whereas the impression comes from the external object ('exinneous', Pat.42). This somewhat unsatisfactory dichotomy seems to be the sole basis for maintaining that assent is voluntary.

It can be used as an argument for or against determinism that we are not free to act against our nature. It is for this reason that we are not free to refuse assent to clear impressions. The mind yields to these impressions because it is constituted by nature to do so, in the same way that it accepts a necessary truth or repudiates an obvious falsehood. The problem arises partly because of the causal link with external objects, and partly because Lucullus' image of the descending scale suggests a form of compulsion rather than a mental initiative.

¹Cf. I,40 'quam quae vult in nobis positam et voluntariam' (Zeno). Pat.43 'sed addensio nostra crit in potestate' (Chrysippus).
²Cf. Aristotle's definition of 'hypothetical' necessity (Hist.199b 34 ff.). Chrysippus (1.6.) distinguishes 'principal and perfect' from 'auxiliary and proximate' causes, the effect of external objects on the will being of the latter kind. Cf. N.J. Furley's explanation of Lucretius' reference to 'an external force' endangering freedom (Lucre.11,239) as 'compulsion exercised by external objects through the medium of sense perception' (Two Studies in the Greek Atomists, p.187).
The view that the cataleptic impression is virtually irresistible is attributed by Sextus to the later Stoics (A.M. VII, 257), and I suggested in the Introduction (p. 25) that Antiochus shared their view and that it was the generally accepted Stoic doctrine after Carneades. Its purpose seems to have been to reassert the independent validity of the cataleptic impression as a criterion in the light of the Academic criticisms and Carneadean demand for concurrence. In virtue of its clear and striking character, the cataleptic impression will win assent, 'provided there is no obstacle'. This addition to the definition of the criterion (A.M. VII, 253) shows the Carneadean connection, but also creates a presumption that it was not the intention of these Stoics to deny freewill. If only the cataleptic impression (with certain exceptions) were to 'compel' assent, and freedom were exercised in all other cases. Again it is the metaphor used ('all but drags us by the hair to assent') that seems inconsistent with freedom, although one may add that Chryssippus' examples, the spinning top and the cylindrical drum rolling downhill, are not much more reassuring. But if it is borne in mind that, for the Stoic, freewill means freedom to follow one's nature, not freedom to go against it, the problem becomes less acute.

The image of the turn of the scale, which is here made very explicit, suggests the Greek word ἐπιταγή which is occasionally used in the sources for the 'inclination' of the mind in belief or action. In Plutarch Adv. Col.

1In Fat. 40 Cicero explains the position of Chrysippus as midway between the older philosophers who believed that assent was free and those who held that it was determined by necessity ('μα όφικεν ψυχή κατανοησαν'). He nowhere mentions that there were other Stoics who took the latter view. It is unlikely that he would have overlooked so significant a change in the Stoic viewpoint. Sandbach (Problems, p. 14) states that Zeller's explanation of the word 'cataleptic' as 'grasping' the percipient has now been abandoned, and that the ancient authorities always represent 'grasp' as an activity in which the percipient is the agent. But see Hamlyn, Perception and Perception, p. 39.

2Cf. Aristotle's distinction between 'natural' and 'enforced' movement, = movement contrary to the nature of the thing (προκτον. 215a 7 ff.).

3SVP II, 980, p. 288, 25; Numenius, fr. 27, 31 (Dea Mecce).
it is applied to impulse. Defending the sceptics against critics who used the Stoic argument from ἄξονας, Plutarch declares that, in spite of all their efforts, impulse was unwilling to become assent or to accept perception as 'turning the scale' (οὔτε τὴς ὁσιωτής ἄρχην ἀδέκατο τὴν αἰσθησιν \(^1\)), but plainly led to action without need of assent. A little later (1122C) he describes the impulse roused by the impression as an 'inclination' (ὁσιωτή, νεφεύς) that takes place in the ἰθυμονομόν. P. De Lacy\(^2\) has suggested on the evidence of the Lucullus (37-9, 52) that it was Antiochus who borrowed from the Stoics the argument which Plutarch is attacking. There is obviously common ground between that argument and Lucullus' line of thought in the present passage, the chief difference being that for Lucullus the falling scale represents the assent given to impressions in perception,\(^3\) whereas for Plutarch's opponents it is impulse which receives its inclination from perception. For Plutarch himself this inclination, or impulse, follows directly upon the impression. In suggesting that, for his opponents, ὁσιωτή is something which follows perception, Plutarch may indeed be misrepresenting his source, since it would be one and the same act of assent which confirms perception and directs impulse towards its object.

But whether or not Antiochus (or the Stoics) used ὁσιωτή in this way, Cicero has chosen to confine the image to perception, while retaining the connection with impulse in the form of an analogy. This change, if change it is, is a significant one, for it brings out the point that assent in rational beings can have a wider context than mere action, but that even so it is part of a behaviour pattern that is common to all living things.

\(^1\) πρόσθεσιν (Fehlenz).
\(^2\) JPT 77 (1956) p.74.
\(^3\) A further link with Lucullus' argument can perhaps be seen in 1122F ff., where Plutarch, still defending ἀποκινήσις, mentions an objection from the opposition that it is impossible not to assent to what is evident, and that it is more unreasonable neither to affirm nor deny accepted beliefs than to deny them. Though in the context this appears to be an Epicurean argument, it suggests that ἀποκινήσις as a state of mental suspension between affirmation and denial was thought to be unnatural, and the image of the falling scale might have been used to oppose it.
The mind which yields to 'peripicua' is clearly the human mind. In what follows, the link between 'animum' and 'animal' is again exploited. The principle that the living thing cannot fail to pursue what is adapted to its nature does not exclude man, but the analogy is effective only if it is interpreted in very general and basic terms. The doctrine of \( \omega \lambda \varepsilon \iota \omega \sigma \iota \varsigma \) starts from the assumption that nature created every animal to be well-disposed to itself and seek what contributes to its safety and well-being. The wide acceptance of this theory would make it plausible to suppose that, since pursuit of the \( \omega \lambda \varepsilon \iota \omega \sigma \iota \varsigma \) is a primary natural impulse, the animal to which such an object is presented must respond to it, and cannot do otherwise. Lucullus appears to be maintaining that the mind in approving 'obieotam rem perspicuam' is similarly following nature, and cannot do otherwise. The support which his argument derives from this analogy is somewhat slender. If perception and therefore assent are necessary preconditions of impulse and action, he is assuming in the analogy one of the points at issue. And even if the question of impulse, like assent, being necessitated yet free can be left on one side, there still remains the problem of deciding what accords with nature, about which there was no general agreement (Fin-V, 17). For this the ambiguity of the concept of nature was largely responsible. The Academics themselves would probably not have disputed that action must be motivated by what is \( \omega \lambda \varepsilon \iota \omega \sigma \iota \varsigma \). But they could have argued that the mind is also following its own nature in refusing assent, since there are no self-evident impressions in the sense understood by the Stoics.

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1 Although 'peripicua' suggests primarily sense-experience, it need not be confined to this; cf. Epictetus II, 26, 7, where in spite of a corrupt text it appears that the scale image is being applied to a conclusion of reason.
2 D.L.VII, 65; Fin-III, 16; V, 24 cto. For a detailed discussion of the theory see S.G. Pembroke's chapter in Problems, p. 114 ff. Chrysipus attributed its origin to the Academic Poliano (Fin-IV, 45). It was also accepted, at least for the purpose of argument, by Carneades (Fin-V, 17).
3 Hence \( \omega \lambda \varepsilon \iota \omega \sigma \iota \varsigma \) is said to depend on perception. Cf. SVT I, 197; II, 724.
4 This is particularly so if perception/knowledge belongs to the class of \( \tau \alpha \omega \lambda \varepsilon \iota \omega \sigma \iota \varsigma \) (cf. 26; Fin-III, 17-18; V, 48), or depends on the possibility of recognizing what is \( \omega \lambda \varepsilon \iota \omega \sigma \iota \varsigma \) (Problems, pp. 113 ff., 130 ff.).
5 Cf. Fin-V, 17 ff. (Carneades); see p. 207 below (Arcesilaus).
Lucullus goes on to assert (cf. his opening remarks in 37) that if his previous arguments about perception are valid, there is no point in talking at all about perception as if it were a separate issue: 'qui enim quid percipit adsentit tur statim.' It does not, however, follow from this that έποξή is a psychological impossibility, or that, if assent is given, the fact of perception is thereby proved. For even if people do not as a rule refrain from accepting what appears to them to be true, what is taken to be true is not necessarily so, and it is possible to pass other forms of cognitive judgement than those involving assent, and to base action upon them.

The consequences of withholding assent

38-39 (p.46,12-24) sed hac etiam sequuntur ... tollit o uita.

Summary. It also follows that without assent there can be neither memory nor concepts nor art. Above all, granted that there is free will, there will be none in him who assents to nothing. (39) What then will happen to virtù? It is ridiculous that vice should be voluntary and rest on assent, but not virtue, the strength and steadfastness of which are wholly derived from what it has assented to and approved. In any case, impression and assent must precede action, so that he who takes away either takes all activity out of life.

This diagnosis of the consequences of scepticism has a familiar look (cf. 21-25). There is a difference, however, and it lies in the deduction of the same conclusions, not from the thesis of απαφήλλαξα, but from the

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1 'si illa de quibus disputatum est sara sunt' must refer to Lucullus' own treatment of Antiochus' case. There was, however, an argument used against the Pyrrhonian sceptic, that he assumes in discussion the truth of his statements (cf. Sextus E.H.II,1 ff.; D.L.IX,102; Clement Strom VIII,5/STFP II,121). If Lucullus were implying that each side takes his case to be true, it would give a different slant to 'qui enim quid percipit ...'

2 Lucullus means, not that assent succeeds perception, but that 'it follows without argument' that assent in given, an something built-in and integral to perception. There is thus no need to see, with Reid (p.224 n.6), a difficulty in the suggestion that assent immediately follows perception. Once something is recognised as true, assent would merely follow have been given.

3 'sequuntur' here refers to the consequences of permanent έποξή (cf. Adv.Col. 1120D έξατα ... τωτω). Reid,p.224 n.7, wrongly takes it in the same sense as 'acquirit' in 30, as a reference to the order of treatment in the § commentary.
doctrine of ἔποχή. Lucullus' statement at the beginning of 37, that since assent is a part of perception the foundations of his argument have already been laid, applies equally to the present section.

The conclusion that concepts, memory and art are impossible without a secure base in perception was reached in 22, and since without assent there is no perception, it can be taken for granted that the conclusion, if not the argument as such, applies equally to assent. In addition, the progression from sensation to knowledge described in 30 shows clearly the dependence of memory, concepts and art upon assent, implied in the attention of the mind which enables it to retain and classify impressions and build up through memory a system of concepts, leading eventually to knowledge and moral wisdom. The possibility of retaining images not consciously assented to does not affect this argument, since without assent they could have no direction or motivation. Lucullus sees his opponent, who refused to complete the act of perception, as one for whom experience would be a mere flux of impressions and images, unrelated to objects or to one another, and rightly concludes that neither art nor concepts would be possible on such a basis.

Lucullus' next point, that without assent there is nothing in our power, is stated briefly and with little explanation. It would of course follow that if all impulses and action depend upon assent, freedom as it is ordinarily understood, as involving a choice between alternative courses of action, would be an irrelevant issue for one who assents to nothing. And if action is impossible, virtuous action is also impossible. But the consequence that without assent there is no activity at all is reaffirmed at the end of the section and does not seem to be the premise of this particular argument. In saying that freedom will not exist for one who practises ἔποχή, Lucullus seems to mean that it is through the act of assent, and through this alone, that freedom is exercised, from which it follows that apposition and action

1 Memoriae must also be abiding and stable impressions (cf. Comm. Not. 1095A-B).

2 Cf. Chrysippus' criticism of Cleanthian interpretation of Zeno's definition of an impression as τὰ πώς ὅν ψυχή (p. 130 n. 1 above).
are also in our power (cf. Fat. 40). The same is presumably true of the moral
judgment, by which appetition is directed to what is suited to our nature
at the rational level. The steadfastness of the wise man is the consequence
of the indubitable truth of the propositions he has assented to (23), so that
even if in one sense he cannot act otherwise, he nevertheless acts freely
and as the result of his own nature. Clearly, if assent is to be permanently
withheld, virtuous action of this kind will no longer be possible.

Lucullus finds it paradoxical that men's vices, which depend on assent
to a false or incorrect judgement, will still be voluntary, but that the wise
man by refusing to assent should make himself and everyone else incapable of
virtue. The implication that the ordinary person, who assents, would not be
a sceptic is of course due to the fact that the dispute is about the wise
man. But in arguing in this way, Lucullus appears to be begging the question.
For the fact that the morally vicious and the ordinary person both assent
does not establish the possibility of perception. The Academic can also
dispute Lucullus' conclusion by arguing that freedom does not necessarily
depend on assent since there are other forms of cognitive judgement or atti-
tudes to experience, such as judgements of probability. It was, moreover,
the Academic view that impulse and action can be moved directly by the
impression, which may imply that actions are determined solely by external
factors, but we can assume that this implication would not have been accepted
(pp. 207-8). Still, it has to be allowed that the Academic position does not
make virtue in the Stoic sense possible, since the 'firmitas' and 'constanta'
of the wise man must, on the Stoic view, derive from firm and strong assent,
and this is what is basically meant by virtue being 'in our power'.

The paradox that vice but not virtue would be voluntary reverses the
Socratic view that 'no one sins willingly'. That moral responsibility implies
freedom is widely accepted, and it was also held that the fact that we assign

1 But Lucullus' contention that freedom disappears with assent is not answered
by Cicero. Carnecedo's defence of free will in the De Fato (31 ff.) concerns
a different problem, that of antecedent causes.
praise or blame to actions presupposes that it was in the agent's power to act otherwise. How far this is ever strictly the case is a matter of debate and need not affect the present issue. The Stoics did not suppose the moral agent free to act against his nature and we may suppose that Antiochus, though he disagreed with the Stoics on some other ethical questions, would not have disagreed with them on this one. In asking, therefore, 'Where is virtue, if nothing rests with ourselves?' Lucullus is thinking, as before, of assent and its consequences for action, not of absolute freedom of choice between alternatives modes of conduct.

Lucullus concludes his objections to ἔξοχη with a brief re-statement of the argument from inaction. Although impulse is not here specifically mentioned as following assent, Cicero clarifies the position when, answering the argument in 108, he sets out the Stoic view that sensations are followed by impulse and consequently by action because they are themselves acts of assent. The argument from inaction was, we are told, the one most often used by Chrysippus and Antipater against the 'lies and empty postulates' of those who claimed that, when an appropriate impression occurred, they were moved by impulse immediately without yielding or assenting to the impression (Plut. Sto. Rep. 1057A/SVP III, 177). The same argument is referred to by Plutarch (Ad. Col. 1122A-B) as the ultimate weapon brought out like a Gorgon's head for use against the Academicians by their opponents.2

The claim that an appropriate impression is sufficient to rouse impulse and action without assent presumably goes back to Arcesilaus.3 Plutarch, in his defence of ἔξοχη in Adv. Col. 1122C-7 explains that in withholding assent the Academic does not avoid the impulse which is directed 'naturally'

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2 This comparison aptly suggests the Stoic belief that scepticism 'petrifies' its adherents (cf. Epictetus 1,5,1-3). Cf. 62 'subhina omnis adscensione omnem et motum enim ornum et actionem rerum sustulerunt'. Cf. Aug. ASC II,5,12; for the dogmatist's use of the argument from inaction, see fluid, p.500 n.9. The Epicureans also used it (Fin. I,64; p.104 n.4 above).
3 Zeller, Stoica, Epicureans and Sceptics, p.743 n.2.
towards the impression; he avoids only the false opinion involved in assent, which contributes nothing useful to the psychological process. It is, however, by no means obvious that some form of cognitive or value judgement is completely unnecessary prior to action. The very fact that impulse is roused means that we recognize what is represented in the impression and respond to this, not merely to the impression. But whether assent as defined by the Stoics must be part of this response is arguable. The Stoic is prevented from exploring any other possibility by his exclusive interest in the firm and strong convictions of the wise man, which could only arise from assent as the Stoics understood it. Hence they could not argue that some form of belief, if not assent, must underlie action and so betray an element of dogmatism. But this may also be taken as a strong point in their position, since it allowed them not to move from their definition of perception or water down their definition of wisdom.

The Academic case and methodological approach

40-42 (p.46,25 - p.48,3) nunc ea uideamus ... non posse comprehendī.

Summary. (40) Let us now take a look at the arguments usually advanced on the other side. But first you may learn the basis of their whole system. They start by putting together what we might call a general theory of impressions, defining their nature and kind, including the character of that which can be perceived and grasped, word for word as do the Stoics. They then set out the two propositions which comprise this whole issue. First, in the case of impressions that are such that other impressions could be exactly similar, so that there is no difference between them, it is impossible that some should be perceived and others not. Secondly, this applies not only if they are actually identical in every respect, but also if they cannot be distinguished apart. Having laid these down, they state their whole case in the form of a single

1Watson (Stoic Theory of Knowledge, p.69) remarks that the Academics were, in Chrysippus' view, forgetting that there is such a thing as assent by action. In saying that sensations ('sensus') are acts of assent, the Stoics seem also to have been implying that perception, as they understood it, is inherent in the use of the senses (16v; ∼ΠΠ II, 72-74). It is doubtful if they were playing on the ambiguity of αἰδηγεῖν, since they did not identify sensation with perception.

2For this meaning of 'totidem curbias', cf. Brut.320; Fin.II,100. Reid wrongly translates 'at an great length' (p.226 n.1).
proof, as follows. 'Of impressions, some are true, others false; and what is false cannot be perceived. But every true impression is such that a false impression can be exactly like it; and if impressions are such that there is no difference between them, it cannot be the case that some of them can and others cannot be perceived. No impression therefore can be perceived.' (41) Two of these premises they think they can take for granted, for no one contests them, namely that false impressions cannot be perceived, and secondly, that of impressions between which there is no difference, it is impossible that some should be perceived and others not. The other two they defend with lengthy and diverse arguments, namely that some impressions are true and others false, and secondly, that any impression derived from a real object is such that it could be derived from a false one. (42) These two themes they amplify with considerable care and diligence, dividing them into broad sections, first sensations, then what is derived from sensations and ordinary experience, which they wish to darken; finally they come to the impossibility of perception even by means of reason and inference. These general topics are further subdivided, each being treated as you saw in yesterday's conversation in the case of sensations, with the aim of showing in the smallest detail that true impressions co-exist with false ones, there being no difference between them, and that therefore they cannot be perceived.

Although Academic scepticism is elsewhere referred to as a 'ratio' by both Cicero and Lucullus (7, 16, 29), its use here, like that of 'ars' (= a system of knowledge), seems to be ironical, especially since in 29 Lucullus had expressed doubt whether a sceptic could be said to have a 'sententia'. He emphasises, with obvious scorn, the orderly and logical manner in which the Academics present their case for the impossibility of perception, which seems typical of their methodology in general. In 43 he explicitly attacks

1 Pläberg excludes this sentence from the inverted commas, thereby destroying both the form and the cogency of the argument. I follow Reid and Rackham in retaining it as part of the 'unius argumenti conclusio'.

2 A. Naess (Scepticism, p.5) objects to the application of the term 'system' to Pyrrhonism, but seems to imply that he would not object to its use if applied to Academic scepticism.

3 Although Carneades himself wrote nothing, Sextus' account of his arguments on the criterion reflect a conspicuously clear and orderly arrangement (A.N.VII, 159 ff., 166 ff.). In Fin.V, 16, there is a reference to his
their use of logical processes such as proof, definition and division as inconsistent with their scepticism. In this section (40) the implication is rather that a good deal of time and effort has been wasted in support of a position which is clearly untenable.

Though Lucullus, in his usual dogmatic manner, professes to be giving his listeners a chance to 'get to know' the Academic case, he is somewhat vague on the preliminaries, the definition and classification of impressions, except in saying that the nature of what can be perceived is defined by the Academics in the same terms as by the Stoics ('totidem urbibus quot Stoici').

We may assume that among these preliminaries would have been the Academic definition of an impression as such, and a classification and description of the main types of impression, including the cataleptic. The Academics certainly seem to have adopted the main assumptions of the Stoic theory of perception, including their various divisions and definitions of impressions. And it appears that Lucullus intends it to be a reproach that the Academics should have worked out a case for scepticism within the framework of the Stoic theory of perception.

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complete classification of opinions about the ethical end, which included not only opinions actually held but also those that were possible.

1Cf. Arcesilas' alleged discussion with Zeno (77) and Carneades' analysis of the nature of an impression and the conditions it must satisfy to be true (Sextus A.M.VII,159 ff.). It is thus very likely that 'totidem urbibus quot Stoici' refers to the whole sentence (from 'corumque ot uim et genera definiunt') and not only to the latter part of it.

2Carneades' definition of the impression (Sextus A.M.VII,162) is very similar to that of the Stoics (Act.IV,12,1/SVP II,54; A.M.VII,220 ff.). Sextus gives 'trustworthy' and 'untrustworthy' as a basic division of impressions accepted by both Stoics and Academics (A.M.VII,401). Their subdivisions of the probable are fairly similar (A.M.VII,174 and 243-244). The most conspicuous difference is that, whereas the Stoics further divided the true into cataleptic and non-cataleptic (ibid.247), Carneades is said in 99 to have divided impressions into (1) those which are perceptible and those which are not (i.e. cataleptic and non-cataleptic), and (2) the probable and improbable.

3The Academics do not, however, seem to have displayed any interest in the Stoic explanation of the physical process of perception.
According to Lucullus, the Academics next lay down two propositions, the first that, when some impressions \((a^1, a^2, a^3)\) exactly resemble others \((b^1, b^2, b^3)\), it is impossible that one of these groups should be perceived but not the other. This is stated as a general principle, but must concern, in the context of the dispute between the Academics and the Stoics, the indistinguishability of true and false, whatever be the source of the false impression (i.e. a mere delusion or an object mistaken for another one). ¹

The second proposition is that the first applies whether there is actually no difference between the two groups or whether none can be detected by an observer. ² A case in point would be the series of shapes presented by two coins of the same denomination, or the similar appearances of different individual members of the same class, eggs, bees, or identical twins \((a^3-6)\). For even if no two eggs, or two bees, look exactly alike, the difference cannot always be detected. And if no difference between impressions can be detected, it is impossible that some should lead to perception, but not others.

The force of this argument is more clearly seen if we think of it in terms of the cataleptic impression. The proposition states that of, say, two exactly similar impressions, either both must be cataleptic or neither. This seems to be obviously true. According to the Stoic definition, there could not be identical cataleptic impressions from two different objects or sources. If there were to be identical impressions, they would have to come from the same object. Otherwise, such impressions would not be cataleptic on the view that to perceive means not only to grasp both the impression and the object that gives rise to it but also to grasp what is existent or real \((τὸ ἄρα ἀληθὲς)\). ³ And in the case of impressions that might be generically

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¹Held, however, (p.226 n.3) confines its meaning only to the confusion of objects.

²Since the reference is to impressions not objects, the second proposition may seem irrelevant. But see p.213 below.

³For the first meaning, see D.I. VII,46 and Sandbach, Problems pp.13-14. For the second meaning, see Sextus A.I. VII,426 where τὸ ἄρα ἀληθὲς is explained as that which excites a cataleptic impression. The cataleptic impression is
different but qualitatively identical, one would be unable to know their respective sources or know whether any of them has the relationship with the real that is required for perception. It follows that exactly similar impressions could be cataleptic if they came from the same object, but non-cataleptic if they came from different sources. The first proposition is consequently stated in a form which suggests that the impressions in question come from different sources ("quae ita uidentur ut etiam alia eodem modo uideri possint"). Its importance is obvious in that it is used as a fourth premiss in the Academic argument that follows.

In representing this somewhat complicated argument as a demonstrative proof ("argumenti conclusio"), Lucullus is in part preparing the ground for his criticism in 44 that since a proof must have premisses that are known to be true, the Academic is being most inconsistent in deducing from perceived facts that nothing can be perceived. In his reply Cicero does not commit himself to the phrase "argumenti conclusio", but speaks of four 'heads' or main points which make up the proof that nothing can be perceived ("quattuor sunt capita quae concludunt nihil esse quod nonci percepi comprehendi possit", 23); the four are given in a slightly different form, the order of the last two being reversed, but the argument is essentially the same. In view of its conclusion, the Academics are not likely to have represented it as a proof in the sense understood by the Stoics, but as a deductive argument resting on a probable basis. On the other hand, the Academics may have been

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also described as the test of reality (D.L. ibid.). This meaning of perception is quite in line with the belief generally held that the real is the correct and legitimate object of perception. It may also be noted that the two meanings may not be so different if ὑπὲρ τὴν εἰναι is interpreted as what is the case.

1Defined in 26 as 'ratio quae ex rebus perceptis ad id quod non percipiebatur adducit.' Cf. pp.145-146 above. For the definition as given in Sextus, see P.146 n.1.

2Cf. Sextus P.H.II,187; A.P.VIII,473. The argument is not syllogistic in form, i.e. it does not deduce the consequent from the hypothetical major premises and the antecedent (if A, then B; but A, therefore B); cf. Sextus P.H.VIII,149. It is not demonstrative, in that the premisses are not matters of direct perception. For the Academic attitude to proof, cf. pp.193-4 above.
tempted to give their argument the form of a logical proof in order to argue on their opponents' own grounds. The premises are partly granted and partly assumed to be valid, and the conclusion logically follows. The Stoics would of course not have agreed with the third proposition or the Academic arguments to establish it. But then they themselves had argued (Sextus A.M. VIII, 367) that proof cannot be required of everything and that certain things must be accepted as postulates.

In its context, therefore, the fourth premiss does yield the conclusion that no impression can be cataleptic, and on its truth depends the relevance of the third premiss, that a false impression can exactly resemble a true one. Hence the fourth proposition and its corollary, that there is no difference between impressions not only if there is no intrinsic difference but also if there is no apparent difference, were said at the beginning to contain or embrace the whole matter at issue ('quasi continent omne hanc quaestionem', 40). This may seem oddly at variance with Lucullus' later statement that the fourth proposition, like the second, that the false cannot be perceived, was contested by no one. But the same could not perhaps be said of the corollary, the main immediate purpose of which is to ensure that the third and fourth premises can be taken together. If this corollary might seem irrelevant as a further explanation of the fourth proposition alone, it is not so in the light of both the third and fourth propositions. For by explaining 'nihil interesse' in terms of the absence either of an intrinsic or of an apparent difference, the Academic allows it to be understood that what matters to his case is not the fact that there may not be any intrinsic difference between the true and the false, but only that there may be no discernible difference (52, 60, 90). He is thus able to meet the Stoic argument that, since no two individuals are alike, there must in fact be some difference, however small, between the impressions of them. Whether or not it makes sense to distinguish between real and apparent difference in the case of impressions, by doing so the Academic guards against the assumption that the nature of its source is
necessarily reflected in the impression. In leaving the possibility of there being no intrinsic difference between true and false, or between individuals (cf. 85), an open question, he also avoids a dogmatic claim and so forestalls the criticism that his position is as objectionable as the Stoic view, which he is opposing, that there is a discernible difference between the true and the false.

Given the two meanings of perception referred to above (to grasp both the impression and the object, and also to grasp what is existent or real), it is easy to understand why the false cannot be perceived. Since a false impression is not representative of its source, it is not perceptible in one of the senses defined. Secondly, the false, being also the unreal or non-existent, cannot be perceived. The reasons why the false cannot be perceived thus not only serve to explain why impressions between which there is no difference cannot be perceived but also throw light on the relevance of the third premiss. For if the true can be qualitatively similar to the false, no impression, even if true, can be perceived since doubt is automatically thrown on the capacity of any impression to represent its source accurately, and it likewise becomes impossible to know if any impression proceeds from what is real or existent. The second premiss (the false cannot be perceived) could, even without the fourth, support the inference from the third that nothing can be perceived. The relevance of the fourth proposition and the importance attached to it must therefore rest on its corollary which seeks to explain what the Academics meant by there being no difference between impressions.

Lucullus states and Cicero confirms (83) that the second and fourth propositions were not disputed by anyone, and that the controversy revolved

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1 Sextus A.M.VII, 163; 249 etc.
2 D.L. VII, 46. For the equation of false with what is not real or existent, see Sextus A.M.VIII, 10, and p. 129 above.
3 On this view of perception, it is impossible to perceive without knowing it. Contrast the view set out by H.H. Price, Perception, p. 23, according to which it is possible to have perception without being aware of it.
4 The one could not have been granted without the other if to perceive had
round the first and third. Since the first was granted by the Stoics, who were their principal opponents, it is not easy to understand why the Academics should have gone to so much trouble to defend it, unless they were also maintaining their position against the Epicureans, who (as Cicero points out in 83) did not grant it. If Lucullus is to be believed, the proposition that there are both true and false impressions was as elaborately defended by the Academics as the claim of ἀπαρασκεία. Its relevance to their case is, however, evident at every turn, especially since the very principle of ἀπαρασκεία rests upon it. Since it is obviously difficult for a sceptic to maintain a valid distinction between true and false impressions, it was no doubt important for the Academics to establish their position on this point. There may, however, be some exaggeration in Lucullus' statement, in view of his intended attack on the ground of inconsistency between the first and third propositions (44).

In claiming that unless all impressions are considered true, all must be considered untrustworthy, Epicurus was trying to fortify the dogmatist's position against scepticism. Hence, on the Epicurean view the Academic argument would be valid once the first proposition is granted. And since

more or less the same meaning for all the disputants. In 83 Cicero mentions only the Stoics and the Epicureans, but even the Peripatetics would probably not have disagreed. For Epicurus' equation of true with what exists (ὑπάρχων) and his explanation of false as that which is not in fact as it is said to be, see Sextus A.M.VIII,9 (Us.244). That the false cannot be perceived also underlies his controversial view that all impressions are true.

1The Peripatetics too maintained the same view. Sextus A.M.VII,369; VIII,185.

2Sextus P.H.II,77; 92. In principle, therefore, a sceptic would be expected to attack and not defend such a view. The Academics, on the other hand, were only using it to establish their case.

3In M.D.I,70 it is stated that Arcesilas argued that all sense-impressions were false, against Zeno who held that only some were false. Possibly this is a careless misrepresentation of the Academic argument (expressly attributed to Arcesilas in Sextus A.M.VII,154) that there are no true impressions such that they could not be false.

479; 101; M.D.I,70; K.D.23 and 24.
their position was indirectly affected, we may assume that they would have had sufficient reason to dispute the first proposition. But they could not have maintained that by upholding the first proposition the Academics were paving the way for scepticism, which would have meant endorsing a conclusion which the Academics were themselves seeking to establish. They might have attacked the Academic division of impressions into 'trustworthy' and 'untrustworthy', though such an attack would have been irrelevant to the present argument, since, for the Academic, the trustworthiness of an impression lies not in its truth but in its probability. Nevertheless, the concept of probability rests ultimately on the belief that the ordinary distinction between true and false has meaning and validity. Whether they were entirely consistent in maintaining this distinction, particularly in view of their claim of ἀπαράλλαξια, seems to have been a matter of concern not only to their opponents (44) but also to the Academics themselves, or at any rate to Philo (111).

That the Academics, on their side, attacked the Epicurean contention that all impressions are true may be implied in Cicero's criticism of that view (79-80, 101) and his arguments against the senses which affect not only the Stoics but also the Epicureans. In 101 Cicero maintains that Epicurus' view that if the senses were detected in a single lie, no sense should ever be believed, coupled with the Stoic admission that there were false impressions, was enough to cast doubt on the validity of sense-experience. The Epicurean answer would probably have been that it is in the combination of the Stoic and Academic views that leads to scepticism. But since the Academics could not argue their case within the framework of the Epicurean epistemology - which may explain why the battle was mostly between them and the Stoics - it is unlikely that disproving the Epicurean view of the truth of all sense-impressions was their main concern. On the other hand, it is hard to see with what other motive they could have laboriously defended the first and third propositions if the Stoics granted them the first one.
Thus in representing the Academics as spending much time and effort on proving the first as well as the third proposition, Lucullus may be oversimplifying their purpose and approach. He may be doing this deliberately, since he will later argue that these two propositions are inconsistent (44).

As Cicero confirms in 83, the main dispute between the Academics and the Stoics centred on the third premise, which contains the Academic principle of ἀπαραλλαξια, or indistinguishability of true and false impressions, and thus states the exact opposite to the Stoic definition of the cataleptic impression and constitutes a direct challenge to it. The Academic proposition is formulated in three different ways: (1) 'every true impression is such that a false one can be found exactly like it' (40); (2) 'every impression which comes from the real is such that it could come from the false' (41); (3) 'coupled with all true impressions are false impressions which do not differ at all from true ones' (42). In 83 the formulation is similar to (3): 'there is no true impression arising from sense to which there is not joined another which does not differ from it at all and which cannot be perceived.' From this selection it can be seen that the simplest formula is 'there is no true impression which could not be false' (i.e. (2) above; cf. Soxtus A.N.VII,150).

Since this Academic proposition directly contradicts the last clause in the Stoic definition, the Academics must have claimed to derive it from a consideration of all the possible causes of deception that are guarded against by the Stoic definition, including cases of delusion.¹ The principle of ἀπαραλλαξια can be assumed to have the same meaning in all these cases, though there may be different explanations for each type of deception. In a case where one confuses two closely similar objects (54 ff., 84 ff.), one may be deceived into taking an impression coming from an object (X) which is present to have come from X¹ not present. The impression is therefore false.

¹Rackham, however, explains the argument entirely from the point of view of cases of mistaken identity.
and it is being confused with a true one.\(^1\) Similarly, the illusion of, say, a bent oar which is false, is qualitatively similar to the true image of a bent oar (19, 79 ff., Sextus A.M.VII, 413 ff.). A delusion is likewise a case where a false impression is confused with a true one (48, 88 ff., Sextus A.M. VII, 402 ff.). On the basis of such considerations, it is inferred that the true and the false are qualitatively indistinguishable, so that one could at any given time be confusing the one with the other.\(^2\) Lucullus will criticize this move later (49 ff.).

Judging from the various formulations of the principle, one is inclined to think that the Academics are arguing that every true impression has a false counterpart, or that there are pairs or sets of exactly matching impressions, one of which is true and the other false.\(^3\) This interpretation would seem to derive support from the fact that all the forms of deception mentioned above are reducible to the basic explanation that one is taking what is not 'there' to be 'there'.\(^4\) The two exactly matching impressions (i.e. the true and the false) could not of course be experienced simultaneously, but the false impression can be thought of as either an actual or a possible experience. Against this interpretation it could be argued that, when one is deceived, one does not in fact experience both the true and the false impressions of the same object. In the case of a delusion, for instance, the 'true' is not necessarily a different impression with a similar content,

\(^1\) For this explanation, see p. 292 below.

\(^2\) 48, 85; Sextus A.M.VII, 154, 164.

\(^3\) Cf. Sextus A.M.VII, 164: 'Since there is no true impression such that it could not be false, but for every apparently true impression is found to exist a false one exactly similar ....'. A.M.VII, 252: the Stoics added the last clause to the definition of the cataleptic impression 'because the Academics did not, like the Stoics, think it impossible that an exactly similar but false impression could be found.'

\(^4\) This consideration determines the phrasing not only of the Stoic definition of the cataleptic impression, but also of the Academic proposition, as in 41: 'omnia ut sum quod sit a vero tale esse quo qualém ciam a falso (ἀπὸ μὴ νῦν ὁκρονος) possit esse.' Because of this, delusion becomes perhaps the most important form of deception considered in the dispute.
but can be (and sometimes has to be) the same impression thought of as if it were true. That the Academics were aware of this is shown by the fact that they considered any true impression capable of turning out to be false. But if this were all that they claimed, there would be little point in speaking of two qualitatively similar impressions, or in drawing fine distinctions between different degrees of resemblance, as in the sorites argument (49). We must therefore assume that the Academics meant what they said when they spoke of any true impression having a false counterpart (whether actual or possible), and that the possibility of any given impressions, however probable, being false and not true is a deduction from this principle.

Sometimes the true and the false are spoken of as actually linked or placed side by side (‘adiuncta’, 42; ‘adpositum’, 03; cf. Sextus A.M.VII,430 παρακελευτα). The indistinguishability of true and false as elements in the same experience is illustrated by Sextus’ example of Heracles having a true impression of his bow and arrows but a false impression of his children as those of Eurystheus (A.M.VII,407). It is difficult, however, to see how two impressions with a similar content could be linked together in this way. Such an explanation would be more appropriate to rational impressions dealing with certain qualitative and quantitative concepts, which may be difficult to demarcate from their opposites (e.g. few and many, poor and rich). In such cases the true and the false can be said to lie in close proximity. But even then, the use of expressions like ‘adiuncta’ or ‘adpositum’ may not be too appropriate, since the similar impressions are not experienced simultaneously, though they may be brought together by the mind for the purpose of comparison.

190 ff.; Sextus A.M.VII,414 ff.

2Sextus(A.M.VII,417) uses the verb παρακελευτα of successive impressions in the sorites, where the difference between true and false is claimed to be so small as to be ‘indistinguishable’ (421).
The Academic claim that there is no true impression which could not be false may be met, in the first instance, by a simple denial: there is such an impression, and it is the cataleptic impression. In order to establish that an impression is not cataleptic, it is necessary to show that there could be another impression exactly like it coming from a different object or acknowledged to be false. In the case of similar objects which could give rise to confusion, a direct comparison between exactly matching impressions may be possible, but this cannot be so in the case of delusive impressions. Hence it may be difficult to accept that every true impression has a false counterpart, or that even if this were the case, they could not be differentiated in normal situations. It may be noted, however, that the simplest formula (i.e. there is no true impression which could not be false) does not fit the scheme of the Academic proof, which requires that there should be pairs or sets of exactly matching impressions, one of which cannot be perceived without the other.

In 63 Cicero confines the principle of ἀπαράλλαξια to sense-impressions (‘nullum esse uiusum uerum a sensu præfectum qui non adpositum sit uiusum alium quod ab eo nihil intereat quodque perciipi non possit’). In 41, however, Lecullus indicates that the Academics argued their case on the basis of an elaborate classification of experience, including reason and inference as well as sense and impressions derived from it. In implying that his opponents were obsessed with division for its own sake, he omits to mention (as at the beginning of his exposition in 40) that they were operating within

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1 Cf. Pumienius fr.27, 33 ff. (Des Planes), who gives the example of the wax and the real egg, the former representing what is false.
2 One would doubt the possibility of maintaining it in the case of rational impressions. For Antiochus’ own early attempt to do so, see 71.
3 Cf. 49 ‘itaque et sensibus probanda multa sunt, tenacius modo illud, non inesse in illius quiquam tale quale non atiam faluam nihil ab eo differens esse resultat’.
4 Division was much practiced in Plato’s Academy, to the point of providing material for the comic poets (W. and M. Kneale, The Development of Logic, p.10). The Academics after Plato continued to consider it an important logical method, but there is no reason to think that it was carried to extremes. Cf. R.E. Witt, Althimn, p.36.
a scheme initiated by the Stoics themselves. Since the Stoics distinguished between \( \chi \alpha \tau \alpha \lambda \nu \gamma \iota \varsigma \) through the senses and by reason,\(^1\) the Academics felt it necessary to show that we can be deceived not only by the senses (79 ff.) but also by reason (91 ff.), and that \( \alpha \pi a r a \alpha l a \varepsilon \iota \alpha \) is a feature of rational as well as sensory experience. It is not, however, very clear by what types of argument they established this, other than the \( \epsilon \varepsilon r i t e s \) (92 ff.) and various logical puzzles such as the Liar (95 ff.).

It is uncertain to what area of experience Lucullus is referring by 'ea quae ducuntur a sensibus et ab omni consuetudine' (42). One possibility is that he has in mind impressions derived by analogical inference from those received directly through the senses.\(^2\) On the other hand, he may be intending to refer to general experience as such and so to impressions based on 'consuetudo' rather than further derived from it. If so, the main divisions would be the same as those attributed by Cicero to Chrysippus, who disconcerted his fellow Stoics by searching out all the arguments 'contra sensum et perspicuitatem contra consuetudines contra rationem' (67).\(^3\) As a category intermediate between the data of sense and the strict processes of reason, 'consuetudo' \( \sigma \nu \nu \varepsilon \varepsilon \iota \varsigma \) represents the accepted beliefs and assumptions of ordinary life, which the Academic sceptic is alleged to undermine ('quam obscurari uolunt', 42).\(^4\) This charge, which is the only explicit criticism in this somewhat general and biased account, echoes such previous objections.

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1. D.L.VII, 52. Diogenes gives the existence of the gods and their providence as an example of \( \chi \alpha \tau \alpha \lambda \nu \gamma \iota \varsigma \) reached through logical proof.
2. Sextus A.M.VIII, 58 ff; XI, 250 ff.; see p.164 above.
3. Cf. 75: 'quam multa ille contra sensum, quam multa contra omnia quas in consuetudine probantur.' Chrysippus seems to have used the title \( \chi \alpha \tau \alpha \tau \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \sigma \nu \nu \varepsilon \varepsilon \iota \varsigma \) for a general attack on perception (Plut.Sto.Rep.1036C/SVF II, 109), which he answered in another work \( \upsilon \varepsilon \tau \sigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \sigma \nu \nu \varepsilon \varepsilon \iota \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma 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as that the Academics are robbing us of daylight (30) or overthrowing the whole of life from its foundations (31) or even robbing us of our eyesight (33). Like Chrysippus, who appears to have looked into every area of experience for examples of error, the Academics are here represented as attempting to establish the principle of ἀκαταστασία separately in all the various sections. Their method of minute subdivision was, we are told, illustrated in Cicero's discourse on the previous day against the validity of the senses (cf. 79; Introduction p.63). The main divisions of the section on 'sensus' can be conjectured from Lucullus' treatment of the subject and from Cicero's reply in 79 ff., where, after a brief introduction on the limitations of eyesight, he deals successively with cases of illusion, mistaken identity and delusion.

A formula of the principle of ἀκαταστασία which implies a duplication of exactly similar impressions would not be suitable if applied to rational impressions. In the case of such impressions, 'a uero' and 'a falso' mean 'from what is the case' and 'from what is not the case' rather than from a real or non-real object, and refer to the same proposition as it is judged true or false. This does not mean that the thought of the proposition as true and the thought of it as false are two different though qualitatively similar impressions. The false impression is qualitatively similar to the true only if it was in fact taken to be true, but is now judged to be false on the basis of a later or some other opinion. There are also cases where it is impossible to decide whether a proposition is true or false, or where the true and the false lie in close proximity, e.g. '50 is few' may be true while '51 is few' may be false. The latter two impressions cannot be said to be exactly similar in content. There is thus no real duplication of exactly similar impressions, and the principle of indistinguishability between true and false does not seem to require it, except for the purpose of the Academic proof, as it is here formulated.
The logical inconsistencies of the Academic position

43-44 (p. 43, 4 - p. 49, 9) nunc ego subtilitates ... suporius conunincetur.

Summary. (43) Such exactness is most worthy of philosophy but extremely alien to the case of those who argue in this manner. For definitions; divisions and language using such embellishments, also fine and subtle differentiation on grounds of likeness and unlikeness are characteristic of men who believe that what they maintain is true and incorrigible, not of those who declare that it is no more true than false. How would they react if asked whether a definition of theirs can be applied to anything other than the thing defined? If they say it can, what reason would they give for the truth of the definition? But if they deny it, they must admit that, since that true definition cannot be applied to the false, what is unfolded by their definition can be perceived, and this is not at all their intention. Every part of their argument can be attacked in the same way. (44) For if they claim that they have a clear insight into the subjects they discuss and are not impeded by any common character of impressions, they will have to admit that they can grasp them. But if they deny that true and false can be differentiated, how will they be able to advance further? For a proof cannot be concluded unless you believe what is assumed in the premises to be such that nothing false can be of a similar nature. What could therefore be more inconsistent than an argument that relies on things grasped and perceived to infer that nothing can be perceived? And when accurate speech professes to reveal what is not clear and to make use of the senses and what is evident in order to do so more easily, what kind of language is that of people who claim that everything seems rather than is? They are, however, especially at fault when they advance these two most incompatible propositions as if they were consistent, first, that some impressions are false, which implies that some are true, and then that there is no difference between true and false impressions. But you made the first assumption as though there were a difference; the later statement is therefore incompatible with the earlier.¹

Keeping the claim of ἀκρουραλλεῖν and indeed the most controversial proposition for critical treatment later (47 ff.), Lucullus attacks the general

¹There seems to be no justification for Lachmann’s translation of ‘prius’ and ‘posteriorius’ as ‘major’ and ‘minor’ prox-iss.

*Corrigendum: For ‘which implies that ...’ read ‘owing to which they assert that ...’. ‘Declarant’ can here mean either ‘assert’ or ‘imply’, but I am taking it in the first sense because the Academics do in fact admit that there are true impressions. Lucullus would otherwise be misrepresenting their position or advancing a totally irrelevant argument.
character of the Academic argument, which he finds to be conspicuously incompatible with scepticism. The faults in the Academic position are found to lie, as is perhaps to be expected, in the inconsistency between the strict methodological procedure and technical language used by the Academics and their claim of ἀπαράλλαξια, and its professed consequence that their own statements are no more true than false ('qui clament nihilo magis uera illa esse quam falsa', 43). The Academic use of logical inference is also criticised. The final argument of Lucullus also concerns the other controversial proposition in the Academic argument, namely that there are true as well as false impressions.

The phrase οὐ μᾶλλον, which 'nihilo magis' translates, may have been more popular as a sceptical formula among Pyrrhonists than among Academics.1 For apart from this passage, there are only two significant references to its use by Academics,2 compared to numerous mentions of it in Pyrrhonean texts.3 The claim of ἀπαράλλαξια, which did not entail the denial of the law of contradiction on the part of the Academics, could not have committed them to using the formula in the place of either a double affirmative ('this is both true and false') or a double negation ('this is neither true nor false'). Moreover, their general position, which repudiates even a single dogmatic statement, would not have allowed them to use it as an assertion, and they would undoubtedly have been aware that the phrase could be self-refuting.4

1For a general discussion, see Do Lacy, Οὐ μᾶλλον and the Antecedents of Ancient Scepticism, Phronesis 3 (1958), pp. 59-71.

2Numenius, fr. 27,36 (Dei Plutos); Hippolytus, Ref.i,23,3.

3E.g. D.L.IX,75-6, 81-2; Sextus P.H.I,187-191; A.M.VIII,320; IX,50; X,49; XI,147; Gellius XI,5,4. In some of the examples listed by De Lacy οὐ μᾶλλον seems to be used in a different sense (e.g. 'one man is no more a standard than another' does not illustrate the sceptic formula, whereas 'a man is no more a standard than not' would have done so; A.M.VII,320). Similarly none of the examples cited from Cicero's works as attesting the Academic use of οὐ μᾶλλον in restricted contexts is in any way relevant.

4For self-refuting arguments, see Arist.Nat.1012b 14 ff.; p.153 of this Commentary.
The claim of ἀπαραδεξία could itself be no more true than false. We can therefore take it that if the phrase was used its purport was, as for the Pyrrhonist, to convey indecision as to the actual reality behind the impression, or as to the absolute truth or falsity of the impression; it is a confession of ignorance which justifies the withholding of assent.

Lucullus, however, appears to be taking the phrase to be assertive of the possibility of contrary predication and therefore as expressing a double affirmative ('this is both true and false'), as is implied, for instance, by his argument about definition. He therefore assumes throughout his argument the truth of the general philosophical belief that things are naturally differentiated from one another, just as there is a difference between true and false, a difference which the Academic perceives and is implied in every aspect of his reasoning, but which he yet denies. With Plato and Aristotle, Lucullus appears to believe that the possibility of assigning contrary predicates to the same subject destroys the identity of things, meaningful language and, above all, knowledge. If things are no more true than false, such logical procedures as definition, division, demonstration can no longer take place. The sceptic might, of course, be only too glad of these consequences of οὐ μᾶλλον, if he wishes to undermine these logical procedures and the precise meanings attached to them by the dogmatist. Lucullus does not go deeper into the implications of οὐ μᾶλλον and does not, for instance, examine, like Aristotle, the consequences for action, for his criticisms

1 For the Pyrrhonian use of the formula, see Sextus P.H.I.14; 188-191. That the phrase expresses indecision as to the truth or falsity of an impression can be gathered from Numenius (fr.27,35-7). The passage in Hippolytus (Ref. 1.23.3) suggests a sceptical reluctance to pass judgment on the nature of physical objects (fire is no more fire than anything else) and a readiness to be content with describing the appearance only.
2 Plato Theaet.152d; Ren.523o ff.; Crat.439d-440a; Arist.Mot.1061b 34 ff.
3 See Sextus' attack on sign (P.H.II.104 ff.), proof (134 ff.), definition (205 ff.), division (213 ff.).
4 Mot.1008b 14 ff., 1065a 28 ff. Another criticism not made here is that the probable implies a commitment to the true rather than to the false and is therefore incompatible with the claim of οὐ μᾶλλον. Cf. Numenius, i.e., unless instead of the second μᾶλλον we read μόνον with Ueber. Reid's οὐ μᾶλλον τὸ ἀπίθανον τοῦ πιθανοῦ (p.245 n.24) cannot be right.
are determined by the main logical features of the Academic argument in 40-42. If οὐ μᾶλλον has these implications, this clashes with the Academic use of the logical procedures mentioned in 40-42, all of which assume perception of the true, and are acknowledged to be the right philosophical method in the search for truth. Lucullus is not prompted to question the reliability of these methods or even to ask whether they are the only possible ones. But he calls in question the consistency of the Academic in using them. What he does not consider is that, since these were the methods of their opponents, the Academics were using them in a polemical context and for an argumentative purpose. He also wrongly takes it for granted that true perception is a necessary condition without which these procedures are impossible.

Since definitions are the ultimate end of the search for knowledge and it is around them that philosophical discussions revolve, and since the other logical procedures are more or less aids to the process of definition, he devotes a whole argument to definition alone. Logically a 'definiens' is related to a fixed 'definiendum', since it is axiomatic that the definition must include the differentiating property ('proprium', ὁ ὅνον) of the thing defined. It cannot, therefore, be applied to anything other than the 'definiendum'. Lucullus accordingly faces the Academic with a dilemma: what would the answer be if he were asked whether a particular definition can apply

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1 Fin. I, 22; II, 3 ff., 30; IV, 8-10.
2 1, 32.
3 Fin. I, 4; II, 3 ff.; Orontius 116; p. 106 of this Commentary; R. E. Witt, Albinus p. 38.
4 The definition will involve division (διαίσος), i.e. the dissection of a genus into its various species ('divisio') or of a thing into its parts ('partitio'), and this will depend on perception of similarities and differences. See Top. 26 ff., where the views expressed are believed to be those of Antiochus (Witt, p. 38; Dillon, pp. 103-4). Despite this distinction between 'divisio' and 'partitio' made in the Themen, Lucullus here uses 'partitio' (43) of the definition of 'genora' (40).
5 See Top. 29; Inrt. Ornat. 41; D.L. VII, 60 (SVF II, 226); Sextus P.H. II, 209, 212.
to something other than the thing defined? If he answers that it can, he
will not be able to claim that it is a true definition. But if he says that
it cannot, he must admit that, since a "true" definition cannot be applied
to a "false" object,¹ the thing defined can be perceived. It is thus presumed
that what is defined is an individual (cf. 21), though the individual can be
defined only as a member of its species, which is defined at the same time.²
Lucullus does not of course mean that the definition cannot be transferred to
another member of the same species; only if it were to extend to a member of
a different species would it be faulty (cf. 50). But if the definition were
no more true than false, it would no more apply to the thing defined than to
anything else. Clearly not even the Academic could accept this consequence.³

The dilemma presented to the Academic offers him an absurd alternative
on the one hand, and one that would contradict his position on the other. If
the Academic turns to the second alternative and denies that his definition
can be applied to what is "false", his claim that nothing can be perceived
will be faulted, since if the definition is true it follows that the
"definiendum" is perceived. Lucullus here makes an important but incorrect
assumption, namely that a true definition necessarily elucidates the nature
of an existing thing. But to offer a definition of something is not the same
as to assert its existence.⁴ If the Academics accepted, for instance, the

¹"Falsum" = τὸ μὴ ὑπάρχον, but here may suggest more strongly the
idea of "something other than". Cf. Aristotle Met.1024b 26-8, where it
is said that definition is false if applied either to the non-existent
or to something other than the thing defined.

²Sextus A.M.XI, 8-9. Sextus goes on (10 ff.) to state the same of division.

³Although Lucullus uses this argument against the Academic definition,
it would clearly apply to any predicate in the same way. Cf. Aristotle's
argument against the followers of Protagoras, that "if the principle of
contradiction is denied, any predicate could be applied to any subject
(Met.1007b 23 ff.).

⁴Arist. Post.An.72a 20-21. The Stoic definition being formulated as a
conditional (cf. 21) did not have this implication; Long, H.Ph. p.141.
It is also debatable whether definitions can have a truth value; see
R. Robinson, Definition, p.5.
Stoic definition of the cataleptic impression, this did not commit them to sharing the Stoic belief that a cataleptic impression existed or could be 'perceived'. For the most part, the definitions posited by the Academic are argumentative and taken from his opponents themselves.

Lucullus believes the same line of attack can be employed against other aspects of the Academic argument as outlined in 40 and 41. Therefore, he again presents the opponents with a dilemma, this time reversing the order of the hypotheses. If they say that they 'clearly see through' the subjects under discussion, without being hindered by the common appearance of true and false impressions, this will amount to an admission that they can grasp them. But if they still maintain that true impressions cannot be distinguished from false, the result of their logical analysis will be worthless, for they will not be able to draw any conclusion from their premises.

No new issue is raised by this second dilemma, which recalls the argument in 28-29 and 35 as to whether the sceptic knows or perceives his own statements. Several variants of the dilemma as used against the Academics occur in Sextus, with the same basic pattern that either the sceptic is making base and unproven assertions or true and proven ones. Here Lucullus develops the same objection as before, that since the Academic refuses to regard his own statements as unambiguously true or false, he cannot correctly make use of the logical processes on which he relies to support

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1 He may intend his criticism to be applicable to the logical procedures other than definition which he has not treated individually as well as to the premises of the Academic 'proof'.


In 33 it is argued that either we have or have not a notion of truth and falsity. In general, the use of the dilemma is connected with the belief that the sceptical position is self-refuting. For the validity of the dilemma as an argument, see H.W.B. Joseph, An Introduction to Logic, p. 361.
his position. In the case of the first alternative offered, Lucullus uses 'dilucide porspicere' either in the sense of or as implying 'comprehendere', just as in 34 he had argued that 'perspicuum' implies 'perceptum'. Just as nothing can be called 'perspicuously' white if what is black could seem to be white, so the Academic cannot support a claim to see his views clearly if opposites (in this case true and false) can present a common appearance. It might be thought that Lucullus is here confusing a clear understanding of the meaning of a statement with a perception of its truth. And the discussion of 'perspicioitas' in the next section suggests that he is using 'perspicere' to mean insight into what is the case, which would be impeded if what is not the case could present the same appearance. But for an Academic who does not identify 'clear' with 'cataleptic', 'dilucide porspicere' and 'comprehendere' are not synonymous.

The premises of a proof must be perceived or they would not lead to a true conclusion. It is not, of course, true that a conclusion cannot be drawn from merely probable premises, though this would not amount to demonstrative proof in the strict sense. Lucullus prefers, however, to regard the Academic proof as a demonstrative argument that is invalidated if the premises fail to reveal the conclusion, which they cannot do if they are not themselves known to be true (Sextus I.II.143; see p. 193 above).

1 Cf. 33, 'ut enim illa oculis modo amoscentur, sic reliqua uinix, sed proprin uori, non commun uori ut falsi nota'.

2 The distinction between 'demonstrative' and 'dialectical' proof is made at the beginning of Aristotle's Topica (100a 27-30). Dialectical argument uses probable premises (τὰ ἐνδοξα), whereas demonstrative or scientific proof uses premises that are true and immediate. This is basically the same as the Stoic conception of demonstrative proof (cf. the definition of ἀναλογική in 26, p. 146 of this Commentary). Lucullus refrains from criticising the Academic proof on the score that doubtful premises render the conclusion doubtful, since that would be to accept the Academic's position that his propositions are merely probable.
The apparently strict logical form in which the argument is presented would seem to justify Lucullus in treating it in this way. He accordingly returns to the first alternative as the only acceptable one if thought is to proceed, and points out that, if a valid proof must have premises that are perceived and grasped, it would be most inconsistent to draw from premises of this nature the conclusion that nothing can be perceived. Hence, even if the argument were valid, its validity would disprove the conclusion. As Lucullus says, 'quid potest reperiri quod ipsum sibi repugnet magis?' The effectiveness of this paradox is unquestionable, and indicates the point at which the Academic may appear most vulnerable, namely the logical status of his own propositions. 2

The belief that language describes reality may have led Antiochus to the view that words are the marks ('notae') of things and that their etymological meanings can serve as guides in inquiry and logical demonstration. 3 Lucullus' criticism of his opponents' use of 'oratio' is similarly based on the view that exact or scientific language is related to things as they are, not merely as they appear to be. The implied contrast with ordinary speech and the purpose for which such language is said to be used, the revealing of the non-evident by means of immediate sense-experience, suggest that here too he is using proof or demonstration as a model (cf. 26). 5 The suggestion

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1 R.E. Witt (Albinus, p. 34) compares Clement's view (Strom. VIII, 7) with the position of Antiochus on this point.
2 The sceptic could, of course, argue that his premises merely appear (cf. Sextus A.M. VIII, 360). A more relevant criticism might have been that the conclusion of the Academic argument is no more true than false.
3 I, 32; Fin. V, 74. Cf. the Epicurean view that the primary meanings of words are important in inquiry (Bailey, Greek Atomists, pp. 240 ff., 267 ff.).
4 Cf. the contrast between ordinary language and the need for accuracy when inquiring into the nature of things in Sextus A.M. VIII, 128-129 and Fin. III, 4. The Epicureans were accused both of repudiating what was acknowledged to be the right philosophical method and of using ordinary and non-technical language (I, 5).
5 'Oratio' was used in a similar sense in 17, 'orationem nullam putabant industrios: ipsa cuidentia reperiri posse', where it is clearly a translation of λόγος. Cf. I, 32, where dialectic is defined as 'oratio ratione concluasa'. Also Sextus A.M. VIII, 77: proof (ἀπόδειξις) in speech (λόγος).
is that the Academics are misusing language by putting their proofs in logical form if they do not intend them to apply to reality. Although Lucullus is here confining his remarks to ‘oratio accurata’, the Stoic view of language in general as descriptive of reality would certainly support them. For instance, Seneca in a well-known passage (Ep. 117, 13) explains that when he sees Cato walking, what he sees is a material object; when he says ‘Cato is walking’, he is making an assertion about a material object. If the Academic maintains that, since both the impression and the statement may be false, the inference can only be to what ‘seems’, the answer might be that neither ordinary nor scientific language takes account of the difference, in the sense that what appears is equivalent to what is. It is, however, by no means certain that the Academic would subscribe to the view that ‘everything seems rather than is’ (‘qui omnia non tam esse quam uideri volunt’, 44) which is rather the language of the Pyrrhonist. Lucullus was perhaps on safer ground when he argued in 35 that a statement which is asserted is normally asserted as true, and may be taken to imply perception.

1Cf. Long, L. Ph., p. 122: ‘The essential point is that in Stoicism, as in Plato, dialectic is a science which has the real nature of things as its field of study’. Also p. 123: ‘Words, things, and the relations which hold between them—that in a nutshell is the subject of Stoic dialectic.’ In 91 Cicero argues that in formulating principles of logic, reason is laying down rules for itself and its own operations, not distinguishing ‘truth’ and ‘falseness’ as such.


3But in another sense, Lucullus would equate what appears with what is unreal (51).

4D. L. IX, 104–105. See p. 100 n. 1 above. Though Cicero recommends the use of ‘uidiur’ in 67 (‘uidcantur sane, non adefteruntur modo’) and in 105, he does so on the ground that experience justifies only statements of probability. By implication Lucullus is here attributing sense statements only to the Academic and therefore seems to be going to the opposite extreme from Stouh’s view that the Academic makes only perceptual statements.
Lucullus concludes this part of his argument by accusing his opponents of failing to see the inconsistency between their statement that there are false impressions and their claim that there is no difference between the true and the false. In Lucullus' view there cannot be false impressions unless there are true discernible impressions, whereas the Academics assert the existence of true impressions only as a necessary corollary of the existence of false ones ('quod cum volunt declarant quaedam esse vera', 44). A position which assumed that all impressions were false would generally have been regarded as self-refuting (Sextus A.M.VII, 39 ff.; E.H.1, 14; see p. 153 n. 2). It can, moreover, be argued that it is no more possible for all experience to be false or delusive than it is possible for all the coins in a country to be false (Ryle, Dilemma, p. 94 ff.). If there is to be false experience, there must be veridical experience. Lucullus claims that the Academics first seem to recognize this distinction, then contradict themselves by maintaining that there is no difference between the true and the false. 1

The Academics do not, of course, assert that there is no difference between false and true impressions. They do, however, maintain that there may be no difference of intrinsic quality, or at any rate no discernible difference. For Lucullus, it is pointless to say that there are true and false impressions unless there can be a discernible difference, for he is seeking to establish not merely that there are true impressions, but that there are true impressions which nothing false could possibly resemble. The Academics, on the other hand, in seeking to avoid this conclusion. The belief that there are true as well as false impressions is thus common to both positions but does not in itself favor one more than the other. It was, however, important for the Academic not only because his doctrine of

1Cf. the argument in 33, pp. 176-80 of this Commentary.
probability depended on this assumption but also because the only way to
fault the Stoic definition was to make the opposite claim of \( \text{ἀπαράλλοξωσία}, \)
and this could not have made sense without the assumption that there are
true as well as false impressions (Long, H.DH. p.95 n.1).

Lucullus' charge that the Academics are primarily concerned to assert
the existence of false impressions seems to be based on the consequence of
the Academic argument, by which true impressions are placed on the level of
the false in that none can be perceived. Since the Stoic too has a tendency
to class the non-cataleptic with the false, he naturally sees this as a
disregard for the essential nature of true impressions. It is never claimed,
moreover, that all false impressions are indistinguishable from true ones.
One might feel, therefore, that there was a certain bias in favour of the
false impression inherent in the refusal of the Academic to allow that any
true impression can be perceived.

The same argument is put in a slightly different form in 111,
where it is specifically attributed to Antiochus in his debate with Philo.
If the Academic allows that there are false impressions, then he must
surely notice a difference between true and false, but he inconsistently
went on to deny the difference. Antiochus seems to have realised that
attacking the Academic on the ground of his recognition that there are
false impressions rather than on that of his admission that there are
true as well as false impressions might be more effective. So Ayer
(The Problem of Knowledge, p.38), after pointing out that Ryle's argument
would not be fatal to the more moderate sceptical position that there are
both true and false experiences but that we cannot differentiate between
them with absolute certainty, notes that such a position could itself be
faced with a similar objection, for deception can only be discerned if
we can compare cases of non-deception. But, as he goes on to argue, a
recognition of false experience in no way entails that the experiences we

\[1\] This is the exact opposite to the argument of Epicurus that, if some
impressions are held to be false, one can never be sure that any are true.
Cf. 79, 101; Sextus A,vIII.64.
take to be trustworthy are indubitably true. It would similarly be possible for the Academic to argue that his recognition that there are false impressions, though it entails that there are true impressions, does not entail that we can know for certain which are false and which are true. It does not therefore entail that true impressions can be perceived, or that they are qualitatively distinguishable from false ones.

According to Cicero, Antiochus claimed that Philo found this charge of inconsistency particularly upsetting. Cicero's reply to the effect that the Academics do not deny the existence of true impressions and do in fact notice a difference between true and false, though not with the certainty required for perception, does not entirely dispose of the problem. But if this was Philo's own answer, we might conclude that Antiochus' criticism had played a decisive part in influencing Philo's new views and his modified theory of perception. The answer is not, however, relevant to Lucullus' statement of the criticism in 44, so that either Philo misunderstood both the Academic position and the import of his opponents' criticism or it was Antiochus who related the objection to Philo's new views and inferred that Philo must have found that objection most upsetting.

Clearness guarantees perception

45-46 (p.49,9 - p.50,2) sed progrediamur longius ... facere constitui.

**SUMMARY.** (45) Let us go further and impartially, but exhaustively, examine their theories. First, we maintain that what we have called 'clearness' is sufficient in itself to reveal things as they are. But in order to keep a firmer and steadier grip on what is perspicuous, there is further need of method and attentiveness, lest we be diverted by sophisms from what is clear in itself. For Epicurus, who wished to solve the problem of perceptual errors and made it the task of the wise man to separate opinion

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1 Reid's comment (p.231 n.16) that the Academic denies apparent, not essential, differences is similarly beside the point.
from the clarity of sense-perception, achieved nothing for he failed
to get rid of errors due to opinion. (46) Since two difficulties beset
what is clear and evident, we must have ready the same number of solutions.
Firstly, people do not pay sufficient attention to things that are clear
to notice the amount of light surrounding them; secondly, some people
are deceived by fallacious questionings and, unable to find a solution,
defect from the truth. We ought therefore to have ready answers, as
stated above, to safeguard clearness and to repel these sophistic attacks.
This will be my next point.

The way is now being prepared for an attack on the third proposition
in 40, which states the Academic claim of ἀκαραλλαξία. In 51 Lucullus
will appeal again to clarity as the only criterion of veridical impressions.
But first, he will set out the arguments used by the Academics in support of
their claim (47-48) and expose their fallacious nature (49-50), thus removing,
with the help of 'ars' and 'diligentia', one of the obstacles in the way of
clarity. The character of 'perapicuitas' was first introduced in 17, when
the Latin word was given, with 'evidentia', as a translation of ἐναργεία. ¹
One view there stated was that arguments should not be brought in defence of
clarity on the ground that nothing was clearer than clarity itself, and
if the Academic could not accept this, it was unlikely that he would be
persuaded by anything else (p.104 above). Another view, however, was that
if clarity was attacked, arguments might be brought to defend it, to avoid
deception ('ne qui fallorentur', end of 17). It is this second position
that is now taken by Lucullus.

The advice of Lucullus concerns first the problem of grasping what is
evident and therefore assumes that there is such a thing as clarity which
guarantees perception. In the last resort the mark of truth or clearness

¹The meaning of ἐναργεία ('evidentia', 'perapicuitas') has already been
discussed (pp.107-108 of this Commentary).
(assuming that these are more or less equivalent) \(^1\) constitutes the final bulwark against scepticism. Though we are not told precisely what clearness is or to what it applies, \(^2\) Lucullus contrives to give the impression that it is an objective and absolute quality that guarantees perception. But the attempt to make it independent of other factors cannot be said to be consistent. While the claim that clearness is sufficient in itself to reveal existing objects as they are seems to suggest that perception does not need any aid other than clearness, \(^3\) it does not tell us what contributes to bring about this clearness. On the one hand, it appears to be something 'given', to which the act of attention on the part of the mind has nothing to contribute, and which, like χαράληχτος, admits of no degrees (cf. 51). Either something is clear or it is not. Thus Lucullus assumes that self-evidence is already 'there' prior to the act of attention: "adversatur enim primum quod parum defigunt animos et intendunt in ea quae perspicua sunt ut quanta luce ea circumfusa sint possint agnosco". Here it is not a question of clarification by the act of judgement but of recognition. Yet Antiochus had argued (Sextus A.M.VII, 162) that perception is the result of the interaction between our perceptual faculties and the objects of perception, and in 51 Lucullus will deny that delusive experiences are ever clear, as though not only the absence of truth but also the abnormal state of the mind had something

\(^1\) It is never explicitly stated whether clearness is to be identified with the 'nota' or mark of truth. In 1, 41, 'uisim con omnibus adiungobat fidem sed its colum quo propriae quamquam habent declarationem carum rerum quae uidarentur', there seems to be a fusion of the characteristic mark of truth with clearness; the use of the objective bonitive with 'declaratio' shows that it is not merely a translation of ἐνδορίτα, as Reid believes (p. 193 n. 13).

\(^2\) Clearness is said to belong to impressions (e.g. 51) or to things (e.g. 10, 34). In this context it seems to apply primarily to sense-experience, but it would also have been used of propositions the truth of which is immediately evident or even of the conclusions of proof, despite the technical distinction between the immediately evident (ἀρύδηκτον) and non-evident (Ἐκήκτον).

\(^3\) Cf. Sextus A.M.VII, 364: the self-evident is what is perceived in itself and needs no other thing to establish it. Sextus disputes this (365 ff.) and argues that, since nothing in perceptible περ ην, everything is non-evident. He thereby erases the distinction between the immediately evident and the non-evident.
to do with the lack of clarity. Secondly, the search for the right perceptual conditions (as described in 19) seems to suggest the dependence of clarity on other factors. Our passage can itself be said to imply a crude association of clearness with light, and therefore a dependence on an external factor.

This dependence on other factors may have been recognised by Antiochus if (as suggested above, pp. 25 and 201) he held the view of the cataleptic impression which Sextus (A.M. VII, 253 ff.) attributes to the 'more recent' Stoics. The proviso that the cataleptic impression forces assent 'provided there is no obstacle' seems to include both objective and subjective factors (A.M. VII, 254-255; cf. 424). The only obstacle to grasp of the evident which is explicitly mentioned by Lucullus in the present passage is lack of attention on the part of the percipient. There is, however, common ground in the emphasis placed in 19 and in Sextus (A.M. VII, 250) on the need to examine the situation closely and to seek for the right conditions of perception, and particularly in the fact that any abnormality of the mental state is considered as a hindrance to perception both by Lucullus (53) and by the 'younger' Stoics (Sextus A.M. VII, 424). It should, moreover, be pointed out that the proviso about obstacles, rather than being a concession that weakens the position of the dogmatist, strengthens it by taking account, on the one hand, of the Academica's own insistence on 'concurrence' and, on the other hand, of their reliance on perceptual errors occurring in what would be generally considered to be abnormal conditions, thus safeguarding the doctrine of the cataleptic impression against the Academic argument that the false can display the same characteristics and bring about the same sort

1This is the view of Couissain (Rev. d'histoire de la philosophie 3 (1929), p. 271) and Long (I. I, p. 129). Hint (Stoic philosophy, pp. 144-145) thinks it 'unnecessary' since it is already implied in the original doctrine of the cataleptic impression.
of reaction as the true. ¹ The new proviso now makes it possible to argue not only that the false can never possess the same qualities as the true but also that any possible confusion is due to aspects of the perceptual situation other than the intrinsic nature of the impressions in question. It could, in reply, be argued that, apart from the objection that there is no such thing as an evident object that is perceptible per se (Sextus A.M. VII, 365-360), there is never an absence of obstacles to perception of what is evident (ibid., 425).²

In 34 Lucullus rejected a distinction between 'perspicuum' and 'perceptum' on the ground that if the former word were correctly applied to anything there could be no possible ground for doubting its truth. Here too clarity is defined as a character which, once it is recognised, guarantees the truth of the impression. It is therefore impossible that any false impression should be clear (51). The doctrine of the later Stoics, which allows for the possibility of a cataleptic impression not being assented to if the percipient has reason to doubt its truth, does not tell us whether or not such an impression would be regarded as 'clear'. But it would obviously be impossible for even a 'clear' impression to be assented to if a false one could exist exactly like it. It is therefore necessary for Lucullus to disprove the Academic arguments that a false impression can

¹According to P. Cousin (loc.cit.), the proviso aims at refuting the destructive aspect of the ἄριστον while preserving whatever positive element there is in it. He holds that the second criterion of Carneades (i.e. the impression that is both probable and uncontradicted) relies on the fact that the impression admits some trust, though the Academics regard all impressions as basically untrustworthy.

²Lucullus himself uses a similar argument against the probable in 59; cf. 36 and 108-9.
exactly resemble a true one. It is these arguments which Lucullus represents as traps and snares designed to distract the mind from evident truths.

Lucullus is also concerned with the problem of how to keep a firm hold on our apprehension of what is evident. But it is not clear if he means that the people who are tricked into abandoning clarity are converted to scepticism or simply give up particular positions ('deserient a veritate', 46). His defence of clarity may, however, be designed to cover both cases.

It is perhaps in opposition to the Academic claim that uncertainty is to be found in the nature of things (32) that Lucullus traces the causes of difficulty in cognition not so much to external factors as to the weakness of the percipient, to his lack of attention and his inability to resist fallacious reasoning. According to Calen, it is not always easy on the spur of the moment to distinguish between true and false, especially in the case of the 'so-called sophisms', which are false arguments specially designed with malicious intent to resemble true ones, so that the falsity is hard to detect for those who are not well-trained in argument. Although the Academics do not escape censure for their use of such 'praestigiae' (cf. 49), these are not as such seen as a direct and serious threat to

1 Similarly Aristotle (Met. 1012a 17 ff.; cf. 1009a 16 ff.) traces one of the causes for adopting theories that deny the laws of contradiction and excluded middle to inability to withstand eristic arguments. R.E. Witt (Albinus, p.39) draws attention to the view expressed by Clement, Strom. VIII, 7, that there are two main causes of scepticism, 'the fickleness of the human mind' and 'the apparent discrepancy which exists in things'. He may be reading too much into the present passage when he adds (quoting 46): 'Such is the view taken by Antiochus'.

2 de anima praest. dis. secundum 3 (SVP II, 272).
clarity. The blame must rather lie with the lack of ability or experience of the ordinary person to resist such arguments and by implication to insecure apprehensions. Similarly Chrysippus (quoted in Plutarch *Sto.Bip.* 1036D-E / *SVF* II,270) warns against too free a use of opposite arguments, so that people may not be misled into abandoning their perceptions; since they do not pay attention to the solutions, they can easily be diverted from the facts of experience by the Magarian interrogations, and by other more numerous and more forceful questionings. The reliance on 'ars' (in the sense of method\(^1\) rather than a system of knowledge) is in line with Zeno's advice that dialectic be resorted to to refute sophisms.\(^2\) The sort of safeguard dialectic offers against deception is described in Diogenes Laertius (VII, 46-48);\(^3\) it enables the wise man to distinguish between the true and the false, the plausible and the ambiguous, and without it he cannot methodically engage in any interrogatory argument. Incorrigibility applies not only to particular items of knowledge but also to the disposition to which acts of knowing conform. Since a disposition of this kind is 'immovable by argument' and is necessarily found in the wise man,\(^4\) Lucullus' professed purpose 'ut mancamus in perspicua firmius et constantius' clearly does not apply to him. Moreover, only outside the context of wisdom can there be degrees of 'firmitas' and 'constantia' (aspects of virtue that are most opposed to error, doubt and scepticism);\(^5\) so that Lucullus' advice must for this reason as well be aimed at those who are striving to be wise and not at those who have already attained wisdom. The use of 'ars' and 'diligentia' is further

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3Cf. *Pin.* III,72; *Plut.* 152-153 where it is described as 'artem omnium artium maximum'.


5Cf. *exp.* 23, 39, 53, 66 and 1,42.
justified by the highly methodical approach of the Academics themselves, which Lucretius had earlier found inconsistent with their scepticism.

In principle, no one, least of all the wise man, can be diverted from what is self-evident. This, however, sharply contrasts with the implication in Epicurus' position that error is still possible however clear impressions may be. The view that all impressions are true and that error is wholly due to judgement or opinion ('opinio', δόξα) entails that clarity is not, even for the wise man, a sufficient safeguard against deception and that he too can be 'driven off' from what is clear, a consequence which is inconceivable for Antiochus and the Stoics. Apart from the controversial rejection of the general belief that impressions are either true or false, the attribution of truth or falsity to 'opinio' may not in itself be unusual since it would have been generally accepted that judgements can be either true or false. The Epicurean caveat that one should not pass judgement on what is still awaiting confirmation or contradiction by the evidence of the senses does also seem to make the clarity of experience the ultimate criterion. And despite the recognition that there is a natural tendency of the mind to form opinions, the wise man is presumably infallible in his judgement since he can 'separate' opinion from the clarity of sense.

1Sextus A.II, VII, 210-211. See Un. 247-248, particularly Tertullien De An. 17: 'Epicuri constantius pircsa omnibus atque perpetuam defendunt veritatem, sed alia sia; non enim sensum mentiri, sed opinicnem.'

2Unless, in view of the Stoic content for opinion, one were objecting to the use of the term δόξα ('opinio') to cover either judgement or the judging faculty. The suggestion that 'opinio' is very likely to lead to 'error' also places the Epicureans in a very bad light in view of the Stoic equation of 'opinio' with 'error'.

3Plutarch, Adv. Col. 1117p (Us. 222), quotes a saying of Epicurus, that only the wise man never changes his opinions. For an example of error due to opinion, see Sextus A.II, VIII, 63 (Us. 253), where Epicurus is quoted as saying that 'those who maintain that some impressions are true and others false are misled owing to their inability to separate opinion from the clarity of the senses (οὐδὲν ἂν διαλέγοντο διὰ αὐτὸν ἄλλην ἰδέαν ἀπὸ τὴν ἀληθείαν, ἐπίσκεψιν ἢ ἐνυπηργεῖς). He also gives Orphus' belief that the Furies were solid bodies as an example of a false opinion.
But despite the Epicurean attempt to solve the problem of error, his system undermines the clearness of experience in two ways. If all impressions are true, the evidence of sense as such becomes controversial and so is opinion since it is based on sense (cf. Sextus A.M.VIII, 65). This, however, is not exactly Lucullus' point. What he seems to be objecting to is the assumption that the responsibility for deception lies with opinion and therefore with the percipient only, and not with the impression. The mind has no other faculty that can select between impressions or grasp their evidence with certainty; and if it can, despite the evidence of sense, pass a false judgement, such evidence loses its validity as a sufficient guarantee against deception. ¹ Whereas for Lucullus, an impression is either clear or not clear and clarity nor no is the ultimate objective criterion of truth, the assumptions of Epicurus rob the evidence of sense, which despite everything he wants to be the ultimate criterion, ² of its unconditional validity and leaves the responsibility for attaining truth to the essentially unverifiable judgment of the mind.

Academic argumenta in support of ἀπαγωγή

1. Divinely caused impressions

47 (p. 50, 2-15) exponam igitur ... nihil sit omnino.

Summary. I shall follow their own method of sifting out each type of argument separately. They first try to show that many non-existent things may appear real since the mind can be moved by what is not existent as by what is existent. Since you admit, they argue, that some impressions are sent by god (e.g. in dreams and through other mental agencies, for they say that the Stoics whom they are opposing accept these), how can the god render false impressions convincing and yet not be able to bring about false impressions which resemble

¹Plutarch ibi, 1121B (Us. 252); Sextus ibid.
²κάντων δὲ κρητικὸς καὶ αριστέλος ἡ ἀνάργυρα (Sextus A.M.VII, 216).
true ones very closely, or if he can do this also, why not those which are hardly distinguishable from true ones, and finally, why not those which do not differ at all from true ones?

Since the crux of the whole case for Academic scepticism lies in the claim contained in the third proposition in 40, namely that for every true impression there can be a false one exactly like it, Lucullus sets out to criticise the Academic use of various types of perceptual error to establish it. In spite of his professed intention to deal systematically with the classes of argument used by the Academics, a treatment of cases of illusion\(^1\) as well as of errors connected with rational impressions will be conspicuously absent.\(^2\) Of the cases of perceptual error he considers, only two are really important, and these are cases of delusion (48 ff.) and cases of mistaken identity (54 ff.). The present one dealing with the possibility of our mistaking divinely caused impressions for existentially true ones, is a variant of the argument from delusion, and involves use of the \textit{moritae} (cf. 49). Its only obvious relevance lies in the similarity of the reasoning to that underlying the argument about delusions proper in 48, and this will give sufficient justification to Lucullus to object in 49-50 to this general type of Academic argument. In answering this argument in 49 Lucullus repeats it in a slightly different form. A comparison of the two passages will also show that what the Academic is trying to establish is not the god's ability to bring about convincing impressions\(^3\) but that the impressions he brings about, which are false in the sense of being existentially delusive, can be indistinguishable from true ones. The

\(^1\)It is insufficient to brush aside the problem (19) on the ground that, unlike Epicurus, he admits that there are false as well as true impressions (cf. 79 ff.). It is possible that Lucullus believes that since an illusion is again a question of seeing what is not 'there', criticism of the Academic arguments about cases of delusion and mistaken identity will apply to their argument about cases of illusion as well.

\(^2\)In 49 he does however attack the \textit{moritae}, which the Academics employed to fault rational cognition (92 ff.).

\(^3\)Buckham's translation in 47 is in this respect incorrect and misleading.
progression in 49 is in five stages: (1) false but probable or convincing, (2) very close to the truth, (3) with difficulty distinguished from the truth, (4) not distinguished from the truth, and (5) no different from the truth. In 47 the fourth stage is omitted.

It was a basic contention of the Academics that existentially real and existentially delusive impressions can affect the mind in a similar manner. And the argument about the god is only one way of showing the possibility of such confusion. Whether it proves as a general principle is debatable, since delusive impressions of this kind are confined to a certain type of experience. It can also be argued, as Lucullus implies in 50, that the deity would have no motive for such deception, even if he had the power, so that the responsibility for errors lies only with the percipient. In principle, the Stoic deity cannot do wrong, and 'false' throughout the argument merely means 'existentially delusive', not that the deity is out to deceive. Similarly Plutarch (Sto.Pap. 1057A ff. / SVF III, 177) states that, according to Chrysippus, god and the sage induce false impressions in us, requiring of us not assent, but only impulse and action, but we are led through weakness to assent to such impressions. To assent here means to accept the impression as actually coming from a real physical object, so that it is only if we assent that we are deceived, and this is not part of the divine purpose. This, of course, does not mean that the impressions are not true in the

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1 Cum animi immutor mouesantur oodeu modo robus iis quaes nullae sint ut iis quae sint(47). Cf. Sextus A.N.VII, 402 (reporting Carneades) γινονται γὰρ καὶ ἂδε μὴ υπαρχόντων συντασσαί ως ἂδε υπαρχόντων. See also 40.

2 There is only one god in Stoicism but he manifests himself in a multiplicity of forms and activities under various names. Hence the Stoics also spoke of 'the gods' (e.g. II. D. II, 3).

3 Sen. En. 95, 47 (SVF II, 1117). If he communicates with us it is because of his love and providential care for men (Div. I, 62). For the Stoic belief in divination, see 107; also SVF II, 1187 ff.

4 Plutarch regards this as an inconsistency, since Chrysippus attacked the Academics for maintaining that impulse and action were possible without assent.
sense that they are actual messages from the deity. But the Stoics possibly preferred to speak of such impressions as 'persuasive' (Plutarch o.c., 105/8 / SVP III, 177), which they have to be if they are to result in action. It is also possible that the Stoics maintained that the deity would not interfere with ordinary impressions or cause the impressions he sends in sleep to be indistinguishable from existentially true ones, so that Lucullus may be including both those points in his refutation in 50 ('quis enim tibi dederit aut omnia dum posse aut ita facturum esse ei possit?'). But the Academic is not claiming that the god might interfere with ordinary impressions and it is more likely that Lucullus' reply in 50 is still concerned only with impressions sent by the god during sleep, although by implication there is a sense in which there would be some interference with ordinary impressions if the conclusion of the Academic argument were true. But in the context of the progression set out in 47 and 49 the deity has nothing to do with normal impressions and the Academic is not suggesting any Cartesian conflict between the existence of the external world and the possibility that we may be suffering from an illusion brought about by an arch-deceiver. The argument might be followed to its logical conclusion to establish the same assumption as that made by Descartes, and we are certainly reminded of that philosopher, but the concept of deception on the part of a higher power is totally foreign to Stoic philosophy and is probably irrelevant here. Secondly, the Academic

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1 N.D.III, 93.

2 Cf. Pld p. 254 n. 2, who however seems to be confusing the Academic argument with that of Descartes.

3 Examples of such deception in particular cases are, however, common in both Greek and Latin literature, e.g. the cloud resembling Hera which deceived Ixion; the false Helen (Stesichorus; Plato, Rep. 566c; Euripides' Helen); the counterfeit Aeneas which deceived Turnus (Virg. Aen. X, 536 ff.). The delusions of madness are also thought of as heaven-sent, e.g. Ajax and Heracles.

4 Plutarch, however, raises the question in his polemic (l.n.), and so does Lucullus in his reply.
is not trying in this particular argument to contend that the whole span of our perceptual experiences might be delusive.

According to Cicero, one established instance of indistinguishability would undermine the veracity of any impression (84). But as was said above, the argument about the deity, since it is confined to a particular area of experience, i.e. the inspired dream,\(^1\) does not necessarily have this effect. It can, however, be said to have force if it merely seeks to invalidate the Stoic definition of the cataleptic impression. For this purpose it is sufficient to prove that a delusive impression can exactly resemble an existentially true one, and in drawing this inference from the common belief in inspired dreams the Academic is only presenting the Stoic with the logical consequences of one of his own theological assumptions. The argument in both 47 and 49 is formulated as a series of questions, each of which moves a step nearer the desired conclusion. It can be looked at from the point of view of the god's power and secondly from the point of view of probability, and it is from the latter that it derives all its force. If the Academic were merely trying to draw on his opponent to admit the ability of the god to bring about impressions that are indistinguishable from true ones, his argument would be pointless. Nor is he trying to argue that the god would, for whatever reason, wish to exert his power to bring about such impressions. Lucullus will take the argument to have this meaning (50) since in this form it is easier to refute. But the argument is not really about the god's ability to do certain things or what motives he might have for doing them. The Academic is simply asking us to think of the divine intervention

\(^1\)It is difficult to see how the other examples of divine revelation mentioned in 47, by means of oracles, auspices and entrails, can be 'false' in the same way as dreams, or that they have any relevance to the argument. Hence they are omitted in 49, when Lucullus repeats the argument.
re one result for which the god is not responsible and no special motive need be assigned. And from the point of view of probability, the conclusion is already contained in the first admission. If an impression is existentially false and is yet convincing, or even resembles the true, there is no reason why such an impression should not be qualitatively indiscernible from an existentially true one.

2. Self-originated impressions

48 (p. 50, 16-25) dainco cum mens moucatur ... intestinum et oblatum.

Summary. Next, if the mind can be moved by itself as is proved by the things that we picture in our imagination or that sometimes appear to madmen and dreamers, it is plausible that the mind can be so moved that not only it may not differentiate true impressions from false ones, but also that there is no difference between them, just as if people were to tremble or turn white either of their own accord through some inner mental movement or through some frightening external cause without there being any discernible or actual qualitative difference between the two types of experience.

Impressions in this second class may be considered false for the same reason as impressions caused by the deity, namely that in their case too there is no external reality that corresponds to them. But there is a contrast established between the two classes in so far as in the present case the impressions are solely and purely fictions of the imagination ('cum mens moucatur ipsa per se'), whereas in the previous section the responsibility for the occurrence of the impressions does not lie solely with the mind.

The contrast between external causes of impressions and internal ones is also to be found in Sextus (A.N.VII, 241)²: an impression is either or

¹This ambiguous meaning of 'probabilia' in the first premise helps to facilitate the transition from 'convincing means' to 'indistinguishability'.

²Cf. Aristotle De Innern, 460b 20 ff.
external objects or of our own internal affections; in the latter case it is a mere 'empty attraction' to an imaginary object (cf. 245). We have, of course, to differentiate between the self-induced flight of fancy or act of pictorial imagination and the mental operations by which our stock of concepts, based ultimately on experience, is further enlarged and extended, although the present passage does not explicitly distinguish them. It was also recognised that impressions occurring either in dreams or in madness could ultimately be traced to previous sense-experiences (Sextus A.M. VIII, 57); but what is important for the Academic argument is that at the time they occur they are false in so far as the objects represented are not in fact present, or may even not exist at any time (e.g. a winged man). Any such appearance is therefore considered to be a mere semblance in the mind (φάντασμα) or an 'empty attraction' (διάχεινος ἐλκυσμὸς).

Of the four cases dealt with by Lucullus in his reply (51-54), namely imagination, dreams, intoxication and madness, intoxication is not here mentioned. Since it does not feature prominently in Cicero's statement of the Academic argument in 68-90, it is possible that, because in the case of intoxication the impressions are not truly self-originated, they did not feature largely in the Academic attempt to establish the claim of ἀπαραλλαξία. It is also not clearly stated whether the argument seeks to establish the indistinguishability of true and false impressions in normal psycho-physical states, though we are no doubt meant to accept this implication. At the beginning of the previous section we were explicitly told that minds can be deceptively moved ('inanitor movantur') by the non-existent in the same way as by real objects. Here we are told that the mind can be moved in

1 See p.164 of this Commentary.

in such a way that not only it cannot discern if the impressions are true or false, but also that there is in fact no difference between them. It is clear that the nature of the affection is not specified (i.e. whether it is 'inaniter' or not) because the argument seeks to establish that we can really be at a loss as to the truth or falsity of the impressions. We are therefore deliberately left in the dark as to the sort of psycho-physical state in which the mind may be moved 'ut non modo non internoscat uera illa uisa sint an falsa sed ut in ils nihil inter sit omnino'. For the Academic is sceptical by virtue of the fact that he thinks that the veracity of even normal experience is doubtful. This does not mean that all our experiences are necessarily delusive. Some of them may be true without our knowing it. In this respect, the Academic resembles Ayer's more moderate sceptic in that his scepticism is opposed to the type that 'is so undiscrimininating in its scope' that it exposes itself to the easy refutation that illusory

1This would in fact not often be the case, since the dreamer and the madman are virtually convinced of the truth of their impressions. On the other hand, this is the point of the argument, i.e. the delusive and the veridical can be confused with one another.

2Reid (p.235 n.12) must be mistaken in thinking that 'illa' refers to the 'uina' mentioned at the end of 47. The word need only refer back as far as 'sic etiam mentem mouert' and includes impressions occurring during both abnormal and normal states.

3As before (47), the Academic (as represented by Cicero) does not take his argument to its logical conclusion. Although the suggestion that we may be dreaming when we think we are awake had been made in earlier Greek philosophy (Plat. Theaet. 158b - c), the Academic does not conclude from the argument about delusions that our waking experiences or even that all life may be a dream; he does not also claim that there is no difference between madness and sanity. Lucullus will, however, accuse him in 54 of disregarding the distinction between sanity and insanity, and Epictetus (I,5,6) that between dreaming and being awake. According to Polybius (XII,26c 2), the Academics were so resourceful in producing plausible arguments that they wondered, among other things, whether, while discoursing in the Academy, they were not in fact dreaming.

4The Problem of Knowledge, pp.37-38.
makes sense only if contrasted with veridical. The moderation of the
Academic is also shown in the fact that, though he entertains the possibility
that there might not be any intrinsic difference between true and false, he
leaves the question an open one.

But if we apply the conclusion 'ut non modo non intornecat uera illa uita sint anne falsa sed ut in itis
nihil intersit omnio' to normal psycho-physiological states, we have to ask
ourselves, as Lucullus does in 53, whether it is a plausible inference from
the premise that the mind is capable of self-originated movement. We might
agree that in sleep or during madness or some other abnormal state a person
might mistake his false experiences for true ones (88-90). It might be
inferred from this, as Cicero does, that true and false impressions are
qualitatively and generically indistinguishable during such abnormal states,
though we cannot assert it, for it cannot be proved either that veridical
and delusive impressions are exactly alike or that they are not exactly
alike. Lucullus is therefore free to insist (52) that there is a difference
even in abnormal states though his subtle avoidance of the issue that
whatever difference there is may not be discernible will be one of the
weaknesses of his counter-argument. But the argument of the Academic does not
include a proof that in normal psycho-physiological states veridical and delusive
impressions are indistinguishable or intrinsically alike, and therefore will
always be plagued with the objection that he tries to establish his case
by appealing to what happens in abnormal states and therefore to what is
irrelevant to normal states (53).¹ We can, for example, imagine things when
in a normal state, but to confuse an imaginary object with a true one would
in itself be a sign of abnormality. The analogy with 'tremor' and 'pallor'

¹The only case cited (68) of a person in a normal state and yet believing
in the truth of a delusive experience is that of someone who even on waking
up continues to believe in the truth of what were in fact dream experiences.
But can such a person be said to be in a normal frame of mind?
as produced by the mind itself and as caused by some terrifying object is not convincing. It is of course possible that in the case of such experiences there is a qualitative similarity between the emotion caused internally and that caused externally, but it does not follow that one would be unable to verify the source of the experience. This does not mean to say that mistakes are not possible even during normal experience, but the Academic does not seek to establish his case from this angle and it is always possible to argue that all the conditions for perception have not been fulfilled if deception occurs.

The most serious difficulty underlying the Stoic perceptual theory is that we can be acquainted with reality only through impressions, and this raises the question whether a valid criterion exists whereby we can measure the efficacy of an image to make us acquainted with its source (Sextus A.M. VII, 427). A sceptic can argue that if there is a single instance of an existentially delusive impression being taken for a true one the whole of experience becomes doubtful. And it is clearly the intention of the Academic to argue thus. But what he perhaps fails to realise (and what Lucullus himself will not point out) is that, since in Stoicism there is a strict causal relation between a true impression and its source (Sextus A.M. VII, 426) and false stands for what is not 'there' or what is not the case, the Academic must, if he wishes to regard self-originated mental impressions as not only indistinguishable but perhaps no different from true ones, renounce the Stoic perceptual theory, with its dichotomy between true and false, and be prepared to allow that all experience may be false, thus casting doubt on the existence of an external world as well as our knowledge of it.

In 80-90 Cicero argues that it is irrelevant if on waking or on recovering a sound frame of mind we judge the previous experience to be false,

1 And ultimately on his own existence and that of other minds.

2 For the physical process underlying perception, see Samburuky, Physics of the Stoics, p. 22 ff. Because the Stoic theory of perception is essentially causal, it offers very little scope for scepticism.
since when they occurred the impressions were taken to be true. From this it is inferred that a false impression may be qualitatively similar to a true one. It may seem rather odd that Cicero should exclude from his consideration the reactions of people in normal states and should pretend that he is not questioning the distinction people would make between normal and abnormal experiences. A sceptic might be expected to consider it particularly relevant to his case, not that people in abnormal states should take their false experiences to be true, but that people in normal states should take what may be false to be true. But the objective of the Academic is to invalidate the Stoic criterion with its assumption that a false impression cannot be qualitatively identical to a true one. He is thus compelled to focus attention on the nature of false impressions and their possible resemblance to true ones, and not vice versa, by this very proviso in the Stoic definition. It is also perhaps easier to try to establish the possible qualitative similarity of false impressions to true ones during abnormal states than the possible similarity of true impressions to false ones during normal states. But because the Academic argument relies on the judgement of the normal person to establish that impressions occurring in abnormal states are false, and on the judgement of the person experiencing them to establish that they are indistinguishable from true, it could in reply be argued that it is impossible to compare the impressions of, for instance, a sleeping and a waking person, and that the judgement of the same subject when awake would be the only valid test of indistinguishability. There appears no way of definitely deciding this question. And if it is argued that the Stoic criterion applies to normal situations, the Academic argument neither invalidates it nor establishes the untrustworthiness of normal perceptions.\(^1\) It remains to be seen how Lucullus deals with the problem.

\(^1\) Indirectly, of course, he does question the distinction and invalidate normal experience as well (cf. 54).

\(^2\) It may be argued that the Academic argument is not even plausible ('uere simile') if applied to the 'normal' context.
Conclusions: why cannot the true and the false not differ?

48 cont. (p.50, 25-31) postrema si nulla ... distinctio apparet.

Summary. Finally, if there are no convincing impressions which are false, it is a different matter. But if there are, why not also those which are not easily distinguishable from true ones? Why not such that they do not differ at all? especially as you yourselves assert that the wise man withholds assent when in a state of madness because no difference between impressions is apparent to him.

The argument at this point does not introduce a third category of delusive impressions although 'postrema' might appear to suggest this, but is simply a concluding recapitulation, supported by a reference to the practice of the wise man. The gradation of five stages used in the sorites in 49, and of four stages in 47, has here been further shortened to three by the conspicuous omission of the second stage (why not also those which approximate as closely as possible to the truth?) as it appears in 47 and 49. The reason for the omission cannot be that this stage does not carry the implication of indistinguishability, since the last but one promise still implies the possibility of a differentiation. The final stage is, on the other hand, so devised that any suggestion of distinguishability is ruled out.

If it were the case that one never mistakos false impressions for true ones, the inevitable inference must be that true and false impressions are in all cases recognizable for what they are; the Stoic position would not have been questioned nor would there be a case for scepticism. But if one can be convinced of the truth of certain impressions though they are false, the case for indistinguishability stands. From the convincingness of some false impressions can be deduced the possibility of there being false

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1 i.e. given that the false can be 'probabilia', why cannot there be false impressions which are not easily distinguishable from true ones? Again, as in 47, Rackham's translation falsifies Lucullus' version of the Academic argument, which is not to establish the convincingness of impressions, but their indistinguishability. Besides, it does not have to be argued that impressions presenting the highest degree of indistinguishability must be convincing, if the false but minimally similar can be so.
impressions that are indistinguishable from true ones, and from this it follows that any impression taken for true may be false. The argument is again presented in such a way that the conclusion is logically contained in the first premise. As we were told previously (40), the suggestion that there is no difference ('nihil intersit') covers both the possible absence of an intrinsic difference and the inability to discern such difference. There are two points to note in the argument. While we are given the impression of an advance from a lesser degree of qualitative similarity to the highest degree of similarity, probability itself is not graded and made variable with qualitative similarity. This is because it is easier to draw the conclusion that false impressions can present the highest degree of similarity once it is granted that 'probable' coincides with the lesser. The second point is that the gradation is not from the qualitatively dissimilar to the qualitatively similar. For false (i.e. delusive) impressions to be convincing, they must in some way resemble true ones. Again the fact that 'probabilia' can also mean 'like the truth' is important to the transition from the first premise to the next one. Thus the first premise already contains to a limited extent the assumption of absence of difference reached in the final conclusion. The same is true of the intermediate statement ('cur non etiam quae non facile internoacantur?'), so that from the first step to the last, it is always a question of similarity, never of dissimilarity. The conclusion only serves to reinforce the point that no difference may be discernible and that this may imply absence of an intrinsic difference rather than failure on the part of the subject to distinguish it.

1 In seeking to argue for the possibility of there being false impressions which are indistinguishable from true ones, the Academic may appear to be trying to establish diapaulagia only in some cases. But ultimately the intention is to establish it as a universal principle.
Taken as it is, the argument looks plausible. But we are not told (perhaps intentionally) to what state of experience it applies. If, as it appears, the first premise applies to abnormal situations and yet the conclusion concerns normal experience as well, the chief weakness of the argument will be that a conclusion based on experience acknowledged to be abnormal and false is then applied to the whole range of normal experience, as if no difference between the two kinds existed. It is in fact part of the argument that no difference may be discernible. But if this is the case, we have perhaps no right to assume in the first place that abnormal experience is false. Even the alleged Stoic admission that the wise man withholds assent while in a state of 'furor' because no difference between impressions is apparent to him does not establish absence of a difference, and therefore the fallibility of the wise man, even under abnormal conditions.

If the Stoics did make the admission in the form reported, it may appear that they were playing into the hands of their opponents. But since the Academicians based their claim principally on the fact that no distinction appears to the perceiver during his abnormal state (48, 52, 88, 90), it is doubtful if the Stoics made the admission exactly in the form stated. Lucullus himself, when replying to the argument in 53, does not confirm the reason given in 48 ('quia nulla in uisa distinctione apparat'), but maintains that, just as at other times when proper perceptual conditions are lacking, the wise man, when deranged, withholds assent lest he should approve false for true ('no adprobet falsa pro vera'). If the Stoics did really make the admission as reported, it was perhaps because they accepted that under certain conditions a distinction between true and false was not easy to make rather than because they believed that no distinction was discernible at all. Alternatively, we may assume that the Stoics explained

1The admission is quoted in SVF (III, 551).
the action of the wise man in the same way as Lucullus does in 53, or merely admitted that impressions occurring during a state of madness are not cataleptic (Sextus A.M.VII, 247), but that this was interpreted by the Academics as amounting to an admission that the false can be indistinguishable from the true. The appeal to the experience of the wise man in particular was important for the Academic because it served to confirm his claim of ἄπαραλλαξιά on the evidence of the only competent judge and to undermine the supposed vantage point of the sage. If the Academic could not, in the case of the wise man, rely on the inference that assent during madness implies indistinguishability, he was still determined to find a way of supporting his case by pointing to the fact that the wise man withholds assent when in a state of frenzy. On the other hand, it is quite possible that it was the Stoics who in the first place brought forward the argument about the wise man to counteract the Academic reliance on the assent of the percipient in abnormal situations. Frenzy ('furor') was the natural choice of an abnormal state required for the argument, since, according to the Stoics, the wise man does not become intoxicated, and they could hardly have argued convincingly about his behaviour in dreams.

The Stoic claim that the wise man will withhold assent under such conditions may appear somewhat paradoxical, since wisdom and normal mental powers cannot surely be operational during an attack of madness. We must presume that it was recognised that 'furor', which here translates μελαγχολία (a physical illness which even the wise man would be liable to contract),

1Not μανία (as Reid, p. 231 n. 2, seems to think) which cannot affect the wise man (D.L.VII, 118) since it refers to a psychological disturbance due to an excess of passion or to the moral and epistemic deficiency of the fool. See Tusc. III, 11; Cicero there notes that 'furor' can also be used in the sense of a serious psychological disturbance. For the occurrence of non-cataleptic and delusive impressions during 'melancholy', see Sextus A.M.VII, 247; Actius Plac. IV, 12, 5 (SVP II, 54).

2Tusc. III, 11; cf. D.L.VII, 118, who adds that he may also suffer from delirium (νηστοτίς). Kitto, Stoic Philosophy, p. 16 ff.
could vary in intensity so that even if the illness could be responsible for the loss of virtue as Chrysippus held,\(^1\) it was generally possible for the Stoics to maintain that the wise man can, when in a state of frenzy, retain his normal mental powers to the extent that he would not assent to what is false,\(^2\) which would entail loss of his status as a wise man. Cleanthes himself had not allowed that virtue can be lost because of the firmness of the wise man's perceptions.\(^3\) If this implies, as it seems to do, that the wise man can distinguish the true and the false even during his illness, then this view would be different from the one expressed in the present passage, unless restraint from all acts of assent ('ab omni adsonsu') does not exclude the possibility of distinguishing true and false at some stages of the state of frenzy.\(^4\)

**Antiochus' reply: the Academic uses fallacious arguments**

49-50 (p. 50,32 - p. 51,29) ad has omnes visiones ... quod fieri qui potest?

**Summary.** (49) Antiochus spent a whole day arguing against those 'empty' impressions. I will, however, state only the main points. First, they must be rebuked for using a most deceitful type of questioning, which is least approved in philosophy, namely that involving small and gradual additions or subtractions, and known as the *norites* because they bring about a heap by adding one grain. A defective and deceitful type of argument: For you climb thus: 'If an impression put before the sleeper by god can be convincing, why can it not also be very much like the truth? Next, why not barely distinguishable? Then, not even distinguishable? Finally, such that there is no difference between the two?' If I admit

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\(^1\)D.L.VII,12 (SVF III,237); another cause is intoxication (cf. D.L.VII,118). For the controversy on whether virtue can be lost, see SVF III,238-9.

\(^2\)According to Sextus A.M.VII,247, people during frenzy and melancholy often do not make any affirmation about their experience or assent to them.

\(^3\) οἶδ' ἰταικοὺς καταληψείς, D.L.VII,127.

\(^4\)Cf. 52, where it is argued that people can, at the initial and final stage of madness, know that the impressions appearing to them are false. But assent in not mentioned there, nor is the argument about the wise man.
this step by step, the error is mine; if you arrive there of your own accord, it is yours. (50) For who will have conceded that the god is omnipotent, or that, if he were, he would act as you say? On what ground do you assume that if one thing is like another, they will be distinguishable only with difficulty, then that they cannot be distinguished, and finally that they are identical? If, for example, wolves are like dogs, you will finally say that they are the same. There are indeed similarities between some things which are honourable or good or artistic and their contraries; then why do we hesitate to assert that there is no difference between them? Do even incompatibles escape us? Nothing can be transferred from its class into another. If impressions of different kinds did not differ, some would be found both in their own class and in a class to which they did not belong, which is impossible.

Lucullus' reply to the Academic arguments involving existentially delusive impressions ('visiones inanes', which seems to include a playful reference to the arguments themselves) is conducted on a very carefully structured basis. Earlier we were told that 'ars' and 'diligentia' were needed to defend what is clear in itself against deceitful arguments based on faulty and contentious reasoning (45-46). It is this obstacle to clarity which Lucullus now tries to remove, as was his intention (46), by criticising the norites of the Academics (49) and their use of unjustified assumptions (50). His next move (51-54) will be to reinstate clarity as an intrinsic property of veridical impressions. We need not take Lucullus seriously when he says that Antiochus spent a whole day on this single topic (see 11-12). Cicero is evidently conscious of the disadvantages of long expositions where the dramatic setting runs the risk of disappearing completely. Lucullus' remark is therefore a mere dramatic device to stress the importance and amount of

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1So Numanius (fr.25, 34 and 41, Don Places) treats Arcesilas' arguments as illusory (σκιαγραφία, φάσματα); elsewhere (fr.27,37-38) he uses δέκαρτα of those of Carneades. Cf. N.D.III,95 where the Epicurean Velleius remarks that even dreams are not as unsubstantial as a Stoic discourse about the gods.

2According to Reid (p.236 n.4), this topic 'filled' one book or section of the original work from which Cicero is here copying. His remark that Sextus often quotes Antiochus when discussing 'this and similar subjects' is unsubstantiated.
time and effort spent by both parties on this issue and also to justify
his cursory and summary treatment of the topic.

The sorites basically concerns the problem of demarcating the limits
of quantitative and qualitative terms and the argument could take on various
forms according to the concept that was being examined.¹ Since the difficulty
it raised coincided very closely with the epistemological problem the
Academics were concerned with, they, and in particular Carneades,² had freely
used it or arguments of a similar structure to establish the close proximity
between cataleptic and non-cataleptic impressions, with the inference that
nothing can be known in the absolute sense (92 ff.; Sextus A.N. VII, 416 ff).
To the question, for instance, whether 9 is few, one might feel at a loss
or answer affirmatively but wrongly, while '8 is few' might have been a correct
answer.³ One might find the same difficulty in delimiting 'divus' from
'pauper', 'clarus' from 'obscurus', and so on (92). The sorites therefore
reveals the possibility of errors of judgment which dialectic, the art
of distinguishing the true from the false, is incapable of solving (91), and
that not only sense-impressions but also rational impressions (see p. 210 above)
may be indistinguishable. Since the original sorites seems to have been
connected with the number series, it is characteristic of this type of
argument that it moves forward in a series of gradual steps or stages,
('aliquid minutatim et gradatim additur aut demitur'), so that the term can

¹For this argument, attributed to the Megarian Eubulides (D.L.II, 108), see
Mol. p.236 n.10 and p.287 n.25; W. and H. Kneales, The Development of
Logic, p.114. In origin it seems to have been simply a logical puzzle, based on
the fact that although one grain does not make a heap, a heap is eventually
made by the addition of one grain ('uno addito e-grano', 49). What the purpose
was of this and other Megarian paradoxes, it is hard to say, but as the Kneales
(1.e.) remark, 'it is incredible that Eubulides produced them in an entirely
pointless way'. They note that arguments such as the heap or the Bald Man
'reveal the essential vagueness of some of our common expressions'. Cf. Horace
Ep. II, 45-49, with Wilkins' note ad loc.
²Les sorites de Carneade', P. Couissin, RSE, 1941, pp.43-57. For Carneades' use of this type of argument against the existence of gods, see Sextus A.N.
IX, 139 ff., 182 ff.; E.D.III, 43 ff.
³See also D.L.VII, 82.
cover the line of questioning illustrated in those sections, by which
the Academica sought to establish that delusive impressions can be
indistinguishable from true ones. There is thus a certain resemblance
to the type of chain-argument which was later given the same name ('if
A is B and B is C and C is D, then A is D', see Joseph, An Introduction
to Logic, p.354 ff.; Zeller, Stoica, Epicureana and Sceptica, p.120). 1

By attacking the use of the sorites-type argument and describing it
as faulty ('vitiosum') and most fallacious ('captiosissimo genere
interrogationis'), Lucullus appears to be voicing the general antagonism
of the contemporary philosophical schools ('quod genus minime in philosophia
probari solet'), and in particular of the Stoics who spent much time and
effort dealing with fallacies (SVP II pp.89-94) and who believed that a
good training in dialectic could help one to see through them (Sextus P.H.II,
229 ff.; D.L.VII,46-48). Although hints were previously given that the
Academic is a deceiver ('ne qui fallerentur', 17) who makes use of fallacious
arguments (45-46), it is now that the accusation is first brought into the
open. The harshness of the criticism is typical of the Stoics (Plut. Comm.
Not.1059A), but the charge of deception is also to be found elsewhere. 2

The Megarian origin of most of these fallacies or 'sophisms' is not commented
on. Despite the fact that opponents had tried to point out the influence
of that school on Academic scepticism, 3 Lucullus fails, both here and earlier
(13-15), to draw any comparison with their eristic which the Stoics believed

1Although the chain-argument, which is virtually a series of syllogisms
with the conclusions suppressed, was known to Aristotle (An.Pr.I,45a, with
Ross' note ad loc.), and further developed by the Stoics (see Zeller, l.c.),
the name 'sorites' was not regularly applied to it before the sixteenth
century (Joseph l.c.).

2Numonius, fr.27,33 and 41-47 (Deo Places). Cf. Polybius XII,26a, where
the school is said to have become notorious for its love of paradoxes.

3See the verses of Aristo and Timon about Arcesillas in Sextus P.H.I,234,
D.L.IV,33 and Numonius fr.25,15 ff. (Deo Places).
was also aimed at diverting others from their perceptions (Plutarch Sto. Rep. 1036 / SVF II,270 and 271). However, as usual, a moral note is introduced into the criticism. 'Sophisms' are by definition false arguments (Sextus P.H. II,229), and so Lucullus assumes that the purpose of the soritum and similar arguments is to divert men from the truth by deception and trickery.2

But unless a respondent is tricked into accepting a false assumption or the argument does not proceed on the basis of an agreed answer, it could be argued that there is nothing fallacious in the method of proceeding by stages (93 f.). Its purpose is not merely to trap the adversary (which Cicero admits, 94) but to put him in the same position of uncertainty as the Academic claims to do in himself.3 Lucullus is, however, not prepared to make any such distinctions and is uncompromising in discrediting the use of arguments of this nature. We may infer from this that in general the soritum was regarded as an effective weapon, but that it was also looked upon with suspicion. The same conclusion can be drawn from Chrysippus' advice that, when being questioned, the respondent should halt and withhold assent well before the critical point in the argument, in order to avoid falling into some absurdity.4 Thus Lucullus follows this advice5 and

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1 I suggested earlier (p.90 n.4) that the reason for this may have been that Arcoelias disassociated himself from the Megarians, as from the Pyrrhonists. In 75 Cicero repudiates any link between Academic scepticism and Megarian dialectic. He also notes how that school had caused trouble to the Stoics with their 'sophismata'.

2 Use of what is false, like ascept to the false, is a moral sin ('uitium'). Hence the soritum is 'vitiösum' also in a moral sense (cf. 93). The failure to detect sophisms can have moral and practical consequences (cf. Sextus P.H. II,229; D.L.VII,48).

3 The general aim of the soritum, which is admittedly to perplex and confuse the opponent, should also be clearly distinguished from its purpose in the present argument, where it is virtually the equivalent of a proof.

4 93; Sextus P.H.,II,253; A.H.,VII,416. Epictetus (II,10,18) refers to the argument as δ 'IHXWΔUV . Chrysippus was apparently so troubled by this sophism that Persius (Sat.6,79-80) humorously says: 'deponas ubi sistam: / inuentus, Chrysiippo, tui finitor aceru.'

5 Sextus (P.H.,II,247 ff.) also reports the view of the dialecticians that a 'sophism' or an argument with false premises should not be assented to.
indicates that he has not granted to the Academics each successive step after the first needed to reach the conclusion (49): 'huc si peruenoris me tibi primum quidque concedentes, meum ultimum fuorit; sin ipse tua sponte processeris, tuum'. It is, furthermore, obvious that Lucullus is not only discrediting the general nature of the Academic arguments concerning existentially delusive impressions, but is also making an indirect attack on the Academic use of the sorites to undermine dialectic and reason (91 ff.). He does not in fact make a separate case against the Academic argument on this issue, although the claim of ἀπαραλλακτικά is applicable to rational impressions as well. He does not therefore seek to understand that the problem posed by the sorites might be a valid one. No solution is thus offered,¹ and indeed Cicero states that the Stoics regarded problems of this nature as 'inexplicabilia'.²

The Academic argument is found to be faulty on two grounds; (1) the assumptions about the god are unjustified and (2) total identity cannot be inferred from similarity. It is not clear whether 'quis enim tibi dederit aut omnia deum posse aut ita facturum esse si possit?' was the answer given by the Stoics or whether it originated with Antiochus. The general Stoic position did not allow the earlier Greek dualism between the divine and some higher power, and to be in line with the Stoic belief, doubts ought not to have been raised about the omnipotence of the deity.³ But since this question was a subject of continuous controversy (Finy N.H.II,27) and may

¹According to Watson (Stoic Theory of Knowledge, p.70), the Stoic reply to the sorites would be that a statement like 'That is big' is not of the same type as 'This is hay seed'. But he offers no evidence for this.

²95; D.L.VII,82. Cf. the medieval 'insolubilia' (W. and M. Knoale op.cit. p.227).

not have been a settled one even in Stoicism, it is possible that the Stoics would not have refrained from the reply reported by Lucullus, since it is one that is suggested by the context and is so formulated as to parry the Academic move. If doubts are raised as to god's power, there is a better chance of faulting the Academic argument, whereas the chances would be halved if it were merely granted that god can do everything but would refrain from certain things. Lucullus also raises the question of the divine motive. The suggestion seems to be that if god did produce impressions that were indistinguishable from existentially true ones, it could only be (like Descartes' Demon) with intention to deceive, and it would be inconsistent with the divine nature. As we have seen (p. 244 of this Commentary), the impressions sent by the god, though convincing, are false in the sense that they do not arise from external physical objects and we are not required to assent to them. Therefore, if god were to render the impressions he sends indistinguishable from existentially true ones, they would be assented to and he would be responsible for the deceit. The question is never raised whether such impressions would be considered true (see p. 244-5 above) as Lucullus is particularly concerned to defend normal veridical experience; the peculiar nature of impressions sent by the deity and criteria by which they may be recognised are therefore wisely ignored. A discussion of this subject would have introduced unnecessary complications, for not only would Lucullus have found himself defending existentially false impressions as well, but he would also have found it impossible to make any justifiable inference from this type of experience to normal veridical

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1Seneca N.O.I, Prof. 16-17; Ep. 95, 47 (SVP II, 1117). There is one notable fragment (SVP II, 1183) according to which Chrysippus held the view that there are certain limitations to god's power as well as to his knowledge, but it has been thought to be unreliable. See M. Dragoa-Monachou, The Stoic Arguments for the Existence and Providence of the Gods, 1976, Athens, p. 32. One of the Stoics' explanations of evil as an accidental result of god's work also implies that his power is limited. Plutarch Sto.Epp. 1051B (SVP II, 1170).
experience. It seems that for the purposes of the argument all such impressions must be classed as false, and in 51 Lucullus will attack 'unreal' impressions ('inania visa') on the ground that they lack clarity. He makes it clear in that section that the impressions he has in mind are those that are imagined or occur in sleep or during intoxication or madness, or any of this nature ('eiusdem modi'). It is unlikely that he is there including the impressions sent by the deity. It is perhaps in order to avoid the issue of criteria in the case of such impressions that the argument about the deity (47) is used to criticise the fallacious nature of the Academic reasoning (49-50), while the argument from delusion proper (48) is reserved for the purpose of reinstating clarity as an intrinsic property of normal veridical impressions. In principle, Lucullus' criticism here should apply to both sections 47-48, but one gets the impression that the argument about the deity is at the centre of his reply in 49-50.

If a criticism has to be made it is that Lucullus fails to take account of the fact that the Academic is, as usual (P. Couissin, o.c. p. 57), forcing a logical conclusion out of a premise granted by the opponents themselves, and that the argument is not about a theological point. If false impressions can be convincing, why cannot there be total absence of a distinction between such impressions and true ones? The question of god's power or motive is irrelevant. He also does not point out that the 'convincingness' of the impressions sent by the deity may lie in the fact that they are correctly interpreted and not exclusively in the fact that they are mistaken for existentially true ones. In interpreting the first premise solely in this latter sense, the Academic may be distorting the Stoic point of view allegedly granted in the first premises, which need not have the same implications for ordinary experience as in the argument in 48 where 'convincing' means solely 'taken for what is existentially true'.
Substituting 'similar' for 'convinving', Lucullus next suggests that the Academic is confusing similarity with identity. In general, the argument is that things in different classes may be alike, but this does not imply there is no difference between them; if there were no difference, a thing could be both in its own class and in a class other than its own, which is impossible. Thus opposites like good and bad, honourable and dishonourable may in certain cases be alike but not identical. It follows that true and false impressions may sometimes be similar but cannot be identical so that a difference between the two is always in principle discernible. The Academic was represented in 47-48 as trying to argue that at least some of the false impressions in question might have the character indicated at each stage of the argument. But his intention being ultimately to establish that every true impression is indistinguishable from a false one, Lucullus is justified in generalizing his counter-argument. The Academic would, of course, not say that wolves and dogs are identical, though he might agree that some dogs may be difficult or impossible to distinguish from wolves. But if the true and the false were indistinguishable, there is a sense in which all objects would lose their determinate character.

Thus the counter-argument simply assumes what the Academic was used by the Academic to disprove, that the difference between classes and kinds, or even between the meanings of terms, is an absolute one. It also assumes that generic difference cannot be maintained without qualitative difference. This difference must be both intrinsic and apparent. In section 40 'nihil

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1Cf. the argument about definition in 43; also 63.

2Lucullus again makes the assumption that there is an absolute difference between what is morally right and what is morally wrong. Cf. 32; Leg.I,44-45. Also typical of the dogmatist is the view that we have the ability to perceive these distinctions and not confuse what are 'repugnante'. 22,91; 1,19; SVE II,135.

3For reference to the traditional resemblance between wolves and dogs, see Reid p.238.
Interesse' was explained for the purpose of the Academic proof as meaning either actual or discernible difference. It is therefore possible that the Academic did carry his argument in both 47 and 48 to the stage where he argued for the possibility of there being no actual difference. On the other hand, it is significant that in both 47 and 48 the conclusion that there is no difference is not preceded by the inference that the impressions in question cannot be distinguished apart as in 49 when Lucullus repeats the argument. In other words, 'nihil interesse' may be intended to have the same ambiguity as in 40, and it is Lucullus who may have got rid of the ambiguity in 49, because of which he ignores the meaning the Academic attaches to 'nihil interesse' and represents him as actually arguing for total identity. He also interprets the Academic argument as though the same two impressions assumed to be similar at the beginning are finally taken to be identical, which is clearly not the case since at each stage it is a question of a different qualitative variant of a false impression, though he cannot be said to be unjustified in doing so if, in every case, a true impression is indistinguishable from a false one.

But whether implied or openly stated, the Academic contention that the true and the false might be identical can, Lucullus believes, be met with the Stoic view that no two individuals are alike,¹ which Locke called the 'principium individuationis',² and which assumes, like Leibniz' principle of the identity of indiscernibles,³ that under examination a difference is always discernible between two particulars. Though more relevant to the argument in 54, this Stoic view also applies to the argument about classes, since it would certainly follow from it that no impression could be placed

¹54, 56, 58, 85. Long, Problems, p. 44 ff., pp. 75-76; Hicks, Stoics and Epicureans, p. 57; Viricou-Reumont, la losienne et l'énétologique des Stoïciens, p. 135.

²An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk II, ch. 27.

in more than one class. But being itself questionable (85), it does not decisively refute the Academic view that there is either no discernible or no actual difference between the true and the false. The Academic might in fact be tempted to classify the same impression twice, as both true and false, on the ground that it was uncertain to which of the two classes it belonged. Lucullus would perhaps have made a more convincing case that the Academic is confusing classes of impressions by pointing out, as he does in 53, that if a false impression is accepted as probable, it means that not all conditions for correct perception have been fulfilled, so that not only the premises but also the conclusion of the sorites argument in both 47 and 48 are inapplicable to the situation in which cataleptic impressions are possible. It may also be noted that by using the analogy with objects and proceeding from individuals to classes, Lucullus avoids the risk of begging the question by re-asserting the difference between true and false. At the same time, he is able to state the maximum confusion resulting from the Academic argument in his conviction that it implies the possibility of mistakes between objects of different classes (cf. 34).

True impressions can be and are differentiated from the false

51-53 (p.51,29 - p.53,1) omnium deinde inanium ... sustinient aut numquam.

Summary. (51) There is therefore only one way of warding off all empty impressions, whether imagined or occurring during sleep, intoxication or madness. They all lack clarity, to which we must at all costs cling. Who, on recollecting himself from a flight of fancy, does not see the difference between clear and empty impressions? Similarly with dreams. Do you think that after walking in his garden with his neighbour, Servius Calba, Ennius said, 'I seemed to myself to be walking with Calba'? But he reported a dream thus: 'The poet Horner seemed to be standing beside me'. And so did Epicharmus: 'I seemed to be dreaming that I was dead'. When we wake we disregard such impressions and do not confuse them with ordinary experience (52). But you will argue that dream experiences at the time they occur are qualitatively similar to waking ones. Firstly,
there is a difference, but let us not delay on that, for our view is that our normal sensory and mental powers are impaired during sleep. Even intoxicated persons do not act in the same positive way as the sober; they hesitate, sometimes check themselves, assent more weakly to impressions, and, having slept off the effects, realise how trifling their experiences were. Similarly, people at the initial stage of, or recovering from, madness are aware of their state and comment on the unreality of their experiences, like Alcmaeon: 'But my mind in no way agrees with what my eyes see'. (53) But the wise man, you contend, withholds assent when in a state of madness to avoid accepting false for true. So he often does when some heaviness or slowness affect his senses or when the impressions are not clear or lack of time prevents him from ascertaining the situation. This argument, however, that the wise man sometimes withholds assent works entirely against you. For if impressions did not differ, he would withhold assent always or never.

Setting out on his second criticism of the Academic argument from delusion, again with a play on 'inanium uieorum' and therefore referring to both the delusive impressions and to the Academic argument itself, Lucullus deploys all four examples of abnormal psycho-physical states in the argument on a very neat schematic basis. The cases of imaginary and dream experiences are used to illustrate the fact that people do recognise a qualitative distinction between these and ordinary experience on returning to their normal states of consciousness. The cases of intoxication and madness are, on the other hand, used for a two-fold function, namely (1) that during the abnormal state one does not have normal powers of cognition and (2) that people can even during the abnormal state notice a difference between veridical and delusive. The withholding of assent by the wise man rounds off his argument that there is a discernible difference between true and

1I interpret 'sustinet ne' as understanding 'ab omni ad sensu' (48) and 'no adprobet falsa pro veris' as final. The alternative is to take the clause as depending directly on 'sustinet ne' ('restrains himself from assenting to false as true'), as Rackham seems to do. But this perhaps falsifies the argument, since it implies that the wise man would in fact be distinguishing true and false. 'Sustinens' does not normally take 'ne' and the subjunctive to complete its meaning.
false, just as in 40 the same point had been used to complete the Academic argument. The whole passage can thus be divided into four separate statements: (i) all delusive experiences lack clarity; (ii) people in a normal state discern a qualitative and generic difference between their veridical and non-veridical experiences; (iii) when in an abnormal psycho-physical state people do not have normal sensory and mental powers but even then it is possible for them to make distinctions between the true and the false, and (iv) the Academic argument about the wise man can be reversed against themselves.

(i) All delusive impressions lack clarity (51)

After preparing the way in 45-46 for his reliance on 'perspicuitas' with the view that such clarity is in itself sufficient to reveal objects as they are, and after removing the 'obstacles' or fallacious arguments lying in the way of clarity in 49-50, Lucullus now proposes absence of such 'perspicuitas' as the only sure means of defence against delusive impressions, a view which places Antiochus beyond doubt in the ranks of those Stoic champions of clearness (Plut. Comm. Not. 1083 C). One is reminded of Descartes' view that we cannot go wrong if we assent only to what is clear and distinct, but the present view is also one that is proposed in direct opposition to the Academic contention that existentially unreal impressions are just as clear and distinct (ἐναργεία) as true ones (Sextus A.M. VII, 403).

The weakness of such a view is undoubtedly betrayed in the inability of Lucullus to say what this clearness is. If by clearness he means a character of impressions experienced in what one might take to be normal and favourable conditions, it could be argued that 'clarity is not a sufficient guarantoo that one is perceiving things as they really are'. It could be said, as the Academics did, that delusive impressions may be just as clear.

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1 R.H. Popkiss, History of Scepticism from Franmin to Descartes, pp. 101 and 194.

2 A.A. Long, Il. Ph. p. 23, criticizing the Epicurean view that all clear impressions are reliable.
as veridical ones. The thirsty man feels the same pleasure in taking a drink during a dream as during the waking state. Heracles, in his madness, kills his own children, mistaking them for his enemy's. ¹ Even if it is wrong to infer that delusive impressions may be no less striking and evident than true ones from the fact that one can observe the same reactions to them as those of people in normal situations, it seems equally wrong to deny that they are clear at all. ² The equation of 'clear' with 'existentially real' would be more convincing if all existentially real impressions were clear in the required sense, but this does not seem to be the case. Such an equation can indeed be said to be circular: an impression is clear because it has an existential referent and an impression has an existential referent because it is clear.

But Lucullus' argument cannot be rejected just for the reason that he understands clearness to be a quality that shows us things as they really are (45) and that delusive impressions cannot possess. Although he does not tell us on what precise basis recognition takes place (thus avoiding the error of an infinite regress if clearness were to be referred to some other quality which would have to be recognised first), he is not totally unjustified in holding that delusive impressions cannot have this character and is not compelled to accept the inference that because they produce the same reactions, they are just as clear as veridical ones; for there might be reasons other than

¹ Sextus A.M. VII, 403-407; Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge, p. 90: 'It is because an experience of this sort (i.e. Macbeth seeing the dagger) is like the experience of seeing a real object that hallucinations are possible.'

² In fact, it is perhaps easier to infer that the false are equally striking and evident than to argue that they are not so.

³ See the contrast between 'perspicua' and 'inaania' (51); cf. 'ludia' (52). The argument indirectly affects Epicurus' confusion of the delusive with the existentially true. The doctrine that every impression is true, including the experiences of dreamers and madmen (D.L.X, 32), would naturally commit him to the view that even delusive experiences can be just as éμαργτζς as normal ones (Sextus A.M. VIII, 63 ff.). Cf. M.D. III, 95.
clearness why such delusive impressions are accepted by people in abnormal psycho-physical states. If normal and abnormal experiences cannot be compared, so that neither the Academic claim nor that of Lucullus can be supported by incontrovertible proofs, the one claim cannot be rejected in favour of the other, for both can be said to be equally plausible. Lucullus' position would have been considerably weaker if he had conceded that clearness is a quality common to both true and false impressions, the only difference being that veridical impressions are clearer.¹ The Academic view that the false can be as clear as the true could well have influenced Antiochus to advance the exact opposite to this view and to avoid the comparison altogether by maintaining that there cannot be degrees of clearness, thus pre-empting the use of the concept to distinguish the cataleptic impression² and turning it into an absolute quality displayed solely by veridical impressions.

(ii) People differentiate their normal from their abnormal experiences (51)

'Indeed, it is a common assumption of mankind that dreams in fact bear little relation to reality' (Slote, Reason and Scoticism, p.90). Life is like a coin with two sides, normal state and abnormal state, and, as a rule, people do differentiate between them and describe them differently. The examples chosen by Lucullus to illustrate this point both contain the verb 'uideor' and are such that the content of the dream in each case is clearly

¹Yet see div. II,126 (SYP II,62): 'praenertim cum Chrysippus, Academicos refellens, permulto clariora at certiora esse dicat, quae vigilantibus uideantur, quam quae somniantibus'. If 'clariora' transalit 'εναργέστερα, Chrysippus' view that there are degrees of clearness would perhaps have contradicted the implication in the general Stoic position that there are no degrees of καταληψις (119,128; Sextus A.M.VII,422-423). Cicero does, however, attribute to Lucullus the view that delusive impressions are feebler ('imbecilliora') than true ones (88, referring to 52).

²Cf. Sandbach, Problemática pp.19 and 32. One finds the equation of what is true and knowable with what is clear (τὸ κατεκχὲτο) as early as Xenophanes (DK 34; Sextus A.M.VII,49-50). The identity is assumed by Sextus arguing against the view that the self-evident is perceived of itself (A.M.VII,365) and also when contending (368) that, to know the truth, there must be something self-evident, but that, since everything is non-evident, nothing is knowable.
at odds with reality, so that their delusive nature would easily be recognised. Since Homer was dead, Ennius, on waking up, could naturally not put his dream experience on the same level as his waking experiences. Again, since Epicharmus was still alive, his dream that he was dead could not have been taken seriously by him. A similar point is made by Aristotle (Met.1010b 2 ff.) in replying to persons who affect to doubt (among other examples) whether the truth is as it appears to be to those who are asleep or to those who are awake; no one, he says, who dreams that he is in Athens when in fact he is in Africa sets off for the Odeon. Normally people do not believe that their dream experiences are true and their waking experiences are always given priority, and this because it is axiomatic that one sees nothing or has no perception whatever in sleep (de Insomni.458b 7-8; 34 ff.), or that one has false perception in dreams or other states of the kind (Plat. Theaet.157e ff.). The same applies to those waking states in which the mind creates fictitious images, which (as was implied in 48) may closely resemble the truth or even be indistinguishable from it. On coming to himself, such a person immediately becomes aware of the difference between reality and illusion ('sentit quid intersit inter perspicua et inania', 51).

The Academic retort that what he is interested in is the fact that at the time the delusive experiences occur they may be qualitatively indistinguishable from true ones (52, 68, 90) reveals that, as far as he is concerned, this argument of Lucullus is totally irrelevant. But since Lucullus prefers to defend the truth of normal experiences before coming to the Academic retort (52), he is obviously aware that a defence of the truth of normal

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1 This view also underlies the general disapproval of the Epicurean doctrine that the experiences of dreamers and madmen are true. But it was also a common ancient belief that the true self becomes acquainted with reality during dreams (Div.1,63; Rohde, Psych., p.7), which Lucullus completely ignores here for the purpose of the argument.
experiences is not as irrelevant as Cicero would want us to believe. For although the Academic denies that he is questioning the beliefs anyone might have during the normal state concerning his abnormal experiences, his reasoning does, as we have said before, erode the distinction between normal and abnormal experiences. If it did not have this effect, he would not have claimed that nothing can be known on the ground that the true and the false are qualitatively indistinguishable. But it is not enough simply to assert that delusive and veridical impressions are not exactly alike because of our beliefs concerning them or because of the fact that we describe them differently. Our beliefs are not necessarily justified. As for the argument from language, it is true that 'uideri' was usually resorted to in Latin literature, and perhaps in everyday life, to describe dreams and visions, and that, like the English 'seem' and 'appear' or the Greek φανερωθείη, it can be used to indicate that one's experience is apparent only as opposed to true in the sense of corresponding to external reality. But distinctions in linguistic usage, while they might presuppose a basic difference between the two levels of experience on the Antiochean assumption (see p. 230 above) that language portrays reality,

1See Ayer, Foundations of Empirical Knowledge, p. 7.

2Sextus P.H. I, 20; Plut. Adv. Col., 1120D. It can also convey doubt and uncertainty (67, 105; Plut., ibid., 1121D), and perhaps Lucullus is thinking of this meaning as well. Ennius could not have said 'uidera sum mihi cum Calba ambularem' not only because he knew it was not a dream, but also because he had no doubt about it. Cf. Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge, p. 101: "It would be considered odd for me to say 'I seem to me that I now see a cigarette case' if I had in fact no doubt that I did see one". Lucullus' argument is perhaps also an indirect way of telling the Academic that his stress on the appearance would commit people to describing their normal experience as though they were dreams.

3It cannot be said that there was and is a well-developed vocabulary to describe abnormal experiences. Compare Austin, Sense and Sensibility, p. 42: 'And we might add here that descriptions of dreams, for example, can't be taken to have exactly the same form and implications as the same words would have, if used in the description of ordinary waking experiences. In fact, it is just because we all know that dreams are throughout unlike waking experiences that we can safely use ordinary expressions in the narration of them; the peculiarity of the dream context is sufficiently well-known for nobody to be misled by the fact that we speak in ordinary terms'. Again, p. 49, 'It is true, to repeat, that dreams are narrated in the same terms as waking experiences: these terms, after all, are the best terms we have; but, it would be wildly wrong to conclude from this that what is narrated in the two cases is exactly alike'.

4It is not enough simply to assert that delusive and veridical impressions are not exactly alike because of our beliefs concerning them or because of the fact that we describe them differently. Our beliefs are not necessarily justified. As for the argument from language, it is true that 'uideri' was usually resorted to in Latin literature, and perhaps in everyday life, to describe dreams and visions, and that, like the English 'seem' and 'appear' or the Greek φανερωθείη, it can be used to indicate that one's experience is apparent only as opposed to true in the sense of corresponding to external reality. But distinctions in linguistic usage, while they might presuppose a basic difference between the two levels of experience on the Antiochean assumption (see p. 230 above) that language portrays reality,
do not necessarily demarcate our waking experiences as being true from our non-waking experiences as being false.

If Lucullus is claiming more than mere belief that our experiences occurring during the abnormal state are untrue, and if he is arguing, as he appears to be, that on returning to the normal state of consciousness one 'perceives' ('sentit') the difference between the two categories of experience, then his argument evidently lies open to the objection that the truth and falsity of experiences occurring during abnormal psycho-physical states cannot be verified and therefore cannot be asserted.¹ It is, however, only reasonable to assume that veridical and delusive experiences cannot be exactly alike and that there must be a discernible difference between them. Austin, objecting to the modern 'argument from illusion', which seeks to establish the doctrine of 'sensory-data' also by way of the same argument that delusive and veridical experiences are qualitatively and generically indistinguishable, points out (Sensus and Sensibilis, p.48) that, for instance, a dream of being presented to the Pope cannot seriously be described as being qualitatively indistinguishable from actually being presented to the Pope, or that seeing stars when one is hit on the head cannot be qualitatively indistinguishable from seeing stars when one looks at the sky (p.49). But it has to be allowed that the degree of probability attached to such an assumption is considerably diminished in a representational theory of perception. Even then, it could have been argued by Lucullus that, while it cannot be proved that people are justified in taking their waking experiences to be in general veridical and their dream experiences to be always delusive, the opponents' thesis that a dream experience and a waking experience may be qualitatively alike cannot be proved either, but that comparatively his own view is more natural and more reasonable.²

¹Sextus Ev. 113; N. Malcolm, Dreaming, p.110.

²If there are true as well as false impressions, it is more reasonable to think that all experiences are not of a uniform character, and that nature has seen to it that the true and the false can be differentiated correctly. Lucullus' view is also not 'inquiry-limiting'. See ibid. (op. cit. p.65 ff.) for this concept.
It could also be argued that abnormal dream experiences, for instance, presuppose normal waking experiences, and that though the two states may overlap, and there is no absolute guarantee that one is not at the moment dreaming, the reasonableness of the belief that the two types of experiences can in general be distinguished far outweighs that attending the belief that they are such that one could not say which is false and which is true.

(iii) A difference can be noticed even during the abnormal state

The argument at this stage would, in Cicero's view, be more relevant since it seeks to controvert the Academic contention that what supports his case is the appearance of the impressions at the time they occur, i.e. during the abnormal state. In the case of dreaming, Lucullus avoids arguing on the Academic's own ground in order perhaps not to claim that the dreamer can be aware of the falsity of his experiences or even that he assents weakly to them. Therefore, after a brief denial of the Academic contention that the appearance of the dream and the waking reality can be the same, he immediately proceeds to his next point, that in sleep our powers of sensation and judgement are greatly diminished. No could not, of course, be expected to draw the inference that, even if the dreamer is unable to distinguish his dream from waking experience, this does not necessarily establish that there is no difference between them, since this would have given support to the opponents' main point that the false at least appear indistinguishable from the true.


288. See Austin, pp. 45-46.


4 *At omnium uidentur eadem est in somnis species eorum quae vigilantes uidomu*. Cf. 88 and 90.

5 It was the general view that sleep involves a slackening of activity on the part of our normal faculties. For the Stoics, see D.L.VII, 150 (SVF II, 766), Act.V, 24, 14 (SVF II, 767), Div.II, 112 (SVF I, 130); for the Epicureans, Tortuill. De An. 43 (Us. 335); cf. Aristotle, *On Sense* 434b 1 ff.
For this same reason, he merely states the opposite ('interest') to the academic claim ('nihil interest') and maintains the same ambiguity between there being an intrinsic difference and there being a discernible difference. Had he tried to argue that there is a discernible difference if only the dreamer were able to notice it, he might have found himself supporting the opponents' view.

Lucullus, therefore, very skilfully shifts attention from the appearance of the dream experience to the state of the dreamer. The case of the 'uinulenti' is used to back up his argument that our perceptual powers are impaired during the abnormal state, his point being that, if intoxication can affect our sensory and mental powers, this is surely the more so in the case of sleep. He does not forget to note the point mentioned in 51, that on returning to the normal state, people fully realize the unsubstantial nature of their former impressions. But what is important in this argument about the 'uinulenti' is that he deduces from their hesitant behaviour a kind of realization of their condition; they assent more weakly ('imbecillius') to what they see, and do not perform actions 'cadem adprobatione qua sobrii'; they can also check themselves, and here it is probably implied that assent is not always given to the false. Lucullus is also following the Academic's example of inferring the character of the experience from the actions based upon it, but coming to the opposite conclusion, namely that assent is either not exercised or it is not given in the same way to the false as to the true. In either case the aim is to meet the Academic contention that there is at least no apparent distinction and to shift the responsibility for action from the nature of the impression to the abnormality of the condition. And if it is possible for a person to be aware of the abnormality of his condition.

\(^1\)Cf. 90, where Cicero states the Academic contention that in respect of the mind's ascent there is no difference between true and false impressions ('inter uisa vera et falsa ad animi adscriptionem nihil interesse').
and of the falsity of his experiences, he will control his reactions.¹

The argument concerning madness has the same purpose, but here Lucullus takes into consideration only the beginning and end of the attack, when the subject is able to some extent to realise the delusive nature of his experience. His state at this stage thus resembles the mental condition of the intoxicated person except that (to judge from the words of Alcmaeon) the false impressions are not assented to. The possibility of conflict between 'heart' and 'eyes' shows that, even in these conditions, the difference between true and false can be discerned. It may lastly be noted that Lucullus is here replying to that part of the Academic argument that does not yet concern the wise man.²

The most striking aspect of this reply is that Lucullus is very evasive on the question of the qualitative appearance of impressions during those stages of the abnormal state when one's normal powers are totally affected. In the case of dreams, for instance, he does say that there is a difference, but we are not told if the difference is discernible or not. Similarly with intoxication and madness. Even if it is the case that at certain stages of the abnormal state one can see through the falsity of the experience, this does not really answer the Academic contention that, as far as the appearance

¹Slote (Reason and Scepticism, p.99 ff.) infers from this phenomenon what he calls the Principle of Illusion and Evidence. 'An astronomer who realises that he has been drinking heavily or has just taken an hallucinogen and in looking through his telescope seems to see a star in a place where none has previously been known to exist, will be more hesitant in thinking that he has made a discovery'. Similarly, Aristotle argues (de Inanirn. 461b 30 ff.) that if a person were aware that a finger was being pressed below his eye or that he was sleeping, any delusive appearance would not carry the same conviction as if he were unaware.

²Though the wise man will take wine, the general view was that he will not get drunk (Eur. VII, 118 / SVM III, 644). Drunkenness can induce dolium (Stob. Ecl. II 7, p.109,5 / SVM III, 643) and even bring about a loss of virtue (see p.257 above). The wise man also cannot suffer from 'insania'. See Tene. III, 11, where Cicero notes that Alcmaeon's state would be referred to as 'furor' in Latin.
of the impressions in question is concerned, there might not be any difference between false and true, even though it may controvert the conclusion that the mind assents as strongly to false impressions as to true. If the intoxicated person assents, even if weakly, could it not be because there is a certain similarity between true and delusive? Again even if (as we are told) the mind of Alcmaeon does not agree with the sight of his eyes, could it not be contended that the false vision as such has the same qualitative appearance as a true one? It would, of course, have been nonsense to argue that in such conditions one can infallibly distinguish true from false, but the mere possibility of recognising the falsity of impressions, and this only at certain stages of the abnormal state, does not really refute the Academic argument. It might perhaps have been better to admit, like Austin, that it is possible for the true and the false to be qualitatively indistinguishable, but that this does not apply to normal situations or to every possible situation. Alternatively, Lucullus could have recognised that neither he nor the Academic can support their respective claims.

Secondly, not all cases of abnormal experiences can be dealt with in the same way; what applies, for instance, to the state of intoxication will not necessarily apply to the case, say, of dreams. In this respect there is a certain fallacy in Lucullus' careful selection of examples to illustrate particular points. The experience of the dreamer would usually be considered to be totally delusive, that of the madman or intoxicated person only partially so; the impressions to which the intoxicated person gives weak assent are

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1Cf. Aristotle, de Innom, 460b 13 ff.

2Senee and Sensibilia p.52.

3Particularly if the content of impressions occurring to dreamers and madmen is generally determined by the material provided by sense experience (Sextus A.M.VIII,57), or if dreams are merely the persistence of waking experiences (de Innom,460b 1 ff.). Cf. Ren.675c: 'Is not dreaming just thin, namely to mistake resemblance for identity?'

4E.g. Creatus mistaking Electra for a fury, and Heracles having a true impression of his bow and arrows but a false impression of his children (Sextus A.M.VII,244-245 and 406).
possibly true, those to which the dreamer assents almost certainly false. In all these cases, normal critical powers may either be impaired or suspended (as in the case of day-dreaming), but again, it is by no means the case that action (if any) is always hesitant. A person who is dreaming cannot be said to be aware that his experiences are false, nor is it the case that all dreams are made light of by the dreamer on waking, as Cicero is able to argue from the example of Iliona believing that her son had really spoken to her (86).

Lucullus is no doubt right to recognise that the behaviour of a person in an abnormal state is to be accounted for not only in terms of the nature of his experience but also in terms of the abnormality of his condition. But this does not disprove the thesis of indistinguishability, although it does perhaps render it unnecessary. To understand why Lucullus does not seek support from the argument that a person in an abnormal state can distinguish the true from the false, but seems content only to maintain that it is possible for such a person to recognise the falsity of his experience, it is important to bear in mind that the Academic represented by Cicero appears intent to argue (83-90), not that our 'normal' experiences may be false, but that our false experiences are taken to be true. Perhaps it is easier to invalidate normal experience by arguing in this way. But the Academic argument itself takes account of the fact that the Stoic criterion primarily guards against a false impression being taken for a true one, and in turn influences Lucullus' reply. Lucullus may also believe, that one single example of distinguishability is sufficient for his purpose, just as Cicero maintains (84-85) that doubt is cast on the whole of experience on the basis of one single case of indistinguishability.

(iv) The argument about the wise man in reversibilo (53)

Lucullus now seems to be assuming that he has already established that the true and the false are not only intrinsically different, but also qualitatively distinguishable. He therefore feels himself to be in position to refer back to the Academic use of the Stoic admission that in a state of
madness the wise man withholds assent because no difference is apparent to
him (48). The point is particularly relevant because so far the reply of
Lucullus has concerned only ordinary people who might be considered to be
more prone to be affected by abnormal perceptual conditions, so that it is
more likely that their powers of judgement would be impaired to the extent
that they would assent to the false than that the wise man would lapse into
folly. Since the wise man would not in principle assent to what is false,
the 
Academi
us could not use their usual argument that assent to the false
during the abnormal state implies qualitative indistinguishability. So, in
the case of the wise man, the withholding of assent rather than assent assumes
relevance. Similarly, the case of the wise man, which is equally important
to Lucullus, imposes the limitation on him that he cannot labour the point
that sensory and mental powers are impaired during the abnormal state. There
is no question here of the wise man seeing through the falsity of his experience
at some stages of his illness, for this would imply that at some other stage
he does succumb to assenting to what is false. Hence the question whether
there can be a lapse into folly is understandably left out. The reasons given
for ἐποχὴ on other occasions as well leave us to suppose that Lucullus
believes that the wise man will remain more or less in control of his faculties
throughout the attack. It is impossible to say if his answer is intended to
take account of cases of extreme illness, and if so, whether he would still
argue that the wise man can exercise ἐποχὴ. He also avoids telling us
if the wise man withholds assent when dreaming. This is a problem which even
the Stoic view that the wise man does not, when sleeping, lapse into folly
would not solve.

The point that ἐποχὴ is not the prerogative of sceptics only, but
is resorted to in certain circumstances by the dogmatist, is also mentioned
by Clement of Alexandria who, like Lucullus, gives lack of clearness as one
of the causes. It is, however, not necessary to assume with R.E. Witt (Albinus, p.36) that 'the view is typically Antiochean', for it is nothing but an elaboration of the Stoic view that the wise man does not opine. What Lucullus is saying is that there is nothing unusual in the occasional exercise of ἐξωκή by the wise man and that if the wise man is not in a position to assent to his experiences in certain situations, this does not mean that he is not justified in doing so in normal conditions. After all, it is a commonly accepted assumption that conditions for perception are not always favourable, and Carneades himself had acknowledged this fact and that lack of time, for instance, might force one to be content with the lowest degree of probability. The argument that assent is withheld on other occasions also is, of course, relevant only if the Stoics refused to allow the Academic interpretation of their claim as implying that there is no qualitative difference between true and false.

In saying that, if there were no difference between true and false impressions, the wise man would withhold assent either always or never, Lucullus is again arguing on the basis of his opponents' views, as he sees them. For whereas the Stoic sage sometimes withholds assent 'no adprobat falsa pro veris', the Academic wise man is permanently in this position. On the other hand, if there were in fact no difference between impressions, there would be no reason to refuse assent to any of them. The wise man could therefore take his choice whether to regard all as false or (like the Epicurean) all as true. There would, moreover, on Lucullus' view, be no reason to regard one impression as more probable than other, so that if assent were given to be probable, again it would be a matter of all or none. As it is, however, since the (Stoic) wise man withholds assent only in certain

1Strom.VIII,5 (SVP II,121, p.37,12-14). The other reasons mentioned are mental weakness and the equipollence of arguments.


3As in the modified Academic position, whether this is attributed to Carneades or Philo.
conditions, this would imply that a difference between impressions is
discernible at other times and so tell against the Academic case.

There is little doubt that the replacement of 'quia nulla in unius
distinctio apparent' (48) with 'ne adprobet falsa pro ueris' deliberately
seeks to avoid the issue of indistinguishability in the Academic sense and
to shift the responsibility for the wise man's action to other causes. The
reason given might, of course, be interpreted as meaning that there is no
apparent distinction. But the important thing is that Lucullus does not
admit it, since it would have meant playing into the hands of his opponents.
By allowing that the wise man can, when in an abnormal state, still more or
less retain control of his faculties by the normal exercise of ἐποχή,
Lucullus may be diminishing the likelihood of there being a causal relation
between the abnormal state and assent to what is false. It would also be a
weakness in his position if he were leaving us to understand that the faculties
of the ordinary person would be more seriously impaired by illness than those
of the wise man.

The relevance and implications of the argument from delusion

53-54 (p.53,1-16) sed ex hoc genere ... non mediocris insanias,

Summary. (53) What is evident from this class of argument is the trifling
nature of the views of these people, who wish to mix up everything. We
are seeking for a criterion that is relevant to dignity, consistency,
steadfastness and wisdom and yet we have to put up with the examples of
dreamers, madmen and drunkards. Do we not see how out of place it all
is? If so, we should not be making out at one moment that there is a
difference between the impressions of those who are awake, sober and sane
and of those who are in the opposite states, and at another moment that
there is no difference. (54) Do they not even discern that they render
everything uncertain (to translate the Greek ἄνηλα),¹ which they do not
intend? For if the case were such that it made no difference whether

¹This remark did not come earlier, in 27 or 32, probably because 'incerta'
was used there in the sense of 'what is absolutely uncertain', and this is
only one of the meanings of ἄνηλα.
things appeared as they do to the mad or the sane person, who would be
certain of his own sanity? To desire to bring this about reveals more
than ordinary madness.

The Academic emerges in this argument in the worst possible light.

Claiming ironically (because there is nothing clear in what is delusive, 51)
that the only evident fact that comes out ('perspici potest') is the frivolity
('leuitas') of the Academic polemic, Lucullus again contrives to suggest that
the views of the Academic are just as delusive (cf. 'leuita', 52) as the
experience of people he quotes, and put him on the same level as the dreamer,
the inebriated and the insane. He adopts a strongly moral tone in his
criticism, contrasting the judgment that is based on dignity, consistency,
steadfastness and wisdom with that of the examples used by the Academics to
undermine the Stoic criterion. The list of the main facets of wisdom
('grauitatis', 'constantiae', 'firmitatis') which are most opposed to error
and doubt may perhaps be intended to match that of the examples of abnormal
psycho-physical states mentioned immediately afterwards, 1 and also to set
into relief the 'leuitas' and 'inconstantia' (cf. 'illud attendimus in hoo
omni genore quam inconstantior loquamur?') of the Academic. 2

According to Lucullus, the 'leuitas' of the Academic case is shown not
only by the falsity of their views, but perhaps also in the confusion of the
two categories of normality and abnormality, of wisdom and folly. By trying
to undermine perception, the Academic places the wise man on the same level
as dreamers, madmen and the inebriated 3 and fails to see that the difference
of condition is highly relevant to the problem of perception. Similarly,

1This is perhaps why the case of imagination has here been dropped. But
there is in any case no convenient single word to express the state of mind
of such persons.

2Cf. 66: 'nihil est enim ab ea cogitatione quam habemus de grauitate sapientia
errorum, leuitate, temeritate diuinitutis.' See 29 for the 'inconstantia' of
the Academic.

3Yet the main reason suggested for δξονή had been to exclude the wise man
from the class of sinners. 66 ff., 71; Sextus A. N. VII, 156-157.
the Academic argument that he does not deny that people make a clear distinction
between their normal and abnormal experiences is seen to be inconsistent with
his alleged claim that there is no difference between veridical and delusive.
It is obvious that Lucullus is going beyond what the Academic himself says,
and in trying to make explicit what he considers to be implicit in the Academic
position, he is willing to introduce a certain degree of falsification. The
Academic never says that there is no difference between, say, waking and
dreaming, and his use of the terms 'true' and 'false' depend on his recognizing
the difference. What he does say or imply is that as far as the dreamer himself
is concerned, there may be no apparent difference (80).² People often believe
in the truth of their dreams, in some cases even after waking (ibid.),
positively
Similarly, he does not assert that there is an intrinsic difference between
the impressions occurring during the abnormal state and those occurring during
the normal state. All Cicero says (80) is that he does not deny what people
believe about their abnormal experiences. Given this element of falsification
in Lucullus' account, it is not certain if the charge of 'incoherentia' here
is entirely justified.³ A more appropriate accusation would have been that
the Academic avoids openly and explicitly drawing some of the conclusions
which are implied in his position.

This entire argument is extremely important because it shows that the
Academic appeal to abnormal perceptual experiences was considered by their
opponents to be totally irrelevant. The question is, did these opponents

¹See 80. Rado (p. 241 n. 23) takes the reference to be the Academic appeal to
the ἐξομή of the wise man, which he thinks is being interpreted by Lucullus
as an admission that there is a real difference between the experiences of
the sane and those of the mad. This is, I believe, a mistake.

²In 88 Cicero recognizes the possibility that Ennius did not in fact dream
the lines exactly as he wrote them, but maintains that, if he did, he heard
them in the same way as if he was awake.

³This is not to say that there might not be an inconsistency. But it is
implied rather than openly stated. It could, for instance, be argued (44) that
it is wrong for the Academic to assume first that certain types of experience
are false (thereby maintaining a difference between delusive and veridical)
and then to use this assumption to prove that there is no discernible difference
between false and veridical.
really mistake 'the force of the Skeptic argument' (Stough, p. 46) or 'miss the point of the Academic criticism' (p. 47)? Stough, arguing like Carradade in Sextus (A.M. VII, 402 ff.), contends that, since it was the cataleptic impression that was at issue and not sense-perception in general, any false impression might display the same properties if the only guarantee that an impression is cataleptic is 'sufficient force and clarity to compel assent' (p. 48). What is relevant in her opinion is not the psycho-physical condition of the percipient, but 'that the experience be forceful enough to compel assent, and to this end any case of genuine error is sufficient'. If delusive impressions do generate such a reaction, 'the Skeptic has made his point, namely, that they are not intrinsically distinguishable from true impressions'.

But it is wrong to see the general Stoic position, and certainly that of Antiochus, as one that explains the cataleptic impression merely in terms of its capacity to compel assent. Lucullus does not, moreover, have to accept that false impressions are as clear as those that are veridical. The psycho-physical condition of a percipient is surely relevant in so far as his accepting his experiences as true or assenting to them might be due to the very fact that he is in an abnormal state and not to the qualitative appearance of impressions. Sextus (A.M. VII, 424 / SVF II, 68) reports the Stoic view (which would be that of Antiochus as well), that, for perception to take place, it is necessary that five things should concur: the organ of sense, the object of sense, the place, the manner and the intellect. If only one factor is absent (e.g. if the intellect is in an abnormal condition), perception will be impossible. Although it cannot be positively asserted that the experience of a person in an abnormal state is not qualitatively similar to that of a person in a normal state (and Lucullus perhaps rightly avoids raising the issue), the Academic fails to take account of the important requirement for perception, that the percipient be in a normal and healthy state and that the context in which the definition of the cataleptic impression is applicable is that of normal and not of abnormal experience. Moreover, it is the wise man
who is infallible and the Academic has not shown that the wise man, even if mad, would confuse delusive impressions with true ones to the extent of regarding them as cataleptic. Stough recognizes that the Academic argument does not render all experience doubtful. Yet she believes that the Academic criticism does undermine the Stoic criterion. This is quite debatable.

It may be argued that it is a weakness in the Stoic position that the 'abnormality' of any condition is hard to establish without reference to the impressions experienced. If the impressions are qualitatively indistinguishable from others judged to be 'normal', there would be, at the time of occurrence, no way of distinguishing the mental state of the perceiver. If the cataleptic impression is to provide an absolute guarantee of truth, it must stand or fall on its own merits and not by limiting the conditions in which it is supposed to occur. But, on the other hand, Lucullus does not have to accept that the distinction between 'normality' and 'abnormality' breaks down at the time the delusive impressions occur, just as he does not accept that such impressions are qualitatively similar to veridical ones. It is also natural to assume that certain conditions must be satisfied if perception is to take place.

Although Lucullus has already implied his dissatisfaction with the Academic distinction between 'incertum' and 'id quod percipii non posse' (32 ff.), it is only now that he clearly indicates his complete repudiation of it. Having argued earlier that the doctrine of probability, on which the distinction rests, cannot survive the failure to differentiate between true and false impressions (33-36), he now renews the charge that the Academic

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1 For the indistinguishability of 'normal' and 'abnormal' sense-data, see H. H. Price, Perception, p. 31. It was generally assumed that perceptions differed according to the state of mind of the perceiver (e.g. Sextus P.H. I, 101; II, 54), but not that only 'normal' perceptions were true (cf. Aristotle, Met. 1011a 3 ff.). The issue of normality is also raised in the context of the argument from illusion (79-82; Sextus A.H. VII, 412-414); cf. Price, p. 209 ff.

2 Hence the view that this 'proviso' weakens the Stoic position. See p. 237 above.
'make everything uncertain', after considering part of the Academic argument for ἀναρραϊκα and in the light of the erosion of the distinction between veridical and delusive experience, normal and abnormal states of mind. The charge that the Academics desire to bring about a general confusion also makes sense in relation to their failure to make these distinctions. The uncertainty resulting from such a confusion would be absolute, in that not only would there no longer be objects of immediate perception, but even inference would become impossible. Lucullus now also spells out the conclusion implied in the Academic position, that if what appears to the mad and the sane person can be qualitatively alike, no one can be sure that he is sane and not mad (adding by way of a joke that the wish to produce such a state of affairs would indeed be a sign of madness). By the same argument, we cannot know that we are now awake and not dreaming. The answer of the Academic would probably

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1 Nic Conche (Pyrrhon ou l'Apparence, p.64) thinks that the accusation is aimed at Philo in particular, on the ground that 'quod nolunt' is reminiscent of 'so quo minimus uult' in 16. But the reference is solely to 32 here.

2 Cf. 58 ('no confundam omnia'); Numenius fr.25,66 ff., fr.27,56 ff. (Dos Places). We are reminded of the warning of Epicurus (Fr.954,52) that acceptance of the criteria provided by sense is necessary if we are not to confuse everything by maintaining the erroneous. It is unlikely that the last clause is specially directed at sceptics. Lucretius, however, does speak of the sceptic as a person who stands on his head instead of his feet (IV,472). A variant of the charge is that the sceptic confounds or destroys life (31).

3 Cf. 110: 'in qua non metuit no confundere omnia uideatur et incerta reddere'.

4 See pp.169-170 of this Commentary.

5 'Si enim rea ne ita habeat ut nihil interieat utrum cui uideatur ut insano an sane, cui possit exploratur eane de sua sanitate?' Reid retains the MSS reading 'habeat' and takes 'rea' (plural) to refer to external objects (p.242 n.1). It might, however, be difficult to explain what is meant by 'objects being such that it makes no difference whether it appears ('they appear', Rackham, reading 'uideatur') to anyone in the same way as to the mad or to the sane'. It is preferable, therefore, to accept Goeren's correction 'habeat' and to translate: 'if the rea were such that it made no difference whether anyone had impressions resembling those of the mad or of the sane person' (i.e. if there were no way of distinguishing the impressions of the mad and sane person) 'no one could be sure of his own sanity'. The argument here is reminiscent of Aristotle's view (Int.1C07b 19 ff.) that if contrary predication were possible, the nature of things would be indeterminate; cf. Pyrrho's view that things in themselves are indeterminate in the sense that our judgements about them can be neither true nor false (Stouch, p.16 ff.).

6 Plutarch uses a similar argument when attacking Epicurus' confusion of normal and abnormal experience (Adv. Col.1123C ff.).
be that, although we cannot be entirely certain, there is a high degree of probability that we are awake, and that the general belief that there is a difference between dreaming and being awake justifies us in maintaining the distinction.

Cases of mistaken identity do not support *αναλλαγή.*

54-58 (p.53,16 - p.55,20) similitudines uero ... sublata uerit et falsi nota.

**Summary.** But they childishly chase after likenesses between twins or seals impressed by signet-rings. Who would deny that there are similarities, since they appear in so many things? If this abolishes knowledge, why not be satisfied with it, particularly as we grant it, and why rather contend what nature does not allow, that each thing in its own class is not such as it is, and that two or more objects can share a common character with no difference at all? We grant that eggs, bees or twins resemble one another, but you want them to be not alike, but the same, which is impossible. (55) Then you take refuge with the physicists whom the Academy despises, and cite Democritus' claim that there are innumerable worlds, some of which are not only alike but totally identical, and similarly with human beings. In view of this, why, you argue, should not two things in our world be qualitatively alike? Why, if innumerable replicas of Q. Lutatius Catulus not only can but do exist, formed out of the atoms from which Democritus derives everything, may not another Catulus be formed in this world of ours? (56) But more refined philosophers have clearly shown that each individual thing has a particular quality of its own. The famous twin Servilii of old, though alike, were not identical and could certainly be distinguished apart at home and by people close to them. Have we not come through familiarity to distinguish persons, whom we would have thought indistinguishable, so easily that they did not even appear in the least alike? (57) On this point you may show flight, but I will not resist you. Indeed, I will even grant you that the wise man himself, whom this whole discussion is about, will withhold his assent if he is faced with similar things which he cannot distinguish apart, nor will he assent to an impression unless it is such that a false one
could not be like it. But just as in other matters he has a certain
method to distinguish true from false, so to those cases of similarity
he must apply practice, and with practice you, no less than their
mother, can learn to distinguish twins. In spite of the proverbial
similarity between eggs, we hear that poultry-keepers at Delos during
its prosperous days were able to tell which hen had laid a particular
egg simply by looking at it. (50) And this is not detrimental to our
case, since, even if we cannot tell those eggs apart, it is none the
more right to accept that this one is that one, as though there were no
difference between them. For I have a rule to judge as true only such
impressions as could not be false. From this I am not allowed to
diverge a finger's breadth for fear of confusing everything. A lack of
difference between them will abolish not only the knowledge but also
the nature of the true and the false, so that it is absurd to say, as
you sometimes do, that you deny a difference not between the impressions
themselves as they are imprinted on the mind, but between their
appearances or, as it were, their forms. But impressions are necessarily
judged by their appearance, and will have no credibility if the mark
of true and false is abolished.

Lucullus here makes an abrupt transition from the Academic arguments
based on delusive experience to those based on cases of similarity between
existing objects. He does not (as he had professed he would do in 47 and
has up to now been doing) first outline the arguments and then answer them,
but embarks immediately on his criticisms. This is no doubt because he is
continuing the line of abusive attack begun in the previous section, but the
result is that the purpose and relevance of the Academic argument are not
immediately apparent. He begins with a scornful reference to his opponent's
childish interest in cases of resemblance, but the reason for this interest
is not explained, even in 55 which is entirely devoted to a statement of
the Academic argument for the existence of 'doubles'. It is only in 57,
where we are told that the wise man will refuse assent as long as he is
not sure that he can discern the difference between the true and the false,
that the point of the argument begins to emerge, and with it the point of
the Academic distinction between actual and apparent difference, which
Lucullus here refuses to recognise (58).

The Academic appears to believe that the mere possibility of objects
being identical would go a long way to support his claim of ἀπαράλλαξις.
If there could be two objects exactly similar in all respects, there would
obviously be two exactly matching impressions, one of which is 'false' only
because it is incorrectly taken to come from the other object. There could
also be no cataleptic impression of either, not only because the one might
always be mistaken for the other, but also because it is part of the
definition of the cataleptic impression that it reveals the object in such a
way that it could not have come from what is not that object. Apart from
the argument about identical worlds, it is obvious that there is sufficient
similarity between some individuals in the same class to make it doubtful
whether a cataleptic impression can be distinguished by its intrinsic
quality, and there is a fortiori no other way of distinguishing them. It
therefore becomes important for the Academic to show that there are existing
objects which so closely resemble one another that impressions from them
are indistinguishable, and equally important for his opponent to deny that
this is the case. Unlike the case of delusive experience, the case of
mistaken identity offers the Academic the advantage of two impressions that
can be directly compared and may be found to match one another in all
respects. This does not, of course, automatically explain how ἀπαράλλαξις
is supported as a general principle. Because two objects can be mistaken
for one another, it does not necessarily mean that our senses are deceiving
us, or that they may deceive us in all cases and render knowledge impossible.
On this point, Lucullus leaves us much in the dark.

His answer may appear to be unnecessarily lengthy, though it is
carefully organised in that each point follows naturally from the previous
one. Having argued for a difference between similarity and identity (54)
and mentioned the Academic argument in favour of the possibility of identity (55), Lucullus next attempts to undermine the Academic reliance on apparent indistinguishability (56). Most important of all, the wise man is not even deceived by a single case of similarity (57). The last section (58) outlines the consequences of the Academic argument. Since these sections deal continuously with a single issue, I have found it convenient to treat them together, taking first the Academic argument from cases of mistaken identity and then Lucullus' answer.

(1) The Academic argument

To understand the Academic argument we have to refer to Cicero's answer in 84-86 and to Sextus, A.M.VII,408-411. Lucullus' complaint 'similitudinos... geminorum ... pueriliter consectantur' and later question 'quid tibi uis in geminis?' make sense when we realise that in both passages the case of resemblance between twins is a prominent example (the more so in Cicero's reply) used to illustrate the Academic argument. Cicero sets out to prove the validity of the third proposition in section 40 (fourth in 83), namely that 'nullus esse uisum uerum a sensu projectum cui non adposuitum sit uisus aliud quod ab eo nihil intersit quodque percipi non possit'. It is possible, argues Cicero, for someone to be in the presence of one of two twins, say, P. Seruilius Geminus, and yet think that he is seeing his brother Quintus.

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1 The stages in this counter-argument thus follow the same pattern as in the previous one against the Academic argument from delusion (51-54).

2 The example of eggs also features in Sextus (1.c.). Humonius (fr.27,30-40, Des Places) adds the wax egg as opposed to the real egg. Reid(p.245 n.2) draws attention to a work on ψευδονύμια by a Stoic philosopher Hermagoras which is mentioned in the Suda (SYT I,462), but this may have been about divination by eggs and not, as Reid interprets it, a polemic against the Academic argument about mistaken identity. Other examples used by Cicero are seal-impressions (54 and 64), bees (54), hairs, grains of corn, duplicate statues (64). Sextus (1.c.) adds snakes poking their heads out of a hole. Plutarch Comm.Lot.1077C/SYT II,112 has doves, bees, grains of wheat, figs.

3 There is a curious mistake in Hackham's translation at the beginning of 65, which should read: 'Seeing that it is possible for Publius Geminus to appear to you as Quintus'. 
Similarly, the wise man, according to Sextus (A.M.VII,410), may have an experience of Castor and yet think he is seeing Polydeuces. This shows that a false impression (Polydeuces being not present, the impression that is actually seen is considered to be false and non-cataleptic) may be mistaken for a true and cataleptic one.\footnote{Alternatively, it could be said that a true impression (that of Castor) is being taken for a false one, but Sextus does not say so.} The true and the false must therefore be qualitatively indistinguishable as there is no δίωμα (A.M.VII,411) or 'nota' (84) to distinguish them apart. We must now ask how this particular type of perceptual error helps to establish ἀπαραλλαξία as a universal principle. If I confuse two similar, or even identical objects, it does not follow that I can confuse two dissimilar objects. But in opposition to the Stoic definition of the cataleptic impression which stipulates that it cannot come ἐκὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος, it is the general Academic view that it is always possible that something not present should be taken as present (e.g. that an illusion or delusion should be taken as veridical), and this is also the point which this particular Academic argument aims at establishing. Hence although this particular type of error would first and foremost be explained as a case of confusing two existing objects or even of taking what is other than the case to be the case, the argument is conducted on the assumption that one of the two objects is absent, and as though the deception lies in taking what is not 'there'\footnote{On a representational theory of perception, this is the most important mode of falsity. Cf. p.111 above, where Hilt's view of ἐκὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος is also discussed.} to be 'there' as in the previous argument from delusion. This is because the possibility of confusing two exactly similar objects which are both present would not carry the same implication since it would be immediately recognised that such impressions could not be cataleptic. It would also have been argued that the possibility of perceptual error is extremely unlikely in such a case, and that a guarantee against our confusing objects present is provided by the Stoic view that each object is
unique, while the definition of the cataleptic impression only secondarily guards against such a type of deception. Hence, to invalidate the Stoic criterion and to support his claim of ἀξαραλλάξια as a universal principle, it was important for the Academic to conduct his argument on the assumption that one of the two objects is absent. Cicero therefore argues (84) that if there has ever been one such case of fallacious resemblance (i.e. of indistinguishability), doubt has been cast on the validity of the criterion by which an impression is judged to be true in such a way that it could not possibly be false. No impression could thus carry a guarantee that the person you saw was the person you took him to be.

It is obvious that there was a close connection between the Stoic definition of the cataleptic impression and the doctrine that no two individuals are exactly alike, so that by questioning the one, doubt could be cast upon the other. By asserting the unique character of each particular thing, the doctrine ensures that the objects of perception cannot in principle be confused with one another. It thus assumed considerable importance in the face of Academic arguments, particularly that about mistaken identity, to establish that the true and the false are indistinguishable. To establish his case by way of the resemblance between objects, it was sufficient for the Academics to argue that two objects could appear indistinguishable. To deny or assert the Stoic principle of individuation was therefore irrelevant (84). But if their opponents raised the matter, it was necessary for the Academics to question it, particularly if, as Cicero maintains, they believed

1Cf. 85: 'quando igitur potest tibi P. Cencius quintus uideri, quid habes explorati cur non possit tibi Cotta uideri qui non sit, quoniam aliquid uidetur esse quod non est?'

2See p.266 of this Commentary. Also Seneca Ep.113,15-16. The doctrine states that every particular thing is a qualitative individuation of matter (STF 1,378 and 395). Iong, H.Th. p.161.
that the principle is not a convincing one. There is further evidence in
Plutarch of their dispute with the Stoics on this issue. 1 But there is
no reason to think that they questioned it in a context other than the
epistemological one, or that their interest extended to the metaphysical
implications of asserting or denying it. We may suppose that, just as the
Stoics sought to make the Academic case for ἧπαραλαξία less plausible by
asserting the truth of their own principle, so the Academics aimed to support
their case by attacking it.

Being consistent sceptics, however, the Academics must surely have
acknowledged that any assertion of identity applicable to external objects
would be purely conjectural. They cannot have asserted that objects which
appear to be indistinguishable are qualitatively identical in actual fact,
the only difference being purely numerical. 2 Since Academic scepticism
lacked a metaphysical theory of its own from which could be plausibly
inferred the opposite of the Stoic principle, they seem to have tried, quite
naturally, to rest their claim on the assertion of others. The atomic theory
of Democritus and his doctrine of innumerable 3 and possibly identical worlds 4

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1Comm. Not. 1077C (SVF II, 112) where the Stoics are mentioned as quarrelling with
the Academics, both orally and in writing, and crying out that the latter
confuse all things with their 'indistinguishable likenesses' (ὡς ἀντικάθιστα
συνέχειαν ταῖς ἀπαραλαξίαις) by forcing a single qualification on two substances.
Plutarch goes on to criticise the Stoic theory of mixture (1077E ff.). De Lacy
('106 μύλλον and the Antecedents of Ancient Scepticism', Phrenesia 3, 1958, p. 66)
suggests that the Academics may have attacked the Stoics on the score of incon-
istency between their theory of mixture and their principle of individuation.

2Plutarch (Comm. Not. 1077C / SVF II, 112), defending the Academics, suggests a
more possibility: 'there is no one who does not suppose and think that on the
contrary it would be surprising if in the whole of time there have not been
two doves or two bees or two grains of wheat or the proverbial two figs
indistinguishable from one another'. Cf. 55. Rist (Problems p. 47) wrongly
supposes that the Academics did hold the view that two objects can be identical
other than numerically, and regards the Academic position as weak.

3Hippolyt. Ref. 1, 13, 2, (IX 60A 40). According to this passage, Leucippus
too held the same view. See also D.L. IX, 31 (IX 67A 1). Cf. the view of Agatodorus
of Chios (Ref. I, 5, 4/IX 70A 6): 'it is absurd that there should be one single
ear of corn on a large plain or that there should be only one world in the
infinite'. The attribution of the same doctrine to other Pre-Socratics is
without foundation. See Kirk and Raven, The Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 412.

4Cf. 125 'alios dissimiles, alios alius modi mundos esse'. Guthrie, History
would have provided a good basis for the Academic argument. Compared to Epicurus, who too had held a doctrine of innumerable worlds some of which are like our world,¹ but who had also been hostile to the sceptical Academy, Democritus was a more respectable philosopher whose views could, despite Lucullus' suggestion that the Academics were taking shelter with philosophers whom they despised,² reasonably be quoted in support of Academic scepticism.³

The apparent lack of differentiation between twins and some members of the same species could thus be carried a step further by postulating the existence, both in other worlds and in our own, of persons and objects, not merely similar but in all respects identical to those we encounter in daily experience. It is doubtful, however, whether atomism would really justify such an inference. Lucretius (II,347 ff.), while holding that atoms might be identical in shape and size, strongly asserts the opposite principle as operative in the world of nature: 'quorum unus quiduis generatim numero perge, / inuenies tamen inter se differre figuris. / nec ratione alia proles cognoscere matrem / nec mater posset prolem'. The existence of

¹E-M-2dj t. 45.
²Cf. Lucullus' attack on the precedent argument in 13 ff. Reid (p.243 n.15) suggests that the 'physici' were mocked for their dogmatism, but the treatment of the Epicureans in the Lucullus (13 ff., 72 ff.) does not bear this out. The reference could perhaps be to slighting remarks about earlier philosophers in Plato, e.g. Soph. 242c 8 ff., and the 'battle of the gods and the giants' in 246b 4.
³As in 14, 32, 73; 1,44.
doubles' would be purely a matter of chance, and it seems hard to base any cogent argument upon it.

(ii) Lucullus' counter-argument

Although, as we have seen, the question of actual identity between objects or impressions was considered more or less irrelevant to \( \text{ἀξιωματικά} \) (40, 85), the Academics did nevertheless attack the Stoic principle that no two objects are identical. Lucullus' answer, therefore, is for the most part a defence of that doctrine, which he believes holds good even if many similarities exist between existing things. The Academic argument is taken as a statement of fact, not merely of possibility, and one which in confusing similarity with identity propounds a view that goes against nature. Nature, it is argued, will not allow that, within its class, a thing should not be itself or that there should be any common character without individual difference. The sharing of characteristics is, to be sure, a feature of nature so that two or more objects can present close similarities. But this does not mean that they do not also differ in virtue of the unique individuating property of each. Lucullus, however, does not elaborate on the precise nature of these similarities nor does he tell us what it is that individuates an object. According to the Stoics, existing things are differentiated by their 'individual quality' (\( \text{ἰδιωτική ποιότητα} \)), i.e. that particular blend of qualities and the combination of its various parts that gives an object a

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1 The negatives in this sentence ('cur id potius contenditum ... nulla re differens communiter') are hard to disentangle. Packham's note and translation show that he has himself fallen into the trap against which he warns others. See also Reid's note, p.242 n.8. 'Communitas' does not translate \( \text{ἀκαταλλαξία} \) (Reid, Packham), but \( \text{χοινώτης} \) (cf. Plato Theaet. 200d 6-9).

2 No may have in mind common qualities. Or the difficulty of understanding what the 'common quality' is in Stoicism, see Rist in Problems, p.45 ff.
peculiarity of its own. In arguing that two objects cannot be substituted one for the other ('hoc illud esse', 58), Lucullus seems to be assuming that mere numerical difference or purely positional properties are not enough to individuate an object. In making a full statement about a certain object one would have to state its spatio-temporal disposition as well as its relations with other individual objects. But the real individuating property lies in the intrinsic and overall qualitative make-up of an object. Hence, of the four Stoic categories, a statement of the second (\(\pi\alpha\iota\sigma\omicron\nu\)) would already individuate it, because it would necessarily include a reference to the individuating quality (\(\delta\iota\omega\zeta \ \pi\alpha\iota\sigma\omicron\nu\)) of that object.

It is thus easy to understand why the Academic arguments pose a threat to the Stoic principle and that absolute qualitative indistinguishability would mean that two objects could possess the same individuating property, which according to the Stoics would be a contradiction. But if the Academic argument is held to make perception impossible on the ground that the true cannot be distinguished from the false, a similar objection can be raised against the Stoic principle. For by making it necessary that an object and consequently its impression should present its own discernible uniqueness in order to be knowable, the Stoics make accurate perception more difficult and perhaps impossible.

The criticism could also be raised against them that they arbitrarily assimilate the uniqueness of the object with that of its impression, and that on their own principle the impression and the object ought to be treated as two individual things. It is insufficient that the

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2. i.e. it would be equivalent to saying 'hoc illud esse' (58). In objecting to this, Lucullus may also be pointing out that a statement of identity between two different objects would contradict the logical principle that individual substance is not a predicable.


Stoic view should be dogmatically supported because the Stoics are more refined philosophers than the atomists.\(^1\) If Lucullus, on the other hand, believes that the validity of their principle is either self-evident or has been clearly demonstrated ('dilucide docetur', 56), he would be claiming more than is allowed by his case, for whatever the Stoics may have claimed, their view, like that of their opponents, can only remain an unverifiable hypothesis. The inference from the Democritean doctrine could be said to be supported not only by that doctrine but also by the Stoic belief in an endless cycle of destruction and rebirth and its corollary that every new world is identical (ἀπαράλλακτος), to the last detail, with the previous one.\(^2\) It is explicitly stated that this would apply to individuating properties, though there might be some slight variation in non-essential 'accidents' (SVP II, 624). Since these worlds cannot, however, co-exist, and therefore cannot lead to error in this world, it was perhaps easier for the Academics to base their argument on a doctrine of simultaneous immemorable worlds.

Lucullus' second weapon of attack is relatively more to the point. This is his contention that although resonableness exist, and two objects can appear indistinguishable, they can be known apart, in principle if not always in practice since they are not the same. However alike, for instance, two twins may appear to be, experience shows that what is indistinguishable at first become distinguishable with familiarity and habit ('consuetudo'). This might appear to be an admission that strengthens rather than weakens the Academic case, as Lucullus is well aware (57, esen.). For if it is admitted that two objects can appear indistinguishable, this will entail that confusion between them is possible and the Academic will have mad. his point. At the very least, this implies that impressions can be qualitatively indistinguishable;

\(^1\) 'politioribus', 56.

\(^2\) SVP II, 623 ff.
even to the wise man (57). The empirical observation that two objects can appear similar seems here to compel Lucullus to concede what he has been evading so far, i.e. the question of indistinguishability. But his belief that there is always a discernible property immediately annuls the concession. He also avoids playing into the hands of his opponents by assuming that since the similarity is known and the possibility of error recognised, such impressions will not in any case be taken as cataleptic. Hence the wise man will withhold assent until he is sure that he can distinguish between two similar things (57); for the ordinary person it is not necessary to be able to distinguish between, for instance, two eggs, or to assent correctly to a proposition involving the particular identification of one of them. Thus Lucullus' solution involves recognising (1) that indistinguishability does not depend on the nature of the object but is relative to the percipient, and (2) that where the possibility of error exists, the impression must be regarded as non-cataleptic.

Lucullus does not, as in the argument about delusions, settle the matter once and for all by refusing to allow that such experience is 'clear' (51). But his position requires him to maintain that only impressions in which the individual difference is infallibly revealed can be cataleptic. And this is a considerable concession to the Academic argument. For if the wise man withholds assent until he is sure that conditions for a correct judgement are satisfied, the Academic may ask, how can he ever be sure of this? And though one may guard against error where the possibility is recognised, how can one guard against it in cases where the possibility is not even known to exist? Furthermore, in limiting perception to cases where individual differences can be distinguished, Lucullus seems to be requiring more than in his previous argument, where 'clarity' was enough to show us things as they are (45). Whereas before, the ordinary person who was awake, sober and in his right mind could be said to have veridical experience, this now becomes the prerogative of the expert. But even with the help of 'ars' and 'conscutudo',
there will always remain cases in which the individuality of things is hidden from us. In looking at nature, can we not have a 'clear' impression without being able to distinguish two blades of grass? It is never made clear to us whether perception requires the ability to distinguish objects at the level of ordinary experience, or in a more exact and scientific sense. Lucullus perhaps implies the former when, after reporting the skill of the De'ian poultry-keepers (57), he says that for us it is sufficient not to distinguish eggs, but without assenting to the proposition that one egg is the same as another.

As in the earlier argument (53), Lucullus admits that the wise man himself will sometimes meet with unfavourable perceptual conditions and so will withhold assent. But whereas before, an abnormal state of mind was one of the factors responsible for his uncertainty, the fault now is due to unfamiliarity with the likenesses which he encounters. Lucullus assures us that, just as in other cases the wise man has 'a certain art' whereby he distinguishes true from false, so here he will apply experience ('usus'). The implication is that, since the wise man has a way of dealing with the difficulty, the Academic argument about indistinguishable impressions has only a limited

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1 In Sextus A.N.VII, 250-252, the cataleptic impression is said to reproduce its object τεκνίκης, i.e. showing all the individual details (διάμετρα), like carvers finishing their work or seals imprinting their likeness on wax. He who has a cataleptic impression thus discerns τεκνίκης the individual difference of the object. This conception seems somewhat at variance with the view that the ordinary person can have a cataleptic impression.

2 Cf. 66; Pliny N.H.X, 155. Although the poultry-keepers could distinguish which hen has laid a particular egg, we are not told whether they could distinguish each egg laid by that particular hen.

3 Although Lucullus is probably referring to dialectic as the art of distinguishing true and false, the meaning of 'ars' could include method in general and art in the sense of a particular art or expertise. In 20 and 31 we were told that arts like music or painting increase the efficiency of the senses (an argument countered by Cicero in 66, where he does not seem to be distinguishing between the two meanings of 'ars' just mentioned). The admission that the wise man, like the rest of us, will need experience as well as art helps to make him a more credible figure.
validity and does not apply at all to the cataleptic impression. Hence
Lucullus' argument stands or falls with the wise man's ability to distinguish
a cataleptic from a non-cataleptic impression.

There are two anecdotes that show that the infallibility of the wise
man was a matter of controversy; both concern a case of deception through
resemblance. The Stoic Aristo apparently attached considerable importance to
the doctrine that the wise man does not opine. He was, however, refuted by
failing to recognise the difference when a certain Peraeus caused one of a
pair of twins to deposit money with him and sent another to reclaim it (D.L.
VII,162/SVF I,347). The second story concerns the Stoic Sphaerus who, again
in the course of a dispute as to whether the wise man opines, was deceived by
King Ptolemy Philopator into mistaking a wax pomegranate (or bird) for a real
one (D.L.VII,177; Athen.VIII,3546 / SVF I,624-625). These stories do not,
of course, establish the fallibility of the wise man, for both Aristo and
Sphaerus could have claimed that they were not wise men. According to Rist
(Stoic Philoposophy, p.142), Sphaerus gave the wrong answer when he explained
that he had assented not to the proposition that these were pomegranates but
to the proposition that it was reasonable to think that they were pomegranates.
It may be that it tells against Lucullus that the wise man was such an elusive
figure that the Stoics could never point to a living example and always cited
men who were already dead. But this is also the strong point in his argument
since the fallibility of the wise man remains unproven and, as a purely hypo-
thetical issue, is protected against the Academic argument Cicero in 64
argues that one single case of fallacious resemblance will make everything
doubtful. But the thought that the wise man might fall into even a single
perceptual error is, for the Stoic, no less fantastic than the suppositions of
complete indistinguishability produced by the Academics. And even if it were
granted that the wise man could, in exceptional circumstances, make a mistake,
this could hardly render all experience doubtful, since it could be claimed
that the mistake arose from some factor other than the intrinsic nature of
The main weakness of Lucullus' criticism is perhaps that he does not bring out clearly and criticize the line of thought by which the Academics universalized their principle of ἀναπαλλαξία on the basis of this particular argument and the examples quoted. If we make a mistake of identity, we cannot exactly be said to be experiencing what is not 'there', as in the case of a delusive experience. The inference drawn that in any given case we may be taking what is not 'there' to be 'there' seems quite unjustifiable. But the fault perhaps lies with the Stoics themselves. Although in our eyes the error involved is one of judgement rather than perceptual error,1 the Academics were tempted to treat it as the latter owing to the Stoic view that such an impression is non-cataleptic and more or less equivalent to false,2 and also perhaps to their doctrine that it is possible to perceive the individual difference.3 It may be noted too that this present Academic argument is not wholly consistent with the previous one based on cases of delusion. The one rests on the assumption that, since objects are only experienced through impressions, in any given case the impression and the reality may fail to correspond. The other takes for granted that there is correspondence, that similarities in impressions are matched by similarities within groups of objects,4 and that in any given case we may be mistaking one impression for another by referring it to the wrong object. Since either

1 The type of error involved concerns the identification of percepts as explained in Plato's Philebus (193b ff.) as fitting a percept to a wrong memory image.

2 The Stoic view that the impression is false because the judgement is false is the exact opposite of the Protagorean view that because the perception is true, the judgement is also true.

3 On the Aristotelian view that the same form is perceived in more than one individual, the Academic argument would lose much of its force.

4 If a sceptic wants to cast doubt on all impressions, he cannot in the first place make these assumptions.
of those mistakes can occur at any time, the conclusion is drawn that 'for every true impression a false one can be found exactly like it' (i.e. false in either one of these two senses, since it could not be false in both, though there is a sense in which in every single case it will be doubtful if there is an existing object present).

Having admitted that only the wise man or the expert can be sure of recognising the individual difference, Lucullus nevertheless reasserts his intention to abide by the criterion and not to assent to any impressions as true unless they could not possibly be false. To do otherwise would be to destroy not only the knowledge of true and false but also their very nature, and so confuse everything. Even if Lucullus is begging the question by taking for granted that an impression exactly represents its source (Reid p. 246 n. 5), it is difficult not to say that the Academic argument has these implications.

Lucullus seems by mentioning the Academic distinction, which he believes is absurd, between impressions themselves as actually imprinted on the mind and their form or appearance. For impressions are, he says, judged by their appearance, and if they carry no discernible mark ('nota') of true and false, they will have no credibility.

The distinction between actual and apparent difference between impressions was previously made in 40, and seems to arise from a partial acceptance of the Stoic definition of the cataleptic impression as exactly reproducing its object. Lucullus appears to be saying that the Academics admitted that there might be a difference between the impressions themselves, 2

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1 Cf. 53; see also the Stoic accusation to be found in Plutarch and referred to earlier (p. 294 n. 1) that the Academics confuse everything with their 'indistinguishable likenesses'.

2 This seems to be contradicted by Sextus A. M. VII, 408 where the Academics are said to illustrate indistinguishability in respect of 'stamp and imprint' (κατὰ χαρακτήρα καὶ κατὰ τύπον) by the argument from mistaken identity. Sextus is, however, contrasting this with the argument from delusion, where the comparison is in respect of 'clarity and intensity'. In the earlier part of Lucullus' exposition of the Academic argument, it has been assumed that there may be no difference between impressions themselves, an a further step beyond the inability to distinguish them.
but that the 'appearance' of one could be confused with that of another. This raises the issue in what sense an impression could be said to have an 'appearance' that was distinct from itself. According to Reid (p. 246 n. 9), 'species' and 'forma' probably refer to the Greek ἔδοξος, which he translates as 'class' and interprets Lucullus as meaning that, according to the Academics, there are apparent distinctions between individual impressions, but that the two 'classes' of true and false cannot be exactly marked off from one another. This is obviously wrong and conflicts with 'specie ... indicentur' below. Since the Latin is clearly intended to translate the Greek ἔδοξος καὶ μορφή, the reference could be to the appearance of the impression, i.e. the look or shape it presents, but with the implication that such an appearance is something common to the two classes of true and false. The distinction drawn between the intrinsic nature of the impression and its 'appearance' is at any rate typical of the Academics. Lucullus' final remark that true and false impressions are judged by their 'appearance' does in effect question this distinction. It also brings out the dilemma facing the Academic in relying on what 'appears' to pass judgements of probability and at the same time denying the existence of any distinction in the 'appearance' of true and false. It is the 'appearance' that is decisive in any cognitive judgement, and for any such judgement to be worthy of trust, it must be based on the recognition of the 'nota' of truth. The argument looks familiar (cf. 33-36) and it is significant that Lucullus goes on (59) to argue briefly that even judgements of probability should require that there be a recognizable difference between true and false.

1 Reid, in his note on 'specie' (p. 246 n. 9), seems to recognize that 'species' can also mean 'appearance'. The source of his mistake seems to be that he takes 'inter ipsas impressiones nihil interessit' to refer to the 'appearance' and 'inter species et quasdam formas accuratam' to the objective nature of impressions. It is the opposite that, I believe, holds good.

2 The assumption that the imprints themselves may differ is reminiscent of Thilo's view criticised in 34 that true impressions can be stamped on the mind but that they are not cataleptic in the sense that they cannot be false (cf. 112). In 11 Cicero maintains that impressions can be accepted as true on the basis of 'species'. This seems to contradict what Lucullus is here saying.
The Academic argument leads to έπανομή.

Summary. It is absurd for you to say that you follow probability if nothing impedes you. Firstly, how can you not be hindered when false impressions are no different from true, and secondly, what criterion of truth is there when it is common to both true and false? Such considerations necessarily gave rise to έπανομή, i.e. the suspension of assent, in which Arcesilas was more consistent if the views of some people about Carneades are true. For if nothing is perceptible to them, assent must be abolished. For what is so pointless as to assent to what is not known? But as we were told yesterday too, Carneades used to have recourse to the admission that the wise man would sometimes opine, i.e. commit a fault. I, on the other hand, convinced as I am of the possibility of perception (about which I have been arguing too long already), am still more convinced that the wise man never opines, i.e. never assents to anything false or unknown.

Lucullus passes his final indictment on probability, pointing out that διαπαραλλαξία abolishes even the Academic criterion. This conclusion follows from his previous comments on the significance of 'species' in cognition; it also echoes the gist of his earlier criticisms of probability (33-36), namely that there is no criterion of truth if true and false impressions can present a common appearance, that probability, whatever its degree, must be determined by some evidence that is recognised as true, and that lack of a difference between true and false deprives all probable judgements of credibility. But if previously Lucullus was only trying to force on the Academic the fact

1Cf. 'tollendem' in 148; 'must be withheld' (Rackham) is to put it mildly.

2It is very difficult to determine whether 'interdum' qualifies 'dolabi' or 'opinaturum'. It would make sense if it were to qualify either or both (cf. 67). In 112 it qualifies 'opinari'. Rackham similarly takes it to go with 'opinaturum'. See p.311 below, esp. n.3.

3'Porro' does not designate a third step in the argument following on 'primus ... doneo' above, as Reid (p.247 n.21) suggests. Apart from introducing a new point, it also sets up a contrast between the position of Carneades and that of Lucullus.
that he must acknowledge the existence of a mark of truth if his own criterion is to be operational, it is only now, after his survey of the Academic arguments to establish ἀπαραλλαξία, that he makes the final point that, if ἀπαραλλαξία is accepted, there can never be any 'lack of hindrance' to probability. And this proviso will always apply in two ways. Firstly, Academic ἀπαραλλαξία in terms of the appearance of impressions contradicts the alleged reliance of probability on what appears, for it leaves no ground for judging one impression to be more probable than another. Secondly, the appearance is the only aspect of an impression on which any form of judgement can be based. If what is probable is different from what is perceived, it is not because the areas of evidence differ in each case, but because the perceptual conditions differ; lack of any distinction in the 'appearance' of impressions will therefore constitute a hindrance to probable judgement, as to perception.

In using the phrase 'αι nulla re impediamini' (59), Lucullus may be thought to be referring specifically to Carneades' second variant of probability, i.e. the 'probable and unhindered impression' to which Cicero had referred earlier (33) as 'probabilem (uiniones) et quae non impediatur'. Cicero often speaks of the probable and unhindered impression as though it were the preferred criterion as opposed to the merely probable impression. This comes out clearly in 104 where, reporting Clitomachus' explanation of the two meanings of ἀνοχή, he states that not all impressions of the kind that move us to action are actually accepted, but only those that are unimpeded. On the other hand, any 'degree of probability would depend on some form of evidence, so that the phrase may simply mean what it says, that the

1Cicetus, Π.Ι., 227-228; Α.ΙΙ., 176 ff.
probable is accepted provided there is no obstacle to its acceptance. Since the same proviso was applied by the later Stoics to the cataleptic impression (Sextus A.M.VII.253), the proviso as much need not have implied anything more than the probable as a criterion. In general, the Academic can therefore be said to follow probability, provided there is no hindrance, as a norm, so that at any level Lucullus will find a hindrance in the absence of a 'propria nota' of truth. Similarly in his reply, but perhaps without justification, Cicero will claim to have freed probability from all its entanglements. In 109 he evades the issue by attributing to the dogmatist the argument that it is the belief in the impossibility of perception that will impede the action of the man who claims to be following probability providing that nothing impedes him. But Lucullus is not simply arguing that lack of perception is an impediment to action, or that what is judged merely probable should be perceived; he is arguing that his opponents' own doctrine of the common appearance of true and false impairs not only perception but also the judgement of the probable. The force of this argument would have been recognised by those sceptics who regarded probability as inconsistent with and involving a commitment to objective fact, not merely to appearance. While implicitly subscribing to the general belief that probability is inconsistent with scepticism, Lucullus sees the solution to the problem only in the rejection of , the direct consequence of which is .

1 Cf. Off.II.8: 'quid est igitur, quod me impediat ea, quae probabilia mihi uideantur, sequi, quae contra, improbare atque affirmandi arrogantium uitantem fugere temeritatem, quae a sapientia discidet plurimum?'

2 105 'nie igitur industo et constituto probabilii, et eo quidem expedito soluto libero nulla re implicato, uides profecto Lucull: facere iam illud tuum percipuitatis patrocinium'.

If probability is inconsistent with **ἀπαράλλαξια**, and the consequence of **ἀπαράλλαξια** is **ἐποχή**, it naturally follows that the abolition of the probable as a criterion would lead to **ἐποχή**. Though the Academics claim in the first place that following probability does not involve assent (104), Lucullus here seems to imply that a probable judgement is, like a judgement of perception, an act of assent. His deduction of **ἐποχή** from the Academic position and the need to preserve the integrity of the wise man appears to correspond to the attempt by the Academic himself to infer the necessity of **ἐποχή** to safeguard wisdom from the Stoic position. The view attributed to Carneades, that the wise man will sometimes opine, is accordingly seen as contrary both to Arcesilas' view and that of the Stoics. As Cicero points out in 66, in the matter of safeguarding wisdom by refusing to assent to what is false or unknown, Arcesilas saw eye to eye with his opponents.²

One of the meanings of **ἐπέχειν** is to refrain from any definite affirmation or denial of anything (104). Sextus gives a similar explanation.³ When Chrysippus advised that one should keep silent and exercise **ἐποχή** in face of the sorites, the attitude of mind which he was thinking of was again one of restraint from both affirmation and denial. The doctrine of **ἐποχή** also leads to a state of mental suspense whereby one neither affirms nor denies the validity of the point at issue.⁴ The attitude of the wise man in the presence of non-cataleptic impressions (53) is similarly one that

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¹ In 70 Cicero denies that **ἐποχή** necessarily follows from **ἀπαράλλαξια** on the ground that the wise man might, all the same, hold an opinion, but he does not prove the point.


³ P.H.I, 10; 196.

⁴ Cf. I, 46; Sextus P.H.I, 8 ff., 31 ff.; 196; Clem. Strom. VIII, 5 (AVP II, 121).
refrains from both affirmation and denial. Standing for a neutral mental state between affirmation and denial, ἐκοπχή has, therefore, a wider connotation than 'retentio adsensionis', in that the former covers any act of judgement while the latter denotes only a restraint from the act of positive acceptance, assent being, as we have seen (p. 196), an act of approval rather than disapproval. On the other hand, the main, if not the sole justification of ἐκοπχή, in to avoid acceptance of what is false, so that assent is treated as the very opposite of ἐκοπχή and to withhold assent becomes its primary meaning. Hence Cicero here translates ἐκοπχή as 'adsensionis retentio', perhaps not merely because this is the central issue in the controversy, but because this is the primary meaning both for the Stoic and for the Academic.  

Lucullus here means by ἐκοπχή the permanent withholding of assent which he regards as following necessarily from Academic ἀκαταλλαξία which undermines the probable as well as other possible criteria of truth. This is a logical rather than a historical development, though Lucullus may also be saying that these considerations historically gave rise to the doctrine of permanent ἐκοπχή in the Academy. It is plausible to think, however, in view of the general Academic tendency to rely on assumptions made by their opponents themselves, that ἐκοπχή was first practised to a limited extent

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1So Seneca (Ep. 109, 21) uses the expression 'judicium sustine', though probably in the non-technical sense of 'reserving judgement'. For the Pyrrhonists, ἐκοπχή normally has this wider sense, so that even judgments of probability are inconsistent with it.

2Cf. Ait., XII, 21, 31 'non-perque Carneades ἀκαταλλαξία pugilis et retentionem aurigae similem facit ἐκοπχή'. But his translation can sometimes be misleading, as for example in 104, where the passage is clarified to a considerable extent if one understands ἐκοπχή in the sense of 'to suspend judgement' in the place of 'acatussustine'.

3The question 'quod judicium est ueri, cum sit commune falsi?' also refers to the Stoic criterion which is invalidated by the Academic contention that even the 'cataleptic' impression can be matched by a false one. Cf. 33-34.
among the Stoics, and it was from Stoic premises that Arcesilas polemically inferred his doctrine of \( \varepsilon\pi\alpha\chi\varepsilon \) περὶ πάνω.\(^1\)

The point of the contrast between Arcesilas and Carneades is not so much to defend the former as to illustrate the straits to which the Academic may be driven by the absurd nature of his premises and to show the degeneration into which the Academy had sunk as a result of scepticism. The contrast introduces the possible consequences of the Academic case for wisdom and Lucullus' defence of the concept of the wise man. Sextus too regards Arcesilas as a more consistent sceptic than the other Academics and as nearer to the Pyrrhonist.\(^2\) But this is not because of the view in our passage that Carneades had given up \( \varepsilon\pi\alpha\chi\varepsilon \), but because the doctrine of probability implies some form of dogmatism.\(^3\) Lucullus does not here mention the Clitomachean view that Carneades had maintained that the wise man would sometimes opine merely for the sake of argument (78). There can be no doubt that Carneades had made the admission. What is not certain is whether Carneades had advanced it for the sake of argument or had really meant what he said, as Philo and Matrodotus believed (78). Yet it is not clear if Lucullus is expressing doubt as to whether Carneades had in fact made this statement, which had been attributed

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\(^1\) This is the conclusion of P. Couissin, *L'origine et l'évolution de l'\( \varepsilon\pi\alpha\chi\varepsilon \)'*, REG 42 (1929) pp.373-397. There has been much controversy as to whether Pyrrho or Arcesilas invented the doctrine of \( \varepsilon\pi\alpha\chi\varepsilon \). Couissin's view is that \( \varepsilon\pi\alpha\chi\varepsilon \) is not necessary to the scepticism of Pyrrho, which was characterised by an indifference to things rather than ideas. Brochard (pp.95 and 118) attributes the invention of the doctrine of \( \varepsilon\pi\alpha\chi\varepsilon \) to Arcesilas on the basis of this passage and 77. He believes this is backed up by the statement in Diogenes Laertius (IV,28) that Arcesilas was the first to withhold assent owing to the equipollence of arguments.

\(^2\) P.H.I,232. According to Numenius (fr.25,67 ff., Des Places), Arcesilas was held to be a 'sceptic' by Timon and others in the same sense in which they themselves were 'sceptics'.

\(^3\) Sextus, however, does not find Arcesilas to be totally consistent on the ground that he had positively condemned assent (233).
to him in the previous day's conversation, or whether he had actually meant it. ¹

If Lucullus is referring solely to Philo and Metrodorus (70), and presumably to Catulus' father (148), he would then be deliberately ignoring the view of Clitomachus, perhaps to avoid considering the polemical intent of Carneades' admission and its repercussions on the Stoic position itself. The admission that the wise man will occasionally assent and opine may merely have been a way of irritating the Stoics further by going the opposite way to Arscilas and telling them that their definition of perception leads to opining on the part of the wise man and in fact undermines wisdom. Alternatively, Carneades may have been pretending to accept the objection that probability implies assent, without agreeing that assent implies perception. At any rate, it is certain that he could not have been driven to this admission by the criticism that assent is necessary for action,² since the theory that the probable makes action possible without assent (104) ingeniously meets the argument from inaction. It is also quite improbable that Carneades saw, as Philo may have thought, that ἐξοχή about everything would no longer be necessary in the light of a new definition of perception. But, whether we accept the Clitomachean view or that of Philo, assent would only be occasional³ (presumably when the right conditions were thought to prevail), though every act of assent would be equivalent to opinion,⁴ because

¹'si uera sunt quas de Carneade non nulli existimant' (59).
³On Philo's view, Carneades would have give up ἐξοχή for good. In principle, therefore, Philo could not have held that Carneades only occasionally voiced this view. If Lucullus is really ignoring the Clitomachean interpretation here, this would perhaps be another reason why 'interdum' probably qualifies 'opinaturum' rather than 'delabi'.
⁴Cf. 70, 148. At the beginning of 67, Cicero seems to imply that assent would not always result in opinion. But there the argument is being directed at the Stoics who are being told that if assent is exercised on the understanding that what is assented to is perceived, then, if the wise man ever assents, he will sometimes opine. In 112, where Cicero expounds Philo's position, he may be thought to imply that one would not necessarily be opining when exercising assent.
the Academic would still hold that there is no such thing as a cataleptic impression. Since in any case Cicero prefers the explanation of Clitomachus that Carneades had put forward such views only for the sake of argument (70), we may take it that Cicero himself did not believe that Carneades had given up ἐποχή or that the theory of probability required him to do so.¹

Although Lucullus deduces ἐποχή from the same factors which he holds to invalidate probability, he does not claim that the doctrine of probability as such involves the wise man in acts of assent and opinion,² but relies on the alleged admission of Carneades that the wise man will assent to contrast the immorality of scepticism with his own position. If Arcesilas no less than Zeno had sought to preserve the moral and epistemic integrity of the wise man,³ Carneades is here presented as trying to do the very opposite. In order to contrast this integrity with the moral weakness of Carneades' admission, Lucullus here emphasizes the negative side of the conception of the wise man, which is common to Arcesilas and the Stoics, namely that he can never be brought to assent to what is false or unknown (i.e. what is not 'cataleptic') and thus commit a moral sin.⁴

But apart from this one area of agreement, the original Academic and Stoic conceptions of the wise man are very different. For the Academic, avoidance of rashness and error is a virtue in itself; for the Stoic, it is a corollary of the possession of knowledge on which the virtue of the wise man depends. The total exclusion of opinion, whether true or false, from the

¹The connection between assent and probability and Cicero's notion of 'qualified' assent were discussed earlier under sections 37-30, pp.196-199 of this Commentary.

²Consequently, he cannot, like St. Augustine (Ac.III, 15, 33 ff.), condemn probability on the ground that it leads to error and subverts morality.

³66 ff., 77; Sextus A.M.VII, 156-157.

⁴66, 69; Ac.I, 42; Flin.III, 18: 'a falsa autem assensione magis nos alienatam esse casum a ceteris rebus, quae sint contra naturam, arbitrantur.'
realm of wisdom, which was typical of the Stoics, thus resulted in a stricter conception of the infallibility of the wise man than is possible for the Academic. And on the assumption that knowledge involves both the objects of knowledge and the knower, this Stoic view here provides Lucullus with another important guarantee against doubt and scepticism. In contrast with the Stoic view, the Academic wise man has no more wisdom than the ordinary person; indeed, if he is not allowed to hold opinions, he may have less. If Carneades and Philo after him sought to redress the balance by allowing the wise man to have some opinions (though the claim of Carneades may have been purely argumentative), their intention may also have been to narrow the gap between the wise man and the ordinary person.

For Lucullus, on the other hand, the claim of morality and wisdom is paramount, and in view of the numerous occasions on which he has tried to bring a moral note into the discussion, this may also be taken as reflecting the view of Antiochus. It is perhaps unfortunate for Lucullus' own case that he claims to be even more convinced of the fact that the wise man never opines than of the fact that there is something that can be known. This also goes against the Stoic view that there are no degrees of θέταιρος or of truth. The remark, however, qualifying his mention of perception ('de quo iam nimium etiam diu disputo') reaffirms the dogmatist's belief that argument to establish the possibility of perception is relatively pointless, and also looks forward to the end of his counter-argument.

Lucullus questions the motives of the Academic

60 (p. 56, 9 - 21) restat illud quod dicunt ... dicendi uti suisset?

Summary. There is left their claim that the purpose of arguing on both sides of a question is to discover the truth. If I ask what they have discovered, the reply in that they do not reveal it. Come now, what is

1According to Cicero (77, 113), the view that the wise man never opines had never been upheld as explicitly and strongly before Zeno.
that sacred doctrine of yours and why conceal it as though it were something discreditable? The reply is, 'so that the listener may be led by reason and not by authority'. Is not the use of both equally commendable? One doctrine they do not conceal is that nothing can be perceived. Does not authority stand in your way here? To me it seems to do so, and to a considerable extent. For who would have espoused such evidently perverse and false views, had it not been for the eloquence and inventiveness of Arcesilaus and, still more, of Carneades?

Lucullus, now near the end of his argument, takes up two points raised by Cicero in the proem (7-9), namely that the aim of the Academics is to discover truth, and their independence of authority. His treatment is purely general, but since he has chosen to make his points in the form of a fictitious conversation (cf. 32), the subject of the singular 'inquit' has been thought to be Arcesilaus, on the ground that the charge of concealed dogmatism is most appropriate to that philosopher. If so, Lucullus would be conceding that Arcesilaus was among those whose professed aim was the discovery of truth, although it is not at all certain that this motive had a legitimate place in the Academy of Arcesilaus. There are, however, claims in Cicero that Arcesilaus, like Carneades, was actively engaged in the search for truth. Lucullus does not believe this (16), but he is accepting his opponents' contention as a basis for argument (whether or not this involves a charge of concealed dogmatism). This does not, however, constitute a reason for us to identify the subject of 'inquit' with Arcesilaus only.

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2 See pp. 74-75 above, where the Academic method of arguing on both sides and of opposing the views of others are discussed.

3 76-77. See p. 75 n. 5 above. For Carneades, cf. N.D.I, 4.

4 For the common use of 'inquit' without subject, see Lewmann-Hofmann-Szantyr, Lateinische Grammatik II, pp. 417-418. Cf. Frut. 287: 'Thucydides,' inquit, 'imitamur.'
The charge of concealed dogmatism could be brought against other Academics as well, particularly in view of Cicero's claim that they have all along been searching for the truth. Accusations of concealment are made against Carneades by Numenius who, however, seems to be alluding to the notorious difficulty of finding out Carneades' real views. The remark attributed to Cicero by St. Augustine (Ac. III, 20, 43), that the Academics used to hide their doctrine and not reveal it to any except those who had lived with them up to old age, may similarly be thought to refer to this fact. Philo's innovations, by which he attempted to bridge the gap between the New Academy and Plato, might also have exposed the school to the charge of 'secret doctrines'. St. Augustine speculates (Ac. III, 17, 37 ff.) that the Academics had all along been keeping secret the doctrines of Plato in order to reveal them at the appropriate time, and interprets Philo's innovatory move as a return to Platonic dogmatism. Lucullus can therefore be said to have had enough grounds to accuse the Academics of hiding their views, especially if they were in principle unwilling to voice them for pedagogical reasons.

Because of his desire to bring to the fore the charge of concealment, Lucullus ignores Cicero's claim that the Academic also aims at and cannot go beyond probability, and for the same reason he does not differentiate between the early negative Academic method of opposing the views of others and that of arguing on both sides which was characteristic of Aristotle and

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1 Fr. 27, 56 ff., 69 ff. (Die Fische).

2 (Academica) morum sui oculando occultandi sententiam suam, nec eam quiquam nisi qui necem a concectum usque uixissent aprioro consueved (Flasberg, p. 24).

3 He even interprets the probable in terms of resemblance to the truth as concealed by Carneades (Ac. III, 10, 40).

4 Cf. Pin. II, 2 ff. concerning Arceatus. According to De Gr. I, 84, Charmadas followed the same custom of not revealing his own views.
probably of the later Academy.¹ Lucullus does not seem to be concerned with historical veracity, nor does he point out explicitly the logical or even psychological incompatibility between the aim of the Academic and his scepticism.² But he cannot really believe that the Academicians were dogmatists in secret, especially since he has earlier (26-27) argued that the notion of 'search' or 'inquiry' is meaningless unless truth is, at least in principle, discoverable. Indirectly, therefore, he must be pointing out the inconsistency between a search for truth and the Academic proposition that nothing can be perceived. What he is saying is that, if the Academic has been searching for the truth, then let him tell us what he has found. If his inability to do so is interpreted as unwillingness to reveal some secret doctrine, or alternatively, something disgraceful, this is merely ironical and does not imply a serious charge.³ The criticism of Lucullus here is not really that scepticism is in practice untenable and that the Academic is in fact a dogmatist, but that his professed motives are a mere façade to conceal the true negative nature of the Academic philosophy. He may also have in mind allusions to secret doctrines in Plato,⁴ which the reference to 'mysteria' (ἀγρύητα) may suggest. These allusions might in fact have been one of the reasons why the charge was brought against Arcesilaus that his

¹ In Fin. V, 10, however, Piso, Antiochus' spokesman, does differentiate the method of Aristotle from that of Arcesilaus. See pp. 74-75 above.

² Cf. p. 76 above.

³ The suggestion 'quasi turpe aliquid contentiam veatram (celatias)' may imply that Lucullus too is thinking of the difficulty of finding out Cynicadeuos' real views. One such view that would be 'turpe' is that the wise man opines (59).

scepticism was merely a front to test his pupils and that in secret he passed on to them the doctrine of Plato. But it must be emphasised that no support can be derived from this section in the Lucullus for supposing that the New Academy ever had any esoteric doctrines. Although the tradition that Plato held secret doctrines and the fact that these were attributed to all or most philosophical schools might have lent some colour to Lucullus' insinuations, his obviously ironical representation of the Academic as admitting that he conceals his views so that his pupils may be led by reason and not by authority must make any charge of this nature at best dubious and at worst malicious.

Lucullus argues that the one proposition which the Academic does not conceal, i.e. that nothing can be perceived, contradicts his alleged independence of authority, since, like the rest of the Academic doctrines, it is so obviously false that it could not have been established except by authority. 'Authority' means in this case the persuasive eloquence of Arresilas and Carneades. The assumption that Carneades possessed 'copia rororum' and 'dicendi uis' to an even greater extent than Arresilas is no doubt based on the fact that under him the New Academy reached the peak of its development.

1 Sextus P.H. I,234. This charge may also be based on an arbitrary interpretation of Aristotle's verse ('Plato in front, Pyrrho behind, Diodorus in the middle'), which, like the verses of Timon, could only have been meant to refer to the various influences on Arresilas (cf. D.L.IV,33; Numenius fr.25,15 ff., Das Placca). Even Numenius (fr.25,75 ff.) rejects the allegation that he was afraid of the attacks made on philosophers by Bion and the followers of Theodorus of Ainos, and so concealed his views in order to avoid trouble.

2 See Brochard, p.116.

3 Reid, p.248 n.2.

4 The rhetorical and argumentative skill of both is well documented. For Arresilas, see 16; Do Or. III,67; D.L.IV,37,43 and 44; Numenius fr.25, 27 ff. (Das Placca). For Carneades, Fil. III,41; Bon. II,0; Do Or. III,161; D.L.IV, 69-65; Numenius fr.27,7 ff. For the argument, cf. Sextus Advet. VII,326.

5 Lucullus judgement is supported by Numenius, fr.27,7 ff. (Das Placca).
The answer which Lucullus gives in passing to the Academic aversion to
authority, namely that a combination of reason and authority may be better
than either alone, fits in well with Antiochus' support for the Old Academic
tradition, which did not, however, involve blind adherence to that tradition
or to Stoicism. Although Cicero maintains in 137 that Lucullus is bound to
follow the doctrines of Antiochus and defend them as he would the walls of
Rome, this is perhaps not a fair statement of the dogmatist's attitude to
authority. The Academics themselves seem to have made extensive use of
precedent (13 ff.) and even Cicero does sometimes claim to be following
authority. He would, however, have no doubt agreed that reason and authority
are the best guides when they point the same way, but that, of the two, reason
should lead, not follow.

The peroration

61-62 (p.56,22 - p.57,16) hace Antiochus ... minuatur autoritatis.

Summary. (61) Those were more or less the views Antiochus put forward
at Alexandria, and long afterwards with even more emphasis when we were
in Syria shortly before his death. Having established my case, I shall
not hesitate to give you a warning as a good friend - he was talking of
me - and my junior by several years: will you, despite your own praise
of philosophy and its influence on Hortensius, follow a system that
confuses the true and the false, and deprives us of judgment, every act
of approval, and the senses? The Cimmerians, though deprived of sunlight,

1Cf. Aug.,Ac.,III,20,43: 'nulli autem dubium est genus pondere nos impelli ad
diccendum autitatis atque rationis'. The context in which "his judgement
occurs tempt. one to think that St. Augustine was influenced, if not by this
passage, at least by what corresponded to it in the second edition.

2In N.,III,10, the Stoic Falbus claims to despise authority and follow reason.

3Cf. Log.,I,35 ff. In Turc.,I,36, he would prefer to go wrong with Plato ('errare
cum Platonis') and believe in immortality though it cannot be proved.

4See pp.46 ff., 74. Cf. Seneca Ep.,45,4: 'multum magnorum uiuorum judicio credo,
aliquid et meo uindicco.'

5Reading 'omni' with Plasberg.
at least had fires to provide them with some illumination; but the people you follow have shrouded everything in such darkness that they have left us not even one single spark of light. Adherence to their system would leave us in chains and total immobility. (62) For by abolishing assent, they have abolished all thought and action, which is not only wrong, but also impossible. You should be the last person to embrace such a theory. After revealing things that were most deeply hidden and stating on oath that you had found them out (a claim I could have made myself after learning of them from you), will you now affirm that nothing can be grasped, perceived and known? Take the greatest care that you do not detract from that most glorious deed. Thus ended his speech.

Lucullus ends with a reminder that he is transmitting from memory the arguments of Antiochus. For the sake of verisimilitude, he admits the account is only an approximation ("fore") of what he heard at Alexandria, but to give it greater authenticity, he adds that Antiochus used to express the same views even more strongly¹ years later, when he was with Lucullus in Syria (cf. 4 and 10, "eadem de re saepius").² This would have the effect of shortening by almost a third the interval between the dramatic date and the time when Lucullus heard Antiochus, thereby compensating for any dramatic deficiency the incident at Alexandria might have if used alone.

Cicero's philosophical dialogues often end, like an epideictic speech, with some form of exhortation.³ Hence Lucullus' summing-up contains a strong hortatory element which also conforms with what was perhaps an important Roman

¹"Adoeurantius" would have a pejorative sense from Cicero's point of view; so would be the characteristic "confirmata" on Lucullus' part.

²One cannot, however, be certain that in 10 Lucullus is thinking of the period when both he and Antiochus were in Syria. In any case, it is only now that Cicero explicitly puts this fact to dramatic use.

³E.g. the argument in Fam. II ends with a personal appeal to the Epicurean Torquatus to abandon hedonism; Tusq. IV concludes with an exhortation to philosophy; the Academic Cotta is at the end of N.d.II urged by the Stoic Balbus to adopt his own theological views.
tradition, namely that those advanced in age should pass on orally the benefit of their experience to their juniors.\(^1\) The summing-up and the personal warning are very skilfully fused together so as to bring out the supposed incompatibility between the actions of the author and the philosophy he upholds.

Refutation on grounds of inconsistency between the views of the opponent and his own actions could have been a well-recommended rhetorical practice,\(^2\) and since this has been all along one of Lucullus' chief means of counter-argument, it seems suitable that he should now come to the conflict, if any, between the scepticism supported by Cicero and events in his life, which suggest convictions one would not expect of a sceptic. It is also obvious that Cicero is using the peroration to anticipate any question of inconsistency between his beliefs and his political actions that might arise, now that he is for the first time openly supporting the scepticism of the New Academy (see Introduction p.52 ff.). There will be those who will show undue curiosity about his own opinions on certain problems (N.D.I,10). Others will see an incompatibility between his scepticism and his habit of putting forward his views on many issues (Off.II,27). As noted in the Introduction (pp.53-55), there will appear to be glaring inconsistencies between Cicero's new support for scepticism and the conspicuous dogmatic features in his philosophical works, whether earlier or later than the Academica, as well as his conduct in practical situations. But it is clear that Cicero himself did not see any inconsistency either with regard to his intellectual activities or his political actions, which Lucullus' mention of his praise of philosophy and his cognitive claim concerning the

\(^1\)Lucullus, who was quaestor in 89, must have been at least ten years older than Cicero.

Catilinarian conspiracy respectively deal with. As far as his actions relating to his everyday and professional life are concerned, Cicero probably thought that they had always conformed to his general anti-dogmatic disposition as well as to his moderate form of scepticism (cf. Introduction, p.54). Alternatively, he could be defended on the ground that he cannot be expected to have been a sceptic in his public and professional activities. It is, however, less easy to exculpate Cicero on the charge of incompatibility between his praise of philosophy in the Hortensius and 'conversion' of the chief antagonist who gave his name to the dialogue, and his support for Academic scepticism. For it was both the traditional and the current view that philosophy was the love of wisdom and dealt with the search for truth in the absolute sense while on the Academic view the wise man does not possess any knowledge. Cicero's insistence that the Academic is a 'searcher' is one way of bridging the gap between the idea of philosophy as concerned with truth and knowledge and the Academic denial that anything can be known. But this is a dilemma which he never really solves (cf. Introduction p.49). In the present dialogue, Cicero gives no explicit answer to either of the two points raised by Lucullus.

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1 The key word here is 'comperisse' which Cicero had apparently used in the Senate to indicate that he had knowledge of the conspiracy. In Att.I,14,5 we are told that Clodius quoted the word in his accusation of Cicero: 're tantum "comperisse" omnia criminabatur.' The implication would be that Cicero had suppressed evidence. Cf. Lowe's note ad loc. (p.74) and Fmg.V,5,2; Reid, p.250 n.6. In 63 Catulus interprets Lucullus' warning ('vide quiesco...'), 62 as a reference to the much-dreaded tribunate of which Cicero should (prophetically) beware.

2 For the view that some theories cannot be carried into daily life, see Hassen, Scanting, pp.146-147. Nuxenius (fr.26,9 ff., see Places) tells a humorous tale about Lycydus illustrating the same point.

3 See Introduction (p.59) on this.
Another important method used by Lucullus to refute Academic scepticism has been to highlight its consequences and show its untenability in practice. He does the same here but not all the main points previously raised are recapitulated. By concentrating mostly on the effects of scepticism on the percipient, he appears to be giving priority to the argument (cf. 31,37-39) that such a philosophy would overturn human life and is in psychological terms an impossibility. Just as St. Augustine was motivated to refute Academic scepticism because of religious convictions, Lucullus has so far given us the impression that the ethical argument was the most important for Antiochus. The only obvious reason why this argument is not brought in here is that it would not carry such conclusive weight as the view that scepticism is a negation of the percipient as a living being and results in an eradication of all intrinsic distinctions in nature. There is also the point that the objection that scepticism undermines the nature of both the knower and the known would in itself imply all the other consequences which Lucullus fails to mention in this conclusion.

Although the weakest point of the Academic case could be considered to be the claim of ἀπαραλλακτικόν, Lucullus here seems to be assigning more importance to his arguments about assent, as though these still had total relevance at the time of the dramatic date of the dialogue and as though the withholding of assent would not only have entailed in theory but also produced in practice the undesirable consequences here set out. But even if these arguments had still been relevant, only the activity of the wise man, who practices total ἀνοχή, would have been affected by them. Similarly the ad hominem argument alleging inconsistency between Cicero's theory and his practice would apply only to a man who claimed to be wise. Lucullus speaks as if any who embrace the Academic philosophy risk bringing on themselves and their followers the fate he describes.

1Apart from the comment 'non modo recte...tici non posset' (62), if this is interpreted in a moral sense.
Lucullus also gives prominence in his conclusion to the metaphor of light and darkness (see p. 144 n. 4 above). The charge that the Academics plunge us into total darkness\(^1\) is vividly supported by the allusion to Homer's Cimmerians (\textit{Od. XI}, 14 ff.). The assumption that even the Cimmerians had the light of fires to see by is pure guess-work on the part of Lucullus. But this thought, together with the image of being chained down with not even a single spark of light, may be taken to suggest a situation worse than that conceived in Plato's analogy of the Cave (\textit{Rep.} 514a ff.), where the prisoners could at least see the shadows of reality.

\(^1\) Cf. 16, 26, 30, 33, 42; N.D.I, 6. The accusation is partly a retort to the Academic's own claim that everything is 'obscure' (7, 32; I, 44).
ADDITIONS TO THE BIBLIOGRAPHY

I regret that I was not able to use the valuable work of J. CLUCKER, Antiochus and the Late Academy (Hypomnemata 56), Göttingen, 1978, in the preparation of this thesis. Other works that should have been included in the Bibliography are:


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