| dc.contributor.author | Tyson, CJ | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2015-06-02T09:22:18Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2010-06 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0938-2259 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/xmlui/handle/123456789/7553 | |
| dc.description | The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-009-0454-0 | |
| dc.description.sponsorship | The work reported here has been supported by the National Science Foundation, the Stanford University Graduate School of Business, and Nuffield College, Oxford. | |
| dc.format.extent | 457 - 477 | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartof | ECON THEOR | en_US |
| dc.subject | Backward induction | en_US |
| dc.subject | Coalition | en_US |
| dc.subject | Core | en_US |
| dc.subject | Weak dominance | en_US |
| dc.subject | SIMULTANEOUS-OFFERS | en_US |
| dc.subject | MODEL | en_US |
| dc.subject | INFORMATION | en_US |
| dc.title | Dominance solvability of dynamic bargaining games | en_US |
| dc.type | Article | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/s00199-009-0454-0 | en_US |
| pubs.issue | 3 | en_US |
| pubs.notes | No embargo | en_US |
| pubs.volume | 43 | en_US |
